( « Pa Book COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT Abstract FEDERALIST. A. N >*• ■ v ABSTRAC1 OF )awson'sFoederalist BY WM. A. FALCONER. ^0^' Copyrighted by Anderson Bros., University of Virginia. 1895. h < Ppoui, The Printer, ehaplotteeville, Virginia. r^F^K^ 4CE, An inherent modesty and a becoming regard for the truth force me into the confession that this "Abstract" did not wholly origi- nate in a spirit of philanthropy ; nor was it altogether conceived in a selfish desire for riches and renown ; but it was rather the result of a condition (not a theory) over which the averageUniversity student has no control; of a well-defined conviction that without the summary adoption of heroic measures my longing and thirst- ing after a certificate oni Constitutional Law would prove but an empty "an irridescent dream. The ghost of many a good man who had made "everything except Foederalist" in his mad strug- gle after a " B. L." rose up to admonish me that something must be done and that quickly ; that something took definite form in the plan here adopted. Hence, you will see, that my" Abstract" was begun in a spirit of self-preservation ; and it was not until some 400 pages of Foederalist had been generously interspersed with "wherein consider's" that desire for pelf and the world's applause gained the mastery. And now if the students will be as charitable as I have been frank, and regard this effort with some degree of favor, then will I account myself thrice happy. William Armistead Falconer. Ft. Smith, Ark., June 6, '94. FOEDERALIST. PRELIMINARY. The War of the Revolution was at its height, when in 1776, the American colonies feeling the necessity of unity and system in their struggle against Great Britain, called a Convention to meet at Philadelphia to organize a general Government. On the 4th of July this Convention reported the Declaration of Indepen- dence and eight days after adopted the "Articles of Confedera- tion," whose many glaring defects are so strongly portrayed in the"Foederalist." Under this loose-jointed form of Government, the colonies fought out the Revolution ; but after a six years' trial of this Govern- ment, during profound peace, with no authority at home and no influence abroad, its insufficiency was too apparent. It was in this state of affairs that eleven of the thirteen States responded to a call to meet at Philadelphia in May, 1787, to try and patch up the tottering Governmental fabric. The delegates that met in compliance with this call composed one of the ablest and most patriotic bodies that ever assembled in any country: Washington, Peyton Randolph and Madison, from Virginia; Luther Martin, of Maryland; Benjamin Franklin and Robert Morris, of Pennsylvania ; Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, and Alexander Hamilton, of New York, were the tran- scendent spirits of the Convention. During the four long, exciting and trying months of that Convention, the calm dignity and firmness and the calm confidence of Washington, which never abated; and the wisdom, philanthropy and good nature of Ben- jamin Franklin, ever ready with a joke or a compromise, made the Constitution possible. When it came to adjusting the con- flicting claims of the larger and smaller States and men like Luther Martin had left the Convention in disgust, despairing of a satisfactory accommodation, these two men, more than any others, brought that eventful session to a successful termination. FOEDERALIST. O Three general plans of Government were proposed : one each by Hamilton, Randolph and Charles Pinckney. It was the desire of Hamilton and Randolph, whose plans were in the main quite similar, to do away with all Federal features in the Constitution and establish one strong, central and National Government. Both of these plans were rejected, and Hamilton's, which smacked somewhat more of a limited monarchy, was so espe- cially distasteful and was so summarily rejected that he thought it best to refrain from any further expressions till near the close of the session, when he gave his hearty support to the Constitu- tion as adopted, which embodied the principal features of the Pinckney plan. Although a silent member and but 26 years of age, Hamilton took high rank among the great men in that great body. He was a member of the "Committee on Style," which gave to the Constitution its present arrangement and splendid style. But, for learning, exhaustive reasoning and conscientious statesmanship, probably no one in that body was Madison's equal. As soon as the Constitution had been adopted by the Conven- tion, in September, 1787, and it had been sent to the various States to be ratified, before going into effect, it was received with the most bitter opposition. In New York, under the leadership of George Clinton, and probably, Aaron Burr, this feeling was intense; while in Virginia, the eloquent invective of Patrick Henry made the more enlightened friends of liberty tremble for the outcome. It was this condition of affairs in their own States that inspired Hamilton and Madison to give to the people through weekly and semi- weekly newspaper articles that splendid work of genius, the "Foederalist," which as an authoritative, contempo- raneous treatise on the Constitution has no equal. Before the profound learning and irresistible logic of these two men, assisted in four or five articles by John Jay, all material opposition melted away and the Constitution was adopted. So highly did Mr. Jef- ferson appreciate the "Foederalist," that he selected it as the text book of the University of Virginia on Constitutional Law and as such it remains, and as such, I trust, will remain. W. A. F. FOEDERALIST. (1). General Introduction. (2). Argument in Favor of Adoption of the Constitution. (3). Conclusion. Part I. Introduction— w. c. (1). Importance of the Subject: (Consideration of the Constitution). (2). Obstacles to a Fair Consideration of the Constitution. (3). Necessity For a Fair Consideration. l a . Importance of the Subject. l b . It involves the existence of the Union, etc. 2\ The safety and welfare of the States involved. 3 b . It will " decide whether societies of men are capable of establishing good Government from reflection and choice." 2 a . Obstacles to a Fair Consideration of Constitution. 1\ "The obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes that may diminish their power." 2 b . "The perverted ambition of another class of men who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country or flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from a division into sev- eral Confederacies than under one Government." 3 b . Because the Constitution affects so many particular interests. 4\ Because it innovates upon too many local institu- tions. 3 a . Necessity of a fair consideration of the Constitution. l b . To prevent the obscuring of the main question by a torrent of passions. 3 b . To guard against all attemps to influence a decision in a matter of so great importance by any impressions except those which result from the evidence of truth. Part II. Argument in Favor of the Adoption of the Constitution— w. c. (1). Theutility of Union to political prosperity. (2). The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve the Union. (3). Thenecessity of a Government at least equally energetic with that of Constitution to preserve the Union. (4 ) . The conformity of Constitution to the true principles of Republican Government. (5). Its analogy to the New York Constitution. (6). The additional security which its adop- tion will afford to Republican Government, to liberty and to property, w. c. l a . The Utility of Union to Political Prosperity. (1). Introduction. (2). Argument. l b . Introduction — w. c. V. Necessity to prove the utility of Union. (2). A general view of the utility of Union. l d . Because it is already being intimated that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any gen- eral system and that we must resort to distinct and separate Confederacies. 2 d . This doctrine may be gradually propagated. 3 d . The reasons for adopting a Union argue for a pres- ervation of that Union now. 2 C . A general view of the utility of the Union. (1). A doctrine until lately unquestioned. (2). The natural and physical inducements to Union. (3). Our past history shows the appreciation of the people of the utility of Union. l d . A doctrine till now unquestioned. 2 d . The natural inducements to Union. l e . The character of the country (soil, rivers, etc.) 2 e . The character of the people. 3\ The association of the people as one nation dur- ing a long and bloody war. 3 d . Our past history shows appreciation, etc. dawson's foederaust. 10 dawson's foederaljst. (1). From the adoption at an early date of the Arti- cles of Confederation. (2). From their convening, "as with one voice," the late convention at Philadelphia. l e . From the adoption at an early date of the Articles of Confederation. l f . Proved defective by experience. 2 f . Causes of defects in the Articles. I s . Formed by men comparatively inexperienced. 2 g . Formed during times of bloodshed and excite- ment. 3 s . No sufficient opportunity for calm and mature reflection. 2*. From their convening, "as with one voice," the late Convention of Philadelphia. l f . Object of that Convention. 2 f . Character of that Convention. l g . Composed of wisej patriotic and tried men possessing confidence of the people. 2 g . Many of the members of former Convention were in this Convention. 3 g . They sat in the "mild season of peace." 4 g . With minds unoccupied by other subjects. 5 g . They deliberated daily for many months. 6 g . They were unanimous in presenting the Consti- tution. 2 b . Argument for the utility of the Union. (1). The several instances of the utility of the Union. (2). Reply to the objection that the extent of territory is too great for one general Government. l c . The several instances of the utility of the Union — w. c. (1). As a security against foreign arms and influence. (2). To prevent dissensions among the States. (3). In our commercial relations. (4). In establishing a navy. (5). As a barrier against domestic faction and insur- rection. (6). In respect to revenue. (7). In the greater economy in the administration of the Government. l d . As a security against foreign arms and influence. dawson's foederalist. 11 12 dawson's foederalist. (1). In the case of just wars. (2). Unjust wars. l e . As a security against foreign arms and influence in the case of just wars. (1). Through a removal of the causes. (2). From the greater ability to settle amicably such causes. l f . Through a removal of the usual causes of a just war. (1). Violations of treaties. (2). Direct violence. I s . Removal of causes resulting from violations of treaties. 1\ By securing a better administration of Gov- ment. (p. 13.) 2\ By the employment of better men. l j . More general and extensive reputation for ability and integrity will be required. 2 j . There will be a wider field for choice. 3 h . By an uniform interpretation of treaties. 1 J . Because of a single tribunal under the general Government. 2 J . Because of singleness of interest. 3 J . Because there will be wanting the bias of local interest. 4\ By avoiding the local Temptations to bad Faith to which a single State may yield. 5\ By avoiding local Prejudices of a single State. 2 g . Direct Violence (2d cause of just war). l h . Experience of the past shows that several In- dian wars were caused by individual States and not one by the Federal Government. 2\ The neighborhood of Spanish and British ter- ritory bordering on some States— just apprehen- sion for the future, (p. 15.) 2 f . Through the greater ability it will afford to set- tle amicably the causes of just war. l g . In the absence of local Pride and Prejudice. 2 g . In the greater strength of Union. 2 e . Through a security against Foreign Arms and Influence in the case of Unjust Wars— w. c. dawson's foederalist. 13 14 dawson's foederalist. (1). Causes of unjust wars. (2). Instances where- in Union would afford greater security in this re- spect. l f . Causes of Unjust Wars. (1). In general. (2). In case of States. 2 s . Causes, etc., in general. 1\ Affecting absolute Sovereigns. l j . Thirst for Military Glory. 2 J . Revenge for personal affronts. 3 j . To aggrandize their Families and Partisans. 2\ Causes affecting Nations and particularly the States. l j . From the ambition of influential men. 2 J . Those growing out of Situation and Circum- stances. l k . The States are rivals with France and Bri- tain in Fisheries. 2 k . The States are the rivals of Spain, Britain and others in the Navigation and Carrying Trade, (p. 19). 3 k . Their rivals in the trade to India and China. 2 f . Instances wherein Union would afford greater security against Unjust Wars. (Fed. p. 19 andseq). l g . One general Government can avail itself of the ablest men in every part of the Union. 2 g . It can move on uniform principles of policy. 3 g . It can apply the Resources of the Whole to Protection of a Part. 4 g . The Militia will be more efficient. 5 g . It can establish a strong navy. 2 d . The utility of the Union as a security against Dis- sensions among the States themselves — w. c. (1). The danger of hostilities arising between in- dependent, unconnected and neighboring sovereign- ties. (2), Certain objections of anti-constitutionists. ( 3 ) . The inducements the disunited States would have dawson's foederaeist. 15 16 jdawson's foederaust. to make war on each other. (4). The consequences of inter-state hostilities— w. c. l e . The Danger of Hostilities arising between inde- pendent, unconnected and neighboring Sovereignties l f . Through love of Power. 2 f . Through jealousy of Power. 3 f . Through competition of commerce. 4 f . Through the Passions and Influences of Individ- uals — illustrated from history, (pp 29—30). l g . Pericles, to gratify the resentment of Aspasia, attacks and destroys the city of the Samnians. 2 s . Pericles, (1) stimulated by private pique against the Megarensians or (2) to avoid prosecution for a supposed theft of statuary of Phidias, (3) or to avoid a prosecution for dissipating public funds, was the primitive author of the Peloponne- sian war. 3 s . Cardinal Wolsey, aspiring to be Pope and to secure the influence of Charles V, plunged England into a war with France. 4 g . Shays, being a desperate debtor, plunged Mas- sachusetts into a civil war. 2 e . Certain objections of anti-Constitutionists an- swered. (1) The objections stated and (2) answered* l f . The objections stated. I s . "The genius of Republics is Pacific. " 2 g . "The spirit of commerce tends to Peace." 3 g . " Commercial Republics will never be disposed to so far forget interest as to engage in wars." 2 f . The objections answered. l g . It is the interest of all nations to cultivate peace. 2 g . Republics are administered by men, as Monarch- ies, and are subject to rage, jealousy, etc. 3 g . History appealed to. 1\ Republics have been warlike. 1\ Sparta. dawson's foederalist. 17 18 2\ Athens. 3\ Rome. 4 k . Carthage. 5 k . Venice. 6 k . Holland. 2 h . Commercial Republics have been warlike. l k . Athens. 2\ Carthage. 3\ Venice. 4 k . Holland. > e . The inducements which the disunited States would have to make war on each other, (p. 34). (1). General causes. (2). Particular causes. l f . General Causes. The same that have produced wars elsewhere. 2 f . Particular Causes — w. c. (1). Unadjusted territorial disputes. (2). Com- mercial rivalry. (3). The existing debts of the Con- federacy. (4). Local laws violative of private con- tracts. (5). Alliances between individual States and foreign powers. l g . Unadjusted Territorial Disputes — w. c. (1). Thenatureof such disputes. (2). Arguments of the disputants. (3). Example of past territorial disputes. l h . The Nature of such Disputes — w. c. (1). They will arise out of the " Crown Lands." (2). The Western lands, etc. (3). In regard to appor- tionment. l k . Those arising out of claims to Crown Lands. 2 k . Those arising out of claims to Western ter- ritory. 2\ Arguments of the disputing States. 1\ Those claiming Crown Lands. (1) "They are ours because they were in the limits of our State under the colonial Govern- ment." (2) "No, they are the proportionate prop- dawson's foederalist. 19 20 dawson's foederalist. property of all because the rights of the Crown devolved on the Union." 2 k . Those claiming Western lands (which arebj cession or anterior right the property of the Union). (1) The ceding States: "They are ours by reversion." (2) The others: "No, we are all entitled to a proportionate share, for a grant once made can never be revoked" 3 k . In regard to apportionment. If, contrary to probability, all the States should admit that each was entitled to a share of these lands, then trouble would result as to proper rule of apportionment. 3\ Examples of past territorial disputes. l k . Dispute between Connecticut and Pennsyl- vania over Wyoming lands. 2 k . Dispute between New York and Vermont. 2 s . Commercial Rivalry. (1) Causes. (2) Illustrated by New York, Con- necticut and New Jersey. l h . Causes. l j . Jealousy of States whose locality is not favor- able to commerce, (p. 37.) 2 J . From the different systems of commercial polity. 2\ Illustrated by New York, Connecticut and New Jersey. New York from her situation and for revenue lays duties on imports ; New Jersey and Connecticut become jealous. 3 s . The existing debt of the Confederacy. 1\ The Difficulties of a proper Apportionment. 2 h . The Difficulties of a proper Extinguishment. 4 g . Local Laws violative of Private Contracts. E. g. The enormities of the Legislature of Rhode Island and retaliation of Connecticut. 5 s . Incompatible Alliances. dawson's foederalist. 21 22 4 e . The Consequences of inter-state Hostilities. (1). The primary, and (2). The ultimate conse- sequences. l f . The primary consequences of inter-state Hostili- ties : Sudden conquests, rapid desolation. 2 f . The ultimate consequences of inter-state Hostil- ities. l g . Standing Armies. 2 g . A strong executive — Monarchy. 3 g . The elevation of the Military over the Civil Power. (p. 47). 3 d . The utility of Union as a Barrier to domestic Fac- tion, etc. (1), The nature of a faction. (2). Liability of Re- publics to tactions. (3). Advantages of a Confederacy in cases of Factions. (4). Modes of curing mischiefs of factions — w. c. l e . The Nature of Factions, (p. 56). "A Faction is a number of citizens, whether amounting- to a majority or minority of the whole, who are actuated by some common impulse of pas- sion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens or the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." 2 e . Liability of Republics to Faction. (1). Illustrated from history. (2). This tendency furnishes arguments for advocates of despotism. l f . Illustrated from History. l g . The Grecian Republic. 2 g . The Italian Republic. 2 f . This Tendency An Argument for Advocates of Despotism. 3 e . The advantages of a Confederacy in cases of Fac- tion — w. c. (1). Montesquieu's Views. (2). Nature of a Con- federacy. l f . Montesquieu's Views. dawson's foederalist. 23 24 dawson's foederalist. 1) As represented by opponents of the Constitu- tion, and (2) as they are. l g . Montesquieu's views as represented: That he argues against an extended territory for a Republican Government and a general union of States. The standards he had in view were smaller than most of the States. Consequences of an adoption of this view. (1) Either a division of each of these States, or (2) Taking refuge in the arms of monarchy. 2 s . Montesquieu's views as they are. He explicitly treats of a Confederate Republic as expedient for extending the sphere of popular gov- ernment and reconciling the advantages of Mon- archy with those of Republicanism. He defines a Confederate Republic to be * 'a convention by which "several smaller States agree to become members of "a larger one which they intend to form. It is a "kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a "new one, capable of increasing by new associa- tions, till they arrive to such a degree of power as "to be able to provide for the security of the united "body." 2 f . Nature of a Confederacy. (1) Distinction between a Confederacy and a Con- solidation of the States. (2) Confederate Republic defined. (3) Nature of Lycian Confederacy— w. c. l g . Distinction between a Confederacy and a Con- solidation of the States, (p. 53.) A distinction between the two, more subtle than accurate, has been drawn. The essentials of the first are said to be (1) The restriction of its authority to the mem- bers in their corporate capacity ; (2) No concern in internal matters; (3) An exact equality of suffrage. These positions in reality are (1) Arbitrary; (2) Unsupported by principal or precedent. ; (3) The principles contended for are the cause of disorder and imbecility in Government. dawson's foederalist. 25 26 dawson's foederalist. 2 g . The Confederate Republic defined. An assemblage of societies or an assemblage of two or more States into one State. It will exist as long as (1) the members have separate organ- izations, and (2) exist by constitutional necessity for local purposes. 3 g . Nature of the Lycian Confederacy. (1) It consisted of twenty-three cities or Repub- lics : the largest had each three votes in the common council, the next had two and thesmallest one; (2) the common council appointed all the judges and magistrates of cities. 1\ Montesquieu takes this as a " model of an ex- cellent Confederate Republic." 