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# *“Atlanta And Its Builders”*



# Atlanta and Its Builders

*A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY  
OF THE GATE CITY OF THE SOUTH*

By  
THOMAS H. MARTIN

Volume One



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## *Preface*

CONSCIOUS of its deficiencies, the editor presents this result of his labors to his fellow townsmen. Although the work is largely a compilation of facts and figures touching the history of Georgia's metropolis from its founding to this good year, and no special merit of originality is claimed for it, the reader will find much in these pages as is not elsewhere easily accessible in printed form—matter authentic and valuable for reference. Particularly is this true of the war history recorded with great fidelity and no little detail in the first volume. The facts therein contained were gathered from original sources—Federal and Confederate—mostly direct from field orders, reports and correspondence. The task involved a vast deal of research and reading, but the editor feels compensated by the belief that a fuller or more reliable narrative of the famous “Atlanta Campaign,” from Dalton to Jonesboro, was never written.

The second volume, which deals with post-bellum and modern Atlanta, will, we believe, be found to be brought down to date in preserving a record of the city's upbuilding and remarkable progress. The past decade has completely metamorphosed Atlanta physically. Her rehabilitation after the ruthless legions of Sherman passed through her ashes to the sea was not more magical, if we may use the word, than has been her rapid transformation in this latter conquest of peace. It is surprising, at first blush, but nearly all of the better buildings of Atlanta, business and residential, have been constructed within less than the past ten years,

and this means the practical rebuilding of the city and its wide expansion in that short space of time. It goes without saying that, under such progressive conditions, Atlanta has been making history very fast of late.

The enterprise of the publishers in the way of handsomely illustrating Atlanta of to-day, will, we are sure, be appreciated by subscribers to these volumes. Many of the views are the first and exclusive, while some familiar ones are seen from a new viewpoint.

We cannot close these few prefatory words without acknowledging with sincere appreciation our indebtedness to Col. E. Y. Clarke and Mr. Wallace Putnam Reed, distinguished pathfinders and record keepers of Atlanta's short but wonderful annals. Acknowledgments are also made for valuable assistance in the work of compiling these volumes to Mr. Lucian L. Knight, literary editor, and Frank L. Fleming, assistant city editor of the Atlanta Constitution.

THOMAS H. MARTIN.

ATLANTA, October, 1902.



# *Contents*

## CHAPTER I

WHEN THERE WAS NO ATLANTA.....	I
--------------------------------	---

## CHAPTER II

NORTHWEST GEORGIA SETTLERS.....	11
---------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER III

WHEN ATLANTA WAS TERMINUS.....	19
--------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER IV

WHEN ATLANTA WAS MARTHASVILLE.....	29
------------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER V

SOME EARLY CONDITIONS AND INCIDENTS.....	40
--	----

## CHAPTER VI

SOME FURTHER REMINISCENCES.....	52
---------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER VII

THE CHRISTENING OF ATLANTA.....	66
---------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER VIII

WELL-KNOWN PIONEER CITIZENS.....	76
----------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER IX

PROGRESS AND OUTLAWRY.....	88
----------------------------	----

## CHAPTER X

THE EARLY FIFTIES.....	100
------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XI

UNINTERRUPTED DEVELOPMENT.....	114
--------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XII

SOME ANCIENT MUNICIPAL HISTORY.....	122
-------------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XIII

ATLANTA IN THE PANIC YEAR.....	133
--------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XIV

ATLANTA IN 1859.....	143
----------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XV

WAR CLOUDS.....	154
-----------------	-----

## CHAPTER XVI

FIRST YEARS OF THE WAR.....	164
-----------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XVII

ANDREWS'S RAILROAD RAID.....	177
------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XVIII

"ON TO ATLANTA".....	202
----------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XIX

EVACUATION OF DALTON.....	215
---------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XX

RESACA .....	226
--------------	-----

## CHAPTER XXI

BACK TO THE ETOWAH.....	248
-------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XXII

NEW HOPE CHURCH AND DALLAS.....	265
---------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XXIII

INCH BY INCH.....	294
-------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXIV

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN.....	314
------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXV

DOWN TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE.....	336
--------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXVI

CLOSING IN ON ATLANTA.....	357
----------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXVII

BATTLE OF PEACHTREE CREEK.....	371
--------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXVIII

BATTLE OF ATLANTA.....	393
------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXIX

THE MOVEMENT TO THE WEST.....	422
-------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXX

BATTLE OF EZRA CHURCH.....	436
----------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXXI

CAVALRY RAIDS AND STONEMAN'S CAPTURE.....	454
---	-----

CHAPTER XXXII

REACHING FOR THE MACON ROAD.....	474
----------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXXIII

SHELLING ATLANTA.....	491
-----------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXXIV

INSIDE ATLANTA DURING THE CAMPAIGN.....	507
---	-----

CHAPTER XXXV

OPERATIONS NEAR EAST POINT AND WHEELER'S RAID.....	328
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXVI

SHERMAN'S GRAND FLANK MOVEMENT.....	551
-------------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XXXVII

BATTLE OF JONESBORO.....	568
--------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE FALL OF ATLANTA.....	591
--------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XXXIX

THE UNION OCCUPATION.....	611
---------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XL

THE DESTRUCTION OF ATLANTA.....	629
---------------------------------	-----

*Appendix*

## CHAPTER XLI

SHERMAN'S REPORT.....	643
-----------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XLII

JOHNSTON'S REPORT.....	676
------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XLIII

HOOD'S REPORT.....	687
--------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XLIV

HARDEE'S REPORT.....	698
----------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XLV

SMITH'S REPORT.....	706
---------------------	-----

# *Illustrations*

FIRST TWO-STORY BUILDING IN ATLANTA.....	24
GEORGE W. ADAIR—PORTRAIT.....	31
ER LAWSHÉ—PORTRAIT.....	41
RICHARD PETERS—PORTRAIT.....	50
OLD HOMESTEAD OF EX-GOV. JOSEPH E. BROWN.....	72
JONATHAN NORCROSS—PORTRAIT.....	77
JOHN COLLIER—PORTRAIT.....facing	79
JOHN SILVEY—PORTRAIT.....	102
C. H. STRONG—PORTRAIT.....	123
N. J. HAMMOND—PORTRAIT.....	138
SIDNEY ROOT—PORTRAIT.....	160
JOSEPH PAYNE LOGAN, M. D.—PORTRAIT.....	166
GEN. L. J. GARTRELL—PORTRAIT.....	169
HOME OF EX-GOVERNOR COLQUITT.....	216
GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S HOME.....	229
GOVERNOR'S MANSION.....	252
CONFEDERATE BREASTWORKS, ON HOWELL'S MILL ROAD.....	267
CONFEDERATE BREASTWORKS, MADE IN '64, NOW IN THE CITY LIMITS.....	281
WHERE CAPT. E. P. HOWELL'S BATTERY WAS PLACED, JULY 20, '64.....	372
SCENE ON PEACHTREE CREEK BATTLEGROUND, TWO MILES NORTHWEST OF ATLANTA .....	378
MCPHERSON MONUMENT.....	402
CONFEDERATE MONUMENT.....	450
LAMP POST, CORNER ALABAMA AND WHITEHALL STREETS, SHOWING FRACTURE CAUSED BY YANKEE SHELL .....	492
COLLIER RESIDENCE, CORNER OF NELSON AND CHAPEL STREETS.....	500
THOMAS S. POWELL, M. D.—PORTRAIT.....	511
ATLANTA COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS.....	516
CONFEDERATE BREASTWORKS, MADE IN '64, ON MARIETTA STREET.....	521

CONFEDERATE BREASTWORKS, GRANT PARK, MADE TO DEFEND THE CITY OF ATLANTA IN 1864.....	531
ENTRANCE TO OAKLAND CEMETERY.....	547
CONFEDERATE MONUMENT, OAKLAND CEMETERY.....	559
MEMORIAL DAY PARADE, APRIL 26, 1901.....	571
CONFEDERATE SOLDIERS' HOME OF GEORGIA.....	586
JAMES M. CALHOUN—PORTRAIT.....	596
KONTZ RESIDENCE THE, MARIETTA STREET.....	616
EDWARD E. RAWSON—PORTRAIT.....	622
VIEW FROM THE CAPITOL DOME.....	631
OLD SLAVE MARKET, THE, A WAR TIME VIEW.....	636
FIRST BUILDING ERECTED ON WHITEHALL STREET AFTER GENERAL SHER- MAN'S DEPARTURE IN 1865.....	638
PEACHTREE STREET, FROM THE RAILROAD TRACKS.....	640

## CHAPTER I

### WHEN THERE WAS NO ATLANTA

A city whose non-existence can be remembered by a man who has only reached the psalmist's allotted span of life is entitled to the designation of new, especially in a section of the country first to be explored by the Spaniard and which boasts of the oldest town in North America. Savannah, rich and proud of her shipping, a miniature Venice, ambitious of international trade exploitation, was one of the growing cities of the thirteen colonies when the region around Atlanta was a howling wilderness, unpenetrated by a Daniel Boone. Augusta, a bustling cotton mart and the outlet of a long distance overland trade, had been incorporated for a century when the first settler's cabin reared its rude walls on the site of Atlanta. Other leading cities of Georgia had railroad connections and for a generation or more had enjoyed a wide commercial intercourse when the magic word Atlanta first appeared on the map of the old commonwealth. Indeed, the metropolis of the Southeast may truthfully be said to be a post-bellum product, for, search through its length and breadth, and you will with difficulty find a landmark that recalls so recent and momentous an era of history as the civil war—the bloody cradle in which the infancy of Atlanta was rocked. This, anywhere but in the West, is anomalous. Many of the booming Western cities are older than the South's most progressive and quickly growing city. Atlanta is new. The hope of youth is in her heart and the suppleness of youth is in her limbs. She is the civic personification of strength and promise. Her glories are not reminiscences. Her life is all before her, and her achievement but an earnest of what she will do.

It is appropriate, in setting about the task of attempting to trace the growth and chronicle the annals of so remarkable a city

to look somewhat into the environing conditions antedating its birth. In these conditions, themselves anomalous, will be found the reason of Atlanta's comparative newness. When the coast region and lowlands of the state were thickly settled, and, in some respects, already effete, the region now immediately tributary to Atlanta—the whole of northwest Georgia, in fact—was a great Indian reservation, to enter which was legally “intrusion,” punishable by fines and imprisonment. The Cherokees, the most intelligent and powerful of all the aboriginal tribes, occupied the primeval forests of this half explored hill country and carried on, in a primitive way, their agriculture and domestic industries. They were not savages, by any means, in the generally accepted view of the Indian. They were not there by sufferance, or as buffalo in a national park, to satisfy a sentimental governmental sense of equity. They owned these lands and had established upon them comfortable, though humble, homes, with occasional villages which supported schools and churches. Since the landing of Oglethorpe they had been the object of the religious solicitude of the missionaries, and may be said to have been quite effectually christianized and civilized. Moreover, they preserved, by virtue of their treaty rights with the general government, a kind of political autonomy that exempted them from amenability to the state laws and left them free to carry on a queer mixture of civil and tribal government. They had the proud characteristics of their race in a superlative degree and were extremely jealous of white encroachment. During those days they amalgamated little with the Caucasian and insisted on their treaty guarantee of social isolation. Every attempt on the part of the “boomers” of that time to break down their Chinese wall of exclusiveness was met with a rude diplomacy in the committee rooms and departments at Washington, creditable to the Cherokee's reputation for statesmanship. They had strong leaders—such men as John Ross and Elias Boudinot—and as the cordon of civilization drew tighter about them their stubborn resistance to the attempt to make them take “the white man's path” was ready for any lengths of patriotic heroism.

The state of Georgia, during the first quarter of the century, had resorted to every expedient to crowd the Cherokees across its



western borders. At first it was successful in obtaining possession of much of their lands through the William Penn policy of "swapping," but in time the Indians came to set the true value upon what was left of their broad acres, and further cessions by one-sided purchase were no longer possible. In northwest Georgia the tribe made its last stand for a home, begirt by pioneer settlers. The state was determined to oust the unwelcome red men, and, it is easy to believe, prepared to make any means justify the end. The history of the banishment of these Indians from the state is as pathetic as was the exile of the Acadians. The conflict of the laws of the Cherokee Nation and those of Georgia was seized upon by the latter as the easiest method of weakening the tribe's hold on congress. The Georgia delegation in the national legislature began a systematic campaign of dispossession. On the floor and in cloakroom and lobby persistent arguments were advanced and schemes proposed to accomplish the difficult result. The Indians, in an ugly mood, had occasion to resist with force repeated attempts on the part of determined white men to invade their lands. The state of Georgia, restive under the denial of its sovereignty within its own borders on the part of the United States, which the latter's adherence to the Cherokee treaties amounted to, threatened to ignore federal authority to the extent of treating the tribe as amenable to the state jurisdiction, and there were clashes of authority with the view of making test cases of the questions at issue. Indeed, the state legislature did embrace the tribe within the scope of its criminal jurisdiction, notwithstanding the assumption by the central government of the sole right to exercise authority in all matters affecting the Indians, collectively or individually. The tribe had its own legislative council and machinery of local government, modeled, in the main, after white administration, and the supervisory office of the powers at Washington was nominal, except in extraordinary emergencies. The Indians punished their own criminals, and cases involving offenses between the races were adjudicated by federal courts. The United States were pledged to exclude from the Cherokee reservation all white people who had not been permitted to enter by permission of the tribal council. The triangular conflict of authority extended through several years, becom-

ing more aggravated each year, until, to make a long story short, Georgia succeeded in inducing congress to pass a law providing for the emigration of the tribe in a body to the lands set apart for them in the Indian Territory. The state was given authority to assume its long deferred jurisdiction over the Cherokee territory, and, upon the removal of the Indians, to dispose of the vacated lands to settlers. This was in 1827.

But a few hundred of the 15,000 Cherokees obeyed the mandate of removal. Chief Ross refused to acknowledge the legality of the proposed procedure and was backed in his recalcitration by the council and head men. For four years the tribe remained upon the old reservation in quiet defiance of nation and state, the white usurpers fearing to precipitate an Indian war by taking decisive measures. It was known that the young braves were eager to resist the abandonment of their homes with arms in their hands. The wary old statesmen of the tribe filibustered with the Indian department and tried to entangle the situation with red tape. A case was brought by Chief Ross, for his people, in the supreme court of the United States, praying for an injunction to prevent the state of Georgia from exercising jurisdiction over a Cherokee criminal whose offense had theretofore been cognizable in the tribal courts. The supreme court ruled in favor of the Indians, and the effect of the ruling was to prevent the state from executing its laws within the territory occupied by the Cherokees. This brought matters to a focus. The legislature of 1831 passed a bill to survey the lands of the Cherokee Nation, and Governor Lumpkin a little later ordered the survey to be made, but it was the purpose of the state to take no steps toward taking possession of the lands until a reasonable time had elapsed, the Washington authorities promising to see that the Indians left peaceably. Georgia also passed a law requiring all white men resident in the Cherokee Nation by consent of the tribe to take the oath of allegiance to the state. The penalty of non-compliance was a minimum term of four years in the penitentiary at hard labor. The latter law further complicated and aggravated the dangerous situation, and, with the decision of the supreme court, raised the direct issue of "state's rights" with the Washington government. Some of the white missionaries laboring among the Indians,

northerners for the most part, ignored the new law. Two of them, by name Worcester and Butler, were arrested by state officers, and upon conviction in a state court, sentenced to long terms in the penitentiary, in spite of the fact that the United States supreme court had issued a mandate requiring their release. These unfortunate missionaries remained in prison a couple of years, obtaining their freedom, after the exertion of much influence throughout the state in their behalf, through the governor's pardon.

The Indians showing no disposition to obey the "Great Father at Washington," Georgia "took the bull by the horns" and formally organized ten counties in the lands embraced by the Cherokee Nation and established a lottery for the disposition of the allotted claims to settlers. By this time, it being evident that emigration would be forced upon them, even at the point of the bayonet, the Cherokees had become divided among themselves and there was a strong pro-emigration party led by John Ridge, who held that the tribe would fare infinitely better by obeying the power of the government and obtain beneficial concessions. Chief Ross held out doggedly against the proposition, contending for \$20,000,000 and the settlement of impossible claims. In 1835 the two factions were represented in the Washington lobby by strong delegations headed by these opposing leaders, and the whole question was reopened in congress. Much interest was aroused in behalf of the Indians all over the country, particularly in religious circles. The South, then dominant in Washington, supported the contention of Georgia, probably largely because of the issue of state sovereignty raised, and the Ross party returned to the reservation hopeless. Feuds broke out among the Indians and killings resulted from their differing opinions. In another year the Ridge party had won a majority of the tribe to its side, and a final treaty was ratified. Under this treaty the Indians proposed to move peaceably to their new homes beyond the Mississippi, under the direction of agents of the government, relinquishing their lands for \$5,000,000, to be held in trust by the United States. Their new lands were to contain some \$7,000,000 acres, with an unrestricted outlet to the great western plains, to be theirs "so long as grass grows and water runs." The

treaty was signed by Andrew Jackson, president of the United States, and up to a few years ago, when the descendants of these same Indians were forced to consent to take their allotments and dispose of their surplus lands to Uncle Sam, they regarded this treaty as their magna charta and swore by it. It was further stipulated that their new home should never be included within the bounds of any state or territory, without their consent; that the government would protect them from white intrusion, pay them certain sums annually for the support of their schools, etc. The government agreed to settle a mass of old claims, pay a number of influential Indians pensions, and provided for the subsistence of the tribe for a year, during the removal, which was to be made two years from the time the treaty was signed.

As the date set for the hegira approached—May 24, 1838—it was generally believed that trouble was in store and that a large part of the tribe would have to be forcibly evicted. The Ross partisans were making “war medicine,” it was said, and intended to defend their homes with their lives. Two or three volunteer companies were raised among the near-by settlers to be in readiness for an outbreak at any time, and the governor ordered detachments of militia to points close to the reservation. The morning of the eventful day dawned with no signs of preparations having been made on the part of the mass of the Indians, but with plenty of hostile signs. General Winfield Scott, of the war department, had kept in touch with the situation and requested the state to furnish two regiments for the emergency. This was promptly done, General Charles Floyd commanding. Early on the morning of the 24th the military moved upon the reservation, five companies under Captains Stell, Daniel, Bowman, Hamilton and Ellis proceeding to Sixes Town in Cherokee county; two companies under Captains Story and Campbell to Rome; two companies under Captains Horton and Brewster to Fort Gilmer, and Captain Vincent’s company to Cedartown.

Contrary to expectations, there was no trouble, but the wholesale eviction of some 15,000 home-loving Indians was little the less lamentable. Every Indian cabin was entered by the soldiery and the inmates collected in squads and hustled to guarded camps. The state officials protested that this work was done

humanely, and without resorting to violent force, but to this day the Cherokees preserve a tradition of ruthless cruelty connected with their enforced removal of more than three score years ago, which has strengthened their deep-seated race hatred. It was fortunate for the state of Georgia that decisive action was taken by the local authorities, for toward the close of his administration it is said that Jackson was inclined to reverse his Indian policy to please the northern sentimentalists, and Governor Gilmer, then the occupant of Georgia's executive chair, says in his memoirs that Van Buren, who had succeeded to the presidency, was closeted with the lobbyists of the Ross party and had committed himself to a let-alone policy at the very time the Georgia militia was successfully prosecuting the eviction. On June 3 the entire tribe was started for Ross' landing, and by the end of the month several thousand had begun the westward march. It was feared, however, that the heat of midsummer would result in an undue mortality among the emigrants, and word came from Washington that the remainder would not be allowed to move before fall. Accordingly the bulk of the Indians remained in camp until September. It is doubtful if the postponement was in the interest of humanity, for the last half of the journey was through the dead of winter. Hundreds are said to have died of pneumonia and exposure, while small-pox carried away many more. Some idea of the severe sufferings of these Indians can be formed by the bare statement that fully four thousand perished on the march—one-fourth of the entire number. With few exceptions the Cherokees walked the six or seven hundred miles that intervened between their old and new reservation, and their progress was necessarily very slow. Epidemics made long stops necessary, and though the federal government had made abundant provision for their sustenance en route, it was charged that the contractors and agents stinted and made inferior their food supply. Old Indians now residing on the western reservation still speak mysteriously of the mysterious deaths on that historic march. There can be no doubt but that not a few Indians fell victims to the vendetta that the Ross-Ridge feud engendered, while making the journey, some of them, it was suspected, from poison. In less than a year after they had left Georgia, Major Ridge, his son,



John Ridge, and Elias Boudinot were assassinated. Similar crimes continued for more than a generation among the Cherokees as the result of their exile from Georgia. The victims were those who had taken an active part in negotiating the removal treaty.

At this day it is difficult to appreciate the importance to Georgia of the Indian problem then claiming her best statesmanship. The state was upon the edge of the frontier and more or less annoyed by Indian depredations. Even after the Cherokee removal the state found it necessary to send a military expedition to the swamp region in the south to drive marauding Creeks across the line. But, undoubtedly, the principal reasons for desiring to be rid of the Cherokees were because the tribe assumed to maintain an alien sovereignty and fee ownership of a considerable part of the state's territory, and because the Cherokee country was known to be rich in gold. The Cherokees claimed their title from the Creeks, who had early in the century occupied northwest Georgia. Tradition has it that the land was lost by the latter tribe as the prize at stake in a ball game played between the skillfullest warriors of the two tribes. This great ball game was said to have occurred sometime between 1816 and 1820. In his admirable book of reminiscences, "The Georgians," Governor George R. Gilmer throws a flood of light on the "inside facts" connected with the whole Cherokee imbroglio. While the author does not write with the impartiality supposed to belong to the historian, he presents both sides of the controversy clearly enough to enable readers at this late day to form correct conclusions. The state denied the Cherokee title, which the general government sustained. At that time there was a great hue and cry being raised by the citizens of those states that were well rid of Poor Lo against the government's "unchristian" Indian policy. In the north congressmen made their canvass on a platform pledged to the protection of "Indian rights," and the church denominations of that section were strongly represented in the Washington lobby fighting for what they considered a humanitarian cause. Indeed, the Georgia Indian question was a factor in the contest for the presidency between Adams and Jackson, the former standing as the Indian's friend. Contemporary writers

assert that Adams had the better of his opponent on this question, so far as the majority sentiment was concerned, and that Jackson would have lost the race in consequence of what was regarded as his anti-Indian views, had not his military record been so glorious. Moreover, as has been shown, the jealousy of a southern state over its disputed sovereignty was a sharp issue. At several stages of the long controversy the troops of the United States and the militia of the state of Georgia were on the point of a collision. Colonel Harden, who had entered the disputed territory at the head of the Hall county militia to expel gold-seekers, was placed under arrest by a military officer of the United States and his command not allowed to execute its commission. Then, too, the course of the missionaries, Worcester and Butler, in making a "stage play" of martyrdom for the benefit of the northern church people, was a most aggravating incident. They claimed federal protection on the ground that they were employees of the government. Governor Gilmer in his book speaks with much bitterness of the sectional and religious prejudice that the missionaries settled among the Cherokees were inciting, and in his correspondence with the federal authorities makes clear the danger of a serious breach between the state and national governments. It was not until 1830 that congress, by the narrow margin of five votes, passed a bill authorizing the president to exchange with any Indian tribe lands of the United States west of the Mississippi river for lands occupied by them in any state or territory. The methods by which the "consent" of the Cherokees was obtained to their banishment will continue to remain unwritten history. This law freed Georgia forever of their obnoxious presence, though not until eight years after its passage.

Governor Gilmer had a very poor opinion of the "civilization" of these Indians that gave him so much official trouble. He thought them incorrigible savages, brutish as the beasts of the field. Like many of our modern authorities on the Indian question, he held that their only salvation lay in amalgamation with the whites, and he makes no disguise of his lack of respect for a white man who would make himself a personal factor in thus solving the problem. He stigmatized the wealthy half-breeds who

owned slaves, cultivated large farms and kept ferries and taverns as social renegades, and declared many of them were refugees from justice. It was this element, to which Chief Ross and the ringleading mischiefmakers belonged, that influenced the genuine Indians to oppose the wishes of the Federal government and defy the authority of the state. It will be remembered as an incident of those troublous times that in the late winter of 1830 a party of armed and painted Cherokees raided white settlements within the disputed territory and drove the settlers from their cabins while the ground was covered with snow and sleet, burning the houses and farm improvements. This outrage sealed the doom of the tribe, so far as retaining a home in Georgia was concerned.

In closing this chapter, which, it will presently be seen, deals with a phase of Georgia history that directly concerns the foundation and early progress of Atlanta, it is interesting to note that more than sixty years after the Cherokees sought a new home in the West, they are confronted with almost identically the same, to them, dangers, that they abandoned Georgia to escape. The United States, contrary to the letter and spirit of the treaty of 1836, is about to divest the tribe of independent self-government, change its ancient system of land tenure, make American citizens of the Indians, and include their extinguished reservation within the boundaries of a state or territory of the union. Of course, as in the Georgia case, the Cherokees have deemed it the part of wisdom to "consent" to this.



## CHAPTER II

### NORTHWEST GEORGIA SETTLERS

To understand the spirit characteristic of Atlanta since her foundation—the spirit of pluck and push—one must take into consideration the peculiar character of the pioneers who made the country that made Atlanta. In doing so one cannot but be struck by the analogy of her history with that of the average Western town. While it is true that the portion of DeKalb county which included Atlanta the first few years of her history was outside the disputed Cherokee territory, it was but a few miles from the Indian border—so close that some of the land in the vicinity of the then unborn town was clouded by Cherokee claims. When Georgia finally obtained possession of the great reservation, a considerable portion of it was added to DeKalb county. The rest was added to Carroll, Gwinnett, Hall and Habersham counties. Georgia, it will be borne in mind, was a comparatively old state at the time of the Cherokee emigration. Its desirable public lands were long since taken by settlers, and many of her hardy sons had joined the constantly growing army of pioneers seeking homes on the rich prairies a few hundred miles west. In those days it was a common expression among the restless landless class that “A poor man has no chance in Georgia.” The arable lands of the commonwealth were largely in the hands of large landlords who cultivated them by means of slave labor, and the poor white who could not obtain a foothold in the Piedmont hill country and clear a farm from the forest, naturally drifted west. For years before the opening of the Cherokee reservation was accomplished, the eyes of thousands of worthy men with little capital but the will and muscle to do, were turned toward the forbidden land, hoping to ere long be able to find homes there.

Since these men largely laid the foundation of Atlanta's prosperity, it is well to know something about them in this con-

nection. Few of them could boast of aristocratic forebears who received handsome land patents from their English sovereign, or who were members of exclusive colonial society. They sprang from the stock that made possible the patriot victory at King's Mountain—the shaggy wearers of homespun and coonskin caps whose long-barreled rifles made the Hessian dearly earn his hire. Davy Crockett will stand as a representative type of the "back-woodsmen" who cleared the farms of the great Appalachian region, and it was from such ancestors that the settlers of north Georgia came. These indomitable home-makers were for the most part of the matchless strain known as Scotch-Irish, possessing those rugged traits of independence, industriousness and honesty that Burns extols in his verse. Probably the descendants of these pioneers represent to-day the most distinctive type of American. They have preserved their native blood against the hybridizing effect of foreign immigration, so manifest in all other sections of the country, and their Americanism is as unadulterated.

Speaking of this important element of citizens, the "The Commonwealth of Georgia" thus describes the North Georgians: "The population of Northeast Georgia is largely made up of immigrants and their descendants from the mountain regions of the states lying eastward. These, in their turn, had an unusual sprinkling of Scotch blood, due to another natural law that impels emigrants from an older country to seek the counterpart of their own familiar mountains, dales or plains, as the case may be, in the El Dorado of their future. The rough, hardy Scotch, inured to hardship, accustomed to their cold mountain springs, and their clear streams of water, upon landing on the coast regions of the Old Dominion and the Old North State, would naturally seek the Piedmont region. From thence, along the valleys, they have crossed over into Georgia, still finding a congenial home and a thousand reminders of bonny Scotland. Thus the people of Northeast Georgia are largely of Scotch descent, as is otherwise indicated by the prevalence of the prefix, 'Mac.' Northwest Georgia has received considerable accessions of population, by way of reflex, from East Tennessee, whose rich valleys extend into the northwestern counties of Georgia. Many of these were also of Scotch descent. The seacoast counties, on the other

hand, received their principal accessions of population from a class who were blessed with more wealth and corresponding culture—a class more strongly wedded to the traditions of England and France.”

There is a good deal of romance associated with the settlement of North Georgia. A history of the period of Cherokee troubles, picturesquely treated, would read very much like a Pike's Peak rush or the Leadville excitement. As has been stated, the existence of gold in paying quantity in several of the counties afterwards formed from the Cherokee nation, had much to do with the coveting of the country by the white man, and was the source of much trouble and no little expense to the state of Georgia. A large adventurer class was attracted to the Georgia mountains while the Indians still retained possession of the country, and crudely mined in the region between the Chestatee and Etowah rivers. Their operations were carried on mainly by the placer process, and, from Governor Gilmer's account, they must have been a lawless lot. They numbered some ten thousand, gathered from the four quarters. Many of them had, or pretended to have, the permission of the Indians to search for gold. The state regarded their presence with extreme displeasure and sent several military expeditions against them to drive them off the reservation. In a communication to the attorney-general of the United States, Governor Gilmer said: “The state considers itself entitled to all the valuable minerals within the soil of the Cherokee territory, by virtue of its fee simple ownership, and is now permitting itself to be plundered of its wealth from the strong desire of its authorities to avoid any collision with the general government.”

Speaking of the motley crew rendezvousing in the mountain fastnesses of north Georgia, the governor continues: “When this letter was written to the attorney-general, a community was forming in the gold regions scarcely ever paralleled anywhere. Many thousands of idle, profligate people flocked into the country from every point of the compass, whose pent up vicious propensities, when loosed from the restraints of law and public opinion, made them like the evil one, in his worst mood. After wading all day in the creeks which made the Etowah and Chattahoo-

chee rivers, picking up particles of gold, they collected around lightwood knot fires at night and played on the ground and their hats at cards, dice, push pin, and other games of chance, for their day's finding. Numerous whiskey carts supplied the appropriate aliment for their employments. Hundreds of combatants were sometimes seen at fisticuffs, striking and gouging, as frontiersmen only can do these things."

After much importunity on the part of the state of Georgia, the federal authorities took action and drove the gold-hunters out with several companies of infantry, but no sooner were they gone than the Cherokees took possession of the "diggings," mostly through their adopted white citizens, and continued to extract large quantities of gold. The federal troops did not interfere, and indignation among the white people along the border was at a high pitch. Governor Gilmer again wrote the attorney-general, saying: "Very great excitement is said to be the result. There is much reason to apprehend that the Indians will be forcibly driven from the gold region, unless they are immediately prohibited from appropriating its mineral wealth."

The state militia was shortly afterward ordered to the reservation to drive the Indians away from the gold streams, and it was during the first of these expeditions that Col. Harden, in command of the Hall county militia, was put under arrest by the federal commander in the reservation. Time and again the white boomers came back and were driven out. Several times there threatened to be an armed collision between the reckless miners and the military, and there was one riotous encounter that was dignified by the wags of the day by being called the "Battle of Leathersford." The militia had made a number of arrests, when it was set upon by a mob of boomers, who made desperate efforts to release the prisoners. Some heads were cracked with musket butts before the mob was driven off.

It is said that fully twenty thousand men, some of whom were accompanied by their families, had gathered around the Cherokee Nation in regular Oklahoma fashion, to await the departure of the aboriginal occupants. On the northern border the mountaineers of Tennessee and North Carolina were largely in evidence, and the canvas-topped wagons of the Piedmont Geor-

gians dotted the southern border. It was a weary waiting, some of the intending settlers suffering severely for the necessities of life. Some of them lived in camps for seven or eight years before they were allowed to offer their names in the lottery that determined who should go in and enjoy the promised land. The Cherokee craze extended over the whole north half of Georgia and the adjacent region of neighboring states. The popular songs of the time referred to the common hope of obtaining Indian land. There was one, a couplet of which ran:

“ I’m goin’ for to leave my poor relation  
And get me a home in the Cherokee Nation.”

Such conditions as have been briefly described may with more degree of truth than appears on the surface be said to have given birth to Atlanta. Not that Atlanta came up like a mushroom, as a supply point for the Indian country or the receptacle of its overflow. It was several years after the Cherokees had removed to their new home before the little hamlet in the woods, destined to be the metropolis and capital of Georgia, contained a dozen shanties. But the opening of the Cherokee Nation had much to do with railroad building in northwest Georgia, and Atlanta was essentially the creation of the railroads. Two years before the Cherokees left, railroad conventions met in Knoxville, Tenn., and Macon, Ga., to project the construction of a railroad between the Chattahoochee and Tennessee rivers, and in the same year the legislature of Georgia passed a bill to build the State road as a main trunk between those important rivers, passing through the Cherokee territory. One of the strong points urged by the state before congress was the impediment of the Cherokee Nation to material progress. The great valley of Tennessee, unable to find an eastern outlet to the seaboard, because of the insuperable barrier interposed by the lofty Appalachian range, was anxious for railroad connection with Georgia to that end. When the Indians departed from Georgia, the bars were thrown down. There was no room for a large town northwest of the center of the state prior to that important event. There were no local resources to invite the railroads, and nothing to invite the people. Once the impediment was removed, the change was almost instantaneous. Less than a year after the federal



government had given the Cherokees but two years longer to remain, the chief engineer of the railroad that was to be the connecting link between the Tennessee and Chattahoochee had run the preliminary survey and settled upon the site of Atlanta as a junction point.

At this period the few settlers along the southern outskirts of the Cherokee reservation carried on a wagon trade with Augusta. The haul was a very long one, over wretched roads, and the round-trip generally consumed more than a fortnight. What little cotton and corn was raised was exchanged by the few merchants for dry goods and groceries of the most staple kind. There were very few families in the entire region that could afford luxuries. The houses were, almost without exception, built of logs, and many of them had dirt floors. Plenty of these rugged settlers had never seen wheat flour. Their commercial wants were exceedingly few, as they "lived at home" in the strictest meaning of the expression. Their boasted independence in this respect was purchased at the expense of great physical effort and discomfort, to say nothing of the waste of time. And yet, from what our surviving pioneer citizens and the printed chronicles of that well nigh forgotten time tell us, the people were happy and contented in their impoverished isolation. They were hospitable to the few strangers who happened along, and the wayfarer was never turned away from their humble doors. Among themselves they were highly sociable, often walking long distances to "preaching," dances, "log-raising" and the other primitive amusements peculiar to remote communities. Life among the mountaineers of North Georgia was wilder then than now, and such exciting sports as bear fighting, sometimes witnessed by the whole population of a township, were common. "White's Statistics of Georgia," in describing these counties back in the forties, says of one of them (Hall): "Hunting and rifle shooting occupy a large part of the time of the people, who are generally temperate and hospitable, but rather shy of strangers." Of the people of Murray county, the same work says: "The amusements are dancing, racing, cock-fighting, gander-pulling and bear fights." Still, for all the roughness of their environment and the crudeness of their manner of living, these mountain

folk were law-abiding and peaceably inclined. Homicides were rare among them, as the court records of their counties will show, and they seem, by the same testimony, to have had little use for lawyers. It may sound strange, writing at this day, to class the early inhabitants of the region immediately tributary to Atlanta, with the quaint mountaineers still presenting a picturesque type in the highland counties, but at that time DeKalb, and the other foothill counties, presented the same sociological conditions. The cultured and easy-living people of the low country regarded them as "yahoos," to use an expressive provincialism, and their fighting proclivities, as in the case of the westerner to-day, were exaggerated. It was the coming of the railroads that wrought the change.

Before concluding these cursory observations on the descent and characteristics of the first settlers of the wide section of Georgia that gave to the Southeast its chief city, it is well to refer to the fact that the so-called "cavalier" stock had little to do with laying the foundation of the new empire. The planter with his semi-feudal ideas and mode of life, descended from the old-line families of Virginia, was to be found further down in the state. Prosperous in his landed possessions, he had no motive to impel him to hew out a home in the wilderness to the north. "The Commonwealth of Georgia" says, apropos: "Middle Georgia, especially, is Virginian in modes of life, speech and manners. In common with her sister states of the old South, the ruling class have been the wealthy slave-owners and others in full sympathy with them." The historian could not have said this of North Georgia. Few slaves were owned in the entire region. True, the people were too poor to be slave-owners, and they had, in those times, no need for this kind of labor; but it must also be taken into consideration that they were not of slave-holding stock. A large proportion of them were of indentially the same strain as the Puritans. Indeed, hundreds of them were not even born in the South. Of these some were immigrants from the old world and some from New England and Middle states. Scotchmen as straight-laced as any disciples of John Knox on their native heath, and Irishmen of strong "Orange" prejudices, were vital factors in the building of North Georgia. Wallace Putnam Reed, in his

excellent history of Atlanta, notes this fact as follows: "It should be stated, however, that the state has received two noteworthy streams of immigration, one from Pennsylvania and one from New England. These immigrants at once mingled with the great mass of our people, and their descendants became typical Georgians." To one interested in genealogy, a study of the biographies of the prominent early residents of this section affords abundant proof of this singular fact. Many of the streets of Atlanta named for respected and valuable pioneer citizens, bear the names of men born in New England or elsewhere in the North. This is true of such prominent pioneers as Jonathan Norcross, William Markham, Richard Peters, Edward E. Rawson, Frank P. Rice, Sidney Root, H. I. Kimball, L. P. Grant, and others that might be named. Others Southern born came of the sturdy Scotch or Irish stock that had so much to do with the development of Piedmont Georgia. They were not of cavalier antecedents.



## CHAPTER III

### WHEN ATLANTA WAS TERMINUS

In the spring of 1836 the music of an axe echoed through the forest that covered the hills destined to furnish the site of Atlanta. The brain of the man who swung the axe was not excited with mental visions of a "future great" metropolis where inside lots brought a fabulous price per front foot, and an acre of sterile red clay was infinitely more valuable than all the "diggings" of the Cherokee Nation. It is doubtful if the inner vision of that hardy pioneer—Hardy Ivy—extended further than a stumpy clearing in the woods surrounding a snug cabin with his children playing about the door. The ambition that nerved his arm to strike was the common desire for a home, and in this instance the home-seeker was contented with a very humble one. Mr. Ivy was a poor man, but he possessed the better qualities of the frontiersman. He had energy, pluck and courage. It had been his original intention to locate in or close to Decatur, but land was to be had almost for the clearing over toward the Chattahoochee, and leaving his family at Decatur, Mr. Ivy mounted a mule and went on a little land prospecting expedition in the uninhabited hill country to the west. Nothing but the settler's poverty led him to select the rough piece of woodland six miles above the county seat. It was forbidding enough. Hundreds of land-hunters had rambled over the unpromising soil before, and left it like the stone that the builders rejected. However, the tract was cheap, and that was the chief desideratum. Mr. Ivy concluded he could grub a living out of it, and preferred settling then and there to taking chances in the Cherokee lottery. Accordingly, he concluded the purchase, and having erected his log hut, removed his family to their new home sometime during the summer.

As has been stated in a preceding chapter, the year in which Mr. Ivy made his settlement was a momentous one in project-

ing railroad enterprises for Georgia. The convention attended by delegates from seven Southern states, which met at Knoxville, Tenn., on July 4, of that year, recommended the building of a road from Cincinnati to Knoxville, to connect with the two roads already in course of construction, one from Augusta, and the other from Macon. The Macon railroad convention, held in the fall, discussed a uniform system for the routes to be followed by the several projected roads, and passed resolutions calling upon the state to build the connecting link between the Tennessee and Chattahoochee rivers. By this time the work of construction was already in progress on the Central, Georgia and Monroe railroads, and a charter had been granted to the State road in the west, since known as the Western and Atlantic. The Macon convention was instrumental in securing the passage of a bill by the legislature that winter, extending the charters of these roads to meet the expansive ideas of the railroad enthusiasts of the state. This bill, which was bitterly fought by the non-progressive element from the back counties, passed by a very narrow majority on joint ballot in the general assembly. Governor Schley affixed his signature to the act on the 21st of December, 1836. This legislative measure was of great importance in its bearing on the unborn metropolis. By its terms it authorized the "construction of a railroad from the Tennessee line, near the Tennessee river, to the southwestern bank of the Chattahoochee river, at a point most eligible for the running of branch roads thence to Athens, Madison, Milledgeville, Forsyth and Columbus." This made the way clear for the long talked of connecting link between the great highways of commerce between the Mississippi and Atlantic seaboard. It at once elevated the State road to the dignity of a great trunk line and forecasted its grand destiny. The determination of the eligible point spoken of in the act, called Atlanta into being.

The following spring (1837), Stephen H. Long, engineer-in-chief of the ambitious new railroad, went to the southwestern bank of the Chattahoochee to locate a suitable terminus, as directed by the state. Mr. Long was a practical man with no axe to grind. He saw at once that the topography of the region made the plan of locating an important terminal and junction point any-

where on the banks of the river unfeasible. Seven miles east of the river, however, he found what he considered the logical point for the purpose desired. Here the last foothills of the three great mountain ranges of the middle South converged in a manner that made them the natural roadbed for the proposed intersecting steel highways. Indeed, nothing was left for Mr. Long to do but acknowledge nature's provision in the matter. The place approved by his scientific judgment was peculiarly well adapted for an important railroad center, and he selected it without any hesitation. There was no haphazard luck or land-scheming involved in making the selection. It was in strict conformity to the immutable law of eternal fitness. The intervening years which have made Atlanta the hub from which numerous railroad spokes radiate, have confirmed the wisdom of the chief engineer's action. In no other place could an Atlanta have been built.

At the present day, an engineer bent on the performance of a mission such as that assigned to Mr. Long, would have been followed by an army of townsite promoters and speculators. Immediately upon the official approval of his selection, a rush to the "magic city" would have ensued, and ere a year had elapsed he farms for miles around would have been laid off in townsite additions. There would have followed a veritable "boom," and the scandal of official collusion with land agents for personal gain would have been inevitable. Nothing of the kind attended the location of the South's greatest railroad center and her Empire State's future capital. Engineer Long completed his important work practically unnoticed, and Hardy Ivy went ahead clearing his ridge farm in sublime indifference to the official survey and apparently without suspecting that a fortune was within his grasp. A few curious or captious politicians rode over his and adjacent land and went away shaking their heads. The Cherokee Nation boomers ran over it on their way to the latest El Dorado. It seems to have occurred to nobody to possess themselves of a few acres and quietly await the coming of the railroad. It is likely that few had faith in the road ever being built. Singular as it may seem now, a decided prejudice existed in the popular mind against railroads. They were regarded by many as anything but a desirable acquisition to a town, for the reason that

they built up near-by competing trading points. The long haul wagon traffic was a great thing in those days, and the town lucky enough to be the commercial Mecca of the white-topped caravans was exceedingly jealous of having its supremacy disputed by an upstart railroad station in the vicinity. Decatur was bitterly opposed to the new railroads coming to that flourishing wagon trade town, and if they must come, Mr. Long's paper metropolis was welcome to them. DeKalb's flourishing little court house town actually petitioned against the granting of a right of way through its corporate limits to the Georgia railroad, and by its determined opposition forced that road to run its track at some distance. This feeling prevailed in most of the interior towns of the state. The possibilities of development opened by the iron horse were appreciated by few, and it is to be doubted if the Macon convention represented the majority sentiment of the people. In that, as in most progressive movements, a handful of far-seeing, daring spirits, took the initiative while the great mass of citizens were either ignorant of their purpose or apathetic. Agitation was more apt to provoke a dangerous hostility than a favorable sentiment, and the general assembly had been none too soon in pushing its railroad measures to a vote. Generally speaking, the railroad was regarded as an innovation of questionable benefit or of positive detriment to the community. The logic back of the opposition to labor-saving machinery on the part of manual workers was advanced by this non-progressive element in opposition to the coming of the iron horse. In those days each community lived to itself and was much more co-operative than since mechanical progress made possible the universal interchange of commodities. Every town had its skilled independent mechanics and small proprietors to supply the commercial needs of the inhabitants. Wearing apparel, household articles and farm supplies were largely manufactured in a crude way by local ingenuity and labor, and an industrial condition that built up great, urban working hives for the production and distribution of the things that went to supply human convenience and necessity was naturally regarded with suspicion. The railroads changed the thrifty independence of many of the flourishing country towns of half a century or more ago to a condition of comparative unimportance,

insufficient self-support and dependence. The "old fogies" had wit enough to foresee this, and hence their seeming lack of enterprise. The most vociferous Othello of the time who feared his occupation would be gone was the teamster or wagoner who profited by the growing traffic as population increased. The men directly connected with or employed by the wagon trade were numerically strong and had much to do with exciting a bitter hostility to railroads. In not a few counties of Georgia this influential retrogressive element made their representative in the legislature pledge himself to oppose railroad legislation. In the vicinity of Atlanta there were men who made threats against the railroad property, and pioneer citizens residing in our midst recall the protestations of neighbors that they would never ride on the cars if they did come.

The Cherokee reservation settled up, and still Hardy Ivy was the only denizen of the embryonic city. But the State road was slowly creeping Atlantaward from the west, and as it approached Marietta, interest in the eastern terminus seems to have been revived to the extent of inducing one more settler to cast his lot on the future townsite. This man was John Thrasher, who had not located there for agricultural purposes. He had an eye to the near future and erected a combination house and store room. This was in 1839. Mr. Thrasher put a few staple goods on his shelves and sat down to wait for customers. He took a partner named Johnson, the firm name being Johnson & Thrasher. Business was slow and the visits of customers few and far between. The store did not enjoy the advantages of a well located cross-roads general mercantile establishment, for it was out of the way and settlers living to the west of Terminus, as the place was beginning to be called, half in derision, as a rule continued to go to Decatur to trade. From the coming of John Thrasher, who was familiarly known to the few settlers of the vicinity as "Cousin John," until the coming of the railroad laborers to grade through the hamlet preparatory to laying the track, the dwellings in Terminus did not number over half a dozen, and these did not make the original Ivy cabin look humble in comparison. The early chronicles speak of Thrasher and an old woman and her daughter as the only residents of the place in the latter part of 1839. The





First Two-story Frame Building in Atlanta. Built in 1836 and Still Standing

This antiquated looking old structure, which is standing to-day in an out-of-the-way place on Trinity avenue not far from Trinity Methodist Church, where it receives scant attention at the hands of the passer-by, is the first two-story frame building ever erected in Atlanta. No special effort has been made to preserve it, but some mysterious providence has kept it from disappearing, and even amid the ravages of civil war when the city itself was destroyed by the torch and nearly every building burned to the ground, it managed to survive. Dating back to 1836, it was erected by the owners of the Western and Atlanta Railroad when this place, which was then an almost uninhabited wilderness, was first chosen as the terminal point of the line, and it was used as the headquarters of the company while the work of constructing the line was in progress. Ex-Chief Justice Logan E. Bleckley once kept books for the company in this building and religious services were frequently held upstairs by visiting ministers who came to the frontier settlement for the purpose of preaching to the future history-makers of Atlanta. Originally the building stood on the site of what is now the Brown block near the Union passenger depot, but it was subsequently moved to where it now stands.

railroad gang put in their appearance in the summer of 1842, and in June of the same year Willis Carlisle arrived and opened a store on what was afterward Marietta street, near the present location of the First Presbyterian church. Notwithstanding the graders were on the ground and the Chattahoochee already bridged, Thrasher moved to Griffin, declaring that Terminus was no good for trade and would never make anything with Decatur so close. At this time the population of Terminus was less than thirty, and the country round about was sparsely settled.

Still, it cannot be denied that things began to look up in Terminus after dirt began to fly on the State road. The chief engineer had erected, not far from where the present car shed stands, a frame house, and two stories high at that, for the use of the officers of the road. For a year or two this unpretentious little building was regarded with great admiration by the citizens of the hamlet as the forerunner of valuable improvements. Men later distinguished as railroad magnates or public officers worked in this building as employees of the State railroad, among them Chief Justice Logan E. Bleckley, who years afterward served with distinction on the supreme bench of the state. Jonathan Norcross, the first mayor of the infant city, slept in this historic building the first night he spent in the place. The structure, showing sadly the effect of time, can be seen to-day standing on Peters street, facing the side of Trinity church. It is one of Atlanta's most precious heirlooms of the past, and yet not one in a thousand of the city's inhabitants know of its location or historic associations. Another important event of the latter half of 1842 was the birth of the first infant in Terminus. The little one, a girl, was the daughter of the new merchant, Willis Carlisle. She grew to womanhood in Atlanta and became the wife of the well-known iron founder, W. S. Withers.

The leaves of the forest trees amid which the cabins of the little hamlet clustered had turned yellow, brown, and fallen, when the graders had completed their task and the iron bands bound Terminus to Marietta. This work was done with the help of a locomotive, and after the track was in shape to receive one, the officers of the road prepared to have an engine brought across the country from Madison, a distance of sixty miles. The task was

not an easy one, requiring an immense six-wheel wagon constructed for the purpose, and the propelling force of sixteen able-bodied Georgia mules. The work of hauling the locomotive over the rough roads consumed several days, but was attended by no accident. Its arrival was made the occasion for a gala day by the citizens of Terminus and the hundred or more railroaders in their midst. It must be borne in mind that thousands of people in northwest Georgia had yet to see their first steam engine, to appreciate the full magnitude of this grand celebration. For days before the arrival of the locomotive long strings of farm wagons had been moving up the hills that led to Terminus, some of the occupants having come extremely long distances to see the marvel of the century. Hundreds of Cherokee settlers were in the crowd and DeKalb and adjoining counties were almost depopulated to swell the sea of humanity gathered in the ambitious little burg. It is said that every man, woman, child, negro and dog in Decatur came over to see the mechanical monster run. It was equal to the biggest kind of a county fair. The stores and refreshment stands drove a thriving trade for several days, and after the curiosity of the crowd had been appeased, Terminus found that her population had been nearly doubled on the strength of the opening of the railroad to traffic. The locomotive, attached to a box car, made its first trip to Marietta on the 24th of December, pulling away from Terminus under a full head of steam amid the deafening cheers of the assembled multitude, many of the more exuberant discharging their fire-arms in their enthusiasm.

With the opening of the State road Terminus became a fairly good trading point, though there was no sudden boom and no realty holder became rich by quick transfers. The town moved on in humdrum country fashion, the merchants finding plenty of time to whittle goods boxes and swap yarns with their leisurely customers. There was a good deal of bartering in those days, and many frontiersmen used hides and furs in lieu of currency. The railroad gave the inhabitants no outlet for their small produce, and after the work of constructing the railroad was finished, the local market was very limited. Butter, eggs and the other commodities of the small farmer were a drug on the market, and as these had to be taken by the merchants in exchange for their



goods, if they did any business, it is easy to imagine that no great degree of prosperity resulted. The year following the opening of the road there was talk about Terminus being "overdone," and some of the business men are said to have moved to Marietta and Decatur. The great need felt by the town was an outlet to the larger cities of the coast, and the coming of a road from the east was impatiently awaited. Even with two other railroads headed her way and expected to arrive within two or three years at the furthest there seems to have been no speculative interest in Terminus. The few lot-holders were apparently more interested in what the ground would produce in the way of garden truck and Indian corn than what it would bring in the real estate market. An attempt was made as early as 1842 to get up a little real estate excitement by some of the larger realty holders, but it amounted to little. A land auction was held that year and an attempt made to sell off the famous Mitchell lot, a year or two later the source of dangerous ill-feeling and litigation in which many of the older citizens were concerned. Fred Arms acted as auctioneer, disposing of three subdivisions to David Dougherty, Wash Collier and himself for a very modest sum. By this time there were perhaps a score of buildings in Terminus, most of them log dwellings. But five or six acres of the virgin forest had been cleared. The cross-roads leading to the hamlet, later known as Marietta, Peachtree, Decatur and Whitehall streets, were, when the place was known as Terminus, named for the original landowners, Reuben Cone, Ammi Williams, and Samuel Mitchell. After the railroad was finished, some of the laborers who had been thrown out of employment remained in the village, forming a rather disorderly and disreputable element of the population. They rendezvoused at a drinking dive kept by one of their number and spent their time largely in gambling and cock-fighting.

The engine hauled over from Madison continued to make regular trips over the State road, with W. F. Adair at the throttle. It was one of the largest locomotives manufactured at that time and had been christened "Florida." As traffic with the west increased, the prospects of Terminus brightened. Travel over the road became quite an item in the town's support, many of the travelers stopping over night to take the train. There was no

tavern worthy of the name, but every house was an improvised inn. The entertainment of these transient guests helped to put money in circulation, and small things were not despised when Atlanta was in swaddling clothes. There was also quite a factor of support in the board and trade of the few railroad officials and employees who made their headquarters at Terminus.

It was not until two railroads had arrived in the place that the inhabitants enjoyed school facilities or a regular place of worship. No clergyman resided in Terminus, nor were there professional men of any kind. However, occasionally a circuit rider of the Baptist or Methodist persuasion would ride into town and announce a meeting, generally in the open air. On such occasions the citizens would turn out en masse. Louis L. Parham, one of the best posted chroniclers of Atlanta's early days, says of the primitive religious gatherings: "Early worship in Terminus was not conducive to great spirituality. However devout these pioneers, when it is considered how scant the means for communion, it precludes the thought that 'goin' to meetin' ' was other than irksome. And yet it is recorded that the handful of worshippers who gathered Sundays in any place offered them to worship the God of their fathers, were as devout as any of this day. The first place where services were held in the rude hamlet was in the open air near a cut made by the railroad builders. Some large rocks had been thrown out by the blasters, and on these a handful of men, women and children sat and listened to the simple services—'praised God from whom all blessings flow.' They had the blue canopy of the heavens for a covering and the earth for a footstool. But this was not for long. As the place grew it became necessary to have a house in which to hold services. Occasionally they met in a two-story frame office building which belonged to the Western and Atlantic railroad and stood on a lot now occupied by the Southern Express company and the Brown building on Wall street." The building referred to by Mr. Parham was the frame structure used as headquarters by the officers of the old State road, spoken of in the foregoing.

## CHAPTER IV

### WHEN ATLANTA WAS MARTHASVILLE

The hamlet went by the name of Terminus scarcely two years. In the spring of 1843 somebody, who probably found time hanging heavy on his hands, began an agitation to change the name of the burg. Through most of the summer the proposed change of name was the principal topic of discussion among the ten or a dozen families who inhabited the place. Ex-Governor Lumpkin had been a tireless worker for the railroad development of Georgia and was regarded as an especial friend of Terminus. Efforts were being made to get him to make or influence others to make some investments there, and somebody who believed with Shakespeare that there was nothing in a name, suggested that Terminus be re-christened Marthasville, in honor of Governor Lumpkin's daughter Martha. The handful of denizens, with unanimous bad taste, fell in with the idea, and the meaningless but quaint name of Marthasville was adopted by common consent. When the legislature convened in the winter it was petitioned for a charter under the new name, and on the 23d of December the village was formally incorporated as Marthasville. The name Terminus, which at least meant something, fell into desuetude. In speaking of this action on the part of the Terminusites, the well-known early historian, E. Y. Clarke, says: "This may appear to have been quite fast for a community of ten families at most; but it should be regarded rather as the evidence, or first manifestation, of that spirit of enterprise which afterwards became so distinctive an element of progress."

It may prove interesting, at this distant day, to give excerpts from the act of incorporation and to dwell somewhat upon the first year or two's political organization. Few of the village records have been preserved, and already the history of Marthas-

ville as a municipality is little more than tradition. The preamble of the act of incorporation follows:

"Be it enacted, etc., that from and after the passage of this act, L. V. Gannon, John Bailey, Willis Carlisle, John Kile, sr., and Patrick Quinn, be, and they are hereby, appointed commissioners of the town of Marthasville, in the county of DeKalb, situated at the southeast terminus of the Western and Atlantic railroad; and they, or a majority of them and their successors in office, shall have power and authority to pass all by-laws and ordinances which they or a majority of them may deem expedient and necessary for the improvement and benefit of the internal police of the said town; provided, nevertheless, that said by-laws be not repugnant to the constitution of the United States, nor to the constitution and laws of this state."

The first commissioners were to hold their office until the first Monday in March, 1845, when, and on the same day in each subsequent year, a town election was to be held to elect five commissioners. Under the provisions of the charter these officials were empowered to convene at such time and place within the corporate limits of the town as they might elect, and proceed to select a clerk of the board and transact such business as might properly come before them. They were given corporate jurisdiction to the extent of the boundary lines of the town, with the provision that their jurisdiction should be extended as the boundary lines of the town were extended.

The first year of the history of Marthasville, from all accounts of the surviving pioneers, was a good deal in the nature of a "kangaroo" government. A few ordinances of the most rudimentary kind were passed with due solemnity, but they were not respected by the citizenry, nor was much effort made to enforce them. The spasmodic weak attempts to try offenders only brought ridicule upon the grave and reverend law-makers and the officers entrusted with the enforcement of their laws. The people continued to live as though they were squatter sovereigns in the back woods, and their bucolic ways were undisturbed by superfluous metropolitan frills. The attempt to collect corporation taxes resulted in a "water haul," and the town was utterly without financial resources. As a consequence, the ordinances for the



George W. Adair

This pioneer citizen came to Atlanta as conductor on the first train which entered the city over the Georgia Railroad in September, 1845.



laying out and improvement of streets were dead letters. The most ambitious "avenues" remained mere cow trails, and citizens had to jump across a "deer lick" to walk across the "business center." The riff-raff railroad element of the population, by this time considerably augmented, grew more turbulent and refractory as the impotence of the local authorities was realized. As is frequently the case in small communities, political antipathies and jealousies seem to have divided the population into factions, and the "administration," on the whole, was very unpopular.

In 1845 there was a "new deal" at the town election, but one of the five commissioners, Willis Carlisle, the merchant, being returned to the board. The commissioners elected in March of that year were as follows: Ambrose B. Forsyth, Willis Carlisle, Stephen Terry, James Loyd, sr., and James A. Collins. Among the above names will be recognized some that were later prominent in the public spirit and enterprise of the growing town.

The year 1845 was an eventful one in the history of Marthasville. The Georgia Railroad, which for several years had been toilsomely creeping from Augusta up the Piedmont slope, was completed to Marthasville in the latter part of the summer of that year, and on September 15 the first train came through from the seaboard. As may well be believed, this marked a great epoch in the progress of the little city on the hills, and was made the occasion for a jollification that eclipsed the demonstration celebrating the arrival of the Western and Atlantic a little less than three years before. The old State line had not proven of much practical benefit to Marthasville, because, as the natives expressed it, it "didn't go nowhere." At the time of the arrival of the Georgia Railroad the western connecting line was a rickety sort of "jerk-water railroad," operated but a little way the other side of Marietta. The coming of the Georgia was hailed by Marthasville as the real beginning of her career as a railroad center. It was after nightfall when the first train rolled heavily to a stop in the center of the village, having aboard the president of the road, Judge John P. King, his associate officials, and a distinguished party of citizens from Augusta and intermediate points. Bonfires leapt high in air and hoarse cheers from hundreds of throats greeted the pioneer train and its occupants. Arrangements had been

made for a grand reception to the lowlanders, and the following day was spent in feasting and drinking by the thousands of people gathered to welcome the Georgia Railroad to Marthasville. As was usual in political campaigns and on gala occasions, the big crowd resorted to Walton Spring, just at the edge of the town-site, where speech-making was indulged in by the railroad visitors and the local orators. In these speeches, which were cheered to the echo, great things were predicted for Marthasville.

