Words in Space and Time

Historical Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe

Tomasz Kamusella
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To my Family, Friends, Homeland, and Europe in this big globalized world

Mej Familyje, Frojndom, Hajmatowi a Ojropie w tym wielgym a globalizowanym welcie.

Для маёй Сям’ї, Сяброў, Радзімы і Эўропы ў гэтым вялікім глябалізаваным сьвеце

Dlia majoj Siamji, Siabroў, Radzimy i Eўropy ў hetym vialikim hljabalizavanym śviecie

ואם מיין משפּחה, פֿרענדז, קאומלאנד און אייראָפּע אין דעם גרויס גלאָובאַלייזד וועלט
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Foreword

This extensive Atlas is a blessing for everyone who is interested in Central Europe as a cultural or political phenomenon. It is relevant to teaching, research or governance, as well as general readers interested in a special region of Europe that is haunted by complexity. The book is an unusual blend of theoretical discourse and beautifully executed maps in colour. These maps provide a spatial expression for the formation of political processes that would have been difficult to express in words alone. The maps focus primarily on the formation of dialects and the writing systems in Central Europe from the 9th century to the present. The purpose of the book is to show the role that ethnolinguistic nationalism played in the formation of nation states. The normative correlations between nation states and languages are shown to be the Central European national master narrative.

Moreover, an innovative aspect of this work is the authors’ firm belief that the nation states should not be the decisive framework for understanding the region in the future. There should be a change to the European perspective and indeed the global perspective in research. Therefore the book contains a chapter on the comparative analysis of the contribution of languages to the formation of nation states in Southeast Asia. The volume includes an extensive glossary explaining important concepts, for example ethnolinguistic nationalism or normative isomorphism of language, nation and state. There is also an extended bibliography of publications in non-local languages. The Geography students who attended my Central European course in Dublin decades ago would have loved to have this book at their disposal. It is a welcome companion to Tomasz Kamusella’s monograph The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe (2009) and P.R. Magocsi’s Historical Atlas of East Central Europe (2018).

The production of an atlas is labour intensive and expensive. But, as this new work shows, the effort is worth it. The authors and their sponsors and the editorial team of the Central European University Press in Budapest have provided us not only with an intriguing regional study but also with a most important contribution to European studies.

Anngret Simms,  
Professor Emeritus of Historical Geography, University College Dublin;  
Editor of the Irish Historic Towns Atlas; Member of the Royal Irish Academy
Acknowledgments

I began toying with the idea of *Words in Space and Time: A Historical Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe* in the mid-2000s, when I was still busy finishing my monograph *The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe* (Kamusella 2009). Even though at 1200 pages this monograph was already quite extensive, I could not hope to fit into it all the material I had gathered. Another problem was that it is difficult to maintain the reader’s interest in such an encyclopedic tome. Then it dawned on me that the wealth of information may be more effectively presented in the form of maps, which also makes it possible to show crucial spatial relations among various elements of the story. On the other hand, employing cartography for this task would allow for subverting and problematizing the typically twentieth-century use of this technology for fortifying national master narratives across Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nation-states.

Paul Robert Magocsi’s renowned *Historical Atlas of (East) Central Europe* (1992, 2003, 2019) offered an immediate inspiration. In 2010, I had the good luck to meet him during the conference on Slavic Languages in Migration organized by the Institut für Slavistik at the University of Vienna. Professor Magocsi (and earlier, in 2009, Anngret Simms, University College Dublin, in her capacity as an editorial board member of the *Irish Historic Towns Atlas*) forewarned me that mapmaking was extremely labor-intensive and costly, while there were no customized grants available for covering such expenses, especially commissioning the drawing or generating of maps with professional cartographers. Unfortunately, nothing has changed in this regard during the last decade. Most grant-making institutions either push a historian to acquire a mapmaking skill (which takes decades to hone) or refuse to pay for a cartographer’s services.

That is why I appreciate all the more the understanding and foresight of these few grant-making bodies, which going against the grain of received knowledge and preconceptions, decided to support the research and mapmaking for this atlas. Importantly, the initial two grants that I used to launch this project, came in 2008–2009 with no strings attached, namely, from the Start-up Fund for New Lecturers and the Long Room Hub Research Initiative Funding Scheme, both based in Trinity College Dublin. After a longish hiatus, in 2013, I received a small research grant from the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland. However, a breakthrough came the following year when the grant board of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) agreed with my opinion that purchasing a cartographer’s services is an instrument for analyzing and presenting research data, hence in essence not different from securing a spectrometer for a physicist or a specialized computer for DNA sequencing. The RSE Arts & Humanities Small Grant enabled me to produce more than half of the maps in this atlas. My home School of History at the University of St Andrews kindly offered some further research support for necessary mapmaking. However, in a couple of cases, rather than sitting on my hands, I decided to press on with the project by paying for cartographic services from my own pocket.

In its initial stage, the project gained much from the discussion, which at the invitation of Motoki Nomachi 野町 素己, was held in 2011 in the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center (SRC) at Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan. The discussants, namely, Yukiyasu Arai 荒井 幸康 (SRC), Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly (University of Victoria,
British Columbia, Canada), Catherine Gibson (European University Institute, Florence), Michael Moser (University of Vienna) and Motoki Nomachi (SRC) shared their opinions in the form of articles that were usefully gathered in the edited volume *Central Europe Through the Lens of Language Politics: On the Sample Maps from the Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe* (Kamusella, Nomachi and Gibson 2017). The plans presented in that volume predicted about 70 to 80 maps for this atlas, but the aforementioned problems with securing appropriate grants for mapmaking convinced me to stop this project at 40-odd maps in order to finally conclude it after an entire decade in the works.

Another source of inspiration for the atlas were ad hoc conversations during the exhibitions of sample maps. The first exhibition, thanks to the kind invitation extended by Motoki Nomachi and Akihiro Iwashita 岩下 明裕, took place in 2009 at the Start-up Conference of the Global Center of Excellence Program on Reshaping Japan's Border Studies, held at the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center. Five years later, in 2014, at the invitation of Kiyoishi Hara 原聖 (Joshibi University of Art and Design, Tokyo), Lianqun Bao 包 联群 (University of Tokyo) and Xing Huang 黄行 (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), a broader range of the by then completed maps was exhibited during the conference on Standard Norms in Written Languages: Historical and Comparative Studies Between East and West, held in the Institute of Mongolian Studies at the University of Inner Mongolia in Hohhot, China. In addition, while still at Trinity College Dublin, in 2009, I used the concept of the atlas and some initial maps as a visual backdrop for my talks on “A Steel Hand in a Kid Glove: Language in Modern Central Europe” and “Language and Politics in Postcommunist Europe,” delivered in the framework of the 7th Lewis Glucksman Memorial Symposium for the Long Room Hub at Trinity College Dublin.

In 2009, the renowned Polish-Jewish historian of Central Europe, Jerzy Tomaszewski (University of Warsaw), always eager to support innovative research, put me in touch with cartographer Robert Chmielewski, who drew all the maps. For the full decade, Robert patiently stood by this project, always at the ready to help when an opportunity appeared for producing more maps. On top of that, I appreciate his meticulousness with the seemingly never-ending rounds of corrections, attention to detail, and efforts to make all the maps objets d’art in their own right.

For the sake of depicting Central Europe as seen through the lens of a specific language and culture, I devised maps executed in selected languages and their scripts. With Agata Reibach (Kondrat) (University of Warsaw) and Eleonora Bergmann (Jewish Historical Institute, Warsaw) I collaborated on the Yiddish-language map, with Dorin Lozovanu and Ion Duminica (both from the National Academy of Sciences of Moldova) on the Moldovan-language map in Cyrillic, with Michael Talbot (University of Greenwich) on the map in Osmanleca (Ottoman Turkish), with Andrzej (Andreas) Rocznicki (Silesian National Publishing House—Śląsko Nacyjno Oficyno) on the Silesian-language map, with Ław Subarić (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Neo-Latin Studies, Innsbruck) on the Latin-language map, and with Walter Želazny (University of Białystok, Poland) and Tomasz Chmielek (Akademia Literatury de Esperanto) on the Esperanto-language map. Despite numerous attempts, it proved impossible to develop a map of Central Europe in Romans, or the language of the Roma, who at 12 million are present-day Europe’s largest stateless ethnic group (national minority). However, Elena Marushiakova and Veselin Popov (University of Saint Andrews and Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) came to my succor, and together we developed the map of Roma settlements in Central Europe. All the collaborators (with the exception of the Moldovan-language map) also contributed the explicatory texts that accompany the aforementioned maps. In addition, to meet the ERC regulations, Elena Marushiakova and Veselin Popov declare that their text “Roma Settlements in Central Europe, 2009” was written in the framework of the research project “RomaInterbellum: Roma Civic Emancipation between the Two World Wars,” which received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No 694656). This text reflects only the authors’ view, and the agency is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

In 2009, in Sarajevo, my friend and colleague, Kurt Bassuener (with whom I graduated from Central European University in Prague) arranged a meeting with Ahmet Alibasič (Faculty of Islamic Sciences, University of Sarajevo), who introduced me to Bosnia’s Slavophone literacy in Arabic letters. Significantly, this experience made me more attuned to the fact that a variety of scripts may be employed for writing different languages. I understood that actually, any language can be written in any script.

A word of thanks goes to my colleagues at Trinity College Dublin who helped me with my research, especially, to Balázs Apor, Justin Doherty, Ewa Grzegorczyk, Guido Hausmann, Clemens Ruthner and Sarah Smyth in the Department of Russian and Slavic Languages, and to Moray McGowan and Jason McElligott in the Long Room Hub. After the conclusion of the first batch of maps, Amelie Dorn (Centre for Language and Communication Studies, Trinity College Dublin) proofread them, which made me aware of how much care and time must be lavished on maps in “postproduction” in order to make them work properly. In the course of researching, designing and executing further maps, helpful advice and suggestions were kindly shared with me by Ágoston Berecz (European University Institute, Florence), Peter Burke (Cambridge University), Andrea Graziosi (Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II), Iaroslav Hrytsak (Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv), Krzysztof Jaskulowski (European University Institute, Florence), Peter Burke (Cambridge University), Andrea Graziosi (Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II), Iaroslav Hrytsak (Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv), Krzysztof Jaskulowski (SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw), Mateusz Kamusella (Wrocław), Mariusz Markowski (Opole), Akiyoshi Nishiyama 西山 晃義 (Kyoritsu Women's University, Tokyo), Rok Stergar and Jernej Kosi (University of Ljubljana), Hienadž Sahanovič (Mieńsk and Warsaw), Bardhyl Selimi (Tirana), Timothy Snyder (Yale University), Jolanta Sujecka (University of Warsaw), Paul Wexler (Tel Aviv University) and Leonid Zashkilnyak (Ivan Franko National University of Lviv).
At the University of St Andrews I received many suggestions for improvement, especially from Riccardo Bavaj, John Clark, Andrew Cusack, Tom Dawson, Aileen Fyfe, Elinor Graham, Tim Greenwood, Joanna Hambly, Bridget Heal, Dimitri Kasriris, Konrad Lawson, Christine McGladdery, Frank Müller, Steve Murdoch, Andrew Peacock, Andrew Pettigree, Bernhard Struck, Michael Talbot and Kostas Zafeiris. As peer reviewers of the submitted draft, Andrea Graziosi, Antonio Ferrara (Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II) and Akihiro Iwashita shared with me valuable advice. But above all, I am grateful to my two former students and now researchers in their own right—Catherine Gibson (European University Institute, Florence) and Iemima Ploscariu (Dublin City University)—who attentively read through all the explanatory texts. Obviously, it is me alone who is responsible for any remaining infelicities.

It would have taken considerably longer to complete this atlas without David Stonestreet’s gentle but persistent encouragement. László Kontler and Balázs Trencsényi (both from Central European University) kindly recommended the manuscript to Linda Kunos, Senior Editor of Central European University Press. I was delighted to learn that she immediately was interested in publishing this atlas. Indeed, it is a serendipitous occurrence that the publishing house’s name is shared with the atlas’s title, showing what a fitting home it is for this book. I thank Tertia Gillett for careful editing and John Puckett for compiling the index.

Last but not least, I thank my wife Beata, daughter Anna Maria, and mother-in-law Maria for their love, understanding, patience and forbearance. Thankfully, at the screen of my computer, our cat Mochi 餅 distracted me at times, so at long last I could reconnect with my family.

November 2020
Preface

Until recently there was little dialog between linguists and historians. The former tended to see their field as a “science of language,” presumably governed by universal laws, while the latter rather unquestioningly accepted linguists’ proposal that languages are a product of nature, or even “living organisms.” In reality, though, only language understood as the biological capacity for speech (Sprache) is part of nature. Its actualizations—languages (Einzelsprachen)—are products of human history, invented and shaped by individuals and their groups. Languages (Einzelsprachen) are part of culture, like states, nations, universities, towns, associations, art, beauty, religions, injustice, or atheism. The renowned British historians of (Central) Europe and its culture, Peter Burke and Robert J. W. Evans, took a clear note of this problem. In response to this dilemma, they began analyzing languages as artifacts of culture and history, and have long appealed that historians cease taking Einzelsprachen for granted (Burke 2004; Evans 1998). On the other side of this disciplinary divide, linguists also followed their example, and today more of them study languages in the context of historical developments, as exemplified by the journal Language & History (founded in 2009), or the research of linguists like Tony Crowley (2008), Finex Ndhlovu (2009), Peter Mühlhäusler (1996), or Robert Phillipson (1992).

This integrated approach to the study of the human past is of crucial importance for an improved understanding of the history and present day of modern Central Europe. Uniquely from the global perspective, the political shape of this region has been increasingly composed of ethnolinguistic nation-states during the last two centuries. Hence, Central Europe’s current political order hinges on the myth that languages are natural entities. This myth constitutes the basis on which the region’s nations (not states!) have been constructed, and in turn demanded politics for themselves, that is, nation-states. As a result, the predominant rule is that each Central European nation-state aspires to possess a unique language (unshared with any other polity or nation), which defines its nation and simultaneously legitimizes statehood. In the Central European view, a proper nation is nothing but a speech community, or all the speakers of a single language. Hence, in many ways neither the region’s historians nor linguists (popularly known as philologists in Central Europe) are encouraged to debunk this myth or probe into it through the lens of the history of ideas. Obviously, in Central Europe, as elsewhere in the world, universities and research institutes are mostly financed by the region’s national politics. Hence, the disenchantment of the ethnolinguistic national myth that is employed to legitimate and maintain statehood in this region does not feature high on the official agenda of research priorities. However, some scholars from outside of Central Europe, equally versed in linguistics and historiography, significantly contributed to the analysis of the region’s ethnolinguistic nationalisms (cf Greenberg 2008; Judson 2006; Maxwell 2009). Finally, this example sufficiently impressed some Central European researchers to follow suit, despite a variety of difficulties faced at their home universities (cf Czesak 2015; Kamusella 2009; Kosi 2013; Velčovský 2014). The tight spatial and ideological overlap of a language, nation, and state as the foundation of political order is highly counterintuitive and difficult to imagine in spatial terms. Therefore, Central Europe is also unique in the widespread use of the atlas of history as a required school textbook. In this region, children are typically provided with a wide choice of such school atlases of history, obviously closely at-
tuned to a specific version of ethnolinguistic history as espoused and taught in a given nation-state (Kamusella 2010). This type of school atlas is employed for instilling a state-approved national history in the minds of successive generations for the sake of reproducing a given ethnolinguistic nation and its foundational myth.

However, a change in perspective from the nation-state to Central Europe, and from national history to the comparative analysis of the construction and uses of languages and their scripts should cut on the ideological function of indoctrination and allow for an in-depth analysis of the rise and dynamics of ethnolinguistic nationalisms across the region. That methodological assumption was the starting point of this atlas. Another source of inspiration was obviously Paul Robert Magocsi’s seminal Historical Atlas of (East) Central Europe (1993, 2002, 2018) and the unduly neglected monograph Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia by H. R. Wilkinson (1951). No national project was ever directed at Central Europe as a whole, thus the choice of this geographical region for the atlas usefully reduces any national myopia. In addition, the choice of Einzelsprachen and the comparative history of their construction (and destruction) as the lens through which the story is reported in this atlas further distances it from Central Europe’s national master narratives. Such narratives treat the region’s recognized national languages as natural entities, which, in this national view, obviates any necessity of their analysis.

The largely chronological flow of the presented story, first, focuses on Central Europe’s dialect continua, the emergence of states, and the spread of the technology of writing (Maps 1–10). On this basis, the rest of the atlas’s maps zoom squarely in on the last two centuries, presenting and analyzing Central Europe’s nationalizing and national language politics, alongside its effects. The main effect was the ideologically intended increasing correlation of the region’s nation-states’ frontiers with the boundaries of languages, dialect continua, and scripts. This tight overlap of political borders with cultural boundaries came at the expense of populations who spoke “incorrect” languages, wrote with the use of the “wrong” scripts, or professed “foreign” religions. Seen as “foreigners” or “minorities” in localities where they had often resided for centuries, these singled-out groups became the target of repeated acts of forced assimilation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Unfortunately, this was the other salient effect of the employment of ethnolinguistic nationalism for building ethnolinguistically homogenous nations and their national politics in Central Europe.

Besides the Weberian-style disenchantment of Einzelsprachen, this atlas also aspires to denaturalize the very idea of ethnolinguistic nationalism and its history. Of course, there is no necessity for such an effort on behalf of readers from other parts of the world because the vast majority of the globe’s extant nation-states were not created and are not legitimized with the use of unique national languages. However, readers from Central Europe may need to take an intellectual leap to stop viewing languages as natural entities or “living organisms,” separate from humans and their groups. Only the latter enjoy agency in the realm of social reality, while the former would not have existed at all if people had not created and chosen to maintain languages as languages, that is, in accordance with the Western concept of Einzelsprache (Kamusella 2016). Ethnolinguistic nationalism is the norm of political thinking and practice in today’s Central Europe, as encapsulated by the handy algebraic-like formulation, Language = Nation = State. But outside of this region (with the exception of Southeast Asia, see Map 42), the norm is different, and ordinarily, State = Nation. Hence, this atlas helps scholars and interested readers from other parts of the world to better understand the typical Central European’s view of politics and history, and to see the region through the unusual spectacles of ethnolinguistic nationalism. This exercise reveals the ideological logic of Central European politics and history during the last two centuries, alongside the logic of the ideologized interpretations of the past, as commonly espoused in the region’s national master narratives.

From the perspective of the history of ideas, the atlas’s storyline opens with the eighteenth-century emergence of the Western European concept of the nation. It defines all the population of a polity as a nation; its members, from the legal perspective, are construed as citizens, all equal before the law. In turn, the nation was to provide legitimation for the government and statehood, instead of the traditional “divine right.” This ideal of what later became known as the ideology of nationalism was for the first time consciously implemented in the cases of the nation-states of the United States (1776), revolutionary France (1789), and post-slave Haiti (1791). After the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, during the Napoleonic wars, the nascent German national movement was unable to follow the typical, civic route of overhauling a polity’s population into a nation. According to German national activists, none of the post-Holy Roman Empire polities was sufficiently extensive in territorial terms to function as the desired German nation-state. As a result, in 1813, they developed and settled on a concept of ethnolinguistic nationalism, as captured by Ernst Moritz Arndt’s poem “Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?” (What is the Fatherland of the Germans?) (Arndt 1813). In the wake of the 1848 Revolutions, ethnolinguistic nationalism spread across Central Europe as the leading political ideology of what then was seen as modernity and progress in this region. The ethnolinguistic nation-states of Italy and Germany were founded in accordance with this type of nationalism in 1861 and 1871, respectively. In 1872, at the Eighth International Congress of Statistics, held at St Petersburg, most European countries accepted the census question about respondents’ (“native,” “family,” or “common”) languages as the measure of nationality, or the presumed fact of respondents’ “natural” membership in ethnolinguistically defined nations (Labbé 2019: 53-56). Since the 1880s the language question has been consistently included in censuses, thus generating (or rather, creating) statistics about the number of people belonging to particular nations across Central Europe. The Balkan nation-states were founded on an ethnoreligious base during the nineteenth century. However, beginning with this century’s last decades, they were gradually reshaped in line with the ethnolinguistic definition of the nation. In 1912, Albania became the first-ever Balkan na-
tion-state established on the basis of ethnolinguistic nationalism. In the late stages of the Great War, the United States geographer of Armenian origin, Léon Dominian’s, influential monograph *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe* (1917) informed President Woodrow Wilson’s understanding of Central Europe and its politics in terms of ethnolinguistic nationalism. Subsequently, Washington convinced all the Allies to accept the replacement of the region’s multi-ethnic empires and non-national polities with ethnolinguistic nation-states. As a result, from the interwar period to this day, ethnolinguistic nationalism has remained Central Europe’s sole accepted ideology of statehood and peoplehood formation, legitimation, and maintenance.

Last but not least, the atlas is appended with a Glossary of concepts, ideas, and phenomena from the disciplinary intersection of Central European history, linguistics, language politics, and the sociology of language. Some of these terms may not be familiar to historians, others to linguists, while yet others to scholars with no direct specialization in Central Europe.
My interest in languages and what they really are goes back to my childhood. Now with the privilege of hindsight I can see that I was born and raised in a multiethnic and polyglot region in communist Poland. Upper Silesia retained this character, despite the series of vast acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing visited on Central Europe during the twentieth century by the totalitarian regimes of wartime Germany and the Soviet Union. In the latter case such policies were pursued before, during, and after World War Two. All these processes of radical “demographic engineering” heavily impacted Upper Silesia. The ideological goal and undisputed ideal was to produce homogenous societies (nations), housed in their own unshared homelands (nation-states), where a single language (national tongue) would be in exclusive use across all spheres of public and private life. This elusive homogeneity (“parity”) was defined in (pseudo) racial terms in the Third Reich, and by a sense of social classlessness in the Soviet Union. However, across Central Europe, to this day, ethnolinguistic nationalism has remained the most popular benchmark and source of “real” homogeneity, seen as the proper basis for the creation, legitimation, and maintenance of national statehood. In this view Language = Nation = State. Ethnolinguistic homogeneity is the hallmark of the true nation-state.

My school education inculcated my peers and I with this understanding of society and statehood. We lived in Poland, construed as an ethnolinguistically homogenous nation-state. Upper Silesia was part of it. As agreed at Potsdam, in the latter half of the 1940s, all the remaining Germans were expelled from Upper Silesia, and from elsewhere in postwar Poland. Afterward, everyone spoke Polish in our region. Why then was it that my Oma (Granny) prayed and wrote in German? Our neighbors who were “repatriated” (expelled) from the interwar Polish lands east of the Bug River, annexed by the Soviet Union, spoke a Polish different from that which one heard on radio or television. At times, they were abused as “Ruskies” or “Ukrainians,” because in their ID booklets their place of birth was given as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic or the Soviet Union. And it came as quite a shock to me that Polish language teachers never ceased to criticize my speech by pronouncing time and again that I speak and write Polish “incorrectly” (mówi i pisze niepoprawnie po polsku).

The ideal of total ethnolinguistic homogeneity clashed with the multiethnic and polyglot reality on the ground in the Upper Silesia of my childhood. Because school curricula required that teachers toe the line of ideology, no explanation was forthcoming. The resultant epistemic tension caused much discomfort, and people laughed at my Polish or ridiculed me on this account when I happened to visit other regions in Poland. However, the maternal branch of my family in rural northern Mazovia was more accepting. Babcia (Granny) and Dziadek (Grandpa) spoke in a manner distinctly different from what I heard at school and in the mass media. For them it did not matter how I spoke, we just talked without having to be conscious of some language, school, or nation. I learned that family matters more than the essentially trivial question of a language, this overrated questione della lingua. Perhaps, it helped that in the interwar period my grandparents had experienced the proximity of the Polish-German frontier in East Prussia, where “Lutherans” (Germans) and Jews had been their neighbors, rather than only “Catholics” (Poles).

During the latter half of the 1980s, I read for an MA in English Philology at the University of Silesia in Sosnowiec, meaning the task was to acquire a good working
command of English. It was no mean feat, because in communist Poland with its frontiers sealed tight, there were no English-language publications available in bookstores. It was during the time before the internet and satellite TV, which could have compensated for the acute lack. But all these restrictions “made sense.” English was a foreign language, so in order to understand I had to “learn it,” and it could not be easy. School taught me I spoke Polish, so all the other languages had to be “foreign” by default. After the fall of communism, I had the good luck to study at Central European University in Prague. During the first semester I did not understand Czech and did not have time to attend the kindly offered course in this tongue. I could not understand Czech, because it was not Polish, ergo Czech was “foreign,” and you were unable to comprehend foreign tongues, weren’t you? But one day, at the beginning of the second semester in January 1994, I went to a local grocery store, and instead of talking to the annoyed shop assistant in English, as usual, unexpectedly to myself, I addressed her in some Polish-like Czech or somewhat Czechized Polish. This shop assistant smiled, and I understood her reply. Maybe not perfectly, but sufficiently to engage in everyday chit-chat when purchasing essentials.

The experience made me think. Czech is foreign, so I should not, was not supposed to, comprehend it. But I did. On top of that, our Russian colleague Mikhail (Misha) Baiakovski insisted on talking in a form of simplified Slavic (cobbled ad hoc from elements taken from the Slavic languages known to Misha) to all Slavic-speaking students in our Department of European Studies. He extended this principle to colleagues from non-Slavic countries, who happened to have some command of a Slavic idiom. Initially, Misha’s insistence annoyed us, but after some time we went with it. We understood him, though more often than not we replied to Misha in English. Ergo, foreign languages could be comprehensible without the necessity of formally acquiring them. What is more, the barrier of incomprehension could be successfully scaled, especially if interlocutors gave up on the now widely accepted preconception that a language can belong only to a single “language family” (dialect continuum). In its Romance-Germanic character, English is similar to Esperanto. The latter was deliberately created from Germanic and Romance linguistic elements for the sake of creating a bridge of comprehension for Ashkenazim speaking their Germanic language of Yiddish and Sephardim who used to converse in their Romance tongue of Spanyol (Ladino). Afterward, I spent a year on a postdoctoral fellowship in Italy, thanks to which I got some grounding in the Romance dialect continuum. Italian pronunciation turned out to be quite similar to the Polish, which made the task easier. Furthermore, despite successive rounds of “purification,” Polish remains a very Latinate language at the level of vocabulary.

When researching the politics of language in early modern Central Europe, I found out that I could read and understand antiquated Hungarian-language texts. On the other hand, having never studied Hungarian, I am unable to comprehend any utterance or written sentence in this language beyond some obvious English, German, or Slavic loanwords. The veritable avalanche of Latin, Latinate and Romance words and phrases in bookish Hungarian—as employed by clergy and nobles in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—made it possible for me to grasp it. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Hungarian was “purified” (on the German model), meaning that the vast majority of such Latinate and Romance words and phrases were replaced with “pure” Finno-Ugric neologisms. I had a similar experience with Romanian-language texts produced before the 1830s. Not only were they written in Cyrillic, but also with the employment of numerous Slavic loanwords.

To this day, “yes” in Romanian is the Slavic da, shared with the Serbo-Croatian and Macedonian da of Bulgarian, Macedonian, Serbo-Croatian (that is, today’s Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian), Slovenian, or Russian. Hence, the confines of a dialect continuum can be transcended, people can mix elements from different continua as they need or choose. Should such intercontinua of linguistic crosspollination last for a couple of centuries, especially within
a single polity (empire), it may spawn a linguistic area. Within an area of this kind, languages that clearly belong to various dialect continua are in many ways more similar to one another than to their “continuum kin tongues.”

Nowadays, at the University of St Andrews, when I meet a group of students for the first time, I tend to ask them about languages they may happen to know in speech or reading. Britain is a highly multilingual postimperial polity, where nevertheless the half-realized normative belief rules that English is the sole “true language” of today’s West. As a result, students from English-speaking countries often underestimate their command of other languages and justify their lack of enthusiasm for acquiring other languages by proposing that English-speakers have “no talent for languages.” For instance, when I ask a Scottish student whether she knows Scots, she usually replies that “it is just an accent.” Often, in return for my queries, they ask me how many languages I speak. When I reply that it depends on how they want to define languages, they are taken aback, thinking I am playing with them.

On application forms, in online drop-down menus, or in Google Translate, languages are treated as discrete and countable entities. The whole institutional infrastructure of the internet and international relations hinges on the Western concept of “a language.” It has become so deeply internalized (and almost naturalized) that this concept and its workings are quite difficult to discern. Probing into and questioning the concept of Einzelsprache is unwelcome and resisted, because such attempts unhinge the “modern” world as we know it, making it “foreign” to us. Hopefully, this atlas will facilitate the process of gaining an improved understanding of the present-day (social) world, and how it has been constructed with the employment of languages, especially during the last two centuries. In addition, a clear awareness of this fact will put into sharp relief the pervasive and notorious reality of Western cultural (conceptual, intellectual, linguistic) imperialism, which continues to dominate across the world. This domination is to the permanent disadvantage of other (non-Western) cultural, conceptual, or linguistic practices, which are disregarded, marginalized, and obliterated. In turn, users of and specialists in these non-Western practices are faced with the disability of having to acquire the Western norms in this regard in order to survive in this globalized—that is, Westernized—world.
Dialect Continua in Central Europe, Ninth Century

- **Dialect continua**
- **ALBANIANS**: Albanian-speaking groups
- **LATVIANS**: Latvian-speaking groups
- **MAGYARS**: Hungarian groups
- **NORSMEN**: Norwegian-speaking groups
- **ROMANS**: Romance-speaking groups
- **SLAVS**: Slavic-speaking groups
- **TURKIC**: Turkic-speaking groups

- **RULERS**: Lists of rulers of the period
- **EDICHA**: Edict of the eight nations

- **Map legend**
- **ALBANIANS**: Albanian-speaking groups
- **LATVIANS**: Latvian-speaking groups
- **MAGYARS**: Hungarian groups
- **NORSMEN**: Norwegian-speaking groups
- **ROMANS**: Romance-speaking groups
- **SLAVS**: Slavic-speaking groups
- **TURKIC**: Turkic-speaking groups

- **Border lines**: Borders of kingdoms, principalities, semi-autonomous, and autonomous regions

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On Terminology and Preconceptions

During the past two centuries the concept of “a language” (Einzelsprache) has been a highly politicized category of thinking about politics and societies in Central Europe. Today, the region is divided among nation-states. The founding and existence of practically all these polities has been justified with the ethnolinguistic strain of nationalist ideology. Nationalism proposes that a legitimate state (that is, nation-state) should be for one nation only. Typically, the population in an already extant non-national (pre-national) polity is announced to be a nation, thus making this non-national polity into a nation-state. However, in the case of ethnolinguistic nationalism, the nation is believed to be primary, not the state. The nation precedes its state. But without the prop of a state, another element of the social reality must be employed for defining what the nation is. Since the early nineteenth century the Einzelsprache has been employed in Central Europe in this function.

Einzelsprachen (languages) are actualizations of the human biological capacity for speech, confusingly also known as “language” in English. Hence, to distinguish between this capacity and its actualizations I fall back on the specialist German terminological distinction made between these two, namely Sprache and Einzelsprachen (or Einzelsprache in singular). I keep the article-less English term “language” to refer to the biological capacity for speech, while the un-italicized German term “Einzelsprache” for talking about languages that take the plural form and in singular must be preceded by an article.

The concept of Einzelsprache is not self-explanatory either. It emerged between the second century BCE and second century CE in the Judeo-Graeco-Roman cultural and political milieu of the Middle East and the Balkans. Later, the concept spread across the “tri-continental” Roman Empire and was adopted in the Islamic Caliphate. The emergence of this concept is connected to the invention, and use of, the novel technology of writing. The material difference between speech and written text was conceptualized as starkly dichotomous. From this point of view, linguistic difference came in two opposed forms, namely, that of languages (Einzelsprachen) endowed with a written form, alongside “dialects” that typically were not recorded in writing.

Fast forward to the present, when literacy is nearly universal across Europe and the West, linguistic difference is expressed in terms of languages (Einzelsprachen). At the same time dialects are seen as belonging to this or that “proper” Einzelsprache. Obviously, this intellectual construct is illogical and anachronistic, because people spoke in “unwritten dialects” for well over 100,000 years before writing was invented in Mesopotamia about five millennia ago. Subsequently, the technology of writing also developed independently in what today is China and Central America. Ergo, as a rule of thumb, any dialect is much older than an Einzelsprache. It was dialects that spawned Einzelsprachen, not the other way round. Dialects refer to speech, which is primary, while its graphic representation (writing), which constitutes the foundation of each Einzelsprache, is secondary.

Hence, the idea of “belonging” that is often deployed for describing the relationship between dialects and “their” Einzelsprache must actually signify something else. It reflects the structure of power relations between human groups that speak such dialects, and that write and speak this Einzelsprache. Humans and their groups create dialects and Einzelsprachen, or actualizations of the biological capacity for speech. Without humans (or other species capable of speech) there could be none of these actualizations. Humans are a social species that naturally live in groups. The human group uses a limited number of markers that allow its members to swiftly recognize one another as members for the sake of building and maintaining group cohesion. Yet, these markers allow the group’s members to spot any “intruding Other,” or a member of a foreign group. In this way the group’s socio-spatial boundary is created, often qualified with the adjective “ethnic.” In both today’s scholarly and popular parlance, ethnic refers to the aforementioned markers and group-building processes. The term ethnic stems from the medieval Greek adjective ἔθνικός for denoting “pagans,” or “confessional Others” in the eyes of Christian Greeks. The word’s nominal form ἔθνος ἔθνος (originally denoting “group of people” or “company”) for “pagans” or “heathens,” later yielded the Greek term for “a people” and today’s Greek word for “nation.”

Before the rise of institutionalized religions and the state as a centralized organization controlling a vast number of people over an extensive territory, the main marker of difference used for building and maintaining human groups was speech, or rather immediately noticeable differences in it, that is, linguistic difference of which, people in the West, now construe as “dialects” and “languages.” Since the turn of the twentieth century, Western scholars have tended to speak of such groups as “ethnic groups,” “ethnies” (a Gallicism), or “ethnoses” (a Sovietism drawn from the Russian language). In turn,
this internationalism was back-translated into modern Greek as εθνοτική ομάδα ethnotiki omáda.

In the rarely articulated but widespread modern European belief, ethnic groups are characterized by their “unwritten dialects” as opposed to “civilized” nations with their “full-fledged” Einzelsprachen (languages). Likewise, without giving much thought to this fact, in Europe (stateless) ethnic groups are disparaged as “nationalities” or “(ethnic and national) minorities,” while outside Europe (especially in Africa) as “tribes.” In this context, the word dialect often becomes a term of abuse for “proving” that its speakers are “backward” or “stand at a lower rank of (civilizational) development.” At times this disparaging usage is fortified by replacing the word dialect with such terms as “vernacular,” “tongue” or “idiom.” In the same disparaging manner, French speakers use the term patois instead of dialet, Russian-speakers наречие nareche instead of диалект dialect, or Polish-speakers gwara instead of dialekt.

This politicized thinking about human groups colored with emotions is further complicated by vastly different meanings denoted with the word for nation in the languages of Western and Central Europe, thus leading to serious misunderstandings. In English or French, “nation” commonly functions as a synonym for “state.” Hence, the academic and juridical neologism “nation-state” tends to sound quite superfluous to the uninitiated English-speaker’s ear and as some kind of confusing “state-state.” This difficulty does not arise, for instance, in German or Polish. In the former language, “state” is Staat and “nation” is Volk (or in some specialized meanings, also Nation), while in the latter, państwo and naród, respectively. In normal usage, these terms for nation in German and Polish are not used to mean state. In Polish, the term nation-state is rendered as państwo narodowe and in German as Nationalstaat, so speakers of these languages are not confused by the term, and find it rather meaningful.

A further terminological difficulty arises in the case of the term “nationality” for denoting either the individual’s membership in a nation, or (originating from the legal vocabulary of Austria-Hungary, especially the term Volksstamm) a human group that is more than an ethnic group but less than a nation (some authorities prefer the neologism “proto-nation” in this meaning), entailing that such a group has a right to autonomy, but not to (national) independence. However, in English “nationality” most often functions as the preferred synonym for “citizenship,” unlike in German or Polish. “Nationality” in German is Nationalität and narodowość in Polish, which cannot stand for “citizenship,” or Staatsbürgerschaft (“citizenship”) in German and obywatelstwo in Polish. In Russian the term “nationality,” as opposed to citizenship (гражданство грашданство in Russian), comes in two different forms, namely, as народность narodnost’ and национальность natsionalnost’, the former stemming from the word народа narod (people) and the latter from нация natsia (nation). In the past both terms (narodnost’ and natsionalnost’) were interchangeably employed to mean “proto-nation with a right to autonomy,” while only natsionalnost’ to denote “membership in a nation.” Nowadays, it is almost exclusively narodnost’ that is employed to mean proto-nation. Hence, these two distinctive meanings of the term nationality are rendered with two different words in contemporary Russian, lessening the possibility of confusion between them.

That is why when English-, German-, Polish- and Russian-speakers happen to meet and start discussing nations and nationality in English, they may mean starkly different things using the very same English terms, thus leading to misunderstandings and confusion. These different meanings are a legacy of diverging historical paths taken when nation-states were built in Western and Central (and Eastern) Europe. As mentioned above, in Western Europe it was the polity that refined its population as a nation, thus transforming itself into a nation-state (State = Nation). In Central Europe, where for a variety of reasons this possibility was (or was thought to be) unavailable, all the speakers of an Einzelsprache were defined as a (stateless) nation. They in turn had to win a state for themselves and cleanse it of Others, in order to make the freshly established polity into a “pure” (“true”) nation-state in line with the ideological formula of ethnolinguistic nationalism (Language = Nation = State).

At present, the almost foolproof one-to-one correlation between nation-states and Einzelsprachen in Central Europe is mystifying to Western Europeans, and not followed elsewhere in the world, with the exception of post-1945 Southeast and East Asia. It appears that the phenomenon of ethnolinguistic nationalism as a basis for statehood creation and maintenance is fully confined to Eurasia.

**Dialect Continua**

With so much political capital invested in creating the normative correlation between nation-states and languages in Central Europe, rarely do historians or linguists see Einzelsprachen in Central Europe as products of human ingenuity and decisions, or as actualizations of the very Judeo-Greco-Roman concept of Einzelsprache that was devised only two millennia ago. The monadic-like equation between the Einzelsprache and the nation in this region of Europe translates into a highly ideologized (“nationalized”), and hence, anachronistic, interpretation of the past that was not national in its character often until the turn of the twentieth century. Despite the fact that nationalism and nations are products of the last two centuries, it is speciously proposed that Central Europe’s nations and (“their”) languages are as old as one or even two millennia. At the same time, radical or dogmatic nationalists claim that national languages are “eternal,” “given” to the nation “by a god,” and that they constitute “the legacy and destiny” of today’s nation-states.

Central Europe’s national master narratives, or the nationalized interpretation of the past, tend to retroactively appropriate attested polities from a millennium or two ago as rightly belonging to this or that modern nation. As a result, the (Eastern) Roman Empire (“Byzantium”) is claimed for the Greek nation, the Turkicphone Bulgars’ Khanate for the Bulgarian nation, “Great(er) Moravia” (actually the medieval polity’s official name is unknown) for the Slovak nation, the Holy Roman Empire for the German nation, or the Varangian...
(Norsemen) Rus’ for the Russian nation. This trick of a historian’s hand works because the nationalized approach to interpreting the past is widely accepted and taught at school. These “nationally credulous” populaces (or nations) can then be easily mobilized by a state leader who chooses to refer to a momentous event in “our national past” of a millennium ago.

The continuing success of this national approach to the reinterpretation of the past is fortified by the fact that all Central Europe’s nation-states are intent on playing this power game, including those dealt with the weakest hand. For instance, the Macedonians, not recognized as a nation by Bulgaria, contest the Bulgarians’ claim to the first Bulgarian Empire by saying that it was actually created by the Macedonians. Macedonia employed a similar tactic toward neighboring Greece, which did not recognize the former state’s name until 2018. In this line of thinking, the Eurasian empire created by Alexander the Great was actually created by the Macedonians. Macedonia employed a similar tactic toward neighboring Greece, which did not recognize the former state’s name until 2018. In this line of thinking, the Eurasian empire created by Alexander the Great was not Greek, but rather Macedonian, since this warlord stemmed from the territory which is today part of the Macedonian state. Likewise, the Ukrainians contest Russia’s claim to Rus’ by pointing to the fact that the medieval polity’s capital of Kyiv currently doubles as the capital of modern Ukraine.

Due to the ethnolinguistic character of Central Europe’s nation-states, this politico-historic competition is smoothly extended to languages. Practically all South Slavic nation-states claim (Old Church) Slavonic as exclusively theirs, popularly dubbing it “Old Bulgarian,” “Old Macedonian,” “Old Croatian,” or “Old Slovenian.” In reality, this language was created in Greater Moravia and later successively polished in the Bulgarian Empire and Rus’, Russia claims Ruthenian (the language of Rus’) as “Early Russian,” to which the Belarusians and Ukrainians reply by dubbing it “Old Belarusian” and “Old Ukrainian,” respectively. Present-day nation-states with no credible early medieval polity to fall back on excel at emphasizing the uniqueness and antiquity of their language, which is “older than the Roman Empire.” This is the case of Albania and Estonia, whose ancestors and their distinctive languages were (presumably) mentioned by Ptolemy. Similarly, the nineteenth-century claim that Lithuanian is Europe’s oldest language due to its similarity to Sanskrit is now part and parcel of modern Lithuania’s national master narrative.

From a scholarly perspective, all these anarchonic and mutually exclusive national claims (in reality, stereotypes, prejudices, or anarchonic errors) to languages and medieval, or even antique, polities are methodologically faulty, subscribing to a set of unarticulated normative assumptions. First, with regards to the polities of a millennium or two ago, the typical fallacy is that a common political past may not be translated into separate political present in plural. Second, regarding national Einzelsprachen, the fallacy is that languages do not (or at least should not) change and each can be “owned” (that is, spoken and written) only by a single human group or nation. Hence, from the perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism, neither in the past nor in the present day can a language be shared by several different nations or nation-states.

Aside from school history textbooks, these unspoken normative beliefs and the nationalized interpretations of the past have been reinforced through school atlases of history. The school atlas of history, as a textbook genre, has been commonplace in Central European schools since the mid-nineteenth century. However, it is relatively unknown elsewhere in Europe and the world. In part this is because only in Central Europe is legitimate statehood imagined as steeped in the national Einzelsprache, in accordance with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s formula, Language = Nation = State. But this tight spatial and conceptual overlapping (or “normative isomorphism”) of these elements is highly counterintuitive and fiendishly difficult to impart to schoolchildren without the cartographic prop of a map. In the material world languages and nations are invisible as entities because they are part of the social reality, which is stored in people’s brains. Yet, in Central Europe these are believed to be the very foundation of the region’s nation-states. A school atlas of history is an answer to this pedagogical dilemma. Maps as a hallmark of modernity are perceived as “scientific” and as real as railways or skyscrapers. Hence, it is an easy intellectual jump to the specious conclusion that a cartographic representation of the “historic” territory of a “national language,” as equated with the territory of a given (ethnolinguistically defined) nation, must be real in the terms of material reality. In turn, this ideologically motivated equation of the Einzelsprache and the nation constitutes the “real extent” of the territory of a today’s nation-state. Any serious disjunction between the “real” (or rather, ideal) and actual extent of the nation-state’s territory gives rise to the national program of irredentism, or “bringing home” the as yet “unredeemed” fragments of “our nation.”

However, neither languages nor ethnic groups (nations) are “naturally” (or “divinely destined to be) coupled together and contained within a single nation-state. This way of constructing and maintaining national statehood is rather unusual from the global perspective, and is primarily confined to Central Europe (alongside Southeast and East Asia). In the case of Central Europe this typical disconnection between states and languages can be usefully illustrated through a cartographic presentation of dialect continua that until after the Second World War were not coordinated with the political borders in central Europe.

The concept of dialect continuum is drawn from the analytical toolbox of areal linguistics. Prior to the rise of writing and its formalization in the form of distinctive and separable Einzelsprachen, people spoke language varieties (“dialects”) specific to their locality (village, town, or region). These localities corresponded to different human groups, the observed language (speech) difference divided them into (often “micro” or “village”) ethnic groups. Although a given dialect identified its speaker as a member of this or that local (ethnic) group, this language (speech) difference was too small to prevent successful communication with the speakers of neighboring dialects, belonging to other local (ethnic) groups. A dialect continuum is a spatially contiguous “chain” of mutually comprehensible dialects corresponding to local micro-ethnic groups. A speaker of a dialect from the dialect continuum in question can travel from one end of this continuum to another, on route successfully communicating with inhabitants of increasingly distant villages and towns.
The space of mutual comprehension comes to an end where speakers of dialects from two different continua live side by side. But typically, this cleavage was never radical, rather a zone of bilingualism, the zone’s dwellers having a command of one dialect from dialect continuum A and another from dialect continuum B. In addition, local literati would know a written lingua franca (“international language”) and could help a linguistically challenged traveler.

**Polities and Dialect Continua in the Ninth Century**

A cartographic representation of dialect continua as blocks of solid color helps to disabuse the (Central European) reader from the present-day national preconception that today’s Einzelsprachen existed for a millennium or longer and that the territories where they are in use must correspond as much to present-day nation-states as to polities from the recent and distant past that are claimed as “national predecessors” of the former. It is immediately visible from the map that before the rise of the ethnolinguistic nation-state in Central Europe, the political borders were not coordinated with dialect continuum A or Einzelsprachen. In the ninth century (as to a degree, in the later periods through the mid-nineteenth century, when full literacy became the accepted norm actualized through compulsory elementary education for all) Einzelsprachen in the meaning of “written languages” were few and apart, their command limited to the extremely narrow stratum of literati, usually doubling as clergy of various monotheistic religions based on a “holy book.” In the case of Central Europe it was Latin in the Latin (Roman) alphabet of the Vulgate (canonical Latin translation of the Bible) for Western Christianity (or the Roman Catholic Church after the Great Schism of 1054), Greek in Greek letters of the Greek-language original of the New Testament for Eastern (“Byzantine”) Christianity, alongside the use of Hebrew in the Hebrew script of the Pentateuch among the diaspora of Judaisms (Jews). The Einzelsprache of Old Church (Old Church) Slavonic was devised only in the mid-860s and was gradually shaped through the translation of the Greek original of the New Testament into this new language, before it took off as the official language of the Bulgarian Empire at the turn of the tenth century. The official name of the “Byzantine” Empire was Ρωμαία Ῥωμαίες (not to be confused with the modern nation-state of Romania, which before the mid-1970s was spelled as Romania in English) in Greek for Roman Empire.” The anachronistic name Byzantium was coined only by the Bavarian historian Hieronymus Wolf in his 1557 monograph on the history of the (East) Roman Empire, a century earlier extinguished by the Ottomans’ successful siege of Constantinople in 1453 (Volf 1557). Prior to that moment, Romania’s rulers had a better claim to the politically significant adjective “Roman,” despite the founding of the Holy Roman Empire in 962 in the west. Rulers of the latter hardly dared to use this adjective in international diplomacy before Constantinople’s power was decisively diminished beginning in the thirteenth century during the period of crusades. With his influential scholarship, Wolf successfully claimed the adjective “Roman” for the Holy Roman Empire and anachronistically denied its use to Romania, replacing it with the neologism “Byzantium.” As is clear from this example, ideologically motivated manipulations with the past are not a new thing and did take place before the age of nationalism.

Map 1 shows how the widespread employment of literacy was limited to the line of the Danube in the north and the easternmost reaches of the Carolingian Frankish Kingdom (or the predecessor of the Holy Roman Empire) in the west. This area largely coincided with the territorial extent of the (Western and Eastern) Roman Empire and its direct sphere of political and economic influence. However, the encroachment of the Caliphate, with its Einzelsprache of Arabic in the Arabic script of the Quran, was already being felt across the Mediterranean. The Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian historian of Czech ethnicity, who wrote mostly in German, Constantin (Konstantin) Jireček, established a line bisecting the Balkan Peninsula from today’s Albania to Bulgaria, north of which Latin predominated in official inscriptions, and Greek south of this line. In memory of his intellectual achievement, this line is named the Jireček line.

The model of statehood as embodied by the Frankish Kingdom was an inspiration for local Scandinavian forms of statehood in the north. In turn, it was Germanic-speaking Norwegians who first implanted a rudimentary form of this type of socio-political organization among Slavic ethnic groups along the riverine (Dnieper) route from the Baltic to Romania in what later became Slavophone Rus’. While Rus’ and predominantly Slavophone Bulgaria decided to throw their cultural fate with Romania by accepting the Greek-language form of Christianity, the rulers of Slavic-speaking Greater Moravia wavered between it and the Latin language-based Christianity of the Holy Roman Empire. In the mid-880s they finally settled for the latter option, which entailed replacing (Old Church) Slavonic with Latin for official written use.

Apart from the aforementioned polities, in the north to middle sections of Central Europe there was an extensive area with no large polities that would emulate either the West or East Roman model. Indigenous forms of local statehood and non-scriptural (“pagan”) religions persisted. Some names of the extant ethnic groups (that can be seen as identical with their local polities and religions) were recorded by travelers (merchants or missionaries) and chroniclers from the Frankish Empire, Romania, and farther afield from the (Islamic) Caliphate. These ethnic groups tended to correlate well with respective dialect continua, because in the absence of writing everyday speech (“dialect,” or language difference) used to be the main ethnic marker, or in other words, the core of socio-political cohesion.

Interestingly, names of some ethnic groups are late medieval or even modern inventions for the sake of furnishing a later kingdom or a nineteenth-century national movement with a sufficiently “historic” pedigree to match that of a neighboring or dominant state. For instance, the ethnic group of Polanians was invented in the fifteenth century by the chronicler Ioannes Dlugossi (Jan Długosz) who was active in Poland-Lithuania (Długossi 1614 [1614]). Similarly, it was nationally-minded Slovak historians who projected the present-day national ethnonym “Slovak” backward to the Middle Ages on the anach-
ronistic and not supported assumption that Slavophone predecessors of today’s Slovaks must have also referred to themselves as “Slovaks.”

The attested Slavophone ethnic group, Lendians, are an interesting case in this respect. In the course of the building and eastward expansion of the medieval polity of Poland they were extinguished as an ethnic and socio-political entity, perhaps as a result of numerous wars fought over their region between Poland and Rus’. However, their ethnonym survives in Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian as Лях Liakh in the function of a traditional name for the Poles. In Osmanlıca Poland was known as Lehistan, while to this day a Pole is lengyel in Hungarian. Furthermore, in Polish this ethnonym rendered as Lechita is employed as a poetic synonym for the ethnonym Pole.

Most of the placenames on the map are given in their historically attested forms from the ninth century with their present-day forms in parentheses, for instance, Jomsburg (Wolin). In some cases, the name did not change (for example, Volyn’), while in others two forms were used in writing, while only one survives to this day (for instance, Reginum/Regensburg). The limits of written sources for reconstructing the past is illustrated by the name Etelköz for the Black Sea land of Finno-Ugric Magyars (Hungarians). In Greek language sources it was variably recorded as Ατελ καὶ Οὔζος Atel kai Ouzou, Ἀτελκ Οὔζος Atelk Ouzou, Ἀτελκούζος Atelkouzou, Ἀτελοῦζος Atelouzou, or Ἐτέλ καὶ Κοῦζος Etel kai Kouzou. Etelköz is a modern reconstruction of this name based on the Hungarian language.
Writing is the foundational technology for shaping speech into languages (Einzelsprachen). In the ninth century the stratum of literati, or people with a command of writing, was narrow and largely contained to the former territories of the Roman Empire south of the Danube and to the Frankish Kingdom in the west. The sole extant traditions of writing, which left considerable numbers of codex-style manuscripts (or books as we know them), was limited at that time to the Greek language written in the Greek alphabet, the Latin language written in the Latin alphabet, the Hebrew language written in the Hebrew abjad (consonantry), and the Arabic language written in the Arabic abjad. These four traditions of literacy were intimately connected to the interrelated monotheistic (Abrahamic) religions of Eastern (Orthodox) Christianity, Western (Roman Catholic) Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. These four different languages and corresponding writing systems were connected to the respective "holy books," namely, the Greek language original of the New Testament (alongside the Septuagint, or the canonical Greek translation of the Old Testament), the Vulgate (or the canonical Latin translation of the Bible), the Pentateuch (Torah), and the Quran. The faithful of these four religions were expected to pay utmost respect to their respective holy book. Through the practice of regular worship and inscriptions adorning churches, synagogues, or mosques, they could immediately recognize a given holy book by the sight of its writing system, without actually knowing how to read or write it. This or that writing system became a readily recognizable marker or "brand" of a given religion.

Three of these traditions of religion-based literacies—Greek, Latin, and Arabic—were connected to the polities of the (Eastern) Roman Empire (Romania), the Carolingian East Frankish Kingdom, and the Abbasid Islamic Caliphate, respectively. The Jewish tradition of Judaist literacy existed in diaspora spread out across all the three empires. During the ninth century, in the vast majority of cases literacy was limited to (better educated) clergy, especially in the Frankish Empire. Otherwise, the skill of writing and reading was the preserve of the ruling elite and rich in Romania (not to be confused with today’s Romance-speaking nation-state of Romania) and the Caliphate. In practice, all these literate groups consisted (almost) exclusively of men. It appears that literacy, as motivated by the needs of worship, was most widely spread among Jews, where it was even more strictly limited to men than among the rich in the Roman Empire or the Islamic Caliphate. The Latin language- and alphabet-based literacy of the Frankish Kingdom overlapped with the (West) Romance dialect continuum and the southern half of the Germanic dialect continuum (see Map 1). The successful eastward expansion of this kingdom introduced some Slavophone ethnic groups to this literacy. The Frankish Kingdom’s persistent influence east of its borders convinced the rulers of Greater Moravia to adopt this Latin literacy in the mid-880s. Greek language- and alphabet-based literacy overlapped with the Greek dialect continuum in Romania, the northernmost reaches of the expanding Arabic dialect continuum (in the Romanian-Caliphate Condominium of Cyprus), the southernmost reaches of the West Romance dialect continuum in the very south of the Apennine Peninsula, the Albanian and East Romance dialect continua in the zone contested between Romania and the Bulgarian Empire and with much of the Slavic dialect continuum in this empire itself. The Arabic language- and script-based literacy was limited to the (East) Roman-Caliphate Condominium of Cyprus, but its cultural and political influence was increasingly felt across the Mediterranean in Romania and the southern half of the Frankish Kingdom due to the Caliphate’s numerous successful (though often relatively short-lived) annexations of Mediterranean islands (Balearic Islands, Crete, Cyprus, Sardinia, or Sicily), alongside some bridgeheads in Apulia and Calabria in the south of the Apennine Peninsula and in Lower Burgundy (or today’s southern France). Obviously, the core of this lasting Islamic influence across Europe was Al-Andalus, or the Iberian Peninsula seized by the Caliphate in the early eighth century. It remained part of the Islamic world for seven centuries until 1492.

The Hebrew language- and script-based literacy has no representation on Map 1 devoted to Central Europe’s dialect continua, because in everyday life Jews tended to adopt the speech (dialect, language) of their surroundings. However, their literacy had a significant impact on the economic, political, and cultural development of Central Europe. During the second half of the First Millennium, Jewish merchants, known in sources as Radhanites (רדרית רדה therein Radhanim), participated in and maintained trade routes that spanned Eurasia from Iberia (and North Africa) to China. They also ventured into the central and northern areas of Central Europe sparsely populated by Baltic, Slavic, Finno-Ugric, and Turkic ethnic groups with their traditional polities outside the reach of the Frankish Kingdom or Romania. The spread-out presence of the Hebrew abjad depicted on the map marks the regions where Jews lived in both the polities,
and where the Rhadanite merchants roamed. Their and other Jewish specialists’ rare skill of writing was appreciated in the area north of the Danube and east of the Frankish Kingdom, where prior to the ninth century this technology was utterly unknown. Not surprisingly, many early (twelfth to thirteenth century) coins from this region (especially from Poland, but also some from Hungary) bear inscriptions in local languages but executed in Hebrew letters. The rulers entrusted minting of coinage to Jewish mint masters.

Varangians (Norsemen, Vikings), apart from being fierce warriors and successful looters, also excelled—like Radhansites—at establishing and maintaining new successful trade routes. In Central Europe their enterprise is best illustrated by the trade route known as “from the Varangians to the Greeks,” namely from southern Sweden across the Gulf of Finland, and southward along the Rivers Lovat’ and Dnieper to the Black Sea and alongside its western coast to the trade route known as “from the Varangians to the Greeks,” namely from southern Sweden across the Gulf of Finland, and southward along the Rivers Lovat’ and Dnieper to the Black Sea and alongside its western coast to the

half of Central Europe was connected to the eastward expansion of the Frankish Kingdom and to this polity’s and its competitor, Romania’s, Christianizing efforts. Unlike the Frankish Kingdom, at that time Romania had to defend itself against invaders, and in Central Europe suffered territorial losses at the hands of Bulgaria and Rus’. In spite of their military successes, the rulers of both polities knew that in order to be accepted as (potential) equals among the “Romans” (be it in Romania or the Frankish Kingdom) they had to adopt Christianity as their main ideology of statehood and power legitimization. Otherwise, the survival of their realms and succession within their dynasties would be always imperiled by these two Roman superpowers. Rulers of Greater Moravia arrived at the same conclusion having witnessed the subjugation of neighboring Slavic ethnic groups by the expanding Frankish Empire.

Both Greater Moravia and Bulgaria adopted Christianity from Constantinople at the same time in the mid-860s. The difference was that to Bulgaria Christianity came complete with Greek literacy. Perhaps the Romanian ruling elite saw Bulgaria founded on the historically Roman territories as part of Romania, at least in the ecclesiastic sense, if not politically. In Greater Moravia, located outside the Roman Empire’s traditional boundaries, Romanian missionaries, Cyril and Methodius, developed an indigenous Slavic tradition of literacy. First, they devised a Slavic alphabet, known as Glagolitic, which drew at a variety of sources (for instance, the Coptic, Greek, Hebrew, or Samaritan scripts). Then a program of translating the New Testament and other liturgical material and ecclesiastical books from Greek to Slavonic began. The experiment ended abruptly in 885. The Frankish rulers loathed to tolerate this extension of Romanian political and cultural influence on their eastern border, even if it was highly indirect. Slavonic was replaced with Latin and the clergy with the command of Slavonic written in Glagolitic letters left for Bulgaria. But Glagolitic-based Slavonic ecclesiastical literacy survived in what later became Croatia until the turn of the twentieth century, and in some Czech and Polish monasteries until the fourteenth century. Glagolitic also made a brief appearance in Rus’ during the first half of the eleventh century. Similar to Hungary’s case of Rovásírás (“Notch-like script”) it is currently being revived for political ends. In independent Croatia, Glagolitic has been promoted as the country’s “national script” since the 1990s. However, its use is limited to brief parallel illustration-like Glagolitic texts on monuments. People do not aspired actively read or write in Glagolitic-based Croatian, as they do in Rovásírás-based Hungarian.

Slavonic literati expelled from Greater Moravia found a safe haven in Bulgaria. The country’s rulers saw Christianity as an instrument for legitimizing and wielding power effectively, and so they sought effective control of the religion. To this end they sought to make Bulgaria into a self-governing archeparchy in 870. It was the first step. Greater Moravian exiles were convinced to drop Glagolitic and develop a new script closely modelled on the prestigious Greek alphabet. (Nowadays it is known as Cyrillic in memory of Saint Cyril, who did not invent Cyrillic.) Afterward they completed the translation and copying of the most important Greek-language liturgical and eccle-
siastical books into Slavonic. In the wake of this achievement, Romanian Greek-language clergy became redundant and were expelled from Bulgaria in 893. The Cyrillic-based Slavonic replaced Greek in the function of the liturgical and the state’s official language. In 919 the autocephaly (institutional independence) of the Bulgarian (Orthodox) Church was announced. After a series of military losses to Bulgaria, Romania reluctantly conceded to the existence of the Bulgarian Patriarchy (autocephalous Church) only in a 927 treaty. At present, following Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union in 2007, this country promotes itself with the slogan that Cyrillic is Bulgaria’s “gift to the world.” This slogan was tangibly vindicated when Bulgarian-language Cyrillic inscriptions were added to the new series of Euro banknotes in 2013.
In the first half of the eleventh century, military conflict and political changes altered the ethnolinguistic makeup of the population in the central parts of Central Europe in an unprecedented manner that would not be repeated until the twentieth century. A coalition of pastoralist (“nomadic”) Finno-Ugric and Turkic ethnic groups expanded to the Danubian Basin. Under this military and demographic pressure, Greater Moravia waned and ceased to exist at the turn of the eleventh century. The invaders established their own polity in its stead, which became known as Hungary. The western half of Greater Moravia, organized as the polities of Bohemia and Moravia became part of the Frankish Kingdom, in 962 overhauled into a Holy Roman Empire. The center of Hungary and its eastern borderlands became increasingly Finno-Ugric from the ethnolinguistic point of view. Turkic-speakers assimilated with the Finno-Ugric majority of the invaders and disappeared. However, during the 1237 Mongol invasion of Central Europe, Turkic-speaking Cumans (Polovtsians, Kipchaks) sought refuge in Hungary. Afterward they settled in this kingdom and received territorial autonomy, which they retained until 1876, for centuries after they stopped speaking Turkic. These autonomous territories were known as Cumania Major (Nagykunság) and Cumania Minor (Kiskunság).

The mainly Turkicophone Khazar Khaganate that controlled lands between the Black and Caspian Seas declined in the course of disastrous wars against Rus’ and the (East) Roman Empire (Romania), before collapsing in the 960s. The short-lived alliance of Rus’ with the Turkic-speaking Pecheneg pastoralists, which gave Kyiv access to the Black Sea littoral, was over by the early eleventh century. Simultaneously, in 1018 Romania defeated Bulgaria and re-incorporated its territory south of the Danube. As a result, Bulgaria’s former northern half beyond the Danube was open to penetration by Turkicophone pastoralists. Most probably, around that time (East) Romance-speaking Vlachs, distressed by wars and collapsing states, migrated north of the Danube seeking secluded pastures in the Carpathians. This hypothesis explains the late medieval appearance of Romance-speakers, who then established Walachia and Moldavia in the fourteenth century. In 1866 these two Danubian Principalities gave rise to the Romanian nation-state. However, this hypothesis is at odds with the Romanian national master narrative, which claims a continuous presence of Romance-speakers in this area since the Romans conquered Dacia in the early second century, despite the fact that Rome had evacuated this province already in 271. There are no historical records confirming any Romanceophone presence in Dacia between the late third and thirteenth centuries. However, such presence during this period of one thousand years is reasonably attested south of the Danube.

The short-lived expansion of Rus’ to the Black Sea left the state in control of the exclave of the former Khazar fortress of ‘Tmutorokan’ and its vicinity, both at Crimea’s easternmost end and in the Kerch Peninsula. This explains the persistent Slavic presence in the area. Another political change that altered a dialect continuum took place in the mid-tenth century in the Mediterranean when Sicily was conquered by the Caliphate and turned into an emirate. This added an Arabic-speaking element to the island’s Greek- and (West) Romance-speaking Christian population. In the north, the founding of the Slavic polities east of Denmark on the southern Baltic littoral replaced the earlier Norse presence there. What is more, the eastward expansion of the Holy Roman Empire was stopped by the founding of Poland in the second half of the tenth century, though the country adopted this name only in the early eleventh century.

The region of Central Europe from the east was bordered by the Holy Roman Empire and from the south by Romania. Both these superpowers were Christian and whenever they had the opportunity they conquered any non-Christian polity. This normative principle could not escape the attention of the rulers of Hungary, Poland, or Rus’. In order to prop up their states with a widely accepted legitimizing ideology, these rulers and their courts adopted Christianity as their official religion, namely, in 966 in Poland, 988 in Rus’, and 1000–1001 in Hungary. Poland and Hungary received Christianity from the Holy Roman Empire, complete with the Latin language- and alphabet-based literacy. Rus’ adopted Christianity from Romania, but this event was not followed by the usual cultural package of Greek language- and alphabet-based literacy. Unlike Bulgaria’s autocephalous Church, the Rus’ counterpart remained under the ecclesiastical control of the Ecumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople. However, Rus’ was located too far to the north for Romania to be able to extend effective control over it. Hence, the compromise was struck that the Rus’ Church would fall back on the Cyrillic-based Slavonic literacy as initiated in Greater Moravia and codified in Bulgaria. The cost of not following this normative pattern of Christian statehood was amply illustrated by the fate of the obstinately non-Christian Obodrite state that was crushed and destroyed.
by the Holy Roman Empire in the course of the 1147 Wendish (that is, “Slavic”) Crusade along the Baltic littoral.

The founding of Hungary translated into a stable Finno-Ugric dialect continuum in the middle of Central Europe. With time it “touched” the Germanic dialect continuum in the west, that is, in the Holy Roman Empire. In the east, Finno-Ugricphone Hungarians brushed shoulders with Turkic-speaking pastoralists, first, Cumans, and later Pechenegs and Polovtsians. The semi-permanent—or better, fleeting—presence of these pastoralists effectively extended the Turkic dialect continuum (Central Asian in its origin) into Central Europe. Meanwhile, Romance-speaking pastoralists settled in the previously uninhabited southern and eastern Carpathians, firmly founding an East Romance dialect continuum in the Danubian Basin. These changes in the ethnolinguistic make-up of the population in the middle of Central Europe gradually bisected the original Slavic dialect continuum into a North Slavic dialect continuum and a South Slavic dialect continuum.
By the mid-eleventh century a political shape of Central Europe had emerged that to this day is largely recognizable in the terms of polities and historical regions, religions, and writing systems. The only exception is the Ottoman Empire that replaced the (East) Roman Empire (Romania) in Anatolia and the Balkans during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In contrast to the situation a century earlier (Map 2), the technology of writing had already been present across entire Central Europe with the exception of the eastern Baltic littoral, that is, today's Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia's exclave of Kaliningrad. The area’s ethnic groups practiced their own indigenous forms of (non-scriptural, that is, not connected to some “holy book”) religion and statehood, and for the time being were able to withstand crusading attacks from the Catholic or Orthodox neighboring polities.

Central Europe was split among the three main traditions of religion-underpinned literacies. After the Great Schism of 1054 between Constantinople and Rome, Christian Europe was permanently divided between the Orthodox (Eastern) Church and the (Roman) Catholic (Western) Church. The former was overseen by the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople (Istanbul) and the other by the Pope in Rome (after 1929, in the Vatican City State). Two of these aforementioned literacies were connected to Orthodox Christianity, namely, Greek in Greek letters and (Old Church) Slavonic in Cyrillic. The literacy of Roman Catholicism remained normatively monoscriptal (employing a single script), sticking to Latin in the Latin alphabet. The technology of writing made these three “holy tongues” into immediately recognizable Einzelsprachen, their distinctiveness defined and maintained by liturgy and book (manuscript) production in these languages. The religiously defined necessity of preserving and transmitting “god’s word” faithfully (both, to pronunciation and meaning) led to the revival of the genres of grammar, language (school) textbook, and dictionary as developed and practiced in the Antiquity. This “philological turn” helped to revive Latin as a “proper” Einzelsprache (especially in the course of the so-called Carolingian Renaissance of the eighth and ninth centuries in the Frankish Kingdom, elevated to an Empire between 800 and 843/924). This effort was also prompted by the steep cultural change posed to Charlemagne’s Frankish Empire by the highly militarily successful western neighbor of the Umayyad Emirate (after 929, Caliphate) in Al-Andalus (Iberia). Importantly for Central Europe, the achievements of the Carolingian Renaissance allowed for Slavonic to be shaped into an immediately recognizable Einzelsprache, first in Greater Moravia, and later in the Bulgarian Empire and Rus’. In the case of Greek there was no need for a similar revival, because the philological tradition of the Antiquity was successfully preserved and developed in Romania until its end in 1453. In addition, all these three traditions of Central European literacy interacted and remained in dialog with the Hebrew script-based Hebrew literacy of Judaism. It appears that literate Jewish specialists were of particular import for developing and propping up the Latin literacy in the non-Roman east, then freshly extended to Poland, Bohemia (together with Moravia), and Hungary.

In the mid-eleventh century Roman Catholic literacy in Latin overlapped with Central Europe’s shares of the Germanic and West Romance dialect continua, the Hungarians’ Finno-Ugric dialect continuum, the western half of the North Slavic dialect continuum, and the western half of the South Slavic dialect continuum. Poland, Hungary, and Croatia marked the easternmost extent of this Latin literacy vis-à-vis (1) the non-literate ethnic groups of the Baltic dialect continuum in the eastern Baltic littoral, (2) the Cyrillic-based Slavonic literacy of Rus’ that coincided with the eastern half of the North Slavic dialect continuum, (3) the (overwhelmingly) non-literate pastoralists of the Turkic dialect continuum, and (4) the Greek literacy of Orthodox Romania. This last type of religiously defined literacy overlapped mainly with the eastern half of the South Slavic dialect continuum in the eastern Balkans, including Romania’s ethnically Serbian and confessionally Orthodox vassal state of Dooeia (Dioeclea, known as Zeta since the twelfth century) that gained independence in 1040. Further east, Greek literacy overlapped with the Albanic and East Romance dialect continua, before coinciding with the Greek dialect continuum in the eastern and southern Balkans, alongside western Anatolia. At the same time, since 1071 a permanent presence of the Turkic dialectal continuum was established in eastern and central Anatolia, following the westward expansion of the Seljuk Empire into this area. Already in the seventh century Romania had lost the Middle East to the Caliphate, meaning the gradual replacement of Greek literacy there with its Arabic counterpart. Obviously, the region was predominantly Semitophone (Syriac-Aramaic) and remained so after the introduction of the Semitic Einzelsprache of Arabic as the language of everyday communication.

The expansion of the Latin literacy northward into sparsely populated Scandinavia was a long process, especially on ac-
count of the Norsemen’s warrior polities with military technologies for which the Christian West had no real match until the turn of the Second Millennium. Christianity from Rome (often earlier mediated through Anglo-Saxon missionaries) was adopted by the ruling elite in Denmark during the 960s, in Norway during the 990s, and in Sweden around 1000. All these adoptions were quite tentative, especially in Norway and Sweden, and it took a century or two before this religion took a hold there. Hence, for some time the initially rudimentary Latin literacy brushed shoulders with the non-Christian Norse tradition of Runic literacy. Afterward, the Scandinavian rulers were only too happy to join their counterparts from the Holy Roman Empire on the prolonged Northern Crusade against “pagans” along the southern and eastern Baltic littoral. For instance, between the mid-twelfth and mid-thirteenth centuries, Sweden conquered the eastern land, which later became Finland and imposed Catholic Christianity (complete with its Latin literacy) on its Finno-Ugric-speaking inhabitants. The Scandinavian and Baltic Finno-Ugric dialect continuum is qualified with the adjective “Finnic” to distinguish it from Hungary’s Finno-Ugric dialect continuum dubbed “Ugric.”

The eastward expansion of medieval Poland and Hungary at the expense of Orthodox Rus’ (which after 1054 lost political cohesiveness, divided into semi-, but de facto fully independent principalities) led to a certain overlap between the Catholic Latin literacy and its Cyrillic-based Slavonic counterpart. Overlords employed the former, while the literati of the Orthodox subjects the latter. This example of using religion and literacy to emphasize the cultural and political autonomy of one’s group was not wasted on the Vlachs-turned-Walachians and –Moldavians, who with Hungary’s support and protection gradually carved out their eponymous Danubian principalities from the steppe lands under the control of Turkic-speaking pastoralists. In order to deepen and then legitimize their independence from Catholic Hungary, the (East) Romancephone Walachians and Moldavians adopted the Cyrillic-based Slavonic script of Orthodoxy Christianity, as developed in Bulgaria and adopted in Rus’.

The Turkic-speaking pastoralists of Central Europe’s end of the Great Steppe (though outside Hungary’s eastern frontier) preserved their traditional non-scriptural religions and forms of statehood until the prolonged series of intermittent large-scale attacks by the Mongol Empire on Central Europe between the 1230s and 1290s. As a result, the Mongol Empire permanently extended into Central Europe. Its western part was shaped into a Golden Horde with its capital of Sarai on the Volga River (nowadays in southern Russia, near the village of Selitrennoe, about 130 kilometers north of the Caspian city port of Astrakhan). The central and eastern Rus’ principalities were subjected to the Golden Horde as vassals. Although initially the Golden Horde’s ruling elite was Mongolic-speaking, most of the polity’s population was Turkicphone, hence Kipchak became the preferred lingua franca. Not surprisingly, the official use of Mongolian in its specific script waned, though survived in diplomatic documents until the turn of the fifteenth century. The 1313 adoption of Islam as the Golden Horde’s official religion came with the cultural package of the Arabic language and script of the Quran. Other traditional religions (Buddhism, Shamanism) were banned. In the Central Asian part of the Golden Horde, a local Karłuk Turkic was shaped into the written Einzelsprache of Chagatai (Chaghatay) with the use of the Arabic abjad (consonantry). In the less populated western half of this polity, Anatolian (Ottoman) Turkish (Osmanlıca) of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm (in central and eastern Anatolia) served as a rudimentary written language, before it became the fully developed official (administrative) language of the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century. Interestingly, most surviving texts in the Golden Horde’s Turkic vernacular of Kipchak were recorded in the Armenian alphabet, as Armenian Christians acted as leading merchants for the realm and provided various specialist skills, like Jews in Central Europe. Romania had seized their ethnic polity of (Bagrati or Caucasian) Armenia in 1045, and any remaining traces of political autonomy were obliterated after the Turkic-speaking Seljuks annexed this area to their coalescing empire in 1064.

The Golden Horde began to wane in the late fourteenth century and in the mid-fifteenth century it disintegrated into several successor khanates, including the Crimean Khanate, founded in 1449. As a result, the eastern Rus’ principalities under Muscovy’s control regained independence from the Golden Horde around 1480. Two years earlier, in 1478, the Crimean Khanate became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire. The decline of the Golden Horde allowed the officially non-Christian polity of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, led by the Baltic-speaking ruling elite, to expand their polity from the Baltic to the Black Sea between the 1310s and 1380s. As a result, the majority of central and western Rus’ principalities were incorporated into this Grand Duchy. Meanwhile, Poland and Hungary annexed the westernmost Rus’ lands. In the course of these vast geopolitical changes, groups of Turkic-speaking Tatars mainly from Crimea joined the Lithuanian Grand Duke’s forces between the 1390s and 1410s, giving rise to small indigenous Slavophone (Tatar) Muslim population that survive to this day in Lithuania, Belarus, and Poland. Until the mid-twentieth century they used their Arabic script for writing in Slavic (Belarusian, Polish, or Ukrainian).

Beginning in the mid-fourteenth century the majority of the population in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were Slavophone Orthodox Christians. The polity’s Baltic-speaking ruling elite, who stuck to their traditional religion, had no use for Orthodoxy’s liturgical language of Slavonic. Because of its South Slavic (Macedonian) origin, Slavonic was quite removed from the everyday speech of the Grand Duchy’s Slavophone population. The grand dukes wanted their orders to be clearly understood by the polity’s Slavic-speakers, hence Cyrillic was employed for writing local North Slavic, which produced the Einzelsprache of Ruthenian (Ruski), not connected to any specific religious tradition. The centers of this new secular Ruthenian literacy were the ducal chanceries at Vilnius (Vilnius) and Kyiv.

In 1386, faced with the persistent menace of crusaders in its original Baltic homeland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania signed a dynastic union with the Kingdom of Poland, whose access to
the Baltic was blocked by the very same crusaders. In this manner, Lithuania and Poland joined their forces to stop the crusaders. As a precondition, the Grand Duchy’s ruling elite had to accept Roman Catholicism, complete with the Latin language and script. (However, Cyrillic-based Ruthenian was retained as the Grand Duchy’s main official language until 1697.) In return, the ethnically Lithuanian Baltic-speaking dynasty of Jagiellonians ascended to the Polish throne. Before the Habsburgs, the Jagiellonians were Central Europe’s most successful dynasty. They ruled Poland-Lithuania until 1572, and from the mid-fifteenth century to 1526 also Hungary and Bohemia.

Following the success of the crusades against the Slavic Obodrites and against Finland’s Finno-Ugric population in the twelfth century, Denmark, the Holy Roman Empire, and Sweden set their sights on southeastern Baltic littoral inhabited by Baltic- and Finno-Ugric-speaking ethnic groups, who cultivated their traditional non-scriptural religions and forms of statehood. During numerous military expeditions, jointly referred to as the Northern Crusade, the territories of today’s Estonia and Latvia were conquered during the thirteenth century and made into the monastic polity of Terra Mariana (or ‘Holy Virgin Mary’s Land’). In 1222 a monastic order Livonian Brothers of the Sword was founded to secure and expand the crusading polity’s boundaries. The centuries-long wars, conflicts, and skirmishes between Western Christian literate polities’ armies and warlords on the one hand, and the non-literate ethnic groups of a variety of customs and religions on the other, led to the development of military, administrative, and cultural techniques. Later, the West would employ these techniques in its colonial conquests and expansion across the Atlantic and Caribbean islands into the Americas, and farther, across the East Indies. This process unfolded at the expense of similarly non-literate ethnic groups who practiced their own local customs and religions. Obviously, when Western conquerors encountered literate societies organized into extensive polities (empires), they fell back on techniques and approaches developed while fighting against the Caliphate (Muslim polities), that is, in the course of the Reconquista of Iberia and during the crusades in the Middle East.

The Order of Brothers of the Teutonic House of Saint Mary in Jerusalem, founded in 1190 in the crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, began to look for a territory where it could establish its own autonomous crusading state when it became apparent that the crusaders would eventually lose their Middle Eastern polities to the Muslims. The County of Edessa fell in 1144, the Principality of Antioch in 1268, the County of Tripoli in 1289, and finally the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1291. In 1262 the Teutonic Order established its monastic polity in Mazovia’s northern borderland, or the Chelmno Land (Culmerland). The Mazovian Duke’s intention was to secure his polity’s frontier against “pagan” Baltic-speaking Prutenians (“Prussians”). The task was largely completed by the mid-thirteenth century. Meanwhile, the Baltic-speaking Samogitians defeated the Livonian Brothers of Terra Mariana in 1236. A year later the Teutonic Order adopted the remains of their Livonian Order as an autonomous branch. After joining forces, they attacked “pagan” Lithuania, effectively blocking its access to the Baltic Sea by 1309. In the same year the Teutonic Order seized Pomerelia (with its city port of Gdańsk/Danzig), which intervened between their monastic state and the Holy Roman Empire’s Pomerania. In turn, this annexation also blocked Poland’s access to the Baltic Sea. The low point for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania came after 1398 when the Teutonic Knights seized almost all of Samogitia. In the inevitable stand-off the Teutonic Order lost to Poland-Lithuania in 1410. The following year, Lithuania regained Samogitia, and after half a century of further wars, in 1466, Poland regained Pomerelia and annexed some parts of the Teutonic monastic state proper, made into the Kingdom’s province of Royal Prussia.

As in Terra Mariana, the Teutonic Knights imposed Roman Catholic Christianity across their crusader polity, complete with the Latin language and script literacy. The majority of the Livonian and Teutonic crusaders were Germanic-speaking. Later, in 1358, their ethnocultural commonality was reinforced by the founding of the Hanseatic League with its center in Lübeck. This league of port cities from the southern North Sea littoral and the southern and eastern Baltic littoral created an economic backbone that sustained the Livonian and Teutonic monastic states. The Hanseatic League’s lingua franca was Saxon (Low German). The necessity to use it in writing contracts and accounting soon made it into an Einzelsprache in its own right. With time, Germanic-speakers became the majority of the population in Prussia (Teutonic State), effectively extending the Germanic dialect continuum along the south Baltic littoral into this region. In contrast, Terra Mariana remained predominantly Baltic- and Finno-Ugric-speaking, while Low German-speakers remained the region’s (noble) elite until World War One.

A different kind of a monastic polity was established in the easternmost promontory of the Chalkidiki Peninsula in Romania’s region of Macedonia. During the 860s the first monks and hermits appeared in this area, which became known as Mount Athos. In 885 the first monastery was built and two years later in 885 the Romanian emperor declared Mount Athos a place of monks, off limits to non-monastic population. In the mid-tenth century the borders and territory were formalized, making Mount Athos into a monastic republic. Contemplation proved a better method for ensuring survival than crusading. This Monastic Republic of Mount Athos exists to this day, included as an autonomous region in the nation-state of Greece. All other states extant in Central Europe at the turn of the Second Millennium were either destroyed or changed beyond recognition. This was not the case for Mount Athos, which retains its territory, governance, and guiding values to this day. This monastic republic is Europe’s sole polity which has a credible claim to the (over) millennium-long unbroken tradition of continuous statehood. Even when the Third Reich occupied Greece in 1941, Mount Athos retained its autonomy under its “High Protector of the Holy Mountain,” who was none other than Adolf Hitler. Interestingly, Mount Athos is the only territory in today’s Europe where the Julian (old style) calendar remains in official use. Another peculiarity, which is acutely at odds with Europe’s modern values, is the strictly enforced ban on any female visitors, or female domestic and farm animals.
Because the Monastic Republic of Mount Athos was established and patronized by Romanian emperors, its monasteries predominantly cultivated the Orthodox literacy in the Greek language and script. Yet from the Middle Ages through the modern period, Orthodox Slavophones and Greek-speakers lived in the Chalkidiki, while at times the Bulgarian and Serbian empires included the region within their boundaries. Not surprisingly, a Bulgarian monastery (Zograf) was founded in Mount Athos at the turn of the tenth century, and its Serbian counterpart (Hilandar) in 1198. They were “Bulgarian” and “Serbian” in an ecclesiastical sense, the former a foundation of the Bulgarian Patriarchate, and the latter of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which gained autocephaly in 1219. Since the moment of their establishment these two monasteries have employed and cultivated the Cyrillic-based Slavonic literacy. In addition, in 980 a Georgian monastery (Iviron) was founded. The Christian polity of Georgia in the southern Caucasus was destroyed in the course of the seventh-century northward expansion of the Caliphate. It was re-established in the late ninth century, flourished, and survived until the Seljuk attack on Romania between the 1060s and 1080s. Iviron marked the presence of resurgent Georgia in the monastic heart of the Orthodox world, that is, in Mount Athos. This presence came in the form of literacy steeped in the Georgian language and script of the late fifth-century Georgian translation of the Bible.

The acceptance of Einzelsprachen other than Greek as liturgical languages across Romania meant that there were a handful of monasteries where Armenian, Georgian, and Syriac literacy was preserved and cultivated (especially in Cyprus) after the takeover of the Middle East, Caucasus, and eastern Anatolia by the Muslim power of the Caliphate and the Seljuk Empire. As in the case of Georgian ecclesiastical literacy, its Armenian and Syriac counterparts, complete with their specific scripts, were also tied to the Armenian and Syriac canonical translations of the Bible. The Syriac Bible (Peshitta) was available already in the second century, while its Armenian counterpart was translated in the early fifth century, most probably from the Peshitta. As much as the Georgian script emulated the Armenian alphabet, the translation of the Georgian Bible was modeled on the Armenian Bible.
The main change in the political organization of Central Europe between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries was the establishment of the decisive presence of the Ottoman Empire across Anatolia and the Balkans during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Poland-Lithuania was located at the core of Central Europe, alongside the lands of the Kingdom of Hungary, then mostly either directly incorporated into the Ottoman Empire, or made into this Empire’s vassal (autonomous) Principality of Erdel (Transylvania). The Ottomans accorded a similar status to the Danubian Principalities of Bogdan (Moldavia) and Eflak (Walachia), which previously had been in Hungary’s (and the former also in Poland’s) sphere of influence during the late Middle Ages. The Ottoman Empire made the Black Sea into its internal body of water. The Holy Roman Empire under Habsburg rule dominated the west of Central Europe. They also controlled the westernmost sliver of Hungary (including Croatia and today’s Slovakia), not seized by the Ottomans. What is more, the House of Habsburg established itself on the Spanish throne, meaning they ruled most of the Apennine Peninsula (alongside Sicily), apart from the Papal States and Veneto, the latter dominated by the merchant Republic of Venice. For almost a millennium (from around 800 until 1797) Venice controlled trade in the Adriatic, the Aegean, and much of the eastern Mediterranean. Venice underpinned its commercial and economic success by seizing a string of islands and bridgeheads in this area, together with the Adriatic littoral of the Balkans. To a degree, this republic’s success was a legacy of Venice’s participation in the crusades and due to the fact that its direct competitor, the similarly merchant Republic of Genoa (1005–1797), was permanently pushed out from this area, following the loss of its territories in the Black Sea and the Aegean, either to the Ottomans or to Venice. After the mid-sixteenth century, Genoa’s commercial dominance was largely contained to the western Mediterranean.

As much as the religiously justified conflict separated the Ottomans from the Christian powers in the north (Poland-Lithuania) and the west (Holy Roman Empire), commercial links maintained by Venice (and the Adriatic Republic of Ragusa, 1358–1806) still connected both enemy parts of the region. The territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia and the Balkans coincided with the Muslim loss of Al-Andalus (Iberia) to Spain and Portugal. Drawing on the imagery of the Iberian Reconquista and the tradition of the Middle Eastern crusades, Poland-Lithuania, together with the Habsburgs’ rump Hungary and Spanish Kingdom of Naples, styled themselves into an Antemurale Christianitatis (Bulwark of Christendom). In ideological (confessional) terms, this stereotype was the reverse of the Islamic idea of Dar al-Harb (House of War) for referring to the non-Muslim lands, as opposed to Dar al-Islam (House of Islam), or the lands where the Islamic ummah (community) lived under the Caliph’s (Islamic) rule.

The uneasy relationships between Christians and Muslims in the basin of the Mediterranean led to the rise of a common language, without which it would have been impossible to trade or war. It was Lingua Franca or the “language of the Franks,” as Europe’s Christians were dubbed by the Levant’s Muslims. Lingua Franca was a (West) Romance-based pidgin (rudimentary mixed speech form, not native to any ethnic group) that also incorporated numerous Semitic (Arabic), Turkic, Greek, or Berber elements. It was employed from the height of the Reconquista in Iberia and of the Middle Eastern Crusades in the eleventh century until the turn of nineteenth century, afterward it was mostly replaced with French for interethnic communication. The spread of Lingua Franca was facilitated by the expulsion of Romance-speaking Jews and Muslims from Spain and Portugal in the wake of the Reconquista. Most expellees migrated to Morocco or further east across Islamic North Africa, which gradually became part of the Ottoman Empire. Most, especially Jews, retained their Romance speech.

In terms of the dialect continua, not much changed in Central Europe between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries. The main alteration was the stable emergence of the East Romance dialect continuum, connected to the late medieval founding of the Danubian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia. These two polities together with Hungary’s Transylvania territorially overlapped with this continuum. At the same time, the presence of the medieval Turkic continuum connected to the steppe pastoralists was limited to the northern Black Sea littoral beyond the Danube delta. Similarly, the presence of the Romance-speakers south of the Danube (who probably gave rise to the Romancephone Danubian principalities) waned. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire, preceded by the Seljuks, gradually replaced much of the Greek dialect continuum with its Turkic counterpart in eastern and central Anatolia. Both continua became coterminous in western Anatolia. Turkic-speaking Ottoman administrators, soldiers, craftsmen, and traders established growing pockets of Turkic dialect continuum in the western Black Sea littoral and along the most important trade routes in the southern Balkans. In
these areas the Turkic dialect continuum mostly overlapped with its South Slavic counterpart.

In the northeastern corner of Central Europe, after gaining independence from the Golden Horde in 1480, the Grand Duchy of Muscovy expanded vastly at the expense of other Rus’ principalities (alongside the Republic of Novgorod) and of the post-Golden Horde khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia. As a result, North Slavic-speakers encroached on the lands of Finno-Ugric- and Baltic-speaking ethnic groups in the north, and those of Turkic-speakers in the south. The prolonged and devastating wars between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy did not change anything in terms of dialect continua, because both warring parties were overwhelmingly North Slavic-speaking. The same is true of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), fought between Catholics and Protestants in the Holy Roman Empire. The majority of those involved in the conflict on both sides were Germanic-speaking. Significantly, this war, alongside the 1654–1667 war between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania and the Great Northern War (1700–1721), heralded the arrival of modernity in its worst aspect, namely, the mass extermination of population. The worst affected areas of the Holy Roman Empire lost as many as two-thirds of the population (especially, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, and the Grand Duchy of Würzburg). A similar population loss was observed in the eastern provinces of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (or today’s Belarus) in the case of the second conflict; or in Royal Prussia, Mazovia and Wielkopolska during the third war.

The boundary between the Germanic and North Slavic dialect continua moved somewhat eastward. In the case of the Baltic littoral of the Holy Roman Empire and Poland’s province of Royal Prussia and fief of Ducal Prussia, it was mainly due to the Northern Crusade against a variety of Slavic and Baltic-speaking ethnic groups and their polities who stuck to their indigenous religions and forms of statehood. The same process of forced Christianization led to the rise of German-speaking nobilities as the ruling elite among the overwhelmingly Finno-Ugric- and Baltic-speaking populations in Finland; alongside Sweden’s Estland, Livonia, and Poland-Lithuania’s Duchy of Courland and Semigallia, or today’s Estonia and Latvia. Elsewhere the eastward expansion of the Germanic dialect continuum was a function of settling—on the invitation of rulers and local princes or nobles—formerly uninhabited forestlands and mountain areas. Settlers came from the relatively overpopulated areas of the Holy Roman Empire, or today’s Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, and western Germany. These settlers established important “islands” of Germanic-speakers in Poland-Lithuania’s Wielkopolska, Małopolska, and Ruthenia (Galicia); Hungary’s Upper Hungary (today’s Slovakia), Transylvania (in present-day Romania), and Banat (nowadays split between Romania and Serbia); and in Carniola (today’s Slovenia).

The expulsion of Jews from the Iberian Peninsula led to an increase in Sephardic Jews across the Ottoman Empire, whose presence was felt across the Balkans and Anatolia. In every-day life they spoke the (West) Romance language of Spanyol, which was known as Ladino (from the term “Latin”) when employed for book production, and especially for translating the Pentateuch. Sephardim predominantly wrote Spanyol (Ladino) with the use of Hebrew (“Jewish”) letters until the late fourteenth century. Afterward the French influence in the Ottoman Empire channeled through the Alliance Israélite Universelle convinced Sephardim to adopt the Latin alphabet for this purpose. However, mainstream Central European history is much more intimately connected to Ashkenazic Jews, whose rise is mainly connected to the late medieval and early modern expulsions of Jews from the Holy Roman Empire and western Europe. They were predominantly Germanic speaking. Their ethnon-linguistic influence led to the disappearance of the medieval Judeo-Slavic (Knaanic) language by the turn of the sixteenth century, which was in turn replaced with Yiddish (or “Jewish German”). The majority of Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazim lived in Poland-Lithuania, leading to the diasporic spread of the Germanic dialect continuum as far as today’s western Russia.

The late medieval period is also connected to the arrival of Indic-speaking groups of Roma (“Gypsies”) to the Middle East and the Balkans from around the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It appears that their centuries-long migration from what today is Pakistan and northwestern India was facilitated by the existence of the two Persianate Muslim polities spawned or impacted by the expansion of the Mongol Empire, namely, the Delhi Sultanate and the Ilkhanate. Thanks to the Pax Mongolica these two states offered relatively safe passage to the Middle East. In the fifteenth century the presence of Roma was already observed in Poland-Lithuania and the Holy Roman Empire. Their specific customs and insulation from the outside authorities afforded by the Roma’s ethnic language of Romani mostly prevented their enslavement or reduction to the status of unfree serf peasants, except for in the two Danubian Principalities and Transylvania.

The successive Byzantine and Seljuk conquests of (Caucasian) Armenia in the mid-eleventh century, followed by the destruction of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia (1198–1375) in southeastern Anatolia in the wake of the Middle Eastern crusades, sent successive waves of Armenian refugees. The eleventh century wave moved north of the Black Sea across the Golden Horde to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary, while its fourteenth century counterpart fanned across the Ottoman Balkans and Anatolia. The farther away from their Caucasus and Cilician ethnic homelands, the quicker the diasporic Armenian communities lost their Indo-European isolate language of Armenian and adopted the languages of their environs, especially Kipchak in Poland-Lithuania or Ottoman Turkic.

A similar diasporic presence was built across Poland-Lithuania, mainly from Muslim Tatar soldiers. They fled the Crimean Khanate or entered the military service of the Grand Duke of Lithuania for a variety of reasons. Because Tatar women did not follow them, such soldiers had no choice but to marry local Slavophone Christian women, who thus had to convert to Islam. As a result, the Tatar community survived and grew, but its Tatar ethnic language was lost already within a generation.

Unlike in Western Europe or Muscovy, religious homogeneity was neither made into the ideological basis of statehood
nor enforced. The cleavage between Christianity and Islam cut across Central Europe, and the region’s polities and societies. A system of accommodating (ethno-)religious differences was developed in preference to extermination and lying waste large swathes of land. This was a tactic adopted by Muscovy in its wars on Catholic Poland-Lithuania and especially on the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, the Ottomans tolerated all populations of a monotheistic religion. Under sharia they were protected as dhimmi (protected persons or peoples), and under no compulsion to convert to Islam, apart from having to pay the jizya tax imposed on all non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, such non-Muslim monotheists were granted with non-territorial autonomy in the form of millet. The Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) term millet denotes an ethno-religiously defined group with its own system of law overseen by the groups’ religious (ecclesiastical) authorities, which double as its self-government. A similar system of religiously defined non-territorial autonomy was practiced earlier in Al-Andalus, and to a degree in the Golden Horde and the Crimean Khanate. In the Ottoman Empire the earliest millets were founded for the Rum (that is, “Romans” in the meaning of Orthodox Christians), for Judaists (Jews) and Armenian Monophysites (namely, Christians believing in the single—divine—nature of Christ; the schism between Monophysites and Duophysites broke out in 451 at the Council of Chalcedon, or today’s quarter of Kadıköy in Istanbul). Interestingly, although Roma typically adopted religions of their environs, their ethnocultural specificity convinced the Ottoman authorities to create a non-territorial Roma Sanjak (region, Çingene Sancağı) with its administrative center at the town of Kirk-kilise (Kırklareli).

Poland-Lithuania and Hungary followed suit by creating similar religion-based non-territorial autonomies for Jews and Armenians. In the former polity Roma also obtained a similar autonomy, which like in the Ottoman Empire, was not of a religious character. Tatars in Poland-Lithuania were incorporated into the estate of nobility with the privilege of retaining their religion of Islam. Apart from such ennobled Tatars, the other non-Catholic populations endowed with such non-territorial autonomies tended to have higher and different taxes and other responsibilities due to the Catholic character of Poland-Lithuania and Hungary. It was a disadvantage similar to the jizya tax imposed on non-Muslims in the realms of Islam. In Hungary’s Transylvania, “Saxons” (or medieval Germanic-speaking settlers from the Holy Roman Empire) were granted territorial autonomy, which after the Reformation became the center of Lutheranism.

The diaspora of Türkic-speaking Armenians was too small to leave any immediately discernible dent in the extant dialect continua in Central Europe. The same is true of Poland-Lithuania’s Tatars, especially because they adopted the North Slavic speech as their medium of everyday communication. In contrast, the visible, permanent, and demographically growing diasporic presence of the Indic-speaking Roma is marked on the map. Until recently, traditional European historiography paid hardly any attention to the Roma, because they did not develop their own states, churches, religions, or any elite structures of power and influence.
Central Europe's Writing Systems, 1570

Significant presence of:
1. Arabic
2. Armenian
3. Hebrew
4. Old Church Cyrillic
5. Gothic type (Pointed, Black Letter)
6. Latin (Antiqua)
7. Glagolitic

Writing systems:
- Arabic
- Old Church Cyrillic
- Gothic type (Pointed, Black Letter)
- Latin (Antiqua)
- Armenian
- Glagolitic
- Hebrew
- Magyar runic script (Róvás)

Holy Roman Empire
Habsburg hereditary lands

State borders
Borders of principalities, duchies and vassal states
Boundaries of the polities in the Holy Roman Empire
Provincial boundaries in the Ottoman Empire

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The religion-based presence of different writing systems established at the turn of the Second Millennium (see Map 4) continued in Central Europe largely unchanged until the sixteenth century. However, the founding of the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia and the Balkans added the Arabic abjad (consonantry) to this region. The traditional Greek and Cyrillic alphabets remained in the service of the non-territorial autonomous Rum (Roman) millet of Orthodox Christians. However, the empire’s Muslim elite employed the Arabic language of the Quran for religious and legal purposes, alongside Osmanlica (Ottoman or Old Turkish) and Persian for administration and cultural (literary) pursuits, respectively. Osmanlica was produced as an Einzelsprache (language) for the application of Arabic letters for writing the speech of Anatolia’s Turkic-speakers. In this process, Osmanlica was infused with a lot of high-prestige Semitic Arabisms (especially connected to Islam and religious practices) and Indo-European Persianisms (connected to court culture), making this language sufficiently elitist for the use at the Ottoman Sultan’s court. In 1517, the Ottomans conquered the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo (Egypt), which had claimed to be a continuation of the Abbasid Caliphate. As a result, the Ottoman Sultan became Caliph. His claim to the title was fortified by the Sharifate (Emirate) of Mecca’s recognition of this declaration in return for the Ottomans’ promise to respect the Sharifate’s autonomy. Subsequently, the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph was able to credibly adopt Islam’s most sought-for title of the Defender of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. These developments, in turn, elevated the overall prestige of Turkic Osmanlica as an Einzelsprache.

The rise of New (Classical) Persian as an Einzelsprache is related to the Islamic (Abbasid) Caliphate’s conquest of Persia (or the Sasanian Empire) in the mid-seventh century. Zoroastrianism was replaced with Islam and for a time Arabic was preferred to the defeated empire’s (Middle or Sasanian) Persian written in Pahlavi letters (derived from the Aramaic script). It was difficult for Persia’s Indo-European-speaking population to acquire Semitic Arabic as their speech of everyday communication. Furthermore, the cultural tradition and prestige of Persian was considerable, so eventually Arabic letters were applied for writing this language, gradually making it into an accepted Islamic Einzelsprache. In the ninth century such Arabic script-based Persian was accepted as the official language of administration and court life in Central Asia’s Samanid Empire (with its center in today’s eastern Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, western Tajikistan, and northern Afghanistan). Afterward, in the west, the Seljuks adopted Persian as their official language, alongside a string of further Muslim polities extending from today’s Iran to India and Bangladesh. In addition, Persian became a preferred language of expression in Sufism, as symbolized by the teachings and writings of the thirteenth-century mystic, Rumi. That is why, despite never ending conflicts between the Ottoman Empire of Sunnism and the Safavid Empire (founded in 1501) of Iran allied with Shiism, Persian remained the language of cultural achievement among the Ottomans.

Importantly, whatever ethnolinguistic differences might exist in the ummah (Islamic community of the faithful), the Arabic of the Quran and its Arabic script endowed it with religious and scriptal unity. An Ottoman speaking and writing Arabic, Osmanlica and Persian, to a degree saw these three as different varieties of the same unitary Islamic literacy expressed in “holy” Arabic letters. This Arabic abjad-based monoscriptalism nullified any language difference that otherwise could be seen as categorical and thus uncrossable, and facilitated the relatively free flow of linguistic loans between these three, melding them into one unified literacy (if not a single language).

In the sixteenth century the main impact on the use and creation of Einzelsprachen (languages) in Central Europe had, on the one hand, the invention (or introduction from the East?) of the movable type printing press in the mid-fifteenth century, while on the other hand, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation in the following century. Mechanical printing, which was considered an abhorrence by Muslims and Orthodox Christians, was limited to Catholic and Protestant Europe during the early modern period. At the same time, the prolonged religious, cultural, ideological, and military conflict between these two strains of Western Christianity (not settled until the end of the Thirty Years’ war in 1648) tremendously fueled book production for the sake of propaganda.

Catholics and Protestants (overwhelmingly Lutherans) brushed shoulders across Scandinavia, the entire Holy Roman Empire, the partitioned Kingdom of Hungary, and in many regions of Poland-Lithuania. Following yet another failed war with Poland-Lithuania, in 1521 the monastic State of the Teutonic Order paid homage to the Polish-Lithuanian monarch, was made into a Polish fief, and overhauled into a secular and Lutheran Duchy of Prussia. A similar result of the secularization of statehood and the adoption of Lutheranism in Terra Mariana (or the east Baltic littoral controlled by the
Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order) was brought about by the Livonian War (1558–1583) between Sweden, Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, and Denmark-Norway. Terra Mariana was divided into Courland, Livonia, and Estland. In 1561 the two former regions were made into secular duchies, fiefs of Poland-Lithuania, while the third area became a Swedish province. At the same time, all the three territories' nobility and burghers adopted Lutheranism. The Kingdom of Poland's Germanic-speaking province of Prussia followed suit by giving up Catholicism in favor of Lutheranism. In Poland-Lithuania and the lands of partitioned Hungary, nobles who converted to Protestantism usually selected Calvinism in preference to Lutheranism. The latter strain of Protestantism was appreciated more by (often Germanic-speaking) burghers.

In Scandinavia, Lutheranism replaced Catholicism in Denmark-Norway in 1536. The same process was more prolonged in Sweden where both strains of Western Christianity brushed sides, like in Poland-Lithuania. At that time the Swedish House of Vasa ruled both polities. The Polish-Lithuanian monarch of this dynasty, Sigismund III, was crowned King of Sweden in 1592, creating a short-lived dynastic union between these two states. Attempts at fortifying Catholicism in Sweden in the spirit of the Counter-Reformation were immediately met with much opposition, leading to war that in 1599 deposed the monarch from the Swedish throne. Meanwhile, in 1593 Lutheranism had been announced as the kingdom's official religion. In the wake of the Thirty Years' War, in 1648 the Peace of Westphalia reorganized the Holy Roman Empire, largely putting an end to the Catholic-Protestant religious strife in Western and Central Europe. The southern half of the Empire, overlapping with the Habsburgs' hereditary lands, was fully regained for Catholicism, while the northern half's multiple principalities became predominantly Lutheran. What is more, the independence of confessionally mixed Switzerland and the Protestant (Calvinist) Netherlands was recognized. In line with Poland-Lithuania's tradition of tolerance for different ethnoreligious groups, in 1573 the Sejm (the Commonwealth's Diet of Nobles) promulgated a Warsaw Confederation, which guaranteed the freedom of religion for all the nobles. A similar function was played by the 1438 Unio Trium Nationum (Union of the Three Estate Nations), guaranteeing equality for Transylvania's Hungarian-speaking nobles and Szeklers (free border militiamen) and Germanophone Saxon burghers. In the course of the Reformation, the first group sided either with Catholicism or Calvinism, the second stuck to Catholicism, while the last group adopted Lutheranism. The Union prevented any religious strife between these three ethnically and religiously differentiated groups.

In the wake of the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans (1453), an idea budded that Moscow would become a “Third Rome” of the Christian world. Around 1510 this concept was made into the core of Muscovy’s leading political ideology, employed for legitimizing the polity’s westward expansion at the expense of the Rus’ half of Poland-Lithuania, and toward the Black Sea and the Balkans at the expense of the post-Golden Horde khanates and the Ottoman Empire. Muscovy's successful expansion made this polity into Europe's sole Orthodox power, while the rest of the Orthodox Christian (Rum) world found itself under Ottoman or Catholic political domination. The Orthodox population in Catholic Poland-Lithuania and in the Catholic Habsburgs' share of Hungary were pressed to adopt Catholicism, while in Transylvania the duchy's plurality of Romancephone Orthodox Christians were disadvantaged by their exclusion from the Unio Trium Nationum.

In Poland-Lithuania this Catholicizing pressure on the Orthodox Church and its faithful was partly resolved by the 1569 ecclesiastical Union of Bresč (Brest). In line with the terms of this Union, Orthodox Christians retained their Slavonic liturgy but switched their ecclesiastical loyalty from the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople to the Pope in Rome. Orthodox Christians who adopted this Union became known as “Uniates.” In the wake of the lifting of the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683, the Habsburgs began reconquering the lands of historical Hungary. As part of the process, they imposed similar church unions on the Orthodox population in the Carpathian Ruthenia (including Maramureș; today the region is split between Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine) (1646, 1664, 1713) and Transylvania (1700). In the late eighteenth century, following the partition of Poland-Lithuania, the majority of Uniates found themselves under Maria Theresia's Habsburg rule in Hungary and Galicia. By then the word “Uniates” had become a term of abuse levelled against Uniates both by Catholics and Orthodox Christians (especially those who rejected the ecclesiastical unions in Poland-Lithuania and Hungary), so she replaced it with the now widely accepted neologism “Greek Catholics.” Obviously, none of these Greek Catholics had anything to do with ethnic Greeks or the Greek language and alphabet. The Habsburg's support for Uniates-turned-Greek Catholics ensured their loyalty to this Catholic dynasty. In contrast, in Russia's partition zone of Poland-Lithuania, the Romanovs suppressed Uniates as they were seen as potentially disloyal to the Tsar and sought to make sure that they rejoined the Orthodox Church. In Russia, or the world's sole Orthodox empire, there was no place for such a confessionally ambiguous population that from Saint Petersburg's perspective was “half-Orthodox” and “half-Catholic.”

