area handbook series Sri Lanka a country study A,. Sri Lanka country study Federal Research Division Library of Congress Edited by Russell R. Ross and Andrea Matles Savada Research Completed October 1988 On the cover: Ruwanveli Dagoba, Buddhist shrine built by Dutthagamani, near Anuradhapura Second Edition, First Printing, 1990. Copyright ®1990 United States Government as represented by the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sri Lanka: A Country Study. Area handbook series, DA pam 550-96 Research completed October 1988. Bibliography: pp. 281-300. Includes index. 1. Sri Lanka. I. Ross, Russell R., 1935- . II. Savada, Andrea Matles, 1950- . III. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. IV. Series. V. Series: Area handbook series. DS489.S68 1990 954.93 89-600370 Headquarters, Department of the Army DA Pam 550-96 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Foreword This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The last page of this book lists the other published studies. Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and political order. The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- comed for use in future editions. Louis R. Mortimer Acting Chief Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540 111 Acknowledgments This edition supercedes the Area Handbook for Sri Lanka written by Richard F. Nyrop, et alia, in 1970. Some parts of that edition have been used in the preparation of the current book, and the authors of Sri Lanka: A Country Study are grateful for the seminal work done by the earlier edition's authors. The authors also wish to thank various members of the staff of the Embassy of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in Washington, D.C. for their assistance. Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book. Richard F. Nyrop made helpful suggestions during his review of all parts of the book. Elizabeth A. Park prepared the telecommu- nication sections in chapters 3 and 4; Robert L. Worden researched the data used in preparing maps for the book; Carolina E. Forrester checked the content of all of the maps and reviewed the text of the section on geography; and Arvies J. Staton contributed to the figures on military ranks and insignia. David P. Cabitto, Kimberly Lord, and Paulette Marshall did the illustrations; and David P. Cabitto, Sandra K. Ferrell, and Kimberly Lord prepared the graphics. Martha E. Hopkins edited portions of the manuscript and managed editing of the book; Marilyn L. Majeska edited portions of the manuscript and managed production; and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson performed word processing. Others who contributed were Harriet R. Blood, who assisted in the preparation of maps; Mimi Cantwell, Richard Kollodge, Ruth Nieland, and Gage Ricard, who edited portions of the manu- script; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed final prepublica- tion editorial review, and Shirley Kessel of Communications Connection, who prepared the index. Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congess Composing Unit prepared camera- ready copy, under the direction of Peggy Pixley. The inclusion of photographs in this book was made possible by the generosity of various individ- uals and public and private agencies. Contents Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Country Profile XV Introduction XXV Chapter 1. Historical Setting l Peter R. Blood ORIGINS 5 Ancient Legends and Chronicles 6 The Impact of Buddhism 7 THE CLASSICAL AGE, 200 B.C.-A.D. 1200 8 Early Settlements 8 Rise of Sinhalese and Tamil Ethnic Awareness 11 DECLINE OF THE SINHALESE KINGDOM, 1200-1500 . . 16 Sinhalese Migration to the South 16 A Weakened State: Invasion, Disease, and Social Instability 16 EUROPEAN ENCROACHMENT AND DOMINANCE, 1500-1948 17 The Portuguese 17 The Dutch 22 The British 24 INDEPENDENCE 40 Divisions in the Body Politic 41 United National Party "Majority" Rule, 1948-56 ... 41 Emergence of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 43 Tamil Politics 44 Sri Lanka Freedom Party Rule, 1956-65 45 The United National Party Regains Power, 1965-70 . 48 United Front Rule and Emerging Violence, 1970-77 . 49 The United National Party Returns to Power 51 Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 57 James Heitzman THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 61 Geology 61 vii Topography 61 Climate 64 Ecological Zones 65 Land Use and Settlement Patterns 67 PEOPLE 68 Population 68 Ethnic Groups 72 Ethnic Group Relations 78 SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 80 Caste 80 Family 86 RELIGION 89 Buddhism 89 Hinduism 95 Islam 99 Christianity 101 SOCIAL SERVICES 102 Education 102 Health 108 Living Conditions 110 Chapter 3. The Economy 117 John D. Rogers NATURE OF THE ECONOMY 120 Structure of the Economy 120 Role of Government 121 Development Planning 124 The Economy in the Late 1980s 125 AGRICULTURE 126 Changing Patterns 126 Land Use 129 Government Policies 130 Land Tenure 133 Cropping Pattern 134 INDUSTRY 137 Changing Patterns 138 Industrial Policies 138 Manufacturing 140 Construction 142 Mining 143 ENERGY 143 TRANSPORTATION 145 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 148 viii LABOR 149 Characteristics and Occupational Distribution 149 Government Labor Policies 150 Working Conditions 151 Labor Relations 154 TRADE 156 Internal Trade 156 External Trade 157 Foreign Exchange System 160 External Debt 161 FINANCE 162 Budgetary Process, Revenues, and Expenditures .... 162 Foreign Aid 166 Fiscal Administration 166 Monetary Process 167 TOURISM 169 Chapter 4. Government and Politics 173 Donald M. Seekins POLITICS AND SOCIETY 177 Race, Religion, and Politics 177 The Sinhalese: Racial Uniqueness and Politicized Buddhism 180 Tamil Exclusivism 182 THE 1978 CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 182 Historical Perspective, 1802-1978 183 Government Institutions 185 Presidency and Parliament 186 Local Government 188 Electoral System 189 Judiciary 191 Civil Service 192 THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM 193 Sinhalese Parties 194 Tamil United Liberation Front 197 Other Parties 198 Electoral Performance 199 THE EMERGENCE OF EXTREMIST GROUPS 199 Tamil Alienation 201 Tamil Militant Groups 203 FOREIGN RELATIONS 213 Relations with Western States 215 The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and Foreign Relations . . 215 ix Chapter 5. National Security 217 Robert J. Levy PRIMARY THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 221 The Tamil Insurgency 221 The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 226 THE ARMED FORCES 230 Historical Background 231 Structure and Administration of the Armed Forces . . . 236 Foreign Military Relations 248 Foreign Military Presence 250 The Defense Budget 251 NATIONAL POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES ... 252 Organization 252 Strength 253 Equipment and Training 254 The Home Guard 254 THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 255 Criminal Justice and the Effects of Insurgency 255 The Penal Code 257 Criminal Procedure and the Structure of the Courts . . 258 Rules of Search, Arrest, and Detention 260 Executive Powers of Pardon and Commutation 261 Penal Institutions and Trends in the Prison Population 261 Drug Abuse and Drug Legislation 263 Appendix A. Tables 267 Appendix B. Political Parties and Groups 277 Bibliography 281 Glossary 30 1 Index 305 List of Figures 1 Administrative Divisions of Sri Lanka, 1988 xxiv 2 The Early Kingdoms of Sri Lanka, Third Century B.C.- Eighteenth Century A.D 14 3 Topography and Drainage, 1988 62 4 Precipitation and Irrigation 66 5 Distribution of Population, 1985 70 6 Ethnolinguistic Groups and Religions, 1988 74 7 Accelerated Mahaweli Program, 1988 128 8 Agriculture and Land Use, 1988 132 x 9 Industry, Mining, and Power, 1988 144 10 Transportation System, 1988 146 11 The Structure of Government, 1987 190 12 Enlisted Rank Insignia, 1988 244 13 Officer Rank Insignia, 1988 246 XI Preface SRI LANKA: A COUNTRY STUDY replaces the edition of this work published in 1982. Like its predecessor, this study attempts to treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic, and military aspects of Sri Lankan society. Cen- tral to the study of contemporary Sri Lanka is the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, its history, ramifications, and the toll it has taken on the country. For all intents and purposes, the national capital of Sri Lanka is Colombo — the site of its government ministries and foreign embassies. In 1982, however, a new parliamentary complex opened in Sri Jayewardenepura, Kotte, a suburb of Colombo, and the ad- ministrative capital was moved there. Sources of information included books, scholarly journals, foreign and domestic newspapers, and numerous periodicals. Chapter bib- liographies appear at the end of the book, and brief comments on some of the more valuable sources recommended for further read- ing appear at the end of each chapter. A Glossary also is included. Contemporary place names used in this book are those approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names. Measurements are given in the metric system, and a conversion table is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric measure- ments (see table 1, Appendix A). xiii Country Profile Country Formal Name: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Short Form: Sri Lanka (formerly known as Ceylon). Term for Citizens: Sri Lankan(s). Capital: Colombo, located on the southwestern coast. Administrative Capital: Sri Jayewardenepura since 1982. Geography Size: Pear-shaped island 29 kilometers off southeastern coast of India; total area 65,610 square kilometers, of which land area 64,740 square kilometers. xv Topography: Irregular, dissected, central massif dominates south; highest elevation Pidurutalagala (2,524 meters) but better-known mountain Adam's Peak (2,243 meters), destination of interfaith pilgrimages. Coastal belt (less than 100 meters elevation) succeeded by rolling plains (100-500 meters elevation) of varying width extends from seashore to foothills of central massif. In northern half of island, topography falls away to rolling plain, relieved only by isolated ridges. Rivers extend radially from central massif to coast; longest Mahaweli Ganga (860 kilometers), which flows in northeasterly direction. About 40 percent of island forested. Coast- line regular but indented by numerous lagoons and marked by sandy beaches. Climate: Equatorial and tropical influenced by elevation above sea level, but marked by only slight diurnal and seasonal variations; temperature in Colombo (at sea level) varies from 25°C to 28°C, and in central massif (site of highest elevations) 14°C to 16°C. Sub- ject to southwest monsoon from mid-May to October and north- east monsoon December to March. Rainfall uneven; divides country climatically into wet zone comprising southwestern quarter and dry zone on remainder of island. Annual precipitation in wet zone averages 250 centimeters; in dry zone precipitation varies from 120 to 190 centimeters. Society Population: 14,846,750 (according to 1981 census); 16,639,695 (estimated 1988). Average annual growth rate 1 .6 percent; average life expectancy 67.5 years (males 66 years, females 69 years); gender ratio 103.7 males to 100 females. Ethnic Groups: Sinhalese 74 percent; Tamil 18 percent; Moor (Muslims) 7 percent; others (Burghers, Eurasians, Malay, Veddha) 1 percent. Largest ethnic group divided into low-country Sinhalese (subjected in coastal areas to greater colonial acculturation) and Kandyan Sinhalese (more traditional upland dwellers, named after Kingdom of Kandy, which resisted European encroachments until 1815-18). Tamils divided into Sri Lankan Tamils (on island since early historic times) and Indian Tamils (brought in as plantation labor in the nineteenth century). Languages: Sinhalese speak Sinhala (official language); Tamils speak Tamil (equal with Sinhala as official language since July 29, 1987); English spoken in government and educated circles by about 10 percent of population. xvi Education and Literacy: Schooling organized in four levels: primary (six years), junior secondary (five years), senior secondary (two years), and tertiary (at least two years). Education compulsory to age thirteen, free in government schools, and fee paid in private institutions. Number of students enrolled (1986) about 3.75 mil- lion (government) and 101,000 (private). Government expendi- ture on education (1986) about 3.6 million rupees (see Glossary). Overall literacy (over age 10) about 87 percent. Religion: Theravada Buddhist, 69 percent; Hindu, 15 percent; Christian, 8 percent; Muslim, 8 percent. Sinhalese generally Bud- dhist; Tamils Hindu; Burghers, Eurasians, and minority of Sinhalese and Tamils profess Christianity; Moors adherents of Islam. Health and Welfare: Nationwide health care system, including maternity services provided by government, but facilities and per- sonnel overtaxed, supplies and equipment lacking; medical infra- structure consists of more than 3,000 Western-trained physicians, 8,600 nurses, 338 central dispensaries, and 490 hospitals of all types. Smallpox eradicated; incidence of malaria declining; unsanitary conditions and lack of clean water major cause of gastroenteritis among adults and infants. Death rate declined from 6.6 to 6.1 per 1,000 in decade from mid-1970s to mid-1980s; infant mortality declined from 50 to 34 deaths per 1 ,000 in decade from early 1970s to early 1980s. Traditional medicine (ayurveda), supported by government, enjoys great credibility. Economy Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In mid-1980s, GDP rose incrementally at current and constant factor costs in spite of insur- gency and domestic turmoil. Gross national product (GNP) increased from US$5.48 billion (US$349 per capita) in 1984 to US$5.71 billion (US$354 per capita) in 1986. GDP went from US$5.57 billion in 1984 to US$5.84 billion in 1986, with additional increase to US$6.08 billion (subject to revision) in 1987 and projected US$6.27 billion in 1988. Real (constant) growth rate dipped from 5.1 percent in 1984 to 4.3 percent in 1986, with a further estimated 1.5 percent decline for 1987. Reversal of trend expected in 1988, with increase to 3.5 percent growth. Agriculture: Including forestry and fishing, agriculture accounted for slightiy over 25 percent of GDP in 1982-86, but occupied nearly half of labor force during same period. Wet rice (paddy) main sub- sistence crop with two harvests a year; paddy hectareage and xvn production have risen steadily since 1977; reached about 900,000 hectares under cultivation and 2.6 million tons harvested in 1986, making country about 75 percent self-sufficient in rice production. Principal commercial crops tea, rubber, and coconuts; tea produc- tion in the 1980s varied between 180 and 210 million kilograms annually; rubber production remained constant at about 140 mil- lion kilograms annually since 1983; coconut production rose by about 10 percent a year in 1980s, reaching a peak of slightly over 3 million nuts in 1986. Production of all crops dealt setback by drought in 1987, with recovery expected in 1988. Industry: Contributes somewhat over 15 percent of GDP and occupies nearly 30 percent of labor force; major industrial output consumer goods, especially garments and textiles, and processed agriculture commodities. State plays major role in manufacturing sector, controlling some twenty large-scale enterprises and about fifty corporations; government committed to expanding role of pri- vate sector in developing nontraditional exports, import substitutes, and employment opportunities. Energy: Firewood traditional source, accounts for 60 to 70 per- cent of energy consumption; main commercial/industrial sources hydroelectric and thermal power; installed capacity in 1986 slightly over a thousand megawatts. Accelerated Mahaweli Program, when completed, expected to provide extra 450 megawatts of power and render nation self-sufficient in energy production. Services: Accounts for about 15.7 percent of labor force. Active tourism sector slumped badly because of widespread unrest in country after 1983. Imports: Equivalent to US$1.95 billion in 1986. Major imported commodities include petroleum products, machinery, transporta- tion equipment, food (including rice, wheat, flour, sugar), fertilizer, yarn, and textiles. Principal trading partners Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Imports from United States dominated by wheat, machinery, and equipment. Exports: Equivalent to approximately US$1.22 billion in 1986; major exported goods ready-made clothing and processed agricul- tural commodities such as tea, rubber, coconuts, and spices. Dominant trading partner throughout 1980s the United States, which took US$350 million worth of goods in 1987, or fully 25 per- cent of all Sri Lankan exports. Balance of Payments: Negative balance of payments throughout 1980s, but chronic trade deficit partially offset by foreign aid and xvm remittances from abroad. Current account balance amounted to minus US$425 million for 1986, with minus US$357 million esti- mated for 1987. Total external debt for 1986 amounted to US$412 billion, with debt service ratio about 18.4 percent. Exchange Rate: For five-year period ending in mid- 1988, exchange rate of Sri Lankan rupee fluctuated, on average, less than ten per- cent annually against value of United States dollar. Most precipi- tous decline occurred from 1987 to 1988, when value of rupee fell from 26 (free rate) or 28.93 (official rate) to 32.58 (free rate) or 32.32 (official rate) per dollar. Transportation and Communications Railroads: Government owned; about 1,944 kilometers of track; network extends radially from Colombo to northern, eastern, and southern coastal cities; service to northern and eastern areas erratic because of domestic unrest. Roads: Total approximately 75,000 kilometers; paved (bituminous) about 25,500 kilometers; 478,000 registered vehicles in mid-1980s. Waterways: About 430 kilometers of rivers and canals navigable by shallow draft vessels. Ports: Deep water ports at Colombo, Trincomalee, and Galle, latter two underutilized; government shipping corporation possessed eight freighters and two tankers in late 1980s. Airfields: Fourteen, of which twelve usable in late 1980s, eleven having permanent surface runways, one (Bandaranaike Inter- national Airport at Katunayaka) with runway more than 2,500 meters. Telecommunications: International service provided by satellite earth station and submarine cable; international telephone, telex, and direct dialing in operation; about 106,500 telephones nation- wide; about 29 radio stations, 24 of which are AM, at least 5 are FM) in operation, with more than 2 million registered receivers in use; 2 television networks broadcast over 4 channels; 350,000 television sets nationwide. Government and Politics Government: Constitution of September 7, 1978, guarantees fun- damental rights of thought, conscience, and worship and estab- lished unitary state with strong executive power. President, elected directly for six-year term, serves as chief of state and government xix and appoints cabinet of ministers; October 1982 presidential elec- tion won by incumbent Junius R. ("J.R.") Jayewardene of United National Party (UNP), who received 52.9 percent of vote. Legis- lature consists of 196-member unicameral Parliament having power to pass laws by simple majority and amend Constitution by two- thirds majority. Parliamentary members, chosen by universal suffrage from electoral constituencies corresponding generally to administrative districts, serve six-year terms. Below national level, popularly elected provincial councils established in seven of nine provinces in 1988. Until provincial councils fully operational, basic administrative subdivision remains district governed by council of elected and appointed members, presided over by district minister, who serves concurrently in Parliament. At lowest governmental echelon, administrative functions carried out by popularly elected urban, municipal, town, and village councils. In rural areas, village councils exercise governance over 90 percent of nation's territory. Politics: UNP headed by President Jayewardene, in power since 1977, retained over two-thirds majority in Parliament and won provincial council elections in 1988. Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), left-of-center, alternated in power with UNP since indepen- dence, but boycotted 1988 provincial council elections, and sur- rendered place as principal opposition group to newly formed United Socialist Alliance (USA), which finished second in elections. USA consisted of four left-of-center parties: Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL), Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka Sama Samaja Party — LSSP), New Equal Society Party (Nava Sama Samaja Party— NSSP), and Sri Lanka People's Party (SLPP— Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya). Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) only minor party to gain seats in provincial council elec- tions. Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) principal Tamil party, advocates separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka, but not represented in Parliament since 1983. People's Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna — J VP), formally proscribed, in armed opposition to government. Administrative Divisions: Nine provinces (Northern and Eastern provinces may be combined into a single province in 1989); twenty- four administrative districts. Legal System: 1978 Constitution guarantees independence of judiciary. Legal system based on British common law, Roman- Dutch (Napoleonic) law, and customary practices of Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims. Supreme Court, highest court in nation, has chief justice and between six and ten associate justices appointed xx by president. Country divided into five judicial circuits, subdivided into districts with district courts and divisions with magistrates' courts. Lowest courts are conciliation boards with responsibility for minor criminal and civil cases. International Memberships: Asian Development Bank, Colombo Plan, Commonwealth of Nations, Group of 77, Intelsat, Interpol, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Nonaligned Movement, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, United Nations and special- ized agencies, World Federation of Trade Unions. National Security Armed Forces: Total strength about 48,000 personnel, including reservists on active duty. President serves as commander in chief and defense minister. Minister of national security reports to presi- dent, serves as deputy defense minister, presides over Joint Oper- ations Command, which exercises overall responsibility for government counterinsurgency and counterterrorist effort. Chain of command extends downward to individual service commanders, deputy commanders, and chiefs of staff. Army: Total strength including reservists on active duty, up to 40,000 personnel. Major tactical units five infantry brigade-sized task forces, each with three battalions. Other formations include one or two battalion-sized reconnaissance regiments, plus artillery, engineer, signals, and logistical units. In 1988 army reorganized territorially with individual battalions assigned to each of twenty- one sectors, corresponding generally to administrative districts; sec- tors grouped into two area commands: Division One for southern half of country, Division Two for northern half. Following Indo- Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987, army deployed against Tamil insurgents in Mannar and Vavuniya Districts, Northern Province, and against J VP terrorists in Southern Province. Military equip- ment includes small arms of Chinese, Singapore, Pakistani, and Western origin; armored cars and armored personnel carriers of British, South African, and domestic manufacture; mortars and light-to-medium-artillery pieces from Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Navy: Total strength, including reservists on active duty, about 4,000 to 6,000 personnel. Service organized administratively into three naval area commands: Northern, Eastern, and Western (a fourth, Southern, to be established), with main naval base at Trincomalee, smaller installations at Karainagar, Tangalla, and Kalpitiya, major facility under construction at Galle. In 1988 xxi principal naval mission patrol of " surveillance zone" in Palk Strait to prevent gun-running by Tamil insurgents between India and Sri Lanka; other naval tasks include enforcement of Sri Lankan Exclusive Economic Zone. Total inventory fifty-five vessels; major surface combatants six command ships (used as tenders for patrol vessels in "surveillance zone"); other ships include Cougar patrol craft and amphibious vessels from Britain, Dvora and Super Dvora craft from Israel, plus locally manufactured and older patrol boats from China and the Soviet Union; additional ships under construc- tion in Republic of Korea (South Korea). Air Force: Total strength, including reservists on active duty, about 3,700 personnel deployed at 3 large and 9 smaller airbases country- wide. Principal air force missions tactical air support for ground operations, military airlift, and medical evacuation. Organization and inventory include one counterinsurgency squadron with Italian SIAI Marchetti SF-260TP light trainer aircraft, one helicopter squadron with United States Bell models 212, 412, and Jet Ranger, and French SA-365 Dauphin-IIs rotary wing aircraft; one trans- port squadron with Chinese Yun-8 and Yun-12 turboprops, plus assorted older aircraft, including United States DC-3s (C-47s) and an Indian HS-748; and one trainer squadron of light aircraft, including United States Cessnas. Paramilitary Forces: Sri Lankan National Police, total strength 21,000 to 28,000 personnel, organized territorially into three "ranges," subdivided into divisions, districts, and police stations; includes National Intelligence Bureau and Police Special Force (formerly Special Task Force), latter comprising 1,100 personnel organized into one oversize battalion of seven companies, with units deployed against J VP terrorists in Southern Province, or serving in rotation as presidential security guard. Foreign Military Presence: Prior to Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987, small number of Pakistani, Israeli, and retired British mili- tary advisers. Since August 1987 Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), reported strength 70,000 personnel, organized into 15 brigades, plus supporting units, deployed against Tamil insurgents in Northern and Eastern provinces. Defense Expenditures: Increased from less than 1 percent of GDP in early 1980s to over 5 percent in 1987 because of Tamil insur- gency, but levelled off following Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. In 1987 expenditures, including supplemental appropriations, amounted to US$408 million or about 5.4 percent of GDP. Projected defense ex- penditures for 1988 expected to decline somewhat to US$340 million. xxn Internal Security: Insurgent movement known generically as Tamil Tigers, active since about 1975, fighting for independent state in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka; total estimated strength 5,000 combatants; most prominent insurgent group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); other groups include People's Libera- tion Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT or PLOTE), Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). Separate terrorist movement, known as J VP, composed of Sinhalese chauvinists, estimated strength several hundred, opposed to Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, active in Southern Province. xxm Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Sri Lanka, 1988 xxiv Introduction SRI LANKA WAS NOT IMMUNE to the spirit of the global and monumental change that swept the world in the late 1980s, promis- ing to usher in a new international order in the 1990s. Indeed, at this writing events on the troubled island nation somehow seemed more under control than they had been in the immediate past. Yet Sri Lanka still had to cope with many of the same daunting and unresolved security problems that it faced in 1983, when a vicious separatist war broke out in the north — a situation later aggravated by an altogether different but equally debilitating insurrection in the south. Sri Lanka's descent into violence was especially disturbing because for many years the nation was considered a model of democracy in the Third World. A nation with one of the world's lowest per capita incomes, Sri Lanka nevertheless had a nascent but thriving free-market economy that supported one of the most extensive and respected education systems among developing coun- tries. Sadly, in 1990 the recollection of a peaceful and prosperous Sri Lanka seemed a distant memory. Prospects for an enduring peace, however remote, lingered as the new decade began. On February 4, 1990, as Sri Lanka cele- brated its forty-second Independence Day, the president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, who had assumed power a little over one year before, once again appealed direcdy to the island nation's more than 16 million people for an end to the long-standing communally based friction between the majority Sinhalese and the largest ethnic minority group, the Sri Lankan Tamils. He also pleaded for a cessa- tion of the internecine struggle among competing groups within the Tamil community and of the open warfare by Sinhalese extremists against the government. The collective strife on the island nation, according to international human rights groups, had over the previous year alone taken as many as 20,000 lives and over the span of a decade killed thousands more. The economy was crippled, the democratic values of the country threatened, and the national memory scarred. Soothsayers had characterized Premadasa' s assumption of power in early 1989 as auspicious. Sri Lanka needed a person of stature and vision to guide the country in its healing process. Many thought Premadasa could fill that role. For the first time since indepen- dence, Sri Lanka had a leader who did not belong to the island's high-born Sinhalese Buddhist caste, the Goyigama. Premadasa xxv came instead from more humble origins and was viewed by many Sri Lankans as more accessible than his predecessor, Junius Richard (J.R.) Jayewardene, under whom he had served as prime minister for ten years. One of Premadasa's first actions on assuming office in January 1989 was to lift the five-and-a-half-year state of emer- gency declared by his predecessor. Six months later, Premadasa was praised by both the Tamils and the Sinhalese for his unyield- ing opposition to the presence of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), a military contingent sent into Sri Lanka in 1987 after an agreement between former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene. The IPKF, originally a small force tasked with performing a police action to disarm Tamil separatists in the north, became increasingly entangled in the ethnic struggle and guerrilla insurrection and had grown at one point to as many as 70,000 troops. By mid- 1989 Premadasa was demanding from a sullen India the quick withdrawal of the remaining 45,000 Indian soldiers then on the island. Considering the resentment most Sri Lankans — both Sinhalese and Tamil — had by then developed toward India, the entreaty was both popular and politically expedient. Yet, having to rely on the Sri Lankan military's questionable ability to control the island's mercurial political milieu was a calculated gamble. Still, in June 1989, hopes soared as delicate negotiations were initiated between the government and the most powerful of the Tamil separatist groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). But by then Premadasa was faced with more immediate challenges. A spate of assassinations in the south and a nationwide transpor- tation strike were orchestrated by Sinhalese extremists who had been in the forefront of political agitation against the presence of Indian troops on the island and also against any concessions the government made to Tamil demands for increased autonomy. Premadasa was forced to take urgent action, and he reimposed a national state of emergency, giving his security forces new and draconian powers of enforcement. As bickering between the Sri Lankan and Indian governments over a timetable for the Indian troop withdrawal continued, the Sri Lankan government unleashed a brutal campaign against the Sinhalese extremists. Reports of "death squads" composed of army and police officers who in their zealous pursuit of the subversives also claimed the lives of many innocent victims attracted the attention and ire of Amnesty Inter- national and other international human rights groups. In late March 1990, India withdrew its last troops from Sri Lanka, thereby ending its much maligned three-year period of for- eign entanglement, which had inflamed rather than defused the xxvi island's communal and political passions. The pullout created a power vacuum in the island's Tamil-dominated Northeastern Province that was expected to be filled by the resurgent Tamil Tigers. The Tamil Tigers, represented by their own political party, the People's Front of the Liberation Tigers — cautiously recognized by the government — were expected to combine political as well as military pressure against the rival Tamil groups favored by the Indians. Without waiting for the completion of the Indian depar- ture, the Tamil Tigers already were reasserting their control, waging a vigorous and thus far successful military offensive against the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, which headed the provincial government, and several secondary Tamil politico- military groups and their allied militia — the India-armed and trained Tamil National Army. Politically, their prestige enhanced by a reputation honed by their prolonged and skillful combat against the Indians, and what they called their Tamil "quislings," the feared Tamil Tigers were in a good position to win the elections for the Northeastern Provincial Council to be held later in 1990. In their dialog with the government, the Tamil Tigers no longer emphasized full secession and seemed instead to be more intent, in the absence of their Indian adversaries, on consolidating their military and political power over rival Tamil groups. The govern- ment, aware that the Tamil Tigers had not formally renounced the concept of a separate Tamil state, however, realized that the hiatus in fighting could end in renewed fighting and in what could ultimately be the "Lebanization" of the country. What went so tragically wrong for the beautiful island sometimes referred to as Shangri-la? The answer is elusive and can only partly be explained by the duress experienced by a multifaceted tradi- tional culture undergoing rapid change in an environment restrained by limited resources. A close reckoning also would have to be made of the island's troubled past — both ancient and recent. Sri Lanka claims the world's second-oldest continuous written history — a history that chronicles the intermittent hostility between two peoples — the Indo- Aryan Sinhalese or "People of the Lion," who arrived from northern India around 500 B.C. to establish mag- nificent Buddhist kingdoms on the north-central plains, and the Tamils of Dravidian stock, who arrived a few centuries later from southern India. The Tamil symbol became the tiger, and during one brief juncture in the island's history during the tenth century, Sri Lanka was ruled as a province by the Tamil Chola dynasty in southern India. The ancient linkage of northern Sri Lanka with the Tamil kingdoms of southern India has not been forgotten by today's Sinhalese, who cite as a modern embodiment of the xxvn historical threat of Tamil migration, the proximity of India's southern Tamil Nadu state and its 55 million Tamils — a source of psychological and military support for Tamil separatists on the island. In the sixteenth century, the island was colonized by the Por- tuguese, later to be followed by the Dutch, and finally, and most significantly, the British in the late eighteenth century. The Brit- ish succeeded in uniting the island, which they called Ceylon. They established and then broadened a colonial education system cen- tered in British liberalism and democratic values, which would even- tually groom the generation of native leaders who had successfully lobbied for independence. The British favored the Tamils some- what over the Sinhalese, enabling them to take better advantage of what educational and civil service opportunities were available. By the time independence was attained in 1948, a body of able Sri Lankans, pooled from both the Sinhalese and Tamil elites, was ready to take control from the British in a peaceful and well- orchestrated transfer of power. In its early post-independence years, Sri Lanka was fortunate to be led by Don Stephen Senanayake. He was a Sinhalese who was leader of the United National Party (UNP), an umbrella party of disparate political groups formed during the pre-independence years and one of the two political parties that has since dominated Sri Lankan politics. Senanayake was a man scrupulously even- handed in his approach to ethnic representation, but his vision of communal harmony survived only for a short time after his death in 1952. He was succeeded briefly by two UNP successors, one of whom was his son Dudley. In 1956 control of the government went to the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by Solomon West Ridgeway Dias (S.W.R.D.) Bandaranaike, who be- came the island's fourth prime minister after winning an emotion- ally charged election. The 1956 election marked the first instance of serious communal disharmony since independence and presaged the troubled years to come. Symbolically, the election coincided with the 2,500th anni- versary of the death of the Buddha and also that of the arrival of Vijaya — the legendary founder of the Sinhalese people — on the island. Emotions became dangerously overwrought because Bandaranaike ran primarily on a "Sinhala Only" platform, which decreed that the language of the Sinhalese would be the only offi- cial language, with both English and Tamil branded as cultural imports. Bandaranaike also proclaimed that he would restore Bud- dhism to its historically elevated place in Sri Lankan society. The argument can be made that the 1956 election and its attendant xxvin emotionalism marked the beginning of the great division between what have become two completely separate and mutually hostile political systems in Sri Lanka, one Sinhalese and Buddhist, the other Tamil and Hindu. Post-election emotions escalated, and it was not long before tragedy followed. In 1958 an anti-Tamil rumor was all that was needed to trigger nationwide riots in which hundreds of people, most of whom were Tamils, died. The riots marked the first major episode of communal violence after indepen- dence and left a deep psychological rift between the two major ethnic groups. In the years after the death of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1959, the SLFP has been headed by his widow Sirimavo, who led her left of center party to victory in the election of 1 960 and again in 1970. Popularly regarded as a woman with a mandate to carry on her husband's legacy, she was esteemed by many Sinhalese who heeded her political guidance even when she was out of power. While in office, she vigorously enforced legislation such as the Offi- cial Language Act, which openly placed Sinhalese interests over Tamil, further dividing the body politic. During Bandaranaike' s last tenure in power, from 1970 to 1977, the deteriorating security situation on the island intensified. In 1971 her new government sanctioned university admissions regulations that were openly preju- dicial to Tamils. In the following year, she promulgated a new con- stitution that declared Sri Lanka a republic, but that was notorious for its lack of protection for minorities. In 1972 a serious new threat to the stability of the island appeared. Established in the late 1960s, the People's Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna — J VP), a violent movement alternatively described as Maoist and Trokskyite but one indisputably chauvinist in its championship of Sinhalese values, launched its first major offensive in 1972. The J VP attempted a blitzkrieg operation to take over the country within twenty-four hours; it was suppressed only after considerable fighting during a protracted state of emergency declared by the government. In the late 1980s, an invigorated J VP would arise and gather strength from the anti-Indian sentiment that followed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and the arrival of Indian troops in 1987. In 1977 the UNP, led by J.R. Jayewardene, easily defeated Bandaranaike, whose Common Programme with its loosely admin- istered socialist politics had proven so injurious to the economy. Declaring that his government would inaugurate an era of dharmishta, or righteous society, Jayewardene crafted a new con- stitution the following year, changing the previous Westminster- style parliamentary government to a new presidential system xxix modeled after that of France. The 1978 Constitution, unlike its predecessor, made substantial concessions to Tamil sensitivities. The most blatant excesses of the Bandaranaike government were stopped, especially the discriminatory university admissions criteria aimed at Tamils and the refusal to give Tamil national language status. Yet these measures appeared to be a classical case of too little too late. The political disillusionment of Tamil youth, which had grown during the Bandaranaike years, continued unabated, and the separatist call for a Tamil Eelam, or "Precious Land," became increasingly accompanied by attacks on government targets. Jayewardene, widely admired as one of the most learned leaders in South Asia, nevertheless was criticized for his inability — or reluctance — to recognize the disturbances in Sri Lanka as some- thing more profound than merely a law and order problem. In 1979 with communal unrest growing steadily worse, his government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, at first a temporary, but later a permanent, piece of legislation that gave unbridled powers of search and arrest to the police and military. Government abuses soon followed, attracting the harsh scrutiny and condemnation of international human rights organizations. In time, Jayewardene was forced to broaden his assessment of the deteriorating security situation, and he initiated a series of negotiations on increased autonomy with the major Tamil political organization on the island, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). While the TULF and the government pressed for a conference of all appropriate bodies — a peace forum to represent all the religious and ethnic groups in the country — the Tamil Tigers escalated their terrorist attacks, provok- ing a Sinhalese backlash against Tamils and precluding any suc- cessful accommodation resulting from the talks. Thereafter, the talks took place intermittently and at best with only partial representa- tion between representatives of the heterogeneous Tamil commu- nity and the government. Important opportunities for a constructive dialog on Tamil and Sinhalese concerns continued to be missed as negotiators, driven by events seemingly beyond their control, hardened their positions. Under steady pressure from Tamil extremists and in their abhor- rence of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the moderate Tamil political organizations, notably the TULF, decided to boycott the 1982 presidential election. When the government proposed the fol- lowing year to amend the Constitution to ban all talk of separatism, all sixteen TULF members of parliament were expelled for refus- ing to recite a loyalty oath. The government lost its vital link to mediation. The fissures in Sri Lankan society also grew wider with each new episode of communal violence. Serious rioting again broke xxx out in 1977 and 1981, but the magnitude of unrest and violence that exploded in the July 1983 riots could not have been anticipated. The riots unleashed an unprecedented wave of violence that engulfed the island and divided Sri Lankan society. The aftermath of that social conflagration was still felt in the early 1990s. The 1983 riots were in response to the ambush and killing of thirteen Sinhalese soldiers by the Tamil Tigers on the outskirts of Jaffna, the capital of Sri Lanka's Tamil-dominated Northern Province. A five-day rampage ensued, with lynchings and sum- mary executions occurring all over the island. As many as 1,000 people, mostly Tamils, were slaughtered. Carefully carried out attacks by Sinhalese rioters in possession of voter lists and addresses of Tamils suggested collusion by some members of Sri Lanka's mili- tary and security forces. Shortly after the riots Jayewardene hurriedly convened an All Party Conference, which was envisioned as a series of ongoing talks with the aim of bringing Tamils and Sinhalese together to nego- tiate a political settlement of their communal confrontation. The conference, which was first convened in January 1984, resulted in a series of proposals. These proposals, however, were rejected by several of the major Tamil opposition parties, including the TULF. In July 1985, the government, now joined by the active participation of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India, reopened a dialog with the TULF and other smaller Tamil political groups in a series of proposals and counter-proposals. Tamil demands focused on the issues of the devolution of central legislative, admin- istrative, and judicial authority. Progress in the talks soon proved illusory, however, because the moderate TULF had little credi- bility among the militants, especially the powerful Tamil Tigers, who were steadfast in their opposition to any settlement with the government short of the establishment of a Tamil Eelam. Jayewardene notified India and the TULF in 1986 that he would significantly devolve state powers, a concession he was previously unwilling to make. Jayewardene 's proposed plan offered all nine provinces substantial autonomy, with many of the central govern- ment powers pertaining to law and order, representation, and land settlement transferred to provincial councils. The proposed devolu- tion of central powers at that time fell short of meeting Tamil demands for a merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces into a single Tamil-speaking unit. Predictably, the Jayewardene Plan was attacked by Bandaranaike, who also refused to participate in the 1986 All Party Conference through which Jayewardene had hoped to achieve a national consensus. xxxi By early summer 1987 Jayewardene, sensing that Tamil Tiger guerrilla activities against the government were an insurmount- able impediment to his efforts at a negotiated peace settlement, launched a military campaign to dislodge them from their strong- hold in the north. The Sri Lankan military succeeded in wresting a good proportion of the Jaffna Peninsula from the Tamil Tigers, who then withdrew to the city of Jaffna relying on the consum- mate guerrilla tactic of using a sympathetic citizenry to insulate them from pursuing troops. When the troops continued to advance and threatened to enter the Tamil stronghold, India, pressured by its Tamil politicians, warned that it would militarily intervene to prevent them from doing so. New Delhi accused Colombo of employing starvation tactics against the people of Jaffna in its anti-Tiger military operations and demanded to be allowed to send humanitarian relief. Insulted, Sri Lanka refused the demand. In response, India sent a small flotilla of fishing vessels, carrying supplies of food and medicine. Sri Lanka's tiny but tenacious navy turned it away, however, chang- ing India's gesture into a public relations fiasco. Perhaps because of wounded pride, India sent cargo planes escorted by fighters into Sri Lanka's airspace dropping a few symbolic supplies over Jaffna. Sri Lanka, vociferously protesting that its territorial sovereignty had been violated, labeled India a regional bully. While Tamil separatists applauded India's move, most others in Sri Lanka were incensed. Relations between the two countries plummeted. Good relations with India had been of great importance to Sri Lanka since independence, but the ethnic crisis between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, which culminated in the mid-1980s, poisoned relations between the two states. India had been particu- larly strident in its accusations of alleged atrocities by the Sri Lankan security forces against the Sri Lankan Tamils and once went so far as to declare that the Sri Lankan government's "genocide" was responsible for the flight of thousands of refugees to India. Sri Lanka accused India of encouraging Tamil separatism and providing Tamil guerrillas sanctuary and training facilities in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu since the early 1980s. Jayewardene specifically leveled his public outrage at Tamil Nadu, calling the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam guerrillas a private army of the late M.G. Ramachandran, then the Tamil Nadu chief minister. Ranasinghe Premadasa, as Jayewardene 's prime minister, did not distinguish Tamil Nadu's role from that of India, calling that coun- try's alleged support of Sri Lanka's Tamil separatism the "terrorist equation." xxxn Overcoming much bitterness, both Gandhi and Jayewardene eventually agreed that a confrontational approach would never address the complicated security and bilateral issues linking the two nations. On July 29, 1987, within two months of the airdrop inci- dent, an agreement, henceforth referred to as the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, was signed between the Indian and Sri Lankan leaders with the purpose of establishing peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka. The accord was timely and politically advantageous to both leaders. Jayewardene in Colombo was increasingly perceived as isolated from the events in the north, and his instrument of influence there, the Sri Lankan military, was depicted by the international media as an ill-trained and poorly disciplined force. He agreed to a plan of devolution that would give Sri Lankan Tamils more autonomy over a newly created Northeastern Province but would at the same time safeguard Sri Lanka's unitary status. Gandhi's government, reeling from an arms scandal, was able to trumpet a foreign rela- tions victory as regional peacekeeper. Gandhi's strategy was to exer- cise India's military clout to weaken the separatist insurgency in Sri Lanka by collecting weapons from the same Tamil militant groups that it was accused of having previously trained and equipped. Furthermore, it was agreed that India would expel all Sri Lankan Tamil citizens resident in India who were found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism in Sri Lanka. To enforce this new state of cooperation between the two nations, the Indian Navy and Indian Coast Guard would assist the Sri Lankan Navy in intercepting arms from Tamil militants based in India. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord had another, lesser known aspect, the importance of which Indian officials acknowledged afterwards, which bears on India's geopolitical perception of itself as a regional superpower. India, wary of competing influence in the Indian Ocean region, insisted that the accord be accompanied by docu- ments which assured New Delhi veto power over what foreign nation could use the harbor facilities at Trincomalee in the north- east. Sri Lanka also was asked to cancel an earlier agreement with the United States that gave the Voice of America rights to expand its transmission installations on the island. New Delhi was able to obtain the agreement of the TULF, as well as some of the lesser Tamil political groups, and for a brief time the acquiescence of the powerful LTTE, for a cease-fire. Within forty-eight hours of the signing of the agreement in Colombo, the cease-fire went into effect and the first troops of the IPKF arrived in northern Sri Lanka. Yet implementation of the accord proved problematic. Rioting Sinhalese mobs, inspired by xxxin anti-accord rhetoric voiced by Bandaranaike, disrupted the capital. At the farewell ceremony for Gandhi, following the signing of the accord, in a circumstance that proved more embarrassing than dan- gerous, a Sri Lankan honor guard clubbed the Indian leader with his rifle butt. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the accord held for less than three months. By early September, violence was breaking out in Eastern Province where Sinhalese and Muslims were protesting the provisional merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces effected for the purpose of electing a single provincial council. The Sinhalese and Muslims felt that because the Northern Province was over- whelmingly Tamil, a merger of the two provinces would result in their minority status. Bandaranaike 's SLFP skillfully capitalized on this atmosphere of panic, allying itself with influential Buddhist monks, who together mounted a well publicized campaign against the government's "betrayal" of the non-Tamil population of the Eastern Province. In October 1987, the accord was repudiated outright by the LTTE following a bizarre episode in which seventeen Tamil Tigers were arrested for trying to smuggle in a cache of weapons from India. While in transit to Colombo, fifteen of the seventeen Tamil Tigers committed suicide by swallowing cyanide capsules. The LTTE, claiming that the prisoners had been forced to take such a desperate action while in custody, immediately made a number of retaliatory attacks on Sinhalese setdements in the east. The IPKF, ill suited to counter- guerrilla warfare, was accused by many Sinhalese of allowing the attacks to take place. Jayewardene angrily declared that if the Indians could not protect the citizenry, he would order the IPKF to withdraw from the province and put his own soldiers on the job. India denounced the Tamil Tigers for attempt- ing to wreck the accord and declared its determination to main- tain law and order. The IPKF then began what was the first of its many operations against the Tamil Tigers. The Jaffna opera- tion was costly, taking the lives of over 200 Indian soldiers and bringing home to India the realization that it had underestimated the strength and persistence of the Tamil Tigers. Taking advan- tage of the distractions in the north, Sinhalese extremists of the JVP gained strength in the south, successfully carrying out several arms raids on military camps. The most spectacular attack the JVP attempted occurred in August 1987 during a government parliamentary group meeting, when a hand grenade exploded near the table where President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Premadasa were sitting. xxxiv In 1988 Jayewardene continued working toward the controversial merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces, where the Tamil separatists had long been active. The merger, initially a temporary measure, was a central part of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord under which India sought to ensure that an elected provincial coun- cil in the Tamil majority areas enjoyed substantial power to administer Tamil affairs. Although the LTTE boycotted the provin- cial election and tried to disrupt it, as did the J VP, there was a surprisingly high voter turnout. Still, few Sinhalese voted, and without LTTE participation, the credibility of the provincial council was limited. Furthermore, many viewed the resulting provincial government, dominated by the Tigers' main rival group, the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, as a creation of India. As 1988 drew to a close, Jayewardene announced he would retire and not run in the presidential election scheduled for December. Premadasa, the UNP's candidate, ran against two others, the SLFP's Bandaranaike and a relative political unknown. As the presidential election approached, J VP subversives concentrated on crippling essential services such as buses and trains, fuel supplies, and banking. The UNP's presidential candidate, Premadasa, stated that this was a battle between the ballot and the bullet and that the bullet must not win. The election proved to be the bloodiest in Sri Lanka's history, but the ballot did in fact prevail, with voters defying threats from Tamil as well as Sinhalese extremists. Despite predictions that the voter turnout would not exceed 30 percent in contrast to the 80 percent turnout in the past presidential election, well over 50 percent of the nations 's 9.4 million eligible voters showed up at the polls. Premadasa won by a large margin over his closest rival, Sirimavo Bandaranaike. One of Premadasa' s first problems when he took over on Janu- ary 2, 1989, was what to do about the J VP, which was believed responsible for numerous assassinations the year before. In his vic- tory speech, Premadasa appealed to the J VP to enter into talks with him. The Sinhalese extremists initially were willing to distin- guish between him and the outgoing president, Jayewardene, whom they had earlier tried to assassinate. The J VP, which unleashed a steady barrage of anti-Indian propaganda against "Indian expansionism, invading Indian armies," was impressed by Premadasa' s anti-Indian rhetoric and even went so far as to praise him as a patriotic leader. Encouraged, Premadasa used the occa- sion of Sri Lanka's Independence Day celebrations to make an impassioned appeal for an end to the killings on the island and proceeded a little more than a week later to hold the nation's first parliamentary elections in eleven years. The nation had endured xxxv another challenge to its democratic institutions despite the killing of substantial numbers of candidates of various parties and their supporters by the LTTE and J VP. In May 1989, LTTE guerrillas decided to negotiate with the new government of Premadasa, holding the first direct peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tiger separatist fighters since July 1985. The unexpected decision underscored the fundamental changes that had been taking place among Sri Lanka's Tamil political groups. Political differences among the groups had widened, with some former separatist groups now represented in the Northeastern Provincial Council and in the national Parlia- ment. The LTTE, the remaining guerrilla army in the field, had been isolated and weakened by prolonged combat with Indian troops. Premadasa, stating that he wanted to settle the Tamil problem among Sri Lankans, circumvented Indian participation in the talks. On June 1, Premadasa abruptly called for the with- drawal by the end of July of 45,000 Indian soldiers still in Sri Lanka. Gandhi, for his part, was determined not to lose face by having his forces hurried out of Sri Lanka too quickly in an election year. Yet, India's participation in the struggle had been costly in human, military, and diplomatic terms. The Indian troops were viewed suspiciously by most Sri Lankans, and India's police action had made its neighbors in South Asia uneasy. The Indians, with more than 1,200 casualties, accepted that it was time to go — but at their own pace. There were critics who believed that Premadasa, who in June 1989 was forced to reimpose a state of national emergency after having lifted it for the previous six months, was making unrealistic demands on India to withdraw quickly; they also believed that he was unwisely pandering to prevalent anti-Indian emotions in order to recover from an early period of unpopularity. Although the argu- ment was made that the longer the IPKF stayed in Sri Lanka, the stronger the support would be for the J VP, it was questionable whether the Sri Lankan military, which admittedly had grown dra- matically since 1983, could have successfully controlled the ferocity of both the Tamil Tigers and the J VP without Indian help. Yet, as one Sri Lankan politician admitted, the president was in the unenviable position of having the "IPKF holding his legs and the J VP at his throat." The Tamil Tigers, despite their truce with the government, remained a ruthless and effective military force. It was not known in 1990 how long their gesture of conciliation would last. The J VP had lost its charismatic leader, Rohana Wijewera, in November 1989, when he was captured and subsequently killed by government xxxvi security forces, and it had been brutally suppressed by the govern- ment in late 1989 and early 1990. The group, however, still was active and might ultimately pose the most dangerous long-term threat to Sri Lanka's national security. Premadasa placed much faith in his poverty alleviation plan — his remedy for much of the unrest plaguing the island. But the plan as originally unveiled alarmed both foreign lenders and many Sri Lankan technocrats and would have greatly burdened the already huge government budget. After a period of mounting defense expenditures, systematic destruction of the economic infrastruc- ture by subversives, a worldwide decline in demand for Sri Lanka's traditional raw products, and the partial eclipse of its once robust tourist industry, Premadasa' s plan, while well intentioned, was per- ceived as economically unfeasible. As Sri Lanka entered the 1990s, there were no clear answers as to whether its democratic institutions could survive another onslaught of anarchy, terror, and violence. As India withdrew its last troops from the island amid charges that it had failed to per- form its primary task of disarming Tamil separatists, it, too, accused Sri Lanka of not having fully implemented the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord — charging that there had not been an adequate devolution of central power. Yet Premadasa has declared that "Sri Lanka's problems must be settied among Sri Lankans." Certainly Sri Lanka's problems were increasingly complex and difficult to comprehend. Perhaps the culture of the island with its countervailing forces and fractured institutions can be glimpsed in the somber evocation of struggle captured in lines from "Elephant," a poem written by D.H. Lawrence following a visit to Sri Lanka: In elephants and the east are two devils, in all men maybe. The mystery of the dark mountain of blood, reeking in homage, in lust, in rage, And passive with everlasting patience. . . . May 1, 1990 Peter R. Blood XXXVll Chapter 1. Historical Setting Reclining and standing Buddhas at Polonnaruwa SRI LANKA'S HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL HERITAGE covers more than 2,000 years. Known as Lanka — the "resplen- dent land" — in the ancient Indian epic Ramayana, the island has numerous other references that testify to the island's natural beauty and wealth. Islamic folklore maintains that Adam and Eve were offered refuge on the island as solace for their expulsion from the Garden of Eden. Asian poets, noting the geographical location of the island and lauding its beauty, called it the "pearl upon the brow of India." A troubled nation in the 1980s, torn apart by communal violence, Sri Lanka has more recently been called India's "fallen tear." Sri Lanka claims a democratic tradition matched by few other developing countries, and since its independence in 1948, succes- sive governments have been freely elected. Sri Lanka's citizens enjoy a long life expectancy, advanced health standards, and one of the highest literacy rates in the world despite the fact that the country has one of the lowest per capita incomes. In the years since independence, Sri Lanka has experienced severe communal clashes between its Buddhist Sinhalese majority — approximately 74 percent of the population — and the country's largest minority group, the Sri Lankan Tamils, who are Hindus and comprise nearly 13 percent of the population. The com- munal violence that attracted the harsh scrutiny of the international media in the late 1980s can best be understood in the context of the island's complex historical development — its ancient and intricate relationship to India's civilization and its more than four centuries under colonial rule by European powers. The Sinhalese claim to have been the earliest colonizers of Sri Lanka, first settling in the dry north-central regions as early as 500 B.C . Between the third century B.C . and the twelfth century A.D. , they developed a great civilization centered around the cities of Anuradhapura and later Polonnaruwa, which was noted for its genius in hydraulic engineering — the construction of water tanks (reservoirs) and irrigation canals, for example — and its guardian- ship of Buddhism. State patronage gave Buddhism a heightened political importance that enabled the religion to escape the fate it had experienced in India, where it was eventually absorbed by Hinduism. The history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, especially its extended period of glory, is for many Sinhalese a potent symbol that links 3 Sri Lanka: A Country Study the past with the present. An enduring ideology defined by two distinct elements — sinhaladipa (unity of the island with the Sinhalese) and dhammadipa (island of Buddhism) — designates the Sinhalese as custodians of Sri Lankan society. This theme finds recurrent ex- pression in the historical chronicles composed by Buddish monks over the centuries, from the mythological founding of the Sinha- lese "lion" race around 300 B.C. to the capitulation of the King- dom of Kandy, the last independent Sinhalese polity in the early nineteenth century. The institutions of Buddhist-Sinhalese civilization in Sri Lanka came under attack during the colonial eras of the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British. During these centuries of colonialization, the state encouraged and supported Christianity — first Roman Catholicism, then Protestantism. Most Sinhalese regard the en- tire period of European dominance as an unfortunate era, but most historians — Sri Lankan or otherwise — concede that British rule was relatively benign and progressive compared to that of the Dutch and Portuguese. Influenced by the ascendant philosophy of liberal reformism, the British were determined to anglicize the island, and in 1802, Sri Lanka (then called Ceylon) became Britain's first crown colony. The British gradually permitted native participation in the governmental process; and under the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 and then the Soulbury Constitution of 1946, the franchise was dramatically extended, preparing the island for independence two years later. Under the statesmanship of Sri Lanka's first postindependence leader, Don Stephen (D.S.) Senanayake, the country managed to rise above the bitterly divisive communal and religious emotions that later complicated the political agenda. Senanayake envisioned his country as a pluralist, multiethnic, secular state, in which minori- ties would be able to participate fully in government affairs. His vision for his nation soon faltered, however, and communal rivalry and confrontation appeared within the first decade of independence. Sinhalese nationalists aspired to recover the dominance in society they had lost during European rule, while Sri Lankan Tamils wanted to protect their minority community from domination or assimilation by the Sinhalese majority. No compromise was forth- coming, and as early as 1951, Tamil leaders stated that "the Tamil- speaking people in Ceylon constitute a nation distinct from that of the Sinhalese by every fundamental test of nationhood." Sinhalese nationalists did not have to wait long before they found an eloquent champion of their cause. Solomon West Ridgeway Dias (S.W.R.D.) Bandaranaike successfully challenged the nation's Westernized rulers who were alienated from Sinhalese culture; he 4 Historical Setting became prime minister in 1956. A man particularly adept at har- nessing Sinhalese communal passions, Bandaranaike vowed to make Sinhala the only language of administration and education and to restore Buddhism to its former glory. The violence unleashed by his policies directly threatened the unity of the nation, and com- munal riots rocked the country in 1956 and 1958. Bandaranaike became a victim of the passions he unleashed. In 1959 a Buddhist monk who felt that Bandaranaike had not pushed the Buddhist- Sinhalese cause far enough assassinated the Sri Lankan leader. Bandaranaike 's widow, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias (S.R.D.) Ban- daranaike, ardently carried out many of his ideas. In 1960, she became the world's first woman prime minister. Communal tensions continued to rise over the following years. In 1972 the nation became a republic under a new constitution, which was a testimony to the ideology of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and Buddhism was accorded special status. These reforms and new laws discriminating against Tamils in university admissions were a symbolic threat the Tamil community felt it could not ignore, and a vicious cycle of violence erupted that has plagued successive governments. Tamil agitation for separation became associated with gruesome and highly visible terrorist acts by extremists, trigger- ing large communal riots in 1977, 1981, and 1983. During these riots, Sinhalese mobs retaliated against isolated and vulnerable Tamil communities. By the mid-1980s, the Tamil militant under- ground had grown in strength and posed a serious security threat to the government, and its combatants struggled for a Tamil nation — "Tamil Eelam" — by an increasing recourse to terrorism. The fundamental, unresolved problems facing society were sur- facing with a previously unseen force. Foreign and domestic ob- servers expressed concern for democratic procedures in a society driven by divisive symbols and divided by ethnic loyalties. Origins Ancient Indian and Sri Lankan myths and chronicles have been studied intensively and interpreted widely for their insight into the human settlement and philosophical development of the island. Confirmation of the island's first colonizers — whether the Sinha- lese or Sri Lankan Tamils — has been elusive, but evidence sug- gests that Sri Lanka has been, since earliest times, a multiethnic society. Sri Lankan historian K.M. de Silva believes that settle- ment and colonization by Indo-Aryan speakers may have preceded the arrival of Dravidian settlers by several centuries, but that early mixing rendered the two ethnic groups almost physically indis- tinct. 5 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Ancient Legends and Chronicles The first major legendary reference to the island is found in the great Indian epic, the Ramayana (Sacred Lake of the Deeds of Rama), thought to have been written around 500 B.C. The Ramayana tells of the conquest of Lanka in 3000 B.C. by Rama, an incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu. Rama's quest to save his abducted wife, Ska, from Ravanna, the demon god of Lanka, and his demon hordes, is, according to some scholars, a poetic account of the early southward expansion of Brahmanic civilization. Buddhist Chronicles The most valuable source of knowledge for scholars probing the legends and historical heritage of Sri Lanka is still the Mahavamsa (Great Genealogy or Dynasty), a chronicle compiled in Pali, the language of Theravada Buddhism, in the sixth century. Buddhist monks composed the Mahavamsa, which was an adaptation of an earlier and cruder fourth century epic, the Dipavamsa (Island Geneal- ogy or Dynasty). The latter account was compiled to glorify Bud- dhism and is not a comprehensive narrative of events. The Mahavamsa, however, relates the rise and fall of successive Bud- dhist kingdoms beginning with Vijaya, the legendary colonizer of Sri Lanka and primogenitor of the Sinhalese migrant group. In the Mahavamsa, Vijaya is described as having arrived on the island on the day of the Buddha's death (parinibbana) or, more precisely, his nirvana or nibbana (see Glossary), his release from the cycle of life and pain. The Mahavamsa also lavishes praise on the Sinhalese kings who repulsed attacks by Indian Tamils. Vijaya is the central legendary figure in the Mahavamsa. He was the grandson of an Indian princess from Vanga in northern India who had been abducted by an amorous lion, Simha, and son of their incestuous and half-leonine offspring. Along with 700 of his followers, Vijaya arrived in Lanka and established himself as ruler with the help of Kuveni, a local demon-worshiping princess. Although Kuveni had betrayed her own people and had given birth to two of Vijaya's children, she was banished by the ruler, who then arranged a marriage with a princess from Madurai in southeastern India. Kuveni' s offspring are the folkloric ancestors of the present day Veddahs, an aboriginal people now living in scattered areas of eastern Sri Lanka (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). Many scholars believe that the legend of Vijaya provides a glimpse into the early settlement of the island. Around the fifth century B.C., the first bands of Sri Lankan colonists are believed to have come from the coastal areas of northern India. The chronicles 6 Historical Setting support evidence that the royal progeny of Vijaya often sought wives from the Pandyan and other Dravidian (Tamil) kingdoms of southern India. The chronicles also tell of an early and constant migration of artisan and mercantile Tamils to Sri Lanka. From the fifth century A.D onward, periodic palace intrigues and religious heresies weakened Buddhist institutions leaving Sinhalese-Buddhist culture increasingly vulnerable to successive and debilitating Tamil invasions. A chronicle, a continuation of the Mahavamsa, describes this decline. The main body of this chroni- cle, which assumed the less than grandiloquent tide Culavamsa (Lesser Genealogy or Dynasty), was attributed to the thirteenth century poet-monk, Dhammakitti. The Culavamsa was later ex- panded by another monk the following century and, concluded by a third monk in the late eighteenth century. The Impact of Buddhism Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka in the third century B.C. from India, where it had been established by Siddartha Gautama three centuries earlier (see Buddhism, ch. 2). The power- ful Indian monarch, Asoka, nurtured the new comprehensive religio-philosophical system in the third century B.C. Asoka' s con- version to Buddhism marks one of the turning points in religious history because at that time, Buddhism was elevated from a minor sect to an official religion enjoying all the advantages of royal patronage. Asoka' s empire, which extended over most of India, supported one of the most vigorous missionary enterprises in history. The Buddhist tradition of chronicling events has aided the verifi- cation of historical figures. One of the most important of these figures was King Devanampiya Tissa (250-c. 207 B.C.). Accord- ing to the Mahavamsa, Asoka' s son and emissary to Sri Lanka, Mahinda, introduced the monarch to Buddhism. Devanampiya Tissa became a powerful patron of Buddhism and established the monastery of Mahavihara, which became the historic center of Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Subsequent events also contributed to Sri Lanka's prestige in the Buddhist world. It was on the island, for example, that the oral teachings of the Buddha — the Tripitaka — were committed to writing for the first time. Devanampiya Tissa was said to have received Buddha's right collarbone and his revered alms bowl from Asoka and to have built the Thuparama Dagoba, or stupa (Buddhist shrine), to honor these highly revered relics. Another relic, Buddha's sacred tooth, had arrived in Sri Lanka in the fourth century A.D. The possession 7 Sri Lanka: A Country Study of the Tooth Relic came to be regarded as essential for the legitimi- zation of Sinhalese royalty and remained so until its capture and probable destruction by the Portuguese in 1560. The sacred Tooth Relic (thought by many to be a substitute) that is venerated in the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy links legendary Sri Lanka with the modern era. The annual procession of Perahera held in honor of the sacred Tooth Relic serves as a powerful unifying force for the Sinhalese in the twentieth century. Asoka's daughter, Sanghamitta, is recorded as having brought to the island a branch of the sacred bo tree under which the Buddha attained enlightenment. Accord- ing to legend, the tree that grew from this branch is near the ruins of the ancient city of Anuradhapura in the north of Sri Lanka. The tree is said to be the oldest living thing in the world and is an ob- ject of great veneration. The connection between religion, culture, language, and edu- cation and their combined influence on national identity have been an age-old pervasive force for the Sinhalese Buddhists. Devanam- piya Tissa employed Asoka's strategy of merging the political state with Buddhism, supporting Buddhist institutions from the state's coffers, and locating temples close to the royal palace for greater control. With such patronage, Buddhism was positioned to evolve as the highest ethical and philosophical expression of Sinhalese cul- ture and civilization. Buddhism appealed directly to the masses, leading to the growth of a collective Sinhalese cultural consciousness. In contrast to the theological exclusivity of Hindu Brahmanism, the Asokan missionary approach featured preaching and carried the principles of the Buddha directly to the common people. This proselytizing had even greater success in Sri Lanka than it had in India and could be said to be the island's first experiment in mass education. Buddhism also had a great effect on the literary development of the island. The Indo- Aryan dialect spoken by the early Sinha- lese was comprehensible to missionaries from India and facilitated early attempts at translating the scriptures. The Sinhalese literati studied Pali, the language of the Buddhist scriptures, thus influenc- ing the development of Sinhala as a literary language. The Classical Age, 200 B.C.-A.D. 1200 Early Settlements The first extensive Sinhalese settlements were along rivers in the dry northern zone of the island. Because early agricultural activity — primarily the cultivation of wet rice — was dependent on unreliable 8 9 Sri Lanka: A Country Study monsoon rains, the Sinhalese constructed canals, channels, water- storage tanks, and reservoirs to provide an elaborate irrigation sys- tem to counter the risks posed by periodic drought. Such early at- tempts at engineering reveal the brilliant understanding these ancient people had of hydraulic principles and trigonometry. The discovery of the principle of the valve tower, or valve pit, for regulat- ing the escape of water is credited to Sinhalese ingenuity more than 2,000 years ago. By the first century A.D., several large-scale irri- gation works had been completed. The mastery of hydraulic engineering and irrigated agriculture facilitated the concentration of large numbers of people in the north- ern dry zone, where early settlements appeared to be under the control of semi-independent rulers (see Land Use and Settlement Patterns, ch. 2). In time, the mechanisms for political control be- came more refined, and the city-state of Anuradhapura emerged and attempted to gain sovereignty over the entire island. The state- sponsored flowering of Buddhist art and architecture and the con- struction of complex and extensive hydraulic works exemplify what is known as Sri Lanka's classical age, which roughly parallels the period between the rise and fall of Anuradhapura (from ca. 200 B.C. to ca. A.D. 993). The Sinhalese kingdom at Anuradhapura was in many ways typi- cal of other ancient hydraulic societies because it lacked a rigid, authoritarian and heavily bureaucratic structure. Theorists have attributed Anuradhapura' s decentralized character to its feudal basis, which was, however, a feudalism unlike that found in Europe. The institution of caste formed the basis of social stratification in ancient Sinhalese society and determined a person's social obliga- tion, and position within the hierarchy. The caste system in Sri Lanka developed its own characteristics. Although it shared an occupational role with its Indian prototype, caste in Sri Lanka developed neither the exclusive Brahmanical social hierarchy nor, to any significant degree, the concept of defile- ment by contact with impure persons or substances that was cen- tral to the Indian caste system. The claims of the Kshatriya (warrior caste) to royalty were a moderating influence on caste, but more profound was the influence of Buddhism, which lessened the severity of the institution. The monarch theoretically held absolute powers but was nevertheless expected to conform to the rules of dharma, or universal laws governing human existence and conduct (see Religion, ch. 2). The king was traditionally entitled to land revenue equivalent to one-sixth of the produce in his domain. Furthermore, his sub- jects owed him a kind of caste-based compulsory labor (rajakariya 10 Historical Setting in Sinhala) as a condition for holding land and were required to provide labor for road construction, irrigation projects, and other public works. During the later colonial period, the Europeans ex- ploited the institution of rajakariya, which was destined to become an important moral and economic issue in the nineteenth century (see European Encroachment and Dominance, 1500-1948, this ch.). Social divisions arose over the centuries between those engaged in agriculture and those engaged in nonagricultural occupations. The Govi (cultivators — see Glossary) belonged to the highest Sin- halese caste (Goyigama) and remained so in the late twentieth cen- tury. All Sri Lankan heads of state have, since independence, belonged to the Goyigama caste, as do about half of all Sinhalese. The importance of cultivation on the island is also reflected in the caste structure of the Hindu Tamils, among whom the Vellala (cul- tivator) is the highest caste. Rise of Sinhalese and Tamil Ethnic Awareness Because the Mahavamsa is essentially a chronicle of the early Sinhalese-Buddhist royalty on the island, it does not provide in- formation on the island's early ethnic distributions. There is, for instance, only scant evidence as to when the first Tamil settlements were established. Tamil literary sources, however, speak of active trading centers in southern India as early as the third century B.C. and it is probable that these centers had at least some contact with settlements in northern Sri Lanka. There is some debate among historians as to whether settiement by Indo-Aryan speakers preceded settlement by Dravidian- speaking Tamils, but there is no dispute over the fact that Sri Lanka, from its earliest recorded history, was a multiethnic society. Evidence suggests that during the early cen- turies of Sri Lankan history there was considerable harmony be- tween the Sinhalese and Tamils. The peace and stability of the island were first significantly affected around 237 B.C. when two adventurers from southern India, Sena and Guttika, usurped the Sinhalese throne at Anura- dhapura. Their combined twenty- two-year rule marked the first time Sri Lanka was ruled by Tamils. The two were subsequently murdered, and the Sinhalese royal dynasty was restored. In 145 B.C., a Tamil general named Elara, of the Chola dynasty (which ruled much of India from the ninth to twelfth centuries A.D.), took over the throne at Anuradhapura and ruled for forty-four years. A Sinhalese king, Dutthagamani (or Duttugemunu), waged a fifteen- year campaign against the Tamil monarch and finally deposed him. Dutthagamani is the outstanding hero of the Mahavamsa, and his war against Elara is sometimes depicted in contemporary 11 Sri Lanka: A Country Study accounts as a major racial confrontation between Tamils and Sin- halese. A less biased and more factual interpretation, according to Sri Lankan historian K.M. de Silva, must take into considera- tion the large reserve of support Elara had among the Sinhalese. Furthermore, another Sri Lankan historian, Sinnappah Arasarat- nam, argues that the war was a dynastic struggle that was purely political in nature. As a result of Dutthagamani's victory, Anura- dhapura became the locus of power on the island. Arasaratnam suggests the conflict recorded in the Mahavamsa marked the begin- ning of Sinhalese nationalism and that Dutthagamani's victory is commonly interpreted as a confirmation that the island was a preserve for the Sinhalese and Buddhism. The historian maintains that the story is still capable of stirring the religio-communal pas- sions of the Sinhalese. The Tamil threat to the Sinhalese Buddhist kingdoms had be- come very real in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. Three Hindu empires in southern India — the Pandya, Pallava, and Chola — were becoming more assertive. The Sinhalese perception of this threat intensified because in India, Buddhism — vulnerable to pressure and absorption by Hinduism — had already receded. Tamil ethnic and religious consciousness also matured during this period. In terms of culture, language, and religion, the Tamils had identified them- selves as Dravidian, Tamil, and Hindu, respectively. Another Sinhalese king praised in the Mahavamsa is Dhatusena (459-77), who, in the fifth century A.D., liberated Anuradhapura from a quarter-century of Pandyan rule. The king was also hon- ored as a generous patron of Buddhism and as a builder of water storage tanks. Dhatusena was killed by his son, Kasyapa (477-95), who is regarded as a great villain in Sri Lankan history. In fear of retribution from his exiled brother, the parricide moved the cap- ital from Anuradhapura to Sigiriya, a fortress and palace perched on a monolithic rock 180 meters high. Although the capital was returned to Anuradhapura after Kasyapa was dethroned, Sigiriya is an architectural and engineering feat displayed in an inaccessi- ble redoubt. The rock fortress eventually fell to Kasyapa' s brother, who received help from an army of Indian mercenaries. In the seventh century A.D., Tamil influence became firmly embedded in the island's culture when Sinhalese Prince Mana- vamma seized the throne with Pallava assistance. The dynasty that Manavamma established was heavily indebted to Pallava patronage and continued for almost three centuries. During this time, Pallava influence extended to architecture and sculpture, both of which bear noticeable Hindu motifs. 12 Historical Setting By the middle of the ninth century, the Pandyans had risen to a position of ascendancy in southern India, invaded northern Sri Lanka, and sacked Anuradhapura. The Pandyans demanded an indemnity as a price for their withdrawal. Shortly after the Pandyan departure, however, the Sinhalese invaded Pandya in sup- port of a rival prince, and the Indian city of Madurai was sacked in the process. In the tenth century, the Sinhalese again sent an invading army to India, this time to aid the Pandyan king against the Cholas. The Pandyan king was defeated and fled to Sri Lanka, carrying with him the royal insignia. The Chola, initially under Rajaraja the Great (A.D. 985-1018), were impatient to recapture the royal in- signia; they sacked Anuradhapura in A.D. 993 and annexed Rajarata — the heartland of the Sinhalese kingdom — to the Chola Empire. King Mahinda V, the last of the Sinhalese monarchs to rule from Anuradhapura, fled to Rohana, where he reigned until 1017, when the Chola took him prisoner. He subsequently died in India in 1029. Under the rule of Rajaraja's son, Rajendra (1018-35), the Chola Empire grew stronger, to the extent that it posed a threat to states as far away as the empire of Sri Vijaya in modern Malaysia and Sumatra in Indonesia. For seventy-five years, Sri Lanka was ruled directly as a Chola province. During this period, Hinduism flourished, and Buddhism received a serious setback. After the des- truction of Anuradhapura, the Chola set up their capital farther to the southeast, at Polonnaruwa, a strategically defensible loca- tion near the Mahaweli Ganga, a river that offered good protec- tion against potential invaders from the southern Sinhalese kingdom of Ruhunu (see fig. 2). When the Sinhalese kings regained their dominance, they chose not to reestablish themselves at Anurad- hapura because Polonnaruwa offered better geographical security from any future invasions from southern India. The area surround- ing the new capital already had a well-developed irrigation system and a number of water storage tanks in the vicinity, including the great Minneriya Tank and its feeder canals built by King Mahasena (A.D. 274-301), the last of the Sinhalese monarchs mentioned in the Mahavamsa. King Vijayabahu I drove the Chola out of Sri Lanka in A.D. 1070. Considered by many as the author of Sinhalese freedom, the king recaptured Anuradhapura but ruled from Polonnaruwa, slightly less than 100 kilometers to the southeast. During his forty- year reign, Vijayabahu I (A.D. 1070-1110) concentrated on rebuilding the Buddhist temples and monasteries that had been neglected during Chola rule. He left no clearly designated successor 13 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Historical Setting to his throne, and a period of instability and civil war followed his rule until the rise of King Parakramabahu I, known as the Great (A.D. 1153-86). Parakramabahu is the greatest hero of the Culavamsa, and under his patronage, the city of Polonnaruwa grew to rival Anuradhapura in architectural diversity and as a repository of Buddhist art. Parakramabahu was a great patron of Buddhism and a reformer as well. He reorganized the sangha (community of monks) and healed a longstanding schism between Mahavihara — the Theravada Bud- dhist monastery — and Abhayagiri — the Mahayana Buddhist monastery. Parakramabahu 's reign coincided with the last great period of Sinhalese hydraulic engineering; many remarkable irri- gation works were constructed during his rule, including his crown- ing achievement, the massive Parakrama Samudra (Sea of Parakrama or Parakrama Tank). Polonnaruwa became one of the magnificent capitals of the ancient world, and nineteenth-century British historian Sir Emerson Tenant even estimated that during Parakramabahu 's rule, the population of Polonnaruwa reached 3 million — a figure, however, that is considered to be too high by twentieth-century historians. Parakramabahu 's reign was not only a time of Buddhist renais- sance but also a period of religious expansionism abroad. Parakramabahu was powerful enough to send a punitive mission against the Burmese for their mistreatment of a Sri Lankan mis- sion in 1164. The Sinhalese monarch also meddled extensively in Indian politics and invaded southern India in several unsuccessful expeditions to aid a Pandyan claimant to the throne. Although a revered figure in Sinhalese annals, Parakrama- bahu is believed to have greatly strained the royal treasury and contributed to the fall of the Sinhalese kingdom. The post- Parakramabahu history of Polonnaruwa describes the destruction of the city twenty-nine years after his death and fifteen rulers later. For the decade following Parakramabahu 's death, however, a period of peace and stability ensued during the reign of King Nissankamalla (A.D. 1187-97). During Nissankamalla's rule, the Brahmanic legal system came to regulate the Sinhalese caste sys- tem. Henceforth, the highest caste stratum became identified with the cultivator caste, and land ownership conferred high status. Occupational caste became hereditary and regulated dietary and marriage codes. At the bottom of the caste strata was the Chandala, who corresponded roughly to the Indian untouchable. It was dur- ing this brief period that it became mandatory for the Sinhalese king to be a Buddhist. 15 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Decline of the Sinhalese Kingdom, 1200-1500 Sinhalese Migration to the South After Nissankamalla's death, a series of dynastic disputes hastened the breakup of the kingdom of Polonnaruwa. Domestic instability characterized the ensuing period, and incursions by Chola and Pandyan invaders created greater turbulence, culminating in a devastating campaign by the Kalinga, an eastern Indian dynasty. When Magha, the Kalinga king, died in 1255, another period of instability began, marking the beginning of the abandonment of Polonnaruwa and the Sinhalese migration to the southwest from the northern dry zone. The next three kings after Magha ruled from rock fortresses to the west of Polonnaruwa. The last king to rule from Polonnaruwa was Parakramabahu III (1278-93). The migration is one of the great unsolved puzzles of South Asian his- tory and is of considerable interest to academics because of the parallel abandonment of dry-zone civilizations in modern Cam- bodia, northern Thailand, and Burma. A Weakened State: Invasion, Disease, and Social Instability The Sinhalese withdrawal from the north is sometimes attributed to the cumulative effect of invasions from southern India (a ra- tionale that has been exploited against the Tamils in modern Sin- halese politics). This interpretation has obvious weaknesses because after each of the south Indian invasions of the preceding centu- ries, the Sinhalese returned to the dry zone from the hills and repaired and revived the ancient irrigation system. K.M. de Silva suggests that the cumulative effects of repeated invasions "ate into the vitals of a society already losing its vigour with age." A civili- zation based on a dry-zone irrigation complex presupposes a high degree of organization and a massive labor force to build and main- tain the works. The decline of these public works mirrored the breakdown in the social order. Another factor that seems to have retarded the resettlement of the dry zone was the outbreak of malaria in the thirteenth century. The mosquito found ideal breeding grounds in the abandoned tanks and channels. (Malaria has often followed the destruction of irrigation works in other parts of Asia.) Indeed, all attempts at large-scale resettlement of the dry area in Sri Lanka were thwarted until the introduction of modern pesticides. During the thirteenth century, the declining Sinhalese kingdom faced threats of invasion from India and the expanding Tamil king- dom of northern Sri Lanka. Taking advantage of Sinhalese weak- ness, the Tamils secured control of the valuable pearl fisheries around Jaffna Peninsula. During this time, the vast stretches of 16 Historical Setting jungle that cover north-central Sri Lanka separated the Tamils and the Sinhalese. This geographical separation had important psycho- logical and cultural implications. The Tamils in the north devel- oped a more distinct and confident culture, backed by a resurgent Hinduism that looked to the traditions of southern India for its inspiration. Conversely, the Sinhalese were increasingly restricted to the southern and central area of the island and were fearful of the more numerous Tamils on the Indian mainland. The fact that the Hindu kingdom at Jaffna was expending most of its military resources resisting the advances of the expansionist Vijayanagara Empire (1336-1565) in India enhanced the Sinhalese ability to resist further Tamil encroachments. Some historians maintain that it was the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century that prevented the island from being overrun by south Indians. Foreign rulers took advantage of the disturbed political state of the Sinhalese kingdom, and in the thirteenth century Chandra- bhanu, a Buddhist king from Malaya, invaded the island twice. He attempted to seize the two most sacred relics of the Buddha in Sinhalese custody, the Tooth Relic and the Alms Bowl. In the early fifteenth century, the Ming dynasty Chinese interceded on behalf of King Parakramabahu VI (1412-67), an enlightened monarch who repulsed an invasion from the polity of Vijayanagara in southern India, reunited Sri Lanka, and earned renown as a patron of Buddhism and the arts. Parakramabahu VI was the last Sinhalese king to rule the entire island. During this extended period of domestic instability and frequent foreign invasion, Sinhalese culture experienced fundamental change. Rice cultivation continued as the mainstay of agriculture but was no longer dependent on an elaborate irrigation network. In the wet zone, large-scale administrative cooperation was not as necessary as it had been before. Foreign trade was of increasing importance to the Sinhalese kings. In particular, cinnamon — in great demand by Europeans — became a prime export commodity. Because of the value of cinnamon, the city of Kotte on the west coast (near modern Colombo) became the nominal capital of the Sinhalese kingdom in the mid-fifteenth century. Still, the Sinha- lese kingdom remained divided into numerous competing petty principalities. European Encroachment and Dominance, 1500-1948 The Portuguese By the late fifteenth century, Portugal, which had already established its dominance as a maritime power in the Atlantic, was exploring new waters. In 1497 Vasco da Gama sailed around the 17 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Cape of Good Hope and discovered an ocean route connecting Europe with India, thus inaugurating a new era of maritime supremacy for Portugal. The Portuguese were consumed by two objectives in their empire-building efforts: to convert followers of non-Christian religions to Roman Catholicism and to capture the major share of the spice trade for the European market. To carry out their goals, the Portuguese did not seek territorial conquest, which would have been difficult given their small numbers. Instead, they tried to dominate strategic points through which trade passed. By virtue of their supremacy on the seas, their knowledge of fire- arms, and by what has been called their "desperate soldiering" on land, the Portuguese gained an influence in South Asia that was far out of proportion to their numerical strength. At the onset of the European period in Sri Lanka in the sixteenth century, there were three native centers of political power: the two Sinhalese kingdoms of Kotte and Kandy and the Tamil kingdom at Jaffna. Kotte was the principal seat of Sinhalese power, and it claimed a largely imaginary overlordship not only over Kandy but also over the entire island. None of the three kingdoms, however, had the strength to assert itself over the other two and reunify the island. In 1505 Don Lourenco de Almeida, son of the Portuguese vice- roy in India, was sailing off the southwestern coast of Sri Lanka looking for Moorish ships to attack when stormy weather forced his fleet to dock at Galle. Word of these strangers who "eat hunks of white stone and drink blood (presumably wine) . . . and have guns with a noise louder than thunder ..." spread quickly and reached King Parakramabahu VIII of Kotte (1484-1508), who offered gifts of cinnamon and elephants to the Portuguese to take back to their home port at Cochin on the Malabar Coast of south- western India. The king also gave the Portuguese permission to build a residence in Colombo for trade purposes. Within a short time, however, Portuguese militaristic and monopolistic intentions became apparent. Their heavily fortified "trading post" at Colombo and open hostility toward the island's Muslim traders aroused Sinhalese suspicions. Following the decline of the Chola as a maritime power in the twelfth century, Muslim trading communities in South Asia claimed a major share of commerce in the Indian Ocean and developed extensive east- west, as well as Indo-Sri Lankan, commercial trade routes. As the Portuguese expanded into the region, this flourish- ing Muslim trade became an irresistible target for European in- terlopers. The sixteenth-century Roman Catholic Church was intolerant of Islam and encouraged the Portuguese to take over 18 Historical Setting the profitable shipping trade monopolized by the Moors. In addi- tion, the Portuguese would later have another strong motive for hostility toward the Moors because the latter played an important role in the Kandyan economy, one that enabled the kingdom suc- cessfully to resist the Portuguese. The Portuguese soon decided that the island, which they called Cilao, conveyed a strategic advantage that was necessary for pro- tecting their coastal establishments in India and increasing Lisbon's potential for dominating Indian Ocean trade. These incentives proved irresistible, and, the Portuguese, with only a limited num- ber of personnel, sought to extend their power over the island. They had not long to wait. Palace intrigue and then revolution in Kotte threatened the survival of the kingdom. The Portuguese skillfully exploited these developments. In 1521 Bhuvanekabahu, the ruler of Kotte, requested Portuguese aid against his brother, Mayadunne, the more able rival king who had established his independence from the Portuguese at Sitawake, a domain in the Kotte kingdom. Power- less on his own, King Bhuvanekabahu became a puppet of the Por- tuguese. But shortly before his death in 1551, the king successfully obtained Portuguese recognition of his grandson, Dharmapala, as his successor. Portugal pledged to protect Dharmapala from at- tack in return for privileges, including a continuous payment in cinnamon and permission to rebuild the fort at Colombo on a grander scale. When Bhuvanekabahu died, Dharmapala, still a child, was entrusted to the Franciscans for his education, and, in 1557, he converted to Roman Catholicism. His conversion broke the centuries-old connection between Buddhism and the state, and a great majority of Sinhalese immediately disqualified the young monarch from any claim to the throne. The rival king at Sitawake exploited the issue of the prince's conversion and accused Dharmapala of being a puppet of a foreign power. Before long, rival King Mayadunne had annexed much of the Kotte kingdom and was threatening the security of the capital city itself. The Portuguese were obliged to defend Dharmapala (and their own credibility) because the ruler lacked a popular follow- ing. They were subsequently forced to abandon Kotte and retreat to Colombo, taking the despised puppet king with them. Mayadunne and, later, his son, Rajasinha, besieged Colombo many times. The latter was so successful that the Portuguese were once even forced to eat the flesh of their dead to avoid starvation. The Portuguese would probably have lost their holdings in Sri Lanka had they not had maritime superiority and been able to send rein- forcements by sea from their base at Goa on the western coast of India. 19 Sri Lanka: A Country Study The Kingdom of Sitawake put up the most vigorous opposition to Western imperialism in the island's history. For the seventy- three-year period of its existence, Sitawake (1521-94) rose to be- come the predominant power on the island, with only the Tamil kingdom at Jaffna and the Portuguese fort at Colombo beyond its control. When Rajasinha died in 1593, no effective successors were left to consolidate his gains, and the kingdom collapsed as quickly as it had arisen. Dharmapala, despised by his countrymen and totally com- promised by the Portuguese, was deprived of all his royal duties and became completely manipulated by the Portuguese advisers surrounding him. In 1580 the Franciscans persuaded him to make out a deed donating his dominions to the king of Portugal. When Dharmapala died in 1597, the Portuguese emissary, the captain- general, took formal possession of the kingdom. Portuguese missionaries had also been busily involving them- selves in the affairs of the Tamil kingdom at Jaffna, converting almost the entire island of Mannar to Roman Catholicism by 1544. The reaction of Sangily, king of Jaffna, however, was to lead an expedition to Mannar and decapitate the resident priest and about 600 of his congregation. The king of Portugal took this as a per- sonal affront and sent several expeditions against Jaffna. The Por- tuguese, having disposed of the Tamil king who fled south, installed one of the Tamil princes on the throne, obliging him to pay an annual tribute. In 1619 Lisbon annexed the Kingdom of Jaffna. After the annexation of Jaffna, only the central highland King- dom of Kandy — the last remnant of Buddhist Sinhalese power — remained independent of Portuguese control. The kingdom ac- quired a new significance as custodian of Sinhalese nationalism. The Portuguese attempted the same strategy they had used suc- cessfully at Kotte and Jaffna and set up a puppet on the throne. They were able to put a queen on the Kandyan throne and even to have her baptized. But despite considerable Portuguese help, she was not able to retain power. The Portuguese spent the next half century trying in vain to expand their control over the King- dom of Kandy. In one expedition in 1630, the Kandyans ambushed and massacred the whole Portuguese force, including the captain- general. The Kandyans fomented rebellion and consistently frus- trated Portuguese attempts to expand into the interior. The areas the Portuguese claimed to control in Sri Lanka were part of what they majestically called the Estado da India and were governed in name by the viceroy in Goa, who represented the king. But in actuality, from headquarters in Colombo, the captain- general, a subordinate of the viceroy, directly ruled Sri Lanka with 20 Gadaladeniya Temple, fourteenth century Courtesy Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington all the affectations of royalty once reserved for the Sinhalese kings. The Portuguese did not try to alter the existing basic structure of native administration. Although Portuguese governors were put in charge of each province, the customary hierarchy, determined by caste and land ownership, remained unchanged. Traditional Sinhalese institutions were maintained and placed at the service of the new rulers. Portuguese administrators offered land grants to Europeans and Sinhalese in place of salaries, and the traditional compulsory labor obligation was used for construction and military purposes. The Portuguese tried vigorously, if not fanatically, to force reli- gious and, to a lesser extent, educational, change in Sri Lanka. They discriminated against other religions with a vengeance, de- stroyed Buddhist and Hindu temples, and gave the temple lands to Roman Catholic religious orders. Buddhist monks fled to Kandy, which became a refuge for people disaffected with colonial rule. One of the most durable legacies of the Portuguese was the con- version of a large number of Sinhalese and Tamils to Roman Catholicism. Although small pockets of Nestorian Christianity had existed in Sri Lanka, the Portuguese were the first to propagate Christianity on a mass scale. Sixteenth-century Portuguese Catholicism was intolerant. But perhaps because it caught Buddhism at its nadir, it nevertheless 21 Sri Lanka: A Country Study became rooted firmly enough on the island to survive the subse- quent persecutions of the Protestant Dutch Reformists. The Roman Catholic Church was especially effective in fishing communities — both Sinhalese and Tamil — and contributed to the upward mobil- ity of the castes associated with this occupation. Portuguese em- phasis on proselytization spurred the development and standardization of educational institutions. In order to convert the masses, mission schools were opened, with instruction in Portuguese and Sinhalese or Tamil. Many Sinhalese converts assumed Por- tuguese names. The rise of many families influential in the twen- tieth century dates from this period. For a while, Portuguese became not only the language of the upper classes of Sri Lanka but also the lingua franca of prominence in the Asian maritime world. The Dutch The Dutch became involved in the politics of the Indian Ocean in the beginning of the seventeenth century. Headquartered at Bata- via in modern Indonesia, the Dutch moved to wrest control of the highly profitable spice trade from the Portuguese. The Dutch began negotiations with King Rajasinha II of Kandy in 1638. A treaty assured the king assistance in his war against the Portuguese in exchange for a monopoly of the island's major trade goods, par- ticularly cinnamon. Rajasinha also promised to pay the Dutch's war-related expenses. The Portuguese fiercely resisted the Dutch and the Kandyans and were expelled only gradually from their strongholds. The Dutch captured the eastern ports of Trincomalee and Batticaloa in 1639 and restored them to the Sinhalese. But when the southwestern and western ports of Galle and Negombo fell in 1640, the Dutch refused to turn them over to the king of Kandy. The Dutch claimed that Rajasinha had not reimbursed them for their vastly inflated claims for military expenditures. This pretext allowed the Dutch to control the island's richest cinnamon lands. The Dutch ultimately presented the king of Kandy with such a large bill for help against the Portuguese that the king could never hope to repay it. After extensive fighting, the Portuguese surrendered Colombo in 1656 and Jaffna, their last stronghold, in 1658. Supe- rior economic resources and greater naval power enabled the Dutch to dominate the Indian Ocean. They attacked Portuguese positions throughout South Asia and in the end allowed their adversaries to keep only their settlement at Goa. The king of Kandy soon realized that he had replaced one foe with another and proceeded to incite rebellion in the lowlands where the Dutch held sway. He even attempted to ally the British in Madras in his struggle to oust the Dutch. These efforts ended with 22 Historical Setting a serious rebellion against his rule in 1664. The Dutch profited from this period of instability and extended the territory under their control. They took over the remaining harbors and completely cor- doned off Kandy, thereby making the highland kingdom landlocked and preventing it from allying itself with another foreign power (see fig. 2). This strategy, combined with a concerted Dutch dis- play of force, subdued the Kandyan kings. Henceforth, Kandy was unable to offer significant resistance except in its internal frontier regions. The Dutch and the Kingdom of Kandy eventually settled down to an uneasy modus vivendi, partly because the Dutch be- came less aggressive. Despite underlying hostility between Kandy and the Dutch, open warfare between them occurred only once — in 1762 — when the Dutch, exasperated by Kandy 's provocation of riots in the lowlands, launched a punitive expedition. The expedi- tion met with disaster, but a better-planned second expedition in 1765 forced the Kandyans to sign a treaty that gave the Dutch sovereignty over the lowlands. The Dutch, however, maintained their pretension that they administered the territories under their control as agents of the Kandyan ruler. After taking political control of the island, the Dutch proceeded to monopolize trade. This monopoly was at first limited to cinna- mon and elephants but later extended to other goods. Control was vested in the Dutch East India Company, a joint-stock corpora- tion, which had been established for the purpose of carrying out trade with the islands of Indonesia but was later called upon to exercise sovereign responsibilities in many parts of Asia. The Dutch tried with little success to supplant Roman Catholi- cism with Protestantism. They rewarded native conversion to the Dutch Reformed Church with promises of upward mobility, but Catholicism was too deeply rooted. (In the 1980s, the majority of Sri Lankan Christians remained Roman Catholics.) The Dutch were far more tolerant of the indigenous religions than the Por- tuguese; they prohibited open Buddhist and Hindu religious ob- servance in urban areas, but did not interfere with these practices in rural areas. The Dutch banned Roman Catholic practices, however. They regarded Portuguese power and Catholicism as mutually interdependent and strove to safeguard