area handbook series Cuba a country study I Cuba a country study Federal Research Division Library of Congress Edited by Rex A. Hudson Research Completed April 2001 On the cover: La Iglesia de San Francisco de Asis (Church of San Francisco) and the plaza fountain in La Habana Vieja (Old Havana), 1997 Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan Fourth Edition, First Printing, 2002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cuba: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Con- gress ; edited by Rex A. Hudson — 4th ed. p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA pam ; 550-152) "Research completed April 2001." Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8444-1045-4 (he : alk. paper) 1. Cuba. I. Hudson, Rex A, 1947- . II. Library of Congress. Fed- eral Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA pam ; 550-152 F1758.C94875 2002 972.91— dc21 2002018893 Headquarters, Department of the Army DA Pam 550-152 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C 20402 Foreword This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this book list the other published studies. Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common inter- ests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and political order. The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. Robert L. Worden Chief Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, DC 20540-4840 E-mail: frds@loc.gov iii Acknowledgments This fourth edition of Cuba: A Country Study supersedes the 1987 edition edited by James D. Rudolph. The authors acknowledge any general background information that the 1987 edition may have provided for the present volume, which is a completely new edition. Enrique J. Lopez is gratefully acknowledged for providing the section on telecommunications in chapter three. The book editor would also like to thank the chapter authors for review- ing and commenting on various chapters of this volume. Their shared expertise contributed greatly to its overall quality. The authors are grateful to individuals in various agencies of the United States government and international organizations, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) , as well as scholars affiliated with universities or other institutions, who offered their time, special knowledge, or research facilities and materials to provide information and perspective. None of these individuals is, however, in any way responsible for the work or points of view of the authors. The book editor would also like to thank members of the Federal Research Division who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These include Sandra W. Med- itz, who reviewed all textual and graphic materials, served as liaison with the sponsoring agency, provided numerous sub- stantive and technical contributions, and prepared the index; Marilyn L. Majeska, who provided substantive editing and man- aged editing and production; Janie L. Gilchrist, who did the word processing and prepared the camera-ready copy; and Stephen C. Cranton, who provided automation and typesetting support. The firm of Maryland Mapping and Graphics prepared the book's maps and charts based on the book editor's drafts, as well as the photographs and illustrations for the cover and chapter title pages. Finally, the book editor acknowledges the generosity of the individuals and the United States Government, diplomatic, and international agencies and organizations who allowed their photographs to be used in this study. Contents Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Table A. Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations xv Table B. Chronology of Important Events xxi Country Profile xxxi Introduction xlvii Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Jaime Suchlicki THE EARLYYEARS, 1492-1520 6 The Indigenous Peoples 6 Spanish Conquest and Colonization 9 THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1520-1898 10 Administration and Economy 10 Life and Society 14 The British Occupation, 1762-63 17 Sugar, Prosperity, and Unrest in the Nineteenth Century 18 TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, 1868-1902 23 The Ten Years' War, 1 868-78 23 Jose Marti and the War for Independence, 1895-1902 29 United States Involvement 30 THE REPUBLIC, 1902-59 34 The Piatt Amendment Years, 1902-34 34 An Attempt at Revolution, 1933-34 44 The Failure of Reformism, 1944-52 49 Background to Revolution, 1952-59 55 THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, 1959- 64 Fidel Castro Takes Charge 64 vii Revolutionary Adventurism and Institutionali- zation 74 The Unchanging Revolution, 1980-89 79 PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA 85 Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 89 Sergio Diaz-Briquets PHYSICAL AND NATURAL SETTING 93 Principal Geographic Features 93 Topography and Drainage 94 Climate and Precipitation 98 ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS 100 Economic Policy and Regulatory Environment .... 101 Land Use 102 Agriculture 103 Water Policies 105 Forestry 107 Mining 108 Urban and Industrial Pollution 108 Environmental Consequences of the Special Period, 1990-2000 109 DEMOGRAPHY 110 Population 110 Demographic Transition 113 Migration 117 RACIAL COMPOSITION 117 PRE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY 120 SOCIAL MOBILITY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 122 MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIALIZATION 1 24 Committee for the Defense of the Revolution 125 Women's and Youth Organizations 126 Other Mass Organizations 127 The Military 128 The Family Institution 129 RELIGION 131 The Roman Catholic Church 132 Afro-Christian Rites 134 Other Religions 135 Religion in the Special Period 136 viii Social Consequences of the Papal Visit of January 1998 137 HEALTH 138 EDUCATION 144 SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SPECIAL PERIOD .... 149 Health and Education 149 The Social Safety Net 151 Employment Policies 151 Remittances and Closer Bonds with the Emigre Community 152 Tourism 152 OUTLOOK 154 Chapter 3. The Economy 157 Jorge Perez-Lopez PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY 161 Background 161 The Economic Crisis of the 1990s 163 Economic Reforms 166 STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 179 Background 179 Key Economic Sectors 180 Labor 200 The Second Economy 205 FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 207 Background, 1960-90 207 Foreign Trade and Finance 211 Investment 218 ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 221 Chapter 4. Government and Politics 225 Jorge L Dominguez INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 229 The Constitution 230 National Assembly of People's Power 231 Council of State 235 Council of Ministers 237 Courts 238 Provincial and Local Government 240 National and Local Elections 243 COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA 245 ix Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses 245 Political Bureau and Central Committee 249 Party Organization, Membership, and Role 254 MASS ORGANIZATIONS 256 CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS 259 Religion and the State 259 Nongovernmental Organizations . . 263 Human Rights and Opposition Groups 265 MASS MEDIA 267 POLITICAL PROCESSES 268 Emerging Political Leaders 268 Political Aspects of the Security and Military Forces 270 The Widening of Public Space 271 FOREIGN RELATIONS 274 OUTLOOK 279 Chapter 5. National Security 283 Phyllis Greene Walker BACKGROUND OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES, 1959-91 287 Institutional Consolidation in the 1960s 287 The Era of "Internationalism," 1970-91 291 MINISTRY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES . . 295 Organizational Changes of 1989 295 Challenges Faced by the Institution in the 1990s . . . 298 THE MILITARY IN THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY. .... 301 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS 304 THE UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION AT GUAN- TANAMOBAY 308 THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES 310 Doctrine of the War of All the People 312 Territorial Troops Militia 312 Civil Defense 314 Revolutionary Army 315 Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force . . 319 Revolutionary Navy 320 Conscription and Personnel Resources 322 Professional Training and Education 325 Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms 328 x Relations with Russia 333 Relations with Other Armed Forces 334 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 335 Leadership and Organization 335 Special Troops 337 Border Guard Troops 338 National Revolutionary Police 340 Intelligence Directorate 341 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 344 General Crime Trends 344 Drug Trafficking and Narcotics-Related Problems . . 346 The Problem of Illegal Emigration and Refugee Smuggling 350 Human Rights and Political Prisoners 353 Penal System 356 OUTLOOK 362 Appendix. Tables 365 Bibliography 391 Glossary 425 Index 439 Contributors 451 List of Figures 1 Administrative Units, 1999 xlvi 2 Topography and Drainage 96 3 Population Distribution by Age-Group and Sex 116 4 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1995 166 5 Minerals, Natural Gas, Petroleum, and Thermal Resources, 1996 188 6 Transportation System, 1999 194 7 Central Administrative Structure, 2001 232 8 Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba— PCC) ,2001 250 9 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1999 330 10 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1999 331 xi Preface Like its predecessor, published in 1987, this study is an attempt to examine objectively and concisely the dominant his- torical, social, environmental, economic, governmental, politi- cal, and national security aspects of contemporary Cuba. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the views of the United States Gov- ernment. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book and list sources thought by the chapter authors to be particularly helpful to the reader. Brief comments on sources recom- mended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter. To the extent possible, place-names follow the system adopted by the United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN) . Mea- surements are given in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix). A glossary is also included. The body of the text generally reflects information available as of April 2001. The introduction, in addition to providing his- torical perspective on Cuba's hemispheric relations, discusses significant events that occurred between the completion of research and mid-2002. The Country Profile generally reflects information contained in the chapters. Statistics contained in the tables or figures reflect the most current data available at the time. Although there are many variations, Spanish surnames most often consist of two parts: a patrilineal name followed by a matrilineal name. In the instance of President Fidel Castro Ruz, Castro is his father's name, and Ruz is his mother's maiden name. In nonformal use, Cubans very often drop the matrilineal name. Thus, after the first mention the president is referred to simply as Castro. (His brother is referred to as Raul Castro on second mention in order to avoid confusion.) Some literature on Cuba refers to the Cuban Revolution as the guerrilla struggle that culminated in the fall of Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar during the last days of 1958 and the first days of 1959. In this book, the Cuban Revolution refers to a histori- cal process that began on January 1, 1959, and continues into the present. This definition, as well as the practice of uppercas- xiii ing "Revolution" in this context, conforms with official Cuban government practice and with much scholarly literature. Whenever possible, names, abbreviations, and acronyms of organizations or terms conform to official Cuban government use, as indicated in sources such as the Havana telephone directory, and official United States Government use, as com- piled by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). For example, although the plural form of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) generally refers to the thou- sands of block CDRs, the national committee that heads these CDRs is listed officially in Cuban and United States Govern- ment reference sources as the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (Comite de Defensa la la Revolucion — CDR). Thus, the singular of the abbreviation is used to distinguish the national committee from the block CDRs. xiv Table A. Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term AIC Agrupacion Independiente de Color (Independent Colored Association) AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome AIE Ala Izquierda Estudiantil (Student Left Wing) ALADI Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion (Latin American Integration Association) ANAP Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos (National Association of Small Farmers) ANPP Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular (National Assembly of People's Power) AT&T American Telephone and Telegraph Company BCC Banco Central de Cuba (Cuban Central Bank) BFI Banco Financiero Internacional (International Financial Bank) BNC Banco Nacional de Cuba (Cuban National Bank) BRR Brigadas de Respuesta Rapida (Rapid Response Brigades) Cadeca Casas de Cambio (Exchange Houses) Caricom Caribbean Community and Common Market Caritas Catholic Relief Services CCDRN Comite Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos y Reconciliacion Nacional (Cuban Committee for Human Rights and National Reconciliation) CCPDH Comite Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos (Cuban Committee for Human Rights) CDA Cuban Democracy Act CDR Comite de Defensa de la Revolution (Committee for the Defense of the Revolution) CEA Centro de Estudios sobre America (Center for American Studies) CEATM Comite Estatal de Abastecimiento Tecnico-Material (State Committee for Technical and Material Supply) CEB Comunidades Eclesiasticas de Base (Ecclesiastical Base Com- munities) CEPAL Comision Economica para America Latina CETSS Comite Estatal de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (State Commit- tee on Labor and Social Security) CIEM Centro de Investigaciones de la Economia Mundial (Center for the Study of the World Economy) CIGB Centro de Ingenieria Genetica y Biotecnologia (Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology) Cimex Companfa Importadora-Exportadora (Import-Export Com- pany) CIPS Centro de Investigaciones Psicologicas y Sociologicas (Center for Psychological and Sociological Research) CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CMEA (see Comecon) CNN Cable News Network XV Table A. ( Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term Comarna Comecon CPA CTC Cubalse Cabana Cabanacan DA DAAFA.R DCI DCI DCPI DEP DEU DGG DGI DGSP DGTE DI DI DPEI DPNR DRI DSE DT ECAM ECLAC Comision Nacional para la Proteccion del Medio Ambiente y la Conservacion de los Recarsos Natarales (National Com- mission for Environmental Protection and Conservation of Natural Resoarces) Coancil for Mutual Economic Assistance Cooperatives de Prodaccion Agropecnaria (Agricultural-Live- stock Cooperatives) Central de Trabajadores de Caba (Caban Workers Federa- tion) Empresa para Prestacion de Servicios al Caerpo Diplomatico (Diplomatic Corps Serv ice Company) Empresa Consolidada Cabana de Aviacion (Consolidated Caban Aviation Company) Corporacion de Tarismo y Comercio Internacional (Interna- tional Tourism and Trade Corporation) Departamento America (America Department) Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolacionaria (Antiair- craft Defense and Rev olutionary Air Force) Direction de Cedala de Identidad (Directorate for Identity Cards) Direction de Contra Inteligencia (Directorate of Counterin- telligence) Direccion de Caadros, Personal y Instruction (Directorate of Cadres, Personnel, and Instraction) Direccion de Establecimientos Penales (Directorate of Peni- tential)' Establishments) Directorio Estadiantil Universitario (University Stadents Directorate) Direccion General de Gaardafronteras (General Directorate of Border Guards) Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Intelligence Directorate) Direccion General de Segaiidad Personal (General Director- ate of Personal Security) Direccion General de Tropas Especiales (General Directorate of Special Troops) Direccion de Information (Information Directorate) Direccion de Inteligencia (Directorate of Intelligence) Departamento de Prevention y Extincion de Incendios (Directorate for the Prevention and Extinction of Fires) Direccion de la Policia Nacional Revolacionaria (National Revolationary Police) Direccion de Relaciones Internacionales (International Rela- tions Directorate) Departamento de Segaridad del Estado (Department of State Secarity) Direccion Tecnica (Technical Directorate) Escuela de Cadetes Interarmas General Antonio Maceo (Gen- eral Antonio Maceo Joint-Service School) E< onomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term EEC EJT ELN EMCC EMPA ETA ETECSA EU FAR FARC FEEM FEU FY FMC FNLA FSB FSLN FTAA GATT GDP GNB GNP GONGO GSP GTP HIV IAEA IDI IISS ITM Juceplan KGB LAFTA LCC European Economic Community Ejercito Juvenil de Trabajo (Youth Labor Army) Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army) Escuelas Militares Camilo Cienfuegos (Camilo Cienfuegos Military Schools) Escuela Militar de Pilotos de Aviacion (Aviation Pilots Military School) Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Freedom) Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, S.A. (Telecommu- nications Company of Cuba) European Union Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed Forces) Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolution- ary Armed Forces of Colombia) Federacion de Estudiantes de la Ensehanza Media (Federa- tion of Secondary School Students) Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (Federation of University Students) fiscal year Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas (Federation of Cuban Women) Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service) Frente Sandinista de Liberacion National (Sandinista National Liberation Front) Free Trade Area of the Americas General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross domestic product Grupo Nueva Banca (New Banking Group) gross national product government-operated nongovernmental organization global social product Guerra de Todo el Pueblo (War of All the People) human immunodeficiency virus International Atomic Energy Agency Instituto de la Demanda Interna (Domestic Consumer Demand Institute) International Institute for Strategic Studies Instituto Tecnico Militar (Military Technical Institute) Junta Central de Planificacion (Central Planning Board) Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (Committee for State Security) Latin American Free Trade Association Laboratorio Central de Criminologi'a (Central Laboratory of Criminology) Table A. ( Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term MCR Movimiento Civico Revolucionario (Civic Resistance Move- ment) MGR Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Navy) MINFAR Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces) MNR Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias (National Revolutionary Militias) MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Move- ment for the Liberation of Angola) MPS Material Product System MTT Milicias de Tropas Territoriales (Territorial Troops Militia) NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO nongovernmental organization NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty OAS Organization of American States OCES Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States ONE Oficina Nacional de Estadi'sticas (National Statistical Office) OPJM Organization de Pioneros Jose Marti (Organization of Jose Marti Pioneers) PCC Partido Comunista de Cuba (Communist Party of Cuba) PLA Chinese Popular Liberation Army PNR Policia Nacional Revolucionaria (National Revolutionary Police) PPC Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Cuban People's Party) PPC Orthodox Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) (Cuban People's Party) (Orthodox) PRC People's Republic of China PRC Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary Party) PRC Authentic Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Autentico) (Cuban Revolu- tionary Party (Authentic) PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolu- tionary Party) PSP Partido Socialista Popular (People's Socialist Party) PUND Partido de Unidad Nacional Democratico (Democratic National Unity Party) SA. sociedades anonimas (quasi-private companies) SELA Sistema Economica Latino Americana (Latin American Eco- nomic System) SIGINT signals intelligence SMA Servicio Militar Activo (Active Military Service) SMO Servicio Militar Obligatorio (Obligatory Military Service) SNA System of National Accounts SNTAF Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Agricolas y Forestales (National Trade Union of Agricultural and Forestry Work- ers) SPE Sistema de Perfeccionamiento Empresarial (System for Mana- gerial Improvement) Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term SUPV Sistema Unificado de Prevention y Vigilancia (Unified Pre- vention and Vigilance System) TGF Iropas Guardaironteras (Border Guard Iroops) TCD 1 or Tribunal Supremo Popular (Supreme Court of Cuba) UBPC Unidades Basicas de Produccion Cooperativa (Basic Units of Cooperative Production) UJC Union de Jovenes Comunistas (Union of Young Communists) UMAP Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Produccion (Military Units in Support of Production) UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights UNDP United Nations Development Programme Uneca Union de Empresas de Construccion del Caribe (Union of Caribbean Construction Enterprises) UNITA Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) URC Union Revolucionaria Comunista (Communist Revolutionary Union) USTEC United States-Cuba Trade and Economic Council Table B. Chronology of Important Events Period Descripti PREHISTORY c. 1000 B.C.-c. 1000 A.D. c. 800-c. 1450 FIFTEENTH CENTURY October 27, 1492 Ciboney Indians migrate to central-western Cuba. Successive migrations of Arawak Indians (sub-Taino and Taino) largely displace Ciboney. Christopher Columbus discovers and explores Cuba. SIXTEENTH CENTURY 1508 1511-24 1515 1519 1522- 33 1523- 24 1538 Sebastian de Ocampo circumnavigates and explores the island. Diego Velazquez de Cuellar conquers the Indians and estab- lishes various settlements, including Baracoa, the first settle- ment, established in 1512. Santiago de Cuba is established as the Cuban capital. San Cristobal de Habana is relocated from its original site on the Gulf of Batabano on the south coast to its present loca- tion on the north coast. The last major indigenous peoples' uprising is suppressed. Blacks are brought from Africa to work the mines and fields. La Habana (hereafter Havana) becomes the seat of govern- 1553 1555 1592 1595 SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1607 1628 1662 Santiago de Cuba is selected formally as the capital of the island. The governor's seat moves from Santiago de Cuba to Havana. French pirate Jacques de Sores captures and burns part of Havana. Philip II declares Havana to be a city. Cattle raisers install sugar mills on their lands and begin sugar production. Havana is formally established as the capital of Cuba, and the island is organized into two governing regions. Dutch pirate Piet Heyn captures the Spanish fleet off the northern coast of Cuba. The English capture and ransack Santiago de Cuba. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1715 August 17, 1917 1723 1728 1733 1748 Political administration is centralized following the Bourbons' assumption of power in Spain. Bourbon reforms begin to be introduced into Cuba. More than 500 armed vegueros (tobacco farmers) march into Havana to protest the Spanish tobacco monopoly. The first Cuban printing press is established. The University of Havana (Real y Pontificia Universidad de San Jeronimo de La Habana) is founded. Havana assumes jurisdiction over all Cuban administrative units. Havana is established as a bishopric. XXI Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events Period Description 1762 1763 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 The English capture and occupy Havana and the western half of the island. Havana becomes an open port. Havana is traded back to Spain for Florida under the Treaty of Paris, which ends the Seven Years' War. Cuba is divided into two ecclesiastical jurisdictions, one in San- tiago and the other in Havana. Free slave trade is autho- rized by royal decree. Cuba's first newspaper is established. Haitian sugar and coffee planters flee to Cuba. The Economic Society of Friends of Cuba (La Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pais) is founded. Cuba's first public library is established. NINETEENTH CENTURY 1808 1809 1812 1814 1817 1818 December 2, 1823 1828-30 1830s 1837 1844 1848 1854 1865 October 10, 1868 April 10, 1869 February 11, 1878 March 15, 1878 May 1878 Thomas Jefferson attempts to purchase Cuba from Spain. Joaquin Infante organizes the first independence conspiracy. Jose Antonio Aponte organizes a conspiracy of slaves and free blacks. Ferdinand is restored to the Spanish throne. England and Spain sign a treaty proclaiming the end of legal slave trade effective 1820. A Spanish royal decree opens Cuban ports to free interna- tional trade. The United States issues the Monroe Doctrine. The Agmla Negra (Black Eagle) Conspiracy is organized. Spain imposes harsher authoritarian controls. The first railroad in Latin America commences operation in Cuba, linking Havana with Bejucal and Giiines. A slave conspiracy, called La Escalera (the ladder) because sus- pects are tied to ladders and whipped, is suppressed. President James Polk attempts to purchase Cuba. The United States issues the Ostend Manifesto, calling for the purchase of Cuba. The Reformist Party (Partido Reformista), Cuba's first political party, is organized. The Grito de Yara begins the Ten Years' War between Cuba and Spain. Rebels fighting Spain hold a Constituent Assembly in Guai- maro, where they adopt Cuba's first constitution and elect Carlos Manuel de Cespedes as their president. The Pact of Zanjon, signed with Spain, ends the Ten Years' War but does not win independence for Cuba. The country is organized into six provinces: Pinar del Rio, La Habana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. The Protest of Baragua: General Antonio Maceo rejects the Pact of Zanjon and calls for the abolition of slavery. The Ten Years' War officially ends, after the remaining Cuban forces surrender. Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events Period Description 1879-80 October 7, 1886 1892 May 19, 1895 December 7, 1896 February 15, 1898 April 25, 1898 December 10, 1898 January 1, 1899 TWENTIETH CENTURY June 21, 1901 Republican Period May 20, 1902 May 22, 1903 July 2, 1903 1904 August 1906 1906-09 1908 1912 1912 April 7, 1917 1917 1920 1920 La Guerra Chiquita (The Little War) , a short-lived rebellion against Spain, takes place. Spain abolishes slavery in Cuba. Jose Marti forms the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revo- lucionario Cubano — PRC) in Tampa, Florida. Cuba's foremost hero, poet, and visionary, Jose Marti, is killed on the battlefield at Dos Rios in eastern Cuba. Antonio Maceo, one of the most successful guerrilla leaders, is killed at the Battle of Punta Brava in western Cuba. The battleship U.S.S. Maine, anchored in Havana Harbor, blows up and sinks, killing 260 officers and crew. The United States declares war on Spain, beginning the Span- ish-American War (1898). The United States and Spain sign the Treaty of Paris, ending the Spanish-American War and granting Cuba its indepen- dence. The United States occupies Cuba militarily, installing General John R. Brooke as the first United States military governor. The Cuban constitution is drafted, incorporating the United States-imposed Piatt Amendment, which gives the United States the right to intervene in Cuba. The United States military occupation ends when the republic is proclaimed and Tomas Estrada Palma (president, 1902- 06) is sworn in as Cuba's first elected president. Cuba and the United States sign the Permanent Treaty, which incorporates the Piatt Amendment. The follow-up United States-Cuban Treaty is signed, whereby Cuba agrees to lease the United States military bases in the port cities of Guantanamo and Bahia Honda for an indefi- nite period. Cuba holds its first elections for national Congress. The August War (Guerrita de Agosto) , a Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) uprising set off by Estrada Palma's fraudulent elec- tion, hastens United States intervention. The second United States intervention takes place, with Charles Magoon serving as governor of the island. Liberal Party candidate Jose Miguel Gomez (president, 1909- 13) wins election to a four-year term. A short-lived racial uprising, led by the Independent Colored Association (Agrupacion Independiente de Color) , prompts the dispatch of United States Marines to Cuba. Conservative Mario Garcia Menocal (president, 1913-21) is elected to a four-year term. Cuba declares war on Germany. The Liberal Party leads a short-lived uprising in Oriente and Camaguey. The sugar boom collapses. Liberal Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso (president, 1921-25) wins elec- tion to a four-year term as president. Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events Period Description February 1923 1924 August 16, 1925 1927 1930 1931 1933 August 12, 1933 September 4, 1933 January 1934 May 29, 1934 1934 December 11, 1935 May 1936 December 1936 1939 1938 1939 1940 December 9, 1941 1943 United States representative General Enoch Crowder is sent to Cuba to "reform" the political process. Gerardo Machado y Morales (president, 1925-33) is elected to his first four-year presidential term. The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — PCC) is founded in Havana. The anti-Machado University Students Directorate (Directorio Estudiantil Universitario) is founded. The clandestine ABC organization is established. Carlos Mendieta and former President Garcia Menocal orga- nize a short-lived uprising in Pinar del Rio. Machado's army crushes the expedition from the United States led by Carlos Hevia and Sergio Carbo. The United States becomes involved in mediating between Machado and various groups seeking to overthrow his gov- ernment. The army ousts Machado; Carlos Manuel de Cespedes y Que- sada (president, 1933) becomes provisional president. The Revolt of the Sergeants, led by Fulgencio Batista y Zaldfvar (president, 1940-44, 1952-59), hastens the fall of Cespedes. Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin (president, 1933-34, 1944-48) becomes president of a revolutionary government. Colonel Batista overthrows Grau's regime and appoints Colo- nel Carlos Mendieta (president, 1934—35) as provisional president. The United States abrogates the Piatt Amendment by signing the Treaty of Relations between Cuba and the United States. The Cuban Revolutionary Party (Authentic) (Partido Revolu- cionario Cubano — PRC) (Autentico) is organized. A general strike forces the resignation of President Mendieta, who is replaced by Jose A. Barnet y Vinageras (president, 1935-36). Miguel Mariano Gomez y Arias (president, 1936) is "elected" president. Federico Laredo Bru (president, 1936-40) becomes president for a four-year term. Grau San Martin is elected president of the Constitutional Assembly. The PCC is recognized as a legal political party. The Workers' National Federation (Confederacion Nacional Obrera), created in 1925, is reorganized into the Cuban Workers Federation (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba— CTC). A progressive constitution is drafted. General Batista is elected president for a four-year term. Cuba declares war on the Axis powers. General Batista legalizes the PCC and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which is allied to the United States. xxiv Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events Period Description 1944 1947 1948 1951 March 10, 1952 April 1952 1953 July 26, 1953 November 1, 1954 May 15, 1955 December 2, 1956 March 13, 1957 1957 The PCC changes its party name to Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular— PSP). Grau San Martin is elected president. Eduardo Chibas forms the Orthodox branch of the Cuban People's Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano— PPC) Ortho- dox (Ortodoxo). Carlos Prio Socarras (president, 1948-52) is elected president. Chibas commits suicide. Batista seizes power through a military coup. Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union are broken. Resistance is organized and led primarily by Autenticos and university students. Fidel Castro Ruz launches the ill-fated Moncada Barracks attack. Batista is "reelected" president for a four-year term. Fidel Castro is released from prison and departs for the United States. Castro's eighty-three-member Granma expedition lands in Ori- ente Province. Members of the Directorate (Directorio) and the Autenticos attack the Presidential Palace unsuccessfully. Police kill Directorio leader Jose Antonio Echeverria. Castro consolidates his guerrilla operations in the Sierra Maes- 1958 Revolutionary Period January 1, 1959 January 7, 1959 January 1959 May 17, 1959 1959 February 1960 May 7, 1960 The Castro-organized general strike collapses. A military offensive against the guerrillas fails. The United States gradually withdraws support for the Batista regime, suspending arms shipments to it on March 14. A rigged election produces the victory of Batista's candidate, Andres Rivero Agiiero. Increased demoralization and corruption lead to the gradual collapse of Cuba's armed forces. Batista and his close associates escape to the Dominican Republic. Fidel Castro assumes command and begins consolidation of power. The United States recognizes the Castro government. Trials and executions of former Batista regime officials begin. The first Agrarian Reform Law is promulgated, expropriating farmlands of more than 404 hectares and forbidding for- eign land ownership. Castro becomes prime minister and replaces Manuel Urrutia Lleo with his hand-picked candidate, Oswaldo Dorticos Torrado. The Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificacion — Juceplan) is created to plan and direct the economy. Cuban-Soviet diplomatic relations resume. XXV Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events Period Description October 19, 1960 January 3, 1961 April 17-19, 1961 December 2, 1961 January 31, 1962 October 14, 1962 October 22-November 20, 1962 November 21, 1962 November 6, 1965 November 2, 1966 August 1967 October 9, 1967 1975 October 1975 February 24, 1976 April 1977 April 27, 1977 September 1977 January 1978 August 30, 1979 April 1980 April 19, 1982 The United States declares an embargo on trade with Cuba, except for medical supplies and most foodstuffs. The United States breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba. Cuban forces defeat the United States-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion. Castro declares himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. Cuba is expelled from the Organization of American States (OAS — see Glossary). The Cuban Missile Crisis begins when United States reconnais- sance aircraft photograph Soviet construction of intermedi- ate-range missile sites in Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis brings the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear conflict. President John F. Kennedy ends the quarantine measures against Cuba. The Freedom Flights Program begins, allowing 250,000 Cubans to come to the United States by 1971. The Cuban Adjustment Act allows 123,000 Cubans to apply for permanent residence in the United States. After a one-year suspension, flights resume to take United States citizens out of Cuba Ernesto "Che" Guevara is executed in Bolivia. The United States reports the presence of Cuban soldiers and advisers in Angola to support the Marxist group, the Popu- lar Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola — MPLA) . Cuba begins deployment of 35,000 combat troops to support the Marxist regime in Angola. Cuba's new socialist constitution is promulgated, making Cas- tro head of government as president of the Council of Min- isters, commander of the armed forces, and first secretary of the PCC. The PCC is institutionalized within the formal governmental structure. Cuba undertakes internationalist military assistance to several African countries. Cuba and the United States sign agreements on fishing rights and maritime borders. Cuba and the United States open interests sections in each other's capitals. Cuba begins deployment of 20,000 troops to Ethiopia. The United States Senate announces discovery of a Soviet "combat brigade" of 3,000 troops in Cuba. About 10,000 Cuban refugees seeking asylum enter the Peru- vian Embassy in Havana, starting a mass exodus of Cubans to Peru and the United States. Castro allows 125,000 Cubans to leave for the United States in the Mariel Boatlift. The United States bans travel to Cuba by United States citizens and allows the 1977 fishing accord to lapse. xxvi Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events Period Description 1983 July 31, 1984 December 14, 1984 May 20, 1985 1985 October 4, 1985 1986 May 18, 1986 July 1, 1986 1987 November 19, 1987 United States Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders meets with the head of the Cuban Interests Section in Wash- ington, Ramon Sanchez-Parodi, to request that Cuba take back thousands of Cubans (who came to the United States via the 1980 Mariel Boatlift) because of their criminal con- duct in Cuba. Cuba informs the United States it is willing to discuss the return of some Cubans who came to the United States ille- gally in 1980, but only as part of overall negotiations on "normalizing of migration" between the two countries. Cuban and United States officials start discussions in New York about immigration issues, including the possible return of 1,000 Cuban refugees (Marielitos) from the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Cuba and the United States conclude a migration pact under which Cuba agrees to accept the return of Marielitos. Radio Marti begins broadcast news and information from the United States to Cuba. Twenty-three Cuban Marielitos are returned to Havana. These are the first of more than 2,700 unwanted Cubans the United States wishes to return as part of an agreement with Fidel Castro's government. Havana suspends all immigration proceedings between Cuba and the United States in response to the start-up of Voice of America's Radio Marti. Cuban-Americans are prohibited from visiting Cuba. President Reagan bans travel to the United States by Cuban government or PCC officials or their representatives, as well as most students, scholars, and artists. The United States and Cuba agree to negotiate the revival of the 1984 immigration agreement that enabled the United States to deport several thousand Cubans with histories of crime or mental illness who had arrived in the United States as part of the Mariel Boatlift of 1980. Talks collapse when the United States refuses to recognize Cuba's right to broad- cast over an AM frequency in the United States to match Radio Marti transmissions. Cuba allows seventy political prisoners, many of whom had been in prison for more than twenty years, to leave the country and fly to Miami. Farmers' markets (legal since 1980) are banned. Cuba suspends service on its convertible currency (see Glos- sary) debt. Private home ownership is banned. Cuba agrees to release 348 political prisoners at request of Roman Catholic Church in the United States. The Cuban government, in a policy reversal, agrees to restore an immigration pact with the United States by which 2,600 Cubans, whose criminal records make them ineligible for United States residence, are to be deported from the United States and up to 27,000 Cubans are to be allowed to emigrate to the United States each year. xxvii Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events Period Description March 1988 April 21, 1988 1989 1990 March 23, 1990 1991 September 1, 1991 1992 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (see Glossary) unanimously agrees to accept an unexpected invitation from Havana to investigate human rights in Cuba. Even though UN specialists encounter harsh penal systems in Cuban prisons, they find no evidence to support United States charges of torture and executions. The official UN investigation concludes that abuses have declined. John Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop of New York, meets with Fidel Castro in Havana. It is the first visit by a Roman Catho- lic cardinal to Cuba since 1959. The UN issues a report on the human rights situation in Cuba, suggesting that although there have been big improvements in church-state relations and treatment of political prison- ers, basic political liberties are still widely denied. Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, a highly decorated war hero, is arrested on corruption charges; American offi- cials say the action suggests dissension at the highest levels of the Cuban military; Cuba's Transportation Minister, Dio- des Torralba Gonzalez, a friend of Ochoa's, is also relieved of his duties; Ochoa is accused of being involved in illicit sales in Angola. Minister of Interior General Jose Abrantes Fernandez is replaced as the top security officer following official charges that high military officers in Cuba are involved in drug traf- ficking. The Ministry of Interior is reorganized. Cuba announces that a firing squad has executed four Cuban Army officers convicted by court martial of conspiring to ship tons of cocaine and marijuana to the United States. The four include Ochoa Sanchez, The Castro regime announces a series of austerity measures, the "special period in peacetime" (hereafter Special Period — see Glossary) . TV Marti, an anti-Castro, United States-taxpayer-funded sta- tion, is launched, but the signal is jammed by the Cuban government. Switzerland, which sponsors United States diplomats in Havana, offers to sponsor the Cuban Interests Section in Washington to ensure that both countries have diplomatic representation in each other's capital. The deteriorating economic situation in Cuba prompts a large increase in the number of Cubans seeking to leave their country. Cuba announces the lifting of restrictions on travel abroad; anyone aged twenty or over is to be allowed to leave and visit other countries, provided that the host nation gives them a visa. The Fourth Party Congress is held and resolves to allow mem- bers of religious groups to join the party. In order to remove a major obstacle to increased United States economic aid to the Soviet Union, President Mikhail S. Gor- bachev declares that he will withdraw Soviet troops from Cuba and end the US$2-billion-a-year trade subsidy that Moscow gives Havana. The government of President Castro steps up efforts to crush internal opposition. Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events Period Description August 14, 1993 1994 August 1994 September 9, 1994 late September 1994 1994 December 1994 May 2, 1995 February 24, 1996 November 19, 1996 February 12, 1997 January 11, 1998 January 21-25, 1998 In a rare exception to the economic blockade of Cuba, the Bush administration grants permission to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) to expand telephone services between Cuba and the United States; Cuba rejects AT&T's proposal. Russia and Cuba agree to the withdrawal of a former Soviet infantry brigade that has been on the island since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Cuba and Russia sign trade accords for new ties based on mutual benefits; Cuba is to trade sugar for Russian oil at world market prices. Cuba ends the ban on the use of dollars. The Clinton administration ends the United States' open-door policy toward Cuban refugees, who will be detained for an indefinite period after they arrive in the United States. Following Castro's declaration of an open migration policy, a new boat-lift begins. The United States stops refugees aboard rafts and boats off the Florida coast and begins detaining them at its Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. Cuba and the United States reach agreement under which Cuba pledges to stop citizens from fleeing in small boats and the United States promises to accept at least 20,000 Cuban immigrants a year. Farmers' markets are reinstated. The flood of Cuban refugees ends as the Cuban government implements terms of agreement reached with the United States aimed at halting the exodus. The Clinton administration gives United States telecommuni- cations companies permission to establish direct telephone links with Cuba. Cuba establishes a new currency, the convertible peso (see Glossary) . Cuba and the United States issue a joint communique reaf- firming their commitment to promote safe, legal, and orderly migration. Under this accord, Cubans interdicted at sea or who enter the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station ille- gally are returned to Cuba provided that they do not have any concerns about possible official Cuban retaliation. Cuban Air Force MiG jet fighters shoot down two small unarmed aircraft belonging to Brothers to the Rescue, a Miami-based Cuban exile group, in international waters, killing four persons. Pope John Paul II receives Fidel Castro at the Vatican and accepts an invitation to visit Cuba. The White House approves licenses for ten press organizations interested in establishing bureaus in Havana; Cuba approves only the Cable News Network (CNN). National and provincial parliamentary elections are held. Pope John Paul II visits Cuba. xxix Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events Period Description February 25, 1999 November 25, 1999 TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY March 2000 June 28, 2000 March 21-24, 2001 April 12-15, 2001 June 12, 2001 July 14, 2001 Cuba suspends about 80 percent of its telephone links to the United States in retaliation for the withholding by five United States telecommunication firms of US$19 million ii payments owed to the Telecommunications Company of Cuba (Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, S.A. — ETECSA). A five-year-old Cuban boy, Elian Gonzalez, is rescued in the Straits of Florida. Tough new legislation aimed at combating political dissent and protecting the Cuban economy becomes effective. Decree- Law 88, the Law for the Protection of the National Indepen- dence and Economy of Cuba, provides a penalty of up to twenty years' imprisonment for a series of offenses, includ- ing providing information to the United States government; owning, distributing, or reproducing material produced by the United States government or any other foreign entity; and collaborating, by any means, with foreign radio, televi- sion, press, or other foreign media, for the purpose of desta- bilizing the country and destroying the socialist state. Elian Gonzalez, accompanied by his father, returns to Cuba after an intense seven-month legal and political battle over the child's custody. A conference of American and Cuban scholars, entitled "Bay of Pigs: Forty Years After," is held in Havana, and many declassified United States and Cuban documents on the invasion are released. Chinese President Jiang Zemin pays a state visit to Cuba. United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell says that China had delivered arms to Cuba. United States President George W. Bush confirms support for tougher economic and travel sanctions against Cuba. XXX Country Profile Country Official Name: Republic of Cuba (Republica de Cuba). Short Name: Cuba. Term for Citizen(s): Cuban (s) Capital: La Habana (hereafter, Havana). j w av on 1902 (from Spain on December 10 s Independence: May l^uz p ™i«qq to 19021 1898 but administered by United States from 1898 to 1902). XXXI Geography Location: Caribbean island south of Florida between Carib- bean Sea and North Atlantic Ocean at geographic coordinates 21°30*N, 80°00'W. Size: Slightly smaller than Pennsylvania. Square kilometers: 110,860, including Isla de Cuba (104,945 square kilometers), Isla de la Juventud (2,200 square kilometers), and adjacent keys (3,715 square kilometers). Length of Coastline: 5,746 kilometers. Maritime Claims: As signatory to Law of the Sea Treaty, Cuba claims twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea and 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. Topography: Plains cover about two-thirds of land surface, three principal mountain ranges the rest. Tallest peak, Pico Real del Turquino, at 1,974 meters, is in Sierra Maestra mountain chain. About 60 percent of total land area (11 million hectares) used for agriculture. About 12 percent (800,000 hectares) of agricultural land highly productive deep and permeable soils; 22 percent marginal for agriculture. Of remaining noncultivated land, 21 percent (or 2,311,000 hectares) pasture or fallow, and 25.7 percent (or 2,831,600 hectares) forested. Human settlements account for 6.3 percent (or 694,000 hectares). Principal Rivers: Most important hydrographic basins: Cauto, Zaza, and Sagua la Grande. Average length of major rivers: ninety-three kilometers. Cuba's longest river: 370-kilometer Cauto, flowing from eastern mountains to southern coast. Climate: Tropical, warm, and humid. Annual mean tempera- tures average 25° Celsius (C). Havana's average annual rainfall: 1,146.1 millimeters; days with rain: ninety-six. Average monthly temperatures in Havana range from 27° C in July and August to 22° C in January and February; average temperature: 24.5° C. Relative humidity: 79 percent. Island averages 1,400 milli- meters of rainfall a year, although annual amount varies greatly from year to year. Two well-established dry and rainy seasons: xxxii monthly rainfall averages between thirty-two and ninety-nine millimeters during dry season, from December to April; between 200 and 260 millimeters during rainy season, from May through November. Hurricane season: July to November; months of most frequent storms: September and October. Society Population: Total population (1999): 11,106,000 people. July 2001 estimate: 11,184,023. Net estimated migration rate (2000): -1.52 migrant(s) per 1,000 population. Illicit emi- gration continuing problem. Estimated 3,800 Cubans took to Florida Straits in 1999, 40 percent of whom (1,520) were interdicted by United States Coast Guard. Population density (1998): 100.3 inhabitants per square kilometer. Annual population growth rates in late 1990s less than 0.5 percent a year, down from 0.67 in 1995. Estimated population growth rate (2000): 0.39 percent. Population projection (2010): 11,516,000. Relatively high current median age (30.2 years) projected to increase further (to 38.7 years) by 2010. Country primarily urban, with 78 percent of population residing in cities and towns; 22 percent rural. Largest city: Havana, with 2.2 million inhabitants (1996). Estimated birth rate (2000): 12.68 births per 1,000 population. Estimated life expectancy at birth (for both sexes combined, 2000): 76.21 years (73.84 for males and 78.73 for females). Ethnic Groups: According to 1981 Cuban census, 66 percent of population is "white" and 34.0 percent "nonwhite," latter including black (12.0 percent), mulatto or mestizo (21.9 percent), and Asian (0.1 percent). Since 1959 Revolution, nonwhite share of population has increased significantly. Percent of population classified as white declined from 73 percent in 1953 to 66 percent in 1981, whereas share of mulattos rose from 14 percent to 22 percent (black percentage remained almost same). Official Language: Spanish (Espanol) . Education and Literacy: Adult literacy rate (people age fifteen and older who can read and write) in 1995: 95.7 percent xxxiii (males: 96.2 percent; females, 95.3 percent). In late 1990s, Cuba had eighteen teachers per 1,000 population; and 12,223 schools, including 9,481 primary schools, 1,891 secondary schools, and thirty-two higher education institutions. In 1995- 96 academic year, student enrollment in primary, secondary, and higher education was, respectively, 933,000, 639,000, and 111,000. Health: Estimated infant mortality rate (2000): 7.51. Total fertility rate (1996): 1.54 children born per woman. Estimated total fertility rate (2000): 1.6. Major causes of death per 100,000 population (1996): heart disease, 206; malignant neoplasms (cancers), 37; cerebrovascular disease, 72; infec- tious and parasitic diseases, 53; accidents, 51; influenza and pneumonia, 40. Health personnel total 339,943, including 62,624 physicians and dentists, of whom 28,855, or 46 percent, are family doctors (1997). Total also includes 81,333 nurses and more than 56,342 mid-level technicians. Ratio of popu- lation to physicians (1997): 214, one of world's lowest, down from 1,393 in 1970. Physicians train in twenty-three medical schools, ten of which are located in Havana, and four dentistry schools. Health infrastructure includes 283 hospitals, 440 Polyclinics, 161 medical posts, 220 maternity homes, 168 dental clinics, and other facilities (1997). Forty-eight hospitals in Havana, and sixty-four in rural areas. Other facilities: 196 nursing homes for elderly (sixty-three of which provide only day services) and twenty-seven homes for disabled. Total number of hospital beds, including military hospitals (1997): 66,195; social assistance beds: at least 14,201. Only 2,155 cases diagnosed as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive, 811 of which were known to have developed into full-blown acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) (1999). Religion: No official religion. Nearly 90 percent of population nominally Roman Catholic in prerevolutionary Cuba, but number of practicing Roman Catholics probably less than 10 percent. Estimated half of all Cubans agnostic, slightly more than 40 percent Christian; less than 2 percent practiced Afro- Cuban religions. Limited membership in other religions, including Judaism. Religiosity estimates may be considerably higher, however, if due credit is given to the cultural relevance xxxiv of informal religions, particularly of syncretic Afro-Cuban rites, which historically were minimized. Economy Overview: State-controlled economy. Some reforms imple- mented in 1990s. Central control complicated by existence of informal, mostly dollar economy. Compared with 1990, living standards for average Cuban without dollars remain at depressed level. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): During 1989-93, GDP declined by 35 percent because of lost Soviet aid and domestic inefficiencies. GDP grew by 0.7 percent in 1994, 2.5 percent in 1995, 7.8 percent in 1996, 2.5 percent in 1997, and 1.2 percent in 1998. Cumulative GDP growth rate over 1993-98 period was about 16 percent, compared with contraction of 35 percent between 1989 and 1993. GDP growth rate in 2000: 5.6 percent. Per Capita GDP and Minimum Wage: Average monthly earnings of Cuban workers in main economic sectors, in pesos per month (for value of peso, see Glossary), from highest to lowest (1989): culture and arts, 223; science and technology, 217; transportation, 211; administration, 201; construction, 201; public health, social security, and tourism, 195; education, 191; finance and insurance, 190; agriculture, 186; industry, 186; forestry, 184; communications, 176; community and personal services, 164; and commerce, 163. Within industrial sector, average monthly earnings ranged from 237 pesos per month for workers in electricity production and distribution to 141 pesos per month for workers in apparel industry. Inflation: In early 1990s, Cuba had very high levels of suppressed inflation (expressed through physical shortages and rampant black markets) . Employment and Unemployment: Self-employment in more than 100 occupations, primarily those related to transpor- tation, home repair, and personal services, became legal in September 1993, and number of authorized occupations expanded to 140 in July 1995. Making such employment legal allowed approximately 208,000 workers to engage in self- xxxv employment, fewer than 5 percent of economically active population of 4.5 million workers. By March 1996, number had fallen to 160,000, as result of new taxes introduced that year. Restrictions on self-employment remain quite severe. State- sector employment in 1989 was roughly 4.1 million workers, of whom 3.5 million were civilian employees and 600,000 were classified as other state employees. During 1990s state-sector employment fell sharply, reflecting severe dislocations suffered by state enterprises and sharp reductions in size of armed forces. By 1996 overall state employment was roughly 3.2 million workers, 22 percent lower than in 1989. State civilian employment was 24 percent lower in 1997 than in 1990. From 1989 to 1996, nonstate-sector employment, particularly in agricultural sector, increased more than four-fold, from about 230,000 in 1989 to more than 1 million in 1996, absorbing large portion of workers shed by state sector. Agriculture: Liberalized agricultural markets introduced in October 1994. In 1997 Cuba had 6,686,700 hectares of agricultural land, of which 3,701,400 hectares were cultivated. In 1997 state directly controlled 24.4 percent of agricultural land; nonstate sector controlled 75.6 percent. Besides sugar- cane, which accounted for 48 percent of cultivated land in 1997, state enterprises specialize in production of rice, citrus, coffee, and tobacco, as well as livestock, and market their output. Sugar production fell from 8.1 million tons in 1989 to 3.2 million tons in 1998. Mining: Metal commodities produced in Cuba include chromite, cobalt, copper, crude steel, and nickel. Other nonfuel industrial mineral products include cement, gypsum, lime, ammonia, salt, silica sand, and sulfur. World's eighth leading producer of nickel in 1998, but produces only about 4 percent of world's total nickel mine production. Nickel most important metal to Cuban economy and export sector. Min- istry of Basic Industry responsible for mineral and petroleum sectors. Industry: In 1986 Cuba's manufacturing sector consisted of 827 enterprises of widely varying sizes, employing 726,000 workers. Industries with largest number of enterprises were non- xxxvi electrical machinery (150 enterprises), sugar (148), and foodstuffs (145). Majority of largest manufacturing plants (those employing more than 4,000 workers) were part of sugar industry; other industries having plants with more than 4,000 workers were textiles (three), mining and nonferrous metal- lurgy (one), apparel (one), fishing (one), and beverages and tobacco (one). In addition to sugar and nickel mining industries, significant contributors to national product in 1989 included beverages and tobacco, foodstuffs, nonelectrical machinery, chemical products, electricity generation, and construction materials. Energy: Poorly endowed with energy resources, Cuba relies on imports to meet energy requirements. Coal not found in commercial quantities; hydroelectric resources limited by low- volume rivers; and oil and natural gas deposits inadequate to meet demand. Biomass (in form of bagasse) an important energy source for sugar industry. In 1988 Cuba met 70 percent of energy requirements with liquid fuels (crude oil, light oil products, and heavy oil products), about 29 percent with biomass, and remaining 1 percent with other energy sources such as coal, coke, and hydroelectricity. Domestically produced oil amounted to nearly 1.7 million tons in 1998. Combined electric-generation capacity in 1997: 4.33 gigawatt hours. Real generating capacity may be only 1,200 megawatts. Electricity production in 1998: 15.274 billion kilowatt hours. Electricity consumption in 1998: 14.205 billion kilowatt hours. Services: In 1995 services included trade (hotels and restau- rants); electricity, gas, and water; community, personal, and social services; finance (including business and real estate); and transport (including communications and warehousing) . Trade Balance: Cuba ran deficit in services trade in 1989-91 but has recorded surpluses in every year beginning in 1992. During 1993-95, surpluses were quite sizable, averaging around US$250 million. Income generated by tourism rose by 535 percent between 1990 and 1997; it first exceeded US$1 billion mark in 1995, reached nearly US$1.4 billion in 1996, and exceeded US$1.5 billion in 1997. Tourism surpassed nickel to become second largest source of revenue in 1991 and xxxvii overtook sugar exports in 1994. Imports: Over 1989-93 period, merchandise imports fell from 8.1 billion pesos to slightly more than 2.0 billion pesos, or by 75 percent. By 1998 they had risen to 4.2 billion pesos. Exports: Exports, like imports, began to recover in 1994, rising to about 1.3 billion pesos that year and 1.9 billion pesos in 1996, falling to 1.8 billion pesos in 1997 and 1.4 billion pesos in 1998. Principal export destinations in 1999: Russia, accounting for about 25 percent of exports; Netherlands, 23 percent; Canada, 16 percent. Balance of Payments: Unpaid debt and accrued service pay- ments resulting from Cuba's suspension of payment on con- vertible currency effective July 1, 1986, amounted to nearly US$6.1 billion in 1987, US$6.5 billion in 1988, and US$6.2 billion in 1989. Outstanding debt grew from nearly US$8.8 billion in 1993 to more than US$11.2 billion at the end of 1998. Budget Deficit: Budget deficit fell to pre-crisis level of -1.6 billion pesos in 1994, -766 million pesos in 1995, -569 million pesos in 1996, -459 million pesos in 1997, and -560 million pesos in 1998. Budget deficit as share of GDP was 39.5 percent in 1993, 12.6 percent in 1994, 5.8 percent in 1995, 4.0 percent in 1996, 3.1 percent in 1997, and 3.8 percent in 1998. External Debt: Cuba's overall debt to Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989 estimated at nearly US$27 billion (using official exchange rate of 1 ruble=US$1.58) and at US$30.2 billion in 1990 (using official exchange rate of 1 ruble= US$1.78). Because value of ruble vis-a-vis United States dollar fell sharply in 1990s, so did value of Cuban debt in United States dollar terms. Outstanding debt grew from nearly US$8.8 billion in 1993 to about US$9.1 billion in 1994, US$10.5 billion in 1995, and US$11.2 billion in 1998. Official Exchange Rate: Value of peso dropped precipitously in 1990s as Cuban citizens expressed very strong preference for holding United States dollars to obtain goods and services not available through centrally planned first economy. In mid-1994 xxxviii peso reached probably its lowest point when it was exchanged at about 150 pesos for one United States dollar. In second half of 1990s, unofficial exchange rate fluctuated in range of twenty to twenty-two pesos for one United States dollar. By January 2001, peso valued at twenty-two to dollar. Foreign Investment: By end of 1998, 345 joint ventures had been created. Foreign investment for 1985-95 period totaled about US$2.1 billion. Fiscal Year (FY): Calendar year. Transportation and Telecommunications Air and maritime transportation services provide access to almost every location in Cuba. Infrastructure of ports, airports, and warehouses supports extensive foreign trade. Roads: Estimated 60,858 kilometers of highways, including 29,4820 kilometers of paved roads and 31,038 kilometers of unpaved roads. Main highway: Central Highway, mostly two- lane highway running for 1,200 kilometers from Pinar del Rio in west to Santiago de Cuba in east. Multilane National Expressway being constructed, with 650 kilometers, from Pinar del Rio in west to near Sancti Spiritus in east, completed. Railroads: Standard-gauge railroads, 4,807 kilometers. Railroad transportation neglected since 1959 in favor of truck transport. Poorly maintained railroad system consists of one main axis running length of island, connecting all of major urban centers, economic zones, and ports, either directly or through branches. About one-third of railroads carry both passengers and freight, with rest dedicated to transport of sugarcane. Central railroad line under major reconstruction since late 1970s; equipment last updated with diesel locomotives manufactured in former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Service has been reduced since early 1990s, and fuel shortages and frequent equipment breakdowns have made system largely unreliable. Ports: Most important of eleven main ports capable of handling general export and import cargoes: Antilla, Cien- xxxix fuegos, Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nuevitas, and Santiago de Cuba. Only major deep-water ports: bays of Cienfuegos, Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nipe, Nuevitas, and Santiago de Cuba. Havana by far most important port. In addition, eight bulk sugar loading terminals, one supertanker terminal at Matanzas, and several other smaller import facilities, as well as specialized port facilities for fishing fleet. Number one in sugar export, port of Cienfuegos capable of handling one-third of Cuba's sugar production through its bulk sugar terminal. Its pier for handling oil and oil byproducts allows berthing of ships up to 50,000 tons. Guantanamo Bay, leased by United States for naval base, separated from rest of Cuba by twenty- nine-kilometer boundary. Pipelines: In late 1980s, Cuba completed an oil import facility at port of Matanzas and a pipeline linking it with new refinery built in Cienfuegos. Air Transport and Airports: Ten of seventeen civilian airports handle international flights, with nine linked to nine largest tourist resorts. Main international airports include Camaguey, Ciego de Avila, Cienfuegos, Havana, Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba, and Varadero. Main national airports that handle primarily domestic flights: Baracoa, Bayamo, Cayo Largo, Guantanamo, Holgmn, Manzanillo, Moa, Nicaro, Nueva Gerona, and Santa Clara. Cuba's flag carrier: Consolidated Cuban Aviation Company (Empresa Consolidada Cubana de Aviacion — Cubana). Of estimated 170 airports in 1999, seventy- seven paved and ninety-three unpaved. Telecommunications: Domestic telephone countrywide trunk system coaxial cable; Havana and Isla de la Juventud have fiber- optic distribution. Country has two microwave radio relay installations (United States-built installation is old, with capacity of 960 channels; Soviet-built installation is newer, with capacity of 1,920 channels). Both analog and digital mobile cellular service established. Telephone density very low: 4.5 to 5.5 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Number of main telephone lines in use in 1995: 353,000. Existing lines and systems not suitable for speed, bandwidth, and applications of modern telecommunications. Number of mobile cellular xl telephones in use in 1995: 1,939. About 70,000 new telephone lines being installed per year, with emphasis on public tele- phones throughout Cuba. International telephone system uses satellite earth station Intelsat. Telecommunications Company of Cuba, S.A. (Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, S.A. — ETECSA) is the state-owned telecommunications com- pany. Principal foreign investor: STET, Italy's largest telecom- munications concern. Government and Politics Administrative Subdivisions: Fourteen provinces (provincias) listed from west to east: Pinar del Rio, La Habana, Ciudad de La Habana, Matanzas, Villa Clara, Cienfuegos, Sancti Spfritus, Ciego de Avila, Camaguey, Las Tunas, Granma, Holguin, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantanamo. Special Municipality (municipio especial): Isla de lajuventud (Isle of Youth). Number of municipalities in national territory: 169. Government: Communist state with one party, Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — PCC). Current government of Fidel Castro Ruz in power since January 1, 1959. Castro president (chief of state and head of government) since December 2, 1976. As chief of state, Castro president of thirty-one-member Council of State and thirty-nine-member Council of Ministers. Cuba's most important executive institution: seven-member Executive Committee of Council of Ministers. Six vice presidents of Council of State among Cuba's most important politicians. Fidel Castro's formally designated successor: General of Army Raul Castro Ruz, first vice president of Council of State and Council of Ministers and minister of Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revoluciona- rias — FAR) . Provincial government consists of fourteen provin- cial assemblies, each headed by an Executive Committee, each with president and at least seventy-five members. Municipal government consists of 169 municipal assemblies, each headed by a president, who heads one of 169 executive committees. Legislature: Under 1992 constitution, all formal legislative powers (including powers of amending constitution) vested in 601-member unicameral National Assembly of People's Power xli (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular — ANPP; hereafter, National Assembly) . National Assembly meets only two or three times annually for two or three days. National Assembly elects Council of State to make all decisions on behalf of National Assembly when latter not in session (most of time) . Judiciary: Minister of Justice administers all courts, which are all subordinate to National Assembly and Council of State and lack independence. Office of State Prosecutor (Fiscalia General de la Republica) , overseeing all law enforcement, also subordinate to National Assembly and Council of State. Members of five-chamber Supreme Court of Cuba (Tribunal Supremo Popular — TSP) nominated for terms by minister of justice and confirmed by National Assembly, except for TSP's president and vice president (nominated by president of Council of State) and military chamber members (nominated jointly by ministers of justice and FAR) . Each province has four- chamber provincial courts exercising jurisdiction over most types of crimes. Each municipality has municipal courts handling minor crimes. Electoral System: National Assembly seats elected directly from slates approved by special candidacy commissions; members serve five-year terms. National elections last held January 11, 1998, when single official slate received 89.7 percent of vote and 601 seats; only 5 percent of voters voided their ballots or voted blank. In 1998 National Assembly elections, overall results slightly more favorable to government than in 1993, reflecting trend toward economic stabilization and recovery during intervening years. Results also more favorable to government in La Habana Province, where single slate received 88.4 percent of votes cast and percentage of null or blank ballots fell to 7 percent. Next elections to be held in 2003. Politics: Under 1992 Electoral Law, Cuba has multi-candidate single-party elections with no effective campaigning at munic- ipal level and entirely uncompetitive rules but some cam- paigning at provincial and national levels. At all levels, political regime sharply constrains freedom of political association. Cubans not free to associate in political party other than Com- xlii munist Party of Cuba (PCC) to contest elections. Candidates running for office in different provinces and municipalities on official slate cannot associate into formally constituted "factions." Public authorities and PCC retain right to shape associational patterns at all levels. To be elected, candidate must receive more than half of valid votes cast. No candidate failed to be elected in 1993 and 1998 national elections. Political Party: PCC remains only party, still Marxist-Leninist, but now also follower of Jose Marti. Political Bureau party's leading decision-making institution and Cuba's most important decision-making entity. Party congresses govern PCC by adopting party's statutes and its programs, and choosing membership of Central Committee and Political Bureau. Party congresses meet approximately every five years, Central Com- mittee Plenum at least once a year, and Political Bureau once a week. Party membership 800,000 members by time of Fifth Party 7 Congress in 1997. Mass Media: Principal daily newspaper: Granma, official organ of PCC. Official organ of Union of Young Communists (Union de Jovenes Comunistas — UJC) : Juventud Rebelde, weekly. Long- standing newsmagazine: Bohemia. Television remains principal source of communication for entertainment and news, although costs of production for television led government to reduce number of channels and of hours of transmission in 1990s. Number of television broadcast stations in 1997: fifty- eight. Number of televisions in 1997: 2.64 million. Radio became one of Cuba's more dynamic mass mediums in 1990s. Number of radio broadcast stations in 1998: AM 169, FM fifty- five, shortwave, one. Number of radios in 1997: 3.9 million. Foreign Relations: Collapse of Soviet Union and communist governments of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-90 left Cuba with no international allies. During 1990s, Cuban economic relations with Central and Eastern Europe plummeted. Cuban economic relations with Russia focused principally on barter trade, at market prices, exchanging sugar for petroleum. Consistent with its general policy on non- servicing of any debts, Cuba refused to service its large accu- mulated international debt to Russian Federation. Russian xliii ground troops, stationed in Cuba since 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, departed in 1992. Cuban relations with China recovered only gradually from the sharp bilateral split that had become manifest in 1966. With collapse of European communism, however, political relations warmed more quickly between these two remaining communist governments. Between 1989 and 1991, Cuba repatriated its overseas troops from all countries to which they had been deployed. In 1992 it announced that it had stopped providing military support to revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow governments in other countries. Traditional tension in United States relations with Castro regime continued through 1990s, aggravated by Cuba's encouragement of unauthorized emigration to United States in 1994, unilateral United States efforts to tighten economic embargo against Cuba, Cuba's human rights viola- tions, and, in 1999-2000, dispute over custody of Cuban boy rescued off coast of Florida. Cuban policy has been most effective within Anglophone Caribbean. Admitted to Carib- bean Tourism Organisation in 1992, Cuba in 1994 became founding member of Association of Caribbean States. National Security Armed Forces: Total active armed forces members in 2000: 58,000. Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) includes ground forces, Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucio- naria — MGR) , and Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force (Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria — DAAFAR). Army, including conscripts and ready reserves, totals 45,000; MGR, 3,000; DAAFAR, 10,000. Army reserves: 39,000. Ready reserves serve forty-five days per year to fill out active and reserve units. Military Service: Two years compulsory military service for young men beginning at age seventeen (registration at age sixteen); women volunteers serve three years. Paramilitary Forces: Youth Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil de Trabajo— EJT): 65,000. Civil Defense (Defensa Civil): 50,000. Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de Tropas Territoriales — MTT) : 1 million. State Security: 20,000, including Ministry of xliv Interior's Special Troops (Tropas Especiales). Border Guard Troops (Tropas Guardafronteras — TGF): 6,500. Defense Relations: Has long maintained contacts with armed forces of many developing world nations, including those in Latin America, as well as with Canada and Western Europe. International contacts broadened in 1990s. Ties with Chinese Popular Liberation Army (PLA) most important relationship with foreign military service to develop since Soviet Union's demise. Defense Budget: Figures vary. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance 1999-2000, defense expenditures amounted to estimated US$720 million in 1997 and estimated US$750 million in 1999, and defense budget in 1999 amounted to only P650 million, or US$31 million. Military expenditures approximately 4 percent of GDP (1995), according to the World Factbook 2000, or 1.6 percent, according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Military expenditures 2.2 percent of Gross National Product (GNP — see Glossary) (1995), or 2.3 percent (1997), according to World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1 998. Military Units: Army divided into three Regional Commands: Western (most important), Central, and Eastern, each with three army corps. Army units include four or five armed brigades, nine mechanized infantry brigades (three mecha- nized infantry, one armored, one artillery, and one air defense artillery regiment), one airborne brigade, fourteen reserve brigades, and one border brigade. Navy has four operational flotillas. Cubahas headquarters of Western Naval District, Holguin of Eastern Naval District. Naval bases at Cienfuegos, Cabanas, Havana, Mariel, Punta Movida, and Nicaro. Foreign Forces: As of 1999, United States: 1,080 personnel stationed in Guantanamo (United States Navy: 590; United States Marines: 490). Russia: 810 personnel (signals intelli- gence); military advisers: an estimated ten military personnel. xlv xlvi Introduction THE WORLD'S SEVENTH LARGEST island, with a total land surface of 110,860 square kilometers (about the size of Pennsyl- vania), the independent republic of Cuba is the largest and westernmost island in the West Indies, lying less than 150 kilo- meters south of Key West, Florida. Despite being an island country, it is, in terms of population (more than 11.1 million in 2001) , the ninth largest country in Latin America and the sixty- seventh largest in the world, according to the United States Bureau of the Census. Cuba's strategic location at the entrance to the Gulf of Mex- ico between North America, the Caribbean, and Central Amer- ica has played an important part in its history since Christopher Columbus discovered the island in 1492. The Spaniards first used Cuba as an operational base for the con- quest of Mexico; Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula lies only about 150 kilometers to the west of the island. During almost four centuries of Spanish rule, the Spaniards also used the island's natural harbors as ports for treasure-laden ships sailing between the New World and Spain. Spain imposed oppressive trade restrictions on its Cuban colony, however, until forced to reevaluate its policy after Britain occupied Havana in 1 762-63 and lifted the restraints on commerce. Cuba has been of strategic interest to the United States at least since 1808, when President Thomas Jefferson called it "the key to the Gulf of Mexico." It was suddenly transformed in that century from an unimportant "ever-faithful isle" of Spain into the world's major sugar producer, attracting United States economic interests. Liberated from Spain by the United States in the Spanish-American War (1898), Cuba came under the tutelage of a new power. The United States granted the island independence and a degree of self-rule in 1902 but kept it dependent as a result of economic involvement and successive military interventions, as authorized by the Piatt Amendment (see Glossary) of 1901. The corrupt and brutal dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista y Zaldfvar (president, 1940-44, 1952-59), during which there were 20,000 political killings, ended with its overthrow on January 1, 1959, by a popularly supported guer- rilla force led by Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ), who has xlvii presided over his own brand of communist dictatorship ever since. In addition to being separated from its northern neighbor by the Florida Straits, Cuba has been isolated socially, economi- cally, politically, and diplomatically from the world's leading democracy for more than four decades by an embargo origi- nally imposed by the United States in 1960 for Cold War rea- sons. Only one other country has been under embargo longer than Cuba, namely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (more commonly known as North Korea) , which the United States began embargoing in 1950. This fourth edition of Cuba: A Country Study would be incom- plete without a discussion of the embargo, which the Cubans have always called the blockade (el bloqueo), and of Cuba's dip- lomatic strategy to counter it. The embargo has had a signifi- cant impact on numerous aspects of the island country, including the history of the Castro regime, the health of the population, the economy, foreign policy and relations, and the armed forces. Moreover, Cuba in the new millennium cannot be adequately understood without taking into account the embargo and the reality that the island nation is no longer iso- lated in the world, that it has become gradually integrated into the world system, and that it has been undergoing significant social and economic changes since the end of the Cold War. For these reasons, and also because American public opinion has become increasingly critical of the embargo, this introduc- tion assesses the overall effectiveness of the sanctions during the 1960-2001 period; summarizes Cuba's efforts to use diplo- macy, "internationalism" (see Glossary), and trade relations in the Western Hemisphere to counter it; and shows how the evo- lution of international opinion toward Cuba has evolved in response to the embargo. Since the end of the Cold War, Cuba's diplomatic efforts to counter the embargo have resulted in very significant progress toward the reintegration of the once-pariah island nation into the Caribbean and Latin American communities and the world in general, with the main exception of the United States. As a result of this development, the United States' embargo of Cuba has become paradoxical. According to embargo critics, it would be in the United States' national interest to have Cuba fully integrated into the world community rather than isolated and unconcerned with international opinion regarding the issue. The record shows that when Cuba was relatively isolated xlviii during the Cold War it lashed out by engaging in foreign adventurism and overt domestic repression. As Cuba has become more a part of the world community since the end of the Cold War, diplomatic concerns have increasingly con- strained the Castro regime from engaging in foreign subversive activities and domestic repression. Although the regime lacks the funding to engage in foreign adventurism in any case, it no longer can risk jeopardizing its hard-won diplomatic relations by exporting revolution on even a small scale. Nor can it risk jeopardizing its economically vital tourism industry by repress- ing Cuban citizens in full view of thousands of foreign tourists. Because the objective of the embargo is to keep Cuba iso- lated, the existing situation limits the enormous potential American social, economic, and political influences that schol- ars seem to agree could accelerate the process of change in Cuba. Scholars also seem to agree that change in Cuba comes only from outside the country. For this reason, the issue of how the United States can best promote change in Cuba is likely to need further consideration. By keeping United States influ- ence out of Cuba and thereby allowing the Cuban regime to maintain itself in power, the embargo has, according to this argument, served as a sort of reverse Berlin Wall. Less than a year before the real Berlin Wall began to be erected on August 13 (coincidentally Fidel Castro's birthday), 1961, Washington began to build its invisible barrier around the island nation in retaliation against the Castro regime's nationalization of all United States businesses and property. On January 22, 1962, the Organization of American States (OAS — see Glossary), meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, reluctantly voted by a two-thirds majority to expel Cuba from the OAS because the island nation had "voluntarily" placed itself outside the inter-American system. Only fourteen of the twenty-one members voted for the resolution, with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico abstaining. Cuba's foreign policy subsequently became more radical. The embargo, the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 set the confronta- tional tone for Cuba-United States relations for the rest of the twentieth century. Historian Jaime Suchlicki is critical of Presi- dent John F. Kennedy for allegedly being confused and indeci- sive about the Bay of Pigs invasion and for being apologetic about the outcome. Had Kennedy lived, however, Cuba-United States relations might well have taken a turn for the better, a xlix development that would have been anathema to the Cuban- American community at that time. Kennedy reportedly had second thoughts about the embargo, just as he had regrets about the Bay of Pigs fiasco. On November 17, 1963, he met with French journalist Jean Daniel and asked him to tell Castro that the United States was now ready to negotiate normal rela- tions and to drop the embargo. According to Kennedy's press secretary, Pierre Salinger, "If Kennedy had lived, I am confi- dent that he would have negotiated that agreement and dropped the embargo because he was very concerned with the role the Soviet Union was playing in Cuba and Latin Amer- ica...." The OAS adopted the United States-imposed embargo on July 26, 1964, as a result of Castro's policy of supporting "armed struggle" (the old Cuban euphemism for terrorism and insur- gency) in selective Latin American countries. Within two months, every Latin American country except Mexico had bro- ken diplomatic relations with Cuba, and the island nation became a pariah state. In 1967, at the time of Ernesto "Che" Guevara's fatal guerrilla foray in Bolivia, Cuba had diplomatic relations with only one country in Latin America — Mexico. In the early 1970s, Cuba's rapprochement with Latin Amer- ica and the Caribbean in the form of "internationalist" assis- tance, especially medical aid, began to improve the revolutionary nation's regional image, with diplomatic results that began to erode the embargo. Increasingly, Cuba gave pre- cedence to bilateral relations, such as those between Cuba and Mexico, that enhanced the island's diplomatic and trade secu- rity over support for revolutionary movements. Diplomatic relations were revived with various Caribbean and South Amer- ican nations. By 1975 Havana had restored diplomatic relations with ten of Latin America's twenty-two nations. The OAS, impressed by Cuba's overt goodwill efforts and Castro's diplomatic and trade overtures but apparently downplaying his continuing covert support for revolution, lifted its twelve-year-old diplomatic and economic sanctions on the island nation on July 29, 1975, with the approval of sixteen countries, including the United States. On August 21, 1975, the administration of President Jimmy Carter eased the trade embargo in order to allow United States subsidiaries in third countries to trade with Cuba. With hopes of a rapprochement, Cuba and the United States agreed on May 30, 1977, to establish interests sections in each 1 other's countries, beginning September 1. During 1978, how- ever, Cuba's military involvement in Angola's civil conflict dashed any hope that the United States gesture to liberalize the embargo would lead to normalization of bilateral relations. Prospects for improved relations between Havana and Wash- ington further dimmed during 1978-79, as Cuba expanded its military involvement in Africa and increased its support for rev- olutionary movements in Central America and the Caribbean. At the start of the 1980s, several events disrupted Cuba's nor- malization campaign and contributed to the downturn in Cuba's relations with Latin America. The downturn began with Castro's failure to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Second, Cuba's handling of refugee incidents involving the Peruvian and Venezuelan embassies in Havana was inept and led to the 1980 Mariel Boat-Lift and the flight of more than 100,000 refugees. Castro's attempt to use the Mariel Boat-Lift to force the United States to discuss normalization of relations further exacerbated the situation. In addition, Castro reverted to virulent revolutionary rhetoric and continued support for armed struggle, particularly in Central America, Colombia, and Chile. These actions led the administration of President Ronald Reagan to make new efforts to isolate Cuba. In 1980-81 Cuba suffered major diplomatic setbacks. Its relations were suspended, downgraded, or otherwise damaged with Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela because of Cuban subver- sive activities or breaches of diplomatic protocol, and Colom- bia and Costa Rica broke relations with Havana over Cuba's renewed emphasis on armed struggle. Cuba's involvement in Grenada in 1981 created considerable tension in the Eastern Caribbean and led two other countries — Jamaica and St. Lucia — to break relations. Upon taking office as prime minis- ter of Jamaica that January, Edward Seaga expelled the 500 Cubans working on the island and declared the Cuban ambas- sador persona non grata. By late 1981, Cuba had become so ostracized that even longtime friend Mexico failed to invite Castro to the North-South Conference held in Mexico that October, despite his position as leader of the Nonaligned Movement (see Glossary). The Malvinas/Falkland Islands War between Argentina and Britain in 1982 provided Cuba the opportunity that it needed to break out of its self-created diplomatic isolation and proved to be a watershed in Cuba's relations with Latin America. Cuba improved its standing in South America and specifically its rela- li tions with Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela by joining them in siding with the right-wing military regime in Argen- tina. The Cuban government overlooked its ideological differ- ences with the Argentine junta in large part because trade relations with Argentina gave Cuba another conduit for cir- cumventing the embargo; Argentina soon surpassed Mexico as Cuba's largest regional trading partner. Cuba's relations with the Eastern Caribbean, however, reached a nadir in 1983. The joint United States/Eastern Caribbean intervention in Grenada on October 25 put an abrupt end to Cuban activities in Grenada. The only members of the thirteen-member Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom — see Glossary) to retain relations with Cuba were Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, neither of which sup- ported the joint United States/Eastern Caribbean military action against Grenada. By the mid-1980s, as a result of Havana's new overtures to Latin America, Cuba was again enjoying a rapprochement of sorts with the region. Fortunately for Castro, the demise of right-wing authoritarian regimes and the transition to demo- cratic government in several South American nations in the 1980s improved his prospects for courting the region in the wake of the Falklands/Malvinas War and for normalizing rela- tions with more countries. Cuba also had become more integrated into Latin American multilateral organizations, such as the Latin American Parlia- ment and the Latin American Integration Association (see Glossary), the successor to the Latin American Free Trade Association (see Glossary). Havana finally bowed to Latin American pressure to support the Central American peace pro- cess in 1985 by belatedly endorsing the proposals initiated by the Contadora Support Group (see Glossary), which called for the removal of all foreign forces from Central America. At the same time that Cuba began emerging from its diplo- matic isolation in the mid-1980s, Castro overestimated his self- appointed role in Latin America as revolutionary statesman. His attempt to fill a regional leadership vacuum by rallying Latin American and other developing world nations around his proposals for a debtors' cartel, a repudiation of Latin America's US$360-billion foreign debt, and a "new world economic order" was a failure. Although he succeeded in persuading Peru's President Alan Garcia Perez to suspend his country's debt payments, Castro's grandstanding elicited mainly skepti- lii cism in Latin America and the broader arenas of the develop- ing world. In 1986 the Reagan administration renewed attempts to iso- late Cuba in the Americas by further tightening the embargo. Cuba was able to continue reducing its diplomatic isolation, however, by using its "internationalist" workers to provide med- ical, educational, construction, and other assistance to numer- ous countries. Although, until the early 1990s, Cuba's "internationalist" support to a number of politically unstable countries in the developing world also included military, guer- rilla, and security support, the small-scale Cuban aid to nations where Havana sought to cultivate relations created goodwill that led to the resumption of relations with numerous coun- tries. Contrary to assertions that Cuba provided "international- ist" assistance only to "ideologically compatible" countries in the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba aided several right-wing regimes, such as Peru in June 1970, Nicaragua in December 1972, Hon- duras in September 1974, and the Dominican Republic in 1987. In November 1987, as a result of the goodwill created by Cuba's "internationalist" aid and its diplomatic overtures in the Latin American region, the presidents of eight Latin American countries — Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (the so-called Group of Eight — see Glossary) — agreed at a meeting in Acapulco that Cuba should be invited to rejoin regional organizations, including the OAS. The Group of Eight's proposal was the first direct regional challenge to United States policy toward Cuba. Despite the calls for reintegration of Cuba into the Latin American community, most countries in the region remained wary of the communist island state, and antagonism between Cuba and the United States was greater in 1987-88 than at any time in the previous ten years. The Castro regime voiced sup- port for Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez's Esquipu- las II accord for peace in Central America in 1987, but the sincerity of Havana's support of the peace process came under question when the plan began to stagnate in late 1988. Tension between Cuba and the Soviet Union increased in 1989, and Cuba's economic slide began. Castro formally wel- comed Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev during his offi- cial visit to Cuba in March, but Cuba's special relationship with the collapsing Soviet Union was already all but over. Castro liii reportedly had defied Gorbachev's advice that Cuba should get on track to political pluralism and a free market. During the Cold War, the international community and news media bestowed on Cuba and Castro greatly exaggerated glo- bal significance as minor global actors. But as Havana's once- close ideological allies in the former Soviet bloc distanced themselves from the Castro government in 1989-90, this inflated aura of importance declined markedly. In 1989 skepticism about the Castro regime began increas- ing in the Americas as a result of the televised Havana trials of several Ministry of Interior officials and Division General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez, hitherto a national hero, on trumped-up charges of drug trafficking. The summary execu- tions of Ochoa and three other pro-reform officers in July 1989 shocked democratic leaders in Latin America, Spain, and else- where. By lauding the installation in September 1989 of the de facto, short-term president of Panama, Castro also earned bad publicity for flouting Latin American and world criticism of the lack of a democratic system in Panama. In an attempt to counter the fallout from the Ochoa affair and to improve his country's regional standing, Castro again made overtures suggesting his willingness for closer relations with Latin America, which he described publicly as Cuba's "common fatherland" and "common future." In October 1989, the Group of Eight, absent Panama, added its voice to those calling for Cuba's reincorporation into the OAS. Castro, who throughout the 1960s had referred to the OAS contemptuously as the "ministry of colonies," announced Cuba's willingness to rejoin the organization, if formally invited. Reaching out diplomatically became more urgent for the island nation as its estrangement from its one-time allies in the former Soviet bloc became increasingly apparent during 1990. In that pivotal year, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, whose Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary) trade bloc accounted for as much as 85 percent of Cuba's trade during the 1980s, significantly reduced their ties to Cuba. The Soviet Union also substantially reduced its financial support, and Cuba found itself no longer an indis- pensable Soviet ally. The Soviet Union now regarded it as a drain on its diminishing resources and of questionable value as a Soviet proxy in conflicts in the developing world that were no longer of interest to Moscow. liv As a result of Nicaragua's presidential election in December 1989, Cuba lost a key regional ally. Subsequently, the Castro government, as the only Marxist-Leninist regime in a region of democratically elected governments, increasingly stood out in 1990 as an anachronism. Although the OAS nevertheless voted that year to admit Cuba as a member, the United States vetoed the OAS vote. In order to survive the loss of its longtime Soviet benefactor and to improve its standing in the world, Cuba put a higher pri- ority in the 1990s on continuing to reintegrate itself into the Latin American community of nations (including the Carib- bean region) , on expanding its relations globally, and on devel- oping its tourist industry. Cuba also began actively seeking to cultivate alternative relationships, not only with major develop- ing world nations, particularly China, but also with wealthy cap- italist countries, such as Japan. Regionally, Cuba focused its efforts on the Eastern Carib- bean. By 1990 Cuba had begun new diplomatic initiatives to improve its relations with Caricom and to obtain observer sta- tus on a number of Caricom standing committees, including health and education. Caricom's decision in 1990 to promote cooperative projects with Cuba facilitated Cuba's rapproche- ment with the English-speaking Caribbean. By 1990 Latin America and Cuba's status in the region had also changed significantly. The democratically elected govern- ments that had replaced military regimes in the region had opened diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba (often simply to demonstrate their independence of United States policy) and had admitted it into more inter-American organizations. In addition, Cuba appeared to have sharply curbed its support for armed struggle in South America and the Caribbean, although it continued to support the insurgency in El Salvador. As Cuba pursued its foreign policy of expanding diplomatic relations, it continued its traditional domestic policy of repres- sion. In defiance of the March 5, 1990, vote by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva calling for continued scrutiny of human rights in Cuba, the Castro regime began to crack down on the nascent human rights movement that had flowered since 1989. By April 1990, while communist rule was collapsing in Eastern Europe, the regime had crushed the Cuban human rights movement led by dissident Gustavo Arcos Bergnes, president of the Havana-based Cuban Commit- lv tee for Human Rights (Comite Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos— CCPDH). A short time later, beginning on July 9, 1990, the Castro gov- ernment damaged relations with Italy and Switzerland, as well as with traditional friends and important trading partners, such as Czechoslovakia, Mexico, and Spain (Cuba's principal West- ern creditor), by interfering with attempts by a few dozen Cuban asylum seekers to obtain sanctuary in the embassies or diplomatic residences of these nations in Havana. But despite these setbacks, Cuba was elected on October 18, 1990, for the first time since 1956, to a seat on the United Nations Security Council as one of the ten nonpermanent members. Cuba won the votes of all Latin American and Caribbean nations, as well as the largest number of votes cast for any of the aspirants to vacant seats (146 votes out of a possible 156). In the wake of the democratic tidal wave that swept away Cuba's allies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989- 91, Castro defiantly maintained that Cuba's "socialist" system was unique and would remain unaffected by the sudden demise of East European socialism and the rise of democratic reformism. While the Castro government pursued a policy of fostering foreign relations with most countries, it simulta- neously sought to keep the Cuban population from being con- taminated ideologically, not only by the democratic revolution that had overpowered his former communist allies but also by other outside influences, such as democracy in the Americas, globalization, and capitalism. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost (openness) was anathema to Castro, who openly sided with hard-line conservative Soviet leaders. In the early 1990s, Castro continued to insulate Cuba to a considerable extent from the political and ideological repercussions of the events in the communist bloc, aided by the nation's geographical distance from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the embargo-imposed isolation from the United States, and the government's highly effective repressive apparatus. In 1991, as the full weight of the embargo finally began to be felt in Cuba, Castro faced one of the most critical years of his rule since the Bay of Pigs invasion thirty years earlier. Cuba's severe economic crisis and mounting international pressure on the Castro regime to democratize generated some overly opti- mistic predictions that 1991 would likely be Castro's last year in power. Ivi On May 24, 1991, in the wake of the Cold War's end, the Cas- tro regime completed withdrawing its military troops from Africa and began focusing on implementing the policy, adopted in 1989, of opening its economy and attracting for- eign investment. To that end, Havana sharply shifted its efforts from building its Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Arma- das Revolucionarias — FAR) to developing an international tourism industry and expanding international relations. The new emphasis on tourism was in response to the country's pre- cipitous economic deterioration resulting not only from the cutoff of Soviet aid and the breakup of economic and trade relations with East European countries and the Soviet Union, but also from Castro's unwillingness to radically restructure the economy to introduce free markets and private ownership. The continuation of the embargo, for its part, exacerbated the country's economic collapse. Cuba's participation in the First Ibero-American Summit of civilian heads of state of nineteen Latin American nations and of Spain and Portugal held on July 18-19, 1991, in Guadalajara, Mexico, prompted Havana's rapprochement with Chile, Colombia, and other countries. Leaders in the region urged Castro to quicken the pace of reform in Cuba in return for closer relations and possible reincorporation into the OAS. On August 2, 1991, the Latin American Parliament voted 154 to twenty-seven, with thirty abstentions, for a resolution asking for an end to the embargo of Cuba. Cuba continued to make dip- lomatic advances in Latin America and the Eastern Caribbean during 1992. Spurning the worldwide appeal to lift the embargo, the United States, in the apparent belief that the collapse of the post-Soviet Castro regime was imminent, intensified its embargo on October 15, 1992, with the passage of Representa- tive Robert G. Torricelli's Cuban Democracy Act (see Glos- sary). This legislation, which President George Bush signed into law on October 23, tightens restrictions on humanitarian aid, specifically food, medicine, and medical supplies. In addi- tion to prohibiting American subsidiaries in third countries from trading with Cuba, the Act prohibits any vessel that had engaged in trade with Cuba within the previous 180 days from entering into the United States to load or unload freight. The Cuban Democracy Act outraged the international com- munity. Many countries claimed that the Act violated both international law and United Nations resolutions that food and lvii medicine cannot be used as weapons in international conflicts. Britain and Canada immediately barred United States subsid- iaries located in their countries from complying with its provi- sions. On November 24, fifty-nine members of the United Nations General Assembly voted against the United States in favor of a resolution proposed by Cuba demanding that the law and the trade embargo be terminated. Only Israel and, by mis- take, Romania, voted with the United States in opposing the measure. The European Union (EU — see Glossary) , Canada, Argentina, Mexico, and Japan were particularly incensed over the Cuban Democracy Act. Cuba again did well on the diplomatic front in 1993-94. At the Third Ibero-American Summit, held in Salvador, Brazil, on July 15-16, 1993, the leaders of Latin America, Spain, and Por- tugal called for an end to the United States trade embargo of Cuba. On November 3, the United Nations General Assembly voted by eighty-eight to four (Albania, Israel, Paraguay, and the United States), with fifty-seven abstentions, to condemn the embargo. In 1994 the leaders of Latin America, Spain, and Por- tugal became increasingly critical of the embargo and called for the United States to ease its stance. At the twenty-fourth General Assembly of the OAS in Brazil in early June, the for- eign ministers of most OAS members called for the end of the embargo and the readmission of Cuba to the OAS. At the Ibero-American Summit meeting held in Cartagena, Colombia, on June 14, the leaders of nineteen Latin American nations and of Spain and Portugal approved a communique calling for the elimination of the unilateral United States economic and trade boycotts of Cuba and readmission of Cuba to the OAS. Three months later, on September 10, 1994, the fourteen- member Rio Group (see Glossary) also called for incorporat- ing Cuba fully into regional bodies and lifting the embargo of Cuba. In addition, the Rio Group urged "peaceful transition toward a democratic and pluralist system in Cuba." On October 26, the United Nations General Assembly again voted over- whelmingly to demand an end to the embargo against Cuba, with 101 in favor, two opposed (the United States and Israel), and forty-eight abstaining. In contrast to international opinion, in 1994 only 35 percent of Americans favored ending the embargo, while 51 percent opposed ending it, according to a September 1994 Time/Cable News Network (CNN) poll. Throughout his regime, Castro has invoked the threat of United States military invasion of Cuba as justification for mili- lviii tarizing the island, and he has blamed the embargo for the hardships and privations caused by his own social, economic, and political policies. An independent countrywide survey con- ducted in Cuba in late 1994 and designed by the Miami Herald and CID/Gallup, the Costa Rican affiliate of the Princeton, New Jersey-based Gallup, found that the great majority (62 per- cent) of Cubans blamed the United States economic sanctions, rather than Cuba's political system, for economic difficulties. On March 22, 1995, conservative members of the United States Congress, seeing no reason to change the status quo, proposed to tighten the embargo even more through passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (see Glos- sary; more commonly known as the Helms-Burton legislation) . This legislation proposed augmenting the embargo extraterri- torially by punishing foreign companies that do business with Cuba. Meeting in Quito, Ecuador, on May 22-23, the foreign ministers of the Rio Group unanimously condemned the bill. The bill's adoption by the Congress in October 1995 prompted the leaders of Latin American countries, Spain, and Portugal, all attending the Ibero-American Summit in Bariloche, Argen- tina, at the time, to issue a strong condemnation of United States policy toward Cuba. Shortly thereafter, on November 2, one hundred and seventeen members of the United Nations General Assembly voted to condemn the embargo; only the United States, Israel, and Uzbekistan voted in favor of it. In retaliation for the shooting down by two Cuban MiG-29 fighter jets of two civilian planes piloted by four members of a Cuban exile group, Brothers to the Rescue, over international waters, within sight of Key West, on February 24, 1996, the United States Senate approved the conference report to the Helms-Burton legislation by a vote of seventy-four to twenty-two on March 5. Canada, Russia, the EU, and the four teen-member Caricom strongly condemned the bill. Despite the interna- tional furor aroused by the bill, President William Jefferson Clinton signed the Helms-Burton legislation into law on March 12, thereby halting a series of liberalizing measures toward Cuba. The new law did not deter foreign companies from entering into joint ventures with Cuban state companies. More- over, every six months for the remainder of his administration, President Clinton waived Title III, which would have allowed United States citizens to sue foreign companies for conducting business on confiscated American property in Cuba. lix The Helms-Burton Act intensified international outrage over the embargo. On August 26, 1996, thirty-four members of the OAS passed a resolution declaring that the Helms-Burton Act "does not conform to international law." That October 28, the EU approved legislation forbidding compliance with the Helms-Burton Act. On November 12, the United Nations Gen- eral Assembly voted by 138 to three (United States, Israel, and Uzbekistan) to condemn the embargo. (For the first time, all fifteen EU countries voted yes.) On November 28, Canada's Parliament passed legislation penalizing companies for obey- ing the Helms-Burton Act. The Castro regime's repressive policies, however, continued to limit international solidarity with the island nation. For example, in May 1996 Cuba's failure to enact political reforms and economic liberalization led the EU to suspend discussions with Havana on an economic cooperation agreement. At the annual Ibero-American Summit, held in Santiago, Chile, on November 10-11, 1996, Latin American leaders pressed Castro to make democratic changes on the island, while they denounced moves by the United States to isolate Cuba. On December 2, the EU further conditioned improvement in political and economic relations with Cuba and developmental assistance on progress in human rights and fundamental dem- ocratic reforms in Cuba. Cuba responded to the Helms-Burton Act by adopting a law in January 1997 that penalizes United States citizens who seek restitution of their expropriated properties under the Helms- Burton law. More significantly, the United States was also sub- jected to retaliatory legislation from its trade partners, and in 1997 the United Nations General Assembly voted 143 to three against the embargo of Cuba. Individual countries flouted the embargo. For example, in August 1997 France announced a trade agreement with Cuba. During his visit to Cuba on January 21-25, 1998, Pope John Paul II criticized the embargo several times. The papal visit had a beneficial effect on Cuba's international image. Responding to the pope's call for the world to open up to Cuba and Cuba to open up to the world, numerous celebrities and senior officials and leaders of foreign governments visited Havana during the year. Several countries, including Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Spain, restored diplomatic relations with Cuba as a result of the papal visit. lx Moreover, in the aftermath of the papal visit, the Castro gov- ernment released many of its 1,320 political prisoners, leaving between 350 and 400 in prison. In April 1998, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, for the first time in sev- eral years, voted down a United States-backed resolution con- demning Cuba. Acknowledging the impact of the pope's visit to Cuba, Presi- dent Clinton, on March 20, 1998, eased controls on licensing procedures of direct humanitarian charter flights to Cuba, on resuming cash remittances up to US$300 per quarter for the support of close relatives in Cuba, and on developing proce- dures for streamlining and expediting licenses for the commer- cial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba. President Clinton also agreed to work on a bipartisan basis with Congress on the transfer of food to the Cuban peo- ple. Havana, however, subsequently announced that it would refuse all direct American humanitarian aid as long as the United States maintained the embargo on Cuba. Underscoring the mounting isolation of the United States on the Cuba embargo issue, the United Nations General Assembly on October 14, 1998, again passed a resolution call- ing for an end to the embargo. An overwhelming majority (157 votes, with twelve abstentions) pitted the United States and, symbolically at least, Israel against most of the world. Despite the worldwide criticism of the embargo, on January 5, 1999, President Clinton declined the recommendation of twenty-four United States senators requesting that he establish a National Bipartisan Commission to review United States pol- icy toward Cuba. At the same time, the president announced five minor changes in the embargo: broadening cash remit- tances, expanding direct passenger charter flights from New York and Los Angeles to Cuba, reestablishing direct mail ser- vice to Cuba, authorizing the sale of food and agricultural inputs to independent entities in Cuba, and expanding exchanges among academics, athletes, and scientists. American public support for the embargo began to show signs of cracking. A Gallup poll released on May 24, 1999, showed that, in contrast to the 1994 Time/ CNN poll, only 42 percent of those polled supported the embargo, while 51 per- cent favored ending it. The poll also found that 71 percent of Americans supported reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba. Ixi On November 9, 1999, the United Nations General Assem- bly, by a vote of 155 in favor to two against (the United States and Israel), again adopted a resolution on the need to end the embargo of Cuba. Nevertheless, the island nation's poor human rights record continued to keep many countries at arm's length. Staunch traditional allies such as Canada and Mexico had tended to overlook the Castro government's human rights record, but that attitude began to change in the late 1990s, especially after Havana put a harsh new law on dis- sent into effect in February 1999. The legislation, which pro- vides a maximum prison sentence of twenty years, includes penalties against unauthorized contacts with the United States and the import or supply of "subversive" materials, including texts on democracy, by news agencies and journalists. That March a court used the new antisedition law in sentencing four dissidents to prison terms of up to five years, despite Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien's personal request to Castro in a meeting in Havana in April 1998 for their freedom. Beginning in April 1999, relations between Cuba and Canada — the largest foreign investor in Cuba and Cuba's second-largest trade part- ner, behind Spain — cooled over the Castro regime's continued crackdowns on dissident journalists and human rights activists. Canada had already halted its unsuccessful campaign to restore Cuba's membership in the OAS. In general, human rights issues seemed not to interfere greatly with Cuba's relations with Latin America and the Carib- bean. At the Ibero-American Summit held in Havana in November 1999, Mexico's President Ernesto Zedillo did what no Mexican leader had done before, when he made an implicit call for greater democracy in Cuba, but Cuban-Mexican rela- tions remained unchanged. Nor were human rights a factor in Cuba's strong relations with Venezuela. These relations greatly strengthened after Hugo Chavez Frias, a leftist military officer and populist, was inaugurated as president in February 1999, an event attended by Castro. Nor did human rights issues pre- vent Paraguay, South America's only hold-out, from reestablish- ing full diplomatic relations with the island nation on November 8, 1999. By providing small-scale "internationalist" aid, Cuba has con- tinued to reap diplomatic dividends. In 1998 Cuba reportedly had 2,759 "internationalist" technical workers, professionals, and specialists in eighty-six countries. In late December 1998, in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, which devastated Central lxii America during the October 27 to November 1 period, Cuba dispatched about 600 medical doctors to aid the affected popu- lations of Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In the immediate aftermath of the flooding and mud slides that dev- astated a large area of Venezuela in December 1999, Cuba sent more than 400 health-care personnel to assist in the recovery efforts. In August 2000, Cuba aided El Salvador in combating an outbreak of dengue fever. Despite Cuba's continuing condition as an embargoed nation, the only major country that Cuba was isolated from in 2001-01 was the United States, and the only Latin American countries still without diplomatic relations with Havana were El Salvador and Honduras. Relations between Cuba and the United States were still limited to Interests Sections in each other's capitals. As a result of Havana's diplomatic and "internationalist" ini- tiatives and the global propaganda value to Cuba of the United States embargo, the island nation today no longer stands alone in the court of world opinion. Growing international resent- ment of the embargo appears to have spurred many countries to open relations with Cuba. By 2000 Cuba's public renuncia- tion of its longtime support for armed struggle and revolution- ary military "internationalism" in the early 1990s and its diplomatic initiatives during the decade had allowed the island nation to upgrade its international standing, in the form of diplomatic relations with 172 members of the 187-member United Nations. With the important exception of the United States, Cuba was no longer seen as a rogue state but as a diplo- matically accepted member of the world community. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Havana had succeeded in reestablishing relations with twenty-nine countries and in improving relations with others, such as El Salvador and Hon- duras. Havana has twenty-three accredited missions in the region, and twenty-one Latin American and Caribbean coun- tries have diplomatic posts in Havana. The Castro regime's dip- lomatic comeback in Latin America may be a far more significant Cuban achievement in the region than Cuba's short- lived revolutionary victories in Grenada and Nicaragua. Viewed as a David against Goliath, Cuba is now seen interna- tionally as a victim of a United States isolation strategy widely regarded as punitive and counterproductive, and, because it supposedly ignores the Cuban reality, as irrational. With increasingly large majorities, the United Nations General lxiii Assembly has voted overwhelmingly every year since 1992 for resolutions condemning the unilateral economic sanctions. Only Israel has regularly stood with the United States in oppos- ing United Nations resolutions condemning the embargo since 1992. Israel, however, is an active trading partner of Cuba, as well as a major investor, even though it lacks diplomatic rela- tions with Havana. The embargo is widely seen as having helped to keep the Castro regime in power by preventing Cubans from being influenced by new ideas about human rights, economics, and democracy, and by giving Castro a scapegoat on which to blame Cuba's economic problems. Many Cubans reportedly believe that his regime would not last a year if the embargo were lifted. Just as President Reagan's decision to let American students travel to Eastern Europe helped to bring down the Berlin Wall on November 7, 1989, the Castro regime, according to embargo critics, would be unlikely to withstand the ideological and socioeconomic impact of millions of United States visitors. Cuban-American visitors alone have had a profound impact on Cuban society. As sociologist Sergio Diaz-Briquets points out herein, "Many observers feel that the 1980 Mariel outflow was a direct result of family visits as many disaffected Cubans were deeply influenced by contacts with Cuban-American visitors and the perceptions of their experience abroad." Despite Cuba's geographical proximity, United States citi- zens, unlike those of most other countries, have not been free to visit their island neighbor. United States law restricts travel to Cuba to all but a few American and foreign government offi- cials traveling on official business (including representatives of international organizations of which the United States is a member) , journalists regularly employed by a news-reporting organization, and Cuban-Americans, who are accorded the spe- cial right to make a once-a-year visit to family relatives. The United States ban on travel to Cuba was lifted on March 18, 1977, but it was reimposed on April 19, 1982, and has remained in effect since then. The legal restrictions notwithstanding, as many as 154,000 United States residents, including about 124,000 Cuban-Ameri- cans and 30,000 others, such as journalists, humanitarian work- ers, and academics, reportedly visited Cuba legally during 2000. Estimates of United States citizens, including Cuban- Americans, who visited the island nation illegally in 2000 range from 22,000 to 80,000. Despite these numbers, Cuba remains lxiv largely terra incognita for its northern neighbor as a result of the embargo. It is not surprising, therefore, that, according to a February 1-4, 2001, poll by Gallup, 68 percent of Americans had an unfavorable opinion of Cuba, while only 27 percent had a favorable opinion. The Castro government, however, has not helped its case with its poor human rights record, which has included sharp restrictions on basic rights, such as freedom of expression, asso- ciation, assembly, and movement. Indeed, there has been a pat- tern of crackdowns following United States initiatives to ease the embargo, as if Castro were signaling that his government would prefer not to have the embargo lifted just yet. Human rights issues relating to Cuba also continued to be of concern to several democratic governments in the Americas in 2000 and 2001. In late April 2000, Argentina and Chile voted "yes" in favor of a United Nations Commission on Human Rights vote censuring Cuba for its human rights record, while Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador abstained. The final vote was twenty-one in favor, eighteen against, and fourteen abstaining. In 2000-01, once-close relations between Cuba and Mexico and Spain appeared to be on a somewhat more formal footing because of the Castro government's continued hard line regarding human rights issues. At the Ibero-American Summit held in Panama on November 17-18, 2000, Castro criticized Mexico and Spain for supporting an El Salvador-proposed reso- lution against terrorism because it did not mention Cuba's complaints of Cuban-American-sponsored terrorism perpe- trated in Cuba. (Throughout the 1990s, Cuban-American exiles boasted of paramilitary raids into Cuba, including a series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997.) Cuba's refusal to sign the resolution strained ties with Spain. Two weeks later, on December 1, 2000, Castro attended the presidential inauguration of Mexico's President-elect Vicente Fox. With Fox's inauguration, relations between Cuba and Mexico began on a new footing as the Institutional Revolution- ary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional — PRI), which had ruled Mexico for seven decades and which historically was friendly to Cuba, relinquished the presidency to the opposi- tion. Nevertheless, in 2001 Mexico's economic and commercial relations with Cuba continued, and bilateral relations remained friendly and cooperative. Cuba's human rights record notwithstanding, international disapproval of the embargo has continued to increase. The lxv continuation of the embargo has remained a significant irri- tant in the relations of Latin America and United States allies with Washington. The embargo has remained widely criticized internationally as a relic of the Cold War that lost its justifica- tion when Cuba ceased being a satellite of the former Soviet Union. It is also widely viewed as having been highly ineffective in achieving its main foreign policy goals, and as having failed to oust the Castro government and to keep Cuba from gradu- ally reestablishing cultural, diplomatic, economic, and other ties with Latin America and the rest of the world. In 2000 and 2001, there was no lack of support in Washing- ton for continuing the embargo of Cuba. The embargo lobby continued to argue that economic sanctions should not be lifted until Castro allows free elections and open markets, releases all political prisoners, and restores civil liberties — con- ditions that were not made when the embargo was first imposed. Embargo proponents continued to argue that United States economic ties to Cuba would only boost the Castro regime politically and economically and not benefit the Cuban people. They continued to argue that sustained sanctions can work. Despite the annual Cuban-American visits to Cuba that are a major source of financial support for the Cuban economy in the form of remittances, Cuban-American activists in South Florida have continued to express outrage that American tour- ists have been visiting Cuba illegally and spending money there. The forty years of embargo have been costly for Cuba. According to a Cuban complaint lodged with the United Nations General Assembly in October 1998, the United States' trade embargo on Cuba had cost the Caribbean island US$60 billion in lost revenues, severely undermining the country's economy. In April 2000, Cuba's public health minister told the Group of Seventy-Seven (see Glossary) Summit in Havana that the embargo had cost Cuba's health sector more than US$2 bil- lion. Cuba also announced in April that the embargo had cost the country's world-renowned cigar industry US$1.1 billion in lost revenues. Despite its economic losses from the embargo, Cuba has been able to circumvent it since 1991 by finding trading part- ners among the former socialist nations and among market- economy countries. Cuba's top four trading partners in 1999 were Spain, Canada, China, and Venezuela, in that order. In 2000 Venezuela, as a result mainly of crude oil and refined lxvi product exports to Cuba, jumped to the top spot, with Spain following at a close second, according to Cuba's Central Bank. The pro-embargo lobby has found its stance under increas- ing scrutiny in the new millennium. The story of six-year-old Elian Gonzalez, the ship-wreck survivor who lost his mother at sea and was cared for by relatives in Miami's Little Havana, put Cuba back in the news in early 2000 and created a widespread perception that Cuban-Americans in Miami were extremist. The backlash prompted lawmakers to reexamine United States policy toward Cuba. After four decades of status quo in relations between Havana and Washington, the embargo was widely regarded in the United States as an archaic policy. Increasingly, the American public and lawmakers questioned whether a United States pol- icy that was initially formulated and adopted at the height of the Cold War could still be relevant in the post-Cold War era. United States public opinion favored a reassessment by Wash- ington of the 1960s-era policy framework of the embargo. A May 2000 Gallup poll showed that 48 percent of Americans favored ending the embargo, as opposed to 42 percent in favor of maintaining it. The same poll, perhaps influenced by the Elian controversy, found that 57 percent of Americans favored renewing diplomatic relations with Cuba (a 14 percent decline, however, since the May 1999 poll), while only 36 percent opposed resuming ties. Embargo critics include those advocating an approach that calls for engaging Cuba in dialogue while lifting some United States sanctions that they believe hurt the Cuban people. Oth- ers call for lifting the embargo completely and restoring all relations. They argue that the embargo continues to provide Castro with a pretext not only for keeping Cuban society milita- rized (through mass militias) and under the tight control of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — PCC), but also for exploiting United States-Cuban hostilities. Like the long-standing Piatt Amendment authorizing United States military intervention in Cuba from 1901 until its abroga- tion in 1934 and the leasing "in perpetuity" of the Guantanamo naval base in 1903 and, since 1934, for less than US$4,000 in annual rent, the embargo has long turned public sentiment in Cuba as well as international opinion against the United States. Lifting the embargo and restoring relations, critics argue, would be more likely to lead to a peaceful transition to democ- racy rather than violent civil conflict. Advocates of a policy lxvii change toward Cuba also point to the international consensus against the embargo, the suffering that it has caused the Cuban people, and lost opportunities to United States businesses interested in competing with Canadian and European compa- nies operating in Cuba. Moreover, it is argued that lifting the embargo would not necessarily help the regime but instead would deprive Castro of one of his most important propaganda weapons. On May 25, 2000, a proposed measure to permit the export of food, medicine, and medical products to Cuba marked a sig- nificant shift in Congress and reflected a growing impatience with the embargo's failure. In particular, business interests, including American farmers, alarmed that international com- petitors had been making major sales to countries under uni- lateral United States sanctions, were joining traditional opponents of the embargo. As a result of a growing desire by American farmers and business people to trade with Cuba, by 2000 the once-powerful but still influential embargo lobby had been reduced to the vocal right wing of the Cuban-American community in Florida, its allies in Congress, and other conser- vatives. Nevertheless, a Florida International University poll released in October 2000 found that, although only 25.8 per- cent of Cuban-Americans felt that the embargo had worked well, 64.2 percent of the Cuban-American population expressed strong support for its continuation. The new congressional proposal of May 25, 2000, seemed to herald a gradual easing of the embargo, but its actual helpful- ness to Cuba appeared to be minimal at best because of the conditions attached to it. For example, the proposal disallowed bartering, purchase of any Cuban goods by United States com- panies, or extension of any public or private credit to cash- strapped Cuba from the United States to finance purchases. In addition, under the Cuban Democracy Act, ships visiting Cuba would still be banned from docking at a United States port dur- ing the following six months. Despite the prospects raised by the proposed exemption, a Cuban-American congressional representative from Florida forced removal of the trade provision from the agricultural spending bill on grounds that it was an unacceptable attach- ment to a spending bill. Furthermore, a House-approved mea- sure that would have dropped enforcement of United States restrictions on travel to Cuba by Americans was replaced by a provision that codified the ban on American tourism to the lxviii island. Moreover, on June 20, 2000, the Senate voted, by fifty- nine to forty-one, to again defeat the proposed creation of a National Bipartisan Commission to study the effectiveness of the economic embargo of Cuba. On November 9, 2000, the international community reiter- ated its contrary stance when the United Nations General Assembly passed, with 167 votes in favor, a nonbinding, Cuba- drafted resolution urging Washington to lift the embargo as soon as possible and all countries to refuse to comply with it. Only the United States, Israel, and the Marshall Islands voted against it, while four other countries abstained. On March 10, 2001, Caricom went on record against Cuba's isolation from the integrational process linked with the cre- ation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) zone. In an official statement, Caricom said that any policy of isolation and expulsion is counterproductive in the post-Cold War era. The United States' tattered diplomatic prestige became evi- dent with its ouster from the fifty-four-nation Commission on Human Rights on May 3, 2001. The unprecedented action reportedly reflected a growing frustration with America's alleg- edly noncooperative actions and attitudes toward international organizations and treaties, as well as its votes involving the Pal- estinians and countries like China, Cuba, and Iran. On May 19, President Bush specifically linked the Commission's vote on Cuba with the subsequent loss of the United States' seat. Despite the favorable votes in the United Nations and other multinational fora over the embargo issue, Cuba's pariah status in organizations or pacts involving the United States contin- ued. Cuba was the only country in the Americas to be excluded from the Summit of the Americas held in Quebec, Canada, on April 20-22, 2001, when the agreement was approved, because only democratic countries are eligible to participate in the pro- posed FTAA. Although its economic system survived the 1990s, the island nation underwent significant social and economic changes during the decade as the economy geared toward dollar-based tourism, dollar remittances, and foreign investment. Political scientist Jorge I. Dominguez observes herein that since the 1990s Cuba has been undergoing a gradual social and political transition of a still undetermined nature. He explains that a proto-civil society has grown as a consequence of government reforms (such as greater religious freedom) , as many Cubans become largely independent of the state for their livelihood, lxix and as younger, more dynamic, well-educated, and pragmatic leaders emerge in key institutions. Sergio Diaz-Briquets explains that the greater religious freedom "will inevitably con- tribute to the undermining of the ideological, social, political, and economic power of the Cuban totalitarian state." He adds that tourism and the dollarization of the domestic economy "will further accelerate a process of social change." And he points out that the presence of so many foreign visitors limits the regime's ability to suppress civil and political dissent. In the first quarter of 2001, the Castro regime, apparently more confident from having surmounted the country's eco- nomic depression of the 1990s and angry over international criticism of its human rights practices, returned to the mass protests, hard-line rhetoric, and confrontational diplomacy that had characterized the island nation during the decades of the Cold War. Instead of consumer ads, billboards displayed the old "Socialism or Death" signs. The resurgence of the hard line has been attributed to the divisive effect of the regime's 1993 decision to allow the circulation of dollars and the regime's concern that discontent could get out of control unless redirected away from regime policies and toward the United States. Legalization of dollars made it possible for taxi drivers, hotel workers, and other Cubans, including prostitutes, associated with the tourism industry and getting tipped or paid in dollars to earn far more than professionals, such as government offi- cials, military officers, doctors, scientists, and university profes- sors. Since dollars became legal, resentment has grown between those with access to dollars and those without. Cubans receiving remittances from relatives in the United States have also contributed to the growing inequalities. Many Cubans reportedly also greatly resent the system of tourism apartheid that prevents Cubans from getting near tourist resorts for foreigners or entering hotels for foreign tourists (unless they are employees), that reserves first-class medical facilities for foreigners and high Cuban officials, and that compels many young Cuban women to prostitute them- selves for dollars. If its frequent, government-sponsored, anti-United States ral- lies held in Havana's open-air structure called the protest drome (protestodromo) are any indication, the regime appears to be fearful that this seething resentment could get out of con- trol and, instead of being directed against the United States lxx embargo and government, develop into mass protests against the Castro regime. In this regard, the embargo appears to serve the Castro regime well as a scapegoat and as a mechanism for bottling up growing resentment, at least for the short term. Mounting popular resentment may have the potential for unraveling the Castro regime and is reminiscent of the social discontent that erupted in the 1959 Revolution. On July 14, 2001, President Bush announced plans to strengthen the embargo by enforcing limits on cash payments that Cuban-Americans may send to their relatives on the island and by preventing American tourists from visiting Cuba. On July 16, however, in an unexpected setback for the Cuban exile lobby and its Congressional allies, President Bush announced that he would continue the Clinton administration policy of waiving Title III of the Helms-Burton Act for six months at a time. On July 25, for the second successive year, the House voted, by 240 to 186, to approve a measure that would effec- tively lift the ban on most travel to Cuba, but the measure again died in the Senate. Embargo critics believe that the politically charged embargo has long narrowed the perceptual lens through which United States policymakers view the prospects for effecting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. For example, a related argu- ment against the embargo is that, in the absence of relations between Cuba and the United States, Washington lacks the ability to influence the direction of the generational transition of Cuba's social, economic, and political system, or even the military, still dominated by aging generals of the generation of Fidel and Raul Castro. According to this argument, whether post-Castro Cuba remains under a regime headed by the uncharismatic General of the Army Raul Castro Ruz, the first vice president of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and minister of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias — MINFAR), or instead somehow undergoes a gradual transition to democracy, the lifting of the embargo would allow Cuba to accelerate a process of change that the United States could influence for the better. Additional groundwork for Raul Castro's eventual succession as chief of state reportedly was made as a result of a reorganiza- tion of the FAR High Command in January 2001. Five gener- als — two FAR vice ministers and the commanders of the eastern, central, and western armies — were promoted to the lxxi rank of army corps general (general de cuerpo de ejercito). Until then, Minister of Interior Abelardo Colome Ibarra was the sole individual holding that rank. Few Cubans reportedly believe that the Cuban Revolution will outlast Fidel Castro. According to Professor Jorge Dominguez, younger, more competent, and more urbane civil- ian members of the political elite who are more attuned to eco- nomic and political experimentation include Carlos Lage Davila, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers; and Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada, president of the National Assembly of People's Power (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular) . Although one of these civilian leaders might make a more credible figurehead president in a post-Fidel Cas- tro transitional government than Raul Castro, it appears unlikely that there will be any transition from communism to democracy in Cuba until the Cuban population is allowed to elect a president in a free and fair election. Moreover, there are two important aspects of civil-military relations in Cuba that should be taken into account in any assessment of post-Fidel Castro Cuba. First, the military is well regarded by the Cuban population and is considered by many observers to be the most powerful institutional actor in the political system. Second, although it seems unlikely that the Cuban elites and the population in general would back a regime headed by Raul Castro, a long-time ideological hard- line military man who lacks political charisma and any interna- tional stature, he will likely succeed his brother, as long as he retains the support of the military. In assessing the prospects for change in Cuba's relatively closed society, the impact of the information revolution is also an important consideration. The Cuban government's efforts to expand Cuba's ties with the nations of the world and its reported plans to create an information technology (IT) busi- ness on the island make its long-standing policy of trying to control the population's access to information increasingly untenable. Cuban authorities have long stifled Cuba's IT devel- opment. Because the Internet poses a serious threat to the Cuban government's information monopoly, Internet access is allowed only to businesses, foreigners, and about 40,000 offi- cials of state entities. According to reports by foreign news media, Internet access in Cuba is forbidden to the average citi- zen. The Castro government denied these reports in early lxxii March 2000, however, claiming that access to the Internet is limited only for technological and financial reasons. As the leaks in its information monopoly proliferate, the regime is likely to find its policy of keeping the population iso- lated from the global revolution in IT to be a hopeless and highly counterproductive task. Despite the obstacles, a growing number of younger Cubans, ignoring official Internet prohibi- tions, have been able to purchase computers on the black mar- ket and to find a way to tap into official Internet links without permission. Cuba reportedly began to open a dozen cyber-cafes around Havana in 2001, but the US$5 per hour Internet access charge is likely to limit use of these facilities mainly to tourists and the relatively few Cubans who are paid in dollars. Although this general review of the embargo issue suggests that the arguments in favor of lifting the embargo seem to greatly outweigh those against it, the matter is complicated by the Castro regime's unceasing hostility toward America and the regime's potential or actual military, intelligence, and terrorist threats to United States national security interests. In regard to the potential military threat, an unclassified United States Department of Defense report entitled "The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security" concluded that the Cuban Armed Forces posed "a negligible conventional threat" to the United States or surrounding countries by the late 1990s. Although the greatly downsized and financially strapped Cuban Armed Forces may not pose a significant conventional threat, the report failed to take into account an Armageddon-type crisis, such as a scenario in which the regime were about to be over- thrown. In that situation, the Castro brothers could order some unanticipated terrorist attack against the United States, possibly using MiGs. Furthermore, the Cuban military is highly defensive, with much of its equipment hidden in a vast system of caves and tunnels. Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Cuba in Decem- ber 2000 raised the specter of a new alliance between Havana and Moscow, but reportedly was mostly symbolic rather than a signal of a resumption of once-close relations between Cuba and the former Soviet Union. Rather than resume Russia's sub- sidizing of Cuba, Putin reportedly was more interested in get- ting the Castro government to repay Cuba's multibillion-dollar debt to Russia, as well as making an opening for large Russian companies that might be interested in investing on the island. Putin's visit reportedly failed to achieve a breakthrough in rela- lxxiii tions, a significant trade deal, or even an agreement by Castro to repay the debt. President Putin's visit did, however, reportedly result in the signing by the Russian and Cuban defense ministers of a mili- tary and technical plan that calls for the parties to develop cooperation in such spheres as military personnel training, modernization of armaments, and military equipment. The agreement specifically concerns repair and modernization of Cuban planes made in the former Soviet Union. To that end, a Cuban military delegation headed by Army Corps General Julio Casas Regueiro, deputy minister of the FAR, visited Mos- cow in late April 2001. Cuba's anti-United States intelligence activities have also apparently impeded reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the United States. While the Castro regime has overtly pursued a diplomatic strategy to win acceptance in the interna- tional community, it has a well-publicized record of using its diplomatic posts, including the United Nations, for intelli- gence activities against the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The Cuban intelligence threat was also manifested in 2001 by cases of proven or alleged espionage by Cuban citizens resid- ing in the United States. On June 8, 2001, a federal jury in Miami, concluding a six-month trial, convicted five Cuban agents of espionage against the United States. Five other indicted members of the spy ring, which was revealed in Sep- tember 1998, pleaded guilty in exchange for cooperation and received lighter sentences. The leader of the ring, Gerardo Hernandez, the only one charged and convicted in a murder conspiracy in the death of the four Brothers to the Rescue members whose planes were shot down on February 24, 1996, received a sentence of life imprisonment. Four others were able to flee to Cuba and avoid prosecution. Reflecting the anti- United States hostility of the Castro regime, Granma Interna- tional, the English version of Cuba's official newspaper, on June 24, 2001, headlined the actions of the Cuban spies as "a heroic behavior in the entrails of the monster," a slogan that also appeared on a large poster behind Fidel Castro's podium when he addressed a crowd of 60,000 in Havana on June 23, along with photos of the five indicted Cubans, and on the T-shirts of many Cubans at weekly rallies in Havana. In addition, on Sep- tember 22, 2001, the Washington Post reported the arrest by agents of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation lxxiv (FBI) of a senior intelligence analyst for Cuban affairs, on charges of spying for the Castro regime. Since 1964 Cuba's intelligence threat to the United States and NATO has been symbolized by the Russian-operated Lour- des electronic eavesdropping site, which has targeted the United States. On October 17, 2001, however, President Putin, reversing his earlier stance, announced that Russia will close the Lourdes facility in order to save the annual rental fee of US$200 million, which Castro had refused to cancel as partial payment for Cuban debts to Moscow. The Castro government angrily denounced Putin's decision. Cuba's potential terrorist threat needs to be put in some context. According to Professor Jaime Suchlicki, one of the "major themes" of Cuba's international relations by the 1990s included continuous support of "movements of national libera- tion in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America." By the early 1990s, the regime appeared to have largely ceased active support of revolutionary groups in the absence of subsi- dies and other support that it had received from the former Soviet Union. According to Professor Dominguez, Cuba announced in 1992 "that it had stopped providing military sup- port to revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow govern- ments in other countries." By most accounts, Cuba has promoted tourism, trade, and diplomacy instead of terrorism and revolutionary military internationalism since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the regime has reportedly continued ties with a number of international terrorist groups, and it has remained on the United States Department of State's list of nations sponsoring terrorism. According to the Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, published in April 2001, the island country continued to provide safehaven to members of several terrorist groups, as well as to several United States ter- rorist fugitives. Active terrorist groups with members taking ref- uge in Cuba include the Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna — ETA) and Colombia's National Lib- eration Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional — ELN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — FARC) . Cuba also has continued to maintain ties to other state spon- sors of international terrorism, according to the report. In addition, in May 1998 then Secretary of Defense William Cohen testified in Congress that Cuba possesses advanced bio- lxxv technology and is capable of mass-producing agents for biolog- ical warfare. The Castro regime also reportedly poses a cyberterrorism threat to the United States infrastructure, according to Admiral Tom Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. During the public part of a hearing of the United States Senate Intelligence Committee on February 7, 2001, Admiral Wilson was widely reported to have told the committee, in response to a question concerning Cuba's capa- bility for cyber warfare, that the FAR could start an "informa- tion warfare or computer network attack" that could "disrupt our military." If Cuba is, as alleged by the Department of State report, secretly supporting international terrorism, the Castro regime could be seen by the United States as posing an unacceptable potential threat to vital United States national security interests in the post September 11, 2001, world. If Fidel Castro was will- ing to risk nuclear war between the former Soviet Union and the United States in October 1962, some have argued that he could become desperate enough to help Islamic terrorists use biological weapons against the United States. In the spring of 2001, Fidel Castro toured Iran, Libya, and Syria, and was quoted as telling Iranian university students that "Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees." Like other nations on the list of state sponsors of ter- rorism, Cuba could find itself coming under increasing United States pressure to demonstrate that it deserves to be removed from the list by discontinuing to provide safehaven or other support to members of active terrorist groups. A lack of Cuban cooperation in the antiterrorism war could impede progress toward reestablishing diplomatic relations with the United States. In his speech of September 22, 2001, Fidel Castro was unsparing in attacking the United States and its intention to wage a war in Afghanistan, contending that United States "fanaticism" was stronger than that of the terror- ists who carried out the September 1 1 attacks. Moreover, Cuba was the only nation that failed to condemn terrorism at the United Nations General Assembly session on November 16, 2001. Instead, the Cuban foreign minister, Felipe Perez Roque, used the forum to launch a propaganda attack against the United States. Echoing the propaganda of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, he denounced the United States for waging an "ineffective, unjustifiable bombing campaign" in Afghani- lxxvi stan, which "has targeted children, the civilian population, and the International Red Cross hospitals and facilities as enemies." Prior to the tragic terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, many observers believed that the Castro regime would be able to maintain itself in power and continue to blame the island's socioeconomic problems on the embargo as long as the status quo, Cold War situation between Cuba and America prevailed. Major setbacks to the Cuban economy dur- ing the year, however, had, by late 2001, compelled the Cuban government to reiterate its readiness for normal relations with the United States. Tourism to the island, a critical source of dollars, fell sharply following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Another critical source of dollars, remittances from exiles in Miami, also declined sharply because of the post-Sep- tember 1 1 economic downturn in the United States. President Putin's abrupt decision to close Russia's Lourdes listening post constituted another major loss of revenue. And on November 4, Hurricane Michelle, the island's worst storm in five decades, severely damaged crops that Cuba needed for export and domestic consumption. Creating a crack in the embargo, the aftermath of the storm prompted the first trade accords between Cuba and the United States in four decades, allowing four American companies to sell Cuba about US$20 million worth of wheat, corn, and other foodstuffs. Whether the trade deal heralds a thaw in relations remains to be seen. Meanwhile, post-September 11 world sympathy for Cuba's financial plight and condemnation of the blockade remained unchanged, despite strong United Nations support for the United States-led war against terrorism. This fact was evident when the United Nations General Assembly again voted over- whelmingly on November 27 for an end to the United States trade embargo against Cuba. As in 2000, the vote was 167 to three (United States, Israel, and the Marshall Islands). At a time when vital national security interests of the United States were under threat by international terrorism, maintaining the status quo between Cuba and the United States no longer seemed feasible to many Americans. Thus, it remained a com- pelling argument, that, if Cuba were opened to unchecked United States influences through the lifting of the embargo, the Castro regime would be unlikely to keep the socioeco- nomic impact of American trade and millions of United States visitors, the IT revolution, and the forces of economic global- ization from sweeping his communist system into the same lxxvii dustbin of history now occupied by the former Soviet Union and its East European allies. December 14, 2001 * * * In the first half of 2002, it appeared that Castro himself was increasingly becoming a major liability in his own decades-long diplomatic offensive in Latin America. With his mind-set stuck in the Cold War and in his "untouchable" communist system of rule, Castro had succeeded in alienating even his long-time allies in the region. Despite having diplomatic relations with most countries and worldwide support for the lifting of the United States embargo, Cuba remained ostracized from the United States, and this ostracism adversely affected Cuba's rela- tions with other countries, most notably Mexico. As Mexico's relations with the United States and the global economy grew closer, President Vicente Fox distanced himself from Castro during the first half of the year, and Mexico's four- decades-old policy of neutrality toward Cuban human rights issues began to unravel. President Fox ended a good-will visit to Cuba on February 4 by meeting with several of the Cuban gov- ernment's most prominent opponents and calling on the Cas- tro government to pursue democratic reforms and increase human rights protections. Fox's visit and Castro's subsequent brief appearance at the United Nations development summit meeting in Monterrey, Mexico, in March set the stage for Cas- tro's diplomatic debacle with President Fox a few weeks later. At the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting on April 19, Castro was especially piqued by Mexico's vote cen- suring Cuba. He called it a "despicable betrayal" because it allowed the measure to narrowly prevail by twenty-three to twenty-one votes. In apparent retaliation, Castro seriously dam- aged Cuban-Mexican relations by publicizing a humiliating tape recording that he had made of a private telephone conver- sation with Fox in which the Mexican president had tried to persuade Castro to cancel or cut short his attendance at the Monterrey summit the previous month in order not to "compli- cate" Mexican-United States relations. The audiotape was highly embarrassing to Fox because he had stated publicly that lxxviii he did not ask Castro to cut short his attendance at the meet- ing. For Cuba's annual May 1 commemoration, Castro continued his bitter campaign against his former Latin American allies by ordering several million Cubans to rally in the center of Havana to express condemnation of the "treasonous syco- phants" — otherwise known as the democratic governments of Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. These countries had joined in supporting a resolu- tion critical of Cuba at the United Nations Human Rights Com- mission meeting on April 19. Meanwhile, United States policy toward Cuba under the administration of President George W. Bush appeared reminis- cent of the 1980s. President Bush committed his administra- tion to a continuation of the traditional Cold War policy toward Cuba. Bush's call for Castro to open his country's politi- cal and economic system was part of the "Initiative for a New Cuba" launched as a result of a review that began in January. Bush said that he would veto further measures on trade with Cuba and on lifting the ban that empowers the United States Department of the Treasury to fine Americans traveling to Cuba. In the annual publication entitled Patterns of Global Terror- ism — 2001, released by the United States Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism on May 21, 2002, Cuba remained on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, despite signing all twelve United Nations counterterrorism conventions and the Ibero-American declaration on terrorism at the 2001 summit. Although the report did not mention any- thing about Cuba's biological weapons capabilities, in the March-June period of 2002 United States military and Depart- ment of State officials made conflicting statements as to whether Cuba possessed biological weapons. On March 19, Carl W. Ford, Jr., assistant secretary for intelligence and research of the Department of State, stated in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, "Cuba has at least a limited developmental offensive biological warfare research and development effort." On May 6, a week before former President Jimmy Carter's five-day visit to Cuba on May 12-17, Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton made a similar state- ment to a meeting of the conservative Heritage Foundation, indicating that Cuba is developing biological weapons and has "at least a limited offensive biological research and develop- lxxix ment effort" in germ warfare. Later that month, however, in response to Bolton's allegation that Cuba is developing biologi- cal weapons, Major General Gary Speer, acting commander in chief of the United States Southern Command, stated that he had seen no evidence that Cuba is producing biological weap- ons from its biomedical research program. After being effusively welcomed by Castro, Carter began his historic visit to Cuba with a promise from Castro that he could visit any of the island's biotechnology research centers. Not being in Cuba on an arms-inspection mission, however, Carter toured only the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotech- nology (Centro de Ingenieria Genetica y Biotecnologia — CIGB) in Havana, a facility visited by thousands of foreign sci- entists, including 400 Americans in 2001. Carter was the most prominent American political figure to visit Cuba in forty-three years of communist rule. As Cuban human rights advocates had hoped, his visit lent support to their campaign for greater political and economic freedom. By the time that he arrived in Cuba on May 12, dissident activists had openly collected 11,020 valid signatures on a petition call- ing for a national referendum to institute civil rights, the right to own and operate private businesses, electoral reform, and an amnesty for all political prisoners. Article 88 of the 1976 consti- tution allows any citizen who collects the signatures of at least 10,000 registered voters to petition the National Assembly for a referendum on any subject. The three-year-long petition drive was known as the Varela Project, after Felix Varela, a nine- teenth-century Roman Catholic priest, philosopher, and Cuban independence activist. Although the petition was rejected when its creator, Oswaldo Paya, a dissident engineer, delivered it to the National Assembly on May 10, the Varela Project was the biggest peaceful challenge to date to the Cuban government. Despite being unsuccessful in its reform objec- tives, the Varela Project united more than 140 of Cuba's dissi- dent groups in a single campaign and marked a historic victory over opposition divisiveness and apathy, as well as intimidation by the authorities. As he had done for Pope John Paul IPs visit in 1998, Castro accorded Carter the unprecedented privilege of having the country's news media broadcast the entire text of the former president's address to the Cuban people. In addition, the offi- cial newspaper, Granma, published Carter's entire speech in its May 16 issue, except for his comments about democracy. "Our lxxx two nations have been trapped in a destructive state of belliger- ence for forty-two years," Carter said in his twenty-minute address, which he delivered in Spanish. "And it is time for us to change our relationship and the way we think and talk about each other." Carter called on Castro to allow a national referen- dum to bring about broad reforms in political rights. He also praised the Varela Project and castigated Cuba's socialist system for denying basic freedoms. As Cuban officials had hoped, Carter called in his speech for easing sanctions against the island nation. The next day, forty members of the United States Congress (half Democrats and half Republicans) called for unrestricted American travel and increased trade with Cuba. The continuation of the traditional policy toward Cuba was becoming increasingly unpopular in Congress, where a majority in the House and Senate reportedly favored lifting the travel ban. Nevertheless, a few days later President Bush announced that he would tighten sanctions. In a policy speech at the White House on May 20, Bush condi- tioned any easing of this policy on Cuba's adoption of demo- cratic reforms, such as holding democratic elections; giving opposition parties the freedom to organize and speak, thereby allowing non-communist candidates to participate in the 2003 legislative elections; freeing all political prisoners; and allowing the development of independent trade unions. President Bush's announced intention to expand a program to provide assistance to internal Cuban dissidents through American religious and nongovernmental organizations met with a cold reception among Cuban dissidents. A number of them reiterated their belief that aid offered by the United States government would compromise their efforts. Carter strongly warned against the proposed aid program and con- firmed that the Cuban dissidents he met unanimously oppose the United States embargo on food and medicine and favor more interchange with Americans. Having rejected the reform demands made by opposition figures and President Bush, Castro on June 12 launched a peti- tion drive for a constitutional amendment to declare Cuba's socialist system "irrevocable." He defiantly staged a massive march through downtown Havana, while other marches were held in cities, towns, and villages throughout the island nation. Castro ordered the country's eligible voting population over sixteen years of age — totaling between 7 and 8 million of Cuba's 11 million population — to show their solidarity by sign- lxxxi ing a petition in favor of the proposed constitutional amend- ment. Castro's claim that 99.7 percent of registered voters signed his petition was reflective of the autocratic nature of his regime and suggested that the results were most likely rigged. Moreover, the fact that Castro felt compelled to go to such an extent to ratify his system of government seemed indicative of how worrisome the Varela Project and Jimmy Carter's visit must have been as a challenge to his rule. Just as the papal visit had resulted in a significant opening of religious freedom in Cuba, Carter's visit may have had a similarly profound impact on the human rights movement in Cuba. Although the influx of dollars had created a vibrant under- ground economy, the country's economic outlook remained bleak in the first half of 2002, as tourism remained down and the sugar and nickel industries experienced continuing low prices. In June the government was preparing to close about half of the country's 156 decrepit sugar mills. The resulting dis- missal of thousands of Cuban sugar workers was expected to add to the climate of tension on the island. Cuba's overall terms of trade were not expected to improve until sugar and nickel prices reversed their decline. Cuba also lost a third of its daily oil supply when Venezuela stopped shipping its inexpen- sive oil to Cuba in April 2002, forcing the island nation to spend millions of dollars more than planned on the world mar- ket. The negative economic trends could be reversed some- what by a recovery in agriculture, remittances, and tourism, but the Castro regime's ratification of its "irrevocable" communist system of government effectively sentenced the country to con- tinual suffering without any real prospect for change. The domestic opposition remained weak, but the population seemed be waiting for the moment when the maximum leader would pass from the scene, and the country could begin a long- awaited transition to democracy. July 22, 2002 Rex Hudson lxxxii Chapter 1. Historical Setting Statue of national hero Carlos Manuel de Cespedes in Arms Plaza (La Plaza de Armas), Havana, 1997 Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan THE HISTORY OF CUBA began with the arrival of Christo- pher Columbus in 1492 and the subsequent invasion of the island by the Spaniards. Although aboriginal groups inhabited the island, they were soon eliminated or died as a result of dis- eases or the shock of conquest. As a result, the impact of indig- enous groups on subsequent Cuban society was limited, and Spanish culture, institutions, language, and religion prevailed in Cuba. Colonial society developed slowly, with pastoral pur- suits and agriculture serving as the basis of the economy. For the first three centuries after the conquest, the island remained only a neglected stopping point for the Spanish fleet that vis- ited the New World and returned to Spain with the mineral wealth of continental America. Cuba awakened dramatically in the nineteenth century. The growth of the United States as an independent nation, the col- lapse of Haiti as a sugar-producing colony, Spanish protective policies, and the ingenuity of Cuba's Creole business class all converged to produce a sugar revolution on the island. In a scant few years, Cuba was transformed from a sleepy, unimpor- tant island into the major sugar producer in the world. Slaves arrived in increasing numbers. Large estates squeezed out smaller ones. Sugar supplanted tobacco, agriculture, and cattle as the main occupation. Prosperity replaced poverty. Spain's attention replaced neglect. These factors, mainly prosperity and Spain's involvement, delayed a move toward independence in the early nineteenth century. While most of Latin America was breaking with Spain, Cuba remained "the ever-faithful island." Toward the end of the nineteenth century, all this began to change. Creole rivalry with Spaniards for the governing of the island, increased Spanish despotism and taxation, and the growth of Cuban nationalism all produced a prolonged and bloody war. By 1898 the United States, concerned about its eco- nomic interests on the island and its strategic interest in a future Panama Canal and aroused by an alarmist "yellow" press, focused its attention on Cuba. The emergence of the United States as the victorious power in the Spanish-American War (1898) ensured the expulsion of Spain, United States suprem- acy in the Caribbean, and tutelage over Cuban affairs. 