The invention and spread of printing, widely disseminated by the propaganda needs of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, led to the rapid construction of new Einzelsprachen. The Latin language commonality of Western and Central Europe's literacy, underpinned by the Vulgate and the unity of Latin liturgy, was decisively over. A new Protestant norm prevailed that the Bible should be made available to the faithful in their own vernaculars. The sixteenth century was marked by a flurry of grassroots and state-sponsored translation projects, both Protestant and Catholic, which resulted in vernacular translations of the entire Bible, the New Testament, or the Catechism. The more successful and widely used a given translation became, the better chance a vernacular standardized with this translation had for becoming a recognized Einzelsprache in its own right. Afterward, such an Einzelsprache would be taught at schools as a subject, used as a medium of education, employed in administration, and increasingly more secular books would be produced in it.
end this Einzelsprache in question would become something, which nowadays is recognized as a language. Luther's German translation of the Bible was published in 1534. The publication of similar (official) translations of the Bible followed (or even preceded), into Italian (Florentine, 1471 in Venice), French (1487 in Paris), Low German (1494 in Lübeck), Ruthenian (Belarussian/Ukrainian in Cyrillic, Old Testament only) (1517–1519 in Prague), Swedish (1541 in Uppsala), Danish (1550 in Copenhagen), Ladino (in Latin characters, 1553 in Ferrara), Croatian (New Testament only, 1562 in Galgolitic, 1565 in Cyrillic, both in Tübingen), Polish (1563 in Brześć, today's Brest in Belarus), Czech (1579–1593 in Kralice nad Oslavou), Slovenian (1583 in Wittenberg), Hungarian (1590 in Vizsoly), Dutch (Netherlandish, 1617 in Leiden), Finnish (1642 in Stockholm), Yiddish (in Hebrew characters, 1678 in Amsterdam), Romanian (Walachian in Cyrillic) (1680 in Bucharest), Latvian (1694 in Riga), Lithuanian (1735 in Königsberg, today's Kaliningrad in Russia), or Estonian (1739 in Reval, today's Tallinn in Estonia).

The technological-cum-intellectual grounds for the above translations into newly minted Einzelsprachen had been prepared by Johann Gutenberg's publication of the Latin Bible (Vulgate) in 1455 in Mainz, and the then high-tech Polyglot Bible, published in 1517 in Madrid. On the single page it pairs the holy book's canonical texts in Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek and Latin, each in its own specific script. At that time, following the defeat of Muslim Granada 1492 and the opening of the conquest of the Americas in the same year, Spain was at the forefront of using Christianity to legitimize imperial expansion. In 1671 the first Arabic translation of the Bible was published in Rome for the sake of militarized missionary efforts against Arabic-speaking Muslims in Morocco and the Ottoman Empire. (Interestingly, the Latin translation of the Quran was for the first time published in 1543 in Basel.) The Ottomans' Orthodox vassal Principality of Walachia also allowed for cross-cultural dialogue, as evidenced by the publication of a Greek-Arabic Orthodox missal in 1701 and a Greek-Arabic Orthodox Horologion a year later. Furthermore, the aforementioned translations of the Bible into new vernaculars was facilitated by the publication of the old medieval canonical translations of the Holy Scripture into (Old Church) Slavonic in 1571 (in Ostróg in Poland-Lithuania, today's Ostroh in Ukraine), Grabar (Old Armenian in the Armenian alphabet) in 1666 (in Amsterdam), or Old or Classical Georgian (in the Georgian alphabet) in 1743 (in Moscow).

Sephardic Jews opened the first printing press in the Ottoman Empire (in Istanbul), already in 1494, but they published only in Hebrew letters and for Jewish consumption. The first Ottoman printing house publishing for the state's needs with the use of the Arabic script was founded in the Ottoman capital in 1726 and began production (mostly in Osmanlıca) three years later, in 1729. However, religious books, let alone the Quran, were off limits. This ban on the mechanical reproduction of Arabic-language religious material remained in place until 1803. The Orthodox world's attitude to printing was marked by similar suspicion. However, under Catholicism's ideological pressure emanating from Poland-Lithuania (as evidenced by the printing of an early Slavonic-language liturgical book in Cyrillic in Cracow in 1491), Muscovy had no choice but to adopt this technology. The first printing house opened in Moscow in 1553. Earlier, the Slavonic printing house publishing in Cyrillic was briefly active, between 1493 and 1496, in Cetinje, the capital of Zeta/Montenegro, which was soon dominated and then annexed by the Ottoman Empire in 1514. The Hebrew-language Mikraot Gedolot (literally “Great Scriptures,” popularly known as Rabbinical Bible) was published in Venice in 1517–1519. Central Europe's first Jewish printing press publishing in Hebrew for religious needs of Judaism was founded in Prague in 1522. Four years later, in 1526, it published the Haggadah (this text sets the order of Seder, a Jewish ritual feast that marks the beginning of the Passover).

In the second half of the fourteenth century, incunabulae (or the earliest printed books published before 1501) were printed the “Gothic” (Black Letter) type that emulated manuscript hands, usually the Carolingian minuscule. In the first half of the fifteenth century, a tradition developed for using the Roman Empire's classical Latin hand of the first and second centuries for producing books in Latin. This type of the Latin alphabet became known as Antiqua (“Old” or “Antique” letters) and was preferred by humanist authors of the Renaissance. On the other hand, the Gothic type was preferred for books in vernaculars-turned-Einzelsprachen. Among this type's numerous varieties, Fraktur (“broken letters”) became dominant from the 1510s, because it was Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I who commissioned and supported it. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation further politicized this typeface dichotomy between Antiqua and Fraktur (Gothic type). Protestants, especially Lutherans, sided with Fraktur, while Catholics with Antiqua. In the chaos of the subsequent religious wars, a tradition developed for using Antiqua for publishing in the “Catholic” languages of French, Hungarian, Tuscan (Florentine, Italian), Polish, or Spanish, while Fraktur (Gothic type) was employed for printing books in the “Lutheran” (Protestant) languages of Common German (of the imperial court at Vienna), Danish, Dutch, Estonian, Finnish, High (today's standard) German, Latvian, Low German (of the Hanseatic League), or Swedish. However, in scholarly and scientific books in vernaculars, Antiqua was preferred to Fraktur. As a result, both Antiqua and Fraktur were employed side by side across the Holy Roman Empire and Hungary, in Scandinavia and around the Baltic.

Antiqua predominated, with no prominent presence of any other script, in the Catholic polities of the Apennine Peninsula, in the west of the Kingdom of Poland and in central Hungary directly incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. However, in the latter case, a relative absence of other scripts was a function of the post-conquest devastation of this militarized borderland. Until the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation all of Central Europe's population was overwhelmingly illiterate, writing and reading being the preserve of clergy and state chancellors. The religious strife and the printed book gave a boost to literacy across Protestant and Catholic Europe in line with the new principle that the Bible should be made available in people's languages (vernaculars). As a rule of
thumb, the inhabitants of Protestant countries were more literate than their counterparts in Catholic polities. In the Roman Catholic Church liturgy was retained in the “holy language” of Latin, while vernaculars were employed for this function across Protestant states. The Catholic Church ensured Latin-medium elementary and secondary education for noble boys, with only a limited use of vernaculars. On the other hand, the Protestant churches established wider school systems that targeted some segments of the population beyond the nobility and, more importantly, gradually provided education in vernaculars. Both in Catholic and Protestant countries schooling and vernacular literacy spread in urbanized areas. The business of commerce grew increasingly intensive and financially complicated, necessitating good functional literacy and numeracy. The traditional (“medieval”) approach of leaving literacy and education to the highest echelons of clergy remained the norm across the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy.

The Greek alphabet for the Rum millet brushed sides with the Arabic script across the Ottoman Empire. In the northern Ottoman Balkans, they were joined by Cyrillic associated with the Slavophone variety of Orthodox Christianity. Practically, north of the line of the Danube, Greek letters were not in use and Cyrillic predominated. It was the sole official alphabet of the Danubian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia. The presence of the Greek writing system in the Apennine Peninsula was reinforced in the wake of the fall of Constantinople (1453) as many officials and intellectuals migrated there from the now definitively defunct Romania (Roman Empire). The Ottoman millet system, alongside the tradition of ethnoreligious (ethnocultural) autonomies in Poland-Lithuania and Hungary, facilitated the rise and preservation of diasporas of numerous peoples. As a result, the diasporic use of the Armenian script for Armenian Monophysites, the Hebrew abjad for Judaists (Jews), or of the Arabic script for Muslims (Tatars) spread across this area.

After the turn of the seventeenth century, Uniates (later known as Greek Catholics) constituted a plurality of Poland-Lithuania’s population. Their education employed both Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet. Effectively, this meant an increasing spread of the latter to the Commonwealth’s easternmost frontiers, due to the ideologically Catholic character of Poland-Lithuania. A similar phenomenon was observed in the strongly Catholic Kingdom of Hungary’s Uniate territories of Carpathian Ruthenia and Transylvania. Afterward a steep decline in the use of Cyrillic was observed in Poland-Lithuania, when in 1697 it was decided to stop using Cyrillic for official written purposes, meaning the de facto replacement of Ruthenian with the official language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For a time being Muscovy remained monoscriptal in its use of “Orthodox” Cyrillic. However, wars with Poland-Lithuania and Sweden brought about the need for progressive employment of Latin alphabet-based (Low) German, Latin, Swedish, or Polish for international relations, trade, and education. Likewise, Muscovy’s expansion at the expense of the post-Golden Horde khanates brought comparable territories with Muslim majorities or pluralities among their inhabitants. Obviously, they stuck to their holy alphabet of Arabic.

Although the spread and firm establishment of Christianity in Scandinavia meant that the use of the “pagan” Runes ceased, some rudimentary employment of the “Hungarian Runes” (Rovásírás, today known as the “Old Hungarian alphabet”) continued in Transylvania through the seventeenth century. It appears that from the perspective of writing systems, Transylvania used to be one of Central Europe’s most multiscryptural areas in the early modern period, with the parallel use of, at least, Antiqua, the Armenian Alphabet, Cyrillic, Fraktur, the Hebrew abjad, or Rovásírás. Bosnia-Herzegovina was similarly multiscryptal, as the Arabic script, Antiqua, and Cyrillic were there in common use, alongside some Glagolitic in the Adriatic littoral. This last script was employed by Slavophone Catholics who wished to emphasize their difference vis-à-vis Dalmatia’s Romanceophone Catholics, without opening themselves to any accusation that they might be supportive of the Orthodox Church, associated in this area with Cyrillic. Thanks to a variety of monasteries in Mount Athos and on Cyprus (not subdued by the Ottomans until 1570), the Georgian and Syriac scripts also left their traces in Central Europe. Unlike on the previous map of the dialect continua (Map 5), the presence of the region’s growing population of Roma was not reflected in terms of a script because, as in the case of religion, they also accepted the script of their socio-political environs. Furthermore, the traditional Roma culture does not have a place for writing as the transmission of customs, and social rules are passed on orally through face-to-face contact.
The year 1721 was in many ways a turning point for the history of central Europe. It saw the end of the Great Northern War (1700–1721), which marked the end of the often near-genocidal religious wars between Catholics and Protestants in the Holy Roman Empire. It also signaled the conclusion of the similarly near-genocidal wars between Catholic Poland-Lithuania and Orthodox Muscovy, on the one hand, and between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, on the other. This warring Central Europe of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was the theater in which Sweden launched vast military expeditions against and across the Holy Roman Empire, Poland-Lithuania, or Muscovy, even reaching the Ottoman Empire. Muscovy defeated Sweden, putting an end to the latter country’s dream of a Central European Empire. Even Sweden’s Baltic littoral provinces of Ingria, Estland, and Livonia were lost to Muscovy, alongside Karelia; for the time being Muscovy returned Finland to Sweden. Tsar Peter the Great had gambled on the permanence of his military victories and had ordered the construction of the port city of St Petersburg in Ingria already in 1703. A decade later, the Muscovian capital had been moved from Moscow to this brand new city, built in a European style. The 1721 Treaty of Nystad (now Uusikaupunki in Finland) reestablished peace between Muscovy and Sweden. In the same year, Peter the Great renamed Muscovy as the Russian Empire, though Sweden only somewhat recognized this claim two years later in 1723. Prussia, which had become a kingdom securing its independence from Poland-Lithuania in 1701, acknowledged this change in Muscovy’s official name immediately in 1721. Of its former continental empire, Sweden retained only the Scandinavian province of Scania (gained from Denmark) and a cluster of possessions in the north of the Holy Roman Empire. Poland-Lithuania remained independent, but continued losing territory to Russia and found itself in the latter polity’s sphere of influence. In 1772, when the Habsburgs, Prussia, and Russia partitioned the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for the first time, the Polish-Lithuanian monarch had no choice but to recognize Muscovy under its novel name of the Russian Empire, and also the change in the Prussian monarch’s title from “King in Prussia” to “King of Prussia.” Now the Prussian King was fully equal to all other monarchs of the royal rank.

The southward expansion of Muscovy-turned-Russia toward and around the Black Sea replaced Poland-Lithuania as the Ottomans’ main Christian adversary power in this corner of Central Europe. After the lifting of the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire gradually lost territory both to the Habsburgs and Poland-Lithuania. In 1699 Poland-Lithuania regained Podolia from the Ottomans, while by 1718 the Habsburgs had reconquered all of historical Hungary, alongside southern Walachia and northern Serbia. The vast depopulated steppe border region, in what today is eastern Ukraine, known as the “Wild Fields” in Polish historiography or Zaporizhia (literally, “land beyond the rapids” on the Dniester River) in its Ukrainian counterpart, was a buffer zone between Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy, and the Ottomans. It was populated first by Turkic-speaking pastoralists and later increasingly by runaway serf peasants from Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy, along with some fugitives from the Crimean Khanate. In the early modern period they gave rise to the militarized population of Cossacks, who were predominantly Slavophone and Orthodox. From the sixteenth century through 1820s, they established a series of republican polities centered on successive sitches, or fortified riverine island-capitals, in the Dnieper and the Danube delta. Cossacks switched alliances between all the neighboring powers, as it suited them, but eventually most threw in their lot with Orthodox Russia, increasingly successful in its wars against the Ottomans. In the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (Kaynardzha, in today’s northeastern Bulgaria), St Petersburg compelled the Ottoman Empire to recognize Russia as an empire, alongside the independence of the Crimean Khanate, soon to be annexed by Russia in 1783. By 1792, the Russo-Ottoman boundary had moved to the Dniester River and in 1812 Russia gained a third of Moldavia east or the Prut River, that is, Bessarabia (or today’s Moldova). Meanwhile, in 1795 Poland-Lithuania had been extinguished in the third and last partition carried out by the Habsburgs, Prussia, and Russia. These events limited Ottoman control to the territories south of the Danube and Sava rivers. In 1829 Russia occupied both Danubian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia. The Russian occupation lasted for half a decade until 1834 and left these two nominally Ottoman polities with much broader autonomy than they had enjoyed previously. This 1828–1829 Russian war on the Ottomans was fought in support of the Greek Rebellion or War of Independence (1821–1829). The independent Orthodox Kingdom of Greece was founded in 1832. This event bolstered the autonomous status of the Ottoman Principality of Serbia, founded in 1815 in the wake of the two Serbian Rebellions (jointly known as the Serbian Revolution) in 1804–1817. The Ottoman Sultan, under the pressure of Russia and the Austrian Empire, had no choice
but to fully recognize autonomous Serbia in 1830. Although since the turn of the seventeenth century Montenegro had de facto been an independent ecclesiastical principality, and some European powers engaged in relations with it (especially after the 1852 secularization of this polity), its independence, alongside Serbia’s, was de jure confirmed only in 1878.

The political shape of Central Europe’s western half remained largely unchanged until the French Revolutionary wars (1792–1802) and Napoleonic wars (1803–1815), which ended the relative period of peace in the region that had lasted since 1721. The only exceptions were the two Silesian wars (1740–1742, 1744–1745) fought by Prussia against the Habsburgs. As a result, Prussia annexed the Habsburgs’ richest province of Silesia. Napoleon extinguished the merchant republics of Venice and Ragusa (Dubrovnik) in 1797 and 1808, respectively, and under his pressure the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved in 1806. This was Central Europe’s largest and most stable polity that had survived for almost one millennium, functioning as the region’s pillar of stability. Two years earlier, in 1804, the Habsburgs, fearing such an outcome, had overhauled their hereditary lands into an Austrian Empire. The northern half of the defunct Holy Roman Empire was made into France’s satellite of the Rhine Confederation. For the first time in the modern period, Napoleon put a Kingdom of Italy (1805–1814) on the map. He also created a staunchly pro-French Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1815, or today’s central Poland) from the Polish-Lithuanian lands that had been annexed in the last (third) partition. The northeastern Adriatic littoral (or present-day southern Austria, Slovenia, northeastern Italy, and most of Croatia) was made into the Illyrian provinces, which were directly incorporated into France. The French invention of nationalism as the basic (“infrastructural”) modern ideology of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance translated into the beginnings of Illyrian (Croatian and Slovenian, and later Yugoslav) nationalism and Polish (noble) nationalism in the Warsaw Duchy. Reaction against French domination led to the emergence of German nationalism in the Rhine Confederation, the Austrian Empire, and Prussia.

Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, which saw Russian troops move as far west as France, the postwar Congress of Vienna passed the Duchy of Warsaw, renamed as an (autonomous Kingdom) Congress Poland, to Russia. Cracow and its vicinity were removed from the Duchy and made into a Free City of Cracow under the joint control of Austria, Prussia, and Russia (or the original three powers that had partitioned Poland-Lithuania in the late eighteenth century). Earlier, Russia, when allied with Napoleon, had fought a war against anti-Napoleonic Sweden (1808–1809), leading to the annexation of Finland, made into an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian borders. Furthermore, the Congress of Vienna punished pro-Napoleonic Denmark with the loss of Norway, which in turn was given to anti-Napoleonic Sweden, as a kind of indemnification for the earlier loss of Finland. The former territory of the Holy Roman Empire was overhauled into a German Confederation, with Prussia and Bavaria considerably enlarged, though with the Austrian Emperor still in charge.

Following the War of the Polish-Lithuanian Succession (1733–1735), the Habsburgs lost control of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, which passed to the Spanish Bourbons, who continued ruling them as separate monarchies. In 1806 Napoleon seized the former realm, while the British established control over the latter. Both kingdoms were reestablished in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna and were united the following year (1816) into a single Kingdom of Two Sicilies. As part of their tactic of blockading Napoleonic Europe, in 1807 the British seized the former Venetian territory of the Ionian Islands, subsequently made into a United States of Ionian Islands in 1815.

What is not remembered well enough is that the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars had a profound influence on the Ottoman Empire, mainly due to Bonaparte’s Egyptian campaign of 1798–1801. The Western ideas of nation, revolution, progress, and modernity became part and parcel of the Ottoman politics and intellectual world via Egypt. This land nominally remained part of the Ottoman Empire, but de facto the Sultan lost his richest province to the Albanian warlord, Muhammad Ali Pasha, originally tasked with reestablishing Ottoman control over Egypt. He successfully overhauled his newly gained realm into a Middle Eastern empire, with its lands extending from the Peloponnesus and Crete in the north to present-day Southern Sudan and Somalia in the south, and in the east to Cyprus, Palestine, and Lebanon, and deep into the Arabian Peninsula (including Mecca and Medina). Muhammad Ali claimed the title of Khedive (or Viceroy) for his dynasty, which the Ottoman Sultan finally recognized in 1867. This dynasty Westernized the country’s army, administration, economy, and culture, making Egypt into a nation-state. A program of translations from French and Italian (and later from English) into Arabic transformed this ecclesiastical-cum-juridical language into a Western-style Einzelsprache as we know it. Numerous Albanian specialists migrated from Rumelia (the European section of the Ottoman Empire) to Egypt from the early nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. In 1952 the monarchy was abolished and Egypt was made into a republic. The last king of the Muhammad Ali Dynasty was expelled, together with his predominantly Albanian (in ethnic origin) court. The 4,000 families, or about 10,000 persons, found refuge in Western Europe and the United States.

The upheaval of the French incursion into Egypt, followed by the rise of the Muhammad Ali-led Egyptian Empire, distracted the Ottoman administration’s attention from other parts of the Ottoman Empire. An effort for the “New Order” (Nizam-ı Cedid) reforms in 1789–1807 came to an abrupt end when the Janissaries deposed the Sultan. Subsequently, Russia—in formal alliance with Napoleonic France since 1807—waged a long war against the Ottomans (1806–1812), until Napoleon’s attack on Russia in 1812. In this context, the rebellious disturbances in Serbia and Montenegro’s engagement with enemy Christian powers were too minor for the Ottoman government to deal with them decisively. This relative lack of reaction, additionally fueled by the example of the rise of de facto independent Egypt, only encouraged the Serbs and Montenegrins, and later the Greeks. All of them learned
that in order to get European support and approval they needed to clothe their demands for autonomy or independence in the terms of the novel ideology of nationalism.

All the religious wars and political changes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not alter Central Europe’s dialect continua much. At that time the logic of expulsions or exterminations was (ethno-)religious in its character, not (ethno-)linguistic. In 1620, the Protestant Estates of Bohemia lost to the Catholic Habsburg Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Subsequently, those predominantly Slavophone nobles and burghers of Bohemia who refused to convert to Catholicism had to leave the Habsburg lands, in total 150,000 to 200,000 people. They were replaced with loyal Catholic nobility who were predominantly Germanic-speaking. In 1627 German was made into a co-official language, alongside Czech, and soon became dominant in administration. Afterward, the Habsburgs’ central territories of Bohemia and Moravia that previously had been homogenously Slavic-speaking became increasingly mixed (bilingual), or Slavic and Germanic in their linguistic character. Likewise, the Khmelnytsky Uprising (1648–1657, known as the National-Liberation War of the Ukrainian People in Ukrainian historiography) of Poland-Lithuania’s Slavophone Orthodox Ruthenians and Cossacks (ancestors of today’s Ukrainians and Belarusians) against the commonwealth’s Slavophone Catholic nobility did not change anything in the North Slavic dialect continuum. However, because the Cossacks specifically targeted Yiddish-speaking Jews, their diasporic presence became less pronounced. This resulted in a lower number of Germanic-speakers in the southeastern corner of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In the wake of the Great Northern War, the boundary between the North Slavic dialect continuum and its Finno-Ugric counterpart changed in the former’s favor across Ingria, which Russia seized from Sweden. This change was connected to the construction of St Petersburg and moving Russia’s capital to this new port city. The influx of Slavophones swamped Finno-Ugric-speakers in this previously sparsely populated region. Similarly, Russia’s conquest of the northern Black Sea littoral, often entailing flight and expulsion of the Muslim population, who tended to be Turkic-speaking, led to the expansion of the North Slavic dialect continuum there at the expense of the Turkic dialect continuum. In the Ottoman Empire’s European section (Rumelia), the development of trade and cities caused an increase in the diasporic presence of Muslim Turkic-speakers across the South Slavic and Albanic dialect continua, well into today’s Bosnia. Following the Habsburg reconquest of Hungary and the reestablishment of peace, the diasporic presence of Indic-speaking Roma grew in this kingdom. It is interesting to remember that this diaspora of these Indic-speakers is connected to the Indo-Iranian dialect continuum, which today continuously extends from the Kurdish areas in eastern Turkey and northern Iraq to Iran, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and across northern and central India to Bangladesh.
The variety of different writing systems in use across Central Europe remained largely unchanged between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The main tendency was increasing literacy, which became virtually full among (especially the male part of) the ruling elites, namely, nobility, and burghers in the Christian polities, and the civil servants (“professional Ottomans”) and the top echelons of the millets’ administrations in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Protestantism ensured increasing literacy also among commoners, while the religiously motivated literacy among Jews (especially men) created a path for them into non-Jewish secular literacies in other languages than Hebrew, Yiddish, or Spanyol, namely, in “gentile” Einzelprachen. The production volume of printed books grew exponentially, fueled by the propaganda needs of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. What is more, printing began spreading to Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire, despite Orthodox clergy and Muslim ulema’s (clergy and scholars) continuing shared distrust of the mechanical reproduction of texts. The tradition of hand-written manuscripts persisted (particularly in the case of “holy” texts), especially in the Balkans through the nineteenth century, and among the Tatars on the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania even until the twentieth century. In both cases, some Muslims continued this tradition through the twentieth century, though in the Balkans this practice was rather limited to Bosnia.

The main alterations in the use of scripts were caused by the rise of the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Churches in Poland-Lithuania and Hungary and by the changing frontiers of Central Europe’s main powers. Between the 1596 Union of Brześć (Brest) and the 1697 official removal of Cyrillic from the state offices in Poland-Lithuania, the Uniate clergy increasingly became educated in the Commonwealth’s two main official languages of Latin and Polish, which were both written and printed in Antiqua. As a result, the use of Cyrillic receded farther eastward to the areas alongside the frontier with Muscovy, where some of the population remained loyal to the Orthodox Church, which after the 1596 Union was not officially acknowledged in Poland-Lithuania until 1633. During the wars with Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania lost Kyiv to the former polity in 1654, so the seat of the commonwealth’s Orthodox Church found itself outside Poland-Lithuania, and under Muscovy’s political and ecclesiastical control. In 1686 the Ecumenical Patriarch (questionably) confirmed the subordination of the Kyiv Metropolitanate to the Moscow Patriarchate, while Poland-Lithuania, in the same year in a peace treaty with Muscovy, conceded that the Commonwealth’s Orthodox population would be placed under the Moscow Patriarchate’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction. At the turn of the eighteenth century, three Orthodox bishops joined the Union, meaning that only a single Orthodox bishopric remained in Poland-Lithuania after 1702. Because modernization (or Westernization) initially entered Muscovy via the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Polish became an important foreign language there, leading even to a limited production of Polish and Latin books in Muscovy, initially in Kyiv.

Muscovy’s successful annexation of Sweden’s Baltic provinces of Ingria, Estland, and Livonia in the early eighteenth century effectively removed the use of the Latin script in Ingria, replacing it with Cyrillic on account of the construction of the city port of St Petersburg, where the Muscovian capital was moved in 1713. The estate and institutional structures were retained in annexed Estland and Livonia, but Cyrillic was added there as another important script (alongside Antiqua and Fraktur) with the use of which Russia’s all-imperial administration was conducted. Peter the Great’s Westernizing reforms in Muscovy-turned-Russian Empire emulated Western Europe’s separation of church and state, which had become a prevailing political norm after the end of the Thirty Years’ War. To this end, the Tsar commissioned Dutch engravers to fashion a new version of Cyrillic that closely emulated Antiqua, seen as symbolic of modernity (or the West). In 1708, this new type of Cyrillic, known as Grazhdanka (literally “civil script”), was introduced for the production of secular books in Muscovy. In this way, (Old Church) Slavonic was graphically separated from the secular North Slavic speech. In addition, publications in Grazhdanka employed Arabic numerals, while ecclesiastical books in Old Cyrillic stuck to the use of Cyrillic letters in this function. The persistent employment of Grazhdanka for writing and printing gradually produced what became a Russian language by the turn of the nineteenth century, first in emulation of Poland-Lithuania’s Cyrillic-based secular Einzelprache of Ruthenian, and then of the numerous secular Einzelprachen of Central and Western Europe, as produced by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. By the mid-eighteenth century more books were published in the Russian Empire in Grazhandka than in the original Old (Church) Cyrillic. What is more, Grazhdanka spread to religious publications earmarked for the faithful, while the use of
Old Cyrillic was gradually limited to liturgical books. The use of Old Cyrillic persisted across the Ottoman Balkans, until the growing Russian imperial influence in this region led to the employment of Grazhdanka for book production beginning in the mid-nineteenth century in Serbia, Montenegro, and in Bulgarian-language publishing houses across the Ottoman Empire.

The ecclesiastical union in Transylvania between the region’s Orthodox Christians and Rome, signed in 1698 and promulgated two years later (1700), led to the growing use of Latin and Antiqua among the Romanceophone Uniates. The Walachian (Romanian) language emerged since the sixteenth century in Walachia and Moldavia with the use of (Old) Cyrillic for writing the East Romance speech of the inhabitants of these two Danubian Principalties, as borrowed from (Old Church) Slavonic, which was official language there. The process of building Walachian as an Einzelsprache culminated in the publication of the Cyrillic-based Walachian translation of the Bible in 1680 in Bucharest. The spread of printing and the knowledge of the Latin alphabet among Transylvania’s Greek Catholics resulted in the publication of some books in Walachian (Romanian) in Antiqua, beginning in 1779 with a prayer book published in Vienna.

Across the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier, in the Danubian Principalties, the Sultan installed Greek-speaking Rum (Roman) Hospodars (princes) in Moldavia and Walachia beginning in 1711 and 1715, respectively. They were known as Phanariots because these hospodars and their top civil servants stemmed from Constantinople’s Orthodox Christian mahalla (religiously homogenous city quarter) of Phanar (Fener). Until the 1821 Greek Rebellion (known as the Greek War of Independence in Greek historiography), Phanariots served as the Ottomans’ preferred middlemen in trade and diplomacy between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe. Their knowledge of Western languages made them well suited for the job. In turn, because Lingua Franca was the spoken language of Mediterranean trade and thus numerous treaties between the Ottomans and the Christian powers were negotiated and written in “Italian” (especially Venetian), Phanariots had a good preparation for governing Walachia and Moldavia with their Romanceophone populations. The Phanariot regimes replaced (Old Church) Slavonic with Greek as these two principalities’ official language. In this way, the regular employment of the Greek alphabet for writing and printing spread as far north as the River Dniester. This development weakened the prestige of Slavonic and simultaneously opened more space for Walachian in church, local administration, and book production. In 1821, the Sultan removed Phanariots from the two Danubian Principalties, because of their close (thus, treasonous from the Ottoman perspective) involvement in the outbreak of the Greek Rebellion. This also meant the removal of Greek from administration, which was replaced with Walachian rather than the already half-forgotten Slavonic. But this renewed Walachian drew at the growing awareness of the linguistic connection with the prestigious Western Romance languages, leading to the infusion of this Einzelsprache with numerous Italianisms during the 1830s, and then with Gallicisms since the mid-nineteenth century. The 1850s also marked the attempt at modernization by the conflicting acceptance of both Grazhdanka and Antiqua, resulting in a mixed Cyrillic-Latin script, which was employed for printing and writing in Walachian until the mid-1860s. The official switch to the Latin alphabet in 1860 in Walachia and three years later, in 1863, in Moldavia was connected to the 1859 union of both the Danubian Principalities. They were renamed as the Romanian United Principalities in 1862, before becoming the nation-state of Romania in 1866. The 1862 Union also inspired Transylvania’s Walachians-turned-Romanians to switch fully to Antiqua for publishing in their language. The Romanian Orthodox Church stuck to the use of Cyrillic for printing religious books in Walachian-turned-Romanian through the 1880s. The traditional Cyrillic-based Walachian remained in use in the Russian province of Bessarabia (detached from Moldavia in 1812) until 1917. Interestingly, Old (Church) Cyrillic was employed for printing Walachian in Bessarabia until the mid-nineteenth century, creating a typographic difference between it and Grazhdanka-based Russian.

It should be added that the Grazhdanka-like look of the Walachian Cyrillic, as attested by the 1688 Walachian-language Bible published in Bucharest, was influenced by the tradition of Greek-language publishing. The first Greek-language books were published in Western Europe by humanists, who aspired to recover ancient Greek and Latin classics for secular culture in the form of faithful editions of such texts. For the sake of publishing, they shaped a printing Greek typeface in emulation of Antiqua, as evidenced by the Greek-language New Testament published in 1550 in Paris. This volume provided the first-ever standard of the Greek typeface, known as Grec du roi, which in many ways persists to this day. This typeface was designed by Claude Garamond, a prolific designer of Antiqua typefaces for printing in Latin and French.

Modernity, or Westernization—as practiced in Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, Hungary, or the Christian autonomous and independent nation-states carved out from the Ottoman Balkans—was marked not only by the acceptance of technology (for example, printing), alongside some political and cultural institutions and practices (including Antiqua). The process was much more invasive and intimate at the personal level. First, the ruling elites, and subsequently the rest of the population, gradually adopted Western-style clothing, nowadays epitomized by the suit, tie, and hat for men, or in the case of women by the (relatively) short skirt and blouse, revealing ankles and shoulders, respectively, with no prescribed headdress. This new standard of “modern” attire replaced the Ottoman-style clothing, characterized by caftans and shawls, often alongside religion-specific headdresses. This process became quite extreme in early republican Turkey, where legal bans were placed on some traditional items of clothing to be replaced overnight with prescribed “modern” (Western) counterparts at the pain of steep pecuniary fines or even incarceration, as exemplified by the Hat Law of 1925 and the 1934 Law on Prohibited Garments. Such changes are quite strikingly represented in the portraits of renowned politicians whose careers straddled these modernizing reforms, showing them first

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The ramifications of the independence of Greece as a nation-state (achieved between 1821–1830) went further than the removal of Phanariots from the government and administration of the Danubian Principalities. The Sultan lost faith in the loyalty of the Greek-speaking members of the Rum (Roman, that is, Orthodox) Millet. These traditional medlumen between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe were replaced with enterprising members of the Armenian (Monophysite) Millet and the Judaic (Jewish) Millet, and Slavophones from the Rum Millet in the Balkans and western Anatolia. This sudden loss of privilege and business drew a wedge of discord between Greece and the Greek-speakers of the Rum Millet. Under the influence of western Philhellenes, Greece’s Greeks chose to refer to themselves with the ancient ethnonym “Hellenes.” “The Rum Millet’s Greeks saw this name as “heathen,” and stuck to their “Christian” self-ethnonym, Romioi (“Romans”). Many of these Romans actively sided with the Ottomans and opposed the founding of the Greek nation-state. However, under the example of the establishment of Italy and Germany as nation-states in 1861 and 1871, respectively, the political thinking in the terms of ethnolinguistic nationalism became dominant across Central Europe, including the Ottoman Balkans. Perhaps, Britain’s decision to pass its protectorate of the United States of the Ionian Islands including the Ottoman Balkans. The removal of Phanariots from the government and administration of the Danubian Principalities. The Sultan lost faith in the loyalty of the Greek-speaking members of the Rum (Roman, that is, Orthodox) Millet. These traditional medlumen between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe were replaced with enterprising members of the Armenian (Monophysite) Millet and the Judaic (Jewish) Millet, and Slavophones from the Rum Millet in the Balkans and western Anatolia. This sudden loss of privilege and business drew a wedge of discord between Greece and the Greek-speakers of the Rum Millet. Under the influence of western Philhellenes, Greece’s Greeks chose to refer to themselves with the ancient ethnonym “Hellenes.” “The Rum Millet’s Greeks saw this name as “heathen,” and stuck to their “Christian” self-ethnonym, Romioi (“Romans”). Many of these Romans actively sided with the Ottomans and opposed the founding of the Greek nation-state. However, under the example of the establishment of Italy and Germany as nation-states in 1861 and 1871, respectively, the political thinking in the terms of ethnolinguistic nationalism became dominant across Central Europe, including the Ottoman Balkans. Perhaps, Britain’s decision to pass its protectorate of the United States of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864 also influenced the anti-Greek stance of the Ottoman government. (Among others, these United States were the first-ever modern polity where, alongside Italian, Greek functioned as the leading official language, that is, since 1815, or even since 1803, when the Russian- and French-dominated forerunner, or the Septinsular Republic, had adopted this language for official purposes.) Thus, using the logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism, in 1870 the Sultan proclaimed a Bulgarian Exarchate, which was founded two years later in 1872. In this manner the confessional unity of the Rum (Orthodox) Millet was breached, and this exarchate became the basis of the institutional coalescence of the Bulgar (Bulgarian) Millet for Slavophone Orthodox Christians. As a result, Greece’s claims to all the Rum Millet’s members – irrespective of language and ethnicity – for the ethnolinguistically defined Greek nation were curbed. Furthermore, the formerly non-territorial institution of millet became territorialized in the case of the Bulgar millet, which was endowed with specific boundaries as if a nation-state-in-waiting. Soon this solution to the “Greek problem” proved another step in undoing the Ottoman control over the Balkans. When Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire in the 1877–1878 war, the very existence of the Bulgarian Exarchate was used as an international argument for the founding of the Bulgarian nation-state in 1878. Meanwhile, since the mid-nineteenth century, the increasing application of Cyrillic for producing secular books in South Slavic for the Rum Millet’s Slavic-speakers had led to the emergence of Bulgarian as an Einzelsprache, though in many ways, until the turn of the twentieth century, it had been Slaveno-Bulgarian, or vernacular Bulgarian heavily influenced by (Old Church) Slavonic (in the Russian recension, that is, as employed in Russia).

The Ottomans’ gradual loss of the northern Black Sea littoral to the Russian Empire, and later of the western Black Sea littoral to the Russia-supported nation-states of Romania and Bulgaria, was compounded with the emigration and expulsion of these areas’ predominantly Turkophone populations. They were replaced with Orthodox Christian Slavic- and Romance-speakers. As a result, the employment of the Arabic script for writing and book production receded and was replaced by Grazhdanka and Antiqua. In the monastic republic of Mount Athos, the predominant Greek script brushed sides with the Cyrillic-based Slavonic and Georgian. In 1169 the two earlier Slavonic monasteries connected to the Bulgarian and Serbian patriarchates were joined by the St Panteleimon Monastery founded by the Orthodox Church of Rus’. After the Mongol invasion of Rus’ in the mid-13th century this monastery declined until 1875, when Russia and the Moscow Patriarchate extended their protectorate over it. Since the turn of the nineteenth century, religious books imported from Russia had replaced the local recensions (versions) of (Old Church) Slavonic with the Russian recension across the Slavophone Orthodox Balkans. And this Russian recension also opened the way for Grazhdanka in this region.

At the turn of the eighteenth century, Central Europe played an important role in the development of Ashkharhabar (Modern Armenian) that replaced the 5th-century Grabar (Classical Armenian). During the Middle Eastern crusades, in Cilicia (today’s south-central Turkey or the country’s Mediterranean Region), the Armenian Church entered a de facto union with the Roman Catholic Church. This union was formally renewed in 1439 at the Council of Florence, within the framework of the broader Catholic-Orthodox Union of Florence. But in reality, the agreed upon provisions were never implemented and the Florentine Union was finally revoked in 1484. But a considerable Armenian Catholic community emerged in Poland-Lithuania in the early seventeenth century, while numerous Armenians retained contacts with the Catholic Church in former Cilicia (Lesser Armenia) in the Ottoman Empire. In 1777, Mkhitar Sebastatsi (Mekhit of Sebaste [now Sivas in Turkey]) from this region was allowed to found an Armenian monastic congregation within the framework of the Catholic Order of Saint Benedict. This congregation, known as the Mekhitarists, established their center on the small island of San Lazzaro degli Armeni in Venice. It was a serendipitous choice, because the first-ever Armenian-language book had been printed at this city in 1512. In 1727, the first grammar of Modern Armenian, written by Sebastatsi, was published in Venice. The Mekhitarists wrote and published grammars, books, and periodicals both in Ashkharhabar and Grabar, firmly linking the rise of Modern Armenian as an Einzelsprache to the tradition of Classical Armenian. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries San Lazzaro degli Armeni was the world’s main center of Armenian printing and publishing.

Last but not least, the state-sponsored translation program of books from Italian and French into Arabic in Muhammad Ali’s Egypt during the 1830s and 1840s not only contributed
to the shaping of Arabic as an Einzelsprache, but also led to the rise of standardized Arabic fonts for printing. In 1822 the first printing press was founded in the country and by the mid-nineteenth century almost 600 titles had been published in Arabic (with some in Osmanlıca). Afterward, the doldrums of the 1850s gave way to a virtual publishing boom beginning in the 1860s with the rise of private printing presses. Finally, the Egyptian and western examples inspired the rise of a publishing industry in the Arabic script-based Osmanlıca across the Ottoman Empire during the 1870s. However, it should be borne in mind that it was the printing presses in Cairo’s mahalla of Bulaq where the modern tradition of Ottoman (Turkish) printing in Osmanlıca had commenced during the 1840s.
Europa Media anno 1721: The Latin-Language Geography of Early Modern Central Europe

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Early Modern Latin Culture

This map shows Central and Eastern Europe as a well-educated European of the early eighteenth century might have imagined it when considering scholarly, scientific, or international issues, specifically in Latin.

Around 1721, in some respects, Latin was still a dominant language in Europe. It was the language of education; not only the curriculum’s main subject, but the very medium of education in the majority of secondary schools, as well as at most universities. Latin afforded a common bond for the intellectual elites throughout (Christian) Europe. Hence, it was the language of choice used by the international learned community, or the so-called Res publica litteraria (Republic of Letters), for transmitting and discussing scholarly and scientific knowledge. New ideas still reached learned European audiences most directly in Latin, either as works originally written in it (for instance, the Philosophiae Naturalis Prinicipia Mathematica, which Isaac Newton wrote in Latin and published in 1687, 1713 and 1726), or as translations (for example, when Christian Wolff—otherwise a champion of German as an academic language—translated his mathematical work Anfanggründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften into Latin for the international audience in 1713).

Unlike in western and northern Europe, where vernaculars had superseded Latin in official use by the end of the sixteenth century, across large areas of Central and Eastern Europe the language of the Romans still retained its elevated place in public life, and even in everyday life outside of schools, universities, scholarly networks and the Catholic Church, where it typically thrived. In the Habsburg-ruled Kingdom of Hungary, with its associated lands of Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania, Latin was the language of politics, local and higher administration, the judiciary, and polite conversation and correspondence among the social elites. In parts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Latin was the second language of the elites and played a significant role in the more official or celebratory aspects of public life. The reasons for the persistence of Latin in Central and Eastern Europe were manifold, ranging from its prestige as the language of culture and learning, to the conservatism of the local elites. However, the main motivation for keeping Latin was practical. In these multi-ethnic societies, Latin was perceived as a neutral language. As long as this arrangement lasted, no language group (speech community) could feel threatened by the imposition of another group’s vernacular (Einzelsprache). At any rate, Latin was the language of education and thus familiar to all the (male) members of the social elite, who were the main beneficiaries of the educational system (typically run by the Society of Jesus), regardless from which language group they came. Through the medium of Latin, a Hungarian count, a minor Croat noble, and a German-speaking patrician all participated in the body politic of the Kingdom of Hungary, and thus confirmed their elite status. In Poland-Lithuania, Latin had been largely replaced with French by the mid-eighteenth century, but still retained some of its official functions until the very end of this Commonwealth in 1795. The lands of the Hungarian Crown endured a short-lived experiment with German as the official language in 1786–1790. After the restoration of Latin, a long, increasingly nationalist, struggle ensued in the first half of the nineteenth century to replace it with the Hungarian vernacular to the detriment of other language groups. The “old language” (that is, Latin) was finally abolished as the official means of communication in 1843 across the Kingdom of Hungary. In Croatia and Slavonia, the abolition was enacted only four years later, in 1847.

Latin Geography

The rise of geography as a scientific discipline and as a mode of analysing and describing spatial facts in the Early Modern period is firmly connected to Latin scholarship. The rediscovery of Ptolemy (second century CE) in the fifteenth century and the translation of his work from ancient Greek into Latin (in which language it was known as Cosmographia) transformed the old chorographic and cartographic practices. Another crucial factor in the veritable explosion of geographical knowledge was the printing revolution, which made possible the mass dissemination, not only of texts, but also of maps. Scholars strove to harmonize the ancient knowledge with their own contemporary reality, inserting the actual geographical data into the framework provided by Ptolemy, and producing countless maps, treatises, country descriptions, and travelogues. A great portion of this literature was written in Latin, the geographical knowledge about the country of a respective author being per definitionem more interesting for international audiences than for the locals who were able to experience the described reality first-hand. The ever-expanding store of knowledge, especially information on overseas lands, led to the abandonment of Ptolemy’s model by
the late sixteenth century. Subsequently, the rise of popular literacy generated a rising demand among the reading public for popular geographic works in vernaculars. Scholarly works were nevertheless still being written in Latin, aiming at the glory and approval of the learned community across Europe.

The rise of vernaculars also left its trace on mapmaking. In many cases explanatory texts accompanying maps, such as titles and legends, were still in Latin, especially if a map was aimed at the international audience, as maps of Europe or of the world usually were. However, exclusively Latin-language maps became rather uncommon after the end of the sixteenth century, one exception being, of course, historical maps of the classical or biblical Antiquity, where the use of Latin (and partly Greek) was the usual practice. On early modern maps depicting the contemporary reality, place-names were mostly given in their local vernacular form or in the mapmaker’s vernacular, while the names of states, principalities, and provinces, as well as the names of seas, tended to be offered in Latin. Thus, it is quite usual to see, for instance, the German-language place-name “Salzburg” as the name of the city (Salzburg), but “Archiepiscopatus Salisburgensis” (Archdiocese of Salzburg) for the surrounding ecclesiastical territory on the same map. The names of the rivers were mostly rendered in the vernacular, but their role on the map was sometimes indicated by the Latin abbreviation “fl.” (fluvius for “river”) appended to them, even if a river’s name itself was not Latinized.

**Latin and Latinized Toponyms**

In selecting Latin geographic names, be it on a map or in a text, early modern scholars chose, wherever possible, to use those already attested in earlier literary sources. Although the Graeco-Roman Antiquity did enjoy the highest authority, later (Medieval) Latin names were also employed if they happened to be more common or otherwise widely accepted. The use of classical names was especially prevalent in those parts of Central and Eastern Europe where certain settlements had continually existed since Antiquity, namely in the Mediterranean region. Thus, Tuscany was always referred to by its classical name “Etruria” or “Heturia,” while Vienna was referred to by its ancient Roman name “Vindobona” only in an academic or celebratory context, the city’s usual designation being the medieval Latinized name “Vienna.” For denoting cities and rivers outside the former Roman Empire, their Medieval Latin names were usually employed, if available, for example, “Corona” for Brașov, or “Herbipolis” (a linguistic calque) for Würzburg. In many cases, especially in those parts of Eastern Europe that did not share the heritage of the Latin Middle Ages, or in cases when the cities or polities in question were founded later or changed their political allegiance and with it their names, scholars simply Latinized local vernacular names. Latinizing vernacular names was especially easy if they ended in “-a,” as they could without any transformation be inflected according to the rules of the first declension in Latin, for example, “Poltava, Poltavae” or “Volga, Volgae.” Other names had to be forced into the Latin declension system. Thus, the Ottoman town of Bender became “Bendera,” the Muscovian (Russian) town of Starodub “Starodubium,” while Helsinki was known under the Latinisation of its Swedish-language name Helsingfors as “Helsingforssia.” Likewise, for St Petersburg an elegant Graeco-Latin translation “Petropolis” was coined.

**Sources**

In order to find and determine Latin names of territories, rivers, and cities, one must consult several types of sources. Besides maps, the most convenient ones are the early modern Latin geographical dictionaries (Estienne 1650, Ferrari 1696), which were often revised, expanded, and republished, including their modern counterparts, such as *Orbis Latinus* (Graesse, Benedict and Plechl 1972). Unfortunately, these dictionaries are far from comprehensive when dealing with Central and Eastern Europe. More detailed information on Latin names in this region is found in Latin-language geographic monographs, which offer descriptions of a single or of several neighbouring countries, often combined with a coverage of their ethnography, history, and current politics. Such works, usually with great consistency, Latinize the place-names mentioned on their pages.
The process of construing speech through the technologies of writing (scripts) and printing produced a lot of new Einzelsprachen (languages) from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. This process accelerated when, in the wake of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, the concept of Einzelsprache was secularized. No longer did a “proper” language have to be identical with the “holy tongue” of the original or approved translation of a “holy book.” The only continuity from this previously normative equation was script. New Einzelsprachen, generated by the now officially and legally approved translation of the Bible into vernaculars, almost always retained the “holy tongue’s” script. It was the Latin alphabet in the case of the vernacular Einzelsprachen of Roman Catholics, Cyrillic for Orthodox Slavophones’ and Romancephones’ languages, or the Hebrew abjad in the case of the vernaculars employed for writing and printing by Judaists (Jews). The rise and functional separation of secular Einzelsprachen from this or that “holy tongue” was also underwritten by the normative separation of state and church, especially in the wake of the religious wars. After the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 with the so-called Peace of Westphalia (a series of treaties signed at the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Münster), a new political norm of sovereignty was accepted in Western and Central Europe. This development gave rise to the centralized territorial state, whose ruler (typically, a monarch) enjoyed the exclusive right to decide about the religion of the realm in line with the principle, cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion). People professing another religion (or denomination) either had to convert to the state’s religion or leave. This normative principle of religious homogeneity underpinned the sovereign centralized territorial state. In this normative insistence on the homogeneity of the state’s population, the early territorial state is the direct forerunner of the modern nation-state, whose population (construed as a nation) must be homogenous in one way or another. In today’s Central Europe this normative homogeneity is typically of a linguistic character.

Entrusting a polity’s inhabitants to the ruler’s exclusive rule with no interferences from outside (“abroad”) impacted language building and use in any territorial state. Already in 1492 in his grammar of Castilian (Spanish), Antonio de Nebrija famously proposed that “language has always been the perfect instrument of empire.” This grammar of the then coalescing secular Einzelsprache of Castilian was the first-ever written in Castilian, not in Latin. Nebrija fittingly dedicated his unusual book to Queen Isabella I of Castile, who initially was unable to grasp the work’s staggering importance for the success of the joint rule of her and her husband (King Ferdinand II of Aragon) over Spain and its nascent maritime empire. In the year of this grammar’s publication, Spain commenced its conquest (“discovery”) of the Americas (“New World”). Hence, in the wake of the Reformation and Counter-Reformations, rulers not only decided about the religion of their subjects, but increasingly on the Einzelsprache that was to be used for governance. In this manner, the concept of state (or official) language emerged. Previously there was not much discussion on this subject, because by default it was the “holy tongue” (and script) of a given religion’s “holy book” that served this function.

In 1539, the French King François I signed the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts. The document’s articles 110 and 111 effectively made French the main official language in the Kingdom of France. Importantly, this piece of legislation remains part of the French law to this day. Then, in 1583, an Accademia della Crusca (“Academy of the Bran”) was founded in Florence. The academy’s main task was the compilation and publication of an authoritative dictionary of the (West) Romance vernacular of the Duchy of Florence, already made famous and prestigious by the medieval “vernacular” poets, Dante Alighieri and Francesco Petrarca, in the fourteenth century. (Obviously, both poets wrote their “serious” works exclusively in Latin.) This “academic” dictionary, Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca, was published in 1612. Its title did not feature the described (or rather, created) Einzelsprache’s name, typically referred to as “Florentine” or “Tuscan,” before it became widely known as “Italian,” following the founding of a Kingdom of Italy as the Italian nation-state in 1861.

Rather than by a specific legal decision, it was mostly the evolving day-to-day practices of scribal work at royal and ducal chanceries that tended to “officialize” local vernaculars as spoken by a polity’s elite (or the monarch’s court, aristocracy, nobility, clergy and burghers), typically in the capital and its vicinity. Authoritative (academic) grammars and dictionaries standardized the approved elevated form of a coalescing Einzelsprache as already employed for the translation of the Bible. On the other hand, poets writing in such a newly formed language aspired to make it “famous” by emulating the genres and topics popularized by neo-Latin, Tuscan (“Italian”) and French poets. The Académie française, founded in 1635 in the French capital of Paris, made this manner of standard-
izing a secular Einzelsprache into a “norm of (Western) civiliza-
lation,” including its normative dictionary, *Le Dictionnaire
de l’Académie française* (again, no name of the concerned lan-
guage in the title), whose first complete edition came off the
press in 1694.

However, it was difficult to fully emulate this ideal in
early modern Central Europe. The prestige of Latin, coupled
with political power ideologically buttressed by the Catholic
Church, remained enormous. The sociopolitical unity ensured
by the neutral “holy tongue” of Latin was of more importance
for the Habsburgs and Poland-Lithuania, faced with the con-
tinuing “holy wars” with the Islamic Ottoman Empire and
the Orthodox Muscovy, than throwing the state’s or dynas-
tic resources in favor of this or that coalescing Einzelsprache.
Such a move in these highly multilingual and polyglot polities
could have dangerously weakened or even nullified this cru-
sial sociopolitical unity. Furthermore, rather than being in-
creasingly centralized, like the Kingdom of France, the Holy
Roman Empire, as a confederal structure for a plethora of ter-
ritorial states, had no designated capital. Hence, like in the
case of the Apennine Peninsula with its numerous polities that
sided with different West Romance vernaculars, this Empire’s
many contesting political-cum-cultural centers promoted their
own (often confessionally legitimized) forms of Germanic as the
“correct Einzelsprache” of German. In 1617, in emula-
tion of Tuscany’s Accademia della Crusca, a Fruchtbringende
Gesellschaft (“Fruitbearing Society”) was founded at Weimar,
which then was the capital of the Protestant Duchy of Saxe-
Weimar. Despite its popularity, this society was short-lived and
came to an early end in 1680. The Fruchtbringende
Gesellschaft’s task of standardizing (Luther’s “High”) German
was not achieved, which is not surprising given the ravages and
upheavals of the Thirty Years’ War. However, one of the so-
ciety’s members, the poet-soldier Caspar Stieler, managed to
single-handedly compile an extensive dictionary which was
published in 1691, titled bilingually as *Teutonicæ linguæ semina et germina, sive lexicon germani-
*cum* Stammbaum und Fortwachs, oder T eutscher Sprachschatz/
published in 1691, titled bilingually as a dictionary which was
published in 1694.

The story of the Swedish Royal Academy (Kungliga Vetens-
kapssakademien), established in 1739 in Stockholm, is similar.
Although the academicians began working on an authoritative
dictionary of Swedish (*Svenska Akademien ordbok*) in 1786, its
first volume was published more than a century later in 1898.
This reference work has not been completed yet and its most
recent thirty-seventh volume (covering letter V) was released
in 2017. (The plan is now to publish the last volume in 2024.)

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the academy had a forma-
dible competitor, the Societas regia scientiarum Upsaliensis (Royal
Society of Sciences in Uppsala), founded in 1710. As signaled by
its Latin name, this Society published its members’ works exclu-
sively in Latin until 1865. If one had a command of this language
and French, what would a scholar or aristocrat need Swedish
for? A Swedish or Polish-Lithuanian scholar, or a noble siding
with the long-established tradition of writing and reading in
Latin, could comfortably fall back on the French historian and
philologist Carolo Dufresne (Charles du Fresne) du Cange’s au-
thoritative three-volume dictionary of Latin, *Glossarium mediæ
et infima Latinitatis* (Dictionary of Medieval and Late Latin),
published in Paris to much acclaim in 1678. Subsequently, seven
increasingly enlarged editions of this reference work became
available, the last one consisting of ten volumes (1883–1887). In
turn, reprints of this latest edition were produced in 1937–1938

Since the sixteenth century, the Societas Jesu (Society of
Jesus), founded in 1540, built and maintained an extensive edu-
cational system that consisted of elementary and secondary
schools, alongside academies in the role of regional or state
universities. Latin was the system’s sole medium of instruction,
though local vernaculars were allowed in early elementary ed-
ucation to facilitate the acquisition of Latin. This formida-
ble educational system waned in France and Spain, where the
local Einzelsprachen of French and Spanish replaced Latin as
the main medium of education. However, in the Holy Roman
Empire, the Kingdom of Hungary, Poland-Lithuania, and
Scandinavia, education was available predominantly through
Latin, as provided by Jesuits or Protestants eager to emulate the
Societas Jesu’s unprecedented educational success. In Central
Europe’s Catholic and Protestant areas, practically all male
nobles had a working command of Latin until the mid-nineteenth century.

That is why the dissolution of the Society of Jesus in 1773 was a turning point in the region's history of language politics. It was an additional shock to the wobbling statehood of Poland-Lithuania, which a year earlier, in 1772, had been shorn of much of its territory by the Habsburgs, Prussia, and Russia, in the event that later became known as the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In order to prevent a collapse of the almost exclusively Jesuit-run educational system, a Komisja Edukacji Narodowej (KEN, Committee of National Education) was founded in 1773 to take over this system. In Europe KEN was the first-ever ministry of education. Apart from secularizing the former Jesuit educational system, KEN also began replacing Latin with Polish as the main medium of instruction, thus making it into an increasingly more accepted Einzelsprache in its own right. Although the efforts came to an abrupt end when Poland-Lithuania was erased from the political map of Europe in the course of the third partition in 1795, Russia preserved this Polish-language educational system in its own partition zone that contained almost two-thirds of the former commonwealth's lands. What is more, the Order of Jesus, surviving in the Russian Empire, helped operate this Polish-language system (in which Latin played an important role) until 1820. During the 1820s, the Polish-medium University of Wilno (Vilnius) was Russia's largest university, meaning that at that time about half of the Tsar's subjects with tertiary education graduated from this university. Another quarter obtained their higher education at the German-language University of Dorpat (today's Tartu in Estonia) in Livland (Livland) province (also known as Livonia). Similarly, western Russia's post-KEN educational system ensured that half of the empire's people with a knowledge of reading and writing were literate in Polish. In addition, the former Polish-Lithuanian nobles and their descendants accounted for two-thirds of all Russia's nobility. From the Tsar's perspective there was no Poland, so the burgeoning Einzelsprache of Polish could be safely adopted for the sake of developing the multilingual and polyethnic Russian Empire.

A similar line of thinking prevailed in Prussia, which was made into a Slavic-Germanic country with the acquisition of so much of former Poland-Lithuania's territory, including the Commonwealth's capital of Warsaw. A bilingual Polish-German educational system was developed for Prussia's partition zone of former Poland-Lithuania. In 1800 this system was completed with an academy-like Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk/Gesellschaft der Freunde der Wissenschaften (Society of Friends of Learning). The fully bilingual philologist of Swedish origin, Samuel Linde, was a leading member of this Society and an important official in this bilingual educational system. He compiled an authoritative six-volume dictionary of Polish (Słownik języka polskiego) that was published in Warsaw between 1807 and 1814, when this city served as the capital of the Napoleonic protectorate of the Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815). Thanks to this lexicographic achievement, Polish finally became a fully-fledged Einzelsprache. At the Congress of Vienna, Russia took over most of this Duchy and made it into an autonomous (Congress) Kingdom of Poland. In this Kingdom's French-language Constitution granted by the Tsar, for the first time ever in history, Polish was explicitly made into an official language of a territory (Articles 28 and 33) by a legal act. The Society of Friends of Learning and the aforementioned University of Wilno were dissolved in the wake of the failed Polish-Lithuanian nobility's uprising against the Tsar in 1830-1831. Russian replaced Polish in the function of the official language and medium of education across Russia's partition zone, and was made into the leading official language, alongside Polish, in the Congress Kingdom.

The modernizing (Westernizing) reforms in the Russian Empire copied the extensive use of Latin as the leading language of scholarship and education. This led to a distancing of the state from the Orthodox Church, which traditionally saw the Latin (“Polish”) letters as a “devil's alphabet.” For many Muscovian/Russian literati Poland-Lithuania's Polish and Cyrillic-based Ruthenian offered a convenient bridge to Latin and the world of western learning. Not surprisingly, when Russia's first academy was established at St Petersburg in 1724 it adopted the Latin name of Academia Scientiarum Petropolitana, which was retained until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The academy's official language was Latin (and at times German) until 1773, then replaced with French, and after the Napoleonic wars, gradually with Russian, though German continued to be also used until the late nineteenth century. In 1783, the philosophical segment of the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences was shaped into an Académie impériale de Russie. Before it was collapsed back into the original academy in 1841, in emulation of the Académie française, the Académie impériale de Russie was required to produce a dictionary of the Russian Empire's language. The first edition of this academic dictionary (Словарь Академии Российской) was published in six volumes between 1789 and 1794. In the introduction several different names were employed for referring to this then coalescing Einzelsprache.

In 1755 the Russian polymath Mikhail Lomonosov was tasked with establishing the University of Moscow, which—from the perspective of the present-day borders—is Russia's oldest institution of tertiary education. Quite uniquely at that time, Lomonosov proposed to make the empire’s Slavic vernacular into this university's leading medium of education. He had gleaned this idea that secular learning and scholarship were possible in other languages than Latin in the late 1730s during his studies at the University of Marburg in the Landgraviate of Hesse-Kassel, in the Holy Roman Empire. Some Marburg professors had delivered seminars and lectures in vernacular German instead of the still dominant Latin. The problem was that Russian had not been yet made into an Einzelsprache as understood in Western and Central Europe. To this end, Lomonosov wrote a grammar of Muscovian (or the Slavic vernacular of Moscow) in this vernacular, as an Einzelsprache-in-the-making, which was published in 1755. He composed his work in discussion with and against the Polish-Lithuanian scholar and Orthodox Archbishop Meletius Smotrytsky's highly influential grammar of (Church) Slavonic. Smotrytsky had written this grammar (1619) in order to provide the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth’s Uniate and Orthodox faithful with a western-style description of Slavonic and in order to stop the rising popularity of Polish and Ruthenian. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Smotrytsky’s grammar was republished many times in Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy, decisively contributing to the codification of the Russian (Muscovian) recension of (Church) Slavonic.

Two years after the publication of his grammar of Russian (Rossiiskii), Lomonosov proposed in 1757 that a Russian language should be composed of “three styles” (трёх стилей). The “high style,” or basically (Church) Slavonic, was to be employed for official and celebratory ends, or the literary genres of tragedy and ode. On the other hand, he urged writers to employ the “middle style” (that is, Slaveno-Russian)—characterized by a mixture of Slavonic and the Muscovian vernacular—for composing elegies, dramas, satires, and stories. In turn, Lomonosov proposed to see the vernacular of Muscovian as a “low style,” which would be appropriate for writing comedies, letters, songs, or fables. This was a rare moment of very conscious language engineering. Lomonosov developed a toolkit with which Russia’s Slavophone Orthodox elite—when not busy reading and conversing in French, Polish, German, or Latin, or praying in (Church) Slavonic—tinkered and increasingly sided with the middle style. Subsequently, the shock of Napoleon’s 1812 invasion of Russia weaned the Empire’s Orthodox nobility off French, opening a space for a wider employment of Russian in state offices and publishing. This space widened even more during the 1830s when Polish was removed from official use across Russia’s western provinces (that is, the empire’s partition zone of Poland-Lithuania). At the same time, the Russian name of the Russian language was changed from Rossiiskii to today’s Rossiiskii. Symbolically, the writings of Alexander Pushkin, who flourished as a poet at the turn of the 1830s, are seen as the turning point when finally, Lomonosov’s middle style was firmly equated with the Russian language as it is understood today. In reality, however, it was a gradual process that was also facilitated by the second edition of the academic dictionary (1806–1822) and the 1847 publication of the authoritative four-volume dictionary of Church Slavonic and Russian (Словарь церковнославянского и русского языка Словарь тверковославянскаго и русскаго языка), which decided which Slavonic words also belonged to Russian, and which did not, thus drawing a clear line of separation between these two languages. Ironically, until the Bolshevik Revolution Russian was “modernized” (Westernized) through calquing (that is, translating literally and otherwise closely adopting) French terms and expressions. The fourth edition of Le Dictionnaire de l’Académie française was translated into Russian and made into a normative French-Russian dictionary (1773–1786), followed by the translation of the Slovar’ Akademii Rossiiskoi into French, which spawned an equally normative French-Russian dictionary (1799–1802).

Yet if an Einzelsprache was really to become the everyday language of a polity’s entire population, all the country’s children would have to attend school to acquire, first, the Einzelsprache itself, and subsequently other knowledge through its medium as the language of instruction. The concept of compulsory elementary education for all the inhabitants in a realm budded in the western Holy Roman Empire at the turn of the seventeenth century. The first large country that dared to implement this norm was Prussia in 1717, followed by the Habsburg hereditary lands within the Holy Roman Empire in 1774, and the Habsburg’s Kingdom of Hungary in 1775. At that time this ideal of full literacy turned out to be impossible to actualize, usually due to insufficient financing and a lack of teaching staff. Furthermore, most of the peasantry were serfs, whose labor was required in their lord’s fields, including peasant children. Eventually, full literacy was achieved in the German Empire and the “Austrian half” of Austria-Hungary only in the 1870s. In other parts of Central Europe—apart from Russia’s Protestant Baltic provinces of Estland, Livland (Livonia) and Courland—the ideal of full literacy became an accepted norm only in the interwar period, and its implementation was achieved as late as the second half of the twentieth century.

Like in Poland-Lithuania, the 1774 and 1775 educational reforms in the Habsburg hereditary lands were a reply to the dissolution of the Society of Jesus. There was no one else but the state to take over the Jesuit educational system. Soon it was decided that retaining Latin was an obstacle to popular education, so in 1784 this language was replaced with German as the medium of instruction and administration across the Habsburg hereditary lands within the Holy Roman Empire, and two years later, in 1786 in the Kingdom of Hungary. Grassroots noble backlash against this reform slowed the implementation of this measure in the former case, and succeeded at reverting it in the latter, when in 1790 Latin was reinstated in Hungary. The use of German in an official capacity was extended to the Habsburg’s partition zone of Poland-Lithuania, crowned with the replacement of Polish with German as the medium of instruction at the University of Cracow in 1805. Four years later, in 1809, Polish was reinstated at this university when Cracow found itself within the boundaries of the Duchy of Warsaw. In 1815 the Congress of Vienna made Cracow and its vicinity into a Free City of Cracow with Polish as its official language. This de facto Austrian protectorate survived until 1846 when the Austrian Empire annexed it, meaning that Polish was again replaced with German. Meanwhile, in the Hungarian lands of the Austrian Empire, Hungarian superseded Latin in 1843, though in Croatia and Slavonia the process was not completed until 1847.

The persistence of Latin in the Kingdom of Hungary was partly due to the fact that Hungarian had not been developed into a full-fledged Einzelsprache in its own right by the mid-nineteenth century. A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, MTA) was founded in 1825 in Pozsony (today’s Slovak capital of Bratislava). But in reality, it was inactive until 1830. In 1827 the MTA relocated to Buda, where the Hungarian capital had been moved from Pozsony (or Préßburg in German) in 1874. The work on an academic dictionary of Hungarian commenced in the mid-1840s, but almost immediately was stopped in tracks by the 1848 revolutions, which in Hungary culminated in an anti-Habsburg rebellion, known in Hungarian historiography as the Hungarian War of Independence. Finally, the six-volume A magyar nyelv
szótára (Dictionary of the Hungarian Language) came off the press between 1862 and 1874. Tellingly, it was a joint work, commenced by the Benedictine monk and philologist Gergely (István) Czuczor and completed by the jurist and linguist János Fogarasi. The former compiler’s ecclesiastical background was an echo of the Jesuits’ Latin-language educational system. The ideology of ethno-linguistic nationalism, as formulated in 1812 during the Napoleonic wars, had become one of central Europe’s leading political forces by the mid-nineteenth century. An important dimension of this process was the growing identification of Fraktur (or the Gothic type) with Germanness, which led to the replacement of this type with Antiqua for writing and printing the Protestant Einzelsprachen of Scandinavia and the Baltic littoral. Following the decline of the Hanseatic League in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Luther’s (High) German replaced this League’s Low German as the preferred written language along the southern North Sea and Baltic littorals. When no power center chose to be associated with a budding Einzelsprache, the Bible was not translated into it, no academy was founded to support it, and no authoritative dictionary of it was produced. As a result, such a nascent language faded into obscurity. Obscurity in this case means the restriction of a language to predominantly oral usage, with little and dramatically decreasing employment in writing. The concept of Einzelsprache entails that no “proper” language can be recognized as such unless it is extensively employed for official written purposes and publishing.

A similar fate befell Lingua Franca on the Mediterranean shores as it was gradually replaced with Tuscan and French in its role of the dominant medium of mutual, and increasingly written, communication between sailors from the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe. The “question of language,” or of the relations between Latin and the vernaculars within the West Romance dialect continuum, displayed similar dynamics to the relations between (Church) Slavonic and the Orthodox Slavophone Einzelsprachen. It was a game of degrees of separation with no clear-cut borders established any time soon. Venice’s maritime empire in the Adriatic and eastern Mediterranean made Venetian into the main lingua franca in these areas, however, the Republic’s elite preferred to read and write in Tuscan. In the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, included in 1442 among the lands ruled by the King of Aragon (today in north-eastern Spain), official Latin was replaced with local Romance vernaculars, namely Neapolitan and Sicilian, though these were highly Latinized. Latin was both these budding Einzelsprachen’s “high style.” But the growing fame and prestige of Tuscan (Italian) meant that since the turn of the sixteenth century Neapolitan and Sicilian literati chose to write in this northern language or stuck to Latin. Accademia Pontaniana, founded at Naples in 1443, did not support a project of an authoritative dictionary of Neapolitan. The academy patronized poets and singers who used Neapolitan, but scholarly or any other “serious” work was written either in Latin or Tuscan. Meanwhile, the growing prestige of the Imperial Einzelsprache of Castilian (Spanish) brushed off onto Spain’s Mediterranean possessions, including these two kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. After 1535 it became popular to refer to Castilian as “Spanish,” courtesy of Juan de Valdés’s influential treatise Diálogo de la lengua published in Naples in 1535. (Then Naples was Christian Europe’s second largest city after Paris.) Seven years later, in 1542, the Spanish Viceroy closed the Accademia Pontaniana for the sake of propagating the official use of Spanish in place of Latin and Tuscan. Following the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714) Spain was centralized, meaning the liquidation of local territorial autonomies, especially in the lands of Aragon, between 1707 and 1716. The legal documents instituting this new order are known collectively as the Decretos de Nueva Planta and made Spanish (Castilian) the sole official language of the Kingdom of Spain. This decision was given a sound scholarly underpinning when a Real Academia Española (Royal Spanish Academy) was founded in Madrid in 1713. This Academia published a six-volume authoritative (academic) dictionary of Spanish Diccionario de Autoridades between 1726 and 1739.

The early modern period in Western and Central Europe saw a generalized drive to build secular (vernacular) Einzelsprachen through authoritative grammars and dictionaries, produced by official academies, in turn founded by the state or monarch. State power was increasingly coupled with an Einzelsprache to the exclusion of any others that did not enjoy such state support. The authorized translation of the Bible into a coalescing Einzelsprache and its widespread use in administration, publishing, and education were required to complete this process of linguistic engineering. However, in the Ottoman Empire at the acme of its political and military power during the seventeenth century, it was not deemed advisable to follow the ways of the “Franks,” as Christian Western Europeans had been collectively dubbed in the Middle East since the crusades. The Arabic of the Quran was sufficient to support the ideal of writing correctly in this language, while the corpus of Sufi writings and court poetry played the same role for maintaining the standard of Persian. On the other hand, in the case of Osmanlıca the correct usage based on the well-established traditions of the written employment of this Einzelsprache in the imperial administration. However, the Sultan’s court was de facto the final arbiter in this regard. How courtiers and court scribes tended to write in Osmanlıca set the changing standards of this language’s proper usage.

However, both Western and Ottoman attitudes to written language met and intensively interacted in the Ottomans’ autonomous Transylvania, Walachia, and Moldavia. The use of Latin letters for writing Walachian (Romanian) in Transylvania and the imposition of Roman (Greek) with its specific alphabet as the official language in the Danubian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia amply demonstrated that languages were not inherently (or by any divine will) wed to the script of a “holy tongue.” These examples, even more so than in Western Europe, prepared the ground for conscious linguistic engineering during the nineteenth century when ethnolinguistic nationalism swept across Central Europe. Similar processes unfolded in the Habsburg’s Military Borderland located in this area of historic Hungary that faced the Ottoman Empire, that is, in today’s western and northern Croatia and northern Serbia. To ensure the loyalty of the crucial Borderland’s inhab-
itants to the Habsburg monarch, serfdom was abolished, and peasants were allowed to follow their religion of choice, including Orthodox Christianity. The Latin and Orthodox alphabets were used side by side. Fraktur was employed for writing and printing in German, while Antiqua for Croatian and Hungarian. With time, Church Cyrillic was also joined by Russia’s Grazhdanka across the Military Borderland, when Orthodox authors began to write more secular books. The Franciscan Joakim Stulli (Joakim Stulić) from the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) compiled a six-volume Latin-Italian-Illyrian (Croatian) dictionary, *Lexicon latino–italico–Illyricum/Rječnica slovinsko–italijsko–latinsko /Vocabolario italiano–illirico-latino*, which was published in 1801–1810 in Buda and Ragusa (Dubrovnik). Vuk Karadžić’s 1818 Serbian–German–Latin dictionary (*Српски рјечник истолкован њемачким и латинским ријечма Srpski rječnik istolkovan njemačkim i latino-slovinsko-italijanskim i latinskim riječima/Serbsch-Deutsch-Lateinisches Wörterbuch*) published in Vienna, introduced the idea that it would be possible to replace Church Slavonic with vernacular Serbian also for written purposes. However, (Church) Slavonic and Slaveno-Serbian (a mixture of the Russian recension of Slavonic with Serbian vernacular, quite similar to Lomonosov’s “middle style”) remained the official language of Serbia until the 1860s.

Across the frontier in Ottoman Bosnia, the scriptural unity of the Islamic world allowed for the rise of Slavophone vernacular literacy in Arabic letters to which the codifiers of today’s Bosnian language often refer to. In the Rum (Roman, that is, Orthodox) Millet the New Testament Greek language removed almost two millennia from Demotic (vernacular Greek) remained official, then also in the nation-state of Greece, and for that matter until 1976. This diglossia (or the use of different languages, or divergent forms of a language in different spheres of life) between the standard Arabic of the Quran and the vernacular Arabic ("dialects") continues to this day. Jews, whether they resided in the Ottoman Empire or elsewhere across Central Europe, stuck to their “holy tongue” of (Biblical) Hebrew. This explains why Yiddish used to be disparagingly referred to as a “jargon” by many Jews themselves until the mid-twentieth century, while numerous Sephardim of the Ottoman Empire abandoned their Spanyol in favor of French during the nineteenth century. Interestingly, Armenians were more ready to follow the Western model of building Einzelsprachen, mainly thanks to the Catholic Armenian foundation of San Lazzaro degli Armeni (Սուրբ Ղազար Surb Ghazar) in Venice, as established by Mkhitar Sebastatsi (see Map 8). In 1749 and 1769 he and his pupils published the two volumes of an extensive dictionary of the Grabar (Classical Armenian), which in some parts was paired with Ashkharabar (New Armenian). Tellingly Ashkharabar (Աշխարհաբար) literally means “secular, non-ecclesiastical language,” while Grabar (Սրբ Ղազար) means “literary, written language.” The former name encapsulates the Western concept of Einzelsprache as a secular language, decoupled from a Church, “holy book,” or religion. A full century after the completion of Sebastatsi’s dictionary, in 1869, also in Vienna, a large Ashkharabar-Grabar dictionary came off the press. Its enlarged second edition appeared in 1910. Thus, the boundary and continuities between these two were firmly established. This foundation was the first Armenian “academy of sciences,” (self-)tasked with the construction and standardization of a modern Armenian language, like Tuscany’s Accademia della Crusca or the Académie française.

Quite symbolically, the repeated reinforced separation of a “holy tongue” and a secular Einzelsprache also marked the boundary between the politics of early modernity dominated by religion and the modern age of ethnolinguistic nationalisms. The Western and Central European story of building Einzelsprachen was closely intertwined with secularizing and popularizing the use of writing and publishing, with an eye to deploying it for statehood building, legitimization, and maintenance. It was a messy process of moving from the norm of the divine right to rule to that of *cuius regio, eius religio*, and then to the modern national norm of *cuius regio, eius lingua* (whose realm, his language).
It is often remarked that the twentieth century was a “dark century” of European history, blighted by total war, authoritarianisms, totalitarianisms, genocide and ethnic cleansing. A nuancing caveat comes in the form of the recently developed notion of “Bloodlands” for the large swath of Central Europe where both Hitler’s and Stalin’s murderous regimes subsequently expelled and killed on a mass scale ethnic non-Germans and ethnic non-Russians during World War Two. Hence, the popular tendency is to identify ethnic cleansing and genocide with this war and its immediate aftermath. Although the former phenomenon typically evokes the brutal images of the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s. This association is deepened by the fact that the term “ethnic cleansing” is a translation from Serbo-Croatian that entered the international vocabulary of international relations and international law only in the mid-1990s. Similarly, the term “genocide” is a neologism, coined in 1943 by the Polish Jewish jurist, Raphael (Rafał) Lemkin, before it became part of international law in 1948 when the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

However, the phenomena denoted by both terms did take place much earlier. Instances of genocide from the past used to be referred to as “massacres,” “atrocities,” or “crimes against humanity,” while those of ethnic cleansing as “exoduses,” “expulsions” or “population transfers.” These terms were applied rather vaguely, and in the eyes of public opinion, “massacres” were often equated with “normal” war killings, and expulsions with the “typical” phenomenon of refugees when civilians flee war zones, or even with emigration. The steep rise in the degree of extermination, as characteristic of genocide, was lost in this terminological vagueness, alongside the fact that ethnic cleaners aim at removing a specific “type” of population from one state to another in their entirety. Before these two respective terms were coined, defined, and adopted by international law, there was no clear awareness that genocide and ethnic cleansing are instruments of demographic engineering and warfare. It appeared that no ruler, politician, general, or other decision-maker could be “so vile” to consider such an “evil” act. What is more, the confusion deepened between the end of the Great War and the mid-1990s, when the legal term “population transfer” was widely seen as an instrument for ensuring the observance of human rights and for furthering peace and stability. Politicians and public opinion both considered forced expulsions of thousands, or even millions, against their will as legal, if this helped bring about a desired form of homogeneity (usually, religious, linguistic, or both) in a given nation-state. As such the instrument of population transfer was then enshrined in numerous treaties contracted under international law and enforced accordingly. The belief was then rife that when the populations of all Central Europe’s nation-states were made ethnically (that is, linguistically or religiously) homogenous, stable peace and prosperity would be ensured across the continent. “Un-mixing” of populations followed swiftly, wrecking havoc on a continental scale.

Ethnic cleansing and genocide have taken place in Central Europe time and again since the early modern period, as indicated by the religiously motivated expulsions of Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Protestants or Orthodox Christians in the fourteenth-eighteenth centuries, alongside the examples of the near-genocidal military conflicts of the Thirty Years’ War, the 1654–1667 War between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy (Thirteen Years’ War), or the Great Northern War. These forms of drastic demographic engineering became possible with the rise of the modern state characterized by ubiquitous bureaucracy, relative literacy (almost invariably full among the ruling elite), and centralized government. This triad was underwritten by a variety of methods and technological means to register and control the state’s inhabitants, identify “unwanted groups,” and deploy military rapidly across the polity’s entire territory, also for the sake of removing or exterminating selected “unwanted populations.” From the sociological perspective, both ethnic cleansing and genocide are an exercise in the targeted waging of the state’s “legal monopoly of violence.”

Because the concept of Central Europe as adopted for this atlas encompasses the vertical mid-section of Europe from Scandinavia to the Balkans, the Great War is not a good cesura, either for the end of the so-called “long nineteenth century,” or for the commencement of the “short twentieth century” of totalitarianisms. The two Balkan Wars (1912–1914) engulfed the southern half of the region two years before the formal outbreak of World War One, while the latter conflict continued there and in much of Central and Eastern Europe until 1923, though this late leg of the generalized warfare is usually known under the separate monikers of the Russian Civil War and the Turkish War of Independence (also known as the Asia Minor Catastrophe in Greek historiography). Hence, the “Long Great War” lasted across vast swaths of Central Europe for over one decade, from 1912 to 1923.

Map 11 begins the atlas’s series of maps devoted to ethnic cleansing and genocide during the “bloody twentieth century.”
Ethnic Cleansing in Central Europe Before the Balkan Wars

This introduction takes a glance at selected examples of such phenomena from the eighteenth century until the early twentieth century (or in other words, through the “long nineteenth century”). During this period religion was predominantly used to identify unwanted populations for expulsion or extermination. In the wake of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Western and Central Europe, the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion) underwrote the new norm of religious (denominational) homogeneity within the boundaries of a single polity. This norm was alien to the Ottoman Empire, where monotheists of different creeds were organized into non-territorial autonomies, known as millets. However, Austrian (Habsburg), Russian and Western European incursions that facilitated the rise of the Christian nation-states in the Balkans at the expense of the Ottomans, also introduced this norm of confessional homogeneity to this Empire-cum-Caliphate.

The first early modern wave of religiously-motivated instances of ethnic cleansing (expulsions) was connected to the “rounding up” of the religious wars after the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648. People of the “wrong religion” (denomination) either had to convert to the state religion (denomination), or leave. One of the best-known examples of this kind is the expulsion-forced emigration of about 150,000 Protestants from the Habsburgs’ Bohemia to Prussia and other Protestant polities in the north of the Holy Roman Empire, between the 1620s and 1650s. Later, in the wake of the wars between Prussia and the Habsburgs, between 1713 and 1716, about 0.9 million Protestants left the Habsburg lands for Prussia and other Protestant polities. The process lasted through the eighteenth century, when the principle of religious tolerance became more widespread, as exemplified by Emperor Joseph II’s 1782 Edict of Tolerance issued for the Habsburg hereditary lands. The Habsburgs’ reconquest of the lands of the Kingdom of Hungary resulted in the fluctuation of the frontier between their lands and the Ottoman Empire. The Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox populations caught in the middle of this prolonged struggle switched sides trying to predict who might be the winner of a given conflict. The Ottomans often saw this pragmatic survival attitude as disloyalty of their Christian subjects. Similarly, Habsburg forces considered as “renegades” those Christian subjects of the Sultan who chose to remain loyal to the Ottomans. Reprisals multiplied; vast areas were depopulated. Considerable numbers of Christians felt compelled to leave the Ottoman Empire for the Habsburg lands or the Russian Empire, while Muslims (often alongside Jews) left the territories lost to Christian powers for the shrinking Ottoman Empire.

Muscovy’s westward expansion at the expense of Poland-Lithuania and other independent Rus’ principalities was driven by the desire to “gather all the lands of Rus” in a single polity. On the other hand, Muscovy’s southward and eastward expansion was driven by the undeclared program of “gathering the lands of the Golden Horde.” This program was explicitly underwritten by the myth of Moscow as the “third and last Rome” of the Orthodox world. When Peter the Great overhauled Muscovy into a Russian Empire in 1721 in the wake of his victory in the Great Northern War, the seizure of Constantinople (Istanbul), or the “second Rome,” became the ultimate goal of Russia’s southward expansion. Between the 1770s and 1870s, in a series of devastating wars on the Ottoman Empire and its vassals, Russia annexed the entire northern littoral of the Black Sea from the mouth of the Danube in the west to the Caucasus in the east. The area’s population was overwhelmingly Muslim and predominantly Turkic-speaking. In most cases they were expelled or even exterminated, which was the fate of the Caucasian-speaking Circassians and of many Crimean Tatars in 1864. After this year almost no Circassians were left in Circassia (or today’s Krasnodar Krai in Russia). In the wake of the Russian conquests, Muslim survivors and refugees left on foot or by ship across the Black Sea for the Ottoman Empire. Ironically, a plurality settled in Rumelia, or the Ottoman Balkans, from where they were again expelled or had to flee, alongside the local Muslim populations, following further Russo-Ottoman wars and the founding of the Christian nation-states of Montenegro, Serbia, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria between the turn of the nineteenth century and 1878. The sole Balkan nation-state from which Muslims were not expelled or felt compelled to emigrate was Albania founded in 1912. Unlike the other Balkan national polities founded on the ethnonational principle, Albania was established on the basis of the ethnolinguistic principle, that is, as a nation-state for all Albanian speakers, irrespective of their religion. It was the only pragmatic solution for preventing the partition of the Albanian-speaking territories between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, and for enabling Albanian-speaking Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox Christians to cooperate within a single polity in line with the Ottoman tradition of confessional tolerance.

Some commentators on genocide and ethnic cleansing in the course of the wars of Yugoslav succession during the 1990s see the origin of these phenomena in the Balkans in the 1702 extermination of “Turks” (that is, Muslims) in the de facto independent Montenegro. However, there is no document confirming that this extermination ever took place. It was the Vladika (Prince-Bishop) of Montenegro, Petar II Petrović-Njegoš, who seems to have invented this event in his verse epic The Mountain Wreath (1847). Rather than being a commentary on the events at the turn of the eighteenth century, this epic poem expresses the attitudes of the mid-nineteenth century which saw the extermination of populations of “wrong religion,” as legitimate, as long as it was non-Christians perishing at the hands of Christians. The mass expulsions and massacres of Muslims during the Greek Uprising (or Greek War of Independence) and in the territories seized by Russia from the Ottomans, culminating in the 1864 Circassian Genocide, hardly raised an eyebrow in European (Christian, Western) public opinion. However, increasingly more brutal Ottoman reprisals in kind were often exaggerated and dubbed as “atrocities.” It was seen as “the proof” of “immeasurable sufferings” of Christians under the half a millennium-long “Turkish yoke.”

The rise of the ethnolinguistically defined nation-states of Italy (1861) and Germany (1871) as main European powers posed ethnolinguistic nationalism as a new desired norm
of statehood creation, legitimization, and maintenance across Central Europe. Similarly, reprisals in the wake of the failed anti-Russian uprising of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility (1863–1864) were centered around the policy of replacing Polish with Russian as the official language in Russia’s (Congress) Kingdom of Poland. In the 1880s this policy of enforcing Russian as the sole official language was extended across the entire European section of the Russian Empire. The early modern principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* was replaced with a new one of *cuius regio, eius lingua* (whose realm, his language). Due to European incursions and “modernizing reforms” that emulated European-style governance, elements of this new principle were also adopted in the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the confessional unity of the Rum (Orthodox Christian) Millet was split in 1870, when the Sultan founded a Bulgarian (Bulgarian) Millet for Slavophone Orthodox populations. On top of that, although traditionally millets (or ethnoconfessional autonomies) were non-territorial in their character, the Bulgarian Millet was endowed with a defined territory in the form of a Bulgarian Exarchate, founded in 1872. In this way the model of ethnolinguistic nation-state entered the Ottoman Empire in the guise of the traditional institution of millet.

That is why the 1894–1896 genocide (“massacres”) of Armenians in Anatolia is typically interpreted in national (that is, ethnolinguistic) terms, though the targeted populations were identified not through their language of everyday communication, but by the fact that they were the faithful of the Monophysitic Armenian Apostolic Church. Armenian-speaking Muslims were not touched by these killings, while Turkic-speaking Monophysites were. Likewise, nowadays, earlier expulsions and exterminations tend to be reinterpreted in national (ethnolinguistic) terms. After the failed war (1795) and uprisings (1830–1831 and 1863–1864) against Russia, the Russian authorities exiled tens of thousands of Polish-Lithuanian nobles to Siberia. However, in Polish history textbooks these exiles are portrayed as “Poles,” that is, members of the Polish nation defined as (Catholic) speakers of the Polish language. The first clear-cut instances of expulsion driven by ethnolinguistic nationalism in Central Europe are perhaps that connected to the creation of Germany as an ethnolinguistic nation-state. Shortly prior to and in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), 40,000 ethnic German-speakers (mostly Prussian subjects) left France for Prussia, while after the Prussian annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, over 100,000 French (many bilingual) left the region for France (many resettling in French Algeria, from where, a century later, their descendants had to flee, following the 1962 independence of Algeria). After the founding of the German Empire as a nation-state, several thousand Danes were expelled from the northernmost part of this country to Denmark in 1898–1899. On the plane of confession, both the expellees and the expellers shared the same religion of Lutheranism (Protestantism). An earlier example of the so-called 1885–1887 “Prussian expulsions” (rugi pruskie), as known in Polish historiography, although portrayed as an ethnic cleansing of “Poles,” in reality was a mixed case of an expulsion that straddled the transition from religion to language as the instrument of identifying “unwanted populations.” The Kingdom of Prussia, within the boundaries of the German Empire, decided to round up and deport from its territory subjects of the Russian Tsar and the Austro-Hungarian Monarch, who happened to be Poles (that is, Polish-speaking Catholics) and Jews (that is, Yiddish-speaking Judaisms). From today’s perspective of growing xenophobia (especially after 2015), this expulsion could be also seen as a deportation of “illegal immigrants.”

A possibility of accommodating religious and linguistic differences in a peaceful and constructive manner was shown by Austria-Hungary’s occupation of Bosnia (and Herzegovina) and Sanjak (Sandžak), which was imposed on both territories in 1878. Apart from adding German to both regions’ official languages, the occupation authorities retained the use of Osmanlaca (Ottoman Turkish), alongside Slavic written in Arabic letters (“Bosnian” or “Arebica”) for Muslims, in the Latin alphabet (“Croatian”) for Catholics and in Cyrillic (“Serbian”) for Orthodox Christians. The freedom of confession continued with Arabic as the liturgical language for Muslims, Latin for Catholics, Church Slavonic for Orthodox Christians, and Hebrew for Jews. The ownership of land and properties, as established under the former Ottoman law, was meticulously observed for the sake of preserving socio-economic stability. However, this was a lone experiment, which was not emulated. The obverse of it, in 1878, was the largely forgotten ethnic cleansing of over half a million (overwhelmingly Turkic-speaking) Muslims from the Bulgarian nation-state founded in the wake of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 (known as the Bulgarian War of Independence in Bulgarian historiography, and as the War of 1293 AH [After Hijra] in Ottoman and Turkish historiography).

Today’s focus on ethnic cleansing and genocide often leads to the neglect of other phenomena of generalized unfreedom, which might but did not have to be correlated with ethnicity defined in linguistic, religious, or other terms. The institution of serfdom, or unpaid labor obligation that peasantry was due to provide landowning noblemen and churchmen was gradually liquidated in the Austrian Empire and across Prussia from the turn of the nineteenth century to 1849. In the Russian Empire, where serfdom was the mainstay of economy in the lands seized from the partitioned Poland-Lithuania, the dismantling of serfdom began only in the 1860s and was not complete until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Interestingly, serfdom did not exist either in Scandinavia or the Ottoman Empire. However, tenant farmers and landless agricultural laborers were, in numerous ways, excluded from participating in politics and the usual routes of social advancement in the former area until the 1870s, while arbitrary administration or scant administrative oversight in far-flung provinces allowed for unsanctioned serfdom-like oppression of peasantry in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, slavery was not outlawed in this empire until 1909.

The question often arises whether there was any difference between serfdom and slavery. At its worst, serfdom was quite similar to slavery, including posses hunting for fugitive serfs. The difference, however, was that a serf was not a chattel and could not be legally sold or bought. That said, noth-
ing stopped a noble landowner from selling a village of serfs to another nobleman. Obviously, the purchaser also acquired the serfs’ duty to render unpaid labor. No serf was free to leave their village unless allowed by the land’s noble owner. The case of the Danubian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia is quite interesting regarding serfdom and slavery. In these autonomous (vassal) territories of the Ottoman Empire serfdom existed until the mid-eighteenth century. Ending this system triggered a wave of serf fugitives from Transylvania, another autonomous Ottoman territory, where serfdom was liquidated under the Habsburgs only a century later. The late phase of Walachian and Moldovan serfdom was particularly close to slavery, because rogue noble (boyar) landowners did sell and buy individual serfs as chattel. They turned a blind eye to the legal difference between serfdom and slavery, because apart from serfs, in these Danubian Principalities many nobles and churchmen also possessed slaves. The two systems of serfdom and slavery existed there side by side, with a blurry boundary between them. But the latter was heavily ethnicized, because it was legal to enslave only the Indic-speaking Roma (“Gypsies”).

The end of Roma slavery in Moldavia in 1855 and a year later in Walachia triggered a wave of Roma emigrants to Austria’s Kingdom of Hungary and Russia’s Black Sea provinces. Freed Roma feared that if they remained at home slavery could be reintroduced. Slavery was abolished in the Russian Empire in 1723, but the majority of former slaves were turned into serfs, rather than freed. However, the Russian conquests at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic polities in the Caucasus and Central Asia constantly brought into the empire new territories where slavery was still practiced. Officially, slavery was abolished there during the 1860s and 1880s, but in many ways this institution persisted until 1917. Many of these slaves were Persians and some “Russians” (Slavophones) captured in never-ending skirmishes with the Russian military.
The political map of Central Europe remained relatively stable following the partition of Poland-Lithuania in the late eighteenth century, apart from the continuing territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire to the Habsburgs and the Russian Empire. The Napoleonic wars disturbed this political order for a decade and a half at the very beginning of the nineteenth century. However, the Congress of Vienna (1815) largely recreated the region’s political map as it had been before. The biggest political change that stayed was the disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire. It dissolved in 1806, while the Habsburgs’ hereditary lands, in anticipation of such a development, had been made into an Austrian Empire in 1804.

But European monarchs and diplomats assembled at Vienna in 1815 patched up the loss of this empire with a German Confederation. A more noticeable political change of a permanent character was that of Sweden’s loss of Finland to Russia, followed by Denmark-Norway’s loss of Norway to Sweden.

The stirrings of nationalism, in emulation of the military and political success of revolutionary France made into a nation-state, were quite successfully suppressed in Central Europe after the Congress of Vienna. But the idea of ethnolinguistic nationalism, as firmly formulated during the last leg of wars against the Napoleonic Empire (1812–1815), remained, and its popularity steadily spread across the region split among the studiously non-national empires of the Habsburgs, Ottomans and Romanovs. The Hohenzollerns of the burgeoning Kingdom of Prussia also pledged to maintain this status quo. Worryingly, the German Confederation had the national adjective “German” in its name, but none of this Confederation’s monarchs wished to act on behalf of German nationalism. They preferred to safeguard their monarchies. The 1848 revolutions (known collectively as the “Springtime of the Nations” in the region’s teleologically-minded national historiographies; the term initially appeared in German-language publications as Völkerfrühling), which were mainly national in their character, rattled the Austrian Empire, Prussia, and the rest of the German Confederation, but did not spill over either to Russia or the Ottoman Empire. None of these national revolutions was successful in establishing an independent nation-state in accordance with the tenets of ethnolinguistic nationalism. The Hungarian-speaking coalition of nobles and burghers were the closest to achieve this goal during the Hungarian Revolution of 1848–1849 (also known as the Hungarian War of Independence in Hungarian national historiography). But Russian intervention squashed Hungary’s national revolutionaries and saved the unity of the Austrian Empire.

The failure of the 1848 revolutions is well remembered to the neglect of the fact that as part and parcel of some of these revolutions, and on their own, peasantry rebelled on an unprecedented scale. In Central Europe, from the grassroots perspective, these 1848 revolutions were more anti-serfdom in their character than national. Nationalism was of acute interest to the estates of nobles and burghers, alongside the underemployed intelligentsia (stemming mainly from these two groups), but not to the peasants. However, at that time peasants added up to about 90 percent of the region’s population. The 1840s blight and unseasonal weather deprived peasants of the usual volume of crop several years in a row, which did not stop noble landowners from extracting the same amount of agricultural produce or monetary payments due from “their” serfs. This led to widespread hunger, malnourishment, and epidemics that killed hundreds of thousands. These developments triggered the Great Irish Famine, remembered and commemorated because it was made into one of the founding myths of Irish nationalism. On the contrary, the continental famines are largely forgotten, because the peasants who suffered hunger and their descendants were fashioned into Central Europe’s nations which were largely shaped by nobles, burghers, and intelligentsia. These national elites did not share with the peasant masses the memory of the 1840s famines and hunger. But in 1848, these unprecedented privations made serfs rebel across many areas of Central Europe. In the German Confederation they found a vocal advocate in the person of Hans Kudlich. In the Austrian Reichstag (Imperial Parliament) he drafted and ensured the passing of an act that abolished serfdom in the Austrian Empire. Most revolutionary measures were revoked after the failure of the 1848 revolutions, apart from the abolishment of serfdom. This success earned Kudlich the nickname Bauernbefreier (Liberator of Peasants) and the lasting hatred of the ruling estate of nobles. In 1917 he died as an impoverished émigré in the United States. During the long six decades after 1848, he was never allowed to travel, even for a brief visit, to the Austrian Empire (Austria-Hungary), Prussia (German Empire) or elsewhere in the German Confederation.

On the other hand, monarchs’ rapprochement with nationalists was much swifter. The rise of ethnolinguistic nation-states (Montenegro, Serbia, Greece, Romania, or Bulgaria) in the Ottoman Balkans since the beginning of the nineteenth century was followed by the founding of the Kingdom of Italy and
Residual presence of Greek-speakers
Indic, noticeable presence of Roma
More than 10% Germanic-, i.e., Yiddish-speaking Jews
Germanic
Presence of Finno-Ugric-speakers
Finno-Ugric (Finnic)
Baltic
Albanian
Dispersed Germanic-speaking settlements or noticeable presence of Germanic-speakers
North Slavic
Substantial presence of North Slavic-speakers
South Slavic
Substantial presence of South Slavic-speakers
Turkic
Substantial presence of Turkic-speaking Jews
East Romance
West Romance
West Romance-, i.e., Spanish-speaking Jews
North Slavic
Substantial presence of North Slavic-speakers
Substantial presence of Greek-speakers
Greek
Substantial presence of Greek-speakers
Indic, substantial presence of Roma
Indic, noticeable presence of Roma
Turkic-speaking
Armenian communities
State borders
Borders of autonomous entities, and Italian regions
Jewish Pale of Settlement
Names of provinces other than capitals
Names of autonomous entities
State capitals

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the German Empire as nation-states in 1861 and 1871, respectively. The creation of the latter national polity was preceded by the Seven Weeks’ War (1866) between Prussia and the Austrian Empire, fought in order to decide which state was the actual hegemon in the German Confederation. Vienna’s defeat opened the way for Prussia to overtake the northern half of this Confederation into a German nation-state. However, the loss of legitimacy spelled by this defeat convinced the Austrian Emperor to introduce political concessions for ethnolinguistic nationalists. As a result, in 1867, the Austrian Empire was transformed into a Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The Kingdom of Hungary functioned as a largely autonomous Hungarian nation-state. Within this kingdom, in 1868, a similar national autonomy defined in ethnolinguistic terms was extended to the Croats in Croatia-Slavonia. In the “Austrian half” of the Dual Monarchy (often dubbed “Cisleithania,” but officially known as Die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, or “Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Imperial Council”), numerous crownlands (provinces) received ethnolinguistically defined autonomies, including the use of a variety of languages in administration and education. The main inscriptions on the Austro-Hungarian banknotes were in German and Hungarian, but also in Croatian, Czech, Italian, Polish, Romanian, Ruthenian (Ukrainian), Slovenian and Serbian. In 1907 full male suffrage was introduced in Cisleithania, which in turn fortified ethnolinguistically defined national parties, especially across the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy.

No concessions, especially of linguistic character, were given to nascent national movements in the Russian Empire, where in the European part all local languages were banned from administration and education, fully replaced with Russian after the 1880s. The only exception was the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland, where official Swedish and Finnish were ordered to be replaced with Russian in 1900, but this provision was breached, due to the widespread grassroots opposition. The 1905 Revolution in the wake of the empire’s defeat at the hands of Japan cut short this stalemate. Full male suffrage was introduced, alongside the freedom to use local languages in publishing and education, while also in administration in the Grand Duchy of Finland. Like in Austria-Hungary, numerous ethnolinguistically defined national parties entered the Duma (Russian Parliament). Despite these democratizing changes, the confessionally defined Jewish Pale of Settlement, as established in the late eighteenth century, remained in place, limiting the spatial mobility of Jews to the former Polish-Lithuanian lands and the Black Sea littoral won from the Ottomans.

The concession won for the use of previously banned or suppressed languages led to the resumption of publishing in Lithuanian and Latvian with the use of Latin letters (previously banned), alongside White Russian (Belarusian) and Little Russian (Ukrainian). Earlier any publishing in these two latter languages was banned on the understanding that they were dialects of (Great) Russian. After 1905 the official classification of Belarusian and Ukrainian did not change in the Russian Empire, but books and periodicals published in both languages firmly made them into recognizable and eventually recognized Einzelsprachen (language in their own right). Like in Austria-Hungary, Ukrainian was written and printed in Cyrillic, however, Belarusian-language publications were produced in “Polish” (Latin) letters for Uniates (Greek Catholics) and in “Russian letters” (Cyrillic) for Orthodox Christians. In Estland and northern Lifland (Livonia), from which today’s Estonia is composed, publishing in Estonian in Latin letters continued as in the past (because no ban on the Latin alphabet was ever introduced in the case of this language). In Bessarabia (today’s Moldova), the use of the Moldovan language was allowed, but in Cyrillic, though some pro-Romanian nationalists managed to publish a handful of brochures in Latin letters, and openly referred to this language as “Romanian.” The liberalization broadened the use of German and Polish in publications. Although previously none of these two languages had been banned, the operation of German- and Polish-language publishers tended to be limited to certain provinces.

Tellingly, the post-1905 relaxation in political, social, and cultural control across the Russian Empire resulted in the decision to hold, in 1908, an international conference on the Yiddish language in Czernowitz (today’s Chernivtsi in Ukraine), or the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Crownland of Bukovina. The region was located close to Russia, Romania, and the Kingdom of Hungary, or in the very midst of the Yiddish-speaking zone, allowing all the interested parties to participate. This conference decisively rejected the traditional Jewish and goyim (non-Jewish) perception of Yiddish as an unworthy “jargon,” intimating that the terms “jargon” and “dialect” mean “nothing more than a language that gets no respect” (Lippi-Green 2012: 47). It was high time that Jews and goyim alike started respecting Yiddish. The conference’s proceedings paved the way for the standardization and unification of Yiddish and helped turn the Yiddish-speaking areas of Central Europe into Yiddishland, or the culturally and linguistically demarcated Jewish nation-state (Map 16). Crucial to achieving both ends was the founding of Yiddish YIVO (Yidisher Vishesbeitslekher Institut, meaning Yiddish Scientific Institute) in 1925 in Wilno (today, Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania). It was the first-ever national Jewish academy of sciences, which followed closely the research-cum-political program of building, standardizing, and endowing a language with respect, on the model of Florence’s Accademia della Crusca or the Académie française. This aforementioned “cultural polity” of Yiddishland did not appear on any maps, its representatives (writers, poets, journalists, or researchers) did not claim this geographical space for exclusive use as a Jewish state. Sharing territory, regions, towns, and streets with speakers of other languages and the faithful of other religions was fine with most Jews. It was a late flowering of the Central European tradition of non-territorial autonomies. But all Yiddish-speakers knew where this Yiddishland was located in the geographical sense and whether a given city was part of it or not.

A similar development was observed among European Russia’s Muslims. As in the case of Jews, the tsarist authorities did not intend to assimilate them because of the religious difference that in many ways was perceived as unbridgeable. On
the other hand, it was deemed possible to assimilate Christians of various creeds, hence banning their languages and replacing them with Russian for official use was seen as a good instrument to accelerating this process. In culture and education Jews and Muslims were left to their own devices. Neither Yiddish nor any Muslim language was banned in Russia before 1905. Jadidism (from the Perso-Arabic word جدید jadīd “new”), or the movement for propagating the “new method of teaching” by comprehension (not by rote) originated among the Crimean Tatars at the turn of the 1880s, leading to the standardization and secularization of the Arabic script-based Crimean Tatar, and its use in books and periodicals. Ismail Gaspirali created and directed this movement by establishing schools, newspapers, organizations, and a party. He himself became a de facto Crimean Tatar “academy of sciences,” thanks to his activities and lasting influence. On the other hand, the decade of the 1880s was the time when bans on the use of Christians’ other languages, except the imperial tongue of Russian, swept across European Russia in accordance with the policy of Russification. Hence, the changes brought about by the 1905 Revolution were not really so momentous for the Crimean Tatar language and the empire’s Muslims, as in the case of European Russia’s Christian national movements. However, these changes allowed for the intensification of publishing and education with the employment of Crimean Tatar, inspiring a similar cultural-cum-educational movements in the newly secularized and standardized languages of Tatar (in today’s Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in the Russian Federation), Tatar-Turkic (Azerbaijani in the Caucasus), or Turkic (Uzbek, in today’s Uzbekistan).