2 h . Yet its members had unequal suffrage 3 h . And did not regulate their internal affairs (ap- pointing judges, etc). - 4 e . Modes of Curing the Mischiefs of Faction. (1) By removing its cause. (2) By controlling its effects — w. c. l f . By removing its cause. (1). By destroying the liberty of the people. (2). By causing every citizen to possess the same opinions. l g . By destroying liberty of the people. Unwise. 2 g . By causing every citizen to have the same pas- sion, interests and opinions. Impracticable. 2 f . By controlling its effects. (1) The necessity of faction. (2) The modes of controlling effects of faction. l g . The Necessity of Faction. (Foed., pp. 57-8-9.) Faction must, to some extent, exist in every free government. 2 s . The modes of controlling the effects. (1) When a minority. (2) When a majority. l h . When a minority. By regular vote. dawson's foederalist. 25 28 dawson's foederalist. 2 h When a majority. (1) By preventing the existence of the same pas- sions or interests in the majority at the same time — or (2) they must be rendered unable to con- cert by their number and local situation. l j . By preventing the existence of the same pas- sions or interests in the majority. 2 j . The majority must be rendered unable to con- cert by their number and local situation. (1) The utility of a Democracy in accomplish- ing this object. (2). The utility of a Republic. l k . The utility of a Democracy, etc. A Democracy, which is a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. 2\ Utility of a Republic, etc. (1). Nature of a Republic. (2). Differences be- tween a Republic and a Democracy. (3). Advan- tage of a large over a small Republic in curing faction. I 1 . Nature of a Republic. A government in which the scheme of repre- sentation takes place. 2 1 . Differences between a Republic and a Democ- racy. (1). The delegation of the Government in a Republic to a small number of citizens elected by the rest. (2). The greater number of citi- zens and the greater sphere of country over which it extends — w. c. l m . The Delegation of the Government in a Republic to a small number of citizens elected by the rest. (p. 61). (1). Effect of this difference. (2). A large Republic will be most favorable to election of proper guardians of the public weal. l n . Effect of the Delegation of Government, etc. 29 30 dawson's foederalist. 1°. To refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens. 2°. Or contra, men of factious tempers and sinister designs may, by intrigue or cor- ruption, obtain the suffrages and betray the interests of the people. 2 n . Large Republics will be most favorable to election of proper Guardians of Public Weal. 1°. From Greater Probability of a Fit Choice. However small the Republic, the Representatives must be raised to a certain number to guard against the cabals of a few; and however large it may be they must be limited to a certain number to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence the ratio of Representatives to the people being less in a large Republic there will be greater option. 2°. From the greater difficulty of unworthy candidates practicing successfully their vicious arts, each Representative being chosen by a larger number. 2 m . The greater number of cities and greater sphere of country over which a large Republic may extend. l n . The smaller the society the fewer distinct parties and interests. 2 a . The fewer distinct parties and interests the more frequently will the same party have a majority. 3 n . The smaller the number of persons in majority the smaller their compass. 4 n . Smaller their compass the greater ease of concert and execution of plans. 3 1 . Advantage of a large over a small Republic in curing the mischiefs of factions. The same a Republic has over a Democracy. dawson's foederalist. 31 32 dawson's foederalist. 4 d . Utility of the Union in our commercial relations with foreign States and among the States. (1). Utility of the Union in our commercial rela- tions with foreign States. (2). Among the States. l e . Utility of the Union in our commercial relations with foreign States — w. c. (1) Advantages of union, and (2) disadvantages of disunion. l f . Advantages of Union in this respect. (1). In regard to commercial treaties. (2). In securing the benefits arising from our own markets. (3). In establishing a federal navy. 2 f . Disadvantages of Disunion in this respect. (1). The rivalship of the different States would frustrate all natural advantages of commerce. (2). It would become the prey of nations at war with each other. (3). It would' invite foreign nations to interfere with commercial rights acquired under the Union, (a) in the fisheries; (b) in the navigation of the lakes, and (c) of the Mississippi river. 2 e . Utility of the Union in Commercial Relations among the States. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope from the diversity in the productions of differ- ent States. Variety as well as value of products for exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. 5 d . Utility of the Union in establishing a Navy. The Union could command the resources of all the States ; the sailors of the Northern States ; tar, pitch and turpentine and wood from the South ; iron from the Southern and Middle States, (p. 73-79). 6 d . Utility of the Union in respect of Revenue. (1). Necessity for revenue. (2). How raised (i. e., principally by indirect taxation). l e . Necessity for Revenue, (p. 79). A nation cannot long exist without it. 2 e . Methods of Raising Revenue. 1). By direct taxation. (2). By indirect taxation. DAWSON'S FOEDERAUST. 33 34 DAWSON 'S FOEDERALIST. l f . By Direct Taxation. This method not desirable. (1). Experience of this method. (2). Its disadvantages. l g . Experience of raising Revenue by Direct Taxa- tion. (1). In America. (2). In Great Britain. 2 g . Its Disadvantages. (1). In case of personal and (2) of real property. l h . In case of Personal Property. Too precarious and invisible to be so reached. 2\ In case of Real Property. They will reluctantly yield scanty supplies. 2 f . Raising Revenue by Indirect Taxation. 1 g . This the only Feasible Mode. Follows from the disadvantages of the direct tax. 2 g . Advantages of a Union in Raising Revenue by Indirect Taxation. (1). By increasing commerce. (2). By preventing smuggling. l h . By Increasing Commerce. l j . As commerce flourishes lands advance in value. 2 j . Increases the value of products by giving a freer vent to trade. 3 j . It contributes to the quantity of money and to its rapidity of circulation. 2\ By preventing smuggling. (1). Opportunities for. (2). Consequences. l j . Opportunities for smuggling. l k . In case of the Union. There will be only one side — the Atlantic coast — to guard, and the Government would have the same interest to provide against smuggling everywhere, and would have a strong navy to prevent it. 2 k . In case of Disunion. I 1 . From the relative situation of the States. dawson's foederalist. 35 36 dawson's foederalist. 2 1 . From the affinity of language and manners. 3 1 . From the familiar habits of intercourse. 4\ Mutual jealousy would make duties low in order to discourage smuggling and thus de- stroy revenue. 5 1 . An army of patrols would be necessary on every border line. 2 J . Consequences of smuggling. Attempts to prevent it would cause greater ex- pense from the greater necessity of patrols, while smuggling lessens the Government revenues. 7 d . Utility of the Union in the greater economy in the administration of the Government. l e . There will be but one civil national list to sup- port. 2 e . There will be no necessity of internal patrols for collecting revenue. 3 e . Large military establishments prevented. 2 C . Reply to Objection that the Extent of Territory is Too Great for one General Government. (1). Extent of territory required in a Democracy and Republic respectively. (2). Conformity of the United States to this standard. (3). Certain considerations in advocacy of present extent of territory. l d . The Extent of Territory Required in a Democracy and Republic. l e . In a Democracy. (a) Of such extent that the most remote citizens may conveniently assemble for transaction of public affairs, and (b) will include no greater number than can join in those affairs. 2 e . In a Republic. Of such extent that the representatives may meet at the Capital as often as may be necessary for ad- ministration of public affairs. 2 d . Conformity of United States to this Requirement. (1). Its exact extent. (2). As compared to Great Britain. dawson's eoederalist. 37 38 1*. Its exact extent. l f . From East to West. From the Atlantic to the Mississippi, about 750 miles. 2 f . From North to South. (a). Between 31° and45°=14° (b). Between 31° and 42° -=11° Average about 12^°=about 868 miles. 2 e . Conformity of United States, etc., as compared with Great Britain, etc. l f . As compared with Germany, very little larger. 2 f . As compared with Poland, very little larger. 3 f . As compared with Great Britain. Representatives from North Scotland have as far to travel to Par- liament as Representatives would in this country. 3 d . Certain Considerations in Advocacy of the pres- ent extent of the Union. l e . The general Government's Jurisdiction is re- stricted to certain general and enumerated objects. 2 e . To secure the Union of the Thirteen States and to form new ones. 3°. Intercourse throughout the Union will be daily facilitated by roads, canals, etc. 4 C . Almost every State will have a frontier to guard and thus would find it expedient to sacrifice any supposed inconvenience from the extent of territory to their own safety. 2 a . The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union. l b . Its Insufficiency Not Controverted. 2 b . Consequences of its Insufficiency — (p. 93). 3 b . Necessity for Proof of' Its Insufficiency. While it is admitted that the present Government is destitute of energy, the powers requisite for supplying that energy are denied. 4 b . The Several Defects of the Confederation. (1). The legislation for States in their corporate 39 40 dawson's foederalist. capacity. (2). The total want of a sanction to its laws. (3). The want of a mutual guaranty of the State Governments. (4). Regulating contributions of the States by quotas. (5). Want of a power to regulate com- merce. (6). Raising troops by quotas. (7). Equal suf- frage among the States in Congress. (8). The want of a judiciary power. (9). The organization of Congress utterly improper for exercising the powers necessary to a Federal Union. (10). The Confederation was never rati- fied by the people — w. c. (p. 90.) l e . First Defect. Legislation for States in their corpor- ate capacity. (1). Consequences of this and other defects. (2). The nature of Government and the necessity for it. (3). The modes of enforcing Government — w. c. l d . Consequences of This and Other Defects. l e . Consequences of This, Defect in Particular. Though the Congressional resolutions are in theory constitutionally binding and they may make indefinite requisitions for men or money, in practice they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at pleasure. 2 e . Consequences of This and Other Defects in Gen- eral. l f . Inability to pay foreign debts contracted in a time of imminent peril. 2 f . Possession of important posts by foreign powers. 3 f . We have no troops, treasury or Government. 4 f . Exclusion from Navigation of Mississippi river. 5 f . No Public Credit, (p. 92). 6 f . No Public Commerce, (p. 92). 7 f . Violent Decrease in Value of Lands. 8 f . Want of Private Credit and Confidence, (p. 92). 2 d . The Nature of Government and the Necessity for it. l e . The Nature of Government. 1*. Government implies the power of making- laws. dawson's foederaust. 41 42 dawson's foederalist. 2 f . A Law implies a Sanction. 2 e . The Necessity for Government. Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint. States are less influenced by these dictates of reason and justice because: (1) Regard to reputation has less influence when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number (2) A spirit of faction will often hurry bodies of men into excesses of which, in a private capacity, they would not be guilty. 3 d . The Modes of Enforcing Government. (1) Through a coercion of arms. (2). Through coer- cion of the magistracy. l c . Through a Coercion of Arms. (p. 101). (1). Results of the employment of this mode. (2). Its impracticability. l e . Results of the Employment of this Mode. l g . Constant Inter-State Wars. 2 s . Foreign Alliances. 3 g . Death of the Confederacy. 4 s . A Military Despotism. 2 f . The Impracticability. l g . It is not probable, considering the genius of the country, that the complying States would be often inclined to support the Union in a war against the non-complying States. 2 g . There would be great difficulty in determining when force could be used with propriety — it would often be impossible to determine whether delin- quency proceeded from inability or disinclination. 3 s . The resources of the Union would be insufficient to sustain an army large enough to keep the larger States within the limits of their duty. 2 e . Through Coercion of the Magistracy. (1). Advantages of this method. (2). Objections answered. l f . Advantages of this Method. dawson's foederalist. 43 44 dawson's foederalist. It results from the observations under (l 9 ) that the enforcement of laws by coercion of arms would be disastrous if not impracticable, and hence it is only through the magistracy that the laws can be en- forced — by extending the authority of the Govern- ment to individuals and not restricting it to States. 2 f . Objections to the Government's Employing the Coercion of the Magistracy answered. I s . "That any disaffected State could at any Time Obstruct the Execution of the Laws in this Method as in the other." 1\ When the Government acts on States and not on individuals and the consent of a State Legis- lature is necessary to carry out the Government's plans, mere non-compliance, inaction or evasion will defeat those plans. 2\ When the Government acts on individuals no evasions or omissions would answer. To resist the Government in this case they must act posi- tively. The success of such resistance would de- pend on the concurrence of a majority of the Legislature, on the Courts of Justice and on the People, (p. 105). 2 g . "That individuals, more or less numerous, may still obstruct the Government." 1. As to those partial commotions which do not affect the great body of the community, the general Government would possess greater re- sources to suppress them than any single State. 2. As to those mortal feuds which spread confla- gration through a whole nation, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. No form of Government can always either avoid or control them. 3 g . " That the Reserved Rights of the States would be invaded by the General Government." 1\ No Competent Inducement. The ambitious officers of the Go vernment would find ample fields for exercise of their ambition in dawson's fobdbralist. 45 46 dawson's foederai.ist. commerce, war, negotiation and Bnance, which are all given to the Government. 2\ The People through the House of Representa- tives could prevent it. 3\ There is greater danger that the delegated authority of the General Government will be in- vaded by State Governments. 1 J . The State Governments will possess a greater degree of influence over the people. l k . On account of that diffusive and general con- struction and General Government. 2\ From the nature of the objects to which the State Governments would be directed. E. g., In the ordinary administration of civil and criminal justice. 2 j . Illustrated from History. (1). Illustrated by Feudal System. (2). The Clans of Scotland. (3). The Amphictyonic League. (4). The Achaean League. (5). The Germanic League. (6). The History of Poland. (7). Switz- erland. (8). United Netherlands. 1\ Tendency of States to despoil the General Government, illustrated from the History of the Feudal System. (1). Their similarity to Confederacies. (2). The result of this svstem. - I 1 . Their Similarity to Confederacies. There were a common head and subordinate barons, who were sovereign in their respective territories. 2 1 . The Result of this System. Continual opposition to the sovereign and frequent wars between the barons. 2\ Illustrated by the History of the Clans of Scotland. The spirit of clanship uniting the nobles and their dependants made the aristocracy a con- stant overmatch for the monarch, until the in- 47 48 dawson's foederalist. corporation with England under a more ener- getic Government. 3\ Illustrated by the History of the Amphicty- onic League. (1). Its similarity to the American Confedera- tion. (2). Result. I 1 . Its Similarity to the American Confedera- tion under the Articles of Confederation. l m . The several States were sovereign and had an equal vote in the Common Council. 2 m . The Council had authority to declare war. 3 m . To fine members. 4 m . To admit new members. 5 m . To decide in the last resort all controver- sies between the States. 2 1 . Result of this form of Government. l m . The more powerful members tyrannized over the rest. E. g., Athens was arbiter of Greece 73 years; Lacedaemonia -was arbiter of Greece 29 years ; Thebes next held sway. 2 m . In wars with Persia and Macedon the members never acted in concert. 3 m . When not at war with foreigners internal dissensions ensued. E. g., The Phocians ploughed up some con- secrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo. The Amphictyonic Council imposed a fine. The Phocians at instigation of Athens and Sparta refused to submit. Thebes and others tried to enforce it and invited Philip of Macedon. He bribed his way into the league and became its master. 4\ Illustrated by the History of the Achaean League. (1 . Its composition. (2). Results. I 1 . Composition of Achaean League. l m . Powers of cities composing the League. bawson's foederalist. 49 50 l tt . They retained their municipal jurisdic- tion. 2 n . Appointed their own officers. 3\ They enjoyed perfect equality. 2 m . Powers of the General Government or League. Exercised through a Senate. l n . The sole and exclusive right of peace and war. 2 n . The sole and exclusive right of sending and receiving ambassadors. 3*. Of making treaties and alliances. 4 n . Of appointing a Praetor or Chief Magis- trate. (1). Praetor commanded the armies. (2). By the advice and consent often Sena- tors administering the government in the re- cess of the Senate. (3). Had a share in its deliberation when it was assembled. 2 1 . Results of the Form of Government under the Achaean League. l m . As well after the renovation of the League by Aratus as before its dissolution by the art of Macedon there was infinitely (1) More moderation and justice in its Gov- ernment; and (2) Less violence and sedition among people than were to be found in any of the cities ex- ercising singly all the prerogatives of sov- ereignty. 2 m . Through jealousy of their power. (1). The successors of Alexander and Philip practiced divisions among them. Some of the cities fell under Macedonian power and others under local tyrants. (2). The Achaean League reunited, but was defeated through jealousy of Sparta and Athens. dawson's foederalist. 51 52 dawson's foederalist. 3 k . Illustrated from the History of the Germanic (1). Origin of the League. (2). Its composi- tion. (3). Results in the case of this League. I 1 . Origin of the Germanic League. Formerly Germany was inhabited by seven distinct and independent nations ; one of these, the Franks, conquered France and under Charle- magne in the ninth century, conquered Germany and established the empire. On the dismem- berment under his sons, Germany became a sep- arate and independent empire. The principal vassals gradually threw off the yoke. Out of this feudal system has grown the Federal Sys- tem, which constitutes the Germanic Empire. 2 1 . The Composition of the Germanic League. (1). The governmental functions — how vested. (2). The powers of the Diet. (3). Restrictions on the States. (4). The powers of the Emperor. l m . The Government Functious, how vested. l n . In a Diet, representing the members of the Confederacy. 2\ In the Emperor — the executive. 3\ In the Imperial Chamber and Aulic coun- cil. * 2 m . The Powers of the Diet. l n . The general power of legislating for the Empire. 2 n . To make war and peace. 3 n . To contract alliances, (p. 121). 4 n . To assess quotas of troops and money. 5\ To construct fortresses. 6 n . To regulate coin. 7 n . To admit new members. 8 n . To subject disobedient members to ban of empire. 3 m . Restrictions on the States. l n . To make treaties contrary to the good of the Empire. DAWSON'S FOEDERAU©T» 53 54 dawson's foederalist. 2 n . To impose tolls on inter-State commerce with the consent of the Emperor and Diet. 3 n . To alter the value of money. 4 n . To do injustice to another. 5 n . To afford refuge to disturbers of the pub- lic peace. 4 m . The powers of the Emperor. l n . To make propositions to the Diet. 2 n . To veto resolutions of the Diet. 3 n . To nominate ambassadors. 4 n . To confer dignities and titles. 5 n . To fill vacant electorates. 6 n . To found universities. 7\ To grant privileges not injurious to the empire. 8 n To receive and .apply the public funds. 9 n . To watch over the public safety. 3 l . Results of the Form of Government under the Germanic League. l m . Wars between the Emperor and the State. In the sixteenth century the Emperor and one part of the empire were arrayed against the other States, and once the Emperor was put to flight by the Elector of Saxony. 2 m . Wars between the States themselves. E. g., Thirty Years War. 3 m . This disjointed machine barely holds together and that (1) because of the fear the principal component States have of the sur- rounding Nations; (2) from the obvious in- terests and pride of the Emperor. 