against the reemergence of the former by persecuting the latter. They harassed Catholics and constructed Protestant chapels on confiscated church property. The Dutch contributed significantly to the evolution of the judicial, and, to a lesser extent, administrative systems on the is- land. They codified indigenous law and customs that did not con- flict directly with Dutch-Roman jurisprudence. The outstanding 23 Sri Lanka: A Country Study example was Dutch codification of the Tamil legal code of Jaffna — the Thesavalamai. To a small degree, the Dutch altered the tradi- tional land grant and tenure system, but they usually followed the Portuguese pattern of minimal interference with indigenous social and cultural institutions. The provincial governors of the territo- ries of Jaffnapatam, Colombo, and Trincomalee were Dutch. These rulers also supervised various local officials, most of whom were the traditional mudaliyar (headmen). The Dutch, like the Portuguese before them, tried to entice their fellow countrymen to settle in Sri Lanka, but attempts to lure mem- bers of the upper class, especially women, were not very success- ful. Lower-ranking military recruits, however, responded to the incentive of free land, and their marriages to local women added another group to the island's already small but established popu- lation of Eurasians — the Portuguese Burghers. The Dutch Burghers formed a separate and privileged ethnic group on the island in the twentieth century. During the Dutch period, social differences between lowland and highland Sinhalese hardened, forming two culturally and politi- cally distinct groups. Western customs and laws increasingly in- fluenced the lowland Sinhalese, who generally enjoyed a higher standard of living and greater literacy. Despite their relative eco- nomic and political decline, the highland Sinhalese were nonethe- less proud to have retained their political independence from the Europeans and thus considered themselves superior to the lowland Sinhalese. The British Early Contacts In 1592 an English privateer attacked the Portuguese off the southwestern port of Galle. This action was England's first recorded contact with Sri Lanka. A decade later, Ralph Fitch, traveling from India, became the first known English visitor to Sri Lanka. The English did not record their first in-depth impressions of the island until the mid-seventeenth century, when Robert Knox, a sailor, was captured when his ship docked for repairs near Trincomalee. The Kandyans kept him prisoner between 1660 and 1680. After his escape, Knox wrote a popular book entitled An Historical Rela- tion of the Island of Ceylon in which he described his years among his "decadent" captors. By the mid-eighteenth century, it was apparent that the Mughal Empire (1526-1757) in India faced imminent collapse, and the major European powers were positioning themselves to fill the power 24 Historical Setting vacuum in the subcontinent. Dutch holdings on Sri Lanka were challenged in time by the British, who had an interest in the excel- lent harbor at Trincomalee. The British interest in procuring an all-weather port was whetted when they almost lost the Indian port of Madras to the French in 1758. The Dutch refused to grant the British permission to dock ships at Trincomalee (after The Nether- lands 's decision to support the French in the American War of Independence), goading the British into action. After skirmishing with both the Dutch and French, the British took Trincomalee in 1796 and proceeded to expel the Dutch from the island. The British Replace the Dutch In 1766 the Dutch had forced the Kandyans to sign a treaty, which the Kandyans later considered so harsh that they immedi- ately began searching for foreign assistance in expelling their foes. They approached the British in 1762, 1782, and 1795. The first Kandyan missions failed, but in 1795, British emissaries offered a draft treaty that would extend military aid in return for control of the seacoast and a monopoly of the cinnamon trade. The Kandyan king unsuccessfully sought better terms, and the British managed to oust the Dutch without significant help in 1796. The Kandyans' search for foreign assistance against the Dutch was a mistake because they simply replaced a relatively weak master with a powerful one. Britain was emerging as the unchallenged leader in the new age of the Industrial Revolution, a time of tech- nological invention, economic innovations, and imperialist expan- sion. The nations that had launched the first phase of European imperialism in Asia — the Portuguese and the Dutch — had already exhausted themselves. While peace negotiations were under way in Europe in 1796, the British assumed Sri Lanka would eventually be restored to the Dutch. By 1797 however, London had decided to retain the island as a British possession. The government compelled the British East India Company to share in the administration of the island and guaranteed the company a monopoly of trade, especially the moder- ately profitable — but no longer robust — cinnamon trade. The gover- nor of the island was responsible for law and order, but financial and commercial matters were under the control of the director of the East India Company. This system of "dual control" lasted from 1798 to 1802. After the Dutch formally ceded the island to the Brit- ish in the 1801 Peace of Amiens, Sri Lanka became Britain's first crown colony. Following Lord Nelson's naval victory over the French at Trafalgar in 1805, British superiority on the seas was 25 Sri Lanka: A Country Study unchallenged and provided new security for the British colonies in Asia. Once the British had established themselves in Sri Lanka, they aggressively expanded their territorial possessions by a combina- tion of annexation and intervention, a policy that paralleled the approach pursued by Lord Wellesley in India in the early nineteenth century. This strategy directly threatened the continued existence of the Kingdom of Kandy. Unrest at the Kandyan court between a ruling dynasty of alien, southern Indian antecedents and power- ful, indigenous Sinhalese chieftains provided opportunities for British interference. The intrigue of the king's chief minister precipi- tated the first Kandyan war (1803). With the minister's knowledge, a British force marched on Kandy, but the force was ill prepared for such an ambitious venture and its leaders were misinformed of the extent of the king's unpopularity. The British expedition was at first successful, but on the return march, it was plagued by disease, and the garrison left behind was decimated. During the next decade, no concerted attempt was made to take Kandy. But in 1815 the British had another opportunity. The king had antagonized local Sinhalese chiefs and further alienated the Sin- halese people by actions against Buddhist monks and temple property. In 1815 the Kandyan rebels invited the British to inter- vene. The governor quickly responded by sending a well-prepared force to Kandy; the king fled with hardly a shot fired. Kandyan headmen and the British signed a treaty known as the Kandyan Convention in March 1815. The treaty decreed that the Kandyan provinces be brought under British sovereignty and that all the traditional privileges of the chiefs be maintained. The King- dom of Kandy was also to be governed according to its customary Buddhist laws and institutions but would be under the adminis- tration of a British "resident" at Kandy, who would, in all but name, take the place of the monarch. In general, the old system was allowed to continue, but its fu- ture was bleak because of the great incongruity between the prin- ciples on which the British administration was based and the principles of the Kandyan hierarchy. Because the changes under the treaty tended to diminish the power and influence of the chiefs, the British introduced the new procedures with great caution. The monks, in particular, resented the virtual disappearance of the monarchy, which was their traditional source of support. They also resented the monarchy's replacement by a foreign and impartial government. Troubled by the corresponding decline in their sta- tus, the monks began to stir up political and religious discontent among the Kandyans almost immediately following the British 26 Kandyan dancer, Temple of the Tooth Courtesy Doranne Jacobson annexation. The popular and widespread rebellion that followed was suppressed with great severity. When hostilities ended in 1818, the British issued a proclamation that brought the Kandyan provinces under closer control. British agents usurped the powers and privileges of the chiefs and became the arbitrators of provincial authority. Fi- nally, the British reduced the institutional privileges accorded Bud- dhism, in effect placing the religion on an equal footing with other religions. With the final British consolidation over Kandy, the coun- try fell under the control of a single power — for the first time since the twelfth-century rule of Parakramabahu I and Nissankamalla. Modernization and Reform According to Sri Lankan historian Zeylanicus, each of the three epochs of European rule on the island lasted roughly 150 years, but rather than being assessed separately, these epochs should be thought of collectively as a "mighty cantilever of time with the Pax Britannica as the central pillar." Many British institutions have survived and currently have a direct and lasting influence on cul- tural and political events. Historian E.F.C. Ludowyck concurs, stating that whatever the Portuguese and Dutch did, the British improved upon. He attributed this accomplishment to British grounding in liberalism, a belief in the emancipation of slaves, the absence of religious persecution, and conscious attempts to main- tain good relations between the rulers and the ruled. 27 Sri Lanka: A Country Study When the British first conquered the maritime provinces of Sri Lanka, the indigenous population of the island was estimated at only 800,000. When the British left a century and a half later, the population had grown to more than 7 million. Over a relatively short period, the island had developed an economy capable of sup- porting the burgeoning population. Roads, railways, schools, hospi- tals, hydroelectric projects, and large well-operated agricultural plantations provided the infrastructure for a viable national economy. In the early years of British colonization, Sri Lanka was not con- sidered a great economic asset but was viewed instead almost ex- clusively in terms of its strategic value. By the 1820s, however, this perception was changing. As governor, Sir Edward Barnes was responsible for consolidating British military control over the Kandyan provinces through a program of vigorous road construc- tion. He also began experimenting with a variety of commercial crops, such as coffee. These experiments provided the foundation of the plantation system that was launched a decade later. In ad- ministrative matters, the British were initially careful not to change the existing social order too quickly and were not inclined to min- gle socially. A sharp distinction was made between the rulers and the ruled, but in time the distinction became less defined. The gover- nor, who held all executive and legislative power, had an advisory council made up of colonial officials with top posts filled by mem- bers of a civil service recruited in Britain. The governor was under the director of the Colonial Office in London but was given whatever discretionary powers he needed to balance the colony's budget and to make sure that the colony brought in enough revenue to cover its military and administrative expenses. By the early 1830s, the British had almost finished consolidat- ing their position in Sri Lanka and began to take more of an in- terest in securing the island's political stability and economic profitability. A new wave of thought, influenced by the reformist political ideology articulated by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, promised to change fundamentally Britain's relationship to its colo- nies. Known as utilitarianism, and later as philosophical radical- ism, it promoted the idea of democracy and individual liberty. This philosophy sponsored the idea of the trusteeship, i.e. , that new ter- ritories would be considered trusts and would receive all the benefits of British liberalism. These philosophical abstractions were put into practical use with the recommendations of a commission led by W.M.G. Colebrooke and C.H. Cameron. Their Colebrooke Report (1831-32) was an important document in the history of the island. G.C. Mendis, considered by many to be the doyen of modern Sri 28 Historical Setting Lankan history, considers the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms to be the dividing line between the past and present in Sri Lanka. The Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms In 1829 the British Colonial Office sent a Royal Commission of Eastern Inquiry — the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission — to assess the administration of the island. The legal and economic proposals made by the commission in 1833 were innovative and radical. The proposed reforms opposed mercantilism, state mo- nopolies, discriminatory administrative regulations, and, in general, any interference in the economy. Many of the proposals were adopted and helped set a pattern of administrative, economic, judi- cial, and educational development that continued into the next century. The commission worked to end the protested administrative divi- sion of the country along ethnic and cultural lines into low-country Sinhalese, Kandyan Sinhalese, and Tamil areas. The commission proposed instead that the country be put under one uniform ad- ministrative system, which was to be divided into five provinces. Colebrooke believed that in the past, separate administrative sys- tems had encouraged social and cultural divisions, and that the first step toward the creation of a modern nation was the administra- tive unification of the country. Cameron applied the same princi- ple to the judicial system, which he proposed be unified into one system and be extended to all classes of people, offering everyone equal rights in the eyes of the law. His recommendations were adopted and enforced under the Charter of Justice in 1833. The commissioners also favored the decentralization of execu- tive power in the government. They stripped away many of the autocratic powers vested in the governor, replacing his advisory council with an Executive Council, which included both official and unofficial nominees. The Executive Council appointed the members of the Legislative Council, which functioned as a forum for discussion of legislative matters. The Legislative Council placed special emphasis on Sri Lankan membership, and in 1833 three of the fifteen members were Sri Lankans. The governor nominat- ed them to represent low-country Sinhalese, Burghers, and Tamils, respectively. The commissioners also voted to change the exclu- sively British character of the administrative services and recom- mended that the civil service include local citizens. These proposed constitutional reforms were revolutionary — far more liberal than the legal systems of any other European colony. The opening of the Ceylon Civil Service to Sri Lankans required that a new emphasis be placed on English education. In time, the 29 Sri Lanka: A Country Study opening contributed to the creation of a Westernized elite, whose members would spearhead the drive for independence in the twen- tieth century. The Colebrooke-Cameron Commission emphasized the standardization of educational curriculum and advocated the substitution of English for local languages. Local English schools were established, and the missionary schools that had previously taught in the vernacular also adopted English. Economic Innovations The Colebrooke-Cameron reforms had an immediate impact on the economic development of the island. Many features of the eco- nomic structure the reforms helped put into place still exist. The commission advocated a laissez-faire economy. To encourage free trade, the government monopolies over cinnamon cultivation and trade were abolished. Traditional institutions, such as land tenure by accommodessan (the granting of land for cultivation, as opposed to its outright sale), was abolished, as was the rajakariya system. Rajakariya was opposed not only on moral grounds but also because it slowed the growth of private enterprise, impeded the creation of a land market, and interfered with the free movement of labor. In the mid- 1830s, the British began to experiment with a vari- ety of plantation crops in Sri Lanka, using many of the technolog- ical innovations developed earlier from their experience in Jamaica. Within fifteen years, one of these crops, coffee, became so successful that it transformed the island's economy from reliance upon sub- sistence crops to plantation agriculture. The first coffee plantation was opened in the Kandyan hill region in 1827, but it was not until the mid- 1830s that a number of favorable factors combined to make the widespread cultivation of the crop a highly profitable enter- prise. Governor Edward Barnes (1824-31) foresaw the possibili- ties of coffee cultivation and introduced various incentives for its cultivation, particularly the lifting of coffee export duties and ex- emption from the land produce tax. When slavery was abolished in the West Indies and coffee production there declined, Sri Lankan coffee exports soared, filling the gap in the world market. The problem of limited availability of land for coffee estates was solved when the British government sold lands that it had acquired from the Kandyan kings. The coffee plantation system faced a serious labor shortage. Among the Sinhalese, a peasant cultivator of paddy land held a much higher status than a landless laborer. In addition, the low wages paid to hired workers failed to attract the Kandyan peasant, and the peak season for harvesting plantation coffee usually coin- cided with the peasant's own harvest. Moreover, population 30 Historical Setting pressure and underemployment were not acute until the twentieth century. To compensate for this scarcity of native workers, an inexpensive and almost inexhaustible supply of labor was found among the Tamils in southern India. They were recruited for the coffee-harvesting season and migrated to and from Sri Lanka, often amid great hardships. The immigration of these Indian Tamils began as a trickle in the 1830s and became a regular flow a decade later, when the government of India removed all restrictions on the migration of labor to Sri Lanka. British civilian and military officials resident in Kandy provided initial capital for coffee cultivation, provoking contemporary ob- servations in the 1840s that they behaved more like coffee planters than government employees. This private capitalization led to seri- ous abuses, however, culminating in an 1840 ordinance that made it virtually impossible for a Kandyan peasant to prove that his land was not truly crown land and thus subject to expropriation and resale to coffee interests. In this period, more than 80,000 hectares of Kandyan land were appropriated and sold as crown lands. Between 1830 and 1850, coffee held the preeminent place in the economy and became a catalyst for the island's modernization. The greater availability of capital and the increase in export trade brought the rudiments of capitalist organization to the country. The Ceylon Bank opened in 1841 to finance the rapid expansion of coffee plantations. Since the main center of coffee production was in the Kandyan provinces, the expansion of coffee and the net- work of roads and railroads ended the isolation of the old Kandyan kingdom. The coffee plantation system had served as the economic foundation for the unification of the island while reinforcing the administrative and judicial reforms of the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission. The plantation system dominated the economy in Sri Lanka to such an extent that one observer described the government as an "appendage of the estates (plantations)." Worldwide depression in 1846 temporarily checked the rapid development of the planta- tion system. Falling coffee prices caused financial disruption, ag- gravating the friction that had been developing between the static traditional feudal economy and modernized commercial agricul- ture. In order to make up for lost revenue, the government im- posed a series of new taxes on firearms, dogs, shops, boats, carriages, and bullock carts. All of these taxes affected Sinhalese farmers. Other measures that further alienated the Kandy ans included a land tax and a road ordinance in 1848 that reintroduced a form of rajakariya by requiring six days' free labor on roads or the payment of a cash equivalent. But the measure that most 31 Sri Lanka: A Country Study antagonized the Kandyans (especially those associated with the Buddhist sanghd) was the alienation of temple lands for coffee plan- tations. British troops so severely repressed a rebellion that broke out among the Kandyans in 1848 that the House of Commons in Lon- don commissioned an investigation to look into the matter. The governor and his chief secretary were subsequently dismissed, and all new taxes, except the road ordinance, were repealed. The government adopted a new policy toward Buddhism after the rebel- lion, recognizing the importance of Buddhist monks as leaders of Kandyan public opinion. The plantation era transformed the island's economy. This was most evident in the growth of the export sector at the expense of the traditional agricultural sector. The colonial predilection for growing commercial instead of subsistence crops later was con- sidered by Sri Lankan nationalists to be one of the unfortunate lega- cies of European domination. Late nineteenth-century official documents that recorded famines and chronic rural poverty sup- port the nationalists' argument. Other issues, notably the British policy of selling state land to planters for conversion into planta- tions, are equally controversial, even though some members of the indigenous population participated in all stages of plantation agricul- ture. Sri Lankans, for example, controlled over one- third of the area under coffee cultivation and most of the land in coconut production. They also owned significant interests in rubber. In 1869 a devastating leaf disease — hemleia vastratrix struck the coffee plantations and spread quickly throughout the plantation dis- trict, destroying the coffee industry within fifteen years. Planters desperately searched for a substitute crop. One crop that showed promise was chinchona (quinine) . After an initial appearance of suc- cess, however, the market price of the crop fell and never fully recov- ered. Cinnamon, which had suffered a setback in the beginning of the century, was revived at this time, but only to become an important minor crop. Among all of the crops experimented with during the decline of coffee, only tea showed any real promise of success. A decline in the demand for Chinese tea in Britain opened up possibilities for Indian tea, especially the fine variety indigenous to Assam. Cli- matic conditions for the cultivation of tea were excellent in Sri Lanka, especially in the hill country. By the end of the century, tea production on the island had risen enormously. Because of the inelasticity of the market, however, British outlets soon became saturated. Attempts to develop other markets, especially in the 32 Historical Setting United States, were largely unsuccessful, and a glut emerged after World War II. The tea estates needed a completely different type of labor force than had been required during the coffee era. Tea was harvested throughout the year and required a permanent labor force. Waves of Indian Tamil immigrants settled on the estates and eventually became a large and permanent underclass that endured abomina- ble working conditions and squalid housing. The census of 1911 recorded the number of Indian laborers in Sri Lanka at about 500,000 — about 12 percent of the island's total population. In the 1980s, the Indian Tamils made up almost 6 percent of the island's population (see Population, ch. 2). The Tamil laborers emigrated to Sri Lanka from India not as individuals but as part of family units or groups of interrelated families. Thus, they tended to maintain their native cultural pat- terns on the estates where they setded. Although the Indian Tamils spoke the same language as the Sri Lankan Tamils, were Hindus, and traced their cultural origins to southern India, they considered themselves to be culturally distinct from the Sri Lankan Tamils. Their distinctiveness as a group and their cultural differences from the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils were recognized in the constitutional reforms of 1924, when two members of the Indian Tamil community were nominated to the Legislative Council. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, experimentation in crop diversification, on a moderate level in the years before the collapse of the coffee market, became of greater importance. Responding to international market trends, planters attempted to diversify the crops they produced to insulate their revenues from world price fluctuations. Not all their experiments were success- ful. The first sugar plantation was established in 1837, but sugar cultivation was not well-suited to the island and has never been very successful. Cocoa was also tried for a time and has continued as one of the lesser exports. Rubber, which was introduced in 1837, became a major export during the slump in the tea export market in the 1900s. The rubber export trade exceeded that of tea during World War I. But after suffering severe losses during the depres- sion of the 1930s, rubber exports never again regained their pre- eminent position. Rise of the Sri Lankan Middle Class By the nineteenth century, a new society was emerging — a product of East and West. It was a society with strict rules separating the rulers from the ruled, and most social association between the British and Sri Lankans was taboo. The British community was 33 Sri Lanka: A Country Study largely a microcosm of English society with all its class divisions. At the top of the social pyramid were the British officials of the Ceylon Civil Service. Elaborate social conventions regulated the conduct of the service's members and served to distinguish them as an exclusive caste. This situation, however, changed slowly in the latter part of the nineteenth century and quite rapidly in the next century. In Sri Lanka as in India, the British created an educated class to provide administrative and professional services in the colony. By the late nineteenth century, most members of this emerging class were associated directly or indirectly with the government. Increased Sri Lankan participation in government affairs demanded the creation of a legal profession; the need for state health services required a corps of medical professionals; and the spread of edu- cation provided an impetus to develop the teaching profession. In addition, the expansion of commercial plantations created a legion of new trades and occupations: landowners, planters, transport agents, contractors, and businessmen. Certain Sinhalese caste groups, such as the fishermen (Karava) and cinnamon peelers (Salagama), benefited from the emerging new economic order, to the detriment of the traditional ruling cultivators (Goyigama). The development of a capitalist economy forced the traditional elite — the chiefs and headmen among the low-country Sinhalese and the Kandyan aristocracy — to compete with new groups for the favors of the British. These upwardly mobile, primarily urban, professionals formed a new class that transcended divisions of race and caste. This class, particularly its uppermost strata, was steeped in Western culture and ideology. This anglicized elite generally had conservative political leanings, was loyal to the government, and resembled the British so much in outlook and social customs that its members were sometimes called brown sahibs. At the apex of this new class was a handful of Sri Lankans who had been able to join the exclusive ranks of the civil service in the nineteenth cen- tury. The first Sri Lankan entered by competitive examination in 1840. At that time, entrance examinations were held only in Lon- don and required an English education, so only a few members of the native middle class could aspire to such an elitist career. Con- sequently, in spite of the liberal policies that Colebrooke and Came- ron recommended, the British held virtually all high posts in the colonial administration. Buddhist Revivalism Beginning around the middle of the nineteenth century, the Bud- dhist clergy attempted to reform the sangha (religious community), 34 Historical Setting particularly as a reaction against Christian missionary activities. In the 1870s, Buddhist activists enlisted the help of an American, Colonel Henry Steele Olcott. An ardent abolitionist in the years leading up to the American Civil War, Olcott cofounded and later became president of the Theosophical Movement, which was organized on a worldwide basis to promote goodwill and to cham- pion the rights of the underprivileged. Shortly after his arrival in Sri Lanka, Olcott organized a Buddhist campaign against British officials and British missionaries. His Buddhist Theosophical Society of Ceylon went on to establish three institutions of higher learn- ing: Ananda College, Mahinda College, and Dharmaraja College. Olcott' s society founded these and some 200 lower schools to im- part Buddhist education with a strong nationalist bias. Olcott and his society took a special interest in the historical past of the Sin- halese Buddhist kingdoms on the island and managed to persuade the British governor to make Vesak, the chief Buddhist festival, a public holiday. Constitutional Reform The rediscovery of old Buddhist texts rekindled a popular in- terest in Sri Lanka's ancient civilization. The study of the past became an important aspect of the new drive for education. Archaeologists began work at Anuradhapura and at Polonnaruwa, and their finds contributed to the resurgent national pride. In the 1880s, a Buddhist-inspired temperance movement was also initiated to fight drunkenness, and the Ceylon Social Reform Society was founded in 1905 to combat other temptations associated with Westernization. Encouraged by the free reign of expression that the government extended to these reformists, a growing number of communal and regional political associations began to press for constitutional reform in the closing years of the nineteenth cen- tury. The colonial government was petitioned for permission to have Sri Lankan representation in the Executive Council and ex- panded regional representation in the Legislative Council. In response, the colonial government permitted a modest experiment in 1910, allowing a small electorate of Sri Lankans to send one of their members to the Legislative Council. Other seats held by Sri Lankans retained the old practice of communal representation. World War I World War I had only a minimal military impact on Sri Lanka, which entered the war as part of the British Empire. The closest fighting took place in the Bay of Bengal, where an Australian war- ship sank a German cruiser. But the war had an important influence 35 Sri Lanka: A Country Study on the growth of nationalism. The Allies' wartime propaganda ex- tolled the virtues of freedom and self-determination of nations, and the message was heard and duly noted by Sri Lankan nationalists. There was, however, an event, only indirectly related to the war, that served as the immediate spark for the growth of nationalism. In 1915 communal rioting broke out between the Sinhalese and Muslims on the west coast. The British panicked, misconstruing the disturbances as part of an antigovernment conspiracy; they blamed the majority ethnic group and indiscriminately arrested many Sinhalese, including D.S. Senanayake — the future first prime minister of Sri Lanka — who had actually tried to use his influence to curb the riots. The British put down the unrest with excessive zeal and brutality, which shocked British and Sri Lankan observ- ers alike. Some sympathetic accounts of the unrest take into con- sideration that the judgment of the governor of the time, Sir Robert Chalmers (1913-16), may have been clouded by the loss of his two sons on the Western Front in Europe. At any rate, his actions in- sured that 1915 was a turning point in the nationalist movement. From then on, activists mobilized for coordinated action against the British. The nationalist movement in India served as a model to nation- alists in Sri Lanka. In 1917 the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League mended their differences and issued a joint decla- ration for the "progressive realization" of responsible government in India. Nationalists in Sri Lanka learned from their Indian coun- terparts that they had to become more national and less partisan in their push for constitutional reform. In 1919 the major Sinha- lese and Tamil political organizations united to form the Ceylon National Congress. One of the first actions of the congress was to submit a proposal for a new constitution that would increase local control over the Executive Council and the budget. These demands were not met, but they led to the promulgation of a new constitu- tion in 1920. Amendments to the constitution in 1924 increased Sri Lankan representation. Although the nationalists' demand for representation in the Executive Council was not granted, the Legis- lative Council was expanded to include a majority of elected Sri Lankan unofficial members, bringing the island closer to represen- tative government. Yet the franchise remained restrictive and in- cluded only about 4 percent of the island's population. The Donoughmore Commission In 1927 a royal commission under the Earl of Donoughmore visited Sri Lanka to ascertain why representative government as chartered by the 1924 constitution had not succeeded and to suggest 36 Historical Setting constitutional changes necessary for the island's eventual self-rule. The commission declared that the constitution had authorized a government characterized by the "divorce of power from respon- sibility," which at times seemed "rather like holy matrimony at its worst." The 1924 constitution, considered by the commission to be "an unqualified failure," failed to provide a strong, credible executive body of representatives. To remedy these shortcomings, the commission proposed universal adult franchise and an ex- perimental system of government to be run by executive commit- tees. The resulting Donoughmore Constitution, promulgated in 1931 to accommodate these new proposals in government, was a unique document that provided Sri Lankans with training for self- government. The document, however, reserved the highest level of responsibility for the British governor, whose assent was neces- sary for all legislation. The legislative branch of the government — the State Council — functioned in both an executive and legislative capacity. Seven committees performed executive duties. Each com- mittee consisted of designated members of the State Council and was chaired by an elected Sri Lankan, who was addressed as minister. Three British officers of ministerial rank, along with the seven Sri Lankan ministers, formed a board of ministers. The Brit- ish ministers collectively handled responsibility for defense, external affairs, finance, and judicial matters. The Donoughmore Constitution ushered in a period of ex- perimentation in participatory democracy but contemporary political scientists have criticized it for not having provided an at- mosphere conducive to the growth of a healthy party system. The system of executive committees did not lead to the development of national political parties. Instead, a number of splinter political groups evolved around influential personalities who usually followed a vision too limited or an agenda too communally partisan to have an impact on national politics. Among the Sinhalese, a form of nationalism arose that sought once again to restore Buddhism to its former glory. The Great Council of the Sinhalese (Sinhala Maha Sabha), which was founded by S. W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1937, was the strongest proponent of this resurgent ideology. Other groups followed suit, also organiz- ing on communal grounds. These groups included the Burgher Political Association in 1938, the Ceylon Indian Congress in 1939, and the All Ceylon Tamil Congress in 1944. Growth of Leftist Parties During the Donoughmore period of political experimentation, several leftist parties were formed. Unlike most other Sri Lankan 37 Sri Lanka: A Country Study parties, these leftist parties were noncommunal in membership. Working-class activism, especially trade unionism, became an im- portant political factor during the sustained economic slump be- tween the world wars. The first important leftist party was the Labour Party, founded in 1931 by A.E. Goonesimha. Three Marxist-oriented parties — the Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka Sama Samaja Party — LSSP), the Bolshevik-Leninist Party, and the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL) — represented the far left. All three were divided on both ideological and personal grounds. The Soviet Union's expulsion of Leon Trotsky from the Communist Party after Lenin's death in 1924 and Stalin's subse- quent decision to enter World War II on the Allied side exacer- bated these differences, dividing the Communists into Trotskyites and Stalinists. The LSSP, formed in 1935 and the oldest of the Sri Lankan Marxist parties, took a stance independent of the Soviet Union, becoming affiliated with the Trotskyite Fourth International, which was a rival of the Comintern. Most LSSP leaders were arrested during World War II for their opposition to what they considered to be an ''imperial war." Although in more recent years, the LSSP has been considered a politically spent force, gaining, for example less than 1 percent of the vote in the 1982 presidential elections, it has nevertheless been touted as the world's only suc- cessful Trotskyite party. The CPSL, which began as a Stalinist faction of the LSSP that was later expelled, formed its own party in 1943, remaining faith- ful to the dictates of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Bolshevik-Leninist Party was formed in 1945 as another breakaway group of the LSSP. The leftist parties represented the numerically small urban working class. Partly because these par- ties operated through the medium of trade unionism, they lacked the wider mass appeal needed at the national level to provide an effective extraparliamentary challenge to the central government. Nonetheless, because the leftists occasionally formed temporary political coalitions before national elections, they posed more than just a mere "parliamentary nuisance factor." World War II and the Transition to Independence When Singapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942, Sri Lanka became a central base for British operations in Southeast Asia, and the port at Trincomalee recaptured its historically strategic impor- tance. Because Sri Lanka was an indispensable strategic bastion for the British Royal Navy, it was an irresistible military target for the Japanese. For a time, it seemed that Japan planned a sweep- ing westward offensive across the Indian Ocean to take Sri Lanka, 38 Colombo Harbor with its breakwater Courtesy Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington sever the Allies' lifeline to Persian Gulf oil, and link up with the Axis powers in Egypt. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, mastermind of the raid on Pearl Harbor, ordered Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo to command a large armada to seek and destroy the British Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean. The two nations' fleets played a game of hide-and-seek, but never met. Some military historians assert that if they had met, the smaller British fleet would have met with disaster. The British instead fought several desperate air battles over Colombo and Trincomalee and lost about thirty- six aircraft and several ships. Yamamoto 's grand strategy failed to isolate and destroy any major units of the British fleet. But if the Japanese had persisted with their offensive, the island, with its limited British naval defenses, probably would have fallen. The Japanese carrier force, however, suffered such high aircraft losses over Sri Lanka — more than 100 warplanes — that it returned to Japan for refitting rather than press the attack. By returning to Japan, the force lost its op- portunity for unchallenged supremacy of the Indian Ocean. The focus of the war in this theater then shifted away from the island. On the whole, Sri Lanka benefited from its role in World War II. The plantation sector was busy meeting the urgent demands of the Allies for essential products, especially rubber, enabling the country to save a surplus in hard currency. Because Sri Lanka was 39 Sri Lanka: A Country Study the seat of the Southeast Asia Command, a broad infrastructure of health services and modern amenities was built to accommo- date the large number of troops posted into all parts of the coun- try. The inherited infrastructure improved the standard of living in postwar, independent Sri Lanka. Unlike India, where nationalists demanded a guarantee of in- dependence as recompense for their support in the war effort, Sri Lanka committed itself wholeheartedly to the Allied war effort. Although the island was put under military jurisdiction during the war, the British and the Sri Lankans maintained cooperative rela- tions. Sri Lankan pressure for political reform continued during the war, however, and increased as the Japanese threat receded and the war neared its end. The British eventually promised full participatory government after the war. In July 1944, Lord Soulbury was appointed head of a commis- sion charged with the task of examining a new constitutional draft that the Sri Lankan ministers had proposed. The commission made recommendations that led to a new constitution. As the end of the war approached, the constitution was amended to incorporate a provision giving Sri Lanka dominion status. British constitutional principles served as a model for the Soul- bury Constitution of independent Sri Lanka, which combined a parliamentary system with a bicameral legislature. Members of the first House of Representatives were directiy elected by popular vote. Members of the Senate, or upper house, were elected partly by members of the House and partly by the governor general, who was primarily a figurehead. The British monarch appointed the governor general on the advice of the most powerful person in the Sri Lankan government — the prime minister (see Historical Per- spective, 1802-1978, ch. 4). Independence The British negotiated the island's dominion status with the leader of the State Council, D.S. Senanayake, during World War II. Senanayake was also minister of agriculture and vice chairman of the Board of Ministers. The negotiations ended with the Ceylon Independence Act of 1947, which formalized the transfer of power. Senanayake was the founder and leader of the United National Party (UNP), a partnership of many disparate groups formed dur- ing the Donoughmore period, including the Ceylon National Con- gress, the Sinhala Maha Sabha, and the Muslim League. The UNP easily won the 1947 elections, challenged only by a collection of small, primarily leftist parties. On February 4, 1948, when the new 40 Historical Setting constitution went into effect (making Sri Lanka a dominion), the UNP embarked on a ten-year period of rule. Divisions in the Body Politic The prospects for an economically robust, fully participatory, and manageable democracy looked good during the first years of independence. In contrast to India, which had gained independence a year earlier, there was no massive violence and little social un- rest. In Sri Lanka there was also a good measure of governmental continuity. Still, important unresolved ethnic problems soon had to be addressed. The most immediate of these problems was the "Indian question," which concerned the political status of Tamil immigrants who worked on the highland tea plantations. The Soul- bury Commission had left this sensitive question to be resolved by the incoming government. After independence, debate about the status of the Indian Tamils continued. But three pieces of legislation — the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948, the Indian and Pakistani Residents Act No. 3 of 1948, and the Ceylon Parliamentary Elections Amendment Act No. 48 of 1949 — all but disenfranchised this minority group. The Ceylon Indian Congress vigorously but unsuccessfully opposed the legis- lation. The acrimonious debate over the laws of 1948 and 1949 revealed serious fissures in the body politic. There was a cleavage along ethnic lines between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, and also a widening rift between Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils. In 1949 a faction of the Ceylon Tamil Congress (the major Tamil party in Sri Lanka at the time) broke away to form the (Tamil) Federal Party under the leadership of S.J.V. Chelvanayakam. The creation of the Federal Party was a momentous postindependence development because it set the agenda for Tamil exclusivity in Sri Lankan politics. Soon after its founding, the Federal Party replaced the more conciliatory Tamil Congress as the major party among Sri Lankan Tamils and advocated an aggressive stance vis-a-vis the Sinhalese. United National Party "Majority" Rule, 1948-56 The largest political party in independent Sri Lanka, the United National Party (UNP), emerged as an umbrella party from the colonial era. It was similar in some respects to the Indian National Congress. Like its Indian counterpart, the UNP represented a union of a number of groups espousing different personalities and ideol- ogies. Known later as the "uncle-nephew party" because of the kinship ties among the party's top leadership, the UNP served as the standard-bearer of conservative forces. In late 1947, when the 41 Sri Lanka: A Country Study party won the country's first general election, the UNP attempted to establish an anticommunist, intercommunal parliamentary form of government. Prominent nationalists, such as D.S. Senanayake and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (the country's first and fourth prime ministers, respectively), led the UNP. The party's internal differ- ences gradually worsened, however. The first and most serious break came in July 1951, when Bandaranaike 's left-of-center bloc seceded to form the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the first major non-Marxist political movement to oppose the UNP. Despite the benevolent guidance of Senanayake, the UNP could not defuse the nascent dissension between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Some of Senanayake 's policies, particularly his awarding of land grants to Sinhalese settlers for the resettlement of the north- ern dry zone, precipitated renewed competition between the two ethnic groups. When Senanayake died in a horseback-riding accident in March 1952, not only the UNP, but also the entire nation suffered from the loss of the only man who could pose as a credible symbol for the country's unity. In the election that was held immediately after Senanayake' s death, the UNP, led by his son Dudley, and the SLFP, led by Bandaranaike, vied for Sinhalese votes, while the Tamil Congress and Federal Party competed for the Tamil vote. The UNP won the election, and the SLFP emerged as major op- position party. The SLFP managed to win only nine out of forty- eight seats in Parliament. The Tamil Congress, having supported the UNP, lost much of its following to the Federal Party, which continued to advocate an autonomous homeland within a Sri Lankan federation. Ethnic tensions, although mounting, remained manageable . After D.S. Senanayake 's death, the nation's economic problems became apparent. The terms of world trade were turning against Sri Lanka. The population was growing faster than production in most sectors. A World Bank (see Glossary) study completed in 1952 noted that social and welfare services were consuming 35 percent of the budget. The report recommended that the government rice subsidy — which accounted for the major portion of the expenditure — be reduced. Prime Minister Senanayake followed the advice, but the move proved to be his political undoing. A mas- sive, sometimes violent civil disobedience movement was launched to protest the reduction of the rice subsidy and provoked the resig- nation of Senanayake. In October 1953, his cousin, Sir John Kotelawala, became prime minister and remained in office until the UNP defeat in the 1956 election. 42 Historical Setting The UNP government under Kotelawala disagreed with India's interpretation of political solidarity in the developing world. This divergence became painfully clear to India at the Colombo Con- ference of 1954 and the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955. Kotelawala' s strident condemnation of communism, as well as the more fashionable condemnation of Western imperialism, especially irritated India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Kotelawala was also anxious to have Ceylon join the Southeast Asia Treaty Or- ganization (SEATO), but he encountered strong domestic oppo- sition to the plan. The Soviet Union was especially sensitive to what it considered the government's pro- Western attitude and repeat- edly vetoed Sri Lanka's application to join the United Nations (UN). Sri Lanka was finally admitted in 1955 as part of an East- West agreement. The UNP continued a defense agreement with the British that spared Sri Lanka the cost of maintaining a large military estab- lishment. National defense consumed less than 4 percent of the government budget in the postindependence years, and hence the military was not in a position to interfere with politics. Emergence of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party Following its defeat in 1952, the SLFP marshaled its forces in preparation for the next national election. The 1956 election was destined to become a turning point in the modern history of Sri Lanka and is seen by many observers as a social revolution result- ing in the eclipse of the Westernized elite. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike campaigned as the "defender of a besieged Sinhalese culture" and demanded radical changes in the system. Bandaranaike came from a family of Westernized Sinhalese and was educated at Oxford, but early in his political career, he rejected many of the Western elements of his background and embraced the Buddhist faith and adopted native garb (regarded at the time as an affectation among members of his class). Bandaranaike brought to the election a deep knowledge of the passions that communal politics could provoke. His Sinhala Maha Sabha, founded in 1937 as a movement within the Ceylon National Congress, was the only wing of the congress at that time that sought to infuse a Sinhala consciousness into Sri Lankan nationalism. The Sinhala Maha Sabha formed the back- bone of Bandaranaike 's SLFP and helped spread his 1956 election warning that Buddhism was in danger. Accusations of a "conspira- cy" between the UNP and the Roman Catholic Church helped raise emotions feverishly. As one commentator put it, "Ban- daranaike built up a popular following based on the Sinhalese dislike 43 Sri Lanka: A Country Study of Christian influence, essentially stoking the fires of communal and religious bigotry." Bandaranaike and his supporters used the UNP's pro-Western stance as a potent propaganda weapon against the party. He claimed that the independence granted in 1948 was "fake" and that real independence could only be attained by severing all links with the Commonwealth of Nations. In economic matters, Bandaranaike planned to nationalize plantations, banks, and insurance compa- nies. He advocated the control over trade and industry vested in Sinhalese hands. With such a radical platform, Bandaranaike managed to unite many disparate groups into his People's United Front (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna — MEP), a political coalition under the leadership of his SLFP formed to defeat the UNP. In addition, he was able to forge a no-contest pact with two Marxist parties, the LSSP and the CPSL. The central and most explosive issue of the 1956 election was a linguistic one. After independence, it was commonly accepted that Sinhala and Tamil would replace English as the language of administration, but Bandaranaike announced that only Sinhala would be given official status if his coalition won the election. Ban- daranaike introduced a dangerous emotionalism into the election with his "Sinhala only" platform, which labeled both Tamil and English as cultural imports. The 2,500th anniversary of the death of the Buddha (which also marked the legendary landing of Vijaya and his followers on the island) coincided with the 1956 election, electrifying the political atmosphere. The UNP was susceptible to the emotional power of these issues. In what was later seen as a shameless last-minute rever- sal, the party also espoused the "Sinhala only" program. This po- litical about-face came too late to help the UNP, for the party lost the election, winning only eight seats in parliament. The People's United Front won the majority share of fifty-one seats. Tamil Politics Some political commentators hold that it was in the wake of the 1956 elections that two completely separate and basically hostile political systems emerged in Sri Lanka: one for the Sinhalese and another for the Tamils. The trend toward Tamil exclusivity, however, despite periods of accommodation with Sinhalese politi- cal parties, had begun developing before independence. The first political organization to be formed specifically to protect the wel- fare of an ethnic minority was the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), which G.G. Ponnambalam founded in 1944. The Tamil Congress attempted to secure adequate constitutional safeguards 44 Historical Setting before the country attained its independence. These attempts re- flected Tamil anxieties that British domination would simply give way to domination by the Sinhalese majority. After independence, a dissident Tamil group in the ACTC emerged under the leadership of S.J. V. Chelvanayakam. The new group disagreed with Ponnambalam's policy of collaboration with the intercommunal, but Sinhalese-dominated, UNP. In 1949 the dissidents broke away from the ACTC and formed the rival Federal Party, which proposed establishing an autonomous Tamil linguistic state within a federal union of Sri Lanka. The Federal Party regarded this alternative as the only practical way to preserve Tamil identity. In 1956 the Federal Party emerged as the dominant Tamil po- litical group as a result of its convincing victory over the conserva- tive Tamil Congress. The Federal Party had a distinct advantage because the Tamil Congress had suffered considerably from the stigma of its association with the UNP (which had abandoned its policy of making both Sinhala and Tamil national languages in an attempt to obtain the support of the numerically greater Sinha- lese vote). The Federal Party continued to consolidate its strength and be- came an important player in national politics. In 1965 the party became a component of the UNP-led coalition government by com- mitting its bloc of parliamentary seats to the UNP, which at that time needed the Federal Party's support to form a stable parliamen- tary majority. In 1968 however, the Federal Party withdrew from the UNP government because its leaders were convinced that the party could no longer derive any tangible benefits from further association with the UNP. In 1970 the Federal Party campaigned independently, unlike the Tamil Congress, whose leaders called on the Tamils to join a united front with the Sinhalese. Sri Lanka Freedom Party Rule, 1956-65 Legislation and Communal Agitation Some of the first actions taken by the new SLFP government reflected a disturbing insensitivity to minority concerns. Shortly after its victory, the new government presented parliament with the Official Language Act, which declared Sinhala the one official language. The act was passed and immediately caused a reaction among Tamils, who perceived their language, culture, and eco- nomic position to be under attack. The passage of the Official Language Act precipitated a current of antagonism between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. The Sri 45 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Lankan Tamils, represented by the Federal Party, launched a satyagraha (nonviolent protest) that resulted in a pact between S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and S.J.V. Chelvanayakam. The agree- ment provided a wide measure of Tamil autonomy in North- ern and Eastern provinces. It also provided for the use of the Tamil language in administrative matters. The Bandaranaike- Chelvanayakam Pact also promised that "early consideration" would be extended to Indian "plantation" Tamils on the ques- tion of Sri Lankan citizenship. But the pact was not carried out because of a peaceful protest by Buddhist clergy, who, with sup- port from the UNP, denounced the pact as a "betrayal of Sinhalese-Buddhist people." In May 1958, a rumor that a Tamil had killed a Sinhalese sparked off nationwide communal riots. Hundreds of people, mostly Tamils, died. This disturbance was the first major episode of communal violence on the island since independence. The riots left a deep psychological scar between the two major ethnic groups. The government declared a state of emergency and forcibly relocated more than 25,000 Tamil refugees from Sinhalese areas to Tamil areas in the north. Populist Economic Policies The Bandaranaike government actively expanded the public sec- tor and broadened domestic welfare programs, including pension plans, medical care, nutrition programs, and food and fuel subsi- dies. This social agenda threatened to drain the nation's treasury. Other popular but economically unfeasible schemes promoted by the Bandaranaike government included restrictions on foreign in- vestment, the nationalization of critical industries, and land reform measures that nationalized plantations and redistributed land to peasants. When a Buddhist extremist assassinated Bandaranaike in Sep- tember 1959, the nation faced a period of grave instability. The institution of parliamentary multiparty politics proved strong enough to endure, however, and orderly, constitutional actions resolved the leadership succession. The office of prime minister passed to the minister of education, Wijeyananda Dahanayake, who pledged to carry on the socialist policies of his predecessor. But policy differences and personality clashes within the ruling circle forced the new leader to dissolve Parliament in December 1959. The short-lived Dahanayake government, unable to hold Ban- daranaike 's coalition government together, was defeated by the UNP in the March 1960 general elections. The UNP won 33 46 Historical Setting percent of the seats in the lower house, giving the party a plurality but not a majority. United National Party Interlude The new prime minister, Dudley Senanayake, honored his elec- tion pledge to avoid compromise with the leftist parties and formed an all-UNP government with support from minor right-of-center parties. His overall parliamentary majority, however, was below the minimum seats required to defeat an opposition motion of no- confidence in the UNP cabinet. Less than a month after its for- mation, the UNP government fell. A new election was scheduled for July 1960. Return of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party The UNP fell because it lacked the support of any other major party in Parliament. The leftists tried to bring it down, and the Tamils withheld their support because the UNP had earlier hedged on the issue of the use of the Tamil language. Most important, the UNP had earned the reputation among Sinhalese voters of being a party inimical to Sinhalese nationalism. Meanwhile the SLFP had grown stronger because of its unwaver- ing support for making Sinhala the only official language. The SLFP found in the former prime minister's widow, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias (S.R.D.) Bandaranaike, a candidate who was more capable of arousing Sinhalese emotions than Dahanayake had been in the March elections. In the July 1960 general election, Bandaranaike was profiled as a woman who had nobly agreed to carry on the mandate of her assassinated husband. She received the support of many of the same small parties on the right and left that had temporarily joined together to form the People's United Front coalition (which had brought her husband victory in 1956). She won the election with an absolute majority in Parliament and became Sri Lanka's seventh, and the world's first woman, prime minister. The new government was in many ways the torchbearer for the ideas of S. W.R.D. Ban- daranaike, but under his widow's direction, the SLFP carried out these ideas with such zeal and force that Sinhalese-Tamil relations sharply deteriorated. One of Sirimavo Bandaranaike 's first official actions was to enforce the policy of Sinhala as the only officially recognized language of government. Her aggressive enforcement of this policy sparked immediate Tamil resistance, which resulted in civil disobedience in restive Northern and Eastern provinces. Bandaranaike reacted by declaring a state of emergency and cur- tailing Tamil political activity. 47 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Bandaranaike also antagonized other significant minority groups, particularly the Christians. In response to a recommendation by an unofficial Buddhist commission, her government took over the management of state-assisted denominational schools. The move deprived many Christian missionary schools of support. Roman Catholic activists spearheaded demonstrations, which forced the government to reconsider some of its measures. Still, relations be- tween the prime minister and the Christian denominations re- mained unstable. Bandaranaike moved vigorously early in her administration to nationalize significant sectors of the economy, targeting industries that were under foreign control. The 1961 creation of the State Petroleum Corporation adversely affected the major petroleum companies — Shell, Esso, and Caltex. The new corporation was guar- anteed 25 percent of the country's total petroleum business. Under Bandaranaike 's instruction, state corporations began to import oil from new sources, effectively altering for the first time the pattern of trade that had been followed since British rule. Sri Lanka signed oil import agreements with the Soviet Union, Romania, Egypt, and other countries not traditionally involved in Sri Lankan trade. The government also put important sectors of the local economy, par- ticularly the insurance industry, under state control. Most alarm- ing to Bandaranaike 's conservative opponents, however, were her repeated unsuccessful attempts to nationalize the largest newspaper syndicate and establish a press council to monitor the news media. In foreign relations, Bandaranaike was faithful to her late hus- band's policy of "dynamic neutralism," which aimed to steer a nonaligned diplomatic stance between the superpowers. Sri Lanka exercised its new foreign policy in 1962 by organizing a confer- ence of neutralist nations to mediate an end to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. Although the conference failed to end the war, it highlighted Sri Lanka's new role as a peacebroker and enhanced its international status. The UNP opposition was apprehensive of Bandaranaike 's left- ward drift and was especially concerned about the SLFP alliance with the Trotskyite LSSP in 1964. The UNP approached the March 1965 election as a senior partner in a broad front of "democratic forces" dedicated to fight the "totalitarianism of the left." It enjoyed significant support from the Federal Party (representing Sri Lankan Tamils) and the Ceylon Workers' Congress (representing Indian Tamils). The United National Party Regains Power, 1965-70 The UNP "national government" emerged victorious in the March 1965 elections, capturing more than 39 percent of 48 Historical Setting parliamentary seats, compared to SLFP's 30.2 percent. One of the first actions of the new government, led by Senanayake, was to declare that the nation's economy was virtually bankrupt. Senanayake also announced his intention to improve relations with the United States. (In 1963 the United States had suspended aid to Sri Lanka because of Bandaranaike's nationalization of foreign oil concerns.) The government tried to develop a mixed economy with an emphasis on the private sector. Between 1965 and 1970, private sector investment was double that of the public sector, thereby reversing the trend set in the previous administration. Despite the UNP's emphasis on the private sector, the economy generally failed to show a major improvement. This failure was partly caused by a nearly 50 percent increase in the cost of rice imports after a world- wide shortage in 1965 and a concurrent steep decline in the price of Sri Lanka's export commodities. In 1966 the UNP government was forced to declare a state of emergency to ward off food riots. Senanayake reduced the subsidized weekly rice ration by half. The reduction remained in effect throughout the remainder of the "na- tional government" period and contributed greatly to UNP's defeat in the 1970 general elections. The UNP paid more attention to Buddhist sensitivities than it had in the past, and in an effort to widen the party's popularity, it replaced the Christian sabbath with the Buddhist poya full-moon holiday. This action satisfied Buddhist activists but alienated the small but powerful Roman Catholic lobby. The UNP also tried to earn favor with the Tamils by enacting the Tamil Regulations in 1966, which were designed to make Tamil a language officially "parallel" to Sinhala in Tamil- speaking regions. Sinhalese activists immediately expressed hostility toward the Tamil Regulations. Civil violence ensued, and the government was forced to proclaim a state of emergency that lasted for most of the year. United Front Rule and Emerging Violence, 1970-77 In order to prepare for the 1970 general election, Sirimavo Ban- daranaike formed a coalition in 1968 with the LSSP and CPSL to oppose the UNP. The new three-party United Front (Samagi Peramuna) announced that it would work toward a "people's government" under the leadership of Bandaranaike and that it would follow a so-called Common Programme, which promised radical structural changes, including land reform, increased rice subsidies, and nationalization of local and foreign banks. The United Front resurrected communal emotionalism as a timely and potent campaign weapon. It attacked the UNP for its 49 Sri Lanka: A Country Study alliance with the two main Tamil political groups, the Federal Party and the Ceylon Workers' Congress. At the same time, the United Front also announced that it would adopt a new constitution to make Sri Lanka a republic and that it would restore "Buddhism to its rightful place." The United Front won 118 of the 135 seats it contested, with the SLFP, the biggest-single party, winning 90 seats, the LSSP 19 seats, and the CPSL 6 seats. The UNP won a meager seventeen seats. The United Front government moved quickly to implement key features of its Common Programme. The philosophy of the coali- tion government was seen most transparently from its foreign and economic policies. The United Front issued declarations that it fol- lowed a nonaligned path; opposed imperialism, colonialism, and racism; and supported national liberation movements. The govern- ment quickly extended diplomatic relations to the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (then North Vietnam), the Democratic People's Repub- lic of Korea (North Korea), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. It also pledged to suspend recog- nition of Israel. In economic matters, the United Front vowed to put private enterprise in a subsidiary role. Prime Minister Bandaranaike tolerated the radical left at first and then lost control of it. Sensing mounting unrest, the govern- ment declared a state of emergency in March 1971. In April, the People's Liberation Front Qanatha Vimukthi Peramuna — J VP), a Maoist and primarily rural Sinhalese youth movement claiming a membership of more than 10,000, began a "blitzkrieg" opera- tion to take over the government "within 24 hours." The JVP fol- lowed a program — known as the Five Lectures — that included an agenda to deal with "Indian expansionism," the island's unstable economic situation, and the inability of the traditionalist leftist leadership to assert power or attract widespread support (an allu- sion to the LSSP and the CPSL). The JVP threatened to take power by extraparliamentary means. Fierce fighting erupted in the north- central, south-central, and southern rural districts of the island, causing an official estimate of 1,200 dead. Unofficial tallies of the number of dead were much higher. The JVP came perilously close to overthrowing the government but the military finally suppressed the movement and imprisoned J VP's top leadership and about 16,000 suspected insurgents. In May 1972, the United Front followed through on its 1970 campaign promise to promulgate a new constitution to make Sri Lanka a republic. Under the new constitution, the legislative, ex- ecutive, and judicial branches of government were vested in the 50 Historical Setting National State Assembly. Many important and vocal sectors of society opposed this concentration of power. The 1972 constitu- tion disturbed the UNP, which feared an authoritarian government might emerge because of the new document. The UNP was especially alarmed that a Trotskyite, Dr. Colvin de Silva (Ban- daranaike's minister of constitutional affairs), had drafted the con- stitution. The distinct lack of protection for the rights of minorities in the new constitution dismayed many sectors of the population. The Tamils were especially disturbed because the 1972 constitution con- tained no elements of federalism. Instead, a newly conferred sta- tus for Buddhism replaced the provisions for minorities provided by Article 29 in the 1948 constitution. The constitution also sanc- tioned measures that discriminated against Tamil youth in univer- sity admissions. Tamil youth were particularly irked by the "standardization" policy that Bandaranaike's government in- troduced in 1973. The policy made university admissions criteria lower for Sinhalese than for Tamils. The Tamil community — the Federal Party, the Tamil Congress, and other Tamil organiza- tions — reacted collectively against the new atmosphere the new con- stitution produced, and in May 1972, they founded the Tamil United Front (which became the Tamil United Liberation Front — TULF— in 1976). By the mid-1970s, the antagonism between the right and left was destroying the United Front coalition. The growing political in- fluence of the right wing led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike's son, Anura, precipitated the expulsion of the LSSP from the United Front in September 1975. The withdrawal of the CPSL in 1977 further weakened the coalition. The United National Party Returns to Power After Dudley Senanayake died in 1973, a struggle for the leader- ship of the UNP ensued between his nephew, Rukman Senanayake, and Junius Richard (J.R.) Jayewardene, a more distant relative. Jayewardene had been involved in politics for years, having been elected to the State Council, the parliament's colonial predeces- sor, as early as 1943. A leader of the UNP since independence, Jayewardene had deferred to the Senanayake family. But in 1970, when the UNP suffered a resounding defeat to the United Front, Jayewardene became more assertive. His party manifesto — The UNP in Opposition, 1970 — contended that the majority of Sri Lankans perceived the party as the party of the "haves, the af- fluent, and the employers." He also contended that the people had come to perceive the SLFP as the party of the "have nots, the needy, 51 Sri Lanka: A Country Study and the unemployed." Jayewardene moved forcefully to refurbish UNP's image and announced that the party would inaugurate an era of a just and righteous (dharmishta) society. After becoming presi- dent of the party, Jayewardene began to restructure the UNP and make the party more attractive, especially to young people. By the time of the general election of 1977, Jayewardene had developed an extensive grass roots party organization. Election of 1977 and More Violence After molding the UNP around his personality and having suc- cessfully built up the party's infrastructure, Jayewardene easily be- came prime minister. The UNP won an unprecedented landslide victory in the 1977 elections, winning 140 of 168 seats. The SLFP was reduced to eight seats. The Sri Lankan Tamils, however, gave little support to Jayewardene or any other non-Tamil politician. The Sri Lankan Tamils entered the parliamentary election fray under the banner of TULF, which had elevated its earlier demand for regional self-rule to a demand for an independent state, or Eelam (see Glossary). TULF became the largest opposition party in Parlia- ment and captured all fourteen seats in the heavily Tamil North- ern Province and four east coast seats. TULF won in every constituency with a Tamil majority on the island, except one. In Jaffna District, TULF candidates won all eleven seats, although forty-seven other candidates contested the seats. TULF originally included the largest Indian (plantation) Tamil political organiza- tion, the Ceylon Workers' Congress, but after the 1977 election, the leader of the Ceylon Workers' Congress accepted a cabinet post in the UNP government. The Sri Lankan Tamil demand for Tamil Eelam had never been of central concern to the Indian Tamils, who lived mostly outside the territory being claimed for the Tamil state. The opportunities for peace that the 1977 UNP electoral vic- tory provided were soon lost. Just before the 1977 elections, Chel- vanayakam, the charismatic leader of TULF, died, leaving the party without strong leadership. A Tamil separatist underground (which had split into six or more rival and sometimes violently hostile groups that were divided by ideology, caste, and personal an- tagonisms) was filling the vacuum left by the weakened TULF and was gaining the allegiance of an increasing number of disenchanted Tamil youths. These groups were known collectively as the Tamil Tigers. The strongest of these separatists were the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), founded in 1972 by Velupillai Prabhaka- ran. The LTTE was responsible for some of the earliest and most gruesome acts of Tamil terrorism (see the Tamil Insurgency, ch. 5). 52 Historical Setting The LTTE first gained notoriety by its 1975 assassination of the mayor of Jaffna, a supporter of the SLFP. During the 1977 elec- tions, many Tamil youths began to engage in extraparliamentary and sometimes violent measures in their bid for a mandate for a separate state. These measures precipitated a Sinhalese backlash. An apparently false rumor that Sinhalese policemen had died at the hands of Tamil terrorists, combined with other rumors of al- leged anti-Sinhalese statements made by Tamil politicians, sparked brutal communal rioting that engulfed the island within two weeks of the new government's inauguration. The rioting marked the first major outbreak of communal violence in the nineteen years since the riots of 1958. Casualties were many, especially among Tamils, both the Sri Lankan Tamils of Jaffna and the Indian Tamil plan- tation workers. The Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation Organization estimated the death toll at 300 persons. Constitution of 1978 After coming to power, Jayewardene directed the rewriting of the constitution. The document that was produced, the new Con- stitution of 1978, drastically altered the nature of governance in Sri Lanka. It replaced the previous Westminster- style, parliamen- tary government with a new presidential system modeled after France, with a powerful chief executive. The president was to be elected by direct suffrage for a six-year term and was empowered to appoint, with parliamentary approval, the prime minister and to preside over cabinet meetings. Jayewardene became the first president under the new Constitution and assumed direct control of the government machinery and party. The new regime ushered in an era that did not auger well for the SLFP. Jayewardene' s UNP government accused former prime minister Bandaranaike of abusing her power while in office from 1970 to 1977. In October 1980, Bandaranaike 's privilege to en- gage in politics was removed for a period of seven years, and the SLFP was forced to seek a new leader. After a long and divisive battle, the party chose her son, Anura. Anura Bandaranaike was soon thrust into the role of the keeper of his father's legacy, but he inherited a political party torn apart by factionalism and reduced to a minimal role in the Parliament. The 1978 Constitution included substantial concessions to Tamil sensitivities. Although TULF did not participate in framing the Constitution, it continued to sit in Parliament in the hope of negotiating a settlement to the Tamil problem. TULF also agreed to Jayewardene 's proposal of an all-party conference to resolve the island's ethnic problems. Jayewardene's UNP offered other 53 Sri Lanka: A Country Study concessions in a bid to secure peace. Sinhala remained the official language and the language of administration throughout Sri Lanka, but Tamil was given a new "national language" status. Tamil was to be used in a number of administrative and educational circum- stances. Jayewardene also eliminated a major Tamil grievance by abrogating the "standardization" policy of the United Front government, which had made university admission criteria for Tamils more difficult. In addition, he offered many top-level po- sitions, including that of minister of justice, to Tamil civil servants. While TULF, in conjunction with the UNP, pressed for the all- party conference, the Tamil Tigers escalated their terrorist attacks, which provoked Sinhalese backlash against Tamils and generally precluded any successful accommodation. In reaction to the as- sassination of a Jaffna police inspector, the Jayewardene govern- ment declared an emergency and dispatched troops, who were given an unrealistic six months to eradicate the terrorist threat. The government passed the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act in 1979. The act was enacted as a temporary meas- ure, but it later became permanent legislation. The International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and other human rights organizations condemned the act as being incompatible with democratic traditions. Despite the act, the number of terrorist acts increased. Guerrillas began to hit targets of high symbolic value such as post offices and police outposts, provoking government counterattacks. As an increasing number of civilians were caught in the fighting, Tamil support widened for the "boys," as the guer- rillas began to be called. Other large, well-armed groups began to compete with LTTE. The better-known included the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam, Tamil Eelam Libera- tion Army, and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization. Each of these groups had forces measured in the hundreds if not thou- sands. The government claimed that many of the terrorists were operating from training camps in India's Tamil Nadu State. The Indian government repeatedly denied this claim. With the level of violence mounting, the possibility of negotiation became increas- ingly distant. The Riots of 1981 In June 1981 , local elections were held in the north to elect mem- bers of the newly established district development councils. TULF had decided to participate and work in the councils. In doing so, TULF continued to work toward autonomy for the Tamil areas. Extremists within the separatist movement, however, adamantly opposed working within the existing political framework. They 54 Historical Setting viewed participation in the elections as compromising the objec- tive of a separate state. Shortly before the elections, the leading candidate of the UNP was assassinated as he left a political rally. The sporadic communal violence that persisted over the following three months foreshadowed the devastating communal riots of 1983. When elections were held a few days later, concomitant charges of voting irregularities and mishandling of ballots created the na- tion's first election scandal since the introduction of universal suffrage fifty years earlier. Presidential Election of 1982 TULF decided to boycott the 1982 presidential elections, partly in reaction to the harsh Prevention of Terrorism Act and partly in response to pressures exerted by Tamil extremists. Only 46 per- cent of the voters in Jaffna District turned out. In Sinhalese dis- tricts, 85 percent of voters turned out. Increasing violence by Tamil youths in the north and east of the island accompanied the call for a Tamil Eelam. The rising level of violence in 1983 led the govern- ment to pass a sixth amendment to the Constitution, which specif- ically banned talk of separatism. All sixteen TULF members of parliament were expelled for refusing to recite a loyalty oath, thus removing a critical channel for mediation. The Riots of July 1983 In July 1983, the most savage communal riots in Sri Lanka's history erupted. Conservative government estimates put the death toll at 400— mostly Tamils. At least 150,000 Tamil fled the is- land. The riots began in retaliation for an ambush of an army patrol in the north that left thirteen Sinhalese soldiers dead. The army was reputed to have killed sixty Tamil civilians in Jaffna, but most of the violence occurred in Colombo, where Sinhalese mobs looked for Tamil shops to destroy. More than any previous ethnic riot on the island, the 1983 riots were marked by their highly organized mob violence. Sinhalese rioters in Colombo used voter lists con- taining home addresses to make precise attacks on the Tamil com- munity. From Colombo, the anti-Tamil violence fanned out to the entire island. The psychological effects of this violence on Sri Lan- ka's complex and divided society were still being assessed in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the communal riot- ing, a self-evident truth was that the island's history, and the com- plexity of its society, had a portentous message for the present: Sinhalese and Tamil Sri Lankans were fated by history and geo- graphy to coexist in close proximity. This coexistence could be dis- cordant or amicable, and examples of both could be drawn from 55 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Sri Lanka's history. It was a message, however, whose meaning was forgotten as the ethnic communities were drawn increasingly into a vortex of rancor and violence that made the restoration of harmony a persistently elusive goal for the Sri Lankan government. * * * Informative general histories of Sri Lanka include K.M. de Silva's A History of Sri Lanka, E.F.C. Ludowyk's A Short History of Ceylon, Zeylanicus's Ceylon, S. Arasaratnam's Ceylon, and Chan- dra Richard de Silva's Sri Lanka: A History. Source books on medieval history are Wilhelm Geiger's translations of the Pali chronicles, the Mahavamsa and Culavamsa, and the comprehensive The Early History of Ceylon by G.C. Mendis. Highly informative for the study of modern political events and ethnic disturbances are S.J. Tambiah's Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, A. Jeyaratnam Wilson's Politics in Sri Lanka, and Govern- ment and Politics in South Asia by Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, and Robert C. Oberst. (For further infor- mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 56 Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment Woman bringing "ambula" (noon meal) to the field SRI LANKA LIES practically in the center of the Indian Ocean and thus has climatic and cultural links with three continents. Monsoon winds, driving against Sri Lanka's peaks, support lush vegetation on the southern half of the island, but the northern half is a dry zone. The winds affect human culture as well, having brought wave after wave of immigrants and merchants following the southerly trade routes. Outsiders found a wide range of eco- logical niches on the coast, on the plains, or in the mountains, and they built a remarkably variegated civilization. Merchants long have sought Sri Lanka as the source of pearls, jewels, spices, and tea. Visitors for centuries have marvelled at the beauty and great diver- sity of the island. The South Asian landmass to the north has strongly influenced Sri Lankan culture in the past and continues to do so. From an outlander's perspective, some of the main aspects of Sri Lankan society — language, caste, family structure — are regional variants of Indian civilization. From the perspective of the islander, however, the Indian influence is but the largest part of a continuing barrage of stimuli coming to Sri Lanka from all sides. The people of the island have absorbed these influences and built their own civili- zation. The Sinhalese (see Glossary), a distinct ethnic group speaking the Sinhala (see Glossary) language and practicing a variant of Theravada Buddhism (see Glossary), comprise the majority — 74 percent — of the population, and their values dominate public life. There are, however, substantial minority groups. The Tamils, speaking the Tamil language and generally practicing Hinduism, comprise almost 18 percent of the population. Muslims, many of whom speak Tamil as their main language, make up 7 percent of the populace. Each of the main ethnic groups is subdivided into several major categories, depending on variables of religion or geog- raphy. There also are sizable Christian minorities among the Sinhalese and Tamil. People living in the central highland region of the country generally adhere more closely to their traditional ethnic customs than lowland dwellers. Caste creates other social divisions. The Goyigama (see Glos- sary) caste of the Sinhalese — traditionally associated with land cultivation — is dominant in population and public influence, but in the lowlands other castes based on commercial activities are in- fluential. The Tamil Vellala caste resembles the Goyigama in its 59 Sri Lanka: A Country Study dominance and traditional connection with agriculture, but it is completely separate from the Sinhalese caste hierarchy. Within their separate caste hierarchies, Sinhalese and Tamil communities are fragmented through customs that separate higher from lower orders. These include elaborate rules of etiquette and a nearly complete absence of intercaste marriages. Differences in wealth arising from the modern economic system have created, however, wide class cleavages that cut across boundaries of caste, religion, and language. Because of all these divisions, Sri Lankan society is complex, with numerous points of potential conflict. The population of Sri Lanka has grown considerably since in- dependence in 1948, and in the 1980s was increasing by approxi- mately 200,000 people or 1.37 percent each year. Because of this population pressure, the government has faced a major develop- ment problem as it has attempted to reconcile the divergent in- terests of caste, class, and ethnic groups while trying to ensure adequate food, education, health services, and career opportuni- ties for the rapidly expanding population. Politicians and officials have attempted to meet these needs through a form of welfare so- cialism, providing a level of support services that is comparatively high for a developing nation. Building on colonial foundations, Sri Lanka has created a comprehensive education system, including universities, that has produced one of the best-educated popula- tions in Asia. A free state-run health system provides basic care that has raised average life expectancy to the highest level in South Asia. Ambitious housing and sanitation plans, although incomplete, promised basic amenities to all citizens by the year 2000. In 1988 the government addressed the nutritional deficiencies of the poor through a subsidized food stamp program and free nutrition pro- grams for children and mothers. The crucial problem facing Sri Lanka's plural society is whether it can evolve a form of socialism that will address the needs of all groups, or whether frustrated aspirations will engender further con- flict. In the field of education, for example, excellent accomplish- ments in elementary schooling have emerged alongside bitter competition for coveted places in the university system; this com- petition has fueled ethnic hatred between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. In a land with limited resources, the benefits of so- cial welfare programs highlight the inadequacies of progress for some regional or ethnic groups. In these circumstances, caste, eth- nic, or religious differences become boundaries between warring parties, and a person's language or place of worship becomes a sign of political affiliation. The social organization of Sri Lanka 60 The Society and Its Environment is thus an important component of the politics and economy in the developing nation. The Physical Environment Geology More than 90 percent of Sri Lanka's surface lies on Precambrian strata, some of it dating back 2 billion years. The metamorphic rock surface was created by the transformation of ancient sediments under intense heat and pressure during mountain-building pro- cesses. The theory of plate tectonics suggests that these rocks and related rocks forming most of south India were part of a single southern landmass called Gondwanaland. Beginning about 200 mil- lion years ago, forces within the earth's mantle began to separate the lands of the Southern Hemisphere, and a crustal plate support- ing both India and Sri Lanka moved toward the northeast. About 45 million years ago, the Indian plate collided with the Asian land- mass, raising the Himalayas in northern India, and continuing to advance slowly to the present time. Sri Lanka experiences few earth- quakes or major volcanic events because it rides on the center of the plate. The island contains relatively limited strata of sedimentation sur- rounding its ancient hills. Aside from recent deposits along river valleys, only two small fragments of Jurassic (140 to 190 million years ago) sediment occur in Puttalam District, while a more ex- tensive belt of Miocene (5 to 20 million years ago) limestone is found along the northwest coast, overlain in many areas by Pleistocene (1 million years ago) deposits (see fig. 1). The northwest coast is part of the deep Cauvery (Kaveri) River Basin of southeast India, which has been collecting sediments from the highlands of India and Sri Lanka since the breakup of Gondwanaland. Topography Extensive faulting and erosion over time have produced a wide range of topographic features, making Sri Lanka one of the most scenic places in the world. Three zones are distinguishable by ele- vation: the Central Highlands, the plains, and the coastal belt (see fig. 3). The south-central part of Sri Lanka — the rugged Central Highlands — is the heart of the country. The core of this area is a high plateau, running north-south for approximately sixty- five kilometers. This area includes some of Sri Lanka's highest mountains. (Pidurutalagala is the highest at 2,524 meters.) At the plateau's southern end, mountain ranges stretch 50 kilometers to 61 Sri Lanka: A Country Study ■Tai'k -Hait guff of Mannar Colombo® \_J A ® National capital • Populated place I Jaffna Peninsula Central Highlands Knuckles Massif IV Uva Basin V Hatton Plateau VI Sabaragamuwa Ridges VII Rakwana Hills 20 30 40 Kilometers 10 20 30 40 Miles 'Bay of (BengaC 7% Indian Ocean Figure 3. Topography and Drainage, 1988 62 The Society and Its Environment the west toward Adams Peak (2,243 meters) and 50 kilometers to the east toward Namunakuli (2,036 meters). Flanking the high cen- tral ridges are two lower plateaus. On the west is the Hatton Plateau, a deeply dissected series of ridges sloping downward toward the north. On the east, the Uva Basin consists of rolling hills covered with grasses, traversed by some deep valleys and gorges. To the north, separated from the main body of mountains and plateaus by broad valleys, lies the Knuckles Massif: steep escarpments, deep gorges, and peaks rising to more than 1 ,800 meters. South of Adams Peak lie the parallel ridges of the Rakwana Hills, with several peaks over 1,400 meters. The land descends from the Central Highlands to a series of escarpments and ledges at 400 to 500 meters above sea level before sloping down toward the coastal plains. Most of the island's surface consists of plains between 30 and 200 meters above sea level. In the southwest, ridges and valleys rise gradually to merge with the Central Highlands, giving a dis- sected appearance to the plain. Extensive erosion in this area has worn down the ridges and deposited rich soil for agriculture down- stream. In the southeast, a red, lateritic soil covers relatively level ground that is studded with bare, monolithic hills. The transition from the plain to the Central Highlands is abrupt in the southeast, and the mountains appear to rise up like a wall. In the east and the north, the plain is flat, dissected by long, narrow ridges of granite running from the Central Highlands. A coastal belt about thirty meters above sea level surrounds the island. Much of the coast consists of scenic sandy beaches indented by coastal lagoons. In the Jaffna Peninsula, limestone beds are ex- posed to the waves as low-lying cliffs in a few places. In the north- east and the southwest, where the coast cuts across the stratification of the crystalline rocks, rocky cliffs, bays, and offshore islands can be found; these conditions have created one of the world's best natural harbors at Trincomalee on the northeast coast, and a smaller rock harbor at Galle on the southwestern coast. Sri Lanka's rivers rise in the Central Highlands and flow in a radial pattern toward the sea. Most of these rivers are short. There are sixteen principal rivers longer than 100 kilometers in length, with twelve of them carrying about 75 percent of the mean river discharge in the entire country. The longest rivers are the Mahaweii Ganga (335 kilometers) and the Aruvi Aru (170 kilometers). In the highlands, river courses are frequently broken by discontinui- ties in the terrain, and where they encounter escarpments, numer- ous waterfalls and rapids have eroded a passage. Once they reach the plain, the rivers slow down and the waters meander across flood plains and deltas. The upper reaches of the rivers are wild and 63 Sri Lanka: A Country Study usually unnavigable, and the lower reaches are prone to seasonal flooding. Human intervention has altered the flows of some rivers in order to create hydroelectric, irrigation, and transportation projects. In the north, east, and southeast, the rivers feed numer- ous artificial lakes or reservoirs (tanks) that store water during the dry season. During the 1970s and 1980s, large-scale projects dammed the Mahaweli Ganga and neighboring streams to create large lakes along their courses (see Agriculture, ch. 3). Several hundred kilometers of canals, most of which were built by the Dutch in the eighteenth century, link inland waterways in the southwestern part of Sri Lanka. Climate Sri Lanka's position between 5° and 10° north latitude endows the country with a warm climate, moderated by ocean winds and considerable moisture. The mean temperature ranges from a low of 15.8°C in Nuwara Eliya in the Central Highlands (where frost may occur for several days in the winter) to a high of 29°C in Trin- comalee on the northeast coast (where temperatures may reach 37°C). The average yearly temperature for the country as a whole ranges from 26°C to 28°C. Day and night temperatures may vary by 4° to 7°. January is the coolest month, causing people, espe- cially those in the highlands, to wear coats and sweaters. May, the hottest period, precedes the summer monsoon rains. The rainfall pattern is influenced by the monsoon winds of the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal and is marked by four seasons. The first is from mid-May to October, when winds originate in the southwest, bringing moisture from the Indian Ocean. When these winds encounter the slopes of the Central Highlands, they unload heavy rains on the mountain slopes and the southwestern sector of the island. Some of the windward slopes receive up to 250 centimeters of rain per month, but the leeward slopes in the east and northeast receive little rain. The second season occurs in October and November, the intermonsoonal months. During this season, periodic squalls occur and sometimes tropical cyclones bring overcast skies and rains to the southwest, northeast, and eastern parts of the island. During the third season, December to March, monsoon winds come from the northeast, bringing moisture from the Bay of Bengal. The northeastern slopes of the mountains may be inundated with up to 125 centimeters of rain during these months. Another intermonsoonal period occurs from March until mid-May, with light, variable winds and evening thundershowers. Humidity is typically higher in the southwest and mountainous areas and depends on the seasonal patterns of rainfall. At Colombo, 64 The Society and Its Environment for example, daytime humidity stays above 70 percent all year, rising to almost 90 percent during the monsoon season in June. Anuradhapura experiences a daytime low of 60 percent during the intermonsoonal month of March, but a high of 79 percent during the November and December rains. In the highlands, Kandy's day- time humidity usually ranges between 70 and 79 percent. Ecological Zones The pattern of life in Sri Lanka depends directly on the availa- bility of rainwater. The mountains and the southwestern part of the country, known as the "wet zone," receive ample rainfall (an annual average of 250 centimeters). Most of the southeast, east, and northern parts of the country comprise the "dry zone," which receives between 120 and 190 centimeters of rain annually. Much of the rain in these areas falls from October to January; during the rest of the year there is very little precipitation, and all living creatures must conserve precious moisture. The arid northwest and southeast coasts receive the least amount of rain — 60 to 120 cen- timeters per year — concentrated within the short period of the winter monsoon (see fig. 4). The natural vegetation of the dry zone is adapted to the annual change from flood to drought. The typical ground cover is scrub forest, interspersed with tough bushes and cactuses in the driest areas. Plants grow very fast from November to February when rain- fall is heavy, but stop growing during the hot season from March to August. Various adaptations to the dry conditions have devel- oped. To conserve water, trees have thick bark; most have tiny leaves, and some drop their leaves during this season. Also, the topmost branches of the tallest trees often interlace, forming a canopy against the hot sun and a barrier to the dry wind. When water is absent, the plains of the dry zone are dominated by browns and grays. When water becomes available, either during the wet season or through proximity to rivers and lakes, the vegetation ex- plodes into shades of green with a wide variety of beautiful flow- ers. Varieties of flowering acacias are well adapted to the arid conditions and flourish on the Jaffna Peninsula. Among the trees of the dry-land forests are some valuable species, such as satin- wood, ebony, ironwood, and mahogany. In the wet zone, the dominant vegetation of the lowlands is a tropical evergreen forest, with tall trees, broad foliage, and a dense undergrowth of vines and creepers. Subtropical evergreen forests resembling those of temperate climates flourish in the higher alti- tudes. Montane vegetation at the highest altitudes tends to be stunted and windswept. 65 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Source: Based on information from Agro-Bio-Environmental Chart of Sri Lanka, Tokyo, Resources Council, Science and Technology Agency, 1977. Figure 4. Precipitation and Irrigation 66 The Society and Its Environment Forests at one time covered nearly the entire island, but by the late twentieth century lands classified as forests and forest reserves covered only one-fifth of the land. The southwestern interior con- tains the only large remnants of the original forests of the wet zone. The government has attempted to preserve sanctuaries for natu- ral vegetation and animal life, however. Ruhunu National Park in the southeast protects herds of elephant, deer, and peacocks, and Wilpattu National Park in the northwest preserves the habitats of many water birds, such as storks, pelicans, ibis, and spoonbills. During the Mahaweli Ganga Program of the 1970s and 1980s in northern Sri Lanka, the government set aside four areas of land totalling 190,000 hectares as national parks. Land Use and Settlement Patterns The dominant pattern of human settlement during the last 2,500 years has consisted of village farming communities. Even in the 1980s, the majority of people lived in small villages and worked at agricultural pursuits. Traditional farming techniques and life- styles revolve around two types of farming — "wet" and "dry" — depending upon the availability of water (see Agriculture, ch. 3). The typical settlement pattern in the rice-growing areas is a com- pact group of houses or neighborhood surrounding one or several religious centers that serve as the focus for communal activities. Sometimes the houses may be situated along a major road and in- clude a few shops, or the village may include several outlying ham- lets. The life-sustaining rice fields begin where the houses end and stretch into the distance. Some irrigated fields may include other cash crops, such as sugarcane, or groves of coconut trees. Palmyra trees grow on the borders of fields or along roads and paths. In- dividual houses also may have vegetable gardens in their com- pounds. During the rainy seasons and thereafter, when the fields are covered by growing crops, the village environment is intensely verdant. The nature of agricultural pursuits in Sri Lanka has changed over the centuries and has usually depended upon the availability of arable land and water resources. In earlier times, when villagers had access to plentiful forests that separated settlements from each other, slash-and-burn agriculture was a standard technique. As ex- panding population and commercial pressures reduced the amount of available forestland, however, slash-and-burn cultivation steadily declined in favor of permanent cultivation by private owners. Until the thirteenth century, the village farming communities were mainly on the northern plains around Anuradhapura and then Polonnaruwa, but they later shifted to the southwest (see Decline 67 Sri Lanka: A Country Study of the Sinhalese Kingdom, 1200-1500, ch. 1). In the 1980s, wide expanses of the northern and eastern plains were sparsely populated, with scattered villages each huddled around an artificial lake. The Jaffna Peninsula, although a dry area, is densely populated and in- tensively cultivated. The southwest contains most of the people, and villages are densely clustered with little unused land (see Popula- tion, this ch.). In the Central Highlands around Kandy, villagers faced with limited flat land have developed intricately terraced hill- sides where they grow rice. In the 1970s and 1980s, the wet culti- vation area was expanding rapidly, as the government implemented large-scale irrigation projects to restore the dry zone to agricultural productivity. In the 1980s, the area drained by the Mahaweli Ganga changed from a sparsely inhabited region to a wet rice area similar to the southwest. Through such projects, the government of Sri Lanka has planned to recreate in the dry zone the lush, irrigated landscape associated with the ancient Sinhalese civilization. Beginning in the sixteenth century and culminating during the British rule of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the planta- tion economy came to dominate large sections of the highlands. Plantation farming resulted in a drastic reduction in the natural forest cover and the substitution of domesticated crops, such as rub- ber, tea, or cinnamon. It also brought about a changed life-style, as the last hunting-and-gathering societies retreated into smaller areas and laborers moved into the highlands to work on planta- tions. Through the late twentieth century, workers on large plan- tations lived in villages of small houses or in "line rooms" containing ten to twelve units. The numerous plantations of small landholders frequently included attached hamlets of workers in ad- dition to the independent houses of the plantation owners. The coastal belt surrounding the island contains a different set- dement pattern that has evolved from older fishing villages. Separate fishing settlements expanded laterally along the coast, linked by a coastal highway and a railway. The mobility of the coastal popu- lation during colonial times and after independence led to an in- crease in the size and number of villages, as well as to the development of growing urban centers with outside contacts. In the 1980s, it was possible to drive for many kilometers along the southwest coast without finding a break in the string of villages and bazaar centers merging into each other and into towns. People Population During the early nineteenth century, the population of Sri Lanka was small and concentrated in the southwestern part of the island and in the Jaffna Peninsula in the north. The first official census, 68 The Society and Its Environment conducted by the British in 1871, recorded a total population of 2.8 million. Between then and the 1980s, the population increased sixfold. Population growth until around 1900 was given impetus by considerable immigration from southern India, as the British brought in hundreds of thousands of Tamils to work the planta- tion economy. These immigrants accounted for an estimated 40 to 70 percent of the population increase during the nineteenth cen- tury. Another significant factor in the growth of population after 1900 was a decline in mortality rates (see Health, this ch.). The period of fastest growth was the decade after independence, when the annual rate of increase was 2.8 percent. The official total in the 1981 census was 14,846,750, and some projections suggested a total of 18 million by 1991 and between 20 and 21 million by 2001. Furthermore, if the 1980s trends continue, the population will double in forty years (see table 2, Appendix). Although the increase in the number of people remained a major problem for Sri Lanka, there were indications in the 1980s that the country had moved beyond a period of uncontrolled population ex- pansion into a pattern similar to that of more industrialized nations. The crude fertility rate declined from 5.3 in 1953 — at the height of the postindependence baby boom — to 3.3 in 1981. Emigration, which outpaced immigration after 1953, also contributed to the decline in population growth. Between 1971 and 1981, for example, 313,000 Tamil workers from the plantation areas emigrated to south India. Increased employment opportunities in the Arab nations also attracted a substantial annual flow of workers from Sri Lanka (a total of 57,000 in 1981 alone). The lowering of the population growth rate was accompanied by changes in the age distribution, with the older age-groups increasing, and by the concentration of people in urban areas. Those phenomena also accompanied lower population growth in Europe and the United States. Population is not uniformly spread but is concentrated within the wet zone and urban centers on the coast and the Jaffna Penin- sula. The country's mean population density — based on 1981 census data — was 230 persons per square kilometer, but in Colombo Dis- trict density was 2,605 persons per square kilometer. In contrast, the dry zone districts of Vavuniya, Mannar, Mullaittivu, and Moneragala had fewer than fifty-five persons per square kilometer. One reason for the unequal settlement pattern was the rainfall dis- tribution, which made it possible for the wet zones to support larger village farming populations. Another reason was the slow but steady concentration of people in urban centers during the twentieth cen- tury. The ratio of Sri Lankans living in cities increased from 11 percent in 1871 to 15 percent in 1946 and 21.5 percent in 1981 (see fig. 5). 69 Sri Lanka: A Country Study The Society and Its Environment By 1985 a slowly declining crude birth rate hinted at a gradual aging of the population and changed requirements for social ser- vices (see table 3, Appendix). For the time being, however, there was considerable pressure for jobs, education, and welfare facili- ties from the large number of people who were raising families or pursuing careers. In the remaining decades of the century and be- yond there was likely to be greater pressure for housing and health care for an aging population. Urbanization has affected almost every area of the country since independence. Local market centers have grown into towns, and retail or service stores have cropped up even in small agricultural villages. The greatest growth in urban population, however, has occurred around a few large centers. In 1981 the urbanized popu- lation was 32.2 percent in Trincomalee District and 32.6 percent in Jaffna District, in contrast to the rural Moneragala District where only 2.2 percent of the people lived in towns. Colombo District, with 74.4 percent urban population, experienced the largest changes. Between 1881 and 1981, the city of Colombo increased its size from 25 to 37 square kilometers and its population from 110,502 to 587,647. Since independence was granted in 1948, there have been four main trends in migration. First, every year more people move from rural areas to the cities. Second, the cities have changed from con- centrated centers to sprawling suburbs. During the 1970s, the city of Colombo actually lost population, mostly to neighboring cities in Colombo District. Part of the suburban growth has resulted from a planned strategy to reduce urban congestion. For example, a new parliamentary complex opened in Sri Jayewardenepura in the suburb of Kotte east of Colombo in 1982 (although Colombo is still considered the national capital). Much of the growth, however, has been the unplanned proliferation of slums inhabited by poor and unskilled masses and lacking public utilities or services. Third, government irrigation projects attracted many farmers from the wet zone to the pioneer settlements in the dry zone. During the decade ending in 1981, the highest rates of population increase oc- curred in the districts of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, where the Mahaweli Ganga Program attracted immigrant farmers. Fourth, Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic struggles displaced many people during the 1970s and 1980s. During a Tamil repatriation program in the 1970s, large numbers of Tamil plantation workers left for India or moved out of the hill areas toward the north and the east. After the intensification of communal fighting in 1 983 , an estimated 100,000 Tamil refugees fled to India, where they lived in refugee camps in Tamil Nadu State, and thousands more were relocated 71 Sri Lanka: A Country Study through refugee agencies in Sri Lanka (see The Tamil Insurgency, ch. 5). During the counterinsurgency operations of the Sri Lankan and Indian armies in 1987 and 1988, many residents of the Jaffna Peninsula fled their homes for temporary shelter in refugee camps (see The Armed Forces, ch. 5). As in South Asia as a whole — and in contrast to global patterns — Sri Lankan males outnumbered females in the mid-1980s. In Sri Lanka, for every 100 female births registered there were 104 males. In the past, the gender ratio of the general population was even more unequal — 113 men to 100 women in 1941. In part, this imbalance is attributed to the emigration of plantation workers, many of whom were men. Much of the change, however, may be due to a growing sensitivity to the health of women. Since 1963, the average female life expectancy has increased by seven years, while male life expectancy has risen by three years. Ethnic Groups The people of Sri Lanka are divided into ethnic groups whose conflicts have dominated public life since the nineteenth century. The two main characteristics that mark a person's ethnic heritage are language and religion, which intersect to create four major eth- nic groups — the Sinhalese, the Tamils, the Muslims, and the Bur- ghers (see fig. 6). Ethnic divisions are not based on race or physical appearance; some Sri Lankans claim to determine the ethnicity of a person by his facial characteristics or color, but in reality such premises are not provable. There is nothing in the languages or religious systems in Sri Lanka that officially promotes the social segregation of their adherents, but historical circumstances have favored one or more of the groups at different times, leading to hostility and competition for political and economic power. Sinhalese The Sinhalese are the largest ethnic group in the country, offi- cially comprising 1 1 million people or 74 percent of the popula- tion in 1981. They are distinguished primarily by their language, Sinhala, which is a member of the Indo-European linguistic group that includes Hindi and other north Indian tongues as well as most of the languages of Europe. It is likely that groups from north India introduced an early form of Sinhala when they migrated to the is- land around 500 B.C., bringing with them the agricultural econ- omy that has remained dominant to the twentieth century. From early times, however, Sinhala has included a large number of loan words and constructs from Tamil, and modern speech includes many expressions from European languages, especially English. 