Interestingly, also in 1905, due to prolonged constitutional crisis in Sweden-Norway, after a plebiscite, Norway gained independence from Sweden. Hence, Sweden lost its semi-imperial character and became a nation-state for the ethnolinguistically defined nation of Swedish-speaking Lutherans. Likewise, Independent Norway was fashioned into an ethnolinguistic nation-state for the nation of Norwegian-speaking Lutherans. Although the peculiarity is often overlooked by foreign observers, the Norwegian language comes in two different varieties of equal status, namely, Bokmål (“Book Language”) and Nynorsk (“New Norwegian”). This dual language constituted a vital inspiration for the creation of the Czechoslovak language (consisting of the two equal varieties of Czech and Slovak for interwar Czechoslovakia and for the triple language of Serbocroatoslovenian (“Yugoslavian,” consisting of the two equal varieties of Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian, and the former’s two equal sub-varieties of the Cyrillic-based Serbian and the Latin alphabet-based Croatian) for the interwar Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929, Yugoslavia). It is often claimed that due to their composite character the languages of Czechoslovak, Serbocroatoslovenian, and Serbo-Croatian “had to” split. However, the equally composite language of Norwegian is still around.

Neither the rise and spread of ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic nationalism across Central Europe during the nineteenth century, nor the founding of successive nation-states influenced in any substantial manner the pattern of the region’s dialect continua as obtaining since the late Middle Ages. The main change in this respect between 1721 (Map 7) and 1910 was the reduction in or the wholesale replacement of the Turkic and Caucasian (Circassian) dialect continua alongside the northern shores of the Black Sea with the North Slavic dialect continuum, due to the Russian Empire’s conquest of this area, followed by expulsions and even exterminations of the local Muslim populations. Similarly, the presence of Turkic-speaking Muslims was reduced in the post-Ottoman nation-states of Greece and Bulgaria. The abolition of Roma slavery in Walachia and Moldavia led to the creation or fortification of the diasporic presence of the Indic dialect continuum in Hungary and Russia. Nationalist movements appealed for ethnolinguistic homogeneity of nation-states, but mostly stopped short of executing the ideal, because it would require ethnic cleansing or genocide. Such methods of radical population engineering were then still deemed unthinkable in Europe, despite the Russian example, and colonial genocides regularly perpetrated by European powers overseas.
In the wake of the Napoleonic wars, the nineteenth century was the age of industrialization, spreading nationalism and standardization. The multiplicity of pre- and early modern systems of measurement and calendars were replaced by fewer, as typically adopted by the West's great powers and tacitly enforced on the rest of the world through commerce and imperialism. Trains, in order to ply seamlessly from Paris to Moscow and from London to Istanbul, needed compatible timetables, exactly the same gauges, and the same system of measures and weights. Obviously, this homogenizing ideal of a single set of standards as needed by technology and trade have not been achieved to this day, but the number of different systems was radically reduced. In 1851 the British decided to establish a prime meridian at London's Royal Observatory in Greenwich. In the subsequent three decades two thirds of maps began to be produced with the use of this “Greenwich meridian,” which became accepted by virtually all cartographers by the turn of the twentieth century. In 1875, at Paris, all the great powers (bar Britain), including the Ottoman Empire, and alongside a clutch of independent nation-states from all around the world, signed the Metre Convention. This was the beginning of the metric system as it is known today. The United Kingdom with its worldwide empire preferred to stick to the mile and pound, or its own “imperial system” of weights and measures. In 1582 Pope Gregory XIII promulgated a New Style Calendar, also known as “Gregorian,” in contrast to the former Julian (Roman) Calendar ("New Style") calendar, originally proposed by Julius Cesar in 45 BCE. Because the sixteenth century was the high point of the religious strife between Catholics and Protestants, at first only Catholic polities adopted the Gregorian Calendar, namely Poland-Lithuania and the Habsburgs in Central Europe. Apart from Prussia, which adopted the new calendar in 1610, other Protestant polities within the Holy Roman Empire vacillated for a century longer, while Britain and Scandinavia’s kingdoms followed suit even later, only in the mid-eighteenth century. The Ottomans, the Russian Empire and the Balkans’ Orthodox nation-states desisted until after the Great War. Bolshevik Russia adopted the already two and a half centuries old “new” calendar in 1918, Greece in 1922, and the post-Ottoman Turkey as late as 1926. However, within Greece and the European Union, the Autonomous Monastic State of Mount Athos continues using the Julian Calendar to this day.

In Europe and the Middle East, until the early modern period the use of different scripts (writing systems) had been typically coordinated with a religion or denomination. The literate faithful had been expected to write, print and read with the use of this script in which their “holy book” had been written. All the faithful of a religion had been expected to be able to recognize their “holy script,” and to disparage all others, seen as “infidels’ letters” or the “devil’s alphabets.” The employment of vernaculars for written purposes often led to the sidelining of this or that “holy book’s” antiquated Einzelsprache as a language of administration and book production. However, the unspoken norm was to use the “holy book’s” writing system for creating and writing vernacular languages. Hence, Armenian Monophysites wrote their Einzelsprachen in Armenian characters, Catholics in Latin letters, Judaists in Hebrew characters, Muslims in Arabic letters, and Orthodox Christians in Cyrillic or Greek characters. The split in Western Christianity, where the Latin alphabet was in exclusive employment, introduced a scriptal (typographic) cleavage between Antiqua preferred by Catholics and Fraktur (Gothic type, Blackletter) by Protestants. In the early eighteenth century, the modernizing (Westernizing) reforms in Muscovy (Russian Empire) resulted in the new script of Grazhdanka (“New Cyrillic”) modelled on Antiqua. It was employed for non-religious books and administrative purposes, while Church (Old) Cyrillic was kept for religious publications and ecclesiastical administration until the turn of the twentieth century. During the first half of the nineteenth century, this Grazhdanka-Church Cyrillic split for secular and ecclesiastical uses spread from Russia to the Slavophone Balkan nation-states (Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia) and Romania.

Due to the invention of ethnolinguistic nationalism in the early 1810s, a new political logic of ethnolinguistic homogenization was added to the thinking about the use of scripts in Central Europe. This logic of *cuius regio, eius lingua* (whose realm, his language) either merged with the older religious one of *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose realm, his religion), or trumped the latter; all in the service of building an ethnolinguistically defined nation and winning a coveted nation-state for it. The process was quickened by the gradual adoption and implementation of the ideal of compulsory elementary education for all from the turn of the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. The founding of a German Empire as a German nation-state in 1871 led to the abandonment of Fraktur in favor of Antiqua for writing in Scandinavia’s Lutheran na-
In the Russian Empire, after the 1830–1831 anti-tsarist uprising of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility, not only was Polish replaced with Russian as the language of administration in the Empire’s partition zone of former Poland-Lithuania, but also the idea appeared in the 1840s that all Russia’s language should be written and printed in Cyrillic. With this time this idea faded but reappeared in the wake of yet another uprising staged by Polish-Lithuanian nobles in 1863–1864. This time Polish was banned from the administration of Russia’s autonomous (Congress) Kingdom of Poland, and it was forbidden to print any Latvian or Lithuanian-language books with the employment of Antiqua or Fraktur fonts. Cyrillic was prescribed for this purpose, leading to mass smuggling of Lithuanian books printed in Latin letters from Germany’s East Prussia. Also, orthographic (spelling) differences fell afoul of tsarist censors, and they banned the use of the Little Russian (Ukrainian) style Cyrillic for producing publications in this language, before banning the use of Little Russian and White Russian (Belarusian) in publishing altogether. St. Petersburg’s policy of centralizing and homogenizing the European part of the Russian Empire tacitly adopted yet another principle of *cuius regio, eius abecedarium* (whose realm, his alphabet). However, this effort at the scriptal homogenization of the Russian Empire came to nothing when, in the wake of the liberalization triggered by the 1905 Revolution, all scripts and languages desired by the Tsar’s subjects were allowed back into use, including the phenomenon of bispacism, for instance, the use of Antiqua (“Polish letters”) and Grazhdanka (“Russian letters”) for publishing in White Russian for Uniates and Orthodox Christians, respectively.

The introduction of full male suffrage in the Russian Empire (1906) and in Austria-Hungary’s Cisleithania (1907) led to the rapid coalescence of the linguistic and political dimension of Yiddishland (Map 16). The secular book production in Yiddish grew exponentially. But any official use of Hebrew characters had been long banned in the Habsburg lands (1846), Prussia (1848), and the Russian Empire (1862). When an uneducated Yiddish-speaking wanted to communicate with the administration in Austria-Hungary or Germany, he had no choice but to resign himself to the use of the “gentile” Latin letters for writing in “bad German,” as Yiddish was assessed by German-speakers, when they did not disparage it openly as a lowly “jargon,” not worth writing or reading. A series of the West’s and Russia’s unilateral impositions (“capitulation treaties”) on the Ottoman Empire, among others, led to France’s growing influence on the education of this Empire’s Spanyol-speaking Sephardic Jews since 1860. Under the example of the French language, widely used as the medium of education in their schools, Ottoman Sephardim began gradually switching from Hebrew letters to Antiqua for writing and publishing in their language. This switch was sealed, when in 1928 in Turkey the Latin alphabet superseded the Arabic script for writing and publishing in the Turkish language. This example convinced most Sephardim to ditch the Hebrew script for writing and publishing in Spanyol (also known as Ladino and Judeo-Spanish).

In the Balkan nation-states, which emerged during the nineteenth century at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, the nationalized millet (religious) logic of the politics of script was followed. Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia were founded as national polities for Slavophone members of the Rum (Roman) Orthodox millet, living in the territories of various historical or current Orthodox patriarchates. Obviously, these three states adopted Cyrillic for writing and publishing in their official languages. Because all three looked to Russia for aid and culturally (religiously) acceptable models of modernization, they quickly adopted Grazhdanka in place of Church (Old) Cyrillic, especially for secular uses. The main problem was not the question of script, but whether to write in (Church) Slavonic, a vernacularized version of Church Slavonic (as exemplified by standard Russian) or in a local vernacular. While the vernacular-based Serbian, as standardized by Vuk Karadžić, had been employed in the Austrian Empire for local administration and education since the 1820s, in Serbia itself this “Vukovite” Serbian language was repeatedly banned in 1832, 1850, 1852, and 1860. Belgrade allowed for the unrestricted employment of the vernacular-based Serbian only in 1868, but it took almost two decades more before it replaced, in 1886, the still prestigious Slavono-Serbian, especially preferred by the Orthodox clergy. Obviously, the concept of the common bisscriptal Serbo-Croatian language for the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Serbs (and Montenegrins) was proposed at Vienna by a small group of Croatian and Serbian intellectuals in 1850. But it was a minority pursuit until 1882, when the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences published the first volume of the multivolume dictionary of the “Croatian or Serbian language,” telling printed in Antiqua. In Austria-Hungary the variously named Croatian, Serbian and Serbian-Croatian were officially used with the employment of Latin and Cyrillic letters, while in Bosnia books and newspapers were also published in this language with the use of the Arabic script for Slavophone Muslims. In addition, between 1890 and 1907 this language was known as Bosnian in Bosnia, though the official policy was to use Antiqua to write and publish in it. On the contrary in Serbia and Montenegro Cyrillic was in exclusive use, and this language was known invariably as Serbian. The Great War changed the observed lines of the politics of script and language dramatically. In Austria-Hungary, in 1915, Cyrillic was banned for writing and publishing in Serbo-Croatian or Serbian. The Austro-Hungarian armies occupied Serbia, and the country’s government found itself in exile on the Greek island of Corfu, under the Allies’ protection. ‘With no Cyrillic printing press available, this Serbian government-in-exile had no choice but to use Latin fonts for publishing in Serbian. Subsequently, in interwar Yugoslavia, the 1921 Constitution provided that the name of the country’s national and official language was the tripartite Serbocroatoslovenian, written in the two equal official scripts, namely, Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet.

The politics of script and language developed differently in the two other post-Ottoman Orthodox nation-states in the
Balkans, that is, Greece and Romania. The Rum (Orthodox) millet’s main official language was the New Testament (Byzantine, Medieval) Greek (Ελληνική Ελληνική), obviously written in Greek characters. Both this language and its script were adopted in independent Greece. But the Einzelsprache was removed almost two millennia from the Greek vernacular (Demotic [Δημοτική Dimotiki or Ρωμαϊκή Rhomaikē “Roman”]). This deep diglossia between writing and speech, also doubling as the pronounced cleavage between the tiny literate elite and the illiterate peasant masses, hampered any efforts at developing popular elementary education with the employment of such New Testament Greek as the medium of instruction. Hence, since the turn of the nineteenth century, the Russian solution had been followed of adding some Demotic elements to the New Testament Greek, which yielded Katharevousa (or “Purifying [language]”). Katharevousa remained Greece’s national and official language until 1976, when Demotic superseded it. But none of these changes impacted the Greek script. The modernizing pressure brought about similar developments in the case of Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish), infused with Arabic and Persian lexical and syntactical elements that it was unintelligible to an uneducated Türkic-speaker. This diglossic tension between the former known as fasih türkçe (“correct Turkish”) and the latter dubbed as kabal türkçe (“vulgar Turkish”) led to the rise of a compromise form orta türkçe (“middle-style Turkish”), which was codified in the latter half of the nineteenth century and in widespread use until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Obviously all these three varieties were unified by the same Arabic script.

As remarked above, this model of “compromise Einzelsprache” constructed from an antiquated “holy tongue” and a cognate vernacular was followed in Serbia and Montenegro, where Slaveno-Serbian (or vernacular Serbian heavily influenced by Church Slavonic) was in official use until the 1890s. Prior to this change, due to military and financial aid flowing from Russia since the eighteenth century, the Church Slavonic elements in Slaveno-Serbian had been standardized in line with the ecclesiastically and politically dominant Russian re-daction of Church Slavonic. A similar situation was observed in Bulgaria, founded by the Russians in 1878. Initially, under the continued Russian cultural and military influence, the Church Slavonic elements in Slaveno-Bulgarian were replaced with Russian lexical and syntactic loans, before the modern vernacular-based Bulgarian emerged in its own right during the early twentieth century.

In the Danubian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the literate boyar (noble) elites first emulated the example of official Latin (obviously written in Latin letters), as employed in Hungary’s Transylvania with its plurality of Walachian (Romanian)-speakers. In the 1830s, Florentine/Tuscan (Italian) became another model to be followed, due to the Einzelsprache’s prestige connected to its use for official and commercial contacts between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers. But soon afterwards, because of its unprecedented military, economic and political achievements, France and its official language of French became a permanent point of reference for the Romanian elite until the fall of communism in 1989. But in this quest for a French-inflected Western-style modernization, the traditional use of Cyrillic for writing and publishing in Walachian caused frustration among literati, even though it was Russia’s repeated attacks on the Ottomans in the first half of the nineteenth century that actually made it possible for Romania to emerge as a unified nation-state in 1866. At the same time, the language was firmly renamed as Romanian, and its official script was changed as well, from Cyrillic to Antiqua, or the “French alphabet.” But even earlier, since the early nineteenth century proponents of modernization had employed quite fluid and unstable idiosyncratic varieties of the “mixed,” or rather bi-alphabetic, Cyrillic-Latin script for Walachian (Romanian). Traditionalists had tended to use fewer Latin letters in such a mix, while modernizers used more. Obviously, Cyrillic remained firmly in use for limited publishing in Moldavian (today’s Moldovan or Romanian) in Russia’s province of Bessarabia (present-day Moldova). After 1905 any restrictions on the use of Moldavian were lifted, but tradition, censors, and political pressure required the overwhelming employment of Cyrillic, nevertheless. This changed only in the interwar period when in 1918 Bessarabia became part of Romania; Cyrillic was replaced with Antiqua for writing and publishing in Romanian across the entire interwar Romania. But interestingly, to this day, within the Romanian Latin alphabet a subset of letters typographically transformed to resemble Cyrillic is preserved, especially for the titles of Orthodox religious and theological books, alongside wall inscriptions in Orthodox churches. This practice is similar to the British penchant for using the decorative Blackletter for professional titles on university diplomas and for the titles of liturgical books.

In 1912 an Albanian nation-state was proclaimed. In contrast to other post-Ottoman Balkan national politics, it did not follow the religious logic of turning millets into nations, but that of ethnolinguistic nationalism. Their language and specific customs overrode the fact that Albanian-speakers were members of the three different millets of Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Catholics. Obviously, those few who were literate wrote in the “holy tongues” and dominant Einzelsprachen of these three religions with the use of the confessionally specific scripts. Educated Albanian Muslims wrote and read with the use of Arabic letters in Arabic, Osmanlica (Ottoman Turkish), and Persian. In the southern Albanian-speaking (Gheg) lands, educated Albanian Orthodox Christians wrote and read with the use of Greek letters in Greek (namely, New Testament Greek and Katharevousa), while their northern (Gheg) counterparts with the use of Cyrillic letters in Church Slavonic, alongside Slaveno-Serbian and Slaveno-Bulgarian. In addition, in what today is western Macedonia, the Greek alphabet was also employed for writing in (Church) Slavonic (at present reinterpreted as Macedonian). In turn, educated Albanian Catholics preferred Latin letters, which they employed for writing in Latin and Tuscan (Italian). As a result, when some began writing and publishing in Albanian, they variously employed Arabic, Cyrillic, Greek and Latin characters for this purpose. In the wake of the 1877–1878 Russo-
Ottoman War, the Albanian-speaking area was connected to the rest of the Ottoman Empire only by a narrow land bridge with the anti-Ottoman Greece in the south and the anti-Ottoman Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria in the north. In addition, from the territory around the city of Niš (Niš) granted to Serbia, Muslim Albanians—or a plurality of the inhabitants—fled or were expelled. A realization dawned on the Albanian-speaking elite that they must unify their language and rally around it for the sake of their own autonomous, or even independent, nation-state in order to prevent a potential partitioning of the Albanian-speaking territory among the neighboring millet-based national polities. A feverish period of experimentation followed, marked by “mixed” (multiscriptal) alphabets and some scripts invented from scratch for writing and publishing in Albanian. Although the plurality of Albanians professed Islam, and many—irrespective of religion—went for education and found gainful employment in Egypt ruled by the ethnically Albanian elite connected to the Muhammad Ali (Alawiy) dynasty, the rife Western stereotype associated the Arabic script with “backwardness.” On the other hand, the modern secular Albanian Einzelsprache developed among the Catholic Albanian diaspora in Italy since the 1860s. They wrote and published in Albanian with the employment of Latin letters. In addition, another Western (imperialist) stereotype claimed this script to be the “alphabet of progress and modernity.” Also, the mid-1860s Romanian example of the switch from Cyrillic to the Latin script weighed heavily, since from this time Romania had developed a dense network of schools for Romancephone Vlachs (Aromanians) across the Ottoman Balkans. Bucharest saw these as ethnic “Romanians.” Previously, as Orthodox Christians, Vlachs had predominantly used Greek letters for writing and publishing (though some also used Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet), but under this Romanian influence they switched to the Latin (“Roman,” “Rum,” or “Romanian”) alphabet. Unsurprisingly, in the context of these scriptal (“modernizing”) changes, in 1908, the Latin alphabet was officially adopted for writing and publishing in Albanian.

As a rule of thumb, modernization and the founding of nation-states gradually limited the number of official, state-recognized scripts. Empires were more relaxed in this regard (especially Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans), but between the 1880s and 1905 the Russian Empire did pursue the policy of quite strict scriptal homogenization in Cyrillic. Such a policy of normative monoscriptalism was typical for nation-states. As a result, the Jewish writing system of Hebrew and the Armenian alphabet, which had been part and parcel of Central European history for centuries, had been largely pushed out of state-approved official use by World War One. If compared with Maps 6 (1750) and 8 (1721), it is readily visible that the officially approved scripts became increasingly coordinated with state frontiers, reflecting the increasing politicization of writing systems and Einzelsprachen.

In 1910 the area of Latin-Cyrillic biscriptalism in the west of the Russian Empire mainly coincided with the Russian partition zone of former Poland-Lithuania, in the north with the former Swedish former provinces of Finland, Estland and Livonia (Lifland), and in the south with the province of Bessarabia, which had been wrenched away from the Ottoman vassal principality of Moldavia. With the exception of Crimea, where the official use of the Arabic script for writing and publishing in Crimean Tatar (and Arabic) was preserved, the northern Black Sea littoral became homogenously monoscriptal in Cyrillic, following the flight, expulsion, and genocide of the region’s Turkic- and Caucasian-speaking Muslim populations between the late eighteenth century and the mid-1860s.

The employment of Cyrillic alongside the dominant Latin alphabet in the northeastern corner of Austria-Hungary coincided with the presence of Slavophone Greek Catholics (Uniates) in this region. In the Crownland of Galicia, they stemmed from Poland-Lithuania’s Uniate Church, while in Hungary from this kingdom’s Uniate Churches. In Hungary’s Transylvania, the region’s considerable Romancephone Greek Catholic population had abandoned Cyrillic in favor of Latin letters between the mid-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, under the example of Transylvania’s Catholics and Prot- estants, and Romania’s state-approved switch from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet.

In the Ottoman Empire, the tradition of the official use of “holy scripts” for different millets was maintained. When Austria-Hungary occupied the Ottoman province of Bosnia in 1878 and finally annexed it three decades later, in 1908, Vienna retained there the millet-based system of multiscriptalism. However, all the post-Ottoman nation-states opted for strict monoscriptalism in the writing system of their own millet, which was molded into a nation. The atypical official employment of Arabic letters alongside dominant Cyrillic in the nation-state of Bulgaria was connected to the international guarantees of religious and cultural rights for the country’s Turkic- and Slavic-speaking Muslims who constituted around one-fifth of the country’s population.

In 1910, outside the Ottoman Empire and Bosnia, in Central Europe there were no areas where more than two scripts were in official use. Obviously, the situation looks a bit different if the Fraktur and Antiqua types of the Latin alphabet are seen as different scripts. Actually, some contemporaries did perceive Antiqua and Fraktur as different writing systems. From this perspective, the northeastern (Slavophone Greek Catholic) corner of Austria-Hungary and Russia’s post-Swedish provinces (Finland, Estland, Livonia), alongside the post-Polish-Lithuanian provinces of Courland, Kovno (Kaunas) and Suvalki (Suwałki, Suwałki), were also triscriptal. Hence, Denmark, Norway, the German Empire, or Cisleithania were not monoscriptal, but rather biscriptal, with Antiqua and Fraktur brushing sides in writing and publishing a variety of official and national languages.
Isomorphism of Language, Nation, and State in Central Europe, 1910

The map illustrates the political and linguistic landscape of Central Europe in 1910, highlighting the isomorphism of language, nation, and state. It shows the borders of provinces, semi-autonomous, and autonomous regions, as well as the names of autonomous entities. The map also includes state capitals, other cities, and names of official languages.
Scholars and commentators writing about the modern history of Central Europe frequently remark that ethnic or ethnonationalist nationalism is typical of this region. However, most authors do not venture beyond emphasizing the importance of national languages (Einzelsprachen) for Central Europe’s nationalisms, meaning specific actualizations of the ideology of ethnonationalism. This remark is often combined with the commonplace assertion that prior to the Great War the political scene of Central Europe was dominated by empires, which are qualified with the labels “multinational,” “multietnic,” or “polyglot.” This situation basically leaves the reader alone to interpret what the practices of ethnic nationalism were, and still are, in Central Europe, and how ethnonationalist nations and their nation-states are created, legitimized, maintained, and dismantled. This dilemma is deepened by the continuing methodological quarrel between primordialists (often nationalists themselves, that is, supporters of ethnonationalism) and modernists (constructivists, and at times anti-nationalists). The former believe that nations (or the ethnic groups underlying them) are “eternal” (as emanations of nature or a divinity’s will) or at least “centuries-old,” while the latter stress that nations have been built, each constructed from a myriad of micro-ethnic groups, in Europe during the last two centuries, or only in the modern period, so there is no evidence for the earlier existence of nations or even the very concept of the nation. In reply, primordialists criticize modernists for paying too much attention to nation-states, which are seen as secondary to nations in the Central Europe of ethnonationalist nationalism. They agree with modernists that there is no evidence available for any pre-modern existence of nation-states, but claim that the lack of such evidence does not deny the fact of the premodern existence of nations as “emanations of nature, a divinity’s will,” or of some unspecified “national destiny.” In this line of reasoning, it is proposed that nations existed earlier than the technology of writing, statehood, and scholarly research; that scholars with their concepts and theories only now are able to catch up with such “eternal” characteristics of nations by describing them and “(re-)discovering” their “centuries- or millennia-old” history. In this stance, primordialists confuse historiography with national history (or national master narrative), and mistake nationalism for scholarship. But their “research” is of much use as a potent instrument of statehood legitimation for the governments of Central Europe’s nation-states, so it is lavishly financed. In turn, university professors’ monographs written in the primordialist vein become the much needed “scientific proof” and basis for writing history textbooks for schools. As a result, the primordialist self-perception of a given nation housed in its own nation-state is fortified and reproduced, passed from one generation to another. Typically, such a self-perception (often indistinguishable from self-deception) was constructed and codified no earlier than a century or two ago.

However, it is viciously difficult to breach the resultant socio-political feedback loop, because with time, national historiography becomes impervious to facts and evidence. Those whose research refutes some cherished myths of national history are often branded as “unpatriotic,” or even as “traitors.” They have problems securing grants for research projects or even university posts in their nation-states of origin. When foreigners from outside Central Europe put themselves to the task of probing into (and often debunking) some elements of the region’s national master narratives, national historians “patriotically fight back” by opining that such foreign scholars are “naturally” incapable of “understanding properly” a given nation’s history, because they have an imperfect command of the national language, or—which is an argument of the last resort—that they are not (born, native) members of the nation under scrutiny. In this manner the primordialist (often emic) view of national history wins hands down in Central Europe’s nation-states, often influencing the constructivist (often, outside, or etic) approach. On the plane of international research, this situation yields a widespread myopia, which consigns the existence of nationalism as a modern ideology of statehood formation, legitimation, and maintenance to Central Europe only. It is so, because after the Great War the victorious Allies under the leadership of the United States President, Woodrow Wilson, consciously overhauled the political shape of Central Europe, replacing this region’s non-national polities with ethnonationalist nation-states. Such a concentrated international effort at destroying non-national polities and building nation-states in their place was never repeated anywhere else in the world. (Obviously, the breakup of the Soviet Union produced 15 nation-states of this type, but until the moment of this split it had been a domestic Soviet affair, not an international effort at remolding the non-national communist polity of the Soviet Union into national polities.)

The aforementioned Central European myopia makes the world appear, as though, in the wake of decolonization in the mid-twentieth century, nationalism had not become the entire globe’s sole universally accepted infrastructural ideology of
statehood building, legitimization, and maintenance. Perhaps this myopia is also a result of the Central European insistence that the nation, construed as a group of people speaking their national language (that is, a speech community), is separate from and primary to the nation’s nation-state. This conceptual peculiarity of ethnolinguistic nationalism lets Central European nationalists claim that nations created in a civic manner (that is, by non-national polities redefining their populations as nations, and thus becoming nation-states themselves) are not “real.” Many external observers of Central Europe take it as a sign of “strong nationalism” in the region, entailing (for them) that nationalism elsewhere in the world either does not exist, or is weaker or even much more “benign.” Hence, the majority of classical studies on nationalism (with the notable exception of Benedict Anderson’s 1983 seminal essay *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, or Michael Billig’s 1995 insightful study *Banal Nationalism*) draw at Central European case studies. In turn, this scholarly self-limitation reconfirms primordialists’ opinion that “real nations” exist only in this region, while constructivists and non-Central European students of the region accept this fallacy, which makes it difficult for them to see that nationalism is the present-day world’s sole infrastructural ideology of statehood building and maintenance.

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**In the case of statehood, ethnolinguistic nationalism can be usefully defined through a set of a limited number of practices observed in the construction of polities in Central Europe during the last two centuries, which are popularly recognized as nation-states by their own elites and external observers alike. As a result, such a definition may be applied to a variety of cases across the region and the world in order to establish whether a given polity was (is) an ethnolinguistic nation-state, when it acquired such a character, and whether other (non-national) polities in a given period aspired to overhaul themselves in accordance with the tenets of ethnolinguistic nationalism, or not. What is more, such an operational definition of ethnolinguistic nationalism differentiates the Central European type of nationalism from other types of this ideology extant elsewhere in the modern world, without denying the existence of nationalism outside Central Europe. This intimation shows that instead of focusing on Central Europe when striving to understand the “nature” of nationalism, researchers should rather take samples from all around the world and analyze them in a comparative manner.**

In Central Europe the observable implementation of ethnolinguistic nationalism at the level of state-building follows the principle of the normative isomorphism (or tight spatial and ideological) overlapping of language (Einzelsprache), nation, and state. This principle may be also given in a slogan-like algebraic equation, namely, Language = Nation = State. In the socio-political practice of building nations and their polities across Central Europe, this means, that all the speakers (speech community) of language A are defined as nation A, and the territory, which they inhabit in a (preferably) compact fashion is presented as the “proper territory” of the proposed nation-state A. When an ethnolinguistic nation-state A has already been successfully founded, its sole official language must be the national language A. This national language in question must be also unique, meaning that it may not be shared with any other nation or polity. In addition, should any autonomous entities be proclaimed within the boundaries of nation-state A, no other languages but the national language A should be allowed in such territorial autonomies. By the same token, language A should not be employed in any official function in autonomous regions located in other polities. These are the necessary conditions of achieving the ideal of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state in a “truly ethnolinguistic” nation-state. However, ethnolinguistic nationalists aspire to the ideal of full ethnolinguistic homogeneity, entailing that native-speakers of other languages than the national language A, should be removed from nation-state A. Likewise, native-speakers of language A residing outside the boundaries of nation-state A should be “gathered” in (or coerced to “return” to) “their homeland.” But in most cases, nationalists stop short of carrying out this absolutizing program because its implementation would mean multilateral expulsions of millions and practically never-ending wars with all nation-state A’s neighbors.

However, even short of the ethnolinguistic ideal, the actualization of the necessary conditions of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state is onerous enough on its own. Map 14 takes stock of the actual use of ethnolinguistic nationalism for statehood building, legitimization, and maintenance in 1910, about a century after the formulation of this ideology. Only three national polities fully fulfilled the structures of this normative isomorphism, namely, Norway in Scandinavia, alongside Bulgaria and Romania in the Balkans. In Norway, Norwegian was the nation-state’s sole national and official language, while the same function was fulfilled by Bulgarian in Bulgaria and Romanian in Romania. None of these three languages was shared with any other nation or autonomous region located in another polity.

Although textbooks of European history propose that the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire were created as nation-states for the ethnolinguistically defined nations of Italians and Germans in 1861 and 1871, respectively, none of these two states fully complied with the normative isomorphism. Italy shared its national language with Switzerland, while the German Empire with Austria-Hungary and Switzerland. Hence, at most, Italy and Germany were nation-states “aspiring to fulfill the isomorphism.” In 1910, in Central Europe, this category included five national polities, namely, Austria-Hungary’s Kingdom of Hungary, Montenegro and Serbia, besides the aforementioned Italy and Germany. The Kingdom of Hungary (Transleithania) did not fulfill the conditions of the normative isomorphism because Croatian was employed in official capacity in Hungary’s autonomous provinces of Croatia and Slavonia. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, both nation-states shared the very same national language of Serbian, which was also employed at the local and regional level in the “Austrian half” (Cisleithania) of the Dual Monarchy.
The logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism was also present in some other polities, but not as a leading ideology of the day for statehood creation and legitimization. Five states belonged to the category of these "other ethnolinguistic polities" in 1910, namely, the Cretan State, Cyprus, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland. Denmark retained its all too little known worldwide maritime empire, where either other languages than Danish were employed in official use, or colonials, even if Danish-speaking, were not seen as "real" members of the Danish nation. A similar "imperial compulsion" kept Sweden from becoming a straightforward ethnolinguistic nation-state, though this Scandinavian kingdom lost most of its Central European empire during and after the Great Northern War in the early eighteenth century. Until 1809 Sweden had ruled over Finland, which then Russia wrenched away from Stockholm. Afterward, in 1814, the anti-Napoleonic coalition rewarded the Swedish Kingdom's loyalty with Norway, summarily detached from pro-Napoleonic Denmark. As a result, until Norway gained independence in 1905, Norwegian had been a second national and official language in Sweden-Norway. After Norway parted ways with Sweden, Swedish continued to be shared in official capacity with Russia's autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland. After the 1847 civil war, briefly fought between Catholics and Protestants, Switzerland was reinvented as a confederation of ethnolinguistically and ethnoreligiously homogenous cantons, yielding a nation-state with three official languages (French, German and Italian) and its official name rendered in the neutral language of Latin, that is, the Confoederatio Helvetica.

The situation was different in the cases of the Cretan State (1898–1913) and the British-Ottoman condominium of Cyprus (1878–1914). In the former, Greek and Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) were in official employment, while in the latter both these languages and English. Greek ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious nationalists saw both polities as "unredeemed territories" of the Greek nation-state. The Ottoman Empire, non-national in its character, disagreed with this logic and sought to protect both islands' mainly Turkic-speaking Muslims, while Britain used the continuing Greek-Ottoman enmity for its own imperial interests. None of the great powers intervened when Greece de facto seized Crete in 1908, when the Ottoman Empire was in the throes of the Young Turk (nationalizing) Revolution. However, the great powers did not recognize this annexation until the conclusion of the First Balkan War in 1913.

However, in 1910, the majority of Central Europe’s population lived in non-national polities, be it empires (Austria-Hungary’s Cisleithania, Ottoman Empire, and Russian Empire), the tiny secular polities of Liechtenstein and San Marino, or their ecclesiastical counterparts of Mount Athos and Vatican. The Vatican City was what de facto the Holy See was allowed by Italy to retain after the 1870 annexation of the Papal States. This arrangement was formalized only in 1929, when Rome officially recognized a Vatican City State.

Prior to the Great War, ethnolinguistic nationalism was a growing force of statehood construction and destruction, but it was still secondary to Central Europe’s non-national empires. The situation changed dramatically after 1918 when the victorious Allies, under the leadership of the United States, overhauled the region’s political shape in accordance with the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. The hope that ethnolinguistically homogenous nation-states would ensure stability and lasting peace in Central Europe was not supported by any evidence to this end.
Vilāyetleriñ isimleri

Eyālet-i mümtāzeleriñ isimleri

Tirol

Eyālet-i mümtāzeleriñ ve vilāyetleriñ ḥudūdları

Devletleriñ ḥudūdları

Pāyitaḫtları

Arnāvūdca Elsine-i Almaniye

Rūmca Elsine-i Tūrāniye'ni Türk şu 'besi

İslav elnesnñ cenbənı takım

İslav elnesnñ şəmkən takım

Latinıy elnesnñ garbi takım

Latinıy elnesnñ qərb takım

İslam elnesnñ şəmkən takım

İslam elnesnñ garbi takım

Elsine-i Tūrāniye'ni Fnva-Macar şu 'besi

Latnye elnesnñ şəmkən takım

Elsine-i Tūrāniye'ni Fras-Macar şu 'besi

Latinıy elnesnñ garbi takım

İslav elnesnñ cenbənı takım

İslav elnesnñ şəmkən takım

Latinıy elnesnñ qərb takım

Avusturya - Macaristân

Avusturya Anafurysa tähr

Elsine-i Almaniye

Elsine-i Tūrāniye

Fnva-Macar şu 'besi

Fras-Macar şu 'besi

Devel-i Alye-i Osmāniye

Dəvlət başlıqları

Vilāyetlerin xəritəsi

Eyālet-i mümtāzelerin xəritəsi

Eyālet-i mümtāzelerin ve vilāyetlerin xəritəsi

Authors: Mustafa Sayın and Mustafa Kansu

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Central Europe in 1910 as Seen Through the Lens of Ottoman Turkish

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Viewing the map of Central and Eastern Europe in 1910 through the lens of Ottoman Turkish reveals a number of interesting features, particularly in terms of changes from older forms of place names, but especially a consideration how the focus of this map differs from the sorts of representations found in late Ottoman atlases and maps. The Ottoman Empire had a long and rich tradition of cartography, with a number of scholars engaging in that pursuit, most famously the sixteenth-century geographer Piri Reis. However, it was not until the later part of the nineteenth century that maps became more widely available for viewing by Ottoman subjects, largely due to the explosion of print culture in the second half of that century and the concurrent increase in access to education. During this period, the Ottomans embraced the sort of cartography found in European atlases, a process that had begun in the late eighteenth century. Geographies, atlases, and maps tended to be published for educational purposes, focusing on the Sublime State itself and its setting within the world, adding to the corpus of texts and symbols intended to instill loyalty towards the Ottoman Empire and the sultan. There were, of course, maps with many of these Ottoman atlases, such as the incredibly detailed textual descriptions and provincial maps of Memlîk-i ʿOğlânîye Cêb Atlas (Pocket Atlas of the Ottoman Realms, 1323 AH/1905 CE). However, there were also plenty of publications that saw no need to represent the Ottoman Empire cartographically, presenting instead a written map with place names and descriptions, such as Cognâvâ-yı Muṭâṣalî-ı Memlîk-i Devlet-i ʿOğlânîye (The Comprehensive Geography of the Realms of the Ottoman State, 1304 AH/1887 CE). This was more in keeping with earlier Ottoman and Islamic methods of geographic literature, where text was an essential part of displaying and explaining the world (for a full discussion of changes in Ottoman cartography, see Fortna 2002: 165–201).

In the majority of cases, visual or written, the geography of the Ottoman Empire itself was the primary concern of geographers and cartographers. However, Ottoman authors and presses did produce some interesting atlases of the wider geographic context, particularly historical ones. Some historical atlases provided a Western European-oriented world history, most notably the beautifully produced Târîh-i ʿUmâmi ve ʿOğlânî Aṭlassı (The General and Ottoman History Atlas, 1329 AH/1911 CE). Whereas many Ottoman histories that did not focus exclusively on the dynasty, such as Muṭâṣalî ʿIlām Târîhı (The Concise History of Islam, 1891), began from the time of the Prophet Muhammad, the Târîh-i ʿUmâmi ve ʿOğlânî began its narrative in the world of the Old Testament. It took the reader through Biblical narratives, Greece and Rome, before showing the expansion of Islam, but the view after that rarely returned to the East, focusing instead on the myriad geopolitical changes experienced by Europe from the Middle Ages until the time of writing. Certainly, key events in Ottoman history, especially the expansions into the Caucasus, Hungary, and the conquest of Constantinople received special attention, but this was an unusual case of presenting the Ottoman narrative, not on its own terms, but within the European context. In most texts, be they histories or geographies, the glories of the Ottoman Empire were shown verbally and visually, especially details of conquests and expansion into Africa, Asia, and Europe. Indeed, histories of the Ottoman dynasty frequently included maps, alongside illustrations, to help the reader visualise their achievements, such as the Harîṭâys ve Resîmî Mükemmel Târîh-i ʿOğlânî (The Complete Ottoman History with Maps and Illustrations, 1328 AH/1910 CE). It seems clear that such publications were part of a wider project of putting the Ottoman Empire back at the centre of the world for its subjects in both cartographic and historical terms, at a time when the Sublime State was facing a number of significant internal and external challenges.

In this context, the way in which Central and Eastern Europe is presented in such books is interesting. In many respects, maps of this region are lacking in detail, meaning that to get a full enough picture for the map in this publication, it was necessary to consult a wide range of texts. Some of the most detailed maps and descriptions come from a series of publications produced by the Karîgâh-i ʿUmâmi İstihbârât Şûbesi (General Headquarters Intelligence Division) after the Second Balkan War of 1913. These detailed the organization and location of the armed forces of Ottoman neighbours and erstwhile enemies. The period around 1910 was dominated by external threats, with the Italian invasion of Ottoman Libya and the two Balkan Wars occurring in quick succession between 1911 and 1913. This is reflected in atlases of the time, with far greater attention given to producing detailed depictions of Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy than of other more friendly places such as Germany or Austria-Hungary.

Such threats aside, at the heart of the production of maps in the late Ottoman Empire was the education drive that began during the reforms of the mid-nineteenth century known col-
The realms of the Sublime State are in the east of Europe, the west of Asia, and the northeast of Africa. Since the treaty in the Christian year 1878, the borders in the north and northwest are with Russia, Austria, Serbia and Montenegro; in the south and southwest in Africa with Sudan [Nūba] and Ethiopia [Ḥabējistān], with the Great Sahara, with the plains, and from the shores of the Mediterranean with the Ionian Sea; in the east with Iran [ʿAcemistān] and Caucasia [Kafkās]; and in the southeast with the Gulf of Basra [i.e., the Persian Gulf]. They contain the areas stretching 3,400 kilometres from the border of Bosnia in the northwest to the Shatt al-Arab and the coast of the Gulf of Basra in the southeast. The great lands covering 2,230 kilometres from the borders of the district of Batum to the southern end of the province of Egypt, are divided into three parts: Ottoman Europe, that is Rumelia; Ottoman Asia, that is Anatolia; and Ottoman Africa. The total number of inhabitants, consisting of the confessional groups [millet] of Muslims, Christians, and Jews, amounts to thirty-five million people. (Ahmet Hamdi 1301 AH: 104–5)

One of the primary purposes of these Ottoman geographies, therefore, was to cultivate a sense of spatial identity. A student reading this book in a middle school in Salonica, Istanbul, or Damascus would be encouraged through such a narrative, as well as any accompanying images, to imagine themselves, not as part of a discrete urban or provincial community, but as a constituent community of a vast and diverse but unified polity. “From Bosnia to Shatt al-Arab and from Batum to Egypt”; “Ottoman Europe, Ottoman Asia, and Ottoman Africa”; one can really get a sense of the sort of geographic mantras encouraged in Ottoman schools. At the same time, the reason for the current boundaries of the Ottoman state were merely alluded to here, with “the treaty in the Christian year 1878” referring to the settlement at Berlin following the disastrous Ottoman-Russian war of 1877–78. Geographic descriptions, as well as maps themselves, therefore carried significant meaning for contemporary events as well as history. For an educated Ottoman of 1910—or one in the process of being educated—imbued with all of the force of Ottoman history and loyalty found in the educational system of the recently deposed Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), their spatial understanding of Central and Eastern Europe must have been complex. Part of it, of course, formed Rumelia, the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Then there were those parts of Europe that had once been part of the Empire, now under the dominion of the Austrians or Russians, or of the more recent ethnic or linguistic nation states. Then, of course, there were those regions that had never been under Ottoman rule. It will be useful here to consider this map in such a way, in order to attempt to make sense of it from the perspective of an Ottoman in 1910.

Beginning with the empire itself, such a map presents an instant problem. European maps had long tended to physically divide depictions of the Ottoman Empire according to European terms: Turkey in Europe, being the provinces in the Balkans; and Turkey in Asia, being the rest. This, of course, was part of the European tendency to divide the world into continents, and so Ottoman territory would necessarily be on separate pages, or in separate sections, and rarely would one see the Empire as a whole. Taking, for example, a historical atlas such as The Cambridge Modern History Atlas of 1912, the Ottoman Empire was depicted in five maps: conquests in Europe and Asia Minor; wars with the Habsburgs, Venice, and Poland-Lithuania; the empire in Europe 1792–1870; the empire in Asia since 1792; and the empire in Europe 1870–78. Not once was the entirety of the empire shown in a map. The Ottomans, however, especially by the end of the nineteenth century, went to great efforts to depict their Empire as a whole and contiguous entity. This was not only an assertion of identity, but a claim in the face of territorial losses. By 1910, the Ottoman realms were far more compact, and largely Asian. In North Africa, only Libya remained, and that would soon be lost to the Italians, with Egypt under British rule and the former realms of Tunis and Algiers under that of the French. In Europe, long-time imperial provinces had gained their independence (Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria) or were under foreign rule (Cyprus, Bosnia), and after the Balkan Wars only Eastern Thrace would remain. The core of the Ottoman Empire was therefore in Asia, in Anatolia, Iraq, the Levant, the Hejaz, and Yemen. Here is presented, therefore, only a part of the Well-Protected Domains (Memalik-i Mahṛūse), and parts that would soon be lost, such as the provinces of Cezāyīr-i Bahār-i Sefīd (the Islands of the White, i.e., Mediterranean, Sea), Selânik (Salonica/Thessaloniki), and İskodra (Scutari/ Shkodër), the last two of which had been under Ottoman rule since the fifteenth century. One of the major difficulties, therefore, in researching this map was that it fundamentally presents a very non-Ottoman sense of geographical space. Here, the Sublime Ottoman State (Devlet-i Āliye-i ʿOsmāniye) is peripheral and incomplete in a way that was greatly discouraged by the officially sanctioned maps and descriptions of the early twentieth century.
This map also contains a significant area of land that had once been part of the Ottoman realms that demonstrate another issue, that of the adoption of directly transliterated names for the whole of Europe. In addition to the recently independent states mentioned above, large swathes of Southeastern Europe had been conquered by the Ottomans in the past, such as Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The general rule seems to be that the more recently-ruled the area, the more likely the Ottoman Turkish name is to have been retained. For instance, Montenegro stays as Kara Dağ (a literal rendering of Black Mountain), Moldavia as Bogdân, and Walachia as Eflik. However, in other parts of the Empire previously lost, the names of its new rulers appear in the atlases, notably in the east. Crimea was still known to the Ottomans as çarım, but its main city was no longer written by its Tartar name of Akmescid (the white mosque) but its Russian name of Simferopol. Some older names remained, such as the Aksu (White Water) for the Lower Bug, but new names were the norm, with Dnieper far more common than the older Ozi.

For the rest of Europe covered here, there is a mixture of simple transliteration of local names, or adaptation of other, mainly Germanic forms. Russian names are almost entirely approximate transliterations, with some minor adjustments (Kișif instead of Kishinev, Kief for Kiev and so forth). The same is true for Germany and Italy, although those two nation-states tended to be represented in greater detail than the Ottomans’ deadly northern opponent. With such a focus on nearby states, for those more distant polities such as Sweden and Denmark there are only a few detailed representations in Ottoman atlases, notably in the Sâlnâme-i Nezâret-i Hârîcîye (Yearbook of the Foreign Ministry, 1301 AH/1885 CE). Even the Austro-Hungarian Empire, parts of which had once been under Ottoman rule and otherwise intimately known by Ottoman geographers of all kinds for hundreds of years, was rendered in comparatively little detail and then only by transliteration of local names. The polity once known as Nemçe—a Slavic term for Germans, showing the linguistic influences of those cultures on earlier Ottoman geography—was now simply Avusturya-Macaristan; its capital city, known for centuries as Beç, again from a Slavic root, was now Viyana. Russia was called as such, Rusya, and no longer as Moskov, whilst Poland had long-since ceased to be known as Lehistân (from the medieval name for the Poles) now called Polonya. The Ottoman understanding of its neighbors, as much as the wider region, had begun to absorb the non-Ottoman vocabulary of European geography, in part because the geographic training was itself largely European in origin, and in part because of the necessity in diplomacy and business to deal with Europe on its own terms. By the early period of the Republic of Turkey, atlases such as Yeñi Avrupa Coğrafyası (New Geography of Europe, 1920–22) had removed most of the older names in favor of names that would be commonly understood within a wider context, part of the beginnings of the national identity reforms that would eventually remove the Ottoman language from common use as Europeanisation became ever-more conflated with modernization and progress.

Examining late Ottoman atlases within their wider context, it is clear that they were part of an assertion of Ottoman identity, but also part of an Ottoman identity crisis. The popularity of historical atlases, and maps in history books and textbooks points to the wider attempt to cultivate a sense of the Ottoman position in a hostile European setting, when the Sublime State was less and less geographically a European polity. They reflect the fact that older place names that would have been familiar to earlier Ottomans had been replaced, at least in literature, by European equivalents, indicative of the fact that Western Europe produced the vast majority of the maps on which these examples were based, and that many of the Ottoman authors had undergone a European-influenced education. This is not to say that the Ottomans simply parroted their Western European neighbors; rather, such texts are indicative of the blurred lines of intellectual as well as cultural identity.

It is perhaps education above all that situates these Ottoman maps, however. Ottoman atlases and geographies, visual and literary, were almost always instructive, not simply for perusal or illustration. They formed a significant part of the educational push that the empire witnessed during the reign of Abdülhamid II, and the strong link between geography and history shows how far those two disciplines were combined in atlases to develop a sense of Ottoman identity. At the same time, the large number of military maps also point to one of the primary purposes of that educational drive: to educate and inspire a sense of loyalty and continuity in the future military and civil leaders of a state under significant internal and external threats. This sense of identity that placed the Ottoman realms in a geographic center had consequences for the portrayal of the wider world. This is not to say that the Ottoman Empire was exclusively inward-looking; far from it. Yet it was an outlook that would have made this map of Central and Eastern Europe problematic for an Ottoman in 1910 in being geographically out of focus. As Fortna has argued, the trend in Ottoman cartography from the 1890s was to move away from continental maps that split up the Empire’s territory (Fortna 2002: 186–90) to those that showed it as a whole. As a number of late Ottoman atlases and geographic (and historical) texts show us, understanding world geography, including that of Eastern and Central Europe, was an important subject. But the focus of cartography was important above all in the context of understanding Ottoman geography and emphasizing the Sublime State’s central position in the geopolitical landscape.
16

Yiddishland in Central Europe

The Ashkenazic Jews were not a uniform group. Ashkenazim from the German-speaking territories differed much from Ashkenazim living in the Slavophone areas, despite the fact that both groups are lumped together under the single name of “Ashkenazic Jews.” The Jews who had lived in Central and Eastern Europe for over eight centuries created their own unique culture. The actual medium and inspiration was the language known today as Yiddish. Drawing at this source, the Central and Eastern European Jews created the concept of Yiddishland, or the land of the Yiddish-speaking Jews. It should be understood both as a real, geographically defined place, and as a virtual homeland for numerous Jews who identify with Yiddish language and culture (Geller 2010). Moreover, the phenomenon of Yiddishland underlines the fact that typically a geographically defined place played a secondary role in understanding the Jewish civilization. The stereotype of “the wandering Jew” is still widespread, while the politics and culture of the Jewish diaspora have often conveyed “the pervasive impression, that the Jewish experience is one of displacement, lacking not only a proper territory but also a substantial spatiality or attachment to place” (Brauch, Lipphard and Nocke 2008: 1). Despite this, Jews in Central and Eastern Europe referred to their places of settlement collectively as “Yiddishland.” Yiddishland was a real Jewish “country” that overlapped with present-day Belarus (Beyarslan in Yiddish), Estonia (Estland), Latvia (Lettland), Lithuania (Liet), Moldova (Moldaytse), Poland (Poyln), Romania (Romayye) and Ukraine (Ukraine), and partly with Hungary (Ungern), Slovakia (Slovakay), and European Russia (Rusland).

Understandably, nowadays Yiddish-speakers and their descendants are most interested in these aforementioned territories where their communities used to live and where they created a unique Yiddish civilization. This centuries-long interaction of Ashkenazim with their homelands across Central and Eastern Europe resulted in specific Yiddish-language topography and toponyms, which frequently differ in form and spatial scope from similar terms as employed in the region’s non-Jewish languages (Geller 2010: 51). However, it should be emphasized that these Yiddish-language geographic and place names cover only the areas within Yiddishland. Other places located outside this “Jewish country” were typically referred to with their non-Jewish official names that were only transliterated into Yiddish. Many such toponyms were directly adopted from German, usually in the case of towns, cities, regions and countries located west of the River Oder (Odra). Apart from the capitals and big industrial cities, Yiddish-speakers did not develop their own specific forms for placenames in Western Europe or Scandinavia.

In Central and Eastern Europe, or Yiddishland, Yiddish-speakers creatively borrowed and adapted geographic and place names from the region’s non-Jewish languages. Furthermore,
in quite a few cases, they developed their own specific Yiddish forms of names of these localities, regions and countries that were of much emotional value or other importance to Ashkenazim. A good example of this phenomenon is the Yiddish name *Lite* for “Lithuania.” Importantly, from the perspective of the mental geography of Yiddishland, this term encompasses not only today’s country of Lithuania, but also parts of Latvia and Estonia, Belarus, north-eastern Poland and northern Ukraine, or the pre-1919 Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Jacobs 2005: 6). In Yiddish, Jews conserved an early modern geographic shape of this grand duchy.

The shtetls, towns, and cities of Central and Eastern Europe endowed with specific Yiddish forms of their names allow us to locate Yiddishland in the geographical space of present-day Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Poland, Romania, and Russia. Collections of Yiddish culture and folklore are understandably limited to these areas inhabited by Ashkenazim communities (Prüšťski 1912; Pryłucki and Lehman 1926–1933). Hence, it is particularly difficult to determine Yiddish-language forms of names of localities where Yiddish-speakers did not traditionally live. Yiddish-language cartography for the sake of popular education in the Soviet Union developed only after World War One. What is more, in the war’s aftermath, the region’s empires broke up and were replaced with numerous ethnolinguistically defined nation-states. However, the Ashkenazim’s Yiddish-language mental map of Yiddishland (that is, Central and Eastern Europe) remained largely in place, despite any border changes. Only this assumption allows us to attempt a reconstruction of the Yiddish-language forms of the names of countries, regions, and cities for the Yiddish-language map of Central Europe in 1910.

However, the standardization of Yiddish as a language began in earnest only after the 1908 Language Conference at Czernowitz (today Chernivtsi in Ukraine), Bukovina, and Austria-Hungary, and did not progress much before the late 1920s. Following the 1905 Revolution that allowed for the creation of Jewish and other political parties in the Russian Empire (where the majority of Yiddishland was located at that time), many secular Jewish activists and intellectuals appealed for the formal recognition of Yiddish as a language equal to Russian, German, or Polish. They were displaced with the fact that the non-Jewish authorities and Jewish traditionalists disparaged Yiddish as a “jargon.” The Great War led to the German and Austro-Hungarian occupation of Russia’s western provinces in 1915–1918/19, or much of Yiddishland. In this German area the Germans established a semi-colony of Land Ober Ost, where for the first time in history, Yiddish was used as an official language in local administration and education. But prior to the standardization of Yiddish in the interwar period, dialectal and regional differences yielded many parallel Yiddish forms of the same name of a locality. For example, the city of Kolomyja (nowadays in Ukraine) was known in Yiddish variably as Kolomey, Kalemey, Kalemay, or Kilemay. For the sake of the Yiddish-language map of Central Europe in 1910, I strove to identify the most popular or standard form of a given locality’s name.

### Countries and Cities

The Yiddish-speaking communities of Ashkenazim created their own names for many towns and cities across Yiddishland. “The capital of Poland will always be known in Yiddish not as ‘Warszawa’ or as ‘Warschau,’ but as *Varsho*. And the ‘Jerusalem of Lithuania’ can be part of Russia, Lithuania or Poland, but we will never call it by its Lithuanian name, ‘Vilnius,’ or by its Russian or Polish names (that is, ‘Vil’na,’ ‘Wilno’), but only by its Yiddish name, *Vilne*. Likewise, *Kroko* (Cracow), *Ger* (in Polish, Góra Kalwaria), *Brisk* (Brest), or *Brod* (Budy) are, as far as we can tell, the undisputed Yiddish names of the respective cities” (Schechter 1986: 17). On the contrary, the names of towns and cities located outside of Yiddishland were not of emotional or other importance to Yiddish-speakers. Hence, they tended to adopt forms widespread in the local languages and wrote them down phonetically with the use of Hebrew letters as employed in Yiddish. Hence, Venice became *Venetsiya* in Yiddish, Graz—*Grats*, Sarajevo—*Sarayevyo*, or Burgas—*Burgas*.

Most Yiddish forms of toponyms are the result of phonetic assimilation and reinterpretation either by way of German or Slavic languages. Subsequently, such assimilated Yiddish forms of placenames were adapted to the inflectional and grammatical needs of the Yiddish language. That is why in many cases the final vocalic sound appears in Yiddish as *e*: *Kovno—Kove*, *Grodno—Grodne*, *Moscow* (for example, from Polish, *Moskwa*)—*Moske*, or *Lomzha—Lombze*. Many Yiddish forms, particularly those adapted from Slavic languages, were radically altered in order to better fit the Yiddish phonemic patterns. “Perhaps the best example is *Zhetl* (in western Belarus), which appears to be a compromise between Polish (*Zdzietel*) and Belarusian (*Dyatlava*)” (Glasser 2014: 9).

After World War Two and the Holocaust, many traditional Yiddish-language toponyms fell into disuse and oblivion when no local Jewish communities remained. Ashkenazi survivors often moved to different countries and areas following vast postwar border changes and expulsions. In these new places they began to use official forms of toponyms in the state language. Hence, Yiddish *Frotsd*, closely follows the Polish name of *Wroclaw*, or Yiddish *Gdansk* the Polish name of Gdańsk. Before the war, both cities’ Yiddish-language communities used the specific Yiddish forms *Bresle* and *Dantsk*, respectively. Obviously, the former is derived from the German-language form Breslau, while the latter appears to be a compromised form between the German form *Danzig* and the Polish form *Gdańsk*. The Holocaust destroyed the Ashkenazim and their Yiddishland, alongside the unique tradition of Yiddish-language cartography. This Yiddish-language map of Central Europe in 1910 hopes to recover some elements of this once vibrant geographic and toponymic Yiddish tradition for culture and scholarship in today’s Central and Eastern Europe.
L. L. (Ludwik Lejzer) Zamenhof’s (1859–1917) ambition extended beyond the mere creation of an international language. He wanted to reform all socio-ethnic relations so that:

without uprooting a man from his homeland, from his language and from his confession, [Esperanto] would let him overcome all the contradictions of his national-religious background, thus allowing him to communicate with all people of all languages and religions on the neutral basis of common humanity, according to the principle of reciprocity (Zamenhof 2006: 139).

For this purpose, one of Zamenhof’s far-reaching reforms was to refer to countries and states with the use of “neutral” names. Zamenhof pointed out that no state represents all languages, cultures, and religions of its citizens. Hence, the state should refrain from intervening in these spheres. Zamenhof wrote:

I believe that each state and all provinces should be known under neutral geographical names, and not under names derived from the names of their nations, languages or religions, because the names of many countries derived in this manner are the main reason why some of the inhabitants consider themselves to be better than the others. And the former believe that the latter, who are just like them native sons of the same land, are bound by the interests of another country, while the land [of their birth] is foreign to them (Zamenhof 2006:139).

In adopting such a principled stance, Zamenhof went against the grain of the then increasingly more popular ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism. When more than a dozen European ethnolinguistically defined nations from Ireland to the Balkans and the Baltic were struggling for independence and their own nation-states, he proposed that the names of states should be derived, for example, from the names of their capital cities, thus yielding “Dublin Land” for Ireland, “Riga Land” for Latvia, or “Warsaw Land” for Poland. Zamenhof knew that such a change of their country’s name would not arouse any enthusiasm among the Poles. In his letter to Émile Javal, on May 26, 1906, Zamenhof wrote:

The greatest enemies of my ideas are Warsaw Esperantists, because due to various historical developments, the Poles got used to applying double standards while discussing the current political situation. They agree that Russia should be renamed with the use of a moniker that would not be national, but geographic in its character, that all the country’s languages should enjoy the same legal status, and that Esperanto ought to be made into the sole medium of the Russian Duma. On the other hand, they would never accept that Poland could be renamed as “Warsaw Land,” and that all the languages in Poland should enjoy the same status. They see such an idea as something mad and awful. Alas, I must listen to all that and keep quiet. For the sake of Esperanto I need to refrain from propagating my ideas in this regard (Zamenhof 2006: 21).

Perhaps, while creating Esperanto, Zamenhof did not fully think through the issue of toponyms, because he never dared to officially introduce such neutral names to Esperanto. However, he kept thinking about this problem until the year of his death.

The best solution to the dilemma of the current big and smaller European states would be a “United States of Europe” composed from proportional states of a similar geographical size. But nowadays, it seems, that is too early to talk about it, but at least by official and mutual consent it would be possible to remove this great evil, the source of endless conflicts, which is the identification of the country’s name with an ethnic group (Zamenhof 2006: 230).

Immediately after Zamenhof proposed his constructed language of Esperanto, in Europe dozens of similar languages were created by people of a variety of professions and backgrounds, from proverbial “cooks” to renowned scholars, such as Harry Jespersen (1860–1943), Giuseppe Peano (1858–1932), or René de Saussure (1868–1943). Out of about one thousand planned, artificial, auxiliary, universal (all these adjectives are used here synonymously) languages with a sketch of grammar, only a dozen were further elaborated and supplied with a textbook, while only a few were employed for genuine communication in speech and writing, that is, Volapük, Esperanto, Ido, and Interlingua. Each of these four languages’ creators had a slightly different motive for inventing his own universal language. The Bavarian prelate Johann Martin Schleyer (1831–1912) created Volapük, allegedly compelled by a divine command. Zamenhof created Esperanto for all people, although his original ambition was to devise a single language for the entire Jewish diaspora.
in which the communication was difficult between Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazim and Sephardic-speaking Spanyolim. Ido was invented by anonymous creators who thus aspired to "correct" and "refine" Esperanto. Interlingua was devised for the sake of being readily intelligible to most Europeans.

Of all the planned languages, only Esperanto achieved a genuine success. Esperanto is a "living language," that is, it is employed in speech and writing by a considerable number of users and supported by many more. By using Esperanto for a variety of purposes around the world, Esperantists keep constantly developing this language. Esperanto continues to change in line with their wishes and in reply to the changing socio-economic, cultural, and technological realities of the globe.

At the end of the nineteenth century when numerous artificial languages were created, novel communication technologies also appeared, such as the telegraph and telephone, allowing for near-instantaneous transmission of information across the world, that is, beyond the confines of a single state. At that time, mass tourism also took off in earnest across the West. What is more, numerous ethnonymic nations won their own nation-states in Europe, which entailed their governments' intensive engagement in language politics. The goals of such a policy were typically twofold, first, the liquidation of the use of minority languages, and second, the liquidation of illiteracy by teaching the entire population how to read and write in the state's sole national and official language.

The concept of artificial language and its actualizations are in a certain way an intellectual showcase of the nineteenth century. At that time, aristocracy had already descended from the stage of history, leaving Western Europe's bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia of Central and Eastern Europe to deal with the growing urgent need for international contacts. Earlier, it had been aristocrats who had ensured such international communication was channelled through the pan-European media of Latin and French. But in the late nineteenth century of nationalisms and high imperialism, there was no agreement to adopt a single "living language" for this purpose. The philosophical ideal was a neutral language that could be built from scratch. The means of constructing an artificial language had already been known since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Out of thousands of projects of such languages, more than 80 percent were steeped in the principles developed by the most outstanding Danish linguist, Rasmus Rask (1787–1832). He discussed these principles widely and enumerated them in his 1823 manuscript that subsequently was not published and was presumed lost. This manuscript was found recently in an archive, allowing for the scrutiny of Rask's general principles to be followed in the construction of an artificial language. According to him, any constructed language should be based on:

- the grammar and spelling should be phonetic (phonemic) with no silent letters.
- the accent should fall on the word's penultimate syllable.
- the grammatical gender of nouns should reflect the actual biological gender of living creatures (thus, all animate objects should be referred to with the use of neuter grammatical gender),
- adjectives should be indeclinable,
- pronoun case should be beautiful,
- and spelling should be phonetic (phonemic) with no silent letters.

The principles show clearly that Rask had thought hard about creating an artificial language more than half a century before the "epidemic" of planned languages struck (Hjorth 2011).

To shed light on how Esperantists went about creating toponyms (place names, geographic names) in their language, we need to consult Zamenhof's basic grammar of this language. It constitutes part of the *Fundamento de Esperanto* (Foundation of Esperanto), or the inviolable canon of the rules of Esperanto (Zamenhof 1963). Amazingly, a quick overview reveals that Rask's principles of a constructed language are included almost in their entirety in Zamenhof's grammar. There is no doubt that Zamenhof did not know Rask's work, so both arrived independently at the same conclusions. Below, these fragments of the canonical grammar of Esperanto are cited, which touch upon the issue of creating toponyms.

**B) Parts of Speech**

2. Substantives are formed by adding [a] to the root. For the plural, the letter [i] must be added to the singular. There are two cases: the nominative and the objective (accusative). The root with the added [a] is the nominative, the objective adds an [n] after the [a]. Other cases are formed by prepositions; thus, the possessive (genitive) by [de], "of"; the dative by [al], "to," the instrumental (ablative) by [kun], "with," or other preposition as the sense demands. Eg. root [patr], "father"; la patr'o, "the father," la patr'o'n, "the father" (objective), de la patr'o, "of the father," al la patr'o, "to the father," kun la patr'o, "with the father," la patr'o'j, "the fathers," la patr'o'jn, "the fathers" (obj.), por la patr'o'j, "for the fathers."

3. Adjectives are formed by adding "a" to the root . . .

**C) General Rules**

9. Every word is to be read exactly as written, there are no silent letters.

10. The accent falls on the last syllable but one (penultimate).

11. Compound words are formed by the simple junction of roots, (the principal word standing last), which are written as a single word but, in elementary works, separated by a small line ([']). Grammatical terminations are considered as independent words. Eg. vapor'sip'o, "steamboat" is com-
posed of the roots vapor, “steam,” and sip, “a boat,” with the substantival termination o.
12. If there be one negative in a clause, a second is not admissible.
15. In phrases answering the question “where?” (meaning direction), the words take the termination of the objective case; eg, kie'n vi ir'as? “where are you going?”; dom'o'n, “home”; London'o'n, “to London,” etc.
14. Every preposition in the international language has a definite fixed meaning . . .
15. The so-called “foreign” words, i.e., words which the greater number of languages have derived from the same source, undergo no change in the international language, beyond conforming to its system of orthography. Such is the rule with regard to primary words, derivatives are better formed (from the primary word) according to the rules of the international grammar . . .

Principle 15 of the Fundamento de Esperanto governs the forming of toponyms. In the first-ever textbook of Esperanto, Zamenhof wrote that he created this language “so that learning it would be a trifle” (Dr Esperanto 1887: 3). Students of linguistics (philology) and pedagogy did not research languages in terms of the ease of their acquisition until the mid-twentieth century, while the main goal for creating Esperanto (as well as dozens of other artificial languages) was the ease of learning such a language.

In less than thirty years since its inception, the use of Esperanto had spread sufficiently to make it possible to convene the first world Esperanto Congress in 1905 in Boulogne-sur-Mer, France. The approximately one thousand participants who attended this event freely communicated in Esperanto. Moreover, during these three decades intervening between the creation of Esperanto and this congress, quite a few “repairers” of this language appeared, thus threatening the cohesion of Esperanto. Therefore, during the first congress, Zamenhof proclaimed a Deklaracio pri la esenco de la Esperantismo (Declaration on the essence of Esperantism). Point 4 reads, as follows:

the Fundamento de Esperanto is the single, perpetual obligatory authority over Esperanto, and it cannot be modified. Otherwise, Esperanto depends on no legal authority, neither a governing body nor an individual, including Zamenhof himself. If a linguistic matter is not covered in the Fundamento, it is up to the individual on how to handle the matter (Zamenhof 1929: 277–278).

The success of Esperanto was not decided by its “simple” and regular linguistic structure alone, as many artificial language projects were equally sensible in this regard. The game-changer was the very personality of Ludwik Zamenhof. He was an excellent strategist, a man of compromises, and a consistent propagator of his ideas. Zamenhof began working on Esperanto at the age of 16, presented the finished language to the world when he was only 28, and devoted the rest of his life to propagating it. Creators of other international languages also devoted their lives to improving their projects, often presenting a dozen versions of them. Subsequently, they delved into endless linguistic details, often terrorizing their followers to adhere to this and no other version of a given planned language. On the contrary, Zamenhof subjected his language project to public scrutiny and criticism, and in the ensuing discussion he convinced the majority of Esperanto’s importance, utility, and validity. Zamenhof’s ingenuity stemmed from the fact that, unlike creators of other planned languages, in 1887 he presented a complete language, which neither the author himself nor anyone else would ever be allowed to further “improve.” What is more, Zamenhof neither copyrighted Esperanto nor claimed any intellectual ownership of his project. This approach ensured that Esperanto flourished, while other artificial languages faltered.

In the period of the greatest popularity of Esperanto, that is, in the interwar period, the number of Esperantists was estimated at two million. Over a hundred periodicals were published, tens of thousands of books were either written in or translated into Esperanto, and thanks to this language, hundreds of thousands of tourists traveled across the world. Esperanto had become a “living language” in the fullest sense of the expression.

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Apart from Esperanto, creators and users of the other artificial languages have not developed principles of forming toponyms. But even in Esperanto, otherwise quite a developed language, there is still a slight confusion regarding this matter. The general rule governing the creation of geographical neologisms in Esperanto is that proper names in their original languages are “assimilated” into Esperanto (“Esperanto-ized”) in such a way as to allow for unambiguous identification of them with the original geographical name. Bearing this rule in mind, the neologism is endowed with pronunciation, spelling, and morphology that is typical for Esperanto.

Some “assimilated” geographical names has been around from the very beginning of Esperanto, for instance, Bamako, Berno (Bern), Brno, Idaho, Jamesukro (Yamoussoukro), Kolombo (Colombo), Kuopio, Kongo (Kongo), Kolorado (Colorado), Orinoko (Orinoco), Oslo, Paramaribo, Porto, Porto-Nov, Milano, Montevideo, Monako (Monaco), Maroko (Morocco), Tokago, or Togo. Geographic names are made by assimilation in the following four most usual ways:

1. by adding the nominal suffix -o to the geographic name, for example, London assimilates to Londono, Москва (Moscow) to Moskvo;
2. by phonetic assimilation, the Swiss city of La Chaux-de-Fonds is transformed into La Ĉaŭdefono, or the Canadian city of Charlottetown into Ĉarlotaŭno;
3. in other situations, spelling assimilation is employed, hence, the name of Polish city of Łódź is shorn of its diacritics and supplied with the suffix -o, yielding Łodz'o. Similarly, the Hungarian town of Mezőkovácszáza is transformed into Mezokovázház;
4. At times a geographical name is assimilated into Esperanto from another than a given state’s official (na-
The forming of names of states and of their inhabitants (seen as nations) became an Achilles’ heel of Esperanto. The authors of the *Plena Analiza Gramatiko de Esperanto* (A full presentation of the grammar of Esperanto), Kálmán Kalocsay (1891–1976) and Gaston Waringhein (1901–1991), rightly remark that names of states are a complex problem, as some states get their names from their inhabitants (nations), and vice versa, names of some states are used to derive names for their inhabitants (nations). Actually, the same messiness and ambiguity in this regard is observed across all European languages. For instance, in French the name of Belgique (Belgium) is derived from the inhabitant’s name Belge (Belgian), while in turn it is the state’s name, France, that yields the inhabitant’s name Français (Frenchman). In German, the country’s name Deutschland (Germany) stems from the inhabitant’s name Deutscher (German), while the state’s name England spawns the inhabitant’s name Engländer (Englishman). In English, the inhabitant’s name, German, delivers the state’s name, Germany, but it is the other way round in the case of Hungary and Hungarian. In Italian the inhabitant’s name Greca (Greek) is the source of the country’s name Grecia (Greece), whereas the state’s name Italia yields the inhabitant’s name Italiano (Italian) (Kalocsay and Waringhein 1985: 459).

For regularizing, or normativizing, this perceived lexical chaos, Zamenhof could arbitrarily propose to derive names of states from their main ethnic groups, and even neutrally rename these ethnic groups, or tolerate the extant discrepancies, as long as an Esperanto counterpart of a country’s name retained its “international” character. He settled on the latter, quite pragmatic, solution. Subsequently, Zamenhof divided the names of the countries into three groups, namely:

1. he used the suffix -uj- for the “old civilizations” of Europa, Asia, and some parts of Africa (in accordance with the tradition attested in the majority of Europe’s Indo-European languages) for forming names of countries from the names of their inhabitants (peoples, nations). For instance, Holando (Dutchman) → Holand’uj-o (Netherlands), Kore’oj (Korean) → Kore’uj-o (Korea), Egypt’oj (Egyptian) → Egip’tuj-o (Egypt). I selected these examples on purpose, because half a century later they almost caused a “linguistic war” among the Esperantists (see below).

2. for the “New World” continents of both Americas and Australia, alongside parts of Africa, Zamenhof decided to develop names of countries’ inhabitants (peoples, nations) from the names of their countries with the use of the suffix -an-. For example, Kanada’o (Canada), Kanada’n-o (Canadian), Peru’o (Peru) → Peru’anj-o (Peruvian), Gvine’a (Guinea) → Gvine’anj-o (Guinean).

3. Furthermore, for countries and lands known from Antiquity, Zamenhof employed the suffix -i-, for instance, Asirio (Assyria), Fenicio (Assyria), Egipt’oj (Egypt), Korea’oj (Korea), Kanad’oj (Canada), Perú’oj (Peru), Resovia (Resovia) (from Kolozsvár) by Hungarian Esperantists, and as Klujo (from Cluj) by their Romanian colleagues.

Zamenhof was so scrupulous in his Esperanto language use that in his 1901 letter to Thorsteinsson he employed a complex multiple-suffix derivation to coin the term Rus’uj’ano (Zamenhof 1929: 513) for saying that he was an inhabitant of Russia, but not an ethnic Russian (or Rus’o in Esperanto). In most European languages, including English, this distinction does not exist. However, in Russian itself this dichotomy is well known, namely, Rossiинн (inhabitant or citizen of the Russian Federation) vs ПрусскийRusskii (ethnic Russian).

With time it turned out that numerous Esperantists, especially poets, saw the suffix -uj- as insufficient and began using the suffix -i- outside the context of Antiquity to which Zamenhof had originally wanted to contain it. It appears that Esperantists wanted to have a stand-alone suffix for forming names of states and countries, because the suffix -uj- was burdened with other grammatical functions (for instance, cin’dri’oj for “ashtray” or mon’oj for “purse”). Furthermore, in contrast to -i- some saw the suffix -uj- as “primitive” and “ugly.”
The spread and development of Esperanto took place during the period of rapid decolonization, entailing the establishment of numerous postcolonial states. As a result, the process of developing Esperanto names for states became even more complex. In addition, apart from Central Europe’s unitary ethnolinguistic nation-states, multietnic polities and federations proliferated. The subsequent ad hoc onomastic solutions developed on a case by case basis gave rise to names that are un-intelligible to non-Esperantists, for example, Usno for the United States of America (Unuiĝintaj Ŝtatoj de Ameriko), or Unaremo for the United Arab Emirates. The latter form was not popularly accepted, and most Esperantists speak either of the Unuiĝintaj Arabaj Emirlandoj or UAE.

Creating names for countries became increasingly more complex because names for non-European and postcolonial states were formed in a variety of non-standard ways, for instance, Seychelles from the name of Louis XIV’s minister de Schelles, Mauritius from the name of Prince Maurice of Nassau, from indigenous ethnonyms (as in the case of Utah < Ute ethnic group), from tree names (Barbados < bearded figtree), from names of animals (Sierra Leone < Lion Mountains), from names of mountains (Montenegro, literally “Black Mountain”), from river names (Gabon, Senegal or Congo), or from names of minerals (Argentina > Latin argentum “silver”). Some countries’ names were derived from names of cities (Algeria from Alger, or Mexico from Mexico). In other instances, names of colonies that gained independence were replaced with brand-new names, such as Burkina Faso for Upper Volta, or Benin for Dahomey. Yet, other states adopted names dictated by ideological considerations, as in the cases of Liberia (“liberty”) or Yugoslavia (“land of Yugo [‘South’] Slavs”). There are also portmanteau-style names, for instance, Tanzania (from the names of Tanganika and Zanzibar, which united into a single country), or acronym-style neologisms, as in the case of Tanganika and Zanzibar, which united into a single country, or acronym-style neologisms, as in the case of Tanganika and Zanzibar, which united into a single country.

Disputes about the names of states in Esperanto are intertwined, not so much with politics, as with ideology and language esthetic. There is a tendency to return to the sources: why Albania and not Skiperia (derived from the Albanian-language name for the country, Shqiperia), why Nov-Zelando and not Aotearoa (that is, the Maori-language name of this country)? The author of the first Esperanto dictionaries, Émil Grosjean-Maupin (1863–1933), declared that “race is a myth” (meaning, not only race understood as “skin color,” but also “nations” and “ethnic groups”). Bearing this comment in mind, many years later, the then chairman of the Esperanto Academy (Akademio de Esperanto), Frenchman André Albaut (1923–2017), remarked in 1974 that Esperanto should be based on linguistic facts (that is, on the international character of vocabulary), and not on rapidly evolving racial (ethnic, national) myths. He criticized the use in Esperanto of such national-specific toponyms as Magyarorszag (Hungary), Suomi (Finland), Euskadi (Basque Country), or Karjala (Karelia), instead of the internationally accepted forms of these names (Hungary, Finland, Basque Country, or Karelia) that are immediately recognizable to all across Europe. According to Albaut, Esperanto, which Zamenhof called an “international language” only represents chaos in the case of state names created on the basis of their own national languages. Names of this type are typical for “old European civilizations or polities,” for instance, Holand’uj’o (Netherlands) and Island’uj’o (Iceland). But they were not derived from any ethnic names, so in this they were not contrary to the spirit of Esperanto. Not that this fact lessens the resultant terminological chaos, given that in Icelandic, Iceland is known as Ljóðveldið Island, while French-speakers (who are influential among Esperantists) refer to the Netherlands in French as the Pays-Bas.

Each Esperanto word has a root with the use of which other word forms are created through the system of affixes. The root denoting broadly understood Polishness is pol’. The simplest nominal derivation yields Pol’o (Pole) and Pol’uj’o (Poland). Holand’o means “Dutchman,” so Zamenhof derived the name Holand’uj’o for the Netherlands. However, among Esperantists a spontaneous tendency appeared to form names for some countries with the use of the suffix -land-, for example, Swis’land’o (apart from standard Svis’uj’o) for Switzerland or Skot’land’o (besides standard Skot’uj’o) for Scotland, or even Pol’and’o (apart from standard Pol’uj’o) for Poland. The question is whether this development might be in breach of Article 15 of the Fundamento de Esperanto. What is then the standard root, bol’ or holand’? If the latter, then what is the correct Esperanto name for “Dutchman,” Holand’an’o or Hol’an’o?

In an effort to tackle this discrepancy, the Esperanto Academy under the leadership of its chairman André Albaut decided that the forms Korenoj and Egiptujo violate the Fundamento de Esperanto, and the only correct names for both countries are Koreo and Egipto, respectively, while for their inhabitants (nations), Koreanoj and Egiptoanoj. Admittedly, he did not dare to “correct” Esperanto names of other countries in a similar manner, but the decision taken in the case of the Esperanto names for Korea and Egypt set out the general direction desired, as espoused by the academy for developing and standardizing toponyms (Aktoj 1975: 61–65).

André Albaut’s critique of Esperanto word formation in the sphere of racial, ethnic, and state names upset many acad-
emy members. The ensuing dispute lasted for over a decade. Frankly speaking, André Albaut was guided by a certain concept of Esperanto’s esthetics and a specific logic, like reformers of Esperanto who had then turned it into Ido. Finally, in March 2009, the Esperanto Academy under the leadership of the Brazilian Geraldo Mattos (1931–2014) annulled its previous decisions regarding names of states, concluding that none of the following forms Koreo, Korenjo or Korea, and Egipto, Egiptuo or Egipto is in breach of the Fundamento de Esperanto (Oficialaj 2013). The academy decided to recommend all the forms of names of states attested in wide use among Esperantists. However, this recommendation came with a characteristic caveat:

In order to respect the tradition, and in the spirit of peace, we declare that the name of a country is correct, if the majority of Esperantists use such a form. In the event of an orthographic conflict between two or more forms for the name of same country resulting from derivation, the Academy recommends using the most international form, as postulated by Article 15 of the Fundamento de Esperanto. Regardless of the character of the country’s name (be it ethnic or non-ethnic), the names of a country and its inhabitants (people, nation) must correspond to each other, for example, Angl’ujo (England) and Angl’oj (Englishman), or Nederland’oj (Dutchman). In particular, it is not advisable to form new names of states with the employment of international “words,” not attested in Esperanto, especially with the suffix -(i)stan-, unless it is already in international use in the name of a given country (Listo 2009).

But the academy did not explain, just as nobody else has (including Zamenhof), since the very beginning of the creation of Esperanto, what the term “international” actually means. While during the Enlightenment, the matter was simple and international meant then the standard usages of the French language, nowadays in the era of globalization the concept of “international” begins to be equated with the American usages of the English language. The continuing emergence of new states, quasi-states, or autonomous regions keeps changing the rules of naming countries in Esperanto. What if in the future the name of Greenland is officially changed to in Kalaallit Nunaat, that of New Caledonia to Kanaky, or if Wales is renamed as Cymru?

In practice, these three or four suffixes employed in Esperanto for creating names of countries bring this language closer to how toponyms are dealt with in “natural languages.” In no way does this tendency contradict the principles of Esperanto. Zamenhof himself repeatedly allowed for the introduction of parallel forms of a word or name, pragmatically letting Esperantists decide which form they may eventually adopt when writing and speaking in this language. Paradoxically, Esperanto toponyms and their derivations are the most irregular part of Esperanto grammar (while the rest of Esperanto remains grammatically “regular”). The forms of country names in Esperanto are determined by the actual use, tradition, and a degree of individual arbitrary choice, as exemplified by the Esperanto-language map Centra Eŭropo en 1910 (Central Europe in 1910).

Translated from the Polish by Tomasz Kamusella
Short-lived Polities in Central Europe, 1908–1924

In literature, the discussion is widespread on the creation of ethnolinguistic nations by activists, who from an outside (etic) perspective can be seen as ethnic entrepreneurs or national activists, while from an internal (emic, or national) perspective as national awakeners. The latter term, rife in national histories of Central Europe’s nations, hinges on the tacit assumption—without any evidence to this end—that nations are near-eternal or near-natural entities. In this view informed by ethnolinguistic nationalism, during the period of non-national polities and empires from the late Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, many of the region’s nations “fell asleep.” This far-fetched hypothesis also assumes that the late medieval period was a nationally happy age (even with no records confirming the existence of any nations then), when Central Europe’s “nations” purportedly had a chance to establish their “national” monarchies, such as Bohemia (equated with today’s Czech Republic), Bulgaria, Croatia, Greater Moravia (equated with today’s Slovakia), the Holy Roman Empire (equated with today’s Germany), Hungary, Rus’ (equated with today’s Belarus, Russia or Ukraine), or Walachia and Moldavia (equated with today’s Romania and Moldova). This meta-national master-narrative continues with the period of “great re-awakening of nations” in the nineteenth century, which from the etic perspective, was the busy age of creating ethnolinguistically defined nations by activists through education, the printing press, societies, and statistics.

The formal decision taken in 1872 by Central Europe’s non-national empires and polities to include in censuses the “language question” as a measure of nationality (or one’s membership in a nation) furnished national activists with officially “scientific data” on the demographic sizes of the postulated nations. It was an argument that carried increasingly more weight in the region’s parliaments and regional diets, effectively coaxing the non-national ruling elites to give concessions to speakers of different languages, seen as nations-in-making with some inherent political rights. The target groups, thanks to these concessions and spreading elementary education in national languages, began to believe in this national message, facilitating the creation of postulated nations, often signaled by the rise of ethnonational parties. Gradually, this national message transformed into a novel national identity bridged the centuries-old gaping cleavage between nobles and serfs (peasants). The common national language began to trump birthright, which had firmly kept nobility separate from the serfdom-bound peasantry for over half a millennium.

Few authors and researchers, even if not enamored of the ideology of nationalism, see languages (Einzelsprachen) as artifacts, creations of humans and their groups. Most share the stereotypical and quite mythologized view of languages as near-natural, near-eternal and immutable entities (“living organisms”) that exist independent of human will. Obviously, as in the case of nations, there is no evidence that today’s languages of Czech, Hungarian, Norwegian, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, or Turkish existed a millennium ago. But this claim is equally believed by nationalists and non-nationalists. Indeed, the Finno-Ugric, Germanic, Slavic, Romance, or Turkic dialect continua—from which the aforementioned languages (Einzelsprachen) stem—were around a thousand years ago, but at that time Finno-Ugric-, Germanic-, Slavic-, Romance, or Turkic-speakers in their vast majority were unaware of the Judeo-Graeco-Latin concept of Einzelsprache (“a language”). Furthermore, they were illiterate, and their loyalty was to a monarch and a monotheistic religion, not to a language. With few exceptions, standard languages began to be created across Central Europe on the model of prestigious Latin or (New Testament) Greek only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Literature is readily available on the subject of when the first-ever grammar or dictionary of a given language, and the earliest book or newspaper in this language, were written and published. However, this information does not seem to dispel the myth of Central Europe’s millennium-old languages, because this myth is so useful for “proving” the supposedly long-existence of the extant ethnolinguistic nations connected to these Einzelsprachen. In addition, educational systems in Central Europe’s nation-states quite unanimously reproduce this myth from generation to generation, because it constitutes the basis of ethnolinguistic nationalism employed across the region for creating, legitimizing, and maintaining statehood since the early twentieth century.

If Central Europe’s nations and languages are deemed to be a product of nature or divine will, the same must be true of these ethnolinguistic nations’ nation-states. In the meta-national master narrative, the rise of nation-states was seen as inevitable, thus, “naturally” contributing to the delegitimation and destruction of the region’s non-national empires and polities. Somehow, the fact that many of these non-national polities existed much longer than any present-day nation-state (for instance, the Holy Roman Empire, 962–1806) does not dispel this myth of inevitability. On the contrary, it is proposed that today’s nation-states in one way or another correspond to this or that non-national medieval or early modern polity.
It is rarely noticed that available records point to many more unsuccessful projects of building nations, languages, and states than those that were realized, and at present commonly qualified with the adjective “national.” National historiographies disregard these failed projects or briefly lasting entities, or retroactively appropriate them for this or that nation. Researchers from outside Central Europe, not trained to follow the tenets of ethnomundane nationalism, are not any better at noticing the aforementioned short-lived or failed projects, because so much was written on the national success stories, leaving the short-lived and unrealized projects in the shadows of history. What is more, non-existent states cannot extend grants to interested researchers, while from the perspective of Central Europe’s extant nation-states, research on such non-national or failed national projects is not conducive to strengthening national master narratives. Hence, grant-making agencies, as branches of their respective nation-states’ administrations, do not prioritize research of this type. And in many cases such research is actively discouraged.

However, the “remembrance of things past” is as much composed from what is remembered as from what is cast into oblivion. What is forgotten and repressed constitutes the “dark matter” of history. But without recovering some of this dark matter, it is impossible to understand the emergence of the sociopolitical reality as it currently obtains. This is the practical value of making an effort to look into the neglected corners and nooks of the past, which is, at present, considered taboo by various national master narratives.

Map 18 offers an overview of the short-lived polities in Central Europe whose emergence was generated by the widespread political, economic, and social instability of the “long Great War in the East,” which commenced with Greece’s annexation of the Cretan State in 1908 and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), and came to an end with the conclusion of the Russian Civil War (1922) and the Turkish War of Independence (1923). The map’s end caesura of 1924 alludes to the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, which sent reverberations across the entire Muslim world during the 1920s, from Morocco and Egypt to British India and the Dutch East Indies.

During the first part of the 1908–1924 period, the aforementioned instability was at its highest in the Balkans, due to Greece’s expansionist policies of irredenta and the Balkan Wars; and at the beginning of the Great War in the western borderlands of the Russian Empire, which found themselves under the Central Powers’ occupation. The collapse of previous (typically imperial) administration, occupation and frequent changes in front lines and frontiers sent millions of refugees, deportees, and expellees one way or another on account of their “incorrect” religion or language. Hence, in these areas, short-lived polities emerged, be it the Free State of Icaria in the Aegean or the Republic of Central Albania in the south of Central Europe, while in the north, Land Ober Ost. However, it was the famine and economic collapse in 1916/1917–1918, painfully felt from Scandinavia to the Middle East, and from France to Russia, combined with the marauding armies increasingly left to their own devices, which triggered an entire avalanche of such short-lived polities. Map 18 records almost 80, but it is by no means an exhaustive list. Research and literature available on such polities is scant and often fully incorporated into the respective master narratives, which do not acknowledge any genuine agency to such short-lived polities’ leaderships.

The total, or near-total, collapse of the old order, the virtual disappearance of statehood (understood as state administration and services) across vast swaths of Central and Eastern Europe left the inhabitants with no choice but to take the care of their own villages, towns, cities, regions, or communities, into their own hands. As a result, hundreds (if not thousands) of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ council emerged between 1917 and 1921. Nowadays, the history of these councils is either disregarded or wholesale ascribed to the history of the Soviet-style or Soviet-led communist movement, because the Russian-language word “council,” совет, is invariably and confusingly rendered as “soviet” in English, although to Central Europe’s inhabitants who lived at that time, these councils were known as съвет совет in Belarussian, съвет совет in Bulgarian, съвет совет in Serbian, совет in Polish, нõукога in Estonian, neuvesto in Finnish, conseil in French, Rat in German, символо in Greek, tanács in Hungarian, padome in Latvian, taryba in Lithuanian, рад in Swedish, konseyi in Turkish, рада in Ukrainian, or ראַט in Yiddish. But prior to, or despite, any ideological choices, the councils, first of all, took care to feed, clothe, and house the populations in their self-appointed charge. For months and even years, they provided rudimentary administration, education, local (token) currencies, postal services, military defense, and a variety of other services across Central Europe. Quite a few were indistinguishable from states, but in name. Political, ethnic, and ideological entrepreneurs time and again seized such state-like organizations and proclaimed them to be polities in their own right. A single polity of this kind could, in a matter of days and weeks, change from a revolutionary (Soviet style) polity to a national one, and then to a non-national one. In most cases it hardly mattered to the population under such a polity’s control, the priority being food, clothes, housing, and mere biological survival in the dead of winter.

However, from the sample of the short-lived polities depicted on the map, it is readily visible that at least half of them subscribed to a national program of sorts, over one-quarter to (Soviet-style) socialism (communism), while only one-fifth to some non-national and non-socialist prewar forms of statehood creation and legitimation. Although it is only a sample compiled from readily available sources, this allows the conclusion that the distinctive political preference was for nationalism and socialism (communism), while the traditional forms of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance were generally rejected. The “traditional” forms of politics and statehood, as developed in the post-Napoleonic nineteenth century, were not trusted any longer, and generally blamed, alongside the traditional (noble) elites, for the unprecedented continent-scale conflagration of the Balkan Wars, the Great War, and the related national, revolutionary, and peasant wars. The hope was that something new must be tried to stop a repeat of this tragedy, which for almost two decades, destroyed the peace and livelihood of tens of millions.
Short-lived Polities in Central Europe, 1908–1924
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polities</th>
<th>National polity</th>
<th>Stable interwar state</th>
<th>Revolutionary or Soviet-style polity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUDETENLAND</td>
<td>Non-national and non-revolutionary polity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAISAAAR</td>
<td>Revolutionary or Soviet-style polity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Languages**

- Albanian
- Belorussian
- Croatian
- Crimean Tatar
- Czech
- Danish
- Estonian
- English
- Farsi
- French
- German
- Greek
- Hungarian
- Italian
- Lithuanian
- Moldavian
- Ottoman Turkish
- Polish
- Russian
- Romanian
- Ruiny
- Slovak
- Serbo-Croatian
- Serbian
- Slovenian
- Turkish
- Ukrainian
- Yiddish

**Writing systems**

- Arabic
- Cyrillic
- Hebrew
- Latin

**Religions**

- Buddhism
- Islam
- Orthodox Christianity

**Politics**

- Poland
- Serbian

**Free State of Upper Silesia**

- Unrealized project
It is common knowledge that millions were exterminated across Central Europe in genocides and massacres during World War Two, that tens of millions were expelled, resettled, evacuated, or fled across the region or from it during the war and in the latter half of the 1940s. This awareness of the human and demographic tragedy effectively overshadows quite similar developments during, and in the wake of, the Balkan Wars and the Great War. Indeed, the Second World War’s bloodbath and ethnic cleansing were on a larger scale, but not extremely so, hence the question arises why the tragedy of the Balkan, Caucasian, Eastern, and Sontig (Soča, Isonzo) fronts of World War One is so much neglected and forgotten. Perhaps, part of the answer is the fact that all of the main states (empires) which underpinned the political reality of Central Europe prior to 1918 were subsequently destroyed and replaced with radically novel ethnolinguistic nation-states after the Great War. On the other hand, the interwar nation-states that were equally obliterated or radically overhauled during the Second World War were mostly recreated (even if in somewhat changed territorial and political forms) after 1945. After 1918 there was no Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire, or Russian Empire left to commemorate the wartime tragedy of their inhabitants, while following World War Two, Central Europe’s nation-states, the non-national communist polity of the Soviet Union (with its component national in their character Soviet socialist republics), and the newly founded Jewish nation-state of Israel were at hand to ensure such remembrance and commemoration of the victims.

Map 19 seeks to redress this silence about the scale of human tragedy, which wreaked lives and livelihoods of tens of millions during and after the Balkan Wars and the Great War, in line with the tenets of ideologically informed “demographic engineering.” It should be consulted in conjunction with Map 11, which offers an overview of earlier expulsions, deportations, and genocides, with a clear focus on the nineteenth century when demographic engineering became a consciously wielded instrument of politics. Map 11 debunks the common Western preconception that the long nineteenth century (1815-1914) was a period of stability and peace in Europe after the earlier bloodbath of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (1791-1815). The creation of the Balkan nation-states and the Russian imperial expansion toward and around the Black Sea, and in the Caucasus and the Balkans left hundreds of thousands of victims in their wake, and generated similar numbers of destitute refugees, expellees and deportees. The story is as much forgotten as the even starker reality of ethnic cleansing, mass murder and genocide in the course of the Balkan Wars and the Great War. From the Central European perspective, from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, every generation of the region’s inhabitants suffered ethnic cleansing and genocide. Even later, during the Cold War, some populations that were deemed nationally or ideologically unwanted continued to suffer a similar awful and inhuman fate, though curbed to a degree by the nuclear stand-off between the two superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union. The strategic doctrine of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) prevented Washington and Moscow from taking any unilateral decisions in Europe that could trigger a worldwide nuclear Armageddon of a feared World War Three.

But warfare forcing millions of refugees away from their homes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide did not disappear after 1945. The West exported these phenomena to the colonial world in the throes of decolonization, which subsequently was made into a theater of hot proxy wars between the Cold War world’s two ideological blocs. Earlier, the methods and instruments of demographic engineering for perpetrating genocide and ethnic cleansing had been first invented and trialed in the West’s colonies, and resulted in wiping out numerous ethnic groups (alongside their speech varieties and languages) across the Americas and Australia. Afterward, at the turn of the twentieth century, the first-ever now fully recognized instances of genocide had taken place in (Belgian) Congo and Germany’s South West Africa (today’s Namibia), costing the lives of 10 million and 150,000 victims, respectively. This strain of colonial demographic engineering, combined with its Russian imperial counterpart employed along the Black Sea’s northern littoral, had exported genocide and ethnic cleansing to the Europe of the Balkan Wars and both world wars, before “outsourcing” it to the postcolonial (“Third”) world in the wake of World War Two.

In Map 19’s time period, the dynamics of ethnic cleansing and genocide were conditioned by warfare, state destruction, and border changes carried out in accordance with imperial, national, and revolutionary goals. A fine-grained picture of this process is offered in Map 18, which sketches the sheer intensity and speed of state destruction and building through the lens of short-lived polities. Despite their brief existence of days, weeks, months, and a couple of years, these polities set the stage for ethnic cleansing and genocide, or importantly added to this stage, in some cases facilitating these processes, while
in others hindering. A detailed story of what happened at the grass-roots level during this tragic time in Central Europe still needs to be researched and written, otherwise most available accounts give snapshots of the situation, selected to fit a given national master narrative or an ideological stance.

Initially, in the course of the Balkan Wars, the nineteenth-century tradition of expelling or destroying unwanted populations as defined in terms of religions (and the “holy scripts” connected to them) continued across the Balkans, in Anatolia, and around the Black Sea. But the 1912 founding of Albania as an explicitly ethnolinguistic nation-state was a game changer. It rapidly added “a language” (Einzelsprache) to this definitional equation of demographic engineering, in emulation of Italy and Germany, established as ethnolinguistic nation-states half a century earlier (see Map 19b). Immediately prior to the outbreak of the Great War and during it, foreign aliens (or subjects of other monarchs) were removed from the border areas into the hinterlands of the empires, alongside some “untrusted populations.” In the case of the Russian Empire, the latter group was composed mainly of Jews and German(ic)-speakers simplistically seen as “Germans.” To quite a few, Jews’ “jargon” of Yiddish also appeared to be “a kind of German.” Likewise, Austria-Hungary mistrusted Orthodox Slavic-speakers, especially Rusyns, many of whom had converted from Greek Catholicism (Uniatism) to Orthodox Christianity at the turn of the twentieth century. The period’s largest removal of population was caused by St Petersburg’s 1915 order to evacuate the entire civil service (typically, ethnic Russians), and as many Orthodox Christians (that is, Belarusians and Ukrainians) as possible prior to the occupation of Russia’s western provinces (today’s Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) by the Central Powers (see Map 19a).

At the close of the Great War and during its aftermath, the destruction of the empires and the founding of ethnolinguistic nation-states in their stead across Central Europe left numerous groups in ethnically (nationally) “foreign” countries, even if they had lived in their regions and localities for centuries. The concept of ethnolinguistic homogeneity as the basis for legitimizing these national polities turned, overnight, some ethnolinguistically defined groups into unwanted populations that had to be removed to their “kin countries,” or assimilated, often by force. Some, especially if they had been part of the imperial elite or privileged social stratum, tended to leave these new “foreign” nation-states of their own accord. What is more, the revolutionary fervor (be it communist, fascist, or nationalist) caused further millions to flee, when the political change endangered their traditional way of life, religion, socio-economic position, or if the new political situation was at variance with their espoused values.

Millions of these expellees, deportees, evacuees, émigrés, or survivors of ethnic cleansing and genocide did their best to restart normal lives in their new kin states or emigrated to North America and Western Europe. This was especially true in the case of Jews, who after a millennium in Central Europe were left with no state of their own, “foreigners” in the region’s nation-states, at the mercy of growing anti-Semitism. Similarly, all too rarely discussed in literature, Roma—with no state to call their own—found themselves at mercy of rife anti-Tsiganism. The interwar Soviet Union’s promise of accommodating ethnolinguistic difference, alongside cultural and linguistic autonomy for Jews and Roma was a false dawn, a short-lived policy, decisively replaced with “Russophone internationalism” in the early 1930s. But apart from the peaceful majority resigned to their fate as survivors of ethnic cleansing and genocide, many organized state-supported revanchist groups and movements that sought to redress the postwar peace treaties, which they deemed unjust. These groups and attitudes fueled generalized populism, underpinning the rise of fascism and illiberal parties, which between the mid-1920s and the late 1930s, overhauled Central Europe’s democracies into dictatorships and totalitarian states, with the partial exception of Scandinavia and Czechoslovakia. With the privilege of hindsight, it can be said that the region was primed for yet another bloodbath, namely World War Two, following the United States’ withdrawal from Europe, the Great Depression, and subsequently the Entente’s and the League of Nations’ fateful decision not to guarantee and enforce the postwar peace settlement in Central Europe.
Ethnic Cleansing in Central Europe During the Balkan Wars, World War One in Their Aftermath
It is commonly proposed that the Great War lasted for four years, from 1914 to 1918. But this is a Western perception (or even preconception), which unfortunately dominates to this day, obscuring the dramatic and lasting effects that World War One visited on Central and Eastern Europe. Paradoxically, this war is best remembered in Belgium, Britain, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, because the conflict on the western front removed none of these polities from the political map of Europe. On the contrary, the much longer and extremely mobile eastern front (including the related Balkan and Caucasian fronts) destroyed or dramatically overhauled all Central Europe’s polities. Furthermore, the Great War lasted much longer in this region. The two Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and 1913–1914 were a prelude that almost seamlessly spilled over into the First World War across Central Europe, and the conflict was not over until the Russian Civil War petered out in late 1921, and the Turkish War of Independence a year later, in the summer of 1923. What is more, the follow-up population transfers, as the then legal instrument of ethnic cleansing was known, continued throughout the interwar period, effectively merging the Great War and World War Two into a single protracted conflict, which subsequently morphed into the Cold War. Central and Eastern Europe suffered an eight-decade-long “hot” and “cold” conflict from 1912 until the end of communism in 1989. But even the last cesura does not mark any definitive end of this prolonged twentieth-century warfare; the Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994), the wars of Yugoslav succession (1991–2001), and the Transnistria War (1992) were a post-1989 “hot spillover” that extended this dark century across the threshold of the twenty-first century. In many respects it has continued with the Russo-Georgian War (2008) and the Russo-Ukrainian War (2014).

And the reverberations are still felt to this day in the form of the “frozen” Armenian-Azerbaijani (that got “defrosted” in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War), Transnistrian and Kosovan conflicts, and the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus. Furthermore, if the post-Ottoman Anatolia and Near East are taken into account, it appears that the dark twenty century continues unabated there, rapidly becoming an equally dark twenty-first century. The undeclared Turkish-Kurdish civil war that broke out in 1978 rages on to this day. The conflict’s origins go back to the Great War, when the Allies proposed but failed to secure an ethnolinguistic nation-state for Kurds. On the other hand, London’s 1918 promise of a Jewish nation-state resulted in a similarly intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic in its character. In 2014, Russia added to this toxic mix, first, with the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, and a year later (2015) by supporting the governmental forces in the Syrian Civil War (2011). From the long durée perspective, it seems almost a case of wishful thinking to propose that the Great War ended in 1918. In many places in Central and Eastern Europe, the conflict-driven cycle(s) of statehood destruction, overhauling and (re)-creation, commenced by the Balkan Wars and the Great War, has not come to an end yet. The only constant in this upheaval is the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism in the name of which all the aforementioned series of interconnected conflicts have been fought. Other ideologies—be it anarchism, communism, democracy, ethnoreligious nationalism, fascism, national socialism, royalism, or the program of a worldwide caliphate—have had walk-on roles, but came and went, while the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state still seizes the political imagination of the region’s populations, as it did a century ago.

Map 14 shows the shy rise of ethnolinguistic nationalism as an incoming ideology of statehood creation and legitimation, taking a snapshot of the three fully ethnolinguistic nation-states in 1910, and six more polities just aspiring to this ideal, while the majority of states (with the majority of the region’s populations) remained firmly non-national. The Balkan Wars and the Great War destroyed this long-established non-national order. First, a plethora of national, revolutionary, and other statehood projects were tried out mostly between 1917 and 1922 (Map 18), adding to the economic and political commotion and collapse. Second, the Balkan Wars and World War One, and their aftermath, were marked by vast forced evacuations, expulsions, and population transfers—or, in the present-day parlance—by successive waves of ethnic cleansing and even acts of genocide as in the case of Armenians and Assyrians in eastern and central Anatolia (Map 19). Moving borders and peoples opened the space for radical political and demographic engineering. While in 1910 only a handful of Central Europe’s polities were nation-states, eight years later, in 1918, most of them were already self-declared and internationally recognized national polities. Bulgaria, Norway, and Romania, which were fully isomorphic (fulfilling the necessary conditions of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state) nation-states already before the Great War, were joined now by the short-lived independent Belarus, alongside Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Poland, which survived throughout the interwar period. The prewar nation-states of Greece and Italy that had aspired to the full normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state, were joined by many more, mostly emerging from the ruins of Austria-Hungary, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. Albania was founded in 1912 as the Ottoman Balkans’ first-ever ethnolinguistic nation-state, that is, without using religion in the process of statehood formation and legitimation. However, during the Great War this nation-state was occupied and striven with a series of semi- or non-national statelets, which stripped Albania of full isomorphic status. In 1917, in the crumbling Russian Empire, Ukraine was founded as an ethnolinguistic nation-state. It was fully isomorphic only for a year, because in 1918 a second Ukrainian polity was established when Austria-Hungary split, namely, Western Ukraine. Both Ukraines united in 1919, so the short-lived single Ukrainian nation-state rejoined the “isomorphic club.” The Rusyns proclaimed a series of national councils-cum-republics along the east Galician-Hungarian borderland. Most were located in Carpathian Ruthenia, which survived in interwar Czechoslovakia as the country’s province of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (nowadays, Transcarpathia in Ukraine). Out of Galicia’s Rusyn councils-cum-polities, the Koman’cha Republic (presently in Poland) was best known. But no coherent Rusyn nation-state was formed. Although Finland announced its independence already in 1917, the process of ethnolinguistic statehood construction was stopped in its tracks by the near-genocidal war between communists and nationalists in the first half of 1918. The latter won but needed to accept Swedish alongside Finnish as the country’s two equal official languages. In 1918, quite similarly, Czechoslovakia was not yet an ethnolinguistic nation-state, because it was still devised for the two separate ethnolinguistic nation-states of Czechs and Slovaks, speaking the two separate national languages of Czech and Slovak. Only later that year was a unitary Czechoslovak nation proclaimed, which two years later, in 1920, was endowed with the single national and official language of Czechoslovak. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, composed from the southern provinces of Austria-Hungary, alongside Serbia and Montenegro, was a tri-national polity with three official languages until 1921, when Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian were melded into the unitary national language of Serbocroatoslovenian. However, only much later, in 1929, the kingdom’s tripartite name was changed to Yugoslavia and its three nations rolled into a single Yugoslav nation. The Allies at the Peace Conference in Paris denied ethnolinguistically defined national self-determination to the defeated Central Powers and their successors, namely to German-Austria, Germany, and Hungary. German-Austria (including, German Bohemia, German South Bohemia, German South Moravia, and Sudetenland) was prohibited from uniting with Germany and using its preferred name, instead it had to become known as “Austria.” Unlike the “Austrian half” of the Dual Monarchy, Hungary wanted to retain all of its ethnically non-Hungarian borderlands, and to this end fought wars with all its neighbors except Austria. Budapest also propped up the short-lived pro-Hungarian polities of Carpathian Ruthenia and Eastern Slovakia, before Hungary was defeated. The country was engulfed by a Soviet-style revolution, and finally shorn of its border regions containing one-third of all Hungarian-speakers, in line with the Treaty of Trianon that came into power in 1921.