6 k . Illustrated from the History of Poland. I 1 . The composition of the Polish Government. A government over local sovereigns. 2 1 . Results of this Form of Government in Poland. Unfit for government or self-defence, it was dismembered. dawson's foedbraust. 55 56 7 k . Illustrated from the History of the Swiss Cantons. I 1 . The composition of their Government. (1). Their Government not a Confederacy. (2). Reasons for its duration. l m . The Government of the Swiss Cantons not a Confederacy. l n . There is no common treasury. 2 n . No common Judicatory. 3 n . No common troops. 4*. No common coin. 5 n . No other work of sovereignty. 2 m . Reasons for its duration, (p. 125) l n . Topographical position. 2 n . Weakness and insignificance. 2 1 . Results of this form of Government of the Swiss cantons. l m . In ordinary cases. Very satisfactory. 2 m . In cases of dispute or real trial. Proved a failure. Result has been three bloody religious wars. Protestant and Cath- olic cantons have separate Diets; counter leagues with foreign States. 8 k . Illustrated from the History of the United Netherlands or Belgic Confederation. (1). Composition of the Government. (2). Results. I 1 . Composition of the Government. (1). Its origin and general nature. (2). In what authorities vested. (3). Powers of each. (4). Restrictions on States. l m . Origin and general nature. A confederacy of seven co-equal and sovereign States ; each State is composed of equal and independent cities. In all important cases the States, provinces and cities must be unani- mous. dawson's foederalist. 57 58 dawson's foederalist. 2 m . The Go vernment of United Netherlands— in what authorities vested. l n . The States General. They represent the sovereignty of the Re- public and consist of about fifty delegates appointed by States, some for one, some for two, three and six years, for life and for pleas- ure. 2 n . The Stadtholder. Chief executive, a hereditary Prince ; salary 300,000 florins. 3 m . Powers of these several authorities. l n . Of the States General. 1°. To make treaties. 2°. To make war and peace. 3°. To raise armies and equip fleets. 4°. To ascertain quotas and demand contri- butions, provided, they unanimously agree and have the consent of their constituents. 2 n . Of the Stadtholder. 1°. He is a hereditary Prince. 2°. Is Stadtholder in each State and for the Union. l p . Powers as Stadtholder in each State or Province. l q . He appoints town magistrates. 2 q . Executes provincial decrees. 3 q . Presides, at pleasure, in the provincial tribunal. 4 q . Has power of pardon. 2 P . Powers as Stadtholder for the Union. l q . Commander-in-Chief of the armies. 2 q . Admiral general of the navy. 4 m . Restrictions on the States or members of the United Netherlands. l n . They are not allowed, except by general consent, to make foreign treaties. dawson's foedbraust. 59 60 dawson's foederalist. 2 n . From establishing imposts injurious to each other. 3 n . From charging their neighbors higher duties than their subjects. 2 1 . Results under the Government of United Netherlands. l m . Imbecility in the Government; discord v among the Provinces. 2 m . Deficiencies in quotas are often collected at the point of the bayonet. 3 m . Foreign ministers elude matters taken ad referendum, by tampering with the provinces and cities, e g. In 1726 the treaty of Han- over was so delayed a whole year. 4 m . In critical emergencies the States General must often over-leap the Constitution, (p. 132). 2°. Second defect in the Articles of Confederation. Total want of a sanction to its laws. l d Nature of a Sanction. It prescribes the punishment for disobedience. 2 d . Power of enforcing laws not given to the Govern- ment. l e . Such a power not expressly given. 2°. The Articles of Confederation declare " Each State shall retain every power, jurisdistion and right not expressly delegated to the United States in Con- gress assembled. 3 d . Consequences of this Defect. The United States is a Government destitute of every Constitutional means of enforcing its laws. 3 C . Third defect in the Articles of Confederation : The want of a mutual guaranty of the State Govern- ments. (1) Nature of a Mutual Guaranty. (2) Consequences of this defect and (3) certain objections answered. l d . Nature of a Mutual Guaranty of the State Gov- ernments. dawson's foederalist. 61 62 dawson's foederalist. It is an authority given to the general Government to protect the States from violent attempts to over- throw their State Governments. 2 d . Consequences of this Defect. The Union can render no assistance in a State in re- pelling domestic dangers. E. g., Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts. 3 d . Objection that this Mutual Guaranty will allow officious intermeddling on the part of the United States Government. l e . This objection would deprive us of one of the greatest advantages of the Union. 2 e . It proceeds from misapprehension of the provi- sion. 3 e . There will be little pretence for such interference in a Government where the whole power is in the people, (p. 135.) 4 C . Fourth defect in the Articles of Confederation : Reg- ulating Contributions to the Treasury by Quotas. (1) Nature of this defect. (2) Consequences and (3) Remedy. l d . Nature of this defect. There is no common standard or barometer by which the degrees of Constitutional wealth can be ascer- tained. (1) Neither the value of lands, nor (2) the numbers of the people, which have been proposed as the ratio of State contribution, is a just representa- tive. E.g., Compare Holland and Russia; Virginia and North Carolina. 2 d . Consequences. . 1°. There can be no common measure of national wealth. 2°. Quotas are productive of glaring inequality and oppression. 3 e . Such inequality would work the destruction of the Union. 3 d . Remedy for this Defect. Is by allowing the National Union to raise its own dawson's foederalist. 63 64 dawson's foederalist. revenues in its own way, either by (1) direct, or (2) indirect taxation, (pp. 137-138). l e . Power in the Government of Direct Taxation. Apportionment according to the number of people. This is not the preferable mode. 2 e . Power in the Government of Indirect Taxation. (1). The amount to be contributed by each citizen will in great measure be at his own option. (2). They contain in their own nature a security against excess. If duties are too high, consumption is lessened and the revenue is lessened. 5 C . Fifth Defect in the Articles of Confederation : The Want of a Power to Regulate Commerce. l d . The Utility of such a Power. Foed., p. 139 and seq. 2 d . The Consequences of the Want of Such a Power. (1) In our foreign relations. (2) In our domestic relations. l e . In our Foreign Relations. The want of such a power has pre vented beneficial treaties with foreign nations, (p. 139). E. g., Mr. Jenkinson's bill in the House of Commons. 2 e . In our Domestic Relations. l f . Several States, by separate prohibitions, have attempted to influence Great Britain to favorable commercial treaties, but their plans have been frustrated from want of concert. 2 f . Interfering and unneighborly regulations. E. g. Result in the case of the German Empire. 6 C . Sixth Defect in Articles of Confederation : Raising contributions of Troops by Quotas. (1). Result of the system of quotas in general and (2) in the war of Independence. l d . The result of the system of quotas in general. A system of imbecility in the Union ; inequality among States. 2 d . The Result of this system in the War of Indepen- dence, (p. 140.) dawson's foederalist. 65 66 dawson's foederalist. (1). Replete with obstructions to a vigorous and economic defence. (2) Unequal in its burdens on the States. l e . Replete with obstructions to a vigorous and econ- omical defence. l f . Created an auction of men. 2 f . Bounties grew to an enormous size. 3 f . Men delayed enlisting to get a larger price and for short periods. 4 f . Slow and scanty levies and fluctuations in the troops. 5 f . Oppressive expedients for raising troops. 2 e . This system unequal in its burdens. Especially unjust on the States near the seat of war. 7 C . Seventh Defect in Articles of Confederation : Equal Suffrage Among the States. (1). Nature of this defect. (2). Certain objections answered. l d . Nature of This Defect. l e . Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle which gives equal votes to Rhode Island and New York. 2 e . It contradicts that fundamental maxim of Re- publican Government : " Let the majority rule." 2 d . Certain objections answered. (1). "That Sovereigns are equal." (2). "That a two-thirds vote is required for the most important resolutions and two-thirds of the States contain a majority of the people." (p. 142). l e . "That Sovereigns are equal and that a majority of the States are a majority of Confederate Amer- ica." l f . This maxim is contrary to justice and common sense. 2 f . This maxim is false in fact. E. g., 1, New Hampshire; 2, Rhode Island; 3, New 67 68 dawson's foederalist. Jersey ; 4, Delaware ; 5, Georgia ; 6, South Carolina ; 7, Maryland, are a majority of States, but they do not contain one-third of the people. 2 e . "That two-thirds of the States are required for the most important resolutions and that these two- thirds would be a majority." l f . This still allows the States an equal vote. 2 f . This statement false in fact. E. g., New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Car- olina, Georgia, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, New York and Connecticut are two-thirds of the States and are less than a majority. 3 f . The mischiefs attending this rule. (1). In the ordinary operations of the Govern- ment. (2) The danger of foreign corruption. l g . In the ordinary operations of the Government. It gives a minority a negative upon the majority ; one-sixtieth of the Union (Delaware and Rhode Island) has often been a bar to the operations of the Government. 2 s . From the danger of foreign corruption, (p. 147). l h . This danger is one of the great weaknesses of Republics. 2\ Foreigners would have only one-third to buy — in a majority one-half. 8 e . Eighth Defect in the Articles of Confederation : Want of a Judiciary Power. l d . To give meaning and uniformity to the Laws and Treaties of the United States. 2 d . As a protection to the General Government against the States. 9 C . Ninth Defect in Articles of Confederation : The Or- ganization of Congress improper for the exercise of all the Functions of Government. 10 c . Tenth Defect of Articles of Confederation : Never Ratified by the People. (1). Nature of this defect. (2). Remedy. l d . Nature of this Defect. The articles having been ratified by the Legislatures dawson's foederalist. 69 70 of the States, it has been contended that the same au- thority might repeal the lawratifying them. (p. 149). 2 d . Remedy for This Defect. The fabric of America's empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people. 3 a . The Necessity of a Government at Least Equally- Energetic with the One Proposed to Preserve the Union. (1). The objects to be provided for by the Federal Gov- ernment. (2). The persons on whom the power should operate. (3). The quantity of power necessary to the ac- complishment of those objects. l b . The objects to be provided for by the Foederal Gov- ernment. l e . The common defence of the members. 2 C . The Preservation of Public Peaceas well as Against Internal Convulsions as External Attacks. 3 C . The regulation of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. 4 C . The superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries, (p. 150). 2 b . The persons on whom the Governmental powers should operate. It was shown (Foed., p. 94 and seq.) that legislation for States in their corporate capacity was the radical defect of the Articles of Confederation ; and that the Government could only operate success- fully on individuals. 3 b . The Quantity of Powers in General Government Necessary to Accomplish the Objects of Union — w. c. (1). In respect to common defence. (2). Taxation. (3). Regulating militia. l c . The quantity of powers in the General Go vernment necessary to accomplish the objects of Union in re- spect to common defence. (1). The several authorities necessary to the care of common defence. (2). The extent of those authorities and reasons therefor. (3). Certain objections thereto. l d . The several authorities necessary to the care of the common defence. 71 72 dawson's foederalist. l e . To Raise Armies. 2 e . To Build and Equip Fleets. 3 e . To Prescribe Rules for Their Government. 4°. To Direct Their Operations. 5 e . To Provide for Their Support, (p. 151). 2 d . The extent of those authorities and reasons there- for. l e . The Extent of Those Authorities. They should exist without limitation. 2 e . Reasons for unlimited extent of those authorities l f . Because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies; 2 f . Or to foresee the extent and variety of means nec- essary to satisfy those exigencies. 3 f . This principle recognized in the Articles of Con- federation. 3 d . Certain objections to unlimited extent of author- ities of Government in providing for common de- fence answered. (1). "In tending to foster standing armies." (2). " In not vesting these authorities in the State Governments." (3). "The proposed Government will require force." l e . "In tending to foster standing armies." (p. 156). Objection answered. (1). The source of this objection. (2). Objection answered. l f . The source of this objection, (p. 170). It comes from the jealousy which our English an- cestors had of standing armies when the authori- ties for raising them was vested, not in the legisla- ture, as under proposed Constitution, but in the executive, and from their failure to note the distinc- tion between vesting this power in the executive and in the people's representatives. 2 f . Objection Answered. (1). The authorities for raising armies— where vested. (2). The safeguards provided by the vari- dawson's foederalist. 73 74 dawson's foederalist. ous State Constitutions by the Articles of Confeder- ation and by the United States Constitution superi- ority of the latter. (3). The danger of fettering the Government in raising armies and necessity for such authority. 1*. The Authorities for Raising Armies — where vested. In the Legislature (Congress) and not in the President, (p. 156). 2 s . The safeguards provided by the various State Constitutions, by the Articles of Confederation and by the United States Constitution superi- ority of the latter. 1\ The safeguards provided by various State Constitutions, by Articles of Confederation and by the United States Constitution. l j . By the Constitutions of the various States. 1\ In Pennsylvania and North Carolina. "Standing armies in time of peace ought not to be kept up." 2 k . By the Constitutions of the remaining States . No provision whatever. 2 J . Safeguards provided by the Articles of Con- federation. None whatever. 3 j . Safeguards provided by the United States Constitution. By vesting in Congress the power to raise and support armies, " but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years" 2 h . The superiority of the safeguards provided by the United States Constitution. (It is more than a parchment barrier— it takes away the means of keeping up an army) . (p. 171 . ) l j . It causes the subject to be reconsidered every two years. 2 j . Schemes for sub verting the liberties of thepeo- dawson's foederalist. 75 76 pie require more time for maturing than this provision allows, (p. 174). 3 g . The Danger of Fettering the Government in re- gard to Standing Armies and the necessity for such Authorities in the Government. l h . The Danger of Fettering the Government in regard to Standing Armies. (1). As regards keeping up of standing armies. (2). As regards raising armies. l j . As regards keeping up Standing Armies. Because of the uncertainty of the period or ex- tent of the danger to be guarded against. 2 j . As regards Raising Armies in times of Peace. 1\ The United States would then exhibit the ex- traordinary spectacle of a nation incapaci- tated by her Constitution for preparing for de- fence before actually invaded, (p. 166). 2 b . She would be forced to depend on the militia which : (1). Well nigh lost us our Independence. (2). Which is more expensive than a regular army. (3). Less efficient than a regular army. 2\ The necessity for such authorities in the Gen- eral Government. l j . Because of the danger from Indian, Spanish and English hostilities. 2 j . To provide a Navy for protecting our grow- ing commerce. 3 J . In cases of internal violence. l k . Pennsylvania, notwithstanding her bill of rights, was forced to resort to an army to put down insurrection, and still keeps up the army. (P- 167). 2 k . Massaschusetts, notwithstanding the Arti- cles of Confederation, did the same. 2\ Objection that " These Authorities for Raising Armies were not vested in the State Governments." l f . Such a doctrine would be a subversion of the dawson's foederalist. 77 78 dawson's foederalist. primary principle of Union — i. e., the protection of all through the Union — by transferring this protec- tion to the individual and component members. 2 f . It would be oppressive to some States and too light on others. 3 f . It would become dangerous to all the States — through weakness of some, from the military es- tablishments of others. 4 f . It would be dangerous to the Union. 3 9 . Objection that " the proposed Government cannot be exercised without force" answered, (1) The pro- posed Go vernment will be better administered than the State Governments, and will therefore have the popular confidence; (2) It will be less likely to require force than the present Government; (3) There may be times in all Governments when force must be used. (p. 176).. l f . The proposed Government will be better admin- istered than the State Governments. l g . From the greater latitudes of choice in the se- lection of its officers. 2 s . From the peculiar care with which the Presi- dent and Senate will be chosen. 3 g . Congress will be less exposed to the momentary whims of the people than the State Legislatures — being more intelligent and farther distant. 4 K . From the greater strength of the General Gov- ernment, (p. 178). 2 f . The proposed Government is less likely to re- quire force than the present Government, chiefly from its operation upon individuals instead of upon States, as in the case of the latter, (p. 180 and seq). 3 f . There may be Times when Force must be used. l g . Illustrations. l h Massachusetts and Pennsylvania under the Articles of Confederation. 2\ If the thirteen States were divided into sev- dawson's foederalist. 79 80 dawson's foederalist. eral confederacies would not each be liable to the same casualty, (p. 183). 2 g . Safety of the people under the Proposed Gov- ernment on such occasions. 1\ Through their representatives in Congress, who regulate the force to be used. 2 h . Through the jealousy of the State Govern- ments, (p. 185). 3\ Through the great extent of the Union. 4\ Through the impracticability of raising a Gov- ernment force large enough to overrun the coun- try. 2 C . The quantity of power in the General Government necessary to accomplish the objects of Union in re- spect of Taxation. (1). The necessity for a power of taxation. (2). The extent of the power. l d . The Necessity for a Power of Taxation. 1*. In General. l f . Prevents official plunder — such as exists in the Turkish Empire — from lack of this power. 2 f . Prevents that atrophy and dissolution of Gov- ernment. 2 e . In Particular. l f . In providing for military operations and ar- rangements. 2 f . In providing support of the National Civil List. 3 f . In paying the National debts. 4 f . To meet any other exigencies. 2 d . The Extent of the Power of Taxation. It may be (1) limited, or (2) unlimited. l e . Limited Powers of Taxation. (1). Several ways in which the powers of taxation may be limited. (2). The effect of such limitations. l f . The Several Ways in which the Powers of Tax- ation may be limited. (1). To external taxation. (2). Partly to exter- Dawson's fobderalist. 81 82 mal and partly to requisitions. (3). To particular objects. 2*. The Effect of Such Limitations. l g . In case of Limitations to External Taxation. 1\ Violates the maxim, " Every power should be co-extensive with its objects ; " the exigencies of the Government being incapable of limitation, the means of vesting them should be. (p. 189). 2\ External taxation may be insufficient. l j . To supply present necessities. 2 J . Much more, to supply present necessities. 2 s . In case of Limitation partly to External Taxa- tion and partly to Requisitions. 1\ This is an Admission that External Taxation may not suffice. 2\ It exposes the Government in case of a failure in external taxation to the evils of requisitions, (p. 135). l j . The General Effect of Requisitions. (p. 135). 2 j . The Effect of Requisitions in Time of War. If external taxes should suffice for ordinary ex- igencies, requisitions must be resorted to in time of war. 1\ Necessitates the diversion of funds already appropriated for other purposes to supply the pressing demands of war. 2 k . Will destroy public credit, (p. 191). The means of the Government for paying her debts being so restricted loans will be hard to get and heavy to support. 3 s . In case of Limitation to Particular Objects. (1). The oppression of particular branches of in- dustry. (2). Unequal distribution of taxes. 1\ The Oppression of Particular Branches of In- dustry, (p. 216). dawson's foederalist. 