3 Cuba: A Country Study In 1902 Cuba launched into nationhood with fewer prob- lems than most Latin American nations. Prosperity increased during the early years. Militarism seemed curtailed. Social ten- sions were not profound. Yet corruption, violence, and politi- cal irresponsibility grew. Successive United States interventions and economic involvement weakened the growth of Cuban nationality and made Cuba more dependent on its northern neighbor. The 1930s saw a major attempt at revolution. Prompted by a cruel dictatorship, the economic hardships of the world depression, and the growing control of their economy by Span- iards and North Americans, a group of Cubans led by students and intellectuals sought radical reforms and a profound trans- formation of Cuban society. In January 1934, after the over- throw of the regime of Gerardo Machado y Morales (president, 1925-33) and the short-lived first presidency of Ramon Grau San Martin (president, 1933-34, 1944-48), they were cata- pulted into power. Their revolution failed, however. The rise of militarism, the opposition of the United States, and divisions among Cuban political elites and within the revolutionary ranks returned the island to less turbulent times. Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar (president, 1940-44; dictator, 1952-59) and the military emerged as the arbiters of Cuba's politics, first through de facto ruling and finally with the election of Batista to the presidency in 1940. The end of World War II and the end of this early Batista era brought to power the inheritors of the 1933 revolution. With the election in 1944 of Grau San Martin and, four years later, his successor, Carlos Prio Socarras (president, 1948-52), an era of democratic government, respect for human rights, and accelerated prosperity ensued. Yet political violence and cor- ruption increased. Many saw these Autentico administrations, that is, administrations belonging to the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano — PRC), more com- monly known as the Authentic Party (Partido Autentico) , as having failed to live up to the ideals of the revolution. Others still supported the Autenticos and hoped for new leadership that could correct the vices of the past. A few conspired to take power by force. Batista's coup d'etat on March 10, 1952, had a profound effect. It led to doubts and disillusionment about the ability of the Cubans to govern themselves. It began a brutal dictatorship that resulted in the polarization of society, civil war, the over- 4 Historical Setting throw of the dictatorship, the destruction of the military and most other Cuban institutions, and the rise of a long totalitar- ian system led by a charismatic, anti-United States caudillo (see Glossary). Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ) seized power on January 1, 1959, as the result of his successful guerrilla cam- paign against the Batista regime. In power for four decades, Fidel Castro converted Cuba into a Marxist-Leninist society with no individual freedoms or pri- vate property and with a Soviet-style centrally planned econ- omy (see Glossary) run by a vast and cumbersome bureaucracy that has stifled innovation, productivity, and efficiency. Despite massive Soviet aid, the Cubans sank to unprecedented levels of poverty, aggravated further by the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Cuba's alliance with the Soviets provided a protective umbrella that propelled Fidel Castro onto the international scene. Cuba's support of anti-United States guerrilla and ter- rorist groups, military intervention in Africa, and unrestricted Soviet weapons delivery to Cuba made Castro an important international player. Cuba's role in bringing to power a Marxist regime in Angola in 1975 and in supporting the Sandinista overthrow of the dictatorship of Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979 perhaps stand out as Castro's most signifi- cant accomplishments in foreign policy. In the 1980s, the United States expulsion of the Cubans from Grenada, the elec- toral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the peace accords in Central America, including El Salvador, showed the limits of Cuba's "internationalism" and influence. The collapse of communism in the early 1990s had a pro- found effect on Cuba. Without Soviet support, international- ism decreased significantly, and Cuba found itself in a major economic crisis. Minor adjustments, such as more liberalized foreign investment laws and the opening of private, but highly regulated small businesses and agricultural stands, were intro- duced. Yet the regime continued to cling to an outdated Marx- ist and caudillista (see Glossary) system, refusing to open the political process or the economy. Castro remained one of the last unyielding communist bulwarks bent on remaining in power and perpetuating his dynastic vision of a communist Cuba, led by his anointed successor, his brother General Raul Castro Ruz, first vice president of the Council of State. 5 Cuba: A Country Study The Early Years, 1492-1520 The Indigenous Peoples Knowledge about the early inhabitants of Cuba is sketchy. The people who inhabited the island at the time of Columbus's landing, estimated at about 60,000, had no written language. Most of them, although peaceful, were annihilated, absorbed, or died out as a result of the shock of conquest. Whatever infor- mation is available comes primarily from the writings of early explorers and from later archaeological discoveries and studies of village sites, burial places, and so forth. These sources indi- cate that at least three cultures — the Guanahatabey, the Ciboney, and the Taino — swept through the island before the arrival of the Spaniards. The first of these, the Guanahatabey, was the oldest culture on the island. It was a shell culture, characterized by its use of shell gouge and spoon as its principal artifacts. The Guana- hatabey might have come from the south of the United States, for their artifacts display certain similarities with those of some early inhabitants of Florida. Yet some archaeologists and anthropologists are more inclined to accept the theory that the Guanahatabey migrated from South America through the chain of islands in the West Indies until finally settling in Cuba. By the time of the Spanish arrival, they had retreated to the most western part of Cuba. The Guanahatabey built no houses and lived mostly in caves. They were fruit pickers and food gatherers and did little fish- ing or hunting. They seem to have relied on mollusks as their principal foodstuff. Their civilization apparently was in decline by the time the Europeans arrived. The second culture, the Ciboney, was part of the larger South American Arawak group. The Ciboney inhabited west- ern Cuba and the southwestern peninsula of Hispaniola. It is generally agreed that the Ciboney, as well as the more advanced Taino, the other Arawak group found in Cuba, origi- nated in South America and had island-hopped along the West Indies. The Ciboney were a Stone Age culture and were more advanced than the Guanahatabey. They were highly skilled col- lectors, hunters, and fishermen and inhabited towns, usually near rivers or the sea. Some lived in caves while others had begun to inhabit primitive dwellings called bajareques or barba- coas. The Ciboney practiced some form of elementary agricul- 6 Historical Setting ture, and their diet included turtles, fish, birds, and mollusks. Two of the more typical artifacts they developed included a stone digger (gladiolito) and a ball (esferolito), both symbols of authority or high social status; they were also considered magi- cal objects. The Ciboney fell prey to the more advanced Taino and became their servants, or nabories. Bartolome de Las Casas, an early chronicler known as the "protector of the Indians," described the Ciboney as "a most simple and gentle kind of people who were held like savages." The Taino was the second and more advanced Arawak group to enter the island. The Taino people occupied the central and eastern parts of Cuba, as well as most of Hispaniola, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico. The Taino made extensive use of pottery and stone artifacts that are reminiscent of Old World neolithic arti- facts. The short, olive-skinned Taino people subjected their children to artificial cranium changes by binding the frontal or occipital regions of their heads during early childhood; hence, their faces and particularly foreheads were unusually wide. They preferred high and fertile terrain close to sources of fresh water and lived in small villages in round houses with conical roofs made up of bamboo and thatched palm called caneyes or rectangular ones called bohios. The Taino developed a rather advanced economic system based on agriculture with commonly cultivated fields. The cul- tivation and preparation of yuca (manioc), a sturdy tuber, played a significant role in their society. After the yuca, which has a period of growth longer than a year, had been harvested, the Taino grated it, drained it of its poisonous juice, and baked it into unleavened bread called cassava, which the Spaniards labeled "bread of the earth." This bread was both nutritious and tasty and kept for several months, even in humid weather. Tobacco, cotton, corn, and white and sweet potato were also an important part of the Taino economy. Tobacco was used for smoking as well as for religious ceremonies and for curing the ill. After the Spanish occupation, tobacco became an impor- tant item for export. Cotton was mostly used for hammocks, bags, and fishing nets. Both the manufacture of textiles and the making of pottery items were tasks performed by women, while men engaged in hunting, fishing, or agriculture. The Taino also developed a number of wooden artifacts, such as powerful canoes, which gave them great mobility by water. Society was organized along distinct class lines. At the top was the chief, or cacique, who managed all the affairs of the 7 Cuba: A Country Study community and ruled over a specific territory. The line of inheritance to become a cacique was not direct; the eldest son of the cacique's eldest sister became chief when the former cacique died. If the cacique did not have any sisters, then his eldest son would inherit the post. The caciques were aided by the nitainos, a group of advisors who supervised communal work and seem to have been in charge of various sectors of the population. Aware of the nitainos 1 importance in controlling the labor sup- ply, the Spaniards used them later on as overseers on their plantations. Next to the nitainos was the medicine man, or behique. The lower class was composed of the nabories, who did most of the work of the village. The Taino believed in a supreme invisible being, and their religion was dominated by a series of gods represented by idols. Ancestor worship was common, and the Taino carved special idols resembling their ancestors. The souls of the dead were thought to reside in a nearby island and to return at night to hunt the living. In terms of economic development, social organization, technological advances, and art, the native peoples of Cuba were far inferior to the more advanced civilizations of the mainland, such as the Maya and Aztec of Mexico or the Inca of Peru. The Ciboney and Taino left only a mild imprint on Cuba's later culture; the Guanahatabey left almost none. There was little mingling of races between Spaniards and Indians. A new society, first of Spaniards and then of Spaniards and blacks, supplanted the indigenous society. New institutions, new values, and a new culture replaced the old ones. Some Indian words, foods, and habits, as well as agricultural tech- niques, however, were retained by later generations. Retained also was the bohio, the typical and picturesque dwelling of many Cuban farmers, which still can be seen today and remains per- haps the most visible legacy of the native society. For the most part, however, the Cuban native peoples' con- tribution to the development of a Cuban nationality must be considered minor. Nevertheless, for generations after the con- quest, Native American warriors such as Hatuey, who fought the Spanish conquest in eastern Cuba, were glorified in the pages of Cuban history books and raised to the status of folk heroes. They represented for Cuban children a symbol of native resistance against the oppressive Spanish conquistador. The Indians' innocence and kindness were contrasted with the cruelty of the Spanish invaders. But for those present-day 8 Historical Setting Cubans in search of the roots of a uniquely Cuban national identity, this Indian heritage was not enough of a foundation. Unlike for the Mexicans, the glory of the Aztec past was not there for the Cubans to turn to. Instead, Cuban writers in search of the roots of Cuban nationality would later look to Spanish or Negro contributions and try to find in them the missing link with the past, but with little luck. The Spanish her- itage was dismissed as part of the rejection of colonialism, and Negro contributions were never totally recognized, particularly by white Cuban society. Spanish Conquest and Colonization In the early sixteenth century, following Christopher Colum- bus's discovery of the island in 1492, the Spanish crown became increasingly intrigued with the possibility of finding gold in Cuba. Spanish officials, desirous of increasing their labor supply as well as exploring possible new sources of wealth, also began to look toward Cuba. Columbus's son, Diego Columbus, who had been appointed governor of the Indies in 1508 and lived in Hispaniola, was particularly interested in extending the territory under his control. As a preliminary step toward colonization, Nicolas de Ovando (governor of His- paniola, 1502-9) sent an expedition headed by Sebastian de Ocampo that circumnavigated Cuba in 1508; he brought back tales of wealth and a more detailed picture of the island's fine terrain and harbors. Finding a conquistador who combined military skill, admin- istrative talent, and loyalty to the crown as well as to Diego Columbus himself was no easy task. The choice finally fell on Diego Velazquez de Cuellar (governor of Hispaniola, 151 1— 21), Ovando's lieutenant and one of the wealthiest Spaniards in Hispaniola. Although not as heroic or daring as later con- quistadors such as Francisco Pizarro, conqueror of Peru, or as cunning as Hernan Cortes, conqueror of Mexico, Velazquez had achieved a reputation for courage and sagacity because of his role in subduing Indian caciques in Hispaniola. From the start, Velazquez faced an outraged and hostile Indian population. Led by Hatuey, a fugitive Indian chieftain from Hispaniola, the natives of eastern Cuba resolved to resist the Spanish onslaught. It was a futile gesture, for the peaceful Tainos lacked the military skills and weapons to face the better armed and trained Spaniards. Spanish horses and hounds, both unknown in Cuba, played a decisive role in terrorizing the 9 Cuba: A Country Study indigenous peoples, who soon surrendered or fled into the mountains to escape the wrath of the conquistadors. Hatuey himself was captured, tried as a heretic and a rebel, and burned at the stake. Velazquez set out to pacify the country and end the abuses against the Indians. He induced groups of Indians to lay down their weapons and work near the several new towns that he established throughout the island. Among these were Baracoa, Bayamo, Trinidad, Sancti Spiritus, La Habana (hereafter, Havana), Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. In this task, Velasquez was decisively aided by the work of Bartolome de Las Casas. The Dominican friar preceded the Spaniards into native villages on many occasions and suc- ceeded in convincing the indigenous peoples to cooperate with the conquistadors. Las Casas, however, was horrified by the massacre of the natives and became an outspoken critic of the conquest of Cuba. He wrote extensively condemning the Span- iards' cruelty and claiming that the Indians were rational and free and therefore entitled to retain their lands. To strengthen his own power and gain supporters both in Cuba and in Spain, Velazquez began to grant encomiendas (see Glossary), or contracts, whereby large landowners (encomen- deros — see Glossary) , who were favored conquistadors, suppos- edly agreed to provide protection and religious instruction to Indians in return for their labor. The crown used the encomienda concept as a political instrument to consolidate its control over the indigenous population. Many encomenderos, however, interested only in exploiting the resources of the island, disregarded their moral, religious, and legal obligations to the Indians. A conflict soon developed between the crown and the Spanish settlers over the control and utilization of the labor by the exploitative encomenderos, and also over the crown's stated objective to Christianize the natives and the crown's own economic motivations. In the reality of the New World, the six- teenth-century Christian ideal of converting souls was many times sacrificed for a profit. Christianization was reduced to mass baptism; and despite the crown's insistence that Indians were not slaves, many were bought and sold as chattels. The Colonial Period, 1520-1898 Administration and Economy As soon as the conquest was completed and the Indians sub- 10 A view of El Castillo del Morro (Morro Castle) and the lighthouse from El Castillo de la Punta (Point Castle), 1997 Courtesy Mark P Sullivan jugated, the crown began introducing to the island the institu- tional apparatus necessary to govern the colony. The governor, the highest representative of the crown on the island, ruled Cuba with almost complete authority over administrative, polit- ical, and judicial affairs. The governor was technically subject to the audiencia (see Glossary) in Santo Domingo and to a vice- roy in New Spain, the highest royal official in the New World. In practice, however, he exercised great autonomy, particularly after the wealth of Mexico was discovered, diverting the crown's interests away from Cuba and its lack of resources. Nominally responsible for the collection and expenditures of revenues and all financial affairs, the governor delegated these functions to several royal officials (oficiales reales — see Glossary) appointed directly by the crown. At first the seat of government remained in Baracoa, the first village founded by Velazquez. In 1515 it was transferred to Santiago, and finally in 1538 to Havana because of Havana's geographic location and excellent port. In 1607 Havana was formally established as the capital of Cuba, and the island was divided into two provinces 11 Cuba: A Country Study with capitals at Santiago and Havana. The governor-captain general at Havana ruled in military matters over the entire island, but the governor at Santiago was able to exercise con- siderable political independence. Although the governor-captain was nominally subject to the viceroy of New Spain, the viceroy exerted little control over the affairs of the island. Of more direct influence, and a powerful check on the governor, was the audiencia of Santo Domingo. This tribunal heard criminal and civil cases appealed over the decisions of the governor. But it soon, as in Spain, became more than a court of law; it was also an advisory council to the governor and always exercised its right to supervise and investi- gate his administration. At the local level, the most important institution was the cabildo (see Glossary) , a town council, usually composed of the most prominent citizens. The alcaldes (judges) acted as judges of first instance, and, in the absence of the governor or his lieu- tenant, presided at meetings of the cabildo. They also visited the territories under their jurisdiction and dispensed justice in rural areas. As royal government became better organized and more entrenched in Cuba, the powers and prerogatives of the cabildo were progressively curtailed. By the end of the colonial period, few responsible citizens wanted to become involved in local government. Those who did were more interested in their per- sonal well-being than in the affairs of the colony. Peninsular Spaniards, or peninsulares (see Glossary; hereafter, Peninsu- lars) , who bought their offices sought rewards for their invest- ments and enriched themselves at the expense of public funds. Creoles (criollos), Spaniards born in the New World, also joined the Spanish bureaucracy in order to gain wealth and partici- pate in other opportunities controlled by Peninsulars. They looked to local government as one of the few potential areas of employment in which they could succeed. Very few Creoles ever attained a position of importance in the political hierar- chy of the island. As the bureaucracy grew in the colonial period, a latent hostility developed between Peninsulars and Creoles — a hostility that erupted into hatred and violence dur- ing the wars for independence in the nineteenth century. In the early years, cabildo members were content to eke out an existence until such time as new opportunities might arise for them to migrate to better lands or until mineral wealth that would bring them instant wealth might be discovered in Cuba. 12 Historical Setting Those who expected to enrich themselves from Cuba's mineral resources were greatly disappointed. The island did not enjoy the large deposits of gold and other minerals that were later found in Mexico and South America. Gold found in the river banks did not represent any great wealth, although washing the gold did require a large labor supply as well as costly equip- ment. A handful of Spanish entrepreneurs controlled the busi- ness and used Indians as a labor supply. The crown was also involved from the earliest times in controlling mining opera- tions. The Spanish monarchs took one-fifth of all production as a tax for the right of mining, especially when Indians in an encomienda arrangement did the mining. Foodstuffs also were an important part of the economy. The Indian agricultural practices were taken over by the Spaniards, who continued to grow some of the native foodstuffs, particu- larly yuca. New crops and new grains from the Old World were also brought to the island. Sugarcane, which had been grown by the Spaniards in the Canary Islands, was also a part of the island's economy. As early as 1523, the crown instructed the Contracting House (Casa de Contratacion — see Glossary) to lend money to settlers in Cuba to help finance the construction of a sugar mill. Other similar loans were made in later years, but it was not until the eighteenth century and particularly the nineteenth century that sugar assumed any importance. Lack- ing large amounts of capital, an adequate labor supply, and official encouragement, the sugar industry remained overshad- owed in importance by the more lucrative and important busi- ness connected with the cattle industry and its derivative products. Cattle-raising became one of the most prosperous busi- nesses, especially in the seventeenth century. Although the activity called for daring horsemanship, it required no sus- tained effort, for Cuba's abundant pasture lands facilitated breeding. The cattle were let loose on Cuba's savannas, where they multiplied rapidly. They were used as a means of transpor- tation as well as for feeding purposes. Salted meat became an important item sold to the Spanish ships that called at Cuba's ports. Perhaps the chief value of cattle lay in the hides. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as demand for leather grew in Europe, cattle hides became Cuba's chief export, yield- ing considerable profit. Tobacco also made some modest gains, particularly in the seventeenth century. Because it was not too bulky and com- 13 Cuba: A Country Study manded high prices in Europe, tobacco was a favorite item for smuggling. By the eighteenth century, it became an important export item to the French. Throughout this period, the tobacco business remained in private hands. But under the administration of Charles III (1759-88), it was converted into a government monopoly. The crown advanced money to the growers, who sold their crops to the government at a fixed price. In the early nineteenth century, the value of tobacco as an export began to decline. By then the price of land had increased tremendously, partly as a result of the growth of sugar estates. Tobacco growers found themselves either squeezed out of their lands or selling them to the sugar capital- ists. The crown's emphasis on coffee and sugar growing was also detrimental to the tobacco industry. In desperate need of capital, the Spanish monarchs encouraged the more lucrative sugar business as a source of revenue. The economy was oriented toward importing the bare neces- sities, with little or no provision for domestic manufacturing. Spain followed a thoroughly mercantilist economic policy, encouraging Cuba's dependence on outside sources of supply for its needs and looking at the island as a producer of raw materials to satisfy the needs of the mother country. Life and Society In the early years, Cuba became the source of support for the conquest of nearby lands. It was from the island that Hernan Cortes's expedition sailed in 1519 to conquer the Aztec Empire. The conquest of Mexico meant temporary pros- perity and great euphoria, but it also meant the decline of Cuba's importance. The days of boom soon gave way to years of bust. Farmers and adventurers all left the island in search of El Dorado in Mexico, or joined the ill-fated expedition of Panfilo de Narvaez of 1527 and Hernando de Soto in 1539 to conquer Florida. Exodus of population, decline of food production, and economic misery afflicted the island. Estates were abandoned by their owners and bought cheaply by less adventurous Penin- sulars, humble folks willing to produce for the passing ships and live a modest existence. For the next two centuries, Spain focused most of its atten- tion on the continental colonies from which it obtained much- needed mineral wealth. A complex and at times cumbersome political and defense system developed to ensure the uninter- rupted flow of this wealth. Cuba was relegated to a mere stop- 14 Historical Setting ping point for passing ships. It remained valuable only because of its strategic location as the gateway to the New World, not because of its products. Cuba's population diminished continuously throughout this period. The indigenous peoples continued to die out and there was little new influx of Spanish immigrants. An economy of scarcity and a hot, sickness-ridden tropical climate offered little incentive for new immigration. Those who did come to Cuba were mostly Spanish officials, soldiers, and members of the clergy; there were also many transient migrants on their way to Mexico or South America. By 1544 Cuba had a popula- tion of fewer than 7,000, composed of 660 Spaniards, some 5,000 native Americans, and 800 black slaves. This early society was characterized by little social mobility as well as lack of interest in the arts or in education. Creoles were less educated and seemed less interested in a formal education than were their ancestors. Living in small towns, surrounded by an unknown and at times hostile environment, fearful of Indian or later of black rebellion, or of foreign attacks, most had little time for cultural activities and were mainly concerned with the daily problems of existence. Brutality, opportunism, corruption, and smuggling characterized this society. Violence and lack of observance of the law flourished as the struggle for survival became harsher. Whatever education existed was offered within the Roman Catholic Church. Protected by the power of the state, the church grew in num- bers and influence. By the mid-seventeenth century, there were about 200 friars and priests and about 100 nuns on the island. Churches were built in every new city, and church wealth increased through the continuous acquisition of lands donated to the church and through the collection of rents, as well as of the special tax called diezmo. With wealth came not only pres- tige and influence, but also the loss of the church's early mis- sionary zeal. The priesthood began identifying with the wealthier classes to the neglect of Indians and blacks and became a conservative institution interested in preserving the status quo. The uninterrupted arrival of blacks throughout the colonial period decisively influenced this developing society. African sla- very existed in Spain, and the first slaves had come to Cuba with the early conquistadors. Later they were brought in greater numbers to pan for gold; they replaced the weaker indigenous groups. The importation of black slaves was costly, 15 Cuba: A Country Study however. As gold reserves became exhausted, there was little need for a large and expensive labor supply, and so their importation slowed down. Not until the full-scale development of the sugar industry was there again a significant need for manpower. Thousands of black slaves entered Cuba in the nineteenth century, and by 1825 the black population had sur- passed the white one. The condition of the slaves, although not unbearable, was poor. Blacks were much more valuable than the Indians and seemed to have received better treatment. Yet Spanish officials complained to the crown that the blacks were given little food or clothing and that they were subjected to abusive corporal punishment, forcing many to escape into Cuba's mountains. These runaway slaves, called cimarrones, were a constant con- cern to the Spaniards because by their example they encour- aged other slaves to escape captivity and to rebel. As early as 1538, black slaves rioted and looted Havana, while French pri- vateers were attacking the city from the sea. Although most blacks worked in rural areas, some per- formed a variety of jobs in the cities. A considerable number labored in artisan industries, in construction, in the wharves, and in domestic service. Some were able to obtain their own earnings and thus liberate themselves or pay the price of their manumission. Others were freed after they had performed ser- vices their master was willing to reward. The number of slaves decreased continuously until reaching the low figure of 38,879, out of a total population of 171,620 in 1774. The opportunities for slaves to become free contributed to the development of a uniquely Cuban society. Spanish law, the Roman Catholic religion, the economic condition of the island, and the Spanish attitude toward blacks all contributed to aid their integration into Cuban society. While the black population in the British sugar-producing colonies in the Caribbean lived under the tight political control of a small, exploiting minority of overseers and government officials, blacks in Cuba coexisted with the rest of the population and lived mainly by farming and cattle grazing. Prior to the eigh- teenth century, the island avoided the plantation system with its concomitant large-scale capital investment, latifundios (large estates), and docile black slave labor force. Instead, soci- ety developed with little outside interference. Cuba thus began to find its own identity in a society that combined racial bal- 16 Historical Setting ance, small-scale agriculture, and folk-Catholicism within a Spanish framework. The British Occupation, 1762-63 Of all the wars that ravaged the Caribbean, one in particular, the Seven Years War (1756-63), had a profound effect on Cuba. At first only France and Britain were at war, but soon Spain came in on the French side. Motivated by dynastic con- nections with France, by grievances against Britain and its colo- nies in the New World, especially in Central America, and by an awareness that if France lost the war Britain would be supreme in the Caribbean, Spain cast its lot with the French. Spain's entrance into the war proved disastrous because Spain lacked the naval power to confront the British or to prevent them from capturing Spanish possessions. In August 1762, the Brit- ish destroyed a large Spanish naval force and captured Manila and Havana, only to trade the latter back to Spain for Florida in the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Several factors converged in the late eighteenth century to bring Cuba out of its isolation and into the mainstream of world affairs and to give the sugar industry the boost it needed. These developments included the relaxation of Spanish trade restrictions, the emergence of the important and nearby United States market for Cuban products, and the devastation of Haiti's sugar and coffee estates following the rebellion of that country's slaves in the 1790s. But it was the British capture and occupation of Havana that really shocked Cuban society out of its lethargic sleep. During the brief eleven months of British occupation, the oppressive Spanish trade restrictions were lifted, and Havana was thrown open to trade with Britain and particularly with the North American colonies. More than 700 merchant ships vis- ited the port during those months, more than the number that had visited Havana in the preceding decade. British capital, as well as large numbers of low-priced slaves, entered the island, boosting sugar production. For the most part, Britain main- tained Spanish administrative institutions, although an attempt was made to reform the judicial system by ending some of the existing privileges and streamlining judicial practices. The impact of the occupation was long-range. It made the Cubans aware of the benefits of trading with the British and particularly with a close and growing market like the United States. The large quantities of British goods that entered the 17 Cuba: A Country Study island gave the Cubans a taste for those products and increased their demands for freer trade. Similarly, the occupation focused the attention of North American entrepreneurs on Cuba's economic potential as an area for investment, a source of raw materials, and a market for British and North American products. Finally, Spain was forced to reexamine its policies toward Cuba. The island was no longer the stopping point of the fleets, but a bone of contention among European powers, one important enough to have merited a British effort at con- quest. Spain had to look at its Caribbean possession and try to satisfy, or at least placate, the demands and aspirations of her tropical subjects. The British occupation had given the island the initial eco- nomic boost it needed. When the slave uprisings and the destruction of properties took place in Haiti, Cuba was ready to become the sugar bowl of the Caribbean and soon replaced Haiti as the supplier of European sugar. Cuban planters pleaded with the Spanish crown for the easing of trade rela- tions and for the free importation of slaves. Spain acceded to these pleadings in 1791. In the years that followed, the sugar industry grew substan- tially. Annual production rose from 14,000 tons in 1790 to more than 34,000 tons in 1805, and the number of sugar mills grew to 478, more than twice as many as had existed prior to the British capture of Havana. Sugar also benefited from the close commercial relations that developed between Cuba and the United States. The wars of the French Revolution isolated Spain from her colonies, thus helping the growth of trade between Cuba and the United States. By the turn of the cen- tury, Cuba enjoyed substantial trade with the United States, and when Cuban ports were thrown open to free trade with all nations in 1818, commercial relations between the two grew even closer. Sugar, Prosperity, and Unrest in the Nineteenth Century Throughout the nineteenth century, sugar as well as coffee became increasingly important in the Cuban economy. Large cattle estates were subdivided and sold to enterprising Span- iards for sugar or coffee cultivation. Aware of the profit possi- bilities, the Spanish crown encouraged and aided the subdivisions of land. Prior to this time, much suitable land was often part of large estates, the owners of which could neither divide nor sell the land because it had been granted to them 18 Historical Setting for use, not ownership. The crown agreed in 1819 to consider landowners all those who could prove they had been on the land for the past forty years. This measure facilitated the break- down of large estates, contributed to the growth of the sugar industry, and benefited a new class of proprietors. These new landowners could sell their land at a profit, become sugar pro- ducers themselves, or lease their land to other less fortunate and smaller planters, who did not receive title to a piece of real estate. In 1827 Cuba had 1,000 sugar mills, 2,067 coffee estates, and 5,534 tobacco farms. By 1860 it is estimated that there were about 2,000 sugar mills, the greatest number in Cuban history. A prosperous and large class of rural proprietors who based their prosperity on the cultivation of sugar and tobacco had emerged. Despite its rapid growth, the sugar industry's development was not without serious problems and setbacks. Overproduc- tion, fluctuations in price, competition from the British islands in the Caribbean, and the appearance of a dreaded competitor, beet sugar, in the second decade of the century depressed the sugar market and slowed down Cuba's sugar boom. These problems were further complicated by the British-imposed legal suppression of the slave trade in 1821. This action deprived the island of a continuous source of labor. Moreover, Cuba lacked an appropriate network of internal transportation that could facilitate movement of sugar to the mills and the ports of embarkation. In the 1840s, however, two events renewed the acceleration of the sugar industry. Coffee, which had come to occupy an important position in the island's economy, was seriously affected by a fall in prices that almost ruined coffee planters. Capital and labor fled from coffee into sugar, and much land was shifted to the growing of cane. The second event was the introduction of the railroad. Cane could now be brought from remote areas to the mills and then to the ports for shipment. What started out as a relatively small business grew into a pow- erful, capitalistic enterprise based on large landholding, slave labor, and mass production. In the early decades of the century, most Cubans seemed content with their status. The new aristocracy of wealth that had developed around the sugar industry enjoyed its recently acquired wealth and feared that a repetition in Cuba of the continental wars would upset the social order upon which its prosperity depended. This "plantocracy" was willing to tolerate 19 Cuba: A Country Study a limited number of political and economic reforms, so long as the status quo was not endangered. The status quo meant the presence of a foreign power to protect their position against the possibility of a black rebellion similar to the one in Haiti. By the 1840s, there was real concern about preserving Cuba's colonial status. Still fearful of a slave rebellion, or even an actual end to slavery forced on a weak Spain by Britain, the plantocracy looked toward the United States for a possible per- manent relationship. Painfully aware of the problems in the British Caribbean since the abolition of slavery and its impact on sugar production, the property owners saw in the United States, particularly in the southern states, a slave-owning society similar to Cuba's own plantation economy. A series of slave revolts in Cuba in the early 1840s increased apprehension and the desire for a permanent relationship with the United States. United States interest in Cuba and in its strategic location grew, particularly after the war with Mexico and the acquisition of California. In the 1840s and 1850s, Presidents James K. Polk, Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan attempted unsuccessfully to purchase Cuba from Spain. In 1854 three United States min- isters to Europe signed a secret report, later known as the Ostend Manifesto (see Glossary), which called for the United States purchase of Cuba or, if this failed, the forceful wresting of the island from Spain. The Ostend Manifesto was the high watermark of United States interest in acquiring Cuba peacefully in the 1850s. Other efforts, however, proved bolder. During the administrations of Zachary Taylor (president, 1849-50) and Millard Fillmore (president, 1850-53), pro-slavery elements were discouraged by the lack of official support. Some turned to filibustering expeditions, hoping that they might lead to the overthrow of Spanish power on the island. The principal filibusterer was Narciso Lopez, a Venezuelan-born Spanish general. He lived in Cuba and became involved in a conspiracy and various expedi- tions to the island in an attempt to annex Cuba to the United States. The failure of Lopez's expeditions and his death in 1851 and the United States Civil War ended, at least temporarily, the clamor for annexation. The abolition of slavery in the United States deprived Cuban slaveholders of the reason for wanting to tie themselves permanently to their northern neighbor. Abraham Lincoln's coming to power also had a significant effect on the Cuban policy of the United States, for Lincoln 20 Historical Setting and his advisers were willing, as long as Spain remained nonag- gressive, to allow Cuba to stay under Spanish control. The expansionist attempts of the 1840s and 1850s thus gave way to the less aggressive era of the 1860s. The proponents of the acquisition of Cuba were not defeated, however, only silenced. What their brethren were unable to achieve in mid-century, the expansionists of the 1890s accomplished at the turn of the cen- tury when the United States occupied Cuba during the Span- ish-American War and later exerted considerable political and economic influence over the affairs of the island. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, Cuba continued to prosper. The progressive changes known as the Bourbon Reforms (see Glossary), initiated throughout Latin America by Charles III (King of Spain, 1759-88), quick- ened economic and political activities and started a complete transformation of Cuban society. Population increased, agricul- tural production and profits expanded, and contacts with vari- ous Spanish ports as well as with the rest of Europe became closer, leading to the introduction of new ideas into the colony. The old order began to decay. To the forefront of Cuban soci- ety came a new and active class of Creole hacendados (hacienda owners) and entrepreneurs, who based their prosperity on sugar, coffee, land speculation, and the slave trade. It was only natural that members of this group would make their point of view felt concerning economic and social mat- ters. As the century progressed and their power increased, they began questioning Spanish mercantilist policies. Their primary focus concerned their immediate economic interests. Yet at a time when Europe was undergoing profound intellectual changes resulting partly from the Enlightenment (see Glos- sary) , their questioning of Spain's economic policies naturally led to the growth of a more critical attitude on the part of many Creole writers and intellectuals on the island. The desire for economic reforms was later translated into a desire for political and even social change. Intellectual activity flourished so intensely during the century that the period has come to be known as Cuba's Golden Century. Many of the attitudes of prominent Creoles were influenced by ties with the international community and particularly by Spain's inability to satisfy the island's economic needs. It finally became clear that Spanish policy had little to offer in exchange for increased taxation, ineffective administration, and the exclusion of Creoles from responsible positions in govern- 21 Cuba: A Country Study ment. The Cubans turned away from any hopes of reform and toward independence. With the annexation movement faltering and the possibility of independence still remote, some Cubans turned to attempts at reform within the Spanish empire. Reformism (reformismo) , a movement that had existed in Cuba since the beginning of the nineteenth century for the purpose of reforming Spanish insti- tutions in Cuba, took new impetus in mid-century, partly as a result of the failure of a number of conspiracies aimed at expel- ling Spanish power and because of black uprisings against sla- very on the island. Spain also seemed at the time to be following a more conciliatory policy toward Cuba. In 1865 the reform movement was strong enough to orga- nize the Reformist Party (Partido Reformista), the first such political party to exist on the island. The party was not a cohe- sive political organization. Some of its members had been pre- viously involved with the annexation movement, and a few still flirted with the idea. Others wanted some form of political autonomy for Cuba within the Spanish empire. Still others called for the island's representation in the Cortes (see Glos- sary). A few felt that reformism could be a step that would eventually lead to complete independence. In general, the party advocated equal rights for Cubans and Peninsulars, limi- tation on the powers of the captain-general, and greater politi- cal freedom on the island. It also supported freer trade and gradual abolition of slavery, and called for an increase of white immigrants into Cuba. The slave trade was partially curtailed in 1865, and the Spanish governor issued a law abolishing slavery in Cuba on November 5, 1879. It was not until October 7, 1886, however, that a royal decree completely abolished slavery in Cuba. The activities of the Reformists soon met with strong opposi- tion from a group of Peninsulars, who formed the Uncondi- tional Spanish Party (Partido Incondicional Espanol). Trying to prevent any economic or political change, especially if it affected their interests, the Peninsulars used their newspaper, the Diario de la Marina, to attack the reformers. They cautioned that any concessions from Spain could only strengthen the Cre- oles, weakening continuous Spanish control over Cuba. The work of the Reformists and their clash with the Peninsu- lars had an impact on Spain. Following the successful move- ment for independence in Santo Domingo against Spanish rule in 1865, and at a time when Spain was experiencing 22 Historical Setting renewed economic and political difficulties, the Spanish mon- archy felt it would be best to moderate its policy toward Cuba. It therefore called for the election of a reform commission that would discuss changes to be introduced on the island. The Information Board (Junta de Information) (1866-67), as the Reform Commission came to be known, was composed of twelve elected Creole reformers and four Peninsulars, reflecting Cubans' desire for reform. To appease the fears of the conservative elements within Cuba and to prevent the elec- tion of radical reformers, the Spanish government instructed the Cuban municipalities to set high property qualifications for voting. Yet to everyone's surprise, the reformers won a major victory in the elections. Of the sixteen Cuban commissioners, twelve were Creole reformers. The results of this election clearly indicated the Cubans' desire for reform, rather than a widespread Cuban desire for independence. It seems that a sig- nificant proportion of the white Creole population of the island still hoped, as late as the 1860s, for a modification of Spanish policy and the introduction of reforms that would per- mit them to continue within the Spanish empire. Yet the hope for change was short-lived. The Spanish govern- ment, which had come to power as the Reform Commission began deliberations several months earlier, had decided to let the commission meet, but had no intention of implementing its recommendations. In early 1867, the government not only disbanded the Information Board and dismissed all of its rec- ommendations, but also imposed new and irritating taxes. Fur- thermore, Spain sent to Cuba Francisco Lersundi (captain- general, 1867-69), a reactionary captain-general who prohib- ited public meetings and tightly censured reformist literature. The failure of the Information Board in particular and of reformism in general gave new impetus to the independence movement. Aware that Spain would not permit any significant changes and that the island's destiny as well as their own would best be served by an independent Cuba, Creoles began prepar- ing for complete separation from Spain. Toward Independence, 1868-1902 The Ten Years' War, 1868-78 Although remaining in the Spanish fold, the "ever-faithful" island, as Cuba became known, grew away from the crown. The interests and views of the Creoles and Peninsulars increasingly 23 Cuba: A Country Study clashed. Reconciliation seemed difficult; those who clamored for violence became more numerous, and, finally, war broke out. The wars for independence that followed lasted more than thirty years, from 1868 until the outbreak of the Spanish-Amer- ican War, followed by the intervention of the United States in 1898. The wars were Cuba's belated reaction to the fight for independence waged throughout most of Latin America dur- ing the first quarter of the century. This is not to say that Cubans made no attempts to separate from Spain in the first part of the century. As early as 1809, at a time of turmoil and rebellion against Spanish power in Latin America, several Cubans conspired to gain independence for Cuba. Lacking widespread popular support, however, the early attempts at independence were weakened by several factors. Among these were the growth of the sugar industry and of wealth in general, the fear of a black rebellion, and the increased sentiment in favor of annexation by the United States. Then, too, a number of Spanish royalists and troops set- tled in Cuba following their defeat in Latin America. Cuba became a heavily fortified garrison, the last significant bastion of Spanish power in the New World. The international picture also was not favorable to the Cuban cause for independence. Fearful of European expan- sion into the New World and particularly of British and French designs on Cuba, the United States was quick to issue the Mon- roe Doctrine (1823), which warned in part that the nation would not tolerate the transfer of New World colonies from one European power to another. The United States seemed to have preferred Cuba under a weak Spain than under a mighty Britain. If anyone else were to have Cuba, some United States politicians and business interests reasoned, it would be its neighbor to the north. The reasons for the war that broke out in 1868 in Cuba were many and complex. Throughout the nineteenth century, Spain had experienced increasing political instability, with liberal and reactionary governments alternating in power. Spanish policy changes were particularly reflected in the colony under the rule of such arbitrary and ruthless captain-generals as Miguel Tacon (1834-38) and Francisco Lersundi (1867-69), the latter sharing power with more moderate and understanding offi- cials, such as Domingo Dulce and General Francisco Serrano. The clash between Spanish economic measures and the desires of the Creole sugar slavocracy also contributed to the 24 Historical Setting mounting tension. Throughout the nineteenth century, the planters had grown into a powerful and vocal group that could control or at least decisively influence the internal politics of the island. The planters now found themselves saddled with an imperial power whose protectionist policies were challenging their status by attempting to curtail their prerogatives and reduce their mounting importance. Naturally, they were not about to relinquish their position without a fight. Throughout the century, the Cubans had also progressively developed a separate and distinct identity. Although many thought of Cuba as another province of Spain and demanded equal rights and representation, others longed for an indepen- dent nation. Writers, painters, and poets, by looking inward to portray themes of their homeland, helped to develop the roots of their nationality. Through their works, they fostered not only a pride in being Cuban and a love for Cuban subjects but also a sort of shame over the fact that the island remained a Spanish colony. While Spanish America, with the exception of Puerto Rico, had successfully overthrown Spanish power, Cuba was still clinging to its colonial ties. The war broke out in 1868. It was organized and directed by radical Creole landowners in Oriente Province together with a group of lawyers and professionals. The peasants did the bulk of the fighting, however, with blacks joining the rebel ranks. The leadership of the movement was in the hands of the son of a wealthy landowner from Oriente Province, Carlos Manuel de Cespedes y Quesada. Cespedes and his group were determined to strike a blow at Spanish control of Cuba. When they learned that the Spanish authorities had discovered their conspiratorial activities, the conspirators were forced to act. On October 10, 1868, Cespedes issued the historic call to rebellion, the "Grito de Yara," from his plantation, La Demajagua, proclaiming Cuba's indepen- dence. He soon freed his slaves, incorporated them into his dis- organized and ill-armed force, and made public a manifesto explaining the causes of the revolt. Issued by the newly orga- nized Revolutionary Junta of Cuba (Junta Revolucionaria de Cuba) , the manifesto stated that the revolt was prompted by Spain's arbitrary government, excessive taxation, corruption, exclusion of Cubans from government employment, and depri- vation of political and religious liberty, particularly the rights of assembly and petition. It called for complete independence 25 Cuba: A Country Study from Spain, for the establishment of a republic with universal suffrage, and for the indemnified emancipation of slaves. The manifesto was followed by the organization of a provi- sional government, with Cespedes acting as commander in chief of the army and head of the government. Cespedes's almost absolute power as well as his failure to decree the imme- diate abolition of slavery soon caused opposition within the revolutionary ranks. Facing mounting pressure, Cespedes con- ceded some of his power and called for a constitutional con- vention to establish a more democratic provisional government. The war centered in eastern Cuba. Cespedes decreed the destruction of cane fields and approved the revolutionary prac- tice of urging the slaves to revolt and to join the mambises, as the Cuban rebels were then called. Numerous skirmishes took place, but Cuban forces were unable to obtain a decisive victory against the Spanish army. Simultaneously, Cespedes made sev- eral unsuccessful attempts to obtain United States recognition of Cuban belligerency. While Cespedes retained civilian leadership, the military aspects of the war were under the leadership of the Dominican Maximo Gomez. Unhappy with the treatment Dominicans had received from Spain during Spanish occupation of his own country (1861-65), and horrified by the exploitation of the black slaves, Gomez started to conspire with the Cuban revolu- tionaries and joined Cespedes after the Grito de Yara. His expe- rience in military strategy was invaluable to the revolutionary cause, and he was soon promoted to the rank of general and later to commander of Oriente Province. A master of guerrilla warfare, Gomez alternated training the Cubans in that type of struggle with commanding his forces in numerous battles. Antonio Maceo, a mulatto leader, supported Gomez's plans and actions. Under Gomez's direction, Maceo had developed into one of the most daring fighters of the Cuban army. Show- ing extraordinary leadership and tactical capabilities, Maceo won respect and admiration from his men, as well as fear and scorn from the Spanish troops. He kept tight discipline in his encampment, constantly planning and organizing future bat- tles. Maceo enjoyed outsmarting and outmaneuvering the Spanish generals, and on successive occasions he inflicted heavy losses on them. Maceo's incursions into the eastern sugar zones not only helped to disrupt the sugar harvest but more 26 Historical Setting importantly led to the freedom of the slaves, who soon joined the ranks of the Cuban army. By 1872 Maceo had achieved the rank of general. His promi- nent position among revolutionary leaders soon gave rise to intrigue and suspicion. Conservative elements that supported the war effort began to fear the possibility of the establishment of a black republic with Maceo at its head. The example of Haiti still loomed in the minds of many. Dissension in the revo- lutionary ranks and fears of the blacks slowed down the revolu- tionary effort. The war dragged on, with neither the Cubans nor the Span- iards able to win a decisive victory. Finally, on February 11, 1878, the Pact of Zanjon ended the Ten Years' War. Most of the generals of the Cuban army accepted the pact; Maceo, how- ever, refused to capitulate and continued to fight with his now depleted army. On March 15, 1878, he held a historic meeting, known as the "Protest of Baragua," with the head of the Span- ish forces, Marshal Arsenio Martinez Campos, requesting inde- pendence for Cuba and complete abolition of slavery. When these conditions were rejected, he again resumed fighting. It was, however, a futile effort. Years of bloodshed and war had left the Cuban forces exhausted. Aid from exiles decreased, and Maceo now faced the bulk of the Spanish forces alone. Realizing the hopeless situation, he left for Jamaica. From there he traveled to New York to raise money and weap- ons necessary to continue fighting. He soon joined the activi- ties of Major General Calixto Garcia, then organizing a new rebellion. This uprising in 1879-80, known as the Little War (La Guerra Chiquita) , was also to end in disaster. Maceo was kept in exile for fear of antagonizing the conservative elements in Cuba, and Garcia was captured soon after he landed on the island. Exhausted and disillusioned after the long, bitter strug- gle and faced with a powerful and determined Spain, the Cubans were in no mood to join this new and ill-prepared attempt. After more than ten years of strife, the Cubans were unable to overthrow Spanish power on the island. The reasons for this failure are to be found partially in internal dissension, region- alism, and petty jealousies among the leaders, and partially in lack of internal organization and external support, which resulted in chronic shortages of supplies and ammunition. The odds against the Cubans were also almost insurmountable. They were fighting well-disciplined, well-organized, and well- 27 Cuba: A Country Study equipped forces augmented steadily by reinforcements from Spain. The Spaniards also controlled the seas, preventing the smuggling of reinforcements and weapons from abroad. The Cubans were thus forced to carry on guerrilla operations in the hope of demoralizing the Spanish army or creating an interna- tional situation favorable to their cause. The protracted war had a profound effect on Cubans. Many Creoles fought in parts of the island they had never even seen before. Gradually, regionalism collapsed and a common cause emerged; the little homeland (patria chica), with its stress on local loyalties, gave way to the fatherland. The war also forced many to take sides on issues, thus accelerating the process of popular participation and integration. Finally, the war pro- vided numerous symbols that became part of Cuba's historical heritage. The national anthem and flag as well as the national weapon, the machete, came out of this war. In particular, the dedication of the mambises, who abandoned position and com- fort to fight Spanish power, became for future generations an example of unselfish sacrifice for the fatherland. The impact of the war was particularly felt in the economic realm. The destruction caused by the fighting did away with the fortunes of many Cuban families. Although the struggle was concentrated in eastern Cuba and many sugar plantations escaped the ravages of war, the continuous development of a landed slavocracy in Cuba suffered a severe blow. Numerous participants and sympathizers with the Cuban cause lost their properties. Most Peninsulars sided with Spain, and many estates passed from Creole to loyalist hands. Because they had backed the Spanish cause, some Creole loyalists also profited from the losses of their brethren. The growth and power of the Creole propertied class was to be further undermined in 1886 with the abolition of slavery. With the first major attempt at independence having ended in partial disaster, many Cubans turned to autonomismo (auton- omy movement). The movement, which advocated autono- mous rule for Cuba under the Spanish monarchy, differed little from reformism. Autonomismo had its origins in the first half of the century but lost momentum during the periods of annex- ation and reformism. Now, after the end of the Ten Years' War, it coalesced into the Autonomous Liberal Party (Partido Lib- eral Autonomista) . The founders of the party, former annex- ationists and reformists, called for a system of local self- government patterned on the British colonial model and 28 Historical Setting requested numerous economic and political reforms, but within the Spanish empire. It soon became clear, however, that Spain still intended no radical changes in its policies. By 1892 the much promised and awaited reforms were not forthcoming. Disillusionment and frustration began to take hold of those who still hoped for a continuous association with Spain. The party warned that unless Spain stopped its policy of repression and persecution, another rebellion would be inevitable. While the stage was being set for the decisive effort at independence, however, the forces that advocated independence were still racked by schism and indecision. The enthusiasm and prestige of the military leaders of the Ten Years' War were not sufficient to coordinate and direct the independence effort against Spain. This leader- ship vacuum came to be filled by a young poet and revolution- ary, Jose Marti. Jose Marti and the War for Independence, 1895-1902 Jose Marti realized very early that independence from Spain was the only solution for Cuba and that this could only be achieved through a quick war that would at the same time pre- vent United States intervention in Cuba. His fear of a military dictatorship after independence led in 1884 to a break with Maximo Gomez and Antonio Maceo, who were at the time engaged in conspiratorial activities. He withdrew from the movement temporarily, but by 1887 the three men were work- ing together, with Marti assuming political leadership. In 1892 he formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucio- nario Cubano — PRC) in the United States and directed his efforts toward organizing a new war against Spain. Marti's pilgrimage through the Americas in the 1880s and early 1890s helped to unite and organize the Cubans, and with Gomez and Maceo he worked tirelessly toward the realization of Cuban independence. So well had they organized the anti- Spanish forces that their order for the uprising on February 24, 1895, assured the ultimate expulsion of Spain from the island. The war, however, was not the quick and decisive struggle that Marti had sought. It took his life on May 19, 1895, dragged on for three more years, and eventually prompted the United States intervention (1899-1902) that he had feared. After Marti's death, the leadership of the war fell to Gomez and Maceo, who were now ready to implement their plan to invade the western provinces. In repeated attacks, they under- 29 Cuba: A Country Study mined and defeated the Spanish troops and carried the war to the sugar heart of the island. From January to March of 1896, Maceo waged a bitter but successful campaign against larger Spanish forces in the provinces of Pinar del Rio and La Habana (see fig. 1). By mid-1896 the Spanish troops were in retreat, and the Cubans seemed victorious throughout the island. Then came a change in the Spanish command: the more con- ciliatory Marshal Arsenio Martinez Campos was replaced by General Valeriano Weyler, a tough and harsh disciplinarian. Weyler's policy of concentrating the rural population in garri- soned towns and increasing the number of Spanish troops allowed the Spaniards to regain the initiative after Maceo's death on December 7, 1896, in a minor battle. Yet they were unable to defeat the Cuban rebels or even to engage them in a major battle. Gomez retreated to the eastern provinces and from there carried on guerrilla operations. He rejected any compromise with Spain. In January 1898, when the Spanish monarchy introduced a plan that would have made Cuba a self- governing province within the Spanish empire, Gomez categor- ically opposed the plan. United States Involvement In April 1898, the United States declared war on Spain. The reasons for United States involvement were many. A growing and energetic nation, the United States was looking for new markets for its budding industrial establishment. United States investments in Cuba were now threatened by the devastating war carried on by the Cubans. National security also demanded the control of the Central American isthmus and of its mari- time approaches. A strong navy as well as naval bases would be essential to protect the future Panama Canal. The rich Spanish colony, located 145 kilometers from the Florida coast and dom- inating the sea-lanes to the isthmus, was a growing haven for investors and the dream of every expansionist in the United States. It now seemed ripe to fall into the hands of its northern neighbor. Throughout the century, United States interest had wavered. Early on, United States policy makers supported a Cuba under a weak Spain rather than in the hands of other European pow- ers. In mid-century, annexation became a temporary hope, only to be ended by the United States Civil War. In the 1870s and 1880s, United States investments grew in Cuba as a result of the war. Taking advantage of the bankruptcy of many Span- 30 Jose Marti Courtesy Organization of American States ish and Cuban enterprises, United States capital acquired sugar estates and mining interests. When the expansion of European beet sugar production closed this market for Cuban sugar, the United States became the largest and most important buyer of the island's crop. The depressed world price of raw sugar ruined many Cuban producers and facilitated United States economic penetration. The McKinley Tariff of 1890, which placed raw sugar on the free list, led to an increase in Cuban- American trade and especially to the expansion of sugar pro- duction. Although by 1895 control of the economy was still largely in the hands of the Spaniards, United States capital and influence, particularly in the sugar industry, were dominant. 