The non-national Ottoman Empire, deprived of most of its territories in the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, limped under repeated Allied and Greek attacks until 1923, when its Anatolian core was overlapped into a pronouncedly secular nation-state of Turkey. With its official and national language of Turkish, Turkey would have almost fulfilled the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state but for the continuing use of Osmanlica/Turkish in the British colony of Cyprus. Likewise, the employment of Greek as an official language in this colony did not permit Greece to become a fully isomorphic ethnolinguistic nation-state, either. The ethnically Russian core of European Russia, in the wake of the October (Bolshevik) Revolution of 1917, was overlapped into a communist polity of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. In late 1922 it became the largest constituent of the then founded Soviet Union. Italian and French territories-cum-polities in the Balkans were evacuated by the early 1920s, though Rome retained its outpost of the Aegean Islands (occupied in 1912) until 1947.

Map 20’s snapshot of the political situation in late 1918 clearly indicates the rise of ethnolinguistic nationalism as Central Europe’s dominant ideology of statehood formation, legitimation, and maintenance. It was only rivaled in the east by the Soviet-style universalism of communism. The Bolsheviks hoped for a swift victory of the revolution(s) across Europe and Asia, leading to a global communist universal state for the entire world, that is why they opted for a highly unusual name of their state, which did not include a single ethnic or geographic reference, so that this name could comfortably fit any place in the world, or ideally, the entire world. In the three subsequent years, the Bolsheviks’ hopes for a worldwide revolution were dashed in the wake of the harrowing multi-front Russian Civil War, which among others, involved the militarily very successful self-defense anti-ideological peasant non-polity, known as the Free Territory (Makhnovia), only later reinterpreted as an “anarchist state.” The defeat of the Red Army in the Polish-Soviet War (1919–1921) stopped the westward expansion of communism and liquidated the independent nation-states of Belarus and Ukraine, subsequently split between Poland and Bolshevik Russia. What is all too often forgotten, however, is the fact that the Soviet Union was not the interwar period’s only communist polity. Unlike in Europe, the Bolsheviks successfully spread communism in Asia. They transformed imperial Russia’s former protectorate of Uriankhai and (Outer) Mongolia (temporarily controlled by Russian Whites in 1920–1921) into the Soviet-style communist polities of Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva, which also functioned as ethnolinguistic nation-states. Hence, between the two world wars, three communist polities existed, the Soviet Union and its de facto Asian satellites of Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva.
It is often remarked that in Europe there are very few languages in comparison to other parts of the world per a unit of territory or population, be it sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, or Central and South America. However, this conclusion does not stem from dispassionate observation and analysis of the sociolinguistic reality on the ground. The perceived paucity of languages in Europe and their multitude elsewhere is caused by the application of two different sets of observation and analysis guidelines in the case of Europe and the rest of the world. What is counted in Europe is predominantly the standardized languages, officially endowed with the status of state or national languages. The “other languages” are brushed aside as mere dialects, jargons, tongues, vernaculars, idioms, kitchen gab, village talk, or other unbecoming mixed speech. From this hardly realized or commented on, and highly normative perspective, in Europe a language is not seen as a language (Einzelsprache) unless it is recognized by a state as official, and widely employed for writing, publishing, administration and education.

On the contrary, the European and other Western explorers and scholars doing research in the colonies and non-European territories chose to see, through the lens of anthropology, a multiplicity of languages. Basically, whenever they identify an ethnic group, they deem their speech a language. This tendency has been reinforced by Christian missionaries who, before decolonization, ensured a modicum of education and local administration in colonies, apart from affording useful legitimation for a myriad of colonial conquests and projects. Missions multiplied, as each (Western) Christian Church or denomination wanted to carve out a “spiritual share” for itself in the field of evangelization. They were driven, as some still are, by the millennial compulsion to spread the Gospel by making it available in all the world’s languages. The assumption was, and still remains, that every single person needs to have learned about Jesus through the medium of their language before the “Second Coming of Christ,” purportedly, becomes possible.

In the past, many of the early scholars in the field were missionaries, and at present, numerous researchers, more or less tacitly follow this evangelizing principle. As a result, wherever a mission was founded, the speech of this locality was made into the basis of a written language (Einzelsprache) as constructed and standardized through a dictionary and a grammar for the sole purpose of translating the Bible into it. In this manner, a plethora of colonial Einzelsprachen were created, typically with no consultation with their speakers and without rapport with or understanding of the local cultures and political structures. Hence, most languages mis-created in this way are Western impositions for the (rarely acknowledged) purpose of destroying local “heathen” cultures with an eye to replacing them with “civilization,” as equated with Christianity and the Western-style modernity. In turn, the resultant multiplicity of colonial languages served as a useful argument for why it would not be feasible or otherwise sensible to provide education and publishing (let alone administration) in these languages, apart from rudimentary literacy, catechism, and translations of the Bible. Hence, in both Americas, Oceania, and sub-Saharan Africa the European languages of the former colonizers are almost invariably employed in official capacity in state offices, schools, universities, publishing, and administration. All these languages are Western European in their origin, and thus written in Latin letters. From the point of view of writing systems, the postcolonial world is eerily monoscriptal in the Latin alphabet. Even when some indigenous languages rarely make it to the public space, they are also written in the Latin letters of these European languages.

Exclusively in Eurasia and Northern Africa indigenous languages are employed in the function of state and official languages. However, Arabic, Chinese (Mandarin), English, French, Hindi/Urdu, Indonesian/Malaysian, Persian, Turkish, and Russian tend to serve as lingua francas across vast areas of Asia and Northern Africa where multiple indigenous languages are spoken. Often education and social advancement are available only through the media of these lingua francas, to the neglect and marginalization of the indigenous languages. The situation is similar to the norm in Europe through the early modern period, when one needed to write and speak Latin or French to gain access to the ruling and economic elite, or for a professional career.

Europe’s age of lingua francas (for instance, Greek, French, Latin, or Slavonic) came to an end with the rise of nationalism at the turn of the nineteenth century. In Central Europe each national movement and each successfully established nation-state aspired to have its own unique national language, not shared with any other nation or polity. Whenever an ethnolinguistically defined national movement achieved a modicum of official recognition in an empire, gained its own autonomous region, or even an independent nation-state, one of the first tasks to accomplish was founding a full educational system with the national language as its medium of instruc-
Non-State Minority, Regional and Unrecognized Languages, and Written Dialects in Central Europe, 19th–21st Centuries
### List of Non-State Minority, Regional and Unrecognized Languages, and Written Dialects in Central Europe, 19th–21st Centuries

#### Baltic Continuum
- **New Curingian**: [L] [TW]
- **Laguian**: [L] [TW]
- **Samogitian**: [L] [W]

#### Finno-Ugric (Finnic) Continuum
- **Võro**: [L] [W] (see also SETO)
- **Herbolsheimer**: [L] [W]
- **Võro**: [L] [W] (see also SETO)
- **Pottic**: [L] [W]

#### Finno-Ugric (Ugrian) Continuum
- **Romungro**: [L] (Romano-Hungarian)
- **Kazikli**: [L] [TW]
- **Izhorian**: [L] [TW]
- **Votian**: [L] (see also SETO)
- **Izhorian**: [L] (see also SETO)
- **Pottic**: [L] [W]

#### Germanic Continuum
- **Alamanic**: [L] (see also SWABIAN, SWISS GERMAN)
- **Austro-Bavarian**: [L] (Swabian) [W] (see also NORYK, SAMORSK)
- **Cimbrian**: [L] (see also MOCHEN)
- **Elfdalian**: [L] [W] (see also CIBRMIAN)
- **Swedish** [L] [W] (Swedish Frisian) [TW] (North Frisian)
- **German Low**: [L] (Low Saxon) [L] [TW] (see also ROMAN, SAMORSK)
- **Mocheni**: [L] (see also CIBRMIAN)
- **Danish**: [L] (see also ALAMANNIC)
- **South Jutish**: [L] [TW]
- **Swiss German**: [L] (Schweizerdeutsch, Schweizerdütsch) [L] [TW] (see also ALAMANNIC)
- **Wilamowiczian**: [L] (Wilamowicze) [TW]
- **Yiddish**: [L] [TW]
- **Yenichi**: [L] (Jiycz) [L]

#### Greek Continuum
- **Biblical Koine** [L] [TW] (see also MATTHAUS)
- **Byzantine Greek**: [L]
- **Cappadocian Greek**: [L]
- **Cretan Greek**: [L]
- **Cypro-Greek**: [L]
- **Greek** (Etalian Gres) [L]
- **South Italo-Greek**: [L]
- **Pontic Greek**: [L] [W]
- **Romano-Greek**: [L] (Romano-Greko) [L]
- **Saksonian**: [L] [TW]
- **Sevantic**: [L] (see also MATTHAUS)

#### Indic
- **Romanian**: [L] [TW]
- **Romanian**: [L] [TW] (see also MATTHAUS)
- **Bulgarian**: [L] [TW] (see also MATTHAUS)
- **Croatian**: [L] [TW] (see also MATTHAUS)
- **Hungarian**: [L] [TW] (see also MATTHAUS)

#### West Romance Continuum
- **Aromanian**: [L] [TW] (disputed, see West Romance Continuum)
- **Slovenian**: [L] [TW] (disputed, see West Romance Continuum)
- **Moldovanian**: [L] [W] (disputed, see West Romance Continuum)
- **Nogayian**: [L] [TW]
- **Veranic**: [L] (see also MATTHAUS)

#### Other Languages
- **Albanian**: [L] [TW]
- **Bulgarian**: [L] [TW]
- **Croatian**: [L] [TW]
- **Hungarian**: [L] [TW]
- **Moldovanian**: [L] [TW]
- **Russian**: [L] [TW]
- **Turkish**: [L] [TW]

#### Influence on Other Continua
- **Baltic**: [L] [TW]
- **Indo-European**: [L] [TW]
- **Romance**: [L] [TW]
- **Turkic**: [L] [TW]

### Writing Systems
- **Magyar**: [L] [TW]
- **Runic alphabet**: [L] [TW]
- **Church Slavonic**: [L] [TW]
- **Georgian**: [L] [TW]
- **Greek**: [L] [TW]
- **Istrian**: [L]
- **Spanglish**: [L] [TW]
- **Latin**: [L] [TW]

### Modern Languages
- **Magyar**: [L] [TW]
- **Romani**: [L] [TW]
- **Romany**: [L] [TW]
- **Serbian**: [L] [TW]
- **Vladic**: [L] [TW]

### Ethnic Minorities Continuum
- **Albanian**: [L] [TW]
- **Bulgarian**: [L] [TW]
- **Croatian**: [L] [TW]
- **Hungarian**: [L] [TW]
- **Moldovanian**: [L] [TW]
- **Russian**: [L] [TW]

### Regional Languages
- **Arabic**: [L] [TW]
- **Croatian**: [L] [TW]
- **Dalmatian**: [L] [TW]
- **Ladino**: [L] [TW]
- **Sevantic**: [L] [TW]

### Unrecognized Languages
- **Turkish**: [L] [TW]

### Turkish Continuum
- **Albanian**: [L] [TW]
- **Bulgarian**: [L] [TW]
- **Croatian**: [L] [TW]
- **Hungarian**: [L] [TW]
- **Moldovanian**: [L] [TW]
- **Russian**: [L] [TW]
- **Turkish**: [L] [TW]

### Influences Other Continua
- **Albanian**: [L] [TW]
- **Bulgarian**: [L] [TW]
- **Croatian**: [L] [TW]
- **Hungarian**: [L] [TW]
- **Moldovanian**: [L] [TW]
- **Russian**: [L] [TW]
- **Turkish**: [L] [TW]
tion, from elementary school to university. The aspiration was that all aspects of modern life—from railways and telegraph to radio and television, from classical philology to biology, from medicine to architecture, from engineering to textile industry, from business and commerce to import and export, or from sport and ballroom dances to car races and aviation—should be available to the nation in its “own” national language.

The heavily linguistic slant of the ideology of ethnonationalism resulted in the creation of an unprecedented number of full-fledged national languages per unit of territory or population. In the early interwar period, the number of Estonian- or Slovenian-speakers was under 1 million, while that of Latvian- or Albanian-speakers amounted to about 1.5 million. After World War Two, a Macedonian language was created for 0.7 million Macedonian-speakers, while the Soviet Union required that East Germany recognize and support the development of the two closely related standard Sorbian languages spoken by not more than 100,000 people. In the wake of the breakup of Serbo-Croatian, a third of the population of Montenegro (or 230,000) see their language as Montenegrin. Other languages that are not used (widely) in writing, not recognized as national, official or state languages, are marginalized. Their existence is often denied, and their classificatory status as accepted in scholarly research is downgraded. Typically, they are labelled as “dialects” of the nation-state’s official language. In other cases, such unwanted languages are disparaged as “jargons,” “argots,” or “patois.”

Staking so much political capital on Einzelsprachen as the basis of statehood construction, legitimation, and maintenance turned speakers of other recognized national languages into minorities, should they happen to reside in the “incorrect” state. If they do not assimilate or become fluent in the national language of their country of residence, their Einzelsprache is often classified and even officially recognized as a “minority language.” The ideal of homogeneity as espoused by ethnonationalists made this label into another pejorative for something that is not, or should not be, seen as a language from a given polity’s national perspective. Speakers of minority languages tend to be seen as “foreigners” (members of other nations), and as such are considered to be inherently disloyal and an existential danger to the nation-state of their residence. Speakers of languages defined from the national perspective as dialects of the national language are assessed as speaking the national language incorrectly, and in dire need of education. There is even a lower discriminatory category of “people without a language,” which in a colonial fashion has been extended to the Roma and their language of Romani until recently. Across the Soviet bloc, Roma were defined as “lumpenproletariat,” or a “(criminal) working underclass deprived of any national consciousness.” In this racist-cum-colonial perspective, Roma apparently did not speak a language, and were just “mumbling” or “blabbing.” In the light of this diagnosis, first of all they had to be “civilized,” before they would even become capable of acquiring a “proper” (that is, national) language.

In Europe, the minority and unrecognized languages, alongside dialects and denied languages, are non-languages, whose existence is suppressed in favor of normative monolingualism in nation-states’ respective official languages. The ideological compulsion of ethnonationalist homogeneity reinforces this official attitude, which is “scientifically” rubberstamped by universities and national academies of sciences that do research and official business in the medium of this or that national language. Hence, the previously described dynamics of the implementation of ethnonationalist nationalism explains the strange phenomenon of the occurrence of more unique national (official) languages per unit of territory and population in Central Europe than elsewhere in the world. Turning a blind eye to studiously unnoticed non-languages and their progressive suppression considerably lowers the overall number of languages across this region in comparison to other areas of the globe. In Western and Eastern Europe the same effect of the paucity of languages is achieved by the sheer volume of book and audiovisual production in the former colonial-cum-imperial-turned-world languages, namely, English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Russian.

At the turn of the 1980s, in the field of Slavic (socio)linguistics, the Soviet (Russian) scholar, Aleksandr Dulichenko, based at the University of Tartu in Soviet Estonia, developed the nowadays increasingly popular concept of “(literary) microlanguages” (Dulichenko 1981). This novel concept allows researchers to take note of some “non-languages,” as long as there was, or still is, some tradition of literacy and book production in them, hence the frequent qualification “literary microlanguages.” This approach also shields scholars from falling afoul of this or that ethnonationalist nationalism, because their research is seen as appropriately “scientific,” and not at all “unpatriotic,” though still may be assessed as “ill-considered.”

Dulichenko was ideally placed to develop this concept of microlanguage. Although the scholar is an ethnic Russian from Krasnodar Krai (or present-day Russia’s northwestern Caucasus), he graduated with a degree in Slavic philology from the University of Ashgabat in Soviet Turkmenia (today’s Turkmenistan), and afterward was employed as an academic in Estonia. This experience attuned him to the sociolinguistic dynamics of non-dominant, non-Slavic languages in the Soviet Union, alongside his keen interest in constructed languages like Esperanto. Earlier, in his home region, Dulichenko observed the gradual disappearance of Ukrainian dialects and Caucasian languages in the wake of postwar Russification.

Furthermore, Soviet philologists (linguists) had a clear awareness of the fact that languages are constructs built by humans and their groups, not autonomous entities in their own right, let alone “living organisms.” This naturalist (biologizing) attitude toward languages persists across the West to this day. In the interwar Soviet Union, as part of the larger communist experiment, the aspiration was to overhaul the staggering number of oral vernaculars (speech varieties) observed among the country’s inhabitants into full-fledged standard written languages for the sake of publishing, education, and administration in these newly minted Einzelsprachen, to be harnessed for ideological work in the function of standard written media. Instead of the Bible, works of Lenin, Stalin, Marx, and Engels were translated into such newly founded standard languages. Over a hundred languages of this kind were created, and al-
most all were endowed with the Latin alphabet as their writing system, to the exclusion of the Arabic script and Cyrillic. Then, from the late 1930s to the mid-1940s their Latin alphabets were replaced with Cyrillic, and the extensive use of these hundred odd languages was effectively limited to fifteen Einzelsprachen, corresponding to the USSR’s fifteen union republics, each defined in ethnolinguistic terms of a single titular nation’s language. Despite the protestations to the contrary, ethnolinguistic nationalism was tacitly espoused in the Soviet Union at the level of union republics, entailing a speedy process of turning the other Einzelsprachen created between the two world wars into non-languages.

Dulichenko has applied the concept of microlanguage exclusively to Slavic non-languages, such as Čakavian, Kashubian, Molisean, Polesian, or Rusyn. In the traditional national view, Čakavian is a dialect of Croatian, Kashubian was a dialect of Polish until 2005 and now is defined as a regional language, Molisean is seen as a dialect or minority language in Italy, Polesian is said to be a language project, and Rusyn is an official language in Serbia’s Vojvodina, an ethnic language in Poland, and a dialect of Ukrainian in Ukraine. From the perspective of speakers of microlanguages, Dulichenko’s term returns some respect to their languages, whose existence was previously denied by ethnolinguistic nationalists and scholars in state employment. Interestingly, the concept is not extended to non-Slavic languages, though the Albanian languages of Arvanitic and Gheg, the Baltic languages of Latgalian and Samogitian, the Finno-Ugric languages of Csango and Seto, the Germanic languages of Alemannic and Low German, the Greek languages of Grico and Pontic, the Romance languages of Aromanian or Ladin, or the Turkic languages of Gagauz and Karaim, or the numerous varieties of Romani seem to be excellent examples of microlanguages.

However, the concept of microlanguage does not appear to be of much use outside the context of Central Europe, or more broadly, in these areas of the world where ethnolinguistic nationalism is not employed for the sake of statehood construction, legitimation, and maintenance. At first glance, the prefix “micro-” in the term microlanguage appears to indicate that it denotes “small” languages, in the sense of the demographic size of their speech communities. However, the speech communities of Rusyn and Silesian amount to 0.6 million and 0.5 million persons, respectively, which is not decisively fewer than the 1.4 million speakers of the recognized state languages of Macedonian or the 1.6 million speakers of Slovenian. The 230,000 speakers of the state language of Montenergin is half the number of Silesian-speakers, though the 110,000 Kashubian-speakers is half the number of Montenergin-speakers. Indeed, speech communities of Slavic microlanguages tend to be smaller than speech communities of official Slavic languages. However, from this perspective, some of the latter are smaller than the former. Hence, it is not the number of speakers alone that defines a microlanguage, but rather the low status of non-language, typically suffered by speakers of Slavic microlanguages in Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nation-states.

The term microlanguage’s defining feature of the status of non-language is more clearly visible in quite a sharp relief outside Europe. For instance, about 400 million people speak Arabic. Exclusively this language’s standard, based on the language of the Quran, is employed for written purposes and publishing. In Egypt, in the course of everyday life, 64 million inhabitants speak Masri, or the Egyptian dialect of Arabic, which is as different from the standard Arabic as French is from Latin. But next to no one would consider writing and publishing in Masri in the context of its lowly status of non-language, Masri is a microlanguage, though numerically speaking its speech community is bigger than the speech community of any Slavic language, with the lone exception of Russian with 150 million speakers. Hindi is India’s sole official and national language, spoken (and less often written, the function often fulfilled by English) by over half a billion Indian citizens. Roughly the same number of India’s inhabitants speak and write languages that are either recognized as “scheduled” (official at the level of states) or “unscheduled” (without any official status). But is Bengali with 80 million speakers in India (and about 160 million speakers in Bangladesh) a microlanguage?

In the age of the Internet, during the last two decades (or since the mid-1990s), speakers and writers of Europe’s suppressed non-languages (microlanguages) found a space of literary freedom and creativity on the web. In Europe, as yet, none of the continent’s states (with the qualified exception of Belarus and Russia) has extended effective censorship across the internet within its territory. Activists and users of non-languages multiplied, contributing to their standardization in the way that is suitable for the needs of cyberspace. At present, one of the best indicators of the online existence (or recognition) of a language is a Wikipedia encyclopedia available in such a language. The more articles on Wikipedia of this kind per the number of this language’s speakers, the more such a language is visible or present on the internet. In 2017, Wikipedias were available in Europe’s 135 national languages and non-languages, so almost three times more than the number of the continent’s states. From the ideological perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism, the number of “real” languages should closely correspond to the number of the extant states. Hence, the online situation indicates an unprecedented level of emancipation enjoyed on the web by speakers of microlanguages.

The success of this grassroots movement for the de facto recognition of non-languages is underpinned by the unprecedented economic prosperity of Europe’s population compared with the rest of the world. As a result, even relatively small speech communities of Seto (12,000) or Lower Sorbian (10,000) can afford to produce online references without state support. The 135 Wikipedias in Europe’s indigenous languages is the highest for all the world’s continents. In European languages there are over three times more Wikipedias than in African languages, over six times more than in the indigenous languages of both Americas, and nine times more than in the indigenous languages of Australia and Oceania. Only Asia with its population, which is six times bigger than Europe’s, approaches the latter continent’s number of Wikipedias, namely, 91 exist in Asia’s indigenous languages.

However, individual Wikipedias may contain anywhere from several to millions of articles. Once again, in the light
of this indicator, the Wikipedias in Europe’s indigenous languages are the largest. This continent’s Wikipedias contain two times more articles than Asia’s, 38 times more than Africa’s, 181 times more than both Americas’, and a staggering 1,112 times more than the Wikipedias in the indigenous languages of Australia and Oceania. The European non-language (microlanguage) of Silesian with the Wikipedia of 7,500 articles is more of a de facto recognized online language than South Africa’s official language of Xhosa with 750 articles. Silesian-speakers number about half a million, while the Xhosa speech community counts over 8 million speakers. Actually, the 2.4 million speakers of South Africa’s official language of Ndebele do not have a Wikipedia in their Einzelsprache. From this vantage point, the availability of publications and online resources in Europe’s microlanguages (non-languages) is oftentimes much better than even in the respect of other continent’s indigenous languages that are recognized as official. The legacy of imperialism and the West’s colonial domination over the rest of the world continues in an unacknowledged manner in the patterns of worldwide language politics, and is characterized by stark inequalities. Linguistic imperialism is the norm. It is a much higher hurdle to scale for speakers of non-European languages than the obstacle posed by ethnolinguistic nationalism to speakers of Europe’s non-languages (microlanguages).

Map 21 presents some non-languages or microlanguages that were or still are spoken and written in Central Europe. Our knowledge of such languages from the nineteenth century exists almost exclusively thanks to the fact that some writings and publications in these languages remain, even when in many cases their speech communities have already disappeared. Speakers of the defunct languages and their descendents began using national (official) languages of the nation-states of their residence. However, if one remembers at least the 159 languages depicted on this map, then the paucity of languages in Europe is no more. It was the successful national projects steeped in ethnolinguistic nationalism that marginalized and condemned to oblivion these languages around which no national movement developed or whose speakers did not manage to win their nation-states, or at least autonomous regions where they could preserve and develop their Einzelsprachen. In the case of surviving non-languages (microlanguages) their speakers are invariably bi- or multilingual, due to compulsory education in the national (official) language of their state of residence. Hence, the majority of the speakers of microlanguages (non-languages) are much better versed in writing a given state’s national (official) language than their own (native, indigenous) Einzelsprache.

Presently, with 34 (ethnic, sub-ethnic, group) varieties (dialects), the unstandardized Romani languages account for one-fifth of the forgotten languages. Gadjos (non-Roma) have no desire to understand Roma culture and societies, like goyim did not display any interest in Jewish culture and languages before the Holocaust. Prior to and during World War Two, anti-Semitism blighted Central Europe (with the rare exception of Albania and the partial exception of the Soviet Union), as anti-Tsiganism (anti-Roma sentiment) tends to blight this region to this day, despite the fact that like Jews, Roma suffered the Samudaripen (Roma Holocaust, also known as the Kali Trä or Porajmos) at the hands of Nazi Germany. But after the war, the Jewish state of Israel was created in 1948, which helps keep anti-Semitism under control and made the Holocaust into the cornerstone of Europe’s politics of memory. The Roma have no nation-state of their own, and in their majority do not

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1 In this respect some Protestant proselytizing groups were an exception, like the Institutum Judaicum established in 1724 at the University of Hal- le, or the London Jews’ Society, founded in 1809. (I thank Iemima Ploscar- iu for this important qualification.)
want one. They wish for fruitful coexistence and full acceptance for speakers of multiple languages, for the faithful of different religions, and for different ways of living. Some Roma and non-Roma intellectuals believe that a wider recognition of the Samudaripen could be of help in this respect. Adding the Samudaripen to the Holocaust as the foundation of the politics of memory in Europe, alongside the incorporation of the Roma past into mainstream European history, could decisively limit anti-Tsiganism. Otherwise, the Roma strive to live as they used to before the rise of nation-states intent on ethnolinguistic homogenization of their populations. They continue many traditions of the pre-national (traditional, pre-World War One) Central Europe. But in the current context of national exclusivism, unfortunately, the Roma are seen in Central Europe as “unwanted” and “foreign,” while their language(s) as “uncivilized” or even “non-existent.”
The “genetic” (Stammbaum-style) classification of languages (Einzelsprachen) has been preferred by scholars and nationalists alike since the mid-nineteenth century because it allows for the allocation of distinctive languages to ethnolinguistically defined nations (groups of people). Einzelsprachen are imagined as self-contained entities, completely separate from one another. This radical discontinuity, at the conceptual level, can be easily translated into territorial discontinuity, or into a state frontier. In a quantum leap of ideologized thinking about the linguistic, the non-territorial character of a language is territorialized into the boundaries of an ethnolinguistic nation-state, in accordance with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state: Language = Nation = State. The modern-style statehood underpinned with the norm of (Westphalian) sovereignty does not allow for overlapping territories or jurisdictions in the case of nation-states recognized as independent and sovereign (“normal”). Hence, multilingualism and polyglossia are seen as an “aberration” from the perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism, since these phenomena are a form of social and spatial overlapping of languages, which blurs any sharp divisions among them.

The concept of dialect continuum makes it possible to depict the typical gradual change in language use across a territory where speech varieties (dialects, languages) employed belong to the same language family. In this way, the ideologized sharpness of genetic classification is somewhat contained, though radical separateness is still imagined to exist at the meeting point (or alongside the “language boundary”) between two dialect continua. In reality, multilingualism and polyglossia used to allow interlocutors from different dialect continua to communicate successfully. In Central Europe there was no tight, let alone impenetrable, language barriers (or language borders) until the rise of ethnolinguistic nation-states. With their educational and political practices, these national polities have enforced monolingualism in the national language across their territories and have done their best to produce radical language discontinuity along their frontiers.

In 1923, after his move from the University of Sofia to the University of Vienna, the Russian émigré linguist, Nikolai Trubetzkoy, proposed the concept of Sprachbund (linguistic area) (Trubetzkoy 1931). Already a century earlier, in 1829, the Austrian imperial censor and philologist of Slovenian extraction, Bartholomäus (Jernej) Kopitar (1829: 86), had come to the conclusion that Albanian, Bulgarian, and Romanian appear to be “one grammar with three lexicons” (nur eine Sprachform . . . mit dreierlei Sprachmaterie), although from the perspective of genetic classification these three Einzelsprachen belong to three radically different language families (and dialect continua) of Albanian, South Slavic, and East Romance languages. For a long time, a similar dilemma has been known to English-speakers who happen to learn French. In its official and scholarly register English seems to be a French in English (Germanic) pronunciation, but in a traditional view these two Einzelsprachen belong to radically different language families (dialect continua) of West Romance and Germanic languages, respectively. This “Frenchification” of English (or a form of English-French amalgamation) is a legacy of intensive political, economic, and social interactions between Romancepeople and Germanic-speaking members of the English ruling elite. The situation lasted for half a millennium while the English monarchs held vast territorial possessions in what is today France between the mid-eleventh and mid-sixteenth centuries. Initially, the exchange of linguistic elements was facilitated by the shared lingua franca of Western Christianity, Latin, and later by the use of (Norman, or Anglo-) French as the (leading) official language of the state institutions in the Kingdom of England, as late as the turn of the eighteenth century, in the case of courts of law. Afterward, the standardization and development of English as an Einzelsprache was conducted with the use of numerous French linguistic loans and through coining Latinate and French-like neologisms. What is more, Latin was adopted as the model for “regulating” English grammar in the process of the standardization of this language.

Similarly, the syntactical, morphological, and lexical convergence of the languages of the Balkan linguistic area is a function of the one to two millennium-long social, economic, political, and religious (cultural) interaction between Albanian-, Greek-, Romanian-, Romani-, and Turkic-speakers, first, within the boundaries of the (East) Roman Empire, and later in the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan languages slowly and gradually separated from one another with the rise of the Balkan nation-states, from Serbia and Greece in the early nineteenth century, Montenegro and Romania in the mid-nineteenth century, Bulgaria, Albania, Slovenia, and Turkey at the turn of the twentieth century, Croatia and Macedonia in the mid-twentieth century, and to Bosnia and Kosovo at the turn of the twenty-first century. But this separation has not been complete and many shared linguistic elements remain, reinforced by the process of European integration and the spread of English as the lingua franca of present-day Europe.
There is no set standard or ideological preconception for how many common elements must be shared by languages and speech varieties to qualify as members of this or that linguistic area. This concept is more of a heuristic instrument that allows for researching the rarely acknowledged influence of long-lasting sociopolitical and economic structures and patterns on language convergence and divergence. In 1931, Trubetzkoy's colleague and fellow Russian émigré, Roman Jakobson, proposed a Eurasian linguistic league, extending from Lisbon to Vladivostok, as underpinned by the empires of the Great Steppe, which beginning with the fourth century established a space of common communication extending from the Pacific Ocean to Europe. Between the thirteenth century and today, this space was maintained first by the Mongol Empire and its successor khanates, and afterward by the Russian Empire, which in the twentieth century morphed into the Soviet Union and its Soviet bloc. Similarly, in the south, the expansion of the Islamic Caliphate (and Islam as such) from Maghreb to India and Indonesia, between the seventh and eighteenth centuries, also contributed to the rise of this Eurasian linguistic league. In the high age of imperialism, the same routes were traced by English, Dutch, and Spanish colonialists, who extended their European rule over India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, respectively. These developments fortified the southern section of the Eurasian linguistic league (Jakobson 1931).

The proposition of a linguistic area for a region does not preclude the possibility of another linguistic league overlapping, intersecting with, or containing the former. Furthermore, one linguistic league may be a subsection of another. Scholars tracing linguistic commonalities between languages and speech varieties of a proposed linguistic league, in reality, probe into the palimpsest of human history of a given region. They peel a proverbial onion of history, whose different temporal skins may yield different linguistic leagues, which can be related or not, or may overlap or not.

In 1939, the United States autodidact linguist, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1941: 77–78), proposed the concept of Standard Average European (SAE) for covering the Indo-European languages of Europe, but mainly the Germanic ones (as led by the imperial Einzelsprachen of English and German) and the Romance ones (as led by the imperial Einzelsprachen of French and Spanish). In a way, he traced the Judeo-Christian commonalities of Western Christianity as underpinned by the use of Latin as the area's sole and then leading lingua franca well into the early modern period. Afterward, these commonalities were reinforced by industrialization, the intensification of economic exchanges and the imperial competition between Western Europe's imperial metropolises. In Whorf's and his followers' opinion Slavic, East Romance or North Germanic (Scandinavian) languages are peripheral to SAE, hence in terms of a linguistic area, SAE is limited to Western Europe.

The Hungarian linguist and historian, Gyula Décsy, had to leave his country in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, crushed by the Soviet intervention. He settled in West Germany and switched to writing in German. In 1973 Décsy proposed a scheme of several linguistic areas for Central Europe. In his opinion, the Danubian linguistic area covers the non-German(ic) languages and speech varieties of Austria-Hungary, including Montenegro and Serbia. However, the territorial extent of this linguistic area includes historical Hungary's Saxon and Swabian dialects, which are Germanic in their character. The Rokytno linguistic area corresponds to the territory of Poland-Lithuania, which was erased from the political map of Europe in the late eighteenth century. While the name of the former linguistic area unambiguously refers to the Danube River, Décsy's choice of "Rokytno" for dubbing the latter linguistic league is quite opaque to most Western readers. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's geographic center was occupied by the Priet (or Polesie) Marshes, now split between western Belarus and western Ukraine, with their westernmost terminus reaching Poland. Several Belarusian and Ukrainian villages and towns bear the name of Rokytno (Rokytne, Rokitno, Rakitnaje, or Rakitnica), which refers to red-stemmed feather moss (Pleurozium schreberi), known as rokitnik in Polish, this linguistic area's leading language. This plant is widespread across the Priet Marshes, which due to its preponderance, sometimes used to be referred to as the Błota Rokitkije (Rokytno Marshes) in Polish. The Peipus linguistic area takes its name from Lake Peipus, now split by the Estonian-Russian frontier. This linguistic area gathers the Einzelsprachen of Estonian and Latvian, alongside their cognate regional languages of Latgalian and Võro, respectively. Historically speaking, the region's type of Low German also belongs to this linguistic area, which coincides with the Livonian Order's medieval and early modern monastic state. Later, this region changed hands between Poland-Lithuania and Sweden, while in the early eighteenth century it became an administratively and linguistically distinctive region of Russia, composed of the governorates of Courland, Estland, and Livonia. German remained the official language of administration and education for these governorates until the 1880s. Last but not least, in Décsy's scheme of Central Europe's linguistic areas, Scandinavia's Germanic and Finno-Ugric languages are included in the Viking linguistic area with the self-explanatory name referring to the Norsemen (Vikings), who politically and militarily dominated this area beginning in the sixth century (Décsy 1973).

In the case of Crimea and the North Sea littoral, the Kama and Littoral linguistic areas have walk-on roles, respectively, on this map. In the former case, when reflecting on the convergence among speakers of Finno-Ugric and Turkic languages in the region of the middle Volga, in 1971, the Soviet linguist Boris A. Serebrennikov proposed a Volga-Kama linguistic area, its name sometimes shortened to the Kama linguistic area. The Kama River (Çulman in Tatar, Kam in Udmurt) is the longest left (Eastern) tributary of the Volga (İdel in Tatar). The Littoral linguistic area refers to the Northern Sea Shores where the merchants of the Hanseatic League were active between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries. They employed Low German as their leading language of commerce and administration, now preserved in the form of standard Dutch (Flemish).
Linguistic Areas (Sprachbünde) in Central Europe: An Alternative Classification, c 1930

In Europe (or more broadly speaking, in Eurasia) the standard manner of classifying Einzelsprachen is the “genealogical language tree” (Stammbaum). Other less popular schemes frequently employed by linguists include the classificatory concepts of dialect continuum and linguistic area (Sprachbund). All are context specific, and none is universal, meaning that these classificatory approaches and systems were developed first in Europe for sorting Einzelsprachen, that is, languages constructed in line with the Judeo-Graeco-Romano-Christian-Islamic concept of Einzelsprache. This concept of a language (Einzelsprache) assumes that the speech of a country’s ruling elite, usually residing in the capital, should be the (dialectal and sociolectal) basis for a planned (intended) Einzelsprache, which in practice is created by applying to it the technology of writing. Empires and modern states are possible thanks to widespread bureaucracy, which typically is conducted with the employment of a single official (national) language. In order to ensure that the bureaucratic system covers relevant issues in a similar and comparable manner across the entire territory of a polity, administrators and scribes need to stick to the same usages in order to avoid confusion, so that a document produced hundreds of kilometers away would be comprehensible to bureaucrats at the other end of this state. The main instruments of creating such uniformity of language use are a writing system with an orthographic norm, an authoritative grammar, and a state-approved dictionary. The adoption of a single writing system and standard methods of coding sounds (phonemes), syllables and words (morphemes) limits the initial spelling variety in this regard, which previously often made a text appear gibberish to a reader with no knowledge of a specific local orthographic system. The authoritative grammar ensures uniformity at the level of syntax (sentences), while the approved dictionary limits or expands the vocabulary, as suitable, and curbs semantic ambiguity by linking specific meanings to specific words and by cutting out redundant alternatives. This is, in essence, the process of standardizing and creating languages in line with the Western concept of Einzelsprache, as developed some two millennia ago in the Roman Empire. This is not a universal process or method of shaping languages, though many believe so due to the fact that in the course of the Western colonization of, and extending domination over the world, this model of linguistic engineering was imposed on the entire globe and is accepted as the norm to this day.

Neither of these language classificatory schemes, nor the model of language standardization (as they are known and practiced in the West, and nowadays across Eurasia) are universal. For instance, the application of these instruments to the linguistic in sub-Saharan Africa did not produce expected results known from Europe, or in other words, clear-cut “genealogical language trees,” separate dialect continua, or unambiguous linguistic areas. First, Einzelsprachen created out of local speech by missionaries for the sole purpose of spreading Christianity were often rejected by the target groups. Many disliked this foreign imposition with no respect for the local ethnic and religious traditions. What is more, a given ethnic group’s thinking on how the linguistic should be shaped and used typically differed radically from the Western (European) concept of Einzelsprache. Second, unless they had been previously in contact with Muslim or Christian traders (typically along the coast), sub-Saharan Africa’s ethnic groups did not employ the technology of writing, which is of defining importance for the Einzelsprache. Typically, a small polity (a union of villages or extended family clans) equating an ethnic group could be successfully run by the proverbial “word of mouth.” Speech varieties employed at local rulers’ courts obviously held more prestige and projected more power than peripheral varieties or those employed by the lowest stratum of community (society). However, the populations of such small polities were equally tiny, counting thousands or tens of thousands individuals, so the social and actual difference between high status speech varieties (acrolects) and low status ones (basilects) was actually much smaller than the socio-communicative distance of this kind observed in Europe between the prescribed standard of an Einzelsprache (national language) and its “sub-standards dialects.” Third, until the mid-twentieth century the usual imperialist’s racist conviction was that people in sub-Saharan Africa had “no history.” As a result, little effort has been invested in researching the history of this region’s polities and communities. Hence, unlike in Europe, there are no props in the form of historical studies on multiple states, towns, and ethnic groups going back a millennium or more on which linguists could fall back, while thinking on sub-Saharan Africa’s speech varieties (languages) and the relations between their speech communities. Although the fact is not fully acknowledged, such historical monographs do help linguists to rationalize about this type of connections across Eurasia, and assumptions made on their basis richly underpin “genealogical” classifications of languages. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, any detailed overviews of history begin with European colonization in the mid-nineteenth century and are of little help to linguists, because they are mostly about Europeans extending
their dominion over Africans, rather than on the latter. Finally, the anatomically modern human with the biological (evolutionary) capacity for speech emerged in Africa about 200,000 years ago, meaning that the processes of human group building and splitting have unfolded on the continent for a period of the same length. At the level of language, it means that many more cycles of convergence and divergence have taken place among sub-Saharan Africa’s speech varieties (languages) than elsewhere in the world.

In this context, the classificatory instruments of the genealogical language tree, dialect continuum, or linguistic area are overly-simplistic and too context-specific, specifically geared toward and based on examples from Eurasia. Faced with this classificatory conundrum, in 1948, the British linguist Malcolm Guthrie came up with the concept of “geographical zone” for classifying over 500 (and still counting) Bantu languages (speech varieties), as spoken by 350 million people currently (2018). Guthrie’s sixteen zones are neutrally coded with the Latin alphabet’s successive letters from A through S. Interestingly, the inhabitants of today’s Central Europe also number over 300 million. One can assume that if nothing has been known about the region’s populations beyond the last century, they did not use the technology of writing and lived in small polities of several to some tens of thousands inhabitants, an outsider observer would face exactly the same dilemma as Guthrie in sub-Saharan Africa, with half a thousand speech varieties connected to various ethnic groups (that is, ethnolocets, languages) with no prop of political or textual history to classify them in a “genealogical” fashion. Even without such a far-fetched assumption, it is enough to imagine that Europe’s national or official languages were never created (or proclaimed), and the dialects that are now gathered under the former’s “umbrella” are “set free.” This would mean several hundreds of dialects (speech varieties, languages) and the necessity to establish the nature, dynamics, and history of the relations among their speech communities in order to come up with a working classification scheme. In the case of 500 such ethnic groups and their “languages” the potential number of interactions among them would amount to staggering 250,000.

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Map 23 presents an alternative classificatory scheme of Central Europe’s linguistic areas to that offered in Map 22. The political situation in both maps is the same, anchored in 1930. However, the historical entities underpinning the linguistic areas in Map 22 and the thinking on them date back to the turn of the twentieth century, while the thought and such underpinning entities in Map 23 date more to the postwar period, or more broadly, to the second half of the twentieth century. Although Benjamin Lee Whorf’s concept of ASE (Average Standard European) seems to keep wartime Allies together (including the defeated Germany and Austria, as jointly occupied by these Allies), Roman Jakobson’s Eurasian linguistic area eerily sketches out the Soviet Union’s seizure of Central Europe’s nation-states, then corralled into the Soviet bloc. The traditional Balkan and Danubian (Austro-Hungarian) linguistic areas remain almost unchanged, only with Macedonia decisively included in the former, instead being shared by both these linguistic areas. However, Turkey, following the 1923 mutual ethnic cleansing (“population exchange”) with Greece, is excluded from the Balkan linguistic area, and rather attached to the Central Asian (Altaic) linguistic area on account of Istanbul’s interwar and postwar attachment to the ideology of Pan-Turkism, which stresses the Central Asian origin of Turkic-speakers. Another difference between both maps is the disappearance of the Kama linguistic area in Crimea, from where, in 1944, the Soviet authorities expelled the Crimean Tatars to Central Asia.

Interestingly, while considering the northern section of Central Europe in the climate of renewed openness brought about by the end of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union, at the turn of the twenty-first century, scholars proposed to see the Baltic Sea region as a common space of communication and interaction. In the second half of the first millennium Norsemen (Vikings) spanned this region, thanks to their economic and military pursuits, their crowning achievement being the founding of (Kyivan) Rus’ in the ninth century, a polity extending from the Baltic and White seas to the Black Sea. Afterward, Sweden and Denmark remained intimately involved in this region in constant competition with the Teutonic and Livonian orders that drew support and fresh knight recruits from the Holy Roman Empire. In the early modern period, the Hanseatic League ruled supreme in city ports dotting the Baltic littoral and the North Sea’s southern shores. Bound together in a contentious dynastic union, Poland-Lithuania and Sweden each strove to make the Baltic into their own “internal sea.” Sweden turned out to be more successful at executing this plan until the pan-Central European conflict of the Great Northern War (1700–1721), won by both contestants’ common enemy (and at times an ally), namely Muscovy. This victory overhauled Muscovy into a Russian Empire. After the partitions of Poland-Lithuania, the Baltic Sea was shared by Prussia, Russia, and Sweden with a small walk-on role reserved for Denmark. The political configuration survived until the Great War. Nowadays, the shores of the Baltic are shared by nine states, namely, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Sweden. Already during the Cold War, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden began closely cooperating. After the fall of communism Estonia and Latvia joined them, with the aspiration to become “Nordic” states. Finally, beginning in 2004 all the Baltic states (with the exception of Russia, or rather its exclave of Kaliningrad) are members of the European Union. The Baltic area is again a space of common communication and interaction.

Hence, the possibility of a Circum-Baltic linguistic area is not so far-fetched as it might seem at first glance (Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2006). Remembering the past and consciously linking historical analysis with research on language helps with language classification and explains, from a longue durée perspective, a variety of interrelations extant among speech communities. A Baltic linguistic area is included on the map as a distinctive subsection of the Circum-Baltic linguistic area. The co-existence of Estonian- and Latvian-speakers in the same Livonian monastic polity-turned-administrative unit lasted for over 700 years, from the early thirteenth to the early twentieth century.
The construction of ethnolinguistic nation-states across Central Europe, especially after the Great War, was legitimized through (and at the same time enforced) official monolingualism in a single unique, and ideally unshared, national-cum-official language. A similar overlap was also achieved in the case of official scripts (writing systems) across Central Europe. However, it was a gradual process which was largely completed only after the end of communism.

First of all, the number of the leading official writing systems in Central Europe was reduced to three, namely, the Cyrillic, Greek, and Latin alphabets. The Arabic abjad was employed for writing Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) and Turkish until 1928 across the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, and parts of the post-Ottoman Balkans. In 1928 it was replaced with the Latin alphabet, above all in Turkey. The very same year, in the Soviet Union, Latin letters superseded Arabic script for writing and publishing in the language of Crimean Tatar, officially employed in the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This change was part and parcel of the broader Soviet policy of Latinization, that is, of changing the Soviet languages’ various (mainly Arabic and Cyrillic) scripts to the Latin alphabet or endowing freshly codified (and previously unwritten) languages with this alphabet. The reform was carried out from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s and was applied to almost 70 languages in an unsubstantiated ideological belief that modernization (that is, Westernization) and progress (or industrialization, as it was defined in the Soviet Union) may be almost automatically brought about by an appropriate change in script. Although plans existed to Latinize the Cyrillic-based languages of Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian, ultimately, they were never implemented.

In the interwar period, Arabic script survived in non-official use among Yugoslavia’s Slavophone Muslims who wrote and published in their Slavic vernacular (often equated with the country’s then official and national language of Serbo-Croatian) with the employment of Arabic letters until the partition of this South Slavic kingdom by the Axis coalition in 1941. Now, this tradition of Arabic script-based Alhamijado (Aljamiado) or Arebica–Slavophone publications is reinterpreted as “properly” belonging to the heritage of the post-Serbo-Croatian language of Bosnian. Interestingly, the 1914 authoritarian coup in Bulgaria also affected the politics of script in this nation-state. In order to separate Bulgaria’s Turks from any unwanted revolutionary and anti-royalist influences emanating from the Kemalist Turkey, the use of the Latin script for writing and publishing in Turkish was banned. Sofia placed the control of Bulgaria’s extensive Turkish-medium minority education and publishing industry in the hands of traditionalist and pro-Ottoman groups, who championed the continued use of the Arabic abjad and Osmanlıca. As a result, any legal Turkish-language education or publications and periodicals produced in Bulgaria had to be in Arabic letters until 1946. The reinstatement of the Latin alphabet for the Turkish language in Bulgaria, alongside extensive and numerous educational systems in the languages of the country’s minorities, was imposed by the Kremlin in the wake of World War Two. The Soviet authorities saw it as a kind of punishment for Bulgarian ethnolinguistic nationalists, meted out for the fact that Sofia had switched its allegiance from the Axis powers to the victorious Allied coalition three days later than Romania in August 1944. However, the Arabic script continued to be used in a handful of Turkish-language religious calendars published for Bulgaria’s Muslims until the turn of the 1980s.

In the mid-1930s the campaign of Latinization was abandoned in the Soviet Union, and most of the country’s languages were (re-)Cyrillicized, namely, their Latin alphabets had been replaced with Cyrillic by the mid-1940s. In this way, a high degree of monoscriptalism in Cyrillic was achieved across the postwar Soviet Union. However, Cyrillic was not forced onto the Baltic Soviet Socialist Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which the Kremlin had annexed in 1940. Furthermore, between 1940 and 1956 the now largely forgotten sixteenth Soviet Union republic existed, the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1940, the region’s Cyrillic-based Finno-Ugric language of Karel was replaced with Finnish written in Latin letters. Moscow hoped that as in the case of the aforementioned Baltic republics, in line with the 1939 German-Soviet division of Central Europe, the Red Army would swiftly conquer Finland too, which then could be “united” with the Karelo-Finnish SSR. But the Soviet Union did not manage to annex Finland, and a decade after the end of World War Two, the Kremlin acquired this fact and demoted the Karelo-Finnish SSR to the lower rank of a Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, placed back within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The situation returned to what it had been prior to 1940, though remarkably Finnish remained the renewed ASSR’s co-official language alongside the de facto dominant Russian. Last but not least, in the Caucasus the Soviet Union’s republics of the Armenian SSR and the Georgian SSR preserved their specific Armenian and Georgian alphabets, respectively. However,
after World War Two, the majority of the Soviet population lived in Soviet republics where the republican official languages were written in Cyrillic.

Apart from the Arabic abjad, another widespread script that failed to survive beyond the mid-twentieth century is Fraktur. After the Great War, which resulted in the breakup of Austria-Hungary, the official employment of Fraktur was limited to interwar Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, and to a limited degree, to Calvinists in Slovakia and Lutherans in Estonia and Latvia who employed this Gothic type for producing religious publications in Slovak, Estonian, and Latvian, respectively. This script was also preserved among the German(ic) communities across Central Europe. In the German-speaking countries Fraktur was preferred for writing and publishing belles lettres, alongside books in the humanities and social sciences. On the other hand, natural scientists preferred Antiqua. During World War Two, the rapid territorial expansion of Germany brought in numerous populations without a working knowledge of Fraktur, let alone its written hand, Sütterlin. Hence, in 1941 Fraktur was ideologically denigrated as the “Swabian Jewish letters” (Schwabacher Judenlettern), and swiftly replaced with the “Normal Script” (Normal-Schrift), that is, Antiqua. After 1945, despite some half-hearted attempts at reviving Fraktur as a supposedly “anti-fascist alphabet,” it never returned to official use.

Due to secularization (including the anti-religion campaign of combative atheism across the Soviet Union) and the enforcement of monolingualism in the official (national) language, by the mid-1930s the unofficial use of Church (Old) Cyrillic for religious books was largely discontinued, while Armenian and Sephardic communities had adopted, respectively, languages and scripts of their countries of residence, or the Latin alphabet, especially for writing and publishing in the Sephardic language of Spanyol (Ladino). (In Bulgaria, Sephardim also used Cyrillic for writing and publishing in Spanyol [Studemund-Halévy 2021].) The sole stateless community in the process of reinventing itself as an ethnolinguistic nation, namely, Ashkenazic Jews stuck to the Hebrew script for writing both Yiddish and Hebrew across Central Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The only place where this writing system became official was Soviet Belarus, which between 1924 and 1938 was quadrilingual, with Belarusian, Polish, Russian, and Yiddish as its official languages. Uniquely, from the perspective of the twenty-first-century normative tendency toward official monoscriptalism and monolingualism, interwar Soviet Belarus was also tri-scriptal. Cyrillic was employed for writing and publishing in Belarusian and Russian, the Latin alphabet in Polish, while the Hebrew abjad in Yiddish. Interestingly, the pre-1918 tradition of Latin script-based publications in Belarusian for Uniates and Cyrillic-based ones for Orthodox Christians in this language survived in interwar Poland. The Holocaust, perpetrated by Germans and Austrians with the aid of the Axis allies, wiped out the vibrant Ashkenazic Jewish culture (Yiddishland, see Map 16), including the Hebrew script itself. Some Yiddish-language culture with the use of Hebrew letters was revived in the postwar Soviet Union, but the official use of this script at the state level was decisively revived only in Israel. This Jewish polity was founded in 1948, for better or worse, on the Central European model of an ethnolinguistic nation-state. Israel has two official languages, that is, Hebrew and Arabic, meaning that two abjads, Hebrew and Arabic, brush sides in this country.

In interwar Central Europe, the 1918 founding of a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes brought the use of the Latin alphabet to Serbia and Montenegro, which previously had been monoscriptal in Cyrillic. Similarly, Cyrillic was introduced to Bosnia, alongside the Slovenian and Croatian territories where the Latin script had predominated, especially after the wartime 1915 ban on Cyrillic for publishing in Croatian (Serbian) across Austria-Hungary. In this new Kingdom (Yugoslavia, since 1929) both alphabets, Cyrillic and Latin, were recognized as equal and were employed for writing and publishing in the country’s official language of Serbo-Croatoslovenian. In post-1945 communist federal Yugoslavia, this statewide official bispensalism was curbed with the decision to take out Slovenian and Macedonian, as national languages in their own right, from the interwar Serbo-Croatoslovenian ethnolinguistic commonality. Slovenian, monoscriptal in Latin letters, became the official and national language of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, while Macedonian, monoscriptal in Cyrillic, the official and national language of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. In a way, these northernmost and southernmost republics of communist Yugoslavia doubled as the poles of the country’s official bispensalism. In between these poles, the respective mixtures of bispensalism either privileged Cyrillic in Montenegro and Serbia, or the Latin alphabet in Croatia, with the well-balanced, almost equal pairing of both alphabets observed in Bosnia.
Isomorphism of Language, Nation, and State in Central Europe, 1931

After the Great War the Allies transformed Central Europe in accordance with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. In 1910 (Map 14), there were only three isomorphic polities in this region, namely, Bulgaria, Norway, and Romania. In 1918, when the political shape of the region was in flux, as many as five further nation-states joined the isomorphic club, that is, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, for a total of eight countries. Germany-Austria and Germany might have joined this group of fully isomorphic nation-state had the Allies not banned any union between these two countries. In addition, Vienna was required to drop the adjective “German” from the country’s preferred name. Obviously, even if the Allies had not stood in the way of Vienna’s and Berlin’s desire of unification after 1918, the official use of German in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg would have continued to undermine the status of full ethnolinguistic normative isomorphism for such a hypothetical common “Greater German” (Großdeutsch) nation-state of Germany and Austria.

Interwar Greece and Turkey found themselves in a similar situation of near isomorphism. Only in Greece, Greek was the sole official and national language, as was Turkish in Turkey. But the isomorphic status of both nation-states was undermined by the fact that Greek was employed as a co-official language in Italy’s Aegean Islands and the British colony of Cyprus. Likewise, in Cyprus, Turkish was in co-official use, alongside English and Greek. In 1924, the isomorphic status of Poland was cancelled by the adoption of Polish as a co-official language in quadrilingual Soviet Belarus (Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic), side by side with Belarusian, Russian, and Yiddish. Uniquely in interwar Europe, Soviet Belarus was an officially tri-scriptal country, where Cyrillic was used for writing and publishing in Belarusian and Russian, the Hebrew script for the same in the case of Yiddish, while the Latin alphabet for Polish. The founding of a Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924, in the southwestern corner of Soviet Ukraine could have deprived Romania of its isomorphic status of long standing. However, the Soviet authorities dubbed the autonomous republic’s Cyrillic-based ethnic Einzelsprache “Moldavian” in order to distance it from Romania’s national and official language of Romanian. This name was retained for Moldavian, even though in 1912 this Einzelsprache was Latinized, making Moldavian largely indistinguishable from Romanian, but for some lexical Sovietisms. The 1938 reintroduction of Cyrillic for writing and publishing in Moldavian, once again made Soviet Moldova’s republican language distinctive from Romanian at the level of script.

Although apparently bi-national and bi-lingual, as announced by its composite name, Czechoslovakia was proclaimed in 1918 in the name of the unitary Czechoslovak nation. But in speech and writing this nation with its composite name used two national languages, namely Czech in the Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia, and Czech Silesia), while Slovak in Slovakia. Furthermore, in 1919 the Allies pressed Subcarpathian Ruthenia (nowadays Transcarpathia in western Ukraine) into Czechoslovakia’s lap to prevent this former Austro-Hungarian territory from falling under Soviet influence. Additionally, the Allies granted this region autonomy, which the Rusyns hoped would be followed by a recognition of Rusyn as the region’s official language. However, Prague reneged on the promise of autonomy for Subcarpathian Ruthenia, as it did with the earlier promise of autonomy for Slovakia. Then, in 1920, a composite Einzelsprache of Czechoslovak was announced as the country’s sole official and national language, in accordance with the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state. In this manner, Czechoslovakia joined the growing interwar club of isomorphic nation-states in Central Europe. Interestingly, something that is all too little noticed, in respect of language policy, Prague copied this solution from Norway. In the latter country, since 1885, two Einzelsprachen have been in official use side by side, namely, Bokmål (Book Language) and Nynorsk (New Norwegian). In 1905 Norway gained independence and immediately became an isomorphic nation-state, because the country’s legislation construes these two Einzelsprachen as varieties of the single official and national language of Norwegian. From this perspective Norwegian is a composite language, though it has a unitary linguonym, unlike the composite name of the Czechoslovak language.

A year later after the proclamation of the Czechoslovak language, in 1921, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes emulated this solution by making the tripartite Einzelsprache of Serbocroatoslovenian the country’s sole official and national language. However, the kingdom’s name remained unchanged, unambiguously pointing to the fact that it was a home to three nations. However, in the wake of the 1929 coup, the kingdom was renamed Yugoslavia, and its inhabitants became a unitary nation of Yugoslavs. Officially, the name of the state (official) and national Serbocroatoslovenian language remained unchanged, but in colloquial speech many began referring to
At this moment, for all practical reasons, Yugoslavia became a fully isomorphic nation-state. But the sociopolitical reality on the ground was even more complicated than in Czechoslovakia. In statistics and administration, the two national categories of Serb-Croats and Slovenes were in use, instead of a single category of Yugoslavs. The Slovenian variety of Serbocroatian was used in Drava (today’s Slovenia), the Latin alphabet-based Serbo-Croatian variety (“Croatian”) of this language in the historically Croatian area of Yugoslavia and in Bosnia (that is, in Drina, Littoral, Sava, and Vrbas), while the Cyrillic-based Serbo-Croatian (“Serbian”) variety of Serbocroatian on the territory of pre-1918 Montenegro and Serbia (that is, in Danube, Morava, Zeta, and Vardar). Numerous Croatian parties questioned the project of making Yugoslavia into a unitary ethnolinguistic nation-state, which they interpreted as identical with the imperial project of Greater Serbia. Hence, these parties pushed for a separate Croatian language and nation. Their wish was tentatively granted in 1939, when an autonomous Banovina of Croatia was founded. Two years later the ravages of World War Two reached Yugoslavia; the Axis powers and their allies attacked Yugoslavia, which subsequently was partitioned among Albania, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Montenegro. The late interwar Banovina of Croatia and Bosnia were made into a wartime nation-state, officially named the Independent State of Croatia.

Albania, founded in 1912, was the first-ever straightforwardly ethnolinguistic nation-state in the Balkans. It was internationally recognized a year later, in 1913. Following multiple occupations by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, France, Italy, Montenegro, and Serbia during the Great War and in its immediate aftermath, Albania was recreated as a fully isomorphic nation-state in the interwar period. The status of full isomorphism was retained, because despite the sizeable Albanian minority in southwestern Yugoslavia (or today’s Kosovo), no official status was granted to the Albanian language in this country during the interwar period. Belgrade and Ankara entered agreements that provided for “transfer” (that is, expulsion) of Turks from Yugoslavia to Turkey (see Map 19b). In reality, each non-Slav Muslim was counted as a “Turk.” The majority of such “Turks” were Albanians who, despite Tirana’s protests, were expelled to Turkey rather than to Albania. From the Yugoslav point of view, Turkey was located beyond the “buffer” of Bulgaria and Greece, while Albania, with a growing population could turn out to be a potential geostrategic threat if the country’s population became strongly anti-Yugoslav. The arrival of tens of thousands of expellees from southern Yugoslavia to Albania would have surely radicalized the Albanians’ stance toward Belgrade overnight.

No similar challenges to the isomorphic status were observed in the interwar Baltic nation-states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. A certain exception to this rule was Latvia with its legal recognition and protection for the Latgalian language in the easternmost region of Latgalia (Latgale) on the border with the Soviet Union. However, rather than a separate Einzelsprache in its own right, Latgalian was construed as a “historical variant” of the Latvian language. Hence, in practice, in Latgalia, in emulation of the Norwegian and Czechoslovak examples, Latvian was construed as consisting of two varieties, namely the national and leading one of Latvian and the historical and regional one of Latgalian. But this officially composite character of Latvian was short lived since this recognition was accorded to Latgalian only between 1920 and 1934. Afterward, from the legislative and political vantage point, Latvian became a unitary national and official language, like Estonian in neighboring Estonia, and Lithuanian in Lithuania.
Chapter 6: Ethnic Cleansing

Ethnic Cleansing in Central Europe During the 1930s
In literature it is often erroneously maintained that between the two world wars no major cases of “population transfer” (ethnic cleansing) or “massacres” (genocide) were observed in Central Europe. By the mid-1920s, the various continuing legs of the Great War in Central and Eastern Europe had come to an end, while the region’s destroyed or territorially curtailed empires had been firmly replaced with ethnolinguistic nation-states and the communist (non-national in principle, but nationally organized) polity of the Soviet Union. This gigantic overhauling of the political shape of Central Europe generated waves of millions of refugees and expellees. Similarly, millions had earlier been forced out of their homes during the Balkan Wars, World War One, and the follow-up conflicts; many died in orchestrated bloodbaths, out of which the 1915 genocide of Armenians and Assyrians is the best known (see Map 19).

The prime goal of nation-states built in accordance with the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism was homogeneity. All inhabitants were expected to speak and write the national polity’s official and national language, including minorities. Despite the League of Nations’ extensive minority protection system, Central Europe’s nation-states excelled at not observing the seemingly treaty-guaranteed rights of the minorities residing within their boundaries. During the interwar period, often falsified censuses indicated a constant decrease of such minorities as a share of a given state’s population, and frequently also in absolute numbers. Schools with a minority language as the medium of education were forced to close, the state’s official language was added as a second medium of instruction, and subsequently made into the sole medium of instruction at the cost of the minority language, which was turned into a mere school subject. This suppression of ethnolinguistically defined minorities was facilitated by the rise of authoritarianism, which during the two interwar decades gradually replaced democracy with dictatorships across Central Europe. Map 26 illustrates the policy of national homogenization with the case of ethnically Polish military and civilian settlers dispatched from central and western Poland to the eastern half of the country, predominantly populated by Belarusians, Jews, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians. What is more, growing authoritarianism, which increasingly morphed into totalitarianism, sent a wave of political refugees from fascist Italy. Meanwhile, in the early 1930s, concentration camps became increasingly popular as the place where political opponents (including leaders of minorities) could be removed, tortured, and often murdered.

Outside the area covered by the League of Nations’ minority treaties protection system, the Soviet Union engaged in its own version of demographic engineering in a quest for the ideological purity (homogeneity) of socialist (communist) classless society. The classes of aristocracy (dubbed “former people”) and bourgeoisie were liquidated through expropriation, incarceration, expulsion, and summary execution. Subsequently, the liquidated pre-revolutionary elite was replaced with the communist party’s leadership, doubling as government and managers of the economy. A new communist society was built from the “fraternal” classes of peasants and workers “united in a socialist alliance.” In turn, “uncertain elements,” or peasants and workers who stuck to the “prejudices” of religion or nationalism were “re-educated” in the vast network of forced labor concentration camps. The totalitarian (that is, extremely repressive) character of the Soviet system methodically crushed any effective opposition. In this situation, the communist party-state enjoyed monopoly in all aspects of public life and control over many spheres of private life.

The interwar years saw a growing popularity of eugenics, also known as “racial hygiene,” in Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia. This biologization of ethnolinguistic nationalism spawned a theory of “racial purity,” readily adopted by many scholars who developed a new field of research, known as the “science of race” (Rassenkunde). Unfortunately, from these scholars’ perspective, craniometry or other “methods” employed in their field did not allow for sorting members of an approved “higher” or “better” race from those belonging to “inferior” or “foreign” ones. Time and again, practitioners of Rassenkunde and the state administrators financing their research had no choice but to fall back on religion and Einzelsprachen as tools of identifying members of “scientifically defined” races. Somehow, when applied for the sake of social engineering, “science of race” did not differ in its methods from traditional national movements. However, the presumed and then widely accepted “scientific character” of Rassenkunde allowed for legitimizing the implementation of more drastic and unilateral policies than under this or that nationalism, whose proponents typically saw it as part of politics, not of science. Hence, not only were members of “inferior” or “foreign” races slated for marginalization and expulsion, but also for wholesale extermination. This was the fate meted out in Germany to the ethnoreligious group of Jews, to the ethnic group of Roma, and otherwise to the disabled, homosexuals, and opponents of national socialism, mostly communists.
and social democrats. The genocidal part of this program, with the ample use of concentration camps, was experimented with during the second half of the 1930s and implemented in full during World War Two. Map 26 depicts the beginning of this process, marked by the flight ("emigration") and expulsions of Jews and political opponents from Germany and Austria, annexed by the former state in 1938.

The Third Reich’s totalitarian policy of marginalization, expulsion, and extermination was mirrored in the Soviet Union by the communist leadership’s program of hastened progress toward “full socialism.” In the marxist-leninist view, the Russian Empire was a feudal polity. Since in the ideology’s dogmatic ("scientific") interpretation of history it is impossible to jump over marxist stages of human development, capitalism had to first be built in the economic sphere, while in the field of social organization the population had to be molded into ethnolinguisitically defined nations. For the sake of the latter, the policy of *korenizatsiya* (nativization or indigenization) was implemented with an eye to building Einzelsprachen and employing them as languages of publishing, education, and regional administration. Additionally, the New Economic Policy (NEP) ushered a form of limited capitalism into agriculture and industry across the Soviet Union. With these concomitant stages of social and economic development achieved by the turn of the 1930s, the Kremlin pressed on to another social stage of multiethnic socialist society with the leading “Soviet socialist language” of Russian and to the socialist stage of planned economy. But most did not want to give up their private farms and shops to the state, or to abandon their newly standardized and now valued languages in favor of Russian.

In the early 1930s the opposition to the collectivization of agriculture was broken with the genocides of Ukrainians and Kazakhs, known as Holodomor (death by starvation). Their protracted mass execution was carried out through administratively created hunger, which lasted for several years in the respective republics and led to millions of deaths by starvation. Opponents of collectivization during the Holodomor, and afterward, some survivors, whom by default the authorities did not trust, were thrown into concentration camps, or exiled to Siberia and Central Asia. During the latter half of the 1930s, the national elites (writers, journalists, scholars, and party leaders) of the Soviet Union’s recently constructed or revived ethnolinguistic nations were liquidated, be they Armenians, Azeris, Belarusians, Georgians, or Ukrainians. For the sake of securing its western border, Moscow ordered the eastward expulsion and decimation of borderland populations with their co-ethnics living across the state frontier. Massacres of genocidal proportions were meted out especially to Soviet Poles, but also to Soviet Germans and Greeks, alongside other ethnolinguisitically defined groups of Soviet citizens.

Prior to the outbreak of World War Two, Germany, Hungary, and Poland annexed the adjacent parts of Czechoslovakia in 1938, triggering flights and expulsions of Czechs, Jews, Slovaks, and Rusyns to rump Czechoslovakia. The following year, when Germany and Hungary annexed most of what remained of Czechoslovakia, the rest was turned into the nation-state of Slovakia. Subsequently, many Czechs and Jews fled or were expelled from independent Slovakia to the Czech lands, made into Germany’s Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The stage was set for wartime ethnic cleansings and genocides of a scale unprecedented in Europe (Maps 27 and 28). Ethnic cleansers and genocidaires drew upon methods of mass expulsion, incarceration, and extermination, as developed in colonial lands. For instance, between 1864 and 1867, the Russian armies expelled over 90 percent of the Circassians from their north Caucasian homeland. In 1864 alone half to three-quarters of the Circassians were exterminated. In Belgian Congo the colony’s 20 million inhabitants were de facto made into slave labor of companies producing rubber. In the process, between 1885 and 1908, half of the population, or 10 million, were killed. In Germany’s South West Africa, the German army rounded up the colony’s inhabitants, the Hereros and Namas, and exterminated 80 percent of them between 1904 and 1907. A clear course for Western-style modernity was set.
On August 23, 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union contracted an alliance and agreed on a plan to divide Central Europe between these two totalitarian powers. The implementation commenced, when on September 1 and 17, 1939, respectively, the Third Reich and the Red Army attacked and partitioned Poland. In 1940 the Soviets annexed Romania’s Bessarabia (and northern Bukovina), Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Despite a concentrated effort to conquer Finland, the Red Army managed to grab only 10 percent of the country’s territory, though complete with its second largest city, Viipuri (Vyborg).

Map 27 focuses on the period of the German-Soviet alliance, which is unduly neglected, especially in Western historiography. The German-Soviet partition of Central Europe and the subsequent border changes entailed massive population engineering, coordinated with the political needs and aspirations of the ideologies of national socialism and communism. In this case, despite any differences between these two ideologies, their German and Soviet proponents executed forced emigration, expulsions, and forced resettlement (that is, numerous acts of ethnic cleansing) in accordance with the principles of ethnolinguistic nationalism. The perception of Central Europe’s inhabitants exclusively through the lens of their Einzelsprachen (and at times, religions) as the measure of their identity (groupness) and potential (dis)loyalty constituted a common basis for German and Soviet demographic policies. This approach also informed the national socialist Third Reich’s allies, namely, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Slovakia.

Immediately in the wake of the German-Soviet conquest, partition, and occupation of Poland, thousands of Polish soldiers and refugees from the country’s ruling elite sought safe haven in Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania. Only Hungary and Romania, as Germany’s allies, turned out to be relatively safe for Polish refugees. The Soviets annexed Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia already in 1940. A sizeable part of interwar Poland’s officer corps was rounded up by the Soviets and exterminated in a preplanned act, which many (especially in Poland) assess as genocide. This event is symbolized by the 1940 massacre in the Katyn forest near Smolensk, where the majority were executed. Around a quarter of a million Polish Jews escaped from the German occupation zone of Poland to the Soviet Union, fearful of Berlin’s program of instituted anti-Semitism. At the same time, the last wave of German Jews managed to flee to British Palestine and the Americas, despite the West’s restrictions on Jewish immigrants. The partition of Poland and Central Europe complete, Germany agreed to evacuate German(ic)-speaking communities from the Soviet zone of Central Europe. In the framework of the program Heim ins Reich (Back Home in the [Third] Reich), they were resettled from Estonia, Latvia, or Bessarabia to the western Polish territories directly incorporated into wartime Germany. In addition, similar German(ic) communities were resettled from Italy’s South Tyrol and the coastal areas of Romania and Bulgaria (Dobruja). Ironically, three or four years later they fled or were expelled again, when following the defeat of Germany in 1945, the country’s eastern frontier was moved 300 kilometers westward to the Oder-Neisse line. Meanwhile, from the aforementioned incorporated Polish territories, ethnic Poles were removed to the former central Poland, which had been overhauled into Germany’s semi-colony of the Generalgouvernement. Some Slavs (Kashubs, Mazurs, and Silesiens) were retained and deemed to be “Germanizeable.” Generalgouvernement became a “dumping ground” for “racially inferior” Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians. The 1940 General Plan Ost predicted that the area’s population would be starved to death, and the remnants expelled to a Slavic “reservation” in the east. The Lebensraum (living space), cleansed of its former “inferior” inhabitants, would be re-populated with “racially pure” (“Aryan”) German(ic) settlers. Hunger and starvation as the plan’s main instrument shows that national socialist Germany actively learned from the Soviet example of holodomors (death by starvation), deployed in the early 1930s for accelerating collectivization in and for Russifying Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Kazakhstan. However, for a while, the “racially inferior” Slavs could be used for work. Hence, millions of Poles and Czechs were rounded up as forced laborers and dispatched to central and western Germany, severely deprived of working age menfolk, who had been drafted into the Wehrmacht (German Army).

In the Soviet occupation zone of Poland and Central Europe, the Kremlin engaged in its own version of demographic engineering. In order to produce a higher degree of ethnolinguistic homogeneity and to preventively neutralize any opposition to Soviet rule in reunited or enlarged Soviet Belarus and Soviet Ukraine, the local Polish communities were rounded up and exiled to Siberia and Kazakhstan. In addition, “ideologically unreliable” Belarusians, Jews, and Ukrainians were sent alongside them. In the wake of the breakup of Czechoslovakia and the annexation of their homeland of Subcarpathian Ruthenia by Hungary, some Orthodox Ruthenophile Rusyns left for the
Soviet Union. They were joined by a number of Lemkos and Ukrainians from the German occupation zone of Poland. Ironically, as "uncertain elements," most were exiled to Siberia and Kazakhstan.

In 1940 Berlin and Rome saw to an overhaul of some borders within the Axis camp. The idea was, first, to satisfy outstanding nationalist demands, and second, to make the beneficiaries of these border changes even more dependent on Germany and Italy. Both leading Axis powers guaranteed these alterations of state frontiers. Romania lost northern Transylvania to Hungary and southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. The involved nation-states committed to population exchanges (or mutual ethnic cleansing). Numerous Romanians from the ceded part of Transylvania left for Romania, while many Hungarians from the part of Transylvania remaining within Romania, decided to move to Hungary. Likewise, Romanians from southern Dobruja incorporated into Bulgaria went to Romania. In turn, Bulgarians from Dobruja remaining within the Romanian boundaries left for Bulgaria.

However, this new order in German-Soviet Central Europe did not last long. In 1941 Germany and its allies attacked its ally, the Soviet Union. Borders were altered again, and new acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide followed, as depicted on Map 28.
The 1941 attack by the Third Reich on the German ally of the Soviet Union accelerated the processes of ethnic cleansing and genocide. They were carried out in the midst of the total war waged by these two totalitarian powers, each aiming at the total destruction and subjugation of the other. With no pretenses to uphold, no outside checks on any policies or projects, German and Soviet plans of demographic engineering were implemented in full, and accelerated to full throttle in the context of the perceived needs of the war effort. In 1941 more than ten million inhabitants of the Soviet western borderlands (incorporated just in 1939–1940) were evacuated eastward before the rapidly advancing German armies. This evacuation was similar in scale and in its forced character to the 1915 evacuation in the western provinces of the Russian Empire that had been overrun by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies.

When the frontline had somewhat stabilized, the Kremlin exiled ethnic Germans from Leningrad and its vicinity and from Crimea to Siberia and Kazakhstan. In line with the logic of ethnolinguistic identification, Soviet Germans were seen as potentially more loyal to Germany than to their own country. In most cases this was a baseless suspicion, but to remain on the safe side, in 1941 the Kremlin dissolved the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The republic’s 370,000 ethnic Germans were transported to concentration camps and exile settlements in Siberia and Kazakhstan. A similar fate was meted out to smaller numbers of equally untrusted Finns and Ingrs in Leningrad’s vicinity, alongside Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians in their respective countries, which a year earlier had been annexed and made into Soviet republics.

The German armies’ steady advance eastward continued without much disruption until mid-1942. This effort starved the Third Reich of menfolk. In their place millions of “racially inferior” Belarusians, Czechs, Hungarians, Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians from the occupied territories were hauled to Germany as forced laborers. Beginning in 1940, in its own zone of occupation in Poland, Germany created urban ghettos for Jews and a network of associated forced labor camps. In this manner Jewish assets were stolen, and subsequently unpaid labor extracted from them. The system was extended to the adjacent Soviet areas when German troops launched an attack against the Soviet Union in 1941. But at that time, Berlin had already taken the decision to exterminate all the Jews. In total, over 5,000 ghettos were created, and the associated camps were made into death camps.

For the sake of swift extermination in line with the ideology of national socialism, and in most cases against the actual needs of the war effort, no ghettos or camps were founded for Jews across most of the Soviet territory under German occupation. In their stead, mobile Einsatzgruppen (special task forces) were deployed for hunting down and murdering Jews. What is unduly forgotten is that the same extermination policy was applied to Central Europe’s Roma. As a result, half of the murdered Jews and Roma were liquidated in the death camps, while the Einsatzgruppen exterminated the other half. In literature the fate of the latter group of victims is known as “Holocaust by bullets” (Desbois 2008).

In 1941 the ravages of total population engineering were extended to Yugoslavia, and Greece was attacked, occupied, and partitioned by the Axis powers and their Balkan allies. Germany and Italy allowed for the creation of a new nation-state of Croatia, which proved a staunch ally. Ethnic Serbs (that is, Slavophone Orthodox Christians) left or were expelled from Croatia, Vojvodina (annexed by Hungary), Macedonia (annexed by Bulgaria), Kosovo (incorporated into Albania under Italian control) to rump Serbia under direct German military control. In turn, Montenegrins domiciled in rump Serbia left for Montenegro that had been recreated under Italian control. Wartime Germany, as usual, hauled hundreds of thousands of Croats, Montenegrins, Serbs, Slavophone Muslims (or today’s Bosniaks), and Slovenes as forced laborers to the Third Reich. Sofia expelled Greeks from Greece’s eastern Thrace, incorporated into wartime Bulgaria. In the interwar period, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria periodically expelled or forced Turks from both countries to “emigrate” to Turkey. In many cases, these “Turks” were Albanian-speaking and Slavophone Muslims. The Albanian government protested, but to no avail, that if any Albanian Muslims needed to be expelled from Yugoslavia they should be sent to Albania. During the war Bulgaria continued expelling Turks (Muslims) to Turkey, which remained neutral during the conflict.

In accordance with the program Heim ins Reich (Back Home in the [Third] Reich), devised in 1940 mainly for Central Europe under Soviet occupation, German(ic)-speaking communities from Slovenia and Vojvodina were sent to the Polish territories directly incorporated into Germany. Villages and homesteads emptied of Serbs and Germans in Vojvodina, which had been annexed by Hungary, were partly repopulated with Szeklers, or Hungarians from this part of Transylvania, which remained within wartime Romania’s boundaries.
inspired by the German example, Romania and Croatia embarked on their own extermination programs of “racially inferior” populations, which from the ethnolinguistic perspective, were deemed as un-Romanian and un-Croatian, respectively. Bucharest created a network of death camps in its wartime semi-colony of Transnistria with its administrative center at Odessa (Odesa), where many Romanian Jews and Roma were exiled and murdered through overwork and starvation. Other Romanian Jews were killed where they lived or sent to German death camps in occupied Poland (including the territories east of the Bug/Buh River, which after 1939/1945 became western Ukraine). Meanwhile, Croatia established death camps for exterminating the country’s Serbs, Jews, and Roma. Some Jews found an unexpected safe haven in wartime Albania. It was the only country under Axis control, and then under German occupation, that successfully opposed Berlin’s demands to send Albania’s Jews to Germany’s death camps. Albania’s other claim to fame is that during the war the number of Jews in this country grew over ten-fold, from fewer than 200 to over 2,000.

The year of 1943 shook the Third Reich to its core, despite the fact that the state’s official name was changed from the German Empire (Deutsches Reich) to the Greater German Empire (Großdeutsches Reich). The Red Army gained an upper hand over the Wehrmacht, and a German retreat from the east began. At the same time, Italy switched sides in the war. As a result, Germany had to occupy Italy’s territorial gains in the Balkans. In addition, to protect the southern rear of the Third Reich, Berlin extended its military control over the northeastern corner of Italy proper. In the wake of these changes the rudderless Italian troops in the Balkans were rounded up, incarcerated, and sometimes massacred. Germany treated them as traitors and refused them the status of POWs, instead labelling these soldiers as “Italian military internees” (Italienische Militärinternierte). And again, as was the case with Jews, Albanians saved numerous Italian troops (about 20,000 to 30,000) and refused to give them up to the German authorities, while others joined the Yugoslav or Albanian resistance. Germany rolled out another punitive measure against Italy by hauling hundreds of thousands of Italians as forced laborers to Germany.

The rapid Soviet advance westward convinced many pro-German and/or anti-Soviet Belarusians, Cossacks, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Russians, Tatars, and Ukrainians to flee in the same direction rather than to be caught, incarcerated, and murdered by the Soviets. They hoped to reach western Germany, while some Estonians and Latvians, alongside Swedes from Estonia, opted for neutral Sweden. Those heading for western Germany rightly expected that the area would find itself under the occupation of the Western Allies, namely, Britain, France, and the United States. They knew better what to expect of murderous Soviet totalitarianism, especially if the Kremlin decided to treat an ethnolinguistically defined population as traitors. As earlier in the case of the Volga Germans, in 1944 the entire population of Crimean Tatars was rounded up and sent to Uzbekistan. The Crimean Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic was formally dissolved a year later, in 1945. The Crimean Tatars’ only crime was that the Red Army did not manage to stop the Wehrmacht’s advance, so Crimea found itself under German occupation. A similar fate was meted out to the Northern Caucasus’ non-Slavic nations of the Balkars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, Karachays, and Meskhetian Turks. They were also blamed for not stopping the German occupation of their ethnic areas. But in reality, their deportation brought about a higher degree of ethnolinguistic homogeneity to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic’s Crimea and northern Caucasus, alongside Soviet Georgia. Given that apart from the Buddhist Kalmyks, all the exiled groups were Muslims, the 1944 deportation seems to have been a direct continuation of the Russian imperial policy of de-Islamizing the Black Sea northern littoral, heralded by the 1864 genocide and expulsion of Cricassians (see Map 11).

The Finns saw their participation in World War Two on the side of Germany as their own separate Continuation War (1941–1944) fought against the Soviet Union for regaining the territorial losses sustained under the Soviet attack during the Winter War (1939–1940). Hence, in 1944 Moscow agreed to a separate peace with Helsinki. In addition to the territories ceded in 1940, Finland lost further areas. The seeming permanence of these losses convinced 400,000 Finns and Karelians to leave the annexed areas for Finland within its new boundaries. Meanwhile, with the Red Army marching toward Berlin, the Kremlin engaged in another bout of demographic engineering for the sake of fortifying its hold over Central Europe. The 1940 Soviet western frontier, as established in line with the 1939 German-Soviet Pact, was reinstated. Hundreds of thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians perceived as traitors or somewhat anti-Soviet in their views were exiled to Siberia for suppression and “re-education.” For the sake of deepening the ethnolinguistic homogeneity of Soviet Lithuania, Soviet Belarus, and Soviet Ukraine, and to win the support of at least part of the local nationalists, ethnic Poles (that is, Slavophone Catholics) were expelled to post-war Poland, the territory of which was moved 300 kilometers westward. In return, ethnic Lithuanians (or Baltic-speaking Catholics), Belarusians (Slavophone Orthodox Christians and Uniates) and Ukrainians (Slavic-speaking Greek Catholics) remaining in postwar Poland were expelled to the Soviet Union. The advancing Soviet front was closely followed by pro-Soviet Poles and Polish Jews, who had survived the war and the Holocaust in the Soviet Union. They were instrumental in the creation of a communist Poland after the war. Meanwhile they established a rudimentary Polish administration, especially in the deutsche Ostgebiete (Eastern German territories), located east of the Oder-Neisse line. Earlier, a plurality or majority of these territories’ German populations had fled or had been evacuated westward. In the Balkans, Albanians were expelled from northern Greece to Albania. With the end of the war apparently just round the corner, faits accomplis in the name of ethnolinguistic homogeneity multiplied. Perpetrators rightly expected that any postwar settlement would approve the resultant new ethnonationalist order, as there was little taste left for another war that would right the numerous wrongs generated by World War Two.
At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, the victorious Allies tentatively approved a new political shape for Central Europe under Soviet domination. The brief postwar period of uneasy cooperation between the Western Allies and the Kremlin swiftly came to an end with the 1948–1949 Soviet blockade of West Berlin. Subsequently, the western occupation zones of Germany were fashioned into West Germany, and the Soviet occupation zone into East Germany. By 1948 the process of installing pro-Soviet communist regimes in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania had been complete. These countries were molded into a Soviet bloc, to which the communist, but not Soviet-dominated, Albania also pledged loyalty in the wake of the 1948 split between communist Yugoslavia and the Kremlin.

It is often forgotten that the wartime Greater German Empire (Großdeutsches Reich, 1943–1945) was split into at least 14 occupation zones, namely the aforementioned four that were later made into East and West Germany, the further four subsequently overhauled into Austria, France’s Staar Protectorate that was allowed to join West Germany in 1956, the Sudetenland and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia reincorporated into reestablished Czechoslovakia, Memelland (Klaipėda Region) reincorporated into Soviet Lithuania, interwar Poland’s western borderlands reincorporated into postwar Poland, and the Polish and Soviet sections of the deutsche Ostgebiete (German eastern territories, located east of the Oder-Neisse line) incorporated into Poland and the Soviet Union, respectively. In addition, Poland’s section of the deutsche Ostgebiete included the interwar Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk). The strategically thorny issue of re-founding Austria as a nation-state was resolved at the height of the Cold War in 1955. Unlike in the case of the divided Germany, all the four Western and Soviet occupation zones of Austria were molded into a capitalist and democratic Austria, which promised to remain neutral. In practical terms, it meant that the country would not join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, established in 1949) and its economy would be in many ways integrated with the Soviet bloc’s economies, but without the necessity of joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon that stands for “Communist Economies,” founded in 1949) or the Warsaw Pact (established in 1955). Earlier, a similar offer had been extended to Finland and become known in literature under the moniker of “Finlandization.” In 1956, the Kremlin rewarded the capitalist Finland’s loyalty by giving up the Soviet naval military base in Porkkala, just 30 kilometers west of Helsinki.

The postwar re-establishment of the 1919–1941 Soviet western frontier was accompanied by numerous acts of population engineering conducted mainly in accordance with the principle of ethnolinguistic homogeneity, though clearly with an eye to fortifying the Soviet system, especially in the territories that had not belonged to the Soviet Union prior to 1939–1940. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians were rounded up and exiled eastward or incarcerated in the Soviet network of concentration camps, which officially existed until 1956, but in practice persisted to the end of the Soviet Union. The ostensible cause of this harsh policy was the fact that in the areas alongside the Soviet western border, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian anti-Soviet guerillas operated until the mid-1950s. The removed populations were replaced with Russophone settlers from the Soviet hinterland, that is, from within the boundaries of the interwar Soviet Union. Prior to the outbreak of the Cold War in 1948–1949, the Western Allies sent anti-Soviet Cossack units and soldiers from the anti-Soviet Russian Liberation Army led by General Andrei Vlasov back to the Soviet Union. Both the Soviet authorities and the Western Allies saw them as traitors who had fought for the Third Reich, and thus in need of punishment. The officers were summarily executed, while the soldiers, denigrated as Vlasovtsy (Vlasovites), were incarcerated in the Soviet concentration camps, often together with their immediate families. The demographic changes were facilitated by the 1946–1948 localized famines, which killed hundreds of thousands. Indispensable food supplies were withheld from “uncertain elements,” condemning them to death. The Kremlin also prevented any lifting of the famine in Soviet Moldavia, which turned into a Holodomor-style genocide (Țăranu 2017). Over one-tenth of the republic’s population was wiped out, which prevented the continuation of any pro-Romanian and anti-Soviet guerilla movement or underground.

Across the postwar Soviet-Polish border, ethnic Poles from Soviet Lithuania, Soviet Belarus, and Soviet Ukraine were expelled to Poland (or granted their request to leave) well into the 1950s. In turn, Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians remaining in postwar Poland were resettled in the Soviet Union by the end of the 1940s. A higher degree of ethnolinguistic homogeneity was the policy’s outcome in Poland and the Soviet republics involved. The Kremlin, however, decided to retain a considerable number of ethnic Poles in Soviet Lithuania and founded a full-fledged Polish-medium minority educational...
Ethnic Cleansing in Central Europe After World War Two, 1945–1950
Yugoslavia. Furthermore, immediately after the Red Army’s ror image of wartime Germany’s policy of Germanization became a target of forced Polonization, which was a maintenance of the Slavophone ethnic groups of Kashubs, Mazurs, and Silesians, who held German citizenship. Subsequently, they were insufficient to fully repopulate Poland’s share of overpopulated central Poland, Polish forced laborers returned to Western Allies or West Germany, which obliged the reunified Germany to sign a border treaty with Poland. This border treaty was done in 1990 and ratified two years later, in 1992. During the interval between the signature and ratification, Poland’s postcommunist government requested the Red Army troops stationing in Poland since World War Two to be withdrawn before this ratification. That is why the Soviet-turned-Russian soldiers left Poland only in 1993, while they had been pulled out from neighboring Czechoslovakia already two years earlier, in 1991.

The Poles’ grudging loyalty to the Soviet Union was also won by the Kremlin’s tough stance on the necessity of removing any remaining Germans from the deutsche Ostgebiete granted to Poland as quickly as possible. The “population transfer” (that is, ethnic cleansing) agreed upon at Potsdam was to commence by the loss of the eastern half of interwar Poland to the Soviet Union, was somewhat mollified with the “recompense” in the form of most of the deutsche Ostgebiete. The Kremlin helped itself rather modestly only to the northern half of East Prussia, made into Kaliningrad Region. Second, the Red Army turned out to be the only guarantor of the new Polish-German frontier. Although this frontier was agreed upon at Potsdam, it remained to be reconfirmed in light of international law at a future peace conference, which never took place due to the Cold War. None of the Western Allies or West Germany fully recognized this frontier until the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (informally known as the Two Plus Four Agreement, that is, contracted between the two German states and the four wartime Allies), which obliged the reunified Germany to sign a border treaty with Poland. This border treaty was done in 1990 and ratified two years later, in 1992. During the interval between the signature and ratification, Poland’s postcommunist government requested the Red Army troops stationing in Poland since World War Two not to be withdrawn before this ratification. That is why the Soviet-turned-Russian soldiers left Poland only in 1993, while they had been pulled out from neighboring Czechoslovakia already two years earlier, in 1991.

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The Poles’ grudging loyalty to the Soviet Union was also won by the Kremlin’s tough stance on the necessity of removing any remaining Germans from the deutsche Ostgebiete granted to Poland as quickly as possible. The “population transfer” (that is, ethnic cleansing) agreed upon at Potsdam was to commence in 1946, but the expulsion from Poland’s “former German territories” to the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany began before the Potsdam Conference and continued unabated afterward. The expelled Germans were replaced with settlers from overpopulated central Poland, Polish forced laborers returning from Germany, and with Polish expellees from interwar Poland’s eastern half annexed by the Soviet Union. But these groups were insufficient to fully repopulate Poland’s share of the deutsche Ostgebiete. Hence, the decision was taken to retain the Slavophone ethnic groups of Kashubs, Mazurs, and Silesians, who held German citizenship. Subsequently, they became a target of forced Polonization, which was a mirror image of wartime Germany’s policy of Germanization directed at the very same ethnic groups during the war. The Potsdam and Potsdam-style expulsions of Germans were also extended to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, immediately after the Red Army’s entry into Central Europe, tens of thousands of Germans were rounded up in East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslav’s Vojvodina. They were dispatched as forced laborers to Siberia and Kazakhstan. In the mid-1950s, survivors were not allowed to go to their homelands, but mainly to West Germany. Ironically, the majority of “Germans” rounded up in West Prussia, southern East Prussia, and Upper Silesia granted to postwar Poland were Kashubs, Mazurs, and Silesians, officially deemed to be Poles by the postwar Polish authorities.

Jewish survivors returning to their home villages, towns, and city quarters were met with the locals’ enmity, because the latter had already “repossessed” (that is, stole) the Jewish farms, houses, apartments, and movable property. Many returning Jews were killed, with apparent impunity. The generalized postwar anti-Semitism convinced most Jewish survivors to re-establish their Yiddish-speaking communities in Poland’s share of the deutsche Ostgebiete, mainly in Lower Silesia, where the largest Soviet military base was located in Legnica, offering a welcome curb on Polish ethnolinguistic nationalism. These Jewish settlers often brushed sides with Lemkos and Ukrainians from the southeastern corner of Poland, who, in 1947, were dispersed across Poland’s “former German territories.”

The 1946–1949 Greek Civil War between pro-Soviet communists and pro-Western democrats was the first Cold War-style proxy war fought between the West and the Soviet Union. The Greek communists lost, among whom there were many Slavophone Macedonians, as well. The survivors, in order to avoid incarceration and death, were evacuated and resettled across the Soviet bloc, also in the aforementioned new Polish region of Lower Silesia. Meanwhile, Bulgarians were expelled from western Thrace, which after the war was returned to Greece. A similar fate was met by Italians from the Italian Islands of the Aegean, which were formally passed to Greece in 1947. Italy also lost its territories in Dalmatia and Istria (transferred to Yugoslavia), alongside the colonies in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Libya, entailing the return, flight or de facto expulsion of these areas’ Italian populations to postwar Italy.

After 1945, Hungary lost its wartime territorial gains from Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. In the first case a population exchange was announced. Slovaks from postwar Hungary were to leave for Czechoslovakia (mainly Slovakia), while Hungarians from southern Slovakia for Hungary. This mutual ethnic cleansing was stopped half-way, and in some cases reversed, arguably to provide the Kremlin with the possibility of acting as an arbiter between the two countries, if need be. No policy of expelling Hungarians from postwar Romania was instituted, apart from some Hungarians who were rounded up together with local Germans and sent to the Soviet Union as forced laborers immediately after the Red Army had overrun Romania. Actually, the Soviets pushed for the creation of a Magyar (Hungarian) Autonomous Region (1950–1968) in postwar Romania, which was a “punishment” to the country’s ethnolinguistic nationalists for the mistake of Romania’s switching loyalty from the Third Reich to the Soviet Union so late in the war. Although some tens of thousands of Hungarians left Vojvodina, given back to Yugoslavia, and a similar number of Serbs “returned” from Hungary to
Yugoslavia, the Kremlin was unable to play the ethnic card to influence Yugoslavia. After 1945 this country was re-founded as a Soviet-style multiethnic and polyglot federation. The areas vacated by local German(ic) communities and denuded of inhabitants through flights and de facto expulsions of Italians and Hungarians were repopulated with Croats, Slavophone Muslims (today’s Bosniaks), and Serbs from the country’s hinterland. A similar repopulation, but on a much bigger scale, comparable to what happened in postwar Poland, took place in Czechoslovakia. Three million Germans expelled from the country’s western borderlands (known as the Sudetenland in German-language literature) were replaced with nearly two million Czech and Slovak settlers. However, the former Sudetenland remained even more underpopulated than Poland’s section of the deutsche Ostgebiete. Only the Soviet Union did not face such demographic problems with the repopulation of northern East Prussia denuded of its German inhabitants expelled west of the Oder-Neisse line.

After 1918, under Western Europe and the United States’ watch, Central Europe’s empires were replaced with ethnolinguistic nation-states. Following World War Two, due to the Kremlin and the Western Allies’ decision, these national policies were “purified” through the expulsion and forced assimilation of minorities. By the turn of the 1950s, an unprecedented degree of ethnolinguistic homogeneity had been achieved in the region’s nation-states. This “success” came at the expense of numerous acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing during the first half of the twentieth century. Millions lost their lives in genocides, and tens of millions were expelled from their homes. The rather relaxed and inclusive polyglotism, multiethnicity, and polyconfessionalism of the old Central Europe had been thoroughly erased. It was the German and Soviet murderous totalitarianisms, which ensured such ethnolinguistic homogenization, while the latter totalitarianism continued after World War Two to provide for the maintenance and deepening of this homogeneity across the Soviet bloc. Irrespective of any political, economic, ideological, confessional, or other differences between Central Europe’s countries, ethnolinguistic nationalism became the de facto basis of politics and sociopolitical organization in the region. To this day, ethnolinguistic nationalism remains Central Europe’s sole universally accepted ideology of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance.
By the turn of the 1950s, the postwar political shape of Central Europe had been largely settled. The Iron Curtain cut through the region until the fall of communism in 1989. Presumably, the Cold War “froze” any conflicts and the closed and tightly guarded borders between the Soviet bloc countries and the West prevented any substantial population movements. Hence, the popular opinion maintains that no instances of ethnic cleansing (“population transfers”) were observed during the time in Central Europe. Map 30 seeks to problematize this stereotypical and simplistic view. In the communist period, expulsions, forced migration, and flights of populations were governed by two factors: first, ethnolinguistic nationalism, and second, many Central Europeans’ continuing dislike and distrust of communism and the Soviet Union. With time the latter was deepened by a clearly visible inefficiency of the Soviet bloc’s planned economies, which failed to provide for the population at large. In contrast, the “economic miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder), facilitated by the United States’ postwar Marshall Plan of vast economic and financial aid, beginning in the 1950s produced an unprecedented level of general prosperity in West Germany, Austria, and elsewhere in Western Europe. Due to the arms race between the West and the Soviet bloc, the difference in standards of living continued to widen. The stagnating Soviet bloc economies were unable to catch up with their Western counterparts. As a result, a growing share of the bloc’s GDP had to be spent on armaments in order to maintain a parity in nuclear warheads and conventional arms with the West.

After the war, Jewish survivors faced rife anti-Semitism that often prevented them from returning to their home villages, towns, and cities. In most cases they had no chance to regain their real estate, let alone movable property. What is more, Jewish survivors had no choice but to meet, on an everyday basis, wartime neighbors who often had betrayed their families to Germans. Others found it psychologically impossible to stay in places where most of their family and neighbors were killed. Central Europe’s countries looked to them like one big Jewish cemetery. Hence, when Israel was founded in 1948, many left for this Jewish polity, which is none other than a Central European ethnolinguistic nation-state in the Middle East. Others left for the United States and Western Europe. Unlike the cases of other ethnic populations, the Soviet bloc countries (with the partial exception of the Soviet Union in the 1960s–1980s) did not try to stop the departing Jews. Soon afterward, an anti-Semitic campaign unfolded in the Soviet Union in 1952–1953, and the Soviet satellites in Central Europe dutifully followed suit through the 1950s. The last anti-Semitic campaign of this kind took place in Poland in 1968. The communist states’ governments, administrations and elites were cleansed of “rootless cosmopolitan” Jews. In accordance with the interwar and wartime practice of ethnolinguistic nationalism, there was no acceptance for treating Jews as full-fledged co-citizens, in spite of any constitutional and legal guarantees to this end. For the first time in its one millennium-long history, Central Europe was almost utterly deprived of any Jewish communities. The departure of Jews from the Soviet Union (mainly, the Baltic republics, Soviet Belarus, Soviet Ukraine, and Soviet Moldavia) continued through the 1970s, before stalling due to the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which terminated the decade-long East-West détente.

Between the founding of West Germany and East Germany in 1949 and the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, almost three million East Germans left for West Germany and West Berlin. Despite the subsequent strict militarized and weaponized guarding of the frontiers of East Germany and West Berlin, almost half a million East Germans managed to leave for West Germany and West Berlin prior to the fall of communism in 1989. During the moments of decreased tension between East and West, and especially during the period of détente in the 1970s, West Germany’s burgeoning economy convinced the Soviet bloc countries to negotiate with Bonn the future of their remaining German(ic) minorities. The quid pro quo was that as long as West Germany agreed to some loans or direct payments in hard currency, the Soviet bloc countries conceded to “their” Germans leaving for West Germany. In essence, it was Western hard currency ransom money paid for the release of co-ethnics from the closed Soviet bloc nation-states. In this manner, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans were permitted to leave Czechooslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia for West Germany. Ironically, many of these Germans officially were non-Germans in their communist polities of residence, as in the case of Kashubs, Mazurs, and Silesians in Poland, or that of Saxons and Swabians in Romania. Like with the departure of Jews, the forced emigration-cum-expulsion of ethnic Germans further deepened the ethnolinguistic homogeneity of the Soviet bloc’s nation-states.

Apart from this homogeneity, the ideological homogeneity of unqualified belief in Soviet communism also had to be instilled in the population at large. Detractors, dissidents and “uncertain elements” who stuck to then condemned old na-
Ethnic Cleansing in Central Europe During the Cold War, 1951–1989

Concentration camps in thous. 1951–53 7500
Expulsions in thous. 2500 1000 200 50

Religions
- Greek Catholicism
- Judaism
- Orthodox Christianity
- Roman Catholicism
- Protestantism
- Atheism

Writing systems
- Arabic
- Hebrew
- Cyrillic
- Latin
- Greek

Dialect continua
- Albanian
- Armenian
- Balto-Slavonic
- Finno-Ugric (Ugrian)
- Germanic
- Greek
- Indian, noticeable presence of Roma
- Italic

East Romance
West Romance
West Romance, i.e., Spanyol-speaking Jews
North Slavic
Substantial presence of North Slavic-speakers
South Slavic
Substantial presence of South Slavic-speakers
Turkic

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Ethnic Cleansing in Central Europe During the Cold War, 1951–1989

The communist period commenced with ethnic cleansing and genocide and finished with ethnic cleansing. Later, at the turn of the 1990s, the breakups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia generated more waves of refugees, expellees, and re-settlers. For instance, practically all remaining Jews left the late Soviet Union and the post-Soviet countries for the West and Israel. In 2017, 1.3 million Russophone Jews accounted for almost one-fifth of Israel’s Jewish population (Zadka 2006). Arguably, the most tragic situation was observed during the wars of Yugoslav succession marked by hundreds of thousands of casualties and millions of expellees. These wars actually introduced the term “ethnic cleansing” to the lexicon of international law and international relations. This term firmly replaced the former euphemism of “population transfers.” The latter term normalized expulsions as legal and supposedly conducive to human rights, while the former outlawed them as illegal crimes against humanity. The post-communist period in Central Europe did not commence only with democratization and the transition from a centrally planned to market economy. Its beginning is also steeped in the ethnic cleansings and genocides of the post-Yugoslav wars.

The employment of ethnolinguistic nationalism as the region’s sole legal and popularly espoused ideology of statehood construction, legitimation, and maintenance continues unabated, despite the fact that it has produced periodic bouts of ethnic cleansing and genocide since the early nineteenth century. Many thought that the project of European integration, as epitomized by the Council of Europe and the European Union, may finally change for the better the rules of the political game in Central Europe. The holy grail of ethnolinguistic homogeneity and national egoism might be replaced with the model of open society, which thrives on inclusion. But it appears that after 2015 this hope has been dashed, due to the rise of ethnolinguistic populist movements with strong authoritarian leanings, which gained power from Poland to Bulgaria and from Austria to Slovakia. As a result, “illegal immigrants,” “Islamists,” the “insufficiently patriotic,” and national minorities have become the brunt of these populist-cum-nationalist governments’ criticism and “preventive actions,” which in no time may morph into renewed acts of ethnic cleansing and even genocide. Worryingly, the number of instances of discrimination against, murders, and pogroms of Roma has increased sharply. The combative xenophobic rhetoric works because it generates votes so that illiberal and undemocratic parties may soon solidify their hold on Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nation-states.

Meanwhile in the Balkans, the well-established pattern of ethnic cleansing, carried out in an ethnoreligious manner, continued unabated. The last remaining Greeks (that is, Orthodox Christians) were expelled from Turkey in the mid-1950s, and Greece replied in kind with the expulsion of Turks (or Muslims) from Greece. Similarly, Turks (that is, Turkic-, Albanian, and Slavic-speaking Muslims) continued to be periodically expelled from Yugoslavia and especially from Bulgaria, as they had been since the nineteenth century. In 1974, the heavy-handed Greek attempt at unifying Cyprus with Greece (or annexing it, which was the Turkish interpretation of the events) evoked a swift Turkish counterattack, finally leading to the division of this island. A mutual ethnic cleansing swiftly followed. Greeks (Orthodox Christians) from the Turkish-dominated north left for the Greek south, while Turks (Muslims) from the south to northern Cyprus. In 1984, Turkey’s undeclared war against the country’s Kurds commenced, sending tens of thousands of Kurdish expellees to western Turkey. In the 1990s the number grew quickly to hundreds of thousands, even millions. However, the largest postwar act of ethnic cleansing in Europe during the Cold War was the 1989 expulsion of 370,000 Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria to Turkey. What is often forgotten is that this act of ethnic cleansing was the most important cause of the end of communism in the former country.