83 84 dawson's foederalist. E. g., Consider the result of exorbitant duties on imported articles: High Tariff, (p. 216). l j . Smuggling. 2 3 ' They make " barons" of manufacturers. 3 J . They force industry out of its natural chan- nels. 4\ They often oppress the merchant. 5 J . They are more often oppressive to the con- sumers. 2 h . From an Unequal Distribution of Taxes. The manufacturing States, in case of duties on imported articles, would contribute cash to the general revenue. 2 e . Unlimited Powers of Taxation. (1). Advantages of unlimited powers. (2). Objec- tions answered. l f . Advantages of Unlimited Powers of Taxation. The limited powers being inadequate, the unlim- ited are necessary. 2 f . Certain Objections to Unlimited Powers of Tax- ation Answered. (1) That "such powers would interfere with State levies;" (2) that the power of Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for ex- ecuting the powers vested in the Government by the Constitution" is improper; (3) that the clause of the Constitution, "the Constitution and laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, shall he the Supreme law of the land, " is objectionable. l g . That "Such Powers would Interfere with State Levies. (1). The security against oppression by the Gov- ernment in the matter of taxation ; (2) the instances of exclusive powers vested in the Government ; (3) the concurrent powers, (p. 198). l h . The Securities against Oppression by the Gen- eral Government in the matter of Taxation. l j . The Sense of the People. 2 j . The State Governments. dawson's fobderalist. 85 86 dawson's foederalist. 3'. The Conviction of the Utility of Local Admin- istrations for Local Purposes. 2 h . The Three Instances of Exclusive Powers vested in the Government. The present Government is only a Partial Union or Consolidation and the State Governments re- tain all the powers not exclusively granted to the General Government, (p. 199). 1 J . Where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Govern- ment. E. g., Art. L, §8: "Congress shall exercise ex- clusive legislation over the District of Columbia." 2 J . Where, in one place, the Constitution grants a Power to the Government and prohibits it, to the the States. E. g., Art. F., § 8-1 : " Congress shall have power to lay and collect duties, imposts and ex- cises." Art. I., §10-2: ' 'No State shall, without con- sent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except for executing its in- spection laws." 3 j . Where an authority is granted to the Union, to which the same authority in the States would be contradictory and repugnant. E. g. " Congress shall have power to establish uniform rules of naturalization." (p. 200). 3\ The Concurrent Power — e. g., that of Taxa- tion on Articles other than Exports and Imports. 1 J . This power has not been exclusively granted to the Government. 2 j . It has not been prohibited to the States. 3\ The restraint upon the States in relation to imports is an admission. (1). That if this power had not been inserted it would have resident in the States ; (2). That, as to all other taxes, the authority of the States is undiminished. 4 J . It is not repugnant. dawson's foederalist. 87 88 Dawson's foederalists 5 J . Concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases re- sults from the division of the Sovereign Power between the State and Foederal Governments. 6 j . Art. I., §10, consists entirely of restrictions on the States— of which number that of taxation is not one. 2 g . That "the power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for executing the powers vested in the Government by the Constitution" is improper. 1\ This power results by implication. 2\ It was expressed out of abundant caution and as a protection against State encroachments, (p. 204-5. 3\ The propriety and necessity of the laws will be judged, as in the case of the grant of power it- self. (1). Primarily by the Government. (2). Next by the people. 3 g . That the clause, "the Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof shall be the Supreme Law of the Land," is objection- able. The Constitution and laws of the United States are necessarily supreme. 1\ Their supremacy results from the nature of laws and the association of the people in one government. 2\ The laws of the United States are supreme only when made in pursuance of the Constitu- tion. 4 g . " That the House of Representatives will be too small to contain representatives of all tax-pay- ing classes." 1\ The number of members in the House of Rep* resentatives is neither too large nor too small. (p. 403). 2\ The representation by classes Impracticable. Unless the Constitution should expressly pro* 89 90 dawson's foederalist. vide that each occupation should send one or more, members it would never take place. (1). Merchants will most likely be the repre- sentatives of mechanics and manufacturers from their greater intelligence and from the similarity of their trades. (2). Doctors, lawyer, etc., form no distinct inter- ests and their selection will depend on their situa- tion and talents. (3). The landed interests will vote for those in whom they have the most confidence. 3\ The representation by classes Unnecessary (p. 220-224.) 5 g . "That the Power of Internal Taxation in the Government will be poorly exercised from want of proper knowledge of local circumstances." 1\ The members of Congress from each State will have the proper knowledge; as in State Legislatures, the county representatives. 2\ The knowledge required is general. 3 h . Revenue laws are generally framed by compe- tent boards or committees, adapted especially for the work. 3 e . The Quantity of Powers in the General Government Necessary to Accomplish the Objects of Union with respect to Regulating the Militia, (p. 221). (1). The terms of this grant. (2). The reason for this grant of power. (3). Does not supersede the posse comitatus. (4). The safeguards against an abuse of this power l d . The Terms of This Grant. "Congress shall have power to provide for organ- sizing, arming and disciplining the militia and for " governing such part of them as may be employed in "the service of the United States, reserving to the "States respectively the appointment of the officers "and the authority of training the militia according " to the discipline prescribed by Congress." 2 d . The Reason for the Grant of Such a Power. 91 92 dawson's foederalist. l e . Uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia, when called into service for the public defence, can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the Government, (p. 231). 2 C . It will tend to prevent large standing armies. To render an army unnecessary will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions on paper. 3 d . The Grant of This Power Will Not Supersede the Posse Comitatus. The power of calling out the posse comitatus to as- sist the magistrate in the execution of his duty re- sults from the clause empowering Congress to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute the declared powers of the Government, (p. 233). 4 d . The Safeguards Against an Abuse of This Power. 1*. The militia would consist of but a small part of the population called, from their avocations at in- tervals for drill and discipline. 2°. Being our sons, brothers and neighbors they would not be a source of oppression, but rather of protection. 3 e . The States and not the Government will have the appointment of the officers, (p. 236). 4\ The States and not the Government will have authority to train them, though the tactics maybe prescribed by Congress. 4 a . The Conformity of the Proposed Constitution to the True Principles of Republican Government. (1). Introductory. (2). A survey of the proposed Con- stitution. l b . Introductory. (1). The character of the persons to whom this sur- vey is directed. (2). The inducements to a fair and charitable consideration of the Constitution. l c . The character of the persons to whom this survey is directed. Neither to the predetermined friend nor the prede- termined enemy (the first of whom may be upright, the second must be culpable) ; but to those who add to a dawson's foederalist. 93 94 dawson's foederalist. sincere zeal for the kappiness of their country, a tem- per favorable to a just estimate of the means of pro- moting it. (p. 240). 2°. The inducements to a fair and charitable consider- ation of the Constitution. (1). The difficulties encountered by the convention framing the Constition. (2). In every case reported by ancient history in which a Government has been estab- lished with deliberation and consent it has been framed by a single individual. (3). The defect of the Consti- tution are the result of defects of antecedent experi- ence, and not of a want of care in preparing it. (4). The present situation of America. l d . The difficulties encountered by the convention framing the Constitution. 1*. The novelty of the undertaking. 2\ The difficulty of combining the Requisite Stability and Energy in the Government with a due regard to Liberty and the Republican form. 3 e . The difficulty of marking the proper line of parti- tion between the authority of the Government and that of the States. 4 e . The difficulty of reconciling the interfering pre- tensions of the larger and smaller States. 5 e . The difficulty arising from conflicting interests in the States because of a difference in locality and policy, (p. 245). 2 d . In every case reported by ancient history in which a Government has been established from delibera- tion and consent it has been by a single individual, (p. 247). 3 d . The defects in the Constitution are the result of a defect of antecedent experience and not of a want of care. 4 d . The present situation of America considered, (p. 250). l e . The Severity of her Malady. 2 e . The Diversity of the Advice. 95 96 dawson's foederalist. 4 C . The proposed Constitution is an improvement on the Articles of Confederation. 5 e . The principal objections to the Constitution lie with greater force against the Articles of Confeder- ation. 2 b . A Survey of the Proposed Constitution. (1). A Republican form of Government demanded by the genius of the American people. (2). The distinctive characters of the Republican form. (3). The Govern- ment proposed conforms to those characters. (4). The character of the Government, as to whether it is Foed- eral or National in form. (5). The constitution consid- ered. (6). Objections. l c . A Republican form of Government demanded by the genius of the American people. l d . No other form of Government is reconcilable with the fundamental principles of the Revolution, (p. 258). 2 d . This form demanded by that honorable determin- ation which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self government. 2 C . The distinctive characters of the Republican form. l d . Republican Government Defined. A Government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding" their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. 2 d . The Essentials of the Republican Form. That it be derived from the great body of the so- ciety, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it. 3 d . What is Sufficient to Republican Form. That the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people, and that they hold their appointments during pleasure for a limited time or during good behavior. 3 C . The Government proposed conforms to those dis- tinctive characters of Republican form. dawson's foederalist. 97 98 3*. Improbability that those who object to the Con- stitution could improve it. l d . As Regards the Essentials of Republican Form. l e . The House of Representatives is elected directly by the people, as is the case in most of the States. 2 9 . The Senate, like the Present Congress and the Senate of Maryland, is appointed indirectly by the people, i. e., through the State Legislatures. 3 e . The President is chosen through electors, indi- rectly by the people. 4 e . The Judges and all other officers of the Govern- ment will be chosen indirectly by the people. 2 d . As regards the characters sufficient to the Repub- lican form. l e . The House of Representatives is elected for two years. 2\ The Senate is elected for six years. 3\ The President is elected for four years and is im- peachable in office. 4\ The Judges hold during good behavior. 3 e . In Prohibiting Titles of Nobility. 4 C . The character of the Government, as to whether it is Foederal or National in form. (1). The nature of Foederal and National Govern- ment respectively. (2). The real character of the Gov- ernment as respects the National or Foederal form. (3). The authority of the convention to propose such a Government. (4). How far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of authority. l d . The nature of Foederal and National Governments Respectively, (p. 261). l e . The Foederal Form — regards to the Union as a Confederacy of Sovereign States. 2 6 . The National form regards the Union as a Con- solidation of the States. 2 d . The real character of the Government as respects the National or Foederal form. dawson's foederalist. 99 100 dawson's foederalist. (1). As treated by Mr. Gilmore; (2) as treated in the Foederalist. l e . As treated by Mr. Gilmore. The Government is Foederal in every respect. The House of Representatives (contrary to Foed., p. 263), is Foederal in its election ; for, in determining the number of Representatives in Congress, the pop- ulation of each State separately is divided by 173,- 000 to determine its present representation. (Mill's Republican Government, p. 301 ; Freeman's History of Foederal Government, L, pp. 11— 12; Taylor's Ori- gin and Growth of the English Constitution, p. 50). 2 e . As treated in the Foederalist (i. e., the real char- acter of the Government as regards the Foederal and National Form. (1) The foundation on which the Government is established ; (2) the sources from which its ordinary powers are drawn; (3) the operation of those pow- ers; (4) the extent of those powers; (5) the author- ity on which future changes in the Government are to be introduced. l f . The Foundation on which the Government is Established. It is Foederal, for the assent of a majority of all the people of the United States will not establish the Government over all; but the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it. 2 f . The sources from which the ordinary powers of the Government are to be Drawn. l c . The House of Representatives : National. (See Contra, l e Supra.) 2 g . The Senate: Foederal. 3 g . The Executive: Partly Foederal and partly National. 3 f . The Operations of those Powers. Chiefly National ; party Foederal. as in trial of con- troversies in which States are parties. 4? f . The Extent of those Powers. In this respect the Government is Foederal, since the local or municipal authorities for indistinct and 102 dawson's foederalist. independent portions of the supremacy, no more sub- ject, within their respective spheres, to the general Government, than the general Government is sub- ject to them, within its own sphere, (p. 264). 5 f . The authority on which future changes are to be introduced. Foederal, in computing the required proportion by States; National, in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient. 3 d . The Authority of the Convention to propose such a Government. (1). The sources of that authority; (2) the terms. (3) their construction. l e . The Sources of that Authority. Derived from the commissions of the members of the convention which referred either, (1) to the recom- mendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in Sep- tember, 1786, or (2) to that from Congress in Febru- ary, 1787. (p. 266). 2 e . The terms of that Authority. l f . The Exact Terms. See Foederalist p. 267. 2 f . The substance of that Authority. l g . To establish a firm National Government. 2 g . To establish a Government adequate to the ex- igencies of the Government and the preservation of the Union. 3*. To effect these objects by alterations and pro- visions in the Articles of Confederation. 4 g . To report the Constitution to Congress and to the States. 3 e . The construction of those Terms. (1). Two general rules of construction applicable in this case. (2). The compliance of the convention with those rules. l f . Two general rules of construction applicable in in this case. I s . " Every part of the expression ought, ifp ossi- 103 104 ble, to be allowed some meaning and be made to conspire to some common end." (p. 268). 2 g . " Where the several parts cannot be reconciled the less important should give way to the more important" 2 f . The compliance of the convention with these rules. (1). The great object of the convention was to es- tablish an adequate National Government, and sup- pose they found it impossible to accomplish this ob- ject by alterations and provisions in the Articles of Confederation, referring to Rule 2 (2 g ), we take* the more important, the instruction to form an adequate National Government, and reject the less important, i. e., the altering, etc., of the Articles. (2). But this supposition is unnecessary, for, so long as any part of the old Articles remained, the object was accomplished through alterations and provisions in the Articles of Confederation, (p. 269). 4 d . How far the duty the Convention owed to their country could supply any defect of authority, (p. 272). l e . Their appreciation of the crisis of affairs which led the States, as with one voice, to call the conven- tion. 2 e . They were deeply and unanimously convinced of the necessity to establish the proposed Government. 3 e . The assumptions by Congress of unconstitutional powers at times less urgent than those impelling the convention. 4 e . They contemplated that the plan of Government was of no effect until ratified by the States gener- ally. 5 C . The Constitution considered. (1). The sum or quantity of power which it vests in the Government, including the restraints on the States; (2) the particular structure of the Go vernment and the distribution of power among its several branches, (p. 277). l d . The Sum or Quantity of Power which the Consti- DAWSON'S FOEDERAUST. 105 106 dawson's foederalist. tution vests in the Government, including the Re- straints upon the States. (1) The powers transferred to the general Govern- ment are proper and necessary; (2) they will not be dangerous to the powers left in the several States. l f . The Powers Transferred to the General Govern- ment are Proper and Necessary. Those several classes of powers are (1) Security against foreign danger ; (2) regulation of intercourse with foreign nations; (3) maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States ; (4) cer- tain miscellaneous objects of general utility; (5) certain restraints upon the States; (6) provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers. l g . First Class of Powers : Providing for Security Against Foreign Dangers. The authorities comprehended in this power are : l g . To declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal. 2 g . To provide armies and fleets. 3 g . To regulate and call forth the militia. 4 s . To levy and borrow money (Gilmore's Notes, 115). l k . The Extent of This Power, and Reasons There- for — See Foed., 187 and seq. 2 h . Additional Argument for Not Restricting Levies or Taxes to External Taxation— w. c. (1). External taxation defined. (2). Reasons against such a restriction stated, (p. 285). l j . External Taxation Defined. Taxation on articles imported from other coun- tries. 2 j . Reasons Against Such a Restriction Stated. This is, and always will be, a valuable source of revenue. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor the importation must increase as the consumers multiply ; but, as soon as do- mestic manufactures begin, the importation of manufactures will decrease as the people increase. dawson's foederalist. 107 10& dawson's foederalist. Hereafter imports will in a great degree consist of raw materials, which will rather call for boun- ties than duties. Hence, a system of Government intended to endure ought to contemplate and be able to accommodate itself to these changes. 3\ Reply to the Objection that the Power "to Lay and Collect Duties , Imposts and Excises to Pay the Debts, and Provide for the Common De- fence and General Welfare of the United States" amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be neces- sary for the common defence and general welfare. 1 J . The objects alluded to in general terms are particularized immediately. (See United States Constitution, Art. I., sec.viii). If all powers were intended to be granted under the general terms of providing for the common defence and general welfare, why were the particular powers enumerated ? 2 J . This language occurs in the Articles of Con- federation. 2 f . Second Class of Powers : The Regulation of In- tercourse with Foreign Nations, (p. 288). l g . Power to Make Treaties. 2 g . Power to Send and Receive Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls. 3 g . Power to Define and Punish Piracies and Felo- nies Committed on the High Seas and Offences Against the Law of Nations. See Story on Constitution, §1164; Gilmore's Notes, p. 135 ; III Wheat., 339; V Wheat., 184; ib. 76 ; 120 U. S., 678 : Forum Vol. XI., p. 235. 4 g . Power to Regulate Foreign Commerce, includ- ing a Power to Prohibit, after 1808, the Importa- tion of Slaves, and to lay an Intermediate Duty of $10 per head, as a Discouragement to such Im- portation. (See Gilmore's Notes, p. 116 and seq. Foed., p. 291). 3 f . Third Class of Powers: The maintenance of dawson's foederalist. 109 110 dawson's foederalist. harmony and proper intercourse between the States, (p. 291). I s . Power to regulate commerce among the several States and the Indian Tribes. (Foed., p. 292 ; Gil- more's Notes, p. 116). 