An incident which cost one man his life, and another of the same nature which was narrowly averted by Judge King, were exciting incidents of the day. Near the rude depot was a deep well which had been carelessly left uncovered. Stepping off the train in the darkness, the president of the new railroad, after being taken in charge by a local committee, proceeded a few paces toward the hotel, and as he was responding to the hearty greetings on every hand, he tottered upon the brink of the dangerous hole, the existence of which was evidently forgotten in the excitement. A dozen hands were outstretched to save him, and he was drawn back to safety in the nick of time. The incident shocked Judge King greatly, and he received hundreds of congratulations on his escape. His death at that time would have been nothing short of a public calamity, being, as he was, the railroad genius of Georgia. As if Judge King's close call were not warning enough to cause the town authorities to close the hole forthwith, another man fell into the well a few hours later and was drowned.

With the coming of the second railroad, Marthasville had a newspaper, founded the same summer. The tiny, crudely printed sheet called *The Luminary*, was owned and edited by Rev. Joseph Baker, a Baptist minister of the old school, and its contents were more religious than secular, though to keep up with the local happenings was not calculated to tax its diminutive space. Editor Baker was a good man and had a wide circle of friends, but his journal eked out a precarious existence of a few months and was forgotten. There existed ample occasion for a moral reform sheet in Marthasville at the time the *Luminary* entered the journalistic wilderness, and the reverend editor seems to have taken such a policy as a large part of his mission.

By this time the sore need of a building in which to hold religious services and school had resulted in the erection by the

citizens of a non-denominational church and school house combined. The structure, a small, weatherboarded one-story house with old fashioned chimneys at each end, was built by popular subscription and occupied a little clearing to one side of the Decatur road, upon the present Scofield lot, between Peachtree and Houston streets, diagonally across from the First Methodist church. Preaching even at this date was irregular and there seems to have been no resident pastor. It is said that the first sermon was delivered in the new church by Rev. Dr. J. S. Wilson, who afterwards became the pastor of the First Presbyterian church of Atlanta. The various denominations were all represented in a small way, and when a clergyman of a particular sect came to town, he "held forth" to those of his church in the little school house. In this manner the different religious organizations "took turns" in using the structure as a place of worship until they were able to build separate houses of worship. During the week a public school was conducted in the building.

Some men of sterling qualities and strongly imbued with the town-building spirit had cast their lot in Marthasville. Jonathan Norcross, notable among these, began his business career as the owner and operator of what was literally a one-horse saw mill. This rude manufactory was located in the lower end of the town, on the spot occupied by the old Atlanta and West Point depot. The locality was known as Slabtown, in consequence of so many huts in the vicinity being built of the slabs turned out at the mill. The motive power was an old blind horse. About the time of the arrival of the Georgia Railroad, Mr. Norcross opened a general merchandise store. John Thrasher, the pioneer merchant, having heard that Marthasville was forging rapidly to the front, returned from Griffin, and having accumulated a little money invested it in town lots. By this time a number of business branches were represented. Collins & Loyd and A. B. Forsyth conducted general stores, and a man named Kile a small grocery. There was a bonnet and hat store run by a man by the name of Dunn, and Stephen Terry had a real estate office. In addition there were several "eating houses," one of which affected the dignity of a hotel. Dr. George G. Smith was a physician. Hardy Ivy still resided in the neighborhood, and a son, Socrates Ivy, born to him



on November 2, 1844, was the first male child born on the townsite. T. G. Crusselle was a prominent and active citizen, having come with the entry of the State road as a contractor. He built a log shanty for the accommodation of railroad hands on the site of the Kimball block, the only building at Terminus at the time, excepting Thrasher's store and another hut. The next year after the State road reached Terminus, Mr. Crusselle superintended the moving of a story-and-a-half house by rail from Bolton. The structure was supported in an upright position upon two freight cars, Crusselle and his men riding upon the roof some twenty feet above the track. The house narrowly missed toppling over into the Chattahoochee as it was being hauled across the bridge. It was this building that boasted of being Marthasville's first hotel. F. C. Orme was the postmaster, with Lewis H. Clarke as his assistant. Among the other well-remembered residents of this period were Painter Smith, Hack & Bryant, Joseph Thompson, William Crawford, and Mrs. Oslin, the inn landlady.

The fall that witnessed the running of trains between Augusta and Marthasville saw the western terminal point a straggling hamlet of a score of houses. With the exception of the residences of James A. Collins and Stephen Terry, which were constructed of lumber, the dwellings were built of logs or slabs from the saw mill. No man of any considerable means lived in the place, and those who had acquired a foothold on the townsite had done so with a trifling cash outlay. Land could be bought not far from the center of the village for from \$3 to \$4 an acre, and a good business lot was slow sale at \$50. The Ivy farm embraced much of what was later the fashionable Peachtree district, and the tract of about one hundred acres was sold by the old pioneer for a few hundred dollars. Had he held it he would have been a millionaire. The Mitchell property constituted the cream of the townsite, and repeated efforts to sell lots from it at auction met with indifferent success. Probably in all there was not over a dozen acres of land cleared, exclusive of five acres donated by Mitchell for a public square and railroad purposes. The hamlet was unsightly, and after a hard rain the muddy cross roads where the four or five stores clustered were well nigh impassable. The

countrymen who came to the place to exchange their products for merchandise were generally a poverty-stricken lot, uncouth in looks and manners, and given to an inordinate consumption of a very crude species of corn whiskey. On Saturday, the chief trading day, it is said the "sagers" were wont to "take the town," and, to carry the colloquialism further, "paint it red." There was no little disorder, to which the railroad "rowdies" largely contributed, and with which the local authorities were unable to cope. When Marthasville began to grow in earnest, after the Georgia road came, it presented the lively and picturesque appearance of a frontier town, particularly on the busiest market days and public occasions. Canvas-topped mountain wagons with curved, scow-like beds, rolled in by the score, long-barreled squirrel rifles leaning against the front seat beside the husky driver and a troop of hounds and nondescript curs following behind. These rural visitors from a long distance usually camped in the public square and stayed several days. As they sought the railroad only at long intervals, they were heavy purchasers and the merchants exhibited enterprise in endeavoring to attract and hold their trade. There was much rivalry between the new town and Decatur, which up to this time had not been materially affected by her rival's struggling existence. Thenceforth, however, the county-seat realized that Marthasville was a very serious factor to reckon with, and began to lose ground. Cotton, wheat, and other staple country products came to the railroad point in steadily increasing quantity, and the town grew apace.

Before closing this fragmentary record of the first year or two of the corporate existence of Marthasville, it will interest our readers to supplement this chapter with an extract from a paper on the early history of the place which was printed in the *Atlanta Journal*, under date of December 15, 1883. The paper in question describes the hamlet just before the completion of the Georgia Railroad and the celebration of that event, as follows:

"The completion of the first railroad was a great epoch in the history of the town, which was called at that time Marthasville. Before this, however, the Western and Atlantic was slowly working its way to the town, and at that time was in working condition about as far as Marietta, maybe a little further. This, however,

was not sufficient for carrying on the commerce of the town, small as it was. In 1845 Marthasville was too small to be called a village. The four, now principal, streets of the city were then straggling country roads, and the only clearing of any importance was right at their junction. Only about twelve or fourteen families resided here, and the entire population was estimated to be about one hundred souls. The dwellings were mostly log cabins, such as to-day may be seen on the frontier in the West. On the southwest corner of Marietta and Peachtree streets stood a small grocery store, owned by Jonathan Norcross. Fronting this stood Kile's grocery store, and down near where the Markham House now stands was a grocery store kept by Collins & Loyd. In the rear of the Republic block, on Pryor street, stood a two-story frame building which was used by the officers of the Western and Atlantic railroad. On Peachtree street, near the site of the First Methodist church, stood a small wooden building used as a school house, church and public hall. These were the most notable features of that time. On the 15th of September, 1845, the Georgia Railroad was completed to Augusta, and the first through train came to Marthasville, bearing Judge John P. King, the president of the road, and several other railway magnates and distinguished persons. The scene in the neighborhood of the depot can be better imagined than described. Almost the whole population were present, and the wildest excitement prevailed. Farmers in the country, for forty miles around, had heard of the advent of the iron horse for days, and when the time arrived they were on hand in force. Some came in one-ox carts, with their families, and from the supply of provisions which they brought it was evident that they intended to have a jubilee. Atlanta has had bigger crowds, but never one so wild and delirious with excitement. The locomotive was eagerly inspected, the cars were examined inside and out, the engineer and fireman were interviewed, the conductor was looked upon as a hero, the president of the road and the other distinguished gentlemen were heartily welcomed. The enthusiasm of the people knew no bounds, and in accordance with the times, a mass meeting was held. The place chosen was about a half mile northwest of the depot, Walton Spring. The names of the speakers have not been handed down to this generation, but

among them was Colonel John M. Clarke, the father of our well-known fellow citizen, Colonel E. Y. Clarke. An old gentleman who was present at this meeting informed the writer that the address was a masterpiece of eloquence and created tremendous enthusiasm. The speaker pictured, in a prophetic way, the future of Atlanta, dwelt upon the importance of commercial facilities, and speaking of the Georgia road, said that its completion had 'tied the ocean to the hills.'

"With a railroad to Augusta, Marthasville began to grow rapidly. Such men as Jonathan Norcross, James Collins, Dr. George G. Smith, A. P. Forsyth, Joseph Thompson, Thomas Kile, William Kile, the Joys, David Dougherty, Wash. Collier, 'Cousin' John Thrasher, the McDaniels, Colonel L. P. Grant, Judge Hayden, and others, began to put forth their best efforts to build up the town and raise it to a condition of law and order. The attention of capitalists and speculators was drawn to the place, and many made investments which laid the foundation of subsequent fortunes. About this time John C. Calhoun, while journeying to another point, stopped in the town, and with his far-seeing sagacity, predicted that the place would one day be the most important inland city in the South. Business naturally improved under these conditions. Merchants enlarged their stores, and also built new ones, and a better class of dwellings sprang up. The citizens were so full of their dreams of future greatness and prosperity that a general desire was felt to shake off the name of Marthasville. They wanted a name with a bigger sound, and Atlanta was suggested by J. Edgar Thompson, chief engineer of the Georgia Railroad. The name struck the popular fancy, and it was unanimously agreed that it filled a long-felt want. There was no charter, no regularly organized government, but by common consent the name of Atlanta was adopted and recognized by the railroad authorities and everybody. The minister who preached the first sermon in Atlanta, the Rev. F. M. Haygood, recently passed away at his home in this city, having reached the patriarchal limit of four score years. Mr. Haygood, in one of his trips, reached here in 1846. Meeting Mr. Jonathan Norcross, he soon learned that Marthasville was no more, and that Atlanta was the newly adopted name. The next day Mr. Haygood held

service in the school house, and preached from the first chapter of John, 29th verse, 'Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world.' This was the first sermon ever preached in Atlanta. Before dismissing this matter of the naming of the place, it is proper to state, however, that the name of Atlanta was not duly recognized and legalized by the legislature until more than a year later—some time in December, 1847.

"Probably a year after the first railroad reached Atlanta, the population did not number more than four hundred persons, but that was considered rapid progress, under the circumstances. In our early days there was very little law in the place. Every man stood ready to resent an insult, and to defend his person and property with a shot gun or pistol. A population consisting of dangerous and bad characters annoyed the citizens not a little, and it took the most determined measures to keep peace and order."


## CHAPTER V

### SOME EARLY CONDITIONS AND INCIDENTS

It is safe to say that Marthasville trebled her population within a year after the completion of the Georgia Railroad. This brief period witnessed the completion of a third railroad—the Macon & Western, over which the first train was run to Marthasville in 1846. The little town, by this time fully conscious of its bright destiny, was wide awake and aggressive in pushing its interests and publishing its advantages. The third great railroad accession was greeted with a jollification mass meeting, as the other two had been, and it is recorded that this celebration surpassed all preceding occasions of the kind by far in point of attendance and enthusiasm. Daniel Floyd and Mark A. Cooper were the orators of the day. The arrival of the Macon & Western caused a great shaking up in real estate circles and had much to do in making and unmaking fortunes, as witness the following account of realty affairs by Colonel E. Y. Clarke:

“It was intended at first to build the depot of this road near the present round-house of the Western & Atlantic railroad, and the embankment by the mineral spring, known as the ‘Monroe Road,’ that being the name of the Macon & Western before it changed hands. This intention of the management occasioned great excitement in the village. Those who had settled near the present passenger depot became alarmed for fear that the junction of the two roads would become the business center of the future town. Hence they determined to induce the president of the Macon road to abandon the original purpose, and make the junction and depot near the terminus of the State road, or present general passenger depot. To do this, Mitchell offered ground for the depot, and it was accepted. This was a turning point in the affairs of Marthasville, and fixed the location of the coming





Er Lawshé

One of Atlanta's early pioneer citizens who was instrumental in subduing the lawless element of the community before the courts became effective and who was an active promoter of all public enterprises.

city; but it proved an over-turning point for some of its people, among whom was Cousin John Thrasher, who had bought one hundred acres in the vicinity of the first proposed depot of the Macon road, but sold out in disgust, and at half cost, upon learning of the change of base. The property which he thus disposed of at four dollars per acre, he lived to see worth at least half a million."

There were other men besides Mr. Thrasher who, even with three railroads intersecting there, could not bring themselves to see much of a future for Marthasville. Several of the original investors pulled out. Colonel Long, then chief engineer of the Georgia Railroad, ridiculed the ambitions of the town and depreciated its possibilities, declaring that it would gradually settle down to a wood station, with a cross-roads store or two and a blacksmith shop. He deliberately turned his back on his golden opportunities and invested his money in Marietta. In this connection Historian Clarke says: "Partly to this want of confidence, and of the failure to secure a new charter, providing for commissioners to lay out streets, is due the irregularity of our street system; everybody building where he pleased, without reference to any plan."

But men who had the faith that would stake its last dollar on the destiny of the town were not lacking in Marthasville. Upon the completion of the Macon road and until the city of Atlanta was formally organized less than two years later, the active spirits in the advancement of the town were: Jonathan Norcross, A. W. Mitchell, I. O. McDaniel, Allen E. Johnson, Jonas Smith, John Collier, Eli Hulsey, L. C. Simpson, Terence Doonan, Dr. Joseph Thompson, James Loyd, Edwin Payne, Reuben Cone, J. A. Hayden, John A. Doane, Edward Holland, William Herring, Dr. N. L. Angier, William G. Forsyth, Thomas Kile, Jacob Johnson, James A. Collins, A. K. Seago, Rev. Joseph Baker, John Silvey, John R. Wallace, Dr. J. F. Alexander, S. B. Hoyt, Rev. David G. Daniel, A. W. Walton, Joseph Meade, John Weaver, L. P. Grant, Richard Peters, Thomas G. Crusselle, Thomas G. Healey, Z. A. Rice, Moses Formwalt, Benjamin F. Bomar, H. C. Holcombe, Dr. W. H. Fernerden, C. R. Hanleiter, Er Lawshé, R. W. Bullard, George Shaw, Patrick Lynch, and



Messrs. Mann, Davis, Roark, Trout, Morgan, Levi, Haas, Wheat, Bell, Humphries, Crew and Haynes. The first lawyer was L. C. Simpson, with whom John T. Wilson and S. B. Hoyt studied.

Three lively weekly newspapers were established in Marthasville at this period, but they met the same fate as *The Luminary*. The *Democrat* was published by Dr. W. H. Fernerden; the *Enterprise* by Royal & Yarborough, and the *Southern Miscellany*, by C. R. Hanleiter.

The first Sunday school was organized on the second Sunday in June, 1847, in the historic little church and school house built by popular subscription. The records and minutes of this Sunday school, which have been preserved, are especially interesting in preserving the names of many of the early citizens. As high as seventy pupils were enrolled. This school was non-denominational, and was known as the Atlanta Union Sabbath school. James A. Collins and Oswald Houston were the first superintendents of this pioneer Sunday school. Robert M. Clarke was the first secretary and treasurer, and R. M. Browne the first librarian. From the records we learn that Edwin Payne, A. F. Luckie and A. E. Johnson were selected as a committee to solicit subscriptions for carrying out the plans of the organization. The list of those who made the first subscriptions is as follows:

James A. Collins, W. R. Venable, W. T. Bell, W. A. Harp, F. F. Hight, William Printup, Mary J. Thompson, James M. Ballard, M. A. Thompson, William Henry Fernerden, A. L. Houston, A. T. Luckie, W. B. Chapman, George W. Thomasson, A. B. Forsyth, George Tomlinson, J. C. Linthicum, S. T. Downs, J. R. Wallace and T. S. Luckie. In the subscription list of the next year the following additional names are noted: D. G. Daniel, Jonathan Norcross, L. C. Simpson, "Miscellany," J. W. Evans, W. Buell, R. W. Ballard, David Thurman, H. Matheson, H. A. Fraser, Thomas Rusk, James McPherson, A. W. Walton, J. V. W. Rhodes, Samuel Wells, Joseph Thompson, S. Goodall, J. T. Burns, G. M. Troup Perryman, H. C. Holcombe, Z. A. Rice, George W. Cook, J. Wells, A. W. Wheat, J. W. Demby, W. L. Wright, H. M. Boyd, Haas & Levi, J. T. Doane, W. H. Wilson, B. F. Bomar, A. E. Johnson, W. J. Houston, F. Kicklighter, O. Houston, A. L. Houston, J. J. Smith, William P. Orme, Logan

E. Bleckley, A. Wooding, C. H. Yarborough, J. R. Crawford, R. J. Browne, Lewis Lawshe, W. L. Wingfield and M. J. Ivey.

A mental glance at the Marthasville in which these men lived and labored will be interesting before we proceed to the Atlanta period, and a more comprehensive view of the kind cannot be given than to quote from Wallace Putnam Reed's description of the town at the time. He says:

"Toward the close of the Marthasville period the town was laid out, according to Colonel Z. A. Rice, about as follows: There were four roads—Peachtree, running in from Peachtree creek; Marietta, coming from the town of that name; Whitehall, named from a large white house which stood at its terminus in West End, and Decatur, connecting with that town. These roads met where the artesian well now stands, and the junction was known as the 'cross-roads.' Whitehall road then extended to the Decatur and Marietta roads, instead of terminating at the railroad. On the northwest corner of this junction stood the grocery store kept by a man named Kile; on the northeast corner was Mr. Wash. Collier's grocery, containing the post-office; the southwest corner was known as 'Norcross's Corner,' and on it stood a general store owned by Jonathan Norcross. The southeast corner was vacant. The lot on which the Atlanta hotel stood was not far from this corner. The hotel was a brick building of two stories, and the lot on which it stood is now the site of the Kimball House. Pryor street commenced on the north side of Decatur, and ran out to the woods, some three or four hundred yards away. Ivy and Butler streets were scarcely recognizable as streets, as in that part of the town the forest had not been cleared away. Broad street commenced at Marietta and ran northward to the woods. Alabama street was a mere country road. The depot or car shed stood opposite the hotel, and stretched across the ground through which Pryor street now runs. A little to the northward stood the Central Railroad freight depot, and a short distance off on the south side were the Georgia Railroad shops and turn-table. The block fronting the Kimball House at that time ran back to Loyd street, and was vacant, with the exception of the Western and Atlantic freight depot, which faced Decatur street on the corner of Loyd, and a railroad track which ran across the lot to

the depot. It was in the middle of this lot that the Fillmore pole was raised during a memorable political campaign, and the ground was sometimes used by circuses. On the lot now occupied by the Markham House, facing Loyd street, was the Washington Hall, a hotel kept first by James Loyd, and afterwards by Rice & Holcombe. Next to this stood Robert Clarke's grocery store. Back of the post-office, on the corner of Decatur and Peachtree streets, was a bar-room, a tin-shop kept by Moses Formwalt—the first manufacturing enterprise of the kind in the place—and several grocery stores. Alabama street had a store or two, but there was nothing more. On the corner of Broad and Marietta was a cotton warehouse owned by Colonel Rice's father. Nobody predicted that Marthasville would ever be a great city, and real estate commanded low prices. The Inman lot, on the southwest corner of Forsyth and Mitchell streets, then contained four acres, and extended to the railroad. Judge John Collier offered seventy-five dollars an acre for it, and was about to complete the purchase, when the owner demanded eighty dollars an acre. The judge thereupon declined to buy. The place is now easily worth about \$40,000."

The Atlanta Hotel was the first pretentious building erected in Marthasville. The need of a hostelry of some size and a dignity commensurate with the town's ambitions was felt by every loyal Marthasvillian, and after the Georgia Railroad had made the destiny of the place doubly sure, that enterprising corporation set about to build the long talked of new hotel. The bulk of the work was done in 1846, and the hotel was given its name before the name of the town was changed by act of the legislature. The two-story brick structure with its broad, rambling galleries of the ante-bellum style stood as a prophetic monument of the city that was to be. It had two entrances, one on Pryor street and one on Wall street, and its appearance was rather imposing. It stood in the midst of a park which until after the war was a favorite loitering place of leisurely citizens and strangers. Dr. Thompson, the father of Joseph Thompson, was the landlord of the Atlanta Hotel. He soon purchased the property, paying, it is said, \$10,000 for the building and the whole square. The Washington Hall, kept by James Loyd, divided the hotel patronage of

the town with the more handsome Atlanta Hotel. It was a large wooden building, to which additions had been made to accommodate the growing trade. As hotel caste went, Washington Hall did not grade as high as the Atlanta Hotel.

The religious people of Marthasville were active in providing themselves suitable places of worship. The Methodists built a comfortable and rather commodious frame structure near the spot on which the First Methodist church is located. This pioneer church was known as Wesley Chapel, and it was for years the scene of fervent devotional exercises such as only the old-time disciples of John Wesley enjoyed. There was "powerful preaching" in the little sanctuary in those days. Before Wesley Chapel was built the Methodists had had to resort to a cotton warehouse on Wheat street to find room for the large congregations that attended quarterly meetings and revivals. The Baptists were little behind the Methodists in building their own house of worship. The lot at the corner of North Forsyth and Walton streets, now occupied by the First Baptist church, was purchased in 1847, and by the following summer the congregation was worshipping in a neat little wooden church. The Presbyterians did not begin the erection of their church building until 1850, in the meantime continuing to hold regular services in the school house and private buildings. About the same time several fraternal societies were organized. Atlanta Lodge of Masons, No. 59, was organized April 13, 1846, and on the 3d of May following Mount Zion Chapter, No. 16, was chartered. Even the names of the secret societies that flourished in those days are almost forgotten.

In contrast to the moral side of life in Marthasville, it is probably no exaggeration to say that there was not a "tougher" town in the state of Georgia. As the place grew and became more distinctively a railroad center, the vices common to rough frontier settlements in all times held high carnival. Drinking resorts, gambling dives and brothels were run "wide open," and what is commonly known as the "sporting" element were insolent in their defiance of public order and decency. The block on Decatur street, between Peachtree and Pryor, was given over to this unsavory ilk. The locality was known as Murrell's Row, so-called in honor (?) of a notorious Tennessee outlaw of that day,

whose exploits were the favorite theme of conversation among the semi-outlaws of the quarter. Crimes and misdeeds worthy of the wild Murrell were supposed to comport with the ethics of the habitués of Murrell's Row. It does not appear, however, that any grave crimes were committed by these "rowdies" during the period that the place was known as Marthasville. The first homicide did not occur until some time in 1848, when a man by the name of McWilliams was stabbed and killed by one Bill Terrell, who made good his escape. The chief amusement of the Murrellites was cock-fighting. There were several cock-pits in the rear of the block, and some of the fights held therein attracted hundreds of spectators. The low wooden shanties of the quarter, many of them built of rough slabs, harbored all kinds of games of chance, and some of them were downright robber's dens. Nearly every other building was a groggery, in which drunken rows were of almost hourly occurrence. On Saturday nights it was common to have free-for-all fights that assumed the proportions of a riot.

It follows that some restraints were necessary to hold in check such an unruly class, and these were inadequately found in the local courts, which made a show of punishing the worst offenders. A little slab calaboose stood on the corner of Alabama and Pryor streets, which place of confinement was always full of culprits—between deliveries. Every day or two there was a delivery. Sometimes the prisoners would burrow out, and sometimes they would simply turn the frail structure over by main strength and walk back to Murrell's Row without molestation. Once, when a general row had packed the calaboose with "rowdies," the comrades of the prisoners visited the jail at night and lifted it off its foundation, holding it suspended while the inmates crawled from under. It was found necessary to build a larger and safer jail, which was done on Broad street, then known as Market street, near the railroad embankment, there being no bridge in those days. Incarceration was never for a long period, and fines were rarely paid. When the jail became too full to admit a fresh batch of offenders, those who had been in the longest were taken out and given a good strapping on the bare back, after which they were allowed to go free. The arts of the "black-leg,"



while perhaps not as subtle as now, were plied with continuous success by confidence men who rendezvoused in Murrell's Row.

The post-office was kept in Collier's store, at the junction of Peachtree and Decatur streets, at the beginning of Murrell's Row. Floor space was at a premium after the town began to grow in earnest, and in order to make room for the post-office, Mr. Collier partitioned off one-half of a rickety long porch that ran the length of his building, with the delivery window in such a position that people who called for the mail were not required to enter the store. It would ordinarily be supposed that an enterprising merchant who kept the post-office would make the most of the opportunity to attract the public to his store; but the extent to which a post-office was frequented a half a century ago, must be taken into account. There was no free delivery and a large part of the population of country towns seemed to have little else to do than wait for their mail. Many were chronic loafers and gossips, and it is easy to understand how their habitual presence in a small store would be anything but an incentive to trade. Mr. Collier solved the problem with his porch office. He did not allow himself to be disturbed before the mail arrived, or while sorting it, but when the latter task was done and the expectant crowd was assembled on the porch, he took the letters one by one, and called out the names of those to whom they were addressed, disposing of the bulk of the mail in this fashion. When a man's name was called he answered "Here," and pushed through the crowd to receive his mail.

In the rear of the post-office there was a bar-room, and Moses Formwalt had a tin shop next door. Mr. Formwalt, who was the first mayor of Atlanta, did a flourishing business in the manufacture of stills, and his manufactured tin articles had a large sale throughout north Georgia. Edwin Payne, father of Columbus Payne, ran a saw mill, he and a negro slave furnishing the motive power to the saw. This primitive factory made safes, tables, and other articles of household, office and store furniture. About this time Martin & Thurman started a gun factory.


The first brick house to be built after the Atlanta Hotel was a block of brick stores erected on their centrally located property by I. O. and P. C. McDaniel. I. O. McDaniel was the father of

Governor McDaniel. Richard Peters was considered the wealthiest citizen of Marthasville. His residence at the corner of Forsyth and Peters street, a roomy, weatherboarded structure, was regarded as palatial at that time. Mr. Peters owned and conducted a steam mill on the present site of the Georgia Railroad shops. It was a very advanced enterprise for the time, and consumed a tremendous amount of pine fuel. Mr. Peters bought four hundred and five acres of close-in land on what is now the heart of the Peachtree section, for \$1,200, for the express purpose of using the timber for fuel for his engine. He lived to see his land worth fancy front-foot prices, some of it bringing approximately \$75,000 an acre, as parcelled off.

Wallace Putnam Reed relates a little incident of Marthasville progress which may be taken as characteristic of the place and time: "Mr. Crusselle had the contract for building the old State Road stone freight depot, which used to stand in the block in which the office of the Southern Express company now stands, very near the present passenger depot. When Mr. Crusselle finished the depot, he was jubilant, and endeavored to demonstrate that fact to the town by a grand treat. Accordingly he bought a barrel of Georgia planter's corn whiskey, a half a barrel of brandy, and a box of Virginia tobacco, which he dealt out liberally to the citizens. He says that almost everyone got drunk, the fighting became general, and some of them attempted to turn over the town, but they did not succeed."

Reminiscences of the settlers of the Marthasville period are by no means common. There are plenty of the early days of Atlanta proper, but Marthasville has almost faded from human memory. In view of this fact, it is appropriate here that some extracts be given from the "talks" of the surviving pioneers who met in the National Hotel, in the spring of 1884, at a banquet given by D. N. Sloan, the first telegraph operator in Atlanta, to the surviving pioneers of nearly twenty years ago.

On that occasion, Lewis H. Clarke said: "When I first came here it was a thicket—all woods. We had to haul goods in wagons from Madison. That was the spring of 1844. On the first day of April of that year, I was clerking for Collins & Loyd, who had opened a brand new store. It was the first store ever



Richard Peters



opened here. That night, Painter Smith, A. B. Forsyth, Hack & Bryant, and several other who made up the sum and substance of the town, serenaded us with tin pans and horns. In the fall we hauled our goods from Social Circle, and in the spring of 1845 we hauled them from Covington. When the first train arrived I was assistant postmaster with Mr. F. C. Orme, who, when he resigned, suggested Atlanta as a good name for the place."

Thomas G. Crusselle said: "When I came here there was no town. About 1840 we built a log cabin near where the car shed stands. In 1843 we moved a story-and-a-half house from Boltonville, on two freight cars, and I rode on top of the cars across the Chattahoochee river. I thought that it was about the highest ride I had ever had. The following year Bob Clarke came here and we serenaded him with tin pans when he opened his store. We had a habit then, in election times, of gathering the voters in the biggest room in town and keeping them there all night. On election morning we marched them to the polls to vote. We were all Democrats then, until the Know-Nothings came along. Some of them went with them, but we all got back to the old party again."

I. O. McDaniel said that he remembered seeing, in 1845, the shanties here that were built of the slabs turned out by Norcross's saw mill. In 1847 he erected some buildings here. In 1848 he moved to the place. In the early city councils he was chairman of the committee on streets, and he recollected that, in 1849, when he asked for the appropriation for the streets, he fixed the entire amount needed at \$600. The total expenses for the town that year were \$1,400.

Colonel L. P. Grant said: "I was one of the party which located the line of the Georgia Railroad to Atlanta in 1840. Work was suspended on account of the financial trouble, and I went to the Central Railroad. I returned, however, in 1843, and revised the location of the Georgia road. We commenced grading the road in 1843, and from that time to the present I have been connected with Atlanta."

David Mayer said he came to the place in 1847, with a stock of goods, intending to locate, but could not find any town. He saw only a few shanties, became discouraged, and shipped his goods away. A year later he saw his mistake and returned to stay.

## CHAPTER VI

### SOME FURTHER REMINISCENCES

There is a story concerning some threatened land litigation of the Marthasville period that is worth relating here, however oft-repeated. Originally the land on which Atlanta was built was a part of the great body of wild land of the Georgia frontier which was disposed of to intending settlers upon very liberal conditions, the quarter sections being selected by lottery, as was done in the Cherokee reserve. It seems that in one of these early lotteries a man named Beckman was the fortunate drawer of the land on which the center of the city of Atlanta was built. Beckman lived at the time on Cedar Creek, in Putnam county, and was a carpenter by trade. He boarded with a man named Mitchell, with whom he made a deal to the effect that Mitchell was to own the land drawn by Beckman's number, in case any was drawn. The drawing took place in due time, and the number held in Beckman's name drew the land in question. Shortly thereafter Beckman died. When the State Road's engineer selected this land as the most desirable spot for the terminus, as directed by the railroad bill, the governor of Georgia opened a correspondence with Mitchell, to whom the Beckman lot had been presumably assigned, proposing to purchase a few acres for the site of the necessary terminal buildings and facilities. Mitchell expressed his unwillingness to dispose of any considerable portion of his holding, but generously donated to the state, through the governor, the amount of land required for the purpose specified. Mitchell then went ahead and endeavored to make the most of the speculative possibilities of the situation. He subdivided his claim into town lots, and as has been stated heretofore, had public auctions in order to dispose of the realty. In the course of time he made a number of transfers, and what there was of the town was built on land he had sold.

Just when Marthasville was beginning to flourish, like lightning out of a clear sky came the intelligence that the land bought from Mitchell was in dispute, the entire tract having been publicly advertised for sale by Allen E. Johnson, administrator of the estate of the deceased Beckman. It appears, from the meagre information on the subject now at hand, that something like a conspiracy was formed by a few local speculators, led by Johnson, to profit by the setting aside of Mitchell's alleged title. They discovered, somehow, that Mitchell did not possess the original deed from Beckman, but held what purported to be a copy of the deed. Learning that Beckman had been dead some years, the Johnson party boldly charged that he had died before the land was drawn in the lottery, and, therefore, could not have given Mitchell a valid deed to the property. It is superfluous to say that excitement ran high among the denizens of the little town when this state of affairs became known.

Mitchell stood squarely behind those who had purchased lots from him, averring that his title was perfect. He explained the absence of the original deed by saying it was burned by the fire that had destroyed the court house at Decatur, with all its legal papers and records. He claimed that when Beckman made the deed he had taken the precaution to have a copy made and properly attested, forwarding the original to the proper county official at Decatur. In this contingency the exact date of Beckman's death was of vital importance, and the desired information could not be obtained by correspondence with the county authorities of Putnam county. The lot-holders who held under the Mitchell deed, therefore, held a meeting and selected I. O. McDaniel and A. W. Mitchell, of their number, as a committee to journey to Putnam county and secure every available fact bearing on Beckman's death and drawing of the Terminus land.

Messrs. McDaniel and Mitchell went to the Cedar Creek settlement in Putnam county and interviewed all of the former neighbors and acquaintances of Beckman. Nobody could state positively when he died. His grave was unmarked, and there was no mortuary record obtainable to throw light on the disputed matter. When about to return to Marthasville, baffled in their mission, the committeemen came across a man who taught school

in the vicinity of a house Beckman was working on as a carpenter. This school master remembered distinctly that a bridge was being built by the county across Cedar Creek at the same time Beckman was working on the new house near by. He said he passed Beckman at work, and crossed the new bridge, every day, for some time. The county records at Eatonton were carefully inspected, and it was found that the bridge in question was built the year after the lottery drawing participated in by Beckman had been held. Armed with this gratifying information, Messrs. McDaniel and Mitchell returned to Marthasville and made their report to a meeting called to receive it.

After hearing the report of their committee, the citizens interested determined to oppose, in every way possible, the plan of the Johnson party to sell the Mitchell tract. The Johnson party disclaimed any intention of interfering with the title of the particular lots that had passed from the possession of Mitchell, claiming that it was their object to secure possession of only that portion of the Beckman holding that had not been sold by Mitchell's agent. Mitchell was at the time a resident of Zebulon, Pike county. These protestations did not satisfy the innocent purchasers, and they declared they would fight any procedure whose tendency was indubitably to throw a cloud upon their title. Indeed, there were some hot-heads who swore the sale, if it was attempted, would be broken up by force. The feeling between the two parties at interest was very bitter, and as the day advertised for the sale drew near, it was evident that trouble of a serious nature was brewing. The Johnson party was in the minority, numerically, and it was freely predicted that a riot would be precipitated at the sale as a pretext for giving those of them who were present a severe drubbing.

The sale was held at the court house in Decatur, the sheriff who conducted it and the administrator of the Beckman estate who instigated it, being one and the same man. Practically every man in Marthasville went over to Decatur, and they went prepared for trouble. An immense crowd assembled in front of the court house. An attorney was present to represent Mitchell's estate, Mitchell being dead. The opponents of the sale, who were out in force, were well organized. They had selected Tom Crus-

selles to raise every bid made on the property, and had instructed him to never weary in bidding.

Sheriff Johnson took his place on the court house steps at the appointed hour, and after reading the notice of sale, proceeded to call for bids. A member of his party responded, and Crusselle promptly "raised" him. The bids followed quick and fast. Crusselle seemed to enjoy fulfilling his cue and bore himself like a man of millions. It was soon evident to the sale party that the antis were filibustering, and indignant protests were heard. Sheriff Johnson took the Crusselle bids in seeming good part and the price was run up quickly to extravagant figures. When the representative of the Mitchell party called out \$25,000, he turned to his followers and remarked with a twinkle in his eye that he reckoned it would take all of his yellow cotton to raise the amount. As the day wore away, it was evident that the farce would be interminable, and, besides, the crowd was dropping its playful humor and getting ugly. Many of the spectators had been drinking all day, and there was a display of weapons by the most boisterous of them. The close of the sale hours arrived, and still Crusselle bid on. The confused babel of angry voices was heard, interspersed with threatening shouts and oaths. The big crowd surged wildly as weapons were flourished, and a shot or blow would have precipitated a bloody riot. The Mitchell crowd were clearly there to have trouble.

At this juncture Sheriff Johnson stopped calling for bids and drew his lawyer to one side in earnest consultation. He announced that the sale would be called off, if the Mitchell lot-holders would make some little concession to the Beckman claimants. The lawyer of the Mitchell estate and some of the leaders of the citizens on that side conferred with the Johnson party till long after dark, and the result was a compromise satisfactory to all concerned. The heirs of the Mitchell estate gave the other side two acres, located in the choicest part of the disputed tract, and paid the cost of the litigation incurred by the latter. By agreement the land was later sold by Johnson, as administrator of Beckman, to the Mitchell heirs, as a mere act of legal formality, in order that the disputed claim be forever settled. They were given a deed in due and proper form by Johnson, and what



threatened bloodshed and a serious drawback to the growth of Marthasville was happily averted.

The depot and old city park site which were deeded by Samuel Mitchell to the state were included in this litigation, of course, and some anxiety was felt by the state and railroad officials as to the outcome. The park consisted of the block bounded by Wall, Decatur, Loyd and Pryor streets, later the site of the Republic building, and known as the Republic Block. Some time after the sensational attempted sale of all the Mitchell property, the question arose whether, in the event of the abandonment of the state property for railroad purposes, the uses for which it was expressly donated by Mitchell, it would not revert to the Mitchell heirs. The city was intent on buying the block occupied by the Park, and it was the general opinion that such action would vitiate the title. To prevent such a contingency, a compromise was made with the Mitchell heirs, by which they renounced all possible future claims.

George G. Smith, for many years identified with Atlanta of the old days, gives some interesting reminiscences of his recollections of the town a few months before it was incorporated as the city of Atlanta. Mr. Smith says:

"My father, Dr. George G. Smith, removed from Oxford to Atlanta in June of 1847, and the family, of which I was one, followed him in October. On Saturday night, October 15th, 1847, we landed at the old Washington Hall, kept by James Loyd, located where is now the Markham House block. There were then two hotels in Atlanta. The Atlanta Hotel, a brick building, stood on the lot now occupied by the Kimball House. The Washington Hall was a long, rambling house of wood. The bar was in the front room, and in the dining room the long table was spread as in the olden time. The viands were put before you and you helped yourself.

"On Sunday morning my good mother sent five of us to the first Sunday school. It was superintended by O. H. Hunston, a most excellent Presbyterian, then a book-keeper for Jonathan Norcross. It was a union school, and the only one, I believe, in the then village of Atlanta. The school room was a plain, unceiled, unpainted house, about 30 by 15 feet, on the lot near what now is the First Methodist church. There was at this time no church in the town.

"During the summer my father had, in connection with Neddy Payne, Stephen Terry and James Collins, entered upon a protracted meeting, and Bishop Andrew, Dr. Longstreet, George W. Lane and Dr. Means had spent several days in Atlanta preaching in a warehouse belonging to Hey Wheat, on what is now Wheat street. This was the only place where service was held, until the cold weather drove us to the little school house room, and it was here that I listened to the first sermon that I heard in Atlanta, preached by the Rev. John Thurman, a Methodist Protestant.

"On Monday, in company with Jim and Johnnie Loyd and Joel Kelsey, I set out to explore the new town. It seemed to me immense. It was set down in the woods, and houses of many shapes and sizes were among the trees. There was Slabtown, straggling down toward Decatur. There was a right busy center where Peachtree, Marietta and Decatur streets join, where Jonathan Norcross had his store, and where George W. Collier had his post-office, and nearby Moses Formwalt had his two shops and Clark Powell and Tom Kile their well-patronized grog-shops. Old Daniel Dougherty, a genial, warm-hearted Irishman, had a bakery where the railroad crosses Whitehall street. Where the viaduct is there were no houses, but beginning at Alabama street there was an almost unbroken line of wooden stores to Mitchell. A line of small shops and stores was on the north side of Decatur street down to Loyd. The work shops of the railroads were near what is now the union depot. The three railroad depots were close together, the Georgia where it now is, the Macon and Western west of the present station, and the Western and Atlantic depot on what is now the Brown block. There was but one brick house in the town—the Atlanta Hotel.

"Marietta street had only one building of two stories. I went first to Odell's horse mill. A team of lean horses were moving in a ring and turning a circular saw, which was sawing up pines from the woods around. The celebrated Walton Spring, on what is now Spring street, was a beautiful spring of freestone water which Mr. A. W. Walton, who owned it, had provided with an enclosure of granite slabs, and the water came deliciously cool through a trough of granite. The Mineral Spring, or Chalybeate



spring was near the Southern passenger depot. This was a favorite resort of the townsfolk. There was also a fine spring on Alabama street, near where G. and T. Dodd have their store, and a very bold one where the Methodist Protestant church now is. A merry brook made its way through a deep dell across Alabama street, going west.

"The homes in the town were nearly all of one story, but there were a few with two. There were still a great many log cabins scattered in all directions. As there was no pavement anywhere, and as the mud was something fearful, plank sidewalks had been laid in front of the stores on Whitehall street. The First Methodist and First Baptist churches were in course of erection, neither of them at that time even covered. The Methodists, after their house was covered, floored and the window sash put in, were forced to stop for want of funds. The Baptists went on with their work, and this was the first finished church in the city, but months before this was done the Methodists were occupying the shell they had erected. The pews were purchased from the saw mill, and the pulpit desk was my father's prescription table. My brother and I were the sextons. There was no hall in the town, and when the meeting was called to petition for a charter, it met in the old Wheat store, at that time the doctor's shop of Martin & Smith. There was a drinking saloon near where the Lamar drug store is now, and the calaboose was on the nude land about opposite, near the Georgia railroad shops.

"There was a great deal of wagon trade. I have seen Whitehall street so thronged with wagons, from Mitchell to Alabama, that one could with difficulty cross the street. The grain came down Peachtree street, and was largely bought by Jonathan Norcross, and the cotton came through Whitehall. The McDaniels, A. W. Mitchell and E. J. Hulsey were erecting the first brick block in the city, at the corner of Whitehall and Hunter.

"There were two school houses, one near the First Methodist and one near the Protestant Methodist church, for the two sections of the town. There was the Enterprise and the Commercial, and now came the Miscellany, weekly papers. The only school then in the city was taught by Dr. W. H. Fonerder, a Baptist preacher. My mother opened the first select female school

about the first of January, 1848. The city was incorporated in the latter part of 1847, and the first election for mayor held in the early part of 1848."

"The first two years after we came the cotton trade was very large, for the West Point railway had not been opened. There was much trade from eastern Alabama in food products. I have bought delicious venison hams from these Alabama wagons for twenty-five cents each.

"There was no exclusively dry goods store, nor were any of the departments of trade, except heavy groceries, confined to a single article. The stores sold everything to eat or wear, except the one drug store and the one book store. Things to eat were very cheap. Eggs were 8 cents a dozen; chickens, 2 cents apiece; butter from 10 to 12 1-2 cents per pound. I have seen good sweet potatoes sold as low as 15 cents a bushel. No coal was burned, not even on the railways, and the streets were thronged with wood wagons. Wood was sold at 50 cents a load—about \$1.50 a cord. The streets were in execrable condition all winter and summer. I have seen a three horse wagon, almost empty, stalled where the viaduct now is.

"The whole mountain country poured its produce into the few stores near what was known as the Norcross corner. Cotton was bought by street buyers. Armed with their sharp gimlets they sampled the bags, and each one made his pass; the buyer would give the seller a ticket, to be given to John F. Mims, the agent of the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, and he would pay for the cotton, and the buyer, who was frequently merely buying for a commission of 50 cents a bale, would draw on the Charleston or Augusta factor and repay the agency.

"It was a stirring time; everybody was busy; all the boys were at work. Henry McDaniel, afterward governor, and, I think, Bill Hulsey, afterward ordinary, used to carry brick in the brick yard, and I used to peddle books at the depot. I was the forerunner of all the army of news butchers.

"There were then in Atlanta the Peachtree road, Whitehall street, Alabama street, Hunter, Mitchell, Loyd, Pryor, Marietta, Walton and Decatur streets. These were the only streets laid off at that time, and they were then filled with stumps, and the first

work of the new city administration was to have the stumps dug up. The brick yards were on all sides of the city. Few places had more gushing fountains than Atlanta, and a fine body of red clay was under the surface. Labor was abundant and cheap, and so was wood, and in every direction there were yards where a poor horse ground the clay with a wheel. Not a few of the substantial men of the city made their start carrying bricks at twenty-five cents a day.

"There was much gambling in the town, and 'professionals' were in great force. They were not even secret in their games, and I have seen the money on the table as they handled the 'papes,' as they called the cards. After the city was fairly officered, they were a little more hidden in their proceedings. There was no small amount of lawlessness of all kinds. One night some burglars broke into the store of a Scotchman named Frazier and stole a wagon-load of goods and carted them away. The thieves were caught and the goods recovered. A band of thieves carried on a long and extensive robbery of the cars, and some prominent persons were involved.

"The superior court was held at Decatur, and the only court held in Atlanta was the old justice's court of Major Buell. After him the magistrate was Squire Shaw, father of my old friend, Gus Shaw, the Broad street commission merchant. The first law case I ever saw tried was in a then vacant store-house, near the railroad crossing on Whitehall street. His honor was sitting in awful dignity, munching a ginger cake.

"In 1847 Atlanta had one brick house in it, but in 1848 it had a score. The first private dwelling of brick, as I remember, was Dr. Austin's, built in 1848 on Marietta street, and near that time Judge Julius Hayden built the second. The first hall in Atlanta was over McDaniel's store. The first foundry was Dunning's. The first car shop and machine shop was Joseph Winship's.

"The Masonic lodge was already established and my father joined the Masons in the summer of that year. The Odd Fellows, I think, came the next year. They had a hall near the Masonic lodge. The Sons of Temperance had a division the last of 1847, and my father was the first worthy patriarch. It flourished for several years.

"The Catholics began their church, I think, in 1848. It was located on Loyd street, near where it stands now. They had a regular priest as soon as their house was finished. I do not remember the first Catholic priest, but I remember very well the courtly and classic James F. O'Neill, who was in charge at a later day. Father Matthew came to Atlanta, and I heard him deliver a temperance speech. A good many joined his society, but I am afraid their adherence was not long continued.

"The Baptists, who had the first completed church in the city, had regular Sunday services from the middle of 1848. The Methodists, after using their puncheon seats for a few months, succeeded in getting the church supplied with plain pews. I remember my father raised the money—about \$80—by subscriptions of one dollar each. As old Jacob Johnson, the first painter, was a member, I think the church was painted then. When Willis Peck moved to Atlanta, he plastered the church. It had a gallery in it, but one Sunday the gallery fell, and it was not replaced.

"The preachers who gave the Methodists service every month were Anderson Ray and Eustace W. Speer, afterward Dr. Speer, the brilliant and beloved. He was scarcely of age then, though he was a married man. The next year Rev. John Yarbrough and Rev. James W. Hinton were pastors, and Dr. Hinton, still living in Macon, began his ministry here. We had a great many fine preachers to give occasional service in Atlanta. Dr. Stiles, Bishop Pierce, Dr. Pierce, Dr. Means, Bishop Elliott, gave us occasional sermons. Dr. J. S. Wilson gave us a sermon every month, which, as his old hearers will well remember, were stately, orthodox, able and long. Rev. John W. Yarbrough and Dr. Alex Wynn, father of J. O. Wynn, of the Prudential Insurance company, were on the circuits which included Atlanta. A great revival began and over a hundred persons joined the Methodist church.

"The city was growing vigorously. It was rather ungainly, but it was vigorous. It was almost as large as Griffin, and Macon was beginning to notice it. Atlanta, of course, wanted something after she began to spread, and there were hints that the capital ought to be moved from Milledgeville; but as Macon

clamored for that, for the time being the Atlanta people said the penitentiary would do. Apropos of which the Macon paper suggested that a wall around Atlanta and an appointed keeper would provide admirably for the demand.

"There had been no grading in those days, and lofty hills were where are now level highways, and I have found it difficult, and in some places impossible, to identify in the closely built city the hills on which I gathered wild flowers and picked chinquepins fifty years ago. All along what was known as the McDonough road was a long row of one and two-roomed log cabins, owned by very poor people. From Garnett street westward was a very disreputable section known as Snake Nation, whose precincts I feared to enter when I was a boy. There was a small collection of houses on a high hill on Marietta street going toward Squire Payne's. The graveyard was about where the governor's mansion is, and here I saw the first interment with the Masonic ritual I ever saw. Oakland cemetery was secured by the city a little after this, and there were no burials on Peachtree after that. There was no undertaker and no ready-made coffins. Mr. Clarke had a cabinet-maker's shop about opposite Trinity church, which met the demands, and an ordinary wagon was used for a hearse.

"The Enterprise and The Luminary were the papers in 1847. The Enterprise was owned by Rough Rice, and The Luminary, which went out about the time we came, by, I think, a man named Clapp. But in the summer of that year Colonel Cornelius R. Hanleiter brought the Southern Miscellany from Madison and opened an office in Atlanta near Loyd street. The colonel was a very good editor, a fine practical printer, a staunch Episcopalian, and a Whig of the most decided character. In 1847 he published the first carrier's address issued in Atlanta. It was a rhyming description of the city written by my father. It was a photograph of the city as it then was. This address was sold by the sole carrier, now Colonel William R. Hanleiter.

"The war with Mexico was now over, and the officers were returning eastward. I was peddling maps and books at the cars, and was greatly interested in the returning heroes. I remember General Twiggs, General Shields, and General Quitman. One of the officers, supposing I was a newsboy, asked me for a New York



paper. I ran over to the Miscellany office and bought all it had, and sold the first newspaper ever sold in Atlanta. Frank Rice came later than I did, and has made more money from his literary vendings than I ever did. The old colonel left the Miscellany for the telegraph office, and then was a mail agent when my father was postmaster. He had the first job office in Atlanta, published the first directory and wrote the first history.

"Atlanta was so central that it became the assembling place for great Southern conventions. The first I recall was a railway convention in 1847. I remember an address made at it by a New York merchant named Whitney, who was urging the people to petition congress to build a railway to the Pacific. As we did not have California then, he proposed to strike for Oregon. He was sure the road could be built for \$10,000 a mile. In the summer there was a famous temperance convention. The temperance society of Georgia, with Henry Lumpkin as president, was making a vigorous movement on the state, and Dabney P. Jones, known everywhere as Uncle Dabney, was the state lecturer. A convention was called and Judge R. M. Charlton, of Savannah, was to deliver the address. The best people in Georgia were present. My father had written me a speech, and I was on the programme. So, after the judge had spoken, they stood me on the book board and I made my debut before the great assemblage when I was ten years old. The Hon. George Hillyer did the same thing at the same place, some two years later. During the summer another great convention met. If I am not mistaken, it was on this occasion that Judge Cone so severely wounded Alexander H. Stevens with his pocket knife. Mr. Stephens was taken at once to the home of John F. Mims, on Alabama street, and was attended, I think, by Dr. Alexander. At the great Taylor and Fillmore rally he had recovered sufficiently to ride, and the ardent Whigs took the horses from the carriage and drew the vehicle in which he sat to the assembling place at Walton Springs. I remember the pale-faced little man as he rode that day in triumph. They had a great torchlight procession. The torches were brands of fat lightwood. The transparencies were many and loud. A cannon had been brought up from Macon and planted on a tongue of land between the railroad, and, alas! as it was fired, poor D. N.

Poore had his arm shot off by a premature discharge. Poore was an odd character, who belonged to an excellent family in New York. He was then the keeper of the station, and, I think, continued such until he died.

"James Collins was one of the early merchants. He was one of the first Methodists of Atlanta and one of the best men of his time. He gave the largest gift to build the First Methodist church. He married Miss Bolton and moved to a fine plantation at Bolton, then on the Cobb county side of the river. Leonard C. Simpson was one of the earliest lawyers. Willis Buell, the old squire, was a northern man and an old bachelor. The Barneses, Mr. Tay and Mr. Spann were railroad engineers. W. R. Venable was clerk for James Collins, and afterward clerk of the superior court. Reuben Haynes was an easy-going, pious Methodist carpenter, and my Sunday school teacher. Haynes street was named for him. Mr. Silvey was a clerk in the store of one of the Jews with Calvin Humnicutt. Ed Warner, long agent of the Georgia Railroad, was a clerk for A. B. Forsyth and an inmate of his home. William Rushton was the first master mechanic in Atlanta, a red-headed Englishman who had some pretty daughters who went to my mother's school. Old Dad Chapman was a character. He was a professional gambler and made no concealment of it. He was always neatly dressed, well behaved, a thorough gentleman in his manners, but he lived on the profits of his skill at cards. Nat Mangum and his brother Robert were sons of old Uncle Billy, who came from South Carolina. Nat was a lawyer, and a great wag. He went into Fannin county and tried to develop a copper mine. My dear old friend, Logan Bleckley, who, save for his gray hair, looks about as young now as he did fifty years ago, was a clerk in the State road office. Old John Weaver was the patriarch of the engine men. Dr. Hilburn, who was killed by his brother-in-law, Elijah Bird, was our first dentist. Greene B. Pilgrim was our first sexton, a worthy man in every way. Ike, who is still living, was a printer's apprentice. A hypnotist gave a show. He had engaged Ike to be mesmerized, and, sure enough, the vivacious Isaac went properly to sleep, after the passes were made, and then he followed implicitly the mesmerizer's directions. He did as he was bidden, sung, played the fiddle, swam, and at



last the hypnotist gave him a short rod and bade him fish; and Ike fished diligently, and caught a fish, as he was directed. Presently he caught a big one, as the mesmerizer said he would. 'That's a cat,' said the sleeping youth. I decided that 'that's a cat' had given Ike away.

"James McPherson, my worthy employer, was the first book-seller in Atlanta. He was a man of unusual intelligence and enterprise. He died suddenly in Savannah while clerk of the United States court. John F. Mims was the first agent of the Georgia railroad and the first bank agent. The Meads were among the first settlers and so were the Downs. Pete Emmell was Dougherty's baker, and was afterwards a famous saloon keeper. Monkey Baker, a German, had a little shop near West End and a garden, and kept guinea pigs and had a monkey. R. W. Williamson was the first agent of the Macon and Western railroad. L. P. Grant was an engineer of the Georgia road. He and John T. Grant were partners in railroad building. He was one of the staunchest men that ever lived. L. P. Grant, Richard Peters and John Collier would have been ornaments to any community where integrity was at a premium. Jonas S. Smith, an impulsive, funny, fearless, warm-hearted merchant, was the successor of George W. Collier as postmaster. He gave way for my father, who succeeded him in 1851."

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CHRISTENING OF ATLANTA

In the latter part of 1846, after three railroads had made their terminal points in Marthasville, and, as we have seen, the population of the village had trebled and the place become bustling with progress, another agitation for a change of name was begun by a number of the leading citizens, who evidently felt that no town could ever aspire to cityhood handicapped by such a rustic name as Marthasville. Among some of the most progressive spirits, the unfortunate name was treated as a joke, affording play for sarcasm. The people who were there now would never have called any cross-roads with hopes by such a name, and it was soon manifest that sentiment was a unit for a change. The need of a city charter was also felt, if for no other reason than to better control the troublesome riff-raff of Murrell's Row and "Snake Nation." Accordingly, the legislature of that winter was petitioned for a charter, under the new name of Atlanta. There is some controversy as to who has the honor of having first suggested the name of the future metropolis. It is generally given to J. Edgar Thompson, then chief engineer of the Georgia Railroad, who, in a letter to Richard Peters, of Marthasville, is said to have urged the propriety of a change of name and suggested Atlanta as both euphonious and appropriate. Mr. Peters accepted the suggestion with enthusiasm and being a man of wealth and local influence was instrumental in having many of his fellow townsmen do the same. F. C. Orme, a former postmaster of the place, claimed that he coined the word Atlanta and was the first to offer it as a suitable name for the city in embryo. Be this as it may, the word Atlanta was on every tongue before the charter was applied for, and as evidence that the name had been tacitly adopted, the Sunday school was called the Atlanta Union Sabbath school

before the town had the legal right to the name, and the same is true of the new Atlanta Hotel. The meaning of the name was obvious to everybody at that time. The purpose of the founding of Terminus, nearly ten years before, was to afford a commercial highway, or rather, a series of highways, between the great Mississippi Valley and the Atlantic seaboard. The name Atlanta, in the estimation of its early residents, stood for the accomplishment of that momentous project.

There was, however, a very decided hostility by some of the citizens to assuming the increased expenses and responsibilities through municipal incorporation, and when the more progressive faction sent a committee over to Milledgeville to present the petition to the legislature and have a bill in compliance thereto introduced, the opposition was on hand with a strong lobby to smother the measure. The incorporation bill, carrying with it the change of name, went over till the next session. In the meantime the citizens of Marthasville repudiated that name and wrote and spoke of their town as Atlanta. The local newspapers came out under Atlanta date lines, and the railroad companies adopted the new name on their time tables and maps.

On December 29, 1847, the general assembly passed an act framed by Judge Collier, incorporating the "City of Atlanta," a portion of the act reading as follows:

"An act to amend an act entitled an act to incorporate the town of Marthasville, in the county of DeKalb, passed December 23, 1843, and also to enlarge the boundaries of said town, and to incorporate the same under the name of Atlanta, etc."

"Section 1. Be it enacted, etc., that from and after the passage of this act, the town of Marthasville shall be known as and called the city of Atlanta, and the authority and jurisdiction of the said city shall extend one mile from the State depot in every direction.

"Section 2. Be it enacted that within sixty days after the passage of this act, by giving two days' notice, and on the third Monday in every January thereafter, all free white persons, citizens residing within the incorporate limits of said city, who shall be entitled to vote for members of the legislature of said state, shall be entitled to vote for a mayor and six members of the city

council, in lieu and stead of the commissioners, as is provided in the act to which this is amendatory; and that the person or persons legally entitled to vote at said election shall be eligible for mayor or members of the city council, at which election one justice of the inferior court, or of the peace, and two freeholders, neither of whom being a candidate, shall preside, and the person receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared elected; that the managers of said election shall give certificates to that effect, which shall be the highest evidence of their election and authority to act, and be recorded by the clerk of the city council in a book to be kept for that purpose, which record shall be held and esteemed as the highest evidence of their election."

In section 6 the mayor and city council are required to elect a city marshal, and if they deemed it necessary, a deputy marshal or marshals, a clerk of the council, and a treasurer.

Under section 9 it is provided that the mayor and four members of the council should form a quorum to transact all business, and that the mayor and each member of the council should be, to all intents and purposes, a justice of the peace, so far as to enable them, or any of them, to issue warrants for offenses committed within the corporate limits of the city, which warrants were required to be executed by the city marshal, or a deputy marshal, and to commit to the jail of the county of DeKalb, or to admit to bail, offenders, for appearance before the next term of the superior court thereafter, for the county of DeKalb, etc.