National values, religion, or private ownership were sent to concentration camps, which were founded in each Soviet bloc country, alongside Albania and Yugoslavia, in the close emulation of the Soviet and wartime German examples. After the 1950s, most of these camps were closed and replaced with a network of special prisons and “psychiatric hospitals” for dissidents. Unsurprisingly, anti-Soviet or seemingly anti-Soviet uprisings, summarily suppressed, sent hundreds of thousands to the West, namely, in the wake of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the 1968 Prague Spring, or the 1980–1981 anti-communist mass Solidarity movement in Poland. Many of those seen as detractors or dissidents, who nevertheless chose to remain in their countries, were subsequently imprisoned or suppressed. Finally, in 1986, the disaster in the Soviet nuclear power plant in the Ukrainian town of Chernobyl, close to Belarus, led to the forced evacuation of those in the vicinity. The exclusion zone, which straddles both Belarus and Ukraine, remains officially uninhabited to this day. The clearly ecological dimension of the tragedy rapidly delegitimized Soviet rule, which showed no respect for ordinary people. Subsequently, state-sanctioned ecological movements and organizations became the source of growing legal opposition to the communist party.

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After World War Two, most of Central Europe found itself within the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, although the terms of the secret German-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939 were declared null and void in relation to Germany, these terms were tacitly accepted in the context of the postwar Soviet Union. As a result, the Kremlin retained its 1939–1940 territorial gains west of the interwar Soviet western frontier, namely, the interwar nation-states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were made into Soviet Socialist Republics; eastern Poland incorporated into Soviet Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine; and Romania’s Bessarabia made into a Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, drawing on the tradition of the interwar Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Finland successfully withstood the Soviet attack in the course of the Winter War of 1939–1940. But after 1945 Helsinki had to pay a price for this success and wartime alliance with Germany. Independent “capitalist” Finland had to remain neutral, distance itself from NATO and the European Economic Communities, and time and again prove its unwavering loyalty to the Kremlin by subsidizing the faltering Soviet economy with exports of selected Finnish products at discount prices or through barter.

The Poles as a nation lost half of their country during the war, and in their eyes the destruction of interwar Poland was as much due to the attack by Germany as to the simultaneous Soviet attack. A Soviet bloc with restive Poland in its midst would be untenable because this country was this bloc’s largest unwilling member, and had enough troops that they were second only to the Soviet Union’s Red Army. The Kremlin bought postwar Poland’s grudging loyalty at the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945. The country was “recompensed” for the enforced loss of its eastern half to the Soviet Union with the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, known as the deutsche Ostgebiete in German literature. The new German-Polish border was to be fully reconfirmed in light of international law at a future peace conference, which never took place. Hence, the Red Army troops stationed across Poland and East Germany remained the sole guarantor of this new frontier until the Two Plus Four Agreement, or the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, signed by the wartime western Allies and the Soviet Union in 1990. This Treaty obliged reunified Germany to contract an appropriate border treaty with Poland, which was done in the same year. However, Germany ratified this border treaty only in 1992, and the already postcommunist Poland had requested the Soviet-turned-Russian army to remain in their military bases in the country until this moment. That is why, the Soviet/Russian troops were withdrawn from Poland only in 1993.

At Potsdam, from the deutsche Ostgebiete, Moscow gained the northern half of East Prussia with the region’s capital of Königsberg, renamed as Kaliningrad. The Memel Territory (Klaipeda Region) seized by Germany from Lithuania in 1939 was returned to Soviet Lithuania. The rest of northern East Prussia was made into an exclave of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Following the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, this exclave remains part of the Russian Federation, separated from the rest of the country by Lithuania and Belarus. Another Soviet territorial acquisition in Central Europe in the wake of the Second World War, not connected to the 1939 Secret Pact, was Czechoslovakia’s Subcarpathian Ruthenia. When Germany erased Czechoslovakia from the political map of Europe in March 1939, Hungary seized Subcarpathian Ruthenia. After the war, the reestablished Czechoslovakia signed a treaty with the Kremlin ceding the region to the Soviet Union, much to many Rusyns’ resentment. They saw it as a Czechoslovak treason, because Prague’s decisions nullified the Great War Allies’ effort to keep their homeland safe from any Soviet influence.

Apart from the previously enumerated political and territorial changes, the interwar political shape of Central Europe as composed of ethnolinguistically defined nation-states was largely recreated in the wake World War Two. Joseph Stalin’s drive at uniform socialist-style “internationalism” across the freshly established Soviet bloc was cut short by his death in 1953 and the official policy of de-stalinization as adopted by the Kremlin in 1956. This change of the political course in the postwar Soviet Union allowed for “different national paths to socialism” in the countries of the Soviet bloc (Zinner 1957). National communism, which had been the cause of the split between Stalin’s Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia in 1948, became the new norm across the Soviet bloc. But Yugoslavia, as a Soviet-style multiethnic (multinational) socialist (communist) federation remained firmly outside the Soviet bloc, cultivated good political and economic relations with Western (“capitalist”) Europe, and reinvented itself as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movements following the worldwide decolonization of the 1950s and 1960s. There was a plan to make communist Albania into another republic of postwar Yugoslavia, which was annulled by the Tito-Stalin rift. Stalinist Albania remained a loyal member of the Soviet bloc until 1956. Afterward Tirana saw de-Stalinization as a betrayal of com-
munism and began distancing Albania from the Soviet Union. When the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia, Albania formally withdrew from this military organization and officially left the Soviet bloc. Subsequently, Tirana contracted an alliance with China, which at that time was still loyal to the ideals of Stalinism. But Beijing’s gradual adoption of good working relations with the capitalist United States after 1971, and the de facto adoption of capitalism in economy after 1978 led to the Sino-Albanian split in the latter year. As a result, Albania and Yugoslavia were two communist states of differing communist ideologies that found themselves outside the Soviet bloc in Central Europe.

In 1945, the defeated wartime Greater German Empire (unofficially known as the Third Reich), shorn of its territories east of the Oder Neisse line and of its Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, now reincorporated into postwar Czechoslovakia, was split into eight occupation zones, construed as the four occupation zones of interwar Germany and the four occupation zones of interwar Austria. The project of creating a single unitary ethnolinguistic nation-state for all Germans (defined as German-speakers) did not work. In 1949 the Western Allies’ three occupation zones of Germany were made into a Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), while the Soviet occupation zone into a German Democratic Republic (East Germany). West Germany wrote a reunification of Germany into its Basic Law (constitution) and became an officially recognized successor of interwar and wartime Germany. East Germany made an effort to distance this new socialist country from the crimes of national socialism and the Third Reich, and to overhaul its population into a brand new non-ethnolinguistic German-speaking socialist nation of East Germany, meaning no separate East German national language was ever proclaimed. This nation-building project finally faltered due to the dual collapse of communism and of the Soviet bloc in 1989. However, this failed project of building an East German nation should be remembered and discussed in the context of the successful construction of a similarly non-ethnolinguistic German-speaking Austrian nation. After World War One, the Allies’ imposition of an unwanted Austrian national identity on Austria’s German-speakers who had desired to become part of a larger German nation had not worked, either. The 1938 Anschluss (union), or Germany’s de facto annexation of Austria, had been warmly welcomed by the vast majority of putative Austrians, who thus had declared themselves to be “true Germans.” After the war, the Allied occupation of Austria lasted six years longer than in Germany, that is, until 1955. Hence, it made sense for Austria’s population—so deeply and intimately implicated in the German genocide of Jews and Roma—to distance themselves from wartime Germany. Serendipitously, in their 1943 Moscow Declaration, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States dubbed Austria as “the first . . . victim to Hitlerite aggression” (Tripartite 1943). This time the price of becoming a genuine nation of Austrians was not seen as too high to foot. No Einzelsprache of Austrian was proclaimed, and like in the case of Finland, neutrality and pro-Soviet economy were the Kremlin’s conditions for the 1955 reunification of Austria as a capitalist polity, which would remain outside of the Soviet bloc. Nowadays, more than four-fifths of Austria’s inhabitants see themselves as members of the Austrian nation.

The wartime and postwar expulsions (ethnic cleansing), alongside the genocide of Jews and Roma (see Maps 26–30) amounted to a vast demographic engineering that left Central Europe’s postwar nation-states as ethnolinguistically homogenous as they had never been before. The prime example of this process is Poland, where during the interwar period ethnic non-Poles (that is, non-Slavic-speakers and non-Catholics) amounted to one-third of the population. After 1936, this group plummeted to about 1 percent. The feat is even more astounding, given the fact that a decade earlier, in the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line transferred to Poland, about 4.5 million original inhabitants (that is, Germans) still lived there in mid-1945. After World War One such radical “purification” was not possible due to pragmatic and moral considerations for the fate of the populations concerned. During the Second World War such qualms were numbed and finally nullified by the inhumane genocidal policies as practiced by the national socialist Greater Germany and its satellites (Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, and Romania). Earlier, the Soviet Union had trialed and deployed on a mass scale similar genocidal policies against its own population in the 1930s and during the war. Humans became mere statistics at the desk of decision-makers-turned demographic engineers.

In 1938, the number of Central Europe’s fully isomorphic nation-states peaked at 11. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, and Yugoslavia were joined by Poland, because of the decommisioning the Polish language as co-official in Soviet Belarus. A year later, Germany dismantled Czechoslovakia, which nevertheless was replaced with a brand-new fully isomorphic nation-state of Slovakia. In the first two years and a half of the Second World War (1939–1941), when Germany and the Soviet Union were allies, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Yugoslavia were erased from the political map of Europe, Italy annexed Albania, while Berlin and Rome agreed to the creation of Croatia as an isomorphic nation-state. In addition, Germany occupied Norway, but the country was permitted to exist under a pro-German government. Accordingly, the number of fully isomorphic nation-states plummeted to six, namely, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Norway, Romania, and Slovakia. Following Italy’s 1943 decision to switch sides in the war, Germany recognized wartime Albania as a nation-state in its own right, so the number of fully isomorphic nation-states grew to seven.

In 1945, immediately after the end of World War Two, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were re-established, entailing the liquidation of the wartime nation-states of Slovakia and Croatia, respectively. But neither Czechoslovakia nor Yugoslavia rejoined the club of isomorphic states. The latter was made into an ethnic federation, its interwar official and national language of Serbo-Ioatoslavonian replaced with Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and the brand-new Einzelsprache of Macedonian proclaimed in 1944. During the war Bulgaria had annexed southernmost Yugoslavia (or today’s Macedonia) and replaced
Serbocroatoslovenian with Bulgarian as the territory's official and national language. The latter was much closer to the region's Slavic vernacular than the former, hence Belgrade had no choice but to recognize this sociolinguistic fact on the ground. There was no return to the official use of Serbo-Croatian as the leading variety of Serbocroatoslovenian. However, Macedonia's Slavic vernacular was standardized with the use of the Serbo-Croatian (Serbian) Cyrillic into a Macedonian language, thus making it different vis-à-vis Bulgarian with its own specific form of Cyrillic. Although postwar Czechoslovakia was re-launched as a unitary polity, its interwar unitary language of Czechoslovak was replaced with Czech and Slovak, the former initially employed across the entire state, while the use of the latter limited to Slovakia. Officially, the country was designed for the Czechoslovak people (not nation), constitutionally construed as consisting of the two “fraternal nations” of Czechs and Slovaks. Subsequently, in 1969 Czechoslovakia was made into a Soviet-style ethnic federation, consisting of a mere two units, namely, the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics. At the same time, the status of Slovak was equalized with that of Czech, and both Einzelsprachen were in equitable employment across the entire territory of Czechoslovakia until the breakup of the country in 1993.

Thus, immediately after World War Two there were six isomorphic nation-states, namely, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Norway, Romania, and Poland. But in 1974 Yugoslavia adopted a genuinely federal constitution, which translated the previously mostly declarative prerogatives of ethnolinguistic federalism into real-life sociopolitical practices. Among others, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (both located within the Socialist Republic of Serbia) were recognized as federal units of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, hence, in its ethnolinguistic rights equal to the country's socialist republics, including Serbia. In Vojvodina, apart from Serbo-Croatian, also Hungarian, Romanian, Rusyn, and Slovak were allowed to be employed in official capacity, and in the case of Kosovo, Albanian. Significantly, all these languages could be and were employed in the deliberations of Yugoslavia's Federal Assembly (Savezna skupština).

Interestingly, after the Stalin-Tito rift in 1948, Yugoslavia invested in creating a Kosovan Albanian language based on the Gheg (northern) dialect, while in communist Albania party language engineers dismantled the interwar compromise Tosk-Gheg standard of Albanian in favor of a communist Albanian language steeped in the Tosk (southern) dialect. The Kosovan (Albanian) Einzelsprache appeared destined to become another Albanian language on a par with Greece's Arvanitaka written in Greek letters. However, after Tirana's final split with the Soviet Union in 1968, fraternal China refused to extend security guarantees to Albanian and pressed the country to re-establish limited cooperation with Yugoslavia. As part of this process, during the 1968 consultations held in Prishtina, the capital of Yugoslavia's Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, Albanian and Yugoslav party officials and linguists agreed to the formula that the Albanian-speakers of Albania and Yugoslavia are members of “a single nation with one national literary language” (Kamusella 2016). It was the beginning of the end of the Kosovan (Albanian) Einzelsprache. Four years later, in 1972, Kosovan Albanian linguists participated in the Albanian Orthography Congress held at Tirana which wrapped up the standardization and officialization of the Tosk-based Albanian language. Two years later, this standard was adopted as official in Yugoslavia's Kosovo and finally replaced Kosovan.

The 1974 elevation of Albanian, Hungarian, and Romanian to the level of co-official languages in federal Yugoslavia simultaneously nullified the full isomorphic status of Albania, Hungary, and Romania. As a result, only three fully isomorphic nation-states existed in Central Europe in the late communist period, namely, Bulgaria, Norway, and Poland. Numerically speaking, the situation was similar to that in 1910. The profound difference, however, was that in 1910 ethnolinguistic nationalism was an ideology of statehood construction, legitimation, and maintenance in Central Europe. On the other hand, in the 1970s and 1980s, ethnolinguistic nationalism—despite the non-national Soviet Union's lukewarm protestations to the contrary—was the sole fully accepted ideology of statehood construction, legitimation, and maintenance across the region. The aforementioned fully isomorphic nation-states, alongside the national politics aspiring to fulfill this normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state (that is, Albania, Cyprus, East Germany, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Northern Cyprus, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, and West Germany) accounted for the majority of Central Europe's inhabitants. The unquestionable popularity of ethnolinguistic nationalism was so strong that postwar Yugoslavia as a non-national polity was built with the use of national communism, and in 1956 the Kremlin had no choice but to accept this ideology in the Soviet Bloc's countries, while in 1969 non-national Czechoslovakia was federalized in accordance with the tenets of national communism. The obvious trend was for ethnolinguistic nationalism and against any other ideologies in the function of nation-building and state-building. This became obvious with the fall of communism, followed by the break-ups of the non-national polities of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia almost invariably into ethnolinguistic successor nation-states.
Европа Централă въ ануł 1980 (Europa centrală în anul 1980)
Moldavian and Central Europe: Европа Чентра̀лэ ън анул 1980 (Еу̀ропа центрàлà în анул 1980)

The rise of Moldovan language and identity is connected to the tumultuous history of the Danubian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia, especially the latter. Both principalities were located at the fault line between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe, namely, the Habsburg lands, Poland-Lithuania, and Muscovy (Russian Empire). Between the late fifteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century, these two principalities were de facto or de jure Ottoman fiefs. In the case of Moldova, the Ottoman fief of the Crimean Khanate also played a role. At the turn of the fifteenth century, Moldavia’s Black Sea littoral was lost to the Ottomans, who directly incorporated it into their realm following the policy of turning the Black Sea into an internal sea of the Empire. In Osmanlica the annexed littoral became known as Bucak (also spelled as Budjak or Budzhak on the basis of Russian spelling), or “borderland.” Walachia had lost its Black Sea littoral, together with the Danube delta, to the Ottomans even earlier, in the 1420s. This region, known as Dobruja, together with Bucak, was transformed into Silistre (Silistra) Eyalat (province) in 1593.

In the course of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806–1812 (fought when Russia was in alliance with Napoleon’s French Empire), St Petersburg annexed Bucak and the eastern third of Moldova located east of the River Prut. These two territories were shaped into a Russian Governorate of Bessarabia. To the Russian administrators, the local Romance language was known as “Moldavian,” due to the Russian spelling of the name of Moldova, namely, Молда̀вия Moldaviia. However, in Central and Western Europe most people associated this language of Walachia, where it used to be dubbed Walachian. Walachia, on the other hand, in Walachian/Moldavian was known to Walachian/Moldavian-speakers as Țara Românească (Land of the Romanians), hence in Romanian the language is known as Română, which yielded the contemporary English name for the Romanian language. The Slavophone version of Orthodox Christianity and the Cyrillic-based language of (Church) Slavonic historically united the Walachians and Moldovans in the sphere of culture. Between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries, Orthodox liturgical books were translated into Walachian/Moldavian (Romanian), indicating the rise of this language as a full-fledged Einzelsprache of liturgy and state administration. Obviously, due to the continuing high prestige of Slavonic, Walachian/Moldavian was written and printed in Church (Old) Cyrillic, so that the Romanian-language name of Walachia was actually spelled as Църна Рымънскъ, while that of Moldova as Молдова.

In 1818, Moldavian became the official language in Russia’s Bessarabia, while in the Ottoman Principality of Moldavia it finally replaced Church Slavonic in this function only in 1851. In both territories this language was officially known as Moldavian. In Bessarabia, at the level of script, Moldavian and Russian were kept apart, the former written and printed in Church Cyrillic, while the latter in Peter the Great’s early eighteenth-century Grazhdanka (“civil, secular script,” as opposed to Church Cyrillic). During the 1830s and 1840s Russian gradually replaced Moldavian in official use. In 1866 the subject of the Moldovan language was removed from the secondary school in the governorate’s regional capital of Chișinău (Chisinau). It was quite a symbolic decision, given that in the same year the United Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia were made into the unitary nation-state of Romania. The Russian authorities strove to isolate Bessarabia’s Moldavian-speakers from the growing influence of Romanian nationalism.

The use of the Latin alphabet for writing Romanian had commenced during the eighteenth century in the Habsburgs’ Transylvania. This tendency began spreading across the border to the Ottoman Principality of Walachia at the turn of the 1830s. In addition, it filtered through the use of Greek as both Principalities’ language of prestige and the main medium of central administration from the 1710s to 1821. Both the modern type of the Greek script and Russian Grazhdanka (modern Cyrillic) emulate the Antiqua type of the Latin alphabet, which caused a gradual shift from Church to Grazhdanka-style Cyrillic for writing and printing, first in Walachian, and later in Moldavian. Obviously, the Orthodox Church stuck to Church Cyrillic and to the prominent use of Church Slavonic. Early Romanian modernizers (or rather, Westernizers) and nationalists, typically after a formative period of education or employment in Habsburg Transylvania, wanted to distance Romanian-language culture from the Orthodox Church in emulation of Western and Central Europe’s post-Westphalian political standard of the separation of church and state. To this end, they developed a Romanian Civil Script (alfabet civil), in which secular books and the press were produced. Meanwhile, for the time being, Church Slavonic was earmarked for ecclesiastical use. In practice, this Civil Script was quite an arbitrary mixture of Grazhdanka-style Cyrillic letters and Antiqua-type Latin letters, hence present-day historians and linguists tend to dub it the “Transition Alphabet” (alfabetul de tranziție).
(Ivănescu 2000: 686-687). Writers and publishers used it in an idiosyncratic manner.

The alluded transition in the name of the Transition Alphabet, from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet, was a prolonged process. This scriptal transition came to a conclusion at the time when, under continuing Russian pressure, the Ottoman Sultan had no choice but to accept the increasing autonomy of both Danubian principalities, resulting in their union in 1859. Three years later, in 1862, the shift from the Transition Alphabet to a full Romanian Latin script was officially promulgated. However, the Orthodox Church in Romania continued using Cyrillic (gradually more Grazhdanka than Church Cyrillic) for writing and printing in Romanian until 1881. But the symbolic value of Cyrillic was of such high importance for Orthodox Christianity that a modified version of the Latin script was developed, whose appearance closely emulates Cyrillic. This Cyrillicized Latin alphabet is used to this day for wall inscriptions in Orthodox churches and in the titles of religious and theological books. In Habsburg Transylvania the switch from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet (but without the use of a transitional alphabet) was spearheaded by the crownland’s leading Walachian-language newspaper, Gazeta de Transilvania, founded in 1838. Beginning in 1852, its front page was published exclusively in Latin characters, while the rest of the content was mostly in Cyrillic. Under the influence of the official change in script in the United Provinces, this newspaper dropped Cyrillic in 1862, marking the decisive shift from the script to the Latin alphabet for writing and publishing in Walachian across Transylvania.

These changes did not impact the use of Cyrillic in Russia’s Bessarabia. First of all, Moldavian ceased to be employed in official use, decisively replaced with Russian. Second, Russian was obviously written in the “Russian (imperial)” script of Cyrillic, which did not allow for any downgrading of its status. Latin letters were reserved for a handful of scholarly books printed in French or German. The 1905 Revolution brought about political liberalization, including lifted restrictions on the use of scripts and languages in publishing across the Russian Empire. In Bessarabia, it was permitted to use Moldavian (Romanian) in print beginning in 1906. However, most Moldavian-language newspapers and books were published in Cyrillic. The two Moldavian newspapers printed in Latin letters were pressed by the Russian authorities to close in 1907 and 1908, respectively. Hence, the exclusive use of Cyrillic for writing and publishing in Moldavian was de facto enforced, while the use of the alternative name of this language, Romanian, was discouraged. Yet the period of almost 70 years when Moldavian was not in any official use in Bessarabia produced a significant shift, namely, from Church Cyrillic to Grazhdanka. In Bessarabia, all post-1905 Moldavian-language publications were in the latter type of Cyrillic, typically known as “Russian letters.”

In 1918, in the wake of the February revolution in Russia, an independent Moldavian Democratic Republic was proclaimed in Bessarabia. Two months later, in April 1918, the Republic’s parliament voted for a union with Romania, which was recognized in light of international law by the Treaty of Paris in 1920. Meanwhile, in 1919 it was officially forbidden to use Cyrillic for publishing in Romanian, and the alternative name, Moldavian, for this language was discouraged. The union of Bessarabia-turned-Moldavia with Romania also entailed the enforcement of the single (Walachian, Bucharest) standard of the Romanian language across the entire territory of the rapidly enlarged state, including former Bessarabia. In addition, the meaning of the name of Moldavia once again was extended to refer both to post-1812 Moldavia and Bessarabia together. The 1812 partition of historic Moldavia was undone. In popular speech, interwar Romania was often dubbed România Mare, or Greater Romania.

However, in 1924 the Cyrillic-based Moldavian was back to official use in the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, proclaimed on the Soviet frontier with Romania, that is, on the eastern bank of the Dniester. The territory of the interwar Moldavian ASSR had belonged to the prewar governorates of Podolia and Kherson, which had bordered on Bessarabia within the Russian Empire. The Moldavian ASSR was an ethnonationalist political autonomy within Soviet Ukraine. In the framework of interwar Soviet policy of korenizatsiia (nativization), a monumental language engineering effort was undertaken in order to endow almost a hundred previously oral speech varieties with respective written forms, making them into full-fledged Einzelsprachen. In addition, in the Soviet Union’s European borderlands, languages were actively constructed away from the same or similar languages across the frontier. The main idea was to isolate Soviet citizens from unwanted influences from abroad. In the case of Soviet Moldavian, first, traditional Cyrillic was replaced with a new “revolutionary” version of this alphabet. Subsequently, this language was infused with Sovietisms and dialectal Slavicisms, largely absent in (that is, already removed from) standard Romanian. Furthermore, the Dniester area’s Romance dialects were made into a new dialectal base of Moldavian. Part and parcel of korenizatsiia was a push for modernization in the sphere of language politics, stereotypically associated with the Latin script. The official policy of Latinization meant the replacement of Cyrillic, Arabic, and other writing systems of most of the Soviet Union’s languages with the Latin alphabet. As a result, in 1932 Cyrillic was replaced with Latin letters for writing and publishing in Moldavian, making it largely indistinguishable from the “capitalist language” of Romanian. But in another ideological lurch, beginning in the mid-1930s Latinization was replaced with Cyrillicization (sometimes referred to in English as Cyrillicization) so that to ensure a graphic (scriptal) unity (or monoscriptalism) for the Soviet languages. A new type of more Russian-like Cyrillic was reintroduced for Moldavian in 1938. Apart from Moldavian, Russian and Ukrainian were also in official use in the Moldavian ASSR. Moldavian-speakers amounted to one-quarter of the Autonomous Republic’s population, while Russian- and Ukrainian-speakers comprised 10 and 30 percent, respectively. Not surprisingly, all the Moldavian-speakers were bilingual, and this sociolinguistic context translated into the heavy Slavicization of the Moldavian language.

In line with the division of Central Europe, as outlined in the secret Soviet-German Pact of 1939, in 1940 the Soviet
Union seized Bessarabia from Romania. The Moldavian ASSR was dissolved and replaced with a Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was composed from two-thirds of the Moldavian ASSR’s territory that closely hugged the eastern bank of the Dniester and from Bessarabia, but without the latter region’s Black Sea littoral, which was incorporated into Soviet Ukraine. Overnight, the Latin script-based Romanian was replaced with the Cyrillic-based Moldavian. In 1941, Romania retook Bessarabia alongside wartime Transnistria (or the extensive region between the Dniester and the Southern Bug). Moldavian entirely disappeared from official use, fully replaced with Romanian, and the auxiliary employment of Ukrainian and Russian when needed. Three years later, in 1944, the Red Army overran these areas. The Moldavian SSR was reestablished and the international and administrative borders reinstated where they had been in 1940. As a result, Moldavian replaced Romanian as the Moldavian SSR’s national and leading official language, side by side with Russian.

After the war, it soon turned out that the Moldavian standard steeped in the Dniester dialects was hard to understand for many Romance-speakers in the Moldavian SSR who had lived and received their education in interwar Romania. As a result, in 1951, it was decided to make the dialects of central Moldova (that is, of the republican capital of Кишинэу (Kishinėu, or Chișinău in Romanian, and its vicinity) into a new dialectal basis of Moldavian. In this way, Moldavian became much closer to Romanian, the sole substantial difference being the two different scripts employed for writing and publishing in these languages. What is more, after 1945 Romania found itself in the Soviet bloc, postwar Romanian was infused with a lot of Sovietisms and Slavicisms, which in turn made it more similar to Moldavian. Unlike in the case of Serbo-Croatian, no letter-to-letter correspondence was established between the Moldavian Cyrillic and the Romanian Latin alphabet. Requests to this end were rejected, though in 1967 a new unique Cyrillic letter [Ϫ] was introduced, corresponding to the pronunciation /ʒ/ of the Romanian [g] before [a], [e] and [i]. In a way, [Ϫ] crowned the standardization process of Moldavian and became its handy logo-like symbol.

In 1989, the Cyrillic-based Moldavian was replaced with Romanian in Latin letters as the official and national language of the Moldavian SSR. A hope was for a reunification with Romania. Cyrillic and the Moldavian language were seen as symbolic of the unwanted imposition of Soviet communism and the 1940 Soviet annexation of Bessarabia. But this espousal of the Romanian language and national project alienated one-third of the republic’s population, who were mainly Slavophone and identified as Ukrainians, Russians, or Soviets. In 1991 the Soviet Union broke up, Moldavia gained independence, and requested that the Romanian (Moldavian) version of this country’s name, Moldova, should be used in other languages. The following year, in 1992, a civil war broke out, and with the help of the remaining Russian army the part of the country located on the eastern bank of the Dniester was made into a de facto polity of Transnistria (in its own official name known as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic). This area had never belonged to historical Bessarabia but had been part of the interwar Moldavian ASSR.

In reaction to this civil war that endangered the economy, stability, and the very existence of Moldova as a state, the idea of a union with Romania was dismissed (if not altogether abandoned), and in 1994 a new constitution declared Moldovan as the country’s official and national language (Article 13). However, the Latin script was retained for this post-1994 Moldovan, meaning that the language is indistinguishable from Romanian in anything but name. Two years later, in 1996, the internationally unrecognized Transnistria adopted its own constitution, which declared Moldavian, Russian, and Ukrainian as its official languages (Article 12). Apart from sticking to the Russian-style official name of this first language in international use, in Transnistria Moldovan officially continues to be written in Cyrillic. However, in practice few Moldovan-language publications are produced, and Russian dominates as the leading language of the mass media, publishing, and public life. Romance-speakers amount only to one-third of the population, and their cultural and educational needs are met by books and newspapers from Moldova and Romania, obviously published in the Latin script-based Moldovan/Romanian. The world’s sole remaining Moldavian-language newspaper published in Cyrillic is Адвĕрдĕр нистриан (The Dniester Truth, Adevărul nistrian) (The Dniester Truth, Adevărul nistrean, in Moldovan/Romanian). This governmental twice-weekly was established in 1994 as an offshoot of Tiraspol’s Russian daily Днестровская правда Dnestrovskaja Pravda (The Dniester Truth), founded in 1941. Neither newspaper has a website, hence their reach in cyberspace is nil.

But cyberspace is a new field where the ideological conflict between the proponents of the Latin alphabet-based Moldovan/Romanian and the Cyrillic-based Moldovan/ Moldavian continues to be battled out. A Wikipedia in the Cyrillic-based Moldovan/Moldavian was founded in 2005. However, already since 2006 its opponents, who see the use of “Eastern” in its character Cyrillic as ideologically unacceptable for the “Western” Romanian/Moldovan language, repeatedly petitioned for the closure and deletion of this Wikipedia. After a full decade, in 2016, they succeeded in getting the Moldovan/Moldavian Wikipedia closed down, and a year later, in 2017, it was deleted (Proposals for Closing 2016). Nowadays it is available as a reduced functionality resource on mirror sites, with its search function linked to the Romanian Wikipedia (Викимолдия Vikimoldiia 2018). Meanwhile, in the 2004 census, 16 percent of Moldovans declared Romanian as their native language, and in 2011 the constitutional court announced that the Declaration of Independence takes precedence over the Constitution, hence Moldovan should be officially known as Romanian (Roudik 2013). In order not to let the language question become a cause of a renewed conflict that could turn violent, the authorities mostly uphold the constitutional status quo.

The situation can be analyzed from the perspective of the politics of script. Despite their different names, Romanian and Moldovan are written in Latin letters and thus are monoscriptal. This is also true of the Turkic language of Gagauz, which is official in Moldova’s Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia. Its script was changed from Cyrillic to the Latin al-
alphabet in 1996. As such, Romania and Moldova are part of the larger European space of monoscriptalism in the Latin alphabet, which extends from Lisbon to the unrecognized Moldovan-Transnistrian frontier, and from Scandinavia to the Romanian-Bulgarian border. On the other hand, Transnistria belongs to the Cyrillic monoscriptal space that extends from the Transnistrian-Moldovan boundary to Vladivostok.

Whatever a final, if any, decision might be in the discussion on the name of the Moldovan language, the febrile ideological strife already heavily impacted on the preservation of the Soviet printed material published in the Cyrillic-based Moldavian. It appears that amidst the political furor, most books and periodicals in this language deemed as “ideologically undesirable” were ditched by readers, institutions, and public libraries across Moldova and Transnistria. Bookinist stalls and bookstores with second-hand publications do not stock such titles, except for a few classics since some older readers prefer to read Moldovan/Romanian-language fiction in Cyrillic. Geographical and historical school atlases in the Cyrillic-based Moldavian, once ubiquitous, are unobtainable. The National Library of the Republic of Moldova has some such geographical atlases in its holdings, but none of the historical ones. The former can be found with the use of the traditional card catalog. This library’s new online catalog is exclusively in the Latin alphabet-based Moldovan/Romanian with all the Cyrillic-based Moldavian titles transliterated into the former. The only remaining clue that a title may be in Cyrillic is the place and year of publication. The Russian State Library’s online catalog does not yield any hits when search is done with the employment of the Moldavian Cyrillic, while searches with the use of the place and year of publication do not generate any hits either. This means that this second largest library in the world either does not preserve any Soviet-time publications in the Cyrillic-based Moldavian, or information on them is available only through the onsite card catalog.

Given the ideologically motivated and highly successful suppression of the Cyrillic-based Moldavian publications and of information on them, Map 32 offers a glimpse of how Central Europe looked through the lens of this Soviet Einzelsprache in 1980. The inclusion of this map in the atlas does not serve any ideological claims, be it in favor or against the Cyrillic-based Moldavian language. The sole purpose is to preserve a memory of the use of this Einzelsprache in Soviet Moldavia’s publishing, administration, and culture, without which future researchers of the Moldavian SSR may not be even able to locate indispensable published material.

Obviously, from the perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism, which equates language with nation, two different nation-states with the same shared national language appear to be an “abnormality,” hence so much heated discussion on the name of the Moldovan language in Moldova and Romania. However, peace and stability in postwar Central Europe, among others, was ensured by the decision of Austria’s inhabitants that rather than belonging to the German nation, they should constitute a non-ethnolinguistic nation of Austrians in their own right. As a result, Austria and Germany are two separate nation-states with respective Austrian and German nations, though both share the same national and official language of German. Human imagination can easily overcome such discrepancies, and the model of statehood can be redefined with a bit of good will, if people’s interests are put first, before politicians’ unprincipled deal-making in search of votes.
The shape of dialectal continua in Central Europe as it currently exists was established mainly during and in the immediate aftermath of World War Two. However, the earlier Balkan Wars and Great War also strongly contributed to it. Ethnic cleansing (expulsions, deportations, forced evacuations, forced emigration, or forced assimilation) and genocide (“massacres”) occurred in the course of “normal politics” in the region during the first half of the twentieth century, as widely accepted by Central Europe’s leaders and populations (see Maps 19, 26–29). Some elements of the politics of demographic engineering were a continuation of processes pursued during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (see Map 11). This happened in the wake of the Habsburg Reconquista of the Danubian basin, during the southward colonial-like expansion of the Russian Empire around the Black Sea and toward the Mediterranean, and due to the creation of ethnolinguistic and ethnolinguistic nation-states in the Balkans. These three processes invariably occurred at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Likewise, ethnic cleansing did not cease in Cold War Europe either (see Map 30). For most of the citizens of the Soviet bloc countries, it was impossible to cross the heavily militarized and closely guarded Iron Curtain that separated the two opposed political and military postwar blocs. However, it did not prevent the periodic, agreed upon or unilateral “population transfers.” This euphemistic term announced that under the provisions of international law such inhuman decisions were legal, and many commentators actually saw “population transfer” as an instrument for furthering political stability and the observance of human rights. After the end of communism, alongside the breakups of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union, it took the horrors of the wars of Yugoslav succession to convince the international community and the United Nations, in the mid-1990s, that population transfer is a crime against humanity, whose proper name is that of “ethnic cleansing.” Unfortunately, history is no teacher. A recent analysis of opportunity to put postulated ethnolinguistic nation-states and communist polities on the map of (Central) Europe (see Map 18). The Allies at the Peace Conference in Paris decided to overhaul the Central Europe of empires into a Central Europe of ethnolinguistic nation-states without consulting the populations concerned, and without considering the implementation of a similar program of building ethnolinguistically defined nations and new nation-states “back home,” that is, in Western Europe and North America. Britain experienced this to a small degree in the case of the ethnoreligious-cum-ethnolinguistic division of Ireland in the wake of the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921). Another installment of this ethnic civil war was played out in Britain’s Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998. But had the ethnolinguistic “solution” been fully applied to Britain after the First World War, this would have resulted not in just a single ethnic war, but at least in three, in addition to the (Northern) Irish conflict fought against the Welsh (Welsh-speakers) and the Scots (Gaelic- and Scots-speakers), each followed by an “appropriate” population transfer or exchange.

Yet, after World War Two, the Allies applied to Central Europe the same “solution” of further “unmixing” of ethnolinguistically defined populaces through population transfers. And again, no Western power proposed to apply this policy back home. However, in the case of the Soviet Union it had been a typical modus operandi (known as “population engineering” in the Soviet bureaucracy) and was applied across this vast Eurasian communist state since its inception following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Unlike Central Europe’s nationalists in the quest for ethnolinguistic homogeneity and monolingualism in a given nation-state, the Soviet authorities “disentangled populations” in search of a utopia of classless communist society, the former nations and ethnic groups finally merged into a single communist people. It took the atrocities of the post-Yugoslav wars to stop the Western pow-
European Dialect Continua, c. 2009

- **Albanian**: Residual presence of Albanian, substantial presence of Albanian-speakers
- **Armenian**: Residual presence of Armenian, substantial presence of Armenian-speakers
- **Germanic**: Residual presence of Germanic-, or noticeable presence of Germanic-speakers
- **Indo-Iranian**: Substantial presence of Indo-Iranian, substantial presence of Kurds
- **Kurdish**: Substantial presence of Kurdish-speakers
- **South Slavic**: Substantial presence of South Slavic-speakers
- **West Romance**: Substantial presence of West Romance, i.e., Spanish-speaking Jews
- **East Romance**: Substantial presence of East Romance
- **Turkish**: Substantial presence of Turkish-speakers

Names of autonomous regions, members of federations and unrecognized polities:

- **Vojvodina**: Borders of autonomous, strongly self-governmental and Italian regions
ers in their tracks, leading to a fundamental reassessment in this regard. By the turn of the twenty-first century, a consensus emerged that it was wrong and unacceptable to force people to leave their homes for a political project. A new norm of the human right to homeland began to coalesce. It was most fully enforced by the international community when, in the wake of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign of rump Yugoslavia (that is, Serbia and Montenegro), Kosovo’s Albanians expelled by the Yugoslav (Serbian) army in 1998–1999 were able to return home en masse in the summer of 1999.

It appeared that this prohibition on ethnic cleansing (population transfers, expulsions), as increasingly enshrined in international law importantly added to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act’s ban on any unilateral changes in international borders in Europe. However, the West’s tacit acceptance of Russia’s grab at parts of Ukraine’s territory in 2014 indicates that we now live in a post-Helsinki world and that the inviolability of frontiers ceased to be a norm universally observed in Europe. Unlike in the case of Albanians expelled from Kosovo, the United Nations limited their reaction to condemning Burma’s 2017–2018 ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas. The lack of intervention in this case means that this right to homeland has not become a fully accepted human right yet and that a repeat of such expulsions is possible in Europe, too, especially when a border has been altered as a result of a military conflict.

In 1910, speakers of different languages and multilingual populations often shared the same countries, regions, cities, towns, and villages (though frequently living in separate ethnic or religious zones) for centuries and even millennia (see Map 12). The ideas of ethnolinguistically homogenous nation-states and the tight spatial overlap between state frontiers and language borders, as promoted by ethnolinguistic nationalists, were still deemed to be peculiar and impractical until the Great War. Yet, during the subsequent short and dark twentieth century, with the great powers’ support, Central European nationalists implemented their massive program of nation-state building in accordance with the aforementioned concepts (or the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state; see Maps 14, 20, 31, 36). Map 33 shows the end product of this effort, which cost the lives of tens of millions and saw more than 60 million people expelled from their homes. The resultant near perfect overlap of state frontiers with language borders within the region’s dialect continua additionally translates into a similarly tight overlap of state frontiers with the borders between dialect continua. Some interlacing between the Finno-Ugric and Baltic dialect continua, on the one hand, and the North Slavic continuum, on the other, in the case of the Baltic nation-states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, first developed within the Russian Empire. Subsequently this process was “accelerated” in line with the Soviet policy of “ethnic mixing” to facilitate the merger of all the Soviet “nationalities” into a single classless communist Soviet people. The interweaving between the East Romance and North Slavic dialect continua in the case of post-Soviet Moldova is a result of the same policy. On the other hand, the presence of Hungarians in today’s southern Slovakia is a legacy of the Slovak-Hungarian population exchange between Czechoslovakia and Hungary (1945–1948), which was abandoned halfway and partly reversed. The prominent Finno-Ugric splash in the middle of Romania’s East Romance dialect continuum goes back to the Kremlin’s distrust of postwar Romania, which in the very last stage of World War Two switched sides from the Axis powers to the victorious Allies. Unlike in the other Soviet bloc countries, Moscow forbade any expulsion of Transylvania’s Hungarians and ordered that their homeland be made into a Soviet-style Magyar (that is, Hungarian) Autonomous Region. It was a punishment meted out to Romania’s ethnolinguistic nationalists, whose quest for ethnolinguistic homogeneity was frustrated until 1968, when this autonomous region was dissolved. However, subsequently, no expulsion of the area’s Hungarians was permitted, either. In Crimea the presence of the Turkic dialect continuum is marked on the map. Following the 1944 wholesale ethnic cleansing of the peninsula’s Crimean Tatars to Soviet Uzbekistan, no Turkic-speaking communities actually remained there. Crimean Tatars were not actively prevented from returning to their homeland only during the late communist period, under Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika in the late 1980s. This return to their homeland accelerated in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ironically, many Crimean Tatars were compelled to leave again after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Despite the splitting of Austria-Hungary’s crownland of Tyrol between Italy and Austria in the aftermath of the Great War (which led to much tension that was not settled until the introduction of autonomy for Italy’s South Tyrol in 1992), no population transfer or exchange was executed. Hence, across the Alps, the Germanic- and West Romance-speakers brush sides in the same villages, towns and cities. There is no sharp division between these two dialect continua that would overlap with the state frontiers. Furthermore, the area’s Romance vernacular interlaced with Germanic linguistic loans is recognized in Switzerland and Italy as a language in its own right, known among linguists as Rhaetian (or Rhaeto-Romance). Actually, it is construed as three different but closely related Einzelsprachen of Romansh, Ladin, and Friulian. In 1938, Romansh was recognized as Switzerland’s fourth national language, and in 1996 as the country’s fourth official language. In Italy, Ladin and Friulian became recognized minority languages in 1999.

The gradually fading presence of Romance-speakers and Albanian-speakers in Greece, or Turkish-speakers in Bulgaria is overlooked by the nation-states in question. Both countries subscribe to the ideal of ethnolinguistic (and at best, also ethnoconfessional) homogeneity. In the past, the existence of non-Greek-speakers in Greece and non-Bulgarian-speakers in Bulgaria was often denied. In Athens’ official view, Greece’s Albanian-speakers are non-Greek-speaking Greeks who speak the Greek language of Arvanatika. Likewise, the country’s Slavic-speakers are defined as Slavophone Greeks, whose language is dubbed Pomak(ian). After the end of communism in Bulgaria, in 1990, the country’s Turkish-speaking Muslims were recognized as Turks, but no Turkish-medium educational system was recreated for their needs, though such a network of Turkish minority schools had existed in com-
munist Bulgaria until the late 1960s. However, in post-Soviet Moldova, an autonomous region was founded for the country’s Turkic-speaking Gagauzes in 1994. They profess Orthodox Christianity, like the vast majority of the country’s Romance- and Slavic-speakers.

Until 1974, the Greek and Turkic dialect continua intermingled in Cyprus as they had in the Ottoman Empire. The subsequent violent division of the island polity, though not recognized internationally, de facto enforced the principle of ethnolinguistic homogeneity. The Greek and Turkic dialect continua were spatially separated, the former contained to the southern (Greek) half of the island, while the latter to the northern (Turkish) half. Interestingly, the United Nations Buffer Zone in Cyprus, alongside Britain’s Sovereign Base Area of Dhekelia constitute an intervening swath of Germanic continuum with around 3,500 British troops and 1,000 UN international soldiers, who use English as their lingua franca. The recognition of Albanian as a minority and auxiliary language in Macedonia after 2001 and its 2019 elevation to the country’s co-official language, perhaps, will contribute to the preservation of the intermingling of the Albanic and South Slavic dialect continua in this country. As in the case of Cyprus, the tradition of this intermingling goes back to the Ottoman times. The same is not in the cards for the intermingling of the Albanic and South Slavic dialect continua in Kosovo, where the tendency is toward increasing separation between these two national-speech communities. In 2018 a worrying project was also voiced for transferring Kosovo’s Serbian-speaking areas to Serbia.

The diasporic presence of Central Europe’s ten to twelve million Roma was hardly noticed at all until recently. Rife prejudice (typical of anti-Tsiganism) claimed that the Roma had no language or ethnic (cultural) identity of their own. In the Soviet bloc, the Roma were not recognized as an ethnic or national minority. Despite some institutional efforts at the grassroots level and on the part of the Council of Europe and the European Union, the Roma remain Central Europe’s most marginalized and excluded group. Unfortunately, anti-Tsiganism is as widespread and “normalized” in postcommunist Europe as anti-Semitism used to be in interwar and wartime Europe. Together with the growing authoritarian and illiberal tendencies that swept Central Europe and much of Western Europe after 2015, verbal anti-Tsiganism and general anti-Tsigan attitudes increasingly morph into physical violence, the destruction of Roma houses, wanton murders, pogroms, and premeditated separation walls erected in numerous urban areas.

The principle of homogeneity, be it linguistic or confessional, as the basis of statehood construction, legitimation, and maintenance is an idea invented, implemented, and maintained by humans. As such it is solely dependent on humans and their decisions. A change in the preferred feature as the definitional basis of a homogeneity in a given polity may overnight transform a previously homogeneous state into a heterogeneous one and vice versa. For instance, from the confessional perspective, Moldova is a homogenous nation-state, but heterogeneous ethnolinguistically. Many Central European observers criticize Moldova as not a “true” nation-state, due to its ethnolinguistic diversity. However, if the Moldovan nation was defined in ethnoreligious terms as the Orthodox Christian faithful of the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova (irrespective of language), then it would be a perfectly homogenous nation-state.

On the other hand, nothing prevents humans from deciding that heterogeneity should be the foundation of “proper and legitimate” statehood, which would delegitimize Central Europe’s nation-states overnight, after torturously achieving a high degree of ethnolinguistic homogeneity during the last century. There is nothing “natural” about such choices of principles of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance. It is people’s invention and choice, in this case nature does not compel humans to anything. Obviously, it appears to most in Central Europe that ethnolinguistically defined homogeneity is “normal and natural,” but only due to the fact that the region’s nation-states have been typically created, legitimized, and maintained with the use of ethnolinguistic nationalism for well over a century. At the same time, compulsory elementary education in national language, history, literature, culture, and politics lasting for at least eight to ten years has been the norm since the mid-twentieth century. As a result, the last three to four generations of the vast majority of Central Europe’s inhabitants have been brought up to uncritically believe that ethnolinguistic homogeneity is the norm of statehood construction, legitimation, and maintenance.
After the two world wars, genocide, massive ethnic cleansing, and forced assimilation, in today’s Central Europe the frontiers of nation-states overwhelmingly overlap with language borders (see Map 33). The written and oral use of one national-cum-official standard language typically stops at the state frontier, while another national-cum-official standard language is in exclusive employment on the other side of a given frontier. A similar overlap was achieved between the region’s nation-states and their official scripts (writing systems). Unlike in the case of the official languages, the region’s scripts are not claimed as “national,” with the lone exception of the Greek alphabet. To a degree, resurgent Russia, with its traditional Pan-Slavism now reinvented as the novel ideology of Russkii Mir (Russian World) has attempted to claim Cyrillic as the Russian national alphabet since 2014. However, this claim is contradicted and denied by the use of Cyrillic for writing and publishing in numerous languages across Eurasia, including Belarusian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian, and Ukrainian in Central Europe. On the other hand, Moscow’s insistence on the national ownership of Cyrillic in the post-Soviet space is strengthened by the replacement of this script with the Latin alphabet for writing and publishing in Azerbaijani, Turkmen, and Uzbek, the national-cum-official languages of the ethnolinguistic nation-states of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, respectively. Furthermore, in 2017 Kazakhstan announced that by 2025 the Latin alphabet would have superseded Cyrillic for writing and publishing in the nation-state’s national and official language of Kazakh. As a result, beginning in the mid-2020s, few post-Soviet states will employ Cyrillic in official capacity, perhaps, only Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. In accordance with the ideology of Russian World, the Kremlin considers Belarus and Ukraine as part of Russia’s “true” Orthodox historic ethno-cultural space (Lebensraum?), which in the eyes of some Russians makes Cyrillic appear to be a “Russian alphabet.”

The gradual breakup of Yugoslavia between 1991 and 2008 in the wake of the fall of communism and the wars of Yugoslav succession transformed the multiethnic federation’s opposed poles of bisscriptalism into national monoscriptal regimes, namely, the Latin alphabet-based ones in Slovenia and Croatia, and the Cyrillic-based one in Macedonia. Although in Serbia the 2006 constitution recognizes Cyrillic as the country’s official and national alphabet (Article 16), in practice half of the publishing industry’s Serbian-language output is in Latin letters (Marušiak 2017). However, the state administration prefers to stick to Cyrillic quite rigorously. The scriptural divide tends to trace the country’s political division. Users of the Latin alphabet side with the ideals of open society, liberalism, secularism, and the European Union. Those who prefer Cyrillic opt for the “traditional values” of ethnolinguistic nationalism, Orthodox Christianity, and an unwavering political alliance with the world’s sole Orthodox power, namely, Russia. A similar situation is observed in Montenegro, though this nation-state’s constitution (Article 15) proclaims both Cyrillic and the Latin script as the equal scripts of the country’s national and official language of Montenegrin. In Kosovo, both Albanian and Serbian are the polity’s official languages, but in reality, instead of entailed bisscriptalism, the Latin alphabet-based monoscriptalism dominates, because in official use Serbian tends to be written in Latin letters, with the exception of the enclaves with Serbian majorities. In Bosnia, officially trilingual in the post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, the polity’s official bisscriptalism is actually expressed through two spatially separate monoscriptalisms. The exclusively Cyrillic-based Serbian is employed in the Republika Srpska, while the exclusively Latin alphabet-based Bosnian and Croatian in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union transformed the non-national communist polity’s fifteen union republics into the same number of fully recognized nation-states, all of them either fully ethnolinguistic in their socio-political character or aspiring to this model of statehood organization. In Central Europe’s post-Soviet ethnolinguistic nation-states, Russian, alongside Cyrillic, was removed from official use in the Baltic nation-states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, where the Latin alphabet-based official monoscriptalism was enforced in the corresponding national languages of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian. These three Baltic polities are bordered by the post-Soviet nation-states of Belarus and Russia, where Cyrillic is official. Further south, post-Soviet Ukraine was almost monoscriptal in Cyrillic, bar autonomous Crimea, where in 1992 the Latin alphabet replaced Cyrillic for writing and publishing in Crimean Tatar. In reality, to this day Crimean Tatarspeakers employ both Cyrillic and Latin letters for this purpose. Following Russia’s 2014 violent seizure of Crimea, Ukraine became a de facto monoscriptal polity, its official and national language of Ukrainian written exclusively in Cyrillic. In 1989, in Soviet Moldavia the Latin alphabet superseded Cyrillic for writing and publishing in Moldavian, which was simultaneously
renamed as Romanian. These decisions in the sphere of language politics became the flashpoint of sociopolitical conflict in post-Soviet Moldova. The subsequent 1992 civil war ostensibly fought on the question whether the Moldovan (Moldavian) language is Romanian, Moldova should reunite with Romania, or remain an independent nation-state in its own right led to the emergence of the de facto polity of Transnistria. Transnistria, as a Russian client state, is fully monoscriptal, all three of its official languages of Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian are written in Cyrillic. Moldova is officially biscriptal because of the autonomous region of Gagauzia, where Gagauzian and Russian are co-official with the state language of Moldovan. Russian is obviously written in Cyrillic, while in 1996 the Latin alphabet replaced Cyrillic for writing and publishing in Gagauzian. The post-Soviet Russian Federation was on the way to becoming a multisciptoral polity, when in 1999 autonomous Tatarstan adopted a law for transitioning the Tatar language from Cyrillic to Latin letters. Three years later, in 2002, the Russian Duma (Parliament) adopted a federal law that enforces the employment of Cyrillic for all the country's languages in official use, that is, for Russian and the official languages of its twenty-one autonomous republics. Beginning in 2014, Moscow counts Crimea as Russia's twenty-second autonomous republic, but in light of international law, Crimea remains part of Ukraine, though under illegal Russian occupation. In practice, the 2002 Russian law has been extended to Crimea, meaning the enforcement of Cyrillic for publishing and writing in Crimean Tatar.

From the geopolitical perspective, the European Union (EU) almost perfectly overlaps with the area where the Latin alphabet is used for writing and publishing in the official languages of its member states. Central Europe's sole three nation-states (almost) monoscriptal in Latin letters that remain outside the EU are Albania, Moldova, and Turkey. However, two of them, Albania and Turkey, are members of the Western military alliance NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), closely related to the EU. Among the EU's current (2018) twenty-eight member states, two are monoscriptal in different writing systems, namely Bulgaria in Cyrillic and Greece in the Greek alphabet. Apart from Bulgaria and Greece, NATO is also almost exclusively monoscriptal in the Latin alphabet, though in 2017 this alliance was joined by Montenegro, which is officially biscriptal in Cyrillic and Latin letters. At present (2018), similarly biscriptal Bosnia and Kosovo, de facto biscriptal Serbia and monoscriptal (in Cyrillic) Macedonia remain outside of the EU and NATO. Without the Balkans, Central Europe's area of Cyrillic monoscriptalism tightly overlaps with Belarus, Russia, Transnistria and Ukraine. This fact, in accordance with the ideology of Russkii Mir (Russian World), allows the Kremlin to legitimize, at least in the eyes of the Russian public, Russia's more or less veiled claims to Belarus and Ukraine as belonging to the Russian sphere of influence. Some radical Russian nationalists see these two nation-states even as "rightful parts" of "true Russia," often equated with the Russian Empire at its height of territorial expansion in 1914.

When surveying the policy of script in Central Europe, Cyprus also needs to be mentioned. After gaining independence from Britain in 1960, the island state adopted Greek and Turkish as its official languages. As a result, the polity became biscriptal in Greek and Latin letters. However, after the 1974 division of the island into Greek-dominated (southern) Cyprus and the internationally unrecognized de facto polity of Turkish-dominated Northern Cyprus, a Bosnian-style scriptal apartheid obtains in this country. (Southern) Cyprus is de facto monolingual in Greek and monoscriptal in the Greek script, while Northern Cyprus is officially monolingual in Turkish and monoscriptal in the Latin alphabet. Since 2008, Cyprus's two official languages and scripts have mingled only on the Cyprus Euro coins, on which the name of country is given in Greek and Turkish, as Κύπρος Kýpros and Kıbrıs, respectively. Furthermore, in the autonomous monastic republic of Mount Athos in Greece, apart from dominant Greek, Cyrillic is employed in some monasteries with historical and current links to the Slavophone Orthodox Churches of the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Recently, the near-monoscriptalism of the European Union in Latin letters seems to have been additionally breached by the unlikely revival of the Old Turkic Runic-like (that is, incision-style) script. In the Middle Ages, it was used by historic Hungary's Magyars (Finno-Ugric-speakers) and survived through the seventeenth century among Transylvania's Szeklers. At the turn of the 2010s, in Hungary, the previously scholarly and antiquarian interest in this script spilled over to the general public and gradually became associated with Hungarian ethnolinguistic nationalism. The right-to-left script became widely known as an “[Old] Szekler-Hungarian alphabet” (székely–magyar rómaiánt), and since 2010, Viktor Orbán's increasingly populist, authoritarian, and anti-EU government have adopted it as an expression of "true Hungarian patriotism." Hungarian-language websites have been created with the use of this script, books and maps have been printed in it, and in 2011, the entire Hungarian-language Bible was published with the use of this Hungarian alphabet. Many Hungarians master reading and writing the Hungarian alphabet in order to prove their credentials as "good patriots." In 2015 Unicode secured a full set of standardized fonts for this script, so the Hungarian alphabet can be now freely employed in a variety of functions across cyberspace. Subsequently, the Hungarian alphabet visibly entered the public space when the ruling party allowed road signs with the names of localities in this script to be erected, under the regular road sign with the locality's name given in the Latin alphabet-based Hungarian. A similar revival of the Old Slavic script of Glagolitic in Croatia commenced already in the 1990s. Some school textbooks of Glagolitic for writing Croatian were published, and this script is taught as an optional school subject, but its use remains largely symbolic, limited to jewelry, logos, decorative flourishes, commemorative plaques, monuments, and occasional bi-scriptal names of administrative offices. But as in the case of the Hungarian alphabet, a set of standardized Unicode fonts was adopted for Glagolitic in 2002. Hence, potentially, in cyberspace Glagolitic can be used as widely as the Hungarian alphabet. In 2006 an Old Church Slavonic Wikipedia was launched, which allows for the use of Glagolitic, but Church Cyrillic remains this Wikipedia's dominant script.
Map 35 offers a composite glance at (almost) all the scripts employed in Central Europe during the last two millennia, obviously with a clear focus on the second millennium CE, when the technology of writing became widespread across the region due to Christianization and, to a degree, Islamization. Both Christianity and Islam are scriptural religions, steeped in their respective “holy books,” each executed in a given language with the use of a specific script. By extension, traditionally, these languages and scripts were deemed as “holy” too. In premodern terms, when religion served as the leading ideology of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance, this officially sacred status translated into the high prestige of such “holy tongues” and “holy scripts.” Hence, when in the early modern period vernaculars began to be employed for written purposes and publishing, their users stuck to the script of their religion’s “holy tongue.” Subsequent secularization rarely dissolved this premodern scriptal link.

This map is a version of Map 34. The largest extents of the now (largely) defunct scripts are interposed in the form of lines on the blocks of solid color with which present-day Central Europe’s three official scripts of Cyrillic, Greek, and Latin, are denoted. Also, the furthest extents of ancient and modern use of the Greek and Latin alphabets are marked in the form of lines, alongside the furthest modern (mainly nineteenth-century) employment of Cyrillic.

The extents of the ancient and medieval scripts are mainly of antiquarian interest and no contemporary political or ideological claims are typically connected to them. However, in the first half of the twentieth century the early medieval presence of the Gothic (i.e. the Germanic-speaking Goths’) script in the Balkans and the medieval one of (Nordic) Runes from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea allowed nationally-minded German(ic) archeologists, historians, and ideologues to present these finding as “proof” that Central Europe and much of Eastern Europe should “rightfully” belong to the “civilizationally superior” Germans and other Germanic nations rather than to the inferior Slavs and Jews. This view, or rather prejudice, informed Germany’s “science of race” (Rassenkunde), which proposed an extermination of these “weed-like” Slavs and Jews, who were purportedly “choking the natural growth” of the Germans and Germanic nations in “their” natural Lebensraum (living space). Despite the fact that it was wartime Germany that banned the use of Fraktur and the Gothic type of the Latin alphabet (also known in English as Blackletter) in 1941, the easternmost employment of this script eerily marks out the predicted eastern reaches of Germany’s Lebensraum. This clearly shows that thinking about such inherently nebulous concepts as civilization or culture seems to be translated into space with the prop of the attested, however tenuously, presence of this or that script, typically connected to a religion and its holy book.

This regularity is well exemplified by the early nineteenth-century Greek thought on the desired borders of a future Greek nation-state. In the north the limit of the Greek national dream was either the Dniester or the Prut because Moldavia’s inhabitants were Orthodox Christians, and until 1821 were ruled by a Phanariot prince who employed Greek as the language of central administration. As a result, early Greek nationalists claimed all the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox faithful—irrespective of language—for a Greek nation and its nation-state. They equated the empire’s Rum (Roman) millet of Orthodox Christians with a Greek nation on account of the fact that this millet’s main language of administration was Greek. Bulgarian and Serbian nationalists disagreed and pointed to “their” respective medieval empires as indicators of where the frontiers of future Bulgarian and Serbian nation-states, respectively, should be put on the political map of modern Europe. In scriptal terms, these two, to a degree overlapping, empires can be mapped out by the furthest extent of the employment of Cyrillic in the late medieval Balkans. As in the case of Greek nationalists, their Bulgarian counterparts’ claim clashed with Romanian nationalism, because first, the Church Slavonic language, and later the Cyrillic-based Walachian (Romanian) were in official use across today’s Romania from the Middle Ages to the turn of the 1860s. Among others, this clash prompted Romanian national leaders to order a switch in the early 1860s from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet for writing and publishing in Romanian.

Before Cyrillic was invented in the late ninth century, Glagolitic had been in use for writing (Old Church) Slavonic since the 860s. Some rudimentary use of this script survived in Slavophone Catholic liturgy in northern Dalmatia until the turn of the twentieth century. Unsurprisingly, Croatian nationalists seized the history of the use of Glagolitic across the Balkans, especially to strengthen their claim to Dalmatia. On the other end of historical Hungary, Glagolitic and a vague memory of medieval Greater Moravia, where this script was invented and used for two decades, allowed Slovak nationalists to “prove” that their nation had the coveted tradition of early statehood going back in time for at least a millennium.

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What is more, armed with this argument, Slovak national activists could stand up to the Czechs on the ideological arena of national competition by showing that (Moravia-)Slovakia was older than any Czech polity.

The furthest easternmost extent of the Latin alphabet—nowadays deep in the area of Cyrillic in western Russia, east of today’s Belarus and (central) Ukraine—marks out the easternmost frontier of Poland-Lithuania. In turn, the westernmost employment of Cyrillic, cutting through today’s Poland (obviously, monoscriptal in the Latin alphabet) is a memory of the fact that from 1772 to 1815 the Russian Empire annexed over four-fifths of the Polish-Lithuanian territory. To a degree, the historical employment of both alphabets were used by Soviet politicians, alongside Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian nationalists, to propose where the “correct” western frontiers of their polities should be placed. In turn, their Polish counterparts used the same argument in reverse when proposing the proper eastern boundaries of the Polish nation-state.

At present, the furthest northernmost use of the Arabic script does not seem to be serving any political ends or projects, beyond allowing Bosniak (Bosnian) nationalists to substantiate their claim to the Ottoman-Islamic heritage for Bosnia and the Bosniak nation. This script’s northern extent preserves a memory of the early modern military successes of the Ottoman Empire which reached what today is Slovakia and western Ukraine, alongside the Arabic Caliphate’s expansion in the eastern Mediterranean during the medieval period. In contrast, it appears that the northernmost and westernmost extent of the use of the Old Turkic script and its related Old Hungarian version informed political projects of various Pan-Turkic and Pan-Turanian movements in the early twentieth century and in the 1990s, following the fall of communism. Furthermore, after 2015, the Old Hungarian alphabet was elevated to the position of the de facto second national script of the Hungarian language in present-day Hungary.

The extent of the use of the Hebrew abjad is a timely reminder of the fact that the majority of the world’s Jews lived in Central Europe until the Holocaust perpetrated during World War Two by Germans, Austrians, and their wartime allies. Especially in the northern half of Central Europe, from Latvia to Hungary and from Germany to western Russia, the presence of Hebrew letters in books and on gravestones marks out the space of former Yiddishland (see Map 16). The presence of administrative documents and gazettes in the Hebrew script-based Yiddish, marked separately on the map, indicates where Germany’s semi-colonial polity of Ober Ost used to be. For the first time in history, in this occupation polity, Yiddish was used in administrative capacity and as a medium of education. Afterward, in interwar Soviet Belarus, Yiddish became one of the country’s four official languages, alongside Belarusian, Polish, and Russian.

The westernmost extent of the diasporic use of the Armenian script shows where Armenian diasporic communities existed or still exist in the wake of the destruction of medieval Armenia. San Lazzaro degli Armeni in Venice was a monastic institution where Modern Armenian was codified at the turn of the nineteenth century. This institution also gave an impulse to the standardization of the Bulgarian language in the 1820s. In central and eastern Turkey gravestones and buildings with Armenian inscriptions remain silent witnesses to the 1915 Ottoman genocide of Armenians and Assyrians.

Last but not least, the extent of the “mixed” scripts denote the areas where conflicting scriptal and political traditions clashed and then interwove for a time, before monoscriptalism of a certain type was selected as appropriate for a given nation. This was the case of the Walachian (Romanian) language written in an idiosyncratically executed mixture of Cyrillic and Latin letters from the 1820s until the turn of the 1860s in the Danubian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia. Another example is that of Albanian speakers. On the ethnoreligious basis, they used to belong to as many as three Ottoman millets, namely, those for Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Catholics. The initial movement for cultural (and then national) autonomy of Albanian speakers first drew on the tradition of Catholic literacy developed by co-ethnics in southern Italy in Latin letters. In addition, Orthodox Christianity with its prestigious Greek script allowed for distancing the political project from Ottomanism. But until 1908 Albanian national leaders could not agree on a single script, though they subscribed to the idea of nationally and ethnolinguistically motivated monoscriptalism. As a result, another idiosyncratically executed mixed script emerged, as a cross between the Greek and Latin alphabets. In 1908 this mixed script, alongside some others, was replaced with the Latin alphabet, then quite universally seen as the “script of progress and civilization.”
In the late communist period, there were merely three nation-states in Central Europe fulfilling all the requirements of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state, namely, Bulgaria, Norway, and Poland (Map 31). However, most of the region’s polities strove to meet the strict criteria of this isomorphism as dictated by the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism. In the Soviet bloc the non-national ideology of communism had not be an obstacle to this goal since 1956, when national communism had replaced stalinist internationalism. The subsequent fall of communism and the Soviet bloc allowed for a swift spread of the full normative isomorphism across Central Europe.

In 1990, as a foreplay to the prolonged breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the internal structure of Serbia was unified and centralized, while at the level of ideology, socialism (communism) was replaced with ethnolinguistic nationalism. As a result, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina were renamed as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija and the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, respectively. The adjective “socialist” vanished from the provinces’ names, and in the case of Kosovo the (historically) Serbian character of this province was emphasized by adding to its official moniker the indubitably Serbian name of the historic region of Metohija. From the legal perspective, both provinces’ status as entities of the federation was rescinded, and the co-official use of Albanian in Kosovo, alongside Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, and Rusyn in Vojvodina, respectively. The official languages for Muslim Bosniaks and Catholic Croatians, the Serbian republics were liquidated in Croatia, where Bosnian was declared the country’s sole official and national language. A similar development in the sphere of language politics took place in Bosnia, where Bosnian was declared as the polity’s (almost) eponymous official and national language. But Bosnia is an ethnic federation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Bosnian as its official language for Orthodox Serbs. Hence, Bosnia’s official trilingualism prevented Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (that parted ways with Montenegro in 2006) from achieving the full normative isomorphism. But politicians sought to reinvent these three countries’ inhabitants as ethnolinguistic nations.
of Bosnians (Bosniaks), Croats, and Serbs, which necessitated splitting the Serbo-Croatian language into Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. Finally, in its second year of independence, 2007, Montenegro declared Montenegrin as its official and national language. Subsequently, Montenegro became a fully isomorphic nation-state.

Meanwhile, after the civil war in 1992, and the separation of the pro-Russian east of the country, made into the de facto polity of Transnistria, Moldova abandoned the divisive project of any union with Romania, and in 1994 the country’s official and national language was renamed Moldovan. In this way, the full isomorphic status was returned to Romania, but on account of Transnistria with its three co-official languages of Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian, Moldova remained a near-isomorphic polity. The following year, in 1995, Belarus lost full isomorphic status due to the introduction of Russian as a co-official language, which became the country’s de facto leading language at the expense of the marginalized official and national Einzelsprache of Belarusian. In 1993, the non-national ethnic federation of Czechoslovakia broke up yielding the successor nation-states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, with Czech and Slovak as their respective national and official languages. Both polities became fully isomorphic. As a result, before the introduction of Russian in Belarus, there were fourteen fully isomorphic nation-states in Central Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 1995, Belarus dropped out of the club, while in 2007 Montenegro joined it, so the overall tally remained unchanged.

Belgrade’s 1998–1999 ethnic cleansing of Kosovo’s Albanians was followed by the NATO bombing campaign of Serbia and Montenegro (then both constituting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, before it became a State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003), which allowed for the largely unprecedented return of the majority of expellees in the summer of 1999. Afterward, Kosovo found itself under international protection before it was granted independence in 2008, which entailed the acceptance of both Albanian and Serbian as the new country’s official languages. This decision deprived Albania of full isomorphic status, yielding the 2009 situation presented in Map 36, which registers thirteen fully isomorphic national polities.

Meanwhile, the ethnolinguistically defined autonomous status was returned to Serbia’s Vojvodina in 2008, when Kosovo gained independence. However, in practice, the return of Hungarian, Rusyn, Slovak, and Romanian to the province’s administration, alongside the post-Serbo-Croatian Einzelsprache of Croatian, was not complete before 2010, while the first elections under this new autonomous regime took place only two years later, in 2012. These developments nullified the full isomorphic status in the case of Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, pushing down the membership of the isomorphic club to ten polities. In 2014, in blatant breach of the Helsinki Final Accord, Russia attacked Ukraine and annexed the latter country’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In reaction Ukraine reinforced the legally enshrined position of Ukrainian as the country’s sole official and national language in order to prevent a Belarusian scenario, or any co-officialization of Russian that would marginalize Ukrainian overnight. Two years earlier, in 2012, a Belarusian scenario of this kind had been attempted in Latvia, but three-quarters of the votes in the respective referendum had been cast against making Russian co-official in this country.

Although not a single European country recognizes Russia’s illegal annexation (not even Belarus, which together with Russia formed a common Union State in 1996), de facto, Ukraine became almost a fully isomorphic nation-state but for the tenuous complication of the co-official use of Ukrainian in Transnistria. Interestingly, despite its non-isomorphic character, as a country with numerous official languages (between fifteen and thirty-five, depending which of several differing statuses is considered as official) employed in twenty-two national republics, in 2014, the Duma (Russian Parliament) adopted a new citizenship law that offers swift naturalization to all Russian native-speakers. As a result, Russianness has been equated with the Russian language in a standard fashion of Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nationalism. However, in this case the ideology seems to have become part of resurgent Russia’s imperial package, for instance, to extend its power and influence to Israel, where 15 percent of the population, or 1.2 million people, are native Russian-speakers.

The situation of the spread and observance of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state may look different yet again, should the fact of the eastward enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 1995, 2004, 2007, and 2013 be taken into account. By definition the European Union is a multilingual organization-cum-polity with twenty-eight member states and twenty-four official languages. Should membership in the polyglot EU be seen as abolishing the full normative isomorphism of its member states, then Central Europe’s isomorphic club would now (in 2018) be limited to a paltry three nation-states, namely, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Norway. Nevertheless, ethnolinguistic nationalism remains Central Europe’s sole leading ideology of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance. After Russia threw in its political lot with ethnolinguistic nationalism in 2014, Europe’s sole ideologically non-ethnolinguistic polities are the autonomous monastic republic of Mount Athos, San Marino and the Vatican City State, with the combined population of 16,000.

Unsurprisingly, given the continuing, and presently unparalleled influence of ethnolinguistic nationalism, this ideology has mainly informed the current rise of anti-establishment and anti-EU populism across Central Europe since 2015, often leading to anti-Semitic, anti-Tigian, and xenophobic excesses. Typically, the unwanted Other is defined as a speaker of a non-national (foreign) Einzelsprache. A century after replacing Central Europe’s empires and non-national polities with ethnolinguistic nation-states in the wake of World War One, despite half a century of the overbearing existence of the non-national Soviet Bloc and a quarter of a century of the presence of the similarly non-national European Union from Helsinki to Athens, and from Berlin to Bucharest, the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism rules supreme across the region. It continues to shape the inhabitants’ ideas about what
legitimate (“normal”) statehood and politics are about, while the majority of Central Europe’s politicians unreflectively concede and conform to the ideology’s requirements. They follow the tenets of ethnolinguistic nationalism as long as this secures votes, notwithstanding the possibility of flaring up internal and even international conflicts. It appears that in the interest of a short-term electoral gain, most present-day politicians are ready to abandon the postwar moral compass of doing politics in such a way that peace and stability would be ensured and fortified for all across the entire continent of Europe.

Are we to fast forward back to the past, to the 1930s of national egoisms, anti-Semitism, anti-Tsiganism, xenophobia, repressions, censorship, dictatorships, and totalitarianism? Are continent-wide war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide around the corner, again? I hope not. I would sincerely like to be mistaken in this most worrying conclusion.
Management of Difference: Borders and Multiethnic Regions in Contemporary Central Europe

For over a century Central Europe’s nation-states have been created in accordance with ethnolinguistic nationalism, and in turn produced and deepened their respective ethnolinguistic homogeneities. In the first place, this as yet planned homogeneity constituted the widely accepted basis for founding a nation-state. Afterward, the nation-state in question strove to actualize such an ideal of “purity” with the means of population and language engineering, as well as by changing extant political frontiers. Early on this sought-for purity was predominantly defined and measured in the terms of religions and specific scripts associated with these religions’ “holy books.” At the turn of the twentieth century, the tide changed decisively in favor of languages written in the scripts of religions specific to this or that nation-state. Hence, to a varying degree, the ethnolinguistic nationalisms of today’s national polities in Central Europe are often underpinned by a religion, or its cultural or historical remembrance. The aforementioned processes of the construction of ethnolinguistic national statehood commenced in the early nineteenth century in the Balkans, accelerated after both world wars and the end of communism, and continue to this day, despite the rise of the non-national and non-ethnolinguistic polity-in-making of the European Union (EU), which was founded in 1993.

During the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, the hope was that the multiethnic, inclusive, liberal, and citizenship-based EU would dampen the political and social significance of ethnolinguistic nationalism in Central Europe’s national polities which successfully joined the EU in the successive waves of eastward enlargement in 1995, 2004, 2007, and 2013. However, beginning in the mid-2010s, many of the region’s liberal, democratic, and economically successful postcommunist states—led by Hungary and Poland—began embracing authoritarian (“illiberal”) versions of ethnolinguistic nationalism. In many ways, this populist wave brought about through the democratic means of the ballot box, is steeped in xenophobia, anti-Westernism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Tsiganism, which is eerily reminiscent of respective interwar authoritarian ideologies and regimes in Central Europe’s polities. Thanks to the late survival of Latin as an official language in Central Europe until the mid-nineteenth century, this region’s inhabitants are fond of citing Latin tags, like Cicero’s famous dictum Historia magistra vitae est (History is a teacher of life). Unfortunately, current events indicate that history is no teacher of anything, that the majority of Central Europeans prefer illusions of a glorious patriotic past that never was to sensible politics and good life here and now, or to stable and secure political and economic situations for their children in a near future.

Therefore, despite the year of 2009 being this atlas’s national cut-off date, I decided to add two maps on the “management of difference” during the 2010s (Maps 37 and 38). The goal is, first, with Map 37, to historicize the use of cultural differences for creation, legitimation, and maintenance of ethnolinguistic nation-states. On this basis, Map 38 shows how cyberspace may affect these processes. The question remains open whether cyberspace may curb Central Europe’s nationalisms, or if the region’s ethnolinguistic nation-states may decide to territorialize cyberspace, reproducing and enforcing separate ethnolinguistic homogeneities on the internet. Totalitarian China already selected the latter option, increasingly popular around the world, thanks to the country’s present-day economic, if not social, success. During the last decade the “Chinese model” has been time and again evoked by leaders of numerous countries around the world, including Central Europe. In 2017, the European Union began robustly criticizing the Polish government for endangering the rule of law in Poland. Brussels threatened that if Warsaw did not observe the terms of the Poland-EU accession treaty, the flow of structural funds from the EU’s budget to this country might be reduced or stopped entirely. In reply, in 2017, the defiant Polish Prime Minister announced that Poland would receive as much money from China, so it would not matter if Brussels followed up on this threat.

Map 37 shows when a given international border was created, which state frontiers overlap with ethnolinguistic boundaries between dialect continua, and which with territorial cleavages between religions. The stricter the overlap between a nation-state’s frontiers with this kind of religious and ethnolinguistic boundary typically results in a higher degree of ethnolinguistic homogeneity in the national polity in question, and the stricter ethno-cultural separation of it from neighboring polities. Conversely, when political frontiers intersect with ethnolinguistic and religious boundaries, a greater potential is observed for the preservation of multiethnicity and the cultivation of mutual comprehension with inhabitants in neighboring states. In some cases the state frontier overlaps with the ethnolinguistic boundary, though in a given state the presence of a population speaking a language from another dialect continuum is marked, as in the case of Hungarian-speakers in southern Slovakia, or Russian- and other Slavic-speakers in eastern
Latvia. This discrepancy is caused by the employment of the official (national) language of a nation-state for apportioning it to a given dialect continuum. In addition the phenomenon of atheism and irreligiosity is depicted in the countries where it is at its highest. This phenomenon appears to be strongly correlated with areas that have been highly industrialized and economically developed since the nineteenth century (for instance, today’s Czech Republic or Germany) or where the strict version of the communist system lasted for the longest (for example, in present-day Russia or Albania). The overlapping of both tendencies yields the highest degrees ever of atheism and irreligiosity, as in the present-day Czech Republic or Estonia.

The rise of ethnolinguistic nation-states in densely populated Europe brought about numerous wars and border changes, alongside frequent acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide (see Maps 11, 26–30). These solved nothing, because national politics have time and again continued to claim, on a national (ethnolinguistic and/or ethnoreligious) basis, further “unredeemed territories” in neighboring states. In order to insulate themselves against an expected attack, increasingly more nation-states began to construct border fortifications, walls, and barriers. In Central Europe, Switzerland commenced this process in the 1890s. France’s Maginot Line of border fortifications on this country’s frontier with Germany was illustrative of this phenomenon in interwar Western and Central Europe. In Eastern Europe and Northern Asia, it was the communist polity of the Soviet Union that led the way. In the mid-1930s the entire Soviet frontier was lined with a highly guarded militarized border fence, which was additionally strengthened with fortifications in Europe. It was and still is the world’s longest border fence. After World War Two, the Soviet-style system of border fences and fortifications was extended to the Soviet bloc’s outer boundary with the West, resulting in the extremely militarized and guarded Iron Curtain (partly electrified and with automatic armed response), as symbolized by the Berlin Wall, erected in 1961. The international image of the Soviet bloc was not to be marred by any “defectors” (refugees) from the “communist paradise.” What is too often forgotten is that the postwar Soviet Union was doubly separated from the West in this manner. In addition to the aforementioned militarized Iron Curtain, the Soviet Union continued to maintain the militarized and fortified border fence between itself and the rest of the Soviet bloc. In this respect the isolationist maverick of communist Albania was in a class of its own. The country was separated from the outer world with border fences, fortifications and hundreds of thousands of bunkers from all its neighboring states, including the Adriatic coast.

The end of communism was symbolized by the removal of the Iron Curtain border barrier between Austria and Hungary beginning in April 1990. In a widely televised symbolic gesture, the Austrian and Hungarian foreign ministers together cut through the border fence barbed wire on June 27, 1989. Finally, with the sudden collapse of the communist regime in East Germany, on November 9, 1989, the grassroots demolition of the Berlin Wall commenced. The long decades of physical separation between East and West were over. The political transition from totalitarianism to democracy and from a centrally planned to free market economy was marked by the demolition of the Iron Curtain border barriers, including Albania’s own Iron Curtain. This political change of heart in Europe directly rubbed off onto Switzerland’s decision to decommission the country’s frontier fortifications and barriers during the 1990s. Optimists lauded a new unprecedented era of peace, cooperation, and stability in Europe. Few took note of the fact that the border barrier between the former Soviet Union and the erstwhile Soviet bloc countries remained in place, complete with its double and triple fences, and the always freshly ploughed strip of no man’s land. The electrification of the fences was switched off as a slight concession to these momentous political changes, alongside the removal of watch towers with marksmen armed with machine guns.

This former Soviet Union-Soviet bloc border barrier largely remains in place between Poland on the one hand, and Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine on the other; between Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania on the one hand, and Ukraine and Moldova on the other. After the eastward enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007, the Polish-Lithuanian fragment was dismantled in 2007 and the Romanian-Moldovan one in 2010. Meanwhile, also Bulgaria’s former share of the Iron Curtain-style border fences on the frontier with Greece, Yugoslavia (today’s Serbia and Macedonia), and Turkey were dismantled in 1998, 2003, and 2005, respectively. The 1998–1999 Serbian war on Kosovo’s Albanians, leading to the subsequent emergence of independent Kosovo in 2008, necessitated a border barrier between Kosovo and Serbia, erected already in 1999. Also, in the 1990s, Russia built a new border barrier on its frontier with post-Soviet Lithuania. As a result, Russia’s exclave of the Kaliningrad Region is encircled by the border fence that separates it from the European Union territory, in the midst of which this exclave is now placed. In 2018, Russia deployed ballistic rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads in the region. After the end of the Cold War and communism, it was the first time that nuclear weapons reappeared on the territory of Central Europe.

The construction of the border barriers along the Russian-Lithuanian and Kosowo-Serbian frontiers seemed to be exceptions to the general postcommunist and post-Cold War trend of doing away with border fences and fortifications. However, after a quarter of a century of free Europe without frontier barriers, all of that changed overnight in 2014 when Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimea and launched an ongoing attack on eastern Ukraine. As a result, the administrative border of Crimea with the rest of Ukraine was fortified, and the war front in eastern Ukraine morphed into a fortified frontier fence. The following year, in 2015, Ukraine replied with yet another border fence on the Ukrainian-Russian frontier, to be fully completed by the mid-2020s (with the exception of the Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine). Also in 2015, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—fearful that they might be the next target of Russia’s further attacks and annexations—began planning and constructing similar border fences on their respective frontiers with Russia and Belarus, both polities constituting a Union State of Russia and Belarus since 1999. Wary that its membership in NATO and the EU may not shield Estonia from a blitzkrieg-style
Russian take-over, in preparation for such a scenario, the country began considering e-embassies (data embassies) for ensuring the continued deterritorialized functioning of the Estonian nation-state, if need be. In 2018 the first Estonian embassy of this type opened in Luxembourg.

Also in 2015 the so-called "migration crisis" was observed in the European Union. Refugees crossed the Mediterranean and the Aegean from Libya and Syria, which had been destabilized by civil wars and Euro-American interventions, as well as from the Arabic-speaking Middle East and Maghreb where authoritarian regimes were reestablished in the wake of the largely failed Arab Spring (2010–2012), from sub-Saharan Africa suffering overpopulation and at the receiving end of the rapid global climate change, and further afield from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, destabilized by decades of warfare, including Soviet and American military interventions. In 2015, 1.8 million refugees arrived in the European Union and a further 1.6 million followed in 2016. Although the migrants amount to about 0.5 percent of the EU’s population, their arrival was used by populist parties of authoritarian leanings to gain visible presence in the legislatures across the EU, and even to win power in many Central European nation-states. These parties trumped up the rhetoric of xenophobia and racism to rally support for their divisive, authoritarian, and exclusionist programs, reminiscent of the authoritarian 1930s. It is as if everyone forgot that after 1945, Western Europe, devastated by World War Two, was able to cope with tens of millions of refugees and even base its 1950s "economic miracle" (Wirtschaftswunder) on this foundation. Unlike in the latter half of the 1940s, in the latter half of the 2010s, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, and Slovenia replied with a new wave of border barriers to prevent the arrival of refugees by the "Balkan route." Likewise, Italy stopped NGOs from operating rescue ships in the Mediterranean, which had saved dinghies and boats with thousands of refugees in distress.

The member states of increasingly authoritarian and xenophobic leanings have managed to turn the EU into a “Fortress Europe.” It appears that the quarter of a century without border barriers did not produce a new norm of a better and more inclusive Europe, but was just a mere blip, especially in the history of Central Europe’s nation-states that consistently and actively opt for national egoism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia, rather than democracy, cooperation, and open society. The 2017 installment of the populist and pro-Russian president in the United States, and the 2019 Brexit have added another dimension of insecurity and destabilization to the already volatile political situation. Europe has arrived at the most difficult political juncture in its postwar history. The turn of the 2020s will show in which direction or directions the European Union and Central Europe may follow.

It is interesting to observe that in many ways Central European states erecting border barriers after 2015 emulate the example of Israel. In 1994 Israel erected a fortified fence on its border with the Gaza Strip, and between 2000 and 2014, a Berlin Wall-style separation barrier with the West Bank. At that time, the construction of these border barriers appalled the world’s public opinion. Nowadays, it is a new and increasingly more accepted norm in Europe and in the United States. Like many nation-states in Central Europe, Israel was founded through war and on the basis of an act of ethnic cleansing. Arab-speaking Muslims (today’s Palestinians) fled or were expelled and were barred from returning. They were replaced with Jewish Holocaust survivors and expellees, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, where anti-Semitic campaigns occurred regularly across the postwar Soviet Union and in the Soviet bloc countries. Unlike Central Europe’s ethnonationalist nation-states, Israel became a stable democratic polity, which withstood the temptation of ethnonationalist (ethnoreligious) nationalism. Remaining Arab-speaking Muslims and Christians were granted Israeli citizenship, and their language is official in Israel, alongside Hebrew, while English and Russian are largely in de facto official use. To this day, Israel is the Middle East’s sole democracy, despite its numerous faults. In comparison to Central Europe, apart from Scandinavia, Israel has preserved the continuous tradition of democracy for the longest, namely, from its foundation in 1948 to at least 2021, for over 70 years. Germany’s continuous tradition of democracy is one year shorter, because West Germany was founded in 1949. Furthermore, this tradition was considerably weakened when West Germany absorbed the post-totalitarian East Germany in 1990 and a reunified Germany was founded. The current continuous tradition of democracy in Poland commenced in 1989 and seems to have come to an end in 2015, meaning it lasted for 26 years. The same indicator for Hungary is even shorter, at a mere two decades, between 1990 and 2010. In both cases, the starting points of the democratic period are the first free postcommunist parliamentary elections, while the end points indicate the assumption of power by these two countries’ current anti-democratic (“illiberal”) governments. However, Israel’s long period of democracy appears to wane after 2018, when the Knesset adopted an exclusionist law on Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

Thus, the country decisively morphed into a typical Central European ethnonationalist nation-state. The current Israeli administration assumed power in 2009 and has increasingly undermined the country’s democratic system in emulation of the populist United States (2017–2021) and Hungary.
Map 38 should be consulted in tandem with Map 37. Both offer a glance at how cultural difference—be it ethnolinguistic, ethnoreligious, or historic—is employed in today’s Central Europe to legitimize and maintain national statehood, and to separate the region’s nation-states. Map 37 traces the technologies of translating cultural difference into national boundaries of language, religion, political frontiers, and border barriers. In turn, Map 38 probes into how these processes are replicated in cyberspace. The Google search engine and Wikipedia, founded in 1997 and 2001, respectively, afford a useful lens through which the employment of cultural difference and its management in Central Europe may be observed.

Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nation-states are construed as separate spaces of different, and preferably unique, ethnolinguistic (ethnoreligious) homogeneities. In accordance with the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism, during the last century, this kind of homogeneity—ideal or actual—has been the popularly accepted basis for statehood foundation, legitimation, and maintenance. The “purity” and separation of the aforementioned ethnolinguistic homogeneities from one another have been deepened by recurrent bouts of ethnic cleansing and genocide, alongside wars fought with an eye to change the extant frontiers. During the Cold War, the strict territorialization of state-specific homogeneities was enforced with the closed and tightly guarded borders between the Soviet bloc and Western Europe, the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc countries, and among this bloc’s member states. Monolingualism and monoscriptalism in the respective national languages of the Soviet bloc’s nation-states were spread through compulsory elementary education and mass media like newspapers, cheap books, radio, and television. The seemingly obligatory teaching of Russian as the Soviet bloc’s communist lingua franca was not really imposed on the populations outside of the Soviet Union. Actually, Russian as a compulsory subject was removed from Romania’s schools after 1965.

The spread of videocassette recorders and the rise of satellite television during the latter half of the 1980s posed a serious grassroots challenge both to the ideological isolation of the Soviet bloc and to the territorialization of this bloc’s ethnolinguistic homogeneities. The bloc’s leading post-1956 ideology of national communism faced an unexpected existential threat. Films and television programs in the capitalist Western languages of English, German, French, Italian, and Spanish suddenly became widely available across the Soviet bloc. Inhabitants of the communist states gained an intimate (though in many cases, unrealistic and often misleading) insight into everyday life in the West. This was one of the factors that delegitimized the communist system and hastened its collapse in 1989. Afterward, the gradual adoption of satellite television in postcommunist countries allowed for broadcasting in a national language to a given nation-state’s diaspora around the world, including co-ethnics in neighboring countries. The political frontiers in postcommunist Central Europe became increasingly porous. They ceased stopping information, languages, or travelers in their tracks. The eastward enlargements of the European Union in 1995, 2004, 2007, and 2013 brought the four freedoms of the movement of people, services, goods, and capital to Central Europe. The process culminated in 2007 with the subsequent eastward enlargement of the Schengen Area of borderless travel, which currently extends from Portugal in the west to Estonia and Poland in the east, and from Iceland and Norway in the north to Slovenia, Hungary, and Greece in the south.

During the first two postcommunist decades of the 1990s and 2000s, the novel medium of the internet fully reflected and further encouraged this unprecedented openness. For commercial purposes, Central Europe’s nation-states, like countries elsewhere in the world, received geolocated (territorialized) customized versions of the Google search engine. In Central Europe these versions came complete in the nation-states’ official languages and scripts (see Maps 33, 34, and 36). However, in most cases the geolocated (“national”) version of this search engine is also offered in English and the minority languages spoken in a given nation-state. Due to ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the isomorphism of language, nation, and state, different linguistic versions of Wikipedia are more closely correlated with this or that nation-state in Central Europe than the aforementioned geolocated versions of Google. Despite the much-repeated starry-eyed slogan about the freedom of information in cyberspace, for better or worse, many online services and websites target a specific polity and its population. Some geolocated online services are even barred from being accessible to users in other states or territories.

Unlike in other parts of the world, the unexpected rise of Wikipedias in unrecognized minority languages, microlanguages, or dialects chips away at the monolith of nation-states’ ethnolinguistic homogeneities across Central Europe (see Map 21). Apart from Wikipedias in Rusyn, Silesian, or Bavarian, there are others offered in constructed languages (such as Esperanto, Ido, or Novial), and in defunct languages (for in-
The plurality of the world’s 300-odd extant Wikipedias aim at Europe, and especially Central Europe, where the influence of ethnolinguistic politics on politics, culture, and social life is at its highest. A considerable relative economic prosperity in postcommunist Central Europe additionally encourages and enables this unprecedented multiplication of online services in a multitude of languages. Many of these services are more of a symbolic than practical value, while numerous speakers and users of the region’s dialects, national, minority, unrecognized, constructed, or defunct languages turn to the English or German Wikipedia for information.

The case of the four post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian supplies a lot of interesting borderline cases. Although the Montenegro version of Google is offered in the nation-state’s official and national language of Montenegrin, the Wikipedia in Montenegrin was actually scrapped in 2008. The post-Serbo-Croatian Wikipedias are available only in Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. Ironically, the largest of all the post-Serbo-Croatian Wikipedias is offered in the Serbo-Croatian language, which officially ceased to exist with the parallel breakups of Yugoslavia and its state language. There is no Google search engine available in this orphaned Einzelsprache, as it is not in dialects (like Alemannic), unrecognized languages (like Neapolitan), or in many minority languages, which are not employed as official in any state (like Gagauz). Geolocated versions of this search engine are also withheld from unrecognized de facto states, such as Transnistria. This shows how much more strongly commercial online services like Google are connected to the territory of this or that polity than volunteer crowdsource online initiatives like Wikipedia. For instance, the political disagreement on the orthography of Belarusian led to the unique rise of two separate Belarusian-language Wikipedias, one composed in the state-approved Soviet-style spelling, while the other in the traditional, pre-Soviet one, preferred by dissidents and the Belarusian diaspora. It is unlikely that Google would consent to such a solution, which would put the company at loggerheads with Belarus’s current administration which sides with the Soviet-style spelling of the Belarusian language.

It is impossible to predict which tendency is going to prevail in Central Europe’s segment of cyberspace, meaning, either the territorialization or deterritorialization of the internet. A hypothesis can be proposed that populist authoritarianism steeped in the resurgence of state-based ethnolinguistic nationalisms may tip the balance in the former direction, while the preservation of the European Union’s suprastate liberal values as exemplified by the aforementioned four freedoms of movement, in the latter.
A handy litmus test of the presence of ethnolinguistic nationalism as the leading ideology of statehood legitimation and maintenance in a given polity is the medium of education at the university level. In line with its paramount principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state, ethnolinguistic nationalism entails the enforcement of exclusive monolingualism in the national language for all the nation-state’s institutions at each level of administration, including the educational system. In this configuration, the national language doubles as the polity’s official (state) language, and ideally should be unique and not shared with any other nation-state or nation.

The role of the university in an ethnolinguistic nation-state is of much more political and ideological importance than in polities of another character. When the first ethnolinguistic national movements appeared in Central Europe during the nineteenth century, one of their initial goals was to establish a national university with the national language in the role of the exclusive medium of education. For example, in Austria-Hungary’s crownland of Bohemia (or the western half of today’s Czech Republic), Czech became the region’s co-official language, alongside German, in 1881. But that was insufficient from the Czech national perspective, because the University of Prague (founded in 1348) remained monolingual in German after the 1784 switch from Latin to this language as the medium of instruction. Any plans of overhauling this university into a bilingual institution with Czech and German as its equal languages of education did not work either, because this solution was an abhorrence both to Czech and German ethnolinguistic nationalists, who by definition, aspired for nationally-defined monolingualism as the basis of politics and nation-building. As a result, in 1882, the university was split into a Czech-medium University and a German-medium University, both sharing the same name of Charles-Ferdinand University, but spelled differently in Czech (Česká univerzita Karlo-Ferdinandova) and in German (Deutsche Karl-Ferdinands-Universität). Following the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the establishment of the nation-state of Czechoslovakia with its capital at Prague, the university’s shared name was also split. The latter institution became Deutsche Karls-Universität, while the former, Univerzita Karlova. The Czech-language Charles University survives to this day, but its German-language counterpart was dissolved in 1945 in the wake of World War Two and its assets transferred to Charles University.

Due to so much ideological and political capital staked on the medium of instruction, changing it or closing a university altogether was a useful weapon for suppressing a (proto-) national movement. For instance, following the failed 1830–1831 uprising of the Polish-Lithuanian nobles against the Russian Tsar, in the following year, 1832, the tsar ordered the dissolution of the Polish-language Imperial University of Wilno (Vilnius), the Russian Empire’s largest university at the time. Its assets were transferred to Kiev (Kyiv) and used to found Saint Vladimir Imperial University in 1833, obviously with Russian as the language of instruction. Following the Bolshevik Revolution and the establishment of a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union in 1934, this institution was reactivated as the second Ukrainian-medium university after the University of Kharkiv that had been re-established two years earlier, in 1932. A Polish-language University in Wilno was renewed in interwar Poland, but in 1939 the Soviet Union, after partitioning Poland in alliance with Germany, passed the city to Lithuania. Polish Wilno became Lithuania’s capital of Vilnius, and the university the country’s leading institution of tertiary learning. However, the first-ever Lithuanian-medium university was founded earlier, in 1922, in interwar Lithuania’s capital of Kaunas. Today’s Polish capital of Warsaw, a Polish-medium university was founded by the Russian Tsar in 1816. It closed down after the aforementioned uprising of 1830–1831 but was renewed in 1862. In the wake of another failed uprising by the Polish-Lithuanian nobility in 1865–1864, the use of Polish as a medium of instruction was gradually limited at this university in favor of Russian. As a result, in 1870 the institution was re-founded as a Russian-language Imperial University of Warsaw. The loss of the Russian Empire’s western borderlands to the Central Powers in 1915 allowed for the re-establishment of a Polish-medium university in Warsaw under German occupation. The Russian-language staff were evacuated to Rostov-on-Don, where the Russian-medium University of Warsaw continued until 1917. Afterward it became a basis for the founding of a Medical Institute in 1930, finally yielding Rostov State Medical University in 1994. The University of Warsaw remains Poland’s premiere university to this day, alongside the Jagiellonian University (founded in 1364) in Cracow. Actually, the latter institution is the university with the longest tradition of the continuous use of Polish as its medium of instruction, namely since 1869 when Polish became the official language of Austria-Hungary’s crownland of Galicia.
Unsurprisingly, the founding of numerous ethnolinguistic nation-states across Central Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Great War also entailed the founding of the first-ever universities with the polities’ national languages as media of instruction. The first Latvian-medium University of Riga was founded in 1919. In the same year, the Russian-medium University of Iuriev was transformed into the first-ever Estonian-language University of Tartu. Similarly, also in 1919, the first-ever Slovak-language university was founded at Bratislava in Czechoslovakia, and the first-ever Slovenian-medium University of Ljubljana in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia). In 1921 the first Belarusian University was established at Minsk in Bolshevik Russia (Soviet Union), and following the founding of a Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic three years later (1924), Belarusian became the main medium of instruction at this Belarusian State University, alongside, for a time, sidelined Russian, Yiddish, and Polish. However, since the late 1930s Russian has been the leading or sole medium of education at all of Belarus’s universities. No typical monolingual Belarusian-medium university was ever established until 2018, when the Університет імені Ніка Глєбіва (Nil Hilevič University) was tentatively founded in Minsk. It is a private initiative, which has not been launched properly yet. Only the future will tell whether it is going to be successful.

Because Central Europe’s earliest nation-states were established in the Balkans, not surprisingly, universities with the national language as the medium of education were founded there already in the nineteenth century. However, the process was not straightforward given that most of these national polities first were steeped in ethnoreligious nationalism strongly connected to the respective “holy tongues” of this or that religion or Church. As a result, the switch from such a (vernacularized) holy tongue to the standard national language was gradual and often quite prolonged. Serbia’s University of Belgrade began its history as Higher School (Вељка школа Velika škola) in 1808 and was officially made into a university in 1905. Until 1868 Church Slavonic and Slavono-Serbian were the languages of instruction, while the switch to standard Serbian was gradual and was not completed before the turn of the twentieth century. In Greece the University of Athens was founded in 1837 with Katharevousa (or vernacularized New Testament Greek) as the language of instruction, which was superseded by Demotic (vernacular Greek) only in 1976. Such linguistic complications were less pronounced in the cases of Romania’s University of Bucharest (founded in 1864) and Bulgaria’s University of Sofia (established in 1904) with Romanian and Bulgarian as their respective media of education. Albania was the Balkans’ first-ever clearly ethnolinguistic nation-state since the moment of its inception in 1912. The country’s first University of Tirana opened for business in 1957, but the quarrel between proponents of the prewar “capitalist,” postwar “socialist,” and Yugoslavia’s Kosovan standards of the Albanian language was not settled until 1972. The case of Macedonia’s first university is also telling. During the war, in 1941–1944 Bulgaria annexed this southern section of interwar Yugoslavia. In 1943 a Bulgarian-language university was founded at Skopje. At the end of World War Two, in order to cancel out the Bulgarian influence, the communist Yugoslav authorities recognized Macedonian as a language in 1944. During the latter half of the 1940s this institution was gradually revived, and finally, in 1949, officially made into the first-ever Macedonian-medium university.

In many ways, language policies pursued at universities in the Apennine Peninsula served as an example to be emulated in the western Balkans. The switch to Italian as the language of education at universities commenced in the mid-eighteenth century. For instance, in 1754, the first-ever course in Italian was offered at the University of Naples (founded in 1224), nevertheless Latin continued to dominate in this function. The University of Padua (founded in 1222) was the most important institution of tertiary education in the merchant Republic of Venice. The switch from Latin to (Venetianized) Italian (Tuscan) as the language of instruction was gradual and lasted from the 1760s through the 1780s. The process was streamlined after 1797 when this republic was incorporated (and then reincorporated in 1815) into the Habsburg lands, where already in 1784 vernacular German had replaced Latin as the language of education and administration. Meanwhile, at the turn of the nineteenth century, parts of the Apennine Peninsula were directly incorporated into France, while others made into French client states. Across the entire area schools and universities were secularized, a unified educational system introduced, and the balance decisively tipped from Latin to Italian (and, at times, French) as the medium of education. The French administration also introduced the potent revolutionary idea that all the state administration, legal system, and education should be conducted in a single standard vernacular-based language across a polity’s territory. This novel concept dated back to the 1793 decision which, four years into the revolution, had banned languages other than French from public use across France. In the Papal States, the University of Bologna (established in 1088) and the University of Rome (founded in 1303) continued with Latin as the main medium of education until the death of Pope Leo XII in 1829. In the wake of the Congress of Vienna he had reaffirmed the position of Latin. At the University of Sassari (established in 1617) and the University of Cagliari (founded in 1624), located in the island of Sardinia in the Kingdom of Sardinia, Latin remained the language of instruction until 1852.

In Scandinavia, Russia, the German-speaking regions of Central Europe, the Habsburg lands, and in Turkey the rise of universities with national languages in the role of media of instruction is connected to the earlier, typically imperial tradition, as in the case of the earliest Polish-language universities, as discussed above. The University of Vienna in the capital of the Habsburg hereditary lands was founded in 1365. In 1784 its language of instruction was switched from Latin to German. In the same year the University of Pest (Budapest) was established for the Habsburg’s Hungarian lands where Latin was retained as the official language until 1844. In the northern (Protestant) half of the Holy Roman Empire, the University of Marburg (established in 1527) was at the forefront of the gradual introduction of German as a medium of instruction in the
first half of the eighteenth century. The Russian autodidact and polymath, Mikhail Lomonosov, studied there in the latter half of the 1730s. This experience convinced him to introduce Russian as the medium of education at the University of Moscow, the establishment of which he was tasked in 1755. But Russian was not fully standardized until the 1820s, meaning that the actual language of instruction was Slaveno-Russian (that is, vernacularized Church Slavonic written and printed in Graždanka, or Petrine Cyrillic).

The hold of prestigious Latin as the preferred medium of university education lasted longer in Scandinavia’s Protestant kingdoms of Scandinavia and in Prussia. At Prussia’s premiere University of Königsberg (nowadays, Kaliningrad in Russia), founded in 1444, German replaced Latin only in the course of reforms during the early nineteenth century, introduced for shoring up the kingdom after it had been resoundingly defeated by the Napoleonic armies in 1807. At Denmark’s oldest University of Copenhagen (founded in 1479) Danish replaced Latin as the language of instruction in 1830. The process was even more prolonged at Sweden’s oldest institution of tertiary learning, Uppsala University (established in 1477), where a similar switch from Latin to Swedish lasted for a century, from 1852 to 1932. No such complications were observed in Russia’s Grand Duchy of Finland where an Imperial University of Helsingfors (Helsinki) was founded in 1828 with Swedish as its medium of education. The rise of Finnish ethnolinguistic nationalism resulted in the proclamation of the independence of Finland in 1917. After the subsequent civil war, it was decided—quite atypically for modern Central Europe—that the new nation-state should have two official languages of equal importance, Finnish and Swedish. Beginning in 1919, the University of Helsinki became a bilingual institution.

Modernization and ethnolinguistic national movements were the greatest challenge to Central Europe’s multietnic empires. After the Hungarian-medium university in Budapest (1844) and the Polish-language one in Cracow (1869), the Habsburgs coaxed the Hungarian nobility to agree to the founding of a Croatian-medium University of Zagreb in 1874. In turn, the Czechs had to wait for a university in their national language until 1882 when one was established in Prague. Meanwhile, the Polish-Lithuanian nobility in Galicia was at times successfully pressed to allow for opening (Little) Ruthenian (Ukrainian)-medium departments at the Jagiellonian University, and especially at the University of Lvów (Lviv, founded in 1784).

Similar challenges constituted even a higher hurdle in the Ottoman Empire where there was no tradition of secular education. The empire’s oldest university-style institution, Al-Azhar, founded in 970, was located in Cairo, taught in Arabic, and to Westerners appeared to be just a department of Islamic teaching writ large. Nowadays, Al-Azhar is Egypt’s oldest and largest university. The main Medrese of Konstantiniyye (Istanbul) was founded in 1453, immediately after the fall of Constantinople. In 1846 it was made into a university, dubbed as the Darüşşifānān (House of Multiple Sciences). Initially, it was a cross between a traditional medrese and a Western-style university with Arabic as its leading medium of education, and the growing use of Osmanlica. However, the wholesale adoption of Western-style modernization required some courses to be taught in French beginning in 1874. The institution’s name was usually translated into Western languages as “Imperial University.” Both traditionalists and Westernizers, for different reasons, had this university in their sights, which led to its repeated dissolution, so that it had to be re-founded in 1865, 1874, and 1900, increasingly as a Western-like university. In the process Arabic was replaced with Osmanlica (Ottoman Turkish written in Arabic letters) as this institution’s medium of education. After the founding of the Turkish nation-state in 1923, the university’s status was reconfirmed a year later, in 1924. Subsequently, in the wake of the 1928 official switch from Arabic to Latin letters for writing and publishing in Turkish, in 1933 this institution was formally renamed as İstanbul Üniversitesi (Istanbul University). However, Mustafa Kemal (since 1934 Atatürk) disliked the traditionalist and pro-Ottoman Istanbul, so he ordered the creation of a “proper” Turkish-medium national university at the republic’s capital in Ankara. It was a prolonged process that lasted between 1925 and 1946, when the University of Ankara was formally founded. The academic staff grouped in the Faculty of Language, History and Geography (founded in 1935) had underpinned with their expertise and research numerous Kemalist reforms, including the creation and standardization of the vernacular-based Turkish language purged of Arabisms and Persianisms, which replaced Osmanlica.