72 The Society and Its Environment The Sinhalese claim to be descendants of Prince Vijaya and his band of immigrants from northern India, but it is probable that the original group of Sinhalese immigrants intermarried with indigenous inhabitants (see Ancient Legends and Chronicles, ch. 1). The Sinhalese gradually absorbed a wide variety of castes or tribal groups from the island and from southern India during the last 2,500 years. The Buddhist religion reinforces the solidarity of the Sinhalese as an ethnic community. In 1988 approximately 93 percent of the Sinhala speakers were Buddhists, and 99.5 percent of the Buddhists in Sri Lanka spoke Sinhala. The most popular Sinhalese folklore, literature, and rituals teach children from an early age the unique- ness of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, the long relationship between Bud- dhism and the culture and politics of the island, and the importance of preserving this fragile cultural inheritance. Buddhist monks are accorded great respect and participate in services at the notable events in people's lives. To become a monk is a highly valued career goal for many young men. The neighboring Buddhist monastery or shrine is the center of cultural life for Sinhalese villagers (see Buddhism, this ch.). Their shared language and religion unite all ethnic Sinhalese, but there is a clear difference between the "Kandyan" and the "low-country" Sinhalese. Because the Kingdom of Kandy in the highlands remained independent until 1818, conservative cultural and social forms remained in force there. English education was less respected, and traditional Buddhist education remained a vital force in the preservation of Sinhalese culture. The former Kan- dyan nobility retained their social prestige, and caste divisions linked to occupational roles changed slowly. The plains and the coast of Sri Lanka, on the other hand, experienced great change under 400 years of European rule. Substantial numbers of coastal people, especially among the Karava (see Glossary) caste, converted to Christianity through determined missionary efforts of the Portu- guese, Dutch, and British; 66 percent of the Roman Catholics and 43 percent of the Protestants in the early 1980s were Sinhalese. Social mobility based on economic opportunity or service to the colonial governments allowed entire caste or kin groups to move up in the social hierarchy. The old conceptions of noble or servile status declined, and a new elite developed on the basis of its mem- bers' knowledge of European languages and civil administration. The Dutch legal system changed traditional family law. A wider, more cosmopolitan outlook differentiated the low-country Sinha- lese from the more "old fashioned" inhabitants of highlands (see Caste, this ch.). 73 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Figure 6. Ethno linguistic Groups and Religions, 1988 74 The Society and Its Environment Tamils The people collectively known as the Tamils (see Glossary), com- prising 2,700,000 persons or approximately 18 percent of the popu- lation in 1981, use the Tamil language as their native tongue. Tamil is one of the Dravidian (see Glossary) languages found almost ex- clusively in peninsular India. It existed in South Asia before the arrival of people speaking Indo-European languages in about 1 500 B.C. Tamil literature of a high quality has survived for at least 2,000 years in southern India, and although the Tamil language absorbed many words from northern Indian languages, in the late twentieth century it retained many forms of a purely Dravidian speech — a fact that is of considerable pride to its speakers. Tamil is spoken by at least 40 million people in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu (the "land of the Tamils"), and by millions more in neigh- boring states of southern India and among Tamil emigrants throughout the world. There was a constant stream of migration from southern India to Sri Lanka from prehistoric times. Once the Sinhalese controlled Sri Lanka, however, they viewed their own language and culture as native to the island, and in their eyes Tamil- speaking immigrants constituted a foreign ethnic community. Some of these immigrants appear to have abandoned Tamil for Sinhala and become part of the Sinhalese caste system. Most however, continued to speak Tamil and looked toward southern India as their cultural homeland. Their connections with Tamil Nadu received periodic reinforcement dur- ing struggles between the kings of Sri Lanka and southern India that peaked in the wars with the Chola (see Rise of Sinhalese and Tamil Ethnic Awareness, ch. 1). It is probable that the ancestors of many Tamil speakers entered the country as a result of the Chola conquest, for some personal names and some constructions used in Sri Lankan Tamil are reminiscent of the Chola period. The Tamil speakers in Sri Lanka are divided into two groups that have quite different origins and relationships to the country. The Sri Lankan Tamils trace their immigration to the distant past and are effectively a native minority. In 1981 they numbered 1,886,872, or 12.7 percent of the population. The Indian Tamils are either immigrants or the descendants of immigrants who came under British sponsorship to Sri Lanka to work on plantations in the central highlands. In 1981 they numbered 818,656, or 5.5 per- cent of the population. Because they lived on plantation settlements, separate from other groups, including the Sri Lankan Tamils, the Indian Tamils have not become an integral part of society and indeed have been viewed by the Sinhalese as foreigners. The 75 Sri Lanka: A Country Study population of Indian Tamils has been shrinking through programs repatriating them to Tamil Nadu (see Independence, ch. 1). Ethnic Tamils are united to each other by their common reli- gious beliefs, and the Tamil language and culture. Some 80 per- cent of the Sri Lankan Tamils and 90 percent of the Indian Tamils are Hindus. They have little contact with Buddhism, and they wor- ship the Hindu pantheon of gods. Their religious myths, stories of saints, literature, and rituals are distinct from the cultural sources of the Sinhalese (see Hinduism, this ch.). The caste groups of the Tamils are also different from those of the Sinhalese, and they have their rationale in religious ideologies that the Sinhalese do not share. Religion and caste do, however, create divisions within the Tamil community. Most of the Indian Tamils are members of low Indian castes that are not respected by the upper- and middle-level castes of the Sri Lankan Tamils (see Caste, this ch.). Furthermore, a minority of the Tamils — 4.3 percent of the Sri Lankan Tamils and 7.6 percent of the Indian Tamils — are converts to Christianity, with their own places of worship and separate cultural lives. In this way, the large Tamil minority in Sri Lanka is effectively separated from the mainstream Sinhalese culture and is fragmented into two major groups with their own Christian minorities. Muslims Muslims, who make up approximately 7 percent of the popula- tion, comprise a group of minorities practicing the religion of Islam. As in the case of the other ethnic groups, the Muslims have their own separate sites of worship, religious and cultural heroes, social circles, and even languages. The Muslim community is divided into three main sections — the Sri Lankan Moors, the Indian Moors, and the Malays, each with its own history and traditions. The Sri Lankan Moors make up 93 percent of the Muslim popu- lation and 7 percent of the total population of the country (1 ,046,926 people in 1981). They trace their ancestry to Arab traders who moved to southern India and Sri Lanka some time between the eighth and fifteenth centuries, adopted the Tamil language that was the common language of Indian Ocean trade, and settled per- manently in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Moors lived primarily in coastal trading and agricultural communities, preserving their Islamic cultural heritage while adopting many southern Asian cus- toms. During the period of Portuguese colonization, the Moors suffered from persecution, and many moved to the Central High- lands, where their descendants remain. The language of the Sri Lankan Moors is Tamil, or a type of "Arabic Tamil" that con- tains a large number of Arabic words. On the east coast, their family 76 The Society and Its Environment lines are traced through women, as in kinship systems of the south- west Indian state of Kerala, but they govern themselves through Islamic law (see Family; Islam, this ch.). The Indian Moors are Muslims who trace their origins to im- migrants searching for business opportunities during the colonial period. Some of these people came to the country as far back as Portuguese times; others arrived during the British period from various parts of India. The Memon, originally from Sind (in modern Pakistan), first arrived in 1870; in the 1980s they num- bered only about 3,000. The Bohra and the Khoja came from north- western India (Gujarat State) after 1880; in the 1980s they collectively numbered fewer than 2,000. These groups tended to retain their own places of worship and the languages of their an- cestral homelands. The Malays originated in Southeast Asia. Their ancestors came to the country when both Sri Lanka and Indonesia were colonies of the Dutch. Most of the early Malay immigrants were soldiers, posted by the Dutch colonial administration to Sri Lanka, who decided to settle on the island. Other immigrants were convicts or members of noble houses from Indonesia who were exiled to Sri Lanka and who never left. The main source of a continuing Malay identity is their common Malay language {bahasa melayu), which includes numerous words absorbed from Sinhalese and Tamil, and is spoken at home. In the 1980s, the Malays comprised about 5 percent of the Muslim population in Sri Lanka. Burghers The term Burgher was applied during the period of Dutch rule to European nationals living in Sri Lanka. By extension it came to signify any permanent resident of the country who could trace ancestry back to Europe. Eventually it included both Dutch Bur- ghers and Portuguese Burghers. Always proud of their racial ori- gins, the Burghers further distanced themselves from the mass of Sri Lankan citizens by immersing themselves in European culture, speaking the language of the current European colonial govern- ment, and dominating the best colonial educational and adminis- trative positions. They have generally remained Christians and live in urban locations. Since independence, however, the Burgher com- munity has lost influence and in turn has been shrinking in size because of emigration. In 1981 the Burghers made up .3 percent (39,374 people) of the population. Veddah The Veddah (see Glossary) are the last descendants of the an- cient inhabitants of Sri Lanka, predating the arrival of the Sinhalese. 77 Sri Lanka: A Country Study They have long been viewed in the popular imagination as a link to the original hunting- and- gathering societies that gradually dis- appeared as the Sinhalese spread over the island. In the 1980s, Veddah lived in the eastern highlands, where some had been relo- cated as a result of the Mahaweli Ganga Program. They have not preserved their own language, and they resemble their poorer Sinhalese neighbors, living in small rural settlements. The Veddah have become more of a caste than a separate ethnic group, and they are generally accepted as equal in rank to the dominant Goyigama caste of the Sinhalese (see Caste, this ch.). Ethnic Group Relations The different ethnic groups are not evenly spread throughout the island, but live in concentrated areas, depending upon where they settled historically (see fig. 6). The Indian Tamils are heavily concentrated in the highland districts, especially in Nuwara Eliya, where they constitute almost half the population. This settlement pattern reflects their strong relationship with the plantation econ- omy for which they provided much of the unskilled labor. The Sri Lankan Tamils, on the other hand, make up more than 95 per- cent of the population in the Jaffna Peninsula, more than 70 per- cent of the population in Batticaloa District, and substantial minorities in other northern and eastern districts. This pattern reflects the historical dominance of Tamil kingdoms in the north- ern half of the island. The Muslims are not in the majority any- where, although they make up large minorities in Mannar District on the northwest coast and in the east coast districts; their stron- gest presence is in Amparai District, where they comprise 42 per- cent of the population. The Sinhalese exist in substantial numbers everywhere except in the Jaffna and Batticaloa districts, and in some southern districts they comprise almost the entire population. Colombo District approaches the closest to an ethnic melting pot, with a Sinhalese majority and substantial Tamil and Muslim minorities. Colombo is also home to most of the Burghers (72 per- cent) and Malays (65 percent). In many cases, the different ethnic communities live in separate villages or sections of villages, and in towns or cities they inhabit different neighborhoods. The fact that primary education is in either Tamil or Sinhala effectively segregates the children of the differ- ent communities at an early age. Business establishments run by, or catering to a specific ethnic group, tend to broadcast their eth- nicity by signs either in Sinhala or Tamil, each of which possesses its own distinctive script. Sports teams tend to include members of only one community, while Buddhist and Hindu religious services 78 Sinhalese man wearing sarong, circa 1910 Courtesy Library of Congress Tamil nautch (dancing girl), circa 1910 Courtesy Library of Congress 79 Sri Lanka: A Country Study are automatically limited to one ethnic group. Relatively few per- sons are fluent in both Tamil and Sinhala, and accents betray which native community a person belongs to very quickly. Countering the intense pressures favoring segregation, however, are official government policies that treat all citizens equally and numerous personal networks within neighborhoods and among individuals that link members of different ethnic groups and foster friendships. Ethnic segregation is reinforced by fears that ethnic majorities will try to dominate positions of influence and repress the religious, linguistic, or cultural systems of minorities. The Sinhalese are the overwhelming majority of residents within Sri Lanka, but they feel intimidated by the large Tamil population in nearby India; the com- bined Tamil populations of India and Sri Lanka outnumber the Sinhalese at least four to one. The recent memories of Tamil promi- nence in colonial and postcolonial administration, combined with a modern renaissance in Tamil consciousness in south India, are constant reminders of the potential power of the Tamil commun- ity. The Sinhalese feel quite isolated as the only group in the world speaking their language and professing their variant of Theravada Buddhism. The Tamils, on the other hand, are a minority within Sri Lanka. They cannot be sure of Indian support, and they ex- perience increasing restrictions on social mobility as the Sinhalese majority increases its hold on the government. Anti-Tamil riots and military actions in the 1980s alienated a large sector of the Tamil community. In the middle are the Muslims, who speak Tamil but whose religious and cultural systems are alien to both other ethnic groups. Muslim leaders increasingly seek to safeguard the cultural heritage of their own community by adopting a public stance of ethnic confrontation. Social Organization Caste Nature of Caste When the Portuguese began to trade extensively with South Asia, they quickly noticed a fundamental difference between South Asian societies and those of other world areas. In India and Sri Lanka, societies are broken up into a large number of groups who do not intermarry, who are ranked in relation to each other, and whose interactions are governed by a multitude of ritualized behaviors. The Portuguese called these groups casta, from which the English term caste is derived. In South Asia, they are described by the term jati, or birth. According to traditional culture, every person is born into a particular group that defines his or her unchangeable posi- tion within society. 80 The Society and Its Environment One of the most basic concepts underlying caste is purity. On one level this idea translates into a concern for personal hygiene, but the concept ultimately refers to a psychic or spiritual purity that lies beyond the physical body. A religious interpretation associated with Indian thought asserts that personal salvation or enlightenment is the ultimate goal of life, and that the individual goes through many lives and experiences before attaining sufficient knowledge to transcend the material world. Those beings who have gone farther on this road to enlightenment have purified their cons- ciousness and regulate their lives in order to prevent more gross experiences from interfering with their progress toward salvation. Those groups of people whose life-styles are the purest are farthest along on the spiritual road and are most deserving of respect. These ideas about purity offer a rationale for dividing society into a large number of groups, ranked according to the purity of their life-styles or occupations. The persons in each group must be careful to preserve the relative purity of their own group and to avoid close contact with persons of lower purity; otherwise, they may sully or "pollute" themselves or the members of purer groups. The idea of psychic purity blends with a series of traditional notions about pure or polluting substances and about behaviors and rituals, resulting in a rich system that explains caste segrega- tion and modes of caste interaction. It is possible for people to trans- mit their qualities to others by touching them or by giving them objects. In extreme cases, even the shadow of a very low-caste indi- vidual can pollute an individual of the highest, priestly castes. If the physical contact is intimate or if people have manipulated cer- tain objects for a long time, the intensity of the transmitted quali- ties increases. Simple objects such as tools, for example, may change hands between persons of different caste without problem. Food, however, which actually enters and becomes part of a person's body, is a more serious matter. Cooked food, involving processing and longer periods of contact, is more problematic than uncooked food. There is thus a series of prohibitions on the sharing of food be- tween members of different castes. Members of higher castes may avoid taking food from members of lower castes, although lower- caste persons may not mind taking food from members of the higher orders. The most intimate contact is sexual because it involves the joining of two bodies and the transmission of the very substances that determine caste for life. Sexual contact between persons of different castes is discouraged, and intercaste marriage is rare. When intercaste sexual affairs do occur, they are almost always between men of higher caste and women of lower caste, for it is less polluting to send forth substances than to receive them. In the 81 Sri Lanka: A Country Study distant past, women who had sexual contact with men of lower castes were killed, and they would still be ostracized today in some vil- lages. When polluting contacts occur between members of differ- ent castes, personal purity may be restored by performing cleansing rituals. In general, these concepts of purity prevent partaking of meals together and intermarriage between different castes, regu- late intercaste relations through a wide variety of ritual behaviors, and preserve deep-seated social cleavages throughout Sri Lanka. There has been a strong tendency to link the position of differ- ent castes in the social hierarchy to their occupations. Groups who wash clothes or who process waste, thus coming in contact with undesirable substances from many persons, are typically given low status. In both Hindu and Buddhist thought, the destruction of life is very ignoble, because it extinguishes other beings struggling for consciousness and salvation. This idea has rationalized views of fishermen or leather workers, who kill animals, as low and im- pure groups. In many cases, however, the labeling of an occupa- tional group as a caste with a particular status has depended on historical developments rather than theories of purity. As the vil- lage farming economy spread over time, many tribal societies prob- ably changed from hunters and gatherers to low- status service castes, ranked below the landowning farmers. Many poor agricultural laborers in Sri Lanka remain members of low castes as well. Other immigrant groups came to Sri Lanka, fit into particular occupa- tional niches, and became known as castes with ranks linked to their primary occupations. Castes with members who accumulated wealth and power have tended to rise gradually in their relative positions, and it is not uncommon for members of rising caste groups to adopt vegetarianism or patronize religious institutions in an attempt to raise their public ritual status. Caste among the Sinhalese The dominant caste among the Sinhalese population is the Goyigama. Although the government keeps no official statistics on caste, it appears that the Goyigama comprise at least half the Sinhalese population. The traditional occupation of this caste is agriculture, and most members are still peasant farmers in villages almost everywhere in Sri Lanka. In traditional Sinhalese society, they monopolized the highest positions at royal courts and among the landowning elite. In the democratic society of the twentieth century, their members still dominate the political scene. In most villages they might be no richer than their non-Goyigama neigh- bors, but the richest landlord groups tend to be Goyigama, while the poorest agricultural laborers tend to include few Goyigama. 82 The Society and Its Environment In the Central Highlands, some traditions of the Kingdom of Kandy survived after its collapse in 1818, preserved in unique forms of the caste system until the postindependence period. The most important feature of the old system was rajakariya, or the "king's work," which linked each caste to a specific occupation and demanded services for the court and religious institutions. The con- nection of caste and job is still stronger in the Central Highlands, and at events such as the Kandy Perahera, an annual festival honor- ing gods and the Buddha, the various castes still perform tradi- tional functions. The Goyigama in the highlands differ from those of the low country because they preserve divisions within the caste that derive from the official ranking of noble and commoner fami- lies in the old kingdom. Honorific titles hearkening back to ances- tral homes, manors (vasagama), or noble houses (gedard) still marked the pedigrees of the old aristocracy in the 1980s, and marriages between members of these families and common Goyigama were rare. In the low country, these subcastes within the Goyigama have faded away, and high status is marked by European titles and degrees rather than the older, feudal titles. There are still major differences between the caste structures of the highlands and those of the low country, although some service groups are common to both. The southwest coast is home to three major castes whose ancestors may have immigrated but who have become important actors in the Sinhalese social system: the Karava (fishermen), the Durava (toddy tappers — see Glossary), and the Salagama (cinnamon peelers). Originally of marginal or low sta- tus, these groups exploited their traditional occupations and their coastal positions to accumulate wealth and influence during the colonial period. By the late twentieth century, members of these castes had moved to all parts of the country, occupied high busi- ness and academic positions, and were generally accorded a caste rank equal to or slightly below the Goyigama. The highland interior is home to the Vahumpura, or traditional makers of jaggery (a sugar made from palm sap), who have spread throughout the country in a wide variety of occupations, especially agriculture. In the Kandy District of the highlands live the Batgam (or Padu), a low caste of agricultural laborers, and the Kinnara, who were traditionally segregated from other groups because of their menial status. Liv- ing in all areas are service groups, such as the Hena (Rada), tradi- tional washermen who still dominate the laundry trade; the Berava, traditional temple drummers who work as cultivators in many vil- lages; and the Navandanna (Acari), traditional artisans. In rural environments, the village blacksmith or washerman may still belong to the old occupational caste groups, but accelerating social mobility 83 Sri Lanka: A Country Study and the growing obsolescence of the old services are slowly erod- ing the link between caste and occupation. Caste among the Tamils The caste system of the Sri Lankan Tamils resembles the sys- tem of the Sinhalese, but the individual Tamil castes differ from the Sinhalese castes. The dominant Tamil caste, constituting well over 50 percent of the Tamil population, are the Vellala. Like the Goyigama, members are primarily cultivators. In the past, the Vellala formed the elite in the Jaffna kingdom and were the larger landlords; during the colonial period, they took advantage of new avenues for mobility and made up a large section of the educated, administrative middle class. In the 1980s, the Vellala still comprised a large portion of the Tamil urban middle class, although many well-off families retained interests in agricultural land. Below the Vellala, but still high in the Tamil caste system, are the Karaiya (see Glossary), whose original occupation was fishing. Like the Sin- halese Karava, they branched out into commercial ventures, rais- ing their economic and ritual position during the nineteenth century. The Chetti, a group of merchant castes, also have a high ritual position. In the middle of the caste hierarchy is a group of numer- ically small artisan castes, and at the bottom of the system are more numerous laboring castes, including the Palla, associated with agricultural work. The caste system of the Tamils is more closely tied to religious bases than the caste system of the Sinhalese. Caste among the Sri Lankan Tamils derives from the Brahman-dominated system of southern India. The Brahmans, a priestly caste, trace their ori- gins to the dawn of Indian civilization (ca. 1500 B.C.), and oc- cupy positions of the highest respect and purity because they typically preserve sacred texts and enact sacred rituals. Many con- servative Brahmans view the caste system and their high position within it as divinely ordained human institutions (see Hinduism, this ch.). Because they control avenues to salvation by officiating at temples and performing rituals in homes, their viewpoint has a large following among traditionally minded Hindus. The stan- dards of purity set forth by the Brahmanical view are so high that some caste groups, such as the Paraiyar (whose name came into English as "pariah"), have been "untouchable," barred from par- ticipation in the social functions or religious rituals of other Hin- dus. Untouchability also has been an excuse for extreme exploitation of lower-caste workers. Although Brahmans in Sri Lanka have always been a very small minority, the conservative Brahmanical world- view has remained 84 Elephants bathing in a jungle river Courtesy Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington strong among the Vellala and other high castes. Major changes have occurred, however, in the twentieth century. Ideas of equal- ity among all people, officially promoted by the government, have combined with higher levels of education among the Tamil elites to soften the old prejudices against the lowest castes. Organiza- tions of low-caste workers have engaged in successful militant strug- gles to open up employment, education, and Hindu temples for all groups, including former untouchables. The Indian Tamils are predominantly members of low castes from southern India, whose traditional occupations were agricul- tural labor and service for middle and high castes. Their low ritual status has reinforced their isolation from the Sinhalese and from the Sri Lankan Tamils. Caste Interactions in Daily Life The divisions between the castes are reaffirmed on a daily basis, especially in rural areas, by many forms of language and etiquette. Each caste uses different personal names and many use slightly different forms of speech, so it is often possible for people to deter- mine someone's caste as soon as the person begins speaking. Per- sons of lower rank behave politely by addressing their superiors with honorable formulas and by removing their headgear. A stan- dard furnishing in upper caste rural houses is a low stool (kolamba), 85 Sri Lanka: A Country Study provided so that members of lower castes may take a lower seat while visiting. Villages are divided into separate streets or neigh- borhoods according to caste, and the lowest orders may live in separate hamlets. In times past, low-caste persons of both sexes were prohibited from covering their upper bodies, riding in cars, or building large homes. These most offensive forms of discrimi- nation were eliminated by the twentieth century after extensive agi- tation. Outside the home, most social interactions take place without reference to caste. In villages, business offices, and factories, mem- bers of different groups work together, talking and joking freely, without feeling uncomfortable about their caste inequalities. The modern urban environment makes excessive concern about caste niceties impossible; all kinds of people squeeze onto buses with few worries about intimate personal contact. Employment, health, and educational opportunities are officially open to all, without prejudice based on caste. In urban slums, the general breakdown of social organization among the destitute allows a wide range of intercaste relationships. Despite the near invisibility of caste in public life, caste-based factions exist in all modern institutions, including political parties, and when it comes to marriage — the true test of adherence to ritual purity — the overwhelming majority of unions occur between members of the same caste. Family Among all ethnic and caste groups, the most important social unit is the nuclear family — husband, wife, and unmarried children. Even when economic need causes several families (Sinhala, ge; Tamil, kudumbam) or generations to live together, each wife will maintain her own cooking place and prepare food for her own hus- band as a sign of the individuality of the nuclear family. Among all sections of the population, however, relatives of both the wife and the husband form an important social network that supports the nuclear family and encompasses the majority of its important social relations. The kindred (pavula, in Sinhala) of an individual often constitute the people with whom it is possible to eat or marry. Because of these customs, local Sinhalese society is highly frag- mented, not only at the level of ethnic group or caste, but also at the level of the kindred. The kinship systems of Sri Lanka share with most of South Asia and the Middle East the institution of preferred cross-cousin mar- riage. This means that the most acceptable person for a young man to marry is the daughter of his father's sister. The most suitable partner for a young woman is the son of her mother's brother. 86 The Society and Its Environment Parallel cousins — the son of the father's brother or the daughter of the mother's sister — tend to be improper marriage partners. There is a close and special relationship between children and their aunts or uncles, who may become their fathers-or mothers-in-law. Special kinship terminology exists in both Tamil and Sinhalese for relatives in preferred or prohibited marriage categories. In many villages, people spend their entire childhood with a clear knowledge of their future marriage plans and in close proximity to their future spouses. The ties between cross-cousins are so close in theory that persons marrying partners other than their cross-cousins may include a special ritual in their marriage ceremonies during which they receive permission from their cousins to marry an outsider. The system of cross-cousin marriage is ideally suited to maintain- ing the closed ritual purity of an extended kinship group and retaining control over property within a small circle of relatives. The vast majority of marriages in Sri Lanka are monogamous, that is, they involve one woman and one man. Unions between one man and more than one woman (polygyny) are neither illegal nor unknown, however, and wealthy men can take several wives if they can afford to support the families. Unions involving one woman and more than one man (polyandry) are also legal and possible. In the Kandyan region, descent and inheritance are traced through both spouses: both husband and wife possess their own property and may bequeath it in equal shares to their descendants. In the low country, where Dutch Roman Law is in effect, mar- riages create joint property between husband and wife, which on their death is divided among their heirs. On the east coast, Tamil Muslim families trace descent and inheritance through the mother, and men will typically reside with their in-laws. There is a prefer- ence for living near the husband's family in most areas of the coun- try, although a family with no sons may prefer that a son-in-law live nearby and manage their lands. Among all the variations of inheritance and descent, the husband is typically the manager of the nuclear family's property and represents his family in most pub- lic duties and functions. In the rural areas of Sri Lanka, traditional marriages did not require a wedding ceremony or legal registration of the union. The man and the woman simply started living together, with the con- sent of their parents (who were usually related to one another). This type of customary marriage still survives, although it has been declining in recent years. In 1946 about 30 percent of marriages in Sri Lanka were not registered, but in 1981 that figure had declined to 10 percent. Most such unions were concentrated along the north and east coasts and in the Central Highlands. Legal 87 Sri Lanka: A Country Study divorce is easy to obtain, and divorces of customary marriages occur through mutual consent of the partners in consultation with their extended families. Most marriages, however, are quite stable be- cause of the considerable social pressure and support exerted by kindred of both the husband and the wife. In 1981 the divorce rate per 10,000 persons amounted to only 30.5. Most Sri Lankan families have small means and do not spend large sums on wedding parties. Among wealthier families in both the countryside and the cities, marriages occur more often between families that were not previously related, and more elaborate ceremonies take place. In such cases the bride may receive a sub- stantial dowry, determined beforehand during long negotiations between her family and her future in-laws. Preceding these well- publicized affairs are detailed discussions with matchmakers and astrologers who pick the most auspicious times for the marriage. Except for some of the well-educated urban elite, the parents arrange all marriages, although their children may meet future spouses and veto a particularly unattractive marriage . The average age at mar- riage has been increasing in recent years because of longer periods required for education and establishing a stable career. In 1981 the average age of grooms was twenty-seven or twenty-eight, and the average age of brides was twenty-four. Betrothals arranged by parents could begin much earlier, and in rural areas marriages between persons in their early teens still occurred. Whatever the arrangements, however, marriage and the propagation of children were the desired state for all groups, and by age thirty-nine, 86 percent of both sexes had married at least once. All ethnic groups in Sri Lanka preserve clear distinctions in the roles of the sexes. Women are responsible for cooking, raising chil- dren, and taking care of housework. In families relying on agricul- ture, women are in charge of weeding and help with the harvest, and among poor families women also perform full-time work for the more well-to-do. The man's job is to protect women and chil- dren and provide them with material support, and in this role men dominate all aspects of business and public life. At the center of the system are children, who mix freely until puberty and receive a great deal of affection from both sexes. As they enter their teens, children begin to adopt the adult roles that will keep them in separate worlds: girls help with household chores and boys work outside the home. Among the middle- and upper-income groups, however, education of children may last into their early twenties, and women may mix with males or even take on jobs that were in the past reserved for men. There has been a tendency to view the educa- tional qualifications of women as a means for obtaining favorable 88 Tamil woman and child Courtesy Susan J. Becker marriage alliances, and many middle-class women withdraw from the workplace after marriage. Religion Buddhism The Life and Message of the Buddha The founder of Buddhism was a man named Siddartha Gautama, a prince of the Sakya clan in what is now Nepal during the sixth century B.C. Popular stories of his life include many miraculous events: before his birth his mother experienced visions that fore- told his future greatness; when he was born, he could immediately walk and talk; wise men who encountered the child predicted that he would become either a great sage or a great emperor. Behind these legends is the tale of a young man reared in luxury, who began to question the meaning of life. At the age of thirty, he abandoned his home (including his beautiful wife and child) and wandered throughout northeast India as a beggar, searching for truth. Gautama studied under several religious teachers and became adept at techniques of meditation and self-imposed austerity. Finally, he sat down under a bo (pipal) tree and resolved not to move from that spot until he had achieved perfect enlightenment. He entered into deeper and deeper concentration, until he finally 89 Sri Lanka: A Country Study reached an understanding of the nature of existence and the pur- pose of life. He thus became the one who knows, the Buddha (from the verb budh, to know or understand). At first he debated whether other beings would be able to comprehend the knowledge that he had gained, but compassion moved him to bring his message to the world and lead others to enlightment. He spent the next fifty years traveling throughout northeast India, discussing his knowledge with all sorts of people. By the end of his life, his message and exam- ple had attracted large numbers of converts, from kings to beg- gars, from rich men to robbers. At his death around 483 B.C., he left behind a dedicated group of disciples who carried on his work. The Buddha summed up his message in Four Noble Truths that still form the core of Buddhist belief. The first truth is that life is suffering (dukkha). The material world, thoughts, emotions, and ideas are all transitory and do not express or contain any eternal truths. All beings repeatedly experience pain and loss as they pass through innumerable lives, never able to emerge from a conditioned existence (samsara) created through their own consciousness. The second truth describes the cause of suffering as attachment to the world and the products of one's own consciousness. This attach- ment, or craving for existence, causes beings to create mental views of the world and believe they are correct, to form relationships with other beings, to struggle and desire. Such efforts are in vain be- cause none of these strategies allows them to escape from their lim- ited, suffering world. The third truth says that the way to break the limiting trap of samsara is to stop attachment. Once one has concentrated awareness so intensely that all material and spiritual phenomena appear empty, without real substance, then existence becomes liberated and suffering ceases. The fourth truth is the Noble Eightfold Path of behavior, which roots out attachment and the conditioned view of the world and leads toward the state of en- lightenment (nibbana — nirvana, see Glossary) gained by the Bud- dha. The true follower of the Buddha rejects the world, becomes a full-time searcher after truth, and practices meditation that con- centrates awareness. The Buddhist Community In the absence of the Buddha, the custodian of his message is the assembly (sangha — see Glossary) of monks who carry on his work. The members of the Buddhist assembly practice the discipline (vinaya) set forth by the Buddha as a system of rules for a monastic order. The discipline calls for strict control over the senses and dedi- cated meditation by the individual monk (bhikku — see Glossary). Following the Buddha's example, the monk should spend the 90 The Society and Its Environment morning begging for food from the lay community, then abstain from meals after noon. He should shave his head, wear orange (or yellow) robes, and own only his clothes and a begging bowl. He should avoid all sexual contact or any other forms of sensual pleas- ure. The bhikku should rest in one place for an extended period only during the rainy season, when groups of mendicants may stay together in communal houses (vihara). Elaborate rules evolved for admitting novices to the monastic community and conferring ordination on bhikku who passed through a period of initiation and training. The strict organization of the monastic order created a solid basis for the preservation of the Buddha's message and a read- ily adaptable institution that was transplanted in a variety of so- cial environments throughout Asia. Buddhism in Sri Lanka has its roots deep in one of the earliest variants of Buddhism that survives in the world today. The Sin- halese call their beliefs Theravada, or "the doctrine of the elders." Their tradition, frequently described as Hinayana (meaning "lesser vehicle"), preserves a clear understanding of the Buddha as a man who achieved enlightenment and developed monks (arhat) as accomplished followers of his teachings. This tradition differs from the more widespread Mahayana ("great vehicle"), which often treats the Buddha as a superhuman being and fills the universe with a pantheon of enlightened figures (bodhisattvas) who help others achieve enlightenment. In Sri Lanka, people do not offi- cially worship the Buddha, but show reverence to his memory. The most striking expressions of public reverence are dagoba or thupa (stupa), large mounds built over sites where relics of the Buddha or a great monk are buried. The dagoba in Sri Lanka preserve a spherical shape and a style of architectural embellishment that link them directly to the monuments originally erected over the Bud- dha's remains in ancient India. The traditions of the Sinhalese indicate that their oldest dagoba are at least 2,000 years old, from a period when genuine relics of the Buddha came to Sri Lanka. The conservative nature of Sinhalese Buddhism is strengthened through the preservation and living tradition of ancient scriptures in the Pali (see Glossary) language. A dialect related to Sanskrit, the classical language of India, Pali is probably close to the popu- lar language in northeastern India during the Buddha's time. The monks of Sri Lanka have kept alive an unbroken Pali transmis- sion of monastic rules, stories of the Buddha's life, and philosophical treatises that may constitute the oldest body of written Buddhist traditions. For people who do not become monks, the most effective method of progressing on the road to enlightenment is to accumulate merit 91 Sri Lanka: A Country Study (pin) through moral actions. One who performs duties faithfully in this world, who supports the monastic order, and who is com- passionate to other living beings may hope to achieve a higher birth in a future life, and from that position accumulate sufficient merit and knowledge to achieve enlightenment. Meritorious activities include social service, reverence of the Buddha at shrines or at dagoba, and pilgrimage to sacred places. Gifts to monks rank among the most beneficial merit-making activities. Lay devotees invite monks to major events, such as a death in the family or the dedi- cation of a building, and publicly give them food and provisions. In return, the monks perform pirit, the solemn recitation of Pali Buddhist scriptures. Although the average person may not under- stand a word of the ancient language, simply hearing the words and bestowing presents on the monks accumulates merit for the family or even for deceased family members. Some wealthy donors may hold gift-giving ceremonies simply for the public accumula- tion of merit. The monks thus perform important roles for the laity at times of crisis or accomplishment, and they serve as a focus for public philanthropy. Popular Sinhalese Religion There is no central religious authority in Theravada Buddhism, and the monastic community has divided into a number of orders with different styles of discipline or recruitment. The broad out- lines of the modern orders originated in the eighteenth century. By that time, monastic personnel came entirely from the upper levels of the Goyigama caste, and enjoyed easy lives as recipients of in- come from monastic estates worked by lower castes. The official line of monastic ordination had been broken, since monks at that time no longer knew the Pali tradition. In 1753 the Kandyan king fulfilled his duty as a protector of Buddhism by arranging for Theravada monks from Thailand to ordain Sinhalese novices. These initiates set up a reformed sect known as the Siyam Nikaya (the Siamese order), which invigorated the study and propagation of the ancient Sinhalese heritage. The order remained a purely Goyigama enclave. By the nineteenth century, members of rising low-country castes were unhappy with Goyigama monopoly over the sangha, and rich merchants arranged for Karava youths to receive ordination from Tha.i monks. These initiates formed a new sect called the Amarapura Nikaya, that subsequently split along caste lines. Disputes over doctrinal matters and the role of medi- tation led to the establishment of another order, the Ramanna Nikaya, in the late nineteenth century. In the 1980s, the Sinha- lese sangha of 20,000 monks fell into three major orders, subdivided 92 Like father, like son: two generations of Buddhist monks Courtesy Paige W. Thompson into "families": the Siyam Nikaya contained six divisions; the Amarapura Nikaya, twenty- three; and the Ramanna Nikaya, two. Each family maintained its own line of ordination traced back to great teachers and ultimately to the Buddha. Caste determined membership in many of the sects. The members of the Buddhist monastic community preserve the doctrinal purity of early Buddhism, but the lay community accepts a large body of other beliefs and religious rituals that are tolerated by the monks and integrated into Sinhalese religion. Many of the features of this popular religion come from Hinduism and from very old traditions of gods and demons. Sinhalese Buddhism is thus a syncretic fusion of various religious elements into a unique cul- tural system. There is a thin boundary between reverence for the Buddha's memory and worship of the Buddha as a god, and the unsophisti- cated layperson often crosses this line by worshiping him as a tran- scendent divine being. The relics of the Buddha, for example, have miraculous powers; the literature and folklore of the Sinhalese are full of tales recounting the amazing events surrounding relics. Dur- ing the construction of a Buddha image, the painting of the eyes is an especially important moment when the image becomes "alive" with power. At the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, where the Bud- dha's Tooth Relic is enshrined, rituals include elements from Hindu 93 Sri Lanka: A Country Study temple worship, such as feeding and clothing of the Buddha (see Hinduism, this ch.). In general, devotees believe that the Buddha's enlightenment makes him an all-powerful being, able to control time and space and all other supernatural beings. The Buddha is so pure and powerful that he does not intervene personally in the affairs of the world. That is the job of a pantheon of gods (deva) and demons (yakka) who control material and spiritual events. The Buddha never denied the existence of the gods or demons, but said that attention to these matters simply detracts from concentration on the path to enlightenment. The Sinhalese believe that the all-powerful Buddha has given a warrant {varan) to a variety of spiritual entities that allows them to regulate reality within set boundaries (sima). For help in matters of everyday life, the Sinhalese petition these spiritual entities rather than the Bud- dha. Near many dagoba, or shrines of the Buddha, there are separate shrines (devale) for powerful deities. After reverencing the Buddha, devotees present prayers and petitions to the gods for help with daily life. The shrines for the gods have their own priests (kapurala), who practice special rituals of purification that allow them to present offerings of food, flowers, or clothing to the gods. Propitiation of demons occurs far away from Buddhist shrines and involves spe- cial rituals featuring the assistance of exorcists. The popularity of different deities changes over time, as people come to see particular deities as more effective in solving their problems. The principal gods include Vishnu (also a Hindu god, identified by Buddhists as a bodhisattva, or "enlightened being," who helps others attain enlightenment), Natha, Vibhisana, Saman (the god of Adams Peak and its vicinity), and the goddess Pattini (originally an ordinary woman whose devotion to her husband, im- mortalized in poetry, elevated her to divine rank). During the twen- tieth century, the god Vibhisana has declined in popularity while the god Kataragama, named after his hometown in Moneragala District, has become extremely powerful. The annual Kataragama festival brings tens of thousands of worshipers to his small town, including Hindus who worship him as a manifestation of the god Murugan and Muslims who worship at the mosque there. This common devotion to sacred sites and sacred persons is one of the most important features of popular religion in Sri Lanka. Another example of this religious syncretism is the cult of Sri Lanka's leading oracle, Gale Bandara Deviyo, who originally was a Muslim prince slain by the Sinhalese to prevent his accession to the throne. He is revered by Buddhists and Muslims alike at his shrine in the town of Kurunegala (in Kurunegala District). As transportation and communication facilities have expanded in 94 The Society and Its Environment modern Sri Lanka, there has been a big expansion of major pil- grimage sites that are jointly patronized by Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims, thus providing a commonality that may lead to closer cultural cooperation among competing ethnic groups. Buddhism and Politics Buddhism plays an eminent political role in Sri Lanka and serves as a unifying force for the Sinhalese majority . Although the monks must renounce worldliness, they of necessity maintain close rela- tionships with the lay community, whose members must supply them with food, shelter, and clothing. During the past century, as Sinhalese nationalism fueled lay devotion to Buddhism, there was a proliferation of lay support organizations, such as the All- Ceylon Buddhist Congress, the Colombo Buddhist Theosophical Society, the All-Ceylon Buddhist Women's Association, and the Young Men's Buddhist Association. The state has similarly retained close ties with the sangha. Since the time of Asoka, the first great Indian emperor (third century B.C.), the head of state has been seen by Buddhist thinkers as the official protector of Buddhism, the "turner of the wheel of the law" (see Historical Perspective, 1802-1978, ch. 4). One of the recurring problems in the history of Sri Lanka has been a definition of the state as the official sup- porter of Buddhism, which in turn has been the religion of the ethnic Sinhalese. To be successful among the Sinhalese, a government must provide visible signs of its allegiance to the sangha by build- ing or maintaining dagoba, judging disputes among the orders of monks, and fostering education in the Pali Buddhist tradition. Individual monks and entire sects have involved themselves in party politics, but seldom do all families and orders unite behind a coherent policy. When they do unite, they are a potent political force. In 1956, for example, a rare union of monastic opinion gave crucial support to the election of the Sinhalese political leader Solo- mon West Ridgeway Diaz (S.W.R.D.) Bandaranaike (see Sri Lanka Freedom Party Rule, 1956-65, ch. 1). As of 1988, the sangha con- trolled extensive estates in the interior of Sri Lanka and retained an independent power base that, combined