31 Cuba: A Country Study The ingredients for United States involvement were all present in 1898. All that was needed was the proper national mood and a good excuse to step in. The first was easily achieved. The United States wanted intervention. Aroused by stories of Spanish cruelty blown out of proportion by irrespon- sible "yellow journalists" and by a new sense of Anglo-Saxon "racial" responsibility toward the "inferior" people of the Latin world, large sectors of public opinion clamored for United States involvement and pressured President William McKinley to intervene. The excuse was provided by the explosion of the United States battleship U.S.S. Maine in Havana's harbor early in 1898. The Spanish-American War was short, decisive, and popular. Such defenders of manifest destiny as Alfred T. Mahan, The- odore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge seemed vindicated by an easy and relatively inexpensive war. United States busi- ness interests saw new commercial and investment opportuni- ties as a result of the capture of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. United States strategic interests were also assured by the final expulsion of Spain from the New World in 1899 and the emergence of the United States as the dominant Carib- bean power. The defenders of imperialism, however, were not unchal- lenged. In the United States Congress, Senator Henry M. Teller won approval for the Teller Resolution, which pledged the United States to support an independent Cuba. Roman Catholic and labor leaders criticized the United States and called for the granting of complete independence to Cuba. Similarly, Cuban leaders complained that Cuba was not a part of the Treaty of Paris (1898), which ended the Spanish-Ameri- can War, that their soldiers had been excluded from the cities by the United States Army, and that despite innumerable sacri- fices independence still loomed more as a hope than a reality. Although Spain relinquished Cuba under the Treaty of Paris, Manuel Sanguily, a staunch defender of Cuba's sovereignty, denounced the fact that the most reactionary Spanish ele- ments had been permitted to remain on the island and retain their possessions. Those who criticized United States policies, however, were voices crying in the wilderness. This was the finest hour for United States expansionists, and they were not about to give up Cuba completely. It was not until 1902, after two years of United States occupation of the island, that the United States 32 Historical Setting granted Cuba nominal independence, and only after Congress had denned the future relations of the United States and Cuba. On February 25, 1901, Senator Orville H. Piatt introduced in Congress the Piatt Amendment (see Glossary), which stipu- lated the right of the United States to intervene in Cuba's inter- nal affairs and to lease a naval base in Cuba. The bill became law on March 2. On June 12, 1901, a constitutional convention met in Havana to draft a constitution. On June 21, by a majority of one, it adopted the Piatt Amendment as an annex to the Cuban constitution of 1901. The constitution also provided for universal suffrage, separation of church and state, a popularly elected but all-powerful president, and a weakened Senate and Chamber of Deputies. Despite the opposition that it generated, the occupation did have a number of beneficial and generally supported results. The United States faced a difficult task indeed in governing Cuba. Famine and disease were rampant. Industrial and agri- cultural production were at a standstill. The treasury was empty. The Cuban revolutionary army was idle and impatient. With no experience in colonial affairs, the United States tack- led the job. The military governors, Generals John Brooke (1899) and Leonard Wood (1899-1902), supported by a variety of Cuban secretaries, were the supreme authority, and under them were other United States generals in charge of every province. These were soon replaced by Cuban governors. A method of food distribution was established that proved effec- tive. A system of rural guards, initiated earlier by General Leonard Wood in Oriente, was soon extended to all the prov- inces, providing employment to many soldiers after the Cuban army was disbanded. The Wood administration gave particular attention to health and education. It built hospitals, improved sanitation and health conditions, and eradicated yellow fever, primarily through the work of the Cuban scientist Carlos J. Finlay, who discovered the mosquito vector of yellow fever. The Wood administration established a public school system and modern- ized the university. Wood also reorganized the judicial system, provided it with buildings and other facilities, and placed the judges on salary for the first time. In 1899 Wood proclaimed an electoral law that gave the franchise to adult males who were lit- erate, owned property, or had served in the revolutionary army. Elections for municipal offices were held in June 1900, 33 Cuba: A Country Study and in September, thirty-one delegates, mostly followers or rep- resentatives of the revolutionary army, were elected to the Con- stitutional Convention that drafted the constitution of 1901. On May 20, 1902, the occupation ended. On that day, Gen- eral Wood turned over the presidency to Tomas Estrada Palma (president, 1902-06), first elected president of the new repub- lic and former successor to Marti as head of the PRC. It was a day of national happiness, as the Cubans plunged into a new era of political freedom and republican government. Opti- mism, however, was tempered by the shadow of the United States hanging over the new nation. Looking into the future, a few Cubans warned that the immediate task was to resist for- eign encroachments. Many still remembered Martfs prophetic words: "Once the United States is in Cuba, who will get it out?" The Republic, 1902-59 The Piatt Amendment Years, 1902-34 Apparently highly favorable conditions accompanied Cuba's emergence into independence. There were no major social or political problems similar to those that other Latin American nations had experienced after their break with Spain. There was no large unassimilated indigenous population, and although blacks represented a significant proportion of the total population, there was no major racial conflict. The two groups had learned to live together since colonial times. In addition, no strong regionalism or powerful church challenged the authority of the state. Furthermore, the liberal conservative feud that plagued countries like Mexico during the nineteenth century was nonexistent in Cuba. The economic situation was also favorable. The infusion of foreign capital, the increasing trade with the United States, and favorable sugar prices augured a prosperous future. Cuba and the United States signed a Commercial Treaty of Reciprocity in 1903 that guaranteed a 20 percent tariff preference for Cuban sugar entering the United States. In return, Cuba granted cer- tain United States products preferential treatment. The treaty reinforced the close commercial relations between the two countries, but it also made Cuba further dependent on a one- crop economy and on one all-powerful market. Under the terms of the May 1903 Treaty of Relations (also known as the Permanent Reciprocity Treaty of 1903) and the Lease Agree- ment of July 1903, the United States also acquired rights in per- Historical Setting petuity to lease a naval coaling station at Guantanamo Bay, which has remained the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay ever since. Despite apparently favorable conditions, Marti's vision of a politically and economically independent nation failed to materialize in the postindependence years. Whether he would have been able to prevent the events that followed the War for Independence can only be conjectured. A process of central- ization extended the great sugar estates of the colonial period, restraining the growth of a rural middle class and creating an agrarian proletariat of poor whites and mulattoes. Cuba became more and more commercially dependent on the United States, and the inclusion of the Piatt Amendment into the Cuban constitution of 1901 established United States supervision of political developments in Cuba. Another problem was Cuba's preservation of the colonial Spanish attitude that public office was a source of personal profit. Electoral fraud became a standard practice. Politics became the means to social advancement, a contest between factions for the spoils of office. Personalismo was substituted for principle; allegiance to a man or a group was the only way to ensure survival in the political arena. The Spanish legacy of political and administrative malpractice increased in the new nation too suddenly to be checked by a people lacking experi- ence in self-government. The United States' dissolution of Cuba's veteran army prevented a repetition of the typical nine- teenth-century Spanish-American experience. Nevertheless, many veterans took an active part in politics, and their influ- ence was felt in the years following the establishment of the republic in 1902. As successor to Spain as the overseer of the island's affairs, the United States unwittingly perpetuated the Cubans' lack of political responsibility. Cubans enjoyed the assurance that the United States would intervene to protect them from foreign entanglement or to solve their domestic difficulties, but the sit- uation only encouraged an indolent attitude toward their own affairs and was not conducive to responsible self-government. In the early decades of the republic, the Cubans developed a "Piatt Amendment mentality," which led them to rely upon the United States for guidance in their political decisions. This civic indolence was also not conducive to the growth of Cuban nationalism. Although the Cubans were enclosed in a geographic unit and shared a common language, religion, and 35 Cuba: A Country Study background, they lacked national unity and purpose. The influence of the United States weakened the forces of national- ism in the early part of the century. As the century progressed, another force, espanolismo, became an important factor in keep- ing the nation divided. When Cuba became independent, Spaniards were guaranteed their property rights and were allowed to keep commerce and retail trade largely in their own hands. Immigration from Spain, furthermore, increased con- siderably, and by 1934 there were an estimated 300,000 Span- iards on the island. This influx constantly strengthened Spanish traditions and customs. Many Spaniards themselves remained divided, retaining the ways of their own native prov- inces, hoping for an eventual return to Spain and thus failing to assimilate into the mainstream of Cuban society. A dangerous tendency to solve differences through violence also permeated the political atmosphere. In 1906 President Estrada Palma called for United States intervention to offset the so-called Little August War. Organized by Jose Miguel Gomez and his liberal followers, who were outraged by Estrada Palma's fraudulent reelection, this revolt aimed at preventing Estrada Palma from serving a second term in office. United States Marines were sent to end the conflict, initiating a new intervention that lasted from 1906 until 1909. This second intervention differed significantly from the first. The United States was not eager to embark on a new period of rule in Cuba, and the provisional governor, Charles E. Magoon, turned to dispensing government sinecures, or bote- llas, to pacify the various quarreling factions. Magoon also embarked on an extensive program of public works, gave Havana a new sewerage system, and organized a modern army. These accomplishments, however, were partially overshadowed by extravagant spending that left Cuba with a debt where there once had been a surplus. Magoon also drew up an organic body of law for the executive and the judiciary, and for provin- cial and municipal government. He also provided an electoral law, as well as laws for a civil service and for municipal taxation. Evidently, the United States government considered enactment of fair legislation that would prevent civil wars to be one of the main purposes of the intervention. Having pacified the coun- try and introduced this new legislative apparatus, the United States called for municipal and national elections. In 1908 the Liberals, members of the newly created Liberal Party (Partido Liberal), won a solid majority and elected their leader, Jose 36 United States troops marching in Havana, 1 908 United States Marine tents in front of the Palacio de los Capitanes Generates, the old palace of the Spanish governors, 1908 Courtesy Organization of American States 37 Cuba: A Country Study Miguel Gomez (president, 1909-13), to the presidency. The United States seemed willing to allow the democratic process to follow its course, and on January 28, 1909, the intervention- ist forces were withdrawn from the island. The impact of this second intervention was far-reaching in other, less positive ways. It removed any pretense of Cuban independence, strengthened the Piatt Amendment mentality, and increased doubts about the Cubans' ability for self-govern- ment. Disillusionment took hold among many leaders, intellec- tuals, and writers, and this feeling was transmitted to the mass of the population. Cynicism and irresponsibility increased and so did the resort to violence to solve political differences. Even hitherto peaceful racial relations were affected. The 1908 electoral fiasco of a group of radical blacks, who had organized a political party called the Independent Colored Association (Agrupacion Independiente de Color — AIC), increased the frustration of blacks. When the Cuban Senate passed a law prohibiting parties along racial lines, the AIC staged an uprising in 1912. The uprising alarmed Washington, which landed United States Marines in several parts of the island, over the protests of President Jose Miguel Gomez. Try- ing to avert another full-fledged intervention, Gomez moved swiftly and harshly. Government forces captured and executed most of the leaders and crushed the rebellion. The AIC col- lapsed soon after. It was to be the last time that a revolt along strictly racial lines would develop in Cuba. The tendency to resort to violence was displayed in two other instances at this time. In 1912 veterans of the War for Independence demanded the ouster of pro-Spanish elements from bureaucratic positions and threatened to take up arms against the government of President Gomez. When the United States expressed "grave concern" over these events, the veter- ans rapidly renounced their violent tactics. The second inci- dent occurred again in 1917. This time the Liberal Party rebelled to protest the fraudulent reelection of Mario Garcia Menocal (president, 1913-1921). Led by former President Gomez, the rebels took control of Oriente and Camaguey prov- inces. But Menocal, supported by a warning from the United States that it would not recognize a government that came to power by unconstitutional means, moved troops into the areas controlled by the rebels and captured Gomez. The rebellion soon died out, and, although its leaders were arrested, they were later pardoned. 38 Historical Setting As a result of the economic downturn of the 1920s, various groups protested Cuba's economic dependence on the United States. In 1920, after a sharp drop in the price of sugar created a severe economic crisis, Cuba was subjected to financial chaos and social misery. The crisis accelerated the desire for change and led to a questioning of the existing order of society among intellectuals and writers and also among other groups that were barred from becoming productive members of society. This economic crisis led in particular to a resurgence of eco- nomic nationalism. Several groups demanded protective legis- lation for Cuban interests and questioned the close economic ties between the United States and Cuba. The Piatt Amend- ment as well as the repeated interventions of the United States government in Cuba's internal affairs came under attack. Anti- United States feeling, xenophobia, and retrieval of the national wealth became the main themes of this blossoming national- ism. As the decade progressed, however, its scope was widened to include a call for social justice and for an end to political corruption and economic dependence on a single crop. Liberal Alfredo Zayas y Alonso (president, 1921-24), as cor- rupt as his administration was, managed to take advantage of this nationalism to reassert Cuba's sovereignty vis-a-vis the United States and its special envoy, Enoch Crowder. Although his administration was overshadowed by graft and mismanage- ment, Zayas retrieved Cuba's credit, averted intervention, and through later negotiations secured definite title to the Isla de Pinos (now Isla de la Juventud) off the southern coast of Cuba after a two-decade delay imposed by the Piatt Amendment. The inability of Cuban society to absorb all university gradu- ates accentuated the feelings of frustration in a generation that found itself with little opportunity to apply its acquired knowl- edge. In 1922 university students in Havana created the Federa- tion of University Students (Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria — FEU), occupied university buildings, and orga- nized short-lived student strikes. The students obtained a series of academic and administrative reforms, larger government subsidies, and the establishment of a University Reform Com- mission composed of professors, students, and alumni. The university reform movement, which had started as a cru- sade for academic reform, developed political overtones in 1928 when students began protesting the decision of President Gerardo Machado y Morales (president, 1925-29, 1929-33) to remain in power for another term. Claiming that his economic 39 Cuba: A Country Study program could not be completed within his four-year term and that only he could carry it out, Machado announced his deci- sion to reelect himself. In April 1928, a packed constitutional convention granted Machado a new six-year period of power without reelection and abolished the vice presidency. In November, through a fake election in which he was the only candidate, Machado was given a new term, to run from May 20, 1929, to May 20, 1935. Whereas a similar attempt by Estrada Palma to remain in power had resulted in rebellion, Machado's decision at first brought about only a wave of national indignation against the invalidation of suffrage. The regime still enjoyed the support of the business and conservative sectors of society. Increased reve- nues had brought prosperity, and Machado's improved admin- istration, especially in the field of public works, had gained him a strong following. The Cuban armed forces, organized two decades earlier during Gomez's administration, also strongly backed the regime. Machado had successfully won over the mil- itary through bribes and threats and had purged disloyal offi- cers. He used the military in a variety of civilian posts both at the national and local levels, thus increasingly militarizing soci- ety. The few officers who were discontented with Machado's reelection seemed powerless and ineffective to oppose the regime. In the midst of growing domestic and international problems, the United States looked with indifference at events in Cuba and seemed unwilling to become involved in Cuban affairs as long as the Machado administration maintained order and stability and a friendly posture toward Washington. Machado, furthermore, prevented the growth of political opposition by winning control of the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador) and aligning it both with his own Lib- eral Party and with the small Popular Party (Partido Popular) . Through bribes and threats, Machado was able to subordinate Congress and the judiciary to the executive's will. Machado's decision to extend his presidency met with stern student opposition, resulting in riots and demonstrations in several towns throughout the island. Machado took immediate measures to prevent further opposition from that quarter. He temporarily closed the university, dissolved the FEU, and abol- ished the University Reform Commission. He also tightened political control. Several Spanish and European labor leaders were expelled from the country as undesirable aliens. Antigov- ernment newspapers were closed down, and the military took 40 Historical Setting an increasingly growing role in surveilling and policing the population. Machado warned sternly that he would keep order and peace at any cost. These measures, however, failed to control the students com- pletely. In mid-1927, a small but active group organized the University Students Directorate (Directorio Estudiantil Univer- sitario — DEU; hereafter, Directorio) to oppose the regime. The Directorio issued a manifesto defending the right of university students to discuss politics and attacking Machado's reelection attempts. When students demonstrated in front of the univer- sity, Machado rapidly retaliated. Following his orders, the Uni- versity Council, composed of faculty and administrative officials, formed disciplinary tribunals and expelled most of the Directorio leaders from the university. A clash with police that left Rafael Trejo, a student leader, dead was the turning point in the struggle against the regime. From that time on, many Cubans viewed the courageous stu- dent generation that battled Machado's police with admiration and respect. For some, the "generation of 1930," as these stu- dents were later known in Cuban history, seemed irresponsible and undisciplined, but for others it became the best exponent of disinterested idealism. Embattled by the first shock waves of the world depression and oppressed by an increasingly ruthless dictator, many Cubans, especially those among the less privi- leged sectors of society, turned in hope toward these young people. They placed their faith in a generation that, although inexperienced and immature, seemed incorruptible and will- ing to bring morality to Cuba's public life. While the principal leaders of the Directorio were in jail in 1931, a small group formed a splinter organization, the Stu- dent Left Wing (Ala Izquierda Estudiantil — AIE). The AIE, however, became merely a tool of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — PCC) . The party, founded in 1925 and led in the early 1930s by Ruben Martinez Villena, a popular poet and intellectual, directed the organization's activ- ities and used it to influence the student movement. Through- out most of his regime, the communists opposed Machado and advocated, as the only correct strategy to overthrow his govern- ment, the mobilization of the proletariat, culminating in a gen- eral strike. The PCC opposition, however, was ineffectual. The DEU and the AIE were not the only groups opposing Machado. The Nationalist Union (Union Nacionalista) , headed by a War of Independence colonel, Carlos Mendieta, 41 Cuba: A Country Study also condemned the regime in newspapers and in public dem- onstrations. In 1931 Mendieta and Menocal, the former presi- dent, organized a short-lived uprising in Pinar del Rio Province. That same year, a group led by engineer Carlos Hevia and journalist Sergio Carbo equipped an expedition in the United States and landed in Oriente Province, only to be crushed by Machado's army. In New York, representatives of several anti-Machado organizations united and formed a revo- lutionary junta. Most prominent, perhaps, of these anti-Machado groups was the ABC, a clandestine extremist organization composed of intellectuals, students, and the middle sectors of society, estab- lished in 1930. Led by several Cuban intellectuals who were Harvard graduates, the ABC undermined Machado's position through sabotage and terrorist actions, and in December 1932 published a manifesto in Havana criticizing the underlying structure of Cuban society and outlining a detailed program of economic and political reforms. Although the means to achieve its political and economic program were not clear, the ABC called for the elimination of large landholdings, national- ization of public services, limitations on land acquisitions by United States companies, and producers' cooperatives, as well as political liberty and social justice. Such was the existing condition on the island when the United States, attempting to find a peaceful solution to Cuba's political situation, sent Ambassador Benjamin Sumner Welles in 1933 to act as mediator between government and opposi- tion. By then, United States interests in Cuba had grown signif- icantly. Investment was concentrated in land and in the sugar industry, but also extended into transportation, natural resources, utilities, and the banking system. World War I had accelerated this trend, making Cuba more and more depen- dent on its neighbor to the North. As economic dependence increased, so did political dependence. A new crop of Cuban businessmen, technocrats, and, naturally, politicians had devel- oped who identified with their counterparts in the United States and sought political guidance from Washington and Wall Street. This "Piatt Amendment complex" permeated large sec- tors of Cuban society, with the exception, perhaps, of some writers, intellectuals, and students who saw a danger in the close relationship for the development of a Cuban nationality and identified the patria with the workers, the poor, and the blacks. Their ranks were small, however, and economic pros- 42 Historical Setting perity drowned their voices. The fear of, or the desire for, United States involvement in Cuban affairs was the dominating theme, and many Cubans were willing to use the threat of or even actual intervention by the United States to further their narrow political and economic objectives. Most political factions and leaders supported Sumner Welles's mediation, with the exception of the radicals and the Conservative followers of former President Menocal, the Direc- torio, and a few Cuban leaders. The Directorio strongly opposed the United States' action. The leaders of the "genera- tion of 1930" saw themselves as representatives of the national will and heirs to Marti's legacy (see Jose Marti and the War for Independence, 1895-1902, this, ch.); their mission was to carry on the revolution that "the United States had frustrated in 1898." Finding inspiration and guidance in Martfs teaching and his vision of a just society in a politically and economically independent nation, they opposed United States supervision of Cuban affairs and the humiliating Piatt Amendment. Sumner Welles's mediation efforts culminated in a general strike, in dissension within the armed forces, and in several small army revolts that forced Machado to resign and leave the country on August 12, 1933. This general strike deepened the schism between the PCC and the anti-Machado groups. Although the party had played an important role in promoting the strike, it reversed itself just prior to Machado's fall and issued a back-to-work order, fearing that the general strike might provoke United States intervention or the establishment of a pro-United States government. The failure to support the anti-Machado struggle discredited the PCC, especially among the students. From that time on, the party, alienated from pro- gressive and revolutionary forces within the country, found it easier to reach agreements and work with traditional conserva- tive political parties and governments, even with military presi- dents. Sumner Welles and the army appointed Carlos Manuel de Cespedes to succeed Machado. The son of Cuba's first presi- dent during the rebellion against Spain in the 1860s and a pres- tigious although uninspiring figure, Cespedes soon received United States support and the backing of most anti-Machado groups. He annulled Machado's constitutional amendments of 1928, restored the 1901 constitution, and prepared to bring the country back to normalcy. 43 Cuba: A Country Study Returning Cuba to normalcy seemed an almost impossible task amid the worldwide chaos of the early 1930s. The deepen- ing economic depression had worsened the people's misery, and Machado's overthrow had released a wave of uncontrolled anger and anxiety. Looting and disorder were widespread in Havana, where armed bands sought out and executed Machado's henchmen. In rural areas, discontented peasants took over sugar mills and threatened wealthy landowners. Although the appointment of Cespedes as president did not end the crisis, it reduced political tensions and the level of armed conflict. An Attempt at Revolution, 1933-34 Machado's overthrow marked the beginning of an era of reform. The revolutionary wave that swept away the dictator- ship had begun to acquire the characteristics of a major revolu- tion. Although it lacked a defined ideology, this revolution was clearly aimed at transforming all phases of national life. The leaders of the "generation of 1930" were the best exponents of this reformist zeal. Espousing the usual anti-United States and nonintervention communist propaganda and advocating mea- sures of social and economic significance for the less privileged sectors of society, the students monopolized the rhetoric of rev- olution. Cespedes's refusal to abrogate the 1901 constitution, which was regarded as too closely modeled after the United States Constitution and ill-adapted to Cuba's cultural milieu, created a crisis. The Directorio, furthermore, linked Cespedes to the deposed dictator, pointing to his serving in Machado's first cabinet and living abroad as a diplomat. In September 1933, the unrest in Cuba's political picture again came to a head. Unhappy with both a proposed reduc- tion in pay and an order restricting their promotions, the lower echelons of the army, led by Sergeant-Stenographer Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar, invited the Directorio to meet with them at Camp Columbia in Havana on September 4. Batista's contact with Directorio leaders dated back to the anti-Machado strug- gle, when he had served as stenographer during some of the students' trials. By the time the students arrived at Camp Columbia, army discipline had collapsed. Sergeants were in command and had arrested numerous army officers. After con- sulting with Batista and the army, the Directorio agreed to Cespedes's overthrow and named ( five men to form a pentarchy (a five-member civilian executive commission) to head a provi- 44 Havana's Museum of the Revolution (Museo de la Revolucion) , formerly the Presidential Palace (El Palacio Presidencial) , home of President Fulgencio Batista until 1 959 sional government. That same night, Cespedes handed over the presidency to the five-member commission, which formally took possession of the Presidential Palace. September 4, 1933, was a turning point in Cuba's history. It marked the army's entrance as an organized force into the run- ning of government and Batista's emergence as self-appointed chief of the armed forces and the arbiter of Cuba's destiny for years to come. On that date, the students and the military, two armed groups accustomed to violence, united to rule Cuba. The marriage, however, was short-lived. A contest for suprem- acy soon began between the students and the military. Very few expected the students to win. The pentarchy's inability to rule the country became evident at once. The group lacked not only the support of the various political parties and groups, but also the support of the United States. The Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, sur- prised and confused by events on the island, refused to recog- nize the five-member government and rushed naval vessels to Cuban waters. When one member of the pentarchy promoted 45 Cuba: A Country Study Sergeant Batista to the rank of colonel without the required approval of the other four, another member resigned and the regime collapsed. In a meeting with Batista and the army on September 10, 1933, the Directorio appointed a university physiology professor, Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin (president, 1933-34, 1944-48), as provisional president. The new president had no political experience to qualify him for the job at such a crucial time. He had won the admira- tion of the students when in 1928 he allowed the expelled Directorio leaders to read their manifesto to his class. At a time when other professors refused the students' request, Grau's ges- ture gained for him a following at the university. While he was in jail in 1931, Grau and students met again and cemented their relationship. When the pentarchy collapsed, their old professor was the students' first choice. A witty and intelligent man, Grau projected a controversial image. He appeared inde- cisive and powerless, yet he was actually cunning and deter- mined. With Grau, the "generation of 1930" was catapulted into power. The students held Cuba's destiny in their hands. It was a unique spectacle indeed. Amidst thunder from the left and the right, and opposition from most political parties and personali- ties, the Directorio held daily meetings to shape governmental: policy. The Directorio leaders advocated several reforms. Now that Machado had been overthrown, they wanted to wipe out all ves- tiges of his regime, including corrupt, pro-Machado army offic- ers, politicians, office holders, and university professors. They called for a complete reorganization of Cuba's economic struc- ture, including revision of the foreign debt, tax reforms, and a national banking and currency system removing Cuba from monetary and financial dependence on the United States. Aware that the Piatt Amendment allowed for continuous United States interference, they sought its removal. The stu- dents also demanded agrarian reform and eventual national- ization of the sugar and mining industries. Finally, they wanted an autonomous university, sheltered from political interfer- ence. Grau's regime was the high-water mark of the revolutionary process and of the intense nationalism of the generation of 1930. Nationalist sentiment rather than radical doctrines domi- nated the regime's consideration of economic questions. The government was pro-labor and opposed the predominance of 46 Historical Setting foreign capital. Soon after coming to power, Grau abrogated the 1901 constitution, promulgated provisional statutes to gov- ern Cuba, and called for a constitutional convention with elec- tions subsequently set for April 1, 1934. He also demanded the abrogation of the Piatt Amendment, which was subsequently abrogated on May 29, 1934. Taking immediate action to elimi- nate Machado's followers from government positions, Grau appointed commissioners to "purge" government offices. Because the dictatorship had utilized the machinery of the old political parties, Grau issued a decree dissolving them. The gov- ernment also complied with one of the oldest demands of the university reform movement by granting the University of Havana autonomy from government control. With the island facing a mounting wave of strikes and social unrest, Grau implemented a popular and reformist program. On September 20, he issued a decree establishing a maximum working day of eight hours. On November 7, the government issued a decree on labor organization that sought to Cubanize the labor movement and restrict communist and Spanish influ- ences by limiting the role of foreign leaders. It required Cuban citizenship of all union officials, and all labor organizations were ordered to register with the Ministry of Labor. On the fol- lowing day, Grau signed the Nationalization of Labor Decree, popularly known as the "50 Percent Law." This law required that at least half the total working force of all industrial, com- mercial, and agricultural enterprises be composed of native Cubans (except for managers and technicians, who could not be supplanted by natives), and that half the total payroll be allotted to Cubans. Although these two decrees gained much labor support for the government and diminished communist influence in the unions, they also alienated the many Span- iards and other foreign minority groups living on the island. Grau's measures also aroused United States hostility. The United States viewed the unrest in Cuba with much concern. The overthrow of the United States-backed Cespedes regime was undoubtedly a defeat for President Roosevelt's policy toward Cuba in general and for Ambassador Sumner Welles's mediation efforts in particular. Grau's seizure of two United States-owned sugar mills that had been closed down because of labor troubles, and his temporary takeover of the Cuban Elec- tric Company because of rate disputes and additional labor problems, increased Washington's apprehension. 47 Cuba: A Country Study The United States refusal to recognize Grau complicated the many problems facing him because Cuban political leaders considered United States recognition as a key factor for the existence of any Cuban government. The United States policy condemning the Grau regime encouraged opposition groups and rebellious purged army officers. Opposition was strongest from the communists, the displaced army officers, and the ABC. Student leader Eduardo (Eddie) Chibas bitterly com- plained that although the Directorio had never used terrorism against the ABC-backed Cespedes regime, the ABC used it to combat Grau's government. The ABC seemed unhappy over their inability to obtain a share of power and feared that the consolidation of the Grau regime might exclude them from future political participation. Inner conflict in the government contributed to its instabil- ity. A faction led by student leader and Minister of Interior Antonio Guiteras advocated a continuation of the program of social reform. Strongly nationalistic and sincerely motivated, Guiteras initiated much of the regime's legislation, and many considered him the real brains behind Grau. Another faction, which was controlled by Batista and the army, wanted a conser- vative program that would bring about United States recogni- tion. Grau seemed to have been caught in the middle of these conflicting forces. On November 6, 1933, the Directorio, feel- ing that its mandate had expired, declared itself dissolved, announcing, however, that its members would continue to sup- port President Grau. By January 1934, it became evident that the regime would soon collapse. Student support was rapidly waning, the military conspired to take power, and Washington refused to recognize a regime that threatened its vested interests in Cuba. In addi- tion, industrial and commercial leaders opposed Grau's legisla- tion. Fearing that the government's program would attract labor support, the communists violently attacked Grau. A national teachers' strike for better wages further aggravated the already unstable situation. On January 14, Army Chief Fulgen- cio Batista forced President Grau to resign. Two days later, Batista appointed Carlos Mendieta as Cuba's provisional presi- dent. Within five days after Mendieta's accession to power, the United States recognized Cuba's new government. To the United States and to its ambassadors in Cuba — Sum- ner Welles and his successor, Jefferson Caffrey — Batista repre- sented order and progress under friendly rule. Welles had 48 Historical Setting been persistently hostile to Grau, distrusting his personality as well as his ideas and programs. He was fearful of the social and economic revolution that Grau was attempting to enact and the damage this might cause to United States interests in Cuba. Both Welles and Caffrey looked to Batista as the one leader capable of maintaining order while guaranteeing a friendly posture to the United States and its corporate interests in Cuba. The Failure of Reformism, 1944-52 Despite its short duration, the revolutionary process of 1933 had a profound impact on subsequent Cuban developments and events. It gave university students a taste of power, cata- pulted them into the mainstream of politics, and created an awareness among the students and the population at large of the need, as well as the possibility, for rapid and drastic change. It also weakened foreign domination of the economy and opened new opportunities for several national sectors hitherto prevented from obtaining a bigger share of the national wealth because of Spanish and North American presence and control. Furthermore, the state's involvement in the management of the economy was accelerated, and new impetus given to the rise of organized labor. But the failure of the revolution also convinced many that it would be almost impossible to bring profound structural changes to Cuba while the country remained friendly toward the United States. For the more radi- cal elements emerging out of the 1933 process, it became clear that only an anti-United States revolution that would destroy the Batista military could be successful in Cuba. In the years following Grau's overthrow, the "generation of 1930" experienced the harsh facts of Cuba's power politics. The students thought that Machado's overthrow would signal the beginning of a new era of morality and change. They learned differently. Dominated by the army, Cuba's political life returned to the corruption and old ways of the past. To govern Cuba, Batista chose as allies many of the old politicians expelled from power with Machado. Opportunistic and unscrupulous individuals assumed important government posi- tions, corruption continued, repression and terrorism flour- ished. The years of struggle and suffering seemed in vain. Students felt disillusioned and frustrated. Most abandoned their earlier idealism and found comfort in professional and business ventures. Some departed for foreign lands, never to 49 Cuba: A Country Study return. Others accepted radical ideologies such as communism or fascism. Several broke with their past and shared in the spoils of office. Desiring to continue fighting for their frus- trated revolution, many joined the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC), which was organized in February 1934. Taking their name from Martf's PRC of 1892, this group, also known as the Authentic Party, became the repository of revolu- tionary virtue. Former Directorio leaders joined the new party, and Grau, then living in exile in Mexico, was appointed presi- dent. The party's program called for economic and political nationalism, social justice, and civil liberties and emphasized the right of Cubans to share more fully in the country's eco- nomic resources. Although the party was silent on the question of peaceful or forceful methods of achieving power, Grau seemed at first to favor peaceful opposition to Mendieta and Batista. In the years that followed, Batista and the army all but domi- nated Cuba's political life. Until 1940, when he officially assumed the chief-executive office, securing his election through a coalition of political parties that included the com- munists, Batista maintained tight political control, ruling through puppet presidents. In addition to Mendieta, these included Jose A. Barnet y Vinageras (president, 1935-36), Miguel Mariano Gomez y Arias (president, 1936), and Federico Laredo Bru (president, 1936-40). Desiring to win popular sup- port and to rival the autenticos (members of the Authentic Party), Batista imitated his Mexican counterpart, General Lazaro Cardenas (president, 1934-40), by sponsoring an impressive body of welfare legislation. Public administration, health, sanitation, education, and public works improved. Workers were allowed to unionize and organize the Cuban Workers Federation (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba — CTC). Legislation to provide pensions, insurance, limited working hours, and minimum wages largely satisfied the workers' demands. Batista also made a serious effort to bring education and bet- ter living conditions to the countryside. Under his ambitious "civic-rural" program, numerous schools were built. Where teachers were lacking, he sent army personnel to fill their places. The Civic-Military Institute, which he established, pro- vided for the housing and education of the orphans of workers, soldiers, and peasants. In 1936 he issued the Sugar Coordina- tion Law, which protected the tenants of small sugar planta- 50 f It A view of the National Capitol ( Capitolio Nacional) Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations Development Programme tions against eviction. Although Batista and his associates continued the practice of pocketing some of the funds ear- marked for these projects, they nevertheless made a sincere attempt to improve the health and educational level of the rural population. In the late 1930s, Batista called for the drafting of a new con- stitution. With elections for a constitutional convention and for a new president in sight, politics took a more normal course. Grau himself, aware that violence would not bring him to power, returned from exile and engaged in electoral practices, thus legitimizing the Batista-supported regimes. When the convention convened in Havana in early 1940, Grau was chosen president of the assembly. Despite pressure from both right and left, work went smoothly, with Batista and Grau competing for popular support. But when Batista and 51 Cuba: A Country Study former President Menocal signed a political pact that left oppositionist groups in a minority position in the assembly, Grau resigned. Nevertheless, there was an unusual degree of cooperation among the various political groups, and the consti- tution was completed and proclaimed that same year. The constitution was in many respects the embodiment of the aspirations of the "generation of 1930." The president was to serve only one term of four years, although he might be reelected after eight years out of office. Many civil liberties and social welfare provisions were defined at great length. The state was to play a strong role in economic and social development. Workers were guaranteed paid vacations, minimum wages, and job tenure. Cuban nationals were to be favored over foreigners in the establishment of new industries. The University of Havana's autonomy received constitutional sanction in Article 53. The convention thus fulfilled one of the oldest demands of the students. Batista was the first president elected under the new consti- tution. Supported by a coalition of political parties and by the communists, he defeated his old rival Grau. His administration coincided with World War II, during which Cuba collaborated closely with the United States, declaring war on the Axis powers in 1941. The United States, in turn, increased aid and trade relations with Cuba. It granted Batista credits for agricultural development and for public works in Havana. Batista allowed for the establishment of a variety of United States military facil- ities on Cuban territory, and in early 1941 he concluded a sugar deal with the United States authorizing the sale of the whole harvest at $.0265 per pound. Many Cubans complained that the low price represented an excessive sacrifice for Cubans. This burden, combined with a series of war taxes that Batista had earlier imposed and shortages of finished goods and some food, caused much unhappiness among the popula- tion. Although Batista enjoyed wartime powers, his administration was short of dictatorial. He enjoyed the backing of the proper- tied classes, and he cultivated labor support. He also catered to the left, allowing the communists complete freedom of opera- tion. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the Cuban communists ended their denunciation of the United States as an imperialist power and began defending President Roosevelt as a "great statesman" and the war against Germany as a "just war." In 1944 the communists changed the name of 52 Historical Setting their party from Communist Revolutionary Union (Union Rev- olucionaria Comunista — URC) to the People's Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular — PSP) and issued a mild political program that called for racial equality and women's rights. The program failed, however, to attack the United States or even to request agrarian reform or large-scale nationalization of for- eign properties in Cuba. At the end of World War II, as Grau and the autenticos came to power, the organized use of violence took on an unprece- dented dimension. The relative calm of the war years suddenly ended, giving way to a violent and materialistic era. Urban vio- lence reappeared, now with tragic proportions. Although part of the generation that emerged out of World War II retained a redemptionist fanaticism and a desire to fulfill the aspirations of "the frustrated revolution," a still larger part evidenced an insatiable appetite for power and wealth, and a determination to obtain both regardless of obstacles. Violence-prone refugees of the Spanish Civil War also extended their activism and rival- ries to Cuba. Elected to the presidency in 1944, Grau followed a concilia- tory policy toward these groups and permitted their prolifera- tion, in many instances placing their leaders on government payrolls. Fearing the power of these gangs and their trouble- making capabilities if employed against the government, Grau allowed them almost complete freedom of action. This situa- tion continued under the presidency of Grau's protege, Carlos Prio Socarras (president, 1948-52). Elected in 1948, the former Directorio leader also avoided confronting his old friends and continued his predecessor's mild policies. A system of nepotism, favoritism, and gangsterism predomi- nated. Despite numerous accomplishments that included respect for human rights, freedom of the press, and a demo- cratic climate, the autenticos failed to provide the country with an honest government or to diversify Cuba's one-crop econ- omy The reformist zeal evident during Grau's first administra- tion had diminished considerably in the intervening decade. Grau himself seemed softened after years of exile and frustra- tion. He faced, furthermore, determined opposition in Con- gress and from conservative elements that had joined his party. Not only Grau, but many of the old student leaders of the "gen- eration of 1930," shared in the spoils of office. When con- fronted with the reality of Cuban politics, their early idealism and reformism gave way to materialism and opportunism. 53 Cuba: A Country Study For many, the autentlcos had failed to fulfill the aspirations of the anti-Machado revolution, especially in the area of adminis- trative honesty. Perhaps the Cubans expected too much too soon. The people still remembered the rapid reforms imple- mented during Grau's first administration and expected their continuation. Grau's failure to bring honesty and order to Cuba's public life and the presidential aspirations of Eduardo Chibas, an autentico congressman, produced a rift in the party. In 1947 Chibas and other autentico leaders formed the Cuban People's Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano — PPC), Orthodox (Orto- doxo) branch, also known as the Orthodox Party (Partido Ortodoxo) . Led by Chibas, a former student leader of the gen- eration of 1930, the PPC became the repository of the ideals of the "frustrated revolution" and the refuge of a new generation determined to transform those ideals into reality. By 1950 the ortodoxos (PPC members) had become a formi- dable political force. Although the party lacked a well-defined platform, its nationalistic program of economic independence, political liberty, social justice, and honest government, and its insistence upon remaining free from political pacts, had won for it a considerable following, especially among University of Havana students. With the slogan "vergilenza contra dinero" (honor versus money), Chibas, now an elected senator, pounded on the consciences of the Cubans in his Sunday radio programs and sought to awaken their minds to the corruption of the autentico administrations. Chibas monopolized the rheto- ric of revolution, becoming the exponent of the frustrated old generation and the leader of a new generation bent on bring- ing morality and honesty to Cuban public life. It was he more than anyone else who, with his constant exhortations, calls for reform, and attacks on Cuba's political leadership, paved the way for the Revolution that followed. One of those captivated by the Chibas mystique was Fidel Castro Ruz. As a student at the Jesuit Belen High School in Havana in the early 1940s, Castro fell under the particular influence of two of his teachers, who were admirers of Franco's Spain and his fascist Falangist ideology. While studying law at the University of Havana in the late 1940s, Castro participated in the activities of student gangs and associated closely with violent leaders. He soon acquired a rep- utation for personal ambition, forcefulness, and fine oratory. Yet he never became a prominent student leader. On several 54 Historical Setting occasions, he was defeated in student elections or prevented from winning by the nature of student politics. Castro, as did many Cubans, followed Chibas with enthusi- asm, regarding him as the only hope Cuba had of redeeming its political institutions and defending its sovereignty. Yet in one of the most bizarre episodes of Cuban political history, Chibas committed suicide in August 1951, at the end of his radio program. Chibas's death produced a feeling of shock and sadness among the masses. It also created a leadership vacuum, produced a rift in the Orthodox Party, and facilitated Batista's coup d'etat of March 10, 1952. By the time of Chibas's death, Cuba's political life was a sad spectacle. Although Carlos Prio Socorras, elected president in 1948, had introduced a number of reforms and gangsterism had diminished within the University of Havana, his adminis- tration resembled that of his predecessor. Politics came to be regarded by the Cuban people with disrespect. To become a politician was to enter into an elite, a new class apart from the interests of the people. The elected politicians did not owe alle- giance to their constituents, not even to their nation, but only to themselves and their unsatisfied appetites for power and for- tune. Political figures, furthermore, were the objects of popu- lar mockery. In particular, the image of the presidency was ridiculed and abused. Chibas's criticism, furthermore, helped to undermine not only the authority of the autenticos, destroy- ing what little prestige they still enjoyed, but also the stability of Cuba's already fragile political institutions. The breakdown in morale, respect, and values was aggravated by Batista's inter- ruption of constitutional government in 1952. What Cubans believed would never happen again — the return to military rule — became a reality. Background to Revolution, 1952-59 Convinced that he could not win the election scheduled for June 1952, Batista overthrew President Carlos Prio's regime in a bloodless and masterfully executed coup d'etat on March 10. The coup was almost entirely dependent on army backing and caught the Cuban population, as well as Prio and his followers, by surprise. Batista quickly consolidated his position by replac- ing dissenting army officers with his own loyal men, exiling or arresting key Prio supporters, and taking temporary control over the mass media. Prio himself sought asylum in the Mexi- can Embassy and later left the country. 55 Cuba: A Country Study The ease with which Batista took over underscored the weak- ness of Cuba's political institutions. The legislative branch was weak and permeated with corruption. Even the judiciary had lost prestige because of its subservient role to the executive branch. The ortodoxos were leaderless and had been largely ineffectual since Chibas's death. The autenticos corruption and inability to bring profound structural changes to the Cuban economy had cost them a good deal of support and discredited them in the eyes of many Cubans. The failure of this demo- cratic reformist party was perhaps the single most important factor contributing to the 1952 coup and the events that fol- lowed. By then the importance and power of the business commu- nity had grown significantly, helped in part by the rapid eco- nomic growth experienced by the island in the 1940s. World War II had paralyzed sugar production in many areas of Europe and Asia, making possible the further expansion of Cuba's sugar industry. At the same time, the deterioration of international trade during the war years gave Cuba an extraor- dinary amount of foreign exchange that would otherwise have gone toward the purchase of agricultural and industrial import items. All of this served to accelerate the diversification process in Cuba's economic development. Domestic production flour- ished, and other new productive activities were established. This circumstance was put to good use by Cuban entrepre- neurs, who began to occupy relatively important positions in the development of the island's economy. Yet despite this progress, the Cuban economy suffered from certain structural weaknesses that prevented any sustained period of rapid economic growth. Chief among these was an excessive concentration on sugar production and foreign trade, a critical dependency on one major buyer-supplier, sub- stantial unemployment and underemployment, and inequali- ties between urban and rural living standards. Despite the apparent support of business, labor, and peasant groups, Batista failed to develop an active base of political back- ing. Political loyalties were often the result of intimidation or expediency and for that reason were often short-lived. Batista's actual political base was now narrower than in the 1930s. Even within the armed forces, and particularly in the middle and lower echelons of the officer corps, there were numerous dis- gruntled ortodoxo and autentico officers who engaged in conspir- atorial activities against the regime. 56 Historical Setting The imposition of strict censorship by the Batista regime silenced all criticism. Opposition leaders were either jailed or exiled. Repression increased. The voices that clamored for a peaceful solution to the interruption of Cuba's constitutional process were soon drowned by voices clamoring for violence. Cuba again was submerged in terrorism and violence, a vio- lence that finally culminated in a major revolution. Opposition developed from various sectors. Numerous orto- doxos, a faction of the Authentic Party under Grau, and most of Cuba's politicians peacefully opposed Batista, hoping for an honest election. Another faction of the autenticos, together with several Ortodoxo leaders, went underground and began plot- ting insurrectionary activities. The active banner of rebellion, however, was to be carried by university students. Students laid aside their rivalries, directing all their efforts against the new regime. Militant anti-Batista stu- dent leaders emerged with effective political power, not only in the student community, but nationally as well. During the first three years of Batista's rule, student opposition was limited to sporadic riots, demonstrations, and protests. Although at the time these unorganized acts may have seemed unimportant, they did help awaken the minds of Cubans to the increasingly oppressive nature of Batista's regime and thus paved the way for the insurrection that followed. A small faction within the ortodoxos advocated violence as the correct tactic to combat Batista. Fidel Castro belonged to this group. After receiving his law degree from the University of Havana in 1950, he joined the party and was nominated to run as an ortodoxo candidate to the House of Representatives in the aborted 1952 election. Batista's coup thwarted Castro's ambi- tions for a parliamentary career, and Castro began organizing a small group of followers for his ill-fated attack on the Moncada military barracks in Oriente Province on July 26, 1953. Expecting army discipline to be low, Castro and his group planned a surprise attack to capture the Moncada barracks. The attack would coincide with a vigorous publicity campaign projecting the movement as an ortodoxo uprising supported by pro-ortodoxo army officers. Castro hoped for sufficient confu- sion to paralyze the army and thus prevent it from reacting against the rebels. Batista would then be forced to resign, and the ortodoxos would be catapulted into power with Castro as the party's undisputed leader. In reality, the party was not con- 57 Cuba: A Country Study suited, and its leaders were informed of Castro's plans only the day before the Moncada assault. Castro's Moncada attack ended in disaster. The garrison's discipline was not relaxed, and the army fought back the attack. Some of the attackers failed even to enter the military barracks. Those who did were massacred. Castro himself escaped to the mountains, only to be captured and sentenced to prison. In "History Will Absolve Me," his speech before the tribunal that sentenced him, Castro outlined his political program. He associated his movement with the ideals of Marti and Chibas and called for reforms that were within the mainstream of Cuba's political tradition. At no time during his struggle against Batista did Castro outline a program that departed from Cuba's political tradition. Although the most radical ele- ments of the revolutionary leadership thought that Cuba needed major economic changes that would cure the ills of monoculture, unemployment and underemployment, and dependence, most of the oppositionist leaders to Batista wanted political changes. None of these groups offered a pro- gram along Marxist lines. The great majority of the Cuban peo- ple who supported the anti-Batista struggle were hoping for a return to the constitution of 1940, honesty in government, and an end to violence. Cuba's small communist party, the PSP (People's Socialist Party), also opposed Batista, but through peaceful means. Since the 1930s, when it supported the Machado dictatorship, the party had lost prestige and membership and was a weak, ineffectual contender in the political process. Now, as a result of the international situation, particularly the pressure of the United States, the communists were unable to arrive at a modus vivendi with Batista. Not until very late in the anti- Batista struggle did the communists join the revolutionary forces, and even then their participation contributed little to the final overthrow of the regime. The mock election of November 1954, from which Batista, running unopposed, emerged victorious, placed Cuba at a dan- gerous crossroads. The opposition wanted a new election, while Batista insisted on remaining in power until his new term expired in 1958. Government officials and oppositionist lead- ers met throughout 1955 in an attempt to find a compromise. The failure to reach an agreement forced the Cuban people 58 Historical Setting reluctantly onto a road leading to civil war, chaos, and revolu- tion. The students reacted violently to the failure of political groups to find a peaceful solution. At the end of 1955, a series of riots shocked the country. On November 27, the FEU orga- nized a ceremony to honor the memory of eight students shot by Spanish authorities in 1871. Rioting quickly spread to Havana. On April 21, a group of university students stoned a TV station where a government-sponsored youth program was being televised. Several participants were wounded. A police cordon was thrown around the grounds of the University of Havana, and, on the pretext of searching for hidden arms, gov- ernment forces entered the university, demolishing the rector's office and destroying documents, scientific equipment, and furnishings. Batista replied to the moral indignation of univer- sity authorities and students by declaring that the autonomy of the university was limited to educational, administrative, and internal affairs; when subversive political elements were entrenched within the university, the government must enforce law and order. Instead of seeking to discourage rebellion and demonstra- tions, particularly from university students, by moderation, the regime encouraged it by meeting terrorism with a counterter- rorism that defeated its own ends. No better method could have been devised to increase the bitterness and opposition of the people. Each murder produced another martyr and new adherents to the struggle against Batista. By the end of 1955, the leaders of the FEU realized that the efforts of nonpartisan organizations to reconcile government and opposition were futile. They proposed the creation of an insurrectionary move- ment to lead the struggle against Batista. When the FEU pro- posal found little response among the electorally oriented politicians, the students formed their own clandestine organi- zation — the Revolutionary Directorate. While student riots and demonstrations were going on, other Cubans not connected with student activities were plot- ting to unseat Batista. A group known as Montecristi plotted with army officers to overthrow the regime, but Batista uncov- ered the conspiracy and arrested its principal instigators in April 1956. That same month, another group, belonging to Prio's Authentic Organization (Organizacion Autentica), unsuccessfully attacked the Goicuria army barracks in Matan- 59 Cuba: A Country Study zas Province. From jail, Fidel Castro exhorted his supporters to organize and to cooperate with other groups. In 1956 Castro was released from jail and traveled to the United States seeking funds for the revolutionary cause and organizing his followers into the Twenty-Sixth of July Move- ment (Movimiento 26 de Julio), an organization named after his ill-fated Moncada attack. In December 1956, Castro and a group of more than eighty young revolutionaries, including his brother Raul and an Argentine physician, Ernesto "Che" Gue- vara, left from Mexico in the small yacht Granma and landed in Oriente Province. There, underground commando groups had attacked several military installations, touching off a wave of sabotage throughout the province. Terrorism flared, and bombs exploded. Underground cells derailed trains and sabo- taged power lines, blacking out entire towns. By the time that Fidel Castro landed on December 2, how- ever, the uprising was well on its way to being crushed, and most of the leaders of Castro's Twenty-Sixth of July Movement were either dead or in jail. In response to the uprising, Batista suspended constitutional guarantees and established tighter censorship of news. The dreaded military police patrolled the streets of Havana day and night, rounding up suspected revolu- tionary elements. When Castro found that his actions were not supported by the general public, the army, or regular opposi- tion parties, he and about a dozen survivors found refuge in the Sierra Maestra mountain range and from there began wag- ing guerrilla warfare against the regime. Despite the instability of the late 1930s, the fall of Machado had ushered in almost two decades of political freedom and constitutional government. The students and the Cuban peo- ple in general saw Batista's regime as only a temporary inter- ruption of Cuba's democratic political development and as the consequence of Batista's own ambitions for power and Pno's corrupt rule rather than a symptom of more profound national problems. The elimination of Batista's dictatorship became the pana- cea to cure all of Cuba's ills. This simplistic thinking served Fidel Castro's purposes well during his stay in the Sierra Maes- tra. Lacking a well-defined ideology, he proclaimed the over- throw of the regime as the nation's sole, overriding task, advocating only the most obvious popular reforms. The Revolutionary Directorate, together with several auten- tico leaders, planned to overthrow the government by assassi- 60 Fidel Castro flanked by Raul Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos at a Rebel Army camp in the Sierra Maestra Courtesy Library of Congress 61 Cuba: A Country Study nating Batista. Student leaders reasoned that such fast, decisive action would cause the regime to crumble and prevent unnec- essary loss of life in a possible civil war. On March 13, 1957, in one of the boldest actions of the anti-Batista rebellion, a group of forty men stormed the presidential palace in the center of Havana and almost succeeded in killing Batista. Fidel Castro, from his hideout in the mountains, criticized the students' attack. In a taped interview shown in the United States in May, Castro called it "a useless waste of blood. The life of the dictator is of no importance. Here in the Sierra Maestra is where to fight." Throughout his stay in the mountains, Castro opposed a military coup, the assassination of Batista, or any other violent act by a group not directly under the control of his Twenty-Sixth of July Movement. The defeat suffered at the presidential palace and the death of student leader Jose A. Echeverria, perhaps the most popular figure opposing Batista, during a simultaneous attack on a Havana radio station left the Revolutionary Directorate leader- less and disorganized. Almost a year went by before the organi- zation recovered from the blow, and even then it never regained the prestige and importance that it had enjoyed prior to the palace assault. While the Revolutionary Directorate declined, Castro, unchallenged in the mountains, grew in pres- tige, strength, and following. He gained adherents in the cities and won to his side many discontented elements who, whatever differences they might have had with his Twenty-Sixth of July Movement, found no other insurrectionary organization to join. Corroded by disaffection, corruption, and internal disputes, the army was unable to defeat the guerrillas during Batista's final year in power. This inability increased the guerrillas' pres- tige and contributed to the internal demoralization of the armed forces. The guerrillas had certain other advantages over the army. For years the peasantry in the Sierra Maestra had been terrified by Batista's Rural Guard (Guardia Rural), and they welcomed the protection and promises offered by Castro and his group. The knowledge of the terrain and the intelli- gence provided by these allies proved invaluable. In addition, the guerrillas operated in extremely mobile units in a vast and rugged terrain. The Cuban army was not trained in guerrilla tactics and also lacked the military leadership capable of carry- ing out this type of warfare against highly motivated guerrilla fighters. For many of the urban youth who joined Castro in the 62 Historical Setting mountains, there was a sort of mystique in being a guerrilla, fighting for a just cause against an oppressive regime, and liv- ing in a rural environment. Finally, the guerrillas were sup- ported by an urban network that supplied manpower, weapons, money, and other necessary aid. Guerrilla warfare in the rural areas was accompanied by increased sabotage and terror in the cities. A large and loosely related urban resistance movement developed throughout the island. Underground cells of the Twenty-Sixth of July Move- ment, the closely allied Civic Resistance Movement (Movi- miento Civico Revolucionario — MCR), the Revolutionary Directorate, and the autenticos conducted bombings, sabotage, and kidnappings, as well as distributed propaganda. These actions undermined the foundations of the government and helped to create the atmosphere of civil war. This urban underground developed into the backbone of the anti-Batista struggle. It was the work of the urban under- ground more than anything else that brought about the down- fall of the regime. The action of these groups provoked Batista and his repressive forces into such extreme retaliatory mea- sures that the Cuban population became almost totally alien- ated from the regime. United States policy also contributed somewhat to the grow- ing demoralization within the military. Although the United States had supported the Batista regime, by the fall of 1957 the United States government began holding up shipments of weapons and munitions. An arms embargo was publicly announced in March 1958. Although these arms shipments were small and from Batista's point of view not decisive in the struggle against Castro, they did represent a sign of continuous backing for his administration. Thus, when the embargo was declared, many Cubans saw it as a change in Washington's pol- icy, indicating disapproval and withdrawal of support for the regime. United States actions were undoubtedly a strong blow to the declining morale of the Batista regime and of the armed forces in particular. The regime was further weakened when several institutions and sectors of Cuban society began a progressive withdrawal of their support. The church, professional and business groups, and the press exerted pressure on the government to allow a peaceful solution. At first they advocated free elections with absolute guarantees for all political parties, but the rigged elec- tion of November 1958, in which Batista's hand-picked candi- 68 Cuba: A Country Study date, Andres Rivero Agiiero, won the presidency for a new four- year term, convinced many that violence was the only means of eliminating Batista's rule. The army's refusal at the end of 1958 to continue fighting dealt the final blow to a crumbling regime. The Cuban Revolution, 1959- Fidel Castro Takes Charge When Batista and his closest allies escaped to the Dominican Republic in the early hours of January 1, 1959, power lay in the streets. Of the several groups that fought the Batista regime, the Twenty-Sixth of July Movement had an almost undisputed claim to fill the vacuum left by the dictator. Castro's charisma and his revolutionary prestige made him, in the eyes of the Cuban people, the logical occupant of Batista's vacant chair; he was the man of the hour, the new messiah. The other insurrec- tionary organizations lacked the mystique, the widespread sup- port, and the organized cadres of Castro's movement. Castro had unquestionable qualities of leadership. Endowed with an extraordinary gift of oratory and an exceptional mem- ory, he would speak extemporaneously for hours. Like Marti had done years earlier, Castro lectured the Cubans on the evils of their society and the need for profound and rapid changes. The overwhelming majority of the Cubans accepted his leader- ship enthusiastically. The atmosphere of gloom that had pre- vailed during the Batista era was now converted into euphoria and hope for the future. Even those who had failed to partici- pate in the anti-Batista struggle fervently joined the revolution- ary ranks with a feeling of guilt for their past behavior. During the first few weeks in power, Castro assumed no offi- cial position except commander of the armed forces. His hand- picked president, former Judge Manuel Urrutia, organized a government, appointing a civilian cabinet composed mainly of prominent anti-Batista political figures. Urrutia then pro- ceeded to tear down Batista's governmental structure. It soon became clear, however, that real power lay with Fidel and his youthful Rebel Army officers. In public addresses, Cas- tro announced major public policies without consultation with the Urrutia cabinet and complained of the slowness of reforms. In mid-February, Prime Minister Jose Miro Cardona resigned in favor of Castro, and by October Castro had forced Urrutia to resign and had replaced him with Oswaldo Dorticos 64 Four Batista men (among seventy-one executed the next day) on summary trial on Sunday, January 11, 1 959, with Rebel Army members in the audience Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington Torrado (president, 1959-76), an obscure lawyer and former communist party member. Fidel Castro's formal assumption of power initiated a period of increased radicalization. Some of Batista's more prominent military and civilian leaders were immediately and publicly brought to trial before revolutionary tribunals, and the pro- ceedings were televised; hundreds were executed summarily. Faced with mounting criticism, the regime ended these public trials but continued them in private, while also confiscating property of Batista supporters or collaborators. On May 17, 1959, the first Agrarian Reform Law was passed. It required expropriation of farm lands larger than 404 hect- ares and forbade land ownership by foreigners. The law, together with a sharp reduction in urban rents, marked the beginning of the rapid confiscatory phase of the Revolution, 65 Cuba: A Country Study which lasted until the formal establishment of the socialist economy in April 1961, when Castro proclaimed that the Revo- lution was socialist. The revolutionary leadership aimed at agri- cultural diversification and industrialization, thus hoping to lessen dependence upon sugar. They also sought to weaken United States economic presence and influence in Cuba by confiscating foreign and domestic enterprises. Natural resources, utility companies, the credit system, and most large and medium industries fell into the hands of the government. As a result of these actions and the Agrarian Reform Law, the upper classes were wiped out, and middle-class families lost most of their income-producing property. Many emigrated, particularly to the United States, or were absorbed into the larger proletariat created by the Revolution. A gradual take- over of the mass communication media and the educational system also took place, and both became powerful tools of the state apparatus. In addition, the government initiated a pro- gram of low-income housing and a massive literacy campaign, which, according to official claims, has wiped out the 30 per- cent illiteracy rate that existed prior to the Revolution. New equal educational and employment opportunities offered to women had the effect of undermining the family, one of the most important conservers of the old order. Rela- tions between husband and wife were undermined, and the family largely lost control of the children. Large numbers of children attended free boarding schools and saw their parents for only short periods of time during the year. There was, therefore, not only frequent separation of husband and wife because of the work demands of the Revolution, but also sepa- ration of parents from children (see The Family Institution, ch. 2) . The regime systematically encouraged these developments, perhaps aware that the only way to develop Cuba's new socialist man was through the destruction of culture-transmitting insti- tutions, such as the family and the church. During the 1960s, the Castro government sharply curtailed the power and influ- ence of the church (see The Roman Catholic Church, ch. 2). In February 1960, the regime created a Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificacion — -Juceplan) to plan and direct the country's economic development. For the most part, the board adopted the organizational models followed by East European countries and transformed Cuba's private enterprise system into a centralized state-controlled economy. The trans- formation resulted in disorganization, bureaucratic chaos, inef- 66 Historical Setting ficiency, and growing shortages. Agricultural production declined sharply, partly as a result of neglect and Castro's plan for industrialization, and by 1961 food rationing was intro- duced for the first time in Cuba's history. The growing radicalization of the regime was accompanied by the destruction of possible opposition and by the growth in influence of the PSP. Political parties were not permitted to function, with the exception of the communist PSP, which later merged with Castro's own Twenty-Sixth of July Movement and adopted the party's original name, the PCC. Abetted by Castro, communists progressively occupied important positions in the government, gaining in prestige and influence. As a result, former Castro allies became disenchanted with the Revolution, believing that Castro had betrayed the ideals that he espoused while in the mountains. Evidently, Castro saw significant advantages in using the PSP. The party provided the trained, disciplined, and organized cadres that Castro's movement lacked. But more importantly, the party had Moscow's ear, and therefore could serve as the bridge for any possible Cuban-Soviet rapprochement. Castro knew well that as he developed an anti-American revolution and insisted on remaining in power, a conflict with the United States would ensue. Only the protective umbrella of the Soviet Union could defend him against possible United States pres- sures or attack. No other power, Castro reasoned, could or would confront the United States over Cuba. Ideologically, Fidel Castro was far from being a Marxist. Although strongly influenced by Falangist and fascist ideas while a high school student, and by Marxist ideas while at the University of Havana, Castro embraced none of these ideolo- gies and was instead more a product of the Marti-Chibas tradi- tion, although he broke with it in several fundamental respects. Whereas Marti and Chibas had envisioned reforms in a demo- cratic framework in a nation politically and economically inde- pendent of the United States, they both advocated friendly relations with the "northern colossus." Castro did not. He had been anti-United States since his student days, when he distrib- uted anti-United States propaganda in Bogota, Colombia, in 1948. Perhaps because of his anti-North Americanism, and par- ticularly his conviction that a major revolution with himself in absolute control could not be undertaken within Cuba's politi- cal framework and in harmony with the United States, Castro broke with the Marti-Chibas tradition. 67 Cuba: A Country Study Initially, the United States, which recognized the Castro gov- ernment on January 7, 1959, followed a "wait and see" policy. The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration seemed to have been caught by surprise over events in Cuba and failed to grasp the magnitude of the changes going on or the nature of the leader sponsoring those changes. Differences arose between those who, believing that Castro was a Marxist, advocated a hard line toward Cuba and those who counseled patience with him. Although tensions arose in connection with the public trials and executions of Batista supporters, serious differences did not emerge until after the Agrarian Reform Law had been pro- mulgated. The United States protested, to no avail, the expro- priations of United States properties without compensation that were initiated under the law. Agricultural expropriations were followed by additional expropriations of foreign invest- ments, notably in the mining and petroleum industry. Compli- cating the relations between the two countries were arrests of United States citizens, Castro's refusal to meet with United States Ambassador Philip W. Bonsai in late 1959, and the sabo- tage and raids carried out against the Castro government by Cuban exiles operating from United States territory. Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and Raul Castro believed that the political, social, and economic conditions that had produced their Revolution in Cuba existed in other parts of Latin Amer- ica and that revolutions would occur throughout the conti- nent. From 1960 onward, Cuban agents and diplomatic representatives established contact with revolutionary groups in the area and began distributing propaganda and aid. Several Cuban diplomats were expelled for interfering in the internal affairs of the countries to which they were accredited. As ten- sions mounted between the United States and Cuba, Fidel Cas- tro's assertion of the international character of his Revolution increased, as did his involvement in promoting violence in Latin America. By July 1960, Castro was boasting that he would convert "the cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of Latin America," and money, propaganda, men, and weapons began to flow from Havana in increasing quantities to foment the "antiimperialist" revolution. The radicalization of the Revolution and the deterioration of relations with the United States grew apace with Cuban- Soviet rapprochement. During the February 4-13, 1960, visit to Havana of Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, Cuba 68 Cuban government officials, including Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Raul Castro, Fidel Castro, and President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, lead the May Day parade, May 1, 1961. Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington signed a major commercial agreement with the Soviet Union. The agreement provided that Cuba would receive, among other products, Soviet oil in exchange for sugar. Formal diplo- matic relations between the two countries were established on May 8, 1960. That April and May, the Cuban government nationalized major foreign businesses, including the transpor- tation, banking, communications, and educational systems and the media. On June 28, the Castro regime confiscated United States-owned oil refineries without compensation. On July 26, Castro issued the "Declaration of Havana," claiming Cuba's right to export revolution and calling for Soviet support. Nationalization of United States- and other foreign-owned property in Cuba began on August 6. And on October 13, the Castro government expropriated most Cuban-owned busi- nesses. In October the United States announced an embargo on most exports to Cuba, and when Castro restricted the staff of the United States embassy to eleven persons, the United 69 Cuba: A Country Study States, on January 3, 1961, severed diplomatic relations and withdrew its ambassador. By then the United States had embarked on a more aggres- sive policy toward the Castro regime. Groups of Cuban exiles were being trained, under the supervision of United States offi- cials, in Central American camps for an attack on Cuba. The internal situation on the island then seemed propitious for an attempt to overthrow the Cuban regime. Although Castro still counted on significant popular support, that support had pro- gressively decreased. His own Twenty-Sixth of July Movement was badly split on the issue of communism. Also, a substantial urban guerrilla movement existed throughout the island, com- posed of former Castro allies, Batista supporters, Catholic groups, and other elements that had been affected by the Rev- olution, and significant unrest was evident within the armed forces. The Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 17-19, 1961, was a tragedy of errors. Although the Cuban government did not know the date or the exact place where the exile forces would land, the fact that an invasion was in the offing was known both within and outside of Cuba. The weapons and ammunition that were to be used by the invading force were all placed in one ship, which was sunk the first day of the invasion. The site for the invasion was sparsely populated, surrounded by swamps, and offered little access to nearby mountains, where guerrilla oper- ations could be carried out if the invasion failed. The invading forces could, therefore, all but discount any help from the nearby population. At the last minute, a confused and indecisive President John F. Kennedy canceled some of the air raids by Cuban exiles that were intended to cripple Castro's air force. Perhaps trying to reassert his authority over the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) -sponsored invasion, to stymie possible world reaction, or to appease the Soviets, Kennedy ordered no further United States involvement. The failure of the invasion and the brutal repression that fol- lowed smashed the entire Cuban underground. On the first day of the invasion, the regime arrested thousands of real and suspected oppositionists. The resistance never recovered from that blow. His regime strengthened and consolidated, Fidel Castro emerged victorious and boasted of having defeated a "Yankee-sponsored invasion." The disillusionment and frustra- tion caused by the Bay of Pigs disaster among anti-Castro 70 Historical Setting forces, both inside and out of Cuba, prevented the growth of significant organized opposition. Meanwhile, United States prestige in Latin America and throughout the world sank to a low point. Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the United States turned to other methods of dealing with Fidel Castro. It pursued a vigor- ous, although only partially successful, policy to isolate the Cuban regime and strangle it economically. The nation pres- sured its allies throughout the world to reduce their commerce with Cuba. In the Organization of American States (OAS — see Glossary) , the United States forced the expulsion of Cuba by a slim majority in January 1962, and several countries broke dip- lomatic relations with the Castro regime at this time. In 1964, after Castro had increased subversive activities in Latin Amer- ica and had moved fully into the socialist camp, the OAS voted to suspend trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba; except for Mexico, all countries that had not already done so severed relations. The single most important event accelerating Soviet military involvement in Cuba was the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The failure of the United States to act decisively against Castro gave the Sovi- ets some illusions about United States determination and inter- est in Cuba. The Kremlin leaders now perceived that further economic and even military involvement in Cuba would not entail any danger to the Soviet Union itself and would not seri- ously jeopardize United States-Soviet relations. This view was further reinforced by President Kennedy's apologetic attitude concerning the Bay of Pigs invasion and his generally weak per- formance during his summit meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. The Soviets moved swiftly. New trade and cultural agree- ments were signed, and increased economic and technical aid was sent to Cuba. By mid-1962 the Soviets had embarked on a dangerous gamble by surreptitiously introducing nuclear mis- siles and bombers into the island. Through these actions, Khrushchev and the Kremlin leadership hoped to alter the bal- ance of power and force the United States to accept a settle- ment of the German issue. A secondary and perhaps less important motivation was to extend to Cuba the Soviet nuclear umbrella and thus protect Castro from any further hostile actions by the United States. On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy publicly reacted to the Soviet challenge, instituting a naval blockade of the island 71 Cuba: A Country Study and demanding the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba. For the next several days, the world teetered on the brink of nuclear holocaust. Finally, after a hectic exchange of correspondence, Khru- shchev agreed to remove the missiles and bombers, and to allow unsupervised inspection of the removal in exchange for the United States' pledge not to invade Cuba. Although Castro refused to allow a United Nations inspection, the missiles and bombers were removed under United States aerial surveil- lance, and the crisis ended. The United States has never pub- licly acknowledged that it pledged not to invade Cuba, but subsequent United States policies indicate that a United States- Soviet understanding was reached over Cuba that included a United States "hands off policy toward the island. The missile crisis had a significant impact on the countries involved. Although it led to a thaw in United States-Soviet rela- tions, it significantly strained Cuban-Soviet relations. Castro was not consulted throughout the negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and the unilateral Soviet withdrawal of the missiles and bombers wounded Castro's pride and pres- tige. It was a humiliating experience for the Cuban leader, who was relegated throughout the crisis to a mere pawn on the chessboard of international politics. Castro defiantly rejected the United States-Soviet understanding and publicly ques- tioned Soviet willingness and determination to defend the Rev- olution. After the missile crisis, Fidel Castro increased contacts with communist China, exploiting the Sino-Soviet dispute and pro- claiming his intention of remaining neutral and maintaining fraternal relations with all socialist states. Cuba also signed vari- ous trade and cultural agreements with Beijing, and Castro grew increasingly friendly toward the Chinese, praising their more militant revolutionary posture. He also defied the Sovi- ets, as he joined the Chinese in refusing to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963). All of this maneuvering somewhat increased Castro's leverage with the Soviets and gained him more assistance. The Chinese honeymoon was short-lived, however. In 1966 Fidel Castro blasted the Chinese for reducing rice shipments to Cuba below the quantities that Castro alleged had been agreed on between the two countries. He described Mao Tse-tung's ideological statements as lightweight, called for the creation of a "council of elders" to prevent aged leaders from "putting 72 A medium-range ballistic missile site in San Cristobal, Pinar del Rio Province, on October 23, 1962 The Soviet cargo vessel Anosov, carrying eight missile transporters with canvas-covered missiles, departs Cuba on November 7, 1 962. Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 73 Cuba: A Country Study their whims into effect when senility has taken hold of them," and threatened to handle Chinese diplomats the same way "we handle the American Embassy." By then Castro had also become disappointed with China's attitude toward Vietnam and by its propaganda efforts to sway Cubans to its side in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Castro's insistence on absolute control of the revolutionary movement in Latin America and his aware- ness of China's limitations in supplying Cuba's economic needs were further key factors in the cooling of the friendship between the two nations. Subsequently, relations became more cordial, but never reached the closeness achieved before 1966 (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). Revolutionary Adventurism and Institutionalization Revolutionary Adventurism The principal area of Soviet-Cuban conflict in the early 1960s was Fidel Castro's revolutionary ventures in Latin Amer- ica, beginning with his attempt in 1963 to subvert and over- throw the Venezuelan government and his guerrilla operations in Guatemala and Bolivia. Castro's attempts at revolution all ended in disaster, however. His failures weakened his leverage with the Soviets, increased Soviet influence with Cuba, and forced him to look inward to improve his faltering economy. In the early 1970s, Castro's speeches played down the notion of Latin American revolution; Castro had come to recognize that there were "different roads to power." Although not com- pletely renouncing his original goal of exporting his own brand of communism, he became more selective in furnishing Cuban support. The overthrow of the Salvador Allende Gossens regime in Chile in September 1973, however, marked a turning point for the Cuban-inspired revolutionary struggle in Latin America. The Cuban leadership examined its strategy and tactics in the area and concluded that the way to power in Latin America was not through ballots but through bullets. Beginning in the mid- 1970s, Castro increased his support to select groups, particu- larly in Central America, providing them with propaganda material, training, advisers, financial help, and ultimately weap- ons. An acceleration of the revolutionary armed struggle in the area followed. The acceleration coincided with the United States debacle in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. The inability of United 74 Historical Setting States administrations to respond swiftly and decisively to con- ditions in Central America, as well as in other parts of the world, and to the Soviet-Cuban challenge in Africa, embold- ened the Cuban leader. More than 40,000 Cuban troops, sup- ported by Soviet equipment, were transferred to Africa in order to bring to power communist regimes in Angola and Ethiopia. Encouraged by Cuban-Soviet victories in Angola and Ethio- pia, the Castro regime focused its attention on the rapidly dete- riorating conditions in Nicaragua. Cuba, together with Panama and Venezuela, increased support to the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional — FSLN), the principal guerrilla group opposing the Anastasio Somoza regime. In July 1979, Somoza fled and the FSLN rode victorious into Managua. The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua stands as an imposing monument to Cuban strategy and ambitions in the hemi- sphere. The overthrow of Somoza gave the Castro line its most important boost in two decades. It vindicated, although belat- edly, Castro's ideological insistence on violence and guerrilla warfare as the correct strategy to attain power in Latin Amer- ica. Castro's long-held belief that the political, social, and eco- nomic conditions that had produced the Revolution in Cuba existed or could be created in other parts of Latin America, and that revolution would occur throughout the continent, seemed at last justified. From that time on, the tempo of Cuban-supported violence accelerated in Central America. Aided by an extensive network of intelligence, military forces, and sophisticated propaganda machinery, the Cuban government increased its support to var- ious groups in the area. In cooperation with Sandinista leaders, Cuba aided insurgent groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. Castro's commitment to revolutionary violence had been reinforced once again, showing convincingly that the Cuban leadership was willing to seize opportunities and take risks to expand its influence and power. Cuban-Soviet Rapprochement By the late 1960s, the Cuban economy was plagued by low productivity, mismanagement, poor planning, and shortages of almost every item (see Structure of the Economy, ch. 3). Struc- tural shortcomings seemed more entrenched than ever. The ills of the past were still there, with renewed vengeance. Long- 75 Cuba: A Country Study term trade agreements with the Soviets were perpetuating Cuba's role as a sugar producer, forcing the country to aban- don indefinitely any plans for significant diversification and industrialization. Trade continued with one large industrial- ized nation, whose commercial policies reminded Castro of those pursued by Cuba's previous trading partner, the United States. Cuba's foreign debt also reached alarming proportions without significant improvements in the island's ability to save foreign exchange. The unemployment of the pre-Castro era gave way to a new type of unemployment in the form of poor labor productivity, absenteeism, and an ineffective and over- staffed bureaucracy. In response to the situation, the regime resorted to coercive methods to ensure a labor supply for criti- cal agricultural tasks. The living standard of Cubans also deteri- orated, as high capital accumulation was given first priority over consumer goods. In its second decade, the Cuban Revolution faced critical problems. Internally, mounting economic difficulties inspired a new frenzy of planning activity and greater regimentation in the hope of stimulating productivity. One result was the expanded influence of the military in society, and its increas- ingly important role in both economic and political life. The party, which had remained weak and ineffective throughout the 1960s, was enlarged and strengthened its efforts to spread its influence throughout society. Meanwhile, the regime con- tinued to pursue its aim of transforming Cuba in accordance with a new set of values and with the ultimate end of creating a new socialist citizen. Externally, the Cuban leadership attempted to break out of its isolation in Latin America, became selective in its support of revolutionary movements in the area, moved even closer to the Soviet Union, increased its influence on the Nonaligned Movement (see Glossary), and embarked on a series of successful military interventions, pri- marily on the African continent. Although past Cuban-Soviet relations had been punctuated by frequent instances of Castro's insubordination and attempts to assert his independence, in mid-1968 relations entered a period of close collaboration and friendliness. A turning point occurred in August 1968, when Castro supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a response dictated primarily by political and economic considerations. In the early 1970s, Soviet military and economic aid increased substantially, and Cuba moved closer to the Soviet 76 Soviet rocket-launch vehicles in the fourth anniversary parade in Havana on January 2, 1 963 Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington Union, becoming in 1972 a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA; also known as Comecon — see Glossary) . The result was greater direct Soviet influence on the island. During this period, Soviet technicians became exten- sively involved in managerial and planning activities at the national level. The total number of Soviet military and techni- cal advisers increased considerably, and numerous economic advisers arrived. Of special significance were long-term agree- ments between Cuba and the Soviet Union that geared the Cuban economy to the Soviet economic plans. A new Inter- Governmental Coordinating Committee was also established, giving the Kremlin considerable leverage over Cuban develop- ments. Institutionalization In an attempt to increase economic efficiency and in line with Soviet objectives, the PCC was expanded and strength- ened in the 1970s. The aim was greater party conformity to the needs of a socialist society, with principal emphasis on a higher 77 Cuba: A Country Study level of ideological training and the acquisition of specialized knowledge by party members. During the early period, the party remained small, disorga- nized, and relegated to a secondary position vis-a-vis the mili- tary. It lacked a clear and defined role. Internal leadership and coordination remained poor, and meetings were few and of questionable value. Evidently, Castro saw little need for a well- developed party structure, which would have reduced or at least rivaled his style of personalista (personalism — see Glossary) leadership. Conflict between old-guard communists and Fidelistas also created tension and prevented the development of a strong organization. Competition from the military or the bureaucracy took the best talents away from the party. These cadres saw better opportunities for advancement in those other sectors than in a party riddled with factionalism and not warmly supported by the Uder mdximo (maximum leader) . The decade of the 1970s was one of expansion and consoli- dation for the party. During the first half of the decade, mem- bership expanded from some 55,000 in 1969 to 202,807 at the time of the First Party Congress in 1975. During the second half, the rapid rate of expansion slowed down somewhat. By the time of the Second Party Congress in 1980, there were fewer than 400,000 members and candidates. At the Third Party Congress (1986), Castro disclosed that full members and candidates numbered 482,000. The First Party Congress was a watershed in legitimizing the position of the party as the guiding and controlling force in society. It reassured the Soviet Union of Cuba's loyalty and friendship, extolling the Soviets' continuous military and eco- nomic aid to the Cuban Revolution, and rehabilitated old- guard communists, some of whom had been mistrusted and persecuted by the Castroites. The Congress also expanded the party's Central Committee from ninety-one to 112 members, increased the Political Bureau from eight to thirteen members, and maintained the Secretariat at eleven members, with Fidel Castro and Raul Castro as first and second secretaries, respec- tively. In his report to the Congress in 1975, Fidel Castro attempted to reconcile the adoption of Soviet-style institutions on the island with a renewed emphasis on nationalism and on the his- torical roots of the Cuban Revolution. He emphasized that Cuban socialism was the culmination of a struggle against Spanish colonialism and United States neocolonial involve- 78 Historical Setting ment in Cuban affairs. With total disregard for Marti's ideas, Castro linked the Cuban independence leader with Lenin in order to justify Cuba's move into the communist camp. The Congress adopted a Five-Year Plan, calling for closer economic integration with the Soviet Union and an economic system modeled on other socialist states. The approval of the party's platform stressing "Marxist-Leninist principles and the leading role of the party" was further evidence of the impact of Soviet- style orthodoxy on the island. Of paramount importance was the adoption of Cuba's first socialist constitution, which was approved by a 97.7 percent majority in a popular referendum in early 1976. Modeled on other communist constitutions, the Cuban document recog- nizes the party as "the highest leading force in state and soci- ety" and defines the function of mass organizations, such as the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (Comite de Defensa de la Revolution — CDR) and the Federation of Cuban Women (Federation de Mujeres Cubanas — FMC). It divided the island into fourteen new provinces instead of the six old ones. The Unchanging Revolution, 1980-89 In the early 1980s, the Cuban Revolution reached a critical stage in its development. Persistent structural and managerial problems in the economy, low prices for Cuba's export prod- ucts, and an inability to break away from economic depen- dence on the Soviet bloc forced a reexamination of basic goals. Because production in most key sectors had fallen short of expected targets, emphasis was placed on increased planning with more modest goals. The regime adopted Soviet economic methods, decreased emphasis on moral incentives, and attempted to create more efficient economic organizations. In the process, the Cubans suffered more austerity, with greater rationing of food and consumer goods, and, therefore, harder times. Life became increasingly more difficult: people faced long lines to obtain the most basic goods, the public transpor- tation system was collapsing, and the education and health sys- tems were deteriorating rapidly. In desperation, many Cubans fled the country, preferring to risk dying in the Straits of Flor- ida on flimsy rafts rather than live in Castro's Cuba. The establishment of a Soviet-type, centrally planned econ- omy burdened Cuba with a vast and cumbersome bureaucracy that stifled innovation, productivity, and efficiency. The island 79 Cuba: A Country Study continued its heavy reliance on sugar for development of the domestic economy and for foreign trade, and made little attempt to achieve agricultural diversification or industrializa- tion. At the same time, Cuba relied on the Soviets for massive infusions of aid to meet minimal investment and consumption needs and depended almost entirely on Soviet oil exports for energy requirements. Popular expectations of rapid economic improvement were replaced by pessimism. There were signs of decreasing enthusi- asm among Cuba's labor force and increasing signs of weari- ness with constant revolutionary exhortations. Underem- ployment was rampant, and labor productivity was at a low point. Absenteeism from the job place became common. Cubans stole from state enterprises and fed an already growing black market for food and goods. Graft and corruption became widespread as Cuban citizens rejected socialist morality and laws and struggled to survive on a daily basis. Yet this is only one side of the picture. It is in the nature of totalitarian regimes that the key question relates not to eco- nomics per se, but rather to the effects of economic factors upon the levers of political and social control. In an effort to increase productivity and forestall any further decline in revo- lutionary momentum, the regime increased the militarization and regimentation of society and institutionalized its rule by expanding the role and influence of the party throughout soci- ety. This progressive institutionalization contributed to the fur- ther stabilization of the system, while reducing its vulnerability to threats of external subversion and internal revolt. From an institutional standpoint, the regime appeared equipped to withstand the difficult years ahead. Fidel Castro was still domi- nant. He remained "the Revolution" and "the maximum leader." The evidence seemed to indicate that significant seg- ments of the Cuban people continued to be attracted by his personalized style of government. Some regarded him as a pro- tection against the state structures, resembling a traveling ombudsman ready to change or challenge policies of which he was the author. His lengthy speeches before huge throngs served both as a pedagogical device and as an instantaneous plebiscite. Despite some friction within the military after the United States invasion of Grenada in 1983 embarrassed the Cubans, Castro maintained absolute control of his govern- ment, with no other public figure in a position to challenge his undisputed authority. 80 Historical Setting The political elite's values, policy goals, and organizational interests were driven to reinforce Fidel Castro's political incli- nations and policy preferences. The hard foreign policy objec- tives of this group were maintaining Cuba's independence from, and opposition to, the United States; actively supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America; promoting national liberation and socialism in the developing world; acquiring influence and supportive allies among the develop- ing world states; and securing maximum military, economic, and political commitments from the Soviet Union. In foreign affairs, the Cuban Revolution achieved significant successes. In the late 1970s, Fidel Castro emerged as the leader of the Nonaligned Movement. There he espoused four impor- tant themes for the future that became the cornerstone of Cuba's policy toward the developing world: support for violent revolutions; anticolonialism; an end to white supremacy in Africa; and reduction of dependency on Western economies. These policies coincided with Soviet objectives and produced a convergence of Soviet and Cuban actions in the developing world. Castro's willingness to commit his Soviet-equipped, well- trained armed forces on the African continent gained for Cuba much respect and admiration, but also created some fear among African leaders. The Cuban leadership saw its support for revolution as an integral and critical part of Cuba's foreign policy. Helping left- ist insurgents throughout the world was a revolutionary com- mitment, ensuring that these allies would come to Cuba's aid in times of need. But more important, worldwide revolution directed against the United States, the principal enemy of the Cuban Revolution, was used to divert United States attention and resources, and perhaps to restrain its policies and actions against the island. The ultimate goal was to ensure the survival of the Cuban Revolution and its leadership, the most impor- tant objective of Cuba's foreign policy. Armed struggle was fundamental to Fidel Castro's mystique as well as to the image that he projected onto the larger world stage, where he was determined to play a prominent role. Other revolutionary leaders might shed, in time, doctrinaire excesses in favor of the pragmatic pursuit of comfortable rule. Yet there is truly nothing in Castro's personal makeup to sug- gest that he would forsake the global floodlights and renounce his "internationalist" commitments. 81 Cuba: A Country Study Perhaps the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the estab- lishment, albeit temporarily, of a Marxist regime in Grenada were Cuba's most important revolutionary achievements in the Western hemisphere. Although the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was as much the result of internal opposi- tion as of external aid, Cuba claimed a joint effort with Venezu- ela and Panama in bringing down the Somoza dynasty. For Cuba, Nicaragua exemplified the vindication of the Cuban line, which had been emphasizing for years the need for vio- lence and particularly guerrilla warfare to attain power in Latin America. The Sandinista victory gave new life to revolutionary vio- lence in Central America, much of it supported by Cuba. Yet Cuba's support for insurgent groups in the area, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala, was channeled increasingly through Nicaragua. Using Nicaragua or other third countries facilitated the flow of weapons, propaganda, and aid, while making the task of detection and resistance that much harder. Cuba also denied supporting revolutionary groups, thus weak- ening United States credibility and influence, while at the same time facilitating relations with more conservative governments in Latin America. Castro's willingness to come to the aid of the Argentine military regime during the Falklands War (1982) was a further indication of Cuba's pragmatic and opportunistic foreign policy. Throughout these maneuvers in Cuba's foreign policy, Castro remained closely tied to the Soviet Union. Although there were frictions between Castro and the Kremlin, the latter's influence and presence in Cuba were far more extensive than ever before. At the same time, solidarity with the Soviet Union remained a vital element of Cuba's foreign policy. Cuba's policies and actions in the international arena operated in the larger framework of Soviet objectives. Castro continued to pursue his own policies only as long as they did not clash with those of the Soviets. Uncomfortable as he felt in the embrace of the Russian bear, Castro's options were limited. Although relations with China improved from their nadir in 1967, the Chinese seemed unable or unwilling to take Cuba on as an expensive client. Beijing decried Castro's support of Moscow's policies as "revisionist," and the Chinese still remembered his denunciations of Mao in the late 1960s with bitterness and anger. Increased commercial ties with Canada, Western Europe, and Japan beckoned as a healthy development from Cuba's 82 Historical Setting standpoint. Yet the ability of these countries to absorb the island's sugar exports was limited, and Havana had scant cash reserves with which to purchase European and Japanese goods. Cuba's heavy economic commitment to the Soviet Union and the East European countries was an additional deterrent to a broadening of its trading partners, and United States pressures on Western allies tended to limit their willingness to trade with Cuba. To be sure, all of this could have enhanced the desire of the Castro regime to reduce its reliance on the Soviet Union and to reach some accommodation with the United States. Rap- prochement with the United States could have led to a loosen- ing of the embargo and even access to an important neighboring market, if the United States were willing to buy Cuban sugar. It could have bolstered Cuba's immediate security position and provided Castro with leverage in his dealings with the Soviet Union. United States recognition would have meant an important psychological victory for Castro. In Latin Amer- ica, it would have been interpreted as a defeat for "Yankee imperialism" and as an acceptance of the Castro regime as a permanent, albeit irritating, phenomenon in the Caribbean. Cuban moves toward accommodation with the United States would have posed some major problems for the Kremlin. The Soviets were not averse to some amelioration in Cuban-United States tensions, especially if the result was to reduce Cuba's heavy demands for Soviet aid. The Kremlin was fearful, how- ever, that ties with the West could foster a desire for increasing independence by other Soviet bloc members and lead to pro- gressive internal liberalization, as the results of the West Ger- man efforts to establish diplomatic and trade relations with Eastern Europe showed. Although Cuba was not as critical to the Soviet Union as was Eastern Europe, a resumption of Cuba's relations with the United States and a significant weak- ening in Soviet-Cuban ties would have been seen as leading to the eventual subverting of the Revolution and the renunciation of membership in the "socialist camp." Moscow viewed Cuba's possible defection as a blow to its prestige and as damaging to the Soviet power posture vis-a-vis the United States. Rapprochement with the United States would also have been fraught with danger and uncertainties for the Cuban leader- ship. It would have required a loosening of Cuba's military ties with the Soviet Union, the abandonment of visible support for violent revolutions in Latin America, and the withdrawal of 83 Cuba: A Country Study Cuban troops from Africa and other parts of the world. These were conditions that Castro was not willing to accept. He per- ceived them as an attempt by the United States to isolate Cuba and strengthen anti-Castro forces within Cuba, thus posing a threat to the stability of his regime. Castro, therefore, was not able or willing to offer meaningful concessions that would be indispensable for United States-Cuban rapprochement. Nego- tiations proceeded, however, and ad hoc agreements were struck on some issues such as skyjacking and the Mariel Boatlift, which brought 125,000 Cuban refugees to the United States in 1980. Cuban-Soviet relations, for their part, also were beset with serious irritants. Moscow's claim to leadership of the "socialist bloc" and its interference in Cuba's internal affairs have clashed with the forces of Cuban nationalism. Given Castro's personality and past policies, his suspicion, if not dislike, of the Soviets, and his desire to play a leading role in world affairs, he remained an unstable and unpredictable Soviet ally. Yet in the 1980s, Castro had no choice but to follow the Soviet lead, while attempting to emerge from his isolation in Latin America and improve Cuba's faltering economy. By the 1990s, Cuba's international relations revolved around seven main goals: the survival of the Castro Revolution; the internationalization of Castro's personal prestige and cha- risma, with a resulting increase in power and influence; the maintenance, until the collapse of communism, of a close alli- ance with the Soviet Union and its interests throughout the world; the preservation of an anti-United States posture in an attempt to weaken United States power and influence world- wide; the acquisition of influence and supportive allies among developing world states; the development of a "new interna- tional economic order"; and the continuous support of "move- ments of national liberation" in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. The image of a nonaligned Cuba was repeatedly tarnished, however, by Castro's close partnership with the Soviets. His stature suffered as a result of his failure to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and to rally Latin American leaders to repudiate their foreign debt. The Cuban government has helped a broad range of "pro- gressive forces," terrorist groups, and religious fanatics oppos- ing the United States. Since the 1970s, however, the regime has been increasingly willing, despite its Marxist rhetoric, to estab- 84 Historical Setting lish ties with conservative Latin American states. Clearly, ideol- ogy is not the sole factor shaping Cuba's external behavior. Cuban interest in developing such relations has been moti- vated by a desire to foster Cuban and, in the past, Soviet objec- tives, and to undermine United States interests in the area. Despite perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (political opening) in the Soviet Union and differences with Mikhail Gorbachev, Castro remained a close Soviet ally until the end of communism in 1991. Since the late 1960s, the relations between Havana and Moscow had taken the form of a progres- sively closer alliance. The incorporation of Cuba into the Soviet camp was evident not only in economic terms (Cuba was a member of Comecon and was heavily dependent on Soviet eco- nomic and military aid and trade) but also was clearly mani- fested in its model of government and its international behavior. Undoubtedly, Cuba was subservient in most cases to Soviet interests, but Havana had considerable leverage with Moscow 7 , as well as some freedom to act and react in external affairs (especially in the Caribbean and Latin America in gen- eral) . Problems and Prospects in the Post-Soviet Era In the 1990s, Castro faced some of the old problems that had plagued the Cuban Revolution in the past, as well as new and critical challenges. Internally, there was growing evidence of disillusionment with the party's and Castro's exhortations. Absenteeism and youth apathy were increasing. Castro seemed to be losing the battle to create a new generation devoted to the party and to the Revolution. Despite more than forty years of education and indoctrination, the new socialist man was nowhere to be found. The loss of this generation represented, perhaps, the greatest challenge for the continuity of the Revo- lution. Economically, the Revolution was extremely weak. Persistent structural problems, low prices for Cuba's export products, and the inability to obtain aid from the Soviet Union forced yet another reexamination of basic goals. The deepening eco- nomic crisis, aggravated by the collapse of communism not only in the Soviet Union, but also in Eastern Europe, produced a new frenzy of planning activity and greater regimentation, in the hope of stimulating productivity. Rejecting perestroika and glasnost, Castro returned to the failed path of the past, insist- ing that the Cubans should work harder, sacrifice more, and 85 Cuba: A Country Study expect less in the years ahead. Among the populace, pessimism and cynicism replaced revolutionary fervor. Mild overtures from Castro toward the United States and Cuba's deepening economic crisis encouraged those in the United States who believed it was time for a rapprochement with Cuba. In 1989 Castro tried and executed three high-rank- ing officers of the Ministry of Interior and Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, former commander of Cuban troops in Africa, accusing them of drug trafficking. The execution seemed more connected with the elimination of a potential rival than with drugs. Denying his or his brother's involvement with drugs, Castro called on the United States for cooperation in fighting the drug trade. As he had in the past, Castro was willing to negotiate and to cooperate with the United States on specific issues. Mired in economic crisis and without the support of his former benefactor, Castro braced for the difficult times ahead. Yet he was unwilling to budge and change the Marxist course he had set for his Revolution four decades earlier. Fearful that economic change could lead to political change, he rejected both. He remained committed to the cor- nerstones of his policies — a command economy, violent revolu- tion, anti-North Americanism, "internationalism," and personal rule. Although his support for violent revolution and "internationalism'z was quite limited, Castro was unwilling to modify or abandon the five cornerstones of his policies. * * * The study of Cuban history from colonial times to the present has produced a wealth of scholarly works both in Cuba and abroad. Multivolume histories and general histories of the island include Charles E. Chapman's A History of the Cuban Republic, Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez et alia's Historia de la nacion cubana, Willis F.Johnson's The History of Cuba, Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford R. Barnett's Cuba, Levi Marrero's Cuba, Louis A. Perez's Cuba, Fernando Portuondo del Prado's Historia de Cuba, Jaime Suchlicki's Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, and Hugh Tho- mas's Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. The era of Spanish domination has produced an extensive and varied literature, including Gerardo Brown Castillo's Cuba colonial, Jose M. Carbonell y Rivero's eigh teen-volume Evolucion de la cultura cubana, Richard B. Gray's Jose Mar ti: Cuban Patriot, 86 Historical Setting Pedro Jose Guitera's Historia de la Isla de Cuba, Kenneth T. Kiple's Blacks in Colonial Cuba, Allan J. Kuethe's Cuba, 1753- 1815, Manuel Moreno Fraginals's The Sugarmill, Medardo Vi ti- ler's Las ideas en Cuba, and Irene A. Wright's The Early History of Cuba, 1492-1586. The institution of slavery and the role of blacks in Cuba have been revisited in numerous studies, espe- cially since the Castro Revolution, in such works as Arthur F. Corwin's Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886 and Franklin W. Knight's Slave Society in Cuba During the Nine- teenth Century. The independence struggle and United States intervention are controversial subjects and have produced a vast literature. Since the Revolution, numerous studies have been published in Cuba highlighting the role of certain leaders in the wars, particularly Antonio Maceo, a mulatto general, and Marti, the father of Cuban independence. The Jose Marti National Library's Anuario del Centro de Estudios Martianos is the best guide to the extensive literature on Marti. Other useful sources include Jose Franco's three-volume Antonio Maceo, Herminio Portell-Vila's Historia de la Guerra de Cubay losEstados Unidos con- tra Espana, Julius Pratt's Expansionists of 1898, and Miguel A. Varona Guerrero's La Guerra de Independencia de Cuba. The prerevolutionary period that lasted from 1902 until 1959 produced an incisive and critical literature that examined the problems of nationhood and the development of the new nation. A few of the useful books include Luis E. Aguilar's Cuba, 1933: Prologue to Revolution; Raymond L. Buell's Problems of the New Cuba: Report of the Commission on Cuban Affairs', Russel H. Fitzgibbon's Cuba and the United States, 1900-1935; Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez, Jose M. Cabrera, Juan J. Remos, and Emete- rio S. Santovenia's Historia de la nacion cubana; Allan Reed Mil- ieu's The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909, Lowry Nelson's Rural Cuba; Louis A. Perez's Army Politics in Cuba, 1898-1958; Robert F. Smith's Background to Rev- olution: The Development of Modern Cuba; Suchlicki's University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920-1968; Francis Adams Truslow's A Report on Cuba; and Medardo Vitier's Las ideas en Cuba. The Cuban Revolution generated a vast literature that focused originally on the causes of the Revolution, the nature of the leadership, and United States policy. Later on, studies addressed the nature of Castroism, Castro's alliance with the Soviets, Castro's internationalism, and the failings of Cuba's 87 Cuba: A Country Study economic model. A few of the useful books include those by Juan M. del Aguila's Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution; James G. Blight's and David A. Welch's On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis', Jorge I. Dommguez's Cuba: Order and Revolution; Theodore Draper's Castroism: Theory and Practice; Raymond W. Duncan's The Soviet Union and Cuba: Inter- ests and Influence; Richard R. Fagen's The Transformation of Politi- cal Culture in Cuba; Pamela Falk's Cuban Foreign Policy; Carlos Franqui's Diary of the Cuban Revolution; Georgie Anne Geyer's Guerrilla Prince: The Untold Story of Fidel Castro; Edward Gon- zalez's Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma; Maurice Halp- erin's The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro; Cuban Communism, edited by Irving L. Horowitz and Suchlicki; Haynes Johnson's The Bay of Pigs; Revolutionary Change in Cuba, edited by Carmelo Mesa-Lago; Carlos Alberto Montaner's Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution; Andres Oppenheimer's Castro' s Final Hour, Thomas G. Paterson's Contesting Castro; Marifeli Perez-Stable's The Cuban Revolution; Elizabeth Stone's Women and the Cuban Revolution; three volumes edited by Suchlicki: Cuba, Castro, and Revolution, Cuba in a Changing World, and The Cuban Military Under Castro; Szulc's Fidel: A Critical Portrait; and Peter Wyden's Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. (For further information and com- plete citations, see Bibliography.) 88 Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment A view of the smoke-covered Havana skyline and the seaside highway (el Malecon), 1996 Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington CUBA CONFRONTS DAUNTING social issues in its fifth decade of socialist rule, despite having a fairly well-educated and healthy population and low fertility and mortality rates. Many of the widely praised social achievements of the 1970s and 1980s — in health, education, and social security — are no longer sustainable given the absence of Soviet subsidies and the poor performance of the economy. The health sector, severely battered by the economic crisis of the "special period in peacetime" (periodo especial en tiempo de paz; hereafter Special Period — see Glossary), and with some indicators suggesting worsening standards, lacks even the most elementary medical inputs and no longer delivers the services Cubans had come to expect. It is also burdened by a bloated staff of physicians, nurses, and other health personnel far too numerous for the country's needs. Similar difficulties are plaguing the education sector, where even pencils and notebooks are scarce. Cuba has far more teachers than it can use productively, its educational infrastructure is crumbling, and its study programs are poorly attuned to the needs of a country urgently needing to restruc- ture its economy and become integrated into the world econ- omy (see Performance of the Economy, ch. 3). To make matters worse, the financial resources needed to maintain the generous safety net developed since Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ) seized power in 1959 are simply not available. Pensions for early retirement and extensive unem- ployment programs — crucial national entitlements — are taxing the country's finances, while providing only miserly benefits. A rapidly aging population is adding to the onerous cost of these programs. Regardless of developments in the economy, low birth rates ensure that problems associated with the elderly population will intensify as the number of working-age Cubans relative to the elderly continues to decline. On the positive side, Cuba can count on a relatively well-trained work force and the fact that the number of children relative to the working-age population continues to decline further. (The relative decline in the number of children counterbalances the increasing dependency ratio as the proportion of elderly in the total pop- ulation rises.) Under the proper economic incentives system, Cuban workers have the potential to become highly produc- tive. 91 Cuba: A Country Study Cuba must also address worrisome environmental trends. Concern is most warranted in the agricultural sector, where widespread adoption of capital-intensive (see Glossary) meth- ods, such as chemical inputs and mechanization; grandiose but often poorly conceived infrastructure development plans, such as dams and irrigation projects; and central planning (see Glos- sary) may have compromised the sustainable use of some of the country's soils. Cuba, however, is one of the few developing countries that has managed to reverse a long-term deforesta- tion trend, although this achievement may now be threatened by the country's current inability to import lumber and cook- ing fuels. Because of the Special Period, economic and social initia- tives have been implemented that are reversing a long-term commitment to maintaining the national income distribution within a narrow band. The free circulation of the dollar, the assigning of priority to foreign tourism, and policies designed to increase emigrant remittances are having a regressive effect on income distribution. Not all Cubans have ready access to dollars; most of those who do either have family members residing abroad or are employed in, or derive some benefit from, the tourism sector. Because relatively few black Cubans have emigrated, this particular social group suffers the brunt of the perverse income-distribution effects of remittances. So do those Cuban families, who, regardless of race, have no immedi- ate relatives abroad, or whose wage earners are employed in state enterprises or in social sectors, such as health, in which the government has proscribed self-employment. The increas- ing number of visits by emigrants further contributes to the growing income differential trend and serves to highlight social disparities. In response to these conditions, social ills less visible in Cuba before the Special Period — such as prostitution, begging, and property and violent crimes — are on the rise. Mass organizations, although still a dominant feature of social life in Cuba, have lost much of their influence because of general apathy and disillusionment with Cuba's state of affairs. A religious revival is underway; many Cubans seem to want to fill a spiritual void. Participating in religious ceremonies, an activity no longer stigmatized, has become an important social safety valve inasmuch as doing so permits citizens to show dis- content without fear of government retribution. Pope John Paul IPs visit in January 1998 gave added legitimacy to religion 92 The Society and Its Environment as a valid component of Cuban life (see Religion and the State, ch. 4). Physical and Natural Setting Principal Geographic Features The Cuban archipelago — two main islands plus 3,715 small and large keys and inlets — has a total land surface of 110,860 square kilometers. It is nine times as large as Jamaica and twelve times the size of Puerto Rico. The westernmost of the Greater Antilles island chain, the Cuban archipelago is strategi- cally located in the Atlantic Ocean, just below the Tropic of Cancer at geographic coordinates 21°30'N, 80°00'W, safeguard- ing the entrances to the Gulf of Mexico to the west and the Caribbean Sea to the south. Cuba lies seventy-seven kilometers west of Haiti, 140 kilometers north of Jamaica, 150 kilometers south of Key West, and 210 kilometers east of Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. Cuba proper is a long and elongated island that accounts for 94.67 percent of the country's land area, or 104,945 square kilometers. The island is 1,250 kilometers in length from east to west and averages about 100 kilometers in width. Isla de la Juventud (formerly Isla de Pinos), the second largest land mass, located southwest of Cuba in the Golfo de Batabano, has an area of 2,200 square kilometers, or 1.98 percent of the coun- try's total. The remaining keys and inlets cover 3.35 percent of the national territory, or 3,715 square kilometers. The small keys and inlets are primarily clustered in five subarchipelagos, two of which are off the northern coast. The Archipielago de los Colorados (with about sixty keys and inlets) is off Pinar del Rio Province; and the Archipielago de Sabana and the Archi- pielago de Camaguey (with about 400 keys and inlets) run along the northern center of the island. The most important archipelagos on the southern coast are the Archipielago de los Canarreos, which encompasses Isla de la Juventud and 300 other keys and inlets; the Banco de los Jardines and Jardinillos keys, off the Zapata Swamp in central Cuba; and in eastern Cuba, in the Golfo de Guacanayabo, the Archipielago de los Jardines de la Reina. The Cuban coastline measures 5,746 kilometers. The north coast accounts for 3,209 kilometers, while the coastline of Isla de la Juventud has a length of 327 kilometers. Hundreds of kilometers of sandy beaches dot the Cuban archipelago, many 93 Cuba: A Country Study still in their natural state. Fossilized coral formations occupy about half of Cuba's coastline, while living coral reefs are found in adjacent waters — often extending for hundreds of kilome- ters. The coral reef along Cuba's northern coast is second in length in the world only to Australia's Great Barrier Reef. Many of Cuba's more than 200 bays, which have narrow entrances but ample inner areas, make some of the world's best harbors. Several of the country's many harbors, some with deep channels and horseshoe shapes, offer excellent protection from the fury of the seas. The most important harbors on the northern coast — from west to east — are Bahia Honda in Pinar del Rio Province; Bahia de Cabanas, Bahia del Mariel, and Bahia de La Habana in La Habana Province; Bahia de Matan- zas in Matanzas Province; Bahia de Nuevitas in Camagiiey Prov- ince; Bahia de Puerto Padre in Las Tunas Province; and Puerto Gibara and Bahia de Nipe in Holgum Province. Major harbors on the southern coast — from east to west — are located at Bahia de Santiago in Santiago de Cuba Province and Cienfuegos in Cienfuegos Province. The only major deep-water ports are the bays of Cienfuegos, Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nipe, Nuevitas, and Santiago de Cuba. Although relatively small, Havana Bay (Bahia de La Habana) is the country's most heavily used har- bor (see Transportation, ch. 3). Topography and Drainage Although it has three principal mountain ranges, the Cuban landscape is dominated by plains that cover approximately two- thirds of the land surface and are, on average, 100 meters above sea level. The mountainous zones are isolated and sepa- rated by the extensive plains and flatlands. The elevation of the ranges is modest even by Caribbean standards. Only in eastern Cuba, in the provinces of Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, and Granma, do mountain peaks exceed 1,200 meters above sea level. Several mountain ranges are found there, including the Sierra Maestra (along the southern coast), famous for harbor- ing Fidel Castro and his guerrillas between December 1956 and January 1959 (see Background to Revolution, 1952-59, ch. 1). Cuba's tallest peak, the Pico Real del Turquino, at 1,974 meters, is in the Sierra Maestra mountain chain (see fig. 2). Other important mountain chains in the northern section of this region are the Sierra de Nipe, Sierra de Nicaro, Sierra de Cristal, and Cuchillas de Toa. In central Cuba, to the south of the provinces of Cienfuegos and Sancti Spfritus, is the Sierra de 94 Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative QuCf of Mexico 9{prtfiM[antic Ocean D x60 > f , M del I ^ Cabo ^ San Antonio^-^ f PENINSULA DE h CENTRAL COMMITTEE (150 members) PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES (14 committees, 14 first secretaries) I MUNICIPAL COMMITTEES (169 committees, 169 first secretaries) PARTY CELLS Directs, controls, or supervises Elects, appoints, or nominates Source: Based on information from Jorge I. Domfnguez; and Raimundo Lopez, "Prela Report on PCC Membership, Percentages," October 8, 1997. Figure 8. Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — PCC), 2001 size had expanded to twenty-five members, seventeen of its 1991 members (68 percent) were new — unprecedented since the party's founding in 1965. The Fifth Party Congress (1997) dropped nine members (36 percent) of the Political Bureau and added only eight new members. Thus, the Fifth Party Con- gress's Political Bureau (twenty-four members) suffered from less volatility than had its predecessor, as would be expected from a leadership that felt more politically secure. 250 Government and Politics By the conclusion of the Fifth Congress, only the Castro brothers and Almeida had served continuously on the Political Bureau since 1965, and only Jose Ramon Machado, party orga- nization secretary, had been a member since 1975. The next two longest-serving members, both since 1986, were Army Corps General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, minister of interior, and Esteban Lazo, who had served at various times as party pro- vincial secretary in Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba, and Ciudad de La Habana Province. In sum, only six of the twenty-four members of the 1997 Political Bureau had been members of Cuba's top decision- making organ before the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Cuba's top leadership, therefore, has already undergone an important transition at the levels just below the Castro brothers and their closest associates. Most Political Bureau members in the 1990s are themselves the product of a transition that took place under the communist political system. They do not count on Soviet subsidies. They do not count on external military support. They do not expect to be engaged in military or other foreign expeditions. They are much readier to experiment at home with various economic policy changes. They are younger. The median birth year of the 1997 Political Bureau was 1943; six were born after the assault on the Moncada barracks on July 26, 1953. They expect to have a political future in Cuba regard- less of the name of the nation's president or the form of its political regime. The transition among Cuba's political elite is already underway. In 1991 three women belonged to the twenty-five-member Political Bureau; that number dropped to two in 1997. In 1991 four military officers on active duty belonged to the Political Bureau; that number rose to five in 1997. In 1991 five of the provincial first secretaries belonged to the Political Bureau; that number rose to six in 1997. The post of provincial first sec- retary is perhaps Cuba's most challenging position, for all sub- national responsibilities fall on the persons occupying these posts. Not surprisingly, three of the five provincial first secretar- ies from 1991 were dropped from the Political Bureau to be replaced by others. In the judgment of their superiors, the dis- missed first secretaries were poor managers. In contrast to previous decades, in 1991 Carlos Lage, secre- tary of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, was the only civilian minister on the Political Bureau. The PCC leadership clearly understood that its problem in 1991 was emi- 251 Cuba: A Country Study nently political: how to survive the collapse of European com- munism and retain the support, or at least the forbearance, of the Cuban people. By 1997 three of the Political Bureau mem- bers first chosen at the previous party congress had switched jobs to become government ministers: Alfredo Jordan Morales, minister of agriculture; Abel Prieto Jimenez, minister of cul- ture; and Roberto Robaina Gonzalez, minister of foreign rela- tions. They were joined by Marcos Portal Leon, minister of basic industries. Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro became minister of the sugar industry, although he remained formally on active military duty. In 1997, with six out of twenty- four Political Bureau members serving also as members of the cabinet (along with FAR Minister General Raul Castro, Interior Minister Army Corps General Abelardo Colome, and President Fidel Castro), the PCC leadership signaled a higher priority for improving the tasks of governance and in particular the econ- omy's performance. Central Committee The PCC's Central Committee, a much larger group than the Political Bureau, is made up of many key leaders from intermediate levels of responsibility. The Central Committee met infrequently in the late 1960s; for the most part, it con- vened only in times of crisis. The committee met more regu- larly in the 1970s and 1980s; the original party statutes called for a meeting of the Central Committee Plenum approximately every six months to enable the Central Committee to have an impact on major decisions. The party statutes in place since the 1997 party congress stipulate a plenum meeting at least once a year. The history of membership on the Central Committee resembles that of the Political Bureau. The 1975 First Party Congress reelected 77 percent of the 100 founding members of the 1965 Central Committee. The 1980 Second Party Congress reelected 79 percent of the 1975 full members still active in 1980; the size of the committee had expanded to 148 in 1980. The 1986 Third Party Congress reelected 61 percent. The lower rate of continuity in 1986 parallels what was happening at the Political Bureau. The size of the Central Committee remained stable at 146. In 1991 the Fourth Party Congress removed half of the mem- bers of the old Central Committee, and it expanded the size of the new Central Committee to 225. Consequently, only 32 per- 252 Government and Politics cent of the new Central Committee members had served on the previous committee. Not only was the rate of continuity the lowest since the Central Committee had been founded, but the proportion of newcomers was the highest since the PCC's founding. The Fifth Party Congress stabilized membership on the Cen- tral Committee just as it had done for the Political Bureau. The expansion of the size of the Central Committee in 1991 had been a temporary experiment that the Fifth Party Congress reversed in 1997. The size of the Central Committee shrank to 150 members, and 56 percent of the members of the 1991 Cen- tral Committee were dismissed. The 1997 Central Committee's veterans from 1991 constituted, however, two-thirds of the membership of the new Central Committee, and accordingly the new body was far more experienced than its predecessor. The oversized and inexperienced Central Committee in place between 1991 and 1997 was the least important Central Committee since the late 1960s. Then, as in most of the 1990s, the Central Committee met rarely — in the 1990s less often than expected from the party statutes. Moreover, although the party statutes mandate a PCC congress every five years, the Fourth Party Congress met nearly six years after its predecessor. The Fifth Congress met a full year late. In general, the Central Committee's excessive size, inexperience, and infrequency of meetings in the 1990s marked a process of party de-institution- alization that the Fifth Congress sought to reverse, hence the reduction in size and the renewed premium on experience. One result of these processes, however, was to install and sus- tain a Central Committee that was younger than its predeces- sors in the 1970s and 1980s. The Political Bureau and the Central Committee finished the century with a young and energetic leadership, steeled in Cuba's troubled life in the 1990s, ready for political competition with any challenger. The Central Committee chosen at the Fifth Party Congress has an additional characteristic: 36 percent of its members have posts only in the PCC and its youth wing, the Union of Young Communists (Union de Jovenes Comunistas — UJC). This Central Committee is full of municipal party first secretar- ies, not just first secretaries at the level of provinces or on the staff of national party headquarters. This Central Committee represents the party elite better than its predecessors. It is much less a mere assembly of those who have performed meri- torious service in various spheres of life. It is no longer broadly 253 Cuba: A Country Study representative of Cuban society and institutions. Its members seek to rule. Party Organization, Membership, and Role Formally, the PCC is governed by its party congresses. These adopt the party's statutes and its programs, and choose the membership of the Central Committee and Political Bureau. Party congresses are to meet every five years, the Central Com- mittee Plenum every year, and the Political Bureau once a week. In practice, as already noted, the Political Bureau is the party's most important entity and the only one whose actual power corresponds to the formal organization. Party structure was simplified in the 1990s. The post of "alternate" for various posts (including Political Bureau and Central Committee member) was eliminated. The party Secre- tariat is no longer a separate body but simply the party's staff at various levels. The party's subnational organization matches the number of provinces and municipalities. The most rapidly replaced significant party post is that of provincial secretary; that job requires mediation between the demands of the center and the localities and is difficult to perform. The PCC is a party of selection. Not everyone who wishes to belong to the party has the right to join it, although all party members must seek to be a member. Party members are chosen through a complex process. First, all candidates for party mem- bership must be chosen as "exemplary workers" at assemblies held at their workplace. Then, a party commission in charge of membership scrutinizes each candidacy and is empowered to reject any and all. A variant on this procedure is through mem- bership in the UJC, the party's youth wing. Ordinarily, the party hopes that UJC members will, in due course, also be chosen as exemplary workers, but the party commissions can bypass such procedures. Concerned that party membership might drop in Cuba in the 1990s as it had in formerly communist Europe in the late 1980s, the Fourth Party Congress liberalized membership pro- cedures in two ways. First, it eliminated all discrimination against religious believers; the party no longer required a per- son to be an atheist or an agnostic to qualify for membership. Second, the probation time for young UJC members to be eligi- ble for party membership was cut from three to two years. As a result, in the 1990s party membership grew on average some 46,000 persons per year, compared with an annual member- 254 Havana Headquarters of the Union of Young Communists (Union de Jovenes Comunistas — UJC), 1997 Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan ship growth of only about 27,000 persons in the 1980s. Party membership grew to 800,000 members by the time of the Fifth Party Congress in 1997 out of a population of about eleven mil- lion people. In 1997 about 30 percent of the members had joined during the 1990s. Workers constituted about one-third of the entire party membership. Another half-million belonged to the UJC. The PCC's manner of filling public offices differs from how political parties elsewhere in the world go about this pursuit. Elected public offices wield relatively modest power in Cuba. The National Assembly meets infrequently and has limited powers. Provincial and municipal assemblies have limited resources to carry on with their tasks. Although the PCC screens who is elected to these offices, it focuses its attention on appointed offices that wield significant power. The PCC commission at the appropriate level must clear and endorse every officeholder for such posts prior to appointment. Heads of central government agencies, state enterprises, hospitals, military commands, and so forth must all be cleared and 255 Cuba: A Country Study endorsed. This type of control is the party's principal source of power. PCC officials, especially at the subnational level, also play key roles as problem solvers and coordinators. When difficulties arise in a province or a municipality, the party first secretary is often the only person well positioned to appeal through the party hierarchy for additional support or resources from Havana. The party first secretary in the provinces and the municipalities functions also as an arbiter in disputes that may arise in various spheres of life. More controversially, the party municipal or provincial secretary often assumes the responsi- bility of breaking a national policy directive on the grounds that local conditions are not propitious. This last role implies that party provincial and municipal secretaries are, in some instances, high risk-takers, but it also explains why provincial first secretaries are vulnerable to dismissal. The PCC organs are loci for discussion and debate over national, sectoral, provincial, or municipal policies. Although the Central Committee had become less representative of Cuban society by the late 1990s, PCC cells (the party's lowest units) and various assemblies often congregate leaders from various spheres of life effectively. These fora provide opportu- nities to clear the air in a heated dispute and to review, under- stand, and influence decisions issued from on high. The party generally orients policies at various levels and with varying degrees of specificity. In contrast to previous decades, in the 1990s the party's national staff became smaller, and party officials were instructed to interfere less in the routine running of government agencies, state enterprises, and social service entities. The party in the 1990s retained its key tasks, as out- lined above, but withdrew in many cases from becoming a sub- stitute policy executor. This behavior was consistent with turning the party into, and using it, as a political machine. Mass Organizations Three of Cuba's principal mass organizations were founded shortly after revolutionary victory, between late 1959 and 1961. The Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) groups women mem- bers, as might be expected. The National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) brings together smallholders regardless of their crops of specialization. Following the 1963 agrarian reform, many such private smallholders remained. Some culti- vated plots on their own or with their families; others did so as 256 Government and Politics members of cooperatives. All belonged to the ANAP. The Com- mittees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) were estab- lished in every neighborhood to uncover plots against the government. "Revolutionary vigilance" was their main task. The CDRs were also responsible for rooting out common crime and, from time to time, collaborated in such activities as mass vaccination campaigns, garbage recycling, park clean-ups, and the like. The fourth mass organization is much older: the Cuban Workers Federation (CTC) was founded in the 1930s. The CTC groups all Cubans who are gainfully employed. It is organized into federations according to sectors of economic activity, not according to professional categories or trades. The CTC has a presence in every work center, and it and the ANAP often sub- stitute for government agencies in dispute resolution. From the 1960s to the 1980s, these mass organizations were means by which the government and the PCC implemented policies and monitored the population. The moment of high- est recognition of their role came at the Second Party Congress in 1980, when all four heads of the mass organizations became alternate members of the party's Political Bureau. By the 1980s, however, the capacities of the mass organiza- tions had begun to weaken. Consider the ANAP. One of the top national objectives in the rural sector was to promote Agricul- tural-Livestock Cooperatives (Cooperativas de Produccion Agropecuaria — CPAs) ; the national leadership thought it more rational for smallholders to pool their resources. CPA member- ship jumped from 9,103 in 1978 to 82,611 in 1983, but by 1990 membership had dropped to 62,130. The number of hectares in CPAs peaked in 1986; after this high point, the organizations lost nearly a fifth of their pooled land. A generalized weakening of the capacity of the various mass organizations became evident in the late 1980s. PCC leaders, worried that these longstanding means of control were break- ing down, took decisive action in the early 1990s by replacing the leaders of three mass organizations. Thus, Orlando Lugo Fonte replaced Jose Ramirez Cruz, the longtime ANAP presi- dent; Juan Contino replaced Armando Acosta Cordero, the longtime national coordinator of the CDRs; and Pedro Ross Leal replaced the longtime CTC secretary-general, Roberto Veiga Menendez. Lugo Fonte and Contino joined the PCC Central Committee in 1991; Ross Leal was elevated to the Polit- ical Bureau that same year. 257 Cuba: A Country Study Vilma Espm founded the FMC and has remained its only president. She is Raul Castro's wife, Fidel's sister-in-law. Espm was promoted to alternate member of the Political Bureau in 1980 and to full Political Bureau membership in 1986. In 1991 she became a member of the Central Committee but remained as FMC president. Notwithstanding these attempts to reinvigorate the mass organizations, primarily through new leadership, the FMC, the CDRs, and the ANAP remain weaker than in decades past in terms of representing and mobilizing the population. The CDRs hit bottom in the early 1990s; in the mid-1990s, they responded to their reduced capacity by concentrating on some strategic tasks where they are still capable of delivering impor- tant support for the political regime. For example, the CDRs came to play an important role in Cuba's electoral process in the 1990s. (As the 1990s closed, the CDRs counted 7.5 million people on their membership rolls.) During the 1998 National Assembly elections, the CDRs campaigned steadily and mas- sively on behalf of a vote for the single official slate; they com- bated both blank voting and the process of voting selectively for some but not all candidates on the official ballot. On elec- tion day, the CDRs visited some homes repeatedly to ensure the highest possible turnout. The CDRs were literally an arm of the PCC working to achieve the desired electoral results. The CTC, in contrast, found a new, albeit still limited, role in the 1990s: defending the interests of workers in some respects and questioning some of the recommendations of government technocrats. In this latter stance, the CTC differed from its prior role of just helping the government implement its objec- tives. In the 1990s, labor unions, for example, delayed legisla- tion that would have forced recalcitrant workers to relocate to other jobs. As a result, Cuban state firms remained overstaffed and inefficient, but the government was spared from political protest and overt unemployment remained relatively low. Unions also resisted stricter sanctions against labor absentee- ism (thus making it easier for workers to moonlight as self- employed) , and fought off linking wages to productivity. The CTC also spoke out in late 1993 when the government adopted some of its most far-reaching economic reforms and, spurred by Finance Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Garcia, the govern- ment's leading technocrat, began to consider whether to impose taxes on self-employed and salaried workers. The CTC opposed the imposition of taxes on the payrolls of salaried 258 Government and Politics workers and supported a nationwide discussion of the pro- posed measures in "workers' parliaments" during the first half of 1994. In the end, taxes were imposed on self-employed but not on salaried workers (see Tax Reform, ch. 3). The changes that took place in the 1990s increased the CTC's autonomy from the state and imbued it with some claims to represent the interests of state workers. This new political role, of course, came at the expense of delaying or impeding economic reform, but it no doubt made the CTC more impor- tant. During this period, the CDRs, on the other hand, became even more closely connected to the PCC's partisan interests. The ANAP and the FMC have yet to find an effective new role. Civil Organizations Religion and the State The Cuban state is secular, according to the constitution. In fact, in the 1960s government policy was designed to weaken the Roman Catholic Church and other forms of organized reli- gious behavior, while respecting "freedom of religion" at its narrowest level: Cubans remained free to worship. Active churchgoers and their children, however, risked being discrim- inated against when applying to selective schools and the uni- versity and when seeking promotions in the workplace. The PCC was formally atheist until 1991, and membership in the party was often a prerequisite for jobs carrying significant responsibilities. Therefore, the Cuban leadership's decision to drop atheism as a formal requirement for party membership in 1991 and, more generally, in the 1990s to discontinue the active campaigns against organized religion were significant decisions with broad impact. In fact, Cuba witnessed a religious revival in many faiths in the 1990s. The revival began from a fairly low baseline. A large survey (N=3105, with N meaning the size of the random poll sample) conducted in the early 1990s by Cuba's Center for Psy- chological and Sociological Research (Centro de Investiga- ciones Psicologicas y Sociologicas — CIPS) showed that 65 percent of respondents believed in the possibility of magical cures while 43 percent thought well of burial ceremonies. But only 17 percent approved of baptisms, only 6 percent attended religious services, and only 2 percent admitted to belonging to a religious grouping. In 1997 a Cuban government survey showed that more than four-fifths of Cubans believed in some- 259 Cuba: A Country Study thing transcendent, while 15 percent admitted to belonging to a religious grouping. Although its social base of support remains modest, the Roman Catholic Church is Cuba's most hierarchically orga- nized community of faith (see Roman Catholic Church, ch. 2). The rebuilding of the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba began in the mid-1980s in preparation for the 1986 Roman Catholic Congress, the first to be held since 1959. Congress participants reviewed the situation of the church in Cuba, through history and in the present. They formulated broad recommendations for pastoral action and provided the first sustained critique of aspects of Cuban government policy. The final document issued by the Congress complained of discrimination in job promotions suffered by Roman Catholics, criticized official atheism, and called attention to "moral deficiencies" in con- temporary Cuba, including "duplicity, mendacity, fraud." In the early 1990s, Roman Catholic bishops criticized the government and party policies more sharply. The bishops issued their pastoral letter, "Love Hopes All Things," on Sep- tember 8, 1993, the feast of Our Lady of Charity of Cobre, Cuba's patroness, and coincidentally the grimmest moment in Cuba's sharp economic collapse of the early 1990s. The bishops developed several controversial themes that would resurface during the pope's visit in January 1998. In 1993 the bishops claimed the right to speak to all Cubans, including politicians. "We bishops of Cuba," they added, "reject any kind of measure that in order to punish the Cuban government serves to aggra- vate the problems of our people," specifically mentioning the United States embargo and other sanctions on Cuba. The bish- ops criticized official practice "that leads to identifying terms that cannot be made synonymous, such as homeland and social- ism . . . Cuban and revolutionary." They chided the authorities for limiting freedoms, for "excessive surveillance by the state security agencies that even extends into the strictly private life of individuals." They lamented the "high number of prisoners being held," including those "being punished for economic or political reasons In November 1996, President Fidel Castro visited Pope John Paul II at the Vatican and invited him to visit Cuba. The Roman Catholic bishops had first invited the pope in 1989, and infor- mal discussions had been underway since earlier in the 1980s, but the Cuban government had delayed issuing its own invita- tion. In preparation for the papal visit that took place in Jan u- 260 On the occasion of the June 29, 1997, open-air mass held in Havana, the first in almost four decades, a sign advertises the up coming January 1998 visit of Pope John Paul II. Courtesy Mark P Sullivan ary 1998, the first ever to Cuba by a pope, church and state negotiated extensively. The Cuban government agreed to per- mit outdoor masses, not limiting them just to the period of the pope's visit, and authorized religious processions outside church buildings. In addition, in December 1997, Christmas Day became an official holiday for the first time since 1969. The Cuban mass media covered some of the preparation for the pope's visit, and during the visit radio and television broad- cast all public events live. Cardinal Jaime Ortega, archbishop of Havana, was given a half-hour of free television time shortly before the pope's visit to explain the meaning and significance of the forthcoming events. The government also allowed thou- sands of international pilgrims, including Cuban-Americans, to visit Cuba for the duration of the visit, and allowed the church to import paper and other materials to publish necessary infor- mation. Because the pope's visit took place well after a process of social and religious change had begun, his visit may have a longer-lasting impact on Cuban society and politics than if it 261 Cuba: A Country Study had taken place without such prior changes. Thus, the papal visit may be a catalyst or an accelerator of further changes. The Roman Catholic church in Cuba has begun to behave like its brethren in former communist countries or in former Latin American dictatorships. Some parishes sponsor book or film clubs, or other groups to discuss issues of common concern, not just exclusively religious issues. Several dioceses also pub- lish magazines that cover a wide array of topics, not just those of religious significance. For example, the Havana archdioce- san magazine Palabra Nueva often publishes articles that assess and criticize government economic policy. Vitral, the magazine of the diocese of Pinar del Rio, has been the boldest in chal- lenging aspects of government policy. It is difficult to assess the relative size of Cuba's various com- munities of faith. Nonetheless, both before the Revolution and in the 1990s it is likely that the largest such community is heir to Cuba's Afro-Cuban religious traditions. Santeria, regla depalo, spiritualism, and other forms of Afro-Cuban religiosity com- mand significant popular allegiance, probably more than Roman Catholicism. The already mentioned large survey from the early 1990s, for example, suggests strong support for beliefs and practices often associated with Afro-Cuban practices. According to the survey, more Cubans believed in the worth of consulting a babalao (an Afro-Cuban religious leader) than a priest. In the western provinces, Roman Catholic Church atten- dance once a month reached 20 percent by late 1994, but, even after the pope's visit in 1998, consistent weekly church atten- dance nationwide was only about 3 percent, although the pro- portion was much higher in Havana than in eastern Cuba. During the 1990s, evangelical Protestantism reportedly grew rapidly in Cuba, as was the case elsewhere in Latin America and in former communist Europe. More traditional forms of Prot- estantism did not grow much, however. To the extent that reli- gious belief and behavior remained a form of distancing oneself from the government and the PCC, then the fact that other forms of religiosity grew faster than mainstream Protes- tantism could be explained in political terms: Cubans were unwilling to join those communities of faith perceived as too close to the political regime, and some Protestant pastors from mainline Protestant faiths had agreed to serve on the govern- ment's single official slate for National Assembly elections. Cuba also has a small Jewish community but no resident rabbi, although one or two are in training and rabbis from the 262 Government and Politics United States visit Cuba for services on holy days. The Jewish community has also grown, as older and younger Jews have sought to explore their religious tradition. (Some Jews, how- ever, have used this reactivation of their community links as a means to emigrate to Israel. If they are active members of a Temple, Jews have found it more likely that Israel will accept them as immigrants and that the Cuban government will per- mit their emigration.) Nongovernmental Organizations Cuba's