2 s . Power to coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin. (p. 294 ; Gilmore's Notes, p. 116). 3 g . Power to provide for the punishment of coun- terfeiting the current coin, securities of United States. See Gilmore's Notes, p. 128. 4 g . Power to fix the standard of weights and meas- ures. 5 g . Power to establish an uniform rule of natural- ization and uniform laws of bankruptcy, (p. 294; Gilmore's Notes, 124). 6 g . Power to prescribe the manners in which the public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of each State shall be proved, and their effect in other States, (p. 296). 7 s . Power to Establish Postoffices and Post Roads. 4 f . Fourth Class of Powers : Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility, (p. 297). I s . Power to "Promote the Progress of Science "and Useful Articles by Securing for a Limited " Time to Authors the Exclusive Right to Their "Respective Writings and Discoveries." 2 g . Power to "Exercise exclusive Legislation, in "all cases whatsoever, over such district {not "exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession " of particular States and the acceptance, become " the Seat of the Government of the United States, "and to exercise like authority over all places "purchased by the consent of the Legislatures of "the States in which the same shall be, for the "erection of Forts t Magazines, Arsenals, Dock- "yards and other useful buildings" — w. c. (1). The necessity for such a power. (2). The guards against its abuse. dawson's foederalist. Ill 112 1\ The necessity of such a power. l j . It is a power exercised by every Legislature of the Union. 2 j . To secure the public authorities from insult, and their proceedings from interruption. 3 j . To secure the members of the General Govern- ment from a dependence on the State compre- hending the Seat of Government for protection in the exercise of their duty, which might bring on the National Councils an imputation of awe or influence, (p. 298). 2\ The guards against its abuse. l j . The small extent of the District. 2 j . The territory is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it. 3 J . The State ceding the territory will provide in the compact for the rights of its citizens, p. 298). 4 j . The Inhabitants will have their voice in elect- ing the government which is to rule them ; and and a Municipal Legislature, for local purposes, will be granted them. Up to 1855 all voice in the affairs of the District of Columbia was restricted to males, free, white and twenty-one years old, but no legislature was given them until 1871. In 1867 suffrage was ex- tended to all, both black and white ; but the float- ing negro vote of 40,000 was so easily controlled that its government became most corrupt, ac- cording to Senator Ingalls, and finally bankrupt, and in 1871 the citizens of the District of Colum- bia petitioned Congress to take away their right of suffrage. Now, in 1894, the District is ruled under the direction of Congress by three Com- missioners. 5 J . The authority of the ceding State to make the cession will be derived from the whole people of that State, in their adoption of that Constitu- tion, (p. 299). dawson's foederalist. 113 114 dawson's foederalist. 3 g . Power " to Declare the Punishment of Treason " but no attainder of Treason shall work corrup- " tion of blood, or forfeiture, except during the "life of the person attained." See Y Wheat, 97 ; IV Cranch, 75 ; II Burr's Trial, 401, 439; Revised Statutes, U. S. §5332. 4 g . Power to Admit New States Into the Union; "but no new State shall be formed or erected " within the jurisdiction of any other State ; nor "any State be formed by the junction of two or " more States or parts of States without the con- " sent of the Legislatures of the States concerned "as well as of the Congress." (p. 300). As to the constitutionality of the manner in which West Virginia was made a State, see Gil- more's Notes, p. 216 and seq. 5*. Power to ' 'Dispose of and make all needful Rules "and Regulations respecting the territory and "other property belonging to the United States, "provided that nothing in the Constitution shall "be so construed as to prejudice any claims of "the United States or of any particular State. (See Foed. p. 300; Gilmore's Notes; Dred Scot case, 19 How., 393.) 6 R . Power to "Guarantee to every State a Repub- "lican form of Government ; to protect each of " them against invasion ; and, on application of "the Legislature or of the Executive, {when the "Legislature connot be convened), against do- 1 ' mestic violence. ' ' Under this clause was wrongfully claimed the right to reconstruct the South. (Foed. p. 301 and seq. ; Gilmore's Notes). 7 g . Power to "consider all debts contracted and en- " gagements entered into to, before the adoption 1 ' of this Constitution as being no less valid against " the United States, under this Constitution, than %t under the Confederation." (1). The nature of this power; (2) its object. (3) Objection, that this power does not extend to debts due the United States, answered. dawson's foederalist. 115 116 1\ The nature of this Power. It is merely declaratory. 2\ The Objects of this Power. To quiet the fears of foreign creditors, because of the pretended doctrine that a change in the polit- ical form of civil society dissolves its moral obli- gations. 3 b . Objection, that this power does not extend to debts due the United States, answered, (p. 305). l j . Engagements are in their nature reciprocal. 2 j . Every Constitution must limit its precautions to dangers not entirely imaginary. 3 j . The Government would not dare to remit the debts due the public. 8 e . Power to " provide for amendments to be rati- fied by three-fourths of the States, under two ex- ceptions." (p. 306). ' 9 g . Power providing that "the Ratification of the "conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for "the establishment of this Constitution between "the States so ratifying the same." (p. 306.) 1\ The principles on which the Articles of Confed- eration, which stand in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it. (p. 307). l j . Because of the necessity of the case. The principle of self-preservation, (p. 307). 2 j . The Articles of Confederation are but in the nature of a treaty, a breach of any one article of which, by a party to it, abrogates the treaty . These articles or this treaty having been violat- ed in numerous instances, therefore the whole treaty is void, (p. 307-8). 2 h . The relation which is to subsist between the nine or more ratifying States and those not ratifying. While no political relations would subsist, the moral relations would be the same, (p. 308). dawson's foederalist. 117 118 dawson's foederalist. 5 f . Fifth Class of Powers : Certain restrictions on the States ; w. c. (1). The absolute restrictions. (2). The qualified restrictions. l g . The absolute restrictions on the States. ( 1 ) . The several absolute restrictions ; ( 2 ) . their nature. 1\ The several absolute restrictions on the States. w. c. l j . " No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance " or confederation." (p. 308). 2 J . ' 'Grant letters of marque and reprisal." 3 j . "Coin money." 4>. "Emit bills of credit." 5 J . " Make anything but gold and silver, or legal "tender in payment of debts; " 6 J . " Pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto "law or laws impairing the obligation of con- tracts. " 7 j . "Grant any title of nobility." 2 b . The nature and objects of these several abso- lute restrictions on the States. These "absolute restrictions" are such that they cannot be removed, even by the "consent of the Congress." l j . The nature and objects of the First Absolute restriction: "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance or Confederation." This restriction prevails under the Articles, and, for reasons which are very apparent, were copied in the Constitution, (p. 309). 2 J . The Nature and Objects of the several Abso- lute Restrictions : ' ' No State shall grant letters "of Marque and Reprisal." This power naturally belongs to the Govern- ment, from the necessity of uniformity. 3 j . The Nature and Objects of the Third Absolute Restriction : * ' No State shall coin money. ' ' This power was taken from the States to pre- dawson's foederalist. 119 120 dawson's foederalist. vent the multiplying of expensive mints and the diversity in form and weight of coins, (p. 309). 4 J . The Nature and objects of the Fourth Abso- lute Restriction: "No State shall emit bills of "credit." l k . The Nature of a Bill of Credit. It is a written evidence of debt, issued by a State, on the credit of the State and payable at a future day. 2\ The Objects of this Restriction. See Foed., p. 310. 5 1 . The Nature and Objects of the Fifth Absolute Restriction: " No State shall make anything "but gold and silver a legal tender in the pay- ment of debts." See Foed., p. 310. 6 j . Nature and Objects of the Sixth Absolute Re- striction: No State shall pass any bill of at- tainder, ex post facto laws or laws impairing "the obligation of contracts." Such laws are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation, (pp. 310, 311.) 7 j . Nature and Objects of the Seventh Restric- tion: "No State shall grant any titles of no- bility." This restriction needs no comment. 2 g . The qualified restrictions on the States : (two in number) ; w. c. 1\ "No State shall, without the consent of Con- "gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or "exports, except what may be absolutely neces- "sary for executing its inspection laws, and the "net produce of all duties and imposts laid by "any State on imports or exports shall be for ' ' the use of the Treasury of the United States, and "all such laws shall be subject to the revision " and control of Congress." This follows from the necessity of submitting dawson's foederalist. 121 122 dawson's foederalist. the regulation of trade to the Government, (p. 312). 2 h . "No State shall, without the consent of Con- gress, lay any duty on tonnage." 3 h . "Keep troops or ships of war in time of peace." 4\ "Enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power. 5 h . "Or engage in war unless actually invaded "or in such imminent peril as will not admit "of delay." 6 f . Sixth Class of Powers : Powers by which efficacy is given to all the rest. I s . Power to " make all laws which shall be neces- "sary and proper for carrying into execution the "foregoing powers, and all other powers vested "by this Constitution in the Government of the "United States"— w. c. (p. 312). (1). The necessity of such a power. (2). The several forms of expressing it— w. c. l h . The Necessity of Such a Power. The substance of such a power is absolutely necessary ; hence there can be objection only to its form. 2\ The several other forms of expressing this power. (1). By prohibiting the exercise of all powers not expressly delegated. (2). By attempting a positive enumeration of the powers contemplated under the terms "necessary and proper." (3). By attempting a negative enumeration of them. (4). By remaining silent and leaving these neces- sary and proper powers to construction and in- ference, (p. 313). l j . By prohibiting the exercise of all powers not expressly delegated. This would either disarm the Government of all real power or lead to a disregard of this express restriction, (p. 313). dawson's foederalist. 123 124 dawson's foederalist. 2 J . By attempting a positive enumeration of those "necessary and proper powers." This would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to w r hich the Constitution relates, and would have to be accommodated to future changes, (p. 313). 3 J . By attempting a negative enumeration of the powers not " necessary or proper." An equally chimerical task with the second (2 J ), and in effect it would have been a positive grant to the Government of all the powers not prohib- ited, (p. 314). 4*. By being silent altogether and leaving these "necessary and proper powers" to inference and construction. All the particular powers necessary to carry out the general powers would, by necessary im- plication, have resulted to the Government, and the form used was to remove any pretext to question the essential powers of the Union, (p. 314). 2 s . The power declaring that, "This Constitution "and the laws of the United States, which shall "be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties "made, or which shall be made, under the author- ity of the United States, shall be the supreme "law of the land, and the judges in every State "shall be bound thereby, anything in the laws of "any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Necessity of such a power. l h . The want of this power would have annulled all powers in the Constitution which exceeded those enumerated in the Articles of Confedera- tion, (p. 316). 2\ The Constitutions of some States do not ad- mit expressly and fully the existing powers of the Confederacy, and an express saving of the former would, in such States, have brought into ques- tion every power of the Constitution. 3\ The Constitutions of the States differ, and dawson's foederalist. 125 126 dawson's foederalist. hence a treaty, etc., would be valid in some States and not in others, (p. 316). 4\ The Supremacy of the State Constitutions, therefore, would have the head of the Govern- ment ruled and not ruling its members. 3 s . The Power declaring that " The Senators and Representatives and members of the several State Legislatures and all Executive and Judicial offi- cers, both of the United States and the several States shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution;" Necessity for Such a Power, (p. 317). 4 g . The Powers belonging to the Executive and Judiciary Departments. See Foed. pp. 317 ; 467 and seq. ; 538 and seq. 2 e . The mass of powers transferred to the Foederal Government will not be dangerous to the reserved authority of the States. l f . Because of the tendencies in Confederacies to de- spoil the Government of its delegated powers. 2 f . Because the State Governments are constituent and essential elements of the Foederal Government. 3 f . Because the employes of the United States will be fewer than those of the States. 4 f . Because the powers reserved by the States are relatively greater and more numerous than those of the Union. 5 f . Because the Constitution is the result less of new powers in the Union than of an invigoration of the old. 6 f . Because the State Governments will possess more influence among the people, (p. 325). (1). From the greater number of officers. (2). From the character of the interests they pro- vide for. (p. 326). (3). From the greater familiarity of the people with them. (4). Illustrated from their history during the Rev- olution. dawson's foederalist. 127 128 dawson's foederalist. 7 f . Because the pre-possessions of the Government officers will be in favor of their States, (p. 327). 8 f . Because the States possess the means of defeat- ing Foederal encroachments. (1). The means of encroachment possessed by the Foederal Government. (2). Those possessed by States. l g . The means of encroachment possessed by the Foederal Government. A standing army cannot exceed one-twenty-fifth of the population able to bear arms ; and hence, in the United States such an army could not (in 1781) exceed 30,000 men, or one-one-hundredth part of the whole number of people, (p. 331). 2 s . The Means of Resistance to Foederal Encroach- ments Possessed by the State Governments. Twenty-four-twenty-fifths of the arms-bearing population, or 500,000 men, to withstand 30,000. p. 331). 2 d . The particular structure of the Government, and the distribution of power among its several branches — w. c. (1). The particular structure of the Government. (2). The distribution of power among its several branches. l e . The particular structure of the Government — w. c. (1). The maxim on which the Government is founded. (2). The meaning of this maxim. (3). The means hereby to keep these three departments separate and distinct — w. c. l f . The maxim on which the Government is founded. "The Legislative, Executive and Judiciary Depart- "ments should be kept separate and distinct." (p. 334). 2 f . The meaning of this maxim that, "The Legisla- tive, Executive and Judiciary Departments should be separate and distinct." (1). The views of Montesquieu. (2). The pro- visions of the State Constitutions relative thereto — w. c. dawson's foederalist. 129 130 l g . The views of Montesquieu relative to this maxim. (1). As shown from the British Government, as his standard on this subject. (2). As shown from his expressed reasons. l h . The views of Montesquieu, relative to this maxim, as shown from the British Constitution, his standard on this subject, (p. 334). l j . The King forms an integral Part of the Legis- lative authority, (p. 335). 2 j . The House of Lords is the Sole Depositary of Judiciary Power in cases of Impeachment, and is the Supreme Appellate Tribunal, (p. 333). 3 j . The judges attend and participate in the Legislative deliberations. 2\ The views of Montesquieu as shown by the reasons given by him for this maxim, (pp. 336, 337). l j . "When the Legislative and Executive powers "are vested in the same person or body, there "can be no liberty because the same monarch or " Senate may enact tyrannical laws to execute "them in a tyrannical manner." 2 j . " Were the Judiciary and Legislative powers "united, the life and liberty of the subject would "be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge "would then be the legislator." 3 j . "Were the Executive and Judiciary powers "united, the j udge might behave with all the "violence of the oppressor" (p. 337). 2 g . The meaning of this maxim, as shown by pro- visions in the State Constitutions relative thereto. (1). The particular provisions of the several State Constitutions relative thereto. (2). A gen- eral view of the State Constitutions relative to this maxim — w. c. l h . The particular provisions of the State Con- stitutions relative thereto. For a discussion of the Constitutions of New dawson's foederalist. 131 132 dawson's foederalist. Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jer- sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, see Foed. pp. 337, 342. 2\ A general view of the State Constitutions rel- ative to this maxim, (p. 342). 1 J . In some instances this maxim has been vio- lated, and in no instance has a proper method of maintaining it been devised. 2 J . The proposed Constitution does not violate this maxim in its true meaning, nor in the mean- ing heretofore given to it in America, (p. 342). 3 f . The means whereby to keep the Legislative, Ex- ecutive and Judiciary Departments separate and distinct — w. c. (1). The insufficiency of mere parchment barriers to attain this object. (-2). The insufficiency of Mr. Jefferson's proposition, "that whenever any two of "the three branches of Government shall concur in "opinion, each by the voice of two-thirds of their "whole number, that a convention is necessary for "altering the Constitution, or correcting breaches "of it, a convention shall be called for the purpose." (3). The insufficiency of periodical appeals to the people. (4). The proper expedient for keeping these three Departments separate and distinct — w. c. (p. 343). I s . The insufficiency of mere parchment barriers for keeping these three Departments distinct. (1). Because of the tendency of the Executive Department, in hereditary monarchies, to usurpa- tion. (2). Because of the tendency of the Legisla- ture, in a representative republic as the United States, to usurpation — w. c. l h . Because of the Tendency of Hereditary Mon- archies to Usurpation, (p. 344). 2\ Because of the Tendency of the Legislature, in a Representative Republic as the United States, to Usurpation. (1). The causes of this tendency. 133 134 dawson's foederalist. (2). This tendency illustrated from the history of Virginia and Pennsylvania. 1 J . The Causes of this Tendency in the Legisla- ture in, a Representative Republic, to Usurpa- tion. 1\ The Executive Department being limited in extent and duration of power, there is no dan- ger in the United States from that quarter. The Legislature must be jealously guarded be- cause of its supposed influence over the people and from the weight of its numbers, (p. 344). 2 k . Its Constitutional Powers are more exten- sive and less susceptible of precise limits; it can with greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is often a question of real nicety in Legisla- tive bodies, whether the operation of a particu- lar power will or will not extend beyond the Legislative sphere. (See Foed. p. 345; Cooky's Const. Lim., (6th ed.) chap. v. p. 102; 10 Wheat., 46; 11 Pa. State Rep., 494). 3\ The Legislative Department alone has access to the pockets of the people. 2 J . The Tendency of the Legislature to Usurpa- tion illustrated from Virginia and Pennsylvania. l k . From the History of Virginia. Mr. Jefferson in his " Notes on the State of Virginia," p. 195, says: "All the powers of Government — Legislative, Executive and Judi- cial — result to the Legislative body." (p. 346). 2 k . From the History of Pennsylvania. The council of censors of 1783 and 1784, who were appointed to decide in what instances the Legislative and Executive Departments had abused or neglected their powers, reported the following Legislative and Executive violations of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. dawson's foederalist. 135 136 dawson's foederalist. I 1 . Legislative Violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution. l m . A great number of laws were passed with- out first being printed for the consideration of the people. 