In accordance with the provisions of the organic act, a city election was held in the city of Atlanta for the first time on the 29th of the following January. Below is reproduced the entry of the city clerk on the official records, concerning the result of the election:

"GEORGIA, DEKALB COUNTY:

"We, Edwin G. Collier, a justice of the peace, and Patterson M. Hodge and Francis M. Gray, who are freeholders, and who were managers at the election for mayor and members of the council of the city of Atlanta, and neither of whom being candidates, do certify that said election was held on Saturday, the 29th day of January, 1848, and that Moses W. Formwalt received the highest number of votes for mayor, and was declared duly elected.

"Given under our hands and seals this 31st day of January, 1848.

"E. G. COLLIER, J. P. (Seal).

"P. M. HODGE, (Seal).

"F. M. GRAY, (Seal)."

The entry touching the election of the first city council is as follows:

"GEORGIA, DEKALB COUNTY:

"We, Edwin G. Collier, justice of the peace, Patterson M. Hodge and Francis M. Gray, who are freeholders for and who were managers of the election for members of the council of the city of Atlanta, and neither of us being candidates, do certify that said election was held in the city of Atlanta, on Saturday, the 29th of January, 1848, and that Jonas S. Smith, Benjamin F. Bomar, Robert W. Bullard, James A. Collins, Anderson W. Walton and Leonard C. Simpson received the highest number of votes for members of the council, and were declared duly elected.

"In testimony whereof we have set our hands and seals this 31st day of January, 1848.

"E. G. COLLIER, J. P. (Seal).

"P. M. HODGE, (Seal).

"F. M. GRAY, (Seal)."

The new mayor and councilmen took the oath of office on February 2, 1848, and the municipal government was formally inaugurated by the holding of a council meeting the same day. L. C. Simpson and Benjamin F. Bomar were appointed a committee to draft rules of order for the government of the council. The question of official salaries was next taken up. The city marshal was allowed \$200 per annum, and was placed under a \$2,000 bond; the deputy marshal \$150, with a bond of \$1,500. The clerk was allowed no fixed salary, his compensation to be derived from the fees and costs, with a bond of \$1,000. The treasurer was allowed two per cent. for receiving and two per cent. for paying out moneys, and he was required to give bond in the sum of \$4,000. German M. Lester was chosen as city marshal; Thomas I. Shivers, deputy marshal; L. C. Simpson, clerk, and Oswald Houston, treasurer. A committee on ordinances was

elected, consisting of Councilmen Simpson, Walton and Collins. At a meeting of the council held a few days thereafter, Mr. Simpson declined to accept the office of clerk, and the place was given to Robert M. Clarke. H. M. Boyd was elected tax receiver and collector in a close vote that the mayor was required to participate in.

A few chronological extracts from the first year of the city records will not be amiss in this connection. On February 13, 1848, four denizens of the infant city, presumably habitués of the rowdy quarter, were taken before the mayor and fined for disorderly conduct. One of the offenders was fined eight dollars, two of them five dollars, and the fourth two dollars, with the costs added. On the 15th a more serious case was brought before the municipal court. One James Flint stood charged with an assault with intent to kill a Mr. Porter, made the previous evening. The trial attracted a good deal of public interest and terminated in the very lenient decision of a fine of fifteen dollars.

On the 15th, also, Alderman Simpson was authorized to enter into a contract with Stephen Terry, the pioneer real estate agent, to survey and mark the corporate limits of the city of Atlanta. On the 19th of the same month the grist of "disorderlies" in the judicial hopper was so large as to suggest either an incipient riot or the inauguration of a reform raid. The city was a good many dollars the richer by the fines then imposed, and the calaboose had standing room only. The same day council appointed a committee to select a police patrol to aid the marshal and his deputy in preserving the public order.

During the month of March the vigorous prosecution of disorderly conduct cases against the vicious element continued, but the morals of the city were not appreciably improved thereby. Offenders when fined, or upon their release from the calaboose, went straightway and resumed their nefarious occupations—or lack of occupation. On the 4th of that month a permit was granted G. C. Rogers by the council to build a slaughter house within the limits of the city, provided he kept the same in a sanitary condition and it annoyed none of the citizens in the vicinity. There were also a good many cases brought for draying without license and selling intoxicants without license.



On the 5th of June council adopted a resolution exempting its members from municipal taxation, upon condition that the councilman thus exempted relinquish the amount due him under the charter for his official services.


On the 3d of July the mayor was authorized to appoint a board of health, to consist of nine citizens, one of whom should be a legally practicing physician, whose duty it should be to examine into all causes of ill-health in the city, and to report the same to the marshals, who were required to take immediate action, as provided by ordinance, to remove or remedy the cause. Later the mayor appointed the following gentlemen as members of the health board: N. L. Angier, James Boring, Solomon Goodall, J. F. Mims, R. Cain, William Herring, James Loyd, Dr. Joshua Gilbert, and Dr. S. S. Smith.

On the 20th of July, Joseph B. Clapp was elected clerk of the council, vice Robert M. Clarke, resigned. At the same meeting of council a special election was called for July 31st, 1848, to select a member of the council to take the place of R. W. Bullard, who had removed from the city. Out of the one hundred and seventy-four votes cast at this election, Henry C. Holcombe received eighty-seven; Ambrose B. Forsyth, forty-seven; and J. A. Hayden, forty. The superintendents of this election, W. Buell, J. S. Smith and James A. Collins, declared Mr. Holcombe elected, and he was duly sworn in at the next aldermanic meeting.

On the 5th of September council allowed A. L. Rhodes five dollars for lumber furnished, and for hanging the bell over the council chamber. On the 16th of the following month Councilmen Holcombe and Simpson were appointed a committee to consider the matter of opening Pryor street, and on the 23d a petition was presented by J. A. Hayden and John Collier asking that a street be opened from the bridge across the Macon & Western railroad, in a southwestern direction, and intersecting with the Whitehall road within the corporate limits of Atlanta.

On the 4th of November, J. B. Clapp was dismissed from office as clerk of the council, John L. Harris being elected to fill his place. On the 6th council granted a petition of certain citizens for a walk from the new house built by L. H. Davies to the post-office. E. T. Hunnicutt was appointed deputy marshal, on the 12th of December, vice Thomas I. Shivers, dismissed.





Old Homestead of Ex.-Gov. Joseph E. Brown  
War Governor and U. S. Senator

By this time Atlanta was attracting, if not national, Southern, attention. The daily papers of the larger cities had much to say about the progress and possibilities of the lively little city, and much stress was laid on the significance to the town of other projected railroads. In the Southwestern Convention held in Memphis for the purpose of promoting industrial development and encouraging immigration, John C. Calhoun, then recognized as the greatest Southern statesman, made a strong speech outlining the progressive steps necessary to make the Southwest what it was destined to be—another valley of the Nile. The great South Carolinian made in this speech the following allusion to Atlanta:

“What, then, is needed to complete a cheap, speedy and safe intercourse between the valley of the Mississippi and the Southern Atlantic coast is a good system of railroads. For this purpose the nature of the intervening country affords extraordinary advantages. Such is its formation from the course of the Tennessee, Cumberland and Alabama rivers, and the termination of the various chains of mountains, that all the railroads which have been projected or commenced, although each has looked only to its local interest, must necessarily unite at a point in DeKalb county, in the state of Georgia, called Atlanta, not far from the village of Decatur, so as to constitute one entire system of roads, having a mutual interest each in the other, instead of isolated rival roads.”

Senator Calhoun had passed through Atlanta and carefully examined the situation on the ground. He strongly urged upon a future governor of Georgia, Joseph E. Brown, then a young man who had stopped in Washington for a few days while enroute home from college, the desirability of casting his fortunes in Atlanta. The far-seeing statesman is said to have given other Georgia friends the same advice.

By the end of 1848, Atlanta had between 500 and 600 inhabitants, a very small proportion of whom were women and children. It was a new town, full of newcomers, and the wives and babies were left behind at the old home until the plastic “rudiments of empire” had assumed something like form. The establishment of municipal law had much to do with the establishment of homes in the place.

Capital, heretofore chary of Atlanta, now followed eagerly enough in the footsteps of immigration. Real estates values

stiffened and transfers were lively, comparatively speaking. Isaac Scott came up from Macon and founded a banking house in Atlanta in the winter of 1848. U. L. Wright was made agent of the institution, and that well-known pioneer citizen, Washington J. Houston, cashier. The first depositor was James B. Lofton, a slave-trader, who deposited a pair of old-fashioned saddlebags with both ends full of silver dollars. Several new real estate offices were opened, generally in conjunction with the practice of law, and there were a number of private money lenders who made big usury out of the railroad employes and the free-and-easy-class, as is common in Atlanta at this day. The Odd Fellows established their pioneer lodge in this year, and two or three private schools were established, in a small way. "Angier's Academy," founded the year before, was in a flourishing condition.

This year occurred the exciting presidential campaign in which the hero of the Mexican war, Zachary Taylor, was the Democratic nominee. It was an era of intense bitterness, politically, and the Know-Nothing party had gained quite a following in Georgia. In passing it is noteworthy that Georgia furnished some of the most gallant soldiers of the Mexican war, and a number enlisted from DeKalb county. While the short-lived struggle was in progress, the news and letters from the field afforded a topic of absorbing interest for the conversations of the local statesmen and philosophers of Atlanta, and Taylor had a number of very zealous partisans in the town. Indeed, their zeal was so great, fortified by white corn liquor, that nearly every day during the fall witnessed a fisticuff between citizens of contrary political beliefs. A Taylor and Fillmore mass meeting was held at Walton Spring, which drew a tremendous crowd from fifty miles around. There was a grand barbecue, glee club singing, and one of the distinguished orators of the occasion was Alexander H. Stephens. The enthusiasm of the assembled Democrats was so great that hundreds of Stephens's admirers rushed to the Atlanta Hotel, where he was stopping, and demanded a speech before he was driven to the spring. After he had appeared on the gallery and was about to step into the waiting carriage, hundreds of hands were stretched toward him to shake, and a score of others unhitched the horses from the vehicle, the noisy partisans shouting

that they would draw the little statesman themselves. And so they did, a long line of them pulling and escorting the carriage. The first American flag ever given to the breeze in Atlanta was unfurled over the Miscellany printing office by its editor, Colonel Hanleiter, on this occasion.

Atlanta had begun to build on the south side of the railroad, though Alabama street was suburban at the time the city government was organized. The topography of the central portion of the town has changed greatly since that time. There were ravines, knolls, springs, and even brooks familiar to the residents of the latter forties, that have long since been obliterated by the vandal hand of progress. For instance, there used to be a bold spring branch on the east side of Whitehall street, near the railroad crossing. This branch headed on or near the lot later occupied by the old Central block, or James building, and was a very prominent and troublesome landmark of the early days. For years it sadly depreciated good business property in the vicinity, as the expense of filling it up permanently was considered too great to be undertaken with profit, and it undermined the foundations that were first laid along the north side of Alabama street. About one hundred yards from the Western & Atlantic depot was a mineral spring much resorted to and famous before the war. The beaux and belles of early Atlanta invariably included it in their promenades and tender loiterings, and those who felt "poorly" obtained their sole supply of drinking water from its translucent depths. There were a dozen other springs that have long since dried or been filled up. Of the popular medicinal waters we have just spoken of, one of the old-time weeklies had this to say:

"OUR MINERAL SPRING.—This delightful fountain of health is even now a place of great resort for our citizens, male and female, notwithstanding its rough and uninviting appearance; but when it is fitted up, as it will be soon, with a beautiful marble basin to receive the water, and several nice summer houses to receive the visitors, and various other attractive improvements around it, it will doubtless then be thronged all the while with a multitude of ladies and gentlemen, both from home and abroad. We went down a few evenings since and were perfectly astonished at finding so many people there."

## CHAPTER VIII

### WELL-KNOWN PIONEER CITIZENS


We are satisfied that the reader will be loath to reach the end of Mr. Smith's interesting reminiscences. It would be difficult, at this late day, to find one who was a resident of Atlanta at so early a date who was a closer observer of men and events, and who has a more entertaining manner of relating his observations and impressions. Mr. Smith is one of the best-known and beloved clergymen of the old-school in Georgia, his home being in Macon. The following reminiscences of his, which we are glad to be able to continue, relate principally to the personal side of Atlanta in 1847-8:

"The two hotel keepers were Dr. Thompson and James Loyd. Dr. Thompson was a bustling, brusque, loud talking, energetic man, who kept everything moving about him. His hotel was well located and well patronized. There was a bar in the reception room, and it was well patronized also. He was quite a favorite with leading public men, and they always stopped with him. His wife was a famous housekeeper, whose well-kept flower garden and whose luxuriant Maderia vines added to the attractiveness of his hostelry.

"James Loyd was a man of very opposite character. He was one of the greatest, kindest and easiest men I ever knew. His hotel was a free and easy place, and was always well furnished with guests. There was a great deal of transient patronage, and the hotels were sources of large revenues.

"Among the merchants, Jonathan Norcross, a sharp, angular, shrewd, intelligent Yankee, was the leader. He came out to Georgia to set up a horse mill in Atlanta, and bought the property which is now owned by his son on the corner of Peachtree and Marietta streets. When he came to Atlanta, the Irish famine was





Jonathan Norcross

One of Atlanta's earliest pioneers who came to the city in 1844 when the population numbered less than 3,000 and served as mayor before the war and lived to the advanced age of ninety-one and saw the population reach 125,000.



at its height and great quantities of Indian corn were bought for shipment to Ireland. He was a large dealer, and thousands of wagon loads were dumped into his warehouse, where the corn was shelled and sacked and shipped. He had a genuine country store and kept everything a plain farmer needed and bought everything he had to sell. He was a decided temperance man, and although the larger number of merchants sold whiskey, old Jonathan never touched it. He was a kind-hearted, good-natured, eccentric man. He ran for mayor in the first race and was defeated, and his election was not secured until about 1850. The mayor was Moses W. Formwalt, a tin manufacturer, who was elected in 1848. During Formwalt's reign there was little restraint put on anyone. I was passing up Murrell's Row, now Decatur street, where John Silvey's store now is, and I saw John White leap out of the front porch on Coleman Brown and bring him to the ground, where he called lustily for peace. In a vacant house nearby I saw the only cock fight with gaffs I ever saw, and saw men freely betting on the gamiest chicken. There was only one marshal and no policemen. On the day of the election I heard there were sixty fights. In the second election old Jonathan won the prize. He began at once to put on the pressure, and the gamblers began at once to assert themselves against the mayor. One of them was arrested and ordered to the calaboose, a little log pen on the made land near the passenger station. His comrades secured a lever and raised the log sufficiently to give their comrade exit. There was an old cannon, and they dragged it to Decatur street and banged away again and again. They were arrested, and when old Jonathan ordered them to the calaboose, one of them whipped out his bowie knife and struck at the mayor across the table, fortunately missing him. A vigilance committee was organized, with a young Virginian, a teacher, Wilson, at its head. The insurgents were now promptly ousted. A court was held on Sunday, so important was the exigency, and they were sentenced to the calaboose. They stayed in jail until they were legally released. Few worthier men have lived in Atlanta than that typical 'down-easter,' Jonathan Norcross.

"W. L. Wright was the manager of the large grocery concern of Scott, Carhart & Co., and one of the largest cotton buyers





*John Cairns*

on Whitehall street. Terrence Doonan kept a large grocery, and James T. Doane & Co. a large dry goods and grocery store on that street. There was one drug store kept by Dr. Angier, afterward treasurer of the state. Then came a great many small establishments. Steinberger was the leading Jewish merchant, and Mayer & Haas came afterward with a large stock of cheap clothing. The MacDaniels, Mitchell & Hulsey had a large store filled with general merchandise. They did not sell whiskey, but sold all kinds of heavy groceries, dry goods, hardware, etc. Ira O. McDaniel and Philip, his brother, were members of this firm. They were already in Atlanta when we came. Ira O. McDaniel was a man of fine education, of high character, and of great energy. He was on Whitehall street what Jonathan Norcross was on Peachtree. He, too, was once mayor of the city. He was the father of Governor H. D. McDaniel. Cousin John Thrasher, the genial boniface of after days, was a merchant on Whitehall then, with a Mr. Scaife as partner. The book store was in a little house next to Dougherty's bakery. It was kept by James McPhenan, but I do not think it was opened until 1848. There were a great many small, cheap shops, and many grog shops.

"The leading doctor in Atlanta—certainly the most popular—was the genial, warm-hearted Josh Gilbert. He rode on horseback and carried a whistle with him, with which he made his presence known as he galloped his steed through the streets. He kept no books, collected no accounts, and, I think, paid no debts. He was "a natural-born doctor," the people said, and was a universal favorite. Dr. Martin, my father's partner, was a reserved, cynical and well-read medical man, who looked with amazement on Dr. Josh and his ways. My father was the other member of the faculty. I do not think the practice of any of the fraternity was extensive, nor were the incomes of the doctors princely.

"The lawyers were few. John Collier was a young fellow then. He was the partner of William Murphey. Sober, sensible, reliable, he was then as he continued to be till his death, in every respect a valuable man. His brother George was the postmaster, who was very steady at his work and very courteous, though brusque in his manner. The post-office was on the corner of Peachtree and Decatur streets. Richard Peters was then run-

ning a line of stages from Atlanta to Montgomery. He was then, as he always was, a gentleman of the finest type, quiet, dignified, reserved, considerate and polite. He was a mover in everything that looked like progress. George W. Adair was a popular conductor on the Georgia Railroad. These were some of the leading men of the town. On the outskirts lived Uncle Neddy Payne, whose little farm is now in the heart of Atlanta. He was a sturdy, sensible, worthy man, as was Samuel Walker, who lived in what is now North Atlanta. These two men were famous Methodists, so I knew them well. Among the people we found in Atlanta was Reuben Cone, who lived in a great comfortable cottage on Marietta street. He was, I think, a New Yorker. He had a lot of land in the heart of Atlanta.

"I remember that a fourth of an acre on Marietta street was then worth \$250. Reuben Cone's only child married Julius A. Hayden, who resided with his father-in-law. When we came to Atlanta, Colonel Hayden's gentle wife was one of the few who had a piano and a musical education. Without charge, as I remember with gratitude, she gave my little sister musical training. There was a motley people in the city then. Much the larger class were rather poor specimens, but there were not a few most excellent people, and some very few people of cultivation. Among the most striking memories I have is of old Painter Smith. I do not claim kinship with him, but there is no question about his being a distinguished personage. He was always drunk—not drunk enough to be still, but drunk enough to be noisy.

" 'You are a fool and I am a fool, but I am a fool to do as I do, and you are a fool for the want of sense,' he would yell out, or—

" 'I ain't afeard of nothin' sence I killed them two men.'

"Every now and then he would select some man as an object of abuse, and presuming on Stephen Terry's Methodism he began on him; but old Stephen forgot his peace principles and wore out a hickory cudgel on old Painter's back.

"Little Toney was a mite of a Frenchman who kept the first restaurant in Atlanta—a poor affair under Wheat's store, where he served oysters, and ham and eggs, and where, when the gamblers wished, they could have a quiet little game of seven-up.

"Of all the queer characters who were in Atlanta when we came to it, I think Dr. Fruerden was the queerest. He was a duck-legged, bristling Baptist parson. He came of a good Maryland family and was first a printer, then a Methodist preacher, then a botanic physician, then a Baptist preacher, then an editor, then a school teacher. He married an elegant lady and lived in a log cabin. He was a great temperance man in principle, but now and then he was a little off in his practice of total abstinence. He was always a leader in everything, and while he had his derelictions, was, in the main, all right.

"Stephen Terry, who gave old Painter the caning, was a stern, substantial old citizen who was a candidate for mayor and 'persona non grata' to old Painter, who undertook the office of 'cussing him out.' This was a favorite practice of some of the early citizens. The offended man, with his coat off and his sleeves rolled up, would go to the shop or store of the one obnoxious. He would then began a tirade of abuse and pour forth a volley of the fiercest and vilest and most blasphemous oaths. It was really astonishing that any genius could find as many ways of using the divine name in vain as these experts could. He was only waiting to be "clared" of the law, and he would wipe the earth with his foe.

"I once happened at the depot when a little short man vending watermelons was 'cussing out' a rival in trade and daring him to fight him. The angular, long-legged watermelon dealer was averse to a fight, but some Athens college boys urged him to stand to his guns. At last the chips were put upon each shoulder, and the brave little fellow knocked off his rival's chip. The other came to time, there was one blow, and then a foot race, for the little man ran at full speed around the car-shed, his long-legged antagonist in vain pursuit.

"Calvin Hunnicutt was the handsome, genial clerk of, I think, Mayer & Haas, and Jep Rucker, afterwards a leading banker, was clerk for Sternberger. Wash. Houton clerked for Mel. Wright. Dick Venable, father of the Venable brothers, for James Loyd.

"I wonder how many can remember Bill Durham and his basket of ginger cakes. His mother lived in a log house where



Broad street joins Mitchell, and made her living with her ginger bread. There was then no market, and fresh meat was hawked about town in a cart. About 1848 Gresham C. Rogers opened the first meat stall.

"Alexander Luckie, who gave the name to Luckie street, lived on the Peachtree road, on the outskirts of the town. Walton street was named in honor of A. W. Walton, one of the first merchants; Loyd street after James Loyd; Peters street after Richard Peters; Mitchell street after old Samuel Mitchell; Doane street after John T. Doane; McDaniel street after Ira O. McDaniel; Spring after Walton's spring.

"We had preaching every Sunday. Now a Catholic priest had mass, now a Methodist circuit rider, and now a hard-shell Baptist preached. I remember one who called himself a corn stalk preacher, and whose tears and humility touched hearts deeply. Dr. Wilson had a regular appointment after 1849, once a month in the Methodist church until the First Presbyterian was built. The Baptists had services regularly from 1848, I think. Rev. D. G. Daniel was their first pastor. The Episcopalians came after this. The beautiful lot where St. Philip's cathedral stands was owned by Richard Peters. Mr. Mitchell, the owner of the land in the heart of the city, gave a lot to each of the four churches. Mr. Peters told me he took the lot Mr. Mitchell gave to the church and gave in exchange the beautiful square on which the cathedral now stands.

"We had one Sunday school in Atlanta then. It was held in the old school house near the First Methodist church. Mr. O. S. Houston was the superintendent. Mrs. Richard Peters, then Miss Mary Thompson, was one of the teachers, and my mother had the Bible class of young ladies. As soon as the Methodist and Baptist churches had pews in them, denominational schools were established. Our school was superintended by Lewis Lawshe, one of the best men I ever knew.

"Colonel C. R. Hanleiter, one of the pioneer journalists of Atlanta, was one of the interesting characters of this early period. As editor, publisher, councilman and citizen, he was always at the forefront. As long as he lived, Colonel Hanleiter was an enthusiastic friend of Atlanta, chivalrous and generous to a fault. In

the early fifties, while a member of the city council, he introduced and had passed by that body the first ordinances prescribing the width of the streets and grades of crosswalks, the space to be occupied by signs, awnings, etc. He drafted the first comprehensive code of ordinances ever adopted for Atlanta. The first building and loan association ever organized in Atlanta was organized through his instrumentality. The first tent of Rechabites ever organized in Georgia was largely the work of Colonel Hanleiter, Rev. Lewis Lawshe and Major J. H. Linn. The Knights of Jericho were first introduced in Atlanta by him, assisted by A. B. and W. G. Forsyth, C. H. C. Willingham, and Dr. Bateman. The first large American flag ever floated to the breeze was displayed over his printing office. He was an active spirit in every move calculated to advance the material interests of the community.

"Major George Shaw, the second justice-of-the-peace ever in Atlanta, arrived in 1847. He was a Virginian, and a veteran of the war of 1812. He first settled in Jackson county, Ga., and was admitted to the bar in Jefferson. In 1828 he was a member of the Georgia legislature. Squire Shaw was a familiar figure on the streets of the new town, and he enjoyed in a remarkable degree the respect of his fellow-citizens. He was a model gentleman of the old school, genial and kindly. He was blessed with a good helpmeet, nee Miss Louisa Troutt, of Jefferson, Ga., and to them were born three sons—Augustus Shaw, the well-known Atlantan, and George and Samuel H., deceased.

"Dr. Chapman Powell came to Atlanta with the beginning of the fifties. He had recognized the inevitable supremacy of Atlanta and moved over from Decatur. In 1836 he was a member of the general assembly from DeKalb county and an active worker in behalf of the charter for the State road, then in its incipiency. Loving his profession better than politics, he refused a second nomination. His home near Decatur was General Sherman's headquarters while the destruction of Atlanta by the federals was going on in 1864. One of the houses in which Dr. Powell resided was remodeled and removed to East Cain street, where it is now used as a school house. Dr. Powell died in 1870, leaving behind him a highly creditable name as a man and physician."

In his history of Atlanta written a dozen years ago, Wallace

P. Reed gives some reminiscences of Colonel D. N. Sloan, which will interestingly supplement those of Mr. Smith:

"Colonel Sloan came to the place in 1850. When he was young his ideas turned toward adventure. Accordingly, he left his home in South Carolina with the determination to see at least a part of the country. His money was stolen from him on his way to Macon, Ga., and when he arrived at his destination he was destitute of funds. Consequently he had to go to work. Through a friend in Macon he obtained letters of recommendation to Emerson Foote, superintendent of the Macon and Western railroad, and president at that time of the Macon and Western Telegraph Line. Thus Mr. Sloan obtained a position as telegraph operator at the station in Atlanta, and was the first telegraph operator Atlanta ever had. Mr. Sloan could not find words to describe the town at that time. Jonathan Norcross kept a general merchandise store at the corner of Marietta and Peachtree streets. He dealt in groceries and dry goods, and made a specialty of 'shingles and feathers,' and had a sign to that effect. I. O. McDaniel also kept a general merchandise store on Whitehall street. Clark & Grutt kept a grocery store on Whitehall street. Mr. Perryman kept a grocery store on what is now Alabama street, but it was not then called a street. R. Dulin kept a general merchandise store on Whitehall street, and Wash. Collier kept a general merchandise store at what is now the junction of Line, Peachtree and Decatur streets. Richard Kile also kept a general merchandise store on the corner of Marietta and Peachtree streets. J. T. Doane was a great cotton merchant here at that time. His place of business was on Whitehall street. Atlanta had several good doctors. Among them were Dr. Josh Gilbert, who used to carry a shrill whistle around with him, and occasionally stop and blow it to let the people know where to find him; Dr. J. F. Alexander, Dr. W. F. Westmoreland, and a French physician named D'Alvigney. Lawyers seemed to be scarce. Judge L. E. Bleckley was the principal lawyer at that time, and there was one by the name of John Wing.

"Atlanta being the only railroad center for miles around, had a very fair trade in country produce. The countrymen brought

their chickens, eggs and butter into Atlanta from the country, and there was a very much larger range than there is now. The average farmer did not make much profit, for eggs sold at four or five cents a dozen; butter at seven, eight and ten cents a pound, and other country produce in proportion. After selling at these prices he bought his cloth and other necessities, at what would now be considered enormous prices. Calico that can now be bought for two or three cents a yard, was sold then for fifteen to twenty cents. Cotton was lower, though not much below the present market. One thing that lowered the price of country produce was the fact that Atlanta was a country town, and almost everyone had his or her garden of potatoes, onions and other vegetables. Very few melons were raised in the country at that time. Once in a while farmers would bring them in, but not very often. At the present time, however, the melon trade is one of our important industries. Nearly everybody kept their own cows, and so the farmers did not sell much milk. The cows were allowed perfect liberty to graze where they pleased, and so were the hogs, which were owned by many of the citizens. At the time Colonel Sloan lived here, Jonathan Norcross was mayor. There was a council, but it met when it pleased, and made laws at random.

“Mr. Sloan remembers a speech made by Robert Toombs, on the platform in front of his office. He does not remember the issue, but says that Mr. Toombs made a severe attack on South Carolina, for some reason or other. When he finished speaking, Walter Colquitt replied to him in a very able speech, and showed the state up in its true light.

“General Kossuth, the noted Hungarian patriot, was at that time visiting the United States, and with a large body of soldiery passed through Atlanta, on his way to Savannah. He went into Mr. Sloan’s office for the purpose of sending a telegram to Savannah. Mr. Sloan asked him for the money for the telegram, whereupon he replied that he was not in the habit of paying for telegrams, and told him, in very emphatic terms, who he was. Mr. Sloan replied that he had no instructions not to charge the general, whereupon the Hungarian became very angry, but paid the bill.

"General Sam Houston, of Texas, while passing through Atlanta, stopped to look at the telegraph instrument. He said that he had never before seen one. He was at that time a congressman.

"Richard Peters was said to be the wealthiest man in the place. He owned the finest house in town, which was a weather-boarded house, on Peters street, near the corner of Forsyth, and just to the west of Sam Inman's residence. Clark Howell, the father of Evan P. Howell, was also a very wealthy and influential man. Mr. Howell owned and lived in the only brick residence in the city. His young son Evan was the first telegraph messenger in Atlanta, an associate of Colonel Sloan. The houses of the more fortunate citizens were weatherboarded cottages, but the poorer people lived in log cabins.

"About this time Atlanta was noted for its bad characters. There were several gamblers here who were known far and wide, but these were not looked upon as evil-doers, because there was no law against gambling. There was one gambler in town of special note, namely Jack Edmundson. He was looked upon rather as a benefactor. It was said that he would never take the advantage of any man, nor would he take money from a poor man, even though he won it. He neither took advantage of youth nor ignorance, and he gave to the poor and was very much respected. There were a great many other noted gamblers in and around Atlanta, but these, unlike the one spoken of, were generally of bad reputation.

"There was only one telegraph instrument in the city, and that was the one Mr. Sloan used; and the line extending from Macon to Atlanta was the only one known. This instrument was one of the old-style paper register machines, but was a very great curiosity to the people around Atlanta. Telegrams from here to New York had to go around by the way of Savannah. In 1850 Mr. Sloan says that he saw a man by the name of Thomas Kile murdered in front of his office. He was stabbed, and the murderer made good his escape. Kile's daughter caught her father's body in order to support him, and was covered all over with blood. The murderer used to send telegrams to his family here through Mr. Sloan's office. The man was in Alabama and sent the tele-



grams through Macon. The authorities here endeavored to find out through Mr. Sloan his whereabouts, but could not do so. He would not betray the secrets of the office even in such a case, except on one occasion. He received a dispatch to the marshal of Atlanta, notifying him to look out on the Georgia train for one Philip Goode, who was wanted in South Carolina for murder. Mr. Sloan was a native of South Carolina, and knew this man very well, and they were personal friends. He knew that if Goode had murdered anyone he had done so in a drunken row, or something of the kind, as he was of a good family. So he managed to go to the train before he saw the marshal, and the first man he met was Goode, whom he told to escape for his life. Goode left, and immediately afterward Mr. Sloan met the marshal and gave him the telegram. The marshal hastened to the train, but missed his man.

"Once a green countryman came to town to send a negro to Macon, on the train. Several of the fun-loving boys here told him to send him by telegraph, as it would be cheaper. Accordingly, they sent him with the negro over to Mr. Sloan's office. He, suspecting some trick, got them to take hold of the poles of his battery, and then turned on the circuit, whereupon they began to jump around, and the white man said he didn't want to go too. He soon found out, however, that he was being duped, and he broke loose and made for Sloan, who had to hide, for he saw that the countrymen intended to whip him.

"Mr. Sloan had an offer made him in real estate, in 1850, which, if he had accepted, would have been to-day many thousand dollars in his pocket. A party, who was anxious to sell, offered him one hundred acres of land, including the ground on which the new capitol now stands, for \$1,000. Mr. Sloan let the opportunity go by, and narrowly missed making a fortune."



## CHAPTER IX

### PROGRESS AND OUTLAWRY

In 1849 Atlanta began to be looked upon as a big town and an important town. It was the Mecca of the adventurer and shrewd investor, as well as home-seeker, and, as can well be imagined, the elements of citizenship were incongruous and conditions chaotic. This was but the natural consequence in an inchoate town, suddenly made famous. At the first municipal election it was seen that the issue of the near future would be who should rule, the respectable and moral element, or the semi-outlaw, sporting class. Indeed, this issue was raised at that time, though in a more covert way than at the next election. Jonathan Norcross had been a candidate against Moses Formwalt for mayor, and it was well understood, among the "rowdies," at least, that their greatest security lay in the election of the latter. Murrell's Row was solid for Formwalt.

Before narrating the exciting incidents of the Norcross election in 1850, it is best to note something of the progress of the community the previous year, and to consider conditions that made a conflict between the two forces inevitable in the next local political campaign. The completion of the State road was an event of 1849, and a very vital event in the early history of Atlanta. Commercially the young city was now unbound and free to give her feet the wings of Mercury. The increase in population was on the "magical" order. By the end of this year it is safe to say that 2,500 people were numbered in Atlanta's population, and more than an hundred newcomers arriving every month. The amount of building going on was remarkable for so small a town in the East. Brick yards lined the outskirts, and the hum of the circular saw resounded through the environing woods. The place was full of mechanics attracted from an hundred miles

around to get temporary work. Wages were good for that day, and employment to be had for the asking. In the residence portion of the town extensive improvement was in progress. Beautiful residences were going up on Marietta, Peachtree and Decatur streets, then the best residence quarters, some of them spacious brick mansions with classic porticos. The log cabins good enough for two or three years before were torn down to make room for neat frame cottages, and grades were established on the central streets and some preliminary paving done. The shipping interests of the town had become very large, and now that the Western and Atlantic "went somewhere," traffic by rail increased enormously.

In this year of unexampled prosperity and activity, a new paper was born in Atlanta, and its coming was a signal that the time was ripe for grappling with the law and order problem. The sheet was called the *Atlanta Intelligencer*, and its editor was that irrepressible reformer and divine, Joseph Baker, nothing daunted by the extinction of his *Luminary*. The new paper was owned by a joint stock company composed of Colonel Z. A. Rice, Ira O. McDaniel, Benjamin F. Bomar and Jonathan Norcross. They hired the Rev. Baker to edit their paper, and their purpose was soon manifest.

The town was by this time in a disgracefully disorderly condition, the authority of the municipal government being set at naught by the hundreds of "toughs" who had no visible means of support. As the time for holding another city election drew near, the alignment of the opposing forces was well under way, and the bitterest sort of a feeling existed between them long before the nominations were made. The *Intelligencer* thundered against the "Rowdy Party," and called for a clean sweep. A mass meeting of the "upholders of good morals and public order" nominated Jonathan Norcross as the candidate of what was called the "Moral Party," and the other faction nominated Lawyer L. C. Simpson, for mayor. To say that the campaign was hot would not be at all hyperbolic. During every day that it endured, one or more more or less prominent citizens were put "hors du combat" by the crudest exercise of the art of pugilism, and during much of the time, after dark, the town seemed to be in possession of a howling

mob. There were over forty drinking saloons in the place, to say nothing of the groceries that dealt in ardent refreshments, and it goes without saying that they all did a landoffice business while the great political war raged. While Simpson and his backers were turning their money loose in the bar-rooms, Jonathan Norcross and his friends, to emphasize the moral plane on which they were fighting, treated liberally to apples and confectionery. The Moral Party held several big rallies at which the leaders denounced the corruption and disorder existing in Atlanta, and called upon the better element to rescue the city from rowdyism and vice. The Rowdy Party held no mass meetings, but an outlet was not wanting for their enthusiasm. Happily the election passed off without any fatalities, resulting in the election of Jonathan Norcross as mayor of Atlanta.

It had been the boast of the most turbulent spirits in the Rowdy Party that "Uncle Jonathan" would find the town too hot to hold him, if he tried to execute his proposed reforms, and in more than one instance he had been threatened with personal violence. It was a part of the mayor's duties to hold police court, there being no municipal recorder at that time. Mayor Norcross had been in office but a day or two when he was called upon to try a burly ruffian who had been arrested for an affray on the street. Trouble was expected at the hearing, as some of the most dangerous Murrellites were suspected of plotting to do the new mayor harm by getting themselves arrested and attacking him in open court. The city government then had its headquarters in a second story room of the building afterward occupied by the dry goods establishment of John Keely. A large crowd was present to witness the mayor's first case, and a large part of the spectators were by no means sympathetic. The case proceeded with due formality, and as the evidence was conclusive, Mayor Norcross fined the bully and was about to proceed with the next case when the fellow suddenly rose from his chair, as the officers were advancing to his side to take him to the calaboose, and drew a wicked-looking bowie knife with a blade at least a foot long. Flourishing the weapon over his head, the prisoner loudly defied any man in the court room to take him and declared that he proposed

to start a slaughter pen right there. At that he started to cut and slash right and left with his big knife, the crowd falling over each other in their frightened efforts to get down the stairway. Allen E. Johnson, the sheriff of DeKalb county, was present in the room, as were City Marshal William McConnell, and Deputy Marshal Benjamin N. Williford. C. H. Strong joined these officers in their effort to cope with the desperate man. As for Mayor Norcross, he quickly sprang from his old splint-bottom chair, and raising it high above his head in a defensive attitude awaited the attack of the desperado, having no better weapon. It was evident that the man was intent at getting at the mayor. Sheriff Johnson always carried a stout hickory cane, and in this emergency it stood him in good stead. He aimed a blow with his cane at the hand that held the knife, and a second later the knife was ringing on the floor and the hand in a fit condition for a poultice. Sheriff Johnson and Mr. Strong then seized the prisoner and, disregarding the scowling faces of his friends, who had not the nerve to carry out their conspiracy, hustled him down stairs into the street. By this time it was dark, court having been called late in the afternoon, and the prisoner managed to escape amid the jostling crowd in the darkness. He was never seen again in Atlanta.

The next day the town was at fever pitch of excitement, and everybody felt that serious trouble was imminent. Business was practically suspended, and the men of both factions gathered in groups and talked threateningly. There were several hundred unsavory characters in the Rowdy Party who, it was feared, would not scruple to raise a bloody riot, and the more timid of the respectable element were talking seriously of leaving town. Among the majority of the latter, however, the sentiment was strong for organizing a vigilance committee, if the machinery of municipal government was inadequate to cope with the grave situation. The next night the Rowdy Party took the belicose initiative. In the village of Decatur was a small, ancient cannon, a relic of the War of 1812, which the townsfolk were wont to fire on Fourth of July and other occasions of public jubilation. This the "rowdies" obtained by some means, the next night, and planted in front of Jonathan Norcross's store, with the muzzle

trained upon the building. They fired it off two or three times, but it was only loaded with sand and gravel, and no damage was done, save dirtying Norcross's porch. The outlaws left a written notice, however, to the effect that Mayor Norcross must either resign or leave town, or they would return and blow up his store. This lawless act was not interfered with by the city authorities, the marshal and his assistants keeping at a discreet distance, and none of the Moral Party showing themselves. But the next day there was no shrinking on the part of the good citizens. The mayor called a secret meeting of the council, which resulted in his issuing a proclamation calling upon all law-abiding citizens to form themselves at once into a volunteer police force to aid in securing the enforcement of the local laws. The response of the Moral Party was immediate and determined. Citizens assembled in front of the Norcross store with their guns and pistols, and all day the work of organizing them into a volunteer police force proceeded quietly. Trouble was expected after nightfall. The Rowdy Party also perfected a warlike organization during the day, meeting in force in a house on Decatur street, near where the Willingham building now stands.

The old cannon had been left in the middle of the street at the four corners, as a menace to Norcross's store, but the desperate "sporting fraternity" did not muster courage to return and put their threat into execution. Had they done so, a hand-to-hand battle would have been fought right there, for the Moral Party was guarding the vicinity, at least a hundred strong, and its guards and patrols were scattered all over the town. At midnight, there being evidently no danger of an attack by the Rowdy Party, a large squad of the volunteer police, under the leadership of A. W. Mitchell, was detailed to move upon the headquarters of the enemy in the building spoken of on Decatur street. There were several squads, commanded by leaders of well-known courage appointed by the mayor and council, and these moved upon other low quarters of the town where the rowdies rendezvoused. Before this show of courageous force the Rowdy Party dissolved like frost in the warm breath of the sun. Not a man, for all their former bluster, stood his ground, but the whole unsavory lot slunk like coyotes to their holes, except such as fell into the



hands of the volunteer police as they were attempting to escape. Some fifteen or twenty rowdy ringleaders, however, remained in the Decatur street house too long, and when they attempted to flee, found the house surrounded. They were arrested, without offering any resistance, and conducted by a large armed force to the little calaboose, where they were locked up. As the place would not hold all the prisoners, only the worst ones were thrust inside and the rest strongly guarded in a private building.

The cases against the captured rowdies were set for the next day, and the whole town turned out at the trial, the street in front of the city hall being choked with people. One after another the offenders were convicted and fined to the limit allowed by the charter, and in default of the fine, most of them were remanded to jail. This broke the backbone of the "rebellion," though for several weeks unusual vigilance and energy was required on the part of the municipal authorities to preserve order, and the whole volunteer police force was not disbanded for some time. During the rest of his administration Mayor Norcross was not molested, but he received several anonymous threats through the mail and the feeling against him in Murrell's Row was dangerously vindictive.

The effort to reform Atlanta was genuine and in a large measure effective. Shortly after the exciting incidents related in the foregoing, the moral crusaders turned their attention to two pestiferous quarters of the suburbs, known by the pleasing name of Snake Nation and Slab Town. In these places, in particular, occurred scenes of debauchery and indecency that shocked the moral sense of the community. It seems that these pest holes were just beyond the city limits of that time, and that, in consequence, the city was unable to include them in its wholesome regulations. Thither the worst characters of Murrell's Row retired, male and female, and continued their depraved practices without the danger of legal molestation. Finally, determining to endure the disgraceful places no longer, a large body of disguised Atlantans moved against Slab Town and Snake Nation by night. The men found in the filthy huts were whipped by the "White Caps" and warned to leave town, while the abandoned creatures of the other sex were hauled nearly to Decatur, when they were



allowed to go with a similar warning. The shanties of the two disreputable quarters were then destroyed by fire, and so complete was the destruction and effective example that the places were not rebuilt, or similar places built up again soon.

The city administration of 1849 was not regarded as bad, so much as weak. Good men composed it—men prominent the next year in the work of cleaning out the dives. It required a man with the boldness and rigid morality of Jonathan Norcross to give the reform movement the necessary official backbone. The mayor who preceded Mr. Norcross and succeeded Mayor Formwalt was Benjamin F. Bomar, and the members of the council of 1849 were Jonas J. Smith, Ira O. McDaniel, P. M. Hodge, A. B. Forsyth, H. C. Holcombe and J. A. Hayden. The mayor who succeeded Mayor Bomar in 1850 was W. Buell, and the council over which he presided was composed of H. C. Holcombe, Joel Kelsey, P. M. Hodge, J. T. Humphries, S. T. Biggers and B. W. Roark. Before continuing the narrative of Atlanta's progress in the early fifties, it will be well to take some note of the routine municipal happenings of 1849 and 1850.

The office of deputy city marshal was abolished by the new council on January 18, 1849, and the salary of the city marshal was placed at \$300, and he was required to give a bond of \$2,000. Other salary and bond modifications were made at the same time. The treasurer was allowed two per cent. of all moneys received, and two per cent. of all moneys paid out, as before, and his bond fixed at \$4,000. The compensation of the tax collector and receiver was fixed at three per cent. of all moneys received, and three per cent of all moneys paid out, with a bond of \$4,000. The clerk's fees were to be regulated by the ordinances of the city, and he was required to give a thousand dollar bond. The officers elected by this council were: H. M. Boyd, tax collector and receiver; German M. Lester, marshal; Oswald Houston, treasurer; John L. Harris, clerk. A. B. Forsyth and P. M. Hodge were appointed a committee on patrols. Councilmen McDaniel, Smith and Hayden were appointed a committee on streets. At this meeting Daniel Dougherty offered to macadamize "the street" for a distance of one hundred and forty yards, for a width

of forty feet and a depth of sixteen and one-half inches, at a cost to the city of \$700.

On the 7th of February council apportioned the tax for 1849, fixing a rate of thirty cents on each one hundred dollars' worth of real estate and merchandise. On the 24th of May it was resolved that the mayor be authorized to sell the hospital, provided he could obtain original cost. On July 30th a special meeting was held to consider the question of a plank road between Lynch's corner and the post-office. This road was to be twenty feet in width. At the same session the clerk was required to regularly furnish the *Intelligencer* a report of the proceedings of the council. On September 10th the question of opening Pryor street was again before council, and it being evident that there was really a street running parallel with the five acres of land donated to the state by Samuel Mitchell, it was unanimously resolved that all obstructions be removed from Pryor street, and that the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, and the Macon and Western Railway Company be required to remove any obstructions which they may have placed on Pryor street.

On the 4th of October it was resolved that a committee be appointed to make a contract with some landholder of the vicinity for a suitable graveyard for the city. The members of the graveyard committee were A. B. Forsyth, B. F. Bomar and J. J. Smith. On the first of November the committee reported that they had inspected a number of tracts of land near the city, and that they had practically settled on the land desired, but that it was held at an exorbitant price. The committee was continued and instructed, if possible, to exchange the hospital lot for lands adjoining the graveyard then in use.

After the election held in January, 1850, the bonds of the officers appointed by council were again revised, that of the treasurer being placed at \$5,000; tax receiver and collector, \$5,000; clerk, \$2,000; marshal, \$2,000; deputy marshal, \$2,000. It will be noticed from the latter item that the office of deputy marshal was restored by the council of 1850. Oswald Houston was elected treasurer; Hugh M. Boyd, tax receiver and collector; John L. Harris, clerk; and German M. Lester, marshal.

At a meeting of the council held February 8, 1850, the following resolution was adopted: That each and every person,

at the time of taking out his license, shall give bond in the sum of \$200, with two good and sufficient sureties, that he will not knowingly violate or permit to be violated within his retail house, or on the premises thereof, any state law or by-law of the city of Atlanta, without giving notice thereof to the corporate authorities of said city within twenty-four hours thereafter, and that the giving of such notice shall avoid the forfeiture. It was decided at the session on the 15th of the same month to have sidewalks built on every business street, eight feet in width, and property-holders were given permission to plant ornamental trees along the sidewalks. The new council adopted the *Intelligencer* as its official organ, upon the condition that the proceedings be published gratis. The editor, who was present, accepted the honor, and the thanks of the body was tendered him by resolution.

On the 9th of March the committee on graveyard made another report to the effect that Messrs. Cone and Williamson agreed to give the city one acre of land and sell it four acres more at one hundred dollars an acre. The proposition was accepted, but upon a motion to reconsider, the resolution was withdrawn and the committee discharged. A new committee was then appointed, composed of Messrs. Hodge and Roark. On the 11th of March the question of holding an agricultural fair at Atlanta, a pet progressive project of the time, was discussed with much enthusiastic interest. A committee consisting of Messrs. Luckie, Thompson, Hodge, Hayden, Ezzard and Bomar was appointed to solicit subscriptions to the lists which had been sent in by Messrs. Jones and Hayden. On the 5th of April the gratifying announcement was made that the subscription had been sufficiently increased to warrant the statement that the desired sum of \$1,000 could be collected and presented as a bonus to the locating committee of the Southern Agricultural Association as an inducement to secure the annual holding of its fairs at Atlanta. In order to further assist the fair association and make its annual fairs a permanent attraction at Atlanta, council, on the 10th of April, passed a resolution that a conveyance containing ten acres, more or less, particularly described in a bond for title from Lemuel P. Grant to Augustus S. Rhodes, and known as the hospital lot of the city of Atlanta,

be executed to the Southern Agricultural Association, to have and to hold said lot so long as the said association should continue to hold their annual meetings in the city of Atlanta, with a clause in said deed authorizing the officers of said association to permit the city of Atlanta to use said lot and buildings for other public meetings, so long as the citizens shall not abuse said property or privilege; said property, with the buildings thereon, to revert to the mayor and council of Atlanta, when said Southern Agricultural Association should cease to use annually the lot and buildings for the purposes designated in said deed of conveyance.

The Southern Agricultural Association did not see fit to accept the proposition of the Atlanta city council, in its original form, and there was considerable parleying between the two organizations. The fair people seemed to think that Atlanta wanted to exercise too much authority and reserve for herself too many privileges. The terms of the donation were modified, however, to meet the wishes of the fair association, under a mutual compromise. Referring to the matter at some length, Historian Reed says: "On December 10th, 1850, a communication was received from the Hon. Mark A. Cooper, chairman of the committee of the association, with reference to the matter of the fair grounds, which was answered by Jonathan Norcross, mayor of Atlanta, on April 1, 1851. The substance of the communication of Mayor Norcross was to the effect that the mayor and council of Atlanta had, on April 10th, 1850, proposed to deed to the Southern Agricultural Association the hospital lot, containing ten acres of land, upon which the association should have the privilege of holding its fairs, upon the condition that the corporate authorities of the city of Atlanta should have the privilege of opening the grounds for the reception of other public gatherings, when the grounds were not in use by the association. These conditions were rejected by the association's committee on location, and the city authorities subsequently made a deed to the association with the condition only that the land, with the buildings and appurtenances thereon, should revert to the city when the annual fairs of the association had ceased to longer be held thereon. Thus the city authorities were excluded from the grounds, except in times of the fair, and then they had to pay an

entrance fee in the same manner that other people had to pay to gain entrance to the grounds. This condition, taking into consideration the guarantee of \$1,000 which the city had made good, was considered rather severe upon the city authorities, and was the cause of much dissatisfaction. Besides this, there seemed to be some difference of opinion between the association and the mayor and the city council as to the guarantee fund itself. Mayor Norcross was of the opinion that the city had performed its part of the contract by the payment of \$750, the Georgia Railroad Company having paid \$250, which payments together made up the \$1,000 guaranteed. That the \$250 paid by the Georgia Railroad Company was intended to be included in the guarantee, was certified to by W. W. Roark, Joel Kelsey and Stephen T. Biggers, of the council, and by Henry C. Holcombe and the mayor, W. Buell, on February 28th, 1851. Thus the matter rested for a considerable time."

On May 3, 1850, the new graveyard committee reported that they had been unable to purchase a lot within the limits of the city, owing to the exorbitant price at which the ground was held, but that just without the city line they had discovered a suitable lot, which could be purchased at a reasonable price. This did not satisfy council, it seems, for the committee was discharged and it was resolved that the mayor and the members of the council go as a committee of the whole to visit lots within the city limits that were believed to be such as were suitable for graveyard purposes, and particularly to the lot of Judge Cone, which the committee had had under consideration. On the 1st of June a graveyard plot was finally purchased from A. W. Wooding, consisting of six acres, for which \$75 per acre was paid. The new cemetery was called the Atlanta cemetery.

On the 27th of May council adopted a resolution that, in its opinion, there should be a public street on the west side of the public square belonging to the state, and which was properly a continuation of Pryor street, but for lack of means it could not be opened by the city at that time. On the 30th of August council passed a resolution pledging the city of Atlanta to take \$10,000 of the stock of a plank road which it was proposed to build between Atlanta and Dahlonga, to be taken when the amount sub-

scribed should come within \$10,000 of being sufficient to build the plank road with the necessary bridges. The plan was to pay for this stock by issuing city bonds of the amount of \$10,000, redeemable after ten years, and bearing interest at the rate of seven per cent. Another similar resolution was adopted, subscribing to the plank road to Jacksonville, by way of Altamaha. The terms were identical.



## CHAPTER X

### THE EARLY FIFTIES


Things went very well in Atlanta after the forces of disorder and insubordination were subdued. The young city became quiet, so far as law and order was concerned, but not quiet, by any means, as to enterprise and growth. The place was nothing if not bustling. Its trade had steadily expanded, and its reputation as a cheap trading point extended far and wide. Atlanta was known as a cash town in contradistinction to the credit policy so prevalent and so ruinous in the older cities of the state. At a very early period in her history Atlanta laid the foundation of her great commercial supremacy and rapid upbuilding by adopting the plan of trading on a cash basis strictly and selling at a narrow margin of profit.

It was in 1850 that Atlanta experienced her first fire. Two fires, in fact, occurred simultaneously, one in a business house on Alabama street and one in a cotton warehouse a little out of the business center. These fires were extinguished by an improvised bucket brigade made up of well nigh the entire male population, but not, however, until several bales of cotton had been consumed. The night of the fires the money drawer of the Georgia Railroad depot was broken open and its contents stolen. The general opinion was that the fires had been started by incendiaries for the purpose of creating an excitement, in the midst of which they could loot unprotected property. It was known that some suspicious characters were sojourning in the town, and after this occurrence, the police quietly notified them to leave, which they did with alacrity.

Thus warned, the property-holders, who for some time had been agitating the organization of a fire department, met in mass convention and went about the proposed organization in a practical way. The legislature was applied to for a charter, which was granted under the name of Atlanta Fire Company No. 1.



The charter members were: W. W. Baldwin, W. Barnes, C. C. Rhodes, G. R. Frazer, H. Muhlinbrink, B. T. Lamb, Reuben Gardner, S. Frankford, P. J. Immell, C. W. Hunnicutt, John Kershaw, T. J. Malone, H. M. Mitchell, W. J. Houston, L. J. Parr, J. F. Reynolds, C. A. Whaley, A. C. Pulliam and J. S. Malone. The act of the legislature was approved by Governor Herschel V. Johnson, and the company was soon in fire-fighting trim. There was some difficulty in raising the funds necessary for the equipment of a company with a hand engine and 500 feet of leather hose, but by dint of much perseverance the good work was accomplished. The next step was to secure the location for the engine house. A suitable site was found on Broad street, between the old calaboose, which extended to the railroad, and the public market on the other side, which extended to Alabama street. The original building on this lot is said to have been a fine old Southern mansion, the home of Ewell Wright. The yard of the residence occupied the whole square between Alabama street and the railroad, and was very attractive, being filled with lordly shade trees and beautiful flowers. Here was built the little one-story engine house. As other companies were formed, they built houses for the apparatus in other parts of the city, but No. 1 house was known as the general headquarters, and the first alarm bell was put in there. Before the bell was installed in its place, another story was added to the structure and a tower built for the bell. The same bell used a half century ago is still used by the fire department in its handsome headquarters on West Alabama street, and every Atlantan is familiar with its resonant tones. From this little building the protection of the city from fires was directed by the volunteers until the paid fire department was organized about 1877. The old hand engine was called "Blue Dick," and all the country for miles around gathered with no little curiosity to see it perform its work. Fire engines were a decided novelty in those days. The first exhibition was voted a success, and from that day the proud firemen were the pets of Atlanta, the city always evincing much enthusiasm in its support of fire measures. Few of the charter members of Atlanta Fire Company No. 1 are now living. W. W. Baldwin was the first president of the company and was elected chief, which office he



John Silvey

held two terms, declining re-election for a third term. H. Muhlinbrink was the first treasurer, and was succeeded by Henry Kuhlrt, Sr. A number of the early members of the old volunteer fire company are prominent business men and citizens of Atlanta at this writing. Among them are Major John H. Mecaslin, J. H. Ellsworth, "Uncle Tom" Haney, Henry Haney, foreman of Engine House No. 4, Thomas W. Haney, chief of the Jacksonville, Fla., fire department; John Berkele, Charles Heinz, Charles Heinz, Jr., John M. Heinz, Peter Lynch, Charles Klassett, Jemmy Mann, Jacob Emmel, Mike Emmel, William Erskine, George H. Deihl, John K. Weaver, and others. As near as can be ascertained, the old volunteers sold their apparatus to the city in the early spring of 1882, and since leaving active service, the company has been perpetuated with Major Mecaslin as president; George Deihl, vice-president; J. M. Heinz, secretary, and John Berkele, treasurer. Before dismissing the subject of the organization and early history of Atlanta Fire Company No. 1, it is interesting to add that a few years ago the old building partly collapsed and the north end, with the tower, fell over the embankment upon the railroad tracks. It was repaired and transformed into a one-story building again, and was rented out as a store, its tenant generally being a produce commission merchant. It was the remnant of this historic building that was torn down in the summer of 1901 to make room for Hugh Inman's handsome modern structure. For a number of years prior to the partial collapse of the old engine house, one of the interesting features about the place was the grave of a dog, located on the extreme edge of the embankment in a grass plot kept green by the firemen. The grave was marked by a weather-stained wooden board on which was inscribed simply the name "Jeff." The dog belonged to Jake Emmel, of the volunteer company, and was a favorite with the firemen of long ago, running with the company to all fires.

There were a number of substantial citizens in Atlanta by this time. Er Lawshé, who came sometime in 1848, and John Silvey, who came the following year, were leaders in all movements looking to the advancement of the city. The Lynches, energetic Irishmen of sturdy qualities, were among the prominent newcomers. There were five brothers of them. Patrick Lynch

was a stone mason who knew his trade thoroughly and, during his lifetime, had the distinction of building more foundations and stone walls in Atlanta than, perhaps, any dozen masons. He built the Georgia Railroad machine shops in 1850. John and James Lynch were well-to-do grocers.

The banking agencies established in the city were either railroad or branch institutions. A regular bank was now organized by George Smith, a gentleman from Chicago who had large financial connections. The capital stock was \$300,000. The local management was in the hands of J. R. Valentine.

The Catholics and Episcopalians by this time had substantial church structures erected. The first priest of the former church was Father Quinn, and the first rector of the latter church was John J. Hunt.

The council elected to serve under the mayorship of Jonathan Norcross was composed of Julius A. Hayden, John T. Humphries, D. McSheffrey, W. W. Roark, John Jones and Paschal House. The salaries and bonds of the several officers appointed by the new council were fixed as follows: Marshal, salary \$350, and bond \$3,000; treasurer, salary one and one-half per cent. of all moneys received and disbursed, and \$6,000 bond; deputy marshal, salary, \$300, and \$2,000 bond. On the 23d of February, 1851, an ordinance was passed consolidating the two offices of clerk and tax receiver and collector. The salary of this official for acting as clerk was to be in accordance with the ordinances, and for acting as tax receiver and collector it was fixed at two and one-half per cent. on all moneys received and disbursed. The bond of the consolidated office was placed at \$6,000. At the election on January 24th, William McConnell had been elected marshal; Oswald Houston, treasurer; Benjamin J. Williford, deputy marshal; Adam N. Jones, clerk and tax receiver and collector.

On February 14th council adopted an ordinance which required each building within the city limits, kitchens and other small houses excepted, to be furnished with a ladder, and each store and dwelling to be supplied with two buckets to be used in the emergency of fire. On February 21st O. H. P. Canant was elected city sexton, and Mr. Humphries was given authority to

proceed with the plotting and enclosing of the lots in the new cemetery. On the 28th of March Mr. Frankford appeared before the council to urge the great necessity of digging wells to supply the necessary water in case of fire. Subsequently council authorized the committee on wells to proceed with the digging of a well at the corner of Whitehall and Mitchell streets, to be eight feet square and hold fifteen feet of water; another of the same dimensions to be dug at the corner of Marietta and Peach-tree streets, in front of Norcross's store, and one, also, of the same dimensions, at the corner of Whitehall and Hunter streets. These three wells were to be covered with two-inch plank. At the same time a large reservoir fifteen feet square and fifteen feet deep was ordered dug on Alabama street, below the Holland House. On April 11th the foregoing well ordinance was repealed, and as a substitute an ordinance was passed ordering wells to be dug in the four places specified, to be five feet in diameter, to contain ten feet of water, and to be covered with wood. It was further ordered that wooden cisterns be built in connection with each well, not more than three feet distant, to contain ten feet of water.