most important nonreligious nongovernmental orga- nizations (NGOs) are often government operated nongovern- mental organizations (GONGOs). This is the case for two reasons. The nature and extent of government and PCC con- trol over Cuban society and political life have been very exten- sive. The principal forms of societal organization, for example, have been the mass organizations, already discussed. By the late 1970s and thereafter, however, the government and party found it useful to establish organizations with a greater margin of autonomy. In the 1990s, one additional motivation was that GONGOs could more readily obtain international assistance from NGOs in Western Europe and Canada. There are many examples of GONGOs. They include sports clubs; environmental organizations; a Cuban variant of a national rifle association; professional associations of lawyers, economists, engineers, and so forth; as well as many intellec- tual and scientific organizations, including think tanks. The think tanks focused on political, economic, and social analysis, were founded directly by the PCC, and followed its guidelines fairly closely through the 1980s. The Center for the Study of the World Economy (Centro de Investigaciones de la Economia Mundial — CIEM) , for example, conducted research principally on the Soviet Union and East European communist countries until their collapse, but also on the Cuban economy. The director and deputy director of the CIEM, Oswaldo Mar- tinez and Jose Luis Rodriguez, respectively, successively held the post of minister of economy in the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, more than one-half of the publications produced by the CIPS (Center for Psychological and Sociological Research) were clas- sified for the use of government and party officials, not for wider academic circulation. In the mid-1990s, the most notable GONGO was the Center for American Studies (Centro de Estudios sobre America — 263 Cuba: A Country Study CEA). Founded in the late 1970s by the PCC to generate infor- mation and analysis about the United States, Canada, and Latin America, the CEA, by the early 1990s, was strikingly inde- pendent in the development of its work while remaining well connected to some high-ranking government and party offi- cials. Central Committee members and staff, National Assem- bly leaders and staff, and ministers of government solicited the work of CEA staff and at times attended CEA workshops and conferences. In the early 1990s, CEA economists working on Cuba distin- guished themselves by the originality of their thought and their willingness to venture past the officially established canon for discussion of economic policy. One CEA-produced book, Cuba: La restructuracion de la economia, una propuesta para el debate, pro- vides a searching diagnosis and critique of Cuba's economic circumstances and proposes economic policies different from those the government was then pursuing. The CEA economists wished to accelerate the use of market incentives and instru- ments, although still within a socialist framework. The CEA sociologists and political scientists had also been working on domestic Cuban politics and society. In the spring of 1994, they held a conference to assess the quality of Cuban democracy. In that conference and in the resulting book that was published in 1995, some foreign authors were included as well. The publica- tion of these two CEA books, however, alarmed some within the leadership. In March 1996, Raul Castro, minister of the FAR, read a wide-ranging report on behalf of the Political Bureau to the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee. One part of the text sharply criticized the CEA, accusing its academics of parroting the line of United States scholars on Cuba and, more generally, of serving United States interests and undermining revolution- ary ideology. There followed an investigation led by Jose Ramon Balaguer Cabrera, party secretary for ideology. The terms of the investigation resembled a witch hunt. The CEA senior staff held together, however, insisting that they were good revolutionaries and good communists. (The United States government from time to time had denied CEA academ- ics visas to enter the United States precisely for these reasons.) Although they "confessed" to minor issues (for example, some- thing could have been done better) , they held firm in defense of their substantive ideas and professions of loyalty. In the end, although they had to leave the CEA (the institution became a 264 A view of Havana from Fort Spain (Fortaleza La Espana) Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations Development Programme pale shadow of its former self) , each of the senior academics at first found employment that, for the most part, permitted the continuation of much of their academic research. None was immediately expelled from the PCC. The survival of the CEA academics depended greatly on the expression of international support by scholars and governments in many countries that had come to value CEA researchers. NGOs, no matter what their origin might have been, create spaces between state and society, between ruling party and pri- vate citizens. Such an occurrence has been an aspect of the Cuban experience in the 1990s. The CEA case is instructive because the CEA was able to resist more effectively than would have been the case in Cuba in previous decades. Human Rights and Opposition Groups It is not news that the Cuban government harasses or jails human rights activists and groups as well as the political opposi- tion. The news in the 1990s was that the government was no longer succeeding in its repression. Since the defeat and destruction of violent counterrevolutionary forces in the mid- 1960s, the government has not feared violent opposition. But, beginning slowly and haltingly in the late 1970s and gathering 265 Cuba: A Country Study steam in the 1980s, a human rights movement finally blos- somed in Cuba in the 1990s. In the 1990s, when the government jailed human rights activists or opposition political leaders or destroyed some of their organizations, others, hitherto unknown, replaced them. Thus, the work of these groups has continued even if the faces and names of the people and organizations have changed. A high-water mark for human rights groups was reached in 1995-96. On October 10, 1995 (the anniversary of the begin- ning of Cuba's first war of independence), an organization called the Cuban Council (Concilio Cubano) was founded. The Concilio was an attempt by some 140 small, unofficial opposition groups to coalesce around a minimal program. The Concilio's aims were a general amnesty for all political prison- ers, full respect for the present constitution and fundamental laws, a call on the Cuban government to fulfill its obligations to respect human rights under the United Nations Charter, a demand for freedom of economic organization, and a call for free and direct elections on the basis of the pluralist nature of society. In November 1995, the Concilio reaffirmed its commitment to use only peaceful means to achieve its aims. In short, the Concilio respected the country's constitution and legal frame- work while demanding changes within them. In December the Concilio formally asked the government for permission to hold a large gathering on February 24, 1996 (the anniversary of the beginning of Cuba's last war of independence). On February 15, however, the government launched a wave of repression against Concilio leaders and members; the next day it banned the gathering. The Concilio's principal leader and national del- egate, Leonel Morejon, served a prison term for his role in the organization; several others were jailed as well. The Concilio Cubano episode was noteworthy because it was the largest and most ambitious attempt to consolidate human rights and opposition groups. Throughout the 1990s, the repression of human rights and opposition activity and the rebirth in due course were a recurring pattern. In the late 1990s, human rights and opposition activists founded new groups, some of which created new, smaller coalitions. The gov- ernment again resorted to repression, and the activists and oppositionists rebounded as well. As in decades past, in the 1990s the government responded to opposition efforts by forcing some activists into exile and 266 Government and Politics sometimes, in effect, deporting them. One means of assuring political stability since 1959 has been the government's export of its opposition. Many Concilio Cubano leaders and members went into exile after the 1996 crackdown, for example. The government often releases political prisoners only on the con- dition that they emigrate. Mass Media In the 1990s, as in decades past, the state owned and oper- ated all mass media, except for publications of the Roman Catholic Church. Because of the high cost of importing news- print, in the early 1990s the government sharply cut back on the publication of newspapers and magazines. Many journals and magazines were shut down; the circulation of newspapers was cut back. The principal daily newspaper is Granma, official organ of the PCC. Granma reads like a collection of press releases. It often publishes the full texts of official speeches and is gener- ally devoid of editorial or substantive variety. In the late 1990s, it resumed occasional publication of abbreviated "letters to the editor" along with responses to them, thereby providing a glimpse of how official Cuba addresses popular questions. Juventud Rebelde is the official organ of the UJC (Communist Youth Union) . In the 1990s, it changed from a daily to a weekly. It is likely to feature opinion pieces that provide a slightly wider range of political and social commentary. Bohemia is a news- magazine of long standing that at times presents investigative reporting of problems that government leaders wish to bring to light. By the end of the 1950s, Cuba had an impressive nationwide network of television broadcast companies and television sets. Fidel Castro employed television extensively in 1959 and there- after to communicate his vision and his policies to the Cuban people. The Cuban Revolution was the first revolution whose leaders made extensive use of television. In the 1990s, however, the costs of production for television led the government to reduce the number of channels and of hours of transmission. Nonetheless, television remains the principal source of com- munication for entertainment and news. In the 1990s, however, radio, a lower-cost alternative to print or television media, became the more dynamic mass medium. Moreover, the Cuban government's response to the United States-sponsored Radio Marti Program led to wider freedom of 267 Cuba: A Country Study programming for radio. Consequently, Cuban radio engages in investigative reporting of various misdeeds, ranging from stores that do not open when they should or that sell shoddy mer- chandise, to incidents of crime and corruption. Live talk shows urge listeners to call in with their questions and complaints. Some radio programs broadcast internationally popular music, instead of the establishment revolutionary or "solidarity" music favored by official Cuba. In 1993, for example, Radio Taino was revamped to broadcast with the characteristics of commercial- style radio. It featured contemporary Cuban and international Latin dance music, and it carried advertising from foreign firms operating in Cuba. In the 1990s, the Roman Catholic Church was allowed to accept donations to import materials and equipment to pub- lish the texts necessary for the liturgy and to publish magazines of substantial circulation. As already mentioned, several archdi- oceses publish magazines and other limited-circulation publi- cations. The most important one, Palabra Nueva, sponsored by the Archdiocese of Havana, features articles on religious themes, but it has also published regularly on economics and social issues, at times diverging significantly and critically from government policies. Political Processes Emerging Political Leaders Cuba's political processes at the start of the twenty-first cen- tury were more complex than in decades past. President Fidel Castro remained at the pinnacle of power. Although aging (he was born in 1926) and less healthy than in prior years, his energy and talents remained extraordinary. He could still deliver multi-hour speeches with few notes; and he still kept the hours of a night owl, insisting on seeing foreign leaders at midnight or thereafter when the latter were exhausted and he was in his prime. Castro is still thoughtful, eloquent, inspiring, decisive, and charming. He is also ruthless, brutal, intolerant, egomaniacal, and manipulative. These and other traits make him a politician who is revered and feared, admired and loathed, but whom none take lightly. Fidel's slightly younger brother Raul Castro (born in 1931), the FAR minister, is the designated successor. Raul Castro lacks the more attractive qualities of his brother's public personality, but he has inspired respect and loyalty among subordinates for 268 A view of downtown Havana (Old Havana), including the National Capitol (Capitolio Nacional), 1996 Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington his painstaking and effective construction of Cuba's armed forces. Although no longer a formidable force, the FAR won the wars that it fought twice in Angola against South African invasions (1975-76, 1987-88) and once on Ethiopian soil against Somalia's invasion (1977-78). Other important political leaders will most likely continue to play a role in Cuba's future politics. PCC Organization Secre- tary Jose Ramon Machado was a winner in the composition of the Central Committee chosen at the Fifth Party Congress and positioned himself well for the future. Army Corps General Abelardo Colome, "Hero of the Republic of Cuba" for his com- bat service in overseas wars, rose through a professional career in the army and in the late 1980s became interior minister. National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon revitalized Cuba's parliament and, to some degree, political life by reach- ing out to a wider number of loyal "revolutionary" Cubans who were not necessarily PCC cadres. Alarcon has remained the government's chief of relations with the United States. Esteban Lazo Hernandez is the party's expert on subnational govern- ment, having served as first party secretary in more provinces (including La Habana) than anyone else. Lazo (born in 1944) 269 Cuba: A Country Study is the Afro-Cuban who best combines relative youth and signifi- cant experience at the top of the leadership. Carlos Lage, vice president of the Council of State, heads the economic cabinet and, backed by Minister of Economy and Planning Jose Luis Rodriguez Garcia, was the political architect of Cuba's eco- nomic reforms of the 1990s. Younger than these others, Lage portrays on national television and in person an image of quiet competence and candor. Also playing political roles wider than their ministerial portfolios imply are Culture Minister Abel Pri- eto, Division General and Sugar Industry Minister Ulises Rosales del Toro, and Basic Industries Minister Marcos Portal. Portal in particular was the champion of more efficient admin- istrators in state enterprises. In the 1990s, unlike the 1960s, Cuba had no clearly identifi- able "factions" within the party, but it has witnessed varying cur- rents of opinion. These combine and overlap. In general, PCC cadres and Secretary Machado tend to oppose most economic, political, and religious reforms. Leading military and internal security officers in contrast, favor various market reforms. FAR Minister Raul Castro, for example, took the lead in 1994 to advocate market reforms in agriculture, contrary to what had been Fidel Castro's position. The Ministry of Interior, too, favors economic reforms to decriminalize activities that would otherwise occur illegally; ministry officials believe that they have tougher enemies to fight than parents seeking milk for their children. Vice President Lage and National Assembly President Alarcon, among others, have been more willing than other national leaders to support the various economic and political experiments that took place in the 1990s. Political Aspects of the Security and Military Forces Cuban state security remains effective in many ways. In the summer of 1994, it controlled and suffocated with a profes- sional use of force a large riot that took place in downtown Havana, as thousands of Cubans protested the use of force against those seeking to emigrate without prior lawful authori- zation. Cuban leaders quietly pointed out that the People's Lib- eration Army of the People's Republic of China used massive force in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, in 1989 to put down pro- tests. The Cuban military was not called in to put down this riot, however, because internal security forces handled the inci- dent effectively, with restrained use of force. Internal security 270 Government and Politics forces also effectively suppressed illegal job actions and attempted strikes at various moments in the 1990s. Politically, several factors are noteworthy about the FAR. Most Cuban military officers are also PCC members. In the 1990s, military officers on active duty constituted a consistent fifth of the membership of the party's Political Bureau. Two of the key members of the Political Bureau were Generals Raul Castro and Abelardo Colome. And, after the 1997 Fifth Party Congress, the military represented 17 percent of the member- ship of the party's Central Committee, continuing a slide evi- dent over the decades but retaining significant clout (see also The Military in the Government and Party, ch. 5). In the 1990s, the FAR became a pale shadow of its former self, as regards combat readiness and effectiveness. Cuba stopped receiving weaponry free of charge from the Soviet Union at the beginning of the decade, and it could not afford to import sufficient new equipment or even spare parts. As a result, the FAR had to reduce the frequency and scope of its military exercises. Its size shrank greatly, downsizing to not more than 65,000 regular troops. From 1989 to 1997, the size of the military and internal security budget (in pesos) was cut by 45 percent. The leadership's downsizing of the FAR was a major political and budgetary contribution to any future gov- ernment of Cuba. To facilitate the demobilization of personnel and to supple- ment the meager peso-denominated pensions, the government created semi-private companies (they operate as private com- panies, but the state is the sole shareholder) to employ former officers. The military-run tourist firm Gaviota is one example; many of its taxi drivers, former military officers, are paid in dol- lars by tourists. However, military officers on active duty are prohibited from moonlighting and discouraged from receiving funds from their overseas relatives. As a result, the standard of living of military officers dropped appreciably relative to other Cubans who enjoyed lawful access to self-employment or to dol- lar remittances. Some officers moonlighted, nonetheless, and in so doing broke the law they were sworn to uphold. The Widening of Public Space The most notable change in elite political processes in the 1990s was that some disputes could no longer be resolved just in private as had hitherto been quite common. In the 1990s, some disputes became quite public. The new Foreign Invest- 271 Cuba: A Country Study ment Law 77 of 1995 was vigorously debated and its approval consequently delayed. Another publicly debated case, that relating to the imposition of payroll taxes, was the first instance in which an economic initiative advocated by the leadership was defeated. Fidel Castro's need to explain and defend pub- licly his invitation to Pope John Paul II both at the Fifth Party Congress and in the days prior to the pope's arrival was yet another example. The widening of public space was most closely associated, however, with the weakening of the government's control. The boom of illegal markets in the 1990s, discussed in previous chapters, is the best example of weakened control. The govern- ment had been an intrusive micromanager of economic life, shaping the work place and earnings decisions and outcomes for every Cuban. In the 1990s, that changed. Lawfully or not, many Cubans took hold of their economic lives and became largely independent of the state for their livelihood. Given the context of past decades, this was a major political change, not just an economic change. Moreover, President Fidel Castro repeatedly made it clear that he detested authorizing the limited market-oriented poli- cies that he felt compelled to authorize in the 1990s to ensure his government's survival. For Cubans long-accustomed to a ruler who had governed with vast discretion, this, too, was a stunning political change. Fidel Castro could no longer govern his way. Human rights and opposition activists understood this new modest but nonetheless real opening. Each of them might suf- fer repression, abuse, or imprisonment, but they were newly confident that others would pick up their fallen standard to continue to press for wider spaces for democratic liberties. Cuba's government could no longer prevail even in the one area that had always mattered the most, namely, the capacity to eliminate all organized opposition. The academics associated with the Center for American Studies (CEA) did not consider themselves dissidents or oppo- sitionists but loyal PCC members; nonetheless, the party leader- ship came down hard on them. And yet, these academics resisted, as well, in ways unlike in the past. They did not break ranks. They did not betray each other. And, to a surprising degree, they succeeded in continuing at least some aspects of their academic work. 272 Government and Politics "Do not be afraid," said Pope John Paul II during his visit to Cuba in January 1998. Posters with the pope's photograph, plastered all over the country, reiterated this fundamental mes- sage. Cubans took the pope's message to heart in their partici- pation in the events associated with his visit. The pope's pilgrimage to Cuba, as already noted, was likely to have some lasting impact because it rode the crest of a wave of renewed interest in religiosity. The political attitudes of Cubans also changed. In the spring of 1990, Cuba's newsmagazine Bohemia conducted a nationwide public opinion poll (N=957). Asked about municipal govern- ment, more than 40 percent of respondents failed to express trust in the delegate elected from their district; nearly 60 per- cent believed that improvements needed to be made in Cuba's local government structures and procedures. In the spring of 1990, the PCC also sponsored a nationwide survey. Only 20 per- cent of respondents said that the food supply was good, and only 10 percent said that the quality of transportation was good. Having thus reported criticism on certain matters, the poll was believable when it reported that 77 percent of respon- dents thought that health services were good and 83 percent believed in the efficacy of the country's schooling. Cubans were, therefore, unhappy with the capacity of their govern- ment institutions and leaders to represent and serve many of their interests, but they continued to be impressed by perfor- mance in education and health care. This legacy of at least par- tial public support was crucial for regime survival at its moment of greatest peril, when so many Cubans had come to feel free to express their severe unhappiness even to PCC pollsters. In late 1994, an affiliate of the Gallup Poll conducted a large survey in Cuba's western provinces. A large proportion of respondents had no difficulty reporting complaints. Only a quarter of Cubans believed that their needs for food were fully met, although half believed their health care needs were being met and nearly three-quarters were satisfied with Cuba's educa- tion programs. Only one in ten Cubans called themselves "communists" although half thought of themselves as "revolu- tionaries"; a quarter said that they were not supporters of the regime. Half of those surveyed were interested in setting up small businesses, if the government were to authorize them. More Cubans supported the value of equality than the value of freedom. 273 Cuba: A Country Study These views suggest that Cubans had absorbed — and sup- ported — a number of socialist values but that many also dis- agreed significantly with the government and were not afraid to voice those disagreements to pollsters. Support for the PCC was quite low even though, as noted before, many individual party members were highly regarded by their neighbors. Cuban politics changed slowly but decisively in the 1990s. Political leaders could not and did not govern as had been their custom. They were forced to authorize some changes and permit others, even when they disapproved of them. Cubans began to act through the market, legally or not, and chose to explore new political, religious, and intellectual alternatives. The PCC and government leaders, in turn, had enacted important changes on their own to shape Cuba's present and future. The leadership was substantially overhauled in the early 1990s. New, younger people were appointed to significant posts. The armed forces were downsized sharply. After a period of decline and deinstitutionalization early in the 1990s, the gov- ernment took some steps to strengthen and rearticulate regime institutions as the decade closed. The regime's leaders and institutions, however, had changed in perceptible ways even if their purpose continued to be the retention of power. Cuba in the 1990s was in the throes of a political transition, although its end point was uncertain. This "transition to some- where" did not imply a transition to a liberal democratic regime as had occurred elsewhere in Latin America or in much of the former communist world. It was associated with more open spaces for a private and public life autonomous from gov- ernment and party power, and with rules that enabled market processes to operate. Whether Cuba's transition would evolve toward democratization remained unclear as the decade reached a close. Foreign Relations With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist governments of Central and Eastern Europe, Cuba was bereft of international allies. Its trade, investments, military support, and political relations had been disproportionately concen- trated and dependent on governments that no longer existed. As 1990 opened, the Soviet Union required that all bilateral trade be conducted at international market prices by whatever private or state enterprises engaged in pertinent activities. No 274 The North East Gate, Marine Barracks, Ground Defense Force, U. S. Naval Base, Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, 1 993 longer would bilateral trade be mandated and carried out by the central government in Moscow. During the 1990s, Cuban economic relations with Central and Eastern Europe plummeted. Cuban economic relations with Russia focused principally on barter trade, at market prices, exchanging sugar for petroleum (see The Economic Crisis of the 1990s, ch. 3). Cuba refused to service its large accumulated international debt to the Russian Federation, but that was no different from its general policy on nonservicing of any debts. Russian ground troops, who had been stationed in Cuba since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, also departed in 1992. Russia and Cuba retained two somewhat more complicated relationships. The Russian government paid rent to Cuba for the use of electronic eavesdropping facilities set up south of Havana at Lourdes (see Relations with Russia, ch. 5) at the height of the Cold War. And Russia and Cuba continued to negotiate over the fate of the nearly completed but mothballed nuclear power plant near Cienfuegos in south central Cuba. The investment costs of completing the nuclear power plant, however, were beyond the capacities of both governments. 275 Cuba: A Country Study Cuba accepted international inspection of these facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Cuban relations with China recovered only gradually from the sharp bilateral split that had become manifest in 1966. With the collapse of European communism, however, political relations warmed more quickly between these two remaining communist governments. The Cuban government sought to learn fast and well the magic secrets of China's creation of mar- ket Leninism. Economic relations between the two countries remained basically what they had been, however: significant for Cuba, modest for China, and conducted at international mar- ket prices. Sino-Cuban military relations are modest in scope. Between 1989 and 1991, Cuba repatriated its overseas troops from all countries to which they had been deployed. In 1992 it announced that it had stopped providing military support to revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow governments in other countries. The international dimensions of the Cuban government's strategy for survival required the active cultivation of foreign investment and, therefore, of better political relations with market-economy countries. To resist the increased United States economic and political pressures on Cuba, Fidel Castro's government needed to find some international support. United States actions led to some sympathy for Cuba. In October 1992, the United States Congress enacted the Cuban Democracy Act (see Glossary), whose principal sponsor was Representative Robert G. Torricelli. The new law prohibited United States subsidiaries in third countries from trading with Cuba. Other governments deemed it an extraterritorial sec- ondary boycott in violation of the rules under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT — see Glossary). In March 1996, the United States Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (also known as the Helms-Burton Act), sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton. However, invoking procedures in the law itself, President William Jefferson Clinton suspended the enforcement of the act's key feature, Title III, which autho- rizes United States citizens and firms to sue in United States courts those firms from other countries that "traffic" with Cuba. The law is broadly written to affect most foreign invest- ment in Cuba as well as trade. These laws provoked strong opposition from Canada, the European Union (EU — see Glossary), the Caribbean, and 276 Government and Politics Latin American countries, among others. The EU, Canada, Argentina, and Mexico enacted blocking legislation to prevent their firms from complying with these United States laws and to protect them if they were sued in United States courts. At the annual Iberoamerican summits of heads of state, opposition to these United States policies rose markedly. Although the Iberoamerican summits endorsed democracy and human rights strongly, President Fidel Castro was welcomed at each of these events, and his government's authoritarian practices were never explicitly criticized. Within days of the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act, in November 1992, for the first time ever Cuba gained over- whelming support in the United Nations General Assembly for a resolution condemning United States policies toward Cuba. The enactment of the Helms-Burton Act further tilted the vote in the General Assembly against the United States. In 1992 the vote was fifty-nine in favor of Cuba's resolution; three nations, including the United States, voted against the motion; and sev- enty-one abstained. In November 1997, 143 countries voted to condemn United States policy, three voted against, and only seventeen abstained. United States policy served Cuba's pur- poses well. (In separate motions, however, the General Assem- bly repeatedly criticized the Cuban government's violations of human rights.) Cuban policy was most effective within the Anglophone Caribbean. Cuba was admitted to the Caribbean Tourism Orga- nization in 1992, and in 1994 became a founding member of the Association of Caribbean States (see Glossary) led by the Anglophone Caribbean. Caribbean countries became among the most vocal opponents of United States policy toward Cuba. In September 1993, the European Parliament (see Glossary) condemned the Cuban Democracy Act, and in September 1994 it called upon Cuba to enact democratic reforms. Also in 1993, the European Commission (see Glossary) created for the first time a humanitarian aid program for Cuba, although Cuba remained the only Latin American country with which the EU had not concluded a formal cooperation agreement. In response to the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, European governments challenged the United States and refused to accept its imposition on European firms. The government of Canada, along with those of various Caribbean countries, went the farthest in opposing United States policies. Canada strengthened its legislation to block the 277 Cuba: A Country Study impact of United States law on Canadian firms, established a program of official development assistance in addition to humanitarian aid, and financed the business activities of Cana- dian firms with Cuba. It facilitated the work of Canadian NGOs in Cuba. And in 1998, Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chretien visited Havana. Cuban relations with the United States featured three key events in the 1990s. In the aftermath of the riot in Havana in the summer of 1994, the Cuban government lifted all require- ments for an exit permit to emigrate and encouraged unautho- rized emigration by boat or raft to the United States. Tens of thousands of Cubans took to the seas. Many were seized by United States Coast Guard and Navy ships and held for months at the United States base at Guantanamo Bay. Eventually, the United States and Cuba reached agreements in September 1994 and May 1995 to end the crisis. The United States accepted almost all Cubans who had emigrated illegally in 1994, although a few criminals were excluded and returned to Cuba, which accepted them. The United States promised to accept no fewer than 20,000 legal immigrants per year for the indefinite future. The United States also undertook to inter- cept on the high seas and return to Cuba those seeking to enter the United States illegally and without a credible claim to refugee status; this policy has been enforced. Cuba agreed to accept those whom the United States had intercepted and not to discriminate against them. It also agreed to reimpose its bar- riers on unlawful exit. The next significant episode occurred on February 24, 1996, when at least one, perhaps three, unarmed civilian aircraft piloted by Cuban-American members of a group called Broth- ers to the Rescue flew into Cuban airspace. (On a prior trip, Brothers to the Rescue airplanes had dropped antigovernment leaflets over Havana.) As they were fleeing the pursuit of Cuban Air Force jets, two of the planes were shot down over international waters. This Cuban action, condemned by the International Civil Aviation Association, triggered the enact- ment of the Helms-Burton Act. In November 1999, a five-year-old boy, Elian Gonzalez, was rescued in the Straits of Florida, hanging on a raft after his mother had drowned. At first, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service allowed his great-uncle to obtain provisional custody. Soon, however, the boy's father, Juan Miguel Gonzalez, claimed custody, requesting the boy's return 278 Government and Politics to Cuba. An intense seven-month legal and political battle developed over the child's custody, engaging both national gov- ernments, various local governments in southern Florida as well as state and Federal courts, including the Supreme Court. Consistent with their new migration relations, the United States and Cuban governments assumed similar positions on the issue and ultimately prevailed: Elian Gonzalez, accompa- nied by his father, returned to Cuba in June 2000. In the United States, the political battle over Elian was fierce; in Cuba, the government used the incident to mobilize nationalist sup- port. In the end, the Cuban American community's insistence that the boy should remain in the United States, and not with his father in Cuba, received little support. The Elian Gonzalez case may have begun a re-thinking of United States policy toward Cuba. During the 1990s, the United States and Cuba also con- structed modest confidence-building measures to prevent acci- dental war and minimize the likelihood of accidents. These included frequent contact between the two countries' coast guards to enforce the migration agreements and carry out search-and-rescue operations. Regular procedures for contact were also established between both sides at the Guantanamo base. In anticipation of potential trouble, both governments inform each other in great detail and, to the extent possible, coordinate their actions. Outlook As the twenty-first century began, Cuba's communist leader- ship believed that it had survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and the European communist world. It had overcome increased United States sanctions on Cuba. And it had stemmed the economy's decline. Cuban leaders were conscious that popular support had dipped seriously, but they believed that they retained enough support, and wider tolerance, from their people to rebuild the political bases of the regime and to live through the next and perhaps most decisive crisis: Fidel Castro's death. Although Castro remained firmly in charge, his health had begun to fail and, for the first time since 1959, regime loyalists began to contemplate seriously a Cuba without Fidel. Much has already changed in Cuba in anticipation of that future. Cuba's political institutions from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s had been marked by very slow rotation of personnel. 279 Cuba: A Country Study The circulation of elites accelerated dramatically in the early 1990s and then stabilized somewhat later in the decade. Most members of the party's Political Bureau in place in 2000 had joined the bureau after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In effect, a much younger, more dynamic set of leaders was in place, ready for the regime's future battles for political survival. The armed forces had also changed. In particular, the forces were downsized, a move that reduced the political burden on future governments to do more downsizing. Cuba's political institutions, however, were weaker, more brittle, and enjoyed much less political support than in the past. The National Assembly, despite its partial revitalization in the 1990s, remained a toothless institution. The PCC's mem- bers were well regarded by their fellow citizens, but the party as such was not. The PCC as an institution weakened also in the early to mid-1990s, although an attempt was made to reinvigo- rate it in time for the Fifth Party Congress. The strengthening of the PCC in 1997 may have set the basis for a future "renewed communist" party, as in Poland, Lithuania, or Hungary in the mid-1990s. Ordinary Cubans were ready for change and were already seizing the reins of the future. They sought and found jobs on their own. A growing number discovered the value of religion to their lives. Some courageous ones joined human rights and opposition groups, and did not desist despite repression. Intel- lectuals were more willing to challenge the government and the party. And even Fidel Castro grudgingly and publicly con- fessed that he could no longer pursue the policies he preferred most. The future of Cuba lies also in part with the United States. It will be made easier or more difficult by United States govern- ment policies regarding the claims of American citizens and firms seeking compensation for the property expropriated in 1959 and 1960. And it will also be greatly affected by the gener- osity or the revenge of returning Cuban-Americans. Cuba is an island archipelago, battered by hurricanes, natu- ral and political. There is absolute certainty that real as well as metaphorical hurricanes will strike it in the years to come. The only doubt is when and with what force. * * * 280 Government and Politics Much of the literature on Cuban government and politics in the 1990s was polemical or speculative, that is, it denounced the Cuban political regime and imagined a post-Castro future. As a result, there is less careful analytical and empirical work on Cuba in the 1990s than there is for previous times. Most of the material for this chapter had to be constructed from pri- mary sources. Various books do, however, ably place the early 1990s within the broader sweep of Cuban politics since 1959. Among them are Irving Louis Horowitz's Cuban Communism, Carollee Bengelsdorf s The Problem of Democracy in Cuba, Marifeli Perez-Stable's The Cuban Revolution, and Susan Eckstein's Back from the Future. Perhaps the single most comprehensive analyti- cal and empirical work about Cuban politics and economics in the 1990s remains unpublished, however. It is Cuba in Transi- tion, sponsored by the Cuban Research Institute of Florida International University (for the series, see http:// www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/ asce/index.html) . The journal Cuban Studies continues to provide valuable articles, book reviews, and bibliographies. The good news is that significant social scientific work has been published in Cuba in the 1990s. Until 1996, Cuba's lead- ing scholarly institution for political analysis was the Center for American Studies (CEA). The works of then-CEA scholars, such as Julio Carranza, Haroldo Dilla, Rafael Hernandez, and Pedro Monreal, among others, contributed much to the under- standing of Cuba in the 1990s. So, too, did the center's journal, Cuadernos de Nuestra America. Important work was also pro- duced, although infrequently published, at the Center for Psy- chological and Sociological Research (CIPS) and at various research centers within the University of Havana. Cuba's pre- mier social science publication is Temas, edited by Rafael Hernandez. Indispensable primary sources remain the daily newspaper Granma, the weekly newsmagazine Bohemia, and the panoply of journals published, sometimes just occasionally, by Cuba's uni- versities and think tanks. The official legal gazette is the Gaceta Oficial de la Republica. The official Cuban government web site (http://www.cubaweb.cu) is also informative and useful. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 281 Chapter 5. National Security The marble obelisk and statue at the Jose Marti Memorial (Monumento a Jose Marti) in the center of Revolution Plaza (La Plaza de la Revolucion), formerly Republic Plaza (La Plaza de la Republica), 1997 Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan AT THE CLOSE OF THE 1990s, Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias — FAR) was a shadow of its former self. The decline of the Cuban military institution during the 1990s was in stark contrast to the FAR's position in the mid-1980s, when it was one of the largest and most formi- dable militaries in the Latin American region, if not in the entire developing world. The pre-1990 development of the military institution owed much to Soviet aid, a benefit from the Cuban leadership's close ties with the former Soviet Union that dated to the early years of the Revolution. These ties made possible not only the FAR's intensive professionalization, which was deepened in the early 1970s, but also the extension several years later of Cuban mili- tary involvement to other developing world nations. By the time that Cuba's military "internationalism" (see Glossary) in Africa ended in 1991, 300,000 FAR personnel had served as trainers, advisers, and combatants. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the most promising young Cuban officers were trained at the Soviet Union's top military schools; foreign assistance worth millions of dollars was channeled each year to help sup- port the Cuban institution; and the FAR's inventory was replete with many of the Soviet Union's most sophisticated, state-of- the-art weapons and equipment. By the early 1990s, the erosion of the FAR's image as one of the premier military institutions of the developing world was already underway. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the deepening of the island's economic crisis, the Cuban mili- tary found itself confronted with some of the most serious chal- lenges in the history of the institution. By 1989, with the demise of the East European bloc imminent, the Cuban mili- tary leadership was already making plans to "go it alone" with- out the help they had long received. As the era of Cuba's military "internationalism" drew to a close, the combat troops once deployed abroad and hailed as heroes returned home only to be tasked to menial agricultural labor. In the difficult years that followed, the size of the armed forces was halved, the term of military service shortened, and the defense budget reduced sharply. On top of these cuts, much of the FAR's equipment — from its supersonic jet fighters to its aging main 285 Cuba: A Country Study battle tanks — was put into storage because of the continuing shortages of fuel and spare parts. By the mid-1990s, there were signs that the FAR was success- fully defining a new course. The post-Cold War thaw made pos- sible the establishment of closer ties with fellow military officers in Latin America and Europe, which helped somewhat to mitigate the institution's isolation. Even more significant were the reforms introduced on the island that provided an opening for the FAR to assume a more prominent role in the economy. This provided the military the opportunity to serve as an exemplary model for the rest of the nation, as suggested by the "experiments" with the System for Managerial Improve- ment (Sistema de Perfeccionamiento Empresarial — SPE) that were first conducted within the FAR's production enterprises. Of no small import, this economic involvement was also moti- vated by the FAR's interest in economic survival, which was facilitated by the expansion of the military-linked Gaviota Tourism Group, S.A., in the burgeoning tourism industry. Toward the close of the decade, although a United States Department of Defense study affirmed that the weakened FAR no longer posed a serious threat, it appeared equally unlikely that the military institution, still professional and staunchly supportive of the regime, might wither away. The latter half of the 1990s heralded a period of new and different security-related concerns for the Cuban leadership. These concerns — stimulated, in part, by the dynamic set under- way by the economic reforms carried out only years before — led to a higher profile for the police forces of the Ministry of Interior. In an effort to stem the growth of common crime, the regular police found themselves the beneficiaries of increased budgets, new equipment, and training programs, occasionally carried out with modest assistance from European police authorities. At the same time, the political police — as the mem- bers of the Ministry of Interior's Department of State Security are often called — were tasked to monitor and do what was nec- essary to rein in the increasingly bold activities of dissidents and members of the nascent independent press. One serious crackdown, which began in earnest in late 1998, brought changes in the Penal Code that codified new offenses and established harsher sentences for many crimes already on the books. The crackdown included the issuance of harsher sen- tences for what foreign observers might recognize as offenses 286 National Security that were political in nature, as well as the more frequent appli- cation of the death penalty. Cuba's security environment of the 1990s thus appeared quite different from what it did in the 1980s. In some respects, it resembled more the difficult years of the 1960s than either of the two succeeding decades. With the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the Cuban government's focus was redirected from ambi- tious military efforts to bolster socialist allies abroad to efforts simply to maintain domestic order and the regime's own social- ist foundation. Despite continuing economic problems in the final years of the decade, the FAR appeared to be adapting to its new position and economic role. As well, the deterrent mea- sures aimed at halting the surge in common crime appeared to be achieving some success. At the same time, however, there were few indications that the regime's harsher treatment for political offenders had led dissidents and independent journal- ists to cease efforts to press for changes. At the close of the twentieth century, various aspects of Cuban internal security had clearly been challenged, whether directly or indirectly, as a result of the crisis of the past decade. Yet despite the frequent forecasts of impending collapse that were heard throughout the 1990s, the Cuban regime main- tained its stability. This was made possible in part by the con- tinuing loyalty and support of the security forces under the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias — MINFAR) . Moreover, the regime appeared ready to take on the new security challenges that were sure to arise in the coming years. Background of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1959-91 Institutional Consolidation in the 1960s One of the greatest challenges faced by the revolutionary government when it assumed power in January 1959 was that of organizing a new military. Fidel Castro Ruz, who initially had no formal role in the civilian government, was recognized as the commander in chief of the armed forces. In turn, the troops of the Rebel Army formed the core of the new military, and the Rebel Army's top field commanders became the new institution's leaders. However, the issue remained as to what to do with the remnants of Fulgencio Batista Zaldfvar's (presi- dent, 1940-44; dictator, 1952-59) old armed forces and with 287 Cuba: A Country Study the poorly prepared peasants who had joined the Rebel Army's ranks during the final phases of the struggle in 1958. Batista had left behind a 40,000-man military consisting of 35,000 members of the army and 5,000 members of the naval and air forces, including several thousand new recruits. The armed forces also had received new equipment from the United States shortly before the cutoff of aid to the regime. With Batista gone, the armed forces fell into complete disarray. Many officers quickly fled the island upon learning of Batista's departure, and members of army units throughout the country refused to continue fighting, with some abandoning their posts. Although the victorious rebels initially professed plans to unite the two armies into a single large force, the difficulties in building a new military organization composed of both guerril- las and their former enemies may have been recognized. In the months that followed the rebels' arrival in Havana, very few of the old military's officers who remained in Cuba were kept on active duty, and thousands were dismissed peremptorily. Hun- dreds of others were accused of war crimes, court martialed, and publicly executed in fulfillment of what Fidel Castro termed "revolutionary justice." The MINFAR was created on October 16, 1959, to replace the Batista-era Ministry of Defense. Headed by Raul Castro, the MINFAR quickly became the dominant organization in the new government. At first, the new MINFAR's leaders planned to have a military of 15,000 to 25,000 well-trained troops, whose hierarchy would be built around the few hundred individuals who had been the Rebel Army's leaders, were hardened com- batants, and were known for their loyalty to Fidel and Raul Cas- tro. This aim was never fully realized, however, because, despite their low level of professionalism, it was seen as politically unwise to dismiss the many who had joined the rebels in the latter days of the revolutionary struggle. Organized in October 1959, the FAR numbered 40,000 troops and officers by early 1961, making it comparable in size to Batista's old military. The FAR was supported by the National Revolutionary Militias (Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias — MNR) , a civilian organi- zation formed in October 1959. Although maintaining a large force posed a problem, the FAR proved useful in helping the regime counter two threats that developed in the early 1960s. The first was the internal security problem posed by the activities of the counterrevolu- tionaries, who opposed the new government and Fidel Castro 288 Cuban soldiers wearing Soviet helmets and armed with Czech-made automatic rifles stand guard outside the U.S. Naval Base at Guantdnamo in September 1 962. Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington and were roaming the countryside in central Cuba. The Castro government's campaign against the counterrevolutionaries, known as the "fight against bandits" (lucha contra bandidos), began in 1960 and continued until victory was declared five years later. Working together in coordinated operations to defeat the antigovernment rebels were members of at least four organizations — the military, the Ministry of Interior's Depart- ment of State Security (Departamento de Seguridad del Estado — DSE) , the MNR, and the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (Comite de Defensa de la Revolucion — CDR). By the end of 1964, 500 soldiers had died in the cam- paign, and a total of 3,500 counterrevolutionaries had been killed or captured. The United States Government's efforts to bring about the regime's overthrow perhaps posed a more serious threat. On April 17, 1961, the first major United States-sponsored military 289 Cuba: A Country Study action against the Castro government was carried out with the landing of an army of Cuban exiles organized by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on Playa Giron in the Bay of Pigs on the south-central Cuban coast. This ostensibly covert invasion, which came only fourteen weeks after Wash- ington had broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba, pre- sented the first real test of the ability of the regime's security forces, including the militia and the FAR's newly organized air force, to repel external aggression. About 300 of the invaders were killed outright, and 1,179 others were captured and held for twenty-two months. The exile force's ready defeat turned into a propaganda victory for the FAR and the regime. The fol- lowing year, initiation of the United States-sponsored Opera- tion Mongoose, which was aimed at sparking a popular revolt, obliged the FAR to continue to maintain a high state of readi- ness. This readiness continued until the declarations of victory in 1965, at which time the Cuban leadership turned its atten- tion to developing the armed forces' professional capabilities (see Revolutionary Adventurism and Institutionalization, ch. i). This effort began with steps taken in early 1963, when the MNR was disbanded. Also at that time, the armed forces' ranks were trimmed, and several professional military schools were opened to improve the training and competency of the senior officer corps as well as of the various service arms. In addition, the universal conscription system known as Obligatory Military Service (Servicio Militar Obligatorio — SMO) was instituted so that draftees completing their three-year term of service might help fill the scaled-down military's manpower requirements. In 1965 the military budget, which had been reduced along with the manpower cuts, was increased. But the truly capping achievement during this period was the delivery of state-of-the- art MiG-21 supersonic fighters, which lent the FAR the pres- tige of being the first military in Latin America to have such advanced aircraft. Despite the Soviet contributions to the Cuban arsenal dur- ing the first half of the 1960s, tensions in Soviet-Cuban rela- tions persisted over Cuban efforts to "export the Revolution" to other developing countries (at a time when the Soviets were pursuing "peaceful coexistence" with the West) . After the cap- ture and execution by Bolivian army troops of Ernesto "Che" Guevara in October 1967, the regime's radical ardor was tem- pered. One of the Revolution's heroes, Guevara had left Cuba 290 National Security in a vain attempt to fulfill his revolutionary theory by sparking a peasant-led insurgency in that distant nation. With Cuba's decision to return to the Soviet fold, the FAR's professional development was intensified, a move that set the course that the institution would follow for the next two decades. In mid-1969, in one of the first outward signs that the rapprochement would likely extend to the FAR, a Soviet naval squadron entered Caribbean waters on a flag-showing visit to Cuba. Such visits by the Soviet Navy continued on at least an annual basis well into the 1980s. The Era of "Internationalism/' 1970-91 Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the FAR enjoyed a reputation as one of the developing world's preeminent mili- tary institutions, and its troops participated in various interna- tional combat missions. This reputation and foreign involvement were made possible in part as a result of the exten- sive Soviet military assistance that the FAR began receiving dur- ing the early 1970s. By the end of that decade, "internationalist service," as the foreign military duty was known, had become an important part of the institution's professional identity and was counted among the FAR's official missions. The Soviet role in Cuba during the first half of the 1970s was aimed at developing the FAR's professional training and capa- bilities as well as Cuban military installations that the Soviets could use. The latter included Soviet construction of a deep- water submarine support facility at Cienfuegos on Cuba's southern coast. The construction of this militarily significant facility prompted a minor crisis in United States-Soviet rela- tions in 1970. According to a former Soviet diplomat, the Cubans had agreed to the facility's construction in exchange for the promise of modern Soviet fighter aircraft. There were also efforts to model the FAR's development on that of the Soviet military, an aim that included routinely sending FAR officers for training at Soviet military schools. In keeping with this emphasis on training, the Youth Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil de Trabajo — EJT) was created in 1973. As a result, thou- sands of enlisted troops and officers were relieved of their duty to work in agriculture and construction in order that they might dedicate themselves to their professional development. During this period, military ranks and insignia were also revised to resemble more closely the Soviet style. In addition, the size of the FAR was cut by half between 1970 and 1974, 291 Cuba: A Country Study bringing it to 100,000. An attempt was made to improve the combat readiness of these forces through constant training and exercises. This professionalization helped to prepare the FAR for its extensive international involvement in Africa, which began with the surreptitious dispatch of Cuba's elite Special Troops (Tropas Especiales) to the newly independent nation of Angola in 1975 (see Special Troops, this ch.). Although made possible by Soviet aid, this extension of the FAR's international role was principally a reflection of the Cuban regime's abiding interest in providing political and military support to allies abroad. During the early 1960s, Che Guevara had traveled throughout Africa in hopes of building a support network between African nationalists and Cuban revolutionaries. In October 1963, in the first international action in which FAR troops took part, 686 soldiers, including a battalion of 400 tank troops ( tanquistas) , were deployed to Algeria to aid in its border war with Morocco and remained there for six months. Elsewhere in Africa during the 1960s, small numbers of Cuban military personnel were reportedly involved in guerrilla fighting in territory encom- passing Congo (present-day Zaire), Tanzania, and Guinea-Bis- sau. Within the Western Hemisphere as well, the regime also sought to provide aid and military training to members of left- ist guerrilla movements and to organize insurgencies where such groups were lacking. In early 1973, Cuban advisers, even- tually numbering 600 and 700 personnel, were sent to South Yemen to train its military and their guerrilla allies who were fighting in the Dhofari rebellion. In October and November 1973, with the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Cuba's deploy- ment of an 800-man tank brigade to fight for Syria against Israel heralded the more prominent foreign role that the FAR would shortly assume. On the heels of the Special Troops' arrival in Angola, the first large-scale commitment of Cuban combat personnel abroad came in late 1975 when tens of thousands of forces arrived to fight in the civil war on the side of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola — MPLA) , then under the leadership of Agostinho Neto. For the next sixteen years, Cuban troop strength in Angola varied according to the ebbs and flows in the prolonged conflict. The FAR's air and ground forces, equipped by the Soviets, were pitted at different times against personnel of the South African Defence Force; the rebels fight- 292 National Security ing for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola — UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi; and members of a lesser known rebel group, the National Front for the Libera- tion of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola — FNLA), which, despite United States covert funding, soon fell apart. In mid-1976, 33,000 to 36,000 FAR combat troops began to be deployed in Angola during one of the early peaks in the fighting; as many as 80 percent were thought to be activated reserve troops. When fighting intensified again in the late 1980s, the Cuban deployment in Angola grew to 50,000 personnel. The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in early 1988 was the final major clash in which Cuban forces participated. It was hailed by the Cuban leadership as the great victory that paved the way for negotia- tions to end the war and Cuba's withdrawal from the conflict. These negotiations led to the signing of the United States- mediated Tripartite Agreement by representatives of Angola, South Africa, and Cuba in December 1988. In addition, to pro- viding for an end to the Angolan war and Namibian indepen- dence, the agreement set a timetable for the phased withdrawal of Cuban forces over a thirty-month period. In May 1991, the last combat troops returned home to Cuba, two months ahead of schedule. The second major theater to which Cuban troops were deployed was in eastern Africa, where several thousand combat personnel were sent in early 1978 to aid Ethiopia in its war with Somalia. During the peak of the fighting that year, 12,000 FAR troops were involved in the conflict. Following Somalia's deci- sion to end hostilities, the number of Cuban combatants in Ethiopia was reduced to 5,000 personnel, and this number remained relatively constant for most of the next decade. At the time of the decision to withdraw Cuban forces from Ethio- pia in 1989, the Cuban contingent numbered 3,000 personnel. Toward the end of the 1980s, because of economic difficul- ties at home as well as the shifting international environment, Soviet support for the Cubans' continuing involvement abroad was beginning to wane. Nevertheless, the FAR clearly had bene- fitted greatly from the considerable Soviet aid it had received over the past years. At the conclusion of the 1980s, the Cuban military was one of the largest in the Western Hemisphere, with an estimated 180,500 personnel, of whom more than three-fourths were ground troops. The FAR was also one of the 293 Cuba: A Country Study best-equipped armed forces in the Latin American region, if not the entire developing world, counting in its inventory more than 100 MiG fighter jets (including new MiG-29s, which were then being delivered) , several submarines, more than 1,000 main battle tanks, and an array of missiles and other armaments. FAR personnel also remained beneficiaries of the extensive Soviet training program, with the most upwardly mobile officers sent either to Moscow's M.V. Frunze Military Academy or the K.E. Voroshilov General Staff Academy. Others received technical training, often in Eastern Europe, to oper- ate and maintain the sophisticated equipment that the FAR had received. The United States military's intervention in Grenada in late October 1983 ended Cuban activities on that island nation. After the takeover of Grenada's government by the Marxist- Leninist New Jewel Movement in 1979, Cuban military advisers and labor brigades were brought in to help build an interna- tional airport capable of landing large military transports. After only brief skirmishes with the Cubans, the 13,000 United States troops accepted the surrender of the fifty Cuban military advisers to Grenada's then-collapsing regime and of the approximately 600 armed construction workers. The Grenada intervention was the last incident in the twenti- eth century in which armed United States and Cuban person- nel directly confronted each other. In 1990, following the elec- toral defeat of Nicaragua's Sandinista government, the Cuban military advisers who had been active there since 1979 and who had once numbered several thousand were sent home. FAR advisers who were involved in training missions in various other developing world nations also returned home, including the 1,500 personnel who were withdrawn from Congo in 1991. As of the end of 1991, with all Cuban troops at home, the FAR's "internationalist" mission was effectively over. The mem- bers of the military who served abroad had gained valuable combat experience. In addition, the institution's inventory of materiel was expanded by the equipment and weapons that the troops brought back with them. Overall, the FAR's prestige was enhanced as a result of its "internationalist" role, in which the Cuban forces were generally considered to have acquitted themselves well. Both this "internationalist" experience and the ethos of professionalism instilled over the past two decades were important in the FAR's development as an institution, one that might be capable of managing the changes that it would 294 National Security have to embrace during the course of the 1990s (see Chal- lenges Faced by the Institution in the 1990s, this ch.). Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces Organizational Changes of 1989 Toward the end of the 1980s, the political and economic changes already taking place at home and abroad had begun to place strains on the Cuban military institution. The withdrawal of troops from Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere marked the beginning of the end for the FAR's "internationalist" mission and obliged the institution's leadership to seriously consider what the future might hold for the armed forces. At the same time, the military's domestic economic role and interest in eco- nomic involvement were also beginning to change, largely as a result of decisions implemented following the 1986 Third Party Congress, when several select FAR enterprises were authorized to initiate experiments in allowing plant managers greater autonomy in decision-making as a means to spur efficiency and productivity. Only two years later, with the collapse of the east- ern bloc regimes already imminent, the leadership announced its decision, with seeming abruptness, to commit Cuban mili- tary troops, including many returning combat veterans, to agri- cultural production in order to help ensure the country's continuing food supply during the difficult times it saw ahead. By mid-1989, the changes then taking place on the island and abroad had already likely resulted in a shared sense among the Cuban leadership that a crisis might be at hand. The shake- up of Cuba's security apparatus later that same year, together with the events that preceded it, seemed to confirm this. As a result of the shake-up, the prestige of the Ministry of Interior was diminished and its capabilities weakened as many career intelligence officers were forced out of the institution and replaced by military personnel. The events surrounding this shake-up, in which Army Corps General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, the FAR's ranking officer under Raul Castro, was installed as minister of interior, has continued to be debated among scholars who follow Cuban security issues. Because of the secrecy related to these changes in the security apparatus, it remains one of the least understood actions undertaken by the regime (see Ministry of Interior, this ch.). The most important reason for this lack of understanding is linked to what has become popularly known as the Ochoa 295 Cuba: A Country Study affair, named after Division General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez. Although it involved the detention and trial of a num- ber of ranking officers of the country's security forces, nearly all of them Ministry of Interior personnel, it was named the Ochoa affair because it began with the court martial and exe- cution of Ochoa, along with three other officers. Ochoa was a widely respected FAR officer who was not only popular among his men but, as the recipient of the MINFAR's highest decora- tion, a Hero of the Republic. At the time, the Ochoa affair raised widespread speculation about support within the mili- tary for the regime, given Fidel Castro's resistance to imple- menting any political or economic reforms similar to those then being carried out in the Soviet Union under President Mikhail Gorbachev and recurring rumors that Ochoa was somehow involved in plotting against the leadership. It also raised questions yet to be answered concerning the regime's underlying motives in singling out Ochoa for punishment and in joining his case with that made against the Ministry of Inte- rior officials implicated. In June 1989, six months after his return from a tour of duty as the commander of Cuba's "internationalist" forces in Angola, General Ochoa was slated to take over as the chief of the Western Army, the most important of the FAR's three terri- torial commands (see The Revolutionary Armed Forces, this ch.). Instead, on June 13, the well-regarded general was arrested and charged with "serious acts of corruption and ille- gal use of economic resources." Within weeks, a Military Honor Tribunal, composed of forty-seven fellow general officers, was convened. The Honor Tribunal stripped Ochoa of his rank and honors, recommended that he be tried for high treason, and expressed its support for the application of the "full weight" of the law against him, if convicted, by a Special Mili- tary Tribunal. The court martial by the Special Tribunal began on June 30, 1989. In addition to Ochoa, the government identified three other officers, each also stripped of rank, as the key players in a wide conspiracy of self-enrichment that included trafficking in drugs, diamonds, and other contraband, and money launder- ing. Another ten individuals, who had backgrounds in either the Ministry of Interior or the MINFAR, were tried on related charges at the court martial, but were convicted of lesser crimes. Many foreign observers at the time described the hast- ily convened Special Tribunal, the proceedings of which were 296 The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces building at Revolution Plaza (Plaza de la Revolucion), October 1991 Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington broadcast on state television, as a "show trial" that was reminis- cent of the Stalinist era in the Soviet Union. In July, following the Council of State's review and approval of the sentences handed down, the four former officers were executed by firing squad. Well beyond the proceedings that were known formally as Case Number 1 of 1989, the Ochoa affair continued to have repercussions within the state's security apparatus. Only shortly before the court martial began, the government announced that the minister of interior, Division General Jose Abrantes Fernandez, a man who had long been responsible for Fidel Castro's personal guard and was counted among his most trusted aides, had been removed from office for failing to dis- cover the illegal activities that were carried out by the soon-to- be convicted officials under his charge. Abrantes was immedi- ately replaced as minister by General Colome Ibarra. Through the ensuing month, a succession of MINFAR offi- cers were appointed to fill the vacated posts of the top Ministry of Interior officials who resigned. Then, on July 30, Abrantes and a number of those who had worked closely under him were arrested. The crimes with which they were charged included negligence, illegal use of government resources, cor- ruption and/or toleration of corruption by others, and the manipulation and concealment of information of interest to the government. On August 24, a second Special Military Tri- 297 Cuba: A Country Study bunal was convened for Case Number 2 of 1989, to consider the charges against Abrantes and six other former Ministry of Interior officials. At the conclusion of this secret court martial, Abrantes, who was then in his late fifties, was sentenced to twenty years in prison, where he died of a heart attack in Janu- ary 1991. The other former officials were given prison terms ranging from five to fifteen years. By the end of 1989, with Abrantes gone and a trusted career FAR officer in his place, hundreds of Ministry of Interior offi- cials, including many who had spent their entire careers in the organization, had been retired, dismissed, or otherwise replaced by FAR officers. These new Ministry of Interior per- sonnel, according to some analysts, often had little training or background in intelligence matters, and as a result, the institu- tion's effectiveness was thought to have suffered during the 1990s. In 2001 Colome Ibarra remained head of the Ministry of Interior. Challenges Faced by the Institution in the 1990s The decade of the 1990s brought important political and economic changes for the FAR that were associated with the end of the armed forces' "internationalist" mission and the break-up of the Soviet Union and its East European bloc. These changes presented formidable challenges for the Cuban mili- tary, perhaps the most critical of which was simply continuing to maintain the FAR as a professional military institution despite a serious lack of resources. During the course of the decade, the FAR leadership's responses to the continuing chal- lenges led the military to become more involved in national life and to assume a more prominent role as a domestic eco- nomic actor. This shift appeared to be driven both by the FAR's financial need, given the institution's efforts to become "self- financing" as its share of the national budget was pared, and by the regime's prevailing concern about being able to maintain domestic order should a security crisis develop. Well before Fidel Castro's September 1990 declaration of the "special period in peacetime" (periodo especial en tiempo de paz; hereafter Special Period — see Glossary), the FAR had already begun efforts to cut spending and otherwise help mini- mize the impact of what it saw as an impending crisis. Troops returning from "internationalist" service were sent to work in agriculture in order to help boost the national food supply; still others were discharged from active duty, often placed on inac- 298 National Security tive reserve and left to fend for themselves, despite the promise that they would have jobs to return to after completing their foreign military duty. Within the FAR, meetings were routinely convened among service personnel in order to brainstorm on ways to conserve fuel and make do with fewer expenditures. Paramount among the military leadership's planning efforts at that time was the formulation of contingency plans for what was known as the "zero option," which was to be implemented if all foreign aid and supplies were cut off. Changing Ties with the Former Soviet Union By mid-1991, less than a year after Cuba's formal declaration of its economic crisis, the Soviet commitment to the island under President Mikhail Gorbachev had already clearly weak- ened. However, even in the face of the Castro regime's ada- mant refusal to implement any Soviet-style reforms, the long- standing ties between the FAR and the conservative-leaning Soviet Armed Forces might have suggested some slight hope for continuing close military-to-military relations, despite ten- sions between the two countries' political leaders. There appeared some basis for this hope: United States Department of State estimates of Soviet military assistance to Cuba, although said by some scholars to be inflated amounts, had reached US$1.5 billion in 1990, which turned out to be the final year of Soviet aid to the island. In addition, in early 1990, the first six of what was expected to be a squadron of thirty-six state-of-the art MiG-29 jet fighters had arrived on the island. The failed coup attempt against President Mikhail Gor- bachev in August 1991 and Cuba's resounding silence after the fact marked an irreversible shift in relations between the two countries. In September Gorbachev announced plans to with- draw the Soviet military's "special training brigade," which had been based on the island since the Cuban Missile Crisis. According to Fidel Castro, this decision was announced with- out the courtesy of informing him beforehand. The Soviet training brigade, more formally known as an independent motorized infantry brigade, numbered only 2,800 troops in 1991, but it had once had an estimated 20,000 troops. Despite a drawdown in personnel that had already taken place, the bri- gade was considered in Cuba, as well as abroad, as one of the enduring symbols of the Soviet Union's commitment to the regime. The announcement of its formal withdrawal appeared to confirm that it would not be possible for the FAR's ties with 299 Cuba: A Country Study their Soviet counterparts to remain close. In September 1992, months after the formation of the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Cubans reluctantly agreed to the Russians' schedule for the departure of the brigade's last troops. In 1993, as the Cuban economy bottomed out, the final brigade members departed the island. The Military 's Economic Role Since the beginning of the economic crisis in the early 1990s, the military has become increasingly involved in the nation's economy. Such involvement was officially denoted as a new responsibility for the MINFAR in early 1991, when Fidel Castro declared, "[0]ne of the Armed Forces' missions at this time is to help the economy." The military's interest in this eco- nomic involvement has been spurred as much by concerns over the loss of the military aid and training once provided by the Soviet Union as by the weakness of the civilian economy, which has forced reduced government spending on the armed forces and the inception of the MINFAR's efforts to "self- finance" a portion of its budget. In addition, this involvement has helped the military avoid further reductions in personnel that might otherwise have been necessary. Toward the end of the 1990s, some reports estimated that the MINFAR had man- aged to provide for as much as 80 percent of its spending needs through self-financing. The MINFAR's efforts to achieve heightened efficiency and productivity through management innovations in its enter- prises, known as the SPE (System for Managerial Improve- ment) , can be traced to policies embraced as early as 1987. The severity of the economic crisis, however, spurred the military to become more extensively involved in agricultural production. During the most difficult years of the economic crisis in the early 1990s, the military's troops, often having just returned from "internationalist" duty, were routinely deployed in the fields in intensive efforts to boost crop yields, and its trucks were used to help farmers transport their goods to the newly opened farmers' markets. The participation of MINFAR troops in the annual sugar harvest (zafra) and in planting or picking other crops was not unprecedented; however, it did mark the first time in twenty years that regular troops had been assigned to such tasks. During this period, the military is generally con- sidered to have achieved self-sufficiency in terms of its ability to 300 National Security feed its troops, and surplus produce from the military farms (granjas) was sold to bring in additional revenue. Perhaps the most important facet