with high status in the eyes of the Sinhalese population, gave the Buddhist orders influence as molders of public opinion. Monks remained prominent at rallies and demonstrations promoting ethnic Sinhalese issues. Hinduism Whereas Buddhism claims a historical founder, a basic doctrine, and a formal monastic structure, Hinduism embraces a vast and 95 Sri Lanka: A Country Study varied body of religious belief, practice, and organization. In its widest sense, Hinduism encompasses all the religious and cultural systems originating in South Asia, and many Hindus actually accept the Buddha as an important sectarian teacher or as a rebel against or reformer of ancient Hindu culture. The medieval Arabs first used the term Hindu to describe the entire cultural complex east of the Sindhu, or Indus, River (in contemporary Pakistan). Hindu beliefs and practices in different regions claim descent from com- mon textual sources, while retaining their regional individuality. In Sri Lanka, Hinduism is closely related to the distinctive cul- tural systems of neighboring Tamil Nadu. Classical Hinduism includes as a central tenet of belief the con- cept of nonviolence (ahimsa), a concept that was of great impor- tance to the Buddha and to such reformers as Mahatma Gandhi some 2,500 years later. Veneration of pure life, especially of the cow, has come to be intimately associated with orthodox Hindu- ism of all sects. The cow is regarded as, among other things, the sacred embodiment of motherhood and fruitfulness. The deliber- ate killing of a cow is scarcely less terrible than the killing of a Brah- man. For the miscreant it results in immediate and irrevocable outcasting; even the accidental killing of a cow requires elaborate purification ceremonies. The earliest and most sacred sources of Hinduism are the Vedas, a compilation of hymns originating in northern India around 1 ,500 B.C. They are the oldest surviving body of literature in South Asia, created by the culture of the Arya (the "noble" or "pure" ones) in northwest India. Composed in an archaic form of the Sanskrit language, the Vedas were sung by a caste of priests (Brahmans) during sacrifices for the ancient gods. Families of Brahmans have passed down the oral recitation of these hymns for thousands of years, and Brahman claims to high status ultimately rest on their association with Vedic hymns. The vast majority of Hindus know almost nothing of Sanskrit or the Vedas, but even in the late twen- tieth century Brahmans frequently officiate at important ceremo- nies such as weddings, reciting ancient hymns and making offerings into sacred flames. By the time of the Buddha, intellectual speculations gave rise to philosophical concepts that still influence all of South Asia. These speculations became books called Upanishads, originally written as commentaries on the Vedas but later viewed as sacred works in their own right. The Upanishads discuss brahman, an impersonal, eternal force that embodies all good and all knowledge. The in- dividual "soul," or atman, partakes of the same qualities as brah- man but remains immersed in ignorance. Action (karma — see 96 The Society and Its Environment Glossary) is the cause of its ignorance; reason continually searches for meaning in the material world and in its own mental creations, instead of concentrating on brahman, the one true reality. The individual soul, immersed in action, migrates from life to life, until it achieves identity with brahman and is released. There is a close relationship between the Buddha's understanding of suffering and enlightenment, and the ideas of atman, karma, and brahman that became basic to Hindu philosophy. The Buddha, however, claimed that even the idea of the soul was a mental construct of no value, whereas Hindu thought has generally preserved a belief in the soul. As India became a major center of civilization with extensive political and economic systems, Hinduism became associated with new visions of the gods and worship in temples. Tamil Nadu was a major center of this transformation. By about A.D. 1000, the Tamils had reworked Brahmanical culture into a southern Indian type of devotional (bhakti) religion. This religion claimed to be based on the Vedas and the philosophy of the Upanishads, but its roots lay just as deep in strong attachments to local deities and a desire for salvation (moksha) through their intercession. Several gods predominate in the many myths, legends, and styles of worship. One of the main Hindu gods is Vishnu, often represent- ed as a divine king accompanied by his beautiful wife, Lakshmi, the bestower of wealth and good fortune. Besides presiding as a divine monarch, Vishnu periodically descends to earth, assuming a physical form to help beings attain salvation. Vishnu has ten main incarnations, two of which — Rama and Krishna — are particularly popular. Rama was a great hero, whose exploits in rescuing his wife from the demon king of Lanka are recounted in the epic Ramayana. Vishnu's most popular incarnation is Krishna, who com- bines in a single divine figure the mythic episodes of a warrior prince and a rustic cowherd god. As warrior, Krishna figures prominently in what is perhaps the single most important Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gita, where he stresses the importance of doing one's duty and devotion to god. As divine cowherd, Krishna served as an inspiration for a vast body of religious poetry in Sanskrit and the regional South Asian languages. From the eighth to the twelfth centuries, Tamil devotees of Vishnu (alvars) composed poetry in praise of the god. These Tamil poems, collected in anthologies, are still recited during worship and festivals for Vishnu. The second major Hindu deity, and by far the most important god among the Tamils in Sri Lanka, is Siva. He differs considera- bly from Vishnu. In many stories he reigns as a king, but often he appears as a religious ascetic, smeared with ashes, sitting on a tiger skin in the jungle, with a snake around his neck. He is the 97 Sri Lanka: A Country Study lord of animals. Although he is an ascetic, he is also a sexual figure, married to the beautiful Parvati (the daughter of the mountain), and his image is often a single rock shaped like a phallus (lingam). He is often a distant figure whose power is destructive, but para- doxically he is a henpecked husband who has to deal with family squabbles involving his sons. His devotees enjoy retelling his myths, but worshipers visualize him as a cosmic creator who will save his creatures when they have abandoned themselves totally to his love. One of the most powerful expressions of his creative role is the image of Nataraja, ''Lord of the Dance," who gracefully manifests the rhythm of the universe. Great Tamil devotees (nayanmar) of the early middle ages created a large collection of poems dedicated to Siva and his holiest shrines. These collections are still revered among the Tamils as sacred scriptures on the same plane as the Vedas. Female deities are very important among the Hindu Tamils. At temples for Siva or Vishnu there are separate shrines for the god and for his consort, and in many cases the shrine for the goddess (ammari) receives much more attention from worshipers. Hindu philosophy interprets the goddess as the Shakti, or cosmic energy, of the god in the world and therefore the most immediate creative or destructive force, to be thanked or placated. Many of the mani- festations of the goddess are capricious or violent, and she is often seen as a warrior who destroys demons on her own or whom Siva himself has to defeat in combat. As Mariamman, she used co bring smallpox, and she is still held responsible for diseases of the hot season. In addition to the main gods, there are a number of subordinate divine beings, who are often the most popular deities. Ganesha, or Pillaiyar or Ganapati, the elephant-headed son of Siva and Par- vati, is the patron of good fortune and is worshiped at the begin- ning of a religious service or a new venture, such as a business deal or even a short trip. Murugan, his brother, is a handsome young warrior who carries a spear and rides a peacock. He is wor- shiped near hills or mountains, and his devotees are known for fierce vows and austerity that may include self-mutilation. Every village has its own protective deities, often symbolized as warriors, who may have their own local stories and saints. Worship of the gods is known as puja. Worship can occur men- tally or in front of the most rudimentary representations, such as stones or trees. Most people assemble pictures or small statues of their favorite deities and create small shrines in their homes for daily services, and they make trips to local shrines to worship be- fore larger and more ornate statues. Public temples (Jcovil) consist of a central shrine containing images of the gods, with a surrounding 98 The Society and Its Environment courtyard and an enclosing wall entered through ornately carved towers (gopuram). During worship, the images become the gods after special rituals are performed. Worshipers then offer them presents of food, clothing, and flowers as they would honored guests. The gifts are sanctified through contact with the gods, and worshipers may eat the sacred food or smear themselves with sacred ash in order to absorb the god's grace. In public temples, only consecrated priests (pujari) are allowed into the sanctum housing the god's image, and worshipers hand offerings to the priests for presentation to the god. Most of the time, worship of the gods is not congregational, but involves offerings by individuals or small family groups at home or through temple priests. During major festivals, however, hun- dreds or thousands of people may come together in noisy, packed crowds to worship at temples or to witness processions of the gods through public streets. Islam The religion of Islam began, like Buddhism, with the experience of a single man, but the religious environment of early Islam was the Judeo-Christian world of Arabia. Many of the basic premises and beliefs of Islam are thus quite different than those of Buddhism or Hinduism and more closely resemble the systems of Judaism or Christianity. During the last 1,000 years, however, Islam has played a major part in the cultures of South and Southeast Asia, including Sri Lanka. Islam in Sri Lanka has preserved the doc- trines derived from Arabia, while adapting to the social environ- ment of South Asia. During the early seventh century A.D., Muhammad experienced a series of messages from God in the city of Mecca, a trading center in western Arabia. He became a prophet, one of the line of bibli- cal prophets including Abraham, Moses, and Jesus Christ (in Arabic, Ibrahim, Musa, and Isa), and he conveyed to the people of Mecca the last and greatest of the revelations given by God to the world. The message was simple and powerful: "submission" (Islam) to the mercy of a single, all-powerful God (Allah). God exists for eternity, but out of love he created the world and mankind, endowing both men and women with immortal souls. Human be- ings have only one life, and when it ends their souls go to either heaven or hell according to their behavior on earth. Correct be- havior is known through the revelation of prophets inspired by God, and Muhammad is the last of these prophets. To believe in Islam, to become "one who submits" (a Muslim), one must accept the will of the one true God and the message of Muhammad, which is encapsulated in the shahada: "There is no God but God, and 99 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Muhammad is His Prophet." His message is immortalized in the Quran, a series of revelations conveyed by the angel Gabriel, and in the hadith, the sayings and example of the prophet Muhammad. Muhammad described some of the most important actions neces- sary for a believer who wished to submit to God's love and will. In addition to commandments against lying, stealing, killing, and other crimes, the moral code includes prayer five times daily, fast- ing, giving alms to the poor, pilgrimage to Mecca if financially possible, abstention from gambling and wine, and dietary restric- tions similar to those of Judaism. The Prophet linked behavior to salvation so closely that bodies of Islamic law (sharia) grew up in order to interpret all human activity according to the spirit of the Quran. In practice, to be a Muslim requires not simply a belief in God and in Muhammad's status as the final prophet, but ac- ceptance of the rules of Islamic law and following them in one's own life. Islam thus encompasses a rich theology and moral sys- tem, and it also includes a distinctive body of laws and customs that distinguish Muslims from followers of other faiths. Islam is theoretically a democratic union of all believers without priests, but in practice scholars (ulama) learned in Islamic law interpret the Quran according to local conditions, legal officials (qazi) regulate Muslim life according to Islamic law, and local prayer leaders coor- dinate group recitation of prayers in mosques (masjid, or palli). By the fifteenth century, Arab traders dominated the trade routes through the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Some of them set- tled down along the coasts of India and Sri Lanka, married local women, and spoke Arabized Tamil rather than pure Arabic. Their families followed Islam and preserved the basic doctrines and Islamic law, while also adopting some local social customs (such as matrilineal and matrilocal families) that were not part of early Islamic society in the Arabian Peninsula. When the Portuguese took control in the sixteenth century, they persecuted the Muslim traders of the southwest coast, and many Muslims had to relocate in the Central Highlands or on the east coast (see European Encroachment and Dominance, 1500-1948, ch. 1). They retained their separate religious identity, but also adopted some aspects of popular religion. For example, pilgrimage sites, such as Kataragama, may be the same for Muslims as for Hindus or Bud- dhists, although Muslims will worship at mosques rather than rever- ence the Buddha or worship Hindu gods (see Buddhism, this ch.). The growth in ethnic consciousness during the last two centu- ries has affected the Muslim community of Sri Lanka. Muslim revivalism has included an interest in the Arabic roots of the com- munity, increased emphasis on the study of Arabic as the basis for 100 The Society and Its Environment understanding the Quran, and an emphasis on separate schools for Muslim children. Whether there should be an independent Islamic law for Muslims, preserving the distinct moral culture passed down from Muhammad, is a continuing issue. On a num- ber of occasions, agitation has developed over attempts by the Sri Lankan government to regulate Muslim marriage and inheritance. In order to prevent further alienation of the Muslim community, in the 1980s the government handled its dealings with Muslims through a Muslim Religious and Cultural Affairs Department. Christianity According to Christian traditions, the Apostle Thomas was active in Sri Lanka as well as southern India during the first century A.D. Small Christian communities existed on the coasts of Sri Lanka during the succeeding centuries, flourishing on the edges of the Indian Ocean trade routes as Islam did in later times. Christianity made significant inroads only after the fifteenth century, as aggres- sive Portuguese missionary efforts led to many conversions, espe- cially among the Karava and other low-country castes. When the Dutch took control of Sri Lanka, they encouraged their own mis- sionaries of the Dutch Reformed Church. Under their patronage, 21 percent of the population in the low country was officially Chris- tian by 1722. The British, in turn, allowed Anglican and other Pro- testant missionaries to proselytize. The relative number of Christians in Sri Lanka has declined steadily since the end of colonial rule. In 1900 a reported 378,859 people, or 10.6 percent of the population, were officially Christi- ans. Although in 1980, the number of Christians had increased to 1,283,600, the percentage of Christians in the total population had declined to approximately 8 percent. This decline occurred primarily because the non-Christian population expanded at a faster rate. Emigration abroad, conversions of some Christians to Bud- dhism and fewer conversions to Christianity among Buddhists, Hin- dus, or Muslims also were reasons for the decline. In the 1980s, Christians still were concentrated heavily in the low country in the southwest. They comprised 30 percent of the population in Colombo. Some 88 percent of the Christians were Roman Catholics who traced their religious heritage directly to the Portuguese. The Roman Catholic Church has a well-established organization that encompasses the entire island. In 1985 there were 9 dioceses com- prising 313 parishes, 682 priests, and 15 bishops (including two archbishops and a cardinal). The remainder of Christians were almost evenly split between the Anglican Church of Ceylon (with 101 Sri Lanka: A Country Study two dioceses) and other Protestant faiths. The Dutch Reformed Church, now the Presbytery of Ceylon, consisted mostly of Bur- ghers, and its numbers were shrinking because of emigration. Other Christian communities — Congregationalists, Methodists, and Baptists — were small in number. Since the 1970s, there has been a movement of all Protestant Churches to join together in a united Church of Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese community, however, has strenuously opposed this movement. Social Services Education Traditional and Colonial Systems The education system of Sri Lanka until colonial times primar- ily was designed for a small elite in a society with relatively low technology. The vast majority of the population was illiterate or semiliterate. Among the Sinhalese, learning was the job of Bud- dhist monks. At the village level, literate monks would teach privileged students in the pansal, or temple school. The curricu- lum there, still taught to young children, included the Sinhala alphabet and memorization of elementary Buddhist literature — the Nam potha (Book of Names) of Buddhist shrines, the Magul lakuna (Book of Auspicious Symbols on the Buddha's body), and classic stories of the Buddha's life. The pursuit of higher education typi- cally was reserved for men who became monks and took place at universities (pirivena) dedicated almost exclusively to memorization and commentary on the Pali scriptures. Among the Tamil popu- lation, village schools, which were located near temples, were run by literate Brahmans or educated Vellalas (see Glossary). Techni- cal training was highly developed for students of the arts (such as architecture or sculpture); for engineers, who applied geometry to problems of irrigation; and for craftsmen in various trades. This training, however, was generally the preserve of closed corpora- tions, castes, or families. Knowledge was often passed down from fathers to sons. Although colonization brought European-style education to Sri Lanka, especially to prepare students for positions in the colonial administrations, few women went to school and most people re- mained uneducated. During the sixteenth century, Portuguese mis- sionaries established up to 100 schools designed to foster a Roman Catholic culture among the growing Christian community in the low country. When the Dutch took over in 1656, they set up a well- organized system of primary schools to support the missionary efforts of the Dutch Reformed Church. By 1760 they had 130 102 Sinhalese twins near Hikkaduwa Courtesy Paige W. Thompson schools with an attendance of nearly 65,000 students. The British takeover led to the closing of many Dutch schools and a short-term contraction of European- style education in the low country. By the mid-nineteenth century, government-funded schools and Christian schools were again expanding; in 1870, however, their combined student bodies had fewer than 20,000 students. Because they were educated in English, the graduates of the European- style schools, a large portion of them Christians from the low country in the southwest, went on to fill lower and middle-level positions in the colonial administration. Apart from the European-style schools, education continued through the traditional system in Tamil and Sinhala. In 1870 a series of events revolutionized the education system in Sri Lanka. The government began to expand the number of state-run schools and instituted a program of grants for private schools that met official standards. Medical and law colleges were established in Colombo. There was a big increase in the number of students (which totalled more than 200,000 by 1900), but the lopsided development that had characterized the early nineteenth century became even more apparent by the early twentieth century. Private schools taught in English, which offered the best road for advancement, were dominated by Christian organizations, remained concentrated in the southwest, and attracted a disproportionate number of Christian and Tamil students. Although institutions that 103 Sri Lanka: A Country Study used Tamil and Sinhala continued to function as elementary schools, secondary institutions that taught exclusively in English attracted an elite male clientele destined for administrative positions. The education of women lagged behind; by 1921 the female literacy rate among the Christians was 50 percent, among the Buddhists 17 percent, among the Hindus 10 percent, and among the Mus- lims only 6 percent. The colonial pattern began to change in the 1930s, after legisla- tive reforms placed the Ministry of Education under the control of elected representatives. The government directly controlled an ever-larger proportion of schools (about 60 percent by 1947) and teacher-training colleges. As part of a policy to promote universal literacy, education became free in government schools, elemen- tary and technical schools were set up in rural areas, and vernacu- lar education received official encouragement. In 1942 with the establishment of the University of Ceylon, free education was avail- able from kindergarten through the university level. When indepen- dence came in 1948, Sri Lanka had a well-developed education infrastructure. Although still hampered by gross ethnic, geographic, and gender inequalities, it formed the basis for a modern system. The Modern Education System Since independence in 1948, the government has made educa- tion one of its highest priorities, a policy that has yielded excellent results (see table 4, Appendix). Within a period of less than 40 years, the number of schools in Sri Lanka increased by over 50 percent, the number of students increased more than 300 percent, and the number of teachers increased by more than 400 percent. Growth has been especially rapid in secondary schools, which in 1985 taught 1.2 million students, or one-third of the student population. Teachers made up the largest government work force outside the plantation industry. The literate population has grown correspond- ingly, and by the mid-1980s over 90 percent of the population was officially literate (87 percent for those above ten years of age), with near universal literacy among the younger population. This is by far the most impressive progress in South Asia and places Sri Lanka close to the leaders in education among developing nations. The government has taken an ever larger role in education. Be- cause private institutions no longer receive grants from the govern- ment, they are forced to charge fees while competing with free state-run schools. The percentage of students in the state system has grown constantly, and by the 1980s, 99 percent of female stu- dents and 93 percent of male students at the primary school level were being trained in government-run schools. The government 104 The Society and Its Environment did not have a monopoly over education because Buddhist pansala and pirivena, Muslim schools, and Christian schools still thrived (the Roman Catholic Church alone operated several hundred in- stitutions from kindergarten to secondary level, teaching over 80,000 children). The education system of the state, however, had an over- whelming influence on the majority of the population, especially the Sinhalese. The state has tried to change the language of instruction in its primary and secondary schools from English to Tamil or Sinhala. By the 1960s, the vernacular languages were the primary medium in all government secondary schools. In the 1980s, English re- mained, however, an important key to advancement in technical and professional careers, and there was still competition among well-to-do families to place members in private English-language programs in urban areas. Ethnic minorities long associated with European-style education still formed a large percentage of the English-speaking elite. In the 1980s, for example, almost 80 per- cent of the Burghers knew English, while among the Sinhalese the English-speakers comprised only 12 percent. Children from age five to ten attend primary school; from age eleven to fifteen they attend junior secondary school (terminating in Ordinary Level Examination); and from age sixteen to seven- teen they attend senior secondary school (terminating in the Advanced Level Examination). Those who qualify can go on to the university system, which is totally state-run. In the late 1980s, there were 8 universities and 1 university college with over 18,000 students in 28 faculties, plus 2,000 graduate and certificate stu- dents. The university system included the University of Peradeniya, about six kilometers from Kandy, formed between 1940 and 1960; the universities of Vidyalankara and Vidyodaya, formed in the 1950s and 1960s from restructured pirivena; the College of Advanced Technology in Katubedda, Colombo District, formed in the 1960s; the Colombo campus of the University of Ceylon, created in 1967; the University of Ruhunu (1979); and Batticaloa University Col- lege (1981). There was also the Buddhist and Pali University of Sri Lanka, established in Colombo in 1982. Among the major problems still facing the educational system in the late 1980s were a serious dropout rate in the primary grades and a continuing bias toward urban environments at the expense of the countryside. The median level of educational attainment in Sri Lanka was somewhere between grades 5 and 9, and almost 40 percent of the students dropped out of school after 9 years. The reasons were not hard to discern in a primarily agricultural soci- ety, where many young people were more urgently needed in the 105 Sri Lanka: A Country Study fields or at home than in school once they had achieved an opera- tional level of literacy and arithmetic skills. Many urban youth from low-income backgrounds also dropped out at an early age. This pattern provided two-thirds of the students with an education through grade 5 but less than 10 percent of the population with a high school diploma and less than 1 percent with a college degree. Despite government efforts in the 1980s to expand opportunities for youth from rural areas and more sparsely inhabited districts, the pressures for early dropout were more pressing in precisely those areas where illiteracy was most prevalent. In Colombo, for exam- ple, the overall literacy rate was 94 percent in 1988, while in Amparai District it was only 75 percent. Rural schools were more widely scattered, with poor facilities and inadequate equipment, especially in the sciences. Teachers preferred not to work in the countryside, and many rural schools did not even go up to the level of twelfth grade. The most dynamic field in education during the 1970s and 1980s was technical training. In the late 1980s, the Ministry of Higher Education operated a network of twenty- seven technical colleges and affiliated institutes throughout the country. Courses led to national diplomas in accountancy, commerce, technology, agricul- ture, business studies, economics, and manufacture. Other govern- ment institutions, including the Railway, Survey, and Irrigation Departments, ran their own specialized training institutes. The Ministry of Labour had three vocational and craft training insti- tutes. The number of students in all state-run technical institutes by the mid-1980s was 22,000. In addition, the government oper- ated schools of agriculture in four locations, as well as practical farm schools in each district. A continuing problem in all fields of technical education was extreme gender differentiation in job training; women tended to enroll in home economics and teach- ing courses rather than in scientific disciplines. Education and Ethnic Conflict During the first fifteen years after independence, students sought a university degree primarily to qualify for service in government, which remained by far the major employer of administrative skills. Liberal arts, leading to the bachelor of arts degree, was the preferred area of study as a preparation for administrative positions. Because the university exams were conducted in English — the language of the elite — the potential pool of university applicants was relatively small, and only 30 percent of all applicants were admitted. By the mid-1960s, the examinations were conducted in Sinhala and Tamil, opening the universities to a larger body of applicants, many of 106 Sinhalese boy with flowers Courtesy Paige W. Thompson whom were trained in the vernacular languages in state-run secon- dary schools. At the same time, university expansion slowed down because of lack of funds, and it became impossible to admit the increasing numbers of qualified candidates; by 1965 only 20 per- cent of applicants were admitted, and by 1969 only 11 percent. Those students who did manage to enter the university followed the traditional road to a bachelor's degree, until neither the govern- ment nor private enterprises could absorb the glut of graduates. In this way, the direction of educational expansion by the late 1960s led to two major problems surrounding the university system: the growing difficulty of admissions and the growing irrelevance of a liberal arts education to employment. The big losers were mem- bers of the Sinhalese community, who were finally able to obtain high school or university degrees, but who found further advance- ment difficult. Frustrated aspirations lay behind the participation of many students in the abortive uprising by the People's Libera- tion Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna — J VP) in 1971 (see Independence, ch. 1). During the colonial period and the two decades after indepen- dence, the Sri Lankan Tamil community — both Hindu and Christian — outstripped the Sinhalese community in the relative per- centage of students in secondary schools and university bachelor of arts degree programs. As the government increasingly fell into the hands of the Sinhalese, however, possibilities for government 107 Sri Lanka: A Country Study service declined for Tamil students. Tamil secondary schools then used their strength in science curriculums to prepare their students in science and medicine, and by the 1960s Tamils dominated the university student bodies in those fields. Thus, at precisely the time when Sinhalese bachelor of arts candidates found their careers thwarted by changes in the job market, Tamil science students were embarking on lucrative professional careers. Sinhalese agitation aimed at decreasing the numbers of Tamil students in science and medical faculties became a major political issue. Overt political favoritism did not eliminate the dominance of well- trained Tamil students until 1974, when the government instituted a district quota system of science admissions. When each district in the country had a number of reserved slots for its students, the Sinhalese community benefited because it dominated a majority of districts. Tamil admissions ratios remained higher than the per- centage of Tamils in the population, but declined precipitously from previous levels. In the 1980s, 60 percent of university admissions were allocated according to district quotas, with the remaining 40 percent awarded on the basis of individual merit. This system guaranteed opportunity for all ethnic groups in rough approxima- tion to their population throughout the country. Although the admissions controversy and the quota system re- sulted in a more equitable distribution of opportunities for Sri Lankans in general, they damaged the prospects of many excel- lent Tamil students coming out of secondary schools. The educa- tion policies of the government were perceived by educated members of the Tamil community as blatant discrimination. Many Tamil youths reacted to the blockage of their educational prospects by supporting the Tamil United Liberation Front and other seces- sionist cells (see The Political Party System, ch. 4; The Tamil In- surgency, ch. 5). Large-scale improvements in education had, paradoxically, contributed to ethnic conflict. Health Sri Lanka has one of the most effective health systems among developing nations. The crude death rate in the early 1980s was 6 per 1,000, down from 13 per 1,000 in 1948 and an estimated 19 per 1,000 in 1871. The infant mortality rate registered a simi- lar decline, from 50 deaths per 1,000 births in 1970 to 34 deaths per 1,000 births in the early 1980s. These figures placed Sri Lanka statistically among the top five Asian countries. Improvements in health were largely responsible for raising the average life span in the 1980s to sixty-eight years. 108 The Society and Its Environment Traditional medicine {ayurveda — see Glossary) is an important part of the health system in Sri Lanka. The basis of traditional medi- cine is the theory of "three humors" (tridhatu), corresponding to elements of the universe that make up the human body: a> ap- pears as wind, fire as bile, and water as phlegm. Imbalances among the humors (the "three ills," or tridosha) cause various diseases. The chief causes of the imbalances are excesses of heat or cold. Treatment of disease requires an infusion of hot or cold substances in order to reestablish a balance in the body. The definition of ' 'hot' ' or "cold" rests on culturally defined norms and lists in ancient textbooks. For example, milk products and rice cooked in milk are cool substances, while certain meats are hot, regardless of temper- ature. Treatment may also involve a variety of herbal remedies made according to lore handed down from ancient times. Archaeo- logical work at ancient monastic sites has revealed the antiquity of the traditional medical system; for example, excavations have revealed large tubs used to immerse the bodies of sick persons in healing solutions. Literate monks, skilled in ayurveda, were impor- tant sources of medical knowledge in former times. Village-level traditional physicians also remained active until the mid-twentieth century. In the late 1980s, as part of a free state medical system, government agencies operated health clinics specializing in ayurve- da, employed over 12,000 ayurvedic physicians, and supported several training and research institutes in traditional medicine. Western- style medical practices have been responsible for most of the improvements in health in Sri Lanka during the twentieth century. Health care facilities and staff and public health programs geared to combat infectious disease are the most crucial areas where development has taken place. The state maintains a system of free hospitals, dispensaries, and maternity services. In 1985 there were more than 3,000 doctors trained in Western medicine, about 8,600 nurses, 490 hospitals, and 338 central dispensaries. Maternity ser- vices were especially effective in reaching into rural areas; less than 3 percent of deliveries took place without the assistance of at least a paramedic or a trained midwife, and 63 percent of deliveries oc- curred in health institutions — higher rates than in any other South Asian nation. As is the case for all services in Sri Lanka, the most complete hospital facilities and highest concentration of physicians were in urban areas, while many rural and estate areas were served by dispensaries and paramedics. The emergency transport of patients, especially in the countryside, was still at a rudimentary level. Some progress has been made in controlling infectious dis- eases. Smallpox has been eliminated, and the state has been cooper- ating with United Nations agencies in programs to eradicate 109 Sri Lanka: A Country Study malaria. In 1985 Sri Lanka spent 258 rupees (for value of rupee — see Glossary) per person to fight the disease. Although the num- ber of malaria cases and fatalities has declined, in 1985 more than 100,000 persons contracted the disease. Sri Lanka had little exposure to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) during the 1980s. As late as 1986, no Sri Lankan citizens had contracted the disease at home, but by early 1988 six cases had been diagnosed, including those of foreigners and of Sri Lankan citizens who had traveled abroad. Government regulations in the late 1980s required immediate expulsion of any foreigner diagnosed as an AIDS carrier, and by 1988 the government had deported at least one foreign AIDS victim. Government ministers have participated in international forums dealing with the problem, and the government formed a National Committee on AIDS Prevention in 1988. Mortality rates in the late 1980s highlighted the gap that remained between the urban and rural sectors and the long way good medi- cal care still had to go to reach the whole population. Over 40 per- cent of the deaths in urban areas were traced to heart or circulatory diseases, a trend that resembled the pattern in developed nations. Cancer, on the other hand, accounted for only about 6 percent of deaths, a pattern that did not resemble that of developed nations. Instead, intestinal infections, tuberculosis, and parasitic diseases accounted for 20 percent of urban deaths and over 12 percent of rural deaths annually. The leading causes of death in rural environ- ments were listed as ' 'ill-defined conditions" or "senility," reflect- ing the rather poor diagnostic capabilities of rural health personnel. Observers agreed that considerable work needed to be done to reduce infectious diseases throughout the country and to improve skilled medical outreach to rural communities. Living Conditions In the late 1980s, vast differences remained in the wealth and life- styles of citizens in Sri Lanka. In urban areas, such as Colombo, entire neighborhoods consisted of beautiful houses owned by well- off administrators and businessmen. This elite enjoyed facilities and opportunities on a par with those of middle- and upper-middle- class residents of Europe or North America. In the countryside, families that controlled more extensive farms lived a rustic but healthy life, with excellent access to food, shelter, clothing, and opportunities for education and employment. In contrast, at lower levels in the class pyramid, the vast majority of the population expe- rienced a much lower standard of living and range of opportuni- ties. A sizable minority in both the cities and rural villages led a 110 The Society and Its Environment marginal existence, with inadequate food and facilities and poor chances for upward mobility. Intervention by successive governments has had marginal suc- cess in decreasing the differences between income groups. In the rural sector, legislation has mandated a ceiling on private land- ownership and has nationalized plantations, but these programs have provided extra land to relatively few people (see Agriculture, ch. 3). Although resettlement programs have benefitted hundreds of thousands of people, they have not kept pace with population growth. In rural environments, most people remained peasants with smallholdings, agricultural laborers working for small wages on the lands of others, or landless plantation workers. Migration to the cities often did not lead to a great improvement in people's life- styles because most immigrants had little education and few skills. As a result, urban slums have proliferated; by the 1980s almost half the people in greater Colombo were living in slums and shan- ties. Because economic growth has not kept pace with these popu- lation changes, double-digit unemployment continued with the poorest sections of the urban and rural population suffering the most. A hard-core mass of poor and underemployed people, total- ling between 20 and 25 percent of the population, remained the biggest challenge for the government. Cramped and insufficient housing detracted from the quality of life in Sri Lanka. In the 1980s, most housing units in Sri Lanka were small: 33 percent had only one room, 33 percent two rooms, and 20 percent three rooms. More than five persons lived in the average housing unit, with an overcrowding rate (three or more persons per room) of 40 percent. In urban areas, permanent struc- tures with brick walls, tiled roofs, and cement floors constituted 70 percent of houses, but in the countryside permanent houses made up only 24 percent of the units. The rural figures included a large number of village dwellings built of such materials as thatch, mud, and timber, designed according to traditional styles with inner court- yards, or verandas, and providing ample room for living and sleep- ing in the generally warm climate. The rates of overcrowding were declining in the 1980s, as the government sponsored intensive pro- grams for increasing access to permanent housing. Many of the infectious diseases that caused high mortality in Sri Lanka were water-borne, and improvements in water facilities oc- cupied a high priority in government welfare programs of the 1 980s and planning for the 1990s. In urban areas, about half the drink- ing water was piped and half came from wells, while in the coun- tryside 85 percent of the water came from wells and 10 percent from unprotected, open sources. Almost one- third of the well water 111 Sri Lanka: A Country Study was also unprotected against backflows that could cause leakage of sewage. Only about one out of three houses had toilets. With help from United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United States Agency for International Development (AID), Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and the Nether- lands, the government of Sri Lanka set a goal of clean, piped water and sewage facilities for the entire urban population and for at least half the rural population by 1990. Observers doubted, however, that this goal could be reached in the northern and eastern dis- tricts torn by ethnic conflict. Food was another major issue. Beginning in the 1940s, the government ran a food subsidy program that paid farmers a mini- mum price for their crops and also operated a rationing system that allowed people to obtain rice at a guaranteed low price. The importance of this program to the people was dramatically demon- strated in 1953, when the state's attempt to reduce subsidies led to food riots and the fall of the government (see United National Party ' 'Majority" Rule, 1948-56, ch. 1). Since 1979 when the sub- sidy program was abolished, the government has operated a food stamp scheme that allows people in lower-income brackets to ob- tain free rice, wheat flour, sugar, milk powder, condensed milk, dried fish, and kerosene for cooking. This program has reached almost half the population, accounting for approximately 7 percent of the state budget. The government also operated supplementary feeding programs, including a School Biscuit Programme designed to reach malnourished children and a Thriposha Programme to provide for 600,000 needy infants, preschool children, and preg- nant mothers. (Thriposha is a precooked, protein-fortified cereal food supplement.) Despite government intervention in the food market, malnutri- tion continued to be a problem among the poor, the bottom 60 percent of the population who earned less than 30 percent of the national income. As in so many other sectors, the problem remained worse in rural areas, although urban slums possessed their own share of misery. In Colombo city and district, 1 or 2 percent of preschool children experienced severe symptoms of malnutrition, while the rate was 3 or 4 percent in Puttalam District. Mild forms of malnourishment, resulting in some stunted growth, affected around 33 percent of the young children in Colombo but up to 50 percent in rural Vavuniya or Puttalam districts. Malnutrition also affected adults: one out of three agricultural laborers consumed less than 80 percent of recommended calories daily. This problem became worse after the inflation of the early 1980s that reduced the real value of food stamps by up to 50 percent (see Finance, 112 113 Sri Lanka: A Country Study ch. 3). Observers doubted that poverty and malnutrition would be alleviated during the 1980s or early 1990s, while the country experienced economic uncertainty and the government was forced to spend more on security matters (see The Defense Budget, ch. 5). * * * An excellent short survey of Sri Lanka's geology, topography, and climate is found in Sri Lanka: A Survey, edited by K.M. de Sil- va. A more detailed study is J.W. Herath's Mineral Resources of Sri Lanka. The authoritative source for population statistics is Population and Housing, 1981: General Report published by the Sri Lanka Ministry of Plan Implementation. Beginning with basic population data, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka's Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka also includes useful data on health, education, and welfare. Basic texts for ethnic, caste, and family topics are Caste in Modern Ceylon by Bruce Ryan and Under the Bo Tree by Nur Yalman. Michael Robert's more recent Caste Conflict and Elite Formation concentrates on the dominant low-country castes. Muslims of Sri Lanka, edited by M.A.M. Shukri, is a collection of essays dealing with the his- tory and culture of the different groups within the Muslim com- munity. Heinz Bechert, Hans Dieter-Evers, Richard Gombrich, and Gananath Obeyesekere are major figures in the study of Sinhalese religion. Bechert and Gombrich have edited The World of Buddhism, with contributors discussing all world areas; the sections on Indian and Sinhalese Buddhism are excellent introductions. Gombrich' s Precept and Practice is a scholarly investigation of popular Sinhalese religion and its relationship to Buddhist doctrines. For the basic ideas of Hinduism, Thomas J. Hopkins's The Hindu Religious Tra- dition is useful. Kamil Zvelebil's The Smile of Murugan and Hymns of the Tamil Saivite Saints by F. Kingsbury and G.E. Phillips pro- vide more detailed information on Tamil Hindu traditions. Expo- sitions of the basic doctrines of Islam are found in H.A.R. Gibb's Mohammedanism and Fazlur Rahman's Islam. Education in Colonial Ceylon by Ranjit Ruberu describes the precolonial and colonial education systems. Chandra Richard de Silva and Daya de Silva give a detailed description of the postin- dependence education system in Education in Sri Lanka. The rela- tionship between education and ethnic conflict are discussed in chapters by K.M. de Silva and Chandra Richard de Silva in From Independence to Statehood: Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and Asian States. Health and welfare conditions, and government 114 The Society and Its Environment programs addressing them, are summarized in Piyasiri Wick- ramasekara's long article in Strategies for Alleviating Poverty in Rural Asia. A more detailed study of rural conditions is Rachel Kurian's Women Workers in the Sri Lanka Plantation Sector. (For further infor- mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 115 Chapter 3. The Economy Economic activity in Sri Lanka: rubber tapper, tea picker, rice cultivator, and handicraft worker THE DOMINANT SECTOR of the Sri Lankan economy histor- ically has been wet rice (paddy) cultivation. Its importance in an- cient times is demonstrated by the extensive irrigation works constructed in the north-central region of the island in the first millennium A.D. In the thirteenth century, the civilization based on these reservoirs began to decline, and population shifted to the wet zone of the southern and southwestern areas, where irrigation was less necessary to grow rice. Cinnamon and other spices which were valuable in the European market became important export commodities in the sixteenth century, when Europeans, first the Portuguese and then the Dutch, established control over the coastal areas of the island. Commercial agriculture came to dominate the economy during the British period (1796-1948). Extensive coffee plantations were established in the mid-nineteenth century. Coffee failed when a leaf disease ravaged it in the 1870s and 1880s, but it was quickly replaced by the important commercial crops of tea, rubber, and coconut. Although wet rice cultivation remained important, Sri Lanka had to import more than one-half of the rice it needed dur- ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because of the land and labor devoted to the commercial crops. At independence in 1948, almost all of the islands' foreign exchange earnings were derived from commercial agriculture. The fundamental economic problem since the 1950s has been the declining terms of trade. The proceeds from the traditional agricultural exports of tea, rubber, and coconut have had less and less value in the international marketplace. Beginning in the early 1960s, governments responded by intervening directly in the largely free-market economy inherited from the colonial period. Imports and exports were tightly regulated, and the state sector was ex- panded, especially in manufacturing and transportation. This trend accelerated between 1970 and 1977, when a coalition headed by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party nationalized the larger plantations and imposed direct controls over internal trade. The United National Party (UNP) contested the 1977 general election with a platform calling for less regulation of the economy. After its electoral victory, the new UNP government made some effort to dismantle the state sector in agriculture and manufactur- ing. At the same time, it encouraged private enterprise, welcomed foreign investment and slackened import controls. It also shifted 119 Sri Lanka: A Country Study spending away from subsidies and social welfare to investment in the nation's infrastructure, most notably a massive irrigation project, the Mahaweli Ganga Program, which was expected to make Sri Lanka self-sufficient in rice and generate enough hydroelectric power to fill the nation's requirements. These policies resulted in higher rates of economic growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but at the cost of a mounting external debt. Foreign aid from the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and international organi- zations kept the economy afloat. Sri Lanka's economy became more diverse in the 1970s and 1980s, and in 1986 textiles surpassed tea for the first time as the country's single largest export. Nonetheless, the performance of the traditional agricultural exports remained essential to the coun- try's economic health. Other important sources of foreign exchange included remittances from Sri Lankans working overseas, foreign aid, and tourism. Nature of the Economy Sri Lanka's economic prospects in early 1988 were linked at least in part to the political and security situation. If political violence could be brought under control, the government had commitments from foreign investors and donors to finance a reconstruction pro- gram that would ensure economic growth in the short term. If the violence were to continue, the diversion of resources into defense and the negative impact on tourism and foreign investment ap- peared likely to result in economic stagnation. Structure of the Economy Agriculture, both subsistence and commercial, has played a dominant role in Sri Lanka's economy for many centuries. The Portuguese and Dutch, who ruled the coastal regions of the island from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, were primar- ily interested in profiting from cinnamon and other spices (see European Encroachment and Dominance, 1500-1948; The Dutch, ch. 1). Trade with India, Sri Lanka's nearest neighbor, was also important during this period. Sri Lanka exported pearls, areca nuts, shells, elephants, and coconuts, and in return received rice and textiles. The island's economy began to assume its modern form in the 1830s and 1840s, when coffee plantations were established in the Central Highlands. Coffee soon became the dominant force in the economy, its proceeds paying for increasingly large imports of food, especially rice. When coffee fell victim to a leaf disease in the 1870s, it was quickly replaced by tea, which soon covered more land than 120 The Economy had coffee at its height. Coconut plantations also expanded rap- idly in the late nineteenth century, followed by rubber, another cash crop introduced in the 1890s. Stimulated by demand gener- ated by the development of the automobile industry in Western Europe and North America, rubber soon passed coconuts in im- portance. These three products — tea, coconuts, and rubber — provided the export earnings that enabled Sri Lanka to import food, textiles, and other consumer goods in the first half of the twentieth century. At independence in 1948, they generated over 90 percent of export proceeds. Wet rice was grown extensively as a subsistence crop throughout the colonial period. In the nineteenth century, most of it was con- sumed in the villages where it was grown, but in the final decades of British rule the internal market in rice expanded. Nonetheless, more than half of the rice consumed was imported, and the island depended on the proceeds of plantation crops for its food supply. The economy gradually became more diverse after the late 1950s, partly as a result of government policies that encouraged this trend. The main reason successive administrations tried to reduce the coun- try' s dependence on tea, rubber, and coconuts was the long-term decline in their value relative to the cost of imports. Even when Sri Lanka increased the production of its major cash crops, the amount of imports that could be bought with their proceeds declined. Much of the diversification of the economy, especially in the 1960s and the early 1970s, took the form of import substitution, produc- ing for the local market goods that the island could no longer afford to import. Sri Lanka also had some success in diversifying exports after 1970. The proportion of exports linked to the three traditional cash crops fell from over 90 percent in the late 1960s to 71 percent in 1974 and 42 percent in 1986. Textiles, which made up only 0.7 percent of exports in 1974, accounted for over 28 percent in 1986 (see table 5, Appendix A). In 1986 agriculture, forestry, and fishing made up 27.7 percent of the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary), down from 39.4 percent in 1975 (see table 6, Appendix A). In 1986 wholesale and retail trade accounted for 19.9 percent of GNP, and manufactur- ing for 15.6 percent. Transport, storage, and communications stood at 11.2 percent of GNP, and construction at 7.7 percent. The rela- tive importance of the various sectors of the economy was fairly stable during the 1980s. Role of Government The role of government in the economy during the final decades of British colonial rule was considerable. The plantation economy 121 Sri Lanka: A Country Study required extensive infrastructure; the colonial state developed and owned railroad, electrical, postal, telegraphic, telephone, and water supply services. Quasi- state financial institutions served the colony's commercial needs, and during World War II the government set up production units for plywood, quinine, drugs, leather, coir, paper, ceramics, acetic acid, glass, and steel. Welfare policies also began during colonial rule, including a network for free and sub- sidized rice and flour established in 1942. Free