On June 4th the vexed Pryor street opening matter was adjusted by the following action: "This meeting was called to consider a communication just received from John P. King, president of the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company; W. L. Mitchell, chief engineer of the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company, and Isaac Scott, president of the Macon and Western Railroad Company. This communication had reference to that part of Pryor street lying between the public square in the city of Atlanta, belonging to the state, and the depot lot of the Macon and Western Railroad. The action of council in the premises was taken in the following words: 'In consideration of the urgent necessity of the respective railroad interests occupying that portion of said street for tracks, etc., and in consideration of having a more convenient and equitable arrangement of depot buildings upon said square, we do hereby resolve and agree to relinquish and surrender up to the railroad companies and interests in this city, all claims to the aforesaid portion of said street. Be it further resolved that we deem it absolutely necessary for the satisfaction of private claims and interests adjoining the public



square, as well as the interests and claims of the citizens generally, that the respective tracks and depot buildings of the respective railroads be so arranged as to do equal justice to all the public and private claims as the convenience of the respective railroads will allow of being done.' "

In accordance with the foregoing agreement on the city's part, the mayor and clerk were required to execute a relinquishment of that portion of Pryor street lying between the public square and the Macon and Western Railroad depot lot, and such part of said street as crosses the railroad tracks, to the respective railroad companies whose roads terminate in this city, and to the state of Georgia.

For some months the question of building a city hall had been agitated, and at the session of June 4th a committee was appointed to confer with Dr. Thompson with regard to the sale of a lot suitable for its location. The lot was purchased for that purpose from Dr. Thompson, and at a meeting of council held on September 20, 1851, the erection of a substantial brick city hall was determined upon. The plan of the proposed building was as follows: Length, seventy feet; width, fifty feet; building to be two stories high; lower story to have a passageway lengthwise through the building, ten feet in width. In the front end of the building, on the east side of this passage, was to be a room forty feet in length, for an engine room, and the other thirty feet was to be made into rooms for city guard house. The space in the other side of the building was to be divided in the same manner. A justice's court room was to occupy the front room, and the other two rooms were to be occupied by the clerk's office and a guardhouse. The council chamber and mayor's office and court room were to occupy the upper story. The structure was to have large windows at each side and each end, and it was specified particularly that the sashes were to be hung with weights, to slide up and down. This was a new wrinkle in architectural convenience and evidently appreciated as a progressive departure. The lower story was to be twelve feet in height, and the upper one fifteen feet in the clear.

At the city election in January, 1852, I. F. Gibbs was elected mayor, with the following councilmen, viz.: Stephen Terry, I. O.

McDaniel, L. C. Simpson, Jonathan Norcross, R. E. Mangum and Mr. Grimley. The proceedings of the council for this year seem to have been lost. The principal question of public interest during this administration was the building of a new city hall, but the question was how to raise the necessary fund to build it. The plan was to expend between \$15,000 and \$20,000 for this purpose.

While such an extensive public improvement as the city hall was about to be put under way, it will prove somewhat diverting to read, in the *Atlanta Intelligencer* of February 19, 1852, what a wretched condition the streets and sidewalks of the little city were in. By the way, the *Intelligencer* was by this time a daily. This paper said under the head of "A Word to Strangers": "If you arrive in town on any of the numerous railroads that terminate here, it will probably be just before dark. After refreshing yourselves with a hearty meal at some one of our well-conducted hotels, you will feel a desire to take a stroll about town, at least through Whitehall street. Starting from the vicinity of the railroads you can proceed fearlessly till you come to the first cross street, called Alabama street. Don't think of walking out of your direction to walk up that street, unless the moon shines particularly bright, or unless you can hang to the coat tail of some friendly guide; as without such aids you would probably find yourself in about two minutes at the bottom of a pit, fifteen feet in diameter by eighteen feet deep, which occupies the center of the road, and thus occasion considerable trouble to those who happen to be near, in procuring ropes to drag you out; and in such case, you might besides be inclined to form an unfavorable impression of our city regulations, as did a gentleman last week, who was hauled out of the pit pretty severely injured.

"Passing this point, you can continue in Whitehall street, but by all means take the right hand side, as on the left side are two deep trenches dug out for cellars. We are not informed whether the cellar doors are built, or whether they are intended to extend to the center of the street, or only across the sidewalk. At present they are admirably adapted to catch unwary passengers. In one night last week, during a severe rain storm, they caught no less than five—two ladies and three gentlemen returning from a concert. One of these was a stranger in the city, and while spreading

himself before a blazing fire, in the Holland House, to dry the red clay with which his garments were beautifully covered, gave way so much to his feelings that he was observed very much upset at the mention of our venerable city council.

"Proceeding on the right hand side of the street, you will have a very comfortable walk until you come to Cook's corner, where the pavement ceases. Here you had better turn square round and walk back, for directly in advance is another pit, fifteen by eighteen feet, ready to take you in. In some parts of the town we believe these holes have been covered over. The one in front of Lloyd & Perryman's store, where a man fell in and broke his neck some weeks since, we are credibly informed was promptly covered after the event.

"P. S.—Since the above was put in type we are gratified and delighted that each of the pits mentioned have been temporarily covered with plank, so as to avoid the recurrence of further accidents."

It was during 1852 that the Atlanta and West Point Railroad into Alabama was finished, being chiefly constructed by the Georgia Railroad Company. J. P. King was the first president of the road, and W. P. Orme, secretary, treasurer and auditor. There was quite a little opposition in Atlanta to the building of this road, its opponents arguing that it would result in cotton passing through Atlanta to Augusta that was now wagoned to Atlanta and for that reason a source of commercial support. Many who did not actually oppose the building of the Atlanta and West Point were suspicious of the effect of the road in the respect mentioned and inclined to be afraid of the consequences. Such, indeed, was the effect for a few years, and the importance of Atlanta as a great wagon cotton point declined considerably; but what was lost in this respect was compensated for many times over by the greatly increased general commerce and traffic that the new line brought to Atlanta. As Colonel E. Y. Clarke said of the completion of the Atlanta and West Point: "It proved only another feeder to the young giant, which was fast developing a muscular power destined to thrust aside all its rivals, and pass them in the race for commercial prosperity and metropolitan dimensions. In fact, with the completion of these roads, Atlanta needed but one

other element of success to assure a triumphant career, and that was the element of pluck, energy and enterprise in its inhabitants. To what a nervous extent they possessed this element of success, will readily appear in the course of their history. Their railway system, though not complete, was sufficiently so to secure superiority, and to justify the prediction of John C. Calhoun and the bright visions of its most sanguine citizens."

In this year the Christian church was organized by State Evangelist Daniel Hook, with a mere handful of members, but the zeal of the little band was so great that they built a neat and commodious church structure the following year. In 1852 also the handsome new First Presbyterian church was dedicated. It occupied an eligible site on Marietta street, a little way from the original business center, upon a lot donated to the congregation by Judge Cone. The building committee was composed of Judge Cone, Major Merry, Richard Peters, and Julius A. Hayden. Rev. John S. Wilson, the pioneer clergyman of Atlanta, was the first pastor.

In the city election of January, 1853, the officers chosen were: Mayor, J. F. Mims; councilmen, J. A. Hayden, J. Winship, W. M. Butt, J. Norcross, I. O. McDaniel and L. C. Simpson. It may be interesting to give the vote cast at this election. The officers for which the figures are given are those of mayor, marshal and deputy marshal. For mayor, John F. Mims received 369 votes, and T. F. Gibbs 193; for marshal, B. N. Williford received 217, G. M. Lester, 195, Harvey Little 112, and W. C. Harris 42; for deputy marshal, Paschal House received 236, E. T. Hummcutt 215, James Coker 24, F. Wilmot 38, and 31 votes were scattering. The officers chosen by council were: Marshal, Benjamin N. Williford; deputy marshal, Paschal House; clerk and tax receiver and collector, Henry C. Holcombe; treasurer, J. T. McGinty. The salaries and bonds as regulated by the administration of 1853 were as follows: Salary of marshal, \$400 and fees, with a \$2,000 bond; of deputy marshal, \$400 and a bond of \$2,000; clerk and tax receiver and collector, two and one-half per cent. on all moneys received and disbursed, with a bond of \$10,000; treasurer's salary one and one-half per cent. on all moneys received

and disbursed, and \$6,000 bond. The board of health for this year was composed of Dr. D. Hook, Dr. T. M. Darnall, Dr. T. S. Denny, B. H. Overby and R. Peters. G. A. Pilgrim was selected as city sexton.

On the 28th of January, council passed an ordinance to the effect that a night police squad should be elected by that body, in conjunction with the mayor, to consist of three persons, one of whom should be designated chief of police. Under this ordinance it became the duty of the night police to guard the city from the ringing of the council bell at night, and until sunrise next morning, and to enforce obedience to the ordinances and by-laws of the city. On February 4th treasurer McGinty resigned and was succeeded by Ambrose B. Forsyth.

This council hit upon a practical plan to raise money for the erection of the new city hall. At its session of February 9th the committee on finance submitted a report in which it strongly opposed the plan of advertising for the sale of city bonds, expressing the opinion that it did not consider it at all likely that a single bid would be offered if the bonds were advertised. As a substitute plan it submitted the following: That the mayor, at his discretion, borrow \$10,000 for the purpose of erecting a city hall, and give the city hall lot and the city hall itself as security, and also such other property as the city might then own; and in addition to all this, such special tax as might be assessed for the purpose of erecting the proposed city hall. It was proposed to make the loan for a period of ten years, with semi-annual interest, the council reserving to itself the right to pay the entire debt in three, five or seven years. This plan met the approval of the majority of the council and was considered satisfactory by most of the citizens, if the local press reflected public opinion on the question. Many wanted at least \$20,000 expended in the construction of the building, holding that while one so pretentious might be a little ahead of the city's progress, it was only adequately providing for Atlanta's needs a few years hence. The committee of council having the building in charge, however, thought that \$10,000 or \$15,000 at most, would be sufficient to erect a suitable city hall. Little else was talked about all summer, in municipal affairs, and it was not until the 26th of September that the plans and specifica-



tions offered were finally examined and a bid accepted. The plan presented by Mr. Hughes was adopted, and it was determined to begin the work without necessary delay.

The matter of lighting the city was also seriously grappled with by this council. On March 25th, 1853, a resolution was adopted which required that a lamp be placed on the Market (Broad) street bridge, and that street lamps be placed at such points as they were most needed, at the expense of the city, provided the citizens in the neighborhood of the lamps thus erected would agree to supply the lamps with the necessary illuminating fluid. Owing to the resignation of Mayor Mims in the fall, a special election was held on November 12th, at which William Markham, an energetic and thrifty New Englander, was elected mayor. On the 28th of November a committee consisting of Daniel Hook, Thomas S. Denny, Richard Peters and Thomas M. Darnall reported to the council that in their opinion, all slaughter pens within the corporate limits were nuisances and should be abated instanter. This was done.

The report of the city's vital statistics made by the city sexton in 1853 for the quarter ending April 1st, shows: Deaths from pneumonia, 2; delirium, 1; complication, 1; old age, 1; measles, 1; typhoid, 1; pleurisy, 1; consumption, 1; cholera infantum, 1; not known, 3; colored persons, of diseases not known, 3; total number of deaths, 16. For the quarter ending July 1st the total number of deaths was 37; for the quarter ending October 1st, 57, whites 47, blacks 10; and for the quarter ending January 1st, 1854, the number of deaths was 48, making the total for the year 158. At the time the foregoing report was made it will be remembered that the population of the city was in the neighborhood of 6,000. Newcomers were arriving on every train and the town was full of strange faces.

As we are leaving the period when Atlanta was a city in name only and "everybody knew everybody," it will be of interest, to the older inhabitants at least, to append to this chapter a list of the pioneer residents of the period thus far covered, some of them, however, coming a year or two later. This list was found among the papers of the late Colonel C. R. Hanleiter, and it is preserved, with other interesting data of the early days, by that pioneer editor's son, W. R. Hanleiter.



Dr. Joseph Thompson  
Jonathan Norcross  
J. Henry Thompson  
Jos. Thompson, jr.  
J. Edgar Thompson  
Tim Murphy  
John Lloyd  
James Collins  
James D. Collins  
Leonard C. Simpson  
Willis Buell  
Moses Formwalt  
Wm. Barnes  
James Barnes  
James M. Toy  
William Kidd  
William Rushton  
John B. Spann  
Charles Dougherty  
W. R. Venable  
Reuben Haynes  
Gus Haines  
David A. Moyer  
James Loyd, sr.  
James Loyd, jr.  
John Silvey  
A. B. Forsyth  
Wm. G. Forsyth  
Ed. Warner  
Jonas S. Smith  
Allen Johnson  
Terrence Doonan  
A. W. Wheat  
"Dad" Chapman  
Dan McSheffney  
Wm. McConnell  
Sol Haas  
Uel Wright  
Nat Mangham  
Robert Mangham  
Logan E. Bleckley  
Winston Woods  
E. M. Berry  
Jacob Nort  
James J. Lynch  
John Lynch  
Michael Lynch  
Patrick Lynch  
Wm. L. Hubbard  
Tom Kile  
William Kile  
William J. Ivey  
James Loyd  
G. W. Collier  
Joseph Barnes  
John Weaver  
Dr. Wm. Gilbert  
Dr. Sam Gilbert

Lud Edmondson  
John Tomlinson  
Socrates Ivy  
F. A. Hilburn  
Maj. J. H. Lin  
Dr. B. F. Bomar  
Lewis Lawshe  
Er Lawshe  
— — Edson  
James Gullatt  
Henry Gullatt  
Dr. D. O. Heery  
G. C. Rogers  
Dr. N. L. Angier  
James Clark  
David Emanuel  
Levy Morris  
"Painter" Smith  
John Glen  
Wm. P. Orme  
J. C. Peck  
J. B. Peck  
— — Denby  
J. H. Glazner  
John Mecalzin  
John H. Flynn  
J. L. McLondon  
Dr. R. J. Massey  
James E. Williams  
George Shaw  
A. Shaw  
William Shaw  
George Shaw, jr.  
Sam Shaw  
James B. Shaw  
Evan P. Howell  
Clark Howell, sr.  
Albert Howell  
A. K. Seago  
E. M. Seago  
B. F. Abbott  
W. L. Abbott  
Lewis Abbott  
Isaac Bartlett  
J. L. Calhoun  
W. H. Dabney  
L. J. Gartrell  
J. H. Lovejoy  
Burt Lovejoy  
L. J. Glenn  
William Glenn  
William Roche  
Dr. E. J. Roach  
Rev. J. S. Wilson  
Jared I. Whitaker  
J. H. Logan  
V. A. Gaskill  
J. A. Ramsey

D. R. Daniel  
Daniel Daniel  
— — Daniel  
V. P. Sisson  
J. I. Miller  
B. F. Bennett  
Whit Anderson  
Robert Anderson  
Mace Hagle  
O. Houston  
W. J. Houston  
W. R. Horton  
W. Houghton  
W. H. Royal  
J. B. Clapp  
Joel Yarborough  
Richard Peters  
Wm. G. Peters  
John Maclin  
Rev. Isaac Craven  
Horace Mitchell  
Dr. D. C. O'Keefe  
Joseph Wylie  
Dr. U. P. Harden  
John Tomlinson  
W. H. Thurmond  
Dr. Thurmond  
Dr. Gibb  
Dr. Hilburn  
Jere Trout  
W. H. Davis  
J. C. Davis  
William Kelsey  
James T. Doane  
Thomas Hainey  
W. W. Roark  
C. G. Rogers  
Ed. Parsons  
— — Peacock  
O. O. Pease  
David Peal  
E. Hunnicutt  
C. W. Hunnicutt  
Thomas C. Lewis  
Thomas M. Clark  
F. Krog  
G. B. Pilgrim  
Isaac B. Pilgrim  
Wm. R. Hanleiter  
J. F. Boyd  
Dr. B. O. Jones  
O. H. Jones  
C. D. Parr  
L. J. Parr  
T. R. Ripley  
Dr. J. F. Alexander  
Frank Grubb  
Eli Hulsey

I. O. McDaniel  
 P. E. McDaniel  
 R. F. Maddox  
 James McPherson  
 Robt. W. Williamson  
 A. W. Wallace  
 J. R. Wallace  
 Z. A. Rice  
 — — Rice  
 Frank P. Rice  
 Wm. Markham  
 M. O. Markham  
 M. A. Berry  
 Thomas Healey  
 I. Henly Smith  
 C. W. Strong  
 A. W. Jones  
 Dr. J. P. Logan  
 "Cooter" Clark  
 G. N. Lester  
 B. F. Williford  
 Mat Lester  
 J. W. Ellison  
 Thomas S. Ellison  
 Dr. F. J. Martin  
 Dr. G. G. Smith  
 John H. Smith  
 G. G. Smith  
 William Rhodes  
 Charles Rhodes  
 Jake Irnell  
 H. Muhlenbrink  
 A. Kontz  
 F. J. Kicklighter  
 F. R. Richardson  
 G. B. Haygood  
 Atticus Haygood  
 William A. Haygood  
 Fred Williams  
 W. L. D. Mobley  
 H. Cozar  
 James McPherson  
 H. C. Holcomb  
 "Pink" Callhoun  
 A. C. Pulliam  
 G. B. Dodd  
 Phil Dodd  
 Gaines Chisholm  
 — — Buchanan  
 Jack Buchanan  
 Wm. Ezzard  
 Wm. Ezzard, jr.  
 John Ezzard  
 Burt Lovejoy  
 W. R. Dimmick  
 — — Nix  
 Gustavus Orr

Myron Bartlett  
 Sam Elain  
 B. H. Overby  
 J. F. Mims  
 Simeon Frakfort  
 P. J. Immet  
 Sam Downs  
 William Downs  
 Jos. H. Mead  
 Tim Mead  
 "Beau" Berry  
 A. W. Hammond  
 N. J. Hammond  
 J. W. Underwood  
 Reuben Cone  
 J. S. Peterson  
 Dr. Wm. Moore  
 John H. James  
 William Kay  
 William Buck  
 J. W. Rucker  
 J. H. Westmoreland  
 E. R. Mills  
 H. Westmoreland  
 J. G. W. Mills  
 J. L. Dunning  
 Volney Dunning  
 James Dunning  
 R. Williamson  
 Joseph Winship  
 Robert Winship  
 Ezra Andrews  
 — — Miller  
 R. S. Baker  
 "Monkey" Baker  
 Charles Heintz  
 A. Leyden  
 W. C. Parker  
 W. H. Edson  
 John Bridwell  
 Zion Bridwell  
 John L. Harris  
 W. H. Ruggles  
 Ben Harris  
 A. G. Ware  
 A. M. Eddleman  
 F. M. Eddleman  
 John Eddleman  
 Y. S. Daniel  
 Col. Tom Low  
 A. S. Talley  
 S. C. Wells  
 Harry Krous  
 Tom Shivers  
 Tom Sheridan  
 John M. Weaver  
 B. H. Williford  
 Jos. Gatins

John Gatins  
 Dr. A. D'Alvigny  
 Dr. W. T. Campbell  
 John A. Doane  
 W. Baggerly  
 T. L. Thomas  
 — — Johnson  
 Rev. H. McDonald  
 Rev. R. Reneau  
 Jesse Reneau  
 Alex Beach  
 Wm. M. Cutchin  
 W. L. Ormond  
 A. E. McNaught  
 Dr. S. Biggers  
 Willis Biggers  
 Caleb B. Whaley  
 Dr. W. B. Jones  
 Col. E. R. Jones  
 J. S. Richards  
 W. R. Richards  
 J. R. Richards  
 George Terry  
 George Terry, jr.  
 James Terry  
 Peter Hugle  
 Dr. Woodbury  
 Willis Carlisle  
 Pat Hodge  
 Edward Payne  
 C. M. Payne  
 Stephen Daniel  
 Stephen Daniel, jr.  
 Thomas Lowe  
 T. Y. W. Crussell  
 Peter Olrich  
 George Jenkins  
 John Ismis  
 Dr. J. A. Taylor  
 Dr. — — Bradford  
 Willis Chisholm  
 John Center  
 George Center  
 Anthony Murphy  
 Wm. Whittaker  
 P. M. Sutton  
 Frank Grubb  
 Isaac Mitchell  
 R. W. Williamson  
 Willis Peck  
 Alfred Austell  
 L. P. Grant  
 E. E. Rawson  
 Dr. F. Jeter Martin  
 W. P. Orme  
 E. W. Holland  
 Uel Wright

## CHAPTER XI

### UNINTERRUPTED DEVELOPMENT

Atlanta was now populous and important enough commercially to be classed as one of the leading cities of Georgia. The census of 1854 showed 6,025 souls. Building had progressed wonderfully for two or three years, and the little city could boast of a number of quite pretentious brick blocks. Lewis J. Pace, the Wallaces and the Howells had erected a three-story building at the corner of Alabama and Whitehall streets, which was regarded as the "skyscraper" of that day. The top floor was occupied by Pace's Hall, which was esteemed locally as a first-class opera house. Here the well known theatrical manager and actor, W. H. Crisp, the father of the late Speaker Crisp, of the United States house of representatives, had a family troupe of actors. The Crisp attraction was popular and drew for a long time. For a number of years after its construction Pace's Hall was the scene of some exciting political assemblies and conventions. The memorable campaign between the "Tugaloo Democrats" and the "Fire-eaters" saw many wild scenes enacted here, and it was in this hall that the two factions were harmonized and one electoral ticket agreed on in 1852. Before the erection of Pace's Hall, all public meetings and entertainments had been held in the hall over John Keely's store at the corner of Whitehall and Hunter streets. The gatherings too large to be accommodated there were held in one or the other of the large cotton warehouses. The shows that came to Atlanta before the war were "a caution." In those days, however, the circus flourished, if not the double and triple-ring affair of modern progress, and the amusement-loving crowds turned out to see Dan Rice and other sawdust artists of renown.

The south side of the railroad tracks was now far ahead of the north side on which the first settlements were made. Busi-

ness largely centered on Whitehall and Alabama streets, with Broad street, as now, the market district. Speaking of the progress of the early fifties, Dr. Smith says: "Slabtown, as Decatur street was called, was now being covered with frame houses. Whitehall was being built up with stores of brick, and gradually the residences were creeping up Peachtree street, and the board shanties which had lined it beyond Houston were being replaced by better buildings. Pryor street was being built up with residences from the railway to Garnett street, and the woods which crowned the hill on which the capitol stands and stretched to the east were being dotted with small, cheap houses. Richard Peters had a large lot for his stage horses about where the Atlanta Journal office now stands. Captain Kidd had built the Alhambra, the famous drinking room of the railroad men, near where the Centennial building was on Whitehall street. Between the railroad east of Whitehall and north of Alabama streets was the Macon and Western depot and Ragis's butcher shop, the rest of the ground being unoccupied, except by the calaboose, until E. W. Holland came from Villa Rica and bought the corner of Alabama and Whitehall streets and erected thereon the large hotel known as the Holland House. After the removal of the Georgia Railroad shops, which were on the corner of Loyd and Alabama, there was, if I remember correctly, no buildings at all. There were no stores off Whitehall, beyond Mitchell, but the space between Mitchell and Alabama was pretty well filled with inferior frame buildings, generally but one story and very small. These were giving away, and Allen E. Johnson erected the Johnson House beyond Hunter street. Jonathan Norcross continued to have the only establishment of much note on the east side. The laying of the first brick pavements on Whitehall street was an event. The lot of land belonging to Reuben Cone across the Central railroad, near Collins's store, was laid off in lots and sold, and was now being rapidly built up, and the building was steadily advancing up Marietta street."

In 1854 there were, according to a local "boom" pamphlet, sixty stores in the various mercantile lines, doing a business that amounted to a million and a half dollars every year. In this year the long projected city hall was begun. It was a large and rather

ornate structure, 70x100 feet in dimensions, two stories high. The following year it was completed, at a cost to the city of fully \$30,000. About the same time the old Athenaeum was built by James E. Williams. The latter building was famous throughout the ante-bellum South for its amusements and concerts. In 1854 two very important building events of a religious character occurred. The preceding year Green B. Haygood, a prominent lawyer, and Willis F. Peck organized a Sunday school on the McDonough street lot owned by the Haygood family. Since the city had grown to such proportions, the distance to Wesley Chapel was too great for many of the south side Methodists, and they were seriously considering the erection of a second church of that denomination. This Sunday school proved the nucleus of the proposed church, which was erected without delay. A building committee consisting of Green B. Haygood, chairman, Joseph Winship, Edwin Payne and Dr. George Smith, purchased an eligible lot on the court house square, and Trinity Methodist Episcopal church was dedicated with imposing ceremonies in September, 1854, by Bishop Andrew. Rev. J. P. Duncan preached the first sermon in the handsome new church. The Baptists of the south side experienced the same inconvenience in the matter of church going and in consequence organized an independent church known as the Second Baptist church. In a very short time they had raised a sufficient sum to begin the erection of a church in 1854, and when completed the structure represented an investment of \$13,000.

The municipal events of 1854 are interesting. William M. Butt was elected mayor, and the council that served with him was composed of Jared I. Whitaker, W. B. Ruggles, L. C. Simpson, W. W. Baldwin, Paschal House, John Farrar, John Glenn, J. B. Peck, J. K. Swift and J. S. Oliver. It will be observed that the growth of the city had resulted by this time in quite an increase in the membership of the council. The council of 1854 elected the other officers as follows: Clerk, Henry C. Holcombe; marshal, Benjamin N. Williford; deputy marshal, E. T. Hunnicutt; treasurer, Oswald Houston; sexton, G. A. Pilgrim; clerk of the city market, I. F. Trout; surveyor, H. L. Currier. The matter of salary and bond was arranged so that the clerk received two and

one-half per cent. on all moneys received and disbursed, with a bond of \$15,000; marshal's salary \$500 and fees, with a bond of \$3,000; deputy marshal's salary and bond same as marshal's; salary of treasurer, one per cent. on all moneys received and disbursed, with a bond of \$15,000; salary of sexton, \$300; of surveyor, \$300.

On February 3d, 1854, the number of night police was increased to six. A thousand dollar bond was required of the chief, and it was made a part of his duty to cry with a loud voice from the council hall every hour of the night after nine o'clock, to which cry each of his brother policemen was required to respond, likewise in a loud voice. This was a picturesque, if not practical, part of Atlanta's early police regulations. James A. Mullin was elected chief of the night force.

On the 3d of March the progressive proposition to light the city with coal gas was presented to the council. A committee appointed to investigate the feasibility of lighting the city with gas reported that nearly all of the citizens of Atlanta were anxious that a gas works should be established in the city, but ventured the opinion that it would be impossible, at that time, to raise the considerable sum necessary for carrying out the enterprise, by popular subscription, and that the finances of the city were at such low ebb that it was inexpedient that the council make the subscription for the purpose. A communication from Messrs. Perdieu & Hoyt, of Trenton, offering to undertake to put in a gas plant, under certain conditions, was discussed at the same time. The gas lighting matter made no further progress in this council.

On March 3d the city surveyor, H. L. Carrier, reported to the council that he had surveyed the city in accordance with the recent act of the legislature extending the city limits, and a plan of his survey was submitted to that body. The act of the legislature under which the new survey was made was passed on the 20th of February, 1854, its 9th section reading: "And be it further enacted that the corporate limits of the city of Atlanta shall extend so as to embrace the territory lying within the following boundaries, to wit: Commencing on a point on the corporate line one-fourth of a mile from the Macon and Western railroad, and on the south side of said road, and running in a westerly direction parallel with



said road five hundred yards; thence one-half mile in a northerly direction running concentric with the present corporate line; thence in an easterly direction to the corporate line, and thence to the beginning along said line."

As there had been a good deal of talk about removing the state capital from Milledgeville to Atlanta, and some prominent citizens were pressing council to undertake to exert influence in that direction, the session of March 3d appointed what it called a prudential committee composed of Messrs. Whitaker, Ruggles and Peck, to receive the memorial presented by these citizens and make whatever recommendations it might see fit looking to the furthering of the great project. At a session held on the 23d of the same month, the prudential committee recommended the appointment of a special committee to urge upon the people of Georgia the propriety of the removal of the capital of the state from Milledgeville to Atlanta, and this committee, when appointed, was requested to exert all honorable means within its power to secure the end in view. The following gentlemen were appointed to act on this special capital committee: John F. Mins, John Collier, Allison Nelson, A. G. Ulare and Green B. Haygood. What preliminary steps might be found necessary for prosecuting an effective capital removal campaign was left entirely to the discretion of the committee. On the 2d of the following June this committee was enlarged by the addition of W. B. Spofford, J. M. Spullock, L. J. Gartrell, L. P. Grant, J. A. Hayden, William Markham, I. O. McDaniel, J. M. Calhoun, R. I. Cowart, B. H. Overby, T. B. Lanier, and many other leading citizens.

The Atlanta Medical College had been organized the previous year and the officers of the struggling institution petitioned the mayor and council for the use of the city hall for the purpose of giving lectures in the regular instructive course. On the 30th of June the council appointed a committee to consider the petition and report on the advisability of its acceptance. The committee, at the next meeting, handed in an adverse report. A minority report was handed in, however, and the question was brought to a vote by the council, resulting in the petition being granted, the casting vote of the mayor deciding the matter.

The water problem, like that of street lighting, was beginning to be a public question of the first magnitude. The crude rain-

water reservoirs at several street corners were far from adequate to meet the requirements of the situation, and there was a strong sentiment in favor of digging an artesian well in the heart of the city. The artesian well craze had just begun in America at that time, and reports of the success of other cities in this respect made Atlanta feel like trying her hand at boring. The proposition to dig an artesian well was introduced in council and discussed with much interest on July 28th, with the result that a special committee consisting of Messrs. Simpson, Whitaker and Glenn was appointed to investigate the practicability of the project.

The lighting question was again revived by the appearance of Mr. C. Monteith, of Columbus, Ga., before council, on August 25th. The gentleman had been interested in the establishment of the gas works of that city and was considered quite an authority on municipal gas. He discussed the subject at considerable length and was asked a number of questions by members of the council. He gave it as his opinion that a gas plant sufficient to supply the city of Atlanta would require an expenditure of \$32,000. The gas works of Columbus, said he, cost that amount originally, and they had proved financially profitable to the city, paying at that time a dividend of twelve per cent.

On the 22d of September a communication from Drs. James F. Alexander, W. F. Westmoreland and J. G. Westmoreland was read before the council, stating that it was their intention to open a first-class medical infirmary or sanitarium in or near the city for the treatment of all kinds of maladies and accidents, and that they proposed to erect buildings of suitable character for the purpose. The promoters offered to board all persons whom the mayor and council might see fit to send to the infirmary for one dollar per day, the city to pay what it thought proper for such medical treatment as the patients sent to the institution by the order of the city received. The council issued the permit to erect the infirmary, as requested.

Atlanta, while reaching out for capital honors, was not backward in absorbing smaller things. Her influence had been successful in having a new county carved off the west side of DeKalb county, in order that Atlanta might be made a county seat, and we

find, in the council records of 1854, an appropriation made by council on January 16th, giving Clarke Howell \$110.75 "for his services and expenses in the interest of the new county of Fulton."

Many pushing, solid citizens were steadily being added to Atlanta's rapidly increasing population. At this time, or shortly before, Green T. Dodd cast his fortune here, and then such men as Daniel Pittman, L. J. Gartrell, L. J. Glenn, A. J. McBride, W. A. Fuller, Dr. J. P. Logan, Thomas M. Clarke, Mr. Gilbert, his partner, and M. Cole, the large nurseryman.

Atlanta was by this time comparatively free from the lawlessness of a year or two before. Its police regulations were very stringent and gambling no longer flourished openly in Murrell's Row. Many of the "dead game sports" had drifted to more congenial fields, and the others kept discreetly in the background. The saloons were beginning to be regulated by ordinances that showed a hostile tendency to the liquor traffic, and licenses grew higher and higher. Old Jonathan Norcross had become an out-and-out Prohibitionist and purchased the *Republican*, a short-lived newspaper that had been founded in the city by a Northern man, and revived it as a Prohibitionist organ. It was soon the organ of the Know Nothings.

The people of Atlanta were working in enthusiastic unison for several great projects, and public meetings to further these movements were of frequent occurrence. The air was full of new railroad rumors, and if all the projected roads had materialized, Atlanta would have presented on the map the appearance of a thousand-legged spider. One of the proposed railroads did materialize in a short time in the Atlanta and Charlotte Air-Line. To say the citizens believed in the future of the city would be putting it mildly. Every man who held real estate was gifted with the most prophetic sort of an imagination and lost no opportunity to express his great faith in Atlanta's future. While there was no organization designed to further all public enterprises, such as a board of trade or chamber of commerce, the progressive element of the city worked together with wonderful zeal and unanimity, and the city council took upon itself some of the functions of the lacking organization. An aggressive capital removal campaign had been inaugurated over the state by Atlanta, and the ambitions

of the young city as a great commercial distributing center were published far and near. Atlanta, at least, knew how to advertise herself, and the whole state began to talk about her. This aggressive policy of publicity, which Atlanta has never relaxed, bore abundant fruit in material progress. Trade and population multiplied. The place was a surprise to the South. It had about it the restless energy and bustle of a Yankee town.

As this chapter is devoted almost entirely to the year 1854, it will fittingly be closed with an allusion to the visit of President Millard Fillmore to Atlanta, which occurred in that year. Of this visit of the country's chief executive, L. L. Parham says in one of his newspaper reminiscences:

"President Millard Fillmore's visit to Atlanta in 1854 was a notable event, and one which illustrates as nothing else could the hospitable spirit of old Atlanta. Mr. Fillmore came from Augusta to this city, and was received at the 'carshed' by the whole town with great enthusiasm. Every locomotive in town gave forth in unison a welcome which in noise at least was unmistakable. A committee escorted the distinguished guest to a hotel, where a brief but glorious reception was held. In the evening a general reception was held, to which the public en masse flocked, and certainly Mr. Fillmore was flattered. The ladies were out in full force with their best clothes on and their sweetest smiles—at least it is said some of the fair ones were never so charming as on that occasion, since it was known by all that the president was a widower. Added to the position he had adorned as chief executive of the United States, he was of fine personal appearance, being a large figure and possessed of an open, pleasing countenance and warm heart. At a banquet held in his honor those who had the pleasure of attending became deeply impressed with their guest's genial manner, *suaviter in modo*, and ready repartee. When a gentleman noted for a fine voice and willing compliance when requested to sing, was asked to favor the banqueters with a song, he did so with such impressiveness that at its conclusion Mr. Fillmore arose and grasped the gentleman by the hand, and with a voice choked with emotion, thanked him and all Atlanta for their exceeding hospitality, which he declared had never been surpassed, if equaled."


## CHAPTER XII

### SOME ANCIENT MUNICIPAL HISTORY

In the municipal election held January 15th, 1855, national politics became badly mixed with local issues. It was at the height of the Know Nothing agitation, and that party had a large and very active following in Atlanta. When the time came to nominate a city ticket, the party feeling ran so high that two factions, representing the two great parties, strove for the control of the local government. Allison Nelson was put forward by the Democrats as their candidate for mayor, and Ira O. McDaniel as the candidate of the Know Nothings. The Democrats won by a very close vote, and the other side raised the cry of fraud. The ballot as given by the official count was: Nelson, 425; McDaniel, 415. For members of the council, First ward, W. W. Baldwin, 429; U. L. Wright, 417; B. O. Jones, 416; E. Andrews, 398. Second ward, T. M. Darnall, 424; C. H. Strong, 415; L. C. Simpson, 402; J. L. Dunning, 370. Third ward, John Farrar, 439; J. W. Thompson, 430; A. W. Owen, 398; R. Crawford, 387. Fourth ward, William Barnes, 449; John Glenn, 441; Samuel Dean, 401; G. W. Adair, 381. Fifth ward, Thomas Kile, 425; C. Powell, 425; W. R. Venable, 419; J. W. Manning, 396.

No little excitement followed the announcement of the result. The defeated candidates got together and passed resolutions charging the corruption of the ballot by the Democrats, and I. O. McDaniel, B. O. Jones, E. Andrews, A. W. Owen, L. C. Simpson, S. Dean, R. Crawford, G. W. Adair, J. W. Manning and W. R. Venable addressed a petition to the successful candidate for mayor, Allison Nelson, in which it was asserted that they had been defeated by fraud. They said that they could prove that frauds of the grossest character had been committed at the polls, and that these frauds were chargeable to the democratic man-





C. H. Strong



agers of the election. They charged that non-residents, aliens and others who had no right of suffrage in Atlanta had deposited their ballots without question, and if such fraudulent ballots were thrown out the result of the election would be found to be in the interest of the American party candidates. They offered to prove the truth of their charges, if given an opportunity to do so by the new administration. They declared that nobody should be allowed to hold office by fraud, and therefore requested the mayor-elect to appoint a day within the current month upon which a thorough investigation might be held, or, if he preferred, they asked that he submit the question over again to the voters of Atlanta.

The successful candidates received the communication from their late rivals with derision. They replied to it, however, referring to it as "an extraordinary note." Their reply was in part as follows:

We find this document signed by those who comprised the ticket of the American or Know Nothing Party, with the important exception of Mr. C. H. Strong, who was the only one on that ticket who was elected. If you could do what you propose, establish fraud, etc., in the election, why did you not prove it before the managers of the election, when the election was in progress? It certainly was not owing to your want of vigilance, for you had sufficient challengers at their posts all through the day, and if you failed to convince the managers then of the illegality of the votes, it is but reasonable to suppose that a new attempt would likewise fail. It would also be the cause of an excitement which could be but suicidal to the interests of the city, or at least to its peace and quiet, etc.

The respondents then attempted to put the shoe on the other foot by boldly charging that the only frauds committed in Atlanta on election day were committed by the Know Nothings themselves, which they declared they stood prepared to prove. The rejoinder closed with the following wormwood and gall:

"Gentlemen, time and reflection will soothe your feelings and teach you the important lesson of resignation to the will of the people. We are, respectfully yours, A. Nelson, W. W. Baldwin, W. Barnes, U. K. Wright, Thomas Kile, C. Powell, T. M. Darnall, J. W. Thompson, J. Farrar."

In February the question of again assisting a fair association came up in council. It seems that the first fair association had fallen through, despite its liberal treatment at the hands of Atlanta. The new association was called the "South Central Agricultural Association," and it asked for a bonus to hold its fairs in Atlanta. A special committee was appointed to investigate the subject, and in a few days it made a report favoring the request of the fair people, saying that all property holders in Atlanta would be benefited by the holding of the fairs of the association in the city, but knowing that large amounts of property were held by non-residents who would not subscribe, and that, therefore, subscriptions would have to come from a minority of those who would be benefited, it was resolved that an amount not to exceed \$5,000 be appropriated for the purpose of purchasing sufficient ground in addition to the present fair grounds, putting the same under the control of the executive committee of the Southern Central Fair Association, provided that said committee would enter into an obligation to locate the said fair permanently in Atlanta, so long as the said association shall exist, after which the grounds and improvements should revert to the mayor and council of Atlanta. There was considerable discussion and quite decided opposition, but council finally appropriated \$4,000 for the purpose, and purchased five acres of land to be set apart for the use of the association so long as it complied with its part of the contract.

Council now tackled the gas proposition in earnest. William Helme, a gas works expert and promoter from Philadelphia, came to Atlanta early in the spring of 1855, and at several successive meetings of the city council he explained his gas proposition and urged its acceptance. A committee was appointed to finally consider the proposition. On the 23d of March this committee reported that it had thoroughly canvassed the situation, getting the opinions of many business men and leading citizens and carefully going over the whole question with Mr. Helme. The report said that the citizens were practically unanimous for the construction of a gas plant. Council thereupon appointed two special committees, one to confer further with the citizens, and one to confer with Mr. Helme. The former committee was composed of Messrs.

Thompson, Clark and Kile, and the latter of Messrs. Darnall, Powell and Barnes. The committee delegated to confer with Mr. Helme was instructed to report such contract as they might agree upon to the council for its ratification or rejection.

The proposition of William Helme was in substance as follows: "To erect coal gas works, to lay down pipes in the streets, alleys, etc., of the city of Atlanta, for lighting the same, and the public and private buildings therein, under a contract securing to him, among other things, the exclusive privilege of so lighting the same for a period of fifty years. The gas works were to be of sufficient capacity to manufacture 20,000 cubic feet of gas every twenty-four hours. The council was to erect at least fifty street lamps, and to pay for lighting the same thirty dollars each per annum. The property of the gas company was to be free from taxation. The entire cost of the gas plant was estimated at \$50,000, and the city was required to take \$20,000 of the gas company's stock, paying for the same in bonds bearing seven per cent. interest." The foregoing provisions were embodied in an ordinance which was passed with practically no opposition, the mayor being empowered to close the contract with Mr. Helme in accordance therewith. The bonds were of the denomination of \$500, payable fifteen years after date, and bore interest at the rate of seven per cent. per annum. Soon after the completion of this contract between the mayor and Mr. Helme, a contract was entered into with John S. and Joshua Schofield to make and deliver to the city fifty ornamental lamp posts, including lamps and burners, for twenty-one dollars each, all to be delivered on or before October 1st, 1855. In accordance with the terms of the contract, Mr. Helme, on January 28, 1856, transferred to the mayor and council \$20,000 in stock of the gas company, which in the meantime had been incorporated, for \$20,000 in city bonds, and himself gave bond for the completion of the work.

An incident of the municipal history of 1855 which attracted no little interest among the citizens was the resignation of the mayor. The reason for this action was because council reversed one of his honor's decisions while sitting as police judge. It seems that on the night of July 6th two young men of the city were taken before Mayor Nelson charged with disturbing the

peace, quarreling and using profane language in the streets. A number of witnesses on both sides testified to the commission of the misdemeanor, and it was proven that one of the defendants had disfigured a sign. By the provisions of the seventh section of the ordinance for preserving the peace, "any person who is guilty of disturbing the peace by using obscene, vulgar or profane language, or who is guilty of malicious mischief, or of otherwise conducting himself in a disorderly manner, is liable to a fine of not over fifty dollars and costs." Upon the young man who had been proven guilty of mutilating the sign, Mayor Nelson imposed a fine of \$20, and upon one of his companions, \$20. An appeal was taken in both cases, and the defendant accused of disfiguring the sign had his fine remitted by the council, and the fine of the other young man was reduced to \$5. Thereupon the mayor resigned, averring with some warmth that it was useless for him to endeavor to discharge his duties according to the requirements of the statutes and the dictates of his conscience, while acting as a trial judge, so long as the city council would not sustain him in his efforts.

The Atlanta Medical College, which had been launched as a doubtful enterprise in the spring of 1855, received a gratifying number of students, and laid the corner stone of a handsome building in July of that year. Its lecture course, held in the city hall by permission of the council, was largely attended. The work on the gas works progressed with great energy, and on the 25th of December, 1855, the city of Atlanta was for the first time lighted with gas. It was a memorable Christmas day in the young city, for that reason, and celebrated accordingly. The new city hall was completed and formally accepted by the city council about the same time.

In the municipal election of 1856 the successful candidates were: Mayor, John Glenn; councilmen, Messrs. Thompson, Barnes, Clarke, Kile, Strong and Wilson. The clerk of this council was Henry C. Holcombe; marshal, B. N. Williford; deputy marshal, E. T. Hunnicutt. For the first time it was decided to elect a city printer, and on January 26th a resolution to that effect was passed by council, calling for bids from the various printing establishments of the city. The Atlanta Republican and Disci-

pline was chosen as the official organ of the city, the terms of publication of city advertisements being fifty cents per thousand ems for the regular proceedings, and fifty cents per square of ten lines for all other advertisements.

The population of Atlanta in 1856 was given at 8,000 by a local census, and there were said to be seventy-five business places of all kinds in the city. The streets of the city were considerably improved in the matter of grading and cleanliness, and considerable paving had been done. Along most of the streets in the business quarter brick sidewalks had been laid. Buildings continued to go up at a lively rate and many of those erected were of a substantial and expensive character. New enterprises were being established continually. In 1856 the Bank of Fulton was established by Alfred Austell and E. W. Holland, with a capital of \$125,000. P. and G. T. Dodd established the first wholesale grocery and Silvey & Dougherty a large mercantile establishment, in that year. In 1856 also L. Bellingrath, A. Bellingrath and William R. Hill located in Atlanta. J. M. Holbrook established a large exclusive hat store the same year.

It was in August of this year, during the Fillmore campaign, that the famous accident connected with raising a pole in honor of that presidential candidate, occurred. The Whigs were largely in the majority in Atlanta, and in their enthusiasm they had three tall pine trees cut down and hauled to town, which they spliced together, making a flag pole of extraordinary height. The raising of the pole was made the occasion of a grand party rally, and when the appointed day came, the Whigs from many miles on all sides of Atlanta flocked to the speaking and pole raising, which was to take place upon a vacant lot in front of the ground now occupied by the Markham House. By bungling or carelessness, the rope for carrying the flag became badly tangled with the guy-ropes near the top, after the pole was erected, and in consequence the flag could not be hauled up. The great crowd was disappointed. The Democrats and Know Nothings hooted and jeered at the unsuccessful attempt of the Whigs to straighten out the ropes. Just as the committee having the affair in charge decided to take the pole down, a man who had long followed the sea stepped forward and volunteered to climb the pole and untangle



the ropes. The offer was accepted with cheers, and in a moment the sailor was raising himself above the heads of the multitude with apparent ease. When he reached the place where the tangle began, he took out his pocket knife and began to cut the guy-rope loose from the draw-cord. Suddenly, while thousands of eyes were strained upwards and hundreds held their breath with the excitement of the man's perilous position, the knife was seen to fly out of his hand, and the next instant, with a cry of horrified despair, the sailor went hurtling through the air to the ground, where he was dashed to instant death. The thrilling spectacle held the great crowd as if spellbound for an instant, and then, almost as one man, by a common impulse, the people declared their intention to raise a purse for the unfortunate seaman's widow or family before they left the ground. A collection committee was chosen at once, and in a remarkably short time the snug sum of \$2,000 had been contributed.

During the year 1856 the "Kansas Question," as the "Free-soil" agitation in the Jayhawker state was called in the South, was at its height, and no city in Georgia took a livelier interest in the momentous struggle of the two elements for supremacy than Atlanta. At that time parties of Southern emigrants were continually passing through Atlanta for the "bleeding" territory, intent on turning the political scale in favor of slavery, or on taking a hand in the "subsequent unpleasantness." Large crowds would meet these Kansas emigrants at the depot to cheer them on, and often to contribute to their necessities. The Kansas question was paramount. The territory, about to be admitted to the union, would hold the balance of power between the pro-slavery and anti-slavery states, and it was highly essential on the South's part to "redeem" enough Kansas counties to turn the balance in the election in a way to please the South. Boisterous Kansas meetings, addressed by fervid, not to say fire-eating, orators, were of almost nightly occurrence in Atlanta during that summer. In March a company was organized in the city to make the journey to the troubled territory, and before setting out, at a great public gathering held in the court house on March 5th, the following resolutions were adopted:

"WHEREAS, the admission of Kansas territory into the union as a free state would destroy the balance of power between the



several states which are already in an excited condition of aggravated discussion, from which the destruction of the constitution, the subversion of the government, and all the horrors of civil war are likely to ensue; and,

"WHEREAS, the safety of our Southern institutions, and the peace and quiet of all truly patriotic, liberty-loving and law-abiding citizens are endangered, and, in our opinion, doomed to suffer materially or be totally destroyed by the intermeddling and aggressive policy of abolition fanatics; and

"WHEREAS, The geographical situation and the adaptation of its soil to Southern institutions and products combine to make it a state in which slave labor can be profitably and beneficially employed by all the citizens of the South; and,

"WHEREAS, The first settlers and original pioneers of that territory were slaveholders, and so declared themselves immediately after the organization of the territory; be it therefore

*"Resolved, 1.* That each member of this company will lawfully exert himself to the utmost to secure the admission of Kansas territory into the union as a slave state.

*"Resolved, 2.* That individually and as a company of true, patriotic men who have the safety, the honor of our country, and her institutions at heart, we will do all that we can do to prevent the admission of said territory into the union as a free state, a result to be greatly deplored by all the good and true, especially by all genuine Southern men.

*"Resolved, 3.* That as the geographical situation and soil of said territory are naturally and peculiarly adapted to slave labor, Southern institutions and products, it does by right and every principle of justice, belong to the South, and the South alone, and that we will resist, at all hazards, any unlawful attempt to make it a free state.

*"Resolved, 4.* That we highly commend and approve the brave sons of Missouri for the gallant stand and unflinching courage which they have taken and evinced in defending Southern rights; and we now declare our firm and unalterable intention to stand by her side in aiding the people of Kansas territory in enforcing their laws and in the maintenance of the laws and constitution of the United States."

The local newspapers devoted a good deal of editorial and news space to the question of colonizing Kansas with Southerners, and every few days would chronicle the passing of a Kansas-bound party through the city. The *Daily Intelligencer* of March 29, 1856, said in an editorial paragraph:

"Judging from the number of companies passing almost daily through our city on their way to Kansas, we doubt not that there will be a 'smart sprinkling' of Southerners in that interesting region before many weeks. On Saturday night a company of eighteen or twenty passed through Atlanta, and on Thursday we noticed another company of forty-one, all armed and equipped, going on their way rejoicing. They were from Charleston and other points in South Carolina. A company organized in this city is expected to leave in a few days." The company referred to was the one which adopted the resolutions previously quoted. It was called "The Atlanta Company of Emigrants for Kansas Territory."

In the same paper, under date of April 4th, 1856, the following reference was made to the departure of the Atlanta emigrants: "Off for Kansas! Captain Jones's company of emigrants, consisting of twenty-one young and able-bodied men, left this place yesterday morning for Kansas. They will probably be joined by others at Marietta, and along the line of the railroad. Captain Jones is a young man of pure stock and true grit, and we doubt not the success of himself and those under him, in the new territory, while the cause of the South will have in them true and efficient friends."

A largely attended Kansas mass meeting was held in the city hall on the 4th of August, the object of which was to raise funds for the maintenance of Southern emigrants in Kansas who were in need of pecuniary help, and to help in like manner new parties of emigrants that would volunteer to go and "redeem" Kansas. It was explained at this meeting that Georgia was expected to look after three of the thirty counties of Kansas territory, her sister Southern states taking care of three counties each. The speakers were the leading politicians of the city and county, and the audience was worked up to a high pitch of enthusiasm by their eloquence. Two representatives of the Kansas State

Colonization Society, Captain B. Jones and Captain E. M. McGhee, were present and addressed the meeting. A. C. Pulliam presided, and Colonel S. G. Howell acted as secretary. The speakers appealed to the state pride of Georgia in behalf of citizens of the state who had located in Kansas, declaring that every Georgian who had cast his lot in Kansas from patriotic motives had nobly done his duty, despite the severest hardships and trials, largely resultant from a lack of sufficient money. Much stress was laid upon the importance to the South of bringing Kansas into the union as a slave state, and one speaker went so far as to predict that failure to do so would inevitably result in dismembering the union and probably plunge the country into civil war.

This meeting resulted in a large committee being appointed, consisting of Atlantans and citizens from each township of Fulton county, whose duty it should be to solicit cash contributions for the Georgia colonists in Kansas, or those who should thereafter emigrate to the disturbed territory. The names of the committees may be of interest as a relic of the ante-bellum excitement. They were:

For Atlanta—Robert M. Clarke, J. A. Hayden, C. H. Wallace, L. H. Davis, H. Muhlenbrink, O. H. Jones, Dr. R. T. Pulliam, Dr. J. A. Taylor, Colonel A. H. Stokes and Captain G. H. Thompson.

For Black Hall District—Thomas Conally, Dr. J. M. Dorsey, T. J. Perkerson, Meredith Brown and A. R. Almond.

For Buckhead District—Colonel Clark Howell, Henry Irby, Pinckney Randall, B. Pace and M. C. Donaldson.

For Casey's District—Hiram Emory, Nelson Defur, J. M. Cook, J. J. Thrasher and Dr. D'Alvigney.

For Oak Grove District—J. L. Evins, John Isham, S. Jett, Lee Heflin and S. Spruel.

For Stone's District—W. A. Green, Dr. William Gilbert, W. A. Wilson, Murat McGhee and Thomas Kennedy.

Until the admission of Kansas into the union, the keenest interest was then taken in her attitude on the slavery question by the citizens of Atlanta, in common with the people of the South, and when the statehood bill was enacted with the anti-slavery provision, the indignation of Atlanta knew no bounds.

## CHAPTER XIII

### ATLANTA IN THE PANIC YEAR

The year 1857 was memorable for the great panic that ruined so many merchants in the larger cities of the country, closed most of the banking institutions, and plunged the masses of the people into want and distress. The panic of 1857 was felt the hardest in the north, but those cities of the South the basis of whose trade was credit, felt it severely also. Atlanta, in the full flush of her remarkable progress and prosperity, was little affected by the terrible financial stringency and business depression that was working sad havoc with other communities. We will leave Wallace Putnam Reed to tell the reason:

"The great panic of 1857, which was felt so disastrously in many parts of the union, especially in the northern states, was felt but little in Atlanta, for the reason that it was felt but little anywhere in the South. The main reason for this fact was that the cotton crop that year was exceptionally large and the price high, notwithstanding the large crop. The price of cotton was high because there was an unusual demand for it abroad, and it was thus controlled by the market price in Liverpool, England. The heavy demand for it abroad caused payments to be made in cash, and thus there was an abundant supply of specie in the Southern states, though there was very general suspension of specie payments North. The unusually large amount of specie, which that year flowed into the South, rendered it practicable for the banks of this section to avoid suspension, and thus merchants were not affected by the stringency in the money market. It cannot be remembered that any merchant failed in Atlanta during that panic.

"The above is presented as the general reason for the continued prosperity of Atlanta during that period of distress in other

parts of the country. There are, however, two other reasons for that uninterrupted prosperity—one of which may be termed a special reason, and the other a peculiar reason. The former of these two was, that at that time the merchants of the South, including, of course, those of Atlanta, owed much less than the usual amounts to Northern merchants, and hence were not called upon for the payment of debts they could not pay? The latter reason was that the first merchants of Atlanta, as a very general, if not a universal thing, were so limited in their capital that they could not give credit without incurring the risk of almost immediate failure. The business they did was therefore from necessity conducted on a cash basis. Being thus compelled to transact business on a cash basis, they were also compelled to conduct it on the smallest practicable margin of profits in order to attract customers, or, in other words, they were obliged to undersell their competitors in neighboring towns and cities. By thus underselling their competitors, they soon attracted to Atlanta not only the trade of the merchants from other towns and cities, but also very largely that of the majority of private families who could pay cash for their supplies; of private families living in surrounding cities as well as of those living in the surrounding country.

“In this way was the cash basis for the transaction of business adopted and established in Atlanta, adopted from necessity and established from choice. It was so beneficial, it was so conducive to the individual interests and to the combined interests of the business men, it gave Atlanta such an impetus in the direction of prosperity, such a prestige and advantage over her rivals, that it has been adhered to, in the main, ever since, and has, in all probability, been the main principle of the city’s growth and success as a community. Even up to the present time business is conducted in Atlanta either on the “spot cash” principle, or on the “cash” principle, the former plan requiring cash to be paid on delivery of the goods purchased, and the latter requiring it to be paid in thirty days. Thus long credits, always dangerous, have been avoided, and thus the city acquired and sustained the reputation of being a cheap place to trade; and thus, also, has it attracted cash customers and driven the time customers to other cities which either could not adopt, or did not believe in a cash trade, coupled with small profits and safety.

"While the remarks just made are in the main correct as applied to the retail trade and to the smaller class of wholesale dealers, yet they require slight modification when the larger wholesale dealers in dry goods are taken specifically into account. These generally give a credit of sixty days; but this slight modification has no perceptible effect on the volume of business transacted, except to increase it, and no effect on the kind of custom attracted to the city."

In the municipal election at the beginning of 1857, William Ezzard was elected mayor, and Messrs. Lawshe, Sharpe, Simpson, Holcombe, Peck, Glenn and Farnsworth, councilmen. The remaining city officers were: Clerk and tax receiver and collector, James McPherson; treasurer, Cicero H. Strong; superintendent of streets, William S. Hancock; first lieutenant of police, Willis P. Lanier; second lieutenant of police, Daniel C. Venable; clerk of the market, John D. Wells; sexton, G. A. Pilgrim; city surveyor, H. L. Currier.

On the 6th of January, 1857, before the old council went out, an ordinance was passed subscribing to \$100,000 worth of the stock of the Georgia Air Line Railroad, the long talked of new line which was to connect Atlanta with Richmond, Va., Baltimore and the North by the most direct route possible. The survey extended in almost a straight line from Atlanta to Charlotte, N. C. When this conditional subscription to the stock of the Air Line road was made by the city of Atlanta, many citizens were skeptical of it being anything but a "paper railroad."

On the 13th of the same month council entered into a contract with Winship Brothers to supply the city with twenty-five lamp posts, with lamps and burners, for \$500.

The inaugural address of Mayor Ezzard is interesting in throwing light upon some public matters that still concern the city of Atlanta, and in disclosing the financial status of the municipality at the opening of 1857. Extracts are taken from it in part as follows:

"In 1855 the mayor and council entered into a contract with William Helme, of Philadelphia, for the erection of gas works in the city of Atlanta, and subscribed \$20,000 to the capital stock of the Atlanta Gas Light Company. They had also contracted



for the purchase of fifty street lamps and lamp posts for lighting the streets of the city, at a cost of \$1,050, which has not been paid. The stock of said company has been paid for in city bonds payable in twenty years, bearing interest at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually. Early in that year the city council, thinking it doubtful whether this stock would prove to be a profitable investment to the city, and being anxious to discharge some of its debts, passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to sell one-half of said stock for the purpose of liquidating the outstanding debts of the city. Under this resolution stock to the amount of \$1,000 was disposed of at par value for city checks; when, it becoming apparent that the stock would prove a profitable investment, the resolution was repealed. According to the terms of the contract with the gas company, the street lamps were to be lighted with gas for the sum of \$1,500 per annum, but as the lamps were not all in operation the first year, only \$1,458.20 was demanded by the company. At the expiration of the first six months after the commencement of their operation, the company declared a dividend of four per cent. par; for the next six months a dividend of eight per cent. was declared, making the whole amount of dividend received by the city upon its stock for the year, \$2,280, leaving a balance of \$821.80, which has been paid into the treasury.


“In view of the fact that gas pipes have been laid down in many parts of the city which had not been supplied with street lamps, the council authorized me to contract with Messrs. Winship Bros. & Sons for twenty-five additional lamps, which has been done, the lamps to cost \$500. During the summer the citizens of Roswell, Cobb county, being anxious to have a bridge erected across the Chattahoochee river, on the road leading to this place, and having ascertained that a suitable bridge could be built for \$7,000, they organized a company for that purpose, to the capital stock of which they, together with two of the citizens of Atlanta, subscribed the sum of \$4,000, and the city council, having been petitioned by a large number of the citizens of this place, subscribed for the remaining \$3,000 of the stock, to be paid in bonds payable twenty years after date. From the most reliable information which we were able to obtain on the subject, we be-

lieved that the tolls arising from said bridge would be sufficient to pay, not only the interest on the bonds that might accrue, but that also by the creation of a sinking fund, judiciously arranged, to extinguish the principal also by the time it should fall due.