2 m . The Constitutional trial by jury had been violated. 3 m . Executive powers had been usurped. 4 m . The salaries of the Judges had been changed and their powers often assumed. 2 h . Executive Violations of the Pennsylvania Con- stitution. This Department had been guilty of frequent violations of the Constitution, but under the fol- lowing circumstances : (1). From the necessities of war. : (2). In compliance with the declared or known sentiments of the Legislature. (3). From the evils of the plural executive, con- sisting of about twenty members— resembling a Legislature in this respect more than an Executive Department. 2 g . The insufficiency (for keeping these three depart- ments separate and distinct) of Mr. Jefferson's proposition of occasional appeals: "that when- ever any two of the three branches of Govern- * ' ment shall concur in the opinion, each by the voice "of two-thirds of its members, that a convention "is necessary for altering the Constitution or cor- "recting breaches of it, a convention shall be "called for the purpose." (p. 349). 1\ This provision does not reach the case of a combination of two of the departments against the rest. (p. 350). 2\ These appeals, implying as they do some de- fect in the Government, deprive the Government of that veneration which is necessary to stability, (p. 351). 3 h . The danger of disturbing the public tranquil- dawson's foederalist. 137 138 ity by interesting too strongly the public pas- sions, (p. 351). 4\ The decision resulting from such appeals would not preserve this desired equilibrium (p. 352). 1\ The tendency of the Legislature to encroach would render most frequent the appeals by the Executive and Judiciary Departments. The jealousy of the people of the former, their small number,the mode of the appointment of the judi- ciary, their removal from the people, the much greater number composing the Legislature, their personal association among the people, all tend to taint the decision of the people with partiality for the Legislature, (p. 353). 2\ The Legislative party would probably be members of that convention and be their own judges, (pp. 353-4). 3 s . The insufficiency of periodical appeals for keep- ing the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary De- partments separate and distinct. 1\ When the periods are of short intervals. The measures to be reviewed will be recent, and the circumstances that gave birth to them will still wield a potent influence, (p. 353). 2\ When the periods are of long intervals. l j . In respect of recent measures, the objections under (1\) would apply. 2 j . A distant prospect of censure exercises very little restraint on present excesses, (p. 355). 3 j . The remedy would often come too late for the disease. 4 j . Evils of long standing might take deep root and not be easily extirpated. 4 g . The proper expedients for keeping these three Departments separate and distinct. By giving to each department a will of its own and hence : 1\ The members of each department should have 139 140 dawson's foederalist. as little agency as possible in the appointment of the others, (p. 359). In the case of the Judiciary Department this principal cannot be strictly adhered to for two reasons : (1). Their peculiar requirements demand that mode of choice best suited to obtaining persons of those requirements. (2). Their necessarily long duration in office destroys all dependence on the appointing power, (p. 359). 2\ The members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on the others for their emoluments. 3 h . The members of each department should pos- sess the necessary constitutional means and per- sonal motives to resist encroachments, (p. 360). 4\ The encroaching spirit of Republican Legisla- tures should be further guarded against. l j . By dividing the Legislature into two branches, e. g., a Senate and House of Representatives. 2 j . By rendering them as little connected with each other as the good of the society will admit. l k . Through different modes of election, (p. 361). 2\ Through different principles of action. 3 j . By giving to the Executive a qualified veto and a qualified connection with the Senate as a substitute for an absolute veto, which on ordi- nary occasions might not be used with sufficient firmness, and which on extraordinary occasions might be abused, (p. 361). 5 h . Through an extension of the Foederal system of America. l j . In the compound Republic of the United States the power surrendered by the people is divided between two Governments — the State and Foed- eral — and each of these two portions is divided into three parts, thus providing a security double that provided in a single Republic, (p. 362). dawson's foederalist. 141 142 2 j . This Foederal system, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, will render an unjust combination of a majority improbable if not impracticable, (pp. 62, 362-3). 2 e . The distribution— by the Constitution — of power among the three departments— the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. 1*. The Legislature— w. c. (1). The House of Representatives. (2). TheSen- ate. l g . The House of Representatives— w. c. (1). The qualifications of the Representatives. (2). The qualifications of the electors of the Repre- sentatives. (3). The term of office of the Repre- sentatives. (4). The apportionment of the Repre- sentatives to the several States. (5). The number of which the House of Representatives is to con- sist. (6). The authority of Congress to regulate, in the last resort, the election of the House of Rep- resentatives, (p. 363). l h . The qualifications of the Representatives. l j . They must be twenty -five years old when they enter on their duties, not necessarily when elected. 2 j . They must have been seven years citizens of the United States. This restriction applies only to naturalized cit- izens and not to inhabitants of territory acquired by the United States by purchase — e. g., Florida and California — for they became citizens at the moment of the purchase. 3 j . They must at the time of their election be in- habitants of the State they are to represent. 4 3 . They must, during their time of service, hold no office under the United States. 2*. The qualifications of the electors of the Repre- sentatives, (pp. 365—6). (1). The qualifications prescribed by the Con- stitution. (2). The necessity for prescribing them dawson's foederalist. 143 144 in the Constitution. (3). The advantages of the Constitutional provision, (p. 365). 1 J . The qualifications prescribed by the Constitu- tion. The same as those of electors of the most nu- merous branch of the State Legislatures; e. g., any person entitled by the Constitution of Vir- ginia to vote for a member of the lower House of the Virginia Legislature is entitled to the United States Constitution to vote for a member of the United States House of Representatives. 2 J . The necessity for prescribing these qualifica- tions in the United States Constitution. The definition of the right of suffrage is justly regarded as "a fundamental article by Republi- can Government;" hence it was incumbent on the Convention to define and establish this right in the Constitution. l k . To have left the matter open for the occa- sional regulation of Congress would have vio- lated that " fundamental article." 2\ To have submitted it to the Legislative dis- cretion of the States would have given rise to two objections : (1) The violation of the " fundamental arti- cle." (2) The rendering of the House of Represen- tatives dependent on the State Governments, (p. 365). 3\ To have made the qualifications uniform would have been (1) dissatisfactory to some States; (2) difficult for the convention, (p. 365). 3 j . The Advantages of the Qualifications Pre- scribed by the Constitution, (p. 366). 1\ It must be satisfactory to every State. 2\ It will be safe to the United States. Being fixed by the State Constitutions and not subject to the Legislatures. 3\ The term of office of Representatives. dawson's foederalist. 145 146 (1). The length of their term. (2). Will bien- nial elections of the Representatives be safe ? (3) . Will they be necessary or useful ? l j . The length of the term of office of Represen- tatives. Two years. 2 J . Will the biennial election of the Representa- tives be safe ? (1). Affirmatively shown from history. (2). Reply to the objection that, ' ' Where annual elections cease tyranny begins." l k . Affirmatively shown from History that Biennial Elections in the United States will prove safe. (p. 366). It is essential to liberty that the Government in general should have a common interest with the people, and especially essential that the House of Representatives should have an im- mediate dependence on and sympathy with the the people — an end only to be accomplished through frequent elections. But the degree of frequency required is difficult of determination. I 1 . From the History of the House of Com- mons in England. Originally the times of election of the com- mons was within the discretion of the King. In the reign of Charles II. a statute made the period three years, (p. 368). In the reign of William III. the same period was adopted. In 1787 the period was seven years. If, under triennial, and even under sep- tennial elections, the English people have, under the unlimited Legislative authority of the House of Lords and the House of Commons, preserved a considerable degree of liberty, much more ought the people of the United States to be safe with a House of Representatives, lim- ited in authority and elected every two years. 2 l . From the History of Ireland. Originally members of Parliament in Ireland dawson's foederalist. 147 148 were elected seldom, as on the ascension of a king. The Parliament beginning in the reign of George III. continued thirty-five years. In 1787 they were elected every five years. (In 1801 the Irish Parliament was abolished). The conclusion is, that if the Irish have preserved any liberty under their system, much more ought we under ours. (p. 369). 3 1 . From the History of the Colonies. E. g., Virginia elected her Representatives for seven years and was the first to resist the Par- liamentary usurpations of England and the first to espouse the Declaration of Independence, (p. 371). 2 k . Reply to the objection that, " Where annual Elections end Tyranny Begins ". I 1 . There is No Reason for the Objection. For there is no connection between the sun, or the seasons, and the time that virtue can withstand temptation. 2 l . It was not advocated by the States. In Connecticut and Rhode Island the period is six months, in South Carolina, two years and in the other States one year. The ratio between the extreme periods is as 1 to 4 ; yet, does that represent the ratio of liberty enjoyed by the people of Rhode Island and South Caro- lina respectively ? (p. 372 ) . 3 1 . The Ground of This Objection is Inappli- cable to the United States; It is borrowed from England, where no bet- ter security could be desired than an appeal to some simple and familiar period of time to measure the danger of innovations, to fix the national sentiment and unite patriotic exer- tions as barriers against a Legislature, that in England can change even the fundamental Constitution itself. Biennial elections will prove a greater security in the United States dawson's foederalist. 149 150 dawson's foederalist. under a Limited Constitution, unchangeable by the Legislature, than even a less period in England under their present system, (p. 373). 3 J . The Necessity of Biennial Elections of the House of Representatives. 1\ To give the members time to acquire a prac- tical knowledge of their duties — e. g. I 1 . The local laws and situations of the sev- eral States. l m . For the regulation of foreign trade. 2 m . Of inter-state trade and taxes. 3 m . And of the militia. 2 1 . The regulation of foreign affairs. 2\ This period is a greater inducement than one year to competent men to leave home and take the position, (p. 376). 3 k . To prevent too great an accumulation of in- experienced men. 4\ To give sufficient time for investigating spurious elections. 4\ The apportionment of Representatives to the several States. (1). The mode of apportionment. (2). The rep- resentation of slaves, and reasons therefor. l j . The mode of apportionment of Representa- tives to the several States. Representatives are to be apportioned in the several States in the same manner as direct taxes, according to the population of each State. 2 J . The representation of slaves and reasons . therefore. 1\ The Representation of Slaves. In determining the number of Representatives which each State is to have in Congress five negroes are to be counted as three white persons — i. e., one negro is equal to three-fifths of a white person, (p. 378). 2\ Reasons for the Representation of slaves. dawson's foederalist. 151 152 dawson's foederalist. 1\ Slaves are Persons as well as Property. l m . The respects in which they are regarded as property, (p. 379). l n . They are bought and sold. 2 n . They are compelled to labor for their mas- ters. 3 n . They are restrained in their liberty and chastised in their body according to their masters' caprices. 2 m . The respects in which they are regarded as persons. l n . They are protected in their life and limb against the violence of others. 2 n . They are punishable for violence to others. (p. 380). 2 1 . It would not have been just to have counted the slaves when taxes were to be imposed and to have excluded them when the number of Representatives was to be calculated, (p. 380). 3 1 . Reply to the Objection that " Slaves are not included in the estimate of Representatives in any of the States possessing them." It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution that, as the aggregate number of Representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a Foederal rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised in such manner as the State itself may designate. In all the States a certain portion of the inhabitants is not counted. E. g., In Virginia none but freeholders can vote; Massachusetts requires an educational qualification, (p. 381). 3 1 . Representation relates to property as well as to persons, (p. 382.) 5 1 . The votes allowed in the Foderal Legisla- dawson's foederalist. 153 154 ture to the people of each State ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States for another reason: States have not, like individuals, an influence over each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune, (p. 382). 6 1 . This system will tend to the accuracy of the census, (p. 384). 5\ The number o£ which the House of Represen- tatives is to consist, and the objections thereto considered. l j . The number of which the House is to consist. On the ratio of seven Representatives to 30,000 people, the first House of Representatives will consist of sixty-five members. After the first cen- sus it will probably consist of about 100 mem- bers. (It did in fact consist of 105 members in 1793. W. A. F.) 2 j . Objections to the number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, answered. (1). "That so small a number of Representa- tives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests." (2). "That they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents." (3). "That they will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least with the mass of the peo- ple and be most likely to aim at the elevation of a few." (4). "That the number of which the House of Representatives is to consist will be- come more and more disproportionate from the lack of a correspondent increase in the number of Representatives." 1\ First Objection, that "the number of which the House of Representatives is to consist will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests" — answered. (1). The difficulties of determining the proper number. (2). General rules to be observed in determining this number. (3). The securities against encroachments by the number proposed. dawson's foederalist. 155 156 DAWSON 'S FOEDERAUST. I 1 . The Difficulties of Determining the Proper Number. These are best shown by an examination of the several State Legislatures. (1). The number of Representatives in Dela- ware is two. ()2. The number of Representatives in Mas- sachusetts is about three hundred and fifty. (3). The number of Representatives in Penn- sylvania is about seventy. The ratio of rep- resentation is not the same in any two States. The ratio of Representation in Pennsylvania is one Representative to about 4,000 people ; in Rhode Island, one Representative to about 1,000. 2\ General rules to be observed in determining the number of Representatives. First. The number must be so large as to se- cure the benefits of free consultation and dis- cussion and to guard against too easy a com- bination for improper purposes. Second. The number ought to be sufficiently small to guard against the confusion and in- temperance of a multitude, (p. 386). 3 1 . The securities against encroachments by the number proposed. (1). The actual number composing the House of Representatives. ( 2 ) . The securities . l m . The actual number composing the House of Representatives. l n . The number of Representatives in 1787 Sixty-five. 2*. The actual Number in 1793. The number then was one hundred and five > showing that the estimate of the Foederalist of 100 was safe. 3 n . The actual number in 1894. FOEDERALIST. 157 158 Three hundred and sixty-five Representa- tives and four from Territories. 2 m . The securities against such encroachments, (p. 388). 1*. The genius of the people, (p. 388). E. g., Their scorn of the foreign gold. 2 H . The lack of means of corruption by the other branches of the Foederal Go vernment. (p. 390). 2 k . Second objection to the constitution of the House of Representatives, that " the number of Representatives will be too small to possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their various constituencies, " answered. (1). The source of this objection. (2). The objects of Foederal legislation. (3). Comparison drawn between the House of Commons and the House of Representatives, and conclusions thereon. I 1 . The source of this objection. In forgetting that the knowledge of the Foed- eral Representatives will extend only to general subjects of legislation, as commerce and taxa- tion, and need not extend to a knowledge of mi- nute local details, (p. 291). 2 1 . The objects of Foederal legislation. l m . Commerce. Foed., p. 392. 2 m . Taxation. Foed., p. 392. 3 m . The Militia. Foed., p. 393. 3 1 . Comparison drawn between the House of Commons and the House of Representatives as to numbers, and conclusions thereon. 1"\ Comparison drawn between the House of Commons and the House of Representatives as to numbers. dawson's foederalist. 159 160 l n . Ratio of representation in the House of Commons. The total number is 558. Of these, 62 are elected by 364 people, 279 are elected by 5,723 people and 217 are elected by all the people. Hence, we may say that the 8,000,000 peo- ple (in 1787) of England and Scotland had, say, 279 (one-half of 558) representatives, or 1 to every 28,674? people. 2 n . Ratio of representation in the House of Representatives. In 1787, 1 to 30,000; (in 1894, 1 to 156,- 000.) 2 m . Conclusions from this comparison. That, if one Representative to every 28,000 has been able to preserve the liberties of the people and have a proper knowledge of local affairs in England under a monarchy and with an unlimited Legislature, a fortiori ought 30,000 to do so in the United States in a Republic with a limited government? (p. 396). 3\ Third objection to the Constitution of the House of Representatives, that "it will be taken from that class of citizens which have least sympathy with the mass of the people and will be most likely to aim at the elevation of the few, " answered. (1). Certain considerations that will tend to secure the fidelity of the Representatives to their constituents. (2). This objection is inadmissible in its consequences ; it is unreasonable and un- warranted by history. I 1 . Certain considerations that will tend to se- cure the fidelity of the Representatives to their constituents. l m . The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States, and are deter- mined by the States themselves. dawson's foederalist. 161 162 dawson's foederalist. 2 m . Every man whose merit commends him to the esteem and confidence of the people may be a Representative. 3 m . The situation of the men securing the peo- ple's suffrages involves every security for their fidelity that can be desired, (p. 398). l n . The Representatives, having received the suffrages of the people, must have had such qualities as commended them to the people for integrity and fidelity. 2 n . The Representatives will enter into office with a feeling of love and gratitude to their constituents and a desire to retain their good opinions. 3*. Those Representatives elevated by the people will feel .no desire to make any dim- inution in the rights and privileges of the power that elevated them. (p. 398). 4 n . Biennial elections, which keep the Repre- sentatives continually in mind of their de- pendence on the people. 5*. The Representatives can make no laws, oppressive or not, that will not operate equally on themselves as on others. 2 l . This objection is inadmissible in its conse- quences ; it is unreasonable and unwarranted by history. l m . It is Inadmissible in its Consequences. It strikes at the root of the Republican Gov- ernment, and if it proved anything, would prove that the people are incapable of choosing their Representatives, (p. 401). 