education, relief for the poor, and subsidized medical care were introduced in the late British period. Moreover, after 1935 the government took an active role in the planning and subsidizing of colonization schemes. This policy was designed to remove landless peasants from heavily populated areas to newly irrigated tracts in the dry zone. Economic policy since independence is divided into two peri- ods. During the first, which lasted from 1948 to 1977, government intervention was often seen as the solution to economic problems. The expansion of government participation in the economy was fairly steady, resulting in a tightly regulated system. This trend was especially marked during the period of S.R.D. Bandaranaike's second government, from 1970 to 1977, when the state came to dominate international trade and payments; the plantation, finan- cial, and industrial manufacturing sectors; and the major trade unions outside the plantation sector. It also played a major role in the domestic wholesale and retail trade. The trend toward greater government involvement was largely a response to the deteriorating terms of trade. The plantation econ- omy had financed social programs such as subsidized food in the late colonial period, but when the value of exports declined after 1957, the economy's capacity to support these programs was strained. When the foreign exchange reserves of the early 1950s dwindled, import-substituting industrialization was seen as a so- lution. Because the private sector viewed industrial development as risky, the government took up the slack. When balance of pay- ment deficits became chronic, some nationalizations were justified by the need to stem the drain of foreign exchange. Similar con- cerns led to the tighter regulation of private business and the es- tablishment of state-owned trading corporations. When there were shortages of necessities, governments expanded state control over their distribution in order to make them available at low prices. The 1977 elections were largely a referendum on the perceived failures of the closed economy. The UNP, which supported a deregulated, open economy, won decisively. The new government rejected the economic policies that had evolved over the previous twenty years. Some observers believed that the economy had been 122 Villagers and cart in rural Sri Lanka, circa 1910 Courtesy Library of Congress shackled by excessive regulation, an excess of consumption expen- diture over investment, and wasteful state enterprises. Under the UNP, market forces were to play a greater role in allocating resources, and state enterprises were to compete with the private sector (see The United National Party Returns to Power, ch. 1). The main elements of the new policy were investment incen- tives for foreign and domestic capital, a shift in the composition of public spending from subsidies to infrastructure investment, and a liberalized international trade policy designed to encourage export- led growth. Employment creation was a central objective, both through encouragement of domestic and foreign capital investment, and through an ambitious public works program, including the Accelerated Mahaweli Program, which aimed to bring new land under irrigation and substantially increase hydroelectric generat- ing capacity (see Government Policies, this ch.). Two other poli- cies that sought to create employment were the establishment of investment promotion zones (free trade zones) and extensive government investment in housing. The role of government during the decade after 1977 remained significant; the public investment program, for instance, was im- plemented on a greater scale than anything attempted previously, and in early 1988 the state remained heavily involved in many areas of economic activity. But while the government increased its efforts 123 Sri Lanka: A Country Study to develop the nation's infrastructure, it reduced its role in regu- lation, commerce, and production. Its initiatives received the en- thusiastic support of the international development community. As a result, Sri Lanka received generous amounts of foreign aid to finance its post- 197 7 development program. This foreign as- sistance was integral to the government's economic strategy. Be- cause budget deficits were large even before 1977, external financial resources were necessary to pay for the increased spending on in- frastructure and to make up for the revenue lost as a result of the tax incentives given business. Similarly, relaxing import controls put pressure on the balance of payments, which could be relieved only with the help of foreign aid. Development Planning During the early years of independence, successive governments placed little emphasis on development planning, in part because the immediate economic problems appeared to be manageable. The National Planning Council was established in 1956 as part of the Ministry of Finance. Between 1957 and 1959, the council and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka invited a number of foreign economists to visit Sri Lanka and offer the government both their diagnoses of the country's economic problems and their prescriptions for the planning and implementation of recommended remedies. These studies provided many of the rationales for economic policies and planning in the 1960s. In 1959 the National Planning Council issued a Ten-Year Plan, the most ambitious analysis of the economy and projection of plan- ning that had yet been officially published. This plan sought to increase the role of industry in the economy. Unfortunately, its forecasts were based on faulty projections of population and labor force growth rates. Moreover, attempts to implement it collided with the exchange and price crunch of 1961 and 1962, and the plan became increasingly out of touch with the changing economic sit- uation. A new Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (no longer in existence) was established in 1965. The ministry decided not to draft another single long-term plan involving a five- or ten-year period. Instead, it drew up a number of separate, detailed, well- integrated, five-year plans involving different ministries. The government targeted agriculture, especially wet rice, as the area in which growth could best be achieved. The UNP government that came to power in 1970 shifted toward a more formal and comprehensive state direction of the economy. The Five-Year Plan for 1972-76 had two principal aspects. First, 124 The Economy it sought to remove disparities in incomes and living standards. Second, the plan sought to promote economic growth and to reduce unemployment. It envisioned rapid growth in agriculture, not only in the traditional crops of wet rice, tea, rubber, and coconut, but in such minor crops as sunflower, manioc, cotton, cashew, pine- apple, and cocoa. Like the Ten-Year Plan of 1959, this plan proved to be based on overly optimistic assumptions, and it soon ceased to exercise influence on the government's economic policy. In 1975 it was replaced by a Two-Year Plan that placed even greater em- phasis on agricultural growth and less on industrial development. After 1977 the government continued to accept the principle of state direction of economic activity, but in contrast to the 1970-77 period the government encouraged the private sector to partici- pate in the economy. Its first Five-Year Plan (1978-83) included an ambitious public investment program to be financed largely by overseas grants and loans. Its immediate objective was to reduce unemployment, which had risen during the tenure of the previous government. A series of five-year rolling investment plans was set in motion by the Ministry of Finance and Planning in the 1980s. The plan for the 1986-90 period envisaged investment of Rs268 billion (for value of the rupee — see Glossary) with the emphasis on infrastruc- ture projects such as roads, irrigation, ports, airports, telecommu- nications, and plantations. Of this total, 50 percent was to be spent by the state sector. Foreign sources were to supply Rs69 billion. The target annual average growth for the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) was 4.5 percent, a decrease from the 5.2 per- cent envisaged by the plan for the 1985-89 period and the 6 per- cent actually achieved between 1977 and 1984. The Economy in the Late 1980s Growth in GDP was estimated at 3 percent in 1987, down from 4.3 percent in 1986, and the lowest level in a decade (see table 7, Appendix A). By 1987 it was clear that the ongoing civil unrest was causing serious economic difficulties, mainly because rapidly increasing defense outlays forced the government to cut back cap- ital expenditure and to run a large budgetary deficit. Concern over the decline in foreign investment and extensive damage to infra- structure mounted as sectors such as tourism, transportation, and wet rice farming suffered production losses directly related to the decline in security. By early 1988, the ethnic conflict had resulted in extensive property damage. Infrastructure damage in Northern and Eastern provinces was estimated at Rs7.5 billion in August 1987 and was 125 Sri Lanka: A Country Study expected to be revised upwards to include the widespread destruc- tion in the Jaffna Peninsula (see fig. 1). In the predominantly Sin- halese areas, riots against the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord caused damage to government property estimated at Rs4.8 billion (see For- eign Relations, ch. 4). In early 1988, future economic prospects were closely linked to the security situation (see Primary Threats to National Security, ch. 5). Late the previous year, the government succeeded in ob- taining commitments from foreign nations and international organizations to finance an extensive reconstruction program for the 1988-90 period (see Foreign Aid, this ch.). If there were a pronounced ebb in the political violence plaguing the island na- tion, it would be probable that the official target of Rs80 billion foreign aid over this three-year period would be reached. Aid on this scale, which would be a substantial increase on the already generous levels received, would not only enable the rebuilding of infrastructure destroyed by the violence but also fuel growth and allow the large trade and budget deficits to continue. Accordingly, the 1988 budget foresaw a sharp decline in defense spending and an increase in capital expenditure. These economic plans, however, depended on a peaceful solution to the country's political problems. If political violence escalated in subsequent years, not only would the government have to shift its spending back to defense, but some of the expected foreign aid probably would be suspended, Agriculture Agriculture — including forestry and fishing — accounted for over 46 percent of exports, over 40 percent of the labor force, and around 28 percent of the GNP in 1986. The dominant crops were paddy, tea, rubber, and coconut. In the late 1980s, the government- sponsored Accelerated Mahaweli Program irrigation project opened a large amount of new land for paddy cultivation in the dry zone of the eastern part of the island (see fig. 7). In contrast, the amount of land devoted to tea, coconut, and rubber remained stable in the forty years after independence. Land reforms implemented in the 1970s affected mainly these three crops. Little land was distributed to small farmers; instead it was assumed by various government agencies. As a result, most tea and a substantial proportion of rubber production was placed under direct state control. Changing Patterns Since the beginning of the twentieth century, agriculture has been dominated by the four principal crops: rice, tea, rubber, and coco- nut. Most tea and rubber were exported, whereas almost all rice 126 The Economy was for internal use. The coconut crop was sold on both domestic and international markets. The importance of other crops increased in the 1970s and 1980s, but no single crop emerged to challenge the four traditional mainstays. Tea, rubber, and to a lesser extent, coconut are grown on plan- tations established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before the plantations existed, villagers carried out three main types of cultivation. The valley bottoms and lowlands were occupied by rice paddies. These paddies were surrounded by a belt of residen- tial gardens permanently cultivated with fruit trees and vegetables. The gardens in turn were surrounded by forests, parts of which were temporarily cleared for slash-and-burn cultivation, known as chena (see Glossary). Various grains and vegetables were grown on chena lands. The forests were also used for hunting, grazing for vil- lage cattle, gathering wild fruit, and timber. In some villages, es- pecially in the dry zone, there was little rice cultivation, and people depended on the gardens and forests for their livelihood (see Land Use and Settlement Patterns, ch. 2). Under legislation passed in 1840, the title of most forestland was vested in the government. In order to stimulate the production of export crops, the colonial administration sold large tracts to per- sons who wished to develop plantations. At first most buyers were British, but by the end of the nineteenth century many middle- class Sri Lankans had also acquired crown land and converted it to plantation use. The early coffee and tea plantations were often situated at high elevations, some distance from the nearest Sinha- lese villages, but as time went on more estates were developed on land contiguous to villages. The precise impact of the plantations on village society remains controversial, but it is widely believed in Sri Lanka that the standard of living of villagers suffered as they lost use of the forestland. Although the large coffee, tea, and rubber plantations relied mainly on Tamil migrants from southern India for their perma- nent labor supply, Sinhalese villagers were employed in the initial clearing of the forests, and some performed casual daily labor on the plantations in seasons when there was little work in the villages. The coconut plantations, being spatially closer to villages, employed considerable Sinhalese labor. By the early twentieth century, there was no longer much land suitable for the expansion of cultivation in the wet zone, and in the 1930s the focus of agricultural development shifted from the wet zone to the dry zone and from plantation crops to rice. There was ample uncultivated land in the dry zone of the north-central region, but three major obstacles had to be overcome — the prevalence of malaria, 127 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Source: Based on information from Asoka Bandarage, "Women and Capitalist Develop- ment in Sri Lanka, 1977-87," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 20, April-June 1988, 58; and Abhaya Attanayake, et al., Mahaweli Saga: Challenge and Response, Colombo, 1985, 55. Figure 7. Accelerated Mahaweli Program, 1988 the lack of a reliable supply of water to carry out rice cultivation, and the absence of farmers to cultivate the soil. The first of these problems was solved by the success of the antimalarial campaigns of the 1940s. The others were tackled by government policies that sought to restore and build irrigation works and resettle peasants from the wet zone in the newly irrigated areas. In the 1980s, the pace of this program was quickened by the Accelerated Mahaweli Program (see Government Policies, this ch.). The most important change in agriculture in the forty years after independence was the increase in rice production. This increase resulted from better yields and the enlarged amount of land under cultivation. In contrast, with the exception of rubber in the 1950s 128 The Economy and 1960s, the principal export crops showed only modest gains in productivity, and the amount of land devoted to tea and rubber fell. After around 1970, there was growth in the production of other crops, including onions, chilies, sugar, soybeans, cinnamon, carda- mom, pepper, cloves, and nutmeg. Fishing, a traditional industry in coastal waters, accounted for 2.1 percent of GNP in 1986. Government efforts to offer incen- tives for modernization had little impact. The civil disturbances of the 1980s badly affected the industry. Before 1983 the northern region produced nearly 25 percent of the fish catch and around 55 percent of cured fish, but in the mid-1980s fishing was not pos- sible there for long periods. The value of the fish catch off the north- ern coast fell from Rs495 million in 1981 to Rs52 million in 1986. Production off the southern and western coasts and from inland fisheries grew during this period, but not enough to prevent a decline in the island's total catch. In 1987 the government an- nounced plans to provide funds for investment in fishing in the North and East, but implementation was likely to depend on im- proved security in these areas. Land Use Although there have been periodic agricultural censuses, they were limited in purpose and did not provide an overall picture of land use. In 1961 , however, a survey of the use of the island's phys- ical resources was compiled based on a 1956 aerial photographic survey of the entire country. The survey indicated that, of the coun- try's total area of nearly 66 million hectares, 29 percent was under permanent cultivation, just over 15 percent under chena cultiva- tion, 44 percent under forest cover, and about 6 percent under var- ious types of grasses. Nearly 33,000 hectares consisted of swamp and marshlands, and about 63,000 hectares, or 1 percent, unused land. Just over 3 percent of the island's surface was covered by water. Of the total area, approximately 23 percent was in the wet zone, about 63 percent in the dry zone, and the balance lay in an area that the survey labeled "intermediate," as it had characteris- tics of both zones. Of the land under permanent cultivation in 1961 , which included cropland, land under plantation, and homestead gardens, the sur- vey indicated that some 75 percent was in the wet and intermedi- ate zones and about 25 percent was in the dry zone. Chena cultivation, on the other hand, was predominantly in the dry zone, as were the grass, scrub, and forestlands. Although forest covered almost half the country, only about 0.2 percent and 3.1 percent of the forests were characterized as of high and intermediate yield, 129 Sri Lanka: A Country Study respectively. The study further indicated that approximately 70 per- cent of the land in the wet zone was under permanent cultivation, whereas in the dry zone under 12 percent was being cultivated on a permanent basis. Since 1961 irrigation has enabled a much greater proportion of land in the dry zone to be cultivated and in 1978 it was estimated that nearly one-third of the country's dry-zone area was under per- manent cultivation (see fig. 8). This proportion increased in the 1980s, when lands irrigated by the Accelerated Mahaweli Program were added to the total. As a result, the proportion of forestland declined and was estimated at just under 40 percent in 1987. Although the forests had few high-yield timber stands, many areas suffered from deforestation because of the heavy demand for fire- wood in the 1980s. In 1987 it was estimated that 94 percent of house- holds used firewood for cooking. Scarcities of firewood led to price increases well above the general level of inflation in the 1980s. Government Policies Government support for farmers takes several forms, including the provision of credit for producers, the setting of minimum prices for agricultural produce, the building of irrigation works, and the encouragement of internal migration to newly irrigated areas. Since the late colonial period, the government has played a growing role in the provision of credit to smallholders on favorable terms. Until 1986 the main instrument of this policy was the subvention of cooperative societies. Agricultural credit took three forms: short- term loans to farmers for the purchase of seeds and fertilizers; medium-term loans, intended for the purchase of machinery; and long-term loans for capital expenditure on storage, transport, and rice-milling apparatus. The long-term loans were not available for individual farmers, but were used by the cooperative societies to acquire infrastructural facilities. The actual performance of credit provision through cooperatives generally fell short of expectations. Institutional credit did not dis- place the older sources of credit, such as the village moneylender, friends, and relatives. The inability to repay loans, procedural difficulties, and the existence of unpaid loans already taken from the cooperatives were some reasons given by farmers for prefer- ring noninstitutional credit sources. Another problem with the credit furnished by cooperatives was the high rate of default. This rate may have been attributable partly to real difficulties in repayment, but it also was the result of a widely held impression that govern- ment loans were a form of social welfare and that it was not neces- sary to repay them. 130 The Economy The New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme implemented in 1986 sought to increase the flow of credit to smallholders. The Central Bank guaranteed up to 50 percent of each loan in the event of losses incurred by banks lending under the program, and eligi- ble farmers received a line of credit for three years. Loans were automatically rescheduled at concessional rates when crops were damaged by events beyond the farmer's control. In 1986 cultiva- tion loans under this program amounted to nearly Rs257 million, about 74 percent for paddy and the rest for other food crops. Another important policy was the Guaranteed Price Scheme, which came into effect in 1942. Under this program the govern- ment agreed to purchase rice and some other produce at set prices. The intention was to support the farmer's standard of living. For a period in the early 1970s, when the island was threatened by food shortages, the government ordered peasants to market all of their rice through this scheme and at times set the price at a level lower than that of the free market. This policy had the effect of reducing the incentive to grow rice. The program lost some of its impetus in the 1980s. In 1986 the government set the price below the free- market rate for most of the year. As a result of the policy, pur- chases under the program accounted for only about 6 percent of the rice crop, mostly from districts where private traders were un- willing to operate because of the poor security situation. Since the 1930s, governments have promoted irrigation works and colonization projects in the dry zone in an attempt to increase rice production and reduce land pressure and unemployment in the more densely settled wet zone. The lack of infrastructure and the prevalence of malaria hampered these programs in the early years. After the near eradication of malaria, increased government investment in infrastructure and enhanced financial support for migrants made the new lands more desirable. Between 1946 and 1971, the proportion of the population living in the dry zone in- creased from 12 to 19 percent (see Population, ch. 2). At the end of 1968, about 352,000 hectares were under irriga- tion for rice cultivation; some 178,000 hectares under major storage reservoirs and barrages, and approximately 174,000 hectares in minor irrigation projects. In the 1970s and 1980s, governments pursued major irrigation programs, most notably the Mahaweli Ganga Program, which was lent added impetus and became the Accelerated Mahaweli Program in 1978. The increasing size of the Mahaweli project dwarfed its earlier endeavors. According to the plan, approximately 593,000 hectares of previously arid land would be brought under irrigation by 1992. In 1986 some 76,000 hec- tares of new land were under cultivation as a result of this project. 131 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Figure 8. Agriculture and Land Use, 1988 132 The Economy Other long-standing government policies designed to help farmers included subsidies for fertilizer, seed paddy, and other inputs. Government efforts also partly contributed to the adoption of im- proved cultivation practices and high-yielding seed varieties in pad- dy farming in the 1960s. Land Tenure Modern land tenure policy dates from the Land Development Ordinance of 1935, which forbade the transfer of crown lands for purposes of cultivation except to enlarge the landholdings of near- landless or landless peasants. The intent of this ordinance was to help small farmers whose livelihood was seen to be at risk from the exploitation of rich peasants and urban landowners. In 1958 the Paddy Lands Bill was enacted, mainly to benefit the tenant farmers of some 160,000 hectares of paddy land. The bill purported to assist tenants to purchase the land they worked, to protect them against eviction, and to establish a rent ceiling at around 25 percent of the crop. It also established cultivation com- mittees, composed of rice farmers, to assume general responsibil- ity for rice cultivation in their respective areas, including the direction and control of minor irrigation projects. Shortcomings in the law and official indifference in enforcing the act hampered its effectiveness, and many observers termed it a failure. In some regions tenants who tried to pay the lower, official rents were suc- cessfully evicted by landlords, and the old rents, often about 50 percent of the produce, remained in force. In the 1980s, however, the rent ceiling of 25 percent was effective in most districts. The Land Reform Law of 1972 imposed a ceiling of twenty hect- ares on privately owned land and sought to distribute lands in ex- cess of the ceiling for the benefit of landless peasants. Because both land owned by public companies and paddy lands under ten hect- ares in extent were exempted from the ceiling, a considerable area that would otherwise have been available for distribution did not come under the purview of the legislation. Between 1972 and 1974, the Land Reform Commission took over nearly 228,000 hectares, one-third of which was forest and most of the rest planted with tea, rubber, or coconut. Few rice paddies were affected because nearly 95 percent of them were below the ceiling limit. Very little of the land acquired by the government was transferred to individuals. Most was turned over to various government agencies or to cooper- ative organizations, such as the Up-Country Co-operative Estates Development Board. The Land Reform Law of 1972 applied only to holdings of in- dividuals. It left untouched the plantations owned by joint-stock 133 Sri Lanka: A Country Study companies, many of them British. In 1975 the Land Reform (Amendment) Law brought these estates under state control. Over 169,000 hectares comprising 395 estates were taken over under this legislation. Most of this land was planted with tea and rubber. As a result, about two-thirds of land cultivated with tea was placed in the state sector. The respective proportions for rubber and coco- nut were 32 and 10 percent. The government paid some compen- sation to the owners of land taken over under both the 1972 and 1975 laws. In early 1988, the state-owned plantations were managed by one of two types of entities, the Janatha Estates Development Board, or the Sri Lanka State Plantation Corporation. Cropping Pattern Rice cultivation has increased markedly since independence, although in the late 1980s yields remained well below those of the major rice-producing countries. Much of the improvement came in the late 1970s and 1980s. Rice remained a smallholder's crop, and production techniques varied according to region. In some vil- lages, it was still sown by hand, with harvesting and threshing often engaging the entire family, plus all available friends and relatives. Because no completely perennial sources of water exist, there was uncertainty regarding the adequacy of the supply each year. In the wet zone, flooding and waterlogging was experienced in the 1980s, whereas in the dry zone even the irrigated areas were sub- ject to the possibility of insufficient water. In the mid- and up- country wet zone areas, most fields were sown twice a year in the 1980s; in the dry zone most holdings were sown only once; and in the low-country wet zone the amount of flooding or waterlog- ging determined whether to plant once or twice. The maha (greater monsoon — see Glossary) crops are sown between August and October and harvested five or six months later; the yala (lesser monsoon — see Glossary) crops sown between April and May and harvested about four or five months later. Despite some increases in productivity, rice output was disap- pointing in the 1960s and early 1970s. Greater incentives to farm- ers after 1977 contributed to increases in production. Both the area under cultivation and the yield increased steadily between 1980 and 1985, when annual output reached 2.7 million tons, compared to an annual output of around 1.4 million tons in the early 1970s. In 1986 unfavorable weather and security difficulties led to a slight decline in production. A severe drought affected the crop in 1987, when output was estimated at only 2.1 million tons. Tea is Sri Lanka's largest export crop. Only China and India produce more tea. The plants, originally imported from Assam in 134 Gemstone prospector near Ratnapura Courtesy Paige W. Thompson India, are grown in the wet zone at low, middle, and high alti- tudes, and produce a high-grade black tea. The higher altitudes produce the best tea, and terracing is used to eke out the limited area of upper altitude land. Tea cultivation is meticulous and time consuming, requiring the constant and skilled attention of two or three workers per hectare. Because of this requirement, tea is most 135 Sri Lanka: A Country Study efficiently grown on estates, based on large capital investment and having a highly organized and disciplined management and labor supply. Because working and living on estates was not attractive to Sin- halese peasants, the labor supply for the tea industry from its in- ception was provided by Indian Tamil immigrants who lived on the estates. Since independence the number of Sinhalese workers has increased, but in the late 1980s Tamils still dominated this sector (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). The performance of the tea industry was disappointing in the 1970s and early 1980s, because of poor producer prices and low productivity. Tea production was 211 million kilograms in 1986, down from 220 million kilograms in 1969. The fundamental problem of the tea estates was the advanced age of the tea bushes. In 1987 their average age was around sixty years and only 15 per- cent of the total area under tea had been replanted with high- yielding varieties. Replanting had been neglected in the 1960s and 1970s partly because low tea prices and high export duties meant that profit margins were not high enough to make it a profitable enterprise. Between 1972 and 1974, the growing risk of nationali- zation also discouraged investment. Rubber continues to be an important export crop in the late 1980s. It thrives under plantation conditions in the wet zone, although a significant proportion of the crop is produced by small- holders. Although rubber yields improved greatly in the first twenty years after independence, both the output and area planted with rubber declined in the 1980s. Output fell from 156 million kilo- grams in 1978 to 125 million kilograms in 1982. Improved prices caused production levels to recover to about 138 million kilograms in 1986. Despite the importance of rubber, a large number of rubber plan- tations suffer from old age and neglect. The government offered incentives to encourage replanting and improve maintenance proce- dures. Nevertheless, the area replanted in 1986 was 12 percent less than in 1985. This drop in replanting resulted from a shortage of seeds and the reluctance of farmers to retire land from production at a time of relatively attractive prices. In early 1988, however, the short- and medium-term outlook for world rubber prices was considered good. Most of the coconut production was sold in the domestic mar- ket, which consumed about 1 .4 billion nuts in the mid-1980s. Most of the rest of the crop, usually between 2 billion and 3 billion nuts, was exported as copra, coconut oil, and desiccated coconut. Local uses for coconut include timber for construction, leaves for thatch 136 The Economy and siding, coir for rope and rough textiles, and toddy and arrack for alcoholic beverages. Coconut output fluctuates depending on weather conditions, fer- tilizer application, and producer prices. In the 1980s, smallholders dominated its production, which was concentrated in Colombo and Kurunegala districts and around the city of Chilaw in Puttalam District. Because of a drought in 1983, production suffered a set- back during 1984 and fell to 1.9 billion nuts, its lowest level since 1977. The recovery during 1985 was impressive, leading to the record production of almost 3 billion nuts. This level was itself sur- passed in 1986, when production rose a further 3 percent. But the average export price fell by 45 percent in 1985 and by 56 percent in 1986. In 1986 the farm gate price probably fell below the cost of production, and in early 1988 it appeared that fluctuations in the world price of coconut products would remain a problem for the foreseeable future. The 1987 drought was expected to reduce coconut production by at least 20 percent in both 1987 and 1988. Like tea and rubber, the coconut sector suffered from inadequate replanting. Consequently, a large proportion of the trees were old and past optimum productivity levels. The importance of crops other than tea, rubber, and coconut in- creased after 1970, and in 1986 they accounted for around 51 per- cent of agricultural output. There was a substantial increase in minor food crops, including soybeans, chilies, and onions, all of which are grown as subsidiary crops on land irrigated by the Mahaweli project. In the 1960s and earlier, vegetables were imported from India in large quantities, but in the 1980s the island's import requirements were much smaller. Spices, including cloves, nutmeg, cardamom, and pepper, also registered large gains in the 1970s and 1980s. A large proportion of the spice output was being exported in the 1980s. Other crops of importance included corn, millet, sweet potatoes, cassava, dry beans, sesame seed, and tobacco. A wide variety of tropical fruits, including mangoes, pineapples, plantains, and papayas, also were grown; most were consumed in the domestic mar- ket. Sugar output increased in the early 1980s, although in 1986 it still accounted for only 11 percent of the domestic consumption. The expansion in sugar took place despite the problems of the state- run sugar mills and their associated sugar lands in Eastern Province, which have been disrupted by civil strife. Two new mills in Western Province accounted for the increase in production, and in early 1988 the outlook for further expansion was good. Industry Industry, including manufacturing, mining, energy, transpor- tation, and construction, accounted for around 38 percent of GNP 137 Sri Lanka: A Country Study in 1986. The most important products included refined oil, tex- tiles, gems, and processed agricultural products. Construction and tourism both grew rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but contracted after the onset of ethnic violence in 1983. State-owned corporations accounted for over 50 percent of total industrial out- put. An investment promotion zone was established in 1979 with the goal of attracting foreign capital; textile factories accounted for a large proportion of investment there in its early years. The is- land's electricity supply was mainly fueled by hydropower (see Energy, this ch.). Changing Patterns Sri Lanka developed little industry under British rule, relying instead on the proceeds from agricultural exports to buy manufac- tured goods from other countries. Most industry during the colonial period involved processing the principal export commodities: tea, rubber, and coconut. Although these sectors remained important, in the 1980s there was a much greater variety of industrial estab- lishments, including a steel mill, an oil refinery, and textile factories. Industrial diversification began in the 1960s with the produc- tion of consumer goods for the domestic market. This trend was a consequence of government measures aimed at saving foreign exchange, which made it difficult to import many items that had previously been obtained from overseas. Heavy industries were es- tablished in the late 1960s, mostly in the state sector. During the 1970-77 period the state assumed an even greater role in manufac- turing, but after the economic reforms of 1977 the government at- tempted to improve prospects for the private sector. The fastest growing individual sector in the 1980s was textiles, which made up approximately 29 percent of industrial production in 1986. The textiles, clothing, and leather products sector became the largest foreign exchange earner in 1986. Over 80 percent of the manufac- turing capacity was concentrated in Western Province, particularly in and around Colombo. Industrial Policies The enactment of the State Industrial Corporations Act of 1957 provided for the reconstitution of existing state enterprises as well as the establishment of new corporations to promote the develop- ment of large-scale and basic industries. The period 1958 to 1963 witnessed the first phase in the rapid growth of state industrial cor- porations. By 1963 fourteen such corporations were engaged in such fields as textiles, cement, sugar, paper, chemicals, edible oils and fats, ceramics, mineral sands, plywood, and leather. By 1974 there 138 A rubber tapper's child Courtesy \ Paige W. Thompson '£ were twenty-five state corporations, including such major under- takings as a steel mill and an oil refinery. Despite the 1977 policy shift in favor of the private sector, in early 1988 government-controlled enterprises continued to play a major role in industry. State-owned corporations accounted for nearly 60 percent of total industrial output. The most important public company was the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, which ac- counted for about 55 percent of all public-sector production. From the beginning, many industrial corporations in the state sector were troubled by such problems as management inefficiency, technical deficiencies in planning, overstaffing, and defective pricing policies. These difficulties contributed in many undertakings to poor economic results. Moreover, public sector enterprises were asso- ciated with objectives that reflected both growth and welfare con- siderations for the economy as a whole. They became the chief instruments furthering state ownership and social control in the economy, and they were expected to promote capital formation and long-term development. At times they were also looked upon chiefly as major sources of employment and enterprises providing goods and services to the public at relatively low prices. As a result, a number of the state industrial corporations have lost money. In 1987 the debts of state-owned corporations were Rsl9 billion, of which Rsl5 billion were owed to foreign sources and Rs4 billion to the two state-owned banks. 139 Sri Lanka: A Country Study The liberalization of the economy in 1977 was largely prompted by the perceived inefficiency of the public sector, not by any ideo- logical commitment to free enterprise. As a result, the government let private enterprise compete with the state corporations but took few steps to dismantle the state sector. Instead, it attempted to im- prove its efficiency. One major state venture, the National Milk Board, was dissolved in 1986, however. It had been established in 1953, but had never succeeded in developing the milk industry. In 1987 it was reported that consideration was being given to trans- ferring to private control several state-run industrial enterprises. These included the four government textile mills, the State Dis- tilleries Corporation, the National Paper Corporation, the Mineral Sands Corporation, Paranthan Chemicals, Sri Lanka Tyre, and Union Motors. In early 1988, however, doubts remained about the extent of the government's commitment to this program. Although the plan to sell the textile mills was expected to be im- plemented within two years, some of the government's economic advisers reportedly were urging the government to proceed cau- tiously in its privatization policy, in view of the limited capital mar- kets, the concentration of private wealth, and the weak regulatory framework. Manufacturing The share of manufacturing in the economy declined from 21 to 15 percent of GDP between 1977 and 1986. This fall is some- what misleading because it resulted in large part from the rapid growth in the service sector and the decline in output of the state- owned Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. The latter accounted for as much as one-third of the value of manufactured goods in some years and thus strongly affected aggregate manufacturing statis- tics. These statistics fluctuated along with changes in the value of the output of the oil refinery, which in turn varied with oil price levels and the extent of plant closings for maintenance. Some manufacturing sectors grew rapidly during this period. Manufacturing was dominated for most of the twentieth cen- tury by the processing of agricultural produce for both the export and domestic markets. The most important industries were engaged in preparing and packaging for outside markets the principal ex- port commodities — tea, rubber, and coconuts — for which Sri Lanka is noted. Such preparation generally involved low technology, com- paratively modest capital investment on machinery, and uncom- plicated, sequential procedures. Tea leaves, for example, follow a four-part process of withering, rolling (to extract bitter juices), 140 The Economy fermentation, and heating (or roasting), before being packed in chests for export. The processing of coconut and of rubber also were important industries, although their ratio in proportion to all manufacturing fell in the 1970s and early 1980s. The processing of the latter two commercial crops generally involved refining the basic commodi- ties into a range of semi-finished products to be used in manufac- turing finished goods at home or abroad. Coconuts, for example, are transformed into copra, desiccated coconut, coconut oil, fiber, poonac (a meal extract), and toddy. Copra and desiccated coconut are used as oils or as ingredients in food such as margarine; coco- nut oil is used to make soap; coconut fibers such as coir are used to make yarn, rope, or fishnets, while poonac is used as food for livestock. The coconut palm flower is also used in the production of alcoholic beverages. Rubber is also processed in various ways, including latex or scrap crepe and ribbed or smoked sheet, which together account for much of Sri Lanka's export of this commodity. Processing methods for rubber are outdated, however, and Western consumer countries have protested against the hardness, high moisture content, and inconsistent quality of the Sri Lankan product. Manufacturing received a boost in the early 1960s when import controls, which were the result of shortages in foreign exchange, made it difficult for consumers to obtain or afford foreign products. The result was a protected and profitable ready-made home market. This situation led to an expansion of both private-and public-sector manufacturing, with the private sector concentrating on consumer goods. These new enterprises, however, depended heavily on im- ported raw materials, and when the country's balance of payments difficulties became even more serious in the early 1970s, industry suffered from the lack of foreign exchange. In 1974 it was estimated that only 40 percent of the capacity of the industrial sector was used. After the 1977 liberalization, raw materials were more freely available, and in 1986 capacity utilization was estimated at 78 percent. In 1978 the government established the Greater Colombo Eco- nomic Commission primarily to serve as the authority for the free trade zones to be set up near the capital. The first investment pro- motion zone consisted of a large tract that was established in 1979 at Katunayaka, near the Bandaranaike International Airport. A second zone was inaugurated in 1986 at Biyagama, in Colombo District. Foreign companies that built factories in the zones received generous tax concessions. The commission succeeded in attract- ing some foreign investment, especially from Hong Kong and other 141 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Asian countries. At the end of 1985, a total of 1 19 enterprises had signed agreements with the commission, but only 7 were signed in 1986, when there were 72 units in production. The total num- ber of people employed was nearly 42,000. Gross export earnings from the investment promotion zones in 1986 were around Rs5.5 billion, up 43 percent from 1985. Foreign investments outside the free trade zones were coordinated by the Foreign Investment Advisory Committee. The principal change in manufacturing in the 1 980s was the rapid growth of the textile sector, from 10.5 percent of output in 1980 to 29.2 percent in 1986 (see table 8, Appendix A). In the mid-1980s, the government was attempting to diversify foreign investment away from textiles. Most textile factories were located in the investment promotion zones (see fig. 9). During the July 1983 riots, 152 factories were destroyed, but there was little long-term effect. Some observers expressed the view that the equipment destroyed was inefficient, and that moderni- zation was long overdue. Construction Total expenditure for construction was estimated at 7.7 percent of GDP in 1986. The sector was given a boost by the ambitious public investment program of the government that came to power in 1977. Between 1977 and 1980, construction expanded at an an- nual rate of 20 percent in real terms. It stagnated in the 1980s as the number of new projects dwindled and the early ones were com- pleted. The largest construction project of the post- 1977 period was the Mahaweli irrigation program. Conceived in the 1960s as the Mahaweli Ganga Program, the project originally was expected to bring approximately 364,000 additional hectares of land under irri- gation and to provide an extra 540 megawatts of hydroelectric power to the national grid. Completion of the program was to require thirty years. Construction of the first two dams was completed in 1977 and opened about 53,000 hectares of new land to irrigation in a general area south of the old capital of Anuradhapura in the dry zone. When the United National Party swept into power in 1977, the project was given renewed impetus and renamed the Accelerated Mahaweli Program. Construction work was undertaken at five new sites between 1979 and 1982, with the intent of increas- ing the hectares under irrigation and generating an extra 450 megawatts of hydroelectric power for the national grid. By the end of 1987, new dams and reservoirs had been completed at Kotmale, Randenigala, Maduru Oya, and Victoria. The operational power 142 The Economy stations at Randenigala and Victoria together generated 330 megawatts of power, with an additional 147 megawatts expected when the Kotmale station came on line. All construction related to the Accelerated Mahaweli Program was scheduled for comple- tion by 1989. The total cost of the entire project was estimated at US$1.4 to 2 billion. The Urban Development Authority was established in 1978 to promote integrated planning and development of important urban locations. Its responsibilities have included the new parliamentary buildings and the reconstruction of St. John's fish market in Colombo. Total expenditure of the Urban Development Authority was Rs529 million in 1986, well under its annual budget in the early 1980s. The Million Houses Program was established in 1984 to coordinate both public and private housing construction. In early 1988 the government's policy was to subsidize private housing rather than undertake extensive public housing programs. Mining Mining is carried out in both the public and private sectors. The most valuable products are precious and semiprecious stones, in- cluding sapphires, rubies, cats' eyes, topaz, garnets, and moon- stones. Official exchange earnings from gems were negligible in the first two decades after independence because most of the out- put was smuggled out of the country. The setting up of a publicly owned State Gem Corporation in 1971 and export incentives for those exporting through legal channels brought a marked improve- ment. In 1986 legal exports were valued at Rs755 million, but many observers believed that a considerable quantity was still being ex- ported illegally. In the late 1980s, Japan remained the most im- portant market for Sri Lanka's gems. The Moors traditionally have played an important role in the industry (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). Graphite also is of commercial significance. Almost the entire output is exported as crude graphite (plumbago). Ilmenite, a min- eral sand used in the manufacture of paint and the fortification of metals, also is exported. Salt is produced by evaporation for the domestic market. Thorium deposits have been reported in Sabaragamuwa Province and in the beach sands of the northeast and southwest coasts. Exploration also has disclosed the presence of apatite (source of phosphate), dolomite (fertilizer component) and small pockets of economically extractable iron ore. Energy Over 70 percent of the island's total energy consumption was satisfied by firewood, agricultural residues, and animal waste, 143 Sri Lanka: A Country Study ^Kankesanturai Galle National capital • Populated place MINING Graphite Mineral sand Iron ore Gem-bearing area ELECTRIC POWER Hydro Thermal Diesel (I Petroleu 9 Steel mill & Cement § Textiles & Mineral sands INDUSTRY refining •« Fish processing jfc Ship repair processing 40 Kilometers Rairoad equipment and repair Plywood Tires Sawmill Figure 9. Industry, Mining, and Power, 1988 144 The Economy mostly for household use. The country had no coal or petroleum deposits, and the only other indigenous energy source was hydropower. In 1927 the Department of Government Electrical Undertak- ings, now called the Ceylon Electricity Board, took over the trans- mission of electricity throughout the country. Hydroelectric power came into use in 1951 with the commissioning of the Laksapana project in Central Province. Demand for power increased from ap- proximately 20 megawatts in 1951 to nearly 73 megawatts in 1963, about 90 percent of which was met from hydroelectric sources. In the 1970s, the island increasingly came to rely on imported oil for the generation of electricity, but new hydroelectric capacity from the Mahaweli project in the 1980s reduced the importance of oil. In 1986 total installed capacity was 1,010 megawatts, of which 74 percent was from hydropower. In early 1988, it appeared that the Mahaweli project would solve Sri Lanka's electricity supply problem for the foreseeable future. This integrated power generation and irrigation project started con- tributing to power supplies in 1984 when the first two phases of the Victoria Dam were completed, adding 140 megawatts to in- stalled power capacity. In April 1985, the final stage of the Victoria Dam increased capacity by 70 megawatts. A slightly greater ca- pacity was expected to result in the late 1980s. United States and British-owned oil companies in Sri Lanka were nationalized in 1963, and since then the importing, refining, and distributing of all oil products has been the responsibility of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, the state oil company. Its oil refinery started production in 1969. The main products in 1986 were fuel oil (559,497 tons), heavy diesel (60,995 tons), auto diesel (406,569 tons), kerosene (153,692 tons), and gasoline (123,089 tons). Transportation In 1987 the road network extended 74,954 kilometers, of which 25,504 were maintained by the Ministry of Highways and the re- mainder by local governments (see fig. 10). During 1984 the govern- ment embarked on a five-year road maintenance program at an estimated cost of Rs5 billion, to be financed by loans from the World Bank (see Glossary) and the Asian Development Bank, together with a grant from Japan. The total number of registered motor vehicles in 1986 was about 478,000. Road haulage is handled by private companies; some businesses also have their own trucking operations. After 1978 container trans- port became an important mode of freight haulage for exports 145 Sri Lanka: A Country Study ^ Kankesanturai o LUO WING COMMANDER 1 ill 1 IS J ydo OC Ul a z < s s o o OC o z 2 2 o o OC o 3 s OC o < 2 SQUADRON LEADER <° II 1 OC o 2 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER LIEUTENANT COMMANDER z < 1- cl < u (o jhhii z < 0- < o FLIGHT LIEUTENANT <° llll z «t < o t- z < z UJ 1- 3 UJ -J z < z UJ UJ 1- z < z UJ (- 3 UJ □ z < z UJ co o£5 5o >E — 1 11 "■o <° II z z UJ Qj co z < OC o z LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE 1- z < _z Q Ml UJ J (cT~ * z < z UJ UJ Q OC HUJ oo O.U. O <° II i- z z Qj Q K Z < (DZ 3UJ w 5 UJ z o CO z UJ -•oc OC w > 2 DC < to z OC CO lb 1 OC to UJ o DC O LL DC < UJ 1— 1— St z <£ OC CO h -'cc £ (0 > > < z co S£ z < OC CO 246 National Security reportedly had planned to restore order by detaining a number of prominent left-wing politicians from the Bandaranaike coalition and returning the UNP to office. By the time the conspiracy was made public, the original plans had already been abandoned. Nonetheless, the Bandaranaike government used the potential threat to bolster its pro-Buddhist campaign, making political capital from the fact that all of the conspirators had been Christians. Despite the initial resistance from a number of military officers, the government succeeded gradually in recasting the armed forces in its own image. Recruitment at all levels became increasingly dominated by Sinhalese Buddhists, and by mid- 1983 Tamils accounted for less than 5 percent of all military personnel. Mili- tary training that previously had been conducted in a variety of languages was now limited to Sinhala and English. Also, under the leadership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, the army was sup- plemented with the new Sinha Regiment, whose name and un- precedented lack of regimental colors stood in clear opposition to the British colonial regalia of the Ceylon Light Infantry. Even the Light Infantry took on a new Sinhalese cast when in 1961 it adopted an elephant named Kandula as its regimental mascot; as the Times of Ceylon was quick to point out, Kandula was the battle elephant of Dutthagamani (or Duttugemunu), the ancient Sinhalese king who was credited with driving the Tamils out of Sri Lanka in the second century B.C. The Sinhalization of the armed forces continued under the United National Party government of President Jayewardene. The retire- ment of the British-educated cadre of Tamil and Burgher officers gradually depleted the ranks of minority members. At the same time, the growing ethnic divisions in the country and the deploy- ment of the armed forces against the Tamil population in the North- ern Province tended to discourage young Tamil males from pursuing a career in the military. By 1985 almost all enlisted per- sonnel in the armed services were Sinhalese. Women in the Armed Forces The Sri Lankan Army Women's Corps was formed in 1980 as an unarmed, noncombatant support unit. Set up with the assistance of the British Women's Reserve Army Corps, it was identical in structure to its parent organization, and its first generation of officer cadets was trained in Britain. Candidates were required to be be- tween eighteen and twenty years old and to have passed the lowest level of the General Common Entrance examinations. (Officer can- didates