"In compliance with the petition of a large number of our citizens, the city council passed an ordinance directing the mayor to subscribe \$100,000 to the capital stock of the Georgia Air Line Railroad Company, all of which, except \$1,000, is payable in bonds of the city bearing seven per cent. interest, the bonds being issued in the following manner: One-third so as to fall due on January 1, 1873; one-third on January 1, 1878, and one-third on January 1, 1883. The subscription has been made accordingly, and the prospect is that the road will be built at no very distant day."

The attainment of metropolitan proportions by Atlanta made necessary the establishment of fire-limits, and on the 7th of December, 1857, the city council passed an ordinance of that kind. It provided that after its passage no person should erect or cause to be erected any house for any purpose whatsoever, the walls of which should be constructed of wood, on any street within the following limits: On Whitehall street, between the intersections of that street and Mitchell and Marietta streets; on Mitchell street, between Hunter and Alabama streets; at any point between Loyd and Forsyth streets; on Pryor street, between Alabama and Mitchell streets; on Decatur street west of Collins street; on Marietta street east of Market street; on Market street south of Walton street; on Peachtree street from Marietta street to the junction of Market and Peachtree streets.

On the 8th of June, 1857, the Gate City Guards, Atlanta's first military company, was organized with the following officers: George H. Thompson, captain; William L. Ezzard, first lieutenant; S. W. Jones, second lieutenant; John H. Lovejoy, third lieutenant; James L. Lewis, first sergeant; Wilson Ballard, second sergeant; Willis P. Chisholm, third sergeant; James H. Purtell, fourth sergeant; Thomas M. Clarke, first corporal; James E. Butler, second corporal; E. Holland, third corporal; Joseph Thompson, Jr., fourth corporal; James F. Alexander, surgeon; Daniel Pittman, secretary and treasurer. The company soon be-



N. J. Hammond

came one of the crack military organizations of the state, and in a few short years it was destined to take its place in the ranks of the army fighting for Southern independence.

The Young Men's Christian Association was organized in Atlanta the latter part of 1857, with B. H. Overby, president, and N. J. Hammond, secretary and treasurer. Lewis Lawshe, John Clarke, J. Hill Davis and M. C. Cole were the vice-presidents, and a membership of between 150 and 200 was soon enrolled. The association had its first hall in a building on Whitehall street, just below Alabama street. It flourished until the outbreak of the war, when it disbanded.

In the city election of January, 1858, the following candidates were successful: Mayor, L. J. Glenn; aldermen, first ward, F. H. Coleman and John Collier; second ward, William Rushton and Thomas J. Lowe; third ward, James E. Williams and J. M. Blackwell; fourth ward, John H. Mecalvin and George S. Alexander; fifth ward, Hayden Cole and J. A. Hayden; clerk, Clement C. Howell; treasurer, Philip E. McDaniel; marshal, E. T. Hunnicutt; deputy marshal, Willis Carlisle; lieutenant of police, George W. Anderson; clerk of market, E. B. Reynolds; street overseer, Thomas G. W. Crussell; city surveyor, H. W. Fulton; sexton, G. A. Pilgrim.

A communication presented to council on March 5th, 1858, in the form of a memorial signed by some two hundred mechanics and workingmen of Atlanta, throws a good deal of light on an early and unique phase of the labor troubles, in which negro slavery figured. The memorial was as follows:

"We, the undersigned, would respectfully represent to your honorable body that there exists in the city of Atlanta a number of men who, in the opinion of your memorialists, are of no benefit to the city. We refer to negro mechanics whose masters reside in other places, and who pay nothing toward the support of the city government, and whose negro mechanics can afford to underbid the regular resident citizen mechanics of your city, to their great injury, and without benefit to the city in any way. We most respectfully request your honorable body to take the matter in hand, and by your action in the premises afford such protection to the resident citizen mechanics of your city as your honorable

body may deem meet in the premises, and in duty bound your petitioners will ever pray."

Early in April the Georgia Air Line Railroad applied to the city council for the first installment of the city's subscription of \$100,000 to its capital stock. By the provisions of the subscription, when the railroad company had received bona fide subscriptions to the amount of \$650,000, exclusive of the stock subscribed for by the city of Atlanta, ten per cent. of the amount subscribed, or \$10,000 was to be paid to the railroad. To this demand of the Air Line Railroad the council demurred, contending that the railroad had not produced proof of having the necessary amount subscribed. The railroad persisting in its claim, council appointed a special committee to carefully investigate the matter and report the result of its labors at the earliest possible date. The committee brought in a report to the effect that the railroad had not raised the necessary amount, and submitting the following list as representing the sum total of bona fide subscriptions:

Fulton county.....	\$ 84,700
Hall county.....	156,900
Franklin county.....	146,200
Hart county.....	74,600
Gwinnett county.....	18,300
<hr/>	
Total stock subscribed.....	\$480,700

This confirmation of its suspicions caused the council to lay the petition of the Air Line road upon the table without more ado; but the railroad people were not so easily put off. They insisted that the necessary \$650,000 had been subscribed, and at the next meeting of council, on May 6th, they again petitioned that body to issue ten per cent. of the bonds agreed upon. The petitioners accompanied their petition with the following interrogations:

1. Assuming that the stock already subscribed amounts to \$650,000, and that the subscriptions are bona fide, is there, in the opinion of the council, any legal impediment to the city's payment of its regular installment of ten per cent. on \$100,000, when the same shall be demanded by the company?



2. If any legal impediment exist, has the council the power to remove it?

3. Will the council exercise the power if requested so to do by a majority of the legal voters of the city?

4. Will the council provide for the holding of an election by the citizens, that their wishes on this subject may be expressed?

On the 13th of May council again took the railroad bond matter up and replied to the questions of the corporation. The reply was courteous, but firm in its adherence to its previous decision. In substance it said that "while it was never the intention of the city to build the Georgia Air Line railroad alone, it was nevertheless its settled policy to assist in the work of construction to the full amount of its subscription, reserving to itself the right to withhold further aid when the conditions on which the subscription was made had not been complied with, viz.: the subscription of \$650,000 outside of the city's subscription. This amount, as the council thought, had not been secured, yet, nevertheless, the council declared its earnest friendship for the road, and its warm desire for its success. To the stockholders along the line of the road it said once for all: 'We are with you in this work, ready to comply when others have fulfilled.'"

The Georgia Air Line Railroad did not prove to be of the paper variety, and Atlanta did her part in aiding in its construction, as promised. But for the breaking out of the war between the states, then so imminent, the work of construction would have been begun several years sooner.

The population of the city at this time exceeded 10,000, and its rapid growth continued. In 1858 nineteen substantial brick stores, some of them pretentious structures, were erected. The city hall and county court house building was, for the time, a handsome structure of the colonial style of architecture, with white entrance porticos on all sides and a double-story cupola with half-globe roof, surmounted by the inevitable weather-vane. The Atlanta Medical College was among the best of the large buildings, being also of the colonial type of architecture. The church organizations heretofore mentioned had creditable brick houses of worship. The original "carshed" was very similar in appearance and dimensions to the present beautiful (?) structure, and



the early Atlantans, unlike the present fastidious generation, were exceedingly proud of it, a wood cut of the depot adorning every descriptive print of Atlanta. In addition to the large hotels already mentioned, at this time the city boasted of the Fulton Hotel, at the corner of Alabama and Pryor streets, later the site of the Block factory, and the Trout House, at the corner of Decatur and Pryor streets. Both of these hotels were prominent ante-bellum landmarks and helped to make history during that momentous period. It was from the gallery of the latter that General Longstreet, en route to join General Bragg at Chickamauga, delivered an inspiring speech to his troops and the citizens in the streets below. Among the larger brick stores erected at this time was that of Jonathan Norcross, on the site of his pioneer store. Of this period Mr. Reed says: "Among the largest business firms were Beach & Root, dry goods merchants, located where J. M. High's store now is in Whitehall street; McDaniel, Mitchell & Hulsey, dealers in groceries and provisions, located where John Keeley's store now is; McNaught, Ormond & Scrutchins, who had a hardware store on Whitehall street, where now is the hardware store of a son of Mr. Scrutchins; Thomas M. Clarke & Co., dealers in hardware, located where they are at the present time, No. 27 Peachtree street; Thomas Kile, a prominent merchant, located at the corner of Marietta and Peachtree streets. Among the manufacturing establishments were the repair shops of the three railroads which then terminated in Atlanta—the Georgia Railroad, the Western and Atlantic, and the Macon and Western. These shops employed a large number of men, and thus contributed largely to the prosperity of the city. Joseph Winship & Co. manufactured cotton gins, threshing machines, machine gearing, and carried on quite an extensive business where the Winship Machine Company's works now are. Richard Peters had a flouring mill located just below the present site of the Georgia Railroad shops. J. C. Peck & Co. had a planing mill and manufactured quite extensively sash, doors and blinds, and Pitts & Cook also had a planing mill and carried on the same kind of business as J. C. Peck & Co."

## CHAPTER XIV

### ATLANTA IN 1859

In the election of 1859 Luther J. Glenn was chosen for mayor, with the following council: First ward, Thomas G. Healey and Thomas Haney; second ward, James L. Dunning and William Watkins; third ward, J. M. Blackwell and Coleman F. Wood; fourth ward, Bartly M. Smith and Cyrus H. Wallace. The other city officials were: C. C. Howell, clerk; P. E. McDaniel, treasurer; G. A. Pilgrim, sexton; Willis Carlisle, marshal; E. T. Hunnicutt, deputy marshal; G. W. Anderson, first lieutenant of police; G. M. Lester, second lieutenant of police; John Haslett, street overseer; E. B. Reynolds, clerk of the market; H. L. Currier, city surveyor.

In his inaugural address the newly elected mayor expressed much satisfaction with the financial condition of the municipality. The floating debt of \$3,000 had been paid off by the preceding council, and Mayor Glenn declared that his administration began with a clean slate in that regard, not a single check being outstanding against the city. He enumerated the bonded debt as follows:

Bonds issued for fair grounds.....	\$ 3,000
Bonds issued for city hall.....	16,000
Bonds issued for stock in gas company.....	20,000
Bonds issued to Georgia Air Line Railroad Company .....	5,000
Bonds issued for stock in the Chattahoochee bridge .....	3,000

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Total bonded indebtedness of city.....\$47,000

With reference to the erection of the city hall and county court house, Mayor Glenn said that the bonds voted for that pur-

pose were to be redeemed by a special tax of one-fourth of one per cent. on real estate and stock in trade, to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of interest and the ultimate extinction of the principal. The special tax collected up to that time had not been applied to the redemption of the bonds, the interest alone having been applied as directed by the special tax ordinance. This tax for the preceding year amounted to \$5,560, from which sum, after deducting the \$1,120 interest due, there remained \$4,440 to be applied toward liquidating the bonded debt. This was regarded as a most gratifying showing. As yet the Chattahoochee bridge had not paid a dividend, but the success of the enterprise was unquestioned. The gas company, whose stock the city held to the extent of \$19,000, had paid the very substantial dividend of ten per cent. for the first year. The city had been lighted during that time by eighty lamps.

A new arrangement as to the official printing of the city was made by this council in February. The former arrangement had proven very unremunerative to the Republican—indeed, the compensation allowed did not more than cover the actual cost of type-setting. The Daily Intelligencer, and the new paper with the suggestive name of the Southern Confederacy, jointly made a proposition to council, agreeing to insert in their respective journals the proceedings and ordinances of the city council, and any other desired advertising matter, at one-half their regular advertising rates of one dollar a square. To this council agreed.

On May 20th, 1859, Theodore Harris, G. C. Rogers and O. H. Jones petitioned council to protect the licensed hack-drivers of Atlanta from the competition of farmers and other outsiders who owned horses and vehicles. The petitioners alleged that upon every occasion that drew large crowds to the city, many unlicensed people from not only Fulton, but adjacent counties as well, turned many a dollar by doing a transient hack business without taxation, to their great detriment and financial loss. This action was taken in view of the approaching Southern Central Agricultural fair. Council agreed to see that the tax officers were more vigilant in putting down the abuse complained of.

The tax question, as it concerned labor, was extended so as to regulate slave or free negro labor where it entered into competi-

tion with tax-paying white employment. There was much complaint among the mechanics of Atlanta about this phase of the slavery question, and their petitions to council resulted in several ordinances intended to remedy the alleged injustice. One of these petitions read:

"We feel aggrieved, as Southern citizens, that your honorable body tolerates a negro dentist (Roderick Badger) in our midst, and in justice to ourselves and the community, it ought to be abated. We, the residents of Atlanta, appeal to you for justice."

One of the negro ordinances passed was as follows: "All free persons of color coming within the limits of Atlanta to live shall, within ten days after their arrival, pay to the clerk of the council \$200, and in case of failure to do so, shall be arrested by the marshal, or other police officer, who shall put him or her in the guard house for the term of five days, during which time the marshal shall advertise in at least one public city gazette that such person or persons of color will be hired out at public outcry at the city hall, to the person who will take such free person of color for the shortest time for said sum, etc."

On the 3d of June a petition was received asking that an ordinance be passed regulating the purchase and sale of slaves in the city of Atlanta, in order to compel outside slave traders to pay a license, which they had hitherto evaded. Atlanta had become quite a slave-trading center, several of her citizens being engaged in the business, and they, like the hack-drivers, desired to shut out unlicensed competition. A man named Crawford had quite an extensive slave mart on Whitehall street, next to Hank Muhlinbrinck's saloon, and Bob Clark had the same kind of place on the same street, about where Froshin's stand now is. Before council regulated the matter, hundreds of negroes were sold in Atlanta by their private masters and regular traders without the payment of a license.

In 1859 the first city directory of Atlanta was published—a crude affair in comparison with present day directories. It was a mere pamphlet, compiled by Mr. Williams and published by M. Lynch, who was later a member of the well-known firm of Lynch & Thornton. This little work contains much interesting informa-

tion concerning ante-bellum Atlanta, one of its most attractive features being a descriptive sketch of the city written by Green B. Haygood, one of the prominent lawyers of the day. After giving a glowing introduction, the sketch speaks thus of Atlanta's geographical advantages:

"The geographical position of Atlanta being nearly in the center of the southern section of the American union, at the point of the great railroad crossings in a right line from New York to New Orleans, and nearly equi-distant from each; four prominent lines of railroads all centering here, and pouring into the depots and warehouses of the city an amount of trade, and transporting through it a vast tide of travel; situated, too, just upon the dividing line between the cotton and grain sections of the state, altogether, give to Atlanta facilities for receiving and distributing the productions and commerce of the country from one section to another, greater than can be claimed for any other inland city in the South. Atlanta is now connected by rail with Chattanooga, Nashville, Memphis, and thence with the Upper Mississippi, also, with London and Knoxville, Tenn.; Lynchburg, Va.; and thence with the great lines north and east; on the southwest with Montgomery by rail, thence by water with Mobile, New Orleans, and all the lower Mississippi; also with Columbus and all southwestern Georgia, and with Savannah and the Atlantic through Macon. By the Georgia Railroad with Augusta, Charleston, Columbia, Greenville, most of the prominent places in North and South Carolina, Virginia and the great northern cities. Another railroad is now in projection, and considerable progress made towards its accomplishment, in the direction of Anderson Court House, S. C., through the beautiful and productive country known as Northeast Georgia; and another still has been chartered from this point to the great and inexhaustible coal fields of northeastern Alabama, destined to supply fuel and motive power to the teeming millions that shall inhabit these lands for untold ages. Forty-four freight and passenger trains arrive and depart daily from the city.

"The Ocmulgee river, which flows to the Atlantic, has its source in the central part of the city. The head spring of South river, its principal tributary, being located within the railroad reserve, near the present passenger depot, its precise spot being

now indicated by the large perennial cistern between the Holland House and the Macon and Western depot, on the south side of the railroad track: while Walton Spring, an early celebrity of the place, situated a little north of the road, flows into the Chattahoochee, and thence to the Gulf of Mexico; so that here in the heart of the city the marriage of the waters of the Atlantic and the Gulf might have been celebrated high in the air by our own engine companies, drawing their supplies the while from the natural fountains, flowing thence to their far distant destinations in the bosom of the Atlantic and the Gulf. But Charleston must needs go to Memphis, that old Ocean, pent up in hoops and staves, may be received into the embraces of his Amazon bride, and the Father of Waters is shorn of his glories and changed into a huge water station on the road to the West.

"The incorporated shape of the city is a circle two miles in diameter, with a handle of half a mile in length and six hundred yards wide along the line of the Macon and Western Railroad. It covers a portion of sixteen original land lots, each of which was laid off upon a plan to suit the views of the respective owners, and hence our streets are not so regular in width and uniform in direction as is desirable—many of them being much too narrow for public convenience.

"The population of the city is remarkable for its activity and enterprise. Most of the inhabitants came here for the purpose of bettering their fortunes by engaging actively in business, and this presents the anomaly of having very few aged persons residing in it; and our people show their democratic impulses by each allowing his neighbor to attend to his own business, and our ladies, even, are allowed to attend to their own domestic and household affairs without being ruled out of respectable society.

"Atlanta is a name which is understood to have been proposed by J. Edgar Thompson, at that time chief engineer of the Georgia Railroad. The signification of the name, the reasons for its adoption, and the various theories on the subject have now become a theme of inquiry and investigation not without interest. The writer has heard it claimed as due in honor to a mythological goddess, Atlanta, said to have been remarkable for fleetness, strength and endurance. It was certainly a fast town then, and



may have been supposed entitled to the honor of a recognition by the goddess, by reason of its early character and its wonderful achievements. The infant has become a giant, and is rapidly overcoming the obstacles to its growth and prosperity, and making the surrounding country and neighboring villages all tributary to its prosperity, permanency and celebrity. The name was for a short time written Atalanta, which seems to favor the claims of the goddess. An orator of no mean pretensions claimed for it the significance of 'a city among the hills,' while a shrewd writer has declared that it was the opposite, and proclaimed it 'the city in the woods.' And its commercial and geographical position has recently procured for it the appellation of 'the Gate City.'

"And still another theory is set up by some who claim for it an origin more worthy of its present importance as a railroad *entrepot* and commercial emporium, taken in connection with its future prospects as a great railroad center and manufacturing city. The great state work, connecting the waters of the West with the Atlantic, commencing at Chattanooga, on the Tennessee river, and terminating at this point, had nearly been completed. The name Western and Atlantic railroad had been given to it by the legislature of Georgia, and it was not inaptly considered the great connecting artery through which must pass the incalculable mass of produce, manufacture and commerce from the great valley of the West and the Atlantic coast, and the imports from abroad passing thence to the far West.

"Atlanta had been permanently fixed as the southeastern terminus of that great state work, and gave a local idea to its eastern terminus, and that idea, represented or qualified by the adjective Atlanta, was incomplete of itself, but clearly pointed to something more definite, and the mind is put upon the inquiry for the thing signified. The connections by rail from Charleston by way of Augusta, and from Savannah, by way of Macon, had both been completed to this point. Those roads had been gradually ascending the hills from the coast, in search of a 'northwest passage,' they had searched the hills upon which the city stands, and here they met the Western and Atlantic road, just emerging from the wilds of the northwest, seeking by a sinuous and difficult ascent from the Western valley for a highway to the Atlantic.

They met together in our streets, they embraced each other upon these headlands of the Atlantic.

"These Atlantic headlands, when embodied in the noun Atlanta, to our mind, meets the demand and represents the ideal of the thing sought after, and the mind rests upon it as the thing signified by the several indices pointing to Atlanta as the proper name for such a city in such a place. This we now state to the public as the true derivation sustained by the facts in the case.

"Atlanta has had a growth unexampled in the history of the South. In 1854 the population had reached 6,025. The increase for the several years has averaged 1,000 per annum. On the first of April, 1859, it is ascertained by the census-taker, under state authority, to be 11,500 souls. The assessed value of the real estate in the city the present year, 1859, is \$2,760,000, and the personalty, cash, merchandise, etc., in proportion.

"The number of stores in 1854 was fifty-seven, exclusive of drinking saloons. The amount of goods sold in 1853 was \$1,017,000, and the amount sold in 1858 is not accurately known, but is believed to have been about \$3,000,000, and is now rapidly increasing. It is now widening and extending the area of its supply on every side. Dry goods are sold to the country for over one hundred miles around on terms as favorable to purchasers as the retail markets of the great Northern cities, New York itself not excepted, and still our merchants are prosperous, thrifty and energetic. No respectable house here had to suspend during the great crisis in commercial affairs in 1857 and 1858.

"The great secret of the safety, success and independence of convulsions is to be found in the fact that sales are made at low rates, almost entirely for cash, and the profits, though small in detail, are often repeated and amount to a vast sum in the aggregate; a few have fallen by unfortunate speculations.

"The number of stores and other business houses at present is unknown to the writer. Nineteen commodious brick stores were erected in 1858, and as many more are now in progress of erection in 1859, besides a large number of fine dwellings, mostly of brick. Many of the new improvements are imposing structures, and would be creditable in the elegant portions of our modern cities.

"There are at present four capacious hotels, now open and in successful operation, and another still more extensive is nearly completed, designed, we understand, for the accommodation of families, hitherto a felt necessity in the city.

"The city now has in successful operation four large and flourishing machine shops, two of which are connected with railroad companies, and two belong to private individuals, where stationary engines, mill gearing, with almost every variety of castings and machinery are manufactured at short notice. Two planing mills and sash and blind factories are also in successful operation; besides, there are numerous smaller manufacturing establishments in the city; three or four tanneries, one or two shoe manufactories, besides several smaller establishments. The most important establishment in the place is the rolling mill for the manufacture of railroad iron, which is capable of turning out thirty tons of railroad iron of superior quality.

"The clothing trade has become an item of no inconsiderable importance within the past few years, and presents some new features when contrasted with any other Southern cities of equal size and age. The manufacture of clothing in this city is a decided success, and has increased with an unparalleled rapidity for a Southern city. In 1854 five hands were employed in the manufacture of clothing; the number now thus employed exceeds seventy-five, the larger portion of whom are females. The clothing made here has been received with much favor by the public, and is believed to have attracted much attention to the wholesale trade of the city in that article. In this connection it may be stated that this is the great Southern depot for the sale of the most improved model of sewing machines, the use of which extensively has doubtless added greatly to the trade in the clothing department.

"The city was first brilliantly lighted with gas, manufactured from Georgia, Alabama and Tennessee coal, on December 25, 1855.

. . . . .

"We have four prominent lines of railroads, all centering here.

. . . . .

"The city now contains thirteen Christian churches, and one more has been recently projected.

"It is not believed that any other city in the country is blessed with greater or better facilities for procuring building materials, the supply of granite near at hand, of a quality peculiarly adapted to building purposes, is literally inexhaustible; bricks of good quality are made in and around the city on reasonable terms. Lumber of good quality is also obtained at reasonable prices; lime is produced in any desired quantity near at hand.

"The mechanical element prevails in our city, and the major part of them are enterprising, thrifty and prosperous men, who are rapidly rising in the public esteem.

"The health of the city is almost unprecedented, being entirely exempt from the usual summer and fall fevers, cholera, etc. No epidemic has ever prevailed here, and the bills of mortality show a state of health almost without a parallel."

From the directory from which the foregoing is quoted, we also glean the following facts concerning Atlanta up to 1859:

The churches in the city were: The First Baptist, at the corner of Walton and Wadley streets; the Second Baptist, at the corner of Mitchell and Washington streets; the Christian, on the south side of Decatur street, between Collins and Loyd streets; Wesley Chapel Methodist Episcopal church, at the corner of Houston and Peachtree streets; Trinity Methodist Episcopal church, on the south side of Mitchell street, between Washington and McDonough streets; Evans Chapel (M. E.), on the north side of Nelson street and west of Mangum; Congregational Methodist, on the north side of Jones street, between Martin street and Connelly's alley; Protestant Methodist, corner Mitchell and Forsyth streets; African M. E. church, on an alley north of Gilmer street; Episcopal church, northeast corner of Hunter and Washington streets; First Presbyterian, south side of Marietta street, between Wadley and Spring streets; Central Presbyterian, on Washington street, opposite the city hall; Roman Catholic church, on the southeast corner of Hunter and Loyd streets.

The city was protected by three fire companies, well equipped for the time. They were: Atlanta Fire Company No. 1; Mechanics Fire Company No. 2; and Tallulah Fire Company No. 3.

There were five lodges of Masons, two lodges of Odd Fellows, and two temperance societies. N. L. Angier was agent for ten insurance companies; J. E. Butler for one, Alexander M. Wallace for four, and Samuel Smith for two.

The banks of the city were: The Bank of Fulton, the Atlanta Insurance and Banking Company, the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company Agency, the Bank of the State of Georgia Agency, and the Augusta Insurance and Banking Agency.

There were five hotels: The Atlanta, City Hotel, Planters' Hotel, Tennessee House and Washington Hall.

The local press was represented by seven newspapers, one of which was daily and weekly, one weekly and tri-weekly, one weekly and semi-weekly, two of them weekly and two monthly.

The following numbers were engaged in the various trades and professions: Attorneys, 29; clergymen, 10; architects and builders, 3; blacksmiths, 5; boarding houses, 14; boiler manufacturers, 1; boot and shoe dealers, 15; brick manufacturers, 10; clothing dealers, 11; carpenters and builders, 1; carriage manufacturers, 3; commission merchants, 14; cotton dealers, 7; dentists, 7; drug stores, 5; wholesale and retail dry goods dealers, 15; steam engine builders, 2; foundries, 2; planing mills, 1; flour manufacturers, 1; gents' furnishing goods, 7; grain dealers, 3; wholesale and retail grocers, 66; hardware stores, 6; leather and findings, 5; lottery offices, 2; physicians, 31; produce and provisions, 12; real estate agents, 2; rolling mills, 1; private schools, 5; slave dealers, 4; tailors, 4; watches and clocks, 4; wine dealers, 4; besides numerous other branches of business.

According to the federal census of 1860, the population of Fulton county was 14,427. Subtracting from this the 11,500 people that the state census of the previous year gave Atlanta, it will be seen that the county population was very sparse indeed. In presenting, therefore, the government statistics for Fulton county as to the various industries, it will be understood that they practically apply to Atlanta alone of that time, there having been no town of even a handful of inhabitants in the same county. The

census reports show three establishments making boots and shoes, with an invested capital of \$2,000, employing five hands, to whom were paid in wages \$1,800. The raw material cost \$1,700, and the value of the manufactured goods was \$4,625. There was one carriage manufactory employing fifteen men, to whom \$7,200 was paid, and employing a capital of \$25,000. The cost of the raw material was \$3,750, and the value of the finished product \$14,000. Two flour mills, with a capital of \$6,600, employing two hands, to whom was paid \$600. The cost of the raw material was \$4,000, and the value of the product, \$6,500. One iron manufactory with a capital of \$100,000, employing a hundred men, to whom was paid \$36,000 annually. The material cost \$62,500, and the product was worth \$137,230. One leather manufactory with a capital of \$5,000, employing six hands, to whom was paid \$2,160. The material cost \$1,000, and the product sold for \$2,855. A saw mill represented an investment of \$1,000 and employed five hands, with an annual wage roll of \$840. The manufactured product represented \$18,000, and the raw material, \$7,500. Four manufactories of machinery, steam engines, etc., with an invested capital of \$620,000, giving employment to 167 men, who received \$55,000 in wages. The raw material cost \$107,000, and the product was valued at \$212,850. Two tin, copper and sheet iron ware manufactories, with a capital of \$11,000, employing nineteen hands at an annual expense of \$6,840. Value of raw material \$11,084; finished product, \$18,303. The entire number of establishments was fifteen; aggregate capital, \$770,600; hands employed, 319; wages paid, \$110,484; value of product, \$414,366.



## CHAPTER XV

### WAR CLOUDS

At the beginning of 1860 the anti-federal sentiment in Atlanta was at the eruptive point. Hatred of the Abolitionists of the North was especially pronounced, and the first expression of public disapproval of this element came in the form of a proposition to boycott the wholesale merchants of New York, who were known to be anti-Southern in their feelings. The local newspapers published lists of native Georgians or natives of other Southern states who were engaged in the wholesale trade in New York or other large Northern cities, and called upon the business men of Atlanta to give them the preference when they ordered goods. On the 6th of January, 1860, the *Intelligencer* said:

"For many years past the Southern merchants have been accustomed to purchase a large portion of their goods in New York and other Northern markets. Charleston, Savannah, and other Southern cities have been almost altogether neglected in the great furore for Northern purchases. Late movements in reference to the slavery question have caused a healthy reaction among Southern merchants, and we hear of heavy complaints being made of the great falling off of Southern trade and patronage. This is good; the physic begins to work. We have long desired to see this corrective applied for the many grievances of which we have so long complained as having been inflicted upon us by Northern fanaticism. The true policy is to withhold the supplies which we have so long furnished Northern merchants, and there will soon come a torrent of opposition to Abolitionism from the enterprise and capital of the North, which will drive fanaticism from the whole country."

Subsequently there was an organized movement among certain of the more radical citizens of Atlanta to bring such pressure

to bear upon the local merchants, through boycott or otherwise, that they would not patronize a Northern wholesaler who was not known to be a Southern sympathizer. A number of Atlanta business men signed an agreement to purchase goods from none but friends of the South, and to give Southern wholesalers and importers the preference in their purchase whenever possible.

In the midst of this political excitement a well-attended mass meeting of business men was held to take some action respecting what was regarded as the unjust discrimination of the railroads against Atlanta in the matter of freight tariffs. This meeting was held on the 24th of February, 1860. Dr. D. Young acted as chairman, and A. M. Eddleman, secretary. After a long and spirited discussion, in which the leading merchants participated, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:

"Whereas, All the undersigned, merchants and business men of Atlanta, believing it to be for our mutual interest and for the public good, do hereby form ourselves into a mercantile association for the purpose of strength and counsel, to build up the business of Atlanta, and to successfully compete with any city of the South, and for the purpose of remedying the present unjust discriminations against our city, in freights and the commerce of the city.

"Resolved, That by concerted action we will be better protected, not only as Southern men, but as merchants, and that we will feel ourselves in honor bound to impart such information to the association as may be useful to our section and the protection of our trade.

"Resolved, That we look upon the discrimination of Charleston and Savannah in favor of Nashville and other cities in freight, as unjust and oppressive, and objectionable to our interests as a commercial city, and that we will treat all those cities fairly and honorably to get a reduction from those ports to Atlanta.

"Resolved, That we will, individually and collectively, use our best endeavors to make Atlanta a port of entry, believing it would be of benefit to ourselves, our state, and the general government.

"Resolved, That a committee of five be appointed to form a constitution and by-laws for this association, and for other purposes, and to report at a meeting to be held on next Friday night."

The committee appointed under the foregoing resolutions consisted of J. B. Peck, S. B. Robson, W. M. Williams, Dr. John L. Hamilton and Judge S. B. Hoyt. At the same meeting another committee was appointed to look into the matter of freight discrimination, consisting of Sidney Root, William McNaught, William Herring, John R. Wallace, A. K. Seago, William H. Barnes, E. M. Seago, P. L. J. May, and Judge Hoyt.

This organization was quite active for a few weeks, but with the outbreak of the war came to naught. One of its secret purposes was to discriminate in favor of Southern wholesalers doing business in the North.

In common with her sister cities of the South Atlanta was much interested in the movement represented by the organization known as the Knights of the Golden Circle. "General" Bickley, the organizer and promotor of the movement, appeared in Atlanta with other leaders of the mysterious order, in the spring of 1860, and addressed a large mass meeting of Atlantans with the object of enlisting them in the chimerical scheme which was the ostensible object of the Knights of the Golden Circle. After the meeting, a number of citizens appointed an advisory committee to report on the desirability of effecting the organization of a lodge of the order in Atlanta. This committee made the following report:

"Impressed with the necessity of vigilance and determination in the defense of the constitutional rights of the Southern or Slave States, threatened with an irrepressible conflict by and through which these states are to be despoiled of those rights; warned by active aggressions, insurrectionary movements, murder most foul, and the advance onward to political power of the abolition sentiment, it is time to prepare for an ominous future, to guard all that which we constitutionally possess, and as far as in our power may be, to extend Southern sentiments, Southern institutions, and Southern civilization, therefore,

"Resolved 1. That we recognize in the aims of the Knights of the Golden Circle, as set forth by General Bickley, of Virginia, Major Henry Castilanos, of Louisiana, and Colonel N. J. Scott, of Alabama, a movement which we heartily commend, because the Slave States of this Union have in them their success guaranteed, not only for the continuance of the domestic institution of slavery

in their midst, but also its extension south, with all other elements of Southern civilization.

"Resolved 2. That this meeting returns its warmest thanks to the distinguished General Bickley, Major Henry Castilanos and Colonel N. J. Scott, for the valuable information imparted to it, and do most cordially commend them and their course to the respectful and patriotic consideration and support of our fellow-citizens of Georgia and the South."

Subsequent meetings were held, and when he left Atlanta, Bickley left behind him the nucleus of a flourishing lodge, which was industrious in its efforts to raise the "sinews of war," which most deeply interested the prime movers of the Knights of the Golden Circle. A goodly sum of money was turned over to the state "central committee" for propaganda work in the South. Later Bickley was held up as a fraud by prominent Southern papers, but his movement had attracted a very large following by the breaking out of hostilities between North and South, and hundreds of deluded Southerners journeyed to the Rio Grande to mass for the movement on Mexico, which was the prime object of the organization fathered by Bickley, according to him. He proposed to send thousands of armed Southern young men to assist Juarez in establishing his authority in Mexico against Miramon's machinations to overthrow the republic and establish a dictatorship, which, once accomplished, would result in the establishment of negro slavery in Mexico and a political alliance between that republic and the Southern States for the perpetuation of the institution, and if need be, its defense against Abolition fanaticism in the North. Bickley prophesied eventually a great Southern slave republic, formed from the slave states of the United States and Mexico, strong enough to dictate terms to all Yankeedom, and rich enough and enterprising enough, with King Cotton as the basis of its prosperity, to control the commerce of the Western Hemisphere. It was a great scheme, but it dissolved like a child's soap bubble when the guns of Fort Sumter announced that the South had crossed the political Rubicon.

Stephen A. Douglas, the candidate of the Northern Democracy for president in the race against Abraham Lincoln, visited Atlanta while making his stumping tour of the Union, and deliv-

ered a public address in the city on October 30, 1860. Although among state's rights enthusiasts, a large audience heard the distinguished speaker respectfully. Before the meeting was held the following pertinent questions were propounded to the "Little Giant" by the executive committee of the Breckenridge and Lane party of Fulton county, with the request that he make categorical answer in his speech:

"1. Has not each state the sovereign right to decide for itself what shall be sufficient cause for withdrawal from the Union?

"2. If upon the election of Abraham Lincoln any of the Southern States, in sovereign convention assembled, should decide to withdraw from the Union, would the Federal government have a right to coerce her back into the Union, and would you assist the Federal government in so coercing her?

"If you answer that the right of secession is only the right of revolution inherent in the people, then would not the citizens of said state withdrawing, by exercising the right of revolution, be acting as rebels and traitors to the Federal government, and would you aid in their punishment as such?"

Judge Douglas took notice of the questions at the opening of his brilliant speech, but said they were impertinent, because the same questions had been put to Mr. Breckenridge. He contended, however, that in the very nature of it, the Union must be perpetual or liberty fall; that no adequate cause for the secession of any state could exist as the republic was organized, and that the talk of danger from foreign aggression was preposterous. His speech made a strong impression on his hearers, complimentary to his ability, but gained him few votes.

The day following Douglas's address, a "Minute Men Association" was organized at the armory of the Atlanta Grays, the object of which was "to organize in the city of Atlanta, and in Fulton county, men of all parties, not as partisans, but as true Southern men, a body to be known as the 'Minute Men of Fulton County,' to bind themselves to stand by the state rights of the South, their honor, their homes, and their firesides, against a black Republican government." Dr. W. F. Westmoreland presided, and W. S. Bassford acted as secretary. The resolutions adopted are reproduced below:

"Whereas, It is now probable and almost certain that an Abolition candidate will be elected to the chief magistracy of the Union upon the avowed and undisguised declaration on his part and on the part of his supporters, that this common government shall be administered for the destruction of the rights and of the institutions of the Southern States in the Union, and

"Whereas, We recognize the right of any sovereign state to withdraw from the partnership of States whenever in her sovereign capacity she may determine that the objects of the Confederacy have been perverted, or not carried out in good faith, therefore,

"Resolved, That we as citizens of Georgia acknowledge our allegiance to the Federal government, and that in the event of the election of Abraham Lincoln, we pledge ourselves to maintain at all hazards, and to the last extremity, any course that may be adopted for self-defense against the Federal power.

"Resolved, That if any Southern State may determine to secede from the Union, we will by all means in our power assist her in resistance against any effort on the part of a black Republican administration to coerce her back into the Confederacy.

"Resolved, That it is the sacred duty of Southern men in the present alarming crisis to forget past political and partisan differences, and to unite together as brethren of one household, in determined opposition to the policy of a black Republican party."

This organization was perfected and continued its existence with much enthusiasm until Georgia seceded from the Union. At one of its meetings following the announcement that Lincoln had been elected to the presidency, the following resolution was adopted amid wild applause:

"Whereas, News having reached us that Abraham Lincoln has been elected president of the United States by a dominant Free Soil majority, whose sole idea is the destruction of our constitutional rights, and eternal hostility to our domestic institutions, therefore,

"Resolved, That as citizens of Georgia and Fulton county, we believe the time has come for us to assert our rights, and we now stand ready to second any action that the sovereign state of Georgia may take in asserting her independence by separate state





Sidney Root

action, or in unison with her sister States of the South in forming a Southern Confederacy.”

At this meeting strong secession speeches were made by such prominent and conservative citizens as Sidney Root. The roster of the “Minute Men” by this time contained the names of a majority of the adult male population of the city and county.

On the 10th of November a rousing meeting of the organization was held to hear a speech by Hon. Lucius J. Gartrell, member of congress from the Atlanta district. Colonel Gartrell endorsed unqualifiedly the objects and efforts of the organization and made a fiery speech in which he declared that a Southern Confederacy would be an established fact within the next six months.

As a relic of those stirring times, it may prove of interest to give the vote of Atlanta and Fulton county in the presidential election of 1860. In the Atlanta precinct the vote stood: Douglas, 335; Breckenridge, 835; Bell, 1,070. The vote of Fulton county, exclusive of Atlanta: Douglas, 327; Breckenridge, 1,018; Bell, 1,195.

Another enthusiastic meeting of the association was held in the court house on the 12th of November. A committee composed of Green B. Haygood, Thomas L. Cooper, Luther J. Glenn, Jared I. Whitaker, Amos W. Hammond, Thomas C. Howard and Logan E. Bleckley was appointed to draft resolutions urging Georgia to hold a state's rights convention, in imitation of South Carolina, and adopting a secession ordinance, if such was the majority's will. The resolutions as adopted advocated petitioning the legislature, then in session at Milledgeville, to provide by-laws for the election of delegates to a state convention to consider Federal relations; approving the recent special message of the governor recommending the arming of the state forces at the earliest possible moment; recognizing the sovereignty of the state and its consequent right of secession; pledging their obedience to such action as a state convention might see fit to take, and expressing the solemn opinion that the only recourse of the South in the present grave crisis lay in the withdrawal of its several commonwealths from the Federal Union.

At a meeting held on December 3, blue cockades to be worn by the “Minute Men” were presented to the organization by Mrs. John W. Leonard and accepted with resolutions of thanks.

At this meeting a committee of public safety was appointed, with powers to summon before it all suspected characters, and to rid the community of such obnoxious persons as were hostile and dangerous to the rights and interests of the city or state. This committee was composed of Sidney Root, F. Williams, Elias Holcomb, G. W. Anderson, J. T. Lewis, Frank Walker, T. L. Cooper, N. R. Fowler, A. M. Orr, B. N. Williford, William Gilbert, James E. Williams, J. R. Rhodes, Benjamin May, B. M. Smith, W. F. Westmoreland, C. H. Chandler, J. H. Lovejoy, E. T. Hunnicutt, S. W. Jones and William Barnes.

A grand secession demonstration to ratify the selection of local delegates to the state convention was held on December 10th. The delegates nominated by Atlanta were Luther J. Glenn, Joseph P. Logan and James F. Alexander. Fiery patriotic speeches were made at this ratification meeting, by the delegates and other leading citizens, and the demonstration concluded with a grand torch-light procession. The great crowd gave three cheers and a tiger for South Carolina.

From that time on a regular secession campaign was inaugurated throughout the state, and mass meetings were held almost nightly. On the 22d of December the Hon. Howell Cobb addressed the people of Atlanta in the forenoon, and Hon. Henry R. Jackson in the afternoon. The object of the big gathering and procession was to ratify the action of the Palmetto State in seceding from the Union. At night an effigy of President Lincoln was burned in front of the Planter's hotel.

On February 7th a mass meeting was held to extend an invitation to the states of the South to hold a general secession convention in Atlanta, in accordance with a suggestion of the Virginia legislature. The following resolutions were adopted:

"Whereas, We find in the public prints of the country, the report of a series of resolutions that have been introduced into the legislature of Virginia, recommending the holding of a Southern convention or conference in the city of Atlanta, and

"Whereas, We, the citizens of Georgia and the city of Atlanta, believe it not only fit and proper, but the imperative duty of the Southern States of the American Union, in this important and alarming crisis of our national affairs to meet together by their

representatives, duly commissioned for that purpose, in a spirit of fraternity, to counsel with each other as to the best remedy by which the constitutional rights of the South may hereafter be fully respected and preserved in the Union, or if the aggressions of the dominant section should be continued, to devise some peaceable and efficient plan by which the rights, honor and integrity of the South may be preserved out of the Union, therefore,

“Resolved, That the citizens of Atlanta, in mass meeting assembled, without distinction of party, and only recognizing ourselves as belonging to a common country with common honor and common interests to preserve, do most cordially sympathize with and heartily respond to the spirit and object of the resolutions above referred to, and now pending before the Virginia legislature.

“Resolved, That we most cordially offer the hospitalities of the city to the convention or conference, and pledge ourselves to make ample and appropriate provision for the accommodation of said delegates, and for the Southerners generally, and do hereby open to them our hands, hearts and homes.

“Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be duly certified by the chairman and secretary of this meeting, and that the mayor of the city, in his official capacity, be requested to transmit them to the governor of Virginia, with a special solicitation that they be presented to the General Assembly of that State.”

## CHAPTER XVI

### FIRST YEARS OF THE WAR

With the opening of the war, Atlanta became an important military center. In the language of E. Y. Clarke: "Atlanta became one of the military centers and supply depots of the Southern Confederacy. The manufacture of arms, ammunition and war material in general, was conducted on the most extensive scale. There were many other manufactures, as for instance, those of alcohol, vinegar, and spirits of nitre, by Bellingrath, of the firm of Hunnicutt & Bellingrath, for the Confederate government. In 1862 the city passed under martial law, and at once became the headquarters for Confederate quartermasters and commissaries. It was made, too, a chief hospital point. Several hotels, the medical college, female institute building and others, were used for hospitals and store houses. It is probable that in these hospitals, from time to time, there were treated and nursed at least seventy-five thousand Confederate sick and wounded. These different enterprises required the labor of a large force of men, and heavy expenditures of money, which stimulated trade."

Jared I. Whitaker was elected mayor in January, 1861, after a warm municipal campaign. The council elected with Judge Whitaker was composed of Felix Hardeman, F. C. House, James F. Crew, A. R. White, Robert Crawford, C. A. Whaley, J. H. Mecaslin, James Lynch, S. B. Robson and Thomas Kile.

On the 2d of January, 1861, the election to send delegates to the Georgia state convention to take into consideration Federal relations, or to determine whether Georgia should follow South Carolina's secession example, occurred, and Atlanta elected a full secession delegation. The vote stood: For secession, Luther J. Glenn, 950; James F. Alexander, 950; Joseph P. Logan, 956; for co-operation, James M. Calhoun, 503; G. W. Adair, 485; T.

Moore, 473. In Fulton county the vote was: Glenn, 1,053; Alexander, 1,055; Logan, 1,059; Calhoun, 692; Adair, 672; Moore, 661. The convention was called to be held on the 16th of January.


As a characteristic editorial expression of the day, the following is taken from the Atlanta Intelligencer of January 3d:

"Telegraphic news published this morning proves beyond doubt that the administration at Washington is crowded by Northern influence. All the Southern members of the cabinet should resign rather than be *particeps criminis* in the coercion of the South, a course the administration seems determined upon. It is the duty of the Cotton States to secede at once, so as to make coercion impossible. Mr. Lincoln, through the Springfield Journal, said: 'The treason of secession must be put down, if it costs millions of lives.' This is tall talk, and experienced as he has been in splitting logs, he will find the *Palmetto* and the *Quercus Australis* of the Cotton States rather stiff, should he come in contact with them, which he will attempt—in a horn."

On January 3d, 1861, Atlanta's crack military company, the Grays, chose its officers for the ensuing year, as follows: Captain, A. M. Wallace; first lieutenant, Dr. Capers; second lieutenant, S. W. Jones; third lieutenant, Dr. B. M. Smith; fourth lieutenant, H. H. Witt; first sergeant, Frank Baker; second sergeant, J. M. Smith; third sergeant, J. R. Wells; fourth sergeant, J. F. Albert; first corporal, Mr. Thomas; second corporal, J. Adair; quartermaster, James A. Barnes; surgeon, Dr. Thomas.

On the 3d day of January one of the first ward companies was organized—the "Georgia Volunteers." It was the boast of its members, mature men for the most part, that there was not a "feather-bed soldier" in the company. The officers of this organization were: W. W. Boyd, captain; F. M. Johnson, first lieutenant; F. M. Stovall, second lieutenant; William Mackie, third lieutenant; J. W. Brown, first sergeant; W. T. Mead, second sergeant; L. W. DeTaum, third sergeant; W. H. Joiner, fourth sergeant; J. M. Willis, first corporal; W. Shepard, second corporal; A. J. Kennedy, third corporal; Volney Dunning, fourth corporal; treasurer, J. G. Foreacre; recording secretary, L. C. Smith; financial secretary, F. H. Nimms; surgeon, Dr. Roach.





Joseph Payne Logan, M. D.

Another military company was organized on the 25th of January, with the following officers: Captain, G. W. Lee; first lieutenant, Jabez R. Rhodes; second lieutenant, G. W. Anderson; ensign, John A. Foreacre.

When Jefferson Davis arrived in Atlanta on the 16th of February, en route from Washington to Montgomery, Ala., to take the oath of office as president of the Southern Confederacy, he was given a royal ovation by the people of many counties journeying to Atlanta to see Atlanta's distinguished guest. A salute of seven guns was fired by the Atlanta Grays as the president's train rolled into the depot, and he was met and escorted to the Trout House by a large committee of citizens, the mayor and common council, the local military and fraternal organizations, and the five companies. A public reception was given at the hotel, at which, responding to the mayor's address of welcome, Mr. Davis made quite a pretentious speech, in which he set forth the reasons for secession in strong terms and paid a glowing tribute to the bravery and patriotism of the Southern people, soon to be tried in the red crucible of war. He said the North was responsible for the destruction of the Federal Union, as it had deliberately and faithlessly subverted the constitution. The reception committee of the occasion, which was said to be the most splendid in Atlanta's history, was composed of Congressman L. J. Gartrell, Dr. Joseph P. Logan, Col. J. W. Duncan, Dr. B. M. Smith and Capt. A. M. Wallace. The president departed in an elegant private car furnished for his use free by the Atlanta and West Point railroad.

A grand military display was made in the city on the occasion of Washington's birthday. The various military organizations paraded the streets and repaired to the female college to listen to patriotic addresses and exercises by the pupils. The organizations participating were: Gate City Guards, Capt. G. H. Thompson; Atlanta Grays, Capt. A. M. Wallace; Fulton Dragoons, Capt. James Williams; Atlanta Cadets, Capt. W. P. Chisholm; Fulton Blues, Capt. J. H. Purtell.

On the 27th of February another company was organized, known as Davis' Infantry. The officers were: Captain, Wilson J. Ballard; lieutenants, first, Joseph Thompson; second, Albert

Howell; third, John Edgar Thompson; fourth, James H. Mead; sergeants, first, M. O. Markham; second, W. F. Combs; third, A. C. McPherson; fourth, E. B. Lovejoy; fifth, A. N. Salmon; corporals, first, William Clayton; second, Charles Maddox; third, J. B. Simms; fourth, L. W. Wyley; quartermaster, R. E. Cowart; surgeon, Dr. L. S. Mead; secretary and treasurer, T. E. Walker.

Alexander H. Stephens, vice-president of the Southern Confederacy, passed through Atlanta en route from Montgomery to Savannah on March 12th, and the citizens paid him high honors. He was always a favorite in Atlanta. There was a military parade, as on the occasion of President Davis's visit the previous month, and a committee of fifteen prominent Atlantans met him at the train to tender him the hospitality of the city. Captain A. M. Wallace was the chief marshal of the military pageant. Mr. Stephens was entertained at the Atlanta Hotel, where he made a speech of surpassing eloquence and breadth of statesmanship, in which he declared that within ten days Fort Sumter would have surrendered. He expressed the belief that the South would be able to compel the recognition of her independence without recourse to arms, but advised his hearers to prepare for war, as by so doing peace would be doubly assured. At the reception which followed, thousands of enthusiastic Georgians grasped the frail hand of the little statesman and expressed their hearty sympathy with the cause he represented.

On the 1st of April, 1861, the Gate City Guards left for Pensacola, Fla., where they were ordered on guard duty. Before marching to the depot the company, escorted by the other military organizations of the city, marched to the Franklin Printing House, where General Rice, of that institution, on behalf of the ladies of Atlanta, presented the departing soldiers with a beautiful stand of Confederate colors. The guards, through Captain Ezzard, presented Miss Hanleiter, the leader of the group of ladies who made the flag, with a fine gold watch, suitably engraved. A number of speeches were made, and business was suspended while the ceremony was in progress and the gallant guards marched to the depot. The officers of the departing company were: Captain, William L. Ezzard; first lieutenant, H. M. Wyley; second lieutenant, A. Leyden. The privates numbered seventy strong.



General L. J. Gartrell

Distinguished as one of the greatest criminal  
lawyers at the Georgia Bar

As early as April 17th, of that year, the patriotic ladies of Atlanta organized an aid society for the purpose of preparing lint and bandages for the volunteers in the defenses of Pensacola.

When the news of the secession of Virginia on April 18th reached Atlanta, the citizens went wild with joy. It was believed that the example of the grand Old Dominion would now be speedily followed by every slave-holding state. The church bells were rung, steam whistles blown, and the people cheered themselves hoarse. The Atlanta Grays fired a salute of eight guns, significant of the number of seceding states. The bands played, military paraded, speeches were made, and at night there were fireworks and a torchlight procession two miles long.

New companies were organized in rapid succession. The Confederate Volunteers were ready to receive their arms and equipments on April 24, 1861. The officers were: Captain, L. J. Gartrell; first lieutenant, G. J. Foreacre; second lieutenant, Perino Brown; third lieutenant, H. H. Witt; first sergeant R. K. Dillard; second sergeant, W. P. Moore; third sergeant, J. C. Hendrix; fourth sergeant, J. R. Loveless; first corporal, P. Gannon; second corporal, D. W. Daniel; third corporal, W. J. Barritt; fourth corporal, J. W. Blair; surgeon, R. J. Massey; secretary and treasurer, L. P. Grant; chaplain, Rev. J. L. Rogers.

On the same day the Stephens Rifles were organized with L. J. Glenn, captain; R. F. Maddox, first lieutenant; Elias Holcomb, second lieutenant; John H. Lovejoy, third lieutenant; C. A. Amoss, first sergeant; A. O. Bacon, second sergeant; E. D. Cheshire, third sergeant; C. S. Morgan, fourth sergeant; R. Y. Jones, fifth sergeant; W. W. Peck, first corporal; Thomas E. Walker second corporal; A. S. Talley, third, corporal; R. C. Robson, fourth corporal; W. P. McDaniel, quartermaster; W. C. Moore, secretary and treasurer; James P. Hambleton, surgeon.

The Silver Grays were organized on April 26, 1861. This company was unique in that its members were all over forty-five years of age, and a number of them were veterans of the Mexican war. The officers of the Silver Grays were: Captain, Hubbard Cozart; first lieutenant, A. G. Ware; second lieutenant, Isaac Mitchell; first sergeant, John Jones. These men were organized as home guards, to aid the municipal authorities in pre-



serving order and to give aid to the soldiers at the front by caring for their families. In an emergency they were expected to defend the city.

The fire companies also tendered their services to the mayor as home-guards, and as soldiers' relief associations. The physicians of the city agreed to give their professional services gratis to the destitute families of soldiers in the field.

There was also a company known as the Safe Guards, which on April 29th elected the following officers: Captain, William Ezzard; first lieutenant, Joseph A. Reeves; second lieutenant, John Glenn; third lieutenant, A. J. Hayes; orderly sergeant, W. G. Gramling.

The German citizens of Atlanta organized a company called the Steuben Yagers, with the following officers: Captain, Maurice L. Lichtenstadt; first lieutenant, George S. Thomas; second lieutenant, Carl F. Barth; third lieutenant, Charles Heinz; surgeon, Dr. Francis Guetebruck.

A volunteer regiment was organized in Atlanta on May 8, 1861, composed of the following companies: Confederate Volunteers; McDonald Guards, Cobb county; Stone Mountain Guards, De Kalb county; Cobb Mountaineers, Cobb county; Confederate Guards, Cobb county; Paulding Volunteers, Paulding county; Roswell Guards, Cobb county; De Kalb Light Infantry, De Kalb county; Coweta Second District Guards, Coweta county; Davis Infantry, Fulton county. Ex-Congressman Gartrell was honored with the colonelcy of the regiment; James F. Cooper was elected lieutenant-colonel; John Dunwoody, major, and Dr. James F. Alexander, surgeon.

The Lewis and Philips Rifles were organized on the 18th of May with S. C. Rose, captain; Jesse D. Gilbert, first lieutenant; J. P. Winder, second lieutenant; W. A. Fuller, third lieutenant; T. D. Wright, first sergeant; H. W. Bropton, second sergeant; J. W. Farmer, third sergeant; J. T. Thompson, fourth sergeant; D. C. Lackman, first corporal; W. D. West, second corporal; W. G. Buckalew, third corporal; A. S. Bridges, fourth corporal; W. W. Durham, surgeon, D. A. Walker, secretary; J. T. Mays, treasurer.

On the 24th of May the Confederate Continentals were organized and elected the following officers: Captain, E. M.



Seago; first lieutenant, C. H. Castello; second lieutenant, R. S. Pomeroy; third lieutenant, W. L. Abbott; orderly sergeant, Thomas Vigis.

The Atlanta Rifles were organized on the same day as the foregoing company. Their captain was John Collier; first lieutenant, C. A. Pitts; second lieutenant, Er Lawshe; third lieutenant, J. N. Simons; orderly sergeant, A. G. Thomas; secretary, Moses Cole; treasurer, J. S. Willmer; surgeon, Dr. O'Keefe.

The Mechanics Rifles, designed for service as sappers and miners, were organized with the following officers: Captain, C. H. Castello; first lieutenant, J. M. Tay; second lieutenant, James Noble, Jr.; third lieutenant, William Keller; first sergeant, Thomas Vigis; secretary, N. Center; treasurer, T. M. Toy. This company was 100 strong.

The Confederate Guards was another Atlanta organization organized late in the spring of 1861. Its officers were: Captain, John H. Baker; first lieutenant, John H. Mitchell; second lieutenant, E. L. Connally; third lieutenant, J. C. Steger. Besides these there were ten non-commissioned officers and a full hundred privates.

The Fulton True Blues were organized on October 7th, 1861, for coast defense. The officers chosen were: Captain, Albert Howell; first lieutenant, Joseph Thompson, Jr.; second lieutenant, Warren Jourdan; third lieutenant, R. A. Fife; orderly sergeant, J. C. Spencer; second sergeant, C. Brumley; third sergeant, J. A. Baker; fourth sergeant, J. M. Hunnicutt.

On the 19th of the same month the Whitaker Volunteers tendered their services to the Confederacy, with the following officers in command: Captain, M. W. Rasbury; first lieutenant, W. T. Albert; second lieutenant, M. M. Bently; third lieutenant, James F. Christian; first sergeant, James E. Blackstock; second sergeant, W. P. Garrard; third sergeant, George Warren; fourth sergeant, D. C. Coker. On the 28th of October the Whitaker Volunteers left for the front, and were presented with a beautiful stand of colors by Judge Jared I. Whitaker, in whose honor the company name was taken, on behalf of his wife.

The women of Atlanta stopped at no sacrifice to contribute to the comfort of the brave men at the front. The leading women's relief organization was known as "The Atlanta Ama-

teurs," which was organized May 28, 1861, for the purpose of raising funds for the soldiers and their families, by means of entertainments, concerts, etc. The little group of charter members consisted of Mrs. W. T. Farrar, Mrs. W. A. Haynes, and Misses W. F. Grambling, Julia Whitney, M. F. Whitney, R. J. Hale, S. A. Boyd, E. C. Goudy and Nash. There were eighteen male members of the company, as follows: President, S. H. B. Oatman; superintendent, W. T. Farrar; treasurer, S. B. Sherwood; secretary, C. P. Haynes; manager, W. H. Barnes. The Amateurs maintained their organization throughout the war and were the means of hundreds of dollars being sent to the Atlanta volunteers in the field.

The Volunteer Relief Association was organized on May 1, 1861, and did good work for the cause until fall, when the Inferior Court of Fulton county assumed the duty of providing for the needs of soldiers' families. Sidney Root was president of this association, and J. H. Mecalvin, secretary. The organization raised \$2,370 during the few months of its existence.

On June 1, 1862, Atlanta was made a military post, with Major Leyden in command. By the middle of that summer there were a number of Confederate hospitals in the city—the Empire Hospital, Heery Hospital, Gate City, City Hotel, Alexander, Concert Hall, Wilson's, Denny, Medical College, and Jane's and Hayden's. On the 1st of July a provost-guard of fifty men was organized by Provost-Marshal Foreacre, the members of the guard being exempt from conscription. By this time a bounty of \$50 was paid per capita to a new regiment organized in Fulton county, showing that eligible men were scarce. The regiment was called the Fulton County Dragoons. A number of citizens, some of them thrifty and prominent, paid handsome prices for substitutes.

Next Atlanta was placed under martial law, as is shown by the following orders:

*Special Order*

Headquarters Department No. 2.

No. 14.

Chattanooga, Aug. 11, 1862.

Martial law is hereby established within the corporate limits and environs of Atlanta, Georgia.

By command of

GEORGE G. GARNER, A. A. G.

GENERAL BRAGG.

Atlanta, Ga., Aug. 12, 1862.

Martial law having been declared over Atlanta and its environs, I do hereby publish the following special order for the information of hotel and boarding-house keepers:

*Special Order.* No hotel or boarding-house keeper or citizen within the lines of this city or its environs, will be permitted to receive any traveler or visitor until the visitor or traveler shall produce a permit, which permit shall immediately be delivered by the hotel or boarding-house keeper or citizen to the provost-marshal. The traveler or visitor shall thereupon call upon the provost-marshal and have the permit vised by him, or a new permit granted to remain in or leave the city; and no hotel or boarding-house keeper or citizen shall permit any traveler or visitor to take away any package without having a permit vised by the provost-marshal, or his permit to leave the city. Each hotel or boarding-house keeper or citizen receiving travelers or visitors shall return daily at 8 a. m. the names of such travelers or visitors received by them, or the permit before named to the provost-marshal.

G. W. LEE, Commanding Post and Provost-Marshal.

Headquarters Department No. 2.

Chattanooga, Tenn., Aug. 16, 1862.

J. M. Calhoun, Atlanta, Ga.:

Sir: Martial law having been declared at Atlanta, Ga., you are hereby appointed civil governor for the same, and the following officers are appointed your aids: Isaac Bartlett, S. B. Oatman, James R. Crew, James E. Williams, E. R. Sasseen, James Kelly, William Barnes, John H. Flynn, E. W. Hunnicutt, and F. D. Thurman.

The officers of the army are requested to aid Colonel Calhoun in the discharge of his duties.

GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG.

J. R. Singleton, Brigadier and Inspector-General.

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Headquarters, Atlanta, Ga., September 9, 1862.

For the information of all concerned, the following special order from the war department is published.

G. W. LEE, Commanding Post and Pro.-Mar.

*Special Orders.* Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office,  
No. 206. Richmond, Va., Sep. 3, 1862.

XXII. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in Atlanta and for five miles around its corporate limits.

JOHN WITHERS, A. A. G.

By command of the Secretary of War.

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Atlanta, Ga., Sep. 9, 1862.

From the date of this order no livery stable keeper or other person will be permitted to hire a horse or horses or vehicles of any kind whatever to any negro slave or free person of color in this city or its environs, without a permit from the owner of such slave or the guardian of such free person of color, which order shall state the business they are going on, and the order shall be approved at these headquarters.

G. W. LEE.

At the beginning of 1863 the conscription officers were active in Atlanta, and the able-bodied citizen who was able to keep out of the army was "smooth," as the expression goes. On the 21st of July, 1863, John M. C. Reed, commanding the Fulton county militia, issued a call for volunteers from which this paragraph is taken:

"In obedience to instructions received from the commander-in-chief, all white men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five who are now residents of this county, are hereby commanded to appear at the city hall parade ground on Tuesday, the 4th of August, by 11 o'clock a. m., to complete the number of troops which we are called upon to raise in order to fill the requisition made upon the state by the secretary of war for 8,000 men for local defense. This county is required to furnish 500 men, rank and file."

It was necessary to draft 667 men in Atlanta and Fulton county to make up the quotas of the local military organizations by the end of 1863.

The Georgia Railroad Guards were organized in Atlanta September 28, 1863. Its commissioned officers were: Captain, James H. Porter; first lieutenant, A. M. Eddleman; second lieutenant, J. C. Armstead; third lieutenant, W. C. Anderson.

On September 6th the Ordnance Guards were organized with C. D. Findley, captain; M. B. Freeman, first lieutenant; Walter

Paine, second lieutenant; R. C. Massenbury, third lieutenant. This company, 115 strong, was made up of mere boys, not one of whom was over eighteen years old.

The Independent State Road Guards were organized August 3, 1863, with the following commissioned officers: Captain, William A. Fuller; first lieutenant, John P. Mays; second lieutenant, A. S. Bridges; third lieutenant, R. C. Buchanan.

The following chapter, taken entire from Wallace Putnam Reed's history of Atlanta, to which the compiler of this history is indebted for much of his material, describes one of the most thrilling incidents preceding the Atlanta campaign, and has a direct bearing on local events. The subsequent chapters of this volume embrace a thorough and authentic narrative of Sherman's advance to and investment and capture of Atlanta.

## CHAPTER XVII

### ANDREWS'S RAILROAD RAID

There is no more thrilling story connected with the civil war than Andrews's Railroad Raid into Georgia, in 1862. This story is condensed from a story written by the Rev. William Pittenger, one of the participants in the raid. This work is entitled "Daring and Suffering," and is modestly, conscientiously and well written.

In order to clearly understand this remarkable story, it is necessary to take a cursory view of the general condition of military affairs North and South immediately preceding this episode, and to gain some knowledge of the two principal characters in the expedition, Rev. William Pittenger and James J. Andrews.

General McClellan in the East with a large army was thought to be ready to advance on Richmond. General Grant, in February, 1862, had captured Fort Donelson, opening up the way to Nashville, which soon afterward fell into the hands of the Federal army. General Mitchell, relieved from the immediate supervision of General Buell, took his position at Shelbyville, Tenn., where he was planning a movement which he expected would place him in possession of Chattanooga, then the most vital strategic point in that region. The capture of Fort Donelson had driven all the Confederate troops out of Kentucky, and they had all been concentrated by General A. S. Johnston in the immediate vicinity of Corinth, Miss.

The military conditions at the beginning of April, 1862, are thus concisely summed up by Mr. Pittenger, in the work above referred to:

"The main rebel armies—those of Mississippi and Virginia—were united by a chain of railroads running from Memphis through Huntsville, Chattanooga, Knoxville and Lynchburg to Richmond; and this constituted their strong line of defense.



They had indeed no other railroad communication except a very circuitous and precarious one along the sea coast. At Chattanooga this direct line was intersected almost at right angles by another extending from Nashville to Atlanta, and from there to all points of the South. It was the first object of the Union generals to break this line, and thus to isolate the rebel armies and render their defeat easy in detail."

The object of the expedition, of which a brief narrative is here presented, was to sever this chain of railroad communication between the main two Confederate armies, that of North Virginia and that of the Mississippi. A short biographical sketch of the two leading characters in this most daring expedition is here inserted.

The Rev. William Pittenger was born January 31, 1840, near Knoxville, Jefferson county, O. In 1852, his father, Thomas Pittenger, removed to a farm which he had recently purchased. In ten years from that time by dint of industry and close economy he made the last payment on his little farm. During those ten years William Pittenger grew up a strong and active young man, fond of all kinds of rough and boisterous games. His vision was, however, defective, so much so that he could not distinguish the letters of his book at a distance of more than three inches from his face. He never attempted to distinguish persons by their faces, but only by the sound of their voices.

At the age of fifteen he purchased spectacles, which opened up to him a new world. With the naked eye he could see stars of not less than the third magnitude, but with his new spectacles the magnificence of the starry heavens was revealed. He soon longed for the means to see more of the starry heavens; but having no money, and telescopes being expensive, it was necessary for him to work for the means to gratify his desires. Upon applying for the position of district school teacher, he was met by a decided repulse, on account of his near-sightedness, the board of examiners of Jefferson county thinking him too near-sighted to manage a school filled with unruly children. He was then not quite sixteen, and a few months later when he had become accustomed to his spectacles he made another attempt, and was this time successful in obtaining certifi-

cates to teach. Almost the first thing done with the money thus earned was the purchase of a telescope, or rather the materials out of which an impromptu telescope was constructed. This telescope was of great power, showing clearly all the objects commonly described in astronomical works. But Mr. Pittenger required nearly twice as much instrumental power as those who had good eyes, and was thus prevented from becoming a professional astronomer.

Two years later Mr. Pittenger was engaged in teaching a private school near Ravenna, O. Although this was much pleasanter than teaching miscellaneous public schools and indicated that the life of the educator might be made enjoyable, yet he soon gave it up for journalism, uniting with Alexander Clark, another Jefferson county school teacher, in the publication of the "School-day Visitor," Cleveland, O. This periodical, although fairly successful, was afterward absorbed in the *Scribner's St. Nicholas*.

Mr. Pittenger then became a teacher in Illinois, and afterward returned to Ohio, and there made some attempts to establish himself in the business of a photographer; but lacking the necessary capital he again entered the field of the pedagogue. He would have voted for Mr. Lincoln for president in 1860, had he been old enough to do so, but as it was he contented himself with exerting himself to the extent of his ability to secure his election. When it was predicted that in case Mr. Lincoln was elected there would be war between the North and South, he did not deny such an event might occur, but insisted that the war, should one come, would be short, that the abolition of slavery would be the result, and expressed a willingness to enlist in the Union army. His father readily gave his consent to his son becoming a soldier, because he did not believe there would be a war, and if there was one he was satisfied that young William would not be received as a soldier on account of his defective vision. Mr. Pittenger was reading law under engagement with a legal firm at Steubenville, O., when Ft. Sumter was fired upon, and at once secured his release from his contract, and enlisted in the Union army for three months. His company was sent to Washington, and although the company's time was about to expire, it was sent to the front

when the Bull Run movement was made. Immediately afterward he re-enlisted in the Second Regiment of the Ohio Volunteers, which was attached to the Western Army as a part of General O. M. Mitchell's division, which, early in April, 1862, was at Shelbyville, Tenn.

This brings this story down to the first attempt to carry out the design of capturing a locomotive on the Southern railroad, and it is now necessary to briefly sketch the career of James J. Andrews. Of him it is said that had he lived he could scarcely have failed to have made his mark upon the history of his times. Very little is known of his early history, but two years before the breaking out of the war he made his appearance at Flemingsburg, in northeastern Kentucky. He said he had come from western Virginia, and that he was looking for a place to "locate." Seeing the name "Andrews" on a store sign, he inquired if there were many persons of that name in town. Learning that there was a goodly number of that name among the people, he said he thought he would make his home there for a while at least. At first he tried to find a situation as a teacher, but being unsuccessful in this, he engaged in house and ornamental painting. His appearance and manner were prepossessing. He was a fine singer. He taught singing classes evenings and became a general favorite among the people of the town.

Upon the breaking out of the war, Kentucky tried the experiment of keeping out of the struggle by assuming a position of armed neutrality, that is by enrolling a large number of men as a State guard, not to be called into active service unless the sacred soil of the State should be invaded either by the Federal or Confederate forces, and in either case the State guard should be used to repel the invaders. Andrews joined the Union cause, and as the excitement put a stop to house and ornamental painting, he became a clerk in a hotel. Soon he made a trip to Louisville, and upon his return to the little town of Flemingsburg he said he had been appointed United States provost-marshal, and proceeded to perform the duties of that office.

Toward the close of March, 1862, Andrews had a consultation with General Buell, in which he proposed to conduct a small party of men, disguised as Southerners, as far south as Atlanta,

where they would meet a friend of his who was running a locomotive on the State railroad. They would take passage on this train and when a certain point was reached they would seize the locomotive, cut the telegraph wires behind them, and then steam back, burning the principal bridges in their rear, and thus for a time sever the communications of the Confederates at Chattanooga and their comrades further south. Eight men were found willing to volunteer in this scheme of Andrews's, but nothing came of the raid, because they failed to find the train which they were to seize. They all returned safely, however, in a few days.

Before many weeks he let it be understood that his views had undergone a change, and at once went to Nashville, where he became a great favorite with the leading Confederate officers. He made a proposition of entering into the business of getting from the Union lines such articles as the Confederate service stood most in need, especially quinine. With this object in view he formed a kind of partnership with a wealthy merchant in Nashville, who furnished him with a large sum of money for the purpose. As a "blockade runner" he was recognized and welcomed at all Confederate posts. But it is now quite certain that all this time he was in the service of the federal officers. On one occasion he visited Fort Donelson, and gaining a knowledge of the strength of the defense, and making an accurate map of the works, rode sixty miles in one night to carry the information to General Buell.

All of these eight men were from the regiment in General Mitchell's division to which Mr. Pittenger belonged, and instead of going to Nashville, Andrews went to Shelbyville, where Pittenger was, and laid before him a scheme which was far more wide-reaching in its character. This conference occurred at General Mitchell's tent on the night of April 6, 1863; neither of the parties was aware, however, that this night was to be so famous. Generals Johnston and Beauregard had made their bold dash against General Grant's position at Pittsburgh Landing, and in order to interrupt the communications of the Confederate armies in their rear, the plan was laid as an expedition, the details of which had not been made fully known. But twenty-four men, carefully picked out, were to be asked to volunteer for a secret

expedition of much more than ordinary importance and danger. Pittenger had in some way formed a conjecture as to the reason for the detailing of the eight men from his regiment, who had previously gone out with Andrews, and had special reasons for wishing to be one of the party, should a similar expedition ever be set on foot. He thus states what those reasons were:

"My position in Company G—James F. Sarratt, Captain—was then that of first corporal, and I was looking anxiously for promotion to the next grade of non-commissioned officers—that of sergeant. To a civilian these petty grades seem utterly unimportant and undistinguishable, but they are not so to the soldier. On many a lonely guard line and dark night on picket they make all the difference between being commanded and commanding. A sergeant had died, and his place would naturally become mine unless some one below me was considered more meritorious, in which case the captain had the authority to carry him, whether a lower corporal or a private, over my head to the vacant serjeantcy.

"Surles, one of the missing men, happened to be second corporal—a splendid soldier in every respect, competent to fill any position in the company, and a great friend to the captain. I had heard that he might be preferred to me, if for no other reason than because I was near-sighted. Now some of the members of my army mess said: 'Pittenger, when these men come back with feathers in their caps, the captain will be sure to make Surles a sergeant.' At the first opportunity I called Captain Sarratt aside, and told him what I had heard and my own fears. He assured me, somewhat impatiently, that my rights should be cared for, and added: 'Pittenger, this is a very little matter of yours. I only wish the men were back in the camp again.' 'But where are they?' I asked, 'and when will they be back? I would like to know something about it, especially for Mills's sake.' 'I am not permitted to tell anything,' he responded. 'I don't know when they will be back myself; but I know that till they do come I can't sleep much.'

"The look of weariness on his face smote my heart, and in view of such anxiety my errand looked utterly contemptible. But my own uneasiness in another direction was greatly increased, and



when I left him with sincere apologies, it was with the resolve to find out where those men were. Captain David Mitchell, of Company D, was an intimate friend of mine and a distant relative of our commander. His company had supplied one of the missing adventurers, my cousin, B. F. Mills, who had been my messmate during the three months' service terminating with the battle of Bull Run. It was especially for his sake that I felt such solicitude for the missing men; and this, even more than my own interest, had moved me to speak with Captain Sarratt. I resolved to make an attempt on Mitchell, with stronger hopes of success."

These events occurred some days before the conference between Andrews and General Mitchell, at which the new raid was concerted. The result of all was that Pittenger received a promise that if any new men were sent within the enemy's lines, he should be the first one called on. On the night of Monday, April 7th, orders were sent to the colonels of the three Ohio regiments to have a man selected from each company, "for special and hazardous service," the men to have the option of declining if they saw fit. All of those engaged in the first raid had now returned to camp, but none of them would volunteer for the second raid. A week was spent in making all the arrangements necessary for fitting out the twenty-four men for their expedition. Besides Andrews and Pittenger there are two who require special mention. These were Wilson W. Brown and William Knight, both of whom were fully competent to act as engineers when they should have seized upon a locomotive, which was the first actual measure to be attempted upon arriving at the scene of operation. Andrews appointed a place at some distance from the camp as a rendezvous at nightfall, in order that he might give the men some necessary instructions. Andrews is thus described by Pittenger:

"Andrews was now in the prime of manhood, being about thirty-three years of age, six feet in height, a little stooped when not excited, weight about one hundred and ninety pounds, with strong and regular features, very clear complexion, an eye dark grey and penetrating, very abundant black hair, and a fine long silken beard, slightly waved. He gave to everyone the impression of gentleness and strength. His voice was very soft and musical, almost effeminate, never strong, yet with distinctness and firmness of tone which made it well suit the men."



At the rendezvous Andrews stated the object of the expedition, of which the men had been informed only in general terms. He told them if they were detected by the enemy while in disguise, they would probably be massacred at once, or be hung as spies, and if any of them wished to withdraw, he was at perfect liberty to return to camp. Then, in a quiet conversational tone, he proceeded to give his instructions, which Mr. Pittenger quotes as follows:

"You will break up into small squads of two, three or four, and travel east into the Cumberland Mountains, then south to the Tennessee River. You can cross the river and take passage on the cars at Shell Mound, or some station between that and Chattanooga, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. You must be at Chattanooga not later than Thursday afternoon, and reach Marietta the same evening, ready to take passage on the train the next morning. I will be there with you or before you, and will then tell you what to do.

"The road is long and difficult, and you will have only three days and nights to reach Marietta. I will give you plenty of money, and you may hire conveyances whenever safe and convenient. I will ride along the same road that you are to travel—sometimes behind and sometimes before—will give you any assistance in my power. If you should be arrested, I may have influence to secure your release; but depend on yourselves, and be watchful and prudent. Do not recognize me unless sure that we are alone.

"If you are asked who you are, and why you are going south, the most plausible thing to say will be that you are Kentuckians, and that you are escaping from the rule of the Yankees, and that you expect to join some Southern regiment. Say just as little as will carry you through, and always have some reason for not joining just then. After you get into the mountains you will be on the track of the Kentuckians who travel south, and will seem to be coming from there rather than from the Union Army; so you need not have much trouble.

"If you are completely cornered, and they will not believe your stories, don't hesitate to enlist. It will be far better to serve a little while with the rebels than to run the risk of discovering our

plans by holding out. You can probably get away from them some dark night on picket. You are fully authorized to take any course that seems best. There will not be the least trouble about your being allowed to join their army; the difficulty is to keep out of the Southern army, not to get into it. Stick to whatever story you tell; and so long as they do not get any proof that you are Union soldiers, they will be ready to hurry you into service, even if they don't believe a word you say, as the best way of disposing of you."

Pittenger did not apprehend much difficulty in getting as far as they wished into the Southern country; the difficulty he apprehended was to their getting out of it. He asked whether, after they had captured the train and had used it in burning the bridges, they were to be abandoned, and try to steal North as they were now stealing toward the South. To this question Andrews gave the explicit answer: "No, General Mitchell starts South in the morning for a forced march with all his energy, and he will surprise and capture Huntsville on Friday, the very day we are to capture the train, so that when we get back to that point we shall find him ready to receive us. If we cannot quite reach him, we will leave the trains close to our lines and dash through in a body." Other questions were asked and answered. Supposing they should fail to run the captured train through Chattanooga, were they to cling together, etc. Andrews answered emphatically: "When we once meet in Marietta we will stay together, and either come through in a body or die together." The company was then told off into squads to proceed on their journey, after which Andrews addressed to them the following parting words: "Boys, we are entering into a very hazardous expedition, but it will be a glorious one in its results, and we will give the enemy the most deadly blow he has yet received. What a grand thing it will be to run through the South, leaving the bridges burning, and the foe helpless in our hands! If we burn these bridges, Mitchell will capture Chattanooga the very next day, and all East Tennessee will be open before him. But we must be prompt, for if he gets to Huntsville before us, the road will be so crowded with reinforcements moving against him that our task will be much harder. But if we have the bridges down first, they can send no force

against him, and he will have everything his own way. The last train leaves Chattanooga at five in the afternoon. Be sure and catch it not later than Thursday, and I will be either on it, or on an earlier one. Good-bye."

It now began to rain in torrents. The squads filed off one after another, with a considerable interval between them, so that no two squads should be very near each other until they should all come together at Marietta. Pittenger's squad consisted of four, and as they plodded along the railroads through the rain and darkness, he turned around, and, by the aid of a vivid flash of lightning, caught a momentary glimpse of Andrews and three others looking after them. In an instant all was darkness, he turned around again, and they groped their way along the railroad as best they could.

For some time they met with no serious difficulty. To all they encountered they told the story which had been agreed upon—that they were Kentuckians going southward for the purpose of joining the Confederate army as soon as they should fall in with a regiment the appearance of which they liked. They started on Monday night. By noon on Thursday they reached the little town of Jasper, where they heard the first tidings of the battle of Shiloh. According to the reports current at Jasper it was a great Confederate victory, and the combined armies of Grant and Buell had been totally destroyed. One countryman averred that five hundred gunboats had been sunk. Pittenger expressed some doubts as to whether the Yankees had so many gunboats as five hundred, but the countryman's faith remained unshaken. Another bit of news had been picked up—that the Merrimac had steamed out of Norfolk and engaged the Monitor, with no decided result at first, but had at length thrown out her grappling irons, caught the Monitor and dragged her ashore, where she lay of course an easy prey—and now that the Confederates had the two best gunboats afloat they could easily raise the blockade and burn the northern cities one after another.

As they approached Chattanooga, squad after squad came in sight of each other, but they met as perfect strangers. Andrews was encountered by one party after another, but no sign of recognition was exchanged. On account of various causes of delay

they did not reach Marietta on Thursday as had been agreed upon, but on Friday. The seizure of the train had been fixed for that day, but Andrews postponed it until Saturday, a day which was fraught with serious consequences. General Mitchell was on time with his movement on Huntsville on Friday, but the bridges behind him were not burned, and the attempt on Chattanooga had to be postponed or abandoned.

Saturday morning, April 12, came. Before the train for Chattanooga started for Marietta all the members of the party, now twenty-two in number, were collected in Andrews's room in the hotel to receive a last word of direction. Big Shanty, the next station, was the spot where the train, by which they were to proceed, was to be seized, and the work was to begin. The train stopped for breakfast, and there was no telegraph office there. Andrews's directions were brief and to the point. "When the train stops for breakfast, keep your places until I tell you to go. Get seats near each other in the same car, and say nothing about the matter on the way up. If anything unexpected occurs look to me for a word. You and you," designating three engineers and a fireman, "will go with me on the engine; all of the rest will go on the left of the train forward of where it is uncoupled, and climb on the cars, in the best places you can, when the order is given. If anybody interferes with you shoot him; but don't fire until it is necessary."

When the train came up it was found to consist of the locomotive and several close box-cars, into which all the raiders made haste to crowd themselves, each armed with his revolver for instant use; for should the train happen to be guarded while the passengers were at breakfast, the guard must be overpowered.

"Twenty minutes for breakfast," shouted the conductor, as Big Shanty was reached. Conductor, engineer, fireman and most of the passengers made a rush for the long shed, which served as an eating room, and from which the station (now called Kenesaw) took its name. No guard was left for the train, but a large body of Confederate soldiers, three or four regiments, it seemed, were encamped here, and the sentries were pacing to and fro around the station. For some time, short in reality, but long apparently, Andrews, who was seated near

the door, made no signal. At last he quietly arose and left the car, followed closely by one of the engineers belonging to his party. The two walked slowly to the locomotive which bore the name of "General." No one was within. Andrews gave a slight nod to his companion, saying, "Uncouple here and wait for me." He then went back to the box-car and opened the door, saying softly, "Come on boys, it's time to go now." All arose and followed him.

The movement attracted no attention from the few other passengers who remained in the car. Knight, the engineer who accompanied Andrews forward, sprang upon the locomotive, cut the bell-rope, and stood with his hand on the throttle-valve. Andrews stood for a moment or two watching until all his men were in one of the two cars which still remained attached to the locomotive. Two other engineers and a fireman mounted the engine, followed by Andrews, who nodded to Knight. The steam was let on and the engine dashed up the road. Not a shot by the soldiers, who did not recover their guns from their amazement until the short train was beyond the range of their guns.

The train had scarcely gone a mile, however, when the speed began to slacken, and soon it came to a full stop. When the train had been halted at Big Shanty, the dampers of the engine furnace had been closed, and they had not been opened when the start was made, hence the fire was soon almost out. The engine had been running by the steam stored up in the boilers. Fresh wood and a little oil soon put matters to rights and they were soon under way again, with time enough to obstruct the track in the rear and to cut the telegraph wires. When they were fairly on their way again, Andrews broke out in a joyful shout: "We have got them at such a disadvantage that they cannot harm us or save themselves. When we have passed one more train, we'll have no further hindrance. Then we will put the engine at full speed, burn the bridges after us, dash through Chattanooga, and on to Mitchell at Huntsville. We have the upper hand of the rebels for once." There was indeed, as he well knew, three trains already coming toward him then from Chattanooga. The first of these was a local freight, which might be met at any point this side of Kingston. This was apparently the only obstacle in the way,



for the others were running on time, and he knew just where they should be at any minute, so he could meet and pass them at any given station, if he were far ahead of his own time.

Andrews had calculated that no engine for pursuit could be nearer to Big Shanty than Kingston, thirty miles to the north, or Atlanta, about the same distance to the south. The telegraph wires being cut, the enemy could communicate with Kingston only by sending messages on horseback. This would take three or four hours, by which time he would be far out of reach. They might and doubtless would telegraph back to Atlanta, whence an engine might be started at once; but the raiders would have a start of thirty minutes, forty or fifty miles, which would give them ample time to do their work as they proceeded.

The running time as calculated by Andrews, would be thus: Kingston would be reached in a couple of hours, and by that time, the local freight would have been passed. Then they would put on full steam at Resaca, twenty-four miles distant. The bridge at Resaca would be burned, as well as eleven others which crossed the winding Chickamauga at short distances apart. Then they would dash on to Chattanooga, switch off to the railroad running to Huntsville, between which place and Chattanooga they expected to meet General Mitchell.

For some distance all worked precisely as had been intended. When they came to Etowah station, half way between Big Shanty and Kingston, they saw an engine of which they knew nothing, standing on a side track, which connected with a short road running some five miles to the Etowah Iron Works. This as afterward appeared was the Yona, a locomotive capable of great speed, belonging to the proprietors of the iron works, and used by them in their own business. The smoke issuing from the funnel indicated that she could be set in motion at short notice. The engineer suggested to Andrews the destruction of that engine, but Andrews said, "No, it won't make any difference." But it did make a great difference, for to that engine was owing the capture of the raiders a few hours later.

Half a dozen miles farther on is Cass station, the regular place for taking on wood and water, for which purpose they stopped. The station tender was somewhat surprised to see so



short a train running on the regular time of the mail train with none of the regular hands and no passengers. But Andrews had a plausible story ready to account for this. He said that he had been sent to Atlanta by Beauregard, who was at Corinth in the sore straits of want of ammunition. His order was to press any train, load it with powder, and hurry through with all possible speed. Andrews looked so much like a southern officer and spoke with an air of so much authority, that the suspicions of the station tender were dissipated at once. He then coolly asked for a time schedule of the road, with the remark, "I would send my shirt to Beauregard if he needed it." Subsequently, when asked if his suspicions were not aroused by such an unusual request, he replied, "No, I would as soon have suspected Jefferson Davis himself as a man who talked with the assurance that Andrews did."

Kingston was reached a little ahead of time. The local freight had not yet arrived. Andrews quietly directed the switch tender to shunt him off on a side track until this freight train should have passed. He had then only to repeat his story about Beauregard and his powder, with a wave of his hand toward his closed box car, which, instead of ammunition, was freighted with all the raiders, except the three who were with him on the locomotive. The engineer took advantage of this enforced delay to see that the engine was in perfect order, and that she had a full head of steam on. The men in the box car could only guess what was going on outside.

It was not long before the freight train came down. Andrews spoke coolly to the conductor, repeating the same story about the powder, urging the importance of dispatch and asking him to run a little down the track road so that the powder train might be switched back upon the track. But a moment after he noticed a red flag on the rear car, the signal that another train was close behind. "What does this mean?" he asked. "I am ordered to get the powder train through to Beauregard at the earliest possible moment; and now you are signaling to another train on the track!" The conductor was very sorry, but it could not be helped. Mitchell was moving on Chattanooga by forced marches, there was no force there capable of resisting him, and as they were running every possible train out of Chattanooga, and

he had to put on an extra train to get the rolling stock as well as the goods out of the way. Andrews professed to be perfectly satisfied, but added, "I must be off at the earliest possible moment; do you run a good piece down the road so as to leave room for the extra train to pass." "But what will you do about Mitchell at Huntsville?" asked the conductor. "I don't believe the story," replied Andrews, "Mitchell would not be fool enough to run down there; but if he is, Beauregard will soon sweep him out of the road. At any rate I have my orders."

But when the extra train came in it also had a red flag flying at the rear. The conductor explained that the train, as it was made up, was found to be too heavy for one engine, so that it had to be divided, and the last section would be here presently. Andrews gave whispered instructions to Knight, who sauntered down to the box car, against which he leaned without turning his face toward it. "Boys," he said in a low voice, "we have to wait for a train that is a little behind time, and the folks around here are getting mighty uneasy and suspicious. Be ready to jump out if you are called, and let them have it hot and fast."

All these delays consumed a little more than an hour. Then this additional train came in. The powder train was switched upon its proper track and was soon upon its way. It was now three hours and five minutes since they had seized the train at Big Shanty, only thirty miles distant, but at last the road was clear for them. "Push her, boys, push," said Andrews. The next station was Adairsville, ten miles distant. Here they halted for a few moments to take on fuel, to cut the telegraph wires, and to tear up a few rails, so as to delay any pursuer. Onward they went past Calhoun to Resaca, where the Oostonaula was crossed by a long bridge which, if destroyed, would effectually bar the road behind them. This was especially necessary, for it had been almost certain for some little time that they were pursued, and from the increasing loudness of the whistle it was clear that the pursuers were gaining upon them. Who the pursuers were and whence they came may now be told, although Andrews did not then know.

When the halt at Big Shanty was made, William A. Fuller, the Confederate conductor of the train, Mr. Cain, the engineer,

and Anthony Murphy, the foreman of the railroad shops, seated themselves near each other at the table. Before they began to eat, the noise of escaping steam and the whir of moving wheels on the track was heard, accompanied by an outcry from the camp guards. The guards had not noticed the eighteen men who entered the box car—they saw only the four men who had climbed upon the locomotive. Fuller had been ordered to see that no conscripts should get away from this camp on the train. He jumped instantly to the conclusion that it was a party of these conscripts who had run off with his engine. "Some of these men," he said, "one of whom happened to know enough about an engine to pull the throttle open, have jumped on my train to get out of the camp, and as soon as they are outside they will leave the engine and run into the mountains. I must follow as fast as possible, and try to get it back before I get very badly out of time." Calling out to Murphy and Cain to come on with him, all three started off at the top of their speed. Fuller was by far the best runner of the three, and all were soon stretched out at some distance apart along the track. Fuller was pretty well blown when he reached Moon's station, two miles from Big Shanty. Here he found a hand car used by some track repairers. He was well known, and taking possession of this hand car, ran it back until he met his friends, who were taken up. It was what they call a "pole car," that is, one propelled by stout poles, instead of by a crank. By hard work they could make seven or eight miles an hour on a level grade, much more on a descending, much less on an ascending grade. The regular running time of the steam trains was then about sixteen miles per hour. A few miles farther on they made an accession of two more men, and were told that the captors were oiling their engine in a manner which showed they understood their work and that they had a long trip in view. If nothing happened the pole car would reach Etowah in about two hours. "Then," said Fuller, "if we can find the old 'Yonah' at the end of the branch, we can take her and run up to Kingston in fifteen minutes more. There are some extra trains on the road to-day that will bother the scoundrels up there and the chances are that we shall overhaul them at Kingston, where we shall get plenty of help."

But just before reaching Etowah they came nearly to grief. The raiders had taken up a rail, and before the pursuers knew anything about it, they found themselves and the pole car lying in a heap beside the track. When they had gotten the car back upon the track they could see the smoke of the 'Yonah' a mile distant. She had not started, and they might get up in time to secure her. They were just in time with not a minute to spare. Here their party was increased by a number of well-armed men. When they reached Kingston they learned that the 'Yonah' had already gone up the road. At Adairsville they found that Andrews had left only a few minutes before. A northward train came up the cross road, drawn by the best engine on the road, named the 'Texas.'

Fuller and Murphy were recognized and sprang aboard, taking the command, and in spite of some obstructions gained upon the foe, of whom they caught sight at Resaca, endeavoring to set fire to the bridge in a drenching rain. But upon sight of their pursuers they set off again.

It was soon clear that the pursuers had the swiftest engine. The only hope of escape lay in placing obstructions on the track so as to prevent its running at a pace as rapid as that they were able to make. There was no time to halt and tear up a rail here and there. The end of the box car was therefore knocked out; the heavy ties which they were using for fuel were brought into this car and pitched on the track, but most of them struck endwise and bounded off. Enough, however, remained to compel the pursuers to proceed with great caution, and every now and then to get off and remove the obstructions. Pittenger says: "Fuller could not run rapidly in the face of such a succession of obstacles. He did the best he could, giving the signal to reverse whenever he saw a tie upon the track, jumping off and removing it and on again, when the engineer would start with a full head of steam, and reduce speed as the engine gathered headway, to such a speed as would enable it to be stopped when another tie was seen. It was fearfully perilous, and the only wonder is that it was not wrecked long before the chase was done."

By using their fuel the quantity was rapidly diminished. But Andrews, who seemed to have made himself familiar with every

mile of the road, knew that they were approaching a wood station, and here they must at all hazards stop long enough to take on fuel. The very last stick was in the furnace when they reached the wood pile. Every man sprang from the train, and worked for very life; but before the tender was half full they heard the noise of the pursuing train. For a few minutes they kept at their work, and even when Andrews had given orders to get on board, Wilson, the fireman, would not obey until he had brought one huge armful more. Wilson says: "We had secured but a partial supply when the chasing train came in sight, loaded with armed soldiers. Our pursuers were worked up to an infuriated pitch of excitement, and rent the air with their screeches and yells when they came in sight of us, like dogs when the quarry is sprung. They opened upon us at long range with musketry. The bullets rattled around us like hail, but fortunately none of us were hit." "But now," says Pittenger, "we had a good head of steam, and with a joyful bound of the engine, as if refreshed from rest, sped on again. We had been careful to so obstruct the track that the enemy was obliged to come to a full halt, and thus give us time to get out of sight. But water was needed for the engine as well as fuel, and the water station was some distance from the wood station. Here we stopped, told the old powder story, and we were not interrupted while taking in water. "Before the tank was full," says Pittenger, "the pursuers came in sight, but, seeing us, ran slowly, and as a party of our men had run back and put some obstructions upon the track, they were obliged to come to a full stop there, thus giving us the time needed. Then we mounted and sped toward Dalton. The engine again was in good running condition, and we rushed rapidly forward, putting frequent obstructions upon the tracks, mostly by dropping ties or sticks of firewood."

Dalton was passed without the pursuers again coming in sight. Not many miles ahead were the Chickamauga bridges. If these, or even one of them, could be burned, the race was won. Fuller understood this as well as did Andrews. "On he pressed," says Pittenger, "yet but for the wetness of the day all of his efforts would have been foiled. Andrews now ordered us to fire our last car while running, the other having been already cut off.



It was easily said, but was much harder to do. The rain fell in torrents and the wood in the tender was drenched. It was by no small degree of effort that the engine fire could be kept at the heat required for fast running. But desperate fingers tore everything combustible loose from the car and smashed it into kindling. Some blazing faggots were stolen from the engine and the fire made to burn. All but one, who was left on the car to watch the fire, crowded on the tender and the locomotive. The steam was gradually shut off that we might come slowly on the bridge, and be able to leave the burning car just at the right place. We came at a full stop at the first Chickamauga bridge, a large and well covered structure. Knowing that a wood station was not far off we added almost the last of our oil, and nearly the last stick of wood to the burning mass. In fact we put life itself in the last throw, and left ourselves in case of failure, hopelessly bankrupt."

The raiders had indeed made their last throw and lost. The smoke of the pursuing engine was close at hand. The enemy had the advantage of being armed with guns, and would be able to fire on the raiders at long range, while they had only revolvers. The coupling pin was withdrawn, and the slowly burning car was detached from the engine. The pursuers dashed into the thick smoke that covered the bridge, and pushed the burning car on to Ringgold, but a short distance ahead, where it was left to smoke and sputter on a side track in the rain. The "General" crept slowly on until within about five miles of Chattanooga. Here the fuel gave out.

"Every combustible scrap," says Pittenger, "had been carefully gathered up and thrown into the engine. Even a large pair of saddlebags, which we had never seen Andrews without from the time of the midnight conference at Marietta, together with his cap and some other pieces of clothing which he did not need for immediate use, had been remorselessly cast into the furnace. Various papers went along, which were probably documents that he feared would compromise himself and others in case of capture.

But the engine was coming to a stop. Andrews gave his last order to the men huddled together in the empty wood box of



the tender: "Jump off, one by one, scatter in the woods, and each man try to work his own way back into the Union army." The pursuers were again hard upon them. The men sprang from the engine as best they could, and the great "railroad" raid was over.

Pittenger says that he was neither among the first nor the last to jump from the locomotive; but not jumping forward, as he should have done, he was whirled over and over on hands and feet several times before he could straighten himself up. He then looked around and saw others fleeing in all directions, and the soldiers pouring out of the pursuing train in all directions many rods away. He could hear their shouts, and soon afterward the firing of their guns. He tried in vain to overtake some of his comrades, but had to make his way alone. His flight was full of incident, but he was captured on the afternoon of the third day. All the others were also captured, some a little earlier, some a little later. He was taken to Chattanooga, where he was sharply examined by General Ledbetter. The examination closed thus: "Your leader's name is Andrews," said the general; "what kind of a man is he?" "I can tell you one thing about him," was the reply, "and that is, he is a man you will never catch." "That will do for you," said the general with a grim smile, and turning to an officer who stood by, he said, "Take him to the hole; you know where that is."

When Pittenger passed out of the room he saw Andrews at the door, heavily ironed, and two others, but no sign of recognition passed between them. The "hole" was a little building originally designed as a negro prison. They went up an outside stairway and entered a small room directly under the roof, in which was a half dozen miserable looking men. "Where shall I put him?" asked the jailer. "Below, of course," replied the officer.

"The jailer advanced," says Pittenger, "to the middle of the room, and kneeling down, took a large key from his pocket, and applying it to a hole in the floor gave it a turn, and then, with great effort, raised a ponderous trap door at my feet. A rush of hot air, and a stifling stench, as from the mouth of a pit, smote me in the face, and I involuntarily turned backward, but the bayonets of the guards were behind and there was no escape. The

ladder was then thrust down, and long as it was, it no more than penetrated the great depth. The wretches, whom I could hear murmuring confusedly below, were ordered to stand from under, and I was compelled to descend into what seemed to me more like the infernal regions than any place on earth. It was hard to find the steps of the ladder, and I had my handcuffs on, but went down feeling for each step, to a depth of some fifteen feet. I stepped off the ladder, treading on human beings I could not discern. Then the ladder was slowly drawn up, and in a moment more, the trap fell with a dull and heavy sound, and every ray of light vanished. I was shut up in a living tomb—buried alive.

The room was without an entrance except the trap door. Instead of windows there were two holes in the thick wall, not more than a foot square, and having two rows of iron bars. Air and light were admitted only through these two holes. When Pittenger entered there were fifteen prisoners, most of them Union men from various parts of East Tennessee; some of them had been there from six to eight months. Four others were soon added, and not long after these, three more, Andrews and his two companions, making twenty-two in all, shut up in a dungeon about thirty feet square, and about the same height. In the course of a few days all the raiders were brought in, the original prisoners being removed elsewhere to make room for them, so that for several weeks the number in the hole was twenty-two, all of whom were closely ironed; food and water being grudgingly doled out to them.

Late in April a court martial was convened for the trial of Andrews, but the finding of the court was not announced for several weeks. Not long after it was announced to the prisoners that twelve of them were to be taken to Knoxville; and nine others were to remain at Chattanooga. Andrews bade farewell to those who were to go. "Boys," said he, "if I never meet you here again, try to meet me on the other side of Jordan." Pittenger was one of those sent to Knoxville.

In June those who remained at Chattanooga made a desperate attempt to escape. One man standing on the shoulders of two others, succeeded in cutting a hole through the planks overhead, and gaining access to the loft, where they dug a hole through the

brick wall. They had twisted their clothes into a rope by which to let themselves down the outside. Andrews and Wollam went first, and he and Wollam got down and were off. Just then the guards were aroused and began to fire. The others crept back into the hole. Andrews and Wollam were hotly pursued, and both were recaptured on that and the following day. Andrews was thrust back into the "hole." Iron shackles were riveted on his ankles, connected by a stout chain only eighteen inches long. It was announced to him that the sentence of death, pronounced by the court martial, had been confirmed, and would be carried into effect on the fourth day.

But for some reason not clearly ascertained, it was decided that he be brought to Atlanta for execution. He reached here about noon on the 7th of June. In a few hours he was conducted to the place of execution, out on Peachtree street, opposite where Colonel William J. Speer now lives. O. H. Holms was then marshal of Atlanta, and served as executioner. Quite a large number of spectators were on the ground. A shallow grave was dug near by in which the body was cast. In 1887 the spot was identified, and the remains of Andrews, by order of the national government, were exhumed and taken to the national cemetery at Chattanooga.

In the meantime a court-martial was held at Knoxville, before which was tried seven of the twelve raiders there confined. The sentence of the court was approved on the fourteenth of June, by Major-General E. Kirby Smith. It directed: "The sentence of the court will be carried into effect between the 15th and 22d days of June, at such time and place as may be designated by the commanding officer of Atlanta, who is charged with the arrangements of the execution thereof." This officer decided that the execution should take place at the Atlanta cemetery, at the edge of the plot now occupied by a monument to the memory of the Confederate dead. The men met their fate bravely, but with no show of bravado.

"The scaffold," says Pittenger, "which had just been completed, consisted of a single long beam, extending from one post to another, to which the ropes were attached, and a loose plank extended under this, so that the knocking out of the props would cause it to fall. A considerable number of spectators were pres-

ent, but not nearly so many as attended the execution of Andrews, no general meeting of the citizens being permitted. Indeed, the preparations had been carried on as secretly as possible."

When the prop fell five bodies remained dangling in the air, but two of the ropes broke, and two men fell insensible to the ground. As soon as the men could be revived, and the platform readjusted, these two men were hung anew, without any further accident. "As soon as life was extinct," says Pittenger, "first in the five and afterward in the two, the bodies were laid in a shallow trench, already dug, near by, just wide enough for their length and long enough for all seven to lie close together. The earth was filled in, and here they remained till at the close of the war, the National Government removed the bodies to an honored spot in the beautiful National Cemetery at Chattanooga. A monument should mark this spot and that in Atlanta, where heroism in death shone so brightly."

The railroad raid was indeed a failure, but how near it came to being a success is apparent from an account of it, published in the *Southern Confederacy*, a newspaper published in Atlanta, date October the 15th, 1862: "Had these men succeeded in burning the bridges, the enemy at Huntsville would have occupied Chattanooga before night Sunday night. Yesterday they would have been in Knoxville, and thus have had possession of all East Tennessee. Our forces at Knoxville, Greenville and Cumberland Gap would ere this have been in the hands of the enemy. Lynchburg would have been moved on at once. This would have given them possession of the valley of Virginia, and Stonewall Jackson would have been attacked in the rear. They would have been in the possession of the railroad leading to Charlottesville and Orange Court House, as well as the South Side Railroad, leading to Pittsburg and Richmond. They might have been able to unite with McClellan's forces and attack Joe Johnston's army in front and flank. It is not probable that our army in Virginia could have been captured or driven out of the state this week.

"The reinforcements from all the eastern and southern portions of the country would have been cut off from Beauregard. The mind and heart shrink, appalled at the awful consequences

that would have followed the success of this one act. We doubt if the victory of Manassas or Shiloh were worth then as much to us as this frustration, as this grand *coup d'état*. It is not by any means certain that the annihilation of Beauregard's whole army at Corinth would be so fatal a blow to us as would have been the burning of the bridges at that time by these men."

There were now surviving fourteen of the twenty-two by whom the locomotive had been captured at Big Shanty. These had been transferred from Knoxville to Atlanta, where they were lodged in the public jail, but apparently they were indifferently guarded. They overpowered the guard and made off in all directions. Eight of them made good their escape, and after numerous adventures reached the Union forces at various points. Pittenger and three others never got fairly out of the jail yard. Bensinger was apparently more fortunate, but he was recaptured the next day and again lodged in jail. From the jail those who did not escape were soon transferred to the barracks, where they were, upon the whole, not badly treated, although they did complain of the scanty ration served out to them.

At the close of November they were startled by the information that they were all to be sent to Richmond to be exchanged. They reached the Confederate capital on the 7th of December, and and were placed in the so-called "Castle Thunder." The negotiations for a formal exchange somehow hung fire, and it was not until March 18, 1863, that Pittenger and his five companions were on their way to Washington.

Following are the names of the twenty-two who took part in the great railroad raid, and the disposition of them:

Executed June 7, 1862—James J. Andrews.

Executed June 18—William Campbell, George D. Wilson, Marion A. Ross, Perry G. Shadrack, Samuel Slavens and Samuel Robinson.

Escaped October 16—Wilson W. Brown, William Knight, John R. Porter, Martin J. Hawkins, Mark Wood, J. A. Wilson, John Wollam and Daniel A. Dorsey.

Exchanged March 18, 1863—Jacob Parrott, Robert Buffum, William Bensinger, William Reddick, Arthur H. Mason and William Pittenger.



Martin J. Hawkins died in 1867, Mark Wood in 1871, and Robert Buffum in 1886. The others were living and their occupations known at the close of 1887. William A. Fuller, the Confederate conductor, whose fortunate error in regard to the number of the engine captors, and whose plucky pursuit of the raiders, in all human probability, prolonged the life of the Confederacy for three years, received the thanks of the Georgia legislature, which also voted medals to him, and to Murphy and Cain. The medals, however, were never executed. Mr. Fuller remained a conductor on the road as long as it was under Confederate control, though he said, "Sherman, in 1864, bit a piece off of it almost every day till it was gone." Subsequently he was given control of the road, which he succeeded in keeping out of Sherman's hands. After the restoration of the Union he returned to his old position of conductor, retaining it for ten years; then for seven or eight years he was engaged as a merchant in Atlanta, when he retired from active business. Pittenger had a very pleasant meeting with him near the close of 1886.

In March, 1864, Mr. Pittenger was admitted to the ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church, belonging to the Pittsburg conference, and was stationed at several places in Ohio. In 1870 he was transferred to the New Jersey conference. Since 1876 he has been connected with the National School of Elocution and Oratory at Philadelphia, where he has given weekly lectures on Shakespeare and extempore speech. Besides "Daring and Suffering," he has published several other books, among which are the following: "Oratory, Sacred and Secular," "Extempore Speech," and "How to Become an Orator."



## CHAPTER XVIII

### "ON TO ATLANTA"

Chickamauga, bloody and undecisive, had been fought. The great western armies of the Union and the Confederacy were the weaker by at least 25,000 killed and wounded after they drew out of that valley of the shadow through which flowed, as the tongue of the red man named it, the "River of Death." Chattanooga, the mountain fortress of the Confederacy, was in the possession of the hosts of Grant. Then came Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. The tremendous conflicts upon those frowning heights, though no one knew it then, settled the fate of Atlanta. Bragg, after suffering a loss of more than 3,000 in killed and wounded, and 6,000 prisoners, retired from the field in disastrous rout, although he had inflicted upon his enemy a loss in killed and wounded almost double that of his own. Aside from the sharp engagement at Ringgold, immediately upon the heels of Bragg's retreat, and the rash assault of the Federals upon the intrenched Confederates at Tunnel Hill, the opposing armies remained quietly in their winter quarters and did no fighting deserving of the name before spring. The Union army remained in Chattanooga, with its eye toward Georgia, and the Confederate army stood prepared to dispute every foot of the prospective southward advance of the enemy. The beautiful Chickamauga valley lay between the hostile hosts as sort of a neutral zone.

During that suspenseful winter both armies changed commanders. On the 27th of December, 1863, General Bragg, relieved at his own request, turned the command of the Army of the Tennessee over to General Joseph E. Johnston. The victorious General Grant, having been called to the leadership of all the Union armies, left for the scene of his future great operations in Virginia, designating Major-General William T. Sherman as his

successor over the department of the Mississippi, which included Tennessee and Georgia. General Sherman entered upon the discharge of his enlarged duties on the 18th day of March, 1864. Pending the appointment of Johnston to the command of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee temporarily filled the place of Bragg, and for some weeks prior to Sherman's appointment, Major-General George H. Thomas succeeded Grant in command of the Department of the Mississippi.

It was evident, from a movement made by the Federals in force on the 23d of February, that an advance upon Dalton was to be the next move upon the chessboard of war, and the authorities at Richmond prepared to resist the invasion of Georgia with all the force at their command. General Sherman had at his disposal for effective service, in round numbers, 100,000 men. With Major-General Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, there were 50,000; with Major-General McPherson, Army of the Tennessee, 35,000; with Major-General Schofield, Army of the Ohio, 15,000. Against this well-equipped veteran army, composed as it was of the most magnificent fighters of the West, General Johnston was able to muster 50,000 men early in the spring. Later, when the campaign was fairly opened, both armies were augmented by reinforcements, their comparative strength being less unequal. There has been considerable controversy as to the relative strength of Sherman and Johnston, and while the round numbers given are probably fair to both sides, the exact numbers claimed by each general in discussing the campaign after the war, are as follows: Sherman—Army of the Cumberland, 60,733, and 130 guns; Army of the Tennessee, 24,465, 96 guns; Army of the Ohio, 13,559, 28 guns; a grand total of 98,797 men and 254 guns, 88,188 being infantry, 4,460 artillery, and 6,149 cavalry. Johnston—42,856 men and 120 cannon, divided as follows: Infantry, 37,652; artillery, 2,812; cavalry, 2,392.

When the season for the active resumption of military operations approached, there was some conflict of opinion between General Johnston and the war office. The plan of campaign proposed by President Davis and his advisers at Richmond was that General Johnston invade Tennessee with a force of 75,000 men,

which was to include Longstreet's corps, then near Morristown, Tenn. It was proposed to collect necessary supplies and transportation at Dalton, to which point the additional troops, with the exception of Longstreet's corps, were to be sent, after which this reinforced army and Longstreet's command were to form a junction at Kingston, on the Tennessee river, marching thence into the valley of Duck river. General Johnston opposed this plan of campaign as impracticable under the conditions then existing. He declared that the enemy could easily defeat the attempted invasion of Tennessee in force by attacking one of the two bodies of Confederate troops while marching to the place of meeting, throwing their whole army at Chattanooga upon it, or by advancing against Dalton before Johnston's army was ready to take the field. While not opposing the proposed invasion of Tennessee, General Johnston proposed that the plan be modified to permit the reinforcement of his army by Longstreet's corps at Dalton, instead of Kingston, early enough to give him strength to beat Sherman at the former point, in which event the enemy would be pursued into Tennessee.

Richmond did not accept Johnston's suggestions, and as they were not in harmony with the plan proposed, both were abandoned. President Davis did not, apparently, take kindly to Johnston's ideas, even at this early stage of the campaign, and thought he saw in the cautious commander a disinclination to advance. Through Braxton Bragg he sent word to General Johnston that troops could be withdrawn from other points only to advance. Johnston protested that he was willing, nay, eager to advance, with the proper support, complaining that the disparity of numbers between his force and Sherman's was too great, and the condition of his army far from what it should be in other respects, making an aggressive initiative too hazardous. Despite Johnston's importunity, which went so far as to send a confidential officer to Richmond, President Davis insisted that it was out of the question to reinforce the Army of the Tennessee to the extent required to meet the wishes of the new commander. The result was that Johnston determined to adopt the Fabian policy, conserving his forces and disputing his ground doggedly with the minimum of risk. As for Sherman, his orders from General

Grant were very explicit and radical. He was told to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage possible on their war resources. In reply, General Sherman agreed "to draw the enemy's fire within twenty-four hours of May 5th."

It had been foreseen that if Sherman began an aggressive movement from Chattanooga, he would strike for Atlanta, and during the winter, Major-General Gilmer, chief engineer, had thoroughly entrenched that city, the purpose being to make it a base for the army to the north. It was now believed by many of the most sagacious leaders of the Confederacy that the policy comprehended by Grant's "bold offensive by concentric lines" had as one of its chief objectives the capture of the South's great railroad center and supply depot, Atlanta.

The section of the Western and Atlantic railroad between Chattanooga and Ringgold which the Federal forces had destroyed early in the winter as they fell back to their stronghold, was repaired by the 1st of May, and the cars of the Union army were running down to Ringgold. All was in readiness for Sherman's forward movement, and his corps commanders were ordered to move without delay, Schofield to Red Clay, Thomas to Ringgold, and McPherson, who had come over from Huntsville, Ala., to Gordon's Mills. The plan of action as imparted to these commanders, was as follows: Thomas to move in force on Tunnel Hill, secure that stronghold and threaten Dalton in front, but refraining from attacking its defenses without further orders, unless the enemy assumed the offensive against either wing, in which contingency all were to attack directly in front toward the enemy's main army, and not, without orders, detach to the relief of the threatened wing. Simultaneously McPherson was to move to Ship's Gap and Villanow, and secure possession of Snake Creek Gap, from which point he was to operate vigorously against the enemy's flank or line of communication between Tilton Station and Resaca. Thomas was ordered to maintain communication with McPherson through Dogwood alley. Schofield, in moving to Red Clay, was ordered to keep connection with Thomas's left. On the 4th of May, General Sherman telegraphed to General Grant, at Culpeper, Va.:

"Thomas's center in Ringgold, left at Catoosa, right at Leet's Tanyard. Dodge is here. Fifteenth Corps at Whiteside's. Schofield closing up on Thomas. All move to-morrow, but I hardly expect serious battle till the 7th. Everything very quiet with the enemy. Johnston evidently awaits my initiative. I will first secure the Tunnel Hill, then throw McPherson rapidly on his communications, attacking at same time in front cautiously and in force."

From Ringgold, on the 5th, Sherman telegraphed to Major-General Halleck at Washington:

"Telegraph to General Grant that I am here, and we have advanced our lines three miles to-day. McPherson is one day behind. I will attack Tunnel Hill on Saturday, and, in the meantime, will occupy Johnston's whole attention."

The army of General Johnston lay quietly at Dalton, the narrow mountain gaps commanding the town from the direction of Ringgold being strongly defended and fortified with abatis, rock epaulements and commanded by batteries. Rocky Face and Buzzard's Roost, two of the most important approaches, were impregnable. The wings and flanks of the army were protected by Wheeler's magnificent cavalry, and the railroad constituting the line of communication with the base at Atlanta was patrolled and guarded at the bridges by two regiments of Georgia state troops. Although General Johnston's army was inferior to that of Sherman numerically, and weakened in equipment by lack of hearty co-operation with Richmond and the depleting effects of the winter, it was fortunately stationed for defensive operations, and if he could prevent one of Sherman's characteristic flank movements, his Fabian policy promised the most effective results. Sherman was quick to see this, and at the start directed his efforts toward getting between his enemy and Atlanta. He was not anxious to attack Dalton.

On the 2d of May, Johnston was reinforced by 1,400 infantry of Brigadier-General Mercer's command, and other small bodies of his detached troops were hurried up. Johnston continued to press Richmond for reinforcements, and in response Loring's division of Polk's corps was ordered from Alabama to Rome. General Polk was ordered to turn over his department,



temporarily, to Major-General Lee, and take the field in command of the corps to be moved to Rome. French's division was ordered to follow to the latter place without delay. Cantey's division was next to arrive on the 7th, Loring began to come up on the 10th, and on the 17th Jackson's cavalry arrived. French did not get his division up until the 17th. Quarles's brigade was last to arrive on the 26th. These reinforcements, together with the Georgia militia, the furloughed men returned, returned deserters and recruits from the country around, gave Johnston an effective force of in the neighborhood of 70,000 men of all arms, by the latter part of May. During the same time Sherman received something over 10,000 reinforcements, mostly cavalry, making his effective force approximately 110,000 men.

On the morning of the 4th the steadily advancing skirmish line of the Union army drove in Hood's pickets on the Cleveland road, and that general ordered his division commanders to hold themselves in readiness for action. As the right wing of Sherman's army swung around to the south from Ringgold, it was suspected by Johnston that its prime object was to get at once upon his line of communications, and he lost no time in strengthening his defenses to the south of Dalton, the key of which was Dug Gap. On the morning of the 5th he wired Brigadier-General Cantey, at Rome, to move his brigade by rail to Resaca, and put his wagons in motion for that place. Major-General Martin, commanding the cavalry at Cartersville, was at the same time ordered to move his command to the vicinity of Rome, to defend that post and be in supporting distance of Resaca. General Wheeler, commanding the cavalry corps, was ordered to take measures to acquire the most accurate information of the position of the enemy and send notice in due time of any heavy advance. Work on all defenses, and especially those for the protection of the railroad, was pushed forward night and day. Major-General Stewart was ordered to construct an abatis in front of his works at Mill Creek Gap, and on such points along his line on Rocky Face Ridge where there was a possibility of the enemy climbing up. At noon of the 7th General Johnston wired to Richmond:

"The enemy are between Tunnel Hill and Dalton, about five miles from Dalton, and are advancing. We hold Mill Creek Gap.



They have also troops in observation this side of Varnell's Station on the Cleveland road."

On the same day, a division of the Federals being reported at LaFayette, and a larger force preparing to join it with the evident intention of marching by the Confederate left upon the railroad in the rear. General Johnston ordered Major-General Martin, then at Rome, to proceed to Calhoun, in order to better protect the army's communications. Martin was enjoined to keep strict watch on the fords between Calhoun and Rome, and to keep the advancing enemy under close observation, leaving at Rome the men of his command not effective as cavalrymen, with a few mounted men or videttes, to observe in front and give timely notice to the brigade of Loring, advancing from Alabama, of any approach of the Federals to Rome. A messenger was sent to General Loring, at Blue Mountain, ordering him to move to Rome with all possible dispatch. General Cantey, at Resaca, was ordered to keep close observation on all routes leading from LaFayette to Resaca or to Oostenaula, on his left. On the 8th General Davidson was given command of Rome and ordered to organize the troops left there and secure the place until the arrival of Loring. Govan's brigade was ordered to move from Dug Gap and take position on the line to the right of the Cleveland road. A body of Wheeler's cavalry was sent toward Resaca to watch all gaps through which the enemy might pass across Rocky Face, south of Dug Gap.

In the meantime, General Sherman was moving forward in line of battle, covered by strong forces of cavalry. On the 5th Major-General John M. Palmer was directed to have his corps prepared to move on Tunnel Hill at daylight on May 7th, leaving one of his brigades at Ringgold to guard the depot and train. General Sherman's detailed plan of attack, as disclosed in his orders to his corps commanders, was as follows: Thomas to move straight on Tunnel Hill. McPherson to move from Gordon's Mills, via Rock Spring, to Ship's Gap and Villanow; thence to occupy Snake Creek Gap, and from the latter point to operate on the enemy's flank, if in motion, or against the railroad at some point between Tilton and Resaca. Schofield was to keep up communication with Howard, and as the latter moved toward Tun-

nel Hill, Schofield was to move on Varnell's Station, inclining to his right in order to hold the road between Varnell's and Catoosa Springs. If he had reason to apprehend encountering a force superior to his own, Schofield was ordered to cross the hills to his right and make for Catoosa. Hooker was to move through Nickajack Gap on Trickum and threaten the road running from Buzzard Roost to Snake Creek Gap. Garrard's cavalry was to meet McPherson at Villanow to cover the right rear. General Thomas, in occupying the Tunnel Hill ridge, was to threaten Buzzard Roost Pass, the threat not to be allowed to lead to battle unless the enemy came out of his works, and to get, if possible, a small force on Rocky Face Ridge. General Schofield was expected to occupy the gaps at Lee's and Varnell's, and to feel from Lee's along down Rocky Face to the Confederate signal station. In case the enemy left Buzzard Roost Gap, General Thomas was to follow direct, and General Schofield through Lee's Gap, toward Dalton, on the east side of Rocky Face Ridge, through Crow's Valley. In giving these orders, General Sherman remarked that it was not his purpose to attack Dalton from the north, but from the west and south, and continued: "As soon as Tunnel Hill is secured to us, I shall pause to give McPherson time for his longer march, but we must occupy the attention of all the enemy lest he turn his whole force on McPherson, which must be prevented. Therefore, on the sound of heavy battle always close up on Howard and act according to circumstances. We will not be able to detach to McPherson's assistance, but can press so closely from this direction that he cannot detach but a part of his command against him. I have reason to believe Johnston has sent most of his cavalry to North Alabama, but still you should guard against a cavalry sweep on that flank, which can best be done by keeping your columns compact." To General McPherson he wrote: "I hope the enemy will fight at Dalton, in which case he can have no force there that can interfere with you. But, should his policy be to fall back along his railroad, you will hit him in flank. Do not fail in that event to make the most of the opportunity by the most vigorous attack possible, as it may save us what we have most reason to apprehend—a slow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it. In either event you may be sure the forces north of you will

prevent his turning on you alone. In the event of hearing the sound of heavy battle about Dalton, the greater necessity for your rapid movement on the railroad. It once broken to an extent that would take them days to repair, you can withdraw to Snake Creek Gap and come to us or await the development according to your judgment or information you may receive. I want to put this plan in operation, beginning with Saturday morning if possible. The sooner the better for us."

Because of the inability of General McPherson to reach Villanow on Saturday, the 7th, the field orders were modified somewhat, General Kilpatrick, in command of the Third cavalry division, being directed to feel for McPherson's troops, while covering General Hooker's movements, on Sunday instead of Saturday. To General McPherson Sherman sent this order at 1 o'clock p. m., on the 6th: "Thomas's command will move on Tunnel Hill to-morrow. General Schofield will move down to near Varnell's. I want you to-morrow night about the head of Middle Chickamauga, near the word 'Gordon' on the Tavern road, about the intersection of the Gordon's Springs Gap road with the main road lying along the west base of Taylor's Ridge; next day at Villanow and Snake Creek Gap. Hooker to-morrow will be through Nickajack Gap about Trickum and will control the road from Buzzard Roost to Villanow. Thomas will have Tunnel Hill. I have dates from Dalton of the 4th. Johnston is there, expecting our attack from the north."

General Thomas experienced little opposition in advancing against Tunnel Hill. General Stanley's division gained that point, after some skirmishing between cavalry columns of the opposing forces, his advance being slow on this account and because it was necessary to clear the road of timber which had been felled across it to impede his march. A brigade of Confederate infantry in the gap on Rocky Face Ridge made a movement toward Tunnel Hill when the Federals were seen to be in possession, but retired when a few artillery shots were fired at them. Simultaneous with the arrival of Thomas on Tunnel Hill, Schofield reached the point designated in his orders, his cavalry halting at Varnell's Station. Tunnel Hill was secured at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 7th, and at noon General Sherman visited the position. That

night Stanley's division bivouacked on Tunnel Hill, and the day closed rather uneventfully. In the meantime McPherson was moving toward Villanow. The skirmishing throughout the day was slight, with few fatalities. The advanced Confederate troops were pressed back to Snake Creek Gap. During the day General Cantey reached Resaca.

On the 8th, the Fourth corps threatened Buzzard Roost Pass and sought to make a lodgment on Rocky Face Ridge. Colonel Harker got upon the north end of the ridge, not far from a Confederate signal station, and General Davis drove the Confederate pickets on Round Top Hill from their rifle pits, which General Stanley's skirmishers proceeded to occupy. The Federals lost twenty in killed and wounded in the skirmishes while making their reconnoissance on the north end of Rocky Face Ridge. When the day closed Howard and Palmer had possession close up to the gap of Buzzard Roost. General Sherman, who spent three hours on Tunnel Hill watching Butterfield's skirmishers attempting to get possession of the signal hill, expressed the fear that Johnston was annoying him with small detachments, whilst he was assembling around Resaca in force. He complained that he had not succeeded in drawing the fire of a single gun of the enemy.

The most important engagement of the 8th occurred at Dug Gap, four miles southwest of Dalton, late in the afternoon, between Geary's division of Hooker's corps, and two regiments of Reynolds's Arkansas brigade and Grigsby's brigade of Kentucky cavalry, fighting on foot. The plan was for Hooker to seize Dug Gap and push forward sufficiently to protect the flank of McPherson, and strike the flank of Johnston, if he turned on McPherson, while the latter, marching through Snake Creek Gap to Resaca, should not only destroy but hold the only railroad tributary to Johnston. The possession of Dug Gap by Hooker would have rendered Dalton untenable by Johnston and made his retreat southward by the railroad extremely hazardous, at the same time completely protecting McPherson from attack on his left flank. As Geary's division advanced in line of battle toward Dug Gap in the early afternoon, Grigsby's cavalry, over a thousand strong, disputed its progress with much determination, retreating before

it and falling back to the Gap, occupied by the two Arkansas regiments—a mere fragment numbering 250 men under Colonel Williamson. The assaulting force numbered at least four times that of the defenders, but it was at a terrible disadvantage on account of the nature of the ground. Assault after assault was made by Geary, but each time he was repulsed with considerable loss. As his lines crept slowly up the rocky, wooded face of the mountain, they were whelmed with a terrific musketry fire, and great rocks and stones were rolled down upon them by the Confederates. He gained the second ridge of the mountain summit by assault four times, but was compelled to fall back before the withering fire above him, at dark withdrawing his troops under protection of a heavy fire from his artillery. He reported an aggregate loss of 357 officers and men, of whom some 50 were the venturesome advance, who actually reached the crest, only to be made prisoners. The Confederates lost less than a score in killed and wounded. After the day had been won, they were relieved by Granbury's Texas brigade, and Generals Hardee and Cleburne, with their staffs, galloped to Dug Gap to encourage by their presence its defense.

General McPherson took possession of Snake Creek Gap the same evening, meeting with no opposition worthy of the name. Why this important point was not defended by Johnston, as could have been done with a comparatively small force aided by artillery, is one of the enigmas of that chieftain's plan of campaign. The fact that Snake Creek Gap was not guarded, gave Sherman the easy means of causing the subsequent evacuation of Dalton and the retreat of Johnston's army to Resaca. The mistake was seen too late. After the gallant resistance of Grigsby and the Arkansas troops in Dug Gap, that officer was ordered to take his command to Snake Creek Gap, which he did at a late hour of the night, finding McPherson already in possession. A sharp collision occurred between Grigsby and the enemy's skirmish line. McPherson was now in a position to work on Johnston's flank in the event that he fell back, as seemed inevitable. Kilpatrick operated between Villanow and Snake Creek Gap with his cavalry, waiting for Garrard to come up.

The morning of the 9th broke bright and warm. At an early hour skirmishing was resumed in the vicinity of Tunnel Hill, and



the Federals who had gained an uncertain footing on the edge of Rocky Face sought to extend their ground, making repeated rushes close to the Confederate signal tower. A brisk artillery fire played upon the Confederates in Harker's front. Shortly after noon General Stanley's skirmish line had gained the west side of the ridge to the foot of the palisades and there lay inactive, being unable to scale the almost perpendicular walls of the mountain. At the same time Schofield pushed forward in the valley to the east and engaged the Confederate skirmishers. All day the Federals felt the positions of the Confederates cautiously, without taking important ground from them. A strong Federal column under General Morgan, of General Davis's division, moved out Buzzard Roost Pass late in the afternoon, and made threats against the ridge lying opposite to Buzzard Roost, which was strongly fortified by the Confederates. Very heavy skirmishing occurred here, the defenders of the fortifications opening with artillery just before nightfall. This threat developed not only the force of the Confederates and their guns, but the strength of their position. A direct attack against such a natural fortress was seen to be out of the question. Thomas ordered the advanced troops to hold their position close up to Buzzard Roost Gap through the night. The losses of the day were about 200 in the Federal Fourth Corps.

In the meantime, McPherson was not idle down at Snake Creek Gap. Putting a sufficient force in position to hold the strategic point, he proceeded to make reconnaissances in the vicinity of Resaca and to watch his opportunity to break the railroad between that point and Dalton. Grigsby's Kentucky cavalry, which had sought to occupy Snake Creek Gap in advance of McPherson, annoyed his advance through the forenoon of the 9th, causing his march to be as slow as that of a skirmish line. The plucky horsemen were driven before the corps into Resaca, where General Dodge skirmished with Cantey in the forenoon. While Dodge was occupying the attention of the defenders of Resaca, one company of mounted infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips succeeded in reaching the railroad near Tilton Station, but was forced to leave without damaging the track. They tore down a small portion of the telegraph wire. In his report, sent to General Sherman that night, McPherson said: "The enemy have a strong



position at Resaca naturally, and, as far as we could see, have it pretty well fortified. They displayed considerable force, and opened on us with artillery. After skirmishing till nearly dark, and finding that I could not succeed in cutting the railroad before dark, or getting to it, I decided to withdraw the command and take up a position for the night between Sugar Valley and the entrance to the gap for the following reasons: First. Between this point and Resaca there are half a dozen good roads leading north toward Dalton down which a column of the enemy could march, making our advanced position a very exposed one. Second. General Dodge's men are all out of provisions, and some regiments have had nothing to-day. His wagon train is between here and Villanow, and possibly some of them are coming through the gap now, but they could not have reached him near Resaca; besides, I did not wish to block up the road with a train. It is very narrow, and the country on either side is heavily wooded. I had no cavalry except Phillips's mounted men to feel out on the flanks. If I could have had a division of good cavalry I could have broken the railroad at some point. I shall be compelled to rest my men to-morrow forenoon, at least, to enable them to draw provisions."


## CHAPTER XIX

### EVACUATION OF DALTON

Rocky Face was too hard a nut for Sherman to crack—but in reality he had no intention of cracking it. Wily old strategist that he was, his purpose was to occupy the fullest possible attention of Johnston in front of Dalton, while McPherson got upon the railroad to his rear and paid his respects to Resaca. On the 10th the situation on Rocky Face was little changed. There was little skirmishing or picket firing in the forenoon. It rained quite steadily until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and very hard from dark to midnight. Early in the day General Stanley was compelled to draw in his lines a little in front on account of the Confederate sharpshooters firing down from the trees at the top of the palisades into the rifle-pits he had dug the previous night. A sharp fire was kept up for an hour or more from one of Wood's batteries upon the Confederates upon the summit of Rocky Face, to which the latter replied with two guns. The casualties were small on either side. Schofield fell back to his old position undisturbed, and quiet prevailed along his front.

General McPherson was busy all day fortifying his position in readiness for a retrograde movement on the part of Johnston. He reported to Sherman that the ground was admirable for the purpose intended, and suggested that if a large force was thrown in there he would have the chances of a decided victory. At the same time he reported that Kilpatrick's cavalry was arriving and that Garrard would reach Villanow that night. McPherson expected an attack in the morning.

There was much activity on the part of the cavalry. Wheeler was striking where a favorable opportunity presented, and on the 9th reported that he had fought the enemy's cavalry for three



Home of Ex-Governor Colquitt, deceased

hours in the morning, driven them two miles, and captured 200 prisoners, horse equipments, etc. At this date the Confederate army was much elated by the news of Lee's success in Virginia.

General Johnston, alarmed at the reports reaching him of McPherson's movements down about Sugar Valley, sent three divisions, under Lieutenant-General Hood, to Resaca. On the 9th he had written to Cantey, in command there: "General Johnston sends you another brigade. He impresses upon you the importance of the bridges you guard and the absolute necessity of their being held. General Martin is near Calhoun. Make arrangements with him to come to your assistance, if pressed, and keep the general fully informed of everything that takes place. Remember that if you are attacked by a very large force the general will come to your assistance, and that you can hold out with the certainty of being relieved. As the enemy may cross below you and attack the bridge from the south, the general thinks you had better throw up some defenses at the south end of the bridge. If there is no movement in your direction arrangements have been made to bring back the brigade. All your troops should be always prepared to move in this direction."

On the 10th the first of Loring's brigades arrived at Rome, with General Polk, and was at once sent forward to Resaca. The rest of the Alabama reinforcements were reported following close behind. The same evening the following dispatch was sent General Polk from headquarters at Dalton: "General Johnston wishes you to concentrate your troops at Resaca. Assume command of that place and of the district, including Rome, and of Martin's cavalry, and make the proper dispositions to defend the passage of the river and our communications. General Johnston suggests the immediate movement of Forrest into Middle Tennessee. He is fully persuaded he would meet there no force that could resist him."

By this time, despite his precautionary measures at Resaca, it does not appear that Johnston was fully aware of his adversary's intentions. He evidently expected an attack in force at Dalton. On the afternoon of the 10th, General Hardee wrote General Wheeler: "I am unable to decide what the Yankees are endeavoring to accomplish. The force in Crow's Valley, east of Rocky



Face, is reported to be moving to our left. There seems to be no force threatening us except on Rocky Face, and that force has been unusually quiet to-day. All safe at Resaca. Hood and command will return this evening. No news. I am only uneasy about our right, and won't be uneasy about that when Hood returns. Report promptly any movement of troops on Varnell's Station road. It is from that point I apprehend danger."

On the morning of the 11th Sherman continued to keep up his feint of a direct attack on Dalton through Buzzard Roost Gap, while the bulk of his army moved through Snake Creek Gap to attack the enemy in earnest. On the morning of the 10th he had wired Washington: "I am starting for the extreme front in Buzzard Roost Gap, and write this dispatch that you may understand. Johnston acts purely on the defensive. I am attacking him on his strongest fronts, viz., west and north, till McPherson breaks his line at Resaca, when I will swing round through Snake Creek Gap, and interpose between him and Georgia. I am not driving things too fast, because I want two columns of cavalry that are rapidly coming up to me from the rear, Stoneman on my left and Garrard on my right, both due to-day. Yesterday I pressed hard to prevent Johnston detaching against McPherson, but to-day I will be more easy, as I believe McPherson has destroyed Resaca, when he is ordered to fall back to mouth of Snake Creek Gap and act against Johnston's flank when he does start. All are in good condition."

General Sherman expressed keen disappointment that McPherson did not accomplish the breaking of the railroad at Tilton. His plan, as briefly outlined in the dispatch to General Halleck, at first comprehended leaving Schofield's corps to hold the ground at Tunnel Hill, taking Thomas to Resaca to join McPherson. To this Schofield urged objections, declaring: "To leave my small command here would simply result in my being idle or being whipped," and continued: "The moment Johnston discovered the move he would turn upon me, drive me back, and capture your supplies at Tunnel Hill, then turn upon you. If you can carry with you larger supplies to Resaca than Johnston has north of that point, I believe your success would not be doubtful, even if Dalton were fortified toward the south, which I understand it is not.

Dalton being not fortified toward the south, if you can carry supplies enough to last while you defeat Johnston in open field, and then reopen your communication with Chattanooga, your success seems more than probable."

Sherman seems to have accepted Schofield's suggestions and modified his plans accordingly. Instead of leaving one of his corps on Tunnel Hill, he concluded to have all three at Resaca, with the exception of General Howard's command, which, aided by General Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry, was to continue to cover Buzzard Roost Gap. The general commanding declared that the gap was as strong against the enemy as himself. Stoneman arrived on the 11th and preparations were pushed forward. Sherman told McPherson to order Kilpatrick to make a strike at the railroad, if he thought it practicable, in the meantime. In order that the reader may get a clear idea of Sherman's intended movement, the following extract is taken from his orders to McPherson on the 10th: "The Buzzard Roost Gap is so well defended and naturally is so strong that I will undertake to attack Johnston through Snake Creek Gap in this manner: Hooker's corps is already ordered to support you. His troops will arrive to-morrow and next day and will be instructed to widen and improve the road through the gap so that wagons may pass going and coming and troops may march by paths alongside. You had better do this at your end of the gap at once. Another corps of Thomas (Palmer's) will follow, and then Schofield. We expect all to be in motion the day after to-morrow, and to mask the movement as much as possible, Howard will remain here with his corps and will keep up the feint to the last moment, and if forced back, will be prepared to do so, having sent back to Ringgold in advance his supply wagons and all incumbrances. He will have a small division of cavalry to watch the road between this and Snake Creek Gap, the same where Geary now is, and Stoneman, with two brigades of cavalry, to his north and east. This force will cover us to the north; Garrard's newly arrived cavalry will guard to the south and west, and we must take care of ourselves. Once through the gap I would interpose between Johnston and Resaca and might, if it could be done quick, attack Resaca or Johnston. In the mean time mask your own force as much as possible, but



hold your ground and look well to secure the mountain range to the east and north."

At 1 o'clock on the 11th, General Howard, from his position on Rocky Face, reported a heavy column of infantry moving through Dalton, its advanced lines well massed. One camp had been struck. A little later in the day, General Sherman sent word to McPherson that the indications were that Johnston was evacuating Dalton, in which event he said Howard and the cavalry would pursue, and all the rest would follow McPherson's route. He said he would be down to Snake Creek Gap in the morning, and ordered McPherson to strike the enemy, if possible, about the forks of the road. He added: "Hooker must be with you now, and you might send Garrard to threaten Rome and that flank. I will cause the lines all to be felt at once." Following Sherman's instructions, Stanley made a reconnaissance through Buzzard Roost Gap to ascertain whether the Confederates were yet in their works. This was done at 5 o'clock until dusk, developing the enemy in front in considerable force. The fire of seven guns in front was drawn by the reconnaissance. The fire of the Confederate sharpshooters during the movement was very accurate and severe. About forty Federals were killed or wounded. General Wagner, on Rocky Face, reported that the enemy's regiments were leaving the valley on the west side of the ridge, and moving toward Dalton, but that their front line across the valley was still maintained. There was little picket firing along the lines during the day, and the Confederates did not open their artillery from the summit of Rocky Face.

At the time Sherman was closing his preparations for his grand coup to the south, Johnston was exerting every effort to strengthen Resaca and urging speed on the part of the approaching reinforcements. On the 11th he wired Richmond: "On Saturday last the enemy moved to the foot of Rocky Face Ridge. Since then there has been skirmishing and many partial engagements brought on by their attempts to gain the passes and commanding positions on the mountains. They have thus far failed in all their attempts. The enemy now making strong demonstrations on Resaca. Lieutenant-General Polk concentrated his troops at Resaca."

Early on the morning of the 11th General Hardee reported that no enemy was in Crow's Valley, none on his right, and that, in his opinion, the Federals were moving by their right toward the Oostenaula. General Wheeler was ordered to ascertain the truth of this report and the location of the enemy's left. Colonel Grigsby was posted with his cavalry brigade on the Sugar Valley road, facing south, some five miles distant from Dug Gap. General Allen was cautioned to observe the movements of the Federals between General Walker's position, Resaca, and Snake Creek Gap, keeping Walker and Cantey advised. At 8 o'clock that morning General Cantey reported "enemy advancing on this place in force." Cheatham was directed to withdraw his division from the line and move it down the Sugar Valley road toward Dug Gap. General Strahl was ordered to halt his brigade on the same road, opposite Dug Gap, and put himself in communication with the officer in command of the Gap, assisting him, if the Gap was attacked. Cleburne's division was ordered by General Hood to move at sunrise to a point five miles south of where the Sugar Valley road turns to go to Dug Gap, there to threaten the enemy and under certain conditions to attack him. General Govan's brigade was ordered to join Cleburne. Couriers dashed between Resaca and Dalton with hurry orders. General Polk hurried up from Kingston. Walker was ordered to go to Cleburne's assistance if required. General Martin, at Calhoun, was cautioned to be on the lookout for the enemy's advance. In the meantime, cars were being sent from Atlanta to Rome to transport the troops expected to arrive from the west any moment.

On the morning of the 12th Sherman was quietly dropping down to Snake Creek Gap, according to programme, and Johnston kept the defenders of Resaca apprised of the movement of the enemy's columns, at the same time making his preparations to follow, if occasion demanded. General Wheeler, with a small force of his cavalry, had a hard skirmish with double the number of Federal cavalry, near Varnell's Station, and got the better of the fight. The force left at Tunnel Hill received quite a scare during the day from the movements of the Confederates, it being believed that a considerable force of the enemy was being sent to Ringgold. Colonel Butler, with the Fifth Indiana cavalry, was

ordered by Howard to Ringgold, taking two guns of Bradley's battery with him. A considerable portion of Stoneman's command was preparing to make a dash to Ringgold, in pursuit, when it was ascertained that the supposed raid was insignificant. The operations on Rocky Face Ridge were insignificant. Some feinting was done by both sides to develop the opposing strength, but not of a noteworthy character. Much of the time of the Federals was devoted to watching the enemy in the valley and signaling to their comrades on the march. In the middle of the afternoon Howard reported to Sherman that Johnston had marched out a column of cavalry, infantry and artillery—about 10,000 strong, just east of the fort on Potato Hill, as a diversion. The Federals on the ridge made a small diversion, also. Late in the afternoon, General Thomas reported that the road leading from Dalton was full of heavy wagon trains moving south. General Kilpatrick, who went within two miles of Resaca, was compelled to fall back, being constantly flanked. General McPherson had disposed his command to attack Johnston in flank should he prove to be retreating.

At 1.45 in the afternoon of the 12th, General Johnston telegraphed Richmond: "I am convinced that the Federal army, having failed in its attempt on this place, is now, covered by the Rocky Face Ridge, in motion for Calhoun or some point on the Oostenaula. I will follow the movement."

During the night Johnston's infantry and artillery left Dalton for Resaca, his cavalry following next day, the 13th.

After nightfall on the 12th, Schofield sent word from four miles north of Villanow that he was putting his troops in camp, intending to march for Snake Creek Gap in the morning. Sherman ordered him to start by 3 o'clock, remarking: "Johnston is marching and will make his twenty miles before we can make ten." At 2.30 o'clock in the morning of the 13th, Sherman sent word to Howard to feel the enemy's lines at once at all points with infantry and cavalry, and, if possible, follow him, if he was retiring south. Referring to Johnston, he said: "Of course his whole army must be marching at this moment to meet us. If he has not evacuated Dalton he will to-morrow, and I want you boldly to strike him at all points and be prepared to follow up, pressing his

rear. Tell Stoneman I want him to swing a force of cavalry—enough to make a show—well around Dalton, from Varnell's, as though for Spring Place. He will move straight for the enemy, wherever he may be, at sunrise."

At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 13th, General Howard entered Dalton, where he found the rear guard of Johnston's cavalry and a few stragglers. Stoneman covered his left, and McCook his right. The town was soon cleared of the enemy remaining behind. Reporting to this effect to Sherman, Howard said he found the railroad entirely uninjured up to that point, and would make Dalton a depot at once. At noon Sherman replied: "Have the roads repaired to Dalton. Let the cavalry feel forward carefully, supported by infantry. If there be no detached forts at Dalton on the south front, select some good ground and prepare it for defense in case Johnston turns. I have not yet discovered if he be south of Resaca or not. I think he is about Swamp Creek. Keep your troops very light and feel to the right. I have a good force at the gap of Snake Creek. Communicate with me as often as possible. The passage of the gap was a slower process than I expected, and it has taken us until now to get out and up to Camp Creek, where skirmishing is now progressing. I will fight for the railroad this afternoon. Tell Stoneman and McCook now to strike the retiring column of trains, burn all wagons, and secure the horses."

At noon Howard reported: "I think the rebels mean to avoid a fight at Resaca." Sherman ordered him to press the retreat of the enemy with cavalry, supported by infantry, and to open signal communication with his headquarters.

The following correspondence between Generals Thomas and Sherman, on the morning of the 13th, is given as throwing much light on the situation and on the Federal plan of action. After reporting the occupation of Dalton by Howard, General Thomas said: "I have directed General Palmer to march two miles northeasterly from the debouch of the intrenchments, and then take an easterly course until he strikes the railroad, covering his left flank and front with a strong line of skirmishers. Should the enemy be driven down the railroad Generals Palmer and Schofield will be directly in his rear, with General Hooker to support them, if

necessary. In this situation of affairs the enemy must be completely cut off, or compelled to retreat by the various fords southeast of Dalton, across the Connesauga, in which latter event, if General McPherson will merely threaten Resaca with the head of his column, and force a passage across the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry, and take up a strong position on the hills bordering the railroad southeast of Lay's Ferry, Johnston will be compelled to retreat through the mountains to Allatoona, which will be exceedingly difficult, if he succeeds in accomplishing it at all. Should you think well of this plan, I can throw Hooker's corps across Lay's Ferry to the support of General McPherson, and General Palmer's corps also, unless the enemy evacuate Resaca. If Resaca be evacuated the main body of the army could be crossed at Resaca and Lay's Ferry and pursue rapidly along the railroad and vicinity." To which Sherman replied: "Until I hear that Joe Johnston is south of the Oostenaula I would not cross at Lay's. We must first interpose between Dalton and Resaca, threatening the latter all the time. I want Hooker's right and McPherson's left strong until we encounter Johnston, who has not yet got below Resaca, I think. If he retreats east we have the advantage. I want the pontoons up and to secure the railroad on Hooker's right Palmer should join on to Hooker, and Hooker should be strong."

All day and far into the night of the 13th the contending armies were getting into position for the encounter which was promised at Resaca on the day following. Sherman arranged his pontoons for the passage of the river, and the Confederates posted batteries at favorable points to prevent his crossing. There was some lively skirmishing, principally between the cavalry. The lines of battle were formed near together in some instances, the troops being industriously engaged in throwing up parapets, constructing abatis and digging trenches and rifle pits. As the Federals were moving in on the Snake Creek Gap road, a collision was nearly precipitated with Loring's troops, which feinted to gain time for the formation of Hardee's and Hood's corps, just arriving. As the Confederate army was formed, the left of Polk's corps was on the Oostenaula and the right of Hood's corps rested on the Connesauga. The heaviest skirmishing was on Polk's front and Hardee's left, in the afternoon.

In explanation of his course in falling back from Dalton, General Johnston said, long after the close of the war: "The Confederate army was compelled to abandon its position in front of Dalton by General Sherman's flank movement through Snake Creek Gap, and was forced from the second position by the movement toward Calhoun. Each of these movements would have made the destruction of the Confederate army inevitable in case of defeat. In the first case the flank march was protected completely by Rocky Face Ridge, and in the second, as completely by the Oostenaula river. A numerical superiority of more than two to one made those maneuvers free from risk. General Sherman thinks that the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of the troops across the valley almost impossible, saved the Confederate army. "The army remained in its position at Dalton until May 13th, because I know the time required for the march of 100,000 men through the long defile between their right flank, near Mill Creek Gap, and the outlet of Snake Creek Gap; and the shortness of the time in which 43,000 men could march by two good roads direct from Dalton to Resaca; and the additional fact that our post at Resaca could hold out a longer time than our march to that point would require."



## CHAPTER XX

### RESACA

At Resaca the topography of the country placed the two armies on more of an equality, so far as the ground occupied by each was concerned, but the place was anything but a favorable one for the easy maneuvering of troops in battle array. One of the Federal generals, in a subsequent report, described the region as a "conglomeration of hills." It was a blind region, difficult to even abstractly learn on short acquaintance; but Sherman seems to have proceeded with a concrete knowledge of the vicinity. As one of his admirers put it, he "knew every cow trail." At that time there was little cultivated land around Resaca. Such as there was lay in the valley, immediately around the railroad station of the hamlet. Up from the river the ridges were blended confusedly, with frequent abrupt knobs, and these uplands were heavily timbered. Little cleared strips lay along the creeks, in some places. The several roads leading to the place were exceedingly narrow, winding through the timber. Close to the railway station there were railroad and wagon bridges across the Oostenaula, the only means of access to the country lying south. The Confederate fortifications, consisting of earthworks, with lunettes at the vital angles, commanded and ran almost parallel with the railroad, descending to the river and completely covering the open space in which Resaca lay. While the position was naturally strong, enough work had not been done on the works to make them formidable. As Polk got his reinforcements over from Rome, he enlarged and strengthened these defenses somewhat, in the short time allowed him before the Federal army encompassed the place.

General Johnston waited till the last moment before letting go of Dalton. As he said in explanation of his movement, he had

two fairly good roads open to Resaca, better and more direct than any the Federals could take, and his smaller force was much easier to move than Sherman's three cumbersome army corps. When he had made sure that only Howard was left at Tunnel Hill to divert attention from Sherman's real intentions, he lost no time in dropping down to Resaca with the remainder of his army, quietly drawing his troops out of their positions on Rocky Face, before Howard, on the night of the 12th. Howard, after dashing into Dalton in the morning, pursued eight miles in the afternoon and harassed the Confederate rear guard considerably, taking some prisoners. When Sherman had made his junction with McPherson at Snake Creek Gap, on the night of the 13th, he found his wary antagonist in line of battle before him, with greater strength numerically than at Dalton, and already strongly intrenched in an advantageous position. He had had "the pick of the ground," thanks to the timely opposition interposed by Loring.

Johnston so disposed his army that the left of Polk's corps occupied the west face of the Resaca entrenchments. Hardee's corps formed the center, facing west. Hood's corps formed the right, its left division facing to the left and the two others to the northwest, crossing the railroad and reaching to the Connesauga river. While the Confederates were making the most of this ground, the Federals were forming in front of them. General McPherson, first to take position, struck the enemy's pickets, driving them before him, and occupied a ridge of bald hills almost parallel with the Confederate works, his right resting on the Oostenaula, some two miles below the railroad bridge, his left squarely abreast of Resaca. Thomas came up on McPherson's left, facing Camp Creek, behind which the Confederates lay, and Schofield, delayed and worn-out by the tangled forests he had cut his way through, took a position to the left of Thomas. With his eye ever to the enemy's flank, and suspicious of another retrograde movement in good order on the part of Johnston, Sherman at once ordered his pontoons to be thrown across the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry, and before the ball opened at Resaca, he had all arrangements perfected for detached expeditions against Rome and Calhoun, and an avenue of egress for a general forward movement south of the river, should his enemy elude him. At daybreak on

the 14th the artillery was in position on the lines of both armies, and the opposing forces alert and vigilant.

On this day, the first of the battle of Resaca, General Sherman wired Washington: "By the flank movement on Resaca we have forced Johnson to evacuate Dalton, and we are on his flank and rear, but the parallelism of the valleys and mountains does not give us all the advantage of an open country, but I will press him all that is possible. Weather fine and troops in fine order. All is working well and fast as possible. I have announced in orders Mr. Stanton's dispatch as to the victory at Spotsylvania. Let us keep the ball rolling."

It was not until the day following that General Johnston communicated with Richmond, in answer to a dispatch of President Davis, on the 13th, expressing the fear that Grant intended to draw reinforcements from Sherman, and cautioning Johnston to be extremely vigilant, and if he was unable to prevent it to give the earliest information possible of such a movement. Johnston replied: "We are in the presence of the whole force of the enemy assembled from Tennessee and North Alabama. I think he cannot re-enforce Grant without my knowledge (nor do I think will), as my whole line is engaged in skirmishing. Yesterday he made several assaults that were repulsed."

The fighting at Resaca really began on the evening of the 13th, for the term skirmishing is too mild a designation for the encounters that distinguished the opening of the conflict. On his stand against the advance of Sherman, which began early in the afternoon of the 13th, Major-General Loring reported: "Receiving orders to throw forward a brigade to check his advance, Scott's brigade was moved forward and took position in line on Bald Knob, about a mile west of town. About 1 p. m. the brigade became warmly engaged, and held the enemy in check three hours, and could have maintained its position longer, but was ordered to retire into our line of intrenchments. It drew off in perfect order and took position on the right of Vaughan's brigade, Cantey's division. Adams's was drawn up on the right of Scott's, with Featherston's in rear as reserve. I ordered breastworks thrown up on both front and rear lines, which the men set about with great spirit and speedily accomplished. Bouanchaud's, Barry's,




Photo by Edwards & Son

Gen. John B. Gordon's Home



Cowan's, and Charpentier's batteries were placed in position on a high range of hills on line of Cantey's division. The losses occurring in the division after forming behind the intrenchments resulted from heavy shelling of the enemy and his sharpshooters, there being no heavy engagement on the part of the line it occupied."

There was a sharp passage at arms that afternoon all along Polk's front and the front of Cheatham's division of Hardee's corps. On that morning, Logan sent the divisions of Osterhaus and Harrow out of their works, already constructed, advancing them along the Resaca road to the cross-roads, two miles from Resaca, where they were deployed in line of battle to the left of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith's division, previously stationed there. Preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, the column, supported by Smith's division, moved steadily forward toward Resaca, a little more than three miles distant, over very broken ground, heavily covered with underbrush. The Confederates poured upon the advancing enemy a rapid and effective fire, but attempted to make no decided stand until his line debouched from the woods into a wide extent of cleared fields flanked by a range of commanding hills bordering Camp Creek. Upon these hills the Confederates had some hastily constructed barricades and pits, and a battery planted. This battery, playing with small effect upon the Federals, was soon silenced by their artillery, and their column swept on across to the Camp Creek hills, the crest of which was gained without much difficulty, the Confederates having retired before the superior force. The valley of Camp Creek, which contained many "deadened" trees, had been set on fire by the Confederates to check the enemy's advance, but the Federals came on the run through the burning leaves and smoke. The crest overlooked the Resaca forts, the hamlet of Resaca, the railroad and the bridges. The position was seen to be an important one, and General Logan caused artillery to be placed on the heights, with which he opened vigorously on the Confederates in front, and prevented the passage of railroad trains. Rifle pits were thrown up by the Federals and works built for their batteries, in the face of a heavy fire, and here the line rested at night, its skirmishers advanced well forward, holding the line of Camp Creek.

Throughout the 13th Wheeler's cavalry was doing what it could to hamper the advance of Sherman's legions. Of the result of his efforts General Wheeler said: "The resistance the enemy experienced can be appreciated when we consider the fact that during fifteen hours they pressed forward but ten miles."

At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 13th, Hooker's corps, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved out on the Resaca road, in support of McPherson's troops, threatening Resaca and the railroad. Palmer's corps moved out of Snake Creek Gap, two miles northeast of Hooker, taking a course parallel with the Resaca road, with orders to proceed as far as the railroad. On reaching the vicinity of the railroad his skirmishers encountered those of the enemy strongly posted on the hills immediately west of the railroad, and continued a fierce skirmish with them until nightfall. Butterfield's division moved up in support of Hooker's right.

Sherman's order to McPherson for the opening of the battle bright and early on the 14th, was as follows: "At break of day renew the direct attack on Resaca, pushing it with vigor at all points till you draw the fire of artillery, if any, from the forts. Hooker and Palmer on your left will be strong on your left and press, the latter attempting to reach the railroad in a grand right-wheel on you, the pivot. The pontoons are nearly up and will be directed toward the mouth of Snake Creek, and should Johnston retreat south I will pass Schofield first, Thomas next, and you last. If we get Resaca at once set to work to make a trestle bridge to cross there."

Along Johnston's lines on the night of the 13th the order was: "The troops will be under arms and in line at 3 o'clock to-morrow morning."

The 14th opened with very heavy skirmishing all along the lines. Rapid artillery exchanges were made in the vicinity of Resaca, on the extreme Federal right, where Logan had posted the divisions of Osterhaus, Harrow and Smith. But the important movement of the morning, or, indeed, of the day, was on the extreme Federal left, where Schofield measured strength with Hood. The brunt of the Federal attack of the morning fell upon Hindman's division, centering hotly where Walthall's division



was posted, the position being on a bare knob, the highest on the ridge along which the Confederate army lay. A brigade of Bate's division had occupied the ground before it was relieved by Walthall early in the morning. Hastily forming his line and throwing forward his skirmishers, the gallant Mississippian connected with the lines already established on his right and left, and busily set about strengthening the earthworks left by the troops which had preceded him, and cutting out the undergrowth in his front. Covering the front of the Mississippi regiments were three companies of sharpshooters, organized and drilled specially for such service. Walthall's command was the left brigade of Hood's corps, and on his left was posted Lewis's brigade, constituting the right of Hardee's corps. Tucker's brigade formed the rear support. Between Lewis's right and the left of Walthall's intrenched line was Hotchkiss's battalion of artillery, behind which, under cover of the hill upon which it was posted, lay Brantly's consolidated regiment, its three right companies having been put in the trenches. General Walthall thus narrates the exciting events that subsequently transpired in front of his position :

"Hotchkiss's artillery was posted on a bald knob, and from it the line in either wing was slightly refused, conforming in its general direction to the course of the ridge, and forming an obtuse angle, of which it was the point. Immediately in front of this elevation is an open field in a valley, about 300 yards in width, extending from the base of the ridge we occupied to that of a wooded hill beyond, and through it runs a small creek nearly parallel to the course of our trenches. This field extends some distance to the left of the high point the artillery was on, and on the right and opposite the position of my center and right regiments it is 600 or 800 yards wide, but between it and the position of those regiments there is a skirt of woods some 200 or 300 yards in width, very uneven, and thickly covered with undergrowth and timber. Beyond the field and running nearly parallel with that part of the battle line occupied by Bate's division, and about half a mile from it, is a thickly timbered ridge, as high as the point on which our batteries were posted. About 11 a. m. the enemy's skirmish line encountered my own, but the latter held its ground, as directed, till forced back by a line of battle which advanced

about 12. The artillery poured upon it a rapid and well-directed fire from the time it came in view, but it moved steadily forward till within 300 yards of my line, when, from both small-arms and artillery, it was subjected to a fire so deadly and destructive that it soon wavered and then gave way in confusion. In half an hour another line appeared and advanced under a similar fire, nearer than before, and until that part of it confronting the batteries was sheltered by means of a depression in the hill-side, within 150 yards of the guns. It was promptly dislodged by Colonel Brantly, who moved upon it with that part of his command not in the trenches, and at the same time the remainder of the line, which was in the woods opposite my right and center, yielded to the constant and steady fire of the troops occupying those positions, and the whole line fell back. It crossed the field in the wildest disorder, under a damaging fire from the artillery, which was admirably served. As soon as the flying troops reached the hill beyond, a third line moved on us, but it was checked before advancing as far as either of the others had done, and fled before some parts of my command were able to discharge even a single volley. The enemy's sharpshooters, however, in large numbers secured themselves in the woods opposite my right and center, and so irregular and thickly wooded is the ground that it was found impossible to dislodge them. From these, and others posted in woods beyond the field in front of my left, a constant fire was kept up on my own line, as well as the batteries. The number of these sharpshooters in the woods nearest us was gradually increased by small bodies passing at irregular intervals rapidly across the open field to the cover of the woods. Many of them were enabled to shelter themselves behind some slight earth-works which had been constructed in front of the main intrenched line, before I occupied it, for skirmishers. By reason of the unevenness of the ground, these were without the range of our artillery. Others found cover in a small ravine, and by sundown the force in the woods was almost as strong as a line of battle and very well protected. When the enemy made his first advance he employed his artillery, posted directly in our front, but with little effect; but soon after his third repulse he opened a furious fire from the ridge opposite Bate's division, which furnished him very

fine positions for his guns, opposite my left and about three-quarters of a mile distant. The fire of both small arms and artillery was kept up till 8:30 in the evening. During the afternoon a battery from Martin's battalion was sent to my line. After the firing ceased most of the night was spent in strengthening the works all along the line, for they had been materially damaged during the day.

"About 5 o'clock on the morning of the 15th the firing was resumed and was kept up incessantly during the entire day. In the night artillery had been concentrated on the point I occupied, and besides the small-arms, which were used without intermission, not less than thirty guns were employed against us, and with considerable effect. The guns on my left enfiladed the greater portion of my line of works, and the position would scarcely have been tenable but for the fact that its extreme left was its highest point, and in consequence furnished a partial protection for the remainder. The firing ceased about 8 p. m.

"My loss in killed was disproportionate to the number wounded, because most of the casualties were caused by artillery, and those men struck by balls from small-arms were in most cases shot in the head or upper part of the body while in the act of firing over the breast-works. When the engagement opened I had in line 1,158 men. Of this number 48 were killed and 116 wounded and 5 of them mortally.

"I think the loss of the enemy in my front was very heavy. None who have looked upon the field estimate it at less than 1,000 in killed and wounded during both days."

This attack, of which Walthall, as above narrated, bore the brunt, resulted in very aggressive movements on the part of Hood's corps, and had not Sherman hurried up reinforcements and greatly extended his line, there is little doubt but that the Confederates would have succeeded in turning Schofield's left. After nightfall of the 14th Schofield sent this message to Sherman: "My right division (Judah's) still rests in the position which it gained and has held during the day. My left division (Cox's) has been relieved by the Fourth Corps in the enemy's outer works, which it carried and held until relieved, and is now massed immediately in rear of the right of the Fourth Corps.

Hovey's division, which has not yet been engaged, is massed immediately in rear of Judah. My loss is very heavy, but my men are still in good heart. They have done nobly."

The reinforcements were hurried up, but were slow in taking position, owing to the rugged nature of the ground, which was thickly wooded. General Newton, followed by General Wood, marched to the left of Schofield, and General Stanley moved down the Tilton and Resaca road toward the Confederate extreme right. The three relief columns adroitly made their concentration in immediate contact with the enemy's line. The artillery and musketry fire was terrific. Still uncertain of holding his ground, Sherman had Hooker bring a division to the extreme left, and it arrived in the very nick of time, for Stanley's left had been turned by the desperately fighting Confederates and was being slowly but surely forced back. Along some portions of the widely extended line the Federals met with some slight successes. The outlying rifle pits of the Confederates were carried and held in the manner described by General Walthall. Hood was greatly elated by his partial success and lay ready to press the enemy all along his line at break of day. Of Hood's charge on the evening of the 14th, General Johnston said: "The attack was extremely well conducted and executed, and before dark (it was begun at 6 p. m.) the enemy was driven from the ground. This encouraged me to hope for a more important success; so Hood was directed to renew the fight next morning. His troops were greatly elated by this announcement made to them that evening."

When Logan, on the extreme right, heard the roar of Schofield's guns, he caused a feint attack to be made, and continued throughout the forenoon lively demonstrations to deter the enemy from sending reinforcements to Hood. From this point what followed can best be told in General Logan's own graphic language: "General Osterhaus took advantage of the feint to attack the enemy's skirmishers in the heavily wooded valley near the road. This was done in the most gallant manner. The bridge over Camp Creek was carried, and the Twelfth Missouri Infantry thrown forward into the woods previously occupied by the enemy, thus forming a living *tete-de-pont*, which in the ensuing movement proved of great value. Directly in front of M. L. Smith's

division, and at a distance varying from one-half to three-quarters of a mile from it, a series of low, irregular hills extended from the Oostenaula due north as far as the Resaca road. They were occupied by the enemy in force and were partially fortified. This position, if in our possession, would bring us within three-eighths of a mile of the enemy's nearest fort, and within half a mile of the railroad bridge, thus practically cutting the railroad. To gain this position had been the work intended for the next day, and a number of bridges were to have been thrown over Camp Creek on the night of the 14th instant to facilitate the passage of troops, but the continuous artillery and musketry fire on the left, and the necessity for us to make a further diversion, precipitated the movement, and at 5.30 p. m. of the 14th the assaulting column crossed Camp Creek as best they could, some over the bridge, others on logs, and others wading, with their arms and equipments held over their heads. The assaulting force consisted of Brig.-Gen. Charles R. Woods's brigade, of the First Division; the Third Missouri Infantry, of the Third Brigade, being substituted for the Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry, which, being engaged as skirmishers, was unavailable, on the left, and Brig.-Gen. Giles A. Smith's brigade of the Second Division, on the right. Both brigades were formed in double lines, and in front on the left of Woods's brigade the Twelfth Missouri Infantry, disposed as skirmishers, accompanied the assaulting columns. The average distance to the objective point was about one-third of a mile, over a marshy bottom, nearly clear of standing timber, but full of fallen tree trunks and thickets, and intersected with miry sloughs. At ten minutes before 6 p. m. the advance sounded, and the lines of gallant men started at the double-quick over the difficult ground, followed by the cheers of their fellow soldiers on the Camp Creek hills, and met by a storm of lead and iron from the enemy. The rebel infantry poured in from the hills in front a close, destructive, and well-directed fire. The artillery from their forts opened in one continuous roar. The direction of most of their artillery fire was at first diagonally across the lines, the angle growing less as the storming column advanced, until it nearly enfiladed them. Their practice was excellent, the bursting of shells directly over the devoted lines seemed continuous, but neither thicket, nor



slough, nor shot, nor shell, distracted for a moment the attention of the stormers from their objective point. Lines temporarily disarranged were reorganized without slackening the speed, until, without firing a shot, they, at the point of the bayonet, planted their colors on the summits of the conquered hills. Under the soldierly and efficient direction of their brigade commanders the troops were at once disposed in the most advantageous positions for holding the ground, and for protection from the artillery fire still furiously kept up. Pioneers and intrenching tools were sent over, and work was immediately commenced making rifle pits. The indications being that additional troops had been brought up by the enemy, and that an attempt would be made to retake the hills, the vigilant brigade commanders kept their troops ready for every emergency, and the line of skirmishers well advanced and on the alert. The indications proved true, and about 7.30 o'clock in the evening the skirmishers came in, and shortly after them a large force of the enemy, in column of regiments, advanced to the assault. They were met by a withering fire, which, at first, they received steadily, soon shook and finally broke their lines, and forced them to retire and reform. It being evident that their lines were of greater extent than ours, and that their next attack would endanger our flanks, General Lightburn's brigade, of the Second Division, was sent to their assistance. This brigade responded in the most prompt and gallant manner. From the Camp Creek hills they had seen the progress of the engagement; had noted the first repulse of the enemy, and as the red flame from the muskets (showing plainly through the night) defined exactly the position of the opposing forces, they had seen the lines of the enemy gradually closing around and in rear of our flanks, every man felt he would be needed, and without orders prepared to go; so that when the orders came it needed but the word, and the gallant brigade was wading Camp Creek waist deep, and in some places neck deep, and off at the double-quick. General Lightburn reached General Giles A. Smith's position with astonishing quickness, and, forming on his right, the united lines poured a fire on the enemy which swept them entirely from that front, defeated and disheartened. About the time General Lightburn's brigade was sent over, two regiments of the Sixteenth Corps, the Twenty-



fifth Wisconsin and Thirty-fifth New Jersey Infantry, were sent over by General McPherson, to reinforce General Woods in the position where they were most needed, and gallantly did their duty, until, about 10 p. m., the last body of the enemy retired, broken and disheartened, from the field."

Shortly after dark, that night, Major Kuhn, of the Second brigade, Second division, reported that it had crossed the river at Calhoun Ferry and taken 41 prisoners. At about the same time, Brigadier-General Dodge, who had been sent by McPherson to reinforce Logan, reported that he had thrown a small force across the river, connecting with General Smith's right, and stretching to the river. He immediately intrenched.

Sherman was highly gratified at McPherson's success in commanding Resaca from the hills of Camp Creek, and was not at all uneasy about the condition of his left. In the meantime he went ahead with his preparations to effect the passage of the Oostenaula by means of pontoons, the laying of the bridge being in charge of General Sweeney, the boats being kept out of sight till the last moment. Sweeney's attempt to lay the bridge on the 14th was a failure, he being threatened by a force of Confederates crossing the river above him. He feared that he would be cut off from the army and drew back about a mile, out of danger. Logan's work forced Johnston to lay a new bridge across the Oostenaula. Sherman had the gift of almost divining in advance his enemy's movements, and his providence was admirable. The work of throwing the bridge across the river, and the following order to the cavalry general, Garrard, is proof of this. This order was given at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 14th, before the battles at his left and right had been fought: "You will move your whole command down the valley toward Rome in one or two columns by Dirt Town or Dry Creek. If you can possibly cross Oostenaula make a strike for the railroad anywhere north of Kingston. Do this in your own way, but do it thoroughly and well. I will commence crossing McPherson about Lay's Ferry near the mouth of Snake Creek to-day; he will move on the Rome road; communicate with him but do not wait for him. If it be impossible to cross the Oostenaula with even a raiding force, then threaten Rome, and the Coosa below Rome, that the enemy may

not receive provisions, forage, or reinforcements from that direction. Make your own arrangements as to wagons and artillery; the less wheels you have, the better; but I leave it to you—only act with the utmost possible energy and celerity. Johnston is retreating and is encumbered with wagons. I think he is making for Allatoona, but it is not positively demonstrated yet. The breaking of the railroad north of Kingston is desirable on any hypothesis."

On the morning of the 15th Sherman was ready for an overwhelming advance. His intentions are embodied in the following portion of an order to Thomas: "Now you have Howard's and Hooker's corps beyond Camp Creek looking south, with Schofield, as it were, in reserve, and the less time we give the enemy to fortify the better. I want to hear the sound of that line advancing directly down the road on Resaca till it comes within range of the forts. Whilst this advance is being made McPherson's guns will make the bridge and vicinity too hot for the passage of the troops. I am very anxious this advance should be made to-day, that we may secure a line whose left rests on the Connesauga. I have sent Corse down to see what progress Sweeney is making."

The same morning, it is related as an anecdote of Sherman at Resaca, that, after working all night on his maps and multiplex orders, he walked out of his headquarters and sat wearily down on a log hard by, soon falling fast asleep. The men of a brigade swinging by to reinforce Hooker on the left, saw the grim chieftain in the spell of Morpheus, and a high private in the rear rank, making a grimace at "the old man," concluded a slurring remark with the expression: "A pretty way we are commanded, that is!" Sherman, aroused from his nap by the noise of marching feet, caught the fellow's remark. "Stop, my man," said he in a tone of kind expostulation; "while you were sleeping, last night, I was planning for you, sir; and now I was snatching a wink of sleep."

On the night of the 14th Johnston sent Walker's division to Lay's Ferry, to prevent, if possible, Sherman's movement across the Oostenaula at that point, he having heard that the pontoons were down and McPherson's advance guard crossing. This report proved to be a mistake, but it resulted in Hood's orders to

charge the left of the enemy early in the morning being revoked, as that commander was expected to be needed down at the river at that time. As a result of the misapprehension the continued success of the Confederates on the extreme right was made impossible. At the time of revoking Hood's orders to advance, Johnston directed Lieutenant-Colonel S. W. Presstman, his chief engineer, to lay a pontoon bridge a mile above the railroad, and to make the necessary roadways connecting with it. He knew that Sherman was preparing to get around him at Calhoun and proposed to duplicate his movement in falling back from Dalton. The massing of heavy reinforcements by Sherman on his left had settled in Johnston's mind the question of an aggressive movement in that direction, and the situation on Sherman's right was not a whit more reassuring. Under the circumstances, the Confederates did magnificently on the heights of Camp Creek on the 15th.

In Hood's front skirmishing was renewed early in the morning, and the sun was but a few hours high when both sides were preparing for a sally in front of their works. The artillery opened with rapid detonations, and the sharpshooters, with whom the woods swarmed, actively pursued their deadly occupation. Scores of men on both sides were shot through the head while peeping over the parapet. The men of Brown's, Reynolds's and Cummings's gallant brigades who had covered Hindman's division with glory by their partially successful effort to turn the enemy's left on the previous evening, stood ready to repel Hooker's impending assault, and chafed because they were not permitted to take the initiative with the bayonet. The forenoon had nearly passed. General Stevenson was in the act of opening with Corbut's battery, just put in position with much difficulty, upon a Federal battery that was playing havoc behind the Confederate works, when the assaulting column of the enemy swept down into the ravine, a few paces from the battery, and in such a position that its guns could not be turned upon them. The story of this battery, which the Confederates had to abandon, and which the Federals could not capture during the progress of the battle, is interesting. Brigadier-General Geary, in command of the Federal line in the immediate vicinity, tells the story as follows:

"The very irregular formation of the ground gave the enemy unusual facilities for cross-firing and enfilading the ground to be passed over, and they, in posting both their artillery and infantry, availed themselves fully of these advantages. The hills, steep and rough, were thickly wooded; the narrow ravines between, generally cleared. Immediately in front of the position on which my command formed for the attack, a small road passed down a narrow ravine running from the enemy's main line to the Dalton road. Everything being in readiness, the advance was ordered. Ireland's brigade crossed a ravine and a hill swept by the enemy's artillery and musketry fire, and drove the enemy impetuously from another hill, and, turning a little to the right, charged with wild, ringing cheers for the capture of a battery, which from a key position was dealing death on every side. At the same moment on Ireland's left a portion of Butterfield's division was racing with him for the same deadly prize. The advance of both commands reached the battery nearly together, the One Hundred and Eleventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, of Ireland's brigade, under Col. George A. Cobham, leading and forcing its way through the jaws of death, till they had their hands upon the guns and their colors on the earth-works, from which part of the gunners had been driven and the rest killed or captured. This work was a sunken one at the crest of the hill, and open toward its rear. Twenty yards in rear was a line of strong breast-works, from which a deadly shower of bullets poured around and into the battery, rendering it impossible for men to live there. Cobham, with that cool and accurate judgment which never forsook him, formed his line, now augmented by other portions of the brigade, within fifteen yards of the guns, where by the formation of the ground his troops were less exposed to the terrible fire, while at the same time his own muskets covered the battery from the front. During the advance of Ireland's brigade a body of troops from another division, sweeping through the brigade, had severed it, and by my orders all of it, excepting three regiments, were posted in reserve, and Colonel Cobham was directed to take command of the three regiments, which had now silenced and held under command of their guns the battery. Three regiments of Buschbeck's brigade, which had advanced gallantly, driving the enemy from two hills on the left of Cobham, were not far from him.

With these three regiments Colonel Lockman was now ordered to report to Colonel Cobham, which he did promptly. Between 3 and 4 p. m., I received orders from Major-General Hooker, commanding the corps, to relieve whatever of General Butterfield's division was then holding position in the front line. Half of my Second and Third Brigades were then with Cobham. From the remainder of my command the order was at once complied with, and all of General Butterfield's troops were relieved, and by the direct order of Major-General Hooker, as well as my own, Colonel Cobham was directed to make every effort to secure and bring off the battery in his front. To this end I sent him as reinforcements the Fifth Ohio Volunteers from Candy's brigade and other regiments from the Second and Third Brigades, numbering in all ten regiments, and invested him with full command of all the troops at that isolated point. I had now sent him one-half of my entire division. Our lines were now strengthened and established in readiness for further operations, General Williams's division being formed entirely on my left, and General Butterfield's division being wholly withdrawn and posted in reserve. Musketry firing was kept up during the afternoon and night, and strong works were thrown up on the hills occupied by our main lines.

"In the isolated position held by Cobham it was impossible to erect even a slight barricade without receiving a terrible fire from the enemy fifty yards distant. In front of my left and Williams's right was a long, cleared field occupying two hills and a narrow ravine, and extending to a wooded hill on which was the enemy's main line. In front of my right was a field occupying a long, wide ravine, extending from the right of my line to a cleared hill on which was also the enemy's main line. Through this ravine ran the road previously referred to. Across the ravine to my right were lines of intrenchments held by the Fourth Corps and facing nearly eastward at right angles to my front. In front of the center of my main line a series of timbered spurs and knobs extended half a mile toward the enemy's main lines to the detached position held by Cobham. The troops sent to his support by me were so disposed as to hold his flank as well as possible. The only route of communication with him was by way



of these timbered ridges, which were swept in most places by musketry and artillery fires from the enemy's main lines. About 5 p. m. the enemy (Stevenson's division) debouched from the woods in front of my left and General Williams's right, and charged in column, with the effort to gain possession of the ridges in our front. The attempt, if successful, would have exposed Cobham to attack from every side and have forced him to abandon his position; but the attack, though a very spirited one, failed. A tremendous fire concentrated on him from the lines of my division, and those of General Williams, almost destroying his leading regiments (of Brown's rebel brigade), and sent the attacking column back in confusion to their intrenchments, after half an hour of sharp fighting. In this affair the artillery on both sides took an active part, cannister and shrapnel being principally used. Colonel Ireland being wounded by a piece of shell, the command devolved on Colonel Cobham. That officer being already intrusted with the command of six regiments, and the special work of securing the battery in his front, I directed Colonel Rickards, of the 29th Pennsylvania, to assume command of such regiments as remained in the main line. Wheeler's battery had taken position in my line behind log works constructed for the purpose. About dusk Colonel Cobham received instructions to dig through the works in front of the guns and bring them off with drag-ropes during the night. The necessary tools and ropes were sent out and the work performed with alacrity and tact by the officers and men under his immediate supervision. In the darkness of the night the men crept silently on hands and knees to the little fort and carefully removed the logs, earth-works and stones in front of the four guns. At midnight all was ready. The drag-ropes were attached and manned; a line of brave men lay with pieces aimed at the crest of the hill, and at one effort the guns were drawn out and taken rattling down the hill. The enemy, on the alert, sprang over their breastworks and furiously attacked Cobham's line. The sharp musketry fire aroused all the troops. Those in the intrenchments to our right across the ravine, not knowing the meaning of it, evidently believed it to be an attack upon their main line, and opened a tremendous musketry fire, much of which poured into Cobham's lines from his right and



rear. Word was quickly sent them, and their firing was stopped. Cobham held his position, drove back the enemy, and sent the guns, four 12-pounder brass pieces, to my headquarters."

Very thrilling, but there is ground to believe that General Geary has given his imagination too free rein toward the last part of his narrative. As a matter of fact, Hood's corps was not in position on the Camp Creek ridge when Geary's brigade "captured" the four 12-pounders, but on the march away from Resaca with the rest of Johnston's army. Hood refers to the guns and their fate in his report, thus: "During the attack on General Stevenson a 4-gun battery [was] in position thirty paces in front of his line, the gunners being driven from it and the battery left in dispute. The army withdrew that night and the guns, without caissons or limber-boxes, were abandoned to the enemy, the loss of life it would have cost to withdraw them being considered worth more than the guns." General Johnston had this to say of the circumstance: "From our view on the morning of the 15th, Major-General Stevenson advanced four guns some eighty yards and began to intrench them. General Hood had their fire opened at once. A ravine leading from the Federal line within easy musket range enabled the Federal troops to drive away the gunners; but their attempt to take off the guns was frustrated by the Confederate musketry. So the pieces remained in place, and fell into the possession of Hooker's corps on the 16th, after we abandoned the position."

The fighting in the afternoon of the 15th in the vicinity of this unmanned battery was stubborn and bloody. The ground the Confederates yielded was of no great importance, and after they had withstood a number of determined assaults, they attempted a counter-charge of considerable magnitude. The charge, made by Stewart's division, unsustained, was the result of a blunder. The report that McPherson was crossing the Oostenaula having been found to be untrue, Hood was again ordered to assault Hooker in his front. Just as he was on the point of moving forward, positive intelligence was received from General Walker that the Federal right was actually crossing the river. Hastily Hood's fighting orders were countermanded a second time, but the order from corps headquarters to Stewart was de-

layed, and he went in alone. The charge was made at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The punishment Stewart received was terrible, but borne with great heroism. Some of the regiments engaged were in a few minutes reduced in numbers to the full quota of companies. Clayton and Stovall led the charge, supported by Gibson and Baker. Maney's brigade and a small body of cavalry under Colonel Holman moved out on the right, outflanking and covering Stovall's right. The Federal intrenchments against which the division advanced were strongly constructed and manned, and defended by some deadly batteries. The ground was rough and covered thickly with underbrush, amid which the regiments lost their alignment and even companies became separated. Stewart did not return to his trenches, notwithstanding the hopelessness of his position, until notified of the change of orders which had made him a victim. There were a number of conspicuous individual acts of heroism in this charge. After having two color-bearers killed, Colonel Lankford, of the 38th Alabama, was last seen by his comrades with the colors in his hands. Private John S. McMath, of Stanford's battery, after his captain was killed and no one remained in the battery but himself, continued to serve the gun alone in the most perilous situation imaginable. Rev. J. P. McMullen, an aged Presbyterian missionary to Baker's brigade, went forward to where the carnage raged fiercest, and while extending to the dying the comforts of religion, shared their tragic fate.

Logan kept up almost a continuous artillery fire throughout the 15th, the railroad and wagon bridge, and such town as there was at Resaca being at his mercy. The skirmishing along his lines was hot, but Polk seems to have had no orders to engage the Illinoisan at close quarters. The statements of the leaders as to the magnitude and importance of the operations on the Federal right are conflicting. Sherman said McPherson moved his whole line of battle forward, till he had gained a ridge overlooking the town, and that several attempts to drive him away were repulsed with bloody loss. Johnston seems to have attempted to depreciate the whole affair. In his *Century* magazine paper he declared: "The fact is, near night of the 14th, forty or fifty skirmishers in front of our extreme left were driven from the

slight elevation they occupied, but no attempt was made to retake it." But Johnston contradicts himself to a considerable degree. In his published "Narrative" he speaks of the same event as follows: "On riding from the right to the left, after nightfall, I learned that Lieutenant-General Polk's advanced troops had been driven from a hill in front of his left, which commanded our bridges at short range."

At noon on the 15th, General Corse, who was engaged with General Sweeney in throwing a pontoon bridge across at Lay's Ferry, sent word to Sherman that the bridge was finished, one brigade across, and the balance of Sweeney's command crossing. The enemy was reported as not visible in any large force, and the troops that had crossed, intrenching. At 5 o'clock Corse had met Walker, and reported: "After gaining possession of the other bank and getting two brigades into position, Jackson's brigade, of Walker's division, Hardee's corps, assaulted in line of battle and drove our men toward the river till the batteries in position on this side opened with such execution as to send them back, followed by our men, capturing and killing quite a number. The assault proved advantageous to us in two ways: one, it gave us command of a better position, and another, it so demoralized the enemy as to deter him from attempting the same thing again. We are now in possession of a ridge about half a mile from the bridges, which, when properly fortified, which will be done to-night, will resist a large force. I have been over the ground and think the position quite strong. We found forty dead rebels on the field; we lost about 100 killed and wounded."

Johnston's army quietly crept from behind its earthworks about midnight and crossed the Oostenaula, Hardee's and Polk's corps by the railroad and trestle bridges, and Hood's on the pontoon bridge that Johnston had succeeded in throwing across some distance up the river. It was near the first glint of dawn when it was positively known to the Union skirmishers, feeling cautiously up to the silent Southern works, that Joe Johnston had "folded his tent like the Arab." When McPherson made the discovery, he swung his lines down to the pontoons, but a short time behind the enemy, and it is said that one of his shells struck one of the rear Confederate regiments, passing over the Resaca

bridge, at a double-quick, killing and wounding an astonishingly large number. It was not fairly daylight when Osterhaus's and Smith's skirmishers entered Resaca, driving Johnston's rear guard across the bridge while in the act of setting fire to it. They were too late to save the railroad bridge, but saved the wagon bridge, upon which part of Sherman's army crossed in pursuit, a few hours later. General Dodge, of McPherson's advance columns, was close enough upon Johnston's heels to be turned upon and attacked, three miles beyond Lay's Ferry, and Logan hastened to his assistance.

On the morning of the 16th Sherman wired General Halleck, at Washington: "We are in possession of Resaca. It is a strongly fortified position besides being a strong natural position. We saved the common road bridge, but the railroad bridge is burned. The railroad is good to this point, and our cars will run here to-day. Our columns are now crossing the Oostenaula; General McPherson at Lay's Ferry, General Thomas here, and General Schofield about Newton. We will pursue smartly to the Etowah. Generals Stoneman's and Garrard's cavalry are trying to get in rear of the enemy, and I hope will succeed. Our difficulties will increase beyond the Etowah, but if Johnston will not fight us behind such works as we find here, I will fight him on any open ground he may stand at. All well and in high spirits. We have about 1,000 prisoners and 8 guns."

As a postscript, he wired a few hours later: "Railroad track finished and cars in. Columns are well across Oostenaula, and I will aim to reach Kingston to-morrow, and the Etowah on the third day. I take it for granted Rome will fall as a consequence."

## CHAPTER XXI

### BACK TO THE ETOWAH

The losses of the contending armies at Resaca were heavy, considering the brief period and extent of the fighting. The figures are: Federal, 2,747; Confederate, 2,800. The Confederates suffered quite a good many captures. While Sherman was pushing on after Johnston, Major-General Dan E. Sickles, who was a spectator of the battle, sent this message to President Lincoln, on the 16th:

"I have accompanied General Sherman's army in the successful campaign from the Chattanooga to Resaca, witnessing the retreat of the enemy from successive lines of fortified positions through forty miles of mountains. If Georgia cannot be defended on its northern frontier it cannot be defended anywhere. The condition of our army is admirable, all that could be desired. The operations of McPherson on the right, and Thomas on the center, rendered the enemy's works at Resaca untenable besides threatening his communication. Johnston's retreat, out-maneuvered at Dalton and driven from Resaca, will demoralize his army to the level of Bragg's after Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge. The *advance of Logan's corps on the right on Saturday*, and *Hooker's assault yesterday on Hood's intrenched camp on our left*, both of which I was fortunate enough to see, will rank among the brilliant achievements of the war. Among the trophies I may mention a battery and battalion of prisoners with its colonel and flag. The assault was made by Butterfield's division, supported by Williams and Geary. The enemy abandoned artillery, small-arms, materials and subsistence collected at the depot. Prisoners are brought in every hour. The aggregate must be large. Although the enemy *destroyed the bridges* over the Oostenaula to escape pursuit, Sherman is already after him and close upon his heels. To-morrow I return to Nashville en route for the Mississippi."

Johnston's skirmishers had hardly joined his rear guard, slipping out of the abandoned works and crossing the river in imminent danger of capture, when General Sherman issued the following special field orders governing his plan of pursuit:

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,  
No. 8. *In the Field, Resaca, Ga., May 16, 1864.*

The enemy having retreated south, the following general plan will be pursued until he is beyond the Etowah River:

I. Major-General Thomas will pursue substantially by the line of the railroad to Kingston and Etowah bridge, keeping his forces well in hand at all times, but using two or three roads when available.

II. Major-General McPherson will move substantially by the Rome road, keeping up communication with the center.

III. Major-General Schofield will get over on the old Federal road from Spring Place to Cassville, or other road in that neighborhood.

IV. The repairs of the railroad and telegraph lines must be pushed forward with all possible rapidity, but troops must not wait for them.

V. Commanders of armies and the cavalry divisions will forward all prisoners of war to Resaca, there to be delivered to the provost-marshal of the Department of the Cumberland, and sent to the rear. Provost-marshals will be particular in making and sending the proper record of prisoners; deserters and refugees from the enemy will be likewise rendezvoused, and kept separate from prisoners, and disposed of according to known orders.

VI. The provost-marshal of the Department of the Cumberland will make arrangements to receive at Resaca all prisoners collected by the above orders, and send them to the proper depots of prisoners at the North with as much expedition as possible.

VII. The regiments of dismounted Indiana cavalry now at the Camp of Instruction in Nashville, are hereby assigned to the Department of the Cumberland, and the commanding general of that department and army will give all the necessary orders for their proper employment.

VIII. Major-General Thomas is charged with the duty of guarding all railroads to our rear, including all the country north



of the Tennessee, and the post and bridge at Decatur, Ala., and Major-General McPherson may call forward to his army the effective corps and regiments now at and around Huntsville as soon as he can, leaving only small guards till they are relieved by detachments of the Army of the Cumberland, and his non-effective force, under suitable officers, will be left at any suitable point to the rear, say Stevenson or Bridgeport.

IX. Major-General McPherson will collect a force of about 4,000 or 5,000 men out of the militia and garrisons of Paducah and Columbus, Ky., and place them at some suitable point on the Tennessee River, about Eastport, to serve as a threat to North Alabama, and as a support to General Washburn's operations in Mississippi.

By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

The field orders of the Confederate army, as given by the three corps commanders, were as follows:

ORDERS.]

HEADQUARTERS HARDEE'S CORPS,

*May 16, 1864.*

All ordnance wagons will be started at once to Adairsville. The troops will move to Adairsville to-morrow morning at the hours below indicated and in the following succession: Cleburne's division at 1 a. m., Bate's division at 1.30 a. m., Walker's division at 2 a. m. Cheatham's division will bring up the rear. Each division commander will protect his front by pickets. Skirmishers will be drawn in half an hour before the division starts.

By command of Lieutenant-General Hardee:

T. B. ROY,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

CIRCULAR.]

HEADQUARTERS HOOD'S CORPS,

*In the Field, May 16, 1864.*

The march of this corps will be resumed to-morrow morning in the direction of Adairsville in the following order:

Hindman's division will move at 3 o'clock, Stevenson's divi-

sion will move at 4 o'clock, Stewart's division will move at 5 o'clock. One battalion of artillery will accompany each division.

By command of J. B. Hood, lieutenant-general, commanding.

J. W. RATCHFORD,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[CIRCULAR.]

CALHOUN, May 16, 1864.

The troops of this command will be in readiness to take up the line of march to-morrow morning at 4 o'clock. The order of march is right in front, Loring's division leading. Artillery will follow their divisions.

By command of Lieutenant-General Polk :

D. WEST,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

President Davis's answer to General Johnston's dispatch announcing his retirement from Resaca, was cut off at the latter place by Sherman's operator. It read: "Your dispatch of 16th received; read with disappointment. I hope the reinforcements sent you will enable you to achieve important results."

Sherman's army stretched out over hill and valley, nearly to Rome, like a living Chinese wall of steel, feeling cautiously ahead as it went. It was not allowed to lose a particle of its rigid discipline and adherence to the plan outlined by the commander-in-chief, though flushed with success and conscious of its overwhelming brute strength. Every hour some portion of this invincible column had to brush aside a dogged line of Confederate skirmishers, a dashing troop of Confederate cavalry, or stop to silence a battery lying in ambush. Wheeler nagged Sherman's flanks like a pack of sleuth hounds, and every forest in his front was likely to resound with the "rebel yell." In certain quarters Sherman's advance was almost a continuous skirmish. After Dodge's encounter with the Confederate rear guard three miles across the Oostenaula, in the morning, there was no collision in considerable force until the middle of the afternoon of the 16th, when Hardee, isolated in the rear, turned at bay. Major-General Walker, whose division had been at Calhoun for some five or six days to prevent a movement of the enemy across the river




Photo by Edwards & Son

Governor's Mansion

there, reported part of McPherson's command advancing from the ferry west of Calhoun. Hardee was at once put in position to meet the advance, with Polk and Hood on the left and center. Nothing of a threatening character being in sight, Hood and Polk continued to fall back leisurely, leaving Hardee to protect the rear. About noon the enemy were reported advancing in force, from the river west of Calhoun, driving the cavalry in. The skirmishers of the two armies soon came in collision, and brisk firing ensued. At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon Hardee's line of skirmishers was strengthened and an advance ordered for the purpose of developing the enemy. It was handsomely executed by Walker and Cleburne, on the front line, who drove the Federals some distance and held their advanced position in the face of the oncoming host until 1 o'clock on the morning of the 17th. At that hour Hardee retired in compact columns, leaving his cavalry to cover his rear until it had got into Adairsville.

In the meantime, General French arrived at Rome with Sears's brigade, and reported that the other brigades were close behind and would get in on the 17th. The entire division expected to leave for Adairsville that day, but General French was delayed by the threat of a momentary attack on Rome. Late on the afternoon of the 17th he wired Johnston: "As I was embarking on the cars at 1 p. m., General Davidson informed me the enemy in force was but two miles and a half from Rome, and that he had but 150 men. I had to remain to meet this force and protect the town and await the arrival of my other brigade. The skirmishing is pretty severe. A prisoner reports a force of cavalry and a division of infantry with artillery. When I drive them back shall leave here, unless otherwise ordered, and join you."

The rear of the Confederate army reached Adairsville from Resaca at noon on the 17th. Sherman's center, following straight behind, was skirmishing with Hardee's cavalry close to the town, by 3 o'clock. The Federals were not expected up so early, but by dint of great activity, Hardee's corps was in position to confront them in good season, and by dark the cracking of the sharpshooters' rifles was continuous. Cheatham, who occupied Hardee's front line, bore the brunt of the skirmish-fire,

which hourly threatened to swell to the roar of musketry. The troops were ordered to stand to arms and be ready to move forward against the enemy at a moment's notice. The Confederate defenses were slight, having been hurriedly made, and the position did not please General Johnston for either defensive or offensive operations. The country between Resaca and Adairsville was cultivated and rolling, affording few natural strong positions. Sherman rejoiced at the change from Rocky Face and Camp Creek Ridge, hoping to get a pitched battle in an open field. But he was doomed to disappointment.

The Federals made short work of Rome. Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis, in command of McPherson's extreme right, supported by McCook's cavalry, gave General French employment a very short time after he left the train which was to have borne him to Kingston. French promptly moved forward to the attack, about an hour before sunset, on the 17th, inflicting upon Davis a loss of 150, but himself suffering a greater loss. He was compelled to seek the shelter of the fortifications, after dark, leaving his dead upon the field. When the Federal skirmishers moved up to renew the attack in the morning, they found the works abandoned and the bridges across the Etowah and Oostenaula burned. The defenders of Rome continued to hold their works on the south bank of the Coosa, which commanded the town, but these too they abandoned, after a few shells had been thrown over the parapets. General French hastened to join Polk, by the latter's imperative orders, and General Davidson took the Rome garrison along with French. Before leaving, a good deal of property was destroyed, but the iron-works were left in good condition and fell into the hands of the enemy. The Confederate cavalry continued to hover about Rome, protecting French in making his junction with Polk, but it was in poor condition for effective resistance against the Federal cavalry. Its officers reported that their horses had had nothing to eat for two days.

While Johnston's army paused in brief indecision at Adairsville, Sherman made determined efforts to cut his communications with cavalry raids. Garrard and Murray, on Sherman's right flank, were ordered to make a dash at the railroad between Rome



and Kingston, and Stoneman, on his other flank, was ordered to do likewise, between Kingston and the Etowah bridge. The object was, of course to prevent the Confederates from removing their war material or using the railroad to concentrate their troops. The railroad was not broken in time to prevent either.

Before midnight of the 17th the Confederate army was again in motion, headed for Kingston. From the best testimony obtainable, Johnston was almost persuaded to make a stand at Adairsville. He called a council of all his general officers, including Wheeler of the cavalry, and anxiously sought their advice. In this council it was understood that General Hardee was for giving battle without yielding another mile of ground, he asserting that he had information to the effect that but one corps of the Federal army confronted them, McPherson being absent in the neighborhood of Rome, and another corps having just been sent to reinforce Grant in Virginia. In this Hardee was overruled by the other lieutenant-generals, who did not credit the story about but one corps of the enemy being in front. Wheeler declared that the whole of Sherman's army was then west of Oothkaloga creek, just beyond Adairsville, and that only a detachment of McPherson's corps had been sent to Rome. The map before the group was intently scanned by Johnston, and putting his pencil on Cassville, he asked his colleagues in arms how long it would take all his army to go by the same road to that point. Hood protested that it could not be done, and Hardee declared they would have to fight where they were. While the conference was going on, firing could be heard at Rome. Johnston finally decided to proceed to Cassville, where he promised to deliver battle. He ordered his pontoons taken to Etowah.

On the morning of the 17th General Sherman wired Washington: "General McPherson is all across the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry, and is out abreast of Calhoun. General Thomas is across here, where we have improvised three bridges, and General Schofield has passed the Connesauga at Fite's Ferry, and will pass the Coosawattee at or near Field's. To-night I propose my three heads of columns to be abreast of Adairsville. Johnston will be compelled to fight on this side of the Etowah, or be forced to divide his army, or give up Rome or Allatoona. If he attempts



to hold both I will break the line at Kingston. If he concentrates at Kingston, I will break his railroads right and left, and fight him square in front. My belief is he will abandon Kingston and Rome, and retire to Allatoona, beyond the Etowah, in which case I will fix up my roads to Kingston, and then determine in what manner to advance beyond the Etowah. It will take five days to repair the railroad bridge here. We are abundantly supplied, and our animals are improving on the grass and grain fields, which now afford good pasture. I start in person now for Adairsville. I think everything has progressed and is progressing as favorably as we could expect; but I know we must have one or more bloody battles, such as have characterized Grant's terrific struggles. Johnston has Hardee's, Hood's and Polk's corps, with irregulars and militia on his lines of communication. His cavalry outnumbers ours, but acts on the defensive."

At the same time he sent the following message to General Thomas, which is reproduced as an evidence of the keen foresight of the Federal commander-in-chief: "It is probable on reaching Adairsville in the early morning we will find the enemy has retreated via Cassville. If such be the case I want you to put your head of column after him as far as Cassville, when I will determine whether to continue the pursuit as far as Cartersville or let him go. I prefer he should divide between Rome and Cartersville, in which event you will march directly on Kingston. I will be with you in the morning, and only mention these points that you may instruct your leading division. I wish you would put one of your boldest division commanders to lead to-morrow, and explain to him that General McPherson is close on his right and General Schofield on his left, and that two heavy columns of cavalry, Garrard's and Stoneman's, have orders to strike the road, the one between Kingston and Rome, and the other between Kingston and Cartersville. Instead of skirmishing only with the rear guard it should be attacked promptly by his whole division, deployed in whole or part, according to the ground, but it should be preceded by the usual skirmish line. A real battle to-morrow might save us much work at a later period."

From Adairsville, Sherman's army moved closely behind Johnston toward Kingston, his railroad trains following right up

to his rear. This was one peculiarity of Sherman's promptness. When his enemy evacuated a place, the whistle of his locomotive was heard before the retiring rear-guard was out of sight. Sherman was chagrined because he did not succeed in cutting off some railroad supplies of the Confederates at Adairsville. Five heavily loaded trains left the station a few hours before the Federals marched into the town and took possession. His orders were to keep close upon Johnston's rear, until he made a stand, when his generals were commanded to attack. Sherman did not expect a battle at Kingston, but thought Johnston would turn and fight at Cassville. All his orders show this plainly. However, he was prepared for any emergency. To General Halleck, at Washington, he telegraphed on the morning of the 18th, from Adairsville: "Johnston passed last night here. We overtook him at sundown yesterday, and skirmished heavily with his rear until dark. In the morning he was gone and we are after him. By to-night all the heads of columns will be near Kingston, whither Johnston is moving. Whether he proposes to fight there or not we cannot tell, but to-morrow will know, for I propose to attack him wherever he may be. Our cavalry has not yet succeeded in breaking the railroad to his rear. I now have four heads of columns, all directed on Kingston, with orders to be within four miles by night. Weather fine, roads good, and the country more open and less mountainous."

Johnston was determined to fight north of the Etowah, if suitable ground could be found to offset the enemy's superior numbers. The finger of destiny seemed to point to Cassville. He expressed himself sorely disappointed in "the lay of the land" at Calhoun and Adairsville. As he approached Kingston, he formulated an aggressive plan, which can be best understood by quoting his own language. Of this plan he said: "Two roads lead southward from Adairsville—one directly through Cassville; the other follows the railroad through Kingston, turning to the left there, and rejoins the other at Cassville. The interval between them is widest opposite Kingston, where it is about seven miles by the farm roads. In the expectation that the Federal army would follow each road, it was arranged that Polk's corps should engage the column on the direct road when it should arrive opposite

Kingston, Hood's, in position for that purpose, falling upon its left flank, during the deployment. Next morning, when our cavalry on that road reported the right Federal column near Kingston, General Hood was instructed to move to and follow northwardly a country road a mile east of that from Adairsville, to be in position to fall upon the flank of the Federal column when it should be engaged with Polk. An order announcing that we were about to give battle was read to each regiment, and heard with exultation. After going some three miles, General Hood marched back about two, and formed his corps facing to our right and rear. Being asked for an explanation, he replied that an aide-de-camp had told him that the Federal army was approaching on that road. Our whole army knew that to be impossible. It had been viewing the army in an opposite direction every day for two weeks. General Hood did not report his extraordinary disobedience—as he must have done had he believed the story upon which he professed to have acted. The time lost frustrated the design, for success depended on timing the attack properly."

There has been much controversy over this charge of disobedience or faulty co-operation on Hood's part. In a diary kept by Lieutenant T. B. Mackall, aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General W. W. Mackall, chief of staff to General Johnston, the council of the generals at Adairsville on the night of May 17th is briefly described, and in that description occurs this sentence: "Hood has been anxious to get from this place (Adairsville) south of Etowah."

Let the merits of the controversy be what they may, there can be no doubt but that Johnston meant to fight and was trying to exercise good generalship in the choice of a place. The following general order which, being read to each regiment, the general declares was "heard with exultation," shows that Johnston was not only ready to deliver battle, but had in him a vein of pious heroism that would have done credit to Oliver Cromwell:

GENERAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,

No. —

*Cassville, Ga., May 19, 1864.*

Soldiers of the Army of Tennessee, you have displayed the highest quality of the soldier—firmness in combat, patience under

toil. By your courage and skill you have repulsed every assault of the enemy. By marches by day and by marches by night you have defeated every attempt upon your communications. Your communications are secured. You will now turn and march to meet his advancing columns. Fully confiding in the conduct of the officers, the courage of the soldiers, I lead you to battle. We may confidently trust that the Almighty Father will still reward the patriots' toil and bless the patriots' banners. Cheered by the success of our brothers in Virginia and beyond the Mississippi, our efforts will equal theirs. Strengthened by His support those efforts will be crowned with like glories.

J. E. JOHNSTON, *General*.

On the evening of the 18th, Hooker's advance guard ran into Hood's pickets three miles out of Cassville, and McPherson notified Sherman of his arrival at Woodland, where he met Garrard's cavalry. Schofield was to Hooker's rear, with orders to come up on his left. Thomas was straight behind Johnston, ready to hurl the Army of the Cumberland upon him. The entire Union army was thus within easy striking distance of Kingston, whither Johnston had gone, and anxiously awaited his next move, which must be battle or retreat across the Etowah. The Federal cavalry, in the meantime, was seeking to make destructive dashes upon the railroad and the river, having orders to destroy bridges and boats wherever possible. General Sherman expected to attack Kingston on the 19th, "if not already abandoned." On the morning of that day he entered the town, Johnston having eluded him during the night and gone in the direction of Cassville. The armies being so close together, sometimes the opposing columns within musket shot of each other, encounters of a minor nature were frequent and the skirmishing incessant. Sherman lost no time in pressing after his wily antagonist. He had based his calculations on a battle at Cassville, some days before, and that he missed them was from that day to the end of his life, one of Johnston's keenest regrets. Among the orders Sherman gave his generals, immediately after discovering Johnston's retirement from Kingston, was the following to General Schofield, which will enable the reader to keep in mind an intelligent idea of the Federal commander's plans:

"General Thomas is passing through Kingston to the east, and will put the head of his column four miles east of the town, where a mill is represented on Two-Run Creek. Hooker will join him at that point. I want you to put the head of your column at Cassville Depot, your line facing east, and if you are in communication with Stoneman put him toward Etowah bridge, at Pettit's Creek. Garrard will move east, south of the railroad, and will come up on your right. McPherson will halt here, on the Connasene Creek, for the present. Report to me your arrival, and also the distance to Pettit's Creek, to Cartersville, and Etowah bridge."

Why Johnston did not give battle at Cassville, is another disputed question, fraught with no little personal rancor. It is plain, from his statement of the circumstances, that there was a lack of harmony, even then, between himself and Hood, or that their respective judgments were sadly at cross-purposes. He tells the reason thus:

"As I rode along the lines while the troops were forming, General Shoup, chief of artillery, pointed to me a space of 150 or 200 yards, which he thought might be enfiladed by artillery on a hill a half a mile beyond Hood's right and in front of the prolongation of our line, if the enemy should clear away the thick wood that covered it, and establish batteries. He was desired to point out to the officer who might command there some narrow ravines very near, in which his men could be sheltered from such artillery fire, and to remind him that while artillery was playing upon his position, no attack would be made upon it by infantry. The enemy got into position soon after our troops were formed and skirmished until dark, using their field pieces freely. During the evening, Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hood, the latter being spokesman, asserted that a part of the line of each would be so enfiladed next morning by the Federal batteries established on the hill above mentioned, that they would be unable to hold their ground an hour; and, therefore, urged me to abandon the position at once. They expressed the conviction that early the next morning batteries would open upon them from a hill then thickly covered with wood and out of range of brass field-pieces. The matter was discussed, perhaps an hour, in which time I became appre-



hensive that as the commanders of two-thirds of the army thought the position untenable, the opinion would be adopted by their troops, which would make it so. Therefore I yielded. Lieutenant-General Hardee, whose ground was the least strong, was full of confidence. Mr. Davis says ("Rise and Fall," Vol. II, p. 5,333) that General Hood asserts, in his report and in a book, that the two corps were on the ground commanded and enfiladed by the enemy's batteries. On the contrary, they were on a hill, and the enemy were in a valley where their batteries were completely commanded by ours."

At 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th, J. C. VanDuser, the army telegrapher at Kingston, wired his chief at Washington: "Army moved at 7 a. m., and skirmished through a timbered country, arriving here at 11 a. m. Johnston retires slowly, leaving nothing, and hitting hard if crowded. As I write, Hooker's and Howard's guns are hammering at him, and the two armies are in plain sight of each other, two miles east. Davis's division, Fourteenth Corps, is in possession of Rome. On arriving here we connected to southward and got some words from Atlanta before current failed."

With the Federal army pressing it close, the Confederate army quickly swung around to Cass Station and Cassville, and took up a strong position. The Confederate line was principally along a ridge running nearly north and south, covering Cassville and Cass Station road and facing westwardly. Polk's reinforcements from Alabama were now up, and, reasonably, Johnston felt himself stronger and better situated for a determined stand than he had been since the campaign opened. He had no sooner formed his line of battle than the artillery of the enemy began to play upon him, but only from Sherman's advance columns. In that quarter of the field there was lively skirmishing. Then occurred the unfortunate disagreement between Johnston and two of his lieutenant-generals over the ground chosen. While the leaders were haggling the soldiers in the trenches murmured against the waiting policy and clamored to be led against the enemy. It was decided to change the line—a hazardous undertaking while the opposing army was rapidly coming up, but a new line was marked out and the troops skillfully formed on it without



interference from the enemy. While this was being done, however, the guns were roaring and the battle threatened in earnest. That night it was the old story repeated. Johnston fell back across the Etowah, while Sherman was waiting in position, confident of attacking him in the morning. The manner in which the Confederate army reached and crossed the river cannot be said to have been "in good order," as the strict application of the expression goes. There was much confusion. Major Henry Hampton, who kept a complete journal of the operations of Hardee's corps while acting as assistant adjutant-general, says of the retreat south of the Etowah: "Our forces and trains crossed without being molested by the enemy, who might have damaged us severely by pressing us vigorously." In this connection, another extract from Aide-de-Camp Mackall's diary will be read with interest. He describes the situation in the afternoon and night of the 19th, at Cassville, as follows:

"Late in the afternoon considerable skirmishing and artillery. Enemy's skirmishers occupied town. At one time confusion; wagons, artillery, and cavalry hasten back; noise, dust, and heat. Disorder checked; wagons made to halt. Consternation of citizens; many flee, leaving all; some take away few effects, some remain between hostile fires. General M[ackall] and I remain several hours on roadside (Cassville and Cartersville road). Governor Harris brings lunch. General J[ohnston], about 5 p. m. in afternoon, rides down to Hardee's, leaving General M[ackall]; I remain. About 6 p. m. General M[ackall] sets out to find our camp; meets the general, and both go back to a field near road in rear of Polk, as skirmishing brisk. General J[ohnston] tells Governor Harris he will be ready for and happy to receive enemy next day. Wheeler comes up; cavalry falls back behind infantry. Dark ride to camp. By a muddy brook near General P[olk's] find supper ready and tents pitched. After supper General J[ohnston] walks over to General P[olk]. General M[ackall] and rest turn in. Soon General J[ohnston] sends word by courier to send him two of inspectors-general mounted; then one of Polk's staff officers brings word that all the staff must report mounted; I was directed to remain. General Mackall returned to camping-place, where most all staff waited until about

2 a. m., when they rode to Cartersville, passing trains and artillery parked in field; all hurried off without regard to order. Reach Cartersville before day, troops come in after day. General Johnston comes up—all hurried over bridges; great confusion, caused by mixing trains and by trains which crossed first parking at river's edge and others winding around wrong roads; about 2,000 wagons crowded on bank. General Mackall and staff reach Cartersville about 4 a. m., General J[ohnston] later; confusion, hurrying wagons and artillery across Etowah bridge. Supply train parked on plain on south side; two pontoon bridges, one wagon trestle bridge, one railroad bridge, wagons and artillery blocked up on road; trains mixed. Dust and heat, country rough and hilly, little water near railroad, army in line on north side. Wagons move toward Allatoona on two roads. After great delay trains remove out of range. In afternoon headquarters established near Moore's house (Hardee's headquarters), near a crossing of railroad and lower Allatoona road, one mile and a half from Allatoona. Etowah Iron Works—most valuable machinery, teams, wagons, and negroes removed by G. W. Smith. Bridges burned in p. m., including railroad bridge by mistake. Troops jaded, artillery and cavalry particularly; Georgia troops dropped off; all in pretty good spirits up to falling back from Cassville. Change of line not understood but thought all right, but night retreat after issuing general order impaired confidence; great alarm in country around. Troops think no stand to be made north of Chattahoochee, where supply train is sent. Governor Brown has ordered all militia to assemble at Atlanta."

General Garrard, of Sherman's cavalry, took possession of the covered bridge at Moss Bank, which was saved to the Federals, as was also an excellent main bridge across the Etowah, near Kingston. The works at Saltpetre Cave were also taken by Garrard. Following are Sherman's dispatches from Kingston to Washington, announcing Johnston's passage of the Etowah and his (Sherman's) future plans; the first under date of 19th: "We entered Kingston this morning without opposition, and have pushed a column east as far as Cassville, skirmishing the latter part of the day with Hardee's corps. The enemy has retreated south of the Etowah. To-morrow cars will move to this place,

and I will replenish our stores and get ready for the Chattahoochee. The railroad passes through a range of hills at Allatoona, which is doubtless being prepared for us; but I have no intention of going through it. I apprehend more trouble from our long trains of wagons than from the fighting, though, of course, Johnston must fight hard for Atlanta."

Kingston, Ga., May 20, 1864.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C.:

We have secured two bridges and an excellent ford across the Etowah. Our cars are now arriving with stores. I give two days' rest to replenish and fit up. On the 23d I will cross the Etowah and move on Dallas. This will turn the Allatoona Pass. If Johnston remains at Allatoona I shall move on Marietta; but, if he falls behind the Chattahoochee, I will make for Sandtown and Campbellton, but feign at the railroad crossing. General Davis's division occupies Rome, and finds a good deal of provisions and plunder, fine iron-works and machinery. I have ordered the Seventeenth Corps, General Blair, to march from Decatur to Rome. My share of militia should be sent at once to cover our lines of communication. Notify General Grant that I will hold all of Johnston's army too busy to send anything against him.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major-General.*

To which Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton replied: "Your telegram of this date reporting your operations and future plans has just reached here. It is proper to state that the movements of your army since the opening of the campaign, the vigor and success of your operations, merit and receive the admiration of the President, of this department, and of all loyal people, and are already inspiring the hearts of rebel sympathizers with dismay. For yourself, your officers, and troops, please accept renewed thanks."

## CHAPTER XXII

### NEW HOPE CHURCH AND DALLAS

Would Sherman come on to Allatoona? That was the question that most interested General Johnston as he lay at that stronghold, while his enemy gave his jaded troops three days' rest at Kingston. If so, the Confederate chieftain had no doubts as to the result. No more impregnable position was to be found between Chattanooga and Atlanta, and the Confederates hoped that, lured on by the belief that they were afraid to fight, Sherman would forget his cunning and hurl his hosts against the granite walls fortified by his enemy. But it was not to be. Sherman declared he had personal knowledge of Allatoona, acquired in 1844, and he gave the place a wide berth. Besides, he was in the flanking business, and not at all disposed to let Johnston choose his fighting ground.


From the Etowah river, Johnston sent this dispatch to the president of the Confederacy: "In the last eight days the enemy has pressed us back to this place, thirty-two miles. We kept near him to prevent his detaching to Virginia, as you directed, and have repulsed every attack he has made. On the 12th at Resaca my arrangements for an attack were defeated by his crossing a column at Calhoun close to my communications, and yesterday, having ordered a general attack, while the officer charged with the lead was advancing he was deceived by a false report that a heavy column of the enemy had turned our right and was close upon him, and took a defensive position. When the mistake was discovered it was too late to resume the movement."

There was consternation in Atlanta when it was known that Johnston had been pressed south of the Etowah. Everybody had expected a battle on the north bank of the river, and many were disposed to criticise the generalship of the Confederate command-

er-in-chief, averring that his tactics would bring Sherman's army before the gates of Atlanta, as sure as fate. Many others, on the other hand, declared Johnston was wisely carrying out a Fabian policy—the wisest to adopt under the circumstances—and that his army was getting stronger and stronger every day, while that of his adversary was getting weaker and weaker. As an example of the extent of the misconceptions entertained on that score, the following note written General Johnston by one of his engineers, M. Lovell, from Atlanta, toward the last of May, is given: “In company with Wayne I finished the examination to-day of the river as far as a mile below Sandtown (fifteen miles from here). There are two pontoon bridges at Baker's Ferry, but I think the point a bad selection, as there are two commanding heights within short range on the right bank of the river. Green's Ferry, two miles above, is far preferable, as the command is all in our favor, the ridge retiring on their side, so that the bank of the river ‘de-files’ the bridge from their fire, while on our side the elevations are within short range. The two ferries are about equally distant from Villa Rica, but Green's is two miles nearer to Atlanta, and has already a small protecting battery ready for guns. Shall try to-morrow to arrange with Wayne and General Wright for the protection by artillery and infantry of the various points examined, and which, in my judgment, it is necessary to protect. Wayne fully coincides with me. The head of the special service corps, an old acquaintance of mine, says that Sherman claims to have had 112,000 men at Chattanooga, but he only makes 105,000 of all arms. He states that their reports of losses are 13,000 in all the fights and maneuvers about Dalton, and 5,800 at Resaca. He sets down 10,000 sick, and his men report at least that number of stragglers. Their losses about Dallas he has no report of. We know them to be not less than 8,000 or 10,000 men. If these figures be true his army must be greatly diminished. Blair is coming along to relieve Sherman's garrisons and send them forward, as they were included in the 112,000.”

The defenses of Atlanta, made with considerable thoroughness the preceding winter, were strengthened the nearer Johnston approached to his base, and more militia were being continually brought to the city from other parts of the state. Brigadier-Gen-





Confederate Breastworks

Two miles northwest of city, on Howell's Mill Road



eral M. J. Wright, in command at Atlanta, was diligent in his efforts to make the city a fortress. On May 20th, the war authorities at Richmond wired him: "If you should consider the services of the local defense troops at Columbus and Macon, Ga., necessary, you are authorized to order them to report to you. The local troops at Augusta must not be removed from that place; they are necessary to the protection of the powder-works there."

On the 21st of May, the following orders providing for additional reinforcements to Johnston were issued by the Richmond war office:

XX. The following infantry force now serving under Maj. Gen. D. H. Maury, will forthwith proceed to Army of Tennessee and report to General Joseph E. Johnston: Quarles' brigade, Thirty-seventh Mississippi Volunteers, Thirtieth Louisiana Volunteers.

XXXIV. Colonel Anderson's cavalry regiment, now serving in Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, will proceed by highway, via Atlanta, Ga., and report to General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding Army of Tennessee.

About this time a controversy was raised between the war department and Lieutenant-General Polk over the number of reinforcements he had taken to Johnston from Alabama. Polk's corps numbered 14,000 men, and its withdrawal from the west was vigorously objected to by Major-General S. D. Lee and Major-General N. B. Forrest, who were not left with sufficient force to defend the western territory of the Confederate States. The Selma and Blue Mountain railroad was left unprotected by the withdrawal of Jackson's cavalry. Half of Roddey's force was therefore brought from Mississippi to Talladega. Strong Federal raiding parties were sweeping down upon Alabama, meantime.

While Sherman was resting around Kingston and Cassville, the cavalry of both armies continued very active, and there were daily skirmishes. Brigadier-General Ross, of the Texas cavalry, did some valuable scouting service along the banks of the Etowah. Forces were stationed at the south approaches of the remaining bridges and fords, with orders to defend or destroy the former.

On the 21st of May, General Johnston sent the following message to President Davis: "My dispatch of yesterday contained an error in statement. It should have read thus: In the last six days the enemy has pressed us back to this point, thirty-two miles. My arrangements were for an attack on the 15th, not on the 13th.

"Your dispatch of 18th was received yesterday. I know that my dispatch must of necessity create the feeling you express. I have earnestly sought an opportunity to strike the enemy. The direction of the railroad to this point has enabled him to press me back by steadily moving to the left and by fortifying the moment he halted. He has made an assault upon his superior forces too hazardous, and in making this retrograde march we have [not] lost much by straggling or desertion. The Fifty-seventh Georgia has arrived and all General Polk's troops are up."

While Sherman was inactive, he had reinforcements hurried down from Chattanooga to guard his long line of communications, many being raw recruits and militia. Until he could be relieved of guard duty, General Davis was directed to hold his division at Rome. On the 21st Sherman's cars were running to the Cassville depot. The saltpetre works were destroyed by his orders. Major-General F. P. Blair was ordered to come to Rome from Huntsville, Ala., with 10,000 infantry and artillery. The sick and wounded were sent to the rear by rail, as well as all "worthless men and idlers." The whole army was ordered to be ready to march by May 23d, stripped for battle, but equipped and provided for twenty days' subsistence, independent of the railroad. General Logan's pioneer corps was sent to Gillem's bridge to arrange for a crossing. On the evening of the 21st, General Sherman wired General Halleck: "Weather very hot and roads dusty. We, nevertheless, by morning, will have all our wagons loaded and be ready for a twenty days' expedition. I will leave a good brigade at Rome—a strong, good point; about 1,000 men to cover this point, but will keep no stores here to tempt an enemy until I have placed my army about Marietta, when I will cause the railroad to be repaired up to that point. I regard Resaca as the stronghold of my line of operations till I reach the Chattahoochee. I have ordered the Seventeenth Corps to march from Decatur to

Rome, and to this point, to act in reserve until I call it forward. Returned veterans and regiments have more than replaced all losses and detachments, and we move to-morrow with full 80,000 fighting men. General McPherson crosses the Etowah, at the mouth of Connasene Creek, on a bridge, and moves for Dallas, via Van Wert. General Thomas crosses by a bridge, four miles southeast of Kingston, and moves for Dallas, via Euharlee and Huntsville. General Schofield crosses near Etowah Cliffs, on pontoons, and takes position on Thomas's left. I allow three days to have the army grouped about Dallas, whence I can strike Marietta, or the Chattahoochee, according to developments. You may not hear from us in some days, but be assured we are not idle or thoughtless."

There is no doubt but that Atlanta was Sherman's objective, and that he was not going out of his way to hunt Johnston's army. He had determined to bear to the west in the vicinity of Dallas. His telegrapher wired his chief at Washington, on the 22d: "General Sherman's army will commence at daylight to-morrow movement against Atlanta, crossing Etowah in same order heretofore observed, General McPherson the right, General Thomas in center, and Schofield the left. All will be south of the Etowah by to-morrow night with twenty days' subsistence, which can be made, by foraging, to last fifty or sixty. Route not announced, and is not, I think, determined, but will be decided by disposition Johnston makes of his forces after we cross. Railroad will not be opened farther at present, and my orders are to await at Kingston orders from General Sherman or General Thomas, and be ready to follow when railroad or other route is secured. It is a race for Atlanta, and General Sherman hopes to win it or force battle this side. Army in splendid condition and spirits."

Following are Sherman's marching orders:

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS,      HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF MISS.,  
No. 11.      *In the Field, Kingston, Ga., May 22, 1864.*

I. General McPherson will cause the Seventeenth Army Corps, Major-General Blair commanding, to march from Decatur to Rome and Kingston, and will garrison Rome with a force of about 2,000 men until further orders. General Thomas will gar-

risson Kingston with a small force, say 1,000 men, well covered by earth-works or stone buildings. Resaca will be held strong, and will be the depot of supplies until further notice. Such stores and provisions will be kept forward at Kingston and Rome as can be moved by the wagons of the troops present and no more.

II. The several armies will move punctually to-morrow morning, provided, as hertofore ordered, by separate roads, aiming to reach the positions hereinafter assigned them in the course of the third day, and in the meantime each wing communicating freely with the center by cross-roads.

The Army of the Cumberland will move on Dallas by Eucharlee and Stilesborough, the division of General Jeff. C. Davis, now at Rome, marching direct for Dallas by Van Wert.

The Army of the Ohio will move for position on the left, via Richland Creek and Burnt Hickory, to a position on the right at or near the head of Pumpkin Vine Creek, south of Dallas.

III. Marietta is the objective point, and the enemy is supposed to be in force at Allatoona, but with cavalry all along the line of the Etowah. Henceforth great caution must be exercised to cover and protect trains.

By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Aide-de-Camp.*

Before leaving the north side of the river, expeditions from Schofield's corps destroyed the Confederate flour mills and the Etowah iron works. At Kingston, General Sherman received a very handsome horse from the quartermaster at Nashville, which he acknowledged in the following characteristic note: "Horse arrived all safe and sound. He looks well, and I will ride him to-morrow across the Etowah, which is the Rubicon of Georgia. We are now all in motion like a vast hive of bees, and expect to swarm along the Chattahoochee in five days."

At the same time Sherman acknowledged to Quartermaster-General Meigs, at Washington, that no army in the world was better provisioned and provided for in the way of creature comforts than his. In striking contrast to this satisfactory condition

was the condition of a large part of Johnston's army. A large per cent. of the men were ragged, and several thousand were actually barefoot. At least, some of the officers so reported. Johnston's quartermasters's stores were scant, and frequently his men marched on empty stomachs. They depended to a great extent on local supplies. Some of his deserters, when captured, claimed they had left the army from sheer hunger. In both armies the orders against private "foraging" were very strict.

Bright and early on the 24th, Sherman began the second stage of his march to Atlanta, and the vanguard of the Confederate army was not an hour behind in starting for the same destination, as the following orders to Hardee's corps will show :

ORDERS.]

HEADQUARTERS HARDEE'S CORPS,

*May 23, 1864—10 p. m.*

The command will move to-morrow, as follows: Bate's division at 2 a. m. to the church on the Dallas road. From that point General Bate will throw out one brigade one mile in advance on the Dallas road, and two brigades one mile on the Burnt Hickory road. He will remain in observation at this position until the whole column has passed, when he will bring up the rear. Cleburne's division will move at 3 a. m., to the church and thence on the Atlanta road. Walker's division will move at 4 a. m. and follow Cleburne. Cheatham's division will move at 5 a. m. and follow Walker.

Hood's and Polk's corps went west by different routes, it being intended to effect a concentration at New Hope Church, on the Dallas road. Before he started, Hood had the following address read for the inspiration of his command, company by company:

"The lieutenant-general commanding desires to say to the officers and soldiers of his command that in the coming battle their country expects of them victory. This corps must remember the glorious successes of our arms beyond the Mississippi; they must think of their comrades in Virginia, battling against overwhelming odds, and the triumphs which have crowned their efforts, and determine to be outstripped by none in such a course.

"So far, wherever you have engaged the enemy, you have repulsed him; our general has pride in the troops he has the honor



of commanding, and expects them to be victorious. Death is far preferable to defeat."

From Richmond orders came to the First Georgia Regiment, Colonel Olmsted, to proceed with the greatest possible expedition by railroad, via Atlanta, and report to General Johnston. On the 25th, Johnston wired President Davis: "The enemy crossed the Etowah near Stilesborough. We moved in this direction to intercept him and oppose his farther progress. Our cavalry have not ascertained definitely the route of his main body. The only infantry prisoner taken to-day shows Hooker opposite our right. Wheeler beat a brigade of cavalry at Cass Station yesterday. Captured 250 loaded wagons, brought off 80, and burned the rest. He brought in 158 prisoners."

Events developed with remarkable rapidity after the armies began to move. Late on the afternoon of the 25th, Hooker's whole corps was engaged with Hood's at New Hope Church, four miles east of Dallas. Hood formed his line with Hindman on the left, Stewart in the center, and Stevenson on the right. Stewart, who had suffered so severely at Resaca as the result of the tardy delivery of his superior's orders, bore the brunt of Hooker's assault the first day at New Hope Church. Polk's and Hardee's corps were stationed between Hood and the Atlanta road, which Hardee's left covered. As soon as Hood was found to be in force in Hooker's front, orders were hurried to Generals Butterfield and Williams to move their divisions up to Geary's support, which was done promptly, Williams massing on the right, and Butterfield on the left and rear. Each Federal division was quickly formed for attack in columns by brigades, Williams leading, Butterfield next, and Geary as a reserve.

The face of nature at New Hope Church belied the name of the locality. It was a forbidding region, wooded to the point of almost being a wilderness, the roads mere trails, and during the rainy season, then at hand, all but impassable. There never was stickier clay than that the struggling armies encountered around New Hope Church, and for days they literally wallowed in it. The ground was soaking wet with long-continued rains, and the air damp and mouldy smelling, as is peculiar to land that never feels the warmth of the sun. All the Federal commanders com-



ment on the gloomy environment of New Hope Church. It struck a chill to stout hearts, suggesting what it proved to be—a charnel. Sherman says: “The country was almost in a state of nature—with a few or no roads, nothing that a European could understand; yet the bullet killed its victim there as surely as at Sevastopol.” While the bloody charges were being made after nightfall on the 25th, in the depths of that dismal forest, a terrific thunder storm added the terror of nature’s artillery to that of man’s. Hooker’s repeated assaults were futile, but they were none the less desperate. The fatalities were many, especially in his leading division.

An investigator of the documentary evidence of the civil war, from the view-point of both sides, can but be struck by the conflicting testimony of antagonistic eye-witnesses, and their evident disposition to make things appear the best possible for their respective sides. This is noticeable in the reports of the pettiest officer and highest commander. No defeat is ever overwhelming, from the standpoint of the vanquished, and the best is invariably made of a situation, whatever the blunders committed. For this reason it is surprising and far from satisfactory to the historian, bent on an impartial presentation of facts, to carefully follow the reports of a sanguinary conflict, through a hundred or more technical pages, and at the conclusion of his labor be at a loss to know which side really got the better of it. In the first day’s conflict at New Hope Church, the preponderance of evidence is that Hooker met with a decided repulse, and yet we find his division and brigade commanders, in some instances, narrating with spirited adjectives how the enemy was driven back with slaughter and the ground held right up to the muzzle of his guns. General Johnston takes Sherman to task for not even referring to the opening engagements at New Hope Church in his “Memoirs.” Of Hooker’s unsuccessful assault that evening, the Confederate commander-in-chief says: “A little before 6 o’clock in the afternoon, Stewart’s division in front of New Hope Church, was fiercely attacked by Hooker’s corps, and the action continued two hours without lull or pause, when the assailants fell back. The canister shot of the sixteen Confederate field-pieces and the musketry of five thousand infantry at short range, must have inflicted heavy loss

upon General Hooker's corps, as is proved by the name 'Hell Hole,' which, General Sherman says, was given the place by the Federal soldiers."

The fighting in front of Stewart was of the deadliest character. The Federal general, Howard, speaking of the affair, says: "On that terrible night the nearest house to the field was filled with the wounded. Torch lights and candles lighted up dimly the incoming stretchers and the surgeons' tables and instruments. The very woods seemed to moan and groan with the voices of sufferers not yet brought in. Again and again, Hooker's brave men went forward through the forest, only to run upon log barricades thoroughly manned and protected by well-posted artillery." Brigadier-General Stewart, who withstood Hooker's repeated charges, says in his report: "On Wednesday evening, May 25, being in line of battle near New Hope Church—Baker's brigade on the right, Clayton's in the center, Stovall's on the left, Gibson's in reserve, except Austin's battalion, and the Sixteenth [Louisiana], under Colonel Lewis, who were in front as skirmishers—the enemy, after firing a few shells, advanced and attacked along my entire front. Baker's and Clayton's men had piled up a few logs, Stovall's Georgians were without any defense. The entire line received the attack with great steadiness and firmness, every man standing at his post. The fight began toward 5 o'clock and continued with great fury until after night. The enemy were repulsed at all points, and it is believed with heavy loss. The force opposed to us was reported by prisoners taken to be Hooker's corps, of three divisions, and their loss was stated at from 3,000 to 5,000.

"Eldridge's battalion of artillery, consisting of Stanford's, Oliver's, and Fenner's batteries, was admirably posted, well served, and did great execution. They had 43 men and 44 horses killed and wounded. Our position was such that the enemy's fire, which was very heavy, passed over the line to a great extent, which accounts for the fact that while so heavy a punishment was inflicted on the enemy, our own loss, between 300 and 400, was not greater. The calm determination of the men during this engagement of two and a half or three hours was beyond all praise. The enemy's advance seemed to be in three lines of division front

without artillery. No more persistent attack or determined resistance has anywhere been made. Not being allowed to advance and charge the enemy, we did not get possession of the ground occupied by the enemy, who intrenched, and during the two following days kept up a severe and galling skirmish fire, from which we suffered considerably, especially losing a number of valuable officers."

Brigadier-General Clayton, who held part of the line with Stewart, says: "A little before 5 p. m. my skirmish line was driven in, and the enemy soon made his appearance in force, engaging my whole line. Three lines of battle of the enemy came forward successively and in turn were successively repulsed. Men could not have fought better or exhibited more cool and resolute courage. Not a man except the wounded left his position. The engagement lasted uninterruptedly until night, or more than two hours, and when the enemy finally withdrew many of my men had their last cartridges in their guns."

Brigadier-General Williams, commanding the Federal advance columns, says in his report: "Receiving orders from the corps commander to put my division in order of attack, I deployed the division in three lines of brigade front. Two regiments were sent forward as skirmishers. The division, without sufficient halt to recover breath, moved promptly in advance for a mile and a half, driving the enemy before us and forcing back his strong skirmish line and heavy reserves at double-quick. It was quite dark when the column reached the foot of the slopes upon which the enemy were strongly entrenched and across which he threw shot, shell and canister in murderous volleys. During the advance the Second (Ruger's) Brigade passed lines with and relieved the Third (Robinson's), which was leading, and Knipe's (First) brigade in turn relieved a portion of Ruger's brigade, which had nearly exhausted its ammunition. The division forced its way close up to the enemy's works, but darkness, rendered doubly dark by dense clouds of pouring rain, put a stop to further efforts. Butterfield's and Geary's divisions relieved most of my division during the night, and in the morning it was placed in reserve within a few hundred yards of the enemy's works. The major-general commanding the corps followed the

advance brigade of my division in this attack, and I feel confident he will bear testimony to the steadiness and good order, perseverance, and spirit with which it went forward until darkness put an end to the conflict. The loss of the division in this attack was 102 killed, 639 wounded, 4 missing; total, 745."

At 9 o'clock that night, Sherman, in a message to McPherson, who had gone beyond Dallas, said: "Your position was exactly right on the theory that Thomas was to move straight on Dallas; but the enemy has taken position at a point on the road toward Marietta, three miles out from the town, and he burned the bridge leading to Dallas, but we saved one about one mile and a half lower down on a road that crosses over to the point named. I will make a sketch with this. We attacked him about 4:30 p. m., and had a pretty hard fight with two of Hooker's divisions. To-morrow early will renew the fight if the enemy has not disappeared in the night. Howard is now moving up on Hooker's left, and Schofield is near enough to extend still more to the left. I wish you to move into Dallas and then along the Marietta road till you hit the left flank. Use your artillery freely after you have developed his position. We are in dense woods, and see but little, but infer the enemy is behind hastily-constructed log barriers. I don't believe there is anything more than Hood's corps, but still Johnston may have his whole army, and we should act on that hypothesis. Try and communicate with me early. I will be near the battle-field along the road we are traveling. If Davis comes to Dallas use him as a reserve or send him to Palmer, who is at the bridge over Pumpkin Vine in rear of our position."

During the early morning hours of the 26th, the armies were getting into position around New Hope Church, preparatory to a decisive struggle. Schofield was badly injured by a fall from his horse, while trying to work his way through the black forest to Sherman's bivouac, and during the remainder of the battle Cox was in command of the Army of the Ohio. Fighting was not renewed on the 26th, and there was little skirmishing, the opposing armies being too busy intrenching. The Federals, with force enough for lines of extraordinary length, sought to reach the railroad. The Confederates, with inferior force and

insufficient intrenching tools, were not able to keep abreast of the enemy's work, endangering their lines from a possible flank movement in the direction of the railroad. Says Howard: "Now the enemy kept straightening his trench-barricades, which were so covered with thickets that at first we could scarcely detect them. As he did, so did we. No regiment was long in front of Johnston's army without having virtually as good a breastwork as an engineer could plan. There was a ditch before the embankment and a strong log revetment behind it, and a heavy 'top-log' to shelter the heads of the men. I have known a regiment to shelter itself completely against musketry and artillery with axes and shovels, in less than an hour after it reached its position."

On the morning of the 27th it was evident that Sherman intended to pass his armies to the left. Skirmishing became heavy in the forenoon, and as the day advanced it was apparent that a bloody collision was at hand. It came at half-past 5 o'clock. Of the battle that ensued, General Johnston says: "The Fourth Corps (Howard) and division of the Fourteenth (Palmer) attempted to turn our right, but the movement, after being impeded by the cavalry, was met by two regiments of our right division (Cleburne's), and the two brigades of his second line brought up on the right of the first. The Federal formation was so deep that its front did not equal that of our two brigades; consequently those troops were greatly exposed to our musketry—all but the leading troops on a hillside facing us. They advanced until their first line was within 25 or 30 paces of ours, and fell back only after at least 700 men had fallen dead in their places. When the leading Federal troops paused in their advance, a color-bearer came on and planted his colors eight or ten feet in front of his regiment, but was killed in the act. A soldier who sprang forward to hold up or bear off the colors was shot dead as he seized the staff. Two others who followed successively fell like him, but the fourth bore back the noble emblem. Soon after nightfall the Confederates captured about 200 prisoners in the hollow before them."


The story of Howard's and Palmer's stubborn assault on him that afternoon is thrillingly told by Cleburne, as follows: "About 4 p. m., hearing that the enemy's infantry in line of bat-



tle were pressing the cavalry on my right (they had already driven in my skirmishers), I placed Granbury on Govan's right. He had but just gotten into position, and a dismounted cavalry force, in line behind a few disconnected heaps of stones loosely piled together, had passed behind him, when the enemy advanced. He showed himself first, having driven back my skirmishers, in the edge of an open field in front of Govan, about 400 yards across, where he halted and opened fire. From the point on the ridge where Govan's right and Granbury's left met, there made off a spur, which, at about 100 yards from it, turned sharply to the northeast, running then in a direction almost parallel with it and maintaining about an equal elevation. Between this spur and the parent ridge, beginning in front of Granbury's left, was a deep ravine, the side of which next to Granbury was very steep, with occasional benches of rock up to a line within thirty or forty yards of Granbury's men, where it flattened into a natural glacis. This glacis was well covered with well grown trees and in most places with thick undergrowth. Here was the brunt of the battle, the enemy advancing along this front in numerous and constantly re-enforced lines. His men displayed a courage worthy of an honorable cause, pressing in steady throngs within a few paces of our men, frequently exclaiming, 'Ah! damn you, we have caught you without your logs now.' Granbury's men, needing no logs, were awaiting them, and throughout awaited them with calm determination, and as they appeared upon the slope slaughtered them with deliberate aim. The piles of dead on this front, pronounced by the officers in this army who have seen most service to be greater than they had ever seen before, were a silent but sufficient eulogy upon Granbury and his noble Texans. In the great execution here done upon the enemy, Govan with his two right regiments, disdaining the enemy in his own front, who were somewhat removed, and Key with two pieces of artillery ran by hand upon my order to a convenient breach made in our breastworks, materially aided Granbury by a right-oblique fire which enfiladed the masses in his front. In front of a prolongation of Granbury's line and abutting upon his right was a field about 300 yards square. The enemy, driving back some cavalry, at this point advanced completely across the field and passed some forty



or fifty yards in its rear. Here, however, they were confronted by the Eighth and Nineteenth Arkansas (consolidated), commanded by Colonel Baucum, hastily sent by Govan upon Granbury's request and representation of the exigency. In a sweeping charge Baucum drove the enemy from the ridge in his front, and with irresistible impetuosity forced him across the field and back into the woods, from which he had at first advanced. Here he fixed himself and kept up a heavy fire, aided by a deadly enfilade from the bottom of the ravine in front of Granbury. When Baucum was about to charge, Lowrey, of my division, who had been hastened up from his distant position upward of a mile and a half from my right as finally established, came into line, throwing his regiments in successively, as they unmasked themselves by their flank march. His arrival was most opportune, as the enemy was beginning to pour around Baucum's right. Colonel Adams, with the Thirty-third Alabama, which was the first of Lowrey's regiments to form into line, took position on Baucum's right and advanced with him, his seven left companies being in the field with Baucum, and his other four in the woods to the right. Baucum and Adams, finding themselves suffering from the enemy's direct and oblique fire, withdrew, passing over the open space of the field behind them. The right companies of Adams, which were in the woods, retired to a spur which rises from the easterly edge of the field about 200 yards from its southerly edge, where Baucum's and Adams's left companies rested. Here they halted. Captain Dodson, with fine judgment perceiving the importance of the position—it would have given the enemy an enfilading fire upon Granbury, which would have dislodged him—and making his company the basis of alignment for the remainder of Lowrey's, now coming into position. This retrograde movement across the field was not attended with loss as might have been expected, the enemy not advancing as it was made. It was mistaken, however, for a repulse, and some of my staff officers hearing that my line had broken hastened forward Quarles's brigade, of Stewart's division, just then providentially sent up by General Hood to re-establish it. Lowrey, being under the same impression, detached his two right regiments (which had not



Confederate Breastworks made in '64, now in the city limits

been engaged) under Colonels Tison and Hardcastle, and had them quickly formed in support of Baucum and Adams. The error, however, was soon discovered, and my line being ascertained to remain in its integrity, Quarles's brigade