2 m . It is Unreasonable. Because a better Representative should be elected by 5,000 say, than 500, the field of se- lection being larger and more difficult to cor- rupt. 3 m . It is Unwarranted by History. DAWSON'S FOEDERALIST. 163 184 l n . As shown by the History of the House of Commons. The electors of the House of Commons are restricted to freeholders of estates of one hun- dred pounds or more per year, yet there the Representatives have not elevated the few at the expense of the many. 2 n . As shown from the History of the Amer- ican Colonies. E. g., Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and others, (p. 402). 4 k . Fourth objection to the Constitution of the House of Representatives, that "the number of which the House of Representatives is to consist will become more and more dispropor- tionate from a lack of a correspondent increase in the number of Representatives," answered. I 1 . The provision of the United States Consti- tution on this subject will not suffer by con- parison with State Constitutions. The number of Representatives in the first Congress was to last but three years, when a census was to be held then, and every succeed- ing ten years, for the purpose of regulating the number of Representatives ; no such State pro- vision exists, (p. 404). 2 1 . In the States, even under their defective systems, the increase in Representatives has kept pace with the increase in population. 2 1 . The peculiar constitution of the Senate and House of Representatives will conduce to an augmentation of the number of Representa- tives. In the Senate the States are represented and the smaller States have the advantage ; in the House the citizens are represented and the larger States have greater weight and would be most strenuous in their efforts to increase the number of Representatives. The fact that the Senate must pass on any bill dawson's foederalist. 165 166 DAWSON 'S FOEDERALIST. for an increase of Representatives would not defeat it for several reasons : First. The House, being larger and speaking the will of the people and of the larger States and having justice on their side, will have great moral influence over the Senate. Second. The medium States, under these cir- cumstances, will probably join the juster and stronger States. Third. The new and growing States would favor reapportionment, (p. 406). Fourth. The House of Representatives holds the keys to the Treasury and hence may demand a reapportionment, (p. 407). 3 j . Additional reasons for restricting the number of the first House of Representatives to sixty- five. l k . From reasons of economy. 2 k . To secure a greater portion of fit Represen- tatives. 3\ The larger representative assemblies are, the more they will partake of the infirmities of de- mocracies, (p. 409). 6\ The authority of Congress to regulate, in the last resort, the election of the members of the House of Representatives. (1). The exact terms of this authority . (2). The general principle on which this authority rests. (3). The necessity of such an authority existing somewhere. (4). The different ways of modifying or disposing of this authority. l j . The exact terms of this authority. "The times, places and manner of holding elec- tions for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at anytime bylaw, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators." (p. 411). 2 J . The general principle on which this authority rests. dawson's foederalist. 167 168 dawson's foederalist. Every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation. 3 J . The necessity of such an authority existing somewhere. This discretionary power must have been placed somewhere, since an election law, which would have always been applicable to every probable change in the situation of the country, could not have been framed and inserted in the Constitu- tion, (p. 411). 4 j . The different ways of modifying or disposing of this authority. l k . By lodging it wholly in Congress. This plan would have met with universal con- demnation. 2 k . By lodging it wholly in the State Legisia- tures. (1). The chief danger of this plan. (2). An argument in favor of the plan answered. I 1 . The chief danger of this plan. The States could destroy the Government by neglecting to appoint persons to administer it. (p. 413). 2 1 . An argument in favor of this plan, answered. l m . The argument stated. "The election of the United States Senators is entirely in the hands of the State Legisla- tures, and, by forebearing to elect Senators, they could destroy the Government ; having placed the existence of the Government in this case in the States, why not in the case of House of Representatives ? 2 m . The argument answered. l n . The fact that the State Legislatures have the power, in the election of Senators, to de- stroy the Union is no reason why they should be given the additional power through the election of Representatives, (p. 413). This evil in the case of the Senate could not dawson's foederalist. 169 170 dawson's foederalist. be avoided and yet give the Government a Foederal feature. 2 m . More danger is to be apprehended in the case of the election of Representatives than of Senators. Only one-third of the Senators are elected every two years, and no State now elects both of its Senators at the same time, while all of the Representatives are elected every two years. Hence a combination of all the States electing Senators at one time would still leave at least two-thirds of the Senate and more than a quorum ; but a combination of a few States to prevent the election of the Represen- tatives would destroy this branch of Congress and annihilate the Government, (p. 414). 3\ By lodging it primarily in the States and ul- timately in the Congress. (1). The safety of this plan. (2). Its advan- tages. I 1 . The safety of this plan. (1). As '"to promoting the election of some favorite class." (2). As to its lack of a pro- vision requiring, "that all elections shall be held in the counties where the electors reside." l m . As to "promoting the election of some favorite class." l n . Such an attempt would cause a revolt of the people. 2 n . Such an attempt would be difficult of suc- cess from the dissimilar ingredients compos- ing the Government. (1). As to the House of Representatives. The diversity in the property, habits, genius and manners of the electors is a sufficient guarantee for a diversity of Representatives. (2). The United States Senate is to be selected by Legislatures chosen directly by the people. (3). The President will be the choice of elec- tors of the people. dawson's foederalist. 171 172 dawson's foederalist. 3*. The qualifications of electors are to be regulated by the States themselves. 2 m . As to the lack of a provision requiring, "that all elections shall be held in the coun- ties where the electors reside." (p. 424). l n . Such a provision would have been harm- less. , 2 n . There are no such provisions in the State Constitutions. The New York Constitution examined, (p. 424). 2 1 . The advantages of the plan determined by the convention, (p. 411). (For a full and interesting discussion under 6 h , see Gilmore's Notes, pp. 80 and seq.) To establish a uniform time of holding elec- tions for Representatives, should it ever become desirable. 2 g . The Senate — w. c. (1) The qualifications of members; (2) the man- ner of their election ; (3) the manner of filling vacan- cies ; (4) the equality of representation in the Sen- ate ; (5) their number and the term for which they are elected ; (6) the powers vested in the Senate. l h . The Qualifications of Senators. l j . They must be thirty years of age. (p. 428). 2 j . They must have been citizens nine years. These requirements are more extensive than those for the Representatives, because the Sena- torial trust requires greater extent of informa- tion and stability of character. 2 h . The manner of their election. They are elected by the State Legislatures for two reasons : First. As favoring a more select appointment. Second. As a special acknowledgment of the Foederal element in the Government, this action of the several Legislatures being a State act and an act of sovereignty. 173 174 dawson's foederalist. 3\ The Manner of Filling Vacancies in the Sen- ate. (See United States Constitution, Art. I., §3, clause 2 ; Gilmore's Notes, p. 71 ; Madison Papers, pp: 1228, 1269-70, 1543, as to why " resignation or otherwise" was used. It means by " resigna- tion or any other manner whatever.") (1). If the Legislature of the State having the vacancy is not in session the Governor appoints. (2). If the Legislature is in session the Legisla- ture of that State elects the successor. 4 h . The Equality of Representation in the Senate. l j . The Cause of This Equality. It was the result of a compromise between the larger and the smaller States, and, but for such a provision, the smaller States would not have consented to enter the Union. 2 j . The Effect of this Equality. l k/ It is a Constitutional recognition of the resid- uary sovereignty of the States, (p. 430). 2 k . It will prove a check to improper legislation, (p. 430). 5\ The Number of Senators and the Term for Which They Are Elected. l j . The Actual Number of Senators and Their Term of Office. (1). The Senators are two from each State ; hence, with the original thirteen States, the Sen- ate consisted of twenty-six Senators ; as it now (1894) consists of 88. (2). They are elected for six years, (p. 431). 2 J . The objects to be attained by having a Senate. In order to thoroughly appreciate the compo- sition of the Senate, it will be necessary to exam- ine into the purposes of its establishment. We will consider the object of a Senate as, (1) sug- gested by reason ; (2) as illustrated by history. 1\ The objects of a Senate as suggested by reason. dawson's foederalist. 175 176 dawson's eoederalist. (1). As a check on the House of Representa- tives. (2). As a check on the people themselves. I 1 . As*a check on the House of Representatives. l m . By requiring the concurrence of two dis- tinct bodies in schemes of usurpation. 2 m . From the propensitiy of all single and nu- merous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, the House of Representatives will require such a check as the Senate— a stable and small body. (p. 432). 3 m . By supplying the defect of the House of Representatives, in the want of a due ac- quaintance with the objects and principles of legislation, as a result of the short period for which the Representatives are elected. 4 m . By preventing that mutability in the pub- lic councils, resulting from a rapid succession of new members, (p. 433 and seq.) 5 m . By giving to the Government a due sense of National character, (p. 436). 6 m . By supplying the defect of a want of a due responsibility in the Government to the people, arising from the frequency of elec- tions in the House, (p. 437 and seq.) 2 1 . As a Check on the People Themselves. There may be times when the people, in- flamed by passion or misled by artful and in- terested men, will call for measures which they will soon lament. At such times the nec- essity for a temperate and respectable body like the Senate will be great and their influ- ence very salutary. 2\ The Objects of a Senate as Illustrated by History. We have no record of a long-lived Republic without a Senate; e. g., Sparta, Rome and Car- thage, (p. 439 and seq.) 6\ The Powers Vested in the Senate. (1) In the making of treaties ; (2) in the appoint- dawson's foederalist. 177 178 ing of public officers; (3) in the trying of impeach- ments, (p. 446). 1 J . The powers vested in the Senate in the making of Treaties. (1). The exact terms of this power. (2). Rea- sons for associating the Senate in the making of treaties. (3). Objections thereto. 1*. The Exact Terms of This Power. The President " shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.' ' 2\ Reasons for associating the Senate in the making of treaties. I 1 . Because the Senators will possess greater wisdom and experience. 1*. From their maturer age ; they must be at least thirty years of age, the Representatives only twenty-five. 2 m . From the manner of their selection. By the State Legislatures. 2\ Because of the peculiar constitution of the Senate. l m . They are elected for six years. 2 m . Only one-third of the Senators are elected every two years, leaving two-thirds of the Senate at least composed of experienced men. 3\ Because, from their smaller number, they better permit of secrecy and dispatch than the House of Representatives. 3\ Objections to associating the Senate in the making of treaties. I 1 . Because, "the treaties, having the force of laws, should be made only by men invested with legislative authority." (p. 450). The Executive and Judiciary Departments of the Government perform acts that are as bind- ing as those of the Legislature. 2 1 . Because, "treaties so made would be mere dawson's foederalist. 179 180 dawson's foederalist. acts of the Legislature, and therefore ought to be repealable at pleasure and not the su- preme law of the land." The fallacy is in assuming that they are "mere acts of the Legislature." Treaties are contracts, to establish which two parties must agree, and are binding till both agree to cancel or alter them. (p. 451). 2 J . The powers vested in the Senate in the ap- pointing of public officers. See post. p. 469 and seq. 3 J . The powers of the Senate in the trying of impeachments. (1). The exact terms of this power. (2). Rea- sons therefor. (3). Objections thereto. . l k The Exact Terms of This Power. "The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that pur- pose they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried the Chief Justice shall preside, and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two- thirds of the members present, (p. 454). 2\ The Reasons Therefor. I 1 . Impeachment is a method of National in- quest into the conduct of public men, and most properly the Representatives of the Na- tion should be the inquisitors. The House of Representatives being allowed to prefer the charges, the other branch of the People's Representatives should be joined in the inquest. 2 1 . Our plan of impeachment is modeled after that of England. There the House of Com- mons impeaches and the House of Lords tries. 3 1 . The Senate will be superior, for this pur- pose, to the Supreme Court. l m . Because of its greater numbers. 2 m . An officer after conviction, upon impeach- ment, is still subject to further indictment and FOEDERALIST. 181 182 punishment, and thus the Supreme Court, if they tried the impeachment, might be called in another trial to pass upon their former judgment, (p. 457). 4 1 . The Senate alone will be superior, for this purpose, to a court consisting of the Senate and Supreme Judges. This plan would be subject to objection un- der (2 m ). (p. 457). 3 1 . It would be superior to a Court of Impeach- ment established solely for that purpose. This scheme is utterly impracticable. 3 k . Objections to constituting the Senate a Court of Impeachment. I 1 . That it confounds the Legislative and the Judiciary Authority. See Foed., p. 333/ 2 1 . That it will cause such an accumulation of power in the Senate as to make the Govern- ment too aristocratic. l m . The House of Representatives, being the most popular branch of the Government, will be a full match for every other member of the Government. 2 m . The House of Representatives originates money bills. 3 m . The House of Representatives originates all impeachments. 4 m . The House of Representatives will elect the President when the electors fail to choose. 3 1 . That their agency in the appointment of officers will render the Senate too indulgent judges of their appointees. l m . This objection would condemn the prac- tice of all the State Governments, (p. 463). 2 m . The Senators would feel no partiality to- ward their appointees, since the President chooses and they merely confirm. 4'. That their agency in making treaties would dawson's foederalist. 183 184 disqualify them as a court, to try their cor- rupt execution of that trust. See Foed., p. 465; Story on Constitution, pp. 803-6. 2*. The Executive — w. c. (1). The general character of the Executive. (2). The manner of his appointment. (3). The Consti- tutional provision for securing energy in the Exec- utive. I s . The general character of the Executive. (1). As represented by the opponents of the Con- stitution. (2). The true character of the Execu- tive. l h . The general character of the Executive as rep- resented by the opponents of the Constitution. l j . General Misrepresentations. 1\ " The Executive is to be the full-grown prog- eny of monarchy.' ' 2\ "He is to have royal prerogatives." 2\ " To be crowned with a diadem and dress in regal purple.'' 4 k . "He is to indulge in a harem." 2 k . A Particular Instance of Misrepresentation. I 1 . The Misrepresentation Stated. The anti-Foederalists charge that the Con- stitution gives the President power to fill va- cancies in the Senate. ( " Cato," nom deplume of George Clinton). 2 1 . The Misrepresentation Answered. See U. S. Const., Art. II., §2, clauses 2 and 3. l m . The Second Clause gives the President Power to make such appointments as are not otherwise provided for in the Constitu- tion, and which shall be established by law. Hence,this law cannot extend to the Senators, because : (1) Their appointments are otherwise pro- vided for, (Art. I, §3 cl. 1.) ; and because, (2) dawson's foederalist. 185 186 dawson's foederalist. they are already established by the Constitu- tion. 2 m . The third clause cannot be understood to give to the President power to fill vacancies in the Senate, because : l n . This third clause is only a supplement to the second, which simply authorizes the President to make temporary appointments during the recess of the Senate to certain offices (e. g., United States Judgeships), to save the expense, trouble and delay of call- ing the Senate together every time such an appointment had to be made. 2 n . The expression, " during the recess of the Senate," was used and not " during the re- cess of the State Legislature," and shows that the Senators were not the officers con- templated. 3 n . Art. I., §3, clause 2, actually provides the manner of filling vacancies in the Senate. (1). If the vacancy happen when the State Legislature is not in session the Governor of the State having the vacancy appoints till the Legislature meets. (2). If the Legislature of the State happen to be in session they proceed to fill the vacancy. 2\ The true character of the Executive. (1). His absolute powers. (2). His qualified powers. (3). The checks on the Executive. (4). The Executive as compared with the King of Great Britain. l j . The absolute powers of the Executive. 1\ Unity, (p. 474). 2\ The qualified right of veto. 3 k . He is commander-in-chief— (1) Of the army of the United States ; (2) And of the State militia when in actual service. 187 188 dawson's foederalist. 4 k . Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences Against the United States. Except in two cases— (1). In cases of impeachment. (2). In cases of contempt of Congress. See Gilmore's Notes, p. 176; 7 Pet. 150; 18 How. 307; 4 Wall. 333; 13 Wall. 128 and 154. 5 k . Power to make recommendations to Con- gress. 6\ Power to call extra sessions of Congress and to adjourn both Houses when they cannot agree on the time of adjournment, (p. 480). 7\ Power to Execute the Laws. 8\ Power to receive Ambassadors. 2 j . The Qualified Powers of the Executive. 1\ To Make Treaties with the Advice and Con- sent of the Senate. 2\ To Make Appointments to Office with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. 3 j . Checks on the Executive. 1\ Liability to Impeachment. 2\ Term of Office — only four years. 3\ His Command of the Militia-contingent. 4 k . No Power to Declare War or Raise Armies and Fleets. 5 k . No power to adjourn Congress except in one case. (6\) 4?. The Executive as compared with the King of Great Britain. l k . As to duration in office. (1). The President elected for four years. (2). The King of Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary prince. 2 k . As to Veto Power. (1). The President has only a qualified veto. (2). The King an absolute veto. 189 190 dawson's foederalist, 3 k . As to Military and Naval Matters. (1). The President is Commander-in-Chief. (2). In addition, the King can declare war and and raise armies, (p. 485). 4 k . As to Amenity to Punishment. (1). The President is Impeachable. (2). The King is Inviolable. 5 k . As to Treaty-Making. (1). The President is associated with the Sen- ate. (2). The King is absolute. 6\ As to Appointments to Office. (1). The President is associated with the Sen- ate. (2). The King is absolute, (p. 486). 7 k . As to Granting Privileges. (1). The President can grant none. (2). The King is their fountain. 8 k . As to Power Over Commerce and Currency. (1). The President can make no rules in respect thereto. (2). The Kingis in fact the arbiter of commerce and can regulate weights and measures. 9 k . As to Religious Matters. (1). The President is no ex-officio " pillar of the church." (2). The King is head of the church. 2 g . The Manner of the Appointment of the Execu- tive. (1). The manner of his appointment. (2). Its, advantages. l h . The Manner of Appointment of the Execu- tive, including the Vice-President. 1 J . The Manner of Appointment prior to 1804. See Const., Art. II., §1, clause 2. 2 j . The Manner of Appointment since 1804. Amendment XII was the result of the long and momentous struggle in the House of Repre- sentatives between Jefferson and Burr for the dawson's foederalist. 191 192 dawson's foederaust. Presidency, in 1801, growing out of the defects of the original Article. 