of the military's economic involvement came about after the government's 1990 decision to legalize joint investment ventures, when the military became a dominant partner in the state tourism company known as the Gaviota Tourism Group, S.A. Gaviota was originally formed in 1988 in order to provide support for vacations by Cuban and Soviet military personnel on the island. In its new incarnation, Gaviota has teamed with such foreign partners as Spain's Sol Melia and Tryp hotel chains and France's Club Med in order to bring in significant hard-currency earnings for the MINFAR. Gaviota has been active in both the management and the administration of the tourism projects funded by foreign capi- tal, which include four- and five-star hotels and resorts located in prime tourism spots, such as Varadero. It has also established subsidiary operations, such as AeroGaviota, which operates domestically to fly tourists to their vacation destinations. Although the exact connection between Gaviota and the armed forces hierarchy has not yet been publicly clarified, it is widely acknowledged that, since the early 1990s, the firm has been routinely used as a source of employment for loyal offi- cers who are formally retired from active duty. Some direction is provided through the MINFAR's Vice Ministry for Economic Affairs, which in the late 1990s was headed by a Politburo mem- ber, Division General Julio Casas Regueiro, the former com- mander of the Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force (Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria — DAAFAR). The Military in the Government and Party From almost the beginning of the Revolution, the Cuban military has played a prominent role in both the government of the nation and, since its founding in 1965, the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — PCC) . The most notable aspects of this role are the key leadership duties of Fidel and Raul Castro, who exercise overlapping national authority as heads of the government, the military, and the PCC. Other senior military officials may also be found in posi- tions of authority and influence elsewhere within the regime, particularly within the cabinet and in the top councils of the PCC. Their most significant single unifying trait continues to 301 Cuba: A Country Study be their record of loyalty to the Castros, often dating back to the era of the guerrilla struggle. The military's influence within the national government can be most clearly seen in the composition of the Council of Min- isters (Consejo de Ministros) . In addition to Fidel and Raul Castro, five other men with military backgrounds were mem- bers of the Council of Ministers in the late 1990s. These included General Colome Ibarra, the minister of interior; Divi- sion General Ulises Rosales del Toro, the FAR's former Chief of General Staff, who was appointed minister of the sugar indus- try in late 1997; Brigade General Silvano Colas Sanchez, the minister of communications; Captain (Capitan de Navio) Orlando Felipe Rodriguez Romay, the minister of the fishing industry; and Colonel Alvaro Perez Morales, the minister of transportation. In addition, another prominent military offi- cial in the government is retired Brigade General Juan Esca- lona Reguera, the Attorney General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la Republica). Although not a member of the Council of Ministers, Escalona, as attorney general, serves as the country's top law enforcement official and sits on the Gov- erning Council of the Supreme People's Tribunal, the Cuban state's top judicial body. The MINFAR has been under Raul Castro's leadership since its organization in 1959. By the time of the shake-up in 1989, however, the Ministry of Interior had been led by three differ- ent individuals, who, although members of the guerrillas' Rebel Army, did not necessarily build careers within the FAR. Since 1989 the Ministry of Interior has been led by a FAR officer (see Organizational Changes of 1989, this ch.). In addi- tion to the other ministerial posts now held by military officials, the ministries of communications and transportation have pre- viously been headed by military officers, a record that suggests not only the military's expertise in logistics but also that the leadership likely considers these to be important resources to control in the event of a security crisis. Similarly, some analysts believed that Rosales's appointment as minister of the sugar industry signaled the military's expanded influence in domes- tic economic affairs. It should also be noted, however, that Rosales's ministerial post has previously been held by a military man, most recently in the early 1980s. Escalona's appointment as attorney general, a post he has held during the 1990s, is somewhat unusual despite the general's legal background, as none of his predecessors were known to be military officials. It 302 SS-N2 STYX missile on parade in Havana, December 2, 1986 Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington may be explained by his prominent role in 1989 as the lead prosecutor in the Ochoa affair. The military also wields considerable influence within the top echelons of the PCC. Yet, throughout the 1990s, a consis- tent decline in the number of officers elected to the PCC's Central Committee took place. In 1981, following the PCC's Second Congress, officers, all with commissioned ranks, were elected to just over a quarter of the Committee's 225 seats. By contrast, after the Fourth Congress in 1991, their representa- tion in the Central Committee had declined by half. At the same time, the FAR has retained its dominance within the Political Bureau (Politburo) , the PCC's top decision-mak- ing organ. After the 1997 Party Congress, although the overall size of the Politburo was cut by one member, an additional mil- itary officer was named, which brought to seven the number of officials in the twenty-four-member body. They included Com- mander-in-Chief Fidel Castro, General of the Army Raul Cas- tro, Army Corps General Colome Ibarra, and Division Generals Julio Casas Regueiro, Leopoldo Cintra Frias, Rosales del Toro, and the more recently appointed Ramon Espinosa Martin. Given the hierarchical nature of the Cuban regime, the mili- 303 Cuba: A Country Study tary's continuing domination at this top level within the Party suggests that its declining representation on the Central Com- mittee may not be a matter that greatly concerns the military institution and its leadership. Constitutional Provisions and Treaty Obligations Cuba's 1976 constitution, as amended in July 1992, estab- lishes in Article 43 the right of all Cubans to ascend to any rank in the country's security forces, "according to their merits and capabilities." In turn, as described in Article 134, the members of the armed forces and of other security forces also have the same right to vote and to be elected to office as do other citi- zens. In Article 65, the "defense of the socialist homeland" is recognized as "the greatest honor and the supreme duty of every Cuban citizen." As stipulated in this article, military ser- vice is to be regulated by law. Treason is recognized as "the gravest of all crimes," with the person committing it to be "sub- ject to the most severe sanctions." These sanctions, although not specified in the constitution, might include capital punish- ment or life imprisonment (see Penal System, this ch.). The articles guaranteeing Cuban citizens the right to serve in the security forces and setting the primacy of defense as a cit- izen's duty have remained unchanged since 1976. However, the 1992 reforms created a new Chapter 8 in the constitution, com- posed of a single article, that was added to address provisions for a state of emergency. In that chapter, Article 67 sets out the right of the president of the Council of State to declare a state of emergency in case of developments or imminent develop- ments — whether "natural disasters or catastrophes or other cir- cumstances" — which may affect "domestic order, the security of the country or the stability of the State." This state of emer- gency may be applied to all the republic or a part of it, and the president is authorized to mobilize the population while the state of emergency is in effect. Article 67 also states that the manner in which the state of emergency is declared, its enforcement, and its termination are to be regulated by law. Similarly, although still to be subject to law, Article 67 stipulates that the exercise of "the rights and fundamental duties recog- nized by the constitution" during normal times "must be regu- lated differently" while the state of emergency is in force. In complementing the authority granted the president of the Council of State to declare a state of emergency, the National Assembly of People's Power (Asamblea Nacional del 304 National Security Poder Popular — ANPP; hereafter, National Assembly), Cuba's national legislature, formally bears constitutional responsibility to "declare a state of war in case of military aggression and to approve peace treaties." However, as the National Assembly meets in regular session only briefly each year, Article 89 estab- lishes that the Council of State, a body elected by the National Assembly, has the right to represent it between sessions or, according to Article 90, to convene extraordinary sessions. Among other provisions, Article 90 further explicitly assigns the Council of State the right "to decree a general mobilization when required for national defense, to declare war in case of aggression, or to approve peace treaties when the Assembly is in recess and cannot be convened with the necessary security and urgency." According to Article 93, the president of the Council of State, the office held by Fidel Castro that establishes him as chief of the Cuban state and government, has expansive responsibilities in terms of the security forces and national defense. The Council's president serves as the supreme com- mander of the country's security forces, which include the FAR's troops as well as the forces under the immediate supervi- sion of the Ministry of Interior, and is authorized to determine their general organization. As noted above, the president also has the authority to declare a state of emergency in situations addressed by Article 67 of the constitution, and as soon as cir- cumstances permit, to give an accounting of that declaration to the National Assembly or, if the legislature cannot be con- vened, to the Council of State. Further, the president of the Council of State also presides over the National Defense Coun- cil (Consejo de Defensa Nacional), the body established to oversee the defense planning and coordination system adopted in the 1980s. In addition, Article 94 establishes that in case of "the absence, sickness, or death of the president of the Council of State," authority is delegated to the first vice president of the Council of State, an office held by Raul Castro. As the nation's supreme executive and administrative body, the Council of Ministers, whose president is also Fidel Castro, is also invested by the constitution with security-related responsi- bilities. As enumerated under Article 98, these responsibilities include "providing for national defense, the maintenance of domestic order and security, the protection of citizens' rights, and the protection of lives and property in the event of natural disaster." To support these responsibilities, among others, the 305 Cuba: A Country Study Council of Ministers is charged with formulating the national budget and, following its approval by the National Assembly, its oversight. All government ministers, including the heads of the MINFAR and of the Ministry of Interior, are members of the Council of Ministers. Further, because Raul Castro serves as the first vice president of the Council of State, he would remain a member of the Council of Ministers even if he no longer served as the MINFAR' s chief. Lastly, Article 101 addresses the role of the National Defense Council. This body is charged with the responsibility to direct the country during "conditions of a state of war, during the war, the general mobilization, and the state of emergency." It is required to maintain its readiness to assume responsibility for any of these duties at any time. As noted above, the National Defense Council's president is the president of the Council of State — again, Fidel Castro. According to Article 101, the Coun- cil's organization and functions are to be regulated by law. Related to this, Article 119 elaborates the responsibilities of the Provincial Defense Councils, the Municipal Defense Councils, and the neighborhood-based Defense Zones, which within their respective territories mirror those assigned to the National Council. In accordance with the law, the National Council is charged with determining these bodies' organiza- tion and functions. The specific execution of their duties dur- ing a crisis, however, is to be defined by the nation's general defense plan and the role and responsibility assigned each body by one of the country's three regional military councils, which cover geographic territories that correspond to the areas under each of the MINFAR's three regional army commands. In terms of Cuba's security-related treaty obligations, Fidel Castro's government has been reluctant to enter into multilat- eral and bilateral pacts that might limit the scope of its actions either domestically or in the international arena. This stance is underscored in Article 11 of the 1992 constitution, which states that "The Republic of Cuba repudiates and considers illegal and null the treaties, pacts, or concessions that were signed in conditions of inequality or that disregard or diminish its sover- eignty and territorial integrity." In March 1960, shortly after the victory of the Revolution, Cuba withdrew from the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Recip- rocal Assistance (more commonly known as the Rio Treaty — see Glossary), which provides for collective hemispheric defense against external aggressors. In August 1960, months 306 National Security before diplomatic relations with the United States were broken off, Cuba terminated its participation in the United States Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which provided military aid and had been endorsed by Batista in 1952. Cuba's participa- tion in the Organization of American States (OAS — see Glos- sary) was formally suspended on January 31, 1962, after the member states determined that the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Castro government was "incompatible with the interests of the hemisphere." Consequently, Cuba does not have a repre- sentative on the Inter-American Defense Board, nor are its mil- itary personnel eligible to attend the Inter-American Defense College, located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. Until recently, Cuba also resisted entering into any agree- ments aimed at controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. It remains the only country in the hemisphere that has not joined the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which a former Cuban United Nations ambassador said would require Cuba to give up "its inalienable right to defend itself using weapons of any kind." Nevertheless, in March 1995, Cuba did finally sign the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, more commonly known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (see Glossary), which, like the NPT, estab- lishes a commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Cuba also reached an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in May 1980 with respect to implementing safe- guards and allowing inspections at its nuclear power facilities then under construction (and now abandoned) at Juragua, near Cienfuegos on Cuba's southern coast. Despite its avowals, the Castro government has shown an inclination to join other pacts related to the conduct of warfare and the treatment of its victims. In June 1966, Cuba ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol that prohibits the wartime use of poison- ous gases or bacteriological agents. It also has ratified the four international agreements of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the protection of war victims. In 1976 the Cuban government ratified the 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weap- ons Convention. Cuba has refused to sign the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Produc- tion and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, however, largely because of the use of these devices throughout the Cuban side of the no-man's-land that separates the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay from the rest of the mainland. 307 Cuba: A Country Study The United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay The United States Naval Station at Guantanamo consists of a seventy-three-kilometer area (including land and water) , four kilometers wide, located east of the Sierra Maestra in Cuba's southeastern Guantanamo Province. United States Marines first landed at this site during the Spanish-American War in 1898. The United States leased the territory in 1903 as a coal- ing station for United States naval vessels transiting the Carib- bean. A 1934 treaty with the United States replaced the 1901 Piatt Amendment (see Glossary), which had authorized United States military intervention in Cuba. Several of the principal provisions of both treaties were identical, however. For exam- ple, the 1934 treaty also grants a lease to the Guantanamo Naval Station area "in perpetuity" and free maritime access to the land through Guantanamo Bay. In exchange, the United States agreed to continue to pay the Cuban government an annual rent of $2,000, an amount tied to the gold standard that was equivalent in the late 1990s to just over US$4,000. The main difference was that under the 1934 treaty the United States agreed to forego the discretionary right to intervene in Cuba's domestic affairs. The United States also agreed in both 1901 and 1934 to terminate the lease by the joint consent of both governments. In terms of its strategic role, Guantanamo serves as a supply and logistics base for the United States Navy's Atlantic Fleet. Although the base's strategic value to the United States has declined over the years, it would still likely be a platform for operations in the event of war or natural disaster in the Carib- bean or Latin America. For more mundane purposes, the United States Navy uses the base for exercises and maneuvers, the maintenance of United States naval vessels, and the moni- toring of Cuban airspace. From time to time, it has also been used to temporarily house refugees, including 34,000 Haitian refugees in 1991 and many of the 30,000 Cubans who attempted to leave the island during the balsero (rafter) crisis in the summer of 1994. During 1999, the base was briefly consid- ered as a possible temporary shelter for the estimated 20,000 Kosovo refugees left homeless as a result of the war. Although it serves as a permanent "home" to approximately 1,080 United States military personnel and possibly about 2,500 American civilian personnel, as well as 300 foreign nationals, the base is believed to be capable of providing temporary housing for up 308 National Security to 50,000. Since the 1960s, it has been self-sufficient in terms of its water supply and electrical needs. In the late 1990s, approxi- mately 1,000 United States Navy personnel and 640 United States Marines were stationed at Guantanamo. The number of American personnel stationed there is expected to continue to decline over the foreseeable future as a result of ongoing efforts to pare military expenditures. The base, described by Fidel Castro as a "dagger plunged into the heart of Cuban soil," has remained a point of tension in bilateral relations. As a sign of its defiance of the United States' right to use the territory, Castro's government has refused the funds paid annually by the United States Depart- ment of the Navy over the past decades under the terms of the lease. Beginning in 1961, after President Dwight D. Eisenhower broke diplomatic relations with the Castro government, Cuban and United States military troops began patrolling opposite sides of a twenty-eight-kilometer barb-wire-fenced stretch of the perimeter that separates the base from Cuban territory, and watchtowers were constructed on both sides. Since then the base has remained separated from the rest of the island by barbed-wire fencing and a no-man's-land filled with antiperson- nel and antitank mines that are designed as much to keep Cubans out of the base as to keep the American personnel there isolated. Since the onset of Cuba's economic crisis in the early 1990s, tourists on the Cuban side of the perimeter have been able to pay for visits to some of the look-out points used by the FAR's Border Brigade (Brigada de la Frontera) to moni- tor the base's activities. Despite Cuba's continuing adamant demand for the depar- ture of American troops from Cuban territory, the tensions between Cuba and the United States over the base have been reduced in recent years, especially since the bilateral Migratory Accords were signed in August 1994 and May 1995 and the final Cuban refugees left the base. The accords establish that Washington grant 20,000 visas a year to Cubans who wish to reside in the United States and that Cubans picked up at sea be returned to Cuba, with no reprisals by Cuba. The last time that shots were fired by troops stationed on either side of the perim- eter was in December 1989. In 1996 the United States began removing antipersonnel mines from its side of the no-man's- land that separates the base from the rest of the island; the task was completed in 1999. These mines were replaced by motion and sound detectors to warn of any incursion onto the base. 309 Cuba: A Country Study The Cubans, on the other hand, have not made public any plans to begin de-mining their side of the 100-kilometer perim- eter. Rather, the Cuban government maintains that these mines are needed for defensive purposes, and will be removed only after the United States gives up its base on Cuba's national territory. Thirteen American soldiers and five Cubans have been killed by the mines since their installation. Between 50,000 and 70,000 mines were placed in the no-man's-land between Cuba and the Guantanamo base beginning in 1961. The Revolutionary Armed Forces By the end of the twentieth century, the profile of the FAR had changed significantly from that of only a decade before. The change was brought about largely as a result of a change in the armed forces' missions: the abandonment of military "internationalism" and the embrace of a new domestic eco- nomic role; the loss of the extensive financial assistance and training support for the military that was once provided by the Soviet Union; and the continuation of the island's economic crisis, also a product of the loss of Soviet support. As a conse- quence of these changes, the FAR has had to make do with far fewer resources, both in terms of getting by on a reduced bud- get and with reduced manpower, yet all the while attempting to maintain itself as a professional military organization. In the late 1990s, the FAR was composed of three major armed services, as it had been for the past four decades: the Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario), the aforemen- tioned DAAFAR (Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force), and the Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolu- cionaria — MGR) . Of these, the army, as the historical successor to the guerrillas' Rebel Army, is generally recognized as the main force; not until 1972 were separate commands estab- lished for the DAAFAR and the MGR. All three services are under the authority of the MINFAR's General Staff. At the end of 2000, the chief of the MINFAR's General Staff continued to be Division General Alvaro Lopez Miera, also MINFAR vice minister. Lopez Miera assumed the General Staff post in late 1998 on succeeding Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, who, at that time, had only recently been promoted from the rank of brigade general (see Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms, this ch.). As General Staff chief, Lopez Miera also serves as the commander of the Revolutionary Army. The DAAFAR was 310 National Security commanded by Division General Ruben Martinez Puentes, and the MGR, by Vice Admiral Pedro Miguel Perez Betancourt. During the course of the 1990s, the FAR's manpower was reduced by more than half from what had been an estimated 180,500 active-duty troops in 1990. This reduction, with the most severe cuts having been carried out between 1993 and 1995, was the result of efforts to trim expenditures as well as adjust to a greatly reduced need for military manpower follow- ing the end of the "internationalist" mission. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the FAR was composed of 65,000 personnel in 2000. This number included an estimated 45,000 members of the Revolutionary Army, 10,000 of the DAAFAR, and 5,000 of the MGR. The ratio of Cuba's army in proportion to the island's population dropped from twenty-nine soldiers per 1,000 inhab- itants in 1987 to only five soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in 1997, based on data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. This ratio was comparable on a per capita basis to that found in such countries as Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and El Salvador. Moreover, the FAR's present force strength is even lower than it was prior to the adoption of the military's "internationalist" mission in the mid-1970s, a period when its manpower needs were roughly comparable yet its budget was subsidized by Soviet aid. At that time, the FAR was able to maintain an active-duty force strength of 120,000 troops and officers. These regular military forces under the FAR's command, which include conscripts and activated reservists, are sup- ported by yet other organizations that are assigned duties related to defense and the maintenance of internal order. Of these, the EJT (Youth Labor Army) and the Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de Tropas Territoriales — MTT) are the most important. The members of the EJT are primarily engaged in agriculture and military construction projects. The MTT con- sists of civilian volunteers who are trained and led by the mem- bers of the regular military. A Civil Defense (Defensa Civil) force, also made up of civilians and led by military officers, rounds out the nation's defense organization (see Territorial Troops Militia; Civil Defense, this ch.). The FAR's two main missions in the late 1990s consisted of providing for the island's external defense and the mainte- nance of internal order. These have remained the FAR's princi- pal missions since the beginning of the Revolution. In 1976 the 311 Cuba: A Country Study FAR's "internationalist" mission was added, which provided a basis for the military's deployment of troops to foreign combat. However, after the return home of the last "internationalist" forces in 1991, the sixteen-year "internationalist" mission was replaced with a new charge for the military to help the ailing economy. During the course of the 1990s, this newest mission led to the FAR's expanded activities in the economic sphere that extend from the military's role in agricultural production, to manufacturing, and even to providing services for the bur- geoning tourism industry. Doctrine of the War of All the People The military doctrine that guides the FAR in the execution of its traditional defense-related missions is known as the War of All the People (Guerra de Todo el Pueblo — GTP) . This doc- trine has been in force since the early 1980s, around the time that the MTT was established. The GTP centers on the key role assigned to the Cuban population in helping defend the island in the event of an attack. Its objective is to deter such an attack by so raising the costs for an invader, in terms of the casualties inflicted, that the action is deemed unacceptable. The doctrine is built around the defense-related duties assigned to the mem- bers of the MTT, who would be armed in order to support the regular armed forces. Under this doctrine, the country's entire population has been organized into defense zones, which exist at the local and provincial level and which are presided over by the National Defense Council. In the event of a crisis, the local defense zones and the militia would be mobilized and their command taken over by the armed forces. In the Cubans' defensive strategy, the regular military is conceived of as only a "professional vanguard" of the mobilized citizenry, and any ensuing struggle would be waged by means of conventional warfare as well as unconventional or guerrilla warfare. The regime's ability to rely on an armed population for the island's defense, at least rhetorically, has helped to compensate slightly for the loss of capabilities, especially in terms of diminished manpower, that the FAR has suffered since the early 1990s. Territorial Troops Militia The Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de Tropas Terri tori- ales — MTT), a body composed exclusively of civilian volun- teers, was established on May 1, 1980, and placed under the command of the MINFAR. Its creation is recognized as having 312 Afire station in Old Havana, 1999 Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington marked the beginning of Cuba's official embrace of the mili- tary doctrine of the War of All the People, which has remained in force since then. Like the MNR (National Revolutionary Militia) of the early 1960s, the MTT's formation reinforced the notion of the popular will to defend the Revolution. Most members of the MTT are women, the elderly, or retir- ees. Male teenagers who are too young or have not yet been called for military service are also eligible to join the MTT, as are men who are not obligated to serve as reservists. The MTT expanded from 500,000 members in 1982 to 1.2 million by mid-1984. The size of the force has remained at about 1 mil- lion, despite the economic crisis. The MTT's mission during a crisis would be to fight along- side, and provide replacements for, the personnel of the regu- lar armed force; to help protect such strategic infrastructure as bridges, highways, and railroads; and to carry out any other measures that might be needed to immobilize, wear down, or ultimately destroy the enemy. By the beginning of the 1980s, MTT members were extensively involved in the construction of tunnels throughout the island, which would be used as shelter for the population in the event of an attack. As a result of Cuba's continuing economic difficulties during the 1990s, the time that MTT members have spent in training and preparing for their various defense-related activities has been reduced. The reduction includes a decrease in the time that MTT mem- 313 Cuba: A Country Study bers have spent in carrying out joint exercises and maneuvers with regular FAR troops. The MTT is supported through the MINFAR's budget as well as through "voluntary" donations made by citizens. Most of these donations come from workplace contributions, which are paid through weekly deductions from workers' salaries. Accord- ing to the MINFAR, between 1981 and 1995, the expenses incurred for the MTT's training averaged approximately 35 million Cuban pesos (for value of peso, see Glossary) per year. During this same period, popular contributions toward the force averaged about 30 million pesos per year. Just over half of the training expenditures went toward the purchase of study supplies and other training materials; just over one-third were dedicated for the purchase of weapons, communication equip- ment, uniforms, and spare parts. Other organizations also set annual funding goals with respect to their own MTT contribu- tions. Among such organizations were the CDR (Committee for the Defense of the Revolution), the Federation of Cuban Women (Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas — FMC), the National Association of Small Farmers (Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequehos — ANAP) , and even the Organization of Jose Marti Pioneers (Organizacion de Pioneros Jose Marti — OPJM). According to reforms for allocating MTT funds made in the system in 1995, the funds collected for the MTT are no longer sent to a central government account but remain within each municipality to support local MTT activities. Despite the coun- try's economic hardships, the amount of funds collected through popular contributions to the MTT continued to increase after the beginning of the Special Period in the early 1990s. As of 1995, the MINFAR was paying only 14 percent of the MTT's total expenditures. Civil Defense Civil Defense was organized in 1966, following the disband- ment of the Popular Defense Force, which was the immediate successor to the MNR (National Revolutionary Militias) , after the MNR's dissolution in 1963. The mission of the civilian- based Civil Defense, which falls under the command of the MINFAR, is, in some respects, similar to that of the MTT, as the militia's modern incarnation. During a national crisis or war- time, Civil Defense members would be responsible for helping provide for local defense and rear-area security. 314 National Security Civil Defense's more routine duties, however, are to aid the civilian population and help protect economic resources in the event of a peacetime disaster. In practice this has most often meant that the force has been active in helping safeguard the population and property, including livestock, when the island has been threatened or hit by hurricanes or affected by other natural disasters, such as droughts or earthquakes. In 1999 Civil Defense had an estimated 50,000 members, including both men and women. Members are often PCC members or local government officials and are active in their local defense zones. Civil Defense units are often organized at schools as well as at workplaces. Revolutionary Army In 1999 the Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario) represented approximately 70 percent of Cuba's regular mili- tary manpower. According to the IISS, the Army's estimated 45,000 troops included 39,000 members of the Ready Reserves who were completing the forty-five days of annual active-duty service necessary for maintaining their status, as well as con- scripts who were fulfilling their military service requirement. These personnel were under the command of one of three ter- ritorial armies, which are under the authority of the FAR's Gen- eral Staff. These commands roughly divide the island into thirds, corresponding with territory under either the Western, Central, or Eastern Armies. Since 1993 the commands have been unified, with the units of the DAAFAR and MGR having been brought under the operational control of the territorial army chiefs. By the beginning of the 1990s, the Isla de lajuven- tud Military Region — which was established in 1962 and in the 1980s was an independent command, with a single infantry division — had been brought under the authority of the West- ern Army. The Western Army, organized in 1970, is the largest of the three territorial commands, and is generally considered the most strategically important because its troops are responsible for the defense of the nation's capital as well as Cuba's most important military installations. In addition to the Isla de la Juventud, the territory under the Western Army includes the provinces of Pinar del Rio, La Habana, and Ciudad de La Habana, where its headquarters is shared with the MINFAR. The Western Army is also thought to be subdivided into three army corps — the Havana Eastern Corps, the Havana Western 315 Cuba: A Country Study Corps, and the Pinar del Rio Corps — plus the Isla de lajuven- tud Military Region. Since 1989 the Western Army has been led by Division General Leopoldo "Polo" Cintra Frias, a Politburo member, former commander of Cuban forces in Angola, and Hero of the Republic. Each of the provinces under the Western Army's command has its own general staff. This organizational pattern at the provincial level is replicated in the Central and Eastern Armies. The Central Army was established in April 1961, only thir- teen days before the Bay of Pigs landing at Playa Giron in the province of Matanzas. In addition to Matanzas, the provinces under the Central Army's command include Cienfuegos, Santa Clara, and Sancti Spiritus. Its headquarters is in Santa Clara, the capital of Villa Clara Province. The Central Army is further subdivided into three army corps, consisting of the Matanzas Corps, the Central Corps (which has command over troops sta- tioned in Villa Clara, Cienfuegos, and Sancti Spiritus prov- inces), and the Ciego de Avila Corps. In 1999 the chief of the Central Army was Division General Joaquin Quintas Sola, who has held that post since 1984. The Eastern Army, established in April 1961, held command over personnel stationed in the provinces of Camagiiey, Las Tunas, Holguin, Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantanamo from its headquarters in Santiago de Cuba. In 1999 the chief of the Eastern Army was Division General Ramon Espinosa Mar- tin, who has held that command for the past fifteen years. The Eastern Army is also organized into three army corps, consist- ing of the Camagiiey, the Northern, and the Southern Army Corps. The Northern Army Corps had authority over troops in the provinces of Las Tunas and Holguin. The Southern Army Corps had command over units deployed in the provinces of Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantanamo. Also under the Eastern Army's command is the elite Border Brigade (Brigada de la Frontera) , which maintains watch over the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay (see The United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, this ch.). The IISS reported in 1999 that the army's troop formations consisted of four to five armored brigades; nine mechanized infantry brigades; an airborne brigade; fourteen reserve bri- gades; and the Border Brigade. In addition, there is an air defense artillery regiment and a surface-to-air missile brigade. Each of the three territorial armies is believed to be assigned at least one armored brigade — usually attached to the army's 316 A Cuban army colonel inspects an infantry squad and tank crew on April 17, 1993. A front-side view of a BMP-1 armored infantry fighting vehicle at Battalion 2721 in San Jose de las Laj as, January 1998 Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 317 Cuba: A Country Study headquarters — as well as a mechanized infantry brigade. As well, it is known that the Border Brigade in Guantanamo and at least one ground artillery regiment (attached to a mechanized infantry brigade) , based in Las Tunas, are under the Eastern Army's command. Unfortunately, there is relatively little public information available with respect to the organization of the ground forces within the three armies, let alone the equipment that pertains to each of these commands (see table 19, Major Army Equipment, 1999, Appendix). Nevertheless, the Western Army is known to have the greatest priority for the FAR leader- ship, and is also likely to be assigned the most personnel and the most equipment; this would be followed, according to defense priorities, by the Eastern Army, and, lastly, by the Cen- tral Army. Assessing the situation of Cuba's ground forces has been fur- ther complicated by the leadership's decision to put into stor- age three-fourths of the FAR's equipment. The mothballing of so much of the military's equipment began with the onset of the economic crisis in the early 1990s, and was prompted by the lack of spare and replacement parts for the Soviet-era mate- riel as well as the shortage of the hard currency needed to pay for the fuel for training and exercises. Much of this equipment is stored in tunnels and caves throughout the island, but it is not thought to be withstanding well the island's tropical envi- ronment. Especially vulnerable are the equipment and weap- onry that rely on more sophisticated technology. According to the United States Department of Defense's 1998 report enti- tled, "The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security," the moth- balled materiel would not be available for defense on short notice. The same report also concludes that, owing to severely reduced training, the ground forces' overall state of readiness is low and notes that the FAR generally is not capable of mount- ing effective operations above the battalion level. The Cuban military has long maintained its own secret base for intercepting electronic communications. Operated by the FAR's Electronic Warfare Battalion, this smaller, relatively unknown base is located at El Wajay, 14.5 kilometers southwest of Havana, near the Russian operation at Lourdes. Although not as powerful as the Russian facility, the Cuban military's sig- nals intelligence (SIGINT) facility is thought to be capable of monitoring telephone and radio signals at least as far away as Florida. The Electronic Warfare Battalion reportedly has the 318 National Security equipment necessary to jam United States communications, but is not thought to have used it for this end. Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force The Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force (Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria — DAAFAR) traces its origins to the single aircraft that constituted the guer- rillas' Rebel Air Force in April 1958. It was established as a branch of service separate from the Revolutionary Army, with its own command structure, in April 1972, a change that was likely influenced by the then ongoing efforts by the Soviet Union to help professionalize Cuba's armed forces. The DAA- FAR's responsibilities encompass providing for the nation's air defense as well as tactical and airlift support for the FAR's ground forces. According to the IISS, in 1999 the DAAFAR had 10,000 personnel, including conscripts, and represented 15 percent of total regular military manpower. The DAAFAR's territorial commands parallel those of the three territorial armies and consist of the Western, Central, and Eastern Air Force brigades. In addition, the DAAFAR also maintains Air Defense Artillery and Missile Forces. Although their locations are not publicly disclosed, it is reasonable to sur- mise that they are stationed in a position to defend the capital of Havana. The major air installations under the command of the Western Air Force Brigade include bases at San Julian in Pinar del Rio Province and San Antonio de los Banos, as well as the Baracoa Air Base and the Jose Marti International Airport in La Habana Province. Under the Central Brigade are air bases at Guines, Matanzas; Cienfuegos, Cienfuegos; Santa Clara, Villa Clara; and Sancti Spiritus, Sancti Spiritus. The Western Brigade maintains its key installations at the provincial capitals of Camaguey, Holguin, and Santiago de Cuba in the respective provinces of Camaguey, Holguin, and Santiago de Cuba. Of all these, the base at San Antonio de los Banos is con- sidered to be the military's most important airport. It is the only airport that, as of the early 1990s, had three airstrips, one of which was 4,000 meters in length. The operational readiness and effectiveness of the DAAFAR have been severely compromised by the economic crisis and the loss of Soviet aid. Although Cuba is formally acknowledged as having one of the better equipped air forces in Latin Amer- ica, consisting of several hundred combat aircraft and armed helicopters, the reality is that, by the late 1990s, a significant 319 Cuba: A Country Study part of the fleet was no longer deemed operational (see table 20, Appendix) . To become more self-sufficient, the DAAFAR's Research and Development Center is also seeking to build its own aircraft, such as the AC-001 multi-use "Comas" planes that were first produced at the Yuri Gargarin Military Industrial Enterprise in 1992. The United States Department of Defense estimated in 1998 that fewer than two dozen of the DAAFAR's MiGs remain oper- ational. Despite the access to spare parts established by an accord with the Russians as rent for the signals intelligence facility at Lourdes, which is located south of Havana in La Habana Province, the DAAFAR's state of readiness is expected to continue to worsen. The mothballed equipment continues to deteriorate, and pilot training and flight hours, which are essential for flying the more sophisticated MiGs in the Cuban inventory, remain limited because of the cost of fuel. Revolutionary Navy The Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revoluciona- ria — MGR) , which has always been the smallest and least presti- gious of the FAR's three armed services since its establishment in August 1963, is the service that has been most severely affected by the economic crisis. As of late 2000, it barely man- aged as an independent force. The MGR's formal mission has traditionally been to provide for shore-based coastal defense as well as to conduct offshore naval operations. By the end of the 1990s, however, the MGR had no major ships that were still sea- worthy and no longer was considered to be a blue-water navy. It remained capable only of patrolling Cuba's territorial waters, and even that responsibility was shared with the Ministry of Interior's Border Guard Troops (Tropas Guardafronteras — TGF). In 1999 the IISS estimated that the MGR was composed of 5,000 personnel, which represented just over 7.5 percent of total regular military manpower. Of these 5,000 personnel, an estimated 3,000 were conscripts. Another 550 were members of the Naval Infantry, a battalion-size force that was created in the late 1970s. This force, which was assigned to coastal defense, gave the MGR a limited ground combat capability. Although the MGR has no reserve force, it would presumably be supple- mented by members of the Cuban Merchant Marine in the event of a crisis. Naval aviation is a function of the DAAFAR. 320 National Security The MGR's headquarters is located in Havana. Its opera- tional commands are divided in accordance with the three ter- ritorial armies, each of which holds ultimate authority over the MGR's forces within its geographic boundaries. The MGR's western headquarters is believed to be at Cabanas, located approximately 48.4 kilometers west of Ciudad de La Habana Province on the coast in Pinar del Rio Province; and its eastern headquarters, at Holgum, an inland city in the province of the same name. The location of the central headquarters — or even if the headquarters is still maintained, given the cutbacks — is unclear. During the 1990s, the MGR's principal installations were said to include facilities at the Bahia de Cienfuegos, Cien- fuegos; the Bahia de Cabanas, Pinar del Rio; the Bahia de Mariel, Havana; the Bahia de La Habana, Ciudad de La Habana; the Bahia de Matanzas, Matanzas; the Bahia de Nuevi- tas, Camaguey; and the Bahia de Nipe, Holgum. With the exception of that at the Bahia de Cienfuegos, all of these bases were located along the northern coast. Some of the installa- tions may have been closed as a result of the continuing cut- backs that were carried out during the course of the 1990s. The naval academy was one of the installations closed. Located just west of Ciudad de La Habana Province on the northern coast at Punta Santa Ana, the MGR's principal training school was converted into a hospital in the 1990s. As recently as a decade ago, the MGR counted in its inven- tory three submarines, which had been delivered by the Soviets between 1979 and 1984, and two frigates, the last of which was also received in 1984. It was one of the few countries in the region to have such an ocean-going fleet (see table 21, Appen- dix) . But by the end of the 1990s, none of these vessels remained in operation, and only just over a dozen of the MGR's remaining surface vessels were held to be combat capa- ble. The fast-attack boats that are equipped with Styx (SS-N- 2B) surface-to-surface antiship missiles provide the MGR with a continuing, yet weak, antisurface warfare capability. The MGR's shore-based naval infantry reportedly is armed with approxi- mately fifty Samlet (SSC-2B) and two Styx (SSC-3) surface-to- surface missiles. According to the United States Naval Institute, auxiliary ships that remained in operation as late as 1998 included a replenishment oiler, an intelligence collector, a cargo ship, and several hydrographic survey vessels. 321 Cuba: A Country Study Conscription and Personnel Resources Until 1991, Cuban men were required to perform three years of compulsory military service under the SMO (Obliga- tory Military Service) system. The three-year obligation had been in force since the first Law of Military Service was promul- gated in November 1963. In August 1991, however, the Active Military Service (Servicio Militar Activo — SMA) requirement was reduced to two years, beginning at age sixteen, under the General Military Service Law (Ley de Servicio Militar Gen- eral — SMG), formerly the SMO. Young Cubans usually are not called to service until age seventeen. The compulsory service duty reflects the interest of the mili- tary and Cuban leadership in having a large proportion of the island's population prepared to contribute to the defense of the Revolution. By the end of the 1990s, 1.7 million young Cuban men had completed their SMA requirement as con- scripts. Since the onset of the economic crisis, Cuban youth carrying out such compulsory military service continue to play an important role in the military. Although now at reduced numbers because of overall cutbacks in military manpower, they have become most important in providing a source of cheap labor for the MINFAR's efforts to become a self-sustain- ing institution. In terms of overall personnel resources, in 1999 a total of 6.08 million Cubans between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine were considered to be "available" for military service, accord- ing to the Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook. Of this total, only 3.76 million Cubans, or just under two-thirds, were judged to be "fit" for military service. In this latter category, 1.9 million of the Cubans were males and 1.86 million were females. The fulfillment of SMA for conscripts entails their assign- ment to one of the services of the regular armed forces, to the 65,000-member EJT (Youth Labor Army), or to the Ministry of Interior. Cuban males between the ages of sixteen and fifty are required to perform a minimum of two years' service as an active-duty member of one of the country's security forces, a member of the military reserves, or in some combination of both forms of service. Young men are required to register locally for the draft after reaching their sixteenth birthday, and are then issued a certificate that shows they have registered. According to population statistics, just under 75,000 young Cuban males were becoming eligible for conscription each 322 The barracks at Battalion 2721 in San Jose de las Lajas, La Habana Province, January 1998 A view of the sleeping quarters in the Battalion 2721 barracks in San Jose de las Lajas, January 1998 Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 323 Cuba: A Country Study year during the late 1990s. Induction calls are held twice a year, with the youth to be inducted selected by lottery. Young men between the ages of sixteen and twenty-eight who have not been called for Active Military Service are known as prerecruits (prereclutados) . During the late 1980s, new draftees received six to eight months of basic training before being formally inducted into the armed forces. It is likely that the extent and nature of the training given draftees in the 1990s were limited as a result of the economic crisis. Since the end of the FAR's "internationalist" mission, during which tens of thousands of draftees were sent to fight abroad, the military's need for conscripted manpower has fallen mark- edly. The decreased need was likely one of the considerations behind the 1991 decision to reduce the SMA term from three to two years, a move that brought the Cuban system more closely in line with the military service requirements main- tained by other Latin American countries. The official explana- tion for the reduction was that the overall educational level of draftees had so improved over the years that they now needed less training. This explanation does not appear to be wholly without merit, given that since 1987, graduates of preuniversity programs who are drafted are required to perform only one year of service. In addition, the military maintains policies that reflect an interest in supporting the educational accomplish- ments of its draftees, as reflected in a provision known as Order 18. According to this order, youth who were initially not admit- ted to a university but who distinguish themselves during their term of service are given a second opportunity to pursue their higher education. By the end of 1998, 14,000 graduates of Cuban universities had been beneficiaries of this program. Cuban women are not subject to conscription. After turning sixteen years of age, however, they are eligible to enlist in the armed forces under the program known as Voluntary Female Military Service (Servicio Militar Voluntario Feminimo) , which was established in 1986. (Women served in the FAR well before that date, however.) Their applications for enlistment are coor- dinated by the FMC (Federation of Cuban Women), the mass organization that has long been headed by Vilma Espin, Raul Castro's wife. During the 1980s, new female volunteers were accepted twice a year and signed up for two-year tours of duty, in contrast to the five-year commitment that was then required of male enlistees. Those who did not reenlist upon completion of their tour of duty automatically became members of the 324 National Security FAR's reserve forces; they were eligible to remain active in the reserve until reaching forty years of age. Women who enlist in the FAR are formally eligible to ascend within the ranks of the armed forces, yet they are believed to face limited opportunities for the advanced military education that might qualify them for such promotions. At the pre-univer- sity level, women were reported to be subject to meeting more restrictive entrance requirements than male applicants. At the more advanced levels of military education, it was believed that the only professional program open to women was that offered by the Military Technical Institute (Instituto Tecnico Militar — ITM). The prevalence of traditional attitudes regarding sex roles also appeared as an impediment to women's career advancement within the armed forces. Between 1986 and early 1999, more than 18,000 young women had volunteered for mil- itary service. Men who have completed their Active Military Service auto- matically pass to the ranks of the reserves, where they are expected to continue to train annually until reaching age fifty. Reservists are divided into various groups, according to their state of readiness and training. The members of the Ready Reserves are assigned to army units, serve on active duty for at least forty-five days each year, and could reportedly be mobi- lized on a few hours' notice. In 1999 these reserve forces num- bered approximately 39,000 troops. The next tier consists of men who have completed at least one year of Active Military Service and could be mobilized on a few days' notice. The final group consists of those who either have not completed a year of active service or who were deemed unfit for duty, whether for reasons ascribable to their physical condition or political unreliability. Members of this last group appear to be "reserv- ists" only in name, and reportedly are not required to undergo regular military training. Professional Training and Education Cuba's system of military training and education has been developed over the decades to support the specialized needs of a highly professional military force. These schools and training centers are under the authority of a separate directorate within the MINFAR. This directorate is dedicated exclusively to over- seeing the education system and reports to the FAR General Staff. During the late 1970s, as a result of efforts to improve educational standards, the upper-level military educational 325 Cuba: A Country Study institutions were granted university status. The extent to which these schools, their admission standards, and their curricula were affected by the economic crisis of the 1990s and by the downsizing of the armed forces is unclear. The preparation of potential future members of the armed forces may be seen as beginning with the Camilo Cienfuegos Military Schools (Escuelas Militares Camilo Cienfuegos — EMCC), which are open to youth (both males and females) between the ages of eleven and seventeen. The first Camilo Cienfuegos school was opened in Matanzas in 1966. By the 1980s, eleven such schools had been established and were located throughout the island. Each was under the authority of a particular branch of military service, with the army control- ling seven of the schools. They offered a five-year course of study that was considered comparable to a preuniversity educa- tion. Yet in addition to the general curriculum that paralleled that offered by civilian schools, the Camilitos — as the school's students are known — were also given introductory classes on military tactics, the handling of light weapons, topography, chemical defense, and engineering. The students were also expected to adhere to military discipline and participate in drills. Most students gained admission either through their own participation in PCC-related youth organizations — namely, the OPJM (Organization of Jose Marti Pioneers) or the Union of Young Communists (Union de Jovenes Comunistas — UJC) — or through their parents' membership in the FAR or PCC. The graduates of the EMCC were believed to be given preference in admission to the MINFAR's more advanced schools and training programs. The extent to which these schools and their curricula were affected by the economic crisis of the 1990s remained unclear at the time of writing. Beyond this level, each branch of the armed forces has, until recently, operated its own schools and service academies. The exception is the MGR, whose naval academy at Punta Santa Ana, near Havana, was closed in the 1990s and converted into a hospital. The DAAFAR's Aviation Pilots Military School (Escuela Militar de Pilotos de Aviacion — EMPA) is located at the San Julian airbase in western Pinar del Rio Province. Dur- ing the 1980s, the DAAFAR also operated its own technical school, the DAAFAR Technical School (Escuela Tecnica de la DAAFAR). The Ministry of Interior also operates separate schools for training its personnel. 326 National Security The General Antonio Maceo Joint-Service School (Escuela de Cadetes Interarmas General Antonio Maceo — ECAM) has traditionally been the Army's service academy. This school, located at Ceiba del Agua, a short distance southeast of the cap- ital, was first opened in 1963. By the 1980s, admission require- ments had been stiffened to stipulate that entrants must have a minimum of a tenth-grade education and be between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one. ECAM's three- and four-year pro- grams of study emphasize the preparation and training of tacti- cal and technical command officers; the curriculum is designed for members of armored and mechanized infantry units and for engineering and logistics personnel. The Major Camilo Cienfuegos Revolutionary Armed Forces Artillery School (Escuela de Artilleria de las FAR Comandante Camilo Cienfuegos) was founded in 1963 and is located at La Cabana Fortress in Havana harbor. It provides advanced train- ing for field and antiaircraft artillery officers, who upon com- pletion of their studies are awarded a degree in either science or engineering. Those admitted to the school's engineering program, which is a five-year course of study, are required to have graduated from a preuniversity preparatory school, tech- nical institute, or high school, and must be between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one. A four-year program, with similar admission requirements, is offered that focuses on preparing future officers who will command field and antiaircraft artil- lery, reconnaissance, and radio-technical units. The Military Technical Institute (ITM), founded in 1966 and located in Havana, offers the most advanced technical training programs available to MINFAR personnel. Unlike the other academies, the ITM is open to women. It offers enroll- ment in either four- or five-year training programs. Those admitted to the more stringent five-year program must be grad- uates of a preuniversity preparatory school and be between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one. The five-year program pro- vides for instruction in field artillery, infantry, weapons, tanks, and transport; those graduating from the program become qualified mechanical engineers. The two four-year programs offer training for electromechanical and mechanical techni- cians. The admission requirements for the four-year courses of study are slightly less stringent than for the five-year program. So long as an applicant has a minimum tenth-grade education and is between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one, he or she is eligible for admission. As with the other schools and courses of 327 Cuba: A Country Study study already discussed, the demonstration of political loyalty was considered a relevant factor in determining an applicant's qualifications. The MINFAR's senior service school is the General Maximo Gomez Revolutionary Armed Forces Academy (Academia de las FAR General Maximo Gomez), which was founded in July 1963 and is located in western La Habana Province. This school provides training for middle-to upper-ranking MINFAR officers. During the 1980s, attendance at the school became a requisite for those hoping to be assigned to the General Staff. The school's curriculum is roughly comparable to that offered at advanced officer training schools in the United States, such as the United States Army's Command and General Staff Col- lege at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or the United States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. During the 1990s, the most advanced institution for military education was the National Defense College. This recently established college, which was modeled on Canada's senior officer school, offers a curriculum that is roughly comparable to that of the United States' National Defense University at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. Its primary focus, as reflected in the curriculum, is on strategic security issues. Although orga- nized mainly for the benefit of senior military professionals, some civilians — most of whom are government functionaries — also are invited to attend the courses. The faculty of the college includes military officials as well as civilian professors. During the 1990s, a period when the military became increasingly involved in the national economy and was often identified as an advocate for further reforms in that arena, the college's fac- ulty members included civilian economists, some of whom also favored economic reforms in line with those envisioned by the MINFAR's leaders. Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms Since 1976 the MINFAR's system of military ranks has been basically patterned after that used by most Western armed forces (see fig. 9; 10). Prior to that time, the system of ranks was far from conventional, a factor that complicated relations with the Soviet military, which pressed Cuba to carry out such changes as part of its professionalization. In about 1998, a minor revision to the FAR's rank insignia was made when chev- rons were reintroduced to replace the stars on the insignia of junior officers. Two decades earlier, in 1978, the stars had 328 National Security replaced the chevrons. Another minor change, also made in 1978, was the creation of a new rank, adding the warrant officer class for all three services. The lack of conventionality in the MINFAR's system of ranks may be traced to the earliest days of the Revolution, and may be understood as a gesture that reflected the rebels' egalitarian nature. Following the victory of the Revolution in 1959, this unconventionality continued, and the only military ranks rec- ognized were those inherited from the Rebel Army. They con- sisted of lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, and major (comandante) . At that time, three dozen men — nearly all of them Rebel Army veterans — held the rank of comandante, including Fidel Castro (even though he was clearly recognized as the others' superior) . Between 1959 and 1973, no sweeping overhauls were carried out, but new ranks were gradually introduced. In late 1959, the rank of second lieutenant was the first addition to the military echelons. Between 1963 and 1973, other new ranks were added, including brigade commander, division commander, corps commander, army commander, and commander-in- chief. First-class officers included the ranks of first commander, commander, and major; and junior officers, the ranks of first and second lieutenant and first and second captain. In November 1976, Law No. 1315 created the system of ranks that remained basically unchanged for the next twenty- odd years. These ranks are held by personnel assigned to the FAR and by personnel under the Ministry of Interior. Person- nel assigned to the Revolutionary Army, the DAAFAR, and the Ministry of Interior may have similar rank titles, differentiated only by their uniforms and insignia colors. Fidel Castro holds the rank of commander in chief; his brother, MINFAR Minister Raul Castro, as army general (general de ejercito), is the second- ranking officer in the hierarchy of the armed forces. Minister of Interior Abelardo Colome Ibarra, as army corps general (general de cuerpo de ejercito) , is the third-ranking officer. The vice ministerial slots within the MINFAR as well as the commands of the FAR's general staff and of its three territorial armies are filled by officers having the rank of division general (general de division) . The remaining rank at the general officer level is that of brigade general (general de brigada). First-class officer ranks are composed of, in descending order, colonel (coronel), lieutenant colonel (teniente coronel), and major (mayor); junior officers' ranks include captain (capitdn), 329 Cuba: A Country Study 111 t- CC LU q LL COMAND/ EN JEF MAN CHIE 2z o- O < o _i < < NER JERi NER )RAI )MIR LU LU O UJ Q LU C5 v-> Z < Sgg Z — 1 < < LU H 1|S SlSt Z CC LU LU 1- z ALMIRAf LU^LU ZD LU LU O _l < _l LU H . . Z NER O CC H LU < Z VICE 1IRAI Big LU — O LLI Q S LU o _i < LOWER H -i LU _i LU z.g > z < )POI coloi CAPIT DE NA 0- < O 1- Z -I <=r lu < DC LU LU -1 1- LU Q TENIEN CORON LIEUTEN; COLON' CAPIT* DE FRAG 1MAN COI\, OC DC < O < "lu Q LU < < 2 |I -> O TAN CAPTAIN LU p Z> ENANT CAPI nmj,,,,^ „™. TENII DE N, LIEUTE MER ENTE H TENIENTE DE FRAGATA LU H O PRI TENI 1ST JTENAN Z < < DC z e UJ < IEUTE NIOR z LU LU Z...LU z I z £ -J ZD —> LU 1- LU O t— O UJ ANT N LU SIGN si 2D LIEUTEN OC UJ w z LU LL _J < z LU CUBAN RANK ARMY AND AIR FORCE U.S. RANK TITLES CUBAN RANK NAVY U.S. RANK TITLES _0 Q> 330 331 Cuba: A Country Study first lieutenant (primer teniente), lieutenant (teniente), and second lieutenant (subteniente). The noncommissioned ranks of war- rant officers and enlisted personnel include, in descending order, senior warrant officer (primer suboficial) and warrant officer (suboficial), master sergeant (sargento de primera), ser- geant first class (sargento de segunda), sergeant (sargento de ter- cera), private first class (soldado de primera), and private (soldado). Establishing comparability for the highest ranks of MGR per- sonnel remains somewhat difficult inasmuch as the Cuban rank of almirante (admiral) is the equivalent of the United States rank of vice admiral. The MGR rank of vice almirante (vice admiral) is comparable to the United States rank of rear admiral, upper half. A contra almirante (rear admiral), in turn, is comparable to the United States rank of rear admiral, lower half (the rank formerly known in the United States Navy as commodore). First-class officers include, in descending order, the ranks of ship captain (capitdn de navw), frigate captain (capitdn de fragata), and corvette captain (capitdn de corbeta), which correspond to the United States ranks of captain, com- mander, and lieutenant commander, respectively. Junior offi- cers include, in descending order, the ranks of ship lieutenant (teniente de navw), which is comparable to the rank of lieutenant in the United States Navy, as well as frigate lieutenant (teniente de fragata) and corvette lieutenant (teniente de corbeta), which are both considered comparable to the single rank of lieutenant junior grade in the United States Navy. The rank of ensign (alferez) is comparable for both the United States Navy and the MGR. In terms of noncommissioned personnel in the MGR, the most senior rank is that of first sergeant major (primer subofi- cial), which is comparable to a United States Navy master chief petty officer. Confusingly, however, an MGR sergeant major (suboficial) corresponds to two United States ranks, senior chief petty officer and chief petty officer. The ranks of sergeant are divided into three classes: A first sergeant (sargento de primera) and second sergeant (sargento de segunda) correspond directly to the ranks of petty officer, first and second class, respectively. The MGR rank of third sergeant (sargento de tercera) corre- sponds to the two United States Navy ranks of petty officer, third class, and seaman. The ranks of seaman, first class (mari- nero de primera) and seaman (marinero) in the MGR correspond to the United States Navy ranks of seaman apprentice and sea- man recruit, respectively. 332 National Security With respect to uniforms, the olive-drab fatigues made famous by Castro continue to be the standard field uniform for the FAR's ground and air forces. Other uniforms issued to FAR personnel include various styles of service, parade, and cere- monial parade uniforms. The parade uniforms of the Revolu- tionary Army are olive-drab; those of the DAAFAR are blue; and those of the MGR are either blue-black, for winter, or white, for summer. Notwithstanding changes that might be ordered by commanders, summer uniforms are generally worn from mid-March through mid-November. In addition, special uniforms are also issued. For the ground forces, they include paratrooper, chemical warfare, and tanker uniforms. For the DAAFAR, special pilot uniforms include an antigravity uniform and a pressurized uniform. Relations with Russia Following the departure of the last Russian troops in 1993, the SIGINT facility at Lourdes remained one of the only practi- cal vestiges (apart from the extensive Soviet-origin materiel in the FAR's inventory) of the once-close security relationship between Cuba and the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it provided a reason for continuing regular interaction between the leaders of the two countries on issues related to security concerns through the remainder of the 1990s. During this period, the Lourdes facility was maintained and staffed by Rus- sian intelligence personnel of the Federal Security Service (Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti — FSB), a successor entity to the Soviet-era Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosu- darstvennoi Bezopastnosti — KGB). An estimated 810 Russian military personnel were in Cuba in 1999. Under the first bilateral agreement pertaining to Lourdes that was reached in 1993, it was agreed that the facility would remain in operation and that "rent" would be paid in the form of spare parts for the FAR. At that time, the Russians agreed to pay Cuba for the next twenty years for both the Lourdes opera- tion and for a since-closed submarine support facility at Cien- fuegos on the southern Cuban coast, but the amount of the rent was not set. In March 1995, the agreement finalizing the terms for remuneration for Lourdes was signed in Moscow by FAR First Vice Minister Division General Julio Casas Regueiro. It provided for an annual rent in the range of US$200 million, much of which would be in the form of bartered military mate- rials. Although the Russians, owing to their own domestic prob- 333 Cuba: A Country Study lems, had difficulties in providing the Cubans with the bartered goods during the first years that followed the agree- ment's signing, the supply problems were thought to have been resolved by the end of the 1990s. According to the Russians, the "listening post" is used to monitor compliance with international arms-control agree- ments. Yet notwithstanding its likely utility in this regard, the Lourdes facility also is capable of intercepting and monitoring communications along the eastern coast of the United States as well as the circum-Caribbean region. Although the Cubans do not have access to the "raw" intelligence data obtained by the Russians, they are routinely provided intelligence summaries on issues that are thought to affect their interests. Relations with Other Armed Forces The onset of the economic crisis, the end of military "inter- nationalism," and the loss of Soviet support appeared to bring about a heightened awareness within the Cuban armed forces with respect to the institution's potential isolation. As a result, the Cuban military's efforts to build contacts with foreign mili- taries were stepped up during the 1990s. In terms of other countries' receptivity, the Cuban military's efforts were aided by the end of the Cold War and Fidel Castro's 1992 declaration that Cuba would no longer support revolutionary movements abroad. The Cuban military has long maintained contacts with the armed forces of developing world nations that are considered nonaligned or, at least, not ideologically hostile toward the Cas- tro regime. The changed situation of the 1990s, however, helped open the way for broader international contacts. The Cuban interest in reducing the FAR's ideological isolation in the post-Cold War era spurred its efforts to increase coopera- tion and regular contacts with other militaries in the Latin American region. By mid-decade, these efforts appeared to have been somewhat successful. In 1996 Cuba served as host of the biennial meeting of Ibero-American Military Academies, a gathering whose participants included military officials from Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Nicara- gua. In this new environment, the Cuban military has also sought to build ties and expand cooperation with militaries in Canada and Western Europe. Among the latter group of coun- tries with whose militaries the Cubans have been most publicly engaged are Britain, France, and, most significantly, Spain, 334 National Security which in 1996 announced its decision to become the first Euro- pean Union (EU — see Glossary) nation to assign a permanent military attache to Havana. The contacts with these European countries have included hosting visits of students from their military schools as well as conducting discussions on mutual concerns and exploring areas of possible future cooperation. Despite the importance of Cuba's renewed military ties with Latin America and Europe, perhaps the most important tie with a foreign military service to develop since the Soviet Union's demise has been the FAR's relationship with the Chi- nese Popular Liberation Army (PLA). On various occasions during the 1990s, FAR leaders have traveled to the People's Republic of China (PRC) to meet with military officials; and those officials, in turn, have reciprocated in visiting the island. In February 1999, the Chinese defense minister and a delega- tion of military officials paid a three-day visit to Cuba. The FAR's interest in these contacts is believed to stem from the desire to have a powerful ally. In addition, the MINFAR leader- ship's view — and, in particular, Minister Raul Castro's view — that elements of the Chinese model of economic reform may be relevant for Cuba also likely contributed to the interest in broadening ties with their military colleagues, who during the 1990s had a prominent role in the Chinese economy. The PLA, at the same time, may be recognized to have a geostrategic interest with respect to its Cuban ally in the Caribbean, an interest that has raised some concerns in the United States. In late 1999, for example, Cuban officials were obliged to deny a report published by a Miami newspaper that the PRC had established a military communications facility on the island. Ministry of Interior Leadership and Organization The Ministry of Interior was created in June 1961 and charged with maintaining Cuba's internal security, with respon- sibilities ranging from counterintelligence to firefighting. Between that time and 1989, the Ministry of Interior was often pitted against the MINFAR in the bureaucratic competition for primacy in ensuring national security. In contrast to the MIN- FAR, which since its organization has remained under the sole authority of Raul Castro, the Ministry of Interior has been vari- ously headed by Ramiro Valdes Menendez, a Rebel Army vet- eran and the founder of the ministry, and by Sergio del Valle 335 Cuba: A Country Study Jimenez, also a longtime revolutionary supporter. Perhaps owing to his background as a physician, del Valle launched rehabilitation programs and efforts to curtail torture. In the years immediately preceding the trial involving Division Gen- eral Arnaldo Ochoa, the ministry's head was its former first vice minister, Division General Jose Abrantes Fernandez, who was a close associate of Valdes, a trusted aide to Fidel Castro, and who had also played a key role in the organization of Cuba's intelligence community, beginning in the early 1960s (see Organizational Changes of 1989, this ch.). Following the events of mid-1989 that were associated with the Ochoa affair, Abrantes was sentenced to jail. The post of minister of interior was then assigned to the second-ranking officer in the FAR, Army Corps General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, a close associate of Raul Castro. During the ensuing months, the top layers of leadership of the ministry's various directorates were purged and their officials replaced by men who had a background as loyal officers in the FAR. By the late 1990s, a few reports suggested that some of the once-purged Ministry of Interior officials, mainly those who had had back- grounds in intelligence, were being invited back on a selective basis. Nevertheless, some analysts maintained that even a decade later the ministry had still not recovered from the shake-up that followed the Ochoa affair. As of 1999, Colome Ibarra continued to head the ministry and served as its repre- sentative on the Council of Ministers (see The Military in the Government and the Party, this ch.). At the time of the shake-up, the Ministry of Interior was organized with six vice ministries, each of which was in turn responsible for various directorates and departments. Despite some name changes, this basic structure is thought to have remained intact since 1989. The most important of the vice ministries is that of the first vice minister. The first vice minister has authority over a number of key directorates and depart- ments, including the General Directorate of Personal Security (Direccion General de Seguridad Personal — DGSP), which is responsible for safeguarding the life of the Cuban leader; the General Directorate of Special Troops (Direccion General de Tropas Especiales — DGTE); the General Directorate of Border Guards (Direccion General de Guardafronteras — DGG); the Technical Directorate; and the directorates of immigration, control, codes (sometimes referred to as the Eighth Director- 336 National Security ate), and weapons. The Central Laboratory of Criminology is also under the first vice minister's jurisdiction. The remaining five vice ministries have more specific responsibilities. They include the Vice Ministry of Counterin- telligence, which is responsible for the Directorate of Counter- intelligence (Direccion de Contra Inteligencia) ; the Vice Ministry of Intelligence, which oversees the Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion de Inteligencia — DI); and the Vice Ministry of Political Affairs, which reportedly is jointly subordi- nate to the head of the PCC Central Committee's national security commission, as well as to the minister of interior. The Vice Ministry of Internal Order has authority over the follow- ing directorates: National Revolutionary Police, Penitentiary Establishments, Prevention and Extinction of Fires, and Iden- tity Cards. Lastly, the Vice Ministry of the Economy is responsi- ble for overseeing the ministry's administrative functions, including planning, budgeting, and exercising inventory con- trol over motor vehicles and warehouses. Other ministry subdivisions that are organizationally inde- pendent of the vice ministries include the directorates of Cad- res, Personnel, and Instruction; Information; and International Relations. The ministry's Secretariat, a body established in the 1980s and which maintains the central archives, is thought to still be responsible for overseeing the aforementioned directorates. In addition to the personnel who may be stationed abroad, the ministry also maintains delega- tions in each provincial capital that work closely with the local PCC in helping to carry out the charges of the sundry director- ates and departments. Special Troops The Special Troops (Tropas Especiales) are considered the elite of Cuba's security forces. Under the nominal authority of the first vice minister of the Ministry of Interior, they are thought to receive their orders directly from Fidel Castro. Established in the mid-1960s, the Special Troops consist of two battalions made up of an estimated 1,200 highly trained and politically reliable personnel. Despite the economic crisis of the 1990s, the Special Troops are considered to remain capable of executing selected military and internal security missions. The Special Troops' mission is to serve as a highly mobile shock force that can provide protection for high-ranking offi- cials, conduct special military operations, and help support 337 Cuba: A Country Study other special security requirements that the leadership might have. During the 1980s, several foreign advisers, all of whom were from Vietnam, were brought in to aid with the Special Troops' training, especially in survival techniques; in turn the Special Troops are also known to have provided training to selected foreign forces. Roughly comparable to the United States Green Berets or the spetznaz of the former Soviet Union, the Special Troops are trained to operate as commando-style units. Most members of the force are both parachute- and scuba-qualified and trained in the martial arts for hand-to-hand combat. In terms of their publicly known operations, members of the Special Troops were the surreptitious "advance" forces sent by Fidel Castro to Angola in 1975, whose arrival there prior to Angolan independence preceded the formal begin- ning of Cuba's military involvement in that African conflict. Few details are available with respect to the deployment of these forces throughout the island. Most personnel belonging to the Special Troops are believed to be stationed in or near Havana, although at least one unit was reportedly stationed near the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo. Border Guard Troops The Border Guard Troops (Tropas Guardafronteras — TGF) are under the authority of the Ministry of Interior's Directorate of Border Guards, an entity that falls under the jurisdiction of the first vice minister. In 1999 the TGF had an estimated 6,500 personnel, as compared with an estimated 3,500 in the late 1980s. The TGF was originally established under the Ministry of Interior in March 1963 as the Department of Coastal and Port Vigilance. During the counterrevolutionary campaign of the 1960s known as the "fight against bandits," the members of this force engaged in the maritime-oriented "fight against pirates." Their principal mission remains coastal surveillance. Correspondingly, they are charged with helping ensure the security of the country's borders, both in preventing unautho- rized incursions into Cuban territory and in preventing unau- thorized departures by Cubans attempting to leave the island. Although responsible primarily for patrolling Cuba's inland waterways, shores, and coastal waters, their members would be the first line of defense against any external invading force. Up until the significant weakening of Cuba's naval forces during the 1990s, it was expected that the TGF's forces would fall under the operational command of the MGR during a national 338 A Soviet-built Cuban Foxtrot-class patrol submarine, August 1, 1986 Neiu Cuban patrol boats at the Boqueron port facility, August 1992 Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 339 Cuba: A Country Study security crisis. According to a 1996 report, the TGF is thought to have at least one antisubmarine unit. The TGF is equipped with twenty Soviet-era Zhuk patrol craft as well as various fast launches and utility boats. TGF forces also regularly use motor- cycles for helping patrol the shoreline as well as canines for tracking. At the time of the 1994 balsero crisis, the TGF was widely con- demned for its role in the sinking of the tugboat 13 de marzo, which was carrying Cubans seeking to leave the island illegally. As a result of the TGF's ramming and fire-hosing of the vessel, forty-one of the boat's seventy-two passengers drowned, deaths that included women and twenty-three children. Because of the international outcry that the incident provoked, the leader- ship instructed the TGF to no longer use force in preventing such departures. During the late 1990s, by contrast, no reports emerged that cited significant brutality on the part of the TGF. Rather, in helping Cuba comply with the terms of the May 1995 immigra- tion accord signed with the United States, members of the TGF are routinely in contact with their counterparts in the United States Coast Guard. Their main role is to cooperate in the repa- triation of Cuban emigres who are intercepted at sea by United States Coast Guard personnel. National Revolutionary Police The National Revolutionary Police (Policia Nacional Revolu- cionaria — PNR) fall under the authority of the Vice Ministry of Internal Order. As Cuba's primary uniformed law enforcement body, they are responsible for handling routine criminal and law enforcement matters and are also occasionally called on by other security forces to help with what are deemed to be politi- cal matters. The force was established on January 5, 1959, only days after the victory of the Revolution, and in the mid-1980s numbered 10,000. It is unclear how the size of the force may have been affected by the economic crisis of the 1990s. The regime's increased concern over the growing crime problem on the island prompted greater attention to the PNR's professional development during the late 1990s. As a result, the PNR received improved training, was assigned new French Cit- roen cruisers to replace the old Soviet-era Ladas, and also was provided new, more modern communications equipment. Dur- ing this period, the presence of the uniformed PNR officers on the street was also increased, especially with respect to the 340 National Security patrols, often accompanied by canines, assigned to areas fre- quented by foreign tourists. According to Cuban officials, the increases in security-related government expenditures in 1999 were largely attributable to the attention dedicated to beefing up the country's police forces. During the late 1990s, numerous reports by human rights groups also stated that PNR officers routinely assisted the non- uniformed personnel of the DSE in matters related to the activ- ities of Cuban dissidents. On occasion, political detainees have been taken to PNR precinct stations, where they have been held briefly before being released or transferred to other facili- ties associated with the DSE. The PNR's forces have also been criticized for failing to act to break up the so-called spontane- ous demonstrations that often erupted outside the home of dis- sidents and others considered to be antagonistic toward the regime, such as members of the small yet vocal independent press. The participants in these demonstrations, which are known as acts of repudiation (actos de repudio), are usually mem- bers of the officially sanctioned Rapid Response Brigades (Brigadas de Respuesta Rapida — BRR) or of the local CDRs. The BRR, composed of civilian volunteers, were initially orga- nized in mid-1991 to deal with possible problems that could develop in relation to Cuba's hosting of the Pan-American Games in the midst of the then new economic crisis (see Human Rights and Political Prisoners, this ch.). In addition, to assist the regular police in their increased responsibilities in light of Cuba's tourism boom of the 1990s, a new black-bereted force known as the Special Brigade (Brigada Especial) was created in 1998. The main role of the Special Bri- gade has been preventive, often in helping identify and arrest the hustlers and pimps who prey on foreign tourists. The force members have also worked closely with the PNR in coordinat- ing the neighborhood-based, anticrime groups under the Uni- fied Prevention and Vigilance System (Sistema Unificado de Prevencion y Vigilancia — SUPV). The SUPV was conceived during the early 1990s and placed under the PNR's supervision as part of the effort to stem the surge in economic-related crime that accompanied the onset of the crisis and at the same time improve vigilance in relation to "antisocial" behavior. Intelligence Directorate The key organization responsible for Cuba's foreign intelli- gence is the Intelligence Directorate (Direccion de Inteligen- 341 Cuba: A Country Study cia). Before its name was changed in 1989, this body was long known as the General Intelligence Directorate (Direccion General de Inteligencia — DGI). Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the DGI was closely aligned with and organized along the lines of the former Soviet Union's KGB, from which it also received training. During the Soviet era, foreign intelli- gence gained by either organization was occasionally shared. The United States and the resident Cuban exile community in this country have been the two principal foci of the Intelli- gence Directorate's collection and analytical efforts. The col- lection activities include the infiltration of exile organizations, an effort that is relatively easy given the common language and culture and the large numbers of exiles resident in the United States. Following the February 1996 downing of two aircraft piloted by members of the exile organization Brothers to the Rescue, it became known that one of the group's pilots who did not fly that day, Juan Pablo Roque, had infiltrated the organiza- tion on behalf of the Cuban government. Shortly after the air- craft were shot down, Roque disappeared from his home in Florida and resurfaced in Havana. Other United States-based groups and paramilitary organizations reportedly targeted by the Intelligence Directorate include the Democracy Move- ment, the Alpha 66, the Democratic National Unity Party (Partido de Unidad Nacional Democratico — PUND), and even the Latin American Chamber of Commerce. Cuban intelligence operatives are believed to have been somewhat less successful in other United States penetration efforts. On various occasions, members of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C., have been identified as intelli- gence agents, declared persona non grata, and sent home. In September 1998, an extensive effort to penetrate the United States government was revealed, when ten Cubans residing in Florida were arrested for espionage. Related to these arrests, in December 1998, three Cuban diplomats from Cuba's United Nations mission were ordered to leave the United States because of their ties to the ten individuals. The Miami spy ring was the largest single group of Cubans charged with spying by the United States since the Castro government came to power. According to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the ten arrested were tasked with spying on military installations in Florida, including the Boca Chica Naval Air Sta- tion, the United States Southern Command, and MacDill Air Force Base. 342 National Security With respect to the Intelligence Directorate's interests, this shift to military targets was deemed by some observers to reflect a new Cuban intelligence concern, namely its interest in regaining access to the kind of strategic information on the United States military that had once been provided by the Soviet Union. However, the directorate is also active elsewhere in the world, where its operatives are often tasked to collect intelligence related to investments in the island or other busi- ness-related endeavors. Still, even beyond North America, the Cubans have demonstrated a continuing interest in military- related targets, as was suggested by the revelation in early 1999 that the directorate had infiltrated Spanish military intelli- gence. At the time, Intelligence Directorate agents were thought to be seeking details regarding Spain's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as information pertaining to investments in Cuba's tourism indus- try. Spain's capital, Madrid, is believed to serve as the "home base" for the directorate's agents assigned to Europe. By the end of the 1990s, the Intelligence Directorate appeared to be stepping up its overseas activities, apparently having recovered from the shake-up in 1989, when, as occurred in the other bureaucratic entities under the Ministry of Inte- rior's authority, a large number of the directorate's long-time personnel were fired or retired, and were replaced with mili- tary personnel. This extensive changeover in personnel was believed to have negatively affected Cuban intelligence during most of the 1990s, given that scores of operatives with many years of experience were peremptorily dismissed. During the mid-1990s, in an effort to recoup its capabilities, the director- ate was reported to have asked some of these career intelli- gence officers to return to active service. The directorate remained dominated by military personnel, however. In the late 1990s, the Intelligence Directorate reportedly had six divisions, or bureaus, which were divided into two cate- gories of roughly equal size, consisting of operational divisions and support divisions. The operational divisions include the Political-Economic Intelligence Division, which is subdivided into regional sections, including a separate one for North America; the Military Intelligence Division, and the External Counterintelligence Division, which is tasked with penetrating foreign intelligence services and the surveillance of exiles. The support divisions include the Technical Division, the Informa- tion Division, and the Preparation Division. The first is respon- 343 Cuba: A Country Study sible for the production of false documents, maintenance of the communications systems that support clandestine opera- tions, and the development of clandestine message capabilities. The Ministry of Interior's Intelligence Directorate maintains a radio listening and transmitting post on the island that is used primarily to maintain contact with its operatives abroad. The information and preparation divisions assist in matters related to intelligence analysis. During the 1970s and 1980s, the opera- tives of the America Department (Departamento America — DA), an entity formally under the PCC's jurisdiction, worked closely with the DGI (as the Intelligence Directorate was then known) in managing covert activities and support for national liberation movements throughout the world. Crime and Punishment General Crime Trends By the end of the 1990s, the growing national crime problem had become a focal point for the regime. During the early 1990s, economic crimes — often committed by average citizens trying to resolver, or make do, during the most difficult years of the crisis — became the focus of official attention. By the end of the 1990s, however, the types of crimes being committed, as well as those committing them, had changed, prompting heightened concerns. These concerns stemmed from what was recognized as a sudden, alarming increase in violent crime, including armed robbery and murder, that occurred in 1998. In late 1998, a special section in one of the nation's leading weekly newspapers, Juventud Rebelde, identified crime as "one of the great new challenges" facing the regime and said that it even was emerging as a threat to the socialist system. In a major speech made in January 1999 to the country's National Revolu- tionary Police (PNR) , Fidel Castro called for urgent measures to preserve law and order. These measures included changes to the country's Penal Code, with the addition of new crimes as well as increasing sentences for a number of offenses. Throughout most of the Revolution, Cuba has traditionally had low rates of violence and juvenile delinquency, and has been counted among the nations in Latin America that could boast of having "safe streets." During the 1990s, however, this situation appeared to be changing. Many Cuban citizens responded to the increasing incidence of crime by installing bars on the windows and balconies of their homes in order to 344 National Security keep intruders out; others reportedly turned to attack dogs and alarm systems. The government maintains that the increase in crime is "temporary" and blames it on the difficul- ties caused by the longstanding United States embargo. The cause, however, is generally acknowledged to be linked with the long economic crisis, the dollarization of the economy, and the many changes associated with the growth of the tourism indus- try on the island during the 1990s. Apart from the incidence of violent crime, the general trends in crime reflected a rise in all kinds of theft during the late 1990s, whether break-ins, car theft, or livestock theft. Lastly, the theft, usually by employees, of goods and manufacturing materials from state-run indus- tries for sale in dollars on the black market remained a prob- lem that interfered with the government's efforts to achieve greater productivity. In addition to theft, prostitution has increased since the legalization of dollars in 1992 and the growth of the tourism industry on the island during the decade, as Cubans have turned to this profession as a way to earn hard currency. Although prostitution itself is not recognized as a criminal offense, it is viewed as morally reprehensible, and Cuban authorities have instituted periodic campaigns against it. Those who profit from prostitution, whether pimps or those who rent rooms used by the prostitutes, are subject to prosecution and several years' imprisonment. During the 1998 campaign, police patrols in areas frequented by foreigners, such as Varadero Beach and the Cuban Keys, were stepped up in efforts to dis- courage the prostitutes' open solicitation of tourists; yet some reports indicated that the prostitutes were often able to bribe the officers to look the other way. The government has been anxious to keep the increase in crime from negatively affecting the tourism industry, one of the primary sources of the nation's hard currency earnings. (One of the incidents that may have contributed to the sud- denly heightened official concern in late 1998 was the fatal shooting of two Italian tourists during a robbery.) As a result, the government has attempted to increase police training, patrols, and manpower, and to put other resources at the dis- posal of the police (see National Revolutionary Police, this ch.). In this last regard, a special new police force, the afore- mentioned Special Brigade, was created in 1998 to deter crime in tourist areas. Cuban authorities have also called on the pop- ulation for assistance in the anticrime campaign. At the Fifth 345 Cuba: A Country Study Congress of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) in September 1998, CDR members — whose political fervor was generally thought to have diminished as the daily difficulties of economic life increased in the 1990s — were assigned a new role in helping improve anticriminal vigilance in their neighborhoods. As part of this vigilance program, which is coordinated by the PNR, joint patrols by neighbor- hood residents and police were increased in Cuba's urban areas. Drug Trafficking and Narcotics-Related Problems During the late 1990s, the issue of drug trafficking became a heightened concern for Cuban officials. During this period, the island had become an important transshipment point for illicit drugs destined for sale either in Europe or, most often, the United States. With increasing frequency, Cuba was being used for airdrops of South American-produced drugs, usually cocaine, bundles of which were then retrieved and carried by fast launches to the United States. Cuba's ability to prevent the traffickers' operations is limited by its own strategic inability to fully monitor national airspace, particularly the skies over cen- tral Cuba, the air corridor most often favored by the traffickers. Similarly, severe resource shortages have hampered the ability of the Ministry of Interior's Border Guard Troops, which are assigned to patrol the island's coastal waters, to interdict ship- ments, and to apprehend traffickers at sea. Cuban authorities appear to have had mixed success in their interdiction efforts. By the end of 1999, the use of Cuban air- space by traffickers was believed to be on the decline, the rea- son for which may have been their relatively easier access to the skies over the neighboring island of Hispaniola. Still, Cuban officials reported that in 1999 they seized two tons of cocaine that had washed up on the country's north shore. This cocaine, part of failed airdrops at sea, was intended to be picked up by the small speedboats, known colloquially as "go-fasts," that ferry the drugs to the United States. Some analysts maintain that the unconfiscated drugs that have washed ashore have been the source of the island's nascent domestic drug problem. Cuban authorities also have achieved some success in appre- hending individuals who tried to smuggle drugs through one of the island's eleven international airports. Foreigners appre- hended for attempted drug smuggling have included Cana- dian, Jamaican, and British nationals, among others. During 346 National Security 1998 alone, a Ministry of Interior report stated that arrests and seizures had doubled over the previous year. Cuban authorities arrested 1,216 individuals for possession and trafficking and seized a total of 106 kilos of cocaine and eighty kilos of mari- juana. Despite Cuba's efforts, a notable drug seizure made in Colombia in December 1998 suggested a possible new aspect to the island's strategic role in the international narcotics trade. That seizure was of 7.2 tons of cocaine found packed in ship- ping containers aboard a vessel bound for Cuba that had an ultimate destination in Spain. It raised the possibility that the maritime transit of containerized cargo was a new tactic in traf- ficking via Cuba because, as one police official observed, it was unlikely that so large a shipment would have been sent along an untested route. Following the broad negative publicity that the incident generated, President Fidel Castro announced in January 1999 that international traffickers apprehended and convicted by Cuban authorities would be subject to the death penalty. Within the Cuban government, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice are the two principal entities charged with antinarcotics responsibilities. As a reflection of Cuba's concern over what is perceived as a growing problem, the min- ister of justice, Roberto Diaz Sotolongo, also served as the head of the country's National Drug Commission (Comision Nacio- nal de Drogas) . Within the Ministry of Interior, the National Antidrug Division, which in 1999 was led by Colonel Oliverio Montalvo, is responsible for coordinating the antinarcotics efforts of its personnel, which include the police, the Border Guard Troops, and Customs authorities. Also, in recognition of this relatively new national problem and its extension well beyond national borders, Cuba has signed pacts with twenty- five foreign governments in an effort to combat international narcotics trafficking and the associated money laundering that often accompanies it. Included are pacts with Spain, Britain, and even Colombia. Training assistance provided by European governments includes helping the Cubans improve their inves- tigative and ship-searching techniques as well as their airport control measures. Cuban officials have also sought to increase cooperation on antinarcotics issues with the United States, in particular with the United States Coast Guard. These have included efforts to establish and maintain routine communications and contacts 347 Cuba: A Country Study between the Coast Guard and their counterparts in the Border Guard Troops, particularly among lower-ranking officials and on a "case-by-case" basis (see Border Guard Troops, this ch.). In one of the most notable cases involving successful cooperation between Cuba and the United States to deter drug trafficking, the United States informed the Cuban government in late 1996 of a suspicious disabled freighter, the Limerick, which had drifted into Cuban waters. The Cubans searched the vessel and found six tons of cocaine. Cuban officials later testified at the United States trial in which the traffickers were convicted. Despite official concern with narcotics trafficking, Cuban government authorities officially maintained that the domestic consumption of drugs had not become a broad social problem by the end of the 1990s, but they did acknowledge a trend toward growing use. It was also recognized that drug use had increased, in particular in areas frequented by foreign tourists, suggesting that the tourists themselves either were bringing illicit drugs to the island or were a target market for Cubans selling the drugs. The use of illegal drugs has been discouraged in Cuba since the very beginning of the Revolution, when under Order 6, which was issued by Fidel Castro while still a guerrilla in the Sierra Maestra, the use and consumption of marijuana was pro- hibited. Despite the paucity of statistical data on the subject, drug consumption within the Cuban population, especially by youth, is believed to have increased markedly during the late 1990s. Frequently, unretrieved drug shipments that acciden- tally wash ashore are recovered by Cubans, who often choose to sell the drugs and may save some for their own use. The Cubans have favored a community-based, educational approach in addressing this potential problem, as spelled out in their Integrated Drug Prevention Plan. According to a fine line drawn by the Penal Code, drug consumption itself is not a crime, but possession is. An individual with a record of illegal drug consumption or identified as exhibiting behavior that suggests drug use may be subject to "preventive detention." Despite the Cuban government's belief that the country is not a target market for such common illegal narcotics as cocaine, marijuana, or heroin, it does acknowledge that Cuba is one of the largest illegal markets in the hemisphere for the pharmaceutical tranquilizer known as meprobamate, which is medically prescribed to relieve anxiety, tension, and muscle spasms. In terms of the classification of illicit drugs, Cuba 348 National Security adheres to the schedule elaborated by the U.N.'s Vienna Com- mission. The government officially supports international efforts to fight narcotics trafficking. For example, Cuba's minis- ter of justice represented Cuba at the mid-1998 U.N. Anti-Drug Summit in New York. Yet notwithstanding present efforts to build cooperation in this area, the issue of illicit narcotics remains a somewhat sensi- tive subject for the Cuban government, a number of whose offi- cials have in the past been accused of engaging in international drug trafficking. During the 1989 trial of Division General Arnaldo Ochoa, one of the key charges that government prose- cutors highlighted as having threatened the Revolution was the defendants' involvement and contacts with Carlos Lehder Rivas, the one-time head of Colombia's Medellm Cartel, with whom the defendants were said to have discussed collabora- tion. Some critics of the Castro government maintain that the regime's own concern over being exposed for participating in the international drug trade prompted it at that time to convict and "sacrifice" several of its leading security officers in order to save itself. Allegedly, Cuba's interest in facilitating international drug trafficking can be dated to the late 1970s, when the govern- ment first realized that it could gain by providing safe haven and other support for the major drug cartels and independent traffickers that operated in and around the Caribbean. In addi- tion, in supporting the introduction of illicit drugs into the United States, the regime enjoyed an insidious side benefit: the ability to "corrupt" the country from within by promoting drug use. Some of the money obtained was thought to have been used to finance revolutionary activities in Central and South America as well as to help support the sending of Cuban troops to Africa. According to one former Cuban intelligence officer, these operations were initially managed through what was known as Department "Z" of the Ministry of Interior's Special Troops Directorate. They were later transferred to Department "MC," which was under the Ministry of Interior's Vice Ministry of Information. (The initials "MC" are said to stand for moneda convertible (convertible currency), and the generation of moneda convertible was the main purpose of that department.) The heyday of Cuba's covert role in the international drug trade was presumably between 1979 and 1989. At this point, only six weeks before Ochoa's arrest in June 1989, it became known that two traffickers who were in the custody of United 349 Cuba: A Country Study States authorities in Miami were preparing to provide details on Cuba's role in narcotics trafficking and to testify against regime authorities for their involvement. Earlier, in November 1982, four Cuban government officials, including Admiral Aldo Santamana Cuadrado, then the chief of the Revolution- ary Navy, were indicted by a United States grand jury for allow- ing Cuba to be used as a drug transshipment point by foreign traffickers. United States prosecutors' plans in 1993 to indict MINFAR chief Raul Castro along with several top Ministry of Interior officials for their role in facilitating the transit of Colombian cocaine to the United States market over a ten-year period were never carried out. Many of the critics who have cited the Cuban government's role in narcotics trafficking argue that the leadership continues to be deeply involved in trafficking and money laundering. Despite the successful lim- ited cooperation involved in the 1996 Limerick case and the fact that no Cuban authorities have ever been detained based on the indictments handed down, this alleged record of long-time involvement in international narcotics trafficking left some United States officials reluctant in the late 1990s to engage in more extensive cooperation with the Cubans in this area. As of the late 1990s, however, United States intelligence had never publicly revealed any evidence that high-level Cuban govern- ment officials are engaged in drug trafficking. The Problem of Illegal Emigration and Refugee Smuggling By the end of the 1990s, illegal emigration and alien smug- gling had become a growing problem for the regime. Given that Cubans are not free to leave the country without govern- ment-provided exit visas, illegal emigration has long plagued the regime, yet it has also provided a political "relief valve" in that those most dissatisfied with their situation on the island have left. Nevertheless, the incidence of alien smuggling — in which professional smugglers are paid to help Cubans surrepti- tiously leave the country — is a relatively new and growing phe- nomenon. By 1999 United States authorities believed that the majority of the Cubans arriving illegally had been brought in by smugglers. This developing problem was in part spurred by the terms of the 1995 immigration accord, which provides that most Cuban refugees who make it to United States soil are not turned away from this country but that those intercepted at sea by the United States Coast Guard are picked up and repatri- ated to Cuba. This accord reflected a change in United States 350 National Security policy inasmuch as for decades the United States had wel- comed all Cubans. In turn, under the accords, the Cuban regime agreed that it would attempt to stem the uncontrolled flow of Cubans illegally departing the island, as had occurred on various occasions in the past. Two such incidents were the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, in which 125,000 Cubans left the island, and the 1994 balsero crisis, when 30,000 Cubans attempted to leave the island on rafts. Since 1994, thousands of Cubans have attempted to leave the island, often on their own, setting off on makeshift rafts or other unseaworthy vessels. During good weather, the number of Cubans attempting to make the trip across the shark-infested Straits of Florida to United States soil generally increases. From January to July 1999 alone, the United States Coast Guard reported that it had apprehended at sea 1,039 Cubans, who — with the Coast Guard working in coordination with Cuba's Bor- der Guard Troops — were returned to the island. This figure reflects a significant increase over prior years, given that from May 1995 to July 1999, a total of 2,195 Cubans were reported to have been intercepted at sea and repatriated. By contrast, the United States Border Patrol, which assumes jurisdiction once the Cubans reach United States soil, reported that between October 1998 and July 1999, 1,943 Cubans had made it to Flor- ida, thus enabling them to seek permanent resident status in the United States. Based on the physical condition of those arriving and the absence of vessels or other likely means of transport, the Border Patrol estimated that 80 percent had been ferried to the United States by smugglers. The number of those who have perished at sea in attempting to make the 145- kilometer trip to the shores of Florida, however, is unknown and perhaps incalculable. In one of the more noted cases to come to public attention in the late 1990s, a six-year-old boy, Elian Gonzalez, was found clinging to a tire's inner tube and rescued by fishermen in November 1999; he was the sole survi- vor of a raft sinking in which his mother perished. There is little debate that the 1994 balsero crisis, which came as Cuba's economic decline was near its worst, so raised con- cerns on the part of both the United States and Cuban govern- ments that it paved the way for the new agreement on immigration. Yet the unintended consequence appears to have been that the agreement, which also set up a lottery system for the granting to Cubans of only 20,000 United States visas annu- ally, raised the stakes for leaving the island to the point that 351 Cuba: A Country Study Cubans became more willing to pay a smuggler for assistance. In most cases, the smugglers are paid by the Cubans' relatives who reside in the United States and wish to help their family members join them. Occasionally, Cubans are not transported directly from the island, but must first travel to the Bahamas where they are picked up by the smugglers whose networks operate from there. During the late 1990s, the professional smugglers' fees reportedly ranged from a low of US$1,000 to as much as US$8,000 or US$10,000 per person; they often make their trips using fast boats that can outrun the United States Coast Guard's vessels. According to one estimate, a single boat- load that might carry two dozen Cubans could bring the smug- glers more than US$200,000 per trip. Alien smuggling stands as a criminal offense in both the United States and Cuba. Although smugglers apprehended by United States authorities have long been subject to prosecu- tion, not until the late 1990s did Cuba begin instituting laws that were specifically targeted against the smuggling of its citi- zens. According to United States regulations aimed at deter- ring these smugglers' activities, the United States Coast Guard requires that boats up to 45.5 meters in length obtain a United States permit to travel to Cuba from a Florida port. If it is found that a boat intercepted by the Coast Guard has made a trip without permission, the Coast Guard can seize the vessel and subject those aboard to prosecution. For those convicted of smuggling by United States courts, sentences might range from five to ten years' imprisonment. In early 1999, in light of this growing problem, Cuba announced its intent to crack down on those involved in smug- gling. In a widely publicized anticrime speech to the PNR in January, Fidel Castro urged that smugglers who are appre- hended and convicted be "at least" imprisoned for life ( cadena perpetua) (see Penal System, this ch.). In July 1999, in a more direct attempt to deter Cubans from leaving, Decree-Law 194 also established a 500 to 10,000 peso fine (payable in hard cur- rency for foreigners) for those who buy, transport, or repair vessels without first gaining official approval. Despite Cuba's efforts to crack down on this crime, alien smuggling remains very lucrative; its continuation suggests the smugglers may deem their possible apprehension and prosecution by Cuban authorities to be unlikely and worth the risk. As of July 1999, Cuba was holding thirty United States residents arrested for 352 National Security alien smuggling, twenty-six of whom it had offered to send back to the United States for trial. Human Rights and Political Prisoners Cuba is widely recognized as being among the nations of the world whose governments have a poor human rights record. This general assessment is offered by entities as diverse as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the United States Department of State, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House. The Cuban leadership does not accept this assessment; rather, it maintains that any definition of "human rights" should consider a government's efforts to provide for such basic needs of its citizens as food, health care, and education. In this respect, the regime deems it has fared well. Notwithstanding this view of its own perfor- mance, Cuban authorities routinely interfere with the citizens' exercise of political and civil rights to the extent that Canada and member states of the EU have sought to use their diplo- matic and economic ties, most often in vain, to sway the regime toward improving its human rights record. The nature of Cuba's political system, which follows a totali- tarian model according to which the PCC remains the sole legal political party, appears at the core of the issue. Unlike the situation in many countries identified as having poor human rights records, the incidence of politically related "disappear- ances" of individuals has not been reported as problematic in Cuba. However, since almost the beginning of the Revolution, the government has not tolerated active opposition, albeit non- violent, by any who challenge its leadership and political pro- gram. In recognizing such activity as counterrevolutionary, the leadership has developed a sophisticated system to deal with such opposition, often using the Ministry of Interior for sup- port. As a result, those recognized as challenging the regime have for decades been subject to harassment, loss of employ- ment, or even imprisonment, and many have sought exile in the United States or other countries, rather than continue to face oppressive political conditions (see Human Rights and Opposition Groups, ch. 4) . According to the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and National Reconcilation (Comite Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos y Reconciliacion Nacional — CCDRN), Cuban jails held 344 political prisoners in July 1999. This Cuba-based orga- nization — headed by Elizardo Sanchez, himself a former politi- 353 Cuba: A Country Study cal prisoner — is generally recognized by those abroad as being a reliable source of information about both the number of political prisoners and internal political conditions. Because the government refuses to release statistics relating to how many Cubans are imprisoned for political crimes, the CCDRN's estimates are based largely on information confirmed through interviews with the detainees' families. Reports by some human rights advocates in Cuba suggest that many of these detainees are young men who have been imprisoned for their refusal to carry out their obligatory military service. According to the CCDRN, the number of individuals arrested and imprisoned for political offenses began to increase after 1997. This trend continued through the balance of the decade, in contrast to the decline in arrests and detentions that occurred for several years in a row during the early years of the economic crisis. The watershed event that marked this minor shift in the regime's tolerance of political activism and dissent was the detention of four prominent citizens, leaders of what was known as the Internal Dissidents' Working Group (Grupo de Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna), in what became one of the most noted human rights-related cases of the 1990s. These individuals were arrested in mid-July 1997, only weeks after signing and circulating a document entitled "The Homeland Is for All" ("La Patria es de todos") just prior to the convening of the PCC's Fifth Congress in October 1997. This document offered an analysis of the Cuban economic crisis that discour- aged foreign investment, discussed the problem of human rights, and proposed reforms to the constitution that would end the PCC's monopoly on power. They were accused of incit- ing sedition and "other acts against the security of the state." Despite the international concern provoked by the detention of these four respected professionals and the request for their release by many foreign dignitaries, including Pope John Paul II, the regime ignored the pleas and held the four without trial for nearly two years. They were not formally charged with any crimes until September 1998, after they had spent more than a year in prison. In March 1999, they were finally tried behind closed doors, convicted, and given prison sentences ranging from three-and-one-half to five years. However, only one remained in prison as of early 2001. Individuals who have been considered by human rights groups to be political prisoners have occasionally been released in response to requests by foreign officials. The Cuban govern- 354 National Security ment has done this as a means to generate goodwill and, in demonstrating its presumed responsiveness to foreign con- cerns, has used the occasional releases as a tactic to gain politi- cal advantages in its foreign relations. The largest group released during the 1990s consisted of approximately 300 detainees, about half of whom were considered to be political prisoners, who were freed in response to the clemency appeal made by Pope John Paul II during his January 1998 visit to the island. According to human rights monitors, many of those released in response to the papal request were at or nearing the end of their sentences. Shortly thereafter, in late November 1998, in response to a request made to Fidel Castro by the Spanish foreign minister, who had traveled to the island in preparation for King Juan Carlos' upcoming trip, two more prisoners were released. The men, one of whom had already served nearly half of his fourteen-year term, had been con- victed of disseminating "enemy propaganda." According to Cuban officials, they were pardoned for "humanitarian rea- sons," and released to foreign exile in Spain. Frequently, politi- cal prisoners who are released from detention before completion of their sentences are required to accept exile abroad as a condition for their release. These recent instances of the detention of dissidents and occasional prisoner releases in response to outsiders' requests also reflect the regime's methods during the decades preced- ing the 1990s. In 1979, for example, 3,600 political prisoners were released from detention as a result of negotiations between the Cuban and United States governments. Many of those released in 1979 remained on the island for a number of years because of migration-related problems that arose after the 1980 Mariel exodus. In mid-1984, twenty-seven political detainees, along with twenty-two United States citizens who were serving prison sentences in Cuba, were released and granted entry to this country following the intervention of the Reverend Jesse Jackson. In late 1984, under an immigration accord reached between Cuba and the United States, the United States agreed to accept during the following year up to 20,000 Cuban emigres, a figure that included former political detainees still residing on the island. In dealing with its imprisoned dissidents, the Cuban govern- ment routinely seeks to obtain the prisoners' participation in reeducation and rehabilitation efforts as part of the terms of their confinement. Those convicted of politically related 355 Cuba: A Country Study offenses are required to perform wage labor and participate in other prison-sponsored activities. Frequently, however, political prisoners are known to refuse to join in, an act of disobedience that may be interpreted as a sign of continuing defiance. These prisoners, who usually also refuse to wear prison uniforms (as they maintain they are not common criminals) , are known as plantados (literally, the planted ones) . Human rights monitors report that plantados are often accorded the harshest treatment by prison officials. This treatment may include the denial of contact with visitors or fellow prisoners and of basic privileges and needs, such as medical treatment, or the restriction of already meager food rations. Further, depending on the situa- tion, political prisoners are reported to often be intentionally placed in cells with prisoners convicted of violent crimes or held for long periods in solitary confinement, or sealed cells (celdas tapiadas). A 1985 report issued by the American Associa- tion for the Advancement of Science noted that such tactics are generally recognized to be methods of physical and psychologi- cal torture. In May 1995, Cuba ratified the United Nations Con- vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but by the end of the decade it had not yet established criminal penalties for acts of torture. Penal System The revisions in the Penal Code carried out during the 1990s suggested the regime's intent to toughen its stance on crime and tighten political control by recognizing as criminal some offenses that could be deemed to be basically political in nature. These revisions stood in contrast to the trend evident during the preceding decade, when changes in the code car- ried out between roughly 1979 and 1988 deleted some acts pre- viously considered criminal and reduced the length of sentence for a number of common crimes. The revisions of the 1990s appeared to be prompted by a variety of new pressures generated in relation to the economic crisis, including those associated with the dollarization of the economy, the legaliza- tion of foreign investment, and the growth of tourism. They may also be seen as the regime's response to security-related concerns spurred by the efforts of dissidents and the nascent independent press to expand and deepen their contacts with foreign sympathizers, especially those in the United States. 356 National Security As a result, during the latter half of the 1990s, a number of existing code provisions were being enforced more vigorously while new provisions were established in what the regime rec- ognized an the ongoing effort to "adequately respond to the present situation." Specifically, in early 1999, three new crimes were recognized and incorporated in the code. They were the crimes of money laundering ( lavado de dinero) , of trafficking in humans ( trdfico de personas) , and of the sale and trafficking of minors (ventay trdfico de menores). Crimes in Cuba are broadly categorized as either felonies or misdemeanors, for which any- one aged sixteen or above may be convicted. Felony crimes may carry either a potential sentence of greater than one year's imprisonment or a fine above a threshold of 300 cuotas, a vari- able unit that is loosely linked with the Cuban peso. Misde- meanor crimes carry either a potential sentence of less than one year or a fine under or at the 300- cuota threshold. Crimes categorized as felony offenses consist of murder, rape, and rob- bery. Other crimes, including assault, death or injury by vehi- cle, burglary, larceny, vehicle theft, arson, and drug trafficking, may variously be classified as felonies or misdemeanors depending on the severity of the offense. According to the Penal Code, acts that are recognized to be offenses against socialist organization are also subject to crimi- nal prosecution. These crimes have become the focus of heightened state scrutiny during the 1990s, especially in light of the exigencies related to the economic crisis. They include the misuse of employment in a state enterprise for illegal per- sonal gain ( malversation) , obtaining money or property illegally channeled from a state economic venture ( receptacion) , trading in foreign currency (trdfico de divisas), slaughter and distribu- tion of livestock outside the socialist distribution system ( sacrifi- cio He gal) , and attempting to leave the country without complying with formal emigration requirements ( salida ilegal) . Of the existing code provisions that were more vigorously enforced during the late 1990s, many were targeted against individuals who were deemed hostile to the regime. Among these offenses are included contempt for authority (desacato), dangerousness (peligrosidad) , defamation, resisting authority, association to commit criminal acts ( asociacion para delinquir) , and a vaguely defined, catch-all category of other acts against state security ( otros actos contra la seguridad del estado) . Under some of these provisions, it was recognized that the commission of what might normally be considered a criminal 357 Cuba: A Country Study act was not necessarily a prerequisite for arrest. The offense of dangerousness, for example, is recognized under the code as the "special inclination of a person to commit crimes, demon- strated by his conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist norms." Thus, as defined, the code allows for arrests to be made on a preventive basis. According to critics of the current human rights situation on the island, such arrests — which may call for up to several years' imprisonment if an individual is convicted — have reportedly resulted in the detention of thou- sands of Cubans. Lastly, the new Law for the Protection of the National Independence and Economy of Cuba, enacted in Feb- ruary 1999 and sometimes referred to simply as Law 88, appeared specifically directed against dissidents and indepen- dent journalists. Law 88 identifies a broad range of activities as undermining state security, with sanctions of up to twenty years' imprisonment established for contacts or collaboration with the United States or other foreign media aimed at destabilizing the country or destroying the socialist state. According to Cuba's Law of Penal Procedures, once an arrest is made police are required to file formal charges within the next ninety-six hours and to provide those detained with access to a lawyer within seven days. Between the arrest and the filing of formal charges, in what is known as the preparatory phase {fase preparatoria) , the police, possibly in conjunction with the government prosecutor {fiscal) , gather the witnesses and evidence considered necessary to demonstrate that a crime has been committed. Police and other security officers are permitted to exercise their discretion in stopping, detain- ing, and interrogating probable offenders, who during such a period are often not provided access to counsel. The individu- als detained may then be released without charges. According to the Law of Penal Procedures, those suspected of having com- mitted an offense may be held no more than twenty-four hours before their case must be submitted to an investigator. Human rights monitors report that such methods are frequently used to intimidate political dissidents. In addition, as occurred with the members of the aforementioned Working Group, individu- als may sometimes be held for long periods without formal charges being filed. According to the Cuban constitution, the state reserves the right to deny the civil rights of anyone who actively opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." The state invokes this right to justify its detention of some individuals, 358 National Security even though doing so stands in violation of the penal proce- dures law. Once a determination is made that a crime has been committed, the prosecutor issues a bill of indictment (conclu- siones provisionales) that details the charges and circumstances surrounding the crime. The case is then sent to trial, with a copy of the criminal indictment being provided to the defense attorney, if one has been identified. Lawyer collectives ( bufetes colectivos), whose members charge fees set by the state, exist to provide the accused with legal counsel. All criminal cases are required to be adjudicated; no provisions exist for plea bar- gaining. Pretrial incarceration (prision provisional) is permitted for those charged with serious felony offenses, those charged with multiple crimes, or those who are deemed likely to flee prosecution. The determination regarding the need for such incarceration in relation to any specific case is made by the court of first instance. Penal Code The Penal Code delineates the range of sentences that might be handed down. They include probation, public chas- tisement (amonestacwn) , fines, correctional labor without con- finement, correctional labor with confinement to the worksite, incarceration, and execution. A conviction for first-degree murder, for example, might warrant a sentence in the range of fifteen to twenty years' imprisonment. The maximum prison term is twenty to thirty years. During the crackdown on crime initiated at the end of the 1990s, Cuban leader Fidel Castro called for harsher sentences for a number of other crimes, including drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and robbery; life sentences were also to be recommended for repeat offenders. Unlike many countries in the region, Cuba does carry out capital punishment, as it has since the beginning of the Revolu- tion. From the 1980s to the early 1990s, death sentences were not handed down as frequently as during the first twenty years of the Revolution. However, by the end of the 1990s, this trend appeared to be reversing. Under the Penal Code, the death penalty has traditionally been reserved for particularly heinous offenses, or exceptional cases ( casos excepcionales) , whether rep- resented by crimes against individuals or against state security. In 1999 the Penal Code recognized 112 different types of offenses for which capital punishment could potentially be applied, two-thirds of which involved crimes against state secu- rity. As a result of revisions in the Penal Code that became 359 Cuba: A Country Study effective in March 1999, the death penalty was established as a possible punishment for convictions of drug-trafficking, cor- ruption of minors, and armed robbery. The mode of execution in Cuba is by firing squad. Persons either under twenty years of age or pregnant at the time of the crime or at sentencing can- not be condemned to death. Cuban law stipulates that all death sentences are automatically appealed to the Supreme Court and subject to review by the Council of State, which has the authority to commute the sentences to life imprisonment. Although on occasion executions have been carried out within weeks after a judgment is rendered, the appeal and review pro- cess can sometimes continue for months. It is believed that eleven individuals were executed in Cuba between 1989 and the end of 1997. Included in this group were the four MINFAR and Ministry of Interior officers who were put to death in 1989. A trend toward more frequent applica- tion of the death penalty was apparent during the final years of the 1990s. Based on data released by Amnesty International, although no executions were carried out during 1997, "at least" five individuals were executed during 1998. Then, during 1999 alone, "at least" thirteen Cubans were executed, and nine oth- ers were under sentence. Among the individuals sentenced to death in 1999 were two Cubans convicted for the murder of four foreign tourists. In addition, two Salvadoran nationals, tried in entirely separate cases, were convicted of terrorism and sentenced to death for a string of hotel bombings carried out in 1997, in one of which a foreign tourist was killed. According to the prosecutors, both Salvadorans were acting on behalf of anti-Castro exiles in an effort to sabotage Cuba's tourism indus- try. As of the close of 1999, the sentences had not been carried out. Penal Institutions Cuba's prison system falls under the authority of the Ministry of Interior's Directorate of Penitentiary Establishments. In 1998 there were 294 prisons and correctional work camps located throughout the island. These prisons included forty maximum security facilities, thirty minimum security prisons, and more than 200 work camps or farms (granjas) where those convicted of less serious offenses might complete their sen- tences. Of the prisons, nineteen were reported to be "closed," meaning that the detainees are not allowed contact with outsid- ers. In addition to these facilities, police stations, offices of the 360 National Security Ministry of Interior's Department of State Security, and even the headquarters of the Ministry of Interior at Villa Marista are often used as prisons. The Ministry of Interior supervises the administration of these various places of confinement, and pro- vides guards, work camp and farm overseers, and other staff for the facilities. Cuba in the late 1990s was believed to have one of the high- est per capita confinement ratios in all of Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1996 one estimate placed the island's prison population at between 100,000 and 200,000 prisoners of all cat- egories. This number stood in marked contrast to a 1990 esti- mate that indicated a prison population of only 19,000. Although the Cuban government reportedly maintains a com- puterized database to keep track of its prison population, it does not release or allow any public access to statistics regard- ing it. In addition to those serving time for their convictions, large numbers of pretrial detainees are also held in the prisons, many of whom, according to human rights critics, may be con- fined six to nine months or longer before being brought to trial. Darker-skinned Cubans are reportedly overrepresented in Cuba's prisons. Separate penal establishments are maintained for women; delinquent youth under sixteen years of age might be sent to school-like facilities. Conjugal visits with spouses are formally permitted once every two months, yet might occur more or less frequently, based on a prisoner's conduct. In the late 1990s, the conditions for prisoners at many of the island's facilities were generally considered to be substandard, unhealthy, and not in compliance with the United Nations' Standard Minimal Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Prob- lems frequently noted by those knowledgeable of prison condi- tions included inadequate food, overcrowding, inadequate or denied medical attention, and forced participation in "re-edu- cation" programs for all detainees. In tacit recognition of these oft-cited problems, the Cuban government made some efforts during the late 1990s to improve the state of confinement. In May 1997, the Ministry of Interior promulgated several new regulations designed to achieve this end. Further revisions in the Penal Code in early 1999 explicitly prohibited the use of corporal punishment by guards and other security officials against detainees. However, the code set no penalties for violat- ing that provision. 361 Cuba: A Country Study Outlook The Cuban military in 2001 is a very different institution from what it was when the regime first came to power. At least three distinct generations have been through the institution since the Revolution, from the veterans of the guerrilla war to the young professional technicians of the present generation. Recognizing the different formative experiences of these indi- viduals is as important as considering how their varied back- grounds may relate to the effectiveness of political control. The officers who are now prepared to move into positions of leader- ship in the institution have spent their careers as military pro- fessionals. Their perspective on the future of the Cuban military institution is likely to be quite different from that of the guerrilla leaders who led the Revolution in the late 1950s. And the mechanisms necessary to ensure their continuing sub- ordination to political authority may be quite different as well. * * * The study of the Cuban military and national security is seri- ously hampered by the lack of publicly available information. The Cuban government rarely makes public any details regard- ing the status of its security forces and related security con- cerns; rather, it tends to view efforts to obtain and relate such information, whether by private Cuban or foreign citizens, as inimical to the interests of the Revolution. Consequently, of the information garnered, most is gathered by United States or for- eign government authorities and obtained in such a manner that leads it to be classified. Despite these difficulties, the care- ful monitoring of the press and other open-source documents and reports can often yield fragmentary details that help fill out the picture. Defectors are also an often valuable source, particularly when the details they provide help to corroborate other information. The PCC's official daily newspaper, Granma, is the single best source to consult. Within the United States, the Miami Herald and its Spanish-language counterpart, EINuevo Herald, have the most regular coverage of Cuban affairs, and offer the best chance for finding information related to Cuban military and security affairs. Digital versions of these newspapers can be found on the Internet (Miami Herald at http://www.her- ald.com; El Nuevo Herald at http://www.elherald.com). The 362 National Security Cuban Armed Forces Review (http://www.cubapolidata.com/ cafr/cafr.html) is a private website containing military-related details and photographs compiled from other public sources. Lastly, an excellent resource for general information is the Cuba Today e-mail list operated by political scientist Nelson Valdes at the University of New Mexico. This list tracks daily media coverage related to Cuba and often includes reporting on security-related concerns. Studies by academics also have contributed to an improved understanding of the FAR and its role in national life. Among the important authors of such studies are Domingo Amu- chastegui, Jorge I. Dommguez, Edward Gonzalez, and Jaime Suchlicki. Rafael Fermoselle's comprehensive study, The Evolu- tion of the Cuban Military, and the biographies of the officers provided in his Cuban Leadership after Castro should also be noted. The text, Cuban Communism, now in its ninth edition and whose primary editor throughout the years has been Irv- ing Louis Horowitz, has regularly included a section on the mil- itary composed of previously published articles. Lastly, mention must be made of the important 1996 volume that pro- files the prominent members of the FAR. Cuban journalist Luis Baez's Secretos de generales: Desclasificado, a collection of his inter- views with the officers, provides not only insights into the lives and career paths of the military's top officials but also the orga- nization of the institution. Unfortunately, finding information on the forces under the Ministry of Interior is even more difficult than locating infor- mation on the FAR. The little to be found is often based on defectors' recollections that date to the period preceding the economic crisis and the ministry's 1989 shake-up. Nevertheless, two good starting points to be noted are Jose Luis Llovio- Menendez's Insider: My Hidden Life as a Revolutionary in Cuba and Juan Antonio Rodnguez-Menier's Inside the Cuban Interior Ministry. For information related to human rights, penal procedures, and prison conditions, the best sources are the annual human rights reports published by the United States Department of State and those of the widely recognized nongovernmental organizations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. On the Internet, the daily reports by independent Cuban journalists available on the Website maintained by CubaNet (http:/ /www.cubanet.org) offer unusual perspectives 363 Cuba: A Country Study on the difficulties that life on the island may pose for those who fail to go along with the regime. 364 Appendix 1 1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 12 Demographic Trends in Cuba, Selected Years, 1950-2000 13 Trends in Urban and Rural Population Change, Selected Years, 1970-95 14 Enumerated Population Classified by Race, Selected Years, 1899-1981 15 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Economic Activity, 1989- 98 16 Cuban Foreign Merchandise Trade, 1989-98 17 Selected Categories of the State Budget, 1989-98 18 Selected Indicators of Production: Agriculture, 1989, 1993-97 19 Selected Indicators of Production: Manufacturing, 1989, 1993-98 20 Tourism Industry Indicators, 1990-97 21 Employed and Unemployed Economically Active Popula- tion, 1989-96 22 State Civilian Employment, by Economic Sector, 1990-97 23 Foreign Debt in Convertible Currency, 1993-98 24 Balance of Payments, 1993-98 25 Foreign Joint Ventures in Cuba, by Country of Origin, 1988, 1990- 95 26 Foreign Joint Ventures in Cuba, by Economic Sector, 1988, 1990-95 27 Voters in National Assembly Elections, 1993 28 Percentage of Null and Blank Votes Cast in Elections, 1993, 1997, and 2000 29 Major Army Equipment, 1999 30 Major Air Force Equipment, 1999 31 Major Naval Equipment, 1999 365 Appendix Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find Millimeters 0.04 inches 0.39 inches 3.3 feet 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m?) 2 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds Metric tons 3 0.98 long tons 1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit And add 32 Cuba uses the metric system, but old Spanish units are also used. 2 For area measurement, one Cuban cabalkria equals 13.4 hectares or 33.16 acres. 3 Sugar is often measured in Spanish tons of 2,271 pounds, and there is a Cuban quintal of 101.4 pounds made up of four arrobas. 367 Cuba: A Country Study "I .3 to ffi (N it) « 6 ffi m to to to j> eo cm i> co cm a> eo eo cm kfl O OS 00 I> O J> !0 Tf< £ rH X If) °o tj^ I> in eo ^_ to* to" i>" go" O) to o m oo Tt< O i-H cm to 0O J> to 00 o> oT o" o" o" 368 Appendix Table 3. Trends in Urban and Rural Population Change, Selected Years, 1970-95 Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Population size (in thousands) TOTAL 8,520 9,306 9,710 10,102 10,598 11,041 Urban 5,122 5,962 6,605 7,237 7,927 8,560 Rural 3,398 3,343 3,105 2,865 2,671 2,481 Percent urban 60 64 68 72 75 78 Quinquennial growth rates (in percent) 1 TOTAL n.a. 2 1.8 .85 .79 .96 .82 Urban n.a. 3.03 2.05 1.83 1.82 1.54 Rural n.a. -.32 -1.48 -1.61 -1.40 -1.48 Rates refer to the quinquennium preceding the reference period. 2 n.a. — not available. Source: Based on information from Centra Latinoamericano de Demografla, "America Latina: Proyecciones de poblacion urbana-rural," Boletin Demogrdfico [Santi- ago, Chile], 28, 1995, 31, 35. Table 4. Enumerated Population Classified by Race, Selected Years, 1899-1981 (in percentages) Census Year White Black Mulatto or Mestizo Asian 1899 66.9 14.9 17.2 1.0 1907 69.7 13.4 16.3 0.6 1919 72.3 11.2 16.0 0.5 1931 72.1 11.0 16.2 0.7 1943 74.3 9.7 15.6 0.4 1953 72.8 12.4 14.5 0.3 1981 66.0 12.0 21.9 0.1 Source: Based on information from Cuban censuses provided by Sergio Diaz-Briquets. 369 Cuba: A Country Study in J> 00 Ol q co 00 ,754, j> oc o CTi CM to CM j> m © 00 o in m 00 © © m CM O J> co" CO" q in CO q 00 in oq cm 00 in CM m m 1> j> in q 00 m to CO" co" o co © in 00 q q 00 lO j> in CO 00 oo O) CO CO CO m o in CM 00 o CM o 00 m r 1 oo" CO" co" in in ,_, CM CM 00 00 00 in CM in oc CO CM 00 q oo co 00 m m in in co co" CM co" co in CO © q CM ' i> q 00 CO 00^ d 00 j> © CO © m CO GO 00 CO in co q 00 o J> CM © d 00 to CO" CM co" q to CM 1> co 00 d J> 1> CM Ol to Oi CO o m CO CO m 00 co tO CO q CO CO CO m ^ of co" CM co" Oi J> m CM t^- CM q © o CT>" I> in to 00 co d m o co* m co o q o © m J> CO o to O) J> co" TP co" 00 OS to x> in CM q CM in I> CO co_ 00 Oi CM m 00 q © CO 00 m q_ © co 00 o o d m x> © CO m -f 00 o in d CO © CM O CM co o to in 00 o? ■*" CO" 00 in o 00 o to tO © J> lri 00 iO CM Oi CO to 00 00 CM m d d m CM m CO 00 m to 1> CM CO o>" ■*" m co" re tj .ti oiD £ .a S 2 b S w .c! * '2 £ I o U 370 Appendix Table 6. Cuban Foreign Merchandise Trade, 1989-98 (in millions of pesos) Year Exports Imports Turnover Balance 1989 5,399.9 8,139.8 13,539.7 -2,739.9 1990 . . . . 5,414.9 7,416.5 12,831.4 -2,001.6 1991 2,979.5 4,233.8 7,213.3 -1,254.3 1992 1,779.4 2,314.9 4,094.3 -535.5 1993 1,156.7 2,008.2 3,164.9 -851.5 1994 1,330.8 2,016.8 3,347.6 -686.0 1995 1,491.6 2,882.5 4,374.1 -1,390.9 1996 1,865.5 3,569.0 5,434.5 -1,703.5 1997 1,819.1 3,996.0 5,815.1 -2,176.9 1998 1,443.7 4,181.2 5,624.9 -2,737.5 Source: Based on information from Banco Nacional de Cuba, Economic Report, 1994, Havana, August 1995, 11; Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario estadistico, 1997, Havana, 1999, 119; and Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Cuba en cifras, 1998, Havana, 1999, 38. 371 Cuba: A Country Study CM O kO CO q a X o> to c: en o In m en i> en m m o t> X en to to m OJ to o X to CM m sm in j> o to m CO q m m to CM 00 CO to to CO q CO X X m O! o> X CM SM m CO CO CO d q to o cm" CM CM Os (M o> o C m X to CO CM © OJ o> o co q X os en CM to m to tt X CO CM CnT in CM CM oo OS in o> o i> m © m en cm" o> m en 00 o Os in to to co j> Oi q J> 00 CO X 00 t> in en en s q. m to CM en in m to en m en as o to en CM to o "# Os cm" m" "tf to m o CO o o to In J> tc m m CO en i> q en CM in en § CM to to en j> m CM Tf o OJ oT en GO to CM X to ~. on OS en CM eo J> CM X en OS to co 1> 00 <* en CM to CO 00 CM c CM 00 l> CM CM c o X OJ oT en Tf" ,949 OS o> to to q to CM © 'T 1> © in m CM Os CM X X to CM CM o X CM OS © CM en o CM to CM m 5M X X o CO" CM ^r" m m CM q m CM m to "f eo CM o CM to 1> en Os os to en m en X en m en o CM CM «o OJ CM in o X CO. X X o m "* o m o OJ in OS CO m CO 00 OJ q os CM c CM in en O tD X CO 1-H OS O X OS CM rl O en — i r-i i-i i-i £3 oo $ C 2 .2 I .9 I o 1 ! 4 of 12 (O * (O O) (O CO OJ I> 8 1 is lf> 00 l-H M W ltl I> © O i— < tO tT> cm m to oi n co CvF ^ 3 CU ■£ * 1Q If) m cm to m to i> Off off I> to 00 co oo m S> 00 t7> G O C 0> tC 2 o erf ^ I Xi ^ ol "3 § 373 Cuba: A Country Study CM CO CO i-h N rt ffj ID ifl O) ifl 1 ^ (N ^ 00 CM CO i—i CO OS O iO t-h cm as as o d ^ n r— i oo o r— i co to eo CO 00 i— i CM rH cd a> as co eo o CM »T) OS CO CM CM 00 CM CO lO CM CM C) N N H ^H CO a> cm O l-H CM CO CO CO CM 00 lO ooasomomeooo O CO CM t— I i-h " cd i> O 00 i-h l> CO IO CO l-H oo cm oo m oo co co co as cm m cm i-h co i-h CO CO CM i> CM i-h co as cm j> oo as cm cd CD l-H CO i-h CO CO o o as i-h co i-h CD CM CM 00 CM 2 2 ca £ u XJ he S e2 If i 374 Appendix CO if) CO r-H if) eo oo if) j> m oo O) cm co o i— i cm cn oo O) O) j> i— i rH CM CM i—i m co CO 00 CO CM i-H CM if) CM O J> ^ 00 1> r-i rH CM CM O CD r-H CM J> O) COCDcOCDCMr^CMr-HCMCri h n m 1< h n 1< ^ It) M O) l> rH CM CM If) J> CM rH CM O rH O J> CM rH rH CM 00 if) If) oo C> 00 CT> CO CT> CM CO l> CO CO rH rH J> rH CM CM rH >— I CO CM CO rH CO CM CM CO if) if) if) CO C> i> 1> CO O) rH rH CO CM CM if)if)00CMCO00COC0 00 rH CM rH rH CO CO rH CM CO if) CO i— i CT> CO CM °0 CM O) rH O 00 l-H O") 00 CM ^ O CO CM CO 1> — -5 -5 bo jy J? -2 o 13 £ CJ CD w w v to CO oi H (O O <0 Cl a> i> b o o) n 01 CO t— i CO O if! (O * M t— i oj co f Ol H O r-l Tt< Of i> I-H CO (M 00 O CO CM CO ea to pi oa be be .2 U U S o o o o c c a c ■8 i -s 05 £ S 3 3 I O O ^ 3 S -s ■£ s E 5 c c c a •2 ^ 111 S © 3 '5 ^ > I s I So* Cd ^ S> :2 3 a - a . & § j> ^ u g I o H ,l ^ o s , .y o ^ X - cy 2 S > X u § W CO CU On ,S O °^ s 'u ■§ Ip * ? 2 -o 1 £ S | | | ° ^ K 1 ^ II f\ « o i o W U u u •a . y ^ « - - c2 c «! cj c3 cj I o Tf m to 376 Appendix CM <0 3 c QJ O O " 1/) CO O O is v2 3C 377 Cuba: A Country Study OOOOOOOOOCMOO ©'oiriin©in©o©rHod 10 or or o i-h co co cm -H^ GO" rH O i—i CO CO CO m O O m o M to rn CM a>incn©rHJ>©oq-* xri^'incd^coooi-H cncncocMCMcococo© ^r-HTflf-CO^H-— I CO o m C5 to j> S N O N O) If} rH H J> co co co co m o cm O CO CM O CO CO CO o o o> m © © i— i m co co rH CM rH o o © co m m r- ( cm CO CO rH J> J> CO CM CMOOtOGMCOi-HGMCO^fCnm J> CO rH CM rH <3 * i5 3 C CO CO t> d id ic a oo in ct> cm ■rh 1 ^r 1 rH CO rH CO CM CO CM 00 CM CO oi © m d Oi CM CO d m d d CO o CM incoa>rHoqcocMJ>o mcoco-for^oomoo HH tO CM CO rH as CJ5 ^ (M CO CM "<* rH CO H cm od Tfl SO mooi>i>eoomi> CM hh CM CO O O rH rH 00 CM d rH d co d I> CO CO -rj- m oo co cooqcMinoqcMco cMoq d rH cm in d o CO CO CO CM CO Thi CM CD be a s s o 1 « O as '5 £ W U U H S .« en qj cfl U H c3 iT _ r * G 1 e . 2 o .2 3 "1 1 .g | v 3 & 3 S S « S 2 fl o u 379 Cuba: A Country Study O CO CM 0> — i m CO CO (N rt CM* N h h Ci |> j> to 1-1 O CO i> CD i—i 00 00 i— i lO CM rH i— ( CM cm i> i—i a> cn eo eo O) cm m i-H eo i— I CM CM l-l CM CM rH ,-1 i— iCOOCMCMOI>-h O O i—< O CM 00 i—i CO co t ai co gn n « CM CM CM rH rH eo cm 00 CT> o a> -f m m eo j> © a> f I _, C J, » D t« - — ._ H Lo g tn _ ,5 U w u 380 Appendix CO CO S< m m * CO (M 00 CO Ol CO N lO CD X> 01 CM r-H H 00 o> O CO CO CM CM CO -tf I> i— i s CO oo m (O \ in O) w m o in co © j> oo m co cm n oo oi n to to r-T CM CO I> CO O H O J> CO J> I> CO 00 CO CO 00 O) h 00 o> CO CO CM CO (2 £ -S CO CO C7> © CM r-1 CM "f CM cn o i> CO CM oi ^ oq in co j> oi iri co j> O 00 CM CO ' CO CM i— ( rtCOCOcOCMOOCMCMCM CM CO ^ CO t-H CO if) CM CO if) CM in to co co i-h "3 S ■I 3 Q -g 381 Cuba: A Country Study tC * N CO N ffi o 00 CO >f) if) N If) a> eo (M S u ■3 -5 o O O H 382 Appendix — t CM CM W Ol N CM <— i CM > ^ N ffi O QC J> Oi .2 5 3 o £ caw H U U O 383 Cuba: A Country Study ° £P O CO I a «£> I> <£> O O CT> O oq © h q oo o6 ifi io cMcr>cM©©©xn© co" cm m co cm 00 if) M h cM00O00>-i^-<©©CMJ> 51 O) Oi Ol 00 M O CO © CM o m o> j> cm m © oo kT5 I> if) (O iO tD to CM m CM © CO CM in CO 00 CO CM if) CO to X 3 £ u j U E> c£ U U J 384 Appendix Table 18. Percentage of Null and Blank Votes Cast in Elections, 1993, 1997, and 2000 1993 National 1997 Municipal 2000 Municipal Elections Elections Elections Pinar del Rio 6.6 8.3 6.7 Ciudad de La Habana 14.7 9.9 7.9 LaHabana 12.6 11.2 8.8 Matanzas 7.0 8.5 6.6 Cienfuegos 5.0 7.9 6.4 Villa Clara 6.9 8.0 7.1 Sancti Spfritus 4.0 6.3 4.9 Ciego de Avila 4.3 5.3 4.4 Camagiiey 5.0 6.2 4.8 Las Tunas 1.9 4.4 4.0 Holgum 4.5 6.2 5.3 Granma 1.4 4.0 3.4 Santiago de Cuba 2.7 4.4 3.5 Guantanamo 2.0 3.9 3.4 Isla de la Juventud 5.9 5.9 5.3 Countrywide 7.0 7.2 5.9 Source: Based on information computed by Jorge I. Dommguez from Granma [Havana], March 11, 1993, and April 25, 2000. 385 Cuba: A Country Study Table 1 9. Major Army Equipment, 1 999 1 Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory Medium battle tanks T-34, T-54/-55, T-62 Soviet Union 1 ,500 (including 400 T-34, 600 T-54/-55, 400 T-62) Light tanks PT-76 n.a.^ A relatively small number. Reconnaissance BRDM-1/-2 n.a. 250 Armored infantry fighting vehicle BMP-1 n.a. 400 Armored personnel carrier BTR-40/-50/-60/-152 n.a. 700 Towed artillery n.a. 700 76mm ZIS-3 122mm M-1938, D-30 130mm M-46 152mm M-l 937, D-l Self-propelled artillery n.a. 40 122mm 2S1 152mm 2S3 Multiple rocket launcher n.a. 300 122mm BM-21 140mm BM-14 Mortars n.a. 1,000 82mm M-41/-43 120mm M-38/-43 Static defense artillery n.a. n.a. 122mmJS-2 heavy tank 85mm T-34 Antitank guided weapon n.a. n.a. AT-1 Snapper AT-3 Sagger Artillery guns n.a. n.a. 85mm D-44 100mm SU-100 self- propelled, T-l 2 100 SU-100 Air defense guns n.a. 400 ZU-23, 36 ZSU-23-4 23mm ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 self-propelled 30mm M-53 (twin)/BTR-60P self-propelled 100 37mm M-l 939 300 386 Appendix Table 19. ( Continued) Major Army Equipment, 1 999 1 Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 57mm S-60 towed, ZSU-57-2 self- propelled 200 S-60, 25 ZSU-57-2 85mmKS-12 100 100mm KS-1 9 75 Surface-to-air missile n.a. n.a. SA-6/-7/-8/-9/-13/-14/-16 1 Most equipment in storage and not available on short notice. 2 n.a. — not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1999-2000, London, 1999, 228-29; and "The 1999-2000 World Defence Almanac," Military Technology [Bonn], 24, No. 1,2000, 51. 387 Cuba: A Country Study Table 20. Major Air Force Equipment, 1 999 1 Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory Air Force Fighter ground attack (two squadrons) MiG-23 BN Soviet Union Fighters 2 (four squadrons) MiG—21F Soviet Union MiG-21bis Soviet Union MiG— 23MF Soviet Union MiG-29 Soviet Union Attack helicopters Mi-8 and Mi-17 Soviet Union Mi-24 Soviet Union Mi-25 Soviet Union Antisubmarine warfare Mi-14 helicopters Soviet Union Transport (four squadrons) An-2 Soviet Union An-24 Soviet Union An-26 Soviet Union An-30 Soviet Union An-32 Soviet Union Yak-40 Soviet Union 11-76 (Air Force aircraft in civilian markings) Soviet Union Helicopters Mi-8/-l 7 Soviet Union Training L-39C Albatros Soviet Union MiG—15 Soviet Union MiG-21U Soviet Union MiG-23U Soviet Union MiG-29UB Soviet Union Z-326 Soviet Union Missiles Antisubmarine missiles AS-7 Soviet Union Antiaircraft missiles AA-2, AA-7, AA-8, AA-10, AA-1 1 Soviet Union Surface-to-air missiles Active SA-2, SA-3 sites Soviet Union Civil Airline Aircraft used as troop transports 11-62 Soviet Union 1 15 1 2 4 2 40 25 30 8 4 2 20 13 10 388 Table 20. (Continued) Major Air Force Equipment, 1999 Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory Tu-154 Soviet Union 7 Yak-42 Soviet Union 12 An-30 Soviet Union 1 Most aircraft are in storage for lack of spare parts and as a cost-saving measure. 2 The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that probably only about three MiG- 29, ten MiG-23, and five MiG-21bis are in operation. 3 n.a. — not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1999-2000, London, 1999, 229; and "The 1999-2000 World Defence Almanac," Military Technology [Bonn], 24, No. 1, 2000, 51. 389 Cuba: A Country Study Table 21. Major Naval Equipment, 1999 1 Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory Navy Submarines Foxtrot with 533mm and 406mm torpedo tube (nonoperational) Soviet Union 1 Frigates -Koni-class with two antisubmarine warfare rocket launchers (nonoperational) Soviet Union 2 Patrol and coastal combatants missile craft Osa I/II with four SSN-2 Styx surface-to- surface missiles Soviet Union 4 Pauk II fast patrol craft with two anti- submarine warfare rocket launchers and four anti-submarine torpedo tubes Soviet Union 1 Mine countermeasures Sonya coastal minesweeper Soviet Union 2 Yevgenya inshore minesweeper Soviet Union 4 Support and miscellaneous intelligence collection vessel n.a. 2 1 survey n.a. 1 Naval Infantry Artillery 122mm M-1931/37 n.a. n.a. 130mm M-46 n.a. n.a. 152mm M-1937 n.a. n.a. Surface-to-surface missiles SS-C-3 systems n.a. n.a. Mobile Bandera IV n.a. n.a. Naval Aviation Ka-28s Soviet Union 4 Mi-4s Soviet Union 4 MiG-29 Soviet Union 6 1 The Cuban Navy is no longer an operational force. 2 n.a. — not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance. 1999-2000, London, 1999, 229; and "The 1999-2000 World Defence Almanac," Military Technology [Bonn], 24, No. 1,2000, 50. 390 Bibliography Chapter 1 Aguila,Juan del. Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution. Colorado: West- view Press, 1984. Aguilar, Luis E. Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution. Ithaca: Cor- nell University Press, 1972. Barrera, Elsa. Reajustes y reformas en la economia cubana, 1994. Series: Dossier. Havana: Centro de Estudios sobre America, Seccion de Informacion Cientinca, 1995. Batista, Fulgencio. The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic. New York: Devin-Adair, 1964. Benglesdorf, Carollee. The Problem of Democracy in Cuba: Between Vision and Reality. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Benjamin, Jules R. 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