must have passed the Advanced Level.) Enlistment entailed a five-year service commitment (the same as for men), and recruits 247 Sri Lanka: A Country Study were not allowed to marry during this period. In the sixteen- week training course at the Army Training Centre at Diyatalawa, cadets were put through a program of drill and physical training similar to the men's program, with the exception of weapons and battlecraft training. Women recruits were paid according to the same scale as the men, but were limited to service in nursing, communica- tions, and clerical work. In late 1987, the first class of women gradu- ates from the Viyanini Army Training Center were certified to serve as army instructors. Women were first admitted into the navy in 1985. New recruits were given six weeks of training with the Sri Lankan Army Women's Corps. Although they were trained in the use of weapons, they were not assigned to combat positions or shipboard duty. In- stead, they assisted in nursing, communications, stores, and secretarial work. Awards in the Armed Forces In the period between independence and the establishment of the republic, members of the Sri Lankan armed services were eligi- ble for awards from the British government, including the Order of the British Empire (O.B.E.) and the Member of the British Em- pire (M.B.E.). After 1972 however, the nation established its own system of decorations, which was modified in 1979 to conform more closely with the practices of other South Asian nations. Under the system in place in 1988, the nation's highest decoration was the Parama Veera Vibushanaya, equivalent to the Victoria Cross of Britain and the Param Vir Chakra of India, and awarded "for in- dividual acts of gallantry of the most exceptional order." For acts of bravery performed outside a military context, individuals were awarded the Veerodhara Vibushanaya, a decoration equivalent to the British George Cross and the Indian Asoka Chakra. Other awards include the Visiatha Seva Vibushanaya for twenty years of service with an "unblemished record of moral and military con- duct;" the Uttama Seva Padakkama, equivalent to India's Meritori- ous Service Medal, and given to a soldier with not fewer than fifteen years of service marked by exceptional ability and exemplary con- duct; the Videsha Seva Padakkama, for active service in a foreign military mission; and the Veera Vickrama Vibushanaya, equiva- lent to the Military Cross of Britain, and given for acts of gallantry in saving the lives of others. Foreign Military Relations Sri Lanka's oldest and most enduring military relationship has been with Britain. As a British colony, the island was garrisoned 248 National Security with British troops and, following independence, its own indigenous armed forces were organized, trained, armed, and led by British military personnel. Under a mutual defense arrangement dating from 1947, the two nations have agreed to give each other "such military assistance for the security of their territories for defense against external aggression and for the protection of essential com- munications as it may be in their mutual interests to provide." The vague wording of this treaty has allowed it to survive a num- ber of political swings in Sri Lanka's domestic arena, and it re- mained in force in 1988. Even after the government of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike withdrew island base rights from British forces in 1957, the British continued to be a major supplier of military hard- ware. Although the British government has denied any direct in- volvement, for a time former British Special Air Service personnel under the auspices of the private firm of Keeny Meeny Services were instrumental in training Sri Lankan troops in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency techniques. After the anti-Tamil riots of 1983 and as the ethnic insurgency increased in the north, the government turned to a variety of for- eign nations to assist in its counterinsurgency campaign. In May 1984, at considerable cost to its standing among Third World nations, the government arranged for the establishment of an Israeli special interest section in Colombo. Operating out of the United States embassy, agents from Shin Bet, the Israeli counterespionage and internal security organization, trained members of the Sri Lankan Special Task Force and other groups in intelligence gather- ing and internal security techniques. Other nations that have reportedly provided training include Aus- tralia, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the United States. Uncon- firmed press reports suggest that a number of foreign advisers, including Englishmen, Pakistanis, and South Africans, have actually taken part in combat operations against the Tamil insurgents. In April 1986, the Indian press announced that a Pakistani Air Force officer had been killed in an airplane crash shortly after participating in an air assault in Northern Province. Military relations between Sri Lanka and India underwent a major change in mid- 1987. For almost ten years, the Tamil insur- gency in Northern and Eastern provinces had been a major source of friction between the two nations because India provided shelter, training, and weapons to the insurgent groups. The Sri Lankan insurgents found abundant sympathy and support for their cause within the Tamil-dominated Indian state of Tamil Nadu, and Madras served as the headquarters from which they regularly issued condemnations of the government. Beginning in May 1987, the 249 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Indian government changed its official role from that of intermedi- ary to active participant as it sought to abate the turmoil in the island and bring together the Tamil separatists and the Sri Lankan government. Although the resulting Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, which was signed in July 1987, offered an equitable formula for restor- ing peace to the troubled nation, a subsequent exchange of execu- tive letters accorded to India a substantial voice in Sri Lankan military affairs. In particular, Sri Lanka acceded to three major concessions. First, it agreed to consult New Delhi on the employ- ment of all foreign military and intelligence personnel in Sri Lanka "with a view to insuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo- Sri Lankan relations." Second, it guaranteed that no Sri Lankan ports would be made available "for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests." Third, Sri Lanka agreed to review its contracts with foreign broadcasting organiza- tions to insure that none of their facilities in Sri Lanka would be used for military or intelligence purposes. This latter concession was specifically aimed at Voice of America broadcasting operations on the island. In return, New Delhi agreed to deport all Sri Lankan terrorists and insurgents operating on Indian soil and to provide military training and supplies to the Sri Lankan armed forces. Press reports in early 1988 suggested that Sri Lanka was prepared to expand and formalize its military relationship with India through a treaty of friendship and cooperation similar to that linking India with the Soviet Union. Foreign Military Presence Under the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, an Indian military contingent was dispatched to northern Sri Lanka. This contingent, named the Indian Peacekeeping Force was composed of army and paramilitary units from the Indian Army's Southern Command, headquartered in Madras. The IPKF, when it was initially dispatched to Sri Lanka, numbered about 1,600 person- nel. As the cease-fire failed to take hold, and as the tenacity of the Tamil insurgents became increasingly evident, the force was steadily augmented. Within three months of its deployment, the IPKF presence in Sri Lanka had grown to 20,000 personnel. At the end of the year, two brigades of Muslim troops were introduced into Eastern Province to deal with growing tension in the Islamic com- munity of that area. By January 1988, the overall force had a total strength of 50,000 personnel from three Indian Army divisions, plus supporting units. The following month" it was announced in the Indian Parliament that the IPKF would be increased to 70,000 personnel organized tactically into fifteen brigades. Some Sri 250 National Security Lankan sources said privately that the force had grown well in ex- cess of this total, possibly surpassing 100,000 troops, and that its presence in Sri Lanka might well exceed the duration of the insur- gency. In mid- 1988, however, the Indian government did with- draw from Sri Lanka some of its more heavily armed artillery and armored units that were obviously unsuitable for fighting a coun- terinsurgency war. At the time of its deployment, the IPKF was intended as a truce supervisory force that would oversee the disarming of the Tamil insurgents and the disengagement of the Sri Lankan government forces. As the cease-fire between the two sides broke down, however, the Indians were compelled to assume a combat role and were sent into action against the Tamil guerrillas overrunning the Jaffna Peninsula. In this operation, codenamed Operation Parwan, IPKF units of the 54th Indian Army division launched a five-pronged attack to clear the area of insurgents. After sixteen days of fight- ing, Jaffna fell to the Indians, and the Tamil combatants retreated to the more inaccessible areas of Northern and Eastern provinces. Among the residents of Jaffna, the assault on the city provoked widespread bitterness toward the Indian troops, as reports spread of atrocities and high civilian casualties caused by careless bom- bardment of populated areas. Many of these reports were believed to be the result of Tamil insurgent propaganda. Nonetheless, in early 1 988 the Indian Army acknowledged that there had been seri- ous disciplinary problems during the campaign, and a number of soldiers were sent back to India after conviction on rape charges. Such gestures also hinted that the IPKF seemed disposed to apply the lessons learned from the Jaffna offensive and to abandon its previous hamfisted tactics and insensitivity to the civilian popula- tion. When continued insurgent activity required redeployment of IPKF units to Eastern Province and the inland districts of North- ern Province, the Indian forces embarked on an aggressive civic action program to restore the infrastructure in war-ravaged areas, and on an intensive campaign of heavy patrolling to keep the guer- rillas off balance. The Indians gained experience in both urban and counterinsurgency warfare and made some progress in keep- ing the Tamil insurgents at bay. However, the guerrillas were prov- ing a more intractable foe than anticipated, and observers were not optimistic about an early conclusion to the conflict. The Defense Budget The intervention of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in 1987 per- mitted the Sri Lankan government to decrease its defense outlays for the first time in ten years. Since the United National Party came 251 Sri Lanka: A Country Study to power in 1977, Colombo's efforts to quell the Tamil insurgency and the radical Sinhalese movement in the south had demanded an increasing share of the nation's resources; in the early 1980s, defense expenditures represented only 1 percent of the gross domes- tic product (GDP — see Glossary). By 1986 this figure had risen to 3.5 percent, and by 1987 it was estimated at over 5 percent. After a number of supplemental appropriations, 1987 defense costs were estimated at Rsl0.6 billion (for value of the rupee — see Glos- sary), including Rs3.5 billion for the army, Rsl.3 billion for the navy, Rsl .9 billion for the air force, and Rsl .7 billion for the police (see National Police and Paramilitary Forces, this ch.). The dra- matic growth in defense outlays took place at a time when Sri Lan- ka' s major exports were realizing significantly lower prices on the international market and in 1986, for the first time, the govern- ment was forced to resort to large-scale commercial borrowing. A continuation of this trend promised to undermine the government's development efforts and aggravate an already sizable trade deficit (see Trade, ch. 3). After the arrival of Indian troops in July 1987, the Sri Lankan government withdrew most of its forces from North- ern and Eastern provinces, saving significantly on operational costs. As a result, Sri Lanka projected a 37 percent cut in army expendi- tures and a total military budget of Rs9.2 billion, 13 percent below 1987 levels. National Police and Paramilitary Forces The Sri Lankan National Police is an integral part of the na- tion's security forces, with primary responsibility for internal secu- rity. Specially trained commando units of the police are regularly deployed in joint operations with the armed forces, and the police command structure in Northern and Eastern provinces is closely integrated with the other security organizations under the authority of the Joint Operations Command. The police is headed by an inspector general of police who reports to the minister of defense. Organization In 1988 the police force was divided into three geographic commands — known as ranges — covering the northern, central, and southern sectors of the island. The ranges were subdivided into divisions, districts, and stations, and Colombo was designated as a special division. In 1974 there were a total of 260 police stations throughout the country. In more remote rural areas beyond the immediate range of existing police stations, law enforcement func- tions are carried out by locally elected village headmen {grama seva niladhari, literally "village service officers"). In addition to its regular 252 National Security forces, the national police operated a small reserve contingent and a number of specialized units responsible for investigative and paramilitary functions. Routine criminal activity was handled by the Criminal Investigation Department under the command of an assistant superintendent of police. More coordinated threats to in- ternal security, such as that posed by the radical Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna were the responsibility of the Counter subver- sive Division, which was primarily an investigative division. Spe- cial operational units included the Commando Squad of the Colombo police and the Special Task Force. The former, a 200- strong riot control force, was established following the anti-Tamil riots of 1983. The Special Task Force is a police field force. It was set up in 1984 with the assistance of foreign advisers (primarily former British Special Air Service personnel under the auspices of Keeny Meeny Services, see Foreign Military Relations, this ch.). Its 1 , 100-member force was organized into 7 companies and trained in counterinsurgency techniques. It played a major role in the government's combined force operations against the Tamil Tigers in Eastern Province before July 1987. Following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the Special Task Force was redesignated the Police Special Force, and deployed in Southern Province, where it immediately went into action against the JVP terrorists. Com- panies of the force also served in rotation as part of the presiden- tial security guard. Until 1984 the police were responsible for national intelligence functions, first under the Special Branch, and later under the In- telligence Services Division. The perceived failure of the Intelli- gence Services Division during the riots of July 1983 led the Jayewardene government to reevaluate the nation's intelligence net- work, and in 1984 the president set up a National Intelligence Bureau. The new organization combined intelligence units from the army, navy, air force, and police. It was headed by a deputy inspector general of police who reported directly to the Ministry of Defence. Strength By late 1987, the police had an estimated total strength of 21 ,000 personnel, with plans to increase to 28,000. The force expanded most rapidly in the years following the 1971 uprising, an event that constituted the nation's first major challenge to internal security; between 1969 and 1974, the police grew from 11,300 to 16,100, an increase of over 42 percent. According to the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the force was less than 5 percent Tamil. 253 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Equipment and Training Following the British tradition, Sri Lankan police were customar- ily unarmed during routine patrol duty in the years following in- dependence. With the growth of ethnic tensions in the late 1970s and the increasing tendency of both Sinhalese and Tamil extremist groups to target the police, the government decided in 1982 to issue handguns to all sergeants and constables. Chinese copies of Soviet pistols formed an important component of the police arsenal, and included the 7.62mm Type 54 (modeled on the Soviet TT-M1933) and the 9mm Type 59 (based on the Soviet PM). For emergen- cies, the police also used the British Lee Enfield .303 carbine. The Commando Squadron was equipped with Sterling submachineguns, repeater shotguns, revolvers, and tear gas. Regular force training in the 1980s was conducted at the Police College in Katukurunda, Western Province. Separate training fa- cilities for the Special Task Force have been established in Kalutara, 96 kilometers south of Colombo. Starting in 1984, foreign train- ers affiliated with Keeny Meeny Services offered counterinsurgency pilot training in the use of Bell 212 and 412 helicopter gunships. The Home Guard As the Tamil insurgents accelerated their campaign for a separate state in the early 1980s, they turned increasingly against those Sin- halese settlers who, through government- sponsored resettlement programs, had "infringed" on traditional Tamil areas in the north and east. In response, the government authorized the formation and arming of small militias for local self-defense. These armed groups, known as Home Guards, were generally composed of poorly educated Sinhalese villagers with little or no military training. Armed with shotguns that had been provided by the government, they frequently exceeded their original mandate of self-defense, avenging terrorist attacks with indiscriminate killings of Tamil civilians. This violence was an important factor in the increasing radicalization of the Tamil population. By April 1987, there were reportedly 12,000 Home Guards throughout the country, and the National Security Council, a consultative body that meets on defense matters, had announced its intention of increasing the num- ber to 20,000. With the successful negotiation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in July, however, the government moved to dis- mantle this poorly disciplined paramilitary force. The Home Guards in Northern and Eastern provinces were ordered to surrender their weapons to the authorities, and by August the police claimed to have collected 8,000 of the more than 10,000 shotguns that had 254 National Security been issued 3 years earlier. When the Tamil terrorist attacks re- sumed in late 1987, however, the government reportedly reversed its decision and allowed a partial rearming of the force. At the same time that it was acting to limit the Home Guards in the north, the government authorized an expansion of local and private militias in the south. The signing of the accord had unleashed a wave of violence among militant Sinhalese groups who opposed both the accommodation with the Tamil separatists and the presence of Indian troops on Sri Lankan soil. As Jayewardene moved to force passage of the provisions of the accord in Parliament, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna launched a campaign against members of the ruling United National Party who supported the pact. In the sec- ond half of 1987, the party chairman and more than seventy United National Party legislators were killed by Sinhalese extremists. The government responded by allocating 150 Home Guards to each Member of Parliament, leaving the legislators themselves respon- sible for the arming and training of these personal militias. At the same time, the press reported that pro- government gangs of thugs known as Green Tigers (named for the colors of the ruling party) had begun to attack opponents of the accord. The Criminal Justice System Founded on the principles of British law, the Sri Lankan crim- inal justice system underwent major changes in the 1970s as the government attempted to cope with the challenges posed by both Sinhalese and Tamil insurgencies. Through a series of new laws, constitutional provisions, and emergency regulations, Sri Lanka acted to enlarge the legal powers of the police and armed forces and to increase the capacity of the courts to deal with the growing number of cases. These changes were at the expense of individual civil liberties, and the new powers of the state evoked strong criti- cism from all ethnic communities. The most significant changes affected the rules of search, arrest, and seizure and the procedures by which criminal cases were investigated and tried. Through all this flux, the one element that remained relatively constant was the Penal Code, established in the late nineteenth century by the British colonial government. Although various individual provi- sions were amended to suit changing social conditions, in 1988 the general classification and definition of crime and punishment set forth in the code remained the basis of criminal law. Criminal Justice and the Effects of Insurgency Following the insurrection of 1971 , the judicial system was flooded with thousands of young insurgents who had played varying roles 255 Sri Lanka: A Country Study in the attempt to overthrow the government. The established legal channels — holdovers from the colonial era — were clearly insuffi- cient to deal with the crisis. At the same time, the government real- ized that any significant delay in the trial and settlement of cases would only serve to increase the alienation that had led to the rebellion. As a temporary measure, the parliament passed the Criminal Justice Commissions Act of 1972, providing for the estab- lishment of special commissions outside the normal judicial struc- ture and empowered to conduct cases free from the usual stringent rules of procedure. The judicial crisis of the early 1970s also served to promote long- term reforms that had been under consideration for more than twenty years. In 1973 the parliament passed the Administration of Justice Law, a bill to reorganize the entire judicial system. Her- alded as a major break with inherited British colonial traditions, the new law was intended to simplify the court structure and speed the legal process. It repealed thirteen acts and ordinances, includ- ing the Courts Ordinance and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, replacing them with five chapters covering the judicature, criminal, testamentary, and appeals procedures and the destruc- tion of court records. The seven levels of the British court struc- ture were replaced with four levels, including a Supreme Court that held only appellate jurisdiction. The high courts, district courts, and magistrate's courts were assigned jurisdiction respectively over the island's sixteen judicial zones and their respective forty dis- tricts and eighty divisions. After Bandaranaike's defeat in the 1977 elections, the new United National Party government moved quickly to revise the workings of the criminal justice system. Of the five chapters of the Adminis- tration of Justice Law, two (on criminal procedure and appeals) were replaced by the Code of Criminal Procedure Act of 1979, and a third (on the judiciary) was substantially amended by the 1978 Constitution. These radical changes, coming on the heels of the previous reforms, were motivated by a variety of concerns. First, there were political considerations. Jayewardene's electoral suc- cess had been based in part on a popular reaction against the ex- traordinary legal and judicial powers assumed by the Bandaranaike government; the previous six years had been marked by an un- broken state of emergency, the creation of the highly powerful Criminal Justice Commissions, and a growing constriction of the freedom of the press. In his first year in office, Jayewardene declared an end to emergency rule, repealed the Criminal Justice Commis- sions Act, and engineered a new constitution with explicit safeguards of fundamental rights. These rights, set forth in Article 13, included 256 National Security free speech, the right to a fair trial, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention. Although many of these rights had appeared in the previous constitution, the new document put them under the jurisdiction of the courts for the first time. A second motive for the changes stemmed from the sudden ex- pansion of the Tamil insurgency in the late 1970s. Faced with a growing number of terrorist activities in the north, the Jayewardene government moved to streamline the judicial system and establish clearer lines of jurisdiction between the various levels of courts. Primary jurisdiction over criminal cases, previously the concur- rent right of three levels of the judiciary, was now confined to two levels, the high court and the magistrate's courts, with their respec- tive domains clearly demarcated in the new criminal procedure code. The liberalizations of the Jayewardene government soon fell prey to the nation's deteriorating security situation. Hampered by the civil liberties embedded in the new laws and codes, the police and armed forces were unable to deal with an insurgent movement that involved a growing portion of the Tamil civilian population. Legal sanctions against terrorism began with the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979, followed by further antiterrorist provisions in 1982 and full-scale emergency regulations in 1983. With the consent of Parliament, these regulations were renewed on a monthly basis. By early 1988, the existing criminal justice system was a compo- site of permanent and provisional legislation. In contrast with the relatively stable Penal Code, the judicial structure and the proce- dures for criminal cases reflected the complex and sometimes con- tradictory interweavings of the Administration of Justice Law, the Constitution, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the emergency and antiterrorist provisions enacted to cope with the Tamil insur- gency (see Judiciary, ch. 4). The Penal Code The passage of the Penal Code, Ordinance Number 2 of 1883, marked an important stage in the island's transition from Roman- Dutch to British law. Despite the wide variety of amendments to the code, from 1887 to as recently as 1986, it remained substan- tially unchanged, and established a humane and unambiguous foun- dation for criminal justice. Crimes are divided into eighteen categories that include offenses against the human body, property, and reputation; various types of forgery, counterfeit, and fraud; offenses against public tranquillity, health, safety, justice, and the holding of elections; and offenses against the state and the armed forces. The code provides for six different types of punishment: 257 Sri Lanka: A Country Study death by hanging, rigorous imprisonment (with hard labor), sim- ple imprisonment, whipping, forfeiture of property, and fine. For sentences that involve whipping, the provisions of the Penal Code have been modified by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which sets a maximum sentence of twenty-four strokes, and requires that a medical officer be present during the execution of the sentence. Offenders under sixteen are given a maximum of six strokes with a light cane, and the sentence must be carried out in the presence of the court and, optionally, of the parents. In cases of imprison- ment, the Penal Code specifies a maximum sentence permissible for each offense, leaving the specific punishment to the discretion of the judge. Imprisonment for any single offense may not exceed twenty years. The death penalty is limited to cases involving offenses against the state (usually of open warfare), murder, abetment of suicide, mutiny, and giving false evidence that leads to the con- viction and execution of an innocent person. If the offender is under eighteen years of age or pregnant, extended imprisonment is sub- stituted for a death sentence. An attempt by the government to eliminate capital punishment received mixed reactions. In April 1956, the Bandaranaike govern- ment proposed the suspension of the death penalty for murder and abetment of suicide for a trial period of three years; this experi- ment was to be reviewed thereafter with the aim of abolishing capital punishment from the statute book. Parliament passed the Suspen- sion of Death Penalty Bill in May 1956. In October 1958, the government appointed a commission on capital punishment to examine the question of whether the sus- pension had contributed to any increase in the incidence of mur- der. The commission released a provisional report shortly before Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was assassinated in Sep- tember 1959 (see Sri Lanka Freedom Party Rule, 1956-65, ch. 1). Concluding that there was no immediate evidence to support a resumption of capital punishment, the commission recommended that the suspension be continued until April 1961 to permit a more extensive and conclusive study. As a result of the assassination, however, the commission's recommendation was set aside. In October 1959, the government decided to restore the death penalty, and a bill to this effect was passed in November 1959. Criminal Procedure and the Structure of the Courts As defined by the Constitution of 1978, the judiciary consists of a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeal, a High Court, and a num- ber of magistrate's courts (one for each division, as set out in the Administration of Justice Law). In cases of criminal law, the 258 National Security magistrate's courts and the High Court are the only courts with primary jurisdiction, and their respective domains are detailed in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Appeals from these courts of first instance can be made to the Court of Appeal and, under certain circumstances, to the Supreme Court, which exercises final appel- late jurisdiction. In all cases, the accused has the right to represen- tation by an attorney, and all trials must be public unless the judge determines, for reasons of family privacy, national security, or pub- lic safety, that a closed hearing is more appropriate. The vast majority of the nation's criminal cases are tried at the lowest level of the judicial system, the magistrate's courts. Cases here may be initiated by any police officer or public servant, or by any oral or written complaint to the magistrate. The magis- trate is empowered to make an initial investigation of the complaint, and to determine whether his court has proper jurisdiction over the case, whether it should be tried by the High Court, or whether it should be dismissed. Magistrates' courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal cases involving fines of up to Rsl ,500 or prison sentences of up to two years. If the magistrate's court is determined to have the necessary jurisdiction, prosecution may be conducted by the complainant (plaintiff) or by a government officer, including the attorney general, the solicitor general, a state counsel, a pleader authorized by the attorney general, or any officer of any national or local government office. At the trial, the accused has the right to call and cross-examine witnesses. Trials are con- ducted without a jury, and the verdict and sentence are given by the magistrate. Any person unsatisfied with the judgment has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law or fact. For criminal cases involving penalties over Rsl, 500 or two years imprisonment, original jurisdiction resides with the High Court. The High Court is the highest court of first instance in criminal law, and exercises national jurisdiction. Prosecution must be con- ducted by the attorney general, the solicitor general, a state coun- sel, or any pleader authorized by the attorney general. During the trial, the accused or his or her attorneys are allowed to present a defense and call and cross-examine witnesses. For more serious offenses, including crimes against the state, murder, culpable homi- cide, attempted murder, and rape, the law provides for trial by jury. In such cases, a jury of seven members is chosen by lot from a panel elected by the accused unless the court directs otherwise. Both the prosecution and the defense have the opportunity to eliminate proposed members of the jury. The jury is required to reach a verdict by a majority of no less than five to two. (Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979, the right to a jury was 259 Sri Lanka: A Country Study suspended for a wide variety of offenses involving violations of com- munal harmony defined as incitement of one ethnic group against another.) In cases where the law does not prescribe trial by jury, the judge gives the verdict and passes sentence at the conclusion of the hearings. As in the magistrate's courts, the accused has the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any matter of law or fact. As its name suggests, the Court of Appeal has only appellate jurisdiction in matters of criminal law. Cases before the court are conducted without a jury. Appeals from the High Court must be heard by a bench of at least three judges, whereas appeals from a magistrate's court require at least two judges. Verdicts are reached by majority decision, and therefore a supplemental judge is added in cases of a split vote. As in other courts, appellants are entitled to representation by an attorney, but if they cannot afford legal counsel, the Court of Appeal may, at the discretion of the judges, assign an attorney at the court's expense. After the court has handed down its decision, further appeal to the Supreme Court may be made on any matter involving a substantial question of law, but an appeal requires the approval of either the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court was substantially refashioned by the 1978 Constitution, with many of its former functions reverting to the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court in the 1980s consisted of a chief justice and between six and ten other justices who sit as a single panel on all cases before the court. Cases are conducted without a jury, and the court exercises final appellate jurisdiction for all errors in fact or in law. Rules of Search, Arrest, and Detention Despite the numerous protections of individual liberties embodied in the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure, the government has succeeded in greatly expanding the discretionary powers of the armed forces and police through a variety of regula- tions and temporary provisions. The legal basis for these provi- sions comes from the Constitution itself, which sets conditions under which the government may act to restrict fundamental rights. Article 15 states that freedom of speech, assembly, and association may be subject to restrictions "in the interests of racial and religious harmony." It also allows the government, for reasons of national security, to suspend the right of a suspect to be presumed inno- cent until proven guilty. In addition, Article 155 authorizes the Parliament and, in certain circumstances, the president, to make emergency regulations which override or amend existing legislation. 260 National Security Under these special provisions, the government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979. The act empowered a su- perintendent of police, or an officer at or above the rank of subin- spector authorized by the superintendent, to enter and search any premises and to arrest without a warrant upon reasonable suspi- cion of a crime. Although this act was originally slated as a tem- porary provision to be in effect for three years, the parliament voted in March 1982 to continue it indefinitely. In addition, an amend- ment passed in 1983 extended the police powers detailed in the act to members of the armed forces, and provided legal immunity for arrests and deaths occurring in the course of security operations. The Code of Criminal Procedure allows the police to detain sus- pects without a hearing for a maximum of twenty-four hours. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, however, this period has been extended to seventy-two hours, and if the subsequent hearing leads to an indictment, the magistrate is required to order continued de- tention until the conclusion of the trial. The act further provides that the minister of internal security may, upon reasonable suspi- cion, order a suspect to be detained for a period of three months, extendable by three-month intervals up to a total of eighteen months. These provisions have been supplemented by the state of emergency regulations, first put into effect in May 1983 and renewed on a monthly basis thereafter. Under these regulations, police are given broad powers of preventive detention. In addi- tion, a suspect may be detained for up to ninety days by order of the attorney general. At the end of this period, the suspect must appear before a magistrate's court which, with or without an in- dictment, is required by law to remand the suspect to prison. Sub- sequent detention may continue for an indefinite period of time. Executive Powers of Pardon and Commutation The president has the power to grant a pardon or a stay or com- mutation of sentence to any offender convicted in any court in Sri Lanka. In cases involving a sentence of death, however, the presi- dent is required to seek the advice of both the attorney general and the minister of justice before issuing a pardon. The president also has the authority to pardon the accomplice to any offense, whether before or after the trial, in exchange for information leading to the conviction of the principal offender. Penal Institutions and Trends in the Prison Population All correctional institutions were administered by the Depart- ment of Prisons under the Ministry of Justice. In 1980 the depart- ment had a reported staff of approximately 4,000 officers and a 261 Sri Lanka: A Country Study total of 28 prisons, including conventional prisons, open prison camps, and special training schools for youthful offenders. The fa- cilities were regulated by the Prisons Ordinance of 1878, and each was headed by a superintendent or assistant superintendent of prisons. Departmental staff are trained at the Centre for Research and Training in Corrections in Colombo. The center, which was established in 1975, provided new recruits a ten- week training course in law, human relations, unarmed combat, first aid, and the use of firearms. Between 1977 and 1985, the prison population remained rela- tively stable, averaging 11,500 new admissions each year. More than 75 percent of the new inmates in 1985 had been convicted of minor crimes, and 62 percent were serving sentences of less than six months. Those convicted of serious crimes (including murder, culpable homicide, rape, and kidnaping) represented less than 2 percent of the prison population and, although the number of new convicts sentenced to death fluctuated over this period (between 33 and 81), no prisoners were executed. Men represented more than 95 percent of the prison population, and more than one-third of the nation's prisoners were being held in the Colombo District. In the 1980s, convicted offenders between the ages of sixteen and twenty-two were being housed at separate correctional facili- ties and open work camps. Many of them were eligible for admis- sion to the Training School for Youthful Offenders, which provided a special program of rehabilitation. Offenders under sixteen were not accepted into the correctional system. Because of the small number of female prisoners at any one time, in the 1980s there were no separate institutions exclusively for women. Instead, each of the major prisons had a small women's section staffed by female attendants. All female convicts with terms longer than six weeks were transferred to Welikade Prison in Colombo. Mothers with infants were allowed to keep their chil- dren in prison, and a preschool program was established to pro- vide child care during daytime hours. In the 1980s, all male and female prisoners with terms longer than six months received vocational training during their stay in prison. Training was offered in twenty-two trades, including agricul- ture, animal husbandry, rattan work, carpentry, and tailoring. Every convicted offender was required to work eight hours each day and received a wage calculated according to the level of skill. Apart from the correctional system maintained by the Depart- ment of Prisons, the armed forces and the police have operated a number of detention camps for suspects arrested under the Preven- tion of Terrorism Act. According to the United States State 262 National Security Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "there have been persistent reports of torture or ill-treatment by military and police" at these camps, and detainees have been deprived of the legal rights and conditions of incarceration that apply to conven- tional detention facilities. Drug Abuse and Drug Legislation Because of the traditionally accepted roles of both opium and hashish in indigenous ayurvedic medicine, the population of Sri Lanka has historically been tolerant of the use of a variety of psy- choactive drugs (see Health, ch. 2). As a result, the government has been slow to identify drug abuse as an issue meriting national attention, and until the late 1970s, no efforts were made to quan- tify the problem. In 1978 the Narcotics Advisory Board of Sri Lanka coordinated the first systematic field investigation of drug abuse. The survey revealed that opium, cannabis, and barbiturates were the drugs most commonly used for nonmedical purposes, and that the majority of drug abusers were under forty years old (for can- nabis, 48 percent were between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five). Between 1975 and 1979, an average of 4,000 persons per year were arrested for drug-related offenses, while an additional 3,000 peo- ple sought help for drug problems. A 1980 government survey estimated between 3,500 and 5,800 opium dependents and between 16,000 and 18,000 chronic cannabis users. Based on the World Health Organization conversion factor of ten actual drug abusers for every one identified, the government estimated a total usage level as high as 1.5 percent of the population. The delayed appearance of drug abuse among the issues of na- tional concern is reflected in the state of antidrug legislation. As of 1981, one of the major statutes on the books was the Poisons, Opium, and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance. Although it has been amended several times since its enactment in 1929, the ordinance was seriously outdated for a society in the 1980s. It divides drugs into five categories (poisons; poppy, coca, and hemp; opium; dan- gerous drugs; and other drugs) and regulates their import, export, and domestic trade. Rather than attempting to define dangerous drugs, the ordinance simply appends a list of forbidden substances, and this has permitted greater flexibility in amending the law to suit changes in society. More recent efforts to regulate drug abuse include the Cosmetics, Devices, and Drugs Act of 1980, which re- quires companies trading legal drugs to obtain a license from the director of health services. This provision has given an important avenue for the authorities to monitor the import and export of phar- maceuticals. In spite of the government's efforts to eliminate illegal 263 Sri Lanka: A Country Study drugs, the strong Buddhist constituency has insisted on the legiti- macy of traditional medical practices, and the Ayurvedic Act of 1961 assures ayurvedic physicians of continued legal access to opium. Because drug addiction in Sri Lanka has been far less prevalent than in the West, and because terrorism and insurgency have strained to the utmost the nation's security assets, a concerted cam- paign on illegal substance abuse is likely to await a return to nor- mal conditions in the country. As this chapter goes to press, the security crisis in Sri Lanka is more appropriately the subject of current events than of history; the analyses of scholarly journals are quickly outpaced by happen- ings in the field. Recent changes in the structure of the nation's legal and military institutions have yet to be reflected in any major monographs, and, as a result, this study has relied to an unusual degree on the piecemeal reportage of daily newspapers and weekly magazines. The most comprehensive survey of the nation's armed forces ap- pears in a special report by G. Jacobs in the July 1985 issue of Asian Defence Journal. Entitled "Armed Forces of Sri Lanka," the report deals with the strength, organization, training, and equip- ment of the three armed services and the police, and provides valu- able information on the difficulties that the security forces have faced in dealing with the insurgency. For treatment of the Tamil separatist movement, Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam's "The Tamil 'Tigers' In Northern Sri Lanka: Origins, Factions, Programmes" {Internationales Asienforum) and Robert Kearney's "Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement In Sri Lanka" {Asian Survey) provide excellent background material on the origins and organization of the insurgency. Hellmann- Rajanayagam focuses more on the composition and leadership of the individual groups, while Kearney delves into the political en- vironment that gave rise to the movement. S.J. Tambiah's Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy focuses on the anti-Tamil riots of July 1983 and offers insights into the role of the government and the armed forces in intensifying the ethnic conflict. Similar background material on the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna appears in A.C. Alles' Insurgency — 1971. The author was himself a member of the Criminal Justice Commission that in- vestigated the uprising, and his blow-by-blow account, although sometimes excessively detailed, provides a fascinating picture of 264 National Security the rebel group — its ideology, leadership, and the haphazard nature of its attempt to seize power. The United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices offers an annual update on the treatment of prisoners and the effect of the emergency regulations and antiterrorist pro- visions on the administration of criminal justice. Information on the nation's prison system appears in the annual proceedings of the Asian and Pacific Conference of Correctional Administrators published by the Australian Institute of Criminology. In his report to the first, third and sixth conferences, the Sri Lankan Commis- sioner of Prisons, J. P. Delgoda, summarizes the major changes of the previous year and offers information on the structure of the prison administration, the treatment of women and minors, and the vocational training program. (For further information and com- plete citations, see Bibliography.) 265 Appendix A Table 1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 2 Projected Population Growth, Selected Years, 1991-2001 3 Population According to Age-group, 1986 4 Schools and Other Education Institutions, Selected Years, 1975-86 5 Summary of Major Exports, Selected Years, 1976-86 6 Gross National Product, 1975, 1980, and 1986 7 Gross Domestic Product, Selected Years, 1960-87 8 Industrial Production, 1980, 1985, and 1986 9 Medium-Wave AM Radio Stations of Sri Lanka Broadcast- ing Corporation, 1988 10 Balance of Trade and Terms of Trade, Selected Years, 1970-86 11 Government Fiscal Operations, 1982-86 12 Party Performance in General Elections, 1947-77 267 Appendix A Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find 0.04 inches 39 Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres Slnnarp kilnmpfprs: 0.39 scjuare miles 35.3 cubic feet 0.26 gallons 2.2 pounds 0.98 long tons 1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds 9 degrees Fahrenheit (Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32 Table 2. Projected Population Growth, Selected Years, 1991-2001 * (in thousands) Lo w Estimate Medium Estimate Hi *h Estimate Year Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 1991 1996 2001 8,931 9,501 9,980 8,776 9,434 10,021 17,707 18,935 20,001 9,018 9,695 10,320 8,862 9,624 10,354 17,880 19,319 20,674 9,099 9,875 10,644 8,940 9,794 10,665 18,039 19,669 21,309 * Sri Lankan government figures. Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Statistical Office, Landerbericht: Sri Lanka, 1988, Wiesbaden, 1988, 17. 269 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Table 3. Population According to Age-group, 1986 (in percentage of total population) 1986 1 Age-group Male Total Below 5 6.4 12.5 5-10 5.8 11.4 10-15 .. 5.8 11.4 15-20 5.5 10.8 20-25 5.1 10.2 25-30 4.3 8.6 30-35 3.8 7.6 35-40 2.8 5.6 40-45 2.4 4.7 45-50 2.1 4.1 50-55 1.9 3.7 55-60 1.5 2.8 60-65 1.2 2.3 65-70 0.9 1.7 70-75 0.7 1.2 75-80 0.4 0.7 80-85 0.4 0.7 85 and over 0.4 0.7 TOTAL 51.4 100.7 2 1 Based on population estimates as of June 1986. 2 Percentage does not add to 100 because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Statistical Office, Landerbericht: Sri Lanka, 1988, Wiesbaden, 1988, 18. Table 4. Schools and Other Education Institutions, Selected Years, 1975-86 Institution 1975 1980 1984 1986 General, all-purpose schools 9,386 9,117 9,556 9,656 Elementary schools 1 7,656 4,156 4,000 3,938 Intermediate and upper level schools 2 ... 1,730 4,961 5,556 5,718 1,058 677 358 421 289 282 307 372 n.a. 36 31 36 7 4 8 9 9 n.a. — not available. 1 Grades 1-5. 2 Grades 6-12. 3 Including technical and farm schools. * Until the late 1970s, there was one university with seven parts; each became independent in 1979. Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Statistical Office, Landerbericht: Sri Lanka, 1988, Wiesbaden, 1988, 29. 270 Appendix A Table 5. Summary of Major Exports, Selected Years, 1976-86 Export Sector 1976 1984 1985 1986 1986 1 (in percentage of annual total) A • 1 Agricultural 4.Q A 49 9 33 1 97 9 Q 9^3 1 O A 8.8 7.1 7.7 o coo 10.2 5.7 8.5 7.0 2,389 , , 4.2 3.7 3.8 4.4 1,500 *7 C O 60.4 52.5 46.3 1 J, /D't Industrial 1.4 on o 20. 5 no a 28.3 9,629 10.5 8.8 10.7 6.9 2,358 Other industrial 3.0 5.5 6.8 11.4 3,891 14.9 34.6 39.5 46.6 15,878 Minerals 5.4 1.6 1.6 2.2 755 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.3 427 Total minerals 6.0 2.2 2.4 3.5 1,182 2.8 2.7 5.6 3.7 1,249 TOTAL 2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 34,073 1 In millions of SL rupees. For value of rupee — see Glossary. 2 Figures may not add to total because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Review of the Economy, 1987, Colombo, 1988, 157-59. 271 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Table 6. Gross National Product, Selected Years, 1975, 1980, and 1986 (current factor cost prices in millions of rupees) 1 Sector 1975 1980 1986 2 8,643 17,151 44,355 Banking, insurance, and real estate 336 1,785 6,840 Construction 1,018 5,552 12,272 3,217 11,048 24,869 316 1,249 4,155 463 1,457 4,578 Public administration and defense 798 1,965 7,945 Transport, storage, communications, and utilities 1,889 5,894 20,163 Wholesale and retail trade 3,076 10,898 31,808 Other services 2,320 5,247 6,728 GDP at factor cost 22,076 62,246 163,713 Net income factor, from abroad -140 -432 -3,861 GNP TOTAL 21,936 61,814 159,852 1 For value of SL rupee — see Glossary. 2 Provisional. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Sri Lanka, 1987-88, London, 1987, 8-9; and Quarterly Economic Review: Annual Supplement, 1977, London, 1978, 8. Table 7. Growth of Gross Domestic Product, Selected Years, 1960-87 (in percentages) Sector 1960-65 1 1970-77 1 1977-84 1 1987 2 Agriculture 2.7 2.2 3.8 0.8 5.2 1.6 5.6 6.0 Services 3 4.6 3.2 6.1 3.2 Gross Domestic Product Total 4.0 2.9 6.0 3.0 Gross Domestic Product Per Capita . . 1.5 1.3 4.3 1.3 1 Annual averages. 2 Estimated. 3 Including construction. 272 Appendix A Table 8. Industrial Production, Selected Years, 1980, 1985, and 1986 (in millions of rupees) 1 Sector 1980 1985 1986 2 478 123 281 Chemicals, oil, coal, rubber, and plastics . . O' A 1 C y,4-io 19 1 (\A 1 J , 1 Ut I 1 (1QQ I I ,Uoo Fabricated metal products, machinery, 620 1,592 1,754 Food, beverages, and tobacco 3,899 10,497 12,169 Nonmetallic mineral products (except oil 1,156 1,854 2,053 Paper products 476 1,187 1,289 Textiles, clothing, and leather 1,923 9,505 12,088 289 705 632 54 125 136 TOTAL 18,311 38,692 41,490 1 For value of SL rupee — see Glossary. 2 Provisional. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Sri Lanka, 1987-88, London, 1987, 17; and Country Profile: Sri Lanka, 1986-87, London, 1986, 15. 273 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Table 9. Medium- Wave AM Radio Stations of Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation, 1988 Location Frequency (kHz) Power (kw) Language Network Ambawela 531 40 Sinhala National — Channel 1 Ambawela 648 40 Sinhala National— Channel 2 Amparai 693 20 Sinhala National— Channel 2 Amparai 855 20 Sinhala National — Channel 1 Amparai 972 20 Tamil National — Tamil Anuradhapura 774 10 Sinhala National — Channel 2 Diyagama 1 558 10 Tamil National — Tamil Diyagama 621 20 Sinhala National — Channel 1 Diyagama 873 20 English none Diyagama 918 25 n.a. n.a. Diyagama 702 25 Sinhala National — Channel 2 Galle 1026 10 Sinhala National — Channel 1 National — Channel 2 Kandy 567 10 Sinhala National — Channel 2 Kandy 819 10 Sinhala National — Channel 1 Kantalai 585 20 Tamil National — Tamil Kantalai 747 20 Sinhala National — Channel 1 Mahiyangana 1485 1 Sinhala National — Channel 1 Mahiyangana 1602 1 Sinhala National— Channel 2 Maho 639 50 various 2 Regional Maho 801 40 Sinhala National — Channel 1 Ratnapura 603 10 Sinhala National — Channel 1 Ratnapura 729 10 Sinhala National— Channel 2 Wiraketiya 675 40 Sinhala National — Channel 1 Wiraketiya 594 50 various 2 Regional n.a. — not available. 1 Diyagama is in Colombo District. 2 Probably Sinhala. Source: Based on information from World Radio-TV Handbook, 1987, Amsterdam, 1987, 229-30. Table 10. Balance of Trade and Terms of Trade, Selected Years, 1970-86 (in millions of rupees) 1 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 2 Imports 2,313 5,196 33,942 54,049 54,609 2,033 3,968 17,595 36,207 34,072 Balance of Trade . . -280 -1,228 -16,347 -17,843 -20,537 Terms of Trade . . . 194 107 106 108 102 (1981 = 100) 1 For value of SL rupee — see Glossary. 2 Provisional. 274 Appendix A Table 11. Government Fiscal Operations, 1982-86 (in millions of rupees) 1 1982 1983 1984 1985 2 1986 2 Revenue 2 9 3.4 5.5 5.6 4.8 Sales and turnover taxes 6 4 9.5 13.9 14.2 14.6 Import and export duties 6 1 7.3 11.1 10.3 11.6 2.3 5.1 7.2 9.0 10.7 17.7 25.3 37.7 39.1 41.7 Expenditure 19.2 25.1 31.8 34.2 34.6 Capital 18.7 21.7 21.8 30.5 35.1 Total Expenditure 37.9 46.8 53.6 64.7 69.7 Budget Deficit 20.1 21.6 15.9 25.7 26.6 Financing of deficit Domestic bank borrowing 4.0 1.2 -2.7 7.5 2.3 Domestic non-bank borrowing . . . . 7.6 10.1 6.6 8.5 9.2 Foreign grants 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.8 5.4 7.5 8.0 8.9 12.1 Use of cash balances -0.3 -0.7 0.7 -2.5 -0.8 71.3 86.4 95.7 123.7 150.3 1 For value of SL rupee — see Glossary 2 Estimated — figures rounded. Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Review of the Economy, 1986, Colombo, 1987, 232; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Sri Lanka: 1987-1988, London, 1987, 22. 275 Sri Lanka: A Country Study Table 12. Party Performance in General Elections, 1947-77 (showing percentage of popular vote and number of seats won) 1956 March 1960 % Votes No. of % Votes No. of % Votes No. of % Votes No. of Won Seats Won Seats Won Seats Won Seats UNP 1 39.9 42 44.0 54 27.9 8 29.6 50