Perhaps, the University of Chernivtsi, Ukraine is one of the best examples of how ethnolinguistic-style nation-state building impacted universities in Central Europe and their media of education. In 1875 it was founded in Austria-Hungary’s crownland of Bukovina, named as Franz-Josephs-Universität Czernowitz (Francis Joseph University of Czernowitz). German was the institution’s medium of education. At that time, Bukovina was located at the Dual Empire’s frontier with Russia and Romania. Following the breakup of Austria-Hungary, Bukovina was incorporated into Romania, entailing the renaming of the university to that of Universitatea Regele Carol I din Cernăuți (King Carol I University in Cernăuți). In 1919, Romanian was introduced as another language of instruction, alongside German, but by the mid-1920s German had been fully replaced with Romanian in this function. Following the 1940 Soviet takeover of northern Bukovina, this region was incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The university was yet again renamed, this time, as the Чернівецький державний університет Chernivets’kyi derzhavnyi universytet (Chernivtsi State University). Ukrainian superseded Romanian as the language of instruction. After the war, this university became better known under its Russian-language parallel name, that is, the Чернівецький державний університет Chernivotskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, because in the postwar period Russian became the leading medium of education at this institution, as elsewhere across the Soviet Union. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union (1991), in independent Ukraine, in 2000 the university was yet again renamed as the Чернівецький національний університет імені Юрія Федьковича Chernivets’kyi narshional’nyi universytet imeni
Iurii Fed’kovycha (Iurii Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University). In the wake of the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, Ukrainian became the university’s sole language of instruction.

In the framework of ethnolinguistic nationalism, the role of the national university’s medium of instruction is of utmost importance. The Western model of creating an Einzelsprache assumes that, first, a national academy (of sciences) is founded with the primary initial task of producing an authoritative monolingual dictionary of the target national language, alongside a similarly authoritative grammar. In line with the logic of national monolingualism, both publications should be fully executed in the national language that they aspire to standardize. Typically, such a national academy is closely related to the national university where the national language is introduced as the sole (or at least, leading) medium of education. Standardizers (overwhelmingly men) of the national language tend to double as members of the academy and the university’s high-flying professors with close links to a given national movement’s leadership (or an independent nation-state’s government). The academicians-cum-professors make sure that the standard of the national language, which they produced (often with the nation-state’s approval and financial support) is actually employed for university education, and they enforce its consistent employment via the gateway of examinations. Only these students who have a “full and correct command” of “their” national language are allowed to graduate. In turn, graduates become the elite (or more broadly, intelligentsia) of their nation-state and staff its central, regional, and local institutions, including the entire educational system from elementary schools to universities. With the introduction of compulsory elementary education for all, eventually each citizen of the ethnolinguistic nation-state has no choice but to become (relatively) fluent in the national language.

Ethnolinguistic nationalism’s guiding principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state was reinforced and again with the vast acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide during and in the wake of the Balkan Wars and both world wars (see Maps 11, 26–30). In addition, during the interwar period and in the postwar Soviet bloc (as informed by national communism since 1956), monolingualism in the national language was enforced across most of Central Europe. The existence of the non-national communist multiethnic federations of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia reinforced a similar kind of national monolingualism at the level of the union republics. Hence, the breakups of all three non-national federal polities yielded a plethora of ethnolinguistic nation-states. In the Czech Republic, Czech is employed as the sole medium of education; in Slovakia, Slovak; in post-Yugoslav Croatia, Croatian; in Macedonia, Macedonian; in Montenegro, Montenegrin; in Serbia, Serbian; in post-Soviet Estonia, Estonian; in Latvia, Latvian; in Lithuania, Lithuanian; and in Ukraine, Ukrainian (especially after 2014). There are, however, exceptions to this pattern. After 1995, the adoption of Russian as a co-official language led to the rapid marginalization of the national and state language of Belarusian, meaning that Russian is the sole or leading medium of instruction at the universities in Belarus, and in the country’s entire educational system. In officially trilingual Bosnia, Bosnian is employed at Bosniak universities (for instance, the University of Sarajevo) and schools, Croatian at Croatian universities (for example, the University of Mostar) and schools, while Serbian at Serbian universities (for instance, the University of Banja Luka) and schools. Likewise, in officially bilingual Kosovo, Albanian is the language of instruction at the University of Prishtina, while Serbian at the Serbian University of Pristina with its seat in Kosovska Mitrovica (that is, the northern part of the city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica). In addition, in Moldova’s Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, the bilingual, Gagauz and Russian, Komrat/Comrat University has been active since 1991.

Map 39 illustrates the current (2009) shape of the observance of normative monolingualism, which obtains across entire Central Europe with some rare exceptions. At the turn of the twenty-first century, at the level of university education, this drive to deepen and maintain monolingualism in education was a bit softened in recognition of the requirements of the supranational processes of European integration and globalization. At that time, around forty universities were founded with English as their medium of education, in some cases with the parallel employment of a local national language or French. However, most of these English-language universities are located in Southeastern Europe (the Balkans), where the tradition of education in Western Europe’s (post-imperial) languages has survived to this day, especially in Turkey and the divided Cyprus. In the wake of the wars of Yugoslav succession, the prolonged presence of international stabilizing forces in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, respectively, also introduced the idea of English-medium universities as an educational necessity for the post-Yugoslav states and Albania. Following the Albanian uprising of 2001 in Macedonia, Albanian-medium and bilingual (Macedonian and Albanian) universities and schools were officially recognized in this country. The Russian geopolitical pressure on the post-Soviet countries remaining outside of the European Union translated into the widespread use of Russian as the medium of education at Ukrainian universities until 2014, the founding of a Russian-language university in Moldova and the actual monolingualization (obviously, into Russian) of the officially trilingual (Russian, Moldavian, and Ukrainian) university in the de facto polity of Transnistria. Simultaneously, the all too little-known pressure by Bulgaria on Moldova yielded also a Bulgarian-medium university in this country.

The case of central Europe’s two émigré universities is quite telling. In 1921 a Ukrainian Free University was established in Vienna and soon afterward was moved to Prague. After World War Two, it was re-established in Western Germany at Munich where it remains active to this day. With the help of Belarusian emigration in Western Europe and Northern America a Belarusian-medium (de facto trilingual, Belarusian-, Russian- and English-language) European Humanities University was founded at Minsk in 1992. However, the institution’s academic independence and attempts at the preservation of Belarusian as the leading medium of education did not sit well with President
Aljaksandar Lukašenka’s increasingly authoritarian regime, which introduced the de facto Russification of the country’s educational system, administration, and public after 1995. As a result, in 2004 this university had to move its seat to Vilnius. In the Lithuanian capital, a Polish-language university was founded in 1998 for the country’s Polish minority. In light of the fact that Poland did not reciprocate with a similar Lithuanian-language university for the country’s Lithuanian minority indicates that this Polish-language university is perhaps a form of Poland’s geopolitical pressure on Lithuania, similar to that of Bulgaria’s on Moldova. Due to the fact that Transylvania changed hands between Hungary and Romania in 1918, 1940, and 1945, following the Second World War, in the region’s capital city of Cluj (Kolozsvár) two universities were located, one teaching in Romanian and the other in Hungarian. In 1959 both universities were united into a single institution, with two languages of instruction. A unique development for a Soviet bloc nation-state.

With time, Romanian began to dominate, but after the end of communism, almost an equal number of degree programs are offered in Romanian and Hungarian. Last but not least, and for communism, almost an equal number of degree programs are offered in Romanian and Hungarian. In 1999 both universities were united into a single institution, with two languages of instruction. A unique development for a Soviet bloc nation-state.

Hungary offers an interesting example of how different the fates may be of universities not teaching in the national language. In 1991 the English-medium Central European University was founded with its two main campuses in Prague and Budapest. After the mid-1990s wave of populism under the watch of the Czech Prime Minister, Václav Klaus, the Prague campus was shut down and merged with its Hungarian counterpart. Beginning in the mid-2010s another wave of populism (with anti-Semitic undertones) swept across Central Europe, in many ways led by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. After two years of administrative harassment, the university had no choice, and in 2018 moved its seat to Vienna. No restrictions of this kind were levelled against Andrássy Gyula Deutschsprachige Universität (known as Andrássy University Budapest in English) founded in 2001. After 1945 it is the first (and thus far, the only) German-medium university located outside of a German-speaking country.

A survey of Central Europe’s universities and their languages of instruction would not be sufficiently comprehensive without a reflection on Jewish educational efforts. Following the Great War, which completed the transformation of the region’s multiethnic empires into ethnolinguistic nation-states, no national state was formed for the Jews. Since the turn of the twentieth century, the Jewish national movement had not been able to agree on a single national language as required by ethnolinguistic nationalism’s norm of monolingualism. The main preferences were quite equally split between Yiddish (then in the process of rapid standardization) and the “holy tongue” of Hebrew, freshly reinvented as a secular Einzelsprache. Although after the 1905 Revolution some university-level courses began to be offered at Warsaw in Yiddish, there was no possibility of opening a Yiddish-medium university in the Russian Empire. In the interwar Soviet Union, in 1921, the first-ever Yiddish-medium university Jewish Section was founded at the Belarusian State University in Minsk. Yiddish-speaking Jews constituted a plurality of Soviet Belarus’s students throughout by World War Two. In 1924, when the official quadrilingualism of Soviet Belarus in Belarusian, Russian, Yiddish, and Polish was promulgated, the Jewish Section was overhauled into a stand-alone Jewish Department. It survived until 1937–1938 when the policy of Russification was introduced across the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Jewish nationalists (Zionists), who aimed at founding a Jewish nation-state in Palestine established a German-medium Technikum (Higher Technical School) in Haifa in 1912. Many of the staff and benefactors came from the German Empire, which influenced the choice of this language as the medium of instruction. But the Jewish diaspora in North America and Russia contested the decision, and two years later, Hebrew replaced German as this institution’s language of education, and Technikum’s name was duly Hebraized to Technion. This decision set a precedent, and when four years later, in 1918, a Hebrew University of Jerusalem was founded, the choice of Hebrew as its language of instruction had been a foregone conclusion.

Following the Holocaust and World War Two, there was no Jewish university remaining in Central Europe where most of the world’s Jews had lived for a millennium. After 1945, no Yiddish-medium university-level educational institutions were revived in the postwar Soviet Union, apart from teachers’ colleges. However, Hebrew-medium universities multiplied in Israel. This state was founded in 1948 in the Middle East, but in close emulation of Central Europe’s model of the ethnolinguistic nation-state.

In today’s Central Europe about 10 million Roma remain the region’s largest minority. Like earlier in the case of Jews, no national polity was secured for Roma. As a result, now they painfully feel the brunt of widespread (and often politicized) anti-Tsiganism, not unlike Jews, who prior to World War Two suffered similarly ubiquitous and increasingly politicized anti-Semitism. The one telling indicator of the extent of anti-Tsiganism is not only the absence of any Romani-medium university, but of any monolingual school of any kind with Romani as its medium of instruction. The world’s sole Roma secondary school with Romani as an auxiliary language of instruction (alongside Hungarian and English) is I Mashkarutni Shkola Gandhi (Gandhi Secondary School), founded in 1992 in the Hungarian city of Pécs. From the perspective Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nationalism, a nation (ethnic group) does not exist as long as it has no possibility to use its language in publishing, education, and state administration. Sadly, the region’s nation-states have excelled at preventing any extension of this linguistic privilege to the Roma.
Since the Middle Ages, many different and sizeable groups of people have lived in Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe, whose names in local languages used to be translated into English as “Gypsies.” This translation is not entirely adequate, because in English the term “Gypsies” designates communities of different ethnic origins who lead a specific (peripatetic, service-rendering) nomadic way of life, including the “Sea Gypsies” of Southeast Asia. However, a significant number of the ethnically Roma communities living in the region have been sedentary for centuries. Over time, when the old empires collapsed and new ethnic nation-states emerged in the region, some of these local names were turned into “official terms” employed in administrative use in the countries where these groups lived, for instance, Αθιγανοί (Byzantine Empire, Greece), Кибити и Чинге (Ottoman Empire, Turkey), Цигани/Цигани (Serbia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia), Țigani (Romania), Zigeuner (Austria-Hungary, Austria), Циганок (Hungary), Цигани и Циганы (Czechoslovakia), Cyganiec (Poland), Лиарабе Тзягане (Russian Empire, Soviet Union), Циган (Lithuania), Цигани (Latvia), or Мусталасед (Estonia) (Marushiakova and Popov 2016a: 11). In recent decades, these variegated exonyms have been rapidly replaced with the unifying denomination “Roma,” which often becomes a preferred endonym. This replacement can be explained by the perceived “legitimacy of political correctness” (Petrova 2003: 111) and is part of the process of democratization and European integration.

The ancestors of the aforementioned communities migrated to Europe from the Indian subcontinent more than a millennium ago. In most cases, the population self-identifies as Roma and speaks its own Romani language, called Romani šib or Romanes. In Central Europe, however, there are a number of ethnically Roma communities who are described by their non-Roma neighbors as “Gypsies,” but who have lost the command of their ancestral language. They speak official languages of the countries where they live and often accept yet another language as their own mother tongue, such as Turkish, Tatar, Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian, Romanian, Hungarian, or Ukrainian. A change in the language of a community is often, but not always, accompanied by a change in such a community’s identity. This gives rise to the phenomenon of a preferred ethnic identity. This process should not be confused with the Gypsies’ own development of a civic identity as part of the citizenry in the country of their residence (Marushiakova and Popov 2015: 26–54). In any case, regardless of all these differences between Roma groups, the surrounding non-Roma populations continue to perceive and treat all these ethnically Roma communities as “Gypsies.”

From the very beginning of academic interest in the so-called “Gypsies” in Western Europe, their nomadic lifestyle is considered to be the Roma’s most essential social and cultural characteristic that distinguishes them from all other European nations and ethnic groups, and in turn constitutes the main pillar of Roma identity. The presence of millions of Roma who have stuck to a sedentary way of life in Central, South-eastern, and Eastern Europe for centuries is explained by past repressive measures applied to them, especially during the communist era. These measures supposedly made the Roma abandon their “natural” (that is, nomadic) way of life (Crowe 1994; Barany 2002). Historical data on “Gypsies,” however, tells a completely different story. The first reliable historical evidence of their presence in the Balkans clearly shows that the ancestors of today’s Roma led both nomadic and sedentary lifestyles (Soulis 1961: 156–157; Gilsenbach 1994: 58–40).

In the Ottoman Empire over the centuries, there were “Gypsies” (Kıpti or Çingene in Turkic-language historical sources) who were sedentary and earned a living by farming, practising a variety of crafts, and working as unqualified laborers in towns and cities. There were also nomadic Roma, or more precisely semi-nomads, who owned or rented houses for winter. However, sedentary Roma were more numerous than nomads and their share in the overall Roma population increased constantly. By the late nineteenth century, the ratio was at least 2 to 1 (Marushiakova and Popov 2001: 63–64; Kenrick 2007: 170–171).

In the Austrian Empire, the proportion of Roma leading a sedentary way of life sharply grew following the Theresian and Josephine reforms of the second half of the eighteenth century. A special census of Austria-Hungary’s Roma held in 1893 reported a clear predominance of sedentary Zigeuner/Čigányok (that is, “Gypsy” in German and Hungarian) over any nomadic Roma (Königlich 1893; Crowe 2006: 99–120). Obviously, in Austria-Hungary, the former term was the official German-language designation for Roma and the latter was the Hungarian-language one.

The situation in the Russian Empire was different as no consistent or stringent state measures were undertaken to force Roma to settle down. On the eve of the October Revolution in 1917, a significant part of the Russian Roma had already settled in towns, while others lived in villages. In the former case, they
earned a living as merchants, craftsmen, and mostly as musicians, while in the latter, they were mainly farmers. However, the subsequent political, economic, and social turbulences turned many of them into nomads again. They fled their old lives for safety and kept moving to avoid unwanted administrative or political impositions extended by the oft-changing occupation and political regimes (Demeter 2000; Marushiakova and Popov 2003: 289-310).

The processes of transition among the Roma from a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life to a sedentary one in Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe increased again during the 1920s and 1930s as a result of the modernization of the region, leading to a crisis of service nomadism (that is, itinerant or seasonal rendering of a variety of specialized services). The traditional way of life of most nomadic Roma communities became unsustainable and unproductive, forcing them to settle down. After World War Two, the communist countries adopted an active policy of forced settlement for the remaining Roma nomads. The number of such Roma nomads, however, was not very high, and in some countries was negligible. Exact numbers are not available, but it is possible to indicate, at least approximately, the ratio between nomads and sedentary Roma during the time when the processes of modernization and sedentarization took place. In the Soviet Union and Poland, itinerant (nomadic) Roma prevailed at around two-thirds and three-quarters, respectively. The situation in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia contrasted sharply, where itinerant Roma who were subjected to the policy of forced settlement amounted to fewer than 5 percent of all Roma. In other communist states the relative shares of nomadic Roma varied. In Romania and Yugoslavia, the proportion of itinerant Roma was lower than one-third, while less than one-quarter in Hungary and Albania (Marushiakova and Popov 2008).

Differences in Roma policies pursued in respective communist countries were frequently determined, or at least influenced, by earlier historical models. The nation-states under discussion were founded during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the wake of the decline and breakups of the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Russian Empire. Each of these three empires employed different approaches towards “Gypsies.” The features of these three main imperial models and their later influence may be traced through the example of Roma housing policy. In the Ottoman Empire, and the post-Ottoman polities of Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania, Roma live in their own ethnically determined town or city quarter, or mahala. In the post-Austro-Hungarian states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia, alongside some parts of Croatia, Poland, Serbia, and Romania, Roma live in settlements of their own, placed beyond the confines of a nearby non-Roma locality, at times many kilometers away. Such Roma settlements are called cigánytelep (Gypsy settlement) in Hungary; osada (settlement) and kolonia (colony) in Slovakia; kolonija and riganja (Gypsy settlement) in Romania, or osada (settlement) in Poland. In the Russian Empire, and nowadays in the post-Soviet states in Europe and in eastern Poland, Roma usually live on a street or several adjacent streets, embedded in the surrounding non-Roma population. This type of settlement is called tabor (camp) or tsynganskiy posiolok (Gypsy settlement). The only exception to this pattern of settlement is Ukraine’s region of Transcarpathia, where the Austro-Hungarian model prevails, as this region used to belong to the Dual Monarchy until 1918.

Matched according to settlement patterns in the three empires, the number of homes (and residents) in varied types of Roma settlements differs significantly. In the territories of the former Russian Empire, dwellings in a Roma settlement number not more than several dozen. In the former Austro-Hungarian areas, the number of dwellings in a Roma settlement can reach several hundred, while in the post-Ottoman territories they can number several thousand. Because Romania was built from territories belonging to the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, in Oltenia and Muntenia Roma settlements are closer in character to the Ottoman model, while in Transylvania they more closely resemble the Austro-Hungarian ones. The map with the names of Roma settlements in Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe is not complete and comprehensive, because there are no exhaustive and accurate (or even approximate) statistics on the Roma and Roma settlements in the region. The selection of Roma settlements presented on the map is not representative. Instead, the selection is typological and aims at showing a whole range of various types of Roma settlements as attested in the region.

The map shows preselected Roma settlements in the following countries: Turkey (17 settlements), Greece (10), Albania (6), Bulgaria (18), Macedonia (3), Kosovo (3), Montenegro (6), Serbia (19), Bosnia and Herzegovina (3), Croatia (6), Slovenia (5), Hungary (3), Romania (12), Moldova (6), Slovakia (7), the Czech Republic (7), Poland (6), Ukraine (7), Crimea (3), Belorussia (3), Lithuania (4), Latvia (4), Estonia (3), and the Russian Federation (10).

The names of the Roma settlements featured on the map are labelled with the forms used by their Roma inhabitants. These place names typically coincide with the forms employed by the non-Roma majorities. Hence, the names of such settlements are rendered in the language of the surrounding non-Roma population, that is, usually in each given state language. Only in some post-Ottoman Balkan states are the names of Roma settlements in Turkish, while in some former Austro-Hungarian territories they appear in Hungarian. However, the everyday use of all these names in Romani-language communication incorporates them into this language, regardless of the names’ actual origin.

Only rarely did Roma develop their own Romani-language names for their settlements, usually by modifying the “official” one in the majoritarian language, for instance, Šutka, which is a Romani version of the Macedonian-language place-name of Suto Orizari. At times, the Romani-language use preserves an older form of an official placename which subsequently changed, as in the case of the quarter Кон’овица (Кон’овица) in Sofia, Bulgaria. In general Bulgarin-language usage this area lost any distinctive name, while the local Roma still use it. The name of a Roma settlement can also refer to a nearby object, as Fakulteta in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia. This Romani
name is an allusion to the nearby National Center for Agrarian Science (or “Faculty”). In other cases, the Romani-language name of a Roma settlement may be a metaphorical name imposed by the non-Roma population or selected by Roma themselves, such as Fekete Város (“Black Town” in Hungarian) in Slovakia or Abisinia (“Abyssinia”) in Bulgaria.

Balkan Roma settlements enjoy their own specific Romani-language names since they constitute distinctive quarters within towns and cities. However, Roma settlements in rural Central Europe are typically referred to with the name of a nearby non-Roma village. Interestingly, in eastern Slovakia, in accordance with the Law on the Use of Minority Languages (Zákon č. 184/1999), bilingual Slovak and Romani road signs were erected with the names of villages, in most cases both language forms being identical. Because some Roma settlements in Slovakia are located far away from the non-Roma village or city, Google Maps tends to designate them with the uniform label of Rómska osada (Roma settlement) only, which leads to confusion and unjustifiably denies its actual name to a given Roma settlement.

Map 40 features different types of Roma settlements: city, village, district, quarter, neighborhood, mahala (variously spelled as mahalle, maala, mala, mahalava, or mayla), osada, kolonia, tabor, poselok, camp (in the case of Roma refugees from Kosovo). It is important to note that the names of Roma quarters and neighborhoods are official, hence they feature in official documents and on maps. On the other hand, the Romani names of mahalas, osadas, kolonias, or tabors are typically unofficial “folk terms” employed by Roma inhabitants and, often, also by neighboring non-Roma populations. The map also provides the numbers of Roma inhabitants in featured Roma settlements and the relative share of Roma in comparison to their total populations. This information allows for distinguishing homogenous or near-homogenous Roma settlements, Roma settlements where Roma constitute a majority of the inhabitants, settlements with Roma constituting at least one-third of the inhabitants, and localities with Roma constituting 1 to 5 percent of the inhabitants. Obviously, the number of Roma inhabitants can be assessed only approximately.

The map also provides information about the native language of a given settlement’s Roma community, which usually is Romani, but may also be Turkish, Greek, Albanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Romanian, Moldovan, Hungarian, Slovak, Ukrainian, or Tatar. Likewise, similar information is given on the religions professed by Roma in their settlements, namely, Sunni Islam, heterodox Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism, Protestantism, or Greek Catholicism. The presence of new Roma Evangelical churches is also indicated. This category includes, the Pentecostal Church, the Baptists, the Church of God, the Apostolic Church of Pentecost, the Seventh-day Adventist Church, or Jehovah’s Witnesses. However, the map does not aspire to reflect in detail the overall picture of the Roma settlements in Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe. The primary goal is to show how such a comprehensive map could be executed in the future.
Roma Settlements in Central Europe, 2009 (East)

Dialect continua
- Baltic
- Finno-Ugric (Ugrian)
- Greek
- Indic (Roman)
- East Romance
- North Slavic
- South Slavic
- Turkic

Languages
- Fattar
- Turkish

Religions
- Catholicism
- Greek Catholicism
- Islam
- Heterodox Islam
- Orthodox Christianity
- Protestantism
- Roma Evangelical Protestantism

Types of Roma settlements
- >80% Homogenous or nearly homogenous Roma settlement
- >50% Predominantly Roma settlement
- <50% Settlement with Roma constituting at least a third of the inhabitants
- 1-2 Roma population in thous.
- 1-2 Recently destroyed Roma settlement

C – Refugee camp
M – Mahala (mahala, mahala, mahala): a traditional city or town quarter in the former Ottoman areas, nowadays typically not depicted on maps
N – Neighborhood
O – Osada (sometimes kolonia): typically a settlement (rural ghetto) spatially separated from a non-Roma village
P – Posëlok: a village that administratively became part of a town or city, typically a single street lined by Roma houses
T – Tabor: a compact Roma settlement in a village or town in the lands of the former Russian Empire
V – Village: a Roma rural settlement

Šutka – Romani name of Roma settlement
Shuto Orizari – Non-Romani name of Roma settlement

(1) Gazimihal
(2) Gorna mahala Dolna mahala
(3) Gorna mahala Nadezhda
(4) Gazimihal
(5) Komiliki
(6) Kotska
(7) Komlik

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Miteljropa w 2009: The Silesian Language and Central Europe
Creating an Einzelsprache is a long and often bitterly contested process, especially if not supported by the state in which a target speech community happens to reside. In Central Europe this is the typical situation of all the speech communities that are not fully recognized as ethnolinguistic nations with a nation-state of their own. In the literature, such communities’ Einzelsprachen (speech varieties, lects) are dubbed “minority languages.” But this category is confusing because, above all, the term is employed for referring to the languages of national minorities, be it Germans in Poland, Hungarians in Slovakia, or Poles in Lithuania. However, the Einzelsprachen of German, Hungarian or Polish are full-fledged national and official languages used in administration, education, and public life in Germany (alongside Austria and Liechtenstein), Hungary, and Poland, respectively. From the perspective of these ethnolinguistic nation-states, none of these languages suffers any minority status, which in this case is the sociopolitical disability of these speakers of the three Einzelsprachen who live outside “their” national polities (kin states).

Languages of stateless nations or ethnic groups (that is, nations or ethnic groups without kin states of their own) are more “minority-like” in whatever country, because none is an ethnolinguistic nation-state of their speech communities (constructed as ethnolinguistic nations). In Central Europe hardly any state is interested in developing languages of this type into full-fledged Einzelsprachen because such a decision would be at loggerheads with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. Hence, a language of this kind is either sidelined and suppressed, or at best defined (from above, without consulting the concerned) as a mere dialect of the national language. In the former case, the process is known as (forced) assimilation, while in the latter as dialect levelling, which is equally forced by compulsory elementary education in the standard dialect of the national language. However, in both cases the expected effect is the same, namely, the disappearance of such languages and dialects from everyday public and private use. Rarely, due to some cataclysmic geopolitical events, like World War Two in Central Europe, a stateless minority language may be accorded some (international) protection, which helps to develop it into an Einzelsprache and secures recognition, both in the country of the speech community’s residence and abroad. This is the situation of Germany’s two Slavic languages of Lower Sorbian and Upper Sorbian, with 7,000 and 13,000 speakers (in 2007), respectively (Sorbian, Lower 2021; Sorbian, Upper 2021).

In 1992, the Council of Europe adopted a European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages, which came into force six years later, in 1998. The distinction between regional and minority languages was introduced at France’s insistence. Paris, however, was reluctant to sign this charter, which it did only in 1999. Afterward, the ratification was procrastinated until 2015, when the French Senate finally rejected the charter altogether. It appears that the category of regional language was to help the French government to refuse the label of (national) minority language to Dutch in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and to German in Alsace. The former is officially known in France as Western Flemish, while the latter as Alsatian. Poland, which signed and ratified the charter recognizes as minority languages all the Einzelsprachen (speech varieties, dialects) of all the officially recognized minorities. However, in 2005 an act was adopted that ranks the country’s recognized minorities into two groups, the first of the more privileged national minorities, and the other of the less privileged ethnic minorities. The former have a kin nation-state, while the latter do not. In addition, Poland recognizes a single regional language, namely, Kashubian, spoken and written by the Kashubs. But Warsaw does not perceive the Kashubs as an ethnic minority because they are officially defined as a regional group of the ethnolinguistically defined Polish nation. In today’s Poland, Silesian is the largest minority language spoken and written by over half a million people. Yet, irrespective of the Silesians’ wishes to the contrary, the state administration does not recognize this fact. The Silesians are officially defined as a regional or social group of the Polish nation, and their language as a mere group of subdialects (guary) of the Polish language. Some Polish scholars whose research shows the existence of a clearly delineated ethnic difference between Poles and Silesians prefer to speak about the Silesian ethnolect to avoid using the ideologically “inappropriate” term “language.”

The grassroots movement for standardizing and recognizing the Silesian language coalesced at the turn of the twenty-first century. In 2007, Silesian was recognized as a language under the provisions of the ISO 639-3 standard, that is, at the international level and in cyberspace. A year later, in 2008, a Silesian Wikipedia went online and currently (2018) ranks as the 152nd largest Wikipedia by the number of articles among the world’s extant 302 Wikipedias. In 2009, the standard of Silesian spelling was adopted, and in the decade of 2009–2018 almost 50 volumes were published in this orthography.

From the perspective of ethnolinguistic nationalism, the litmus test of the viability of a national (ethnic) movement is
whether its popular support is sufficient for generating a range of resources that, on the one hand, serve as icons reconfirming the existence of a nation (or ethnic group) to other nations (for instance, a national flag or language), while on the other serve to prove that the nation (or ethnic group) in question is “modern” (for instance, presence on the internet). The difficulty is that typically all such icons and proofs need to be produced without any aid on the state’s part, though speakers of an (unrecognized) stateless minority language contribute taxes to such a state budget, like other citizens. One of the most difficult genres of such resources is the map of a continent in a minority Einzelsprache. In order to produce a map in a minority language the movement needs funds in the range of several tens of thousands of Euros, cartographic technology, and standardized versions of the names of countries, cities, towns, rivers, and mountain ranges. The sheer difficulty of meeting all these necessary preconditions is exemplified by the European Union member state of Malta. Apart from the co-official language of English, the nation-state’s national and official language is Maltese. But to this day no school or otherwise widely available Maltese-language map of the country or of Europe has yet been developed. The article on Europe in the Maltese Wikipedia provides maps of the continent in English and German, while the article on Malta provides maps of the country without any placenames.

The first-ever map of Europe in Silesian was made for Wikipedia in 2009. Andrzyj (Andreas) Roczniok is one of the first codifiers of the Silesian language, and in addition, between 2003 and 2017, he published the majority of the Silesian-language books. In 2012, I enquired whether he would be interested in developing a fuller list of Silesian-language place-names for a map of Central Europe. He agreed and the place-names he provided underpin Map 41. But the standardization of Silesian has not been completed and this language has not been recognized by Poland yet. The map is the first of its kind, and therefore, an imperfect, attempt at representing Central Europe through the lens of the coalescing Einzelsprache of Silesian. This explains the differences in spelling and terminological choices between the aforementioned Wikipedia map of Europe in Silesian and this Silesian-language map of Central Europe. Dariusz Jerzyński, the author of the first-ever extensive history of Silesia written from a Silesian national perspective (Jerzyński 2013), shared with me a detailed criticism of the Silesian forms of the placenames employed on Map 41. This amply shows how much spade work remains to be done in order to produce a Silesian-language map of (Central) Europe that would be accepted by the majority of Silesian-speakers. I am afraid that no map of this type will enjoy such wide acceptance prior to the recognition of Silesian as a (regional) language by Poland, and before the introduction of the subject of Silesian language and culture to schools across (Upper) Silesia. And even this may not be enough, as shown by the case of Poland’s recognized regional language of Kashubian, which is taught as a school subject. I also hoped to develop a map of Central Europe in Kashubian, but Kashubian specialists and activists who I approached informed me that by 2006 only the standardization of the Kashubian versions of the place-names in the ethnic region of Kashubia had been completed. Like the Maltese Wikipedia, the Kashubian Wikipedia’s article on Europe features maps of the continent in English and German, with Kashubian employed only for the names of the member states on the map of the European Union.
Ethnolinguistic nationalism, the foundational mechanism for creating and maintaining the sociopolitical reality of nation-states in Central Europe, entails the normative isomorphism (or tight spatial and discursive overlap) of language, nation, and state. Apart from a few outliers elsewhere in Eurasia (for instance, Iceland in the north Atlantic, Turkmenistan in Central Asia, Bhutan in South Asia, or Japan in East Asia), most states fulfilling the requirements of this normative isomorphism are located in Central Europe, where ethnolinguistic nationalism emerged as the foundational principle of state building, legitimation, and maintenance after World War One. Another cluster of isomorphic polities (that is, states built in line with the principles of ethnolinguistic nationalism) is located in Southeast Asia (SEA) and emerged in the wake of World War Two and subsequent decolonization.

The main normative assumption of ethnolinguistic nationalism is that (1) all the speakers of a language (or in other words, a speech community) constitute a nation, and that (2) the territory compactly inhabited by them should be turned into the nation’s nation-state. The desired result is a tight spatial and ideological overlap of language, nation, and state, or the “normative isomorphism” of these three elements. Language appears to offer an additional protective (that is, isolating and insulating) layer to the nation’s typically dual territorial-cum-demographic “morpho-immunological sphere” (Solterdijk 2011: 46) that purportedly shields the nation from the outside world’s dangers. Most of the globe’s extant nation-states are dual in this aspect, namely consisting only of the tightly overlapping nation of citizens and its state, as provided by civic nationalism. In this case, the protective immunological sphere is based on the two demographic and territorial layers, whereas the ethnolinguistic nation-state (as pointed out above) also includes a third linguistic layer.

The further basic principles of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state require that (3) the national language is the only official language of the nation-state, and that this language cannot be shared with any other polity or nation. By extension, (4) no autonomous territories with official languages other than the national one can exist within the nation-state’s borders. Likewise, (5) no autonomous territories with the national language in question as official may exist outside the nation-state, where this language “properly” belongs. An additional, but not necessary, principle is that all members of the ethnolinguistic nation should be exclusively monolingual in the national language, and that no speakers of other languages should reside permanently in the nation-state in question. By the same token, no speakers of the national language should reside permanently outside their own nation-state. This is an almost impossible-to-achieve ideal to which ethnolinguistic (isomorphic) nation-states aspire to but rarely dare to enforce due to staggeringly and prohibitively high human costs, meaning warfare, ethnic cleansing, or even genocide (Kamusella 2006).

Dialects are not included in the principles of normative isomorphism; dialect continua and dialect levelling (that is, liquidation) (Auer 1998; Stieber 1956) are generally ignored by ethnolinguistic nationalism and do not feature in the ideology’s official rhetoric. At best they are seen as part of or belonging to the national language. The process of constructing (“standardizing”) a national language is not explicitly commented on, while the popular belief, which is readily established, claims that the nation and its national language are at least a millennium old (if not eternal) and (almost) immutable. The unique status of the national language is often constitutionally guaranteed in a typical Central European nation-state, while legislation usually omits any reference to dialects. The tacit assumption is that administration, education, and mass media necessitate and facilitate the expected (“natural”) disappearance of dialects, which in due course are replaced with the idealized homogeneous national language that prevails across the entire nation-state and throughout all the nation’s social strata. Perhaps, that is what the Italian nationalist politician and writer Massimo d’Azeglio meant when he famously opined, “We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians” (D’Azeglio 1867: 7; Killinger 2002: 1).

This normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state is an analytical instrument with which it is possible to detect the ethnolinguistic character of the nation-states of both Central Europe and Southeast Asia.

In Central Europe, the first isomorphic (ethnolinguistic) nation-states appeared in the Balkans (Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria) in the nineteenth century, before normative isomorphism became the basic method of nation-state building and of national statehood legitimation and maintenance in the region after the Great War (Sundhaufen 1973). Greece with Greek as its official language, as the first ever nation-state, began to fulfill the requirements of normative isomorphism thanks to the 1864 union with the United States of the Ionian Islands that had two official languages, namely, Italian and Greek (but the former was soon phased out). Previously, the two polities had
Polities aspiring to fulfill isomorphism

Other ethnolinguistic and non-ethnolinguistic polities

States fulfilling isomorphism

- State borders
- State capitals

LATVIAN Names of official languages in states

(1) DANISH
(2) BELARUSIAN
(3) SLOVENIAN
(4) BOSNIAN-CROATIAN-SERBIAN
(5) MONTENEGRAIN-CROATIAN-HRVLACKA
(6) ALBANIAN-SERBIAN
(7) MACEDONIAN
(8) CHINESE-PORTUGUESE
(9) MYANMAR
(10) KHAIR
(11) ENGLISH-MALAY-CHINESE

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shared Greek as their official language, which had prevented them from becoming isomorphic. The model of the ethnolinguistic nation-state emerged first in the Balkans, due to the late nineteenth-century gradual replacement of religion with “a language” (Einzelsprache) as the ideological basis of Balkan nation-states, all initially established as ethnoreligious national polities. This replacement of religion with Einzelsprache was influenced by the military and economic success of the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire. Both were founded, in 1861 and 1871, respectively, as ethnolinguistic nation-states, aspiring to become “homes” for all Italians (meaning, Italian speakers) and for all Germans (meaning, German-speakers). However, neither Italy nor Germany became fully isomorphic ethnolinguistic nation-states, because to this day Italian and German have functioned as official languages in other polities.

The Great War destroyed the non-national multiethnic empires of Central Europe, namely, Austria-Hungary, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. The Western Allies replaced them with nation-states explicitly defined in ethnolinguistic terms. In this way, the normative isomorphism “moved” north from the Balkans to Central Europe proper. In 1929 the following nine broadly Central European nation-states fulfilled all the requirements of this isomorphism: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, and Yugoslavia. All of them employed as official single, specific languages not shared with any other states. That is, Albanian in Albania, Bulgarian in Bulgaria, Czechoslovak in Czechoslovakia, Estonian in Estonia, Hungarian in Hungary, Latvian in Latvia, Lithuanian in Lithuania, Norwegian in Norway, Romanian in Romania, and Serbocroatoslavonian (“Yugoslav”) in Yugoslavia.

The expansion of the Soviet Union during and after World War Two limited the number of Central Europe’s full isomorphic (ethnolinguistic) nation-states, which in turn proliferated after the breakups of the Soviet Union (1991), Czechoslovakia (1993), and Yugoslavia (1991–2008). In 2007, such polities numbered 14: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The requirements of ethnolinguistic nationalism entailed that Yugoslavia’s leading official Einzelsprache of Serbo-Croatian (popularly dubbed “Yugoslav”) had to be split in order to provide each post-Yugoslav nation-state with its own unique and unshared national language: Bosnian with Bosnian, Croatian with Croatian, Montenegrin with Montenegrin, and Serbian with Serbian. However, these new languages are almost identical, and in reality they map out ethnoreligious differences construed as national, tacitly equating Bosnians with Muslims, Croats with Catholics, and Montenegrins and Serbs with Orthodox Christians.

In East and Southeast Asia, the region’s group of isomorphic nation-state emerged after 1945 and is comprised of the following seven polities: Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, and Vietnam. From the emic (in-group) point of view, also North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan may be added to this isomorphic group, because the two Koreas in Korean are known differently as Chosŏn and Hanguk, respectively, yielding Chosŏnmal and Hangungmal as separate names for the Einzelsprachen of North Korean and South Korean. In Taiwan, the name of the official and national Chinese language is Guóyǔ or “National Language,” thus differentiating it from China’s official name of this language, that is, Pǔtōnghuà or “Common Speech.” However, for the sake of brevity, these cases are mostly excluded from this analysis.

Earlier all the aforementioned seven isomorphic nation-states were colonies, except for Japan and Thailand. Under German influence Japan remade itself into an ethnolinguistic nation-state in the 1870s, while Thailand followed the same route in the 1930s in emulation of Japan. Malaysia would almost make it into the Southeast Asia’s cluster of isomorphic states but for the co-official use of Malaysian in Brunei and Singapore. Likewise, Korea could be an isomorphic polity if it was not divided between two states and Korean was not used for official purposes in China’s Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. In Southeast Asia’s full isomorphic nation-states, the single unique and unshared languages are official and national, namely, Khmer in Cambodia, Indonesian in Indonesia, Japanese in Japan, Lao(tian) in Laos, Malaysian (Burmese) in Myanmar (Burma), Thai in Thailand, and Vietnamese in Vietnam. Similarly, as in the case of the split of Serbo-Croatian after the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Malay language of the colonial times was split into the differently named Indonesian and Malaysian in order to supply, respectively, the ethnolinguistic nation-states of Indonesia and Malaysia with their own unique national languages.

The arrival of ethnolinguistic nationalism to Meiji Japan from the German Empire is well established and researched (Farkas 2015). At that time, Japan’s elites were looking for a model of modernization (Westernization), and to this end sent an official governmental mission on a world tour from 1871 to 1873 (Nishi 1998). Regarding the system of government, statehood, and education, the mission’s members liked most of what they saw in the German Empire (Kume 2002). They decided to follow this model in Japan, including the language policy, and the model of the ethnolinguistic (isomorphic) nation-state (Yeonsuks 2010: 160–169). Due to its subsequent military, colonial, and economic successes, Japan became a model in its own right for non-European anticolonial and national movements (Narangoa and Cribb 2003) and also for few remaining independent non-Western polities (Clarke 2011: 37–38; Worringen 2014). The expansion of the Empire of Japan during the first half of the twentieth century brought the model of the ethnolinguistic nation-state to much of Southeast Asia, from Mongolia to the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia), and from Burma to the Philippines (Mendel 2001; Pluver 1995: map 52). During World War Two, Japanese occupation administrations enabled numerous students from Southeast Asia to continue their education at Japanese universities. After the war, these students brought back home an intimate knowledge of the Japanese model of nation-state, and subsequently established postcolonial ethnolinguistic nation-states in Southeast Asia (Goodman 2001: 254–255).

Another channel by which the idea of ethnolinguistic nationalism might have spread to Southeast Asia was the French
colonial statehood is citizenship (Brubaker 1992), but in practice the French nation-state is thoroughly ethnolinguistic (cf Weber 1976). The French channel provided for direct transfer of ideas and political know-how to the French colonies in Indochina, and indirectly to Siam (Thailand). For instance, after seizing Siam’s eastern (Lao) provinces in 1893, Paris codified and widened the tiny cultural and dialectal difference there (cf Pluvier 1995: map 44) into a Lao nation, complete with its own national Laotian language and script, imagined as completely separate and different from the Thai counterparts (cf Ivarsson 2008: 93–144). In reaction to this annexation, Thailand reinvented itself as an isomorphic nation-state (cf Winichakul 1994) for the nation of Thai-speaking Thais, especially in the 1930s (Streckfuss 1993). In Cambodia, the French pursued a similar policy as in Laos, aimed at severing cultural, religious, and linguistic ties with Siam (Thailand). Hence, they encouraged the use of the Khmer language and script in the nascent Khmerophone publishing industry (Chandler 2000: 159–164; Edwards 2004). However, in the case of the territories later made into Vietnam, France sought to distance the Vietnamese from the traditional Chinese influence, while maintaining an ethnocultural difference between Vietnam on the one hand, and the Khmers and the Lao, on the other. Replacing the Chinese script with the Latin alphabet for writing Vietnamese in 1918 served this purpose best (Marr 1981: 136–189). Subsequently, some Vietnamese anticolonial activists hoped to achieve independence through emulating France (cf Mishra 2012: 193–194), while others sought education in Japan (Vo 2011: 93). But in both cases the ideology of statehood to which they aspired was invariably dictated by ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state.

Another channel through which ethnolinguistic nationalism might have reached Southeast Asia was that of Soviet communism, often filtered through communist China. The Soviet model of the “affirmative action empire”—to a degree adopted in Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, China, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam—came complete with Soviet-style policies on ethnolinguistic diversity (cf Martin 2001), for instance, administrative divisions based on ethnolinguistic differences, or the reinforcement of ethnolinguistic differences between the Soviet bloc’s member states. The Soviet model of multilevel ethnolinguistically defined administrative entities was copied in communist China (cf Zhou 2003: 51–85, 169–288) and Burma. However, Southeast Asia’s other communist nation-states chose to follow the Soviet bloc countries in their policies of centralization and ethnolinguistic homogenization.

In the Dutch East Indies, in 1918, the anticolonial national movement adopted Malay as its national language and the name of Indonesia for their postulated nation-state. Subsequently, they renamed this language as “Indonesian” and proclaimed an Indonesian nation of Indonesian-speakers. The Japanese occupation facilitated the founding of the Indonesian nation-state in 1945 (Dharmowijono 1989: 298; Goto 2014; Swaan 2001: 82, 87). However, immediately after the victorious Allies lifted the German occupation from the Netherlands, half a world away, the Dutch government militarily contested Indonesian independence, leading to the outbreak of the prolonged and multi-front Indonesian War of Independence (1945–1949). The Indonesians won, and the war indelibly bound the idea of the Indonesian nation and statehood with the Indonesian language.

The invention of Burma (Myanmar) as an ethnolinguistic nation-state is closely connected to the Buddhist character of the country. Burma Province sat uneasily in British India, which was overwhelmingly Hindu and Muslim from the religious perspective. This arrangement turned untenable, necessitating the detachment of Burma from British India in 1937. Afterward, Burmese national activists emphasized the Burmese language against English for use in offices and schools. In 1930 they adopted an isomorphic program of building an ethnolinguistically homogenous Burmese nation-state, entailing Burmanization of the non-Burmese-speaking ethnic groups (Bečka 2007: 154–155, 164–166; Watkins 2007: 270–273). Burma gained independence in 1948, and the country’s ethnically Burmese and Buddhist elite embarked on the project of the ethnolinguistic (and ethnoreligious) homogenization of the population.

At present there are only two clusters of ethnolinguistic nation-states in the world, one in Central Europe and the other in East and Southeast Asia. The former coalesced after 1918, while the latter emerged in the wake of World War Two. This sequence of events raises the question whether it is a case of idea transfer. Did Southeast Asian anti-colonial activists-turned-modernizers (Westernizers) and nationalists borrow the idea of ethnolinguistic nation-state (alongside ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state) from Central Europe? Did the Allies’ post-1918 radical remodelling of Central Europe’s political shape from empires to ethnolinguistic nation-states inspire Southeast Asia’s anti-colonial movements as a tantalizingly realistic manner and plan for overthrowing the colonial order in their region? This is an interesting hypothesis that may be confirmed, qualified, or falsified only with more comparative and interdisciplinary research. Interestingly, both these clusters of ethnolinguistic nation-states are located in Eurasia, where pre-dominantly local (indigenous) languages are employed as official in administration and education. Elsewhere in the world, (postcolonial) European languages are employed in this function to the thorough marginalization of the local languages (with few exceptions), making it structurally impossible for any ethnolinguistically defined national statehood to be implemented there. An unshared and unique European language as official and national in a postcolonial nation-state outside of Eurasia is (almost) a contradiction in terms.
Abstand language (from German Abstand “distance,” formed from standen “to stand” and ab “apart”)—a contrastive category for classifying Einzelsprachen from the perspective of mutual (in)comprehensibility. Two languages or speech varieties that do not allow any mutual comprehensibility are seen as Abstand languages, for instance, English and Chinese, Polish and Turkish, or French and Arabic. Typically, Abstand languages come from different dialect continua. However, if speakers of languages from different dialect continua interact with one another for centuries or even millennia the phenomenon of linguistic area may override such separation and generate a considerable degree of mutual comprehensibility. This is perhaps the case of some dialects of the Chinese language, which originally may have been Abstand languages.

The term Abstand language and its opposite, Ausbau language, were introduced in the early 1960s by the German linguist Heinz Kloss (1967). During World War Two, in the Third Reich, he was a high ranking official and scholar responsible for designing and implementing language policy (to a degree, also for linguistic engineering) for a variety of ethnic groups (minorities) in the occupied territories (Hutton 1999: 154, 185).

See also roofing language (Dachsprache).

accent (Neo-Latin term accentus “speaking tone,” formed from ad “to” and cantus “a singing”; translation of the Greek term προσῳδία prosōidia “song sung to music, pronunciation of a syllable”)—in linguistics (phonetics) the stress used to emphasize the relative prominence of a syllable in a word. But in popular English usage a neutral or disparaging synonym for a speech variety (dialect) or for a Germanic Einzelsprache (language) closely related to English (for instance, Scots).

acrolact—see prestige.

agency (seventeenth-century neologism from Neo-Latin agentia, in turn derived from agere “to act, to do, to manage”—the capacity of an autonomous being (”agent”) to make independent choices, to act, create, maintain, destroy, change (social) reality and its elements. Social reality, as we know it, is fully generated by humans and their groups, and as such entirely dependent on human will. Hence, in relation to this social reality, only humans are agents, not any elements of the aforesaid social reality, such as languages (Einzelsprachen), speech varieties, dialects, states, or nations. It is important to stress this point, due to the popular but erroneous view that a language may “do” something on its own, “live,” “give birth to offspring languages,” or even “die.” These are confusing metaphors. It is humans alone and their groups who create and do things with languages, as they see fit. In the majority of cases they do such things with languages rather unreflectively, but when they act in this regard with a clear intention, then human actions constitute what amounts to language politics or even language engineering.

anti-Semitism (from the 1870s German neologism Antisemitismus, formed from the prefix “anti-” and the ethnonym “Semite.” The former stems from Greek ἄντι anti “against.” “Semite” is an exonym for Jews and other Semitic-speaking peoples, coined in the eighteenth century at the University of Göttingen from the biblical name of Ἱβρικ Shem, or one of Noah’s sons [Baasten 2003: 58])—anti-Jewish (anti-Judaist) sentiment, prejudice, especially widespread in Central Europe, where the majority of Jews lived for centuries until the Holocaust. See also discrimination, racism.

anti-Tsiganism (also anti-Gypsism, because the English exonym Gypsy is a translation of the Slavic, or more broadly Central European term, for example, Cigan in Croatian, Cikán in Czech, Zigeuner in German, Гетс Gipsos in Greek, Zigan in Italian, Cigan in Hungarian, Cigan in Polish, Ťigan in Romanian, Τσιγάν Tsigan in Russian, Циган Cigan in Serbian, or Ukrainian Циган Tsyhan)—anti-Roma (anti-Gypsy) sentiment and prejudice; a formal or informal policy of structural discrimination observed in the past and present in all the states and regions where Roma communities reside. Most reports on acts of anti-Tsiganism come from Central Europe due to the fact that the majority of Roma have lived in the region since the early modern period. But this in no way means that anti-Tsiganism is less acute elsewhere in the world where Roma and their communities live. Actually, due to centuries-long coexistence, many Central European gadjos (non-Roma) tend to be more tolerant and accepting than gadjos in other parts of the world. Nonetheless, during World War Two, it was in Central Europe that Roma suffered the Samudaripen, or the Roma Genocide at the hands of Nazi Germany and its allies.

The term anti-Tsiganism was coined by Aleksandr German in 1928, who, a year later, teamed up with Grigorii Lebedev, and together published an analytical article on this phenomenon in the Soviet newspaper Komsomol’skaia Pravda. In 1931, the former Chairman of the All-Soviet Union of Gypsies (Roma), Andrei Taranov, appealed for a sustained “struggle against anti-Gyp-

aphasia (late 1860s Neo-Latin term, formed from Greek α a “without,” and φαύνα phainai “to speak”)—literally “speechlessness,” that is a specialist term for the medical condition of not being able to produce or comprehend \( \text{language} \), due to brain damage or another neurological (or medical) condition.

articulation (from Latin articulare, meaning literally “to separate into joints” and metaphorically “to utter distinctly”)—production of an Einzelsprache’s phonemes in an act of speech.

assimilation (from Neo-Latin assimilātus “likened to, made like,” that is, as- “toward,” simil “similar,” and -ātus “verb ending”)—the quest in ethnic nation-states for ethnolinguistic (ethnoreligious) homogeneity as prescribed by the principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state, whereby minorities are coaxed to abandon their languages (and religions) and adopt the language (and religion) of the nation-state of their residence. A given minority’s “home” nation-state may seek to prevent this outcome by supporting education in the minority’s language and the minority’s organizations in the country of their residence. Assimilation usually takes place “naturally” under the influence of the overbearing and ubiquitous normative use of the nation-state’s language in all spheres of public life. Some authoritarian-leaning ethnolinguistic nation-states—especially if prevented by international treaties from availing themselves of population transfers (ethnic cleansing)—may adopt a policy to accelerate the process of assimilation through administrative coercive (punitive) measures, resulting in the phenomenon of forced assimilation. See also integration, population (demographic) engineering.

atheism (from the sixteenth-century French neologism athéisme, derived from Greek α a “without,” and θεός theos “deity, god”)—not professing or practicing any religion, disbelief in the existence of any deity or supernatural forces.

Ausbau language (from German Ausbau “expansion,” etymologically construed as bauen “to build” and aus “away”)—a contrastive category for classifying Einzelsprachen from the perspective of mutual (in)comprehensibility. Two mutually comprehensible languages or speech varieties are seen as Ausbau languages, for instance, Bulgarian and Macedonian, Moldovan and Romanian; or the post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian. The term Ausbau language comments on the process of standardization, which focuses on singling out extant differences and fortifying them to make the Ausbau languages in question less similar, less mutually comprehensible, ideally, more Abstand-like. The construction of the post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian during the past two decades is the prime example of the Ausbau standardizing process in practice. See also roofing language (Dachsprache).

authoritarianism (from the adjective “authoritarian” for “favoring imposed order over freedom,” derived from Latin auctoritas “invention, advice, opinion, command,” in turn from auctor “master, leader, author,” ultimately from Greek αὐτοκράτης autokratēs “sovereign, autocrat,” formed from ἀύτο auto “self” and κράτια krātia “rule,” the latter stemming from κράτος krate “power”)—a political system characterized by limited political and individual freedoms and a strong central government, usually led by a single—almost invariably male—dictator, which rules the polity and its citizenry (nation) in a quite arbitrary manner. Laws and principles of governance are established and changed in line with the dictator’s will. See also totalitarianism, tyranny.

basilect—see prestige.

bidialectism (multidialectism) (etymology: see bilingualism, dialect)—the equally full command of two or more dialects, that is, Einzelsprachen, which typically for political reasons are not recognized as “languages.” See also language politics.

bilingualism (multilingualism, polyglotism) (1870s neologism, formed from Latin bi- “two” and lingua “language”)—the equally full command of two or more Einzelsprachen. This ideal is rarely achieved, usually a person has a varied (unequal) command of language varieties and/or Einzelsprachen and uses them for different functions and in different spheres of life. Hence, in the vast majority of cases, bilingualism (multilingualism) actually means diglossia (polyglossia). Bilingualism (multilingualism) is the bogeyman of ethnolinguistic nationalists. In line with this ideology, they believe that a person may “truly” or “naturally” have only one (national) language (or mother tongue). People speaking and writing multiple languages are seen as “traitors” of these nations whose languages they employ. See also suprastandard bilingualism.

biosphere (late nineteenth-century neologism from German Biotop, formed from Greek βιός bios “life,” and from Latin sphæra “ball, globe, celestial sphere,” in turn from Greek σφαῖρα sphaira “ball, globe”)—the space where biological (DNA-based) life takes place. Within the biosphere the noosphere (semiosphere) is located, where people and their groups live, meaning they use \( \text{language} \) for generating social reality. These parts of the biosphere where there are no humans belong to the extrascientific sphere, or where no social reality is generated through the use of \( \text{language} \).

bisscriptism (from Latin bi- “two” and scriptum, that is, a form of the verb scribere “to write”)—the normative or de facto use of two writing systems for writing a single language (Einzelsprache) (for example, Montenegrin is officially written in both Cyrillic and Latin letters), or for writing official languages, each in a different script in a state (for instance, Serbian in Cyrillic, while...
Bosnian and Croatian in Latin letters in today’s Bosnia). See also monoscriptalism and multisciptalism.

**blasphey** (from Latin blasphemare, in turn from Greek ἔβλασθημεν “to blaspheme,” coined from ἐβλάστημι “harm, injury,” and φίμη fimi “rumor, hearsay”—impious utterance or insulting action concerning a religion’s deity or supernatural force, until the turn of the twentieth century widely criminalized in countries with monotheistic religions. The ultimate act of blasphemy is *atheism*. The perceived crime of blasphemy contributed to the formulation of a similar crime of *lèse-majesté*, transformed in ethnolinguistic nation-states into a popular accusation “traitor of one’s nation,” typically levelled against a person who does not blindly believe in and follow a given national master narrative.

**Bloodlands**—a concept developed by the United States Historian, Timothy Snyder, in his 2010 eponymous monograph (Snyder 2010). It defines Central Europe functionally through the lens of the spatial occurrence of genocide and ethnic cleansing during World War Two, or more broadly, in the short twentieth century (1913/1914–1989/1991). Most repres- sions, deportations, expulsions, mass incarceration in concentra- tion camps, or extermination through administratively-induced famine, extermination camps or death squads were carried out by ethnic Germans (Austrians) and ethnic Russians, and were directed at ethnically non-German and non-Russian populations living between interwar Germany and the interwar Soviet Union’s Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. From the perspective of the Great War, the Bloodlands may be seen as the non-German-speaking parts of Austria-Hungary, alongside the territories occupied by the Central Powers from the Baltic to the Caucasus, and from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. In terms of World War Two, the Bloodlands were demarcated by the easternmost extent of wartime Germany’s occupation (almost up to the gates of Moscow), and the Soviet Union’s westernmost ex- tent of occupation, which after 1945 coalesced into a Soviet bloc, with neutral Finland and Sweden in the north and the maverick communist states of Albania and Yugoslavia in the south. A concept similar to the Bloodlands, namely the “Lands Between,” was proposed in the same year of 2010 by another United States historian, Alexander Prusin (2010), in his monograph *The Lands Between: Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870–1992*. Prusin’s collocation is derived from the 1830s German term Zwischeneuropa for Central Europe (that is, the areas between the German Confederation and the ethnic [Orthodox] core of the Russian Empire), which became popularized in English-language literature as “in-between Europe” during the 1990s.

**bureaucracy** (1810s Gallicism, from French bureaucracte, coined from French bureau “desk, office,” and Greek κράτος krateos “power, rule”)—the manner of ruling a polity through ad- ministration (state offices, civil service), whose work is done through the medium of writing in a given Einzelsprache, with the use of a specific script. This is the main method of creating and maintaining non-face-to-face statehood. The difference between pre-modern and modern statehood is quite clearly marked by indirect bureaucracy in the former case and direct bu- reaucracy in the latter. In pre-modern polities only the literate elite (that is, male members of the estates) were in direct contact with the non-face-to-face state bureaucracy (administration), and thus mediated between the state and the vast majority of the overwhelmingly illiterate population, then mostly composed of peasants (serfs), and living in face-to-face communities (Gemeinschaften, micro-ethnic groups). In modern states that observe or practice the ideal of political equality for all cit- izens, bureaucracy is direct, ubiquitous, and intensive, meaning that each citizen is in continual contact with the state adminis- tration (civil service). Obviously, this is only possible due to compul- sory universal elementary education, which ensures full liter- acy and numeracy.

A change in the official (national) language and writing system when a new nation-state has been founded may over- night make a previously privileged stratum illiterate, innumer- ate, and disenfranchised, especially in an ethnolinguistic na- tion-state where access to citizenship is dependent on one’s “correct” nationality (that is membership in a nation) in accord- ance with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the nor- mative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. All in all, in non-face-to-face human groups (states) writing is power, mean- ing, *cuius regio, eius scripturam* (“whose realm, his writing”).

**canon** (from Medieval Latin canonicus “of or under rule,” in turn from Greek κανών kanôn “measuring rod, rule, principle, law”; akin to Arabic قانون qanûn or Hebrew קנה kaneh “straight,” all meaning literally “reed,” hence English “cane”)—originally an ecclesiastical law or a body of law (“canon law”) in the Catholic Church. Later, by extension, a set of standard principles, axioms and rules to be followed in a field of art or research. Also, a syn- onym for decorum, that is, the social norms as prevailing in a given Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft.

Another meaning of the term canon denotes the standard ap- proved set of the “true” books of the Bible, or any scrip- tural religion’s recognized set of “holy texts (books).” Hence, the present-day meaning of the best books in world literature, or in a country’s literature. In ethnolinguistic nation-states, the term “canon” refers to the best books written in the national Einzelsprache, and to the state-approved principles of correctness (see prescriptivism) of writing and pronouncing a given na- tional Einzelsprache. In a broader understanding, the collocation “national canon” may refer to the preselected standard elements of a nation’s culture that are propagated through compulsory school education.

**Central Europe**—in the mid-nineteenth century, definitely after 1815—this term began to appear in English (as “Middle Europe”) and in German (as Mitteleuropa) for referring to the countries and areas between France and the Russian Empire. It gradually replaced the older conceptual division of Europe into Northern Europe north of the Alps and the Carpathians, and Southern Europe south of these mountain ranges. Hence, the protracted 1700–1721 warfare between Sweden and Muscovy, fought from Scandinavia to the Balkans, and from Denmark to what today is eastern Ukraine, is known as the “Great Northern War,” not
a “Great Central (or Eastern) European War.” Therefore, any uses of the heuristically useful term Central Europe for periods prior to 1815, in essence, are anachronistic. During the Great War, thanks to the German politician Friedrich Naumann’s influential monograph Mitteleuropa, the term Central Europe was identified with the Central Powers (that is, the German Empire and Austria-Hungary) and their sphere of economic and political influence (occupation) (Naumann 1915). In the interwar period, the concept of Central Europe denoted the swath of ethnolinguistic nation-states, mostly founded after 1918, from the southern Baltic littoral to the Balkans, and from Germany to the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, Central Europe disappeared as a (geo)-political concept, due to the Iron Curtain division of the continent into Western and Eastern Europe, without any Central Europe in the middle. Émigré Central European scholars in North America and Britain developed a scholarly concept of “East-Central Europe” for talking about this part of interwar Central Europe, which found itself under Soviet dominance. They successfully defined this region with the authoritative multivolume book series A History of East Central Europe, which commenced publishing in 1974 (cf. Rothschild 1974).

In 1993, the Canadian historian of Rusyn and Ukrainian origin, Paul Robert Magocsi, contributed Historical Atlas of East Central Europe to this series, which nine years later, in 2002, was republished in an extended edition, entitled Historical Atlas of Central Europe (Magocsi 1993, 2002). After the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union, it was felt unnecessary to qualify the term Central Europe with the adjective “East.” Magocsi proposed to define Central Europe as an equidistant vertical (north-south) midsection of the continent of Europe, however, he does not include Scandinavia in this concept’s scope, though the aforementioned midsection seems to be covering it. In contrast to Magocsi’s definition, the concept of Central Europe as adopted in this Words in Space and Time: Historical Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe also covers Scandinavia.

Central Europe is as much imagined as Europe itself, and these concepts, as any others developed by humans, are part of social reality. From the perspective of geography, the term “continent” denotes a large landmass surrounded by oceans and seas. Hence, Europe is a mere western peninsula (or subcontinent) of Eurasia, on par with the Indian subcontinent.

From the thematic perspective of this atlas (Words in Space and Time: Historical Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe), Central Europe is defined as this part of Europe where, after 1918, the model of ethnolinguistic nation-state has been dominant for the sake of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance in accordance with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. In the terms of borders and politics after the end of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Central Europe extends from Italy and Germany in the west to Russia’s western frontier, and from Scandinavia to the Balkans, including Turkey (that is, Anatolia). In this understanding of Central Europe, the term Eastern Europe denotes the European section of Russia alongside the post-Soviet Caucasian nation-states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. However, some observers use the European Union’s eastern frontier to propose that the post-Soviet states of Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine also should be classified as part of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Russia’s official adoption of ethnolinguistic nationalism in the form of the ideology of the Russian World, deployed for the legitimation of the 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea, may be interpreted as an “eastward enlargement” of the concept of Central Europe, as defined by the use of the aforementioned normative isomorphism for nation-state building, legitimation, and maintenance. Hence, it could be proposed that there is no longer an Eastern Europe. But in literature, authors prefer to speak of Central and Eastern Europe when commenting on political, ideological, and social similarities between states and areas that in the past were apportioned to Central Europe, on the one hand, and to Eastern Europe, on the other.

In his influential 1981 essay (swiftly translated into English, German, and French), the Hungarian historian, Jenő Szűcs, proposed to define Central Europe in terms of sociopolitical developments, as the area where serfdom was introduced in the late medieval period and survived through the nineteenth century (Szűcs 1985). Following in the footsteps of his sociohistoric thinking, it could be proposed that Central Europe be defined as the part of the continent where Latin survived as a leading language of administration, instruction, and intellectual discourse until the mid-nineteenth century. Afterward, the same area was denoted by the use of German as a leading language of commerce and scholarship, alongside French as a leading language of social distinction.

From the ethnodemographic angle, the founding of ethnolinguistic nation-states across Central Europe after the Great War made the region’s two diasporic populations, Jews and Roma, “politically homeless” (that is, with no national polity of their own). Respectively, they had lived in Central Europe at least from the tenth and fourteenth centuries. In reply to the rise of anti-Semitism as part of the region’s “normal politics” in the late nineteenth century, Jewish activists and scholars constructed a cultural nation-state of Yiddishland. With the exception of the interwar Soviet Union, Roma intelligentsia was practically inexistent at that time in Central Europe. A Romanistan on the model of Yiddishland, thanks to the policy of korenizatsiia, began coalescing in this communist polity, but this experiment was cut short in the late 1930s. In interwar Poland it was given a brief lease on life by a proposal to establish a Roma nation-state in a colony outside Europe. The genocide of Jews and Roma as perpetrated by wartime Germany and its allies (Croatia, France, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Slovakia) wiped out Yiddishland and convinced most Jewish survivors either to move to the United States or to build a Jewish nation-state in the British Mandate of Palestine. In this way, politically and ideologically speaking, Central Europe was extended to the Middle East. In the Soviet bloc, Roma were commonly seen in the press and by local administration as the poorest, or lowest, stratum of the working class or peasantry, rather than a nationality in its own right, hence they were suppressed as a distinctive ethnic group, though their rights as individual citizens were quite well protected. After the end of communism, anti-Tsiganism re-emerged and appeared in places where it had not existed before as a significant element of the programs of Central Europe’s radical right and nationalist parties.
In this region the popular usage is as follows: the nationalism of one’s own nation is patriotism, while nationalisms of other nations must be a form of chauvinism.

civic nationalism—this form of nationalism was invented in the United States and revolutionary France. Both polities redefined the population living on the state's territory as citizens. In turn, all the state's citizens (citizenry) were declared to be the nation, whose “common will” (instead of divine right) ensures legitimacy for the government and statehood of the resultant nation-state. Most of the present-day world’s polities follow this model. Outside of Eurasia all extant nation-states are civic in their character.

civic vs ethnic nationalism—a normative dichotomy developed in the early 1970s by the Montenegrin political scientist, John Plamenatz, working at the University of Oxford. In this line of thinking civic nationalisms are “good” and typical of the West, while ethnic nationalisms are “bad” and typical of the East (Plamenatz 1973). The “West” in this formulation refers to Western Europe, North America, and Australasia (that is, Australia, New Zealand, and the surrounding postcolonial island nations-states), while the “East” refers to Central and Eastern Europe. In a broader understanding of ethnicity as culture, politics and customs of civic nationalism (such as citizenship or constitution), these are part of human culture (ethnicity). Hence, in reality, all nationalisms are ethnic in their character. Civic nationalism is just a subcategory of ethnic nationalism.

Interestingly, unlike in English or other European languages, in Modern Arabic there are two different terms for each of these two kinds of nationalism. The term فانتييا qaumiyya for ethnolinguistic nationalism is derived from قوم qawm, meaning “a people, tribe (ethnic group) and (ethnolinguistic) nation.” On the other hand, the term وطنية wataniyya for civic nationalism is derived from the word وطن wanat meaning “homeland, country, nation-state.” The ethnolinguistic (Pan-)Arab nationalism grounded in the Arabic language is referred to by the use of the neologism qaumiyyya, while civic nationalisms (disparaged as “regionals” by Pan-Arab nationalists), centered on Arabic-speaking nation-states (such as Algeria, Egypt, or Sudan), are invariably termed wataniyyas.

civilization (from Latin civis “citizen” or “city dweller,” as opposed to “barbarian,” or “villager,” hence the French seventeenth-century verb civiliser “to civilize,” in the mid-eighteenth century adopted in English for denoting “the act or process of bringing out of a savage or uneducated state”)—a blurry, but highly ideologized, concept popularized in the mid-twentieth century by the influential British historian Arnold Toynbee, who used it as a key term of analysis in his massive 12-volume history of the world, A Study of History (1914—1961). Since the mid-1990s, the current understanding of the term “civilization” has been decisively shaped by the United States political scientist Samuel
Huntington’s highly influential work The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996). Nowadays, civilization means a human population (typically) consisting of numerous ethnic groups, nations, or states united by a shared culture, supposedly underwritten by a single religion and the “holy script” (writing system) of the religion’s “holy book,” as written in a “holy tongue” (Einzelsprache). To a large degree Huntington’s “Orthodox civilization” is conterminous with the “post-Soviet space,” on the basis of which, and in line with, the tenets of Eurasianism, the present-day Russian government promotes the ideology of the “Russian World.”

class (from Latin classis “class, division, army, or fleet,” but especially “any one of the six orders of taxation into which the inhabitants of ancient Rome were divided”)—in marxism, a socio-economic stratum with the richest elite being the top stratum. Traditional democracy replaced estates (classes to which one belonged by birthright) with legal and political equality. For marxists (communists, socialists) these provisions are insufficient to achieve true equality, hence it is proposed that classes (socio-economic inequalities) must be mitigated, or even liquidated, leading to a more equal society, or even to classless society, as predicted by communists.

(language) codification (from Medieval Latin codex for a form of book consisting from rectangular pages sewn together at the spine, ultimately from Latin caudex “trunk of a tree, or block of wood”)—often a synonym for (language) standardization, but otherwise the preliminary (in Europe, typically early modern) period for such standardization, connected to the rise of printing and the entailed growing volume of printed books produced in a speech variety or closely related speech varieties. Book publishing excises such a speech variety from the continuous linguistic (dialect continuum, language), tentatively making it into an Einzelsprache. However, the discussion (questione della lingua) typically continues regarding whether such a printed Einzelsprache is a language, and on how to further standardize it usefully and correctly.

collective responsibility (etymology: see collectivism. The noun “responsibility” comes from “responsible,” derived from Latin respondere “to respond, answer, promise in return,” ultimately frompondère “to pledge, promise”—the principle that the entire group (nation) bears responsibility for the acts (typically assessed as “criminal,” or otherwise reprehensible) of any of its members. Hence, punishment for an individual’s (supposed) crimes may be taken out on the entire group or any of its members. Often ethnic cleansing or genocide are a form of collective punishment. See also collectivism, individualism.

collectivism (mid-1870 French neologism collectivisme, in turn from Latin collectivus, or past participle of colligo “assemble, gather together”—an attitude, doctrine, or even ideology, which claims that a group, as consisting of individuals, is of more import than an individual. Collectivism is the foundational premise of communism, fascism, and any totalitarianism, or the phenomenon of collective responsibility. It is also a significant basis of nationalism, especially ethnic nationalism, in which the “survival, fate” of the nation, its national language, or national religion are prioritized over the individual. In civic nationalism, the power of collectivism is reined in by the purely contractual definition of nationality (membership in a nation), as equated with citizenship. One may choose to become a member (that is, citizen) of a civic nation (that is, a nation-state), but on the contrary one is believed to have been “born” to an ethnic nation (speech community, religious community), and thus “naturally” supplied at birth with the nation’s language and/or religion.

colonialism (from Latin colonia “colony,” in turn derived from colere “to inhabit, till or cultivate land,” also yielding coloni[us] “serf” and “inhabitant of a colony”—a modern policy of Western powers (or Westernized powers, such as Russia or Japan) to conquer non-Western lands with an eye of turning them and their populations into subject territories for the sake of exploitation. If a power managed to win a considerable number of colonies, they usually were molded into a colonial empire (see imperialism). Colonial empires were typically maritime in their character, the imperial metropolis separated from its colonial empire by seas and oceans. The notable example is the Russian Empire, which expanded in a contiguous manner across Eurasia, thus forming a continent-wide land empire. Another exception is that under the political guises of the Soviet Union, Soviet bloc, Russian Federation, and Eurasian Union this empire has largely survived to this day. China is also a land empire. See also decolonization.

communalism (etymology: see communism)—ostensibly the phenomenon of creating a sharp difference between cohabiting groups through the politicization of religion. Hence, nowadays, another name for ethnoreligious nationalism. This term is especially popular in South Asian countries that used to be British colonies. Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) was not incorporated into British India due to its Buddhist character, while in 1937 Burma was separated from British India and made into a separate colony, also due to the fact that most of its inhabitants were Buddhists. In 1947 British India was split into the nation-states of India and Pakistan on an ethnoreligious basis, resulting in huge ethnic cleansing (with elements of genocide) across the newly created frontiers. Like the term tribalism in sub-Saharan Africa, in today’s India the word communalism functions as a pejorative for negatively branding ethnoreligious national movements for autonomy or independence. The application of this term to a movement seems to automatically delegitimize it and allows for disregarding such a movement. This is especially true of predominately Muslim Kashmir and Khalistan, or a project of an ethnoreligious nation-state for the Sikhs construed as a nation. See also sectarianism.

communism (from Latin communis “common, universal, for all,” also the etymological source of “community” = Gemeinschaft; ironically, the meaning is shared with Greek word kataholikos “universal, global,” which features prominently in the name of the Catholic Church, prompting frequent comparisons of communism to a religion)—a far-left universalist ideology in its aspirations of building a global-wide classless and
nation-less society for all humanity, where spontaneous self-organization would replace the necessity of statehood, and everyone will contribute according to their skills and receive according to their needs. Although the Soviet Union is typically classified as a communist state, in the Soviet leaders' own opinion only socialism was achieved in this country, namely, a transitional stage between capitalism (= nationalism) and communism. Western observers referred to the Soviet sociopolitical and economic system as "really existing communism (socialism)." In practice, communism has been a monopoly totalitarian or authoritarian tyranny led by an invariably male dictator, in which the ruling party structures double as the state's administrative structures. The co-option of ethnolinguistic nationalism in the interwar Soviet Union was only for accelerating the transition from capitalism (bourgeois society, nations) to socialism (communism), and after achieving this goal nationalism was to be liquidated in favor of classless society with a single socialista language (apparently, Russian). The stubborn persistence of ethnolinguistic nationalism led to the adoption of national (ethnic) languages and cultures as a "form" for the socialist (communist) "content."

After the end of stalinism in 1956, national communisms (in plural) were adopted across the Soviet bloc's countries, meaning these countries' specific (national) "ways to socialism (communism)." Yugoslavia was the first country to adopt this policy, which, in 1948, led to the "rift" (conflict) between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Homogenization of the state, as sought by communists was class-oriented in its character. All classes, but laborers (workers and peasants), were to be liquidated, and thus a uniform (ideally, global-wide) "classless" (that is, single-class) society was to be achieved. In practice, class homogenization was coupled with ethnolinguistic homogenization, namely, Russification of the population in the Soviet Union, or the monolingualization of the population in a given Soviet bloc country's national language (Einzelsprache). See also fascism.

community (etymology: see communism)—see Gemeinschaft.

composite (official) language (etymology: see language. The term "composite" stems from Latin compositus, or past participle of compiere "to put together")—with the rise of the printed book, publishers strove to standardize and limit the number of administrative (chancery) Einzelsprachen employed in a polity's chanceries, as typically connected to this or that city's or town's specific speech variety. Publishers engaging in such language engineering curbed the variants of extant syntactical structures, systematized spelling, and selected preferred forms of words. Furthermore, they provided vocabulary lists in which such selected (standard) forms of words were paired with their counterparts in a given local speech variety. They made this effort with an eye for being able to produce gainfully a bigger number of copies of a book title for a bigger market. In the sixteenth century, there were at least six German(ic) Druckersprachen (printing Einzelsprachen) across the Holy Roman Empire. Subsequently, the Druckersprache of Martin Luther's translation of the Bible rapidly gained popularity with the spread of Protestantism. This translation's Druckersprache was the chancy Einzelsprache of the Electorate of Saxony. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was in direct competition with the Common German of the imperial court at Vienna and with the two "Low German" Einzelsprachen of the Hanseatic League and the Dutch Republic. By the turn of the nineteenth century Luther's version of the Saxon chancery Einzelsprache had become a German language, while the Dutch Low German had yielded a Dutch language. From this historical (diachronic) perspective, today's German is a clear case of a composite language. The aforementioned chancery languages and Druckersprachen of the Holy Roman Empire are too simplistically seen as "belonging to" the German language, while in reality all of them were Einzelsprachen in their own right. With time, some were melded with Luther's Saxon chancery Einzelsprache, while others fell from written use. But nowadays the composite character of the German Einzelsprache as a national language is largely forgotten, especially with the determined and continuing deployment of prescriptivism and purism for enforcing the unitary character of German.

In 1885, the Norwegian Parliament recognized the written standards of Nynorsk (New Norwegian) and Bokmål (Book Language) as official and equal varieties of the Norwegian language. In accordance with the logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism that equates an Einzelsprache's speech community with the nation (see normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state), between 1917 and 1966, Norway's official language politics predicted and encouraged the merger of these two varieties into a monocentric Samnorsk (Common Norwegian), causing much political and social tension before is policy was discontinued. However, for the sake of preserving the ethnolinguistic unity of the Norwegian nation, Bokmål and Nynorsk are not perceived as two separate Einzelsprachen, but as "written dialects (standards)" of the single, though pluricentric, Norwegian language.

In 1918, Czechoslovakia was founded based on ethnolinguistic nationalism as a nation-state of the Czechoslovak nation. But at that time Czech and Slovak were employed as separate national languages, which clashed with the principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. Hence, following the Norwegian example, in 1920 a single (though pluricentric) Czechoslovak national language was proclaimed, comprising two equal written standards of Czech and Slovak. However, in reality the Czech standard was preferred in actual administrative use over the Slovak one. Subsequently, in emulation of the Samnorsk model, an effort was undertaken to Czechize Slovak during the early 1930s to create a single common and monocentric written standard of Czechoslovak, namely a Czech Einzelsprache with some Slovak elements added. Many Slovak activists and intellectuals opposed such an unequal merger of Czech and Slovak, thus reinforcing the separateness of Slovak as an Einzelsprache with the use of anti-Czech purism. The destruction of Czechoslovakia in 1939, followed by the creation of a wartime ethnolinguistic nation-state of Slovakia, tore apart the pluricentric Czechoslovak language into monocentric Czech and Slovak. The Norwegian style model of a composite national language turned out to be unsustainable due to the continuing ethnic (national) difference between the Czechs and Slovaks, additionally reinforced during the war by the state border. See also suprastandard bilingualism.

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, also founded in 1918, faced the same ideological dilemma, like interwar Czechoslo-
vacia. Following the Czechoslovak solution, in 1921, Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian (also spelled Serbocroatoslovenian) was proclaimed as the nation-state’s single (though pluricentric) national language. In practice, it came in the two written standards of Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian. In addition, the former standard had two scriptal varieties, namely, the Croatian one in Latin letters and the Serbian one in Cyrillic. The dilemma of national unity remained unresolved for much longer because the kingdom’s two nations of Serbo-Croats and Slovenes (mentioned in statistical and official documents) were not melded into a single nation of Yugoslavs until 1929. The country’s name was changed accordingly to Yugoslavia, but the name of the Yugoslav nation’s national language of Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian remained officially unaltered, though in popular parlance people began to refer to it as “Yugoslav.” Due to ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious differences reinforced by the wartime breakup of Yugoslavia and the establishment of a Croatian nation-state, the composite (pluricentric) “Yugoslav” language was split into monocentric wartime Croatian, Slovenian, and Serbian, while in what today is Macedonia, then under Bulgarian occupation, southern Serbian was renamed as Bulgarian. In postwar federal Yugoslavia the wartime southern Serbian-turned-Bulgarian was made into a separate national Einzelsprache of Macedonian, wartime Slovenian was retained as a separate national language, while Croatian and Serbian were melded into a renewed composite (pluricentric) language of Serbo-Croatian. In 1974 the four republican-cum-national-cum-scriptal varieties of Serbo-Croatian were recognized, namely, Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian. When in the first half of the 1990s Yugoslavia broke up into successor ethnolinguistic nation-states, pluricentric Serbo-Croatian was split accordingly into the monocentric national languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian. In 2017, without questioning the political and national separateness of these four post-Serbo-Croatian Einzelsprachen, a sizeable group of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian linguists and intellectuals proposed that for the purpose of everyday communication, characterized by uniform mutual comprehensibility (or superscriptual multilingualism), all four languages could be seen as parts of a non-political, non-national, non-official, nameless pluricentric language, only functionally designated as the “Common Language” (Zajednički jezik).

**concentration camp** (from Spanish campos de reconcentración “camps for re-concentrating [populations removed by force from the rebel areas],” used by the Spanish forces during the Cuban War of Independence [1895–1898]; afterward yielding, in 1901, the English-language term “concentration camps,” as employed by the British forces in South Africa during the Second Boer War [1899–1902]; first appearing in German as Konzentrationslager in 1904 in the context of the German genocide of the Herero and Nama in South-West Africa, before becoming the official term [commonly abbreviated as KZ or KL] for a vast network of internment, forced labor and death or extermination camps, developed and maintained by national socialist Germany in 1933–1945; in parallel, the term appeared in Russian in 1919 as концентрационный лагерь konzentrationsnyi lager’ for denoting ad hoc prisons for “enemies of the Bolshevik revolution,” later replaced in Soviet terminology by the term лагерь [принудительных работ] lager’ [принудительн’ykh rabot’] “[forced labor] camp;” a vast system of Soviet concentration camps existed between 1930 and 1956, and unofficially until 1991; during World War Two the Soviet portmanteau word концлагеря kontslager’ appeared as a pejorative for wartime Germany’s Konzentrationslager)—this expression gained wider currency during the Boer Wars at the turn of the twentieth century when enemy combatants and their families and (non-white) farm laborers were indiscriminately rounded up without due trial or any charges and detained in guarded locations surrounded by barbed wire (later, often electrified) fences. The concentration camp as an instrument of population engineering had developed in the colonial context since the 1850s in North America and Australia. In the twentieth century all Europe’s authoritarian and totalitarian states built and maintained vast networks of concentration camps for detaining political opponents and for removing unwanted populations in their quest for the ideal of ethnolinguistic homogeneity. As a result, the term “concentration, re-education or forced labor” became widespread in Central Europe’s languages (for example, kampy in Albanian; лагер fabier in Belarusian; лагере lager in Bulgarian; tabor in Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak; laager in Estonian; leiri in Finnish; στρατόπεδο stratopedo in Greek; campo in Italian; nometne in Latvian; storyklt or lageris in Lithuanian; obóz or lagier in Polish; lagăr in Romanian; sorop logor in Serbo-Croatian and Macedonian; taboríšće in Slovenian; lager in Swedish; kamps in Turkish; or табор tabor in Ukrainian). See also authoritarianism, extermination camp, population (demographic) engineering, totalitarianism.

**constructed language** (etymology: see language. The verb “construct” is derived from Latin com- “with, together” and struere “to build”—typically, a language (Einzelsprache) that was constructed by a single person or institution for the purpose of ensuring “neutral” (that is, not connected to a state language or a nation’s language) communication (for instance, Esperanto). To some extent it is a misnomer because all Einzelsprachen are constructed. The difference is that people tend to believe (wrongly) that national languages and state (official) languages are “natural,” either a product of nature or a divinity’s will. They contrast them to constructed languages that are labelled as “artificial,” meaning “man-made.” But all languages (Einzelsprachen) are man-made. In this context the only natural (biological) element is o language.

**crime against humanity** (the word “crime” stems from Latin crimine “charge, crime.” The term “humanity” comes from Latin humānitās “human nature, humanity,” as derived from humanus “human, humane,” ultimately from homo “human being”—this term was developed, first, in the 1840s among United States abolitionist for referring to slavery, and then in the late nineteenth century it was employed as a chilling assessment of the genocide-scale killings in the Belgian king’s personal colony of the Free State of Congo. Genocide and ethnic cleansing are crimes against humanity.

_Cuius regio, eius religio_ (Whose realm, his religion)—the glossary is not a typical place for probing, in a detailed man-
ner, into the origins of a concept. However, this slogan underlays the principle of normative religious homogeneity, which was alluded to in the terms of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648), subsequently becoming the norm of statehood organization, legitimation, and maintenance across Western and (parts of) Central Europe in the wake of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Most probably, it was the tradition of Judeo-Christian-Islamic monothelism that pushed the signatories of these two aforementioned peace treaties in this direction. In 1612, the Pomeranian scholar Joachim Stephani, professor of law and president of the Protestant University of Greifswald, published a second edition of his opus magnum *Institutiones Iuris Canonici*, which features the key sentence that gave rise to this normative slogan:

Ut & ideo hodie religionem regioni cohergere dici potest, ut *cuius* sit REGIO, hoc est, Ducatus, Principatus, Territorium seu Ius territorii, *eius* etiam sit RELIGIO, hoc est, Ius Episcopale, seu Iuridictio spiritualis (Stephani 1612: 52).

I took the liberty of giving the relevant fragments in bold. Subsequently, the slogan quickly appears in its finalized form, that is, *cuius regio, ejus religio* (Vietor 1615: Conclusio XXXVI; Hampel 1621: 1223; Mager 1625: 484). In 1695 an entire study was published on this principle of the then already international law (see Westphalian statehood), namely, Adam Rechenberg's *Problema Politicum, An Cuius regio, eius sit Religio?* (Rechenberg 1695).

During the West’s (colonial and imperial) expansion across the world, the political question of heterogeneity vs homogeneity was firmly settled in favor of the latter principle. With the rise of the novel ideology of nationalism in the nineteenth century, this norm of religious homogeneity was translated into the ideal of ethnolinguistic homogeneity, readily adopted across Central Europe. In the sphere of language standardization this norm spawned purism, while at the level of state building yielded ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. The old normative slogan was reinvented as the principle of *cuius regio, eius lingua* (whose realm, his language).

**cultural imperialism** (etymology: see *culture, imperialism*)—in the 1920s this term appeared in Russian (культурный империализм kul’turnyi imperialism) and German (*Kulturimperialismus*) as a criticism of the imposition of imperial metropolises’ institutions, legal systems, educational solutions, economic practices, customs, and the like on the colonized populations across maritime and continent-wide empires. In the case of the former language this coinage arose as part of the lexicon of Bolshevik propaganda for countering “Great Russian chauvinism” (see Russification) and for furthering the policy of *ko-renizatsiia*. However, the German-language counterpart arose in the context of the post-World War One partition of the defeated Germany’s colonial empire among the victorious Allied nation-states’ maritime empires. The term “culture” in Russian and German (like in other languages of Central Europe) is a synonym for *civilization*, and the elite’s manners and customs posed as the normative benchmark of decorum, good behavior and manners, or good education.

In the mid-twentieth century, especially in the wake of *decolonization*, the term denotes a strong criticism of the former imperial powers’ continuing (“soft power”) domination over their former colonies through economic, financial, institutional and cultural means, namely, education, literature, books, periodicals, radio, or television in the imperial language. See also *linguistic imperialism*.

**culture** (from Middle French *culture* “the tilling of land,” derived from Latin *cultivare* “the cultivating of land, agriculture,” in turn from *colere* “to till,” attested in the current meaning from the early nineteenth century under the influence of the late eighteenth-century use of the German term *Kultur*, initially spelled *Culture*)—typically, the totality of human customs and norms of behavior observed in human groups (societies), that is, social reality. In a narrower understanding, culture (as equated with *ethnicity*) is opposed to politics, leading to the rise of the *civic vs ethnic opposition*.

However, in Central Europe’s Einzelsprachen this term is often employed as a measure of a *civilization* of an individual or nation, typically, as a synonym for “good manners,” “appropriate customs and skills,” and social norms as prescribed in light of the model of civilization exemplified by Western Europe’s imperial powers. A person or nation not fulfilling these expectations is denigrated as “culture-less” or *without any culture* (typically denoted as “uncultivated” or “uneducated” in English), that is, *kulturlos* in German, *bez kultury* in Polish, or *бескультурный beskul’turnyi* in Russian. In many ways, the pejorative term “without any culture” was a counterpart of the colonial one of “native” or “savage.” In Central Europe serfs or freshly literate persons, and in Western Europe *illiterate* persons and the poor, were the West’s internal Other, those “without any culture,” or in other words “our Other,” as opposed to the colonial “foreign Other.” See also *assimilation, discrimination, national culture*.

cyberspace (mid-1980s portmanteau neologism built from the words “cyber[netics],” a discipline studying regulatory systems, and “space.” Cybernetics is a French scholarly neologism stemming from Greek *kyberneîn*kyberneîn* “helmsman, governor, rudder.” Space is a common noun derived from Latin *spatium* “space, room, distance,” thought to stem from Indo-European *sper* “to stretch, to pull”)—usually a colorful synonym for the internet; otherwise the worldwide space of *non-face-to-face* technologically enabled integrated written, oral, and audio-visual interactive (and often instantaneous) communication, which incorporates and supersedes the former mass media of the press, radio, television, or telephony. Earlier, for most of human history, *social reality* was stored exclusively in humans’ heads (that is, in the brain’s neocortex) and was acted out through the medium of *language* (actualized as speech varieties or Einzelsprachen) in relations between *individuals* and their groups (ethnic groups, Gemeinschaften, Gesellschaften, micro-ethnic groups, nations, nationalities, states). The technology of *writing* and its
products (books, newspapers) became a significant aide-mémoire in humanity’s constant generation and maintenance of social reality, subsequently enhanced by the mass media of telephony, cinema, radio, and television in the twentieth century. However, cyberspace radically shifts the storing and retrieval (generation, maintenance) of social reality from people’s brains to the software and hardware, which make the internet possible. Earlier, the generation, maintenance, and alteration of social reality was fully dependent on human will. Nowadays, the ongoing delegation of social reality to cyberspace leaves it open, and perhaps vulnerable, to software-based automatized manipulation without any direct human involvement, as exemplified by the appearance of ubiquitous “bots” (web robots, internet crawlers, social media bot accounts, or zombie computers).

Due to its initial “borderless” (detached from nation-states) character, cyberspace was seen as the ideal realm of free speech. But subsequently, rampant commercialization quickly compartmentalized cyberspace into insulated “kingdoms” of Facebook, Myspace, Pintrest, Twitter, Viber, or Baidu Tieba, collectively known as “social media.” This designation is confusing to say the least, because it is not society (Gesellschaft) that controls these media, but commercial companies who perceive users as individual “customers,” purely in terms of pecuniary profit. In addition, since the late 1990s totalitarian and authoritarian states—led by the examples of China and Iran—have developed vast and increasingly more refined online systems of control, surveillance, and censorship for preventing any effective web mobilization (Gesellschaft-building) or individual dissidence, which could threaten the current regime’s monopoly of power. On the other hand, these measures (to a degree readily adopted by other nation-states) also rapidly territorialize the internet, insulating the fragment that corresponds (in linguistic, scriptal, political, cultural, and economic terms) to a given nation-state from other national (nation-state-based) fragments of cyberspace. At present, North Korea excels at maintaining its own national cyberspace absolutely isolated—physically (in the terms of the hardware, that is, optical cables) and online—from the rest of the world. As a result, reflections (“avatars”) of sovereign nation-states and their nations are reproduced online. Cyberspace is rapidly nationalized, nation-states reinforce their law and regulations online, making sure that internet companies are controlled by states, not the other way around.

The possibility of storing and operationalizing a nation-state’s entire law, administration, governance, registers, and statistics (that is, statehood) online in the form of a cyberspace “avatar” led to the rise of a novel form of defense. Since the early twenty-first century Estonia has been attacked many times by Russia. Russian secret agents and military planes have illegally breached the Estonian border and air space on multiple occasions. Furthermore, the Kremlin has ordered numerous cyberwarfare attacks on Estonia. After Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea with the employment of the then novel hybrid warfare, the widespread Estonian fear is that one day Russian troops may annex the country in a similarly underhanded manner. The precedent of the Soviet annexation of Estonia in 1940heightens this existential fear. Hence, as a precaution, in 2018 Estonia opened a “data embassy” (also referred to as “e-embassy”) in Luxembourg. This data embassy is a fully functional cyberspace avatar of Estonian statehood. Should an enemy power destroy the fully internet-based systems of the Estonian state through an act of cyberwarfare, such an e-embassy would allow for the swift recreation and operationalization of such systems with the use of the e-embassy servers located in a safe third country. And in the event of a foreign occupation of Estonia, thanks to its data embassy avatar, the Estonian state would continue to serve its citizens, both in Estonia under occupation and abroad, where many Estonians would undoubtedly seek refuge. See also ISO 639.

cyberspace imperialism (etymology: see cyberspace, imperialism)—a form of cultural imperialism and linguistic imperialism; that is, the phenomenon of the initial near-domination of English (75 percent in 1998) and the Latin alphabet (100 percent) on the internet. Unicode allows for the online use of over 600 Einzelsprachen written in about 150 different scripts, but it was only in 2009 that the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) allowed for the (limited) use of non-Latin script characters (graphemes) in URL (Uniform Resource Locator) addresses (see also ISO 15934, ISO 639). In 2018, 53 percent of the internet content was in English, 85 percent in the Latin script, and practically all in Eurasia’s Einzelsprachen only. The West’s domination is clearly visible in the fact that 88 percent of the internet content is available in European Einzelsprachen, while the rest in Asian languages. Although L1 English-speakers constitute only one-quarter of the internet’s users, at least the same number of non-English-speaking L2 users of this language must contribute to the production of the English-language internet content. This disproportion is even more telling in the case of the second largest L1 group users of the web, namely, Chinese-speakers, who amount to over 19 percent. However, the Chinese-language online content is less than 2 percent of all the web content (which is also a function of totalitarian China’s quite stifling tight control of the internet). On the other hand, L1 German-speakers and L1 Russian-speakers, at 2.2 and 2.7 percent of the internet users respectively, hit way above their weight as creators of 6.3 and 6.1 percent of the online content respectively. In addition, Cyrillic-based Russian-language online content accounts for almost half of the globe’s non-Latin alphabet-based internet content, and thus dwarfs Chinese-language content in Chinese characters, which is three times smaller. In the case of Russian, the data clearly shows how the dominant position of this Einzelsprache and online production in it underpin and encourage Moscow’s current ideology of the Russian World and make it possible to launch hybrid warfare operations on this basis.

cyber inequality (etymology: see cyberspace. The term “inequality” stems from Medieval Latin inaequalitas, in turn from inaequalis “unequal,” as formed from in- “not” and aequalis “equal”—during the 1990s and 2000s cyberspace became an integral part of the economy and sociopolitical life across nation-states in the rich North, hence another cleavage was introduced between the poor South and the rich North. In terms of Einzelsprachen, internet content is produced and reproduced only in a clutch of the official and national languages of the rich North’s nation-states, languages which invariably stem
from Eurasia. Hence, speakers of non-Eurasian languages have no choice but to acquire and access the web with the use of the large languages of Eurasia. Another dimension of this divide is the question of literacy and numeracy. These skills are often limited in countries of the poor South, additionally curbing their inhabitants’ access to cyberspace. The promise of the oral internet, run purely through speech, has not been fulfilled yet.

cyberwarfare (etymology: see cyberspace). The term “warfare” stems from Middle English warfare, formed Old English wāfere, “strife, war, conflict,” and faran “the course, progress of,” cognate with German fahren “go, travel”—the militarized use of online content and resources for launching a coordinated series of internet-based attacks by one nation-state against another. Cyberwarfare is played out through software, Einzelsprachen, and writing systems, hence it is fully contained within the internet-enhanced social reality (cyberspace). As such it is bloodless but can lead to mass disruption of a variety of electronic systems from hospitals and schools to trains and administration, and as a result to indirect loss of life and economic hardship. See also hybrid warfare.

Cyrillization (not to be confused with Cyrillicisation): from the name of Saint Cyril, who together with Saint Methodius, in the 860s, developed the script of Glagolitic for writing Slavic. Some decades after these two saints’ deaths, their pupils developed a new, more Greek-like script for the same purpose in the 880s. This second Slavic script’s name commemorates Saint Cyril, who did not invent Cyrillic—transliteration of non-Cyrillic-based Einzelsprachen into Cyrillic-based languages, for instance, of Greek or Estonian into Russian or Belarusian.

Cyrillicisation (not to be confused with Cyrillicisation; etymology: see Cyrillicisation)—a Soviet policy of changing the (predominantly Latin) scripts of Soviet languages into Cyrillic, adopted between the mid-1930s and mid-1940s to end korenizatsia and for ensuring the normative monoscriptalism of the Soviet Union. This policy reversed or thoroughly changed the korenizatsia policy of Latinization, and after 1938 became the hallmark of the policy of Russification. See also politics of script.

decolonization (etymology: see colonialism)—the political process that during the second half of the twentieth century led to the dismantling of the European (Western) powers’ maritime (and continent-wide) colonial empires. Colonies, as constitutive elements of such empires, were given (or won) independence and turned into postcolonial nation-states. Ironically, this studiously non-national communist policy of the Soviet Union that amply used the rhetoric of anti-imperialism in order to criticize the “capitalist West,” eventually turned out to be an empire itself, which was partly decolonized in 1991. However, the Russian Federation with numerous ethnic autonomous republics strewn across its territory, especially in the Caucasus and Siberia, to a certain degree remains an empire, while the Eurasian (Economic) Union founded in 2015 appears to be a conscious effort at re-building the Russian (Soviet) Empire in line with the legitimizing (“soft power”) ideology of the Russian World.

Decolonization usually transformed (democratized) typically monocratic imperial languages into pluricentric languages, which now function as national (official) languages in postcolonial nation-states. Ironically, this process also led to the growing indigenization (autochthonization) of the former imperial languages (all stemming from Europe) at the expense of the indigenous (non-European) languages, which almost by default are excluded from any official written use in the postcolonial nation-states outside of Eurasia. As a result, outside of Eurasia, language conflicts are played out with the employment of European Einzelsprachen, which used to be imperial languages. For instance, the cleavage line in Canada’s Quebec sovereignty conflict is drawn between French- and English-speakers. Even more poignantly, although in everyday life Cameroon’s inhabitants use over 200 ethnic speech varieties (languages), the 2017–2018 military conflict is fought between the officially Anglophone region of Southern Cameroon and the rest of the country where French is the official language. The ethnolinguistically defined dividing line between these two sides of conflict is that of the colonial border between the British colonial mandate of Cameroon and the French colonial mandate of Cameroon. In essence, non-L1 speakers of English and French battle out an old colonial conflict between two European powers who gave up on their maritime empires over half a century ago. See also cultural imperialism, linguistic imperialism.

deep structure vs surface structure (term “structure” stems from Latin structūra, in turn from struere “to put together.” The adjective “deep” stems from Old English dēop and is cognate with German tief. The noun and adjective “surface” was formed from the Latin prefix super- “above” and faciēs “face, shape”—in the early 1960s, the world-renowned United States linguist Noam Chomsky (1928–), postulated that what people actually utter (speech) when speaking is the surface structure of a language (Chomsky 1964: 10, 14–16). Hence, all Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, or lects (actualizations of a language) constitute this surface structure. Allegedly, the principles of generative grammar, as developed by Chomsky, allow for doing away with the confusing “noise” of syntactical, phonological, morphological, semantic, and other structures which vary highly among Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, or lects. When such “surface” has been removed what remains is purportedly the deep structure of “pure” a language, which is postulated to underpin all the human Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, or lects, that is, the surface structure. The surface structure is perceived as responsible for the phenomenon of mutual incomprehensibility, hence, reaching the deep structure could allow for unrestricted access to “pure” meaning as shared by and underlying all Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, or lects. Instantaneous perfect automatic translation among all the extant Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, or lects would then become possible. The confounding of human speech, as related in the biblical myth of the Tower of Babel, would finally be over. Humanity would return to the times immediately after the Great Flood, when—according to this biblical myth—all people still spoke the same Einzelsprache, prior to embarking on the disastrous construction of the Tower of Babel. This project angered the Judeo-Christian-Islamic god so much,
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that this deity prevented its completion by replacing the single Einzelsprache of Humanese with many mutually incomprehensible Einzelsprachen.

This is a strong version of the deep structure, equated with the ur-meaning of Ø language, some edenic thought-Einzelsprache of all-Humanese, or the postulated all-Human mental ese. A weaker version proposes that the deep structure is composed from the linguistic universals shared by all Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, or lects. But it appears that such universals are not more than the biological capacity for producing and detecting pho-
nemes from which morphemes (simple words) are composed. In the weaker version, the deep structure is indistinguishable from the biological capacity for Ø language.

In essence, this dichotomy of deep and surface structure appears to be a rarely realized modern echo of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic (Abrahamic) tradition of monotheism, rather than a heuristic reflection driven by evidence-based research into the observable actualizations of Ø language, that is, Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, or lects. It is a “linguistic” (mystical) take on the Abrahamic dualism of soul and body, nowadays rehashed as the specious mind-body dualism. But there is no scientific evidence for the soul, while mind in no way is separate (or separable) from the human body, but a product of the socio-biological functioning of the latter. Humans are bodies alone (parts of material reality), though their mutual interactions spawn cohesive groups bound together with the face-to-face use of Ø language. In turn, these Ø language-based interactions (or group-bonding) produce the secondary in its character social reality, which exists in the form of shared ideas in human brains.

In its strong version the deep structure is part of social reality, though proponents of generative grammar see it is part of material reality. Because social reality is secondary to material reality, the former cannot underlie the latter. It is material reality that makes social reality possible, not the other way round. Hence, the deep structure, understood as the primal (primary) all-Humanese does not exist. This concept is part and parcel of social reality, like all Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, or lects, being actualizations of the biological (material) capacity for Ø language. In this context, only this biological capacity (Ø language) is part of the (primary) material reality, which allows for the rise of the (secondary) social reality and its elements, be it beliefs (for instance, the dichotomy of deep structure and surface structure) or actualizations of Ø language (that is, Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, or lects).

Obviously, it can be remarked that a widespread and socially accepted belief in some supernatural (divine, metaphysical) reality as underpinning (and transcending) the material reality should be respected, like any religion. But, on the other hand, such a belief does not, and ought not to, constitute a subject matter of evidence-based scientific (material) enquiry. Hence, in its strong version, generative grammar’s dichotomy of deep structure and surface structure is no different than a religious belief. The success of statistics-based machine (automatic) multilingual translation (as epitomized by the Google Translate online service), steeped solely in 100-odd Einzelsprachen of the “surface structure,” without any reference to the (mystical, mythical, transcendental) “deep structure” amply proves the point.

descriptivism (from “describe,” in turn from Latin dēscribere, stemming from de- “off” + scribere “to write”—an attitude toward the standardization and control of the (predominantly written) use of an Einzelsprache. Typically, it is the scholarly elite of a given nation-state who standardize an Einzelsprache into a standard language and codify the principles of its use. Subsequently, the “correct” way of writing and speaking a language “beautifully” becomes a significant (language) barrier one needs to scale to qualify for civil service (bureaucracy), university posts, and other elite jobs. However, unlike in the case of prescriptivism, typically observed in ethnolinguistic nation-states, descriptivism allows for input from the rank-and-file users and several parallel “correct” uses of a certain pronunciation or spelling convention when employed by a considerable share of an Einzelsprache’s speakers. The descriptivist attitude toward language control is usually observed in the case of pluricentric languages and in civic nation-states. In such cases, typically no scholarly or political authority or institute exist to enforce correct language use.

dialect (Latin dialectus, stemming from Greek word διάλεκτος dialectos “discourse,” in turn from διά diá “through,” and λέγo légō “I speak”)—typically, an unwritten speech (Ø language) variety. Otherwise, the term dialect is employed by ethnolinguistic nationalists to deny the existence of or recognition to various languages (Einzelsprachen), which are closely related to the national language employed in the nation-state. Their stance on this issue is conditioned by ethnolinguistic nationalism’s normative principle of ethnolinguistic homogeneity. De facto each speech variety, when used by a group of people for identification, bonding (building and maintaining in-group cohesion), and communication, functions as an Einzelsprache (“a language”). Hence, when uttered, the label “dialect” denotes the speaker’s lack of respect for the Einzelsprache of a group to which she does not belong.

dialect continuum (pl dialect continua; from Latin continuus “uninterrupted,” in turn from continere “to hold together, retain”—prior to the construction of standard or written languages (Einzelsprachen), speech varieties changed gradually from village to village, from region to region, and from polity to polity, forming “dialect chains.” Mutual comprehensibility, though increasingly imperfect with the growing distance, was retained across such dialect chains from one end to the other. The only area of rapid plunge in mutual comprehension was encountered at the (typically blurry) frontier between dialect continua, as for instance, between the Finno-Ugric and North Slavic dialect continua in today’s southern Slovakia. But the gap in comprehension between speakers from different dialect continua has been usually bridged by bilingualism (multilingualism), diglossia (polyglossia) or the use of a lingua franca.

dialect levelling (word “level” is derived from Old French livel “level,” in turn from Latin lībella “plummet line, level”)—a gradual decrease in the variety of spoken and written speech varieties (dialects) in a normatively monolingual nation-state, due to the steady increase in the intensification of communication in
the polity’s *official (national) language* across the entire territory, thanks to compulsory elementary education, the press and electronic mass media. But this term may also refer to a conscious state policy (*language policy*) aimed at the intentional acceleration of this process, entailing administrative *discrimination* against speakers of *dialects* and minority languages, alongside those who speak and write the national language “incorrectly” (*see prescriptivism*). The goal is to achieve or deepen the ethnolinguistic homogeneity of a typically ethnolinguistic *nation-state* in line with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state.