2\ The Advantages of the Manner of Appoint- ment of the Executive. It was the intention of the framers of the Con- stitution for the people to select the electors merely and for the electors to select the President, giving them the right of an independent choice, unimpaired by instructions. Had the spirit of the Constitution been followed the following advan- tages would result : l j . The sense of the people would sufficiently op- erate in their choice of electors. 2 j . The electors, being a small and select body, (1) would be peculiarly fitted for the purpose, and (2) they would act under circumstances most favorable to deliberation. 3 J . It would prevent tumult and disorder. 4\ It would prevent cabal and corruption. Under our present system of National nomi- nating conventions, the electors might be called on to select in case the person receiving the ma- jority of the electoral vote should die before the meeting of the electoral college; as would have been the case had Horace Greeley received a ma- jority of the electoral vote. 3 s . The Constitutional Provisions for Securing Energy in the Executive. (1). The ingredients which constitute this energy . (2). The ingredients which constitute safety in the Republican sense. (3). The Constitutional pro- visions to combine safety and energy examined. l h . The Ingredients Which Constitute This En- ergy. (1). Unity. (2). Duration. (3). Adequate com- pensation. (4). Competent powers. 2 h . Ingredients Which Constitute Energy in the Republican Sense. (1). Due dependence on the people. (2). Due re- sponsibility. dawson's foederalist. 193 194 3\ The Constitutional Provisions to Combine Safety and Energy Examined. l j . In Respect of Unity. (1). Objection to a plural Executive. (2). Ad- vantages of a single Executive. 1\ Objections to a Plural Executive, (p. 492). I 1 . Dissensions and indecisions. 2 1 . It conceals faults and destroys responsi- bility. 3 1 . Additional Expense. 2\ Advantages of a Single Executive. See 1\ 2 j . In respect of duration of office, (p. 496). (1) The extent of duration in office of the Pres- ident; (2) the objects of duration in office; (3) the re-eligibility of the President. l k . The Extent of Duration in Office of the Pres- ident. The term of four years was finally settled on by the convention as best satisfying the two requisites of (1) Stability of the administration, and (2) a proper dependence on the Executive on the peo- ple. 2 k . The objects of duration in office of the Pres- ident ; there are two : (1) To give to the President personal firmness in the employment of his Constitutional pow- ers, and (2) to give stability to his administra- tion. I 1 . To give to the President personal firmness in the employment of his Constitutional powers. l m . From the principle that the greater a man's tenure of a place, or property, the greater his interest in it. (p. 497). 2 m . By its preventing an undue and servile pliancy of the Executive to the Congress or to the people, (p. 500). dawson's foederalist. 195 196 dawson's foederalist. 3 m . By its tendency to keep separate the three departments of Government. 2 1 . To give stability to the Administration of the President, (p. 502). (1). Administration of Government defined. (2). The functions of the President. (3). The effect of duration on the stability of the Presi- dent's Administration. l m . Administration of Government defined. l n . In its largest sense. It comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether Executive, Legislative or Judiciary. 2\ In its most usual and precise sense. It is limited to Executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the Execu- tive Department. - 2 m . The functions of the President. l n . The general superintendence of these mat- ters. 1°. The conduct of foreign negotiations. 2°. The preparatory plans of finance. 3°. The application and disbursement of ap- propriations. 4°. The direction of the Army and Navy. 2 n . The appointment of the persons having immediate management of the above func- tions. 3 m . The effect of duration in office on the sta- bility of the President's Administration. Frequent changes of men usually mean fre- quent changes of measures, or instability of Government. 3\ The re-eligibility of the President. (1). Its advantages. (2). Its pretended dis- advantages. I 1 . The advantages of the re-eligibility of the President. l m . As an inducement to good behavior. DAWSON 's FOEDERALIST. 197 198 dawson's foederalistv 2 m . To prevent the temptation to sordid views, to peculations and to usurpations. 3 m . To lessen the number of ex-Presidents " wandering among the People like discon- tented ghosts and sighing for a place they were never more to fill." (p. 505). [As examples of the contrary spirit : John Quincy Adams was a member of the House of Representatives, after having been Presi- dent, and died in Congress ; ex-President Tyler acted as Justice of the Peace, and ex-President Andrew Jackson acted as road overseer.] 4 m . The people might avail themselves of the experience gained by the President in the ex- ercise of his office, (p. 506). 5 m . There are particular junctures in a State when the continuance of one man in office is of the greatest moment to the public interests. 6 m . Ineligibility would amount to a consti- constitutional interdiction of stability of ad- ministration, (p. 506). 2 1 . The Pretended Disadvantages of Re-eligi- bility. l m . Greater Independence of the President This is a doubtful proposition. 2 m . Greater Security to the People. It is very questionable policy to prevent the people from continuing in office men who have commended themselves to confidence. 3 j . An adequate provision for the support of the President. (1). How secured by the Constitution. (2). The necessity for such declaration in the Constitution, (p. 509). l k . How secured by the Constitution. " The President of the United States shall re- ceive for his service a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the time for which he shall have been elected \ and he shall not receive within that period any other dawson's foederalisT. 199 200 dawson's foederalist. emolument from the United States, or any of them." 2\ The necessity for such a declaration in the in the Constitution. I 1 . It was not to be left to the Congress. For a control over a man's support being in general a control over his will, it would hare rendered the Executive obsequious to the Legis- lative Department and thus made the separa- tion of the three departments merely theoretical, (p. 509). 2 1 . It could not be definitely fixed in the Consti- tution, because of the varying of circum- stances and in the value of money ; an amount that would be proper now might be entirely inadequate ten years hence. 4 J . Competent Powers. l k . The Power of a Qualified Veto. (1). The objects of this power. (2). Its nature and reasons therefor. I 1 . The Objects of This Power. l m . To protect the Executive against the en- croachments of the Legislature, (p. 510). 2 m . To guard against the enaction of bad laws. This assumes not that the President, or one man, will possess more wisdom than Congress, or many men, but that the oftener measures are examined the greater the likelihood of avoiding their defects. 2 l . The Nature of This Power, and Reasons Therefor. l m . The Nature of a Qualified Veto. By this is meant that when a bill passes both Houses of Congress it must be presented to the President, either to sign it and thus make a law, or to return it to the House originating it, with his objections, and it shall require two- thirds of each House to pass a bill over his veto. (p. 514). dawson's foederaust. 201 202 DAWSON 'S FOEDERALIST. 2 m . Reasons for a Qualified Veto. An absolute veto would be less readily used: a man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single veto, might not scruple to return it for reconsideration. 2\ Power of "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States." 3 k . Power to require the opinion in writing "of the principal officer in each of the Executive Departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices" 4\ Power " to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States except." (p. 517.) (1) In cases of impeachment. (2) In cases of punishments for contempts imposed by Congress. (7 Pet. 150 ; 4 Wall. 343 ; Ex- Attorney-General Garland's case, 4 Wall. 333). 5 k . Power "by and with the advice and con- sent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." There are five ways in which this power could have been delegated, contended for. (p. 519). (1). To the Senate and President jointly. (2). To the Senate alone. (3). To the President alone. (4). By joining the House of Representatives in a share of the power. (5). In requiring two-thirds of all the Sena- tors. I 1 . The Constitution gives the power to the President and Senate jointly. l m . Treaty-making is partly a legislative and partly an Executive act, in that a treaty par- takes of the nature of a law and of a con- tract. dawson's foederalist. 203 204 DAWSON 's FOEDERALIST. 2 m . The Senate is associated rather than the House of Representatives, or both the House of Representatives and Senate, because of its superior wisdom and its greater stability. 2 1 . It would not be best to grant this power to the Senate alone. l m . Treaty-making not being altogether a legislative act. 2 m . The benefit of the Constitutional agency of the President would have been lost. (p. 522). 3\ It would not be best to grant this power to the President alone. l m . It is not wholly an Executive act. 2 m . It would be unsafe. 4 1 . It would not have been best to have asso- ciated the House of Representatives. See Foed., pp.448 and 523 and seq. ; ante, p. 183. 5 1 . The reasons for requiring two-thirds of all the Senators present and not two-thirds of all the Senators. See Foed., p. 143. 6 k . The power "to nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to ap- point ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, J vdges of the Supreme Court and all other officers of the United States, whose ap- pointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution:' (p. 526). (1). The advantage of this plan. (2). The disadvantages of others. I 1 . The Advantages of This Plan. l m . In vesting the appointments solely in the President. l n . The undivided responsibility will beget a livelier sense of duty. 2 n . He will have fewer personal attachments than a body of men. 205 206 dawson's foederalist. 3 n . He will be free from that diversity of views and interests that distract a collec- tive body. (p. 528). 4 n . Appointments to office will be more gen- erally the result of merit than of political " trades." 2 m . In vesting the confirmation of the ap- pointments in the Senate. l n . It secures all the advantages from vesting the whole power solely in the President. Whoever may be chosen will be the choice of the President, and the responsibility of the appointment would still rest on him. 2\ It Avoids Several Disadvantages of a Sole Power in the President. 1°. They will be a powerful check on the favoritism of the President. 2°. They will contribute to the stability of the Administration. The consent of the Senate would be neces- sary to displace as well as to appoint to office, (p. 532). [The present doctrine is that this consent is necessary], 7\ The Power of Giving Information to Con- gress of the State of the Union. 8\ The power of recommending measures to Congress. 9 k . The power of convening both Houses or either of them on extraordinary occasions. Power to convene either House was given to prevent the convening of the House of Repre- sentatives when a treaty was to be considered. 10\ Power to adjourn Congress when they can- not agree on a day. ll k . Power to receive ambassadors, etc. 12\ Power to administer the laws. (p. 536). 13 k . Power to commission all United States officers. dawson's foederalist. 207 208 dawson's foederalist. 3*. The Judiciary — w. c. (1). The necessity for a Foederal Judicature. (2). The manner of constituting it. (3). Its extent. I s . The Necessity for a Foederal Judicature. See Foed., p. 146. 2 g . The Manner of Constituting the Judiciary. (1) The mode of appointing the judges; (2) their tenure of office; (3) the partition of the judi- ciary authority between different courts and their relations to each other. 1\ The Mode of Appointing the Judges. See Foed., p. 526 and seq. ; ante p. 218 and seq. 2\ The Tenure of Office of the Judges. (1) Their duration in office; (2) their compen- sation; (3) the precautions for their responsi- bility. l j . The Duration in Office of the Judges. l k . The Constitutional provision thereon. The judges hold their offices during good be- havior, though by Act of Congress a Judge who is seventy years of age and has served ten years can resign on full pay. 2 k . The Reasons for Such Duration in Office of the Judges. 1\ It conforms to the most approved of the then (1787) State Constitutions. 2 1 . To secure the independence of the Judges. l m . The Weakness of the Judiciary. Their tendency is to be the weakest of the three departments of the Government. 2 m . The Necessity for Independence in the Judges. l n . If the Judiciary is not strong enough to secure its independence of either of the other branches, the Union of two against one will result and tyranny will be unavoidable. 2*. Because of our limited Constitution. Limitations on the Legislature can only be dawson's foederalist. 209 210 dawson's foederalist. preserved through the courts with their power of declaring unconstitutional acts void. This does not imply superiority of the Ju- diciary over the Legislative, only the superi- ority of the Constitution over both. (p. 547). 3\ In checking bad legislation. 4\ In warding the Constitution and the Rights of the People against the effects of ill humor. 5\ To give time to the judges to Qualify themselves and become familiar with the Laws and Precedents. 6 n . As an inducement to fit men to accept the Positions. 2 J . The Compensation of the Judges. (1). The constitutional provision and (2) rea- sons therefor. l k . The Constitutional Provision. The judges of the United States 4 ' shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their con- tinuance in office.' ' 2 k . The Reasons Therefor. The fluctuation of money would not admit of a fixed salary in the Constitution and hence it was necessary to leave this to the discretion of Congress without the power of lessening their salaries. 3 j . The Precautions for Their Responsibility. They are liable to impeachment. 3\ The Partition of the Judiciary Authority be- tween the different courts and their relations to each other. (1) The Constitutional provision thereon; (2) the distribution of judicial authority between the Supreme Court and the inferior courts; (3) the jurisdiction of State courts on Foederal questions w. c. (p. 559). l j . The Constitutional Provision Thereon. dawson's foederalist. 211 212 (1) The provision stated; (2) the necessity for one Supreme Court as a separate and distinct body; (3) the necessity for inferior courts. 1\ The Provision Stated. "The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such in- ferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." 2 k . The Necessity for One Supreme Court as a Separate and Distinct Body. I 1 . To guard against an improper intermixture of powers. 2 1 . To prevent the absurdity of referring the revision of the decisions of permanent judges to those appointed for only one, two or six years, as in the case of Representatives and Senators, (p. 562). 3\ Members of the Legislative Departments are not often selected for their Judicial quali- ties, (p. 564). 3 k . The necessity for inferior courts. I 1 . As a matter of convenience. It will prevent the necessity of an appeal to the Supreme Court in every case of Foederal cognizance. 2 1 . As an aid to the Supreme Court. 3 1 . Because the State Courts would not be pro- per substitutes. l m . From their local spirit. 2 m . From the peculiar tenure of the State Judges. 2 J . The distribution of Judicial Authority between the Supreme Court and the inferior courts. 1\ The Judicial Authority of the Supreme Court. I 1 . The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. l m . "In cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls." dawson's fo federalist. 213 214 DAWSON 'S FOEDERALIST. 2 m . "In cases in which a State shall be a Party." 2 1 . The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. l m . In matters of law. (p. 568). This power is unquestioned. 2 m . In matters of Fact. (1) The meaning of "appellate" in this con- nection; (2) it does not endanger trial by jury. l n . The meaning of "appellate" in this con- nection. It denotes the power of one tribunal to re- view the proceedings of another, either as to the law or fact, or both. (p. 569). 2 n . This provision does not endanger Trial by Jury. (Foed. p. 569 and seq. See at length Foed. pp. 557-559.) This provision was adopted because : (1). The appellate jurisdiction will extend to (a). Cases at common law where a revision of the law will be necessary. (b). Cases under the civil law where facts and law are properly and usually reviewed. (2). Express exceptions would not do, hence the most practical plan was that adopted, subject M to such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." (See Foed. p. 569 and seq). (p. 572). 3 j . The jurisdiction of State Courts on Foederal Questions. The jurisdiction of State Courts will remain as it was except where the contrary is shown by the Constitution, or subsequent acts of Congress, (p. 572). As to the course of appeal. (1). It would certainly lie to the Supreme Court of the United States, (p. 574). (2). And probably to the subordinate Foed- eral Courts, (p. 575 and seq). dawson's foederalist. 215 216 dawson's foederalist. 3 g . The extent of the Judiciary Authority. The Judiciary authority of the Union is to extend : 1\ To all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution of the United States. 2\ To cases of Treaties, Ambassadors, other pub" lie Ministers and Consuls, (p. 558). 3 h . To cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdic- tion. 4\ To controversies to which the United States shall be a party 5\ To Controversies (1). Between two or more States. (2). Between a State and citizens of another State. (3). Between citizens of different States. 6\ To cases between .citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States. 7 h . To cases between a State and the citizens thereof. 6 C . Objections to the Constituton Answered. (1). "The Constitution has no Bill of Rights." (2). "The people will be too remote from the capital to watch their Representatives." (3). "There is no provision securing the debts due the United States;" (4) "the great expense of the Government." l d . "The Constitution has no Bill of Rights." l e . Several of the States, including New York, have no Bill of Rights, (p. 595). 2 e . The Constitution has its Equivalent. l f . Limiting the Government in Cases of Impeach- ment. 2 f . Preserving the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 3 f Prohibiting Bills of Attainder and ex post facto Laws. 4 f . Prohibiting Titles of Nobility. 5 f . Preserving Jury Trial in Criminal Cases. 6 f . Defining Treason. 218 DAWSON'S FOEDERALIST. T. Limiting the Punishment of Treason. 8 f . Guaranteeing to the States a Republican Form of Government. 3*. Bills of Rights go into Particulars and Details and are more appropriate in State Constitutions. 4*. Bills of Rights are often Dangerous. The prohibition of certain powers not granted might give a pretence for claiming others not prohib- ited. 2 d . " The People will be too Remote from the Capital to Watch their Representatives." 1*. This Argument Proves too Much. It would prove that there should be no general government. 2 e . The people will have the usual sources of Infor- mation and Safety. l f . Through the Press. 2 f . Through the State Governments. 3 f . The people near the seat of the Government will have personal information. 3*. "There is no provision Securing the Debts of the United States. States do not lose their rights or avoid liabilities by a change of Government, (p. 503 ; Grotius, B. II., chap, ix.) 4 d . "The great expense of the Government. " l e . This is no valid objection if the proposed Gov- ernment be necessary, even if the objection be true. 2 e . As a matter of fact, there will probably be fewer burdens in the matter of expense to the individual citizen than under the Articles of Confederation, (pp. 503, 504 and seq). 5 a . The Analogy of the Proposed Constitution to the Constitution of New York. l b . In its Supposed Defects. l c . The Re-eligibility of the President. 2 C . The Want of a Council. 3 C . The Want of a Bill of Rights. dawson's foederalist. 219 220 dawson's foederalist. 2 b . In its real excellence. 6 a . The Additional Security Which the Adoption of the Constitution Will Afford to Republican Government, to Liberty and Property. l b . Through the restraint which the preservation of the Union will have (1) on local factions, etc. ; (2) on for- eign intrigue, and (3) on military establishments. 2 b . In the express guarantee of a Republican form of Government. 3*. In the Prohibition of Titles of Nobility. 4\ In the wise restrictions on the States. Part III. Part III. — Conclusion. l a . The Necessity for an Immediate Adoption of the Constitution. 1\ No Perfect Constitution can result from Imperfect man. 2 b . No Better Constitution is likely to result from an- other Convention. 3\ The precarious condition of the country demands an early change. 2 a . Amendments to the Constitution can best be secured by first adopting the Constitution.