**diglossia (polyglossia)** (1884) Western scholarly Greek-based neologism, δι τῷ “two” or πολὺ *poly “many, much,” and γλώσσα *glóssa “languages”)—the use of two (or more) language varieties (*Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, dialects*) in different and clearly delineated spheres of life. For instance, in the Czech Republic standard (written) Czech (*spisovná čeština*) is acquired at school and employed in official contexts only, including newspapers and monographs. In families, children are socialized in colloquial Czech (*obecná čeština*), which is used at home and with friends, and quite broadly in films, novels, and plays. Furthermore, in the eastern half of this country (Moravia and Czech Silesia), children are socialized at home in local unstandardized speech varieties (dialects). They acquire standard Czech at school and colloquial Czech from television and the perusal of fiction. On the other hand, members of national minorities use two or more Einzelsprachen in a diglossic (polyglossic) manner. For example, after 1945 in Poland’s Upper Silesia, the region’s ethnic Germans and Silesians spoke German and Silesian, while nowadays, due to forced Polonization, they speak Polish and Silesian. See also *religious diglossia, scriptal diglossia*.

**discrimination** (from the seventeenth-century Neo-Latin term *discriminationem “discerning, the making of distinctions”*; the prejudicial meaning arose in the mid-nineteenth century in American English in the context of slavery and *racism*)—a form of collective (*see collectivism*), often politicized, prejudice against a group of people (usually, *ethnic group, nation, race, religious community, or speech community*) on the arbitrary basis of a *cultural (ethnic) trait* (marker), seen as a “proof” of “inferiority” of such a group and its members. See also *anti-Semitism, anti-Tsiganism, linguistic discrimination*.

** disenchantment** (from the German expression *Entzauberung der Welt “disenchantment of the world”)—*the German sociologist Max Weber’s term, coined in 1917 (Weber 1919: 15), for modernity’s emphasis on the rational (scientific) explanation of material and social phenomena, without resorting to magic or religion, which earlier was often the case. In Central Europe’s politics, this trend meant the shift from *polities of estates* and the divine legitimation of secular power to the “rational” world of *nations* and their *nation-states*, constructed in accordance with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. Otherwise, this change in the paradigms of politics and knowledge production may be also described as a shift from the early modern principle *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose realm, his religion) to modernity’s principle of *cuius regio, eius lingua* (whose realm, his language).

However, from the perspective of *social reality*, no disenchantment has actually taken place, but only an exchange of one set of arbitrary elements of this reality for another. The concept of “god” and its actualizations are as much invented (constructed, imagined) by humans as the now politically significant concepts of the *nation* and *Einzelsprache*, together with their actualizations. In many ways, today’s world of nations and nation-states is as much enchanted as that of medieval and early modern Europe, when the name of a god was invoked in order to legitimize the forms of rule, *statehood*, law, social relations, or thinking about the past. Nowadays, the same purpose is served by invocation to “patriotism,” “duty to our nation” (also meaning *state*), “national language,” “national culture,” “national economy,” “national pride,” “national destiny,” or “national history,” all synonyms for the nation, uttered within the narrow definitional confines of the infrastructural ideology of nationalism.

**divine right** (“divine” from Latin *divus “god”*, “right” stems from Old English / Germanic *riht/reht “that which is morally right, duty, obligation,” cognate with German *Recht “law”)—a religiously underpinned political doctrine (*ideology*), in use across most of *Eurasia* and the Middle East until the turn of the twentieth century, claiming that the *legitimacy* of all *statehood* and rulers stems from (a) *god (divinity),* or heaven. In the present-day, this principle of legitimation was replaced with *modernity’s infrastructural ideology of nationalism, and in Central Europe with a linguistic (Einzelsprache-based) form of this ideology, namely, ethnonlinguistic nationalism, implemented in accordance with the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state.**

**Dunbar’s number**—in the 1990s, the British anthropologist, Robin Dunbar, established that from the biological and evolutionary perspective the human brain (neocortex) allows humans to build stable and cohesive *face-to-face* groups of up to 150 members through interpersonal interaction alone (for instance, hair and body grooming), that is without the use of a *language* (Dunbar 1992). Such natural (biological, evolutionary) groups are part, broadly speaking, of *material reality*, while the bonding function of a language allows for generating *social reality, making it possible to build non-face-to-face* cohesive human groups of millions of members (that is, *nations and states*).

**Einzelsprache** (*pl Einzelsprachen*; an eighteenth-century German neologism *einzel “[a] single” and Sprache “language” for “one
language from many,” coined for contrasting this meaning with that of “ο language,” expressed by the common German word Sprache)—the Western (Graeco-Latin-Judeo-Islamic) concept of “a language,” that is one of many languages. This term is countable and has the plural form. Another closely related meaning is that of an actualization of the biological capacity for speech (see ο language) in the form of an Einzelsprache. From the perspective of Western scholarship and science, the Einzelsprache represents an ideal or normative “quantum” of the linguistic (ο language). As known from the phenomena of dialect continuum and linguistic area, variation in human speech (ο language) is continuous until mediated through the technology of writing. The concept of Einzelsprache and its actualizations in the form of Einzelsprachen (languages) endowed with writing systems, orographies, dictionaries, and grammars overhauls the continuous linguistic continuum into discrete and countable units, popularly known as “languages.” See also ISO 639.

emic—in anthropology the way of doing analysis from the perspective of the (usually ethnic) group on which research is conducted, that is, through the lens of this group’s values, concepts, and beliefs, which are most extensively coded in this group’s Einzelsprache. The term emic is derived from the linguistic concept “phonemic,” namely, a speech sound (or phone) may or may not change a meaning in an Einzelsprache, but if it does then it is one of this Einzelsprache’s limited number of phonemes. The discipline of phonemics deals with phonemes, while phonetics with phones. See also etic, endonym.

elite (middle-twentieth-century linguistic loan from French élite, originally derived from Old French elit “[the] chosen [ones],” and in turn, from Latin eligere “to elect”—the top (dominant, ruling) stratum in a state’s population. In early modern Central Europe, the term elite denotes the estates (of nobility, clergy, and burghers), while in the western part of the continent only the ruling estates (that is, to the exclusion of the estate of commoners). In early modern Central Europe, the elite monopolized all political, economic, and social power, while in Western Europe this monopoly was slightly mitigated by the recognition of commoners as an estate. In today’s world of nation-states, elite can be defined as the top stratum of citizenry who enjoy the most socio-economic power. The modern elite’s hold on political power is usually limited by universal suffrage. But in authoritarian or totalitarian tyrannies, where suffrage is suspended or practiced in a perfunctory manner, political power is also concentrated in the hands of a (typically) narrow ruling elite.

empire (from Latin imperium “empire,” in turn derived from the verb imperāre “to command”)—a type of relatively extensive (“large”) composite polity (state) united by a single ruler (emperor, usually a monarch). The empire’s different parts (provinces, autonomous, fiefdoms, vassal states, colonies) are organized into separate, sometimes overlapping, jurisdictions under different legal systems, often administered with the use of different Einzelsprachen written with the employment of various scripts (writing systems). Likewise, the inhabitants have variegated unequal statuses in the empire’s different territories. In Central Europe, traditionally, the ruling elite was composed from the separate estates of nobles, clergy, and burghers, while the rest, usually peasants, had no political rights and were reduced to servitude through most of the nineteenth century. See also imperialism.

endonym (scholarly neologism formed from Greek ἐνδον endon “within [one’s own group]” and ὄνομα onoma “name”)—autonym, or an ethnic group’s own name (ethnonym) for themselves, or a speech community’s own name (linguonym) for their language (Einzelsprache), dialect, or speech variety. For instance, the German-language endonym for the German language is Deutsch. Likewise, the Georgian-language endonym for the Georgians seen as a nation is ქართული ენენი kartveli. See also exonym.

equality (via French égalité [hence, modern French égalité], from Latin aequalitatem “equality, similarity, likeness”—the modern concept of equality of rights and status (citizenship, suffrage), alongside equality before the law for all the inhabitants of a polity (state) (see individualism) emerged in opposition to the medieval and early modern (“feudal”) practice of unequal statuses for different groups of the population in a polity of estates. From the perspective of the contemporary social sciences, all human societies (Gemeinschaften, Gesellschaften) should be treated with the same level of respect and accorded the same level of prestige: no cultural, economic, religious, linguistic, or other differences may constitute the grounds for prejudice or any form of discrimination. Likewise, from the perspective of language politics, all language varieties (for instance, Einzelsprachen, languages, letics, ethnolects, dialects, sociolects, or speech varieties, including related scripts) employed by distinctive human groups (that is, micro-ethnic groups, ethnic groups, nationalities, nations, or nation-states) should be treated as of equal worth and accorded the same level of respect and prestige. This normative belief underlies the concept of linguistic human rights.

estate (from Latin status, hence, стан stan in Belarusian, stav in Czech, Stand in German, stato in Italian stan in Polish, estado in Spanish; cognate with the English term “state” for “polity,” also from Latin status; in French “estate” is ordre, from Latin ordin “row, rank,” while in Russian сословие soslovie from Greek σόλλογος σύλλογος, originally “assembly,” nowadays “society”)—in early modern Europe a stratum of the polity’s elite with influence on politics, usually, nobility, clergy, or burghers. In Western Europe peasantry typically was organized as an estate of commoners, while in Central Europe peasants were serfs and as such they were excluded from the system of a state’s estates. See also class, polity of estates.

ethnic boundary (“ethnic” stems from Latin ethnicus “heathen, non-Christian, pagan,” derived from Greek Εθνος ethnos “a people, country,” but later, in the wake of Christianization, “a foreign, non-Greek, barbarian people,” also “a non-Christian, pagan people.” The word boundary “border, frontier” is an early seventeenth-century neologism composed from bound “made fast as if
by a band or bond” and the Latinate noun-forming suffix -ary)—in 1969, the Norwegian anthropologist, Fredrik Barth (1969), proposed that **ethnic groups** should be studied in the ecological context of other (neighboring) ethnic groups. Hence, apart from the question of group cohesion (see Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft), that of maintaining separation between ethnic groups should also be addressed. For this purpose, Barth proposed the empirically evidenced (as based on several case studies) concept of ethnic boundary. It is a product of the dynamics of inter-group interactions, namely, members of two different ethnic groups X and Y clearly recognize one another as belonging to different groups by way of displaying and observing the prescribed respective sets of cultural traits (ethnicity), as typical of these groups. Such active display and observance creates, legitimizes, and maintains a stable separation between both groups, that is, the ethnic boundary. An ethnic boundary may be spatial, but most often it is social in its character, with members of different ethnic groups constantly sharing the same public spaces in villages, towns, and cities, and especially in marketplaces. Arguably, endogamy (in-group marriage) is the most popular instrument of maintaining any ethnic boundary in a social sense. Obviously, one can cross the ethnic boundary from one group to another, but it is a costly process in social, economic, and psychological terms, often entailing acquisition of a language (Einzelsprache), a different way of living, conversion to another religion, or permanent separation from one’s original family and friends.

**ethnic cleansing** (the verb “to cleanse” stems from Old English clānsian, cognate with dêne “clean”—this term was developed during the wars of Yugoslav succession by translating the Serbo-Croatian term etničko čišćenje/стихно чишћење into English. It is synonymous with the earlier term population transfer. However, while under international law population transfer was legal, ethnic cleansing is a crime against humanity. In 1994, the United Nations’ Commission of Experts (established in 1992 by the Security Council’s resolution 780) defined this crime of ethnic cleansing as follows: “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas” (Letter 1994: 1, 33).

**ethnic group** (word “group” stems from French groupe “cluster, group,” and Italian gruppo “group, knot”)—this term appeared first as ethnie in the anthropological (rather than evangelizing) sense in the late nineteenth century in French-language literature, and was readily borrowed by English-language scholars. They settled for the current form of this term only in the mid-twentieth century, though some still prefer the French term ethnique. There is yet another form of this term, etnos, which competes with ethnie and “ethnic group.” The leading Soviet anthropologist and official theoretician of the “ethnic question” in the Soviet Union, Yulian Bromley, introduced it (as этнос etnos) to Russian-language literature. During the late Cold War period, under Soviet influence, many Anglophone left-leaning scholars adopted this form “ethnos” as the preferred term for “ethnic group.” In turn, Bromley borrowed (without acknowledgement) the main tenets of his theory from the Norwegian anthropologist, Fredrik Barth, who wrote in English and consistently employed the collocation “ethnic group” (cf Bromlei 1971; Gellner 1977) (see ethnic boundary).

“Ethnic group” denotes a cohesive collection (group) of humans built and maintained with the use of some selected elements of culture (for instance, myths, religion, music, Einzelsprachen, seen together as ethnicity), as opposed to statehood.

ethnicity (etymology: see ethnic boundary)—the use of an element, or typically several elements, of culture (social reality) for defining, building, legitimizing, and maintaining a self-reproducing human group, usually referred to as an ethnic group. Prior to the rise of statehood all cohesive ethnic groups differed in speech. It was spatial and social isolation between groups (necessary for the maintenance of their separateness and internal cohesion) that generated this speech difference, typically perceived in today’s world as different languages (Einzelsprachen).

ethnogenesis (etymology: see ethnic boundary). The word “genesis” stems from Greek γένεσις genesis “origin,” in turn a translation of the Hebrew phrase בְּרֵאשִית בָּרָאָם “in [the] beginning”—the coalescence, emergence, or formation of an ethnic group (nation), or a history of this process as a field of anthropological or historical study. This term, as этногенез etnogeneza, appeared in the Soviet Union during the 1910s in the context of the policy of korenizatsiia, which entailed the state-led massive population (demographic) engineering and language engineering, which overhauled the country’s population into about 150 officially recognized nationalities (nations, ethnic groups), each supplied with its own standardized language (Einzelsprache). Officially, it was emphatically denied that this policy created (engineered) nationalities and languages, but rather “discovered and identified” them for the sake of accelerating the transformation of “backward nationalities” into “developed nationalities,” on the way to the communist future of classless society. Hence, there was an urgent ideological need to supply each Soviet nationality with “centuries-old” culture (songs, customs, or rituals) and history (state, religion, writing, and a national epic poem). This feat of engineering numerous ethnic cultures and histories for the purpose of “archaicizing,” “authenticizing” and “indigenizing” the newly produced nationalities and their Einzelsprachen was posed as “research” on the past, a “discovery” of their “histories.”

Subsequently, the term “ethnogenesis” for the origins of an ethnic group and research into such origins entered English in the 1960s by way of Germany, as many Soviet publications had been translated in the late interwar and early postwar periods into the latter language.

In the 1970s, the term ethnogenesis became a key term of analysis for the official Soviet theory of “ethnos” (that is, ethnic group formation and maintenance). The somewhat dissident historian Lev Gumilev (son of the poets, Anna Akhmatorova and Nikolai Gumilev) added a biologizing and spiritual turn to this official theory, by claiming that ethnoses (ethnic groups, nations) and “super-ethnoses” (multiethnic empires, peoples speaking cognate languages) are living organisms spawned by the biosphere.
They compete with one another for limited resources; winners “live,” while losers “die,” all dependent on which ethnos has been “destined” to receive more “passionary energy” from the universe (which appears to stand for “god”), as filtered through the biosphere (Gumilev 1989 [1973]; Koreniako 2000).

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Gumilev’s “theory” became the most popular for explaining the social world among scholars in the post-Soviet countries, because it purportedly explicates why non-ethnic “chimeras” (for instance, the Soviet Union) are short-lived, and eventually must split into ethnolinguistic nations (for example, post-Soviet nation-states). Gumilev’s thought is of special importance in Russia and Kazakhstan where state leaders use his ideas for “comprehending” international relations and legitimizing some of their political decisions in this regard. Gumilev’s theory is relatively unknown in the West, which often leads to a variety of methodological misunderstandings when Western and post-Soviet scholars meet. They use the very same terms of ethnic group (ethnos, ethnic) or ethnogenesis in starkly different manners, as underpinned by quite varying methodologies. Furthermore, the former see these concepts as terms of analysis, while the latter often see them to be instruments of applied politics.

**Ethnic language** (etymology: see ethnic boundary, language)—a speech variety or an Einzelsprache (standard language) specific to an ethnic group. If the ethnic group in question is recognized as an (ethnic) nation, then its ethnic language usually is referred to as a national language.

**Ethnic nationalism** (etymology: see ethnic boundary, nation)—a type of nationalism that does not use citizenship for defining the nation, but various elements of culture (see ethnicity), in Central Europe typically the Einzelsprache (“a language”; see ethnolinguistic nationalism) or religion (see ethnoreligious nationalism). See also civic nationalism.

**Ethnic nation** (etymology: see ethnic boundary, nation)—a nation built on an ethnic basis, typically, a common Einzelsprache (language) and/or religion. In an ethnic nation-state, not all citizens are members of the polity’s ethnic nation, but only those who speak a “correct” Einzelsprache and/or follow a “correct” religion in order to qualify for membership (that is, nationality) in such an ethnic nation. Unlike in the case of the civic nation, in the ethnic nation nationality does not equate to citizenship. Citizens of an ethnic nation-state who do not qualify as members of this polity’s ethnic nation are typically classified as “national minorities.”

**Ethnographic map** (cartography)—see ethnolinguistic map.

**Ethnolect** (etymology: see ethnic boundary, lect)—lect (speech variety, language variety) of an ethnic group (nation, nationality), in most cases used as a leading marker or one of the important markers of this group’s identity (ethnicity). From this perspective, each distinctive speech community is an ethnic group, while a “proper” ethnic group should be (treated as) a speech community. The alluded normativity of this rule (dating back to Johann Gottfried Herder’s late eighteenth-century inspiration that different peoples speak different languages [Herder 1793: 146]) hinges on mutual comprehensibility, but is not absolute, since other elements of the social reality (ethnic or cultural markers) than speech or language alone may be decisive for the construction, legitimation, and maintenance of an ethnic group. For instance, the Hutus and the Tutsis share the same Einzelsprache of Kinyarwanda, which is Rwanda’s official national language. But this fact did not become a basis for any merger of both groups into a single ethnolinguistic nation and did not prevent the 1994 genocide of Tutsis. During the colonial period, the administratively enforced status of servile-like peasantry for Hutus and of noble-like administrators for Tutsis shaped the two social strata into separate ethnic groups, and this insidious legacy of imperialism continues to this day (see also cultural imperialism).

The ISO 639-3 standard for registering “all the world’s languages” is based on the normative assumption (rarely acknowledged by this standard’s Registering Authority, or SIL International) that each ethnic group speaks (and sometimes writes) its own specific (ethnic) language. Hence, this standard aspires to cover all the human ethnolects. The abandoned ISO 639-6 standard, now preserved by the Linguasphere Observatory/Observatoire Linguistique network, aims at registering all of humanity’s speech varieties. Assessed at 25,000, their number is three times higher than that of the 8,000-odd ethnolects. Hence, ethnolects add up to one-third of all extant speech varieties, meaning that two-thirds of existing speech varieties are not employed for building, legitimating, and maintaining ethnic groups.

Nowadays, in Poland, a growing number of scholars and journalists employ the term ethnolect for referring to the officially unrecognized (in Poland) Einzelsprache of Silesian. It is a kind of compromise usage, which withholds the prestigious label of language from Silesian, but acknowledges that in the past it was inappropriate to dub Silesian as a “subdialect” (guwa); the term seen as offensive by most Silesians. At the level of language politics, this stop-gap solution preserves the Polish national dogma, which claims that Silesian is a dialect of the Polish language, but also confirms that this “Silesian dialect” functions as the main marker of Silesian ethnicity. Importantly for the needs of contemporary Poland’s ethnolinguistic nationalism and national master narrative, this stop-gap measure does not permit Sileseans to be seen as an ethnic group (let alone, nation) in its own right. Officially, the Silesians remain a social or regional group of the Polish nation.

**Ethnolinguistic homogeneity** (etymology: see ethnic boundary). The word “homogeneous” stems from Medieval Latin homogenes, in turn from Greek ὁμογενής construction from ὁμός homos “same” and γένος genos “kind”—the foundational normative idea of ethnolinguistic nationalism, which proposes that the “true” nation-state should be inhabited only by speakers of a single national language. The speech community of such an Einzelsprache is seen as the nation, to which this nation-state “rightfully” belongs. Not surprisingly, the ethnolinguistic nation-state encourages normative monolingualism among its nation, and assimilation to the national language.
among the inhabitants who speak other languages, and thus are stereotypically seen as members of “foreign” nations. Ideally, the entire nation (as equated with a speech community) should be contained within its own nation-state.

**ethnolinguistic map** (cartography) (also known as ethnographic map; “map” stems from Medieval Latin *mappa mundi*, in turn formed from *mappa* “napkin, cloth” and *mundus* “world.”) The term “cartography” stems from Latin *charta* or *carta* “chart, map,” in turn from Greek χάρτης *khártēs* “map,” and γράφω *gráphō* “to write”—a map showing the spatial extent of a people (ethnic group, nation, or nationality) through the lens of an **Einzelsprache** (at times, in conjunction with a religion and customs), which purportedly defines this people (speech community). This genre of cartography began to coalesce at the turn of the nineteenth century in the form of maps with information on the presence of specific religious communities in towns, cities, and regions depicted with the employment of symbols. During the first half of the nineteenth century, when the popularity of ethnolinguistic nationalism grew and spread across Central Europe, religious communities of this type were additionally identified with speech communities, resulting in maps of ethnolinguistic-cum-ethnoreligious groups. In the 1840s, the first maps were produced that used solid blocks of color for depicting different nations (ethnic groups) defined through their national languages. At that time, the business of mapping religious communities (religions) was separated from that of ethnolinguistic nations, but both genres, namely, the map of religions and the (ethnographic) map of (ethnolinguistic) nations (or languages) continued using blocks of color for coding and depicting information. Traditionally, a given polity’s population was queried about their religions by census. After 1872, the language question was added as obligatory to censuses. On this basis, “scientific” maps of ethnolinguistic nations (national Einzelsprachen) began to be produced. Both maps of nations (languages) and religions were included in the new type of school textbook, namely school atlas (of geography and history), which appeared in and became increasingly popular across Central Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. In quick succession, entire ethnolinguistic atlases made an appearance and rapidly were recognized as a “scientific” argument for justifying the destruction of the established state frontiers, then to be replaced with “ethnographic” boundaries in the wake of the Balkan Wars and the Great War. The drive toward increasing precision and inclusiveness even of the tiniest of differences and ethnolinguistic communities led, at the turn of the twentieth century, to the fusion of number (symbol) tagging with color coding on ethnographic maps produced in the Russian Empire. During the age of *korenizatsiya* (mid-1920s to mid-1930s) in the Soviet Union, the development of ethnographic (ethnolinguistic) cartography accelerated even more because Soviet planners and bureaucrats needed maps for organizing and maintaining over 17,000 autonomous ethnolinguistic administrative entities, which existed then in the communist polity. Finally, in the Soviet Union, an entire ethnolinguistic *Atlas narodov mira* (Atlas of the Peoples of the World) was published in 1964 and remains unequaled to this day (Bruk and Apenchenko 1964). In the West, during the Cold War, this Atlas was commonly pirated by specialists in Area Studies, who adapted or just translated relevant maps into English, retaining the Soviet hallmark of color coding combined with number tagging. The school atlas of history and geography (combined or in the form of two separate books), complete with ethnographic maps and maps of religion (sometimes appended with maps of races), remains a compulsory textbook in Central Europe’s nation-states, mainly because with the use of text only it is next to impossible to present and explain in a clear manner ethnolinguistic nationalism’s highly counterintuitive principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. On the other hand, the school atlas of history is a rarity elsewhere in the world, like in the nation-states where civic nationalism is employed for statehood building, legitimation, and maintenance. See also linguistic map.

**ethnonym** (etymology: see ethnic boundary, language, nation)—a form of nationalism that defines or identifies the nation as all the speakers of a language (Einzelsprache). It equates the nation with a speech community. The nation defined in an ethnolinguistic manner is always primary to the nation’s nation-state. In this ideology’s thinking nations can exist without states. In the early twenty-first century, ethnolinguistic nationalism is mainly contained to Central Europe and Southeast Asia. The globe’s most popular form of nationalism is civic (see civic nationalism), while all the extant ethnolinguistic nations-states are contained to Eurasia. Often on the unacknowledged basis of ethnoreligious nationalism, some speakers of a given national language are excluded from the nation, as for instance, Judaists (Jews) from many ethnolinguistic nations of Central Europe (see anti-Semitism). See also tribalism.

**ethnos**—see ethnic boundary, ethnic group, ethnogenesis.

**etic** (not to be confused with “ethnic”—in anthropology the way of researching a (typically, ethnic) group from the outside (“neutral”) perspective, without taking into consideration this group’s values, concepts or believes. The term etic is derived from the lin-
guistic concept “phonetic,” namely, a speech sound (or phone) attested among the extant Einzelsprachen. See also emic, exonym.

Eurasia (1832) German neologism Asia-Europe, coined by geographer Carl Gustav Reuschle from the Kingdom of Württemberg (Reuschle 1852: 43); subsequently, in the 1880s it was more broadly adopted in the form Eurasien, quickly yielding the English-language term “Eurasia.” Interestingly, the coinage “Eurasia” popped up briefly in the 1890s in British India for denoting Brits and other Europeans domiciled or born in India. The name “Asia” originates from Greek Ασία, of uncertain origin, but the proposed Semitic (Akkadian) etymology (ʾalātām) “to go out, to rise,” suggesting “land of the rising sun,” is ideologically appealing, because equates this continent with “the West.” If these etymologies are valid, the names of Asia and Europe may originate from an act of observation conducted by Semitic-speakers from their Middle Eastern homeland, located between Asia and Europe)—Europe and Asia construed as a single continent.

Eurasianism—view or ideology developed during the 1920s by Russian émigrés (including linguist Nikolai Trubetzkoy), which proposes that Russia (that is, the Russian Empire) is a separate civilization; neither European nor Asian, but Eurasian in its character. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, this ideology—given a “scientific” sheen by Lev Gumilev’s theory of ethnos (see ethnogenesis)—was adopted both in Russia and Kazakhstan, presented as a Eurasian civilization and nation-state, respectively. To a degree, this ideology underpins, is combined with or equated with the Kremlin’s twenty-first-century ideology of the Russian World.

exonym, xenonym (from Greek ἐξω ἐκό “out, external,” or ἐκόνες xéno “foreign,” and ἐνδὸς ἐνδόν “name”—exonym, or an external name (ethnonym) imposed on or developed for an ethnic group by another ethnic group; likewise a xenonym (linguonym) imposed on or developed for a speech community language (Einzelsprache), dialect, or speech variety by another speech community. For instance, “Polish” is the English-language exonym for the Polish language, known in Polish under the endonym polski. Similarly, the English exonym “the Poles” for the Polish nation differs from the Polish-language endonym Polacy.

extermination camp (etymology: see concentration camp. The term “extermination” stems from Latin exterminatus, in turn from ex- “utterly, thoroughly” and terminō “I finish, close, end.” The term “camp” is derived from Latin campus “field” and Old English camps or compe “battle, battlefield,” cognate with German Kampf “struggle”)—a concentration camp designed for the total liquidation of inmates, usually political opponents and unwanted populations. See also authoritarianism, totalitarianism.

extrasmiotic sphere (“extrasmiotic” is a late twentieth-century neologism, formed from the prefix “extra-” and the seventeenth-century neologism “semiotics.” The former stems from Latin ab extra “from the outside,” while the latter from Greek σημειωτικός sēmeiōtikós, “observant of signs;” ultimately from σημείο sēmíō, “sign, mark.” The term “sphere” is derived from Greek σφαῖρα sphaira “ball, globe, celestial sphere,” and in turn from Greek σφαίρα sphaira “ball, globe”—the space where no semiosis takes place, that is, where there are no beings capable of using o language to generate social reality. The extrasmiotic sphere is located where no human communities live, that is, (most probably) across the universe, and in parts of the biosphere populated by non-humans (animals, plants).

face-to-face (human) group (etymology: see crime against humanity, ethnic group)—humanity’s natural (biological, evolutionary) propensity to build and maintain cohesive groups up to 150 members (Dunbar’s number) through everyday interpersonal interaction alone (that is, face-to-face) without the use of o language. See also non-face-to-face (human) group.

fascism (from Latin fascis for “bundle [of rods],” employed as a symbol of state authority in the Roman Empire, and then adopted by interwar Italy’s Partito Nazionale Fascista [PNF, National Fascist Party]—a far-right ideology that accepts the infrastructural ideology of nationalism as the basis of statehood construction, legitimation and maintenance. The ethno-linguistically (”racially”) defined nation is at the center of each fascist project, for the nation in question an appropriately large nation-state and empire must be won at the expense of “civilizationally lower” and “biologically less worth” nations and their states. From the perspective of social darwinism (eugenics, racial hygiene), nations are believed to be “living organisms” in constant evolutionary competition for resources and survival. Only the fittest (that is, arguably fascist) nations are to survive and flourish. Fascism shares with communism the monopoly totalitarian, or authoritarian, system of government, with the invariably male tyrant (dictator) at the top, and the ruling party’s structure doubling as the state’s institutions and administration. Proponents of both ideologies see democracy, liberalism, and individualism as unacceptable or even “degenerate,” and share the same vision of the “new modern man of the future,” who is supposed to be either the ideal fascist or communist. The main difference between fascism and communism lies in the latter’s rejection of the nation and nationalism, and in the former’s enmity toward communism (stereotyped as “Judeo-Bolshevia”).

Interwar and wartime Germany’s ideology of fascism is typically known as nazism. This English pejorative term was derived from the official name of the ideology of Germany’s ruling fascist party, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP, National Socialist German Workers’ Party), namely, Nationalsozialismus (national socialism). In none of the Soviet bloc’s countries was communism achieved, and these policies employed only the term “socialism” in their official names. The Soviet satellites’ socialism was national in its form, hence, in scholarly works it is referred to as “national communism” in order to avoid the collocation “national socialism,” which is so negatively tainted and strongly connected to wartime (nazi) Germany (Third Reich).
Like in the case of ethnolinguistic nationalists, fascists aspired to ethnolinguistically and racially (biologically) homogenize the nation. The largest target of such “racial homogenization” (that is, the Holocaust) were the mostly German(ic)-speaking (Yiddish-speaking) Jews. But they were not identified through any measuring methods (for instance, “craniometry”) of the “science of race” (Rassenkunde), but with the aid of synagogues’ registers of faithful. Hence, de facto fascists practiced a form of ethnoreligious homogenization.

Wartime Soviet propaganda made the term “fascist” into a generalized pejorative hurled at any political opponent. The post-communist Russian discourse adopted and popularized this invective, so at present it is used in a similar manner also in English.

Gemeinschaft (German loanword, from gemein “common, together,” and the suffix -schaff “ship, -ness”; hence, also Gemeinde “commune [the lowest administrative unit]”—in essence any face-to-face group (community), where each member knows the others through regular (everyday) interaction. Gemeinschaft stands in the dichotomic opposition to Gesellschaft. It is a classical sociological opposition described and elaborated in 1887 by the Schleswig (German) scholar, Ferdinand Tönnies (1887).

genocide (from Greek γίνος γένος “a people” [see gens] and Latin —cide “act of killing”—a neologism coined in 1943 by the Polish-Jewish jurist, Rafał (Raphael) Lemkin for a planned (intentional) extermination of a people (Lemkin 1944: 79). The United Nation’s 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines, in Article 2, genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (Convention 1948). After wartime Germany’s planned genocide of Jews and Roma, a tradition developed to give ethnic-specific names to widely recognized acts of genocide against specific peoples (ethnic groups, nations, or nationalities), for instance, the “Holocaust” (or Shoah) for the Jewish Genocide, or the “Samudariyen” (also Por[e]jinos or Kali Tras) for the Roma Genocide.

gen (pl gentes; Latin term gens “clan, extended family with the shared male lineage” is cognate with Greek γίνος γένος, both probably derived from the hypothetical from Proto-Indo-European *gēnhtis “birth, production”—a late medieval and early modern Latinate term for “a people,” seen as the entire population of a region or a polity. See also natio.

Geschichtspolitik (a German term, coined by combining the terms Geschichte “history” and Politik “politics”; at times translated into English as “politics of memory”—in the wake of the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War during the 1990s, the grand narratives of the defeat of the Third Reich and the subsequent East-West ideological confrontation unraveled across postcommunist Europe, giving way to revived, and often highly contradictory, national master narratives, especially in Central and Eastern Europe’s ethnolinguistic nation-states. A clear scholarly realization that the remembrance of the past is part and parcel of social reality and can be “shaped” (falsified or interpreted selectively; see invented tradition) in line with the needs of current political projects led to the rise of a new field of study (within historiography) and another of political practice. The former aims at limiting such arbitrary “shaping” of the remembrance of the past through objectivizing respect for the past as known from preserved oral, written, and material (archeological) records. On the contrary, the aforementioned new field of political practice usually focuses on shaping the remembrance of the past as required for legitimizing and furthering a given political or national goal, while paying a mere lip service to the observance of the ideal of historical objectivity.

Gesellschaft (German loanword, from Geselle “journeyman, associate, fellow,” and the suffix -schaff “ship, -ness”—in essence any non-face-to-face group (society), where group cohesion is ensured by social reality. The ideology of nationalism seeks to present the nation (Gesellschaft) in the terms of Gemeinschaft, that is, Gemeinschaft-izes Gesellschaft. The group-bonding of a successful national project is so strong, because although the members of a nation live in a non-face-to-face Gesellschaft, they believe it is a closely-knit face-to-face Gemeinschaft.

globalization (word “globe” stems from Latin globus “ball, sphere”—after the fall of communism and the end to the Cold War division of the world at the turn of the 1990s, globalization was a slogan of a better equal interconnected cooperating and peaceful world. In practice globalization is the freedom of movement for capital and goods across the world for international corporations, the network of international institutions allowing for political cooperation or dialog between all the extant and legitimate (recognized) nation-states, and the internet infrastructure that underpins the worldwide cyberspace. The last element allows relatively rich literate and numerate individuals with a working command of Eurasia’s large languages (preferably written in the Latin alphabet) to access and interact with cyberspace on a global scale. Individuals of this kind live mostly in the rich North, while a considerable percentage, often the majority, of the inhabitants of the poor South’s nation-states do not fulfill these threshold conditions. As a result, they are excluded from active participation in globalization, which however does not shield them from positive and negative ramifications of this process. Hence, in many ways, globalization reproduces and deepens the practices of economic imperialism, cultural imperialism, and linguistic imperialism. The rich North decides on the practices of globalization and their “appropriate” uses, while the poor South has no choice but to concede. There is no equality of opportunities in globalization, this process firmly tilted in the rich North’s favor. These skewed dynamics allow the proposition that in this arrangement the North’s inhabitants can be seen as “globalizers,” while the South’s populations represent the “globalized.” This dichotomy is eerily similar to that of colonialism, namely, between Western colonizers and the colonized populations in the Western(ized) great powers’ maritime and continent-wide empires.

global system of languages (Einzelsprachen) (etymology: see globalization, language, writing system)—the globalized system of formal recognition and registration of lan-
guages (Einzelsprachen), which emerged in an unplanned and piecemeal manner after World War Two in the wake of decolonization, as a reply to the exponential growth in information production, in an equally exponentially increasing number of Einzelsprachen and scripts (writing systems). Initially, this system allowed for automated retrieval of (typically bibliographic) data and facilitated evangelization (predominantly, translation of the Bible into non-European Einzelsprachen), before it became one of the organizational and technical pillars of the internet (cyberspace) at the turn of the twenty-first century (see ISO 15924, ISO 639). Because the registration authorities (Infoterm, Library of Congress, Linguasphere Observatory/Observatoire Linguistique, SIL International, or Unicode) of this global system of languages are located in the West (that is, the rich North), the system tends to meet and champion the West’s needs, to the neglect of and even disrespect (prejudice) for the expectations and needs of non-Western nation-states, nations, ethnic groups, Gesellschaften, and Gemeinschaften. Above all it enforces the Western in its origin concept of Einzelsprache as the standard unit of the linguistic and imposes this norm, alongside the equally normatized dialect vs language (Einzelsprache) dichotomy, on the rest of the world. This situation characterizes present-day linguistic imperialism and cultural imperialism. The creation, recognition, and use of non-Western Einzelsprachen are decided solely in the West and by its agents (missionaries, linguists, anthropologists, or IT specialists), with little or no consultation with the concerned non-Western speech communities. From the perspective of global language politics, the West is all powerful, while the “Rest” are made completely powerless; the former “globalizes” (that is, culturally, linguistically, and technologically colonizes) the latter, making it into “the globalized” (or “new colonials”). The 300-odd linguistic versions of Wikipedia are a good litmus test of this novel “cyberspace imperialism,” or the global internet cleavage. The vast majority of these Wikipedias are available in Eurasian languages, the plurality in European languages, and the vast majority of information is offered in European languages. The half a million-strong speech community of the unrecognized Central European Einzelsprache of Silesian enjoy a Silesian-language Wikipedia with over 7,600 articles, while South Africa’s 8 million Xhosas have a paltry Xhosa-language Wikipedia of 750 articles, and actually there is no Wikipedia in the country’s official language of Ndebele, spoken by as many as 2.5 million people.

global (world) language (etymology: see globalization, language. The word “world” stems from Old English world or woorld, and is cognate with Dutch wereld and German Welt)—a large language, which is a lingua franca employed across several continents and tens of polities by 0.5-1 billion people (for instance, Arabic, English, French or Spanish). See also language of international (interethnic) communication.

glotonym (neologism formed from Greek γλώσσα glóssa “language, and έννομα ὁνόμα “name”)—see linguonym.

grapheme (from Greek γράφημα grafēma “letter”)—a letter, the basic unit of a writing system (script). In linguistics the term “grapheme” is preferred to “letter,” because the former phonetically corresponds to phoneme, emphasizing the point that in alphabets and abjads graphemes typically correspond to phonemes. Obviously, in syllabaries and morphemic scripts graphemes correspond to syllables and morphemes, respectively.

Gulag (from the Russian acronym ГУЛаг GULag, derived from the name Главное управление лагерей и мест заключения Glavnoe upravlenie lagerei i mest zaklyuchenia for “Main Administration of Camps and Places of Detention”—a term for the system of the Soviet (forced labor) concentration camps. In the present-day English often a synonym for concentration camp (typically, “gulag” or “gulag camp”). Officially, no gulag camp was intended for extermination, though in practice some gulag camps functioned as de facto extermination camps.

heterogeneity vs homogeneity (etymology: see ethnolinguistic homogeneity). The term “heterogeneity” stems from Greek ἕτερος heteros “other, different” and γένος genos “kind”—a sociopolitical dichotomy that informs much of medieval and modern European thinking on legitimate forms of statehood. Without giving appropriate attention to this tacitly accepted norm, the widespread belief in Europe (and the West) has been that in order for a state to be legitimate and viable it should be homogenous, meaning that all its inhabitants should conform to a shared single cultural trait (or marker), in the majority of cases this trait being a religion or an Einzelsprache. However, homogeneity is a “movable feast.” For instance, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815–1830) was ethnolinguistically quite homogenous, the majority of its population spoke Dutch (Flemish). However, from the religious perspective (see religious homogeneity), half of this Kingdom’s inhabitants were Catholics and the other half Protestants, which in 1830 led to the breakup of the polity into a Catholic nation-state of Belgium and a Protestant nation-state of the Netherlands. But with the rise in popularity of the concept of ethnolinguistic homogeneity, the religion-based homogeneity of Belgium turned out to be insufficient in the twentieth century, as in the eyes of its inhabitants the country began to appear as ethnolinguistically heterogeneous. This change in perception from the homogeneity to heterogeneity of Belgium has entailed repeated calls for a breakup of this country into a homogenously French-speaking nation-state of Wallonia and a likewise homogenously Flemish (Dutch)-speaking nation-state of Flanders (which could be united with the Netherlands). Practically, each extant nation-state from one perspective may be posed as being homogenous (meaning, legitimate), or as heterogeneous (meaning, illegitimate) from another, depending on the perception of the country’s character by its elite and population. Perception and changes in it are fully dependent on human will, as well as the espousal of the concept of homogeneity in the role of the litmus test of the legitimacy of statehood. Both this concept and such changing perceptions of a polity’s character are part and parcel of social reality. Historically speaking, the normative concept of homogeneity as the basis of legitimate statehood is strongly connected to the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition of monotheism. Finally, nothing prevents humans from...
deciding that only a homogeneously multiethnic or polyconfessonal (that is, heterogeneous) polity is legitimate.

Historiography (sixteenth-century term borrowed from Medieval Latin, in turn a loan from Greek ἱστοριγραφία historiograφía, that is, ἱστορία historia “history” and -γραφία –grαφία from the Greek verb γράφειν gráphein “to write”, meaning written presentation, or record, of the past)—a scholarly discipline that aspires to record, analyze and explain the human past. Traditionally, in a highly Eurocentric (Westernocentric) manner, this discipline’s purview used to be limited to literate (that is mostly, Western) societies (states), which produce written records (see writing). The past of non- or pre-literate societies, dubbed as “pre-history,” was to be researched by anthropologists, that is, the West’s specialists in the Other, or peoples (“tribes”) disparagingly referred to as “civilizationally lower,” “backward,” or even “savage.” On the other hand, until the late twentieth century, the past of Asia’s and Northern Africa’s non-Western literate societies and states was seen as the field of Oriental Studies. Furthermore, when researching the past of Europe (West), earlier historians typically focused on “high history,” that is events impacting and produced by the ruling elite (estates). Until the mid-twentieth century the past of the “lower classes” (peasantry, serfs) or the modern common man was seen as suitable for the discipline of sociology. While anthropology was tasked with the study of the “non-Western Other,” sociologists were to probe the West’s “social Other within.”

Nowadays, historians (or practitioners of historiography) aspire to research the entire human past from the objectivizing (etic) perspective. Historiography’s output is collectively known as “history,” though in popular usage the term “history” is employed as a preferred synonym for the discipline of historiography. See also national historiography.

History (from Greek ἱστορία historia “inquiry, knowledge from inquiry,” or “to judge,” derived from ἱστορίς istos “the one who knows, wise person, judge”)—a description, analysis, and explanation of the past, usually of human societies, ideally from an etic (objectivizing) perspective, through a causal analysis and explanation of the events, which are typically entirely contained within the sphere of social reality. History is a product of historiography (that is, the scholarly discipline of history). See also national history.

“Holy book” (word “holy” stems from Old English hálīg or hālēg “scared, pacific, ecclesiastical,” cognate with ἑάλ “whole[some],” and Dutch and German heilig “holy.” The word “book” is derived from Old English bēc, cognate with Dutch boek and German Buch; perhaps, ultimately from “beech,” or Buche in German, as initially tree bark was employed for writing among Germanic and Slavic ethnic groups)—a collection of texts, construed as a foundation of (typically monotheistic) religion in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic (“Abrahamic”) tradition. Monotheistic religions (faiths) are “scriptural” in their character, because a “divinity’s voice” is imagined to have been written down in the form of a “holy book,” also known as a “holy scripture.”

“Holy script” (etymology: see “holy book,” script)—a writing system in which a “holy book” was written. This writing system often symbolizes the religion and its sociocultural practices, as connected to a given “holy book.”

“Holy scripture” (etymology: see “holy book,” script)—a synonym for a “holy book” in a monotheistic religion. But importantly, a specific writing system (script) in which a given “holy book” (or its canonical translation) was written is usually seen as “holy” and symbolic of a given religion. In many ways such a script serves as a religion’s logo, for example, Cyrillic in the case of Slavophone Orthodox Christianity, the Latin alphabet in the case of Roman Catholicism, the Hebrew abjad in the case of Judaism, and the Arabic script in the case of Islam.

“Holy tongue” (etymology: see “holy book”). The word “tongue” stems from Old English tūnge, cognate with German Zunge “muscle in the mouth”—an Einzelsprache in which the original of a “holy book” (or its canonical translation) was written.

Human (free) will (adjective “human” stems from Latin homō “human being.” The noun “will” is derived from Old English willan or wylan “to will, be willing, wish, or desire”; cognate with German wollen)—here the capacity of humans and their groups to use language and shape Einzelsprachen as they want. Hence, the generation and maintenance of social reality (semiosphere, noosphere) is fully and solely dependent on people, and their intentions and acts. On the other hand, material reality (extrasemiotic sphere, the biosphere, the universe) is fully independent of human will.

Human rights (etymology: see divine right, human will)—the modern belief in and legal practice that all humans (see individualism) should enjoy the same basic rights, for instance, to life, marriage, suffrage, equality before the law, free speech, education, healthcare, or clean environment, alongside some rights earmarked to be enjoyed collectively (collectivism) within human groups (for instance, in the case of national minorities). See also linguistic human rights.

Hybrid warfare (etymology: see cyber warfare. The term “hybrid” stems from Latin híbrida or híbrida “crosbred animal”—conventional warfare combined with cyber warfare.

Ideology (early nineteenth-century French neologism idéologie, from idé “idea” and logie “-logy,” that is, “a body of knowledge, writings”)—in politics, a system of beliefs and assumptions that legitimates (justifies) the exercise of power over the population in a state. Until the American and French Revolutions, the most popular form of legitimation of rule was divine right: presumable a divinity appointed a monarch to rule. Afterward, the function is served by the nation’s “common will,” typically expressed through the ballot box (elections).

Identity (from Latin idem “the same,” see also the etymology of ethnolinguistic homogeneity)—what an individual or a group sees as symbolic of them, as their essential “logo,” usually a set of ideas, beliefs, and values. Identity, as part of social reality, is created and maintained, or altered and discontinued, by humans alone; it is fully dependent on human will. See also national identity.
imagined community (etymology: see communism. The verb "to imagine" stems from Latin *imāginor*, ultimately from *imāgo* "copy, likeness, image")—nowadays a highly popular term among social scientists, originally developed in 1983 by the Irish scholar of Southeast Asia working in the United States, Benedict Anderson, for the purpose of succinctly commenting on the character of the nation, namely, that it is part of social reality, a non-face-to-face group constructed as an act of human will (Anderson 1983). The attraction of the nation lies in the fact that the ideology of nationalism successfully presents the nation, which is a form of Gesellschaft (aka "cold modern society") to its members as a cozy and caring face-to-face Gemeinschaft. See also invented tradition.

imperialism (from Latin *imperium* "empire")—term that emerged in the 1870s as a criticism of the European (Western) powers' policy of acquiring, outside Europe, maritime (continent-wide) empires, typically built from a string of colonies. See also linguistic imperialism.

imperial language (etymology: see empire, language)—the official language of an empire, in the case of modern maritime or continent-wide empires, typically the official (dominant, national) language of a former imperial metropolis ("home country"), turned into a "regular" nation-state. However, such erst-while imperial metropolises-turned-nation-states are "more equal" (that is, powerful) than the postcolonial nation-states, as indicated by the fact that many of the former are permanent members of the United Nations' Security Council and (or) their economies dwarf the latter's economies on the global scale. Nowadays, former imperial languages rebranded as "large languages" (also known as global or world languages) are an important or even the main tool for projecting "soft power," that is, for establishing, legitimizing, and maintaining cultural imperialism and linguistic imperialism across former empires. See also language as a weapon (instrument) of power.

individualism (late 1820s neologism, derived from the word "individual," ultimately from Latin *individuum* "an indivisible thing")—an attitude, doctrine, or even an ideology that prioritizes the individual over their own group, or any groups whatsoever. This doctrine lies at the heart of human rights and underlies the principle of individual merit in capitalism and that of personal choice in democracy. Individualism stands in direct opposition to collectivism, while (Catholic) proponents of personalism propose to mitigate this stark dichotomy.

infrastructural ideology (term "infrastructure" is a late 1920s French neologism, formed from Latin *infra* "below, underlying," and the word "structure," ultimately from Latin *structura* "building, edifice," in turn from *struo* "to build")—the globe's (or a large area's) main or even sole ideology that underpins the founding, legitimation, and maintenance of statehood. In today's world, nationalism fulfills the function of such an infrastructural ideology.

integration (from Latin *integrātiō* "renewal, restoration")—in ethnolinguistic nation-states a policy of full acceptance for minorities, alongside their languages, religions and cultures, on the understanding that members of minorities would reciprocate by becoming fully bilingual and bicultural in the state (national, official) language and culture of their nation-state of residence. Integration of this type is rather impossible without the members of the nation-state's own nation reciprocating in kind. To my knowledge, the sole case of successful integration of a minority can be observed only in Finland. Swedes (Swedish speakers) constitute about 5 percent of the country's population, but their national (minority) language of Swedish enjoys the same status of a state (official) language, like Finnish, spoken by Finland's nation of Finns. Minority Swedes are required to acquire full command of Finnish, but likewise all ethnic Finns are also required to become fluent in Swedish.

international (etymology: see nation. The prefix "inter-") stems from Latin *inter* "between, amid")—characteristic of the relations between states. The Latinate prefix "inter-" means "between, among," but the term "nation" in this compound word, confusingly refers to "state," not the nation in the meaning of a group of people with the recognized right to separate statehood. In the international languages of English and French the term "nation" is often used as the preferred synonym for "state." Hence, the United Nations (or *Nations unies* in French) is an international organization of states, not nations understood as human groups. See also transnational.

international law (etymology: see international. The term "law" stems from Old English *lagu* "law" and is cognate with Swedish *lag* and Danish *lov*)—a body of agreed upon conventions and principles that govern relations between the globe's states (that is, actors of international relations).

international relations (etymology: see international. The term "relation" stems from Latin *relātiō*, in turn from *referō* "I refer, I relate," ultimately from *ferō* "I bear, I carry")—interactions (relations) between states, not nations.

invented tradition (etymology: see traitor of one's nation. The verb "invent" stems from Latin *invenire* "to come upon, find")—nowadays a highly popular term among social scientists, originally developed in 1983 by the tandem of British historians, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, for the purpose of succinctly commenting on how the nation is supplied with "centuries-long history and customs," when needed for a given national project, that is, for constructing and legitimizing a, typically ethnolinguistic, nation (see imagined community) and/or its nation-state. Practically, in all cases such "old" or "long-established traditions" are a modern construct ("invention"), which proves the human remembrance of the past is part and parcel of social reality (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). As such, an act of human will may shape social reality as deemed necessary for a given present-day political (national) project. A conscious realization of this possibility in the 1990s led to the rise of a new field and political practice, that is, Geschichtspolitik, in the freshly postcommunist Europe.

ISO 15924 (etymology: see ISO 639)—a standard for registering the world's scripts (writing systems) developed in 2004 and en-
trusted to the Unicode Corporation, because since 1987 this corporation had developed a comprehensive, and now universally accepted, Universal Coded Character Set. In turn, this Universal Coded Character Set stems from the Xerox Character Code Standard created in 1980. At present (2018) the ISO 15924 covers about 150 scripts and further 40 variants of some of these scripts. See also global system of languages.

ISO 639 (commonly, but incorrectly ISO is believed to be an acronym derived from the name of the International Organization for Standardization, founded in 1947 in Geneva, because standards issued by this organization are preceded by the term “ISO”; actually derived from the Greek adjective ἴσος ἵσος “equal”) — due to the post-1945 explosion in the production of printed and audiovisual material in multiple non-European (that is, overwhelmingly Asian) Einzelsprachen, it was necessary to recognize this fact for ensuring the success of the then nascent automatic retrieval of bibliographic data. In 1967, an ISO 639 standard was developed for supplying the most important post-war Einzelsprachen with machine readable two-letter codes. This standard was maintained by Infoterm based in Vienna. At the same time, the Library of Congress in Washington DC, developed United States MARC (MACHINE-READABLE Cataloging) standards, among others, also for cataloging Einzelsprachen. The MARC standards became official across the United States in 1971. In 1998 the MARC standard for cataloging Einzelsprachen was recognized as an ISO 639-2 standard of three-letter codes, while the original ISO 639 standard was renamed as ISO 639-1, and its maintenance was entrusted to the Library of Congress. At present (2018) ISO 639-1 registers almost 100 languages, while ISO 639-2 almost 600. Both systems underpin the linguistic dimension of cyberspace. Unicode’s Universal Coded Character Set (with over 136,000 characters in 2018) allows for the online use of over 600 Einzelsprachen written in about 150 different scripts, as registered in the ISO 15924 standard, also maintained by Unicode. The relative ease of employing the internet for publishing (see writing) in potentially all the world’s Einzelsprachen and speech varieties led, in 2007, to the issuing of the ISO 639-3 standard for registering “all the world’s languages (Einzelsprachen).” The Library of Congress developed this standard but entrusted its maintenance to SIL International, previously known as the Summer Institute of Linguistics. It is a Christian evangelizing organization specializing in translating the Bible into “all the world’s languages,” hence in the production of Einzelsprachen out of speech varieties of non-European (and typically non-Eurasian) ethnic groups, without much respect for these groups’ wishes or needs. Hence, in the case of the majority of such newly-minted Einzelsprachen, the translation of the Bible is the only book available in them, which often brings about the swift destruction of a local ethnic culture and the related non-scriptural religion (cultural imperialism, linguistic imperialism). At present (2018), ISO 639-3 catalogs almost 8,000 Einzelsprachen. In light of numerous criticisms of SIL International’s clandestine religious agenda, in 2009, yet another standard ISO 639-6 was adopted for registering the globe’s estimated 25,000 Einzelsprachen and speech varieties. But with no donations from religiously motivated donors or state grant agencies, and with no prospect of speedy commercialization of such a huge registration list, this standard was withdrawn in 2014. At present the non-denominational Linguasphere Observatory/Observatoire Linguistique network based in Britain and France developed and maintains a similar register, which complies with the principles of the ISO 639-6 standard. See also global system of languages.

isolgloss—see linguistic map (cartography).

Kinderaustausch (German “exchange of children”—between the sixteenth and mid-twentieth century, a sociocultural practice among the serfs (peasantry) in the villages of the Klein Tiefebene (Little Hungarian Plain; nowadays, Kiséföld in Hungarian and Malá dunajská kotlina in Slovak), that is, in the vicinity of Bratislava. In the wake of the centuries-long wars between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, what today is Hungary changed hands often and was depopulated. Refugees streamed to northern Hungary, which remained under the Habsburgs, or today’s Slovakia. The Hungarian capital was also moved to Prešburg/Pozsony (Bratislava). As a result, illiterate peasants using often incomprehensible speech varieties (that can be anachronistically identified as “Croatian,” “German,” “Hungarian,” and “Slovak”) lived side by side in a single village. In order to survive they needed to cooperate during harvest, house construction, or while negotiating labor owed to the noble landowner. Hence, they had to be able to communicate swiftly and successfully in everyday life. In order to prepare their children for this task, parents speaking different speech varieties regularly sent their children to stay with their neighbors for a fortnight to two months every year for five to six years in a row. The “exchanged children” were treated as one’s own and participated in all the usual household and family activities. As a result, without attending any school and mostly remaining illiterate, the region’s peasants were highly multilingual. However, they did not see this de facto multilingualism in terms of Einzelsprachen, the concept known to the region’s noble elite but not yet to the peasants. Peasants still spoke in order to communicate and did not need to negotiate a mutually comprehensible Einzelsprache prior to the act of communication, which is now the norm in the modern world. See also bilingualism, diglossia, linguistic area, language barrier, language boundary.

korenizatsiia (Russian term коренизация, translated as “nativization,” literally “rooting in,” from корень koren’ “root”) — in the interwar Soviet Union it was a policy of building Einzelsprachen (language engineering) for recognized “backward nationalities,” and for ensuring the use of these new Einzelsprachen and the already extant Einzelsprachen of the “developed nationalities” in a variety of autonomous territories founded for all these nationalities, that is, in administration and education. This policy entailed mass production of books and periodicals in all these nationalities’ Einzelsprachen.

L1 ( acronym derived from the term “Language 1”, or the “First Language”) — the very first Einzelsprache that a person acquires after birth, in early childhood. See also mother tongue.
L1 (L3, L4, etc.)—by analogy to the term “L1,” the second, third, fourth/ and umpteenth Einzelsprache that a person happens to acquire.

L1 speaker—a neutral designation for “native speaker.”

∅ language (from Latin lingua, meaning both “language” and “tongue [muscle in the mouth],” hence the English term “tongue” for Einzelsprache, as in mother tongue)—“language with no article in front of it.” This term has no plural and is uncountable. It denotes the biological (evolutionary) capacity for speech. The main evolutionary pressure that caused language to emerge is improvement in the efficiency of bonding individual humans into cohesive groups. Conveying information is a secondary function of language, which appeared with the rise of large-scale artifacts of social reality, for instance, states or nations. These artifacts allow for creating cohesive non-face-to-face (imagined) groups of millions and even a billion members.

a language (etymology: see above)—English noun that is always preceded by an article in singular, has a plural form and is countable. In linguistics the concept of a “quantifiable unit (quantum) of the linguistic,” that is for making the continuous nature of speech and speech variation (see dialect continuum, linguistic area) discrete, countable, and quantifiable. On the other hand, in popular parlance and politics (especially language politics as pursued by ethnolinguistic nationalists), the term “a language” is a form of status which is accorded to some written speech varieties (for instance, national languages) and withheld from others, disparaged as, for example, “dialects.” Hence, the term “a language” is not a neutral term of analysis. A neutral designation for a (written or not) speech variety with no political connotations is the term Einzelsprache. See also dialect vs language (Einzelsprache) dichotomy.

language as a weapon (instrument of power) (from Russian язык как орудие власти iazyk kak orudie vlasti)—an expression and concept arguably coined by Vladimir Lenin in the early 1910s (cf Stalin 1931: 76-77). It denotes the conscious use of a language as a weapon (instrument) of power (from Russian iażyk kak orudie vlasti) (State Language as a Weapon of Power) explicitly operationalized (“weaponized”) the Russian language as the basic instrument of action within the legitimizing scope of the Kremlin’s current “soft power” ideology of the Russian World (Rybin 2018). Four years earlier, in 2014, the Russian language had been tacitly employed in this manner for legitimizing the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea, the argument being that the majority of the peninsula’s inhabitants speak Russian, hence, they must be Russians, while ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state dictates that all the speakers of the national language (seen as members of the nation) should reside in their own indivisible and singular nation-state.

language barrier (etymology: see language. The word “barrier” stems from Old French barriere, in turn from barre “bar, obstacle”—the concept of the lack of an (adequate) command of a dominant Einzelsprache (typically, an imperial language or large language) appeared at the turn of the twentieth century, but especially during the Great War, when the imperial powers drafted soldiers from across their empires. These soldiers stemmed from an unprecedented number of ethnic groups, all thrown into the tragic melee of the war theaters in Europe and the Middle East as combatants and POWs. The predominantly monolingual manner of command (with the rare exception of the Austro-Hungarian army) hampered the efficiency of military operations and relief efforts for POWs and refugees.

The invention of Esperanto in the 1880s, and other constructed languages later on were a popular solution to this phenomenon of language barrier. But imperialism (even in its “softer” incarnations of cultural imperialism or linguistic imperialism) entailed the great powers’ de facto disdain for constructed languages, often leading to an official ban on their use. In 1922 Esperanto was banned from French schools, and in 1924 Paris blocked the motion to make Esperanto into another working language of the League of Nations, while in totalitarian states (especially in Germany and the Soviet Union during the 1930s) Esperantists were incarcerated in concentration camps, where many were summarily executed or worked to death (“liquidated”).

The term “language barrier” was not in use before the 1880s, because only in the age of high imperialism the concept of Einzelsprache was thoroughly “naturalized” and imposed on the rest of the world, mostly through the spread of the idea of compulsory elementary education for all, channeled through writing, which is the main instrument for creating and solidifying Einzelsprachen. Prior to the age of imperialism, most people talked to communicate (see Kinderaustausch), while later, a mutually comprehensible Einzelsprache first had to be negotiated and agreed upon before communication could take place.

See also ethnolinguistic map, linguistic map, mutual comprehensibility.

language border (etymology: see language. The phrase stems from German Sprachgrenze. The word “border” stems from Old French bordure “seam, edge of a shield, border,” cognate with German Borte “ribbon, trimming.” On the other hand, the German term Grenze, or Grenz in obsolete spelling, stems from Middle High German Grenize or Graniza, which is of Slavic origin, hence cognate with Bulgarian and Russian граница granitsa or Polish granica)—the German term Sprachgrenze appeared with the rise of the concept of normatively monolingual
national territories (of speech communities equated with nations), construed in line with the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism, and made visible with the use of cartography for representing data obtained during censuses by asking the language question (see ethnolinguistic map). In this way ethnolinguistic nationalism was naturalized, and made into an object of scientific research, thus making scholars and civil servants oblivious to the fact that it was them who created this element of social reality by making specific decisions on the basis of specific assumptions. After World War One, at the Peace Conference in Paris, the Allies led by the United States President Woodrow Wilson decided to use the cartographically-cum-statistically imagined ethnolinguistic nations for replacing Central Europe’s multiethnic and polyglot empires with ethnolinguistic nation-states. The United States geographer of Ottoman-Armenian origin Leon Dominian gathered these ideas in his seminal 1917 monograph The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe, which was closely read and followed by Wilson and his team of advisors. Dominian popularized the term “language border” as an instrument of geopolitical decision-making.

Obviously, a language border is a highly ideologized concept, because until the mid-twentieth century bilingualism and diglossia were the norm in Europe, while people speaking and writing different Einzelsprachen and speech varieties could live peacefully side by side without unduly politicizing this fact, let alone making it into an argument for expelling (ethnic cleansing) speakers of a “foreign language,” in quest for ethnolinguistic homogeneity in a given nation-state. In today’s world genuinely “sharp” language borders overlapping with state frontiers exist almost exclusively in Central Europe. This tight overlap, in line with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state is a result of numerous acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the short twentieth century, which touched upon the lives of about 100 million people in this region. See also ethnolinguistic map, linguistic map, mutual comprehensibility.

Language conflict (etymology: see language. The word “conflict” stems from Latin conflictus, past participle of confligere “collide, clash, engage in combat,” in turn from con- “together” and flēgo “strike”)—a form of language politics, in the course of which two or more ethnic or political groups use an Einzelsprache (or its specific variety) as a rallying flag for legitimizing and forcing their preferred solution or point of view on the other group. For instance, after two decades of political pressure, in the early 1880s Czech became a co-official language, alongside German, in Bohemia, and in 1882 Prague University was split alongside the linguistic cleavage into two universities, one with German and the other with Czech as the sole language of instruction. In 1831–1833, an “alphabet war” (abecedna vojna) was waged in the Austrian Empire’s Crownland of Carniola (the central part of today’s Slovenia) between proponents of two different orthographies (spelling systems) of the Einzelsprache of Slovenian. Hence, this conflict fell specifically under the rubric of the politics of script. During the first half of the twentieth century in Ottoman/Mandate (British) Palestine a “war of languages” (in Hebrew מלחמת השפות Milhemet HaSafot), or a heated discussion developed about which Einzelsprache should become official in Jewish institutions, Hebrew, Yiddish or German. The founding of Israel in 1948 settled the conflict in favor of Hebrew. In independent Greece proponents of Katharevousa (antiquated Greek) and Demotic (vernacular Greek) quarreled for almost two centuries before the latter became official in 1976. During the twentieth century this strife led to the persisting association of Katharevousa with traditionalists and conservatives, while Demotic with modernizers and socialists.

Language death (etymology: see language. The word “death” stems from Old English dēap, cognate with German Tod)—a misnomer (from Medieval Latin lingua mortua “dead language,” when commenting on the then observed non-existence of the speech community of Latin or Quranic Arabic) for language disappearance (extinction, obsolescence). A language, Einzelsprachen, speech varieties, dialects, standard languages, or national languages are not living organisms, as popularly, but erroneously maintained. They do not live, they are not born, do not give birth to “offspring (children) languages,” and thus cannot die. It is humans and human groups who use their biological capacity for speech (Ø language) to build (see language engineering), maintain, and employ Einzelsprachen. When a speech community abandons the oral and written use of an (or “its”) Einzelsprache, then this language disappears from active employment and becomes obsolete.

Language disappearance (extinction, obsolescence) (etymology: see language)—occurs when a given Einzelsprache falls out of active use, when its speech community gives up on it and decides to employ another Einzelsprache in speech and writing. Critics of such a shift use the emotionally charged collocation language death for mobilizing (shaming) the original speech community (ethnic group) to recover the use of the abandoned Einzelsprache, or more often to prevent such abandonment (obsolescence) when a new dominant Einzelsprache is preferred to the group’s original (earlier) ethnic (national) language.

Language engineering (etymology: see language. The term engineering stems from Old French enginieor, in turn from Medieval Latin ingeniator “inventor, designer,” ultimately from ingenium “talent, skill,” and gignere “to beget, produce”)—a term borrowed from Russian (языковое строительствоязыковое строительство) for a conscious state or state-supported policy of building Einzelsprachen. The origin of this term goes back to the interwar Soviet Union, when in the framework of the policy of koreṅatsiia over one hundred Einzelsprachen were built for a similar number of ethnic groups.

Language family (etymology: see language. The word “family” stems from Latin familia “household, the slaves of a household”)—in the highly ideologized classificatory method of Stammbaum (language family tree), a group of “genealogically related” Einzelsprachen (typically national languages, other speech varieties or dialects disregarded as “civilizationally or culturally lower elements” of the former, seen as “roofing languages”),
The aforementioned principle closely corresponds to and reinforces the census norm (language question) that a person (constructed as a native speaker) can naturally have only a single national language as her or his "mother tongue," which should clearly indicate their membership (nationality) in a given nation. At the level of research, these aforementioned normative assumptions make scholars oblivious to the fact that, from the Stammbaum perspective, English belongs both to the Germanic and Romance "families" of languages. Similarly, prior to the nationally-induced "purification" (purism) of Hungarian and Romanian, the former belonged both to the Finno-Ugric and Romance "families" of languages, while the latter to the Romance and Slavic ones. Osmanlica (Ottoman Turkish), due to its centuries-long extensive borrowings and adaptations from Arabic and Persian, used to belong to as many as three "families" of Turkic, Semitic, and Indo-European (Iranic) languages. At present, Ivrit (Modern Hebrew), as mainly constructed by Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazim predominantly stemming from Slavophone territories, also belongs to three such "families," namely those of Semitic, Germanic, and Slavic languages. Likewise, due to its spatially central localization in the Balkan linguistic area, Bulgarian may be usefully seen as a member of the four "families" of Slavic, Hellenic (Greek), Turkic and Romance languages.

The constructed and normative character of the Western concept of "language family" became, long ago, obvious to students of non-European languages (speech varieties), especially outside Eurasia. This concept obfuscates rather than helps scholarly efforts at understanding the history and dynamics of linguistic exchanges among non-Western speech communities (ethnic groups). However, this insight on the constructed and normative character of the concept "language family" is still rarely taken note of in today's West of nation-states, especially in the present-day Central Europe of ethnolinguistic nation-states.

Language family tree—see Stammbaum.

Language of instruction (education)—see medium of education.

Language of international (interethnic) communication (etymology: see international, language. The term "communication" stems from Old French communica(s)ion, in turn from Latin communicātiōnem, and ultimately from communīcō "I share, I impart")—a lingua franca, an Einzelsprache employed as a second language (L2) by speakers from different ethnic groups (or ethnolinguistic nations) or citizens from various nation-states who do not share the same L1 (first language). Oftentimes it is a "large language," spoken by at least 100 million speakers or more. At present, a large language that is used as a lingua franca across several continents and tens of politics by 0.5-1 billion people tends to be dubbed a "global (world) language."

Language planning (etymology: see language. The word "plan" stems from French plan ("a ground-plot of a building," in turn from Latin planus ("level, flat, plane")—a synonym for language engineering.

Language politics (etymology: see language, politics)—using languages (Einzelsprachen) for political ends (for example, constructing ethnolinguistic nations and their nation-states); also official legislation that extends a state's control over ("regulates") the use of Einzelsprachen and their writing systems in the state. See also bureaucracy, politics of script.

Language status planning (etymology: see estate, language planning, state)—an element of language engineering and language politics, namely, an official decision on the role which a given Einzelsprache should play in a state. For instance, in the Russian Empire White Russian (Belarusian) was considered to be a dialect of the Great Russian language. After 1864, the use of White Russian in writing and publishing was banned in order to enforce Russian as the sole Einzelsprache for the Empire's all Slavophone Orthodox Christians. The lift of this ban in 1905 saw the making of White Russian into the national language of the then coalescing White Russian national movement. The German occupation of the northwestern Russian provinces made White Russian, for the first time in history, into a language of administration and a medium of instruction. When Belarus emerged briefly as an independent nation-state in 1918, Belarusian was made into the nation-state's sole official language. Subsequently, within the Soviet Union, in Soviet Byelorussia, Belarusian was a co-official language, alongside Polish, Russian, and Yiddish. In 1938, the co-official role of Polish and Yiddish was scrapped, and the leading role of Russian reinforced, which de facto downgraded Belarusian to a second co-official language in Soviet Byelorussia. This situation lasted until the re-emergence of independent Belarus in 1991. Between 1991 and 1994 Belarusian was this nation-state's sole national and official language (see normative isomorphism of language, nation and state). But beginning with 1995, the status of Belarusian was reduced to that of the national and a co-official language, while Russian is de facto the leading co-official language in today's Belarus. See also script status planning.

Language question (census) (etymology: see language. The word "question" stems from Anglo-French question, in turn from Latin quaestīōn, ultimately from quaerere "to seek, ask, inquire")—in Central Europe during the mid-nineteenth century an idea appeared and spread that the demographic size (population) of nations can be identified and measured (counted) by including the "language question" in state-wide censuses. It was argued that a person can "naturally" have only one language (L1, mother tongue), which is "truly" their national language. As such an answer to this language question was believed to be a clear indicator of a person's nationality, that is, their membership in an ethno-
linguistically defined nation. In 1872, the eighth International Congress of Statistics held at St Petersburg recommended that such a language question as a measure of nationality be included in censuses. Afterward, censuses with this question included produced data, which in the numerical and cartographic forms (see ethnolinguistic map), were seen as “evidence” for the existence of a variety of ethnolinguistically defined nations across Central Europe. In reality, census-takers, scholars, and politicians imposed a specific ethnonational view on the region’s social reality, making the as yet non-national inhabitants accept the concept of the ethnolinguistic nation and pledge their allegiance to one of such nations. Thus, Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nations were produced between the 1860s and 1920s, including the region’s supposedly “centuries-old multinational” character. See also language family, native speaker, Stammbaum.

language war (etymology: see cyberwarfare, language)—see language conflict.

large language (etymology: see language. The adjective “large” stems from largus “abundant, plentiful, copious, large, much”)—a journalistic term for an Einzelsprache (usually a lingua franca) spoken by at least 100 million speakers or more in numerous countries. See also global (world) language.

Latinization (from the name of the language of “Latin,” or Latinus in Latin, ultimately from the name of the region of Latium—nowadays Lazio in Italian—where the city of Rome was founded)—a language engineering policy of endowing unwritten Einzelsprachen with a Latin alphabet-based script, or for replacing an Einzelsprache’s different script with the Latin alphabet. In the early twentieth century the Latin alphabet was believed to be the best (“most progressive”) of all the extant scripts (writing systems), and it was naively assumed that writing an Einzelsprache in Latin letters alone would ensure “progress” and “modernization.” Hence, Latinization was part and parcel of the Soviet policy of ko-renizatsia between the mid-1920s and mid-1930s.

Latinization is also a synonym for Romanization.

lect (from Latin lectus, namely, the past participle of legere “choose, gather, read”)—a neutral, scholarly, not ideologized designation for any speech variety or language variety.

legitimacy (from Medieval Latin legitimatus, the perfect passive participle of legititum “to make legal,” in turn from legitimus “lawful, fixed by law, in line with the law”)—in politics the consent of the governed that a ruler exercises power (governs) in a state legally, in accordance with a principle(s). Such a principle (divine right or ideology) is the utmost benchmark to decide that one’s rule is not a tyranny. In today’s world the most widespread ideology for legitimizing not only rule, but above all statehood, is nationalism.

lèse-majesté (lse-majesty) (French loanword, from Latin [crimen] laesæ majestätì “[the crime] of injured majesty”)—originally a criminal offense against the dignity of the public office or the emperor in the Roman Empire, and later against monarchs in medieval and early modern Europe; nowadays an offense against the sovereign nation-state, usually high treason. See also blasphemy, traitor of one’s nation.

lingua franca (pl lingua francæ; from the Italian name Lingua Franca “the language of Franks [Romance-speaking Christians]” for Sabir, or the Romance-based pidgin spoken along the shores of the Mediterranean from the eleventh to nineteenth centuries)—a language (Einzelsprache) of broader communication, typically spoken and/or written by speakers of other languages for the sake of communication across language barriers (between Einzelsprachen) and across dialect continua. In Europe, Latin fulfilled this purpose until the early modern period, and later French until the mid-twentieth century, before it was replaced by English in the wake of World War Two and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Originally, (Mediterranean) Lingua Franca was a pidgin (rudimentary language not native to any speech community) developed by sailors and traders. The name means the “language of the Franks,” that is, Romance-speaking Christians, as perceived by Muslims since the time of the crusades. The Romance dialectal base of Lingua Franca was that of the Mediterranean coasts of today’s Spain, France, and Italy. Furthermore, it was infused with linguistic elements from Arabic, Berber, Greek, and Turkic. See also language of international (interethnic) communication, large language.

linguistic area (also Sprachbund, linguistic league, area of linguistic convergence. Etymology: see language, linguistics. The word “area” stems from Latin ārea “vacant piece of level ground, open space in a town”)—due to centuries-long stable interactions of speakers of languages (Einzelsprachen, dialects) from different dialect continua, a variety of linguistic features comes to be shared by distinctive speech communities; Abstand languages become more similar to one another, or more Ausbau-like. This phenomenon was first described in the case of the Balkans, where Albanic-, Greek-, Indic-, Romance-, Slavic-, and Turkic-speakers brushed sides, first, in the (East) Roman Empire, and then in the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan linguistic area is the best researched and described.

linguistic discrimination (etymology: see language, linguistics, discrimination)—prejudice and unfair treatment of individuals and groups on the basis of the Einzelsprachen and scripts (writing systems) that they employ. For instance, in ethnolinguistic nation-states, speakers of other national languages are seen as “potentially dangerous or disloyal” “minorities.” Within a speech community (ethnolinguistic nation), a person can be discriminated against for speaking their local dialect (“accent”) rather than conform to the standard (official) language as established, spoken, and written by a given nation-state’s elite. See also standardization.

linguistic human rights (etymology: see divine right, crime against humanity, language, linguistics)—a subsection of
human rights, which emerged in interwar Central Europe, where the post-1918 replacement of the empires with ethnolinguistic nation-states yielded the widespread phenomenon of national minorities whose collective rights (see collectivism) were guaranteed under the League of Nations’ minority treaties system. Linguistic human rights were tacitly incorporated in the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, thanks to Article 2, which among others, prohibits limiting any person’s human rights on account of their language (Universal 1948). In light of this norm of international law, from the perspective of language politics, all language varieties (for instance, Einzelsprachen, languages, lects, ethnolects, dialects, sociolects, or speech varieties, including related scripts) employed by distinctive human groups (that is, micro-ethnic groups, ethnic groups, nationalities, nations, or nation-states) should be treated as of equal worth and accorded the same level of respect and prestige. Any person ought to be able to freely avail herself of whatever language variety she may wish in private (see individualism), and should have the freedom to use such a language variety in public, together with other speakers of this variety (including, education, politics, state administration, or mass media). In practice, linguistic human rights are observed (to a degree) only in Eurasia, while elsewhere the actual norm is linguistic imperialism, conducted with the use of the former colonial European Einzelsprachen (“large languages”). During the past decade cyberspace imperialism considerably widened this gap in the observance of linguistic human rights between Eurasia and the rest of the world.

linguistic imperialism (etymology: see empire, language, linguistics)—a term developed by the Scottish linguist, Robert Phillipson, for the policy of imposing European powers’ official (national) languages (Einzelsprachen) and their scripts (writing systems) on the colonized populations in these powers’ maritime (continent-wide) empires. After World War Two, the process of decolonization delegitimized and effectively ended political imperialism, but practically all postcolonial nation-states outside of Eurasia continue to use the European (former imperial) languages as official (national) Einzelsprachen, to the strict exclusion of the indigenous (non-European) languages. European languages and scripts constitute a clear-cut index of the West’s unchallenged material reality, or the same word referring to different objects) within the area where a given language is spoken. Like the ethnolinguistic map (also known as ethnographic map) that makes an ethnolinguistic nation into a depictable and “scientifically” constructed (“recognized”) entity, the linguistic map does the same for an Einzelsprache. The first linguistic maps were produced in the early nineteenth century, while the first linguistic atlas (of Europe) was published in Italian at Milano in 1841 (Atlante Linguistico d’Europa) (Biondelli 1841). Four decades later, a German-language atlas of this kind, however based on a questionnaire poll, came off the press in 1881 at Straßburg (Strasbourg) and London (Sprach-Atlas von Nord- und Mitteldeutschland) (Wenker 1881). But only in 1892, drawing at the method of depicting spatial information in geography (contour lines, or isohypses, late eighteenth century) and meteorology (isobar and isotherm, mid-1860s), the term isoglosse (Greek ἰσός “equal or similar” and γλώσσα “dialect, language”) was proposed by August Bielenstein in “Die Littischen Dialekte der Gegenwart. Isoglossen-Karte” (that is, map 6 in his Atlas der Ethnologischen Geographie des heutigen und des praehistorischen Lettenlandes published in St Petersburg) (Bielenstein 1892). Isohypses are employed for depicting a terrain of equal height, isobars for an atmospheric area of equal pressure, while isotherms for an area of equal temperature, hence all depict material reality.

By contrast, isoglosses depict an area where the same (or similar) linguistic element is employed by speakers, hence social reality. This borrowing of a method from the natural sciences recalls August Schleicher’s 1860s borrowing of some methodologies from the then nascent evolutionary biology (for instance, the concept of “living organism” and the tree diagram of speciation, or Stammbaum) for philology (Schleicher 1861: 4). The hope was that in this way philology would be transformed into an exact “science” of language (linguistics). However, as clearly shown by perceptual dialectology, social reality is solely dependent on human will and often strongly influenced (changed,
re-shaped) by the act of observation (perception) itself. No aspect of social reality can be weighed or measured with a theodolite, hypsometer (thermobarometer), or thermometer. Social reality is visible exclusively to those “in the know,” to the “mind’s eye” of the observer, who is as much of an observer as a participant in shaping and maintaining a given fragment of social reality. Therefore, an observer (cum-participant) of this kind can decide herself, as was shown by Alexander Maxwell in his seminal 1856 article (“Why the Slovak Language Has Three Dialects: A Case Study in Historical Perceptual Dialectology,” *Austrian History Yearbook*), that the territory of Slovakia is intersected by two important “bundles of isoglosses,” yielding three main Slovak dialects, or by many more bundles, yielding multiple dialects. There is no “scientific” way (in the meaning of the natural sciences or laws of physics) to measure the actual or “true” number of Slovak dialects. This common methodological error of seeing isoglosses as a measure or depiction of material reality did not stop an avalanche of laboriously compiled and produced linguistic atlases during the twentieth century, of the majority of Europe’s national languages and some selected Einzelsprachen from elsewhere in Eurasia. Tellingly, the work on linguistic atlases was at its most intensive in Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nation-states and some other European national and non-national polities, where Einzelsprachen were (still are) of import for some administrative and political purposes. The genre of linguistic atlas is practically unknown outside of Eurasia. In the Americas, Africa, and Australasia almost exclusively (former imperial) European Einzelsprachen are in official use, while the continents’ polities are nearly invariably civic nation-states.

In the aftermath of the Great War, linguistic maps (along ethnolinguistic maps) were employed as a “scientific” (that is, politically acceptable) argument for changing borders and establishing frontiers of the newly founded ethnolinguistic nation-states across Central Europe. As a result, the employment of isoglosses for border proposals, demarcation, and legitimation underscored the rise of the political concept of the language boundary at the level of social communication (mutual comprehensibility), corresponding to the idea of a language barrier. The proposed (perceptual) normative, and to a large degree constructed (imposed from above and outside), spatial and conceptual overlapping of isoglosses, language boundaries, language barriers, and state frontiers set the ground for the actualization of ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. The declarative (if not actual) ethnolinguistic homogeneity (normative monolingualism) became the sole basis of statehood creation, legitimation and maintenance in Central Europe of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

linguistics (mid-nineteenth century neologism, perhaps borrowed from German *Linguistik,* ultimately from Latin *lingua* “language”—ostensibly a “science of language,” in opposition to philology [whose followers, from an emic perspective, research Einzelsprachen through the lens of cultural, national, ethnic, religious, and other values and assumptions]. On the other hand, linguists, from an etic perspective, aspire to research language and all speech varieties, without proposing that one should be seen as somehow “better” or “superior” than another. Scientists (or natural scientists) research material reality (the universe) in order to describe it and discover the unchangeable laws that govern it—laws that are fully independent of human will, as material reality is. In this sense, linguistics is “scientific” only in the case of its subdisciplines of morphology, neurolinguistics, phonemics, or phonetics. On the other hand, the subdisciplines of syntax, historical linguistics, lexicography, sociolinguistics, or pragmatics analyze o language and Einzelsprachen in the context of specific human societies (ethnic groups, speech communities), that is, practitioners of these subdisciplines probe into the interaction of material reality with social reality, from the etic perspective, which is typical in anthropology, or the social sciences in general. Obviously, social reality is fully dependent on human will, though some regularities can be observed across societies. In contrast, following the methods of the humanities, philologists focus on Ø language and Einzelsprachen entirely within the confines of the social reality, through the lens of a specific ethnic group’s (speech community’s) values.

linguonym (neologism formed from Latin *lingua* “language” and Greek ὄνομα *onoma* “name”)—language or dialect (Einzelsprache) name, also glotonym. See also ethnonym.

literacy (from Latin *litterātus* “learned, scholarly” [hence, the English term “literati” for “scholars, bureaucrats, civil servants”], in turn from Latin *littera* “letter”)—the skill of reading and writing in a language (Einzelsprache) with the use of a script. See also numeracy.

“living organism” (mid-seventeenth-century neologism “organism” was formed from Greek ὄργανον *órganon* “tool, instrument” and the abstract noun suffix “–ism,” ultimately from Greek -ισμός)—a popular biologizing (see nature) metaphor (often mistaken for material reality) for Einzelsprachen, nations and peoples. Its source is, perhaps, the Saxe-Meiningen linguist August Schleicher’s 1850 pamphlet *Die Sprachen Europas in systematischer Übersicht* (The Languages of Europe: A Systematic Overview), in which he proposed to see Einzelsprachen as Naturorganismen (living organisms) (Schleicher 1850: 27, 38, 75). This claim that languages are a product of nature became popular quickly because it agreed so well with the biologizing tendency of ethnolinguistic nationalism, then a political ideology on the rise. Even more credence to this metaphor was lent by the publication of Charles Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species* in 1859 (Darwin 1859). An idea swiftly appeared that languages, nations, and peoples may be “species.” Schleicher seized on it in his 1863 pamphlet, six years later published in an English translation as *Darwinism Tested by the Science of Language* (1869) (Schleicher 1861, 1869). In this book, the now excessively popular genre of the language family tree (Stammbaum) made its first-ever appearance. In this diachronic manner (from the perspective of the flow of time), Einzelsprachen-species are imagined as branches of a language tree, closely modeled on the Darwin-influenced (evolutionary) tree of life (that is, biological species). This metaphor taken as a faithful reflection of material (natural, biological) reality led to the rapid acceptance of the view that languages are “born” and “die,” or that “parent languages” spawn “offspring,”
which are seen as "sister languages" in relation to one another. In turn, such a "parent language" and its "children/sister languages" constitute a "language family."

While the metaphor of the tree of life helped to turn biology into an exact science (especially after the discovery of the DNA double helix in 1968), its linguistic counterpart spurred and gave undue "scientific" credence to the ideology of social darwinism, which in turn underpinned eugenics, racial hygiene, and the "science of race." What is more, in Central Europe, the language family tree inspired the efforts to create and standardize Einzelsprachen (see purism) and led many to see ethnolinguistic nationalism as a "scientific founding," rather than an ideology solely dependent on human will.

Finally, the unbridled popularity of the family tree ("genalogical") as a method of linguistic research and classification seriously marginalized the models of dialect continuum and linguistic area, which are better grounded in the observed facts and less ideologically driven. Perhaps, due to the sheer diversity of human groups through time and space, there is no single universal model available for classifying all human speech varieties and their highly diversified sociopolitical uses. The employment of the family tree model in a tight feedback loop with the needs of ethnolinguistic nationalism (see normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state) made this model appear a perfect fit for classifying and describing Einzelsprachen. In turn the hubs of imperialism (cultural imperialism, linguistic imperialism) convinced Western academia to announce it (erroneously) as universal for all humanity's languages, myopically seen as Einzelsprachen.

local ethnic group (etymology: see ethnic boundary, ethnic group. The adjective "local" stems from Neo-Latin locālis "belonging to a place," in turn from locus "place")—see micro-ethnic group.

material reality (see biosphere, extrasmiotic sphere; adjective "material" stems from Neo-Latin māteriālis "of, belonging to matter," in turn the noun "matter" is derived from Latin māter "woody part of a tree, material, substance," ultimately from māter "mother." The term "reality" stems from Medieval Latin realitās, in turn from reālis "real")—the universe, nature, matter, and energy, or things (for instance, stone, flowers, the sun, or electrons) and phenomena (for example, radiation, weather, erosion, or evaporation) that can be detected with the senses of hearing, sight, smell, taste, or touch. Material reality is accessible (or detectable = hearable, tactile, or visible) not only to humans, but to all living creatures with organs for sensory perception. See also reality and social reality.

medium of education (word "medium" stems from Latin medius "middle." The term "education" stems from Latin educātiō "breeding, bringing up, rearing," in turn from ēdūcō "I teach, train")—a language of instruction (education), that is, an Einzelsprache with its specific script in official use in a school, university, or an educational system of a region or state. Sometimes the employment of speech varieties not (yet) made into Einzelsprachen is permitted in the lower grades of elementary school, especially if the unstandardized L1 of pupils is radically different from the language of education.

mesolect—see prestige.

micro-ethnic group (etymology: see ethnic boundary, micro-language)—in the late 1970s this term appeared as an idealized criticism for referring to ethnolinguistic movements that sought national autonomy within freshly decolonized states in Africa, or even independence (cf Ashworth 1978: ss) (see tribalism).

In 1991, the Austrian-Slovenian historian Andreas Moritzsch introduced the concepts of Dorfethnos ("village ethnic group") and Lokaletethnos ("local ethnic group") as terms for analyzing the dynamics of ethnicity in Central Europe's polities of estates, among socially and spatially immobile serf populations (Moritzsch 1991: 49, 89). Because of its legally and traditionally prescribed centuries-long serfdom-style immobility, the peasantry identified only with their home village or parish, with no chance of having a personal experience of the broader world. In his famous 1983 diagram representing the social stratification of pre-modern "Agraria," Gellner depicted serf villages (parishes) as spatially isolated communities (Gemeinschaften) differing from one another in customs, speech, views, and identification, that is, in ethnicity (Gellner 1981: 10). Above this peasant (village) population which constituted the vast majority of the inhabitants, a polity's ruling political elite—of the estates of nobility, clergy, and (sometimes) burghers—presided (extended), thus affording the state (empire, kingdom, principality) a degree of social cohesion across its entire territory. The socio-political system and its cohesion were usually underpinned by the same religion (in accordance with the principle cuius regio, eius religio), which allowed for legitimizing and enforcing the entire populace's loyalty (kaisertreu-ness) toward the monarch (ruler) in line with the doctrine of divine right.

In the early modern period, this estates-based elite was already a "modern-style" non-face-to-face urban Gesellschaft, who later, typically internalized the Western European late eighteenth-century concept of the nation, and remake itself into a national movement (that is, a national elite). Subsequently, this estates-based elite-turned-national movement, on the basis of a "common" Einzelsprache in Central Europe, sought to remodel the polity's numerous face-to-face village Gemeinschaften (or micro-ethnic groups) into a single ethnolinguistic nation, indeed e pluribus unum ("out of many, one").

Often the estates-based national movement's internalization (naturalization) of nationalism was so swift and deep that from their own emic perspective, noble national activists were highly surprised to find out that peasants had no awareness of "their" nation, nor displayed any eagerness to join it, especially prior to the introduction of compulsory elementary education for all in the national language, which would effectively communicate the national message to all and sundry across the state's territory. On the other hand, peasants were equally surprised why they should be expected to switch their loyalty from their face-to-face micro-ethnic groups to some invisible and unknowable (non-face-to-face) nation of their former, or even current, noble lords. It took much longer to bridge the estate (class, social) division between the nobles-turned-national activists and peasants who

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preferred to remain members of their rural micro-ethnic groups. Hence, in essence, this mutual incomprehension was an effect of the rarely acknowledged ethnic boundary (cleavage) between the still noble character and membership of the nation-in-making and the target peasant (village) micro-ethnic groups for inclusion (assimilation, coercion, or cooption) into this nation. If the latter successfully withstood this nationalizing pressure, a given national project usually failed.

Prior to the rise of the phenomenon of the state, all human groups were face-to-face micro-ethnic groups. Until the modern period, the majority of people still lived in such micro-ethnic groups, be it in the colonies, or “at home” in Europe, that is, in their insulated rural Gemeinschaften. Only in the wake of decolonization in the mid-twentieth century and following the universal acceptance of nationalism as the world’s sole infrastructural ideology of statehood building, legitimation, and maintenance, did the phenomenon of micro-ethnic groups largely disappear; humanity sullerded among the non-face-to-face Gemeinschaften of their nations and nation-states as the standard units (‘quanta’) of legitimate groupness and statehood.

microlanguage (also “literary microlanguage”; etymology: see language. The prefix “micro-” stems from Greek μικρός mikrós “small”)—a term (developed by the Russo-Estonian slavist, Aleksandr Dulitšenko Александр Дуличenko, or Aleksandr Dulitienko in the Estonian language-based transliteration [Dulitienko 1981]) that became popular at the turn of the twenty-first century for referring to Slavic Einzelsprachen with some written production. In the nation-states where in use, these Slavic microlanguages are officially not recognized as languages or treated as dialects of these nation-states’ Slavic national (official, state) languages. This often occurs despite the wishes of these Slavic microlanguages’ speakers (speech communities) to the contrary. They want their Einzelsprachen to be recognized as languages. The scholarly label “microlanguage” conveys some respect, which the states of their residence deny to such microlanguages’ speakers (speech communities). The elite of a given nation-state denying official recognition to a microlanguage usually espouses ethnolinguistic nationalism. From this ideological perspective, recognizing a language means redefining its speech community as a nation. As a result, the nation-state’s ethnolinguistic homogeneity is compromised, and the newly recognized nation, following the ideology of nationalism, may request an independent nation-state of its own.

millet—from the Osmanlica (Ottoman Turkish) term ἀ μίλλα milla, an ethnoreligious non-territorial autonomy within the Ottoman Empire for the faithful of a monotheistic religion. For instance, the Rum (Roman) Millet was for Orthodox Christians, the Jewish Millet for Judaists, the Millet of Islam for Muslims, and the Armenian Millet for the Monophysite Christians of the Armenian Apostolic Church. In today’s Turkish the term millet means “nation.”

minority (from Medieval Latin minoritas “minority,” in turn from Latin minor “of little importance or significance”)—in international law a term for a part of the population (members) of an ethnolinguistic nation who happen to reside in a polity other than their “home” nation-state. This concept and term entered popular political and legal use in Europe after World War One, when the Allies decided to reorganize the political shape of Central Europe (east of France and west of the Soviet Union) on the principle of ethnolinguistic nationalism (normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state). In this region each nation-state was supposed to be ethnolinguistically (ethnoreligiously) homogenous. This goal of “unmixing” or “homogenizing” the population could be achieved only through the following methods of population (demographic) engineering, namely, assimilation, ethnic cleansing (population transfer), or genocide. While initially the Allies tacitly approved of population transfers, the sheer scale and destabilization they tended to generate made the Allies change their mind in favor of assimilation. Hence, under the auspices of the League of Nations, between 1919 and 1924, a series of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties were contracted for the sake of protecting the rights of (national) minorities, shielding them from population transfers and forced assimilation. However, the resultant normative tension between minority rights and the normative isomorphism (of language, nation, and state) was resolved in most interwar Central Europe’s states to the detriment of the minorities who were suppressed, persecuted, and blamed for the outbreak of World War Two. During this war and in its aftermath, most minorities were ethnically cleansed, exterminated, or their existence was denied. Afterward no international system of minority rights protection was extended over the remaining minorities during the Cold War period. Following the fall of communism and the subsequent breakups of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, a modicum of such a system was recreated under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

minority language (etymology: see language, minority)—a national language of a minority, typically legally recognized in the minority’s country of residence, which is not the minority’s “home” nation-state. Some low-key auxiliary use of the minority language may be allowed in education and local administration in the administrative units (regions) where the minority’s members constitute a considerable share of the population (usually at least more than 20 percent; this arbitrary threshold dates back to Austria-Hungary’s legislation on minority language rights). Since 1998 the use of some minority languages in Europe has been protected under the provisions of the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (European Charter 1992). See also regional language.

modernity (early seventeenth-century neologism, from Neo-Latin modernus “modern,” “in turn from Latin modo “just now”)—the period of the last two to four centuries when the West’s model of statehood organization (especially the nation-state), social organization (especially the nation), economy (capitalism), and technology (industrialization) was either imposed on or adopted by the rest of the world, including, the concept and practice of Einzelsprache. Often, the qualified term “early modernity” is employed for referring to Western and Central Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The rise of the non-Western modern powers such as Brazil, China, India, or Japan—with a combined populations considerably larger than that of the West—prompts many commentators to speak of the world’s “modernities,” or “global modernities” in plural.

monocentric language (etymology: see language. The term “monocentric” is a late twenty-century neologism, formed from the prefix “mono-” and the adjective “centric.” The former comes from Greek μόνος (alone, only, one, single,” whereas “centric” stems from Greek κεντρικός “of, or, pertaining to center.” In turn, “center” is derived from Latin centrum “center,” which stems from Greek κέντρον “needle, spur, pivoting point in drawing a circle,” and in turn from κεντύς keintes, “to sting, prick.”)—an Einzelsprache or speech community (ethnic group, nation), typically housed in its own nation-state. In line with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state, a “true” national language must be monocentric. For instance, this is the situation of Czech or Polish, which nowadays are the sole official (national) languages only in the nation-states of the Czech Republic and Poland respectively. See also pluricentric language.

monoethnic (etymology: see ethnic boundary, monocentric language)—the socio-demographic character of a town, city, region, state, or empire on whose territory only a single ethnic group (nation) resides; such a situation is preferred in Central Europe’s nation-states in line with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. See also multiethnic.

monoscriptalism (etymology: see monolingualism, script)—the normative or de facto use of a single writing system (script) for writing a single language (Einzelsprache) (for instance, English is written exclusively with the employment of the Latin alphabet) or for writing all the official languages in a state (for example, Finland’s two official languages of Finnish and Swedish are written in Latin letters).

monotheism (seventeenth-century neologism, from Greek μόνος monos “single” and θεός theos “god”—belief in a single god, normatively seen as the universe’s only “true god.” Not to be confused with monoreligionism, that is, a neutral descriptive term for the fact of practicing (professing) a single religion by a person or within a human group. Such a single religion can be either monotheistic or polytheistic in its character.

mother tongue (etymology: see holy tongue, material reality)—a highly idealized term for L1, or the first Einzelsprache that one acquires in early childhood. In the popular mind, and especially among ethnolinguistic nationalists, the incorrect belief is rife that a baby is born with the naturally (biologically) installeknowledge of the national language, which is referred to as her “true” or “real” mother tongue. Babies are never born with a command of an Einzelsprache, only with the biological (evolutionary) capacity for speech (Ø language).

The word “mother” in the collocation “mother tongue” appears to be an English translation of the Latin term patria (“fatherland”), as a celebratory synonym for “nation-state.” In English this Latin concept can be translated either as “fatherland” or “motherland,” but the common stereotype claims that a newborn receives their language with the proverbial “mother’s milk,” hence it cannot be a “father tongue.” This terminological choice is highly gendered, reflecting the traditional (that is, patriarchal) gender division of social roles between women and men, tasking the former with child rearing and household duties, while isolating the latter from these.

This leads to semantic paradoxes in some national Einzelsprachen. For instance, in Polish patria is invariably rendered as ojczyzna (“fatherland”), though “mother tongue” as język ojczysty (“fatherland’s tongue,” or “father tongue”). But obviously, also among Polish-speakers, the typical belief is that one acquires one’s L1 from one’s mother, not father. In Polish, the neologism język matczyny (literally, “mother tongue”) is possible to form, but it is considered incorrect. See also L1 speaker, native speaker.

multiethnic (etymology: see ethnic boundary. The prefix “multi-” stems from Latin multius “much, many”—the socio-demographic character of a town, city, region, state, or empire on whose territory several ethnic groups coexist. See also heterogeneity vs homogeneity, monoethnic.

multiscriptalism (etymology: see multiethnic, script)—the normative or de facto use of several writing systems for writing a single language (Einzelsprache) (for example, interwar Yugoslavia’s Serbo-Croatoslovenian [Serbo-Croat-Slovenian] was written in Arabic, Cyrillic and Latin letters), or for writing several official languages, each in a different script, within a state (for instance, Moldovan in Latin letters, while Russian in Cyrillic, and Gagauz in Cyrillic and Latin letters in today’s Moldova). In the present-day European Union, the 24 official languages are written in three scripts, namely, Bulgarian in Cyrillic, Greek in the Greek alphabet, and all the other 22 languages in Latin letters. See also scriptal diglossia.

mutual comprehensibility (adjective “mutual” stems from Latin mútuus “reciprocal,” in turn from mútare “to change.” The term “comprehensibility” stems from the early sixteenth-century Neo-Latin neologism comprehēnsibilis “comprehensible,” in turn from comprehendere “comprehend, understand,” formed from Latin compr- “with, together” and prehendere “to grasp”—the phenomenon arises when speakers of different Einzelsprachen or speech varieties can successfully communicate with one another, hence, their languages are said to be mutually comprehensible. In 1926, the United States linguist Leonard Bloomfield in an effort to overhaul “subjective” philology into a “science” of linguistics published the seminal text “A Set of Postulates for the Science of Language” in the quarterly Language (Bloomfield 1926). Among others, he proposed to employ the category of mutual comprehensibility for defining the difference between the traditional concepts of “language” and “dialect” (dialect vs language (Einzelsprache) dichotomy). He proposed that languages are
speech varieties that are mutually incomprehensible, while dialects (tacitly imagined as always belonging to a language) are mutually comprehensible.

However, the Western category of “a language” (Einzelsprache) and its implementation for dissecting the continuous linguistic (o language) into the countable “quanta” of languages are fully dependent on human will, and as such are part and parcel of social reality. Humans and their groups alter social reality as they want, hence, its elements cannot be expected to follow some aspirationally “scientific” definitions or “laws.” As a result, Bloomfield’s definition is easily falsified by the example of mutually incomprehensible dialects of Chinese that are treated as this language’s dialects, or by the mutually comprehensible post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian, which are not treated as dialects of one another.

In the mid-1960s another United States linguist, Einar Haugen (1966), noticed that comprehensibility between Einzelsprachen is usually asymmetric. Speakers of large languages, living in more populous nation-states are worse at understanding speakers of smaller languages in less populous nation-states. And vice versa, speakers of smaller languages, living in less populous nation-states, tend to be better at comprehending speakers of large languages, living in more populous nation-states. Hence, a Portuguese-speaker from Portugal has no problem to follow Spanish-speakers from Spain, while the latter often claim that they are unable to understand the former. Hence, mutual comprehensibility is (also) a function of power relations between nations and nation-states as well as inside a given nation-state and its official single speech community, between the center and the peripheries, and between the elite (ethnic group) and the masses (subjugated ethnic groups).

See also ethnolinguistic map, linguistic map.

**natio** (pl nationes; etymology: see nation)—a late Medieval Latin (Neo-Latin) term for the estates (nobility, clergy, burghers) construed as the ruling elite in an early modern polity in Western and Central Europe. Sometime, confusingly and incorrectly this Latinate term is translated into English as “nation” or “political” nation. See also gens.

*(the) nation* (from Medieval Latin natio, derived from Latin nāscī “to be born,” hence literal translations into Slavic languages, such as národ “nation” in Czech from rodí “to give birth” or народарод “a people, nation” in Russian from родить родить “to give birth”—according to the ideology of nationalism, the “highest possible type” of human group. On this account only, nations have the right to independent statehood. The actualization of this right produces nation-states.

**national culture** (etymology: see culture, nation)—the culture of a nation; but in ethnolinguistic nationalism, national language, national heritage, literature in the national Einzelsprache, national music, national cuisine, national theater, national fine arts, the national mass media in the national Einzelsprache, national history, national heroes, national legends, national identity, or national religion, all seen as rightfully and exclusively “belonging to” a single nation.

**national historiography** (etymology: see historiography, nation)—the discipline of the study of the past of a nation and/or its nation-state, in line with the social, political, economic, and other assumptions of the ideology of nationalism. Practitioners of national historiography (or national historians) produce national histories in plural, or even national master narratives. The former approach allows for a limited etic approach, which the latter bans, prescribing the emic approach only.

A given nation-state typically maintains tight control over national historiography, because its product (national history, national master narrative) constantly creates and re-creates, legitimates, and maintains national statehood, as required by the government and perceived by the nation, that is, the nation-state’s citizens (population). Furthermore, national history or the national master narrative is often taught in school to the nation’s successive generations in the form of a typically compulsory subject of History.

Generally speaking, in civic nation-states, national historiography focuses on the history of the polity in question. However, in ethnic nation-states, apart from state history, the discipline also covers the stateless (pre-state) period of the nation’s past, or in other words, the history of the nation separate from the history of its nation-state’s history, and the history of the ethnic nation’s important ideological bases or attributes, namely, the history of the national language, national culture, national religion, national music, national folklore, national painting, national art, national theater, or national film.

**national history** (etymology: see history, nation)—history of a given nation. It can be an etic (objectivizing) analysis and description of the founding, development, and disappearance of a nation, researched and written both by members and non-members of the nation in question.

However, in most cases, national history is an emic pursuit of such an interpretation of the past, which is squarely in the interest of a given nation (or rather a given government or regime in power), written in accordance with the nation’s values espoused and cherished, seen as the embodiment of patriotism (meaning, this nation’s specific form of nationalism). In other words, national history produced in this way is none other than a national master narrative. Ideally, only members of the nation should be researching and writing national history, because “foreigners” (non-members) of the nation “naturally” have no access to the nation’s “spirit,” bestowed by “destiny” or a “deity.”

Also analyzing and writing the human past exclusively through the lens of the nation, that is, in line with the vision of nationalism, in which all the world’s states must be nation-states, and all humanity is “naturally” divided into nations. This methodological approach denies the validity or sidelines other perspectives of analyzing the past, for instance, through the lens of a non-national ethnic group, a non-national polity, a religion, a region within a nation-state, or a (fragment of a) continent with numerous national polities (for instance, Central Europe).

**national identity** (etymology: see identity, nation)—a preferred synonym of nationality in the meaning of one’s membership in a nation. But in the nationalist discourse (discourse of nation-
alism), this collocation is often invoked for referring to and ex-
tolling the most important traits and values of a nation, which
collectively are seen as a constructed or even “natural” (“god-
given”) essence of the nation in question. This essence is supposed
to hold the nation together and connect its members to the na-
tion and one another, thus creating a perfectly homogenous na-
tional monad (singularity), which is knowable exclusively to the
nation’s members. This nationally limited knowability is an argu-
ment for why a given nation and its elements (for instance, the na-
tional language) can be truly comprehended and analyzed only
by scholars who are members of this nation. In the case of the na-
tional language or national history, linguists or “foreign” histo-
rians are never up to the task, but only “proper” (that is belong-
ing to the nation) philologists and national historians. Hence, in
the 1840s the now quite popular collocation “[great mystifying]
Russian soul” was developed as a term for the Russian national
(ethnic) identity. Its vague and emotionally-colored usage is sim-
ilar to the usage of the term “German physics” in the 1930s and
1940s. See also identity, national physics.

nationalism (1830s neologism, from “nation,” influenced by the
use of French nationalisme)—an ideology which proposes that
the highest possible kind of human group is the nation, while
the sole legitimate type of statehood is the nation-state. From
the national perspective, all humanity is “naturally” by biol-
ogy or a divinity’s will, divided into nations, and all nations have
right to separate statehood. Hence, implementation of this ideol-
y on a global scale during the past two centuries, and especially
after World War Two in the wake of decolonization, replaced the
globe’s non-national polities with nation-states only. The last
non-national polity to disappear was the Soviet Union in 1991. As
such, nationalism is the present-day world’s sole infrastructural
ideology of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance.

In the national languages of Central Europe, the term na-
tionalism is often used as a pejorative label for “excessive na-
tionalism,” otherwise known as chauvinism in English. “Patriotism
is a positive term for nationalism in these languages, but they have
no neutral word for referring to this ideology, which makes any
discussion on nationalism in Central Europe a tall order. Hence, in
the region’s Einzelsprachen, the term “nationalist” does not denote a mere proponent of the ideology of national-
ism, but functions as a pejorative to be hurled at political oppo-
nents and enemies, often interchangeably with the term “fascist.”

nationality (late seventeenth-century neologism from “nation,”
influenced by the French term nationalité)—a confusing term of
too many closely related meanings in English (and French). In
popular parlance, like the word “nation” is the preferred synonym
for state, the term nationality is the preferred synonym for “cit-
zenship.” Otherwise, this term has two further distinctive mean-
ings of importance for the ideology of nationalism. First, nation-
ality denotes the state of being a member of a nation (see national
identity). Second, nationality means a group of people who are
recognized to be a “semi-nation” with the right to cultural and/or
political autonomy in a state’s province, but not to a separate na-
tion-state of their own. This term originated in Austria-Hungary
as a concession to (ethnolinguistic) national movements, which
on one hand allowed them to meet some of their political goals,
while on the other preserved the territorial integrity of the Dual
Monarchy. In Austria-Hungary’s legislation nationality was al-
ways Volkstamm (pl Volkstämme, literally “tribe”), while the
term Nationalität (nationality, pl Nationalitäten) denoted the
state of being a member of a Volkstamm or Volk (pl Völker, na-
tion). However, in the press, the term Nationalität was loosely
used as the preferred synonym of Volkstamm, giving the rise to
the English translation of “nationality” for both Volkstamm
and Nationalität.

The distinction between the nation and nationality, for
human groups with the right to independent national state-
hood and autonomy, respectively, was adopted in the Soviet
Union. Understandably, none of the different ethnic groups pop-
ulating this communist polity was recognized as a nation, but
almost all as nationalities. However, in Russian, this term came
in two different forms, namely, национальность nationalnost’
(pl национальности nationalnost’i) and народность narod-
ost’ (pl народности narodnost’i). The former was coined from
the term нация natsia (pl наши natsii) for “nation,” while the
latter for the word народ narod (pl народа narody) for “a peo-
ple.” In the Soviet legislation the term nationalnost’ denoted a
“developed nationality” with a full-fledged Einzelsprache and
abundant literature written in it, while narodnost’ “a backward
(undeveloped, developing) nationality” without a (fully-formed)
Einzelsprache. These “backward nationalities” were much more
numerous than the “developed nationalities.”

The interwar Soviet policy of коренизация korenizatsiia
(nativization, literally “rooting in”) was to endow “backward na-
tionalities” with Einzelsprachen, ensuring intensive press and
book production in their newly standardized languages. On the
other hand, regarding “developed nationalities,” this policy was
to ensure autonomous territories for them and the use of their
Einzelsprachen as the main languages of administration and ed-
ucation in these autonomous nationalities.

national language (etymology: see language, nation)—the
nation’s “true” (indigenous, native, unique) language (Einzels-
prache), also known as “mother tongue,” or more neutrally,
as “ethnic language”). In the ethnolinguistic nation-state (see
normative isomorphism), the national language should double
as the polity’s sole state (official) language and should not be
shared with any other nation or polity. Typically, (national) phil-
ology (not linguistics) is the academic discipline tasked with re-
searching (or rather building and shaping) the national language.
Furthermore, in ethnolinguistic nation-states, the national lan-
guage is an important subject of study for the discipline of na-
tional historiography.

The first academies (of sciences), as founded in Europe since
the sixteenth century, were initially established for the singular
purpose of producing an authoritative dictionary and grammar of
a state (national) language in order to make it into a “proper
Einzelsprache,” equal in usefulness and prestige to Latin. Later,
academies became more versatile and encompassing in their re-
search goals, but the creation, standardization, and “fine-tuning”
of the (typically, ethnolinguistic) nation-state’s national lan-
guage has remained the leading goal. For this purpose, usually
a special Language Institute is founded within a national academy of sciences. Since the turn of the twentieth century, such language institutes have been often given the task of "regulating" and "protecting" the national language.

**national master narrative** (etymology: see nation. The noun "master" stems from Old English and Latin magister "master, person with the power to control others, slave owner," in turn from Latin *magnus* "great." The term "narrative" stems from Latin narrare "to tell, report, give an account, narrate")—this collocation made a shy appearance in the mid-1970s, but it was the French sociologist Jean-François Lyotard's 1979 critique of what he called "grand narratives," which made this expression into a recognized term of analysis (Lyotard 1979). This term has been in wide use since the mid-1990s. "National master narrative" is a critical designation for national historiography's product of national history, especially in its highly ideologized emic form, as turned out in strict accordance with a given nation-state's ideology of, typically, ethnic (ethnolinguistic) nationalism.

**national physics** (etymology: see nation. The late sixteenth-century term "physics," stems from Neo-Latin *physica* "natural science, medicine," in turn from Greek *φυσικὴ* "pertaining to nature, natural," from *φύσις* "nature, property, origin"), ultimately from *φύω* "to produce, bear, grow")—physics is a natural science for the study of material reality (matter, radiation, the Universe), which is independent of human will. But, in 1936, the Nobel Laureate in Physics, Philipp Lenard, an Austro-Hungarian and German scientist born in Pozsony (today's Bratislava), published a university textbook, titled *Deutsche Physik* (German Physics). He disparaged the research of British and Jewish physicists as "English physics" and "Jewish physics." In Lenard's opinion the only "true physics" had to be "Aryan," that is, "German" (Lenard 1936).

In this erroneous view, the ethnic (social) reality is either primary to material reality, or a national (ethnically defined) fragment of social reality is seen as identical with material reality, or at least with the biosphere. On the basis of such an assumption, human will of a "racially superior" (ethnoreal) character is believed to prevail over material reality, allowing an absolute ("god-like") insight into its laws and for the manipulation of material reality through thought alone.

This erroneous assumption of the primacy of (national) social reality (human will) over material reality is similar to that which underlies the belief in miracles, namely, that an incantation or prayer ("word," that is, *o* language or an *Einzelsprache*) has the power to alter (create, destroy, or transform) material reality. See also linguistics, philology.

**nation-state** (etymology: see nation, state. The term "nation-state" is a late 1910s neologism)—state for one nation only, as prescribed by the ideology of nationalism.

**national statehood** (etymology: see nation, state)—idea, quality, or condition of being a nation-state in line with modernity's infrastructural ideology of nationalism. Hence, nation-states (national polities) are specific actualizations of this idea, and as such are seen to be units ("quanta") of this quality (condition), imagined as "uncountable abstract substance." See also statehood.

**native** (from Latin *nātus* "inborn, innate," derived from *natus* "birth," as in the case of the etymology of nation)—a noun for referring to a person born and raised in a country, preferably from parents who were also native to this land, or an adjective for qualifying things and attitudes as uniquely produced in or typical of a given country. However, in popular parlance, in accordance with the myth of "civilizational superiority," "natives" is a pejorative designation for the non-European indigenous population of a European power's maritime colony, used to draw a line of distinction between the "backward" or even "barbaric" natives (often denigrated with the pejorative "savages") and the "civilized" European (Western) colonizers. Hence, a "native" from the British colony of Kenya or Ceylon (today's Sri Lanka) was, or maybe still is, referred to as a "native" when living in Britain, while a British person pronouncing such an opinion, who is genuinely native to the British soil, would not refer to herself as a "native."

Outside Europe, in such colonies-turned-settler countries like the United States or Canada, "natives" are the indigenous population as opposed to European colonizers and settlers, alongside their descendants, seen as "whites." In the racialized (racist) political vocabulary, this usage yields the pernicious "natural" opposition between "us-whites" and "them-natives." See also native language, native speaker.

**native language** (etymology: see language, native)—ostensibly any language (Einzelsprache, speech variety) indigenous to a given country or land (see ethnic language). But in actual usage, this term is applied only for referring to the 'natives'" languages in the colonies and postcolonial states, or more broadly to indigenous languages outside of Europe. Hence, no one would speak about English as spoken in England (Britain) or French as spoken in France as "native languages" or "native European languages." On the other hand, if an American (US citizen) is asked to give names of some American languages (such as Apache, Cree, Dakota, Navajo, or Yupik), she usually asks for clarification whether the inquirer may mean "native American languages." In this usage a European language cannot be "native," while all languages outside Europe (with some rare exceptions of the national languages of non-European and non-Western powers, such as, Japan or Turkey, and at present China) are "native" by definition. This means that the term "native" is an unacknowledged synonym for power. Einzelsprachen of all the European (Western) former and current imperial powers, alongside the Einzelsprachen of all the European (meaning, "civilized") nation-states and of some non-European (that is, recently "civilized" = Westernized, so that the West must take note of their opinions) powers are seen as adjective-less "languages." On the contrary, all Einzelsprachen of non-European (non-Western) nation-states, typically former colonies, with the exception of the aforementioned non-Western powers, are qualified as "native languages." Officially, political colonialism or imperialism is over, but economic and cultural imperialism flourishes. In this disposition, "native languages" are spoken by these powerless (non-Western) peoples who continue to be dominated in this manner by powerful (Western) peoples, who speak "languages."
native speaker (etymology: see native. The noun “speaker” stems from Old English sprecean “to speak” — an implicated (ideologized) English-language term, which incorrectly suggests that a human is born with the (natural, potential) full and correct command of the Einzelsprache of the group (ethnic group, nation, nationality, state) to which her parents belong. In reality each newborn comes to this world supplied only with a language (hard-wired biological capacity for speech) and acquires a given Einzelsprache through socialization and schooling. In the everyday but unacknowledged practice in Anglophone states the term “native speaker” is employed to denote a “white, Christian, middle-class university graduate with a formally attested command of the standard (non-dialectal) Einzelsprache of English” (cf Paikeday 1985). Hence, this collocation is an element of language politics, not a neutral term of analysis. A neutral counterpart is, for instance, an L1 speaker. The ideological dimension is readily seen in the fact that typically a native speaker is supposed to be fluent in the colonizers’ European languages of English, French, Spanish, or Portuguese, not in the colonized populations’ (non-European) native languages. Native speakers are not persons versed in native languages.

natsiolekt (Russian neologism нациолект natsiolekt from нация natsia “nation,” and лект lekt “lect”) — a term for a national or state-specific variety of the Russian language, proposed in 1982 by the Belarusian linguists Anatoli Girutskii and Arnol’d Mikhnевич (Girutskii and Mikhnевич 1982), and three years later employed by the latter in a monograph on the Russian language in Belarus (Mikhnевич 1985: 11-12, 169). Interestingly, this term became largely forgotten after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, nowadays in line with the Kremilin’s ideology of the Russian World, any discussion on the national varieties of Russian in the post-Soviet nation-states is discouraged.

nature (from Latin natura “things as they are, the universe,” in turn from natus “born.” The term nation shares the same Latin etymology, which may be the source of the biologizing myth on the “natural” character of nations. The Latin term natura developed as a translation of the Greek term φύσις fysis “nature,” hence τὰ φυσικὰ τὰ φυσικὰ “natural things, material reality” is the subject matter of research for the discipline of physics, as opposed to metaphysics, “beyond the natural”, which in essence focuses on social reality, though specifically construed as a “divine reality” or “hereafter”) — the universe, material reality, matter, and energy, understood as governed by the discoverable universal laws of physics. In a looser, often metaphorical, meaning, “natural” means “traditional,” taking place from “times immemorial,” dictated by the biological and social realities of humanity, construed as one of the biological species, that is, the Homo sapiens sapiens (or anatomically modern human). This metaphorical use confusingly blurs the distinction between material reality and social reality. See also culture.

non-face-to-face (human) group (etymology: see ethnic group. crime against humanity. The word “face” stems from Latin facītis “form, appearance”) — it is impossible to build and maintain cohesive groups of humans with more than 150 members (Dunbar’s number) through interpersonal (face-to-face) contact alone (Dunbar 1992). Such huge cohesive human groups as nations or states with millions and even a billion members are constructed and maintained thanks to the bonding function of a language, which allows for generating social reality. Non-face-to-face groups are part of social reality, while face-to-face groups are part of material reality.

non-scriptural religion (etymology: see script, religion) — a neutral designation for “traditional” religions, which during the past two millennia were destroyed and replaced in Europe and the Middle East with monotheistic counterparts (scriptural religions), each endowed with a dedicated “holy book.” Hence, in this sense, monotheistic religions are scriptural. In monotheistic propaganda, religions with no “holy book” or use of writing in liturgy are seen as “untrue” or “wrong,” and thus disparaged as “heathenish,” “polytheistic,” or at least “animistic.”

Typically, a non-scriptural religion is a faith of a face-to-face human group (Gemeinschaft), that is, a (micro)-ethnic group. As such, it is expressed and reproduced in this group’s speech variety. In few cases a given speech variety might be standardized into an Einzelsprache during the past two centuries, usually by translating the Christian Bible into it. As a result, the group’s non-scriptural religion and socio-cultural traditions connected to it have been largely destroyed, when European (Western) missionaries have succeeded in imposing Christianity on these groups to the exclusion of their indigenous non-scriptural religions. Like the concept of Einzelsprache, monotheism (at best, Christianity) is seen as a “precondition” of successful modernization and progress.

noosphere (from Greek νοῦς nous “mind,” and Latin sphaera “ball, globe, celestial sphere,” in turn from Greek σφαῖρα sphaira “ball, globe”) — during the 1920s the Russian-Soviet scholar of Russian-Ukrainian origin, Vladimir Vernadsky, developed a tripartite categorization of reality, namely, consisting of the universe (entire reality), the biosphere, and the noosphere (Vernadsky 1945). The noosphere is this corner of the biosphere where the (human) mind operates, that is, where humans live and use a language for bonding and generating social reality.
	normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state (etymology: see language, nation, normative monolingualism, state. The term “isomorphism” is an 1820s scholarly neologism from Greek ἰσος tios “equal” and μορφή morphē “form, shape, structure”; the suffix –ism, from the Greek suffix –ισμος –ismos, for forming abstract nouns that denote action or practice, state or condition, principles, doctrines, or ideologies) — formula of the implementation of the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism which proposes that for the sake of establishing a “proper” nation-state, the full and tight spatial and ideological overlap (isomorphism) must be achieved between the national language (Einzelsprache), the nation, and the nation’s nation-state; hence, Language (Einzelsprache) = Nation = State. Ideally, the national language should not be shared with any other nation or state (cf Kamusella 2017).
ethnolinguistic homogeneity

monos from the prefix “mono-,” derived from Greek μόνος “single,” and from Latin lingua “language”—a widespread modern belief that a person is born with, or is capable to master fully, only a single Einzelsprache seen as the person’s “mother tongue,” namely, that only L1 must be the person’s “natural” and “real” language. In English-speaking countries, and more broadly in the West, this belief taken as a social and scholarly norm underlies the ideologized concept of native-speaker, claiming that L2 cannot be mastered to the same level (let alone better) than L1. In stronger versions of this normative conviction, it is popularly maintained that everyone is born with, or to, their Einzelsprachen (typically equated with a speech community). At this juncture, this conviction is indistinguishable from ethnolinguistic nationalism’s normative insistence that normally and naturally a person can only have a single Einzelsprache because it is the very sign (marker, or even “proof”) of a person’s membership in a nation (that is, one’s nationality), and in accordance with the infrastructural ideology of nationalism a person can, or rather, is allowed to, belong only to a single nation. Those who disagreed with this approach (see language question (census)) were effectively silenced in 1872 by the authoritative decision of the eighth International Congress of Statistics at St Petersburg to treat census declarations of, or returns on, one’s Einzelsprache as the “measure” (indicator) of one’s nationality. However, the congress’s participants remarked that for this new statistical norm to function properly it must be assumed that a person cannot have (or be permitted to declare) more than a single Einzelsprache. During the past century and a half, statisticians and linguists (philologists) have fortified this principle of normative monolingualism by proclaiming, oftentimes unreflectively, time and again its scientificness (“scientific character”). Hence, they have been engaged in language politics rather than research. From the perspective of observed ideological practice, without sticking to the axiom of normative monolingualism, the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state would be an impossibility, and thus no nation or nation-state could be successfully built, legitimized, and maintained on the basis of ethnolinguistic nationalism. It appears that this almost “naturalized” rule of normative monolingualism stems from the older monotheistic principle of normative monoreligionism. See also bilingualism, diglossia, ethnolinguistic homogeneity.

However, in such modern states as China or Japan, which are not qualified as “pagan,” people can simultaneously profess (or rather practice) several religions, for instance, Buddhism, Shintoism, and elements of Christianity (that is, Christmas, church wedding ceremonies) in Japan, or Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism in China. From the perspective of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic monotheism, Hinduism is a form of polytheism, that is, polymonoreligionism, or the simultaneous profession of multiple religions connected to separate divinities and divine forces.

Normative monoreligionism underlies Christian Europe’s early modern political principle of cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion). In the nineteenth century, it yielded ethnolinguistic nationalism’s norm cuius regio, eius lingua (whose realm, his language), which underpins normative monolingualism.

Functionally and structurally, as concepts and forms of sociopolitical practice, both normative monoreligionism and normative monolingualism are almost identical. The difference lies in the fact that people may not have or practice any religion, because religion, as an element of social reality, is fully dependent on human will. On the other hand, each healthy human is biologically hard-wired with the capacity for speech (a language), which is part of material reality, hence independent of human will. Thus, under the normal conditions of socialization, each human does have a language (Einzelsprache or speech variety), that is, an actualization of o language. Atheists do exist, but aphasia is a medical condition.

numeracy (from Latin numerātus, that is, the past participle of numerāre “to number,” in turn, from Latin numer “number”)—the skill of counting, representing numbers by (written) symbols, operating numbers, and numerical formulas in writing. See also literacy.

official language (etymology: see language. The word “official” stems from Latin officium “duty, service”)—see state (official) language.

orthography (fifteenth century neologism developed with the use of Greek, ὁρθός orthós “correct” and γραφία raphía “writing”)—usually a synonym for “spelling system,” but otherwise the term for the “correct” employment of a spelling system or a given Einzelsprache in writing (and sometimes even in speech). Typically, it is the scholarly elite of a given nation-state who standardize an Einzelsprache into a standard language and codify the principles of its use. See also descriptivism, prescriptivism.

patriotism—an eighteenth-century Graeco-Latin neologism of a highly patriarchal character, meaning “love of and devotion to one’s own country” (patria or “fatherland”). In the age of nationalism, this love and devotion is directed at one’s own nation-state, while in the case of ethnolinguistic nationalism also at the nation, especially when this nation is stateless (with no nation-state of its own). Typically, patriotism is seen as a laudable and positive civic feeling to be fostered by school and state institutions. Hence, it is a valorizing (emotionally colored) designation for nationalism.
In Central Europe’s Einzelsprachen, which miss a neutral term for nationalism, “patriotism” is posed as such a term, while the word “nationalism” is employed in the meaning of chauvinism. Hence, in this region, one’s own nationalism is seen as “patriotism,” while the nationalisms of people from neighboring nation-states are denigrated as “nationalism,” that is, “chauvinism.”

(a) people (from Latin populus “people,” cognate with plēbōs “common people, crowd,” and with Greek πλῆθος plethos “crowd”) — typically, a non-face-to-face cohesive self-reproducing group of people; an ethnic group, nation, nationality, or state. (NB: in meaning and usage different from the uncountable cognate word “ό people” that takes no plural, used to speak about the entire humanity or some unspecified humans, without designating them as belonging to a specific group.)

perception (from Latin perceptionem “comprehension,” in turn from percipere “to perceive, grasp,” formed from per “by, through,” and capiō “to take”) — the observation or cognizance of social reality from the perspective of a given individual or a specific human group (for example, ethnic group, Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft, nation, or speech community). To the “mind’s eye” of different observers, an element of social reality (for instance, a deity, national master narrative, nation-state, nation, or an Einzelsprache) may exist or not, and also may be interpreted in differing manners. For instance, a civic nationalist has no problem to “see” (perceive) a Canadian or Australian nation, but these nations do not exist from the perspective of an ethnolinguistic nationalist, because both the Canadians and Australians share their official (national) language with other nations across the world (for instance, the British or the Nigerians), which is at odds with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state.

Furthermore, much ink has been spilt on the “duo-continental” character of Russia and Turkey as countries located in both Europe and Asia. However, the continent of Europe does not fulfill the geographical definition of continent, hence from this geographic perspective, Europe and Asia are just a single continent, Eurasia. Should this view be adopted, then Russia and Turkey could be seen as regular “monocontinental” states.

And while discussing perceptions, it is worth noticing that the seemingly objectivizing neologism Eurasia is yet another unacknowledged sign of the periphery and continuing influence of European (Western) imperialism (including cultural imperialism and linguistic imperialism). Why should Europe as the westernmost peninsula of Eurasia take precedence in this name over Asia that constitutes the very bulk of Eurasia? Usually, the neologism Eurasia is traced back to the Electorate of Württemberg geographer Carl Gustav Reuschle’s seminal work Handbuch der Geographie oder Neueste Erdbeschreibung (1858: 57–62). He nevertheless acknowledged the territorial and demographic predominance of Asia; his original coinage was much more objective Asien-Europa (Asia-Europe). So indeed, why not speak of Asiaeuropa, or Asieuropa?

perceptual dialectology (etymology: see perception, dialect) — in the late 1980s, the United States linguist Dennis R. Preston began studying non-linguists’ views on areal linguistics, namely, on the classification of the United States dialects of English as perceived by people from different regions of this country (Preston 1989). Such non-specialist (“folk”) views vary widely, indicating that classifying dialects is highly dependent on the act of observation and a variety of assumptions, including prejudices. Linguists’ perception of dialects in a given territory (for instance, in a nation-state) is more consistent and stable because they have a “scientific” system of periodicals, book presses, universities, academies, conferences, doctoral seminars, or peer review, for working out a consensual view, and subsequently, for enforcing it. Hence, both linguists’ and non-linguists’ views are in essence equally perceptual, because both are directed toward elements of social reality, meaning on Einzelsprachen (speech varieties) and their classification. However, linguists developed certain methodologies for etic-style (outside) observation, which limit the interference of the act of observation with the observed (or distortion). On the contrary, philologists from a specific (typically ethnolinguistic) nation-state usually propose that their emic assumptions on their own national language constitute an objective (etic) van - tage of observation. It is often emphasized, however, that this national vantage is never fully accessible to a philologist (linguist) who is not a member of the nation whose national Einzelsprache is under scrutiny. Scholars can be as gullible as laymen and confuse their perceptions and assumptions with the observed. This phenomenon is richly evidenced by the biologizing metaphors of “language death,” “language family,” “living organism,” or “Stammbaum.”

perilinguistic (etymology: see language, linguistics. The prefix “peri-” comes from the Greek prefix peri peri “about, around, or toward”) — the term is for characterizing the highly intertwined relation between Ø language and elements of social reality that are not part of Ø language. For instance, the technology of writing is not part of Ø language but it is closely related with the creation, maintenance, and use of any Einzelsprache. In turn, in fully literate societies (Gesellschaften, nations), the fact of the intensive use of official (national) language (that is, an Einzelsprache) in writing often impacts syntax, pronunciation, word choice and speech practices, or more broadly, Ø language thus leading to a cultural co-evolution of writing and Ø language. Similarly, the concept of Einzelsprache (like writing) is not part of Ø language, either. The imposition of this concept on the linguistic (Ø language) with the use of writing and the power of state (bureaucracy) enabled the emergence of Einzelsprachen. Significantly, Ø language is part of material reality, while the technology of writing or the concept of Einzelsprache belong to social reality. Hence, it may be proposed that typically, the perilinguistic relationship is between Ø language (that is, part of material reality) and elements drawn from the social reality.

personalism (from “person,” in the meaning of “human being,” in turn, from Latin persona “role [in life, a play, or a tale],” but impacted by the Medieval Latin usage for a “member of the Holy Trinity” originally “actor’s mask,” from Greek πρόσωπον prosōpon “face, mask,” coined from πρός pró̂s “toward” and ὑπὸ ὀπις óps “eye”; see face-to-face)—an answer to extreme collectivism or individu-
philology (a neo-Greek eighteenth-century neologism, namely, ἕλεξ φίλος and λέγες λόγος for “love of words, languages”)—a traditional discipline usually for the study of texts in classical and standard Einzelsprachen (languages), conducted in line with some cultural and ethnorangeal values, beliefs, and preconceptions (that is, within the confines of social reality); in the age of nationalism, often for the sake of creating and shaping national languages, and also for “proving” the superiority of one ethnorangeic nation’s language over other nations’ Einzelsprachen. For instance, from the philological (emic, ethnonational) perspective the Japanese language is seen as 国語 Kokugo (literally, “national language”), which can be analyzed exclusively by Japanese researchers specializing in Kokugo studies. The subject also, “national language”), which can be analyzed exclusively by non-Japanese scholars) who research Japanese as one of many standard Einzelsprachen, refer to it as 日本語 Nihongo (literally, “Japanese [language]”). When a foreigner (non-Japanese) attends a Japanese language course, the subject is referred to in Japanese as Nihongo, not Kokugo.

At present, in ethnorangeic nation-states, in order to give a sheen of scientific respectability to philology, this discipline is often dubbed as “national linguistics.”

phone (from Greek φωνή “voice, sound”—the smallest unit of articulation (human speech), one of the speech sounds occurring in humanity’s languages, dialects. See also phoneme, etc.

phoneme (from French phonème, in turn from Greek φωνήκα φόνέμα “sound produced by speaking”)—a phone (speech sound) which in a given Einzelsprache or speech variety changes the meaning of words. Hence, it belongs to the limited repertory (usually from more than ten to fewer than a hundred) of a given Einzelsprache’s phonemes. See also emic.

pluricentric language (etymology; see monocentric language. The prefix “pluri-” stems from Latin pluris, in turn from plus “more,” and was developed on the model of Greek πολλὰς πολίς “many, much,” which yielded the English prefix “poly-”—an Einzelsprache or speech variety employed and regulated (or not) by several speech communities (ethnic groups, nations), typically living in different nation-states. For instance, English—spoken and written in some varying ways in England, Scotland, the United States, Nigeria, India, or Australia—is a pluricentric language. The same is true of German, which is a national, official, or co-official language in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. Practically all large languages or global (world) languages are pluricentric in their character. Historically speaking, most developed as monocentric languages of colonial metropolises, but the subsequent process of de-colonization transformed (democratized) such former imperial Einzelsprachen into pluricentric languages. For the time being, Russian is the only exception in this regard. Until 1991 it was the sole official and monocentric language in the Soviet Union. Despite the breakup of this communist polity into 15 post-Soviet ethnorangeic nation-states, where Russian is widely employed and has a variety of statuses, the Russian Federation aspires to the position of the sole controller and regulator of this language across the post-Soviet space and the world, in line with the highly ethnorangeic ideology of the Russian World.

Ethnorangeic nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state provides that a “true” national language must always be monocentric. In the wake of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the communist federation’s main official language of Serbo-Croatian became (co-)official in the five post-Yugoslav nation-states, namely, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia. Hence, it was transformed overnight from a monocentric to pluricentric language. But this transformation sat ill at ease with the ethnorangeic nationalism of most post-Yugoslav nation-states. Hence, from this ideological perspective, it became necessary for the sake of separate national statehood construction, legitimation, and maintenance to ban the linguonym Serbo-Croatian and rename this Einzelsprache as “Bosnian” in Bosnia, “Croatian” in Croatia, “Montenegrin” in Montenegro, and “Serbian” in Serbia. As a result, the non-national (multinational, multiethnic) Einzelsprache of Serbo-Croatian was splintered and re-made into the aforementioned four post-Serbo-Croatian national languages. Subsequently, elements of language engineering, language planning, language status planning, and of the politics of script were deployed for deepening selected lexical, morphological, orthographic, pronunciation, or syntactic differences among these “successor languages.” However, the changes still do not prevent mutual comprehension, hence, quite a few linguists and intellectuals in the concerned post-Yugoslav nation-states propose to respect the national and political reality and need of treating Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian as separate national languages, while, at the level of everyday use, treating them as a single, nameless, neutral, and biscriptal “Common Language” (заједнички језик/заједнички језик), not connected to any political or nation-building project.

politics (from Aristotle’s term τα πολιτικά τα πολιτικά “affairs of state”—legitimate exercise of power over a group of people, usually conterminous with a state or nation.

politics of script (etymology: see politics, script)—using scripts (writing systems) for political ends (for example, constructing ethnorangeic nations and their nation-states); also official legislation that regulates or extends the state’s control over the use of writing systems in that state. See also language politics.

polity (via Latin polita “government,” from Greek πολιτεία “citizenship, government, commonwealth,” in turn from Greek πόλις polis “city, city-state”—a general synonym for “state,” which does not imply any specific organizational form of statehood. Hence, the term polity can be employed in a general-
izing manner to refer jointly to states, nation-states, empires, or politics of estates.

**polity of estates** (also "state of estates"); a translation from the German-language term *Ständeestaat*—in early modern Central Europe, the typical form of statehood organization in which the entire population, or just the ruling (political) elite, are divided into *estates* (or *Stände* of nobility, burghers, clergy, commoners) that they are born into. The estate of Catholic clergy was an exception in this respect, because due to celibacy one was not able to be born into it. During the early modern period, and even in the nineteenth century, in many of Central Europe’s politics, peasantry (or the vast majority of the population) were excluded from the system of estates, due to their status as serfs (see *serfdom*).

The concept of the polity of estates is closely related to the post-Westphalian idea of a religiously homogenous territorial state (from German *Territorialstaat* for a polity under a single law and ruler. Such a polity constitutes a single jurisdiction, which ideally should be territorially continuous (within a single piece of territory). The entitled (ethno-)religious homogenization of the population in a polity of estates led to the transformation of confessional homogeneity into the idea of legal equality for all the subjects (inhabitants), giving rise to the concept of the homogenous nation housed in its own nation-state, which underpins the ideology of nationalism. (See also Westphalian (modern) statehood.

The idea of estates-based statehood was revived in fascist Austria (1934–1938) and wartime Slovakia, where all the citizens were allocated, respectively, into *Stände or stavy* (corporate groups) in accordance with their professions (that is, the professions of paterfamilias), in line with the Roman Catholic Church’s social teaching. In the context of fascist Austria, the term *Ständestaat* is usually translated into English as "corporative state."

**polyconfessionalism** (not to be confused with polyreligionism; formed from the prefix "poly-" and term "confession." The former stems from Greek πολυς *polús* "many, much," while the latter from Latin *confessio* "confession, acknowledgment, creed, or avowal of one’s faith," in turn from *confitemini* "I confess, I admit")—the fact of the often formally tolerated practice of different religions on the territory of a single polity, meaning that the polity is confessionally heterogeneous. The situation was typical across early modern Central Europe, where the faithful of different religions, denominations, and churches were free to practice their religious rites and customs in Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire, and after 1781 also in the Habsburg lands. In Western Europe the post-Westphalian principle of religious homogeneity (that is, *cuius regio, eius religio* "whose realm, his religion") within a single polity was observed, and for different reasons the same ideal was also espoused in the Russian Empire.

**polyreligionism** (not to be confused with polyconfessionalism; etymology: see polyconfessionalism, religion)—a neutral term for describing the sociopolitical phenomenon of a group of people (typically, a *Gesellschaft*), who profess simultaneously two or more religions, or venerate (worship) more than one god (or supernatural force) at the same time. The very same phenomenon is denoted by the term polytheism, which is biased due to the fact that it is a criticism of polyreligionism from the perspective of monotheism seen as the "civilized" norm. See also religious dysglossia.

**polytheism** (etymology: see atheism, polyconfessionalism)—a belief in the existence of many equal or unequal gods, deities. See also monotheism.

**population (demographic) engineering** (noun "population" stems from Neo-Latin *populationātio*, in turn from *populus* "people," cognate with *plebēs* "common people, crowd" and with Greek πλῆθος *plēthús* "crowd." The neologism "demography" was formed from Greek δῆμος *dēmōs* "people" and γραφία *grafía*, the latter in turn derived from the verb γράφειν *gráphein* "to write")—in ethnolinguistic nationalism, a sum of policies from assimilation to ethnic cleansing and genocide for achieving the ideal of ethnolinguistic homogeneity in a nation-state.

**population transfer** (etymology: see population engineering. The term "transfer" stems from Latin *transferrē*, formed from *trans* "across," and *ferrē* "to bear, carry")—a legal term coined at the end of the Great War for a bilaterally agreed or unilateral expulsion of a people from one state to another. The first instances of population transfers (exchanges) took place during the Balkan Wars. In 1913, in Annex I (Article C), the Constantinople Peace Treaty between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire used the term "population exchange" in the sense of ethnoreligiously and ethnolinguistically defined expulsions. In international law this instrument of population transfer was assessed positively as conducive to furthering human rights and preserving political stability. Since the mid-1990s, thanks to the United Nations’ decision, population transfer has been considered a crime against humanity and was renamed as ethnic cleansing.

**power** (Middle English *poer*: "vigor, strength, might [especially in battle], ability to extend violence, to coerce," via Old French *povoir* "to be able to," from Latin *possē* "to be able to")—a person’s capacity to impose his or her decisions on other people; or in politics, on groups of people, defined as nations and states.

**prejudice** (from Latin *praējudicium* "prejudgment")—a preconceived unfavorable opinion or feeling. In the sphere of language attitudes (language politics), usually an official stance adopted by the dominant (powerful) elite or nation (and typically justified in "scientific terms," as supported by a given national academy of sciences) that the speech variety of a subjugated (powerless) ethnic group (nationality, minority) never was, is not, and cannot ever be an Einzelsprache, national language, official language, or a medium of education. Typically, this negative and discriminatory attitude is displayed when the first attempts are undertaken to standardize a subjugated group’s speech variety into an Einzelsprache and to start publishing with it. In the late Russian Empire the status of (Einzelsprache) was denied to Belarusian and Ukrainian, publishing was banned in these languages, they were officially dubbed as “White Russian” and
“Little Russian,” and classified as наречия наречия (idioms or dialects) of the standard (Great) Russian language. Bulgarian politicians and linguists recognize the existence of Macedonia as a state (but not as a nation-state), however, they deny the existence of any Macedonian nation or language, and classify the Einzelsprache of Macedonian as another (read: superfluous) written or literary standard of the Bulgarian language. Similarly, in today’s Poland the state administration and university philologists maintain that there is no such thing as a Silesian language (despite the standardization of this Einzelsprache, sustained book production in this language, international recognition in light of the ISO 639-3 standard, or the Silesian Wikipedia that ranks as the 142nd largest among all the 302 Wikipedias [October 2018]). See also respect.

prescriptivism (from the verb “to prescribe,” in turn from Latin praescrībere for “to write before or above,” meaning “to present in writing rules [that must be followed]”—an attitude toward the standardization and control of the (predominantly written) use of an Einzelsprache. Typically, it is the scholarly elite of a given nation-state who standardize an Einzelsprache into a standard language and codify the principles of its use. Subsequently, the “correct” way of writing and speaking a language “beautifully” becomes the very (language) barrier one needs to scale in order to qualify for civil service (bureaucracy), university posts, and other elite jobs. In ethnolinguistic nation-states, the idea of the administrative enforcement of such linguistic correctness becomes part and parcel of politics and domestic power relations, as the main instrument of creating, legitimating, maintaining, and preserving the unity of the nation, in accordance with ethnonationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. In Eurasia (especially in Central Europe and Southeast Asia) most national monocentric languages are placed under protection and control of state-approved scholarly or administrative authorities (institutes) tasked with establishing and enforcing “correct” language use. See also descriptivism.

prestige (from French prestige “deceit, imposture, illusion”; initially, meant “trick” in English and remained derogatory until the early nineteenth century, denoting “dazzling influence”)—high status or reputation in language politics, as ascribed to an Einzelsprache or speech variety by its users and outside observers (from other speech communities). Typically, this high status is a function of political, economic, military, or cultural (religious) power enjoyed by the speakers of a given language (speech variety). Such ascription allows for culture-specific (arbitrary) ranking of Einzelsprachen. For instance, in the Ottoman Balkans, among Muslims the highest prestige was accorded to Arabic as the language of the Quran and jurisprudence, then to Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) as the language of administration and the military, and last but not least to Persian as the language of secular cultural pursuits. From the Muslim perspective, all the non-Muslim Einzelsprachen stood at a lower rung of the prestige ladder in comparison to the three aforementioned Muslim languages, graphically united by the same Arabic script. Hence, Slavic-speaking Muslims of Bosnia tended to write their Slavic vernacular in Arabic letters. In the Rum (Roman) Millet of Orthodox Christians the Greek language in its own specific writing system stood higher than the Cyrillic-based (Church) Slavonic, hence many Slavophones in what today is Macedonia noted down their Slavic vernacular in Greek letters. However, the elevated position of Greek was contested by the Catholic Einzelsprache of Tuscan (Italian) written in Latin letters because the latter was commonly employed for commercial and diplomatic contacts between the Ottoman Empire and the Christian polities of Western and Central Europe. With Russia’s successful forays into the Ottoman Balkans during the nineteenth century, the prestige of (Church) Slavonic and Cyrillic increased due to the fact that Russian is a Slavic Einzelsprache written in Cyrillic. Obviously, in the confines of the Judais (Jewish) Millet Hebrew, written in its own specific script, was the most prestigious language. However, the rise of French-medium education for the Ottoman Empire’s Sephardic Jews led to the switch from the “holy script” of Hebrew to the gentle Latin alphabet for writing their Romance vernacular of Spanyol (Ladino). By the turn of the twentieth century, irrespective of the different millets to which they happened to belong, Albanian-speakers had decided to support the spread of literacy and publications in their Albanic vernacular. Their efforts were frustrated by the parallel employment of a variety of scripts connected to different millets’ “holy tongues.” Finally, in 1908 they settled on the (Catholic and Protestant) alphabet of Latin letters, then seen as the “script of Europe, the West, modernity, and progress.” Again, irrespective of millet, the lowest prestige was accorded to the Romani language (see anti-Tsiganism).

In Central Europe’s ethnonationalist nation-states, the highest prestige is lavished on the national language, invariably in the function of the state’s official language, although in Belarus the co-official language of Russian de facto takes precedence before the country’s national and official language of Belarusian. Recognized minority languages of national minorities residing in “not their own” nation-state are perceived as “lower” (for instance, German or Lithuanian in Poland), followed by minority languages of ethnic minorities without a kin nation-state (for example, Lemkian or Tatar in Poland), large languages of expat and diaspora communities (for instance, English and German in Poland), national languages of unrecognized emigrant minorities (for example, Georgian and Vietnamese in Poland), recognized regional languages of speech communities seen as part of the Polish nation (for instance, Kashubian in Poland), and unrecognized regional languages of speech communities seen as part of the Polish nation (for instance, Silesian in Poland).

In Europe the status of an official language of the European Union has been a game-changer. In light of EU law, such status confers formal legal equality on all the member states’ official (state) languages in accordance with the formal equality of member states as entailed by the principle of sovereignty. As a result, the large languages of English, French, or Spanish; the muddling national languages of Italian, Polish or Romanian; the small national languages of Czech, Danish or Swedish; the smaller national languages of Bulgarian, Slovak or Finnish; the national microlanguages of Estonian, Latvian or Slovenian; and the tiny national languages of Maltese and Irish are seen and treated as equal in the European Union. In turn, due to the political and
economic importance of the European Union in the world, an EU small or smaller national language has more prestige than such a non-EU middling national language like Ukrainian.

From the perspective of the entire globe, Eurasia’s large languages are accorded the highest rank of prestige, though the former imperial European languages are even “more equal,” given the fact that they are employed as official (national) languages in the postcolonial nation-states outside of Eurasia. Eurasia’s national (official) languages employed in administration, education (including universities), and publishing are more prestigious than others of limited use in the aforementioned spheres. The lowest rung of the prestige ladder is occupied by languages not employed in administration, education, or publishing. Their position is largely equal to practically all indigenous languages outside of Eurasia.

Prestige can also be traced within a given Einzelsprache’s speech community and is generally correlated with the socio-economic stratification of a nation, Gesellschaft, ethnic group or Gemeinschaft. In a nation-state, typically the speech variety of the capital’s (political, intellectual, or economic) elite is seen as the most prestigious. Usually, the standard of a national Einzelsprache is steeped in such an elite’s speech variety, or ace- rolect (“high variety,” from Greek ἀρχαῖος ἀρχος “topmost, highest” and [dia]lect “speech variety”). The nation-state’s urban middle class (bourgeoisie), aspires to emulate the speech standard set by the elite, usually not with complete success because the elite keeps moving the goal posts by constantly changing their speech customs. Hence, such a middle class ends up speaking a less prestigious speech variety, or mesolect (“middle variety,” from Greek μέσος μέσος “middle, average” and [dia]lect “speech variety”). The lowest stratum of society, the uneducated, often the rural population, or the inhabitants of a fur-flung province who do not strive to speak and write like the elite, and even may take pride in their own (ethnic, regional, local, social) speech variety, from the national elite’s perspective (see perception) are seen as speaking the least prestigious speech variety, or basilect (“bottom, lowest variety,” from Medieval Latin bassus “low, short” and [dia]lect “speech variety”). Hence, from the Polish elite’s vantage of observation Silesian is a basilect of the Polish language and Silesians a social and/or regional group of the Polish nation. However, from the perspective of the Silesians—who see themselves as a nation or ethnic group—Silesian is an Einzelsprache in its own right, or the Silesian national (ethnic) language.

**Purism** (early nineteenth-century neologism, from “pure,” in turn from Latin purus “clean, unmixed, plain, pure”)—a highly ideological term of long standing in European history. In the course of the Iberian Reconquista the Spanish term sangre pura (pure blood) denoted “true,” “real,” or “old” Christians, as opposed to “recent” Muslim or Jewish conversos (converts) to Christianity. In this politicized (metaphoric) sense, rather than literal washing or cleaning, purification meant an act of ethnic cleansing or even genocide in the quest for ethnoreligious homogeneity within the boundaries of a polity, in line with the principle cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion). Obviously, this idea is the source of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century European norm (obsession) of the ethnolinguistic (in reality, often ethnoreligious) homogeneity of the nation and its nation-state in accordance with ethnolinguistic nationalism’s axiom of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state.

But in the terms of the ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism, the nation could not be “pure,” unless its national (official) language would be pure, too. As a result, the construction, standardization, “correction,” or “purification” of a national Einzelsprache entailed ridding its lexicon of words and phrases seen as “foreign,” “alien,” or belonging to an “enemy” nation’s language. In this way, at the turn of the nineteenth century German was “purified” of “ugly Gallicisms and Latinisms”; in the first half of this century Hungarian was “purified” of the same, alongside a clutch of Germanisms and Slavicisms; in the second half of the nineteenth century, Romanian was “purified” of Slavicisms; between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth century Polish was “purified” of Germanisms and Russianisms; at the same time Bulgarian was “purified” of Turkicisms and Grecisms; in the interwar period Turkish was “purified” of Arabisms, Persianisms, Slavicisms or Latinisms; in the late 1940s Macedonian was “purified” of Bulgarianisms; while at present Croatian is “purified” of Serbianisms, Bosnian of Serbianisms and Croatianisms, and Montenegrin of Bosnianisms, Croatianisms and Serbianisms. The lexical and idiomatic lacunae left by this nationally driven linguistic purism are filled in, preferably, with neologisms created from “pure” root words (morphemes) of the national language, for instance, Croatian zrćna luka (literally “air harbor”) “airport,” Czech divadlo (literally “something for watching”) “theater,” or German Rundfunk (literally “a spark cast around”) “radio”. However, in most instances, such lacunae tend to be filled in with linguistic borrowings from other “ideologically acceptable” Einzelsprachen, for instance, from Italian and French in the case of Romanian, from German in the case of Slovak, from Turkish and Arabic in the case of Bosnian, or nowadays from English for the majority of Central Europe’s languages.

**questione della lingua**—sixteenth-century Italian expression for “language question,” or the dilemma faced by literati of a given speech community (ethnic group, nation, state), namely, how to shape their own speech variety into an Einzelsprache that in versatility and prestige would be equal to Latin. The standardization of each European Einzelsprache (national language), and some non-European languages constructed in accordance with the European concept of Einzelsprache, was typically preceded by a period of experimentation and discussion on the “proper” manner of standardizing a given language.

**race** (from Italian razza “breed [of an animal],” of unclear origin)—in Europe until the mid-twentieth century a synonym for an ethnic group. Nowadays, in line with the American usage, a term for perceived skin color as the main feature to construing people as a group.

**Racism** (1860s neologism, influenced by the French term racisme)—discrimination against a group (“race”) and its perceived members, typically on the basis of a prejudice related to skin color. Oftentimes, any form of ethnic discrimination. See also anti-Semitism, anti-Tsiganism.
raison d’État (French for “reason of state”—national interest, meaning the interest of a given nation-state as perceived and formulated by the polity’s ruling elite. In the framework of the ideology of ethnonlinguistic nationalism, typically any opinion that contradicts the officially adopted national master narrative is seen as a danger to raison d’État, and thus may be criminalize as “treasonous”. See also collectivism, Geschichtspolitik, traitor of one’s nation.

reality (from Medieval Latin reālitas, derived from realis “real,” in turn from res “thing, matter, business”)—all that exists and is accessible to the human senses and mind. See also material reality and social reality.

register (from Medieval Latin regestae “catalog,” derived from regere “to record, to carry back,” in turn from gereō “to carry, bear”)—a speech variety employed in a specific social setting or sphere of life, most often opposing formal to informal settings, for instance, when an acrolect is used in the former case, while a mesolect or basilect in the latter. Typically, registers are construed as belonging to a single Einzelsprache, hence the standard of a given Einzelsprache is employed in formal situations, while a colloquial form or a dialect (purportedly) “belonging to” this Einzelsprache in informal situations. In reality, registers may be ethnolects and separate Einzelsprachen, meaning that in this situation registers function as lects employed in the course of diglossia. In a way, each Einzelsprache is composed from a few registers (lects), which a competent speaker is expected to master and deploy when appropriate. Therefore, it may be proposed that even a monolingual person (monoglot) is “multilingual” (see bilingualism) in the employment of the registers (lects) of her Einzelsprache. The term register in this sociolinguistic meaning was introduced in 1956 by the British specialist in Romance linguistics, T. B. W. Reid, in his article “Linguistics, Structuralism and Philology,” published in Archivium Linguisticum (Reid 1956).

regional language (etymology: see language. The noun “region” stems from Latin regiōn “direction, line, boundary, district,” in turn from regere “to rule”)—an officially recognized language of an ethnic group, which is a minority in the (ethnolinguistic) nation-state of its residence. Irrespective of whether this ethnic group or minority considers itself a nation, this claim is not recognized by the nation-state’s authorities. Typically, this nation-state's government, from above, legally defines such a minority as an ethnic minority (that is, with no “home” nation-state extant), or as a mere regional or social group of the nation-state’s nation. The former is the case of Lemkos or Roma in Poland, while the latter of Kashubs or Silesians in the same country. Under the Polish law, the Einzelsprachen of Lemkian and Romani are recognized as ethnic languages, that of Kashubian as a regional language, while no formal recognition has been extended to the Silesian language yet. Some low-key auxiliary use of a regional language may be allowed in education and local administration in the administrative units (regions) where the language’s speakers constitute a considerable share of the population (usually at least more than 20 percent). Since 1998 the use of some regional languages in Europe has been protected under the provisions of the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which came in force in that year (European Charter 1992). See also minority language.

religion (from Latin religiōn “bond, conscientiousness, obligation, piety, reverence,” coined from religōre “to bind, fasten, tie”)—a set of non-evidence-based beliefs in a supernatural (“beyond or above the nature, universe”) being(s) or force(s) that purportedly created all that exists, namely, the universe (or material reality), with special attention paid to humanity (or social reality). Religion is employed to postulate that beyond material reality and social reality another kind of metaphysical reality (beyond or above the material reality) exists where the aforementioned supernatural being(s) or force(s) reside, invisible and unknowable to humans. Obviously, such a religiously-based “explanation” of the creation of the universe and humanity does not account for the creation of this metaphysical reality with its supernatural being(s) or force(s). Religion’s explanation of the origin and character of the universe and humanity typically comes with a built-in norm enforcement principle, which provides that non-believers (and often the faithful of other “false” religions) must be censured, so that their lack of belief (“wrong” belief) would not endanger the existence of all that is by “angering” a “ wrathful” supernatural being or force.

Religion is created and maintained by a class of specialists (clergy) who engage the faithful in a set of interactive practices (worship) for expressing, reinforcing and reproducing the basic tenets of a given religion, as a form of purported communication, or even “communion,” with a supernatural being or force.

The most important tangible function of religion is to provide, legitimize, and enforce an accepted set of social norms that underpin the social cohesion of a human group. Religions practiced by pre-modern (micro)-ethnic groups (Gemeinschaften) are usually non-scriptural (see non-scriptural religion), while those preferred by modern nations (Gesellschaften) tend to be scriptural (see scriptural religion).

religious diglossia (religious polyglossia) (etymology: see diglossia, religion)—practicing (professing) different religions in different aspects of social life by the same person or group of humans (not to be confused with polyreligionism or religious syncretism). For instance, in Japan people tend to celebrate the birth of a child with a Shinto ceremony, marriage in a Christian-style church wedding, while opting for a Buddhist funeral. The phenomenon of religious diglossia may be also spatial in its character. For instance, after the fall of communism in 1989, some groups of Muslim Roma from Bulgaria have engaged in a form of seasonal migration to Poland for the sake of earning living by commerce. In Bulgaria they practice Islam, however during their sojourn in Poland they switch to Catholicism. Furthermore, some Muslim Roma groups in Bulgaria and Macedonia practice the Muslim-style circumcision of newborn boys and Muslim funerals, but also celebrate the Christian feast of the Assumption of Mary into Heaven in a local Orthodox monastery. Recently, these Roma customs were made better known thanks to publications by Elena Marushiakova and Veselin Popov (Marushiakova and Popov 2018). See also diglossia, monoreligionism, polyreligionism.
religious homogeneity (etymology: see ethnonationalist homogeneity, religion)—the normative (typically monotheistic) conviction that only a single religion should be allowed in a polity, meaning that religious heterogeneity as entailed by polyconfessionalism, is deemed illegal. This norm governed politics and state building in Western Europe from the Middle Ages to the early modern period. After the conclusion of the religious wars, it was codified in the Westphalian principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose realm, his religion). This normative predilection for religious homogeneity within the boundaries of a single polity underpins Central European nationalism’s norm of ethnonationalist homogeneity, namely, *cuius regio, eius lingua* (whose realm, his language). Interestingly, in 1830, the biconfessional (Catholic and Protestant) United Kingdom of the Netherlands was split, yielding the Catholic nation-state of Belgium and the Protestant nation-state of the Netherlands. Subsequently, with the rise of the ethnonationalist nation-states of Italy (1861) and especially Germany (1871), language became an increasingly politicized issue, leading, in 1898 to the introduction of Flemish (Dutch) as Belgium’s second official language, alongside French. The growth of the Flemish ethnonationalist national movement in 1962 brought about the demarcation of the official language boundary between the French and Flemish (Dutch) speech communities in Belgium. Since then the increasingly politicized question has been discussed whether Belgium should be split into two separate ethnonationalist nation-states, which may remain independent, or join the ethnonationalist kin national politics of France and the Netherlands, respectively.

religious syncretism (etymology: see religion. The term “syncretism” comes from the Neo-Latin term *syncretismus*, derived from Greek *συνκρητισμός* *synkrētismós* “alliance of two—typically, radically opposed—parties,” in turn from *συνκρητίζω* *sunkrētízō* “to unite against a common enemy,” formed from *σύν* *sún* “together” and *κρῆτις Krētēs* *Cretans*); ultimately derived from Plutarch’s first-century story on how Cretan city-states formed a union against a common external enemy—the amalgamation of different religions or their elements into a new religion or way of worship. For instance, Sikhism emerged in the sixteenth century as an amalgamation of elements drawn from Hinduism and Islam. Alevism, which used to be practiced across the Ottoman Balkans and Anatolia, emerged in the thirteenth century as an amalgamation of Sunni Islam with elements of Shiism and of the traditional (non-scriptural) Türkic religion (so-called shamanism).

respect (from Latin *rēspicere* “to look back, pay attention to”)—an attitude of admiration, esteem, or regard. In the sphere of language, attitudes (language politics), a favorable opinion expressed by the dominant (powerful) elite or nation toward the speech variety of a (formerly) subjugated (powerless) ethnic group (nationality, minority), recognizing it and supporting its development as an Einzelsprache, national language, official language, or a medium of education. This attitude is rarely observed in the Central Europe of ethnonationalist nation-states, created and maintained in accordance with ethnonationalist nationalism’s principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. However, in 1938 Romansh spoken by some 80,000 people was recognized as the fourth national language in Switzerland, while in 2005 Poland recognized Kashubian as a regional language. Respect for potentially all ethnic groups’ speech varieties was observed and practiced only in the interwar Soviet Union during the period of *korenizatsiia*. Otherwise, post-apartheid South Africa’s 1997 Constitution, uniquely, recognizes the country’s nine main indigenous (non-Eurasian) languages as official (isiNdebele Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Shiswenda, Xitsonga, isiXhosa, and isiZulu), alongside English and Afrikaans. See also prejudice, prestige.

Romanistan (mid-twentieth century neologism formed from the Romani adjective *Romani* “the Roma or their language,” and the Persianate suffix *stan* “state,” the latter derived from Persian *ستان* *stān* “country, place of,” or actually from the Romani cognate word *than* “place”—this term made its first appearances in English-language literature during the early 1970s. However, the idea of a Roma nation-state had appeared earlier in Poland in the 1930s and in France in the 1950s, proposed by early Roma “ethnic entrepreneurs,” who noticed that ethnonationally defined nations and their languages are accorded the full set of political and cultural rights only in their own nation-states. After World War Two the creation of the Jewish nation-state of Israel for the previously stateless nation of Jews might be an inspiration. Later, especially after the end of communism, the term Romanistan became a commonplace rhetorical figure of anti-Tsiganism, rifle in today’s Central Europe. Anti-Tsigan politicians, commentators, and populations use the term Romanistan as an “acceptable” synonym for “Gypsy menace,” proposing that a given town, city, region, or even nation-state faces the “danger of becoming a Romanistan” when Roma and Romani-speakers become a visible group of inhabitants or citizens. Typically, this is a call for and justification of subsequent anti-Tsigan pogroms, expulsions and other discriminatory measures. From this perspective, as the spread of the generalized acceptance of anti-Semitism could define Central Europe before World War Two, after 1989 it is anti-Tsiganism, which can play the same definitional role for this region (notwithstanding the presence of anti-Tsiganism in other parts of Europe and across the world, though the majority of the globe’s Roma live in Central Europe). See also Yiddishland.

Romanization (sometimes known as Latinization; derived from the alternative name for the Latin alphabet, that is, “Roman alphabet,” in turn from Latin *Rōmanus* “Roman, of or pertaining to the city or empire of Rome”—transliteration of words and texts written in other writing systems into the “Roman” alphabet of Latin letters. Romanization is the most widespread form of transliteration since the world’s global languages and most large languages (lingua francas) employ the Latin alphabet. This is the legacy of imperialism (or the West’s colonial domination over the world), which nowadays continues in the form of linguistic imperialism, especially outside of Eurasia. Phonemically Romanization systems differ, given into which

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2 I thank Elena Marushiakova and Veselin Popov for the difficult-to-reach information on this term and the idea of a Roma nation-state.
Latin script-based *Einzelsprache* transliteration is conducted. For instance, Russian or Greek are Romanized differently into English, French, German, or Czech.

roofing language (*Dachsprache*)—a term developed in the early 1960s by Heinz Kloss (in relation to his discussion on *Abstand languages* and *Aufbau languages*) for describing the socio-spatial dimension of creating and standardizing *Einzelsprachen*, especially in Europe (cf Kloss 1967). For instance, in France the Romance speech of the royal court at Paris was made into a French language. Subsequently, other Romance *Einzelsprachen* and speech varieties extant across the territory of France were redefined as "dialects" and unilaterally put "under the roof" of standard French, so nowadays it is popular to hear that they "belong to" French, that these are nothing but French dialects. Such "roofing" is a popular (though rarely acknowledged) instrument of *language policy* for downgrading and liquidating linguistic (dialectal) variety (*dialect levelling*) in quest for ethnolinguistic *homogeneity* in the national language across the length and breadth of a nation-state.

**Russian World** (from Russian Русский мир *Ruskii mir*, the name of the eponymous governmental foundation, established in 2007 in Moscow, in turn borrowed from the eponymous title of the conservative daily published at St Petersburg during the 1870s)—a preferred Russian-language synonym for "Russian civilization," otherwise a highly ethnolinguistic in its character geopolitical concept (adopted by the Russian government since the mid-2000s) that equates the core of the "Russian civilization" with all the territories (states) compactly inhabited by Russian *native speakers* (*L1 speakers* of the Russian language), including today’s Israel. On the other hand, the broader area of Russian civilization, which Russia claims as its "natural" (or civilizational) sphere of influence, is comprised of the territories of the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union, alongside the Orthodox countries in the Balkans (such as Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia). As an ideology, the Russian World is largely synonymous with today’s *Eurasianism*, which also draws at the 1831 Russian imperial formula of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality. The triad’s last element is usually interpreted as the Russian language, while nowadays the first element seems to entail the Russian Federation’s sole dominion over the entire Russian civilization, both in the sense of territory and population. In this aspiration, the Kremlin wishes to emulate China, which numerous observers see as the world’s sole example of a civilization and empire coterminous with a *religion* (Confucianism, or now Chinese-style *communism*) and *writing system* that was successfully turned into a *nation-state*. The Russian governing elite openly aspires to emulate the Chinese model, encapsulated in the program of capitalism in economy and one-party totalitarianism in *politics*. This aspiration seems to be a modern-age implementation of the initial element in the aforementioned formula Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality.

In the light of Lev Gumilev’s theory of *ethnogenesis* (Gumilev 1989 [1973]), the Russian-speaking *multiethnic people (nation)* of Russians is construed to be a *supraethnos* (or supraethnos) coterminous with the Russian *speech community*, and/or the community of the Orthodox faithful. In addition, from the perspective of *language politics*, each superethnos (civilization), due to its large demographic size, is believed to be “destined” to make its *Einzelsprache* into a *lingua franca*, “global” (large) language of international (interethnic) communication, written in this *Einzelsprache’s* specific script (or Cyrillic in the case of Russian). Hence, the Russian World foundation’s concentrated efforts are toward reviving Russian as a global lingua franca and for securing for Russian an official status in each post-Soviet nation-state.

**Russianization** (обрусение *obrusenie*)—a synonym for *Russification*, when wanted and sought for by a non-Russian speaking ethnic group.

**Russification** (русификация *rusifikatsiiia*)—the Russian imperial or Soviet policy of imposing Russian as the sole (or leading) *official language* and *medium of education* on non-Russian-speaking ethnic groups, especially if these groups in question had their own *standard languages* and opposed this imposition. *See also Russianization.*

**scientific(alness)** (from “science,” as derived from Latin *scientia* “knowledge,” in turn from *scire* “to know”)—the quality of being scientific in the meaning of natural sciences, or in other words, regarding discoverable and evidenced laws of the universe’s matter and energy, or *material reality*, which is fully independent of *human will*. Proponents of *nationalism*, *philology*, *linguistics*, *eugenics*, or *racism* (*Rassenkunde* or “racial hygiene”) often spuriously propose that they discover and follow “scientific” laws that govern *ethnic groups*, *nationalities*, *nations*, *Gesellschaften*, *Gemeinschaften*, *Einzelsprachen*, *national languages*, *speech communities* or *states*. In reality, they describe and (often unwittingly, though at times consciously) alter, mold, and co-create *social reality*, which is fully dependent on human will. Their invocation of the scientific character of their findings and opinions (not infrequently dubbed as “laws”) is nothing more than a potent rhetorical figure.

**script** (from Latin *scriptum*, in turn from *scribere* “to write”)—a synonym for *writing system*.

**script status planning** (etymology: *see estate, language planning, script, state*)—an element of *language engineering*, the *politics of script*, and *language politics*; namely, an official decision on the role which a given script (*writing system*) should play in relation to an officially recognized *Einzelsprache*. For instance, in the Russian Empire, in the mid-nineteenth century, specific forms of Cyrillic and Latin alphabet (popularly dubbed then as “Russian” and “Polish” letters, respectively) were developed for writing White Russian (Belarusian). In 1864 the employment of White Russian was banned in writing and publishing, while any limited scholarly uses of this *Einzelsprache* had to be conveyed only in the Russian-style Cyrillic. In 1905 the lifting of the ban on the use of Belarusian in publishing contributed to the coalescence of the two coordinated Cyrillic and Latin national alphabets for Belarusian as a national language. The German occupation of the
northwestern provinces of the Russian Empire led to the ban of Cyrillic, which left Belarusian a monoscriptal language written in Latin letters. Both scripts were revived as equal and official for Belarusian in briefly independent Belarus in 1918. Afterward in Soviet Byelorussia, only Cyrillic was employed for writing and publishing in Belarusian, while émigré intellectuals and ethnic Belarusians continued using the Belarusian Latin alphabet in interwar Latvia, Lithuanian, and Poland. Furthermore, Soviet Byelorussia was officially quadrilingual (with Belarusian, Polish, Russian, and Yiddish as its official languages) and triscriptal (Cyrillic for Belarusian and Russian, the Latin alphabet for Polish, and the Hebrew script for Yiddish). In 1991–1994 the Latin Belarusian alphabet was revived to a very limited degree in post-Soviet Belarus but was de facto banned from any public use after 1995. In its stead a closely related Latin alphabet-based transliteration system was adopted, which differs in a couple of letters from the traditional Belarusian Latin alphabet. See also language status planning.

scriptal apartheid (etymology: see script. The term “apartheid” stems from Afrikaans apartheid “separateness”)—the prescribed or de facto use of two or more different scripts (writing systems) in a country (see multiscr iptalism), but with each script contained to “its own” scriptally homogenous region (see monoscriptalism), and without the legal possibility of employing another region’s script in this region. For instance, the post-Yugoslav state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is composed of the two entities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska. In the Republika, the Serbian language is official, invariably written in Cyrillic. On the other hand, in the Federation, Bosnian and Croatian are the entity’s official languages, both written in Latin letters. Each entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina is radically monoscriptal, though officially the state is multiscr iptal. Script became weaponized for mobilizing ethnonationally and ethnolinguistically defined electorates (see language conflict). In Bosnia-Herzegovina the phenomenon of multiscr iptalism at the level of everyday life, namely, on information and shop signs, in state offices, or on newspaper stands, is observed only in the Brčko District, administratively shared by the Federation and the Republika. A similar situation of scriptal apartheid exists in today’s Kosovo. Albanian and Serbian are the country’s two official languages, hence all signage in public space is bilingual, though written exclusively in Latin letters, which makes signs and information notices in Serbian look as though they were in Bosnian or Croatian, because traditionally Serbian is written in Cyrillic. On the other hand, in Kosovo’s communes with Serbian majorities, Albanian is shunned in public signage, while Cyrillic is strongly preferred on Serbian-language signs and plaques.

scriptal diglossia (polyglossia) (not to be confused with multiscr iptalism; etymology: see diglossia, script)—the use of various scripts within a language’s single writing system for clearly delineated different writing purposes. In the Western Einzelsprachen written in Latin or Cyrillic letters, numbers are typically given in Arabic numerals, which do not belong to either of the two aforementioned alphabets. Previously, Latin and Cyrillic letters were employed in this function. The so-called Roman numerals are a remnant of the former case. In the Japanese language’s writing system, introduced Kanji characters, or the Chinese morphemic script’s selected graphemes (“letters”) are employed for denoting nouns, adjectives, adverbs, personal names, and geographical names. The Japanese syllabary (s yllabic writing system) of Hiragana is used for rendering inflectional endings, while another syllabary of Katakana for transliterating foreign words and names, and for denoting onomatopoeia. Japanese children acquire the prescribed 2000-odd Kanji graphemes gradually at school over the course of their education. Hence, in the early grades, textbooks are written fully in Hiragana graphemes, while the Kanji characters are glossed in Hiragana, allowing children to pronounce them correctly. Hiragana employed in this auxiliary function is known as Furigana. Furthermore, the Latin alphabet used for the official transliteration of Japanese is known as Romaji (Roman script). Although Kanji numerals exist, in most cases Arabic numerals are preferred. Due to its scriptal polyglossia, the Japanese writing system easily adopts graphemes from other scripts for rendering personal or geographic names or for an esthetical effect, especially from the Greek and Cyrillic alphabets. Hentaigana, or the obsolete syllabary, is sometimes employed for giving an archaic flavor to a text.

scriptural religion (etymology: see religion, script)—a religion of large non-face-to-face human groups (Gesellschaften) with a prescribed set of beliefs and practices recorded, regulated, and standardized in a corpus of approved texts (canon). This canon is typically recorded in a specific “holy tongue” (Einzelsprache) with the use of a specific “holy scripture” (writing system). The class of specialists (clergy) who maintain a religion are separated from the rank-and-file faithful by their command of the “holy tongue” and its “holy script,” enabling them to explain (“translate”) the religion and its teachings to the faithful in their varied speech varieties. Until the mid-twentieth century, the cleavage between clergy and laity was deepened by the latter’s illiteracy. Hence, through the privileged status made visible to the faithful by clergy’s literacy in a religion’s Einzelsprache, clergy wielded much power, often in competition with temporal (secular) rulers. The tension between ecclesiastical and temporal wielders of power used to be settled by a “division of work,” as illustrated by the principle of divine right, namely temporal rulers vanquished resources on clergy, who in return, legitimized the former’s reign in a polity with a given religion. See also non-scriptural religion.

sectarianism (early nineteenth-century neologism, from Medieval Latin sectarius “pertaining or belonging to a sect,” in turn from secta “sect,” formed from seco “cut” [off])—ostensibly the phenomenon of creating a sharp difference between cohabiting groups through the politicization of religion. Hence, nowadays, another name for ethnoreligious nationalism. In Britain, at the height of the ethnic civil war (“the Troubles”) in Northern Ireland, this term, especially in the journalistic collocation of “sectarian violence,” became a popular discourse ploy to deny the possibility of any ethnic conflict. Ethnic (ethnolinguistic) conflict would be an anathema in such a “developed democracy,” like the United Kingdom, because the theory is that democracy prevents conflicts of this type. Hence, a very similar ethnoreligious conflict in post-Yugoslav Bosnia can be qualified as “ethnic” or “ethnonational,” but not the ethnoreli-
gious conflict in Northern Ireland, which is “just a case of sectarian violence.” See also communalism.

**semiosphere** (see also noosphere)—in the early 1980s, the Soviet-Latvian scholar of Russian origin, Yuri Lotman, developed this term (Lotman 1984) (in Russian семиосфера semiosfera) for referring to the space where semiosis (from the Greek verb σημεῖον semeion for “to [draw or write] a mark [sign]”) takes place, or the generation of meaning through the development and manipulation of signs, in other words, where Ø language is employed for generating social reality. See also extrasmiotic sphere.

**serf** (from Latin servus “slave”)—a legal term for a peasant, who under the system of serfdom, is obliged to render free (unpaid) labor to a typically noble landowner who is a member of a natio. In Central and Eastern Europe, serfs—or the vast majority of the population—were excluded from a polity’s estates.

**serfdom** (derived from the term serf and the suffix “-dom,” which stems from Old English -dom “state, condition, power, dominion, authority,” and is cognate with German -tum)—a feudal institution of extracting free (unpaid) labor from peasantry (serfs) for a typically noble landowner. In Western Europe serfdom disappeared in the fourteenth century, while in Central Europe, with a qualified exception of Scandinavia and the Ottoman Empire, it persisted through the nineteenth century. From the legal perspective serfdom differed from slavery, that is, a serf could not be sold or bought as a chattel, but a land with a village of serfs could be sold and bought. Obviously, the purchaser also acquired the right to the serfs’ free labor.

**social reality** (see also noosphere, semiosphere; etymology: see material reality, society)—humanity’s “social world,” generated through Ø language use in its primary function, that is, for group bonding. Elements of social reality (also known as institutional reality, fictitious reality, declarative reality, or normal reality), such as, states, nations, universities, ideologies, qualities, money, numbers, or Einzelsprachen, do not exist in the material sense of this word. They cannot be perceived with the use of the senses of hearing, sight, smell, taste or touch, or detectors to enhance these senses (for instance, a microscope, telescope, weighing machine, or spectrometer). It is impossible to take a photo of a nation or Einzelsprache, embrace it, hear it, taste it, smell it, or weigh it. One can “see” elements of the social reality only in one’s “mind’s eye.” Social reality is available only to those “in the know,” that is humans who generate, maintain, and change it through the use of Ø language in its primary, bonding, group cohesion-producing function. Specific elements of social reality, as practiced by a given human group, are accessible only to humans who share the same ideas of social reality in their minds, that is, in the brain. For instance, the nation or Einzelsprache is such an idea. Hence, the (human) social reality is not “visible” to animals and other living creatures, or hypothetical extraterrestrials. If in doubt, whether an element is part of social or material reality, it is sufficient to run the test whether this element is detectable through one of the senses. If yes, it is part of material reality. And if not, and such an element is only “visible” in the “mind’s eye,” then it is part of social reality.

Obviously, social reality is a subcategory of material reality. These invisible and otherwise undetectable (with the senses) elements of social reality are none other than certain physical states and configurations of neurons in the brain’s neocortex. Furthermore, it is important to add that social reality, as a product of the human use of Ø language, is entirely dependent (non-autonomous) on human will. On the contrary, material reality is fully independent (autonomous) of human will.

What humans see as “magic” or “miracle” is a mistaken belief that social reality may change and otherwise influence material reality. That a prayer or incantation (that is, words, or elements of social reality) can move stones or cure the body of a disease (all elements of material reality). See also material reality and reality. **society** (from Latin societas, in turn from socius “associate, friend, comrade”)—see Gesellschaft.

**sociolect** (etymology: see language, lect, society)—lect (speech variety, language variety) of a social stratum or group; for instance, the Polish language developed from the prestigious sociolect of Poland-Lithuania’s nobility and remained identical with this noble sociolect until the mid-nineteenth century. At that time the remnants of serfdom were liquidated in the Austrian Empire and Prussia, and elementary education for all children was enforced. Subsequently, in 1869 in Austria-Hungary’s Galicia, Polish was introduced as this crownland’s official language and medium of education. Since that moment children of all social strata (peasants, burghers, and nobles) began to acquire the Einzelsprache of Polish as their own.

**soft power** (etymology: see power. The adjective “soft” stems from Old English swæft, cognate with Dutch zacht and German sanft)—a manner of wielding power in the international relations between states (nation-states), in the course of which stronger polities (usually former imperial powers) use all forms of economic, technological, educational, or cultural (including language) cooption, persuasion, or coercion (however, stopping short of the employment of military and warfare) in order to ensure that the government of a target nation-state follows the stronger state’s wishes. Typically, from the purely financial perspective, the use of soft power for achieving prescribed objectives is much cheaper than warfare.

**sovereignty** (from Old French souverain “sovereign,” derived from Latin super “above [other people]”)—a sixteenth-century European idea that only a single legitimate ruler or government has the right to govern within a polity’s boundaries, while rulers (governments) of other polities have no right to influence (“meddle” or “intervene”) in the internal matters of the polity in question. In 1648 sovereignty was adopted as a foundational norm of the Westphalian (modern) statehood and international relations. Hence, this norm also underpins the model of nation-state as defined by the infrastructural ideology of nationalism.

**speech** (from Old English spæc, in turn from spean “to speak”; cognate with Dutch spreken or German Sprache)—biological (natural) capacity for oral articulation (speech), or more commonly actualization of this capacity, hence, Ø language.
speech community (etymology: see communism, speech)—
all the speakers of a language (Einzelsprache) or dialect, seen
by the speakers (that is, from the emic, intragroup perspec-
tive) as a group-forming element. A speech community, like an
Einzelsprache, may be also created by outside imposition, when
typically a colonial power or state, from the etic (outside) per-
spective arbitrarily decides that a predefined population are a
speech group. Subsequently, the colonial administration stan-
dardizes (linguistically engineers) a language for this population,
the use of which is enforced through education and state offices.

speech variety (etymology: see speech. The noun “variety” stems
from Latin varietàs in turn from varios (manifold, different, var-
ious, changeable, fickle)—spatial and/or social isolation be-
tween human groups leads to the rise of linguistic difference, also
known as lects. With the rise of writing this difference is often
systematized and construed as languages (Einzelsprachen). See also
dialect vs language (Einzelsprachen) dichotomy, ethnic
language.

spelling system (etymology: see writing system. The verb “spell”
stems from Old French espel[ler], but it is a Germanic word, at-
tested in Old English spellan “to talk,” Old High German spellön,
and Old Norse spál[la]—the usual manner of using a given script
writing system for writing a given Einzelsprache in a typical
or standardized manner. See also orthography.

Sprachbund (pl Sprachbünde “federation of languages”; from
German Sprach “language,” and Bund “union, federation,
league”—see linguistic area.

Stammbaum (from German Stamm “trunk of a tree, stem,
tribe” and Baum “tree”)—German term, literally, “family tree,”
genalogical tree,” or “ancestry chart”; until the early modern
period a diagram of one’s (male) linage executed for proving one’s
legitimate claim to the status of a noble. In politics of estates
where political power and land ownership were overwhelmingly
placed in the nobility’s hands, the Stammbaum constituted the
legal basis for obtaining political and socio-economic order in a
state. Hence, the legitimizing biblical imagery was lavished on
such diagrams, drawing at the myth of Eden’s garden, including its
“tree of life.”

In the mid-nineteenth century, Europe’s Einzelsprachen
were imagined as “living organisms,” whose origin and rela-
tionships with one another can be represented in the form of
a language family tree. This classificatory representation of
languages as related but clearly delineated and separate enti-
ties corresponded well with the novel ideology of ethnolin-
guistic nationalism, especially in light of its governing princi-
ple of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and
state. On the one hand, the implied relatedness of Europe’s
Einzelsprachen underpinned the unity of Western civiliza-
tion, in line with the ideology and practice of imperialism,
thus emphasizing this civilization’s supposed superiority. On
the other hand, in accordance with the ideology of ethnolin-
guistic nationalism, each nation in Central Europe could
have its own unique and unshared national language. In turn,
all these Einzelsprachen were notionally equal as “sister lan-
guages,” because “their” “parent languages” of Latin, Ancient
(Hellenic) Greek, Old (Church) Slavonic, Proto-Germanic,
Proto-Balto-Slavic, Proto-Ugric, Old Albanic, or Proto-Turkic
had been already safely “dead” (see language death), so their
elevated (antequie) status could not be credibly claimed for any
single present-day national (sister) language.

In addition, the metaphor of linguistic Stammbaum also
strengthens the nationally useful idea of native speaker, entail-
ing that each person can naturally know exclusively his or her
mother tongue (L1). In turn, this suggests that bilingualism
(multilingualism) or diglossia (polyglossia) are an “unnatural”
state of things social and political. Hence, only ethnolinguis-
tic (national) homogeneity within a “true” nation-state—in line
with the rarely explicitly declared principle cuius regio, eius ling-
gua (whose realm, his language)—is normatively seen as desir-
able, “normal,” or even “natural.” Since the 1870s, this normative
belief was forced on Central Europe’s populations by asking, in
censuses, the (in)famous language question as the measure (in-
dication) of a person’s nationality, that is, the “natural” state of
belonging to a nation. Census-takers were instructed that a sin-
gle person could declare only one Einzelsprache, polyglotism was
to be disregarded, and some special ad hoc regulations were devel-
oped for census-takers to establish the “real” mother tongue of a
recalcitrant interlocutor, who persisted in the “error” of claiming
more Einzelsprachen than one, or none. In the latter case, illiter-
ate peasants were flabbergasted when faced with the alien concept
of national Einzelsprache, and tended to reply that they “speak in
a simple manner” or that they are just “simple Catholics” (see also
Kinderaustausch).

Furthermore, in the present-day age of cyberspace, the mis-
leading metaphor of language family tree is reinforced by the
ISO 639–5 standard for registering and endorsing language families
and groups with machine readable three-character codes. This
standard was published in 2008 and is maintained by the
Library of Congress, Washington DC (ISO 639–5 Registration
Authority 2008).

(language) standardization (etymology: see standard)—
the typical European (Western) way of exciting a speech vari-
cy from the continuous linguistic (dialect continuum, a lan-
guage) and making it, with the use of writing, into a recognized
Einzelsprache (standard language). Usually, such a standard-
ization of a language is executed by writing and adopting an au-
thoritative spelling system, grammar, and dictionary for a given
Einzelsprache. See also (language) codification.

standard (language) (from the Old French estandart “gather-
ing place, battle flag,” cognate with German Stendart “location,
place, site, position, base,” ultimately from stehen “to stand” and
Ort “place, spot”)—the end product of language standardiza-
tion or language engineering, either a fragment of a dialect
continuum made into the basis of an Einzelsprache through
the use of writing, or an Einzelsprache with its vocabulary, syn-
tax, usages, and pronunciation normativized by a state-approved
authoritative dictionary and grammar. See also language poli-
tics, politics of script.
state (polity) (from Middle English stat, a variant of estate, in turn from Latin status “condition,” in the meaning of Latin status [rei públicae] “state [of the republic]”—the 1914 Montevideo Convention defines “the state as a person of international law [that] should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government, and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states (Convention 1953)”

statehood (etymology: see state)—idea, quality, or condition of being a state. Hence, states are specific actualizations of this idea, and as such are seen to be units (qua of this quality (condition), imagined as an “uncountable abstract substance.” See also national statehood.

state (official) language (etymology: see language, state)—Einzelsprache used for all official written business in a state’s administrative institutions, educational system, politics, economy, and culture. Nowadays, a state typically has a single designated official language. States with multiple official languages (for instance, Finland or India) are exceptions. In the Anglophone world, many states have no legally designated official language (for example, Australia, Britain, and the United States), but usually the practice of written use makes an Einzelsprache (that is, English, or a regional variant of this language, such as US English) into a de facto official language.

Sun Language Theory (from the official Turkish name Güneş Dili Teorisi)—the establishment of a Republic of Turkey in 1923 was followed by the radical (revolutionary) fear of language engineering, which “purified” (see purism) Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) from Arabic and Persian lexical and syntactical loans, yielding a thoroughly Turkic in its character (Modern) Turkish language. In 1928 this overhauling was graphically emphasized with the change from the Arabic to Latin script for writing and publishing in Turkish (see politics of script). Subsequently, it turned out that it was impossible to avoid “foreign” linguistic loans, especially from Western (“civilized”) languages. During the 1930s, their use was justified with the Sun Language Theory, in the framework of which, it was claimed that all the world’s (“civilized”) Einzelsprachen stem from Turkish, so none of these linguistic loans is really foreign, because users of the Western languages had borrowed all their words and syntactical structures from Turkish in the first place (Laut 2000). National philology firmly replaced any scientific norms of linguistics, and the Sun Language Theory became the core of Turkish “national linguistics” at the Faculty of Language, History and Geography, as founded at Ankara in 1935. This radical language engineering, as pursued in interwar Turkey was quite similar to the Soviet Union’s policy of korenizatsiya, especially in its aspects of language building and the politics of script.

suprastandard bilingualism (from the Czech and Slovak specialist term, that is, nadstandardní bilingvizmus and nadstandardný bilingvizmus, respectively. Etymology: see monolingualism. The prefix “supra-” comes from Latin supra “on top of, above, exceeding”—a form of bilingualism in which interlocutors successfully communicate with one another, each using their own (ethnic) Einzelsprache, and without the necessity of switching to the Einzelsprache of her or his interlocutor. This phenomenon was widespread in federalized Czechoslovakia (1969—1992), where both Czech and Slovak enjoyed equal official status and were employed interchangeably and equitably in all aspects of public and private life. Suprastandard bilingualism seems to have largely disappeared among the younger generations of Czechs and Slovaks who were born and raised after the 1993 breakup of Czechoslovakia into the separate nation-states of Czech Republic and Slovakia. A similar phenomenon of suprastandard bilingualism (or bidialecticism) has developed in Norway since 1885, when Bokmål and Nynorsk were recognized as equal official written standards of the Norwegian language. However, in speech Norwegians tend to mix both standards, while in federalized Czechoslovakia Czechs and Slovaks were taught at school to keep their national Einzelsprachen separate also in speech. At present, suprastandard bilingualism (or even multilingualism) tends to develop among the speakers of the post-Serbo-Croatian languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian, especially in Bosnia, where Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian enjoy the same equal official status. See also composite language.

totalitarianism (1930s neologism, borrowed from the 1920s Italian and German neologisms totalitarianismo and Totalstaat “total state,” all derived from Medieval Latin totalis “total,” in turn from totus “entire”—a single-party political system characterized by the highly centralized government’s (or the dictator’s) aspiration of total arbitrary control over public life in a state, and ideally over citizens’ private life, too. See also authoritarianism, tyranny.

traitor of one’s nation (word “traitor” stems from Old French traidor, in turn from Latin traditor, ultimately from tradere “to give over, impart, betray,” formed from trāns “over” and datus “given.” Interestingly, this etymology is shared by the term “tradition,” derived from Latin trādītō)—in the vocabulary of the ideology of (ethnolinguistic) nationalism a popular accusation typically levelled against a person who does not blindly believe in and follow a given national master narrative. The functional usage of this phrase can be traced back to blasphemy and lèse-majesté. The accusation of being a “traitor of one’s nation” can be also expressed by saying that an action or opinion of the person in question “breached raison d’État.”

transcription (etymology: see script, transnationalism)—when two Einzelsprachen are written in scripts that map out speech at different levels (of phonemes, syllables, or morphemes) classical transliteration between their writing systems is impossible. A word or phrase in the source language is transcribed from one script to another via the way of pronunciation. A word written in the phonemic script (for instance, Cyrillic) of a source language (for instance, Macedonian) is reassembled in a syllabary (for example, Devanagari) in accordance with its syllabic structure, and into a morphemic script (for instance, the Chinese writing system) in line with its morphemic structure. In addition, such transcription is attuned to the pronunciation and orthographic patterns as typically employed in the target languages written with
the employment of these scripts, be it Hindi in Devanagari or Chinese in the Chinese script.

For instance, the surname of the famous English playwright William Shakespeare is transcribed into Chinese as 莎士比亚 Shāshìyì, into Japanese as シェイクスピア Sheikusūpia, into Amharic as ሸክ蕲ਪਿੰਤ Shekkipirin, into Hindi as शेक्सपियर Shekspir, into Burmese as သို့ချင်ဖူ Shatekipayaar, into Khmer as ហ្សៃកស៊ូម Shekspeyar, or in Tamil as சேக்சுபி Shekspir, or in Georgian as შექსპირ Sheksp’ir, or in Ukrainian as Шекспір Sheskpir, or in Moldovan as Șeckspir, or in Hungarian as őszínhől Sheksp’iri.

transliteration (etymology: see letter, nationalization)—representing, letter by letter, words and texts of an Einzelsprache A written in script X in Einzelsprache B written in script Y. For instance, the Latin alphabet-based language of Romanian can be converted in this manner into the Russian- or Macedonian-style Cyrillic. This form of transliteration is known as Cyrillicization (not to be confused with Cyrillicification). But when, for instance, Greek or Ukrainian is transliterated into the German- or Slovak-style Latin alphabet, the process is referred to as Romanization. The standard letter-by-letter form of transliteration is usually conducted from alphabet- or abjad-based languages to other alphabet- or abjad-based languages. Basically, such transliteration is possible only between scripts that map out speech at the same level, namely from a phonemic (abjad, alphabetic) script to another phonemic script, from a syllabary to another syllabary, from a morphemic writing system to another morphemic writing system. Otherwise, transcription must be used.

For instance, the surname of the famous English playwright William Shakespeare is Cyrillicized into Belarusian as Філіппір, Traditionally, Belarusian is written in two scripts, Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet. Typically, the Belarusian Cyrillic form informs the Latin script form, hence, Seksipir. In Greek this surname is rendered as Σάξεπιρ, in Armenian as Սեքսիպեր Shaksipir, in Hebrew as ריפוי Fiqqpir, in Arabic as شكسبير Shaksibir, or in Georgian as სექსიპირ Shekspir’i.

translation (from Latin translatio, translatus, the latter form being the past participle of transferre “to transfer, carry across,” equivalent to τρανσέ “across” and λατως the suppletive past participle form of ferre “to carry”)—the act of rendering a written text in a given Einzelsprache (noted in its specific script) into another Einzelsprache (often recorded in a different writing system). The Western tradition of translation arose in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region, first, for translating written texts between mutually incomprehensible (see mutual comprehensibility) codified Einzelsprachen belonging to different language families, that is, from Hebrew into Greek, from Greek into Latin, from Greek into Arabic, from Arabic into Latin, and from Greek into Gothic and (Old Church) Slavonic. Typically, all these languages functioned as the holy tongues of this or that religion or church, and were also official administrative languages of empires, with the qualified exceptions of Hebrew and Slavonic. Translation practically was not practiced between cognate Einzelsprachen (speech varieties) of a single language family (though some translation of religious texts between the Semitic languages of Hebrew and Aramaic occurred) until the rise of written vernacular languages in the wake of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Because translation is overwhelmingly text- and writing-based, in practice, it is nowadays limited to Eurasia’s standardized (codified) Einzelsprachen, mainly to these 180-odd languages registered under the ISO 639-1 standard. However, regular translation takes place in only among around 100 languages, as evidenced by the Google Translate (founded in 2006) automatic translation online service that currently (2018) allows for pairing 103 Einzelsprachen. Potentially, cyberspace-based translation is possible for all the ISO 639-2 standard’s 600 Einzelsprachen, their 150 writing systems supported by Unicode’s ISO 15924 standard. In reality, the bulk of all translations is conducted between the world’s eight large languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Russian, Portuguese, and Spanish) and the official Einzelsprachen of the ethnolinguistic nation-states, mainly located in Central Europe and Southeast Asia. Obviously, the steep gradient of “translation flows” is from the large languages into the aforementioned national languages, the rest of the volume of translations made up by translations from one large language into another and from one national language to another. About 99 percent of the ISO 639-3 standard’s 8,000 languages (speech varieties) are excluded from the globalized world’s “translation-sphere,” though their speakers are not excluded from bearing the sheer brunt of cultural imperialism, namely, the fact that often the sole book available in these 99 percent of excluded languages is the Bible. This rarely noticed and commented stark cyber inequality is a clear sign that at present cyberspace imperialism is the leading form of linguistic imperialism and cultural imperialism. As a result, in (Central) Europe the as yet unstandardized (though quite a bit codified) language of Romani, spoken or comprehended by about 10 million Roma, continues to be excluded from publishing and the translation-sphere, which can be interpreted as a form of unacknowledged discrimination, that is, cultural and linguistic anti-Tsiganism.

Interestingly, in the Soviet Union transcriptions of books from the Arabic script-based Persian (Farsi) into the Cyrillic-based Tajik, and similar transliterations of books from the Latin alphabet-based Romanian into the Cyrillic-based Moldavian (Moldovan) were classified as “translations.” Obviously, for all practical reasons, Persian and Tajik, and Romanian and Moldovan, are (near-)identical, ensuring full mutual comprehensibility. However, in the case of the post-Serbo-Croatian Einzelsprachen of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian (employed in official capacity in the post-Yugoslav nation-states of Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia, and variously written in Cyrillic and Latin letters), books are neither translated from one Einzelsprache into another, nor from one script into another. The language in which a given book was published is either declared, or established on the basis of the place of its publication, that is, if a book was produced in (a Bosniak canton of) Bosnia it is in Bosnian, if in Croatia it is in Croatian, if in Montenegro it is in Montenegrin, and if in Serbia it is in Serbian. Although Bosnian- and Croatian-language books are invariably published with the use of the Latin alphabet (see monoscriptalism), while their Montenegrin and Serbian counterparts, both in Cyrillic and Latin letters (see biscriptalism), the publishing of the same book in one writing system and then in another is not considered...
either an act of translation, or of transliteration. The tradition of biscriptal language of Serbo-Croatian with its two fully equivalent Cyrillic and Latin scripts continues unacknowledged to this day. Hence, a book in a post-Serbo-Croatian Einzelsprache (usually, in Montenegrin or Serbian) once printed with the employment of Cyrillic and at another time of Latin letters are seen as “editions” or “(scriptal) variants” of the same book, the production of these variants dictated by market demand, since some readers prefer Cyrillic while others the Latin alphabet.

transnational (etymology: see nation. The prefix “trans” stems from Latin trans “across”—characteristic of social, economic, political, cultural, or historic processes that take place between or across numerous states. The Latinate prefix “trans” means “across, beyond, through,” but the term “nation” in this compound word confusingly refers to “state,” not the nation in the meaning of a group of people with the recognized right to separate statehood. In the international languages of English and French the term “nation” is often used as the preferred synonym for “state.”

tribe [from Latin tribus “one of the three political or ethnic divisions [of the original Roman polity],” typically identified with the Latins, Sabines, and Etruscans; perhaps ultimately derived from the numeral tres “three”—in anthropology, an obsolete synonym for “ethnic group,” preferable to the more popular “nation.” In colonial and imperial usage that persists to this day, the term “tribe” (Volksstamm) used to be a synonym for “state,” not the nation in the meaning of a group of people with the recognized right to separate statehood, or state (official) languages and/or national languages.

tyranny (dictatorship) (term “tyranny” stems from Medieval Latin tyrannia, in turn from Greek τυράννια τυραννία “tyranny,” ultimately from τύραννος τύραννος “lord, master, sovereign, tyrant.” The term “dictatorship” comes from Latin dictator “chief magistrate,” in turn from dictō “dictate, prescribe,” ultimately from dicō “say, speak”)—illegitimate (illegal) exercise of power, usually with the use of violence, by a ruler who failed to secure the consent of the governed to his or her rule (governance). See also authoritarianism, totalitarianism.

violence (from Anglo-French violence “physical force used to inflict injury or damage,” derived from Latin violentus “vehement, forcible”; the sense of “improper treatment” attested since the turn of the seventeenth century)—the use of physical and/or psychological force to make another person or a group of people to follow the abuser’s (tyrant’s) orders and wishes. In politics, the dictatorial use of force is the hallmark of the illegitimate exercise of power.

weaponization (from “weapon,” stemming from Old English wæpen, cognate with German Waffe)—the use of elements of soft power, that is, of social reality, as instruments or weapons of offensive attack in cyberwarfare, and especially in hybrid warfare, for instance, such an employment of a language as a weapon (instrument) of power. This was observed in the case of the Russian language, especially deployed in line with the ideology of the Russian World for attack against Ukraine and as a justification of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea. Until the first decade of the twenty-first century, the common belief was that it was impossible to use elements of soft power for
waging war. But the rise of **cyberspace** made it possible, given that in the West (that is, the rich global North) “real life” economy, administration, services, medical healthcare, mass media, education, and communication became heavily dependent on the internet (cyberspace) during the 2010s.

**Westphalian (modern) statehood** (also “post-Westphalian”; etymology: see state. Westphalia—a historic region in today’s Germany)—the peace treaties concluded in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) are usually, though incorrectly, collectively known as the Peace of Westphalia. The decisions taken in these treaties transformed the traditional model of statehood (polity of estates) and are the beginning of modern international relations, as created and still dominated by the West to this day. For instance, these treaties that confirmed (granted) independence (from the Holy Roman Empire) to the Netherlands and Switzerland are the world’s oldest “international” (this term was not yet invented in 1648) treaties still in power.

The new model of statehood developed due to the official espousal of the principle of sovereignty and by normatively declaring that only confessionally (religiously) homogenous polities are legitimate, in accordance with the principle *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose realm, his religion). With the addition of the concept of the nation to the Westphalian model of the sovereign homogenous territorial state, it was transformed into that of the **nation-state**. In civic-style nation-states, religious homogeneity was replaced with the principle of equality before the law and the democratic norm of one vote for one citizen (suffrage). On the other hand, in ethnolinguistic nation-states, apart from equality before the law and suffrage for all, the principle of religious homogeneity was replaced with that of ethnolinguistic homogeneity, or *cuius regio, eius lingua* (whose realm, his language).

Like the Western concept of **Einzelsprache**, the model of Westphalian statehood developed in and spread across Europe before it was imposed on, or more rarely, voluntarily accepted by, the rest of the world in the high age of imperialism. In the wake of **decolonization** during the twentieth century, all postcolonial states follow this model. Hence, the model of Westphalian statehood is part and parcel of the infrastructural ideology of nationalism’s package of national statehood building, legitimation, and maintenance.

**writing** (from Old English *wrītan* “to score, outline, draw the figure of,” cognate with Old Saxon *wrītan* “to cut, write,” German *reissen* “to tear, draw,” or Old Norse *rita* “to score, write”)—a technology of graphic representation of speech (ο language). Popularly writing is believed to be part of ο language, and even primary to it. In reality, writing is not part of ο language, as even a photograph of a person is not part of this person. This rife, but incorrect, belief equating writing with ο language stems from the fact that writing is the main method of breaking up the continuous linguistic into discrete quanta of the linguistic, that is, **Einzelsprachen** (languages). The application of writing to speech produces, or makes it possible to produce, Einzelsprachen. The rise of written **standard languages** (Einzelsprachen) alongside the phenomenon of popular literacy leads to increasing influence of a written language on the speech of its speakers, leading to a co-evolution of writing and an Einzelsprache. This increasingly intimate interweaving of writing with numerous Einzelsprachen and allows for us to see the technology of writing as “**perlinguistic**” in its character. The Greek prefix *peri-* for “about,” “around,” or “toward,” indicates this present-day intimate (co-evolutionary) relation between writing and Einzelsprachen, while on the other hand, signals that this technology is not part of ο language. See also bureaucracy, cyberspace, ISO 639, language politics, politics of script.

**writing system (script)** (etymology: see script, writing. The term “system” stems from Neo-Latin *systēma* “system, harmony,” in turn from Greek σύστημα “whole made of several parts,” ultimately formed from σύν σύν “with, together,” and ἱστήμενον (or ἱστήμενον) “to stand”)—a form of graphic representation of speech. Usually writing systems “map” speech at the level of phonemes (“sounds”), syllables, or morphemes (simple words, roots). Alphabets (Cyrillic or Latin) represent the first approach, while the Arabic or Hebrew script constitute a subcategory. They are abjads (consonantries) that map only consonants, the reader must insert appropriate vowels in the text when she reads. Most of scripts in India and Southeast Asia reflect speech at the level of syllables, hence they are known as syllabaries. The world’s sole widespread morphemic writing system is the Chinese (morphemic, logographic) script. The Japanese writing system is unique in the fact that it mixes elements of the phonemic, sylabic, and morphemic scripts. Popularly, but incorrectly, writing systems tend to be identified as characteristic or even inherent of this or that language, for instance, Cyrillic of the Russian language or the Chinese script of the Chinese language. However, each Einzelsprache may be written in each script, as amply evidenced by the 1920s replacement of the Arabic abjad with the Latin alphabet for writing Azerbaijani (Azeri) or Uzbek in the Soviet Union. At the turn of the 1940s, both Einzelsprachen’s Latin alphabets were replaced with Cyrillic. Subsequently, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Latin alphabet was reintroduced for writing and publishing in Azerbaijani and Uzbek. Similarly, Dungan (a variety of Chinese, or a Sinitic language), used in today’s Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is written in Cyrillic, though its users in China employ the Chinese script for writing.

**Yiddishland** (יידישלנד), twentieth-century neologism, formed from “Yiddish” and “land.” The former stems from Middle High German *jüdisch* Diutsch “Jewish German,” and is cognate with the German adjective *jüdisch* “Jewish.” The noun “land” is shared with other Germanic languages, be it German *Land* or Swedish *land*—after the founding of ethnolinguistic nation-states across Central Europe in the wake of the Great War, the region’s (especially Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazic) Jews found themselves to be “foreigners” in the countries of their birth, in towns and cities where they had lived for a millennium. In reply to this ethnolinguistic exclusion, which was highly anti-Semitic in its character, they developed political parties, schools, cultural foundations, and scholarly organizations, which successfully emulated all the aspects of a Jewish Yiddish-speaking ethnolinguistic nation-state (or Yiddishland), bar a central government and political frontiers. In addition, during the Great War the Hebrew
script-based Yiddish was recognized as an official language and medium of instruction in the German Empire’s semi-colony of Ober Ost (that is, in today’s Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus), and between 1924 and 1938 it was a co-official language in quadrilingual Soviet Belarus (alongside Belarusian, Polish, and Russian). During the Holocaust planned and carried out by wartime Germany, most of Central Europe’s Jews were exterminated. As a result, Yiddishland was also annihilated. The remnants of Yiddish-speaking Jews survived in the United States, and until 1991, especially in those parts of the Soviet Union that had not been under German occupation during World War Two. See also Romanistan.
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Acknowledgements


Preface


1 Dialect Continua in Central Europe in the Ninth Century


2 Central Europe’s Writing Systems in the Ninth Century


3 Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c 1050

4 Central Europe’s Writing Systems in 1050


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22 Linguistic Areas (Sprachbünde) in Central Europe, c 1930


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**37 Management of Difference: Borders and Multiethnic Regions in Contemporary Central Europe**


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Canberra: Australian National University Press.


This index follows closely upon the format used in Paul Robert Magocsi’s *Historical Atlas of Central Europe* albeit with several modifications. The index contains three categories of names. Cities and towns are in roman type-face; countries, regions, political, administrative, and ecclesiastical entities, and items of political significance are in italic typeface; geographic names are in bold typeface. Roman-face numbers refer to text pages; italic numbers refer to maps. Place names and geographic names are given in their standard, international form followed by linguistic variants. If the standard international form is equivalent to the English form, as in the case of “Rome”, the name is followed by the requisite language code for English [E], thus Rome [E]. If the standard international form is equivalent to the local non-English language form, as in the case of “Berlin”, the name is followed by the respective language code, in this case [G] for German, thus Berlin [G]. This index also takes into consideration that one English-language form for a name can reflect a variety of different languages and scripts. Thus, “Grodno” can represent the English-rendering of both “Grodno” in Russian and “Grodn” in Polish and “Smolensk” can represent both “Smolensk” in Russian and “Smolensk” in German. Behind this nominal equivalence, however, lurks a wealth of social and political differences and consequences for the populations involved. In order to highlight this difference, the index takes note of the changing dominance of this or that linguistic group in such cases by changing the respective language code appended to such names. Thus, “Smolensk” changes from Smolensk [Ru] in 1939–1940 [map page 116] to Smolensk [G] in 1941–1944 [map page 118]. In other cases this same function is augmented by an actual change in the name of the object, such as Poltava [Ru] [map page 116] and Poltawa [G] [map page 118]. Similarly, Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb component of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is given the language code [SC/Bn], that is, Serbo-Croatian and Bosnian, when Bosnia-Herzegovina is considered as a single entity [map page 160], and the language code [SC/S], that is, Serbo-Croatian and Serbian, when Republika Srpska is highlighted [map page 138], and the language code [SC/Cr] when considering the Croatian occupation of the town in 1941–1944 [map page 118]. The following language codes are used to refer to language variants used in this index.

[A] Albanian  
[Ac] Amharic  
[Af] Afrikaans  
[Am] Armenian  
[Ar] Arabic  
[Az] Azerbaijani/Azeri  
[B] Belarusian  
[Bb] Berber  
[Bg] Bulgarian  
[Bk] Bashkir  
[Bm] Burmese  
[Bn] Bengali  
[Bq] Basque  
[C] Czech  
[Ch] Chinese  
[Cr] Croatian  
[Ct] Crimean Tatar  
[D] Danish  
[Da] Dutch  
[Dz] Dzongkha  
[E] English  
[Em] Emilian  
[Eo] Esperanto  
[Er] Estonian  
[F] Finnish  
[Fp] Filipino  
[Fr] French  
[G] German  
[Gg] Gagauz  
[Ge] Georgian
| [Gr] Greek | [Mg] Mongolian | [Sg] Samogitian |
| [H] Hungarian | [MM] Middle Mongolian | [Sk] Slovak |
| [I] Italian | [N] Norwegian | [So] Somali |
| [Ig] Ingrian | [Nd] isiNdebele | [Sp] Spanish |
| [In] Indonesian | [Np] Neapolitan | [Sr] Sardinian |
| [Iq] Iroquoian | [O] Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) | [St] Seto |
| [Kg] Kyrgyz | [Or] Oromo | [T] Turkish |
| [LG] Low German | [Rm] Romani | [U] Ukrainian |
| [Lg] Latgalian | [Rs] Rusyn | [Ur] Urdu |
| [Li] Ligurian | [Ru] Russian | [US] Upper Sorbian |
| [Lo] Laotian/Lao | [S] Serbian | [Uz] Uzbek |
| [Lm] Lombard | [SC/Bn] Serbo-Croatian/Bosnian | [V] Venetian |
| [Lt] Lithuanian | [SC/Cr] Serbo-Croatian/Croatian | [Vm] Vietnamese |
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| [M] Macedonian | | |
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With forty-two extensively annotated maps, this Atlas offers novel insights into the history and mechanics of how Central Europe’s languages have been made, unmade, and deployed for political action. The innovative application of linguistics, history, and cartography makes a wealth of hard-to-reach knowledge readily available to both specialist and general readers. It combines information on languages, dialects, alphabets, religions, mass violence, or migrations over an extended period of time.

The story first focuses on Central Europe’s dialect continua, the emergence of states, and the spread of writing technology from the tenth century onward. Most of the maps concentrate on the past two centuries. The main storyline opens with the emergence of the Western European concept of the nation, in accord with which the ethnonationalist nation-states of Italy and Germany were founded. In the Central European view, a “proper” nation is none other than the speech community of a single language. The Atlas aspires to help users make the intellectual leap of perceiving languages as products of human history and a part of culture. Like states, nations, universities, towns, associations, art, beauty, religion, injustice, or atheism—languages are artefacts invented and shaped by individuals and their groups.

This long in making magnificent work was supported by the late Eric Hobsbawm: “[I]t seems clear to me that your proposed Atlas will be of enormous interest and value.” 12 March 2009

“A major and original contribution to our knowledge of the European past, based on an innovative combination of linguistics, history, and mapping. The sophisticated maps are extremely valuable by virtue of their unusual richness in combining information on languages, dialects, alphabets, religions, mass violence and migrations over an extended time frame.”

Andrea Graziosi, Professor of History, Università di Napoli Federico II

“Research on spatial transformations focusing on linguistic issues remains rare within border studies and political geography. This Atlas will become an essential reference that will bring the insights of linguistic studies conducted worldwide into dialogue with each other.”

Akihiro Iwashita, Professor and Director of the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University

“This extensive Atlas is a blessing for everyone who is interested in Central Europe as a cultural or political phenomenon. The production of an atlas is labour intensive and expensive. But, as this new work shows, the effort is worth it. The Atlas provides us not only with an intriguing regional study but also a most important contribution to European studies.”

From the Foreword by ANNGRET SIMMS, Professor Emeritus of Historical Geography, University College Dublin; Editor of the Irish Historic Towns Atlas; member of the Royal Irish Academy

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

TOMASZ KAMUSELLA is an interdisciplinary historian of modern Central and Eastern Europe, with a focus on language politics and nationalism. He teaches in the School of History at the University of St Andrews, Scotland, Britain. His previous works include Politics and the Slavic Languages (Routledge, 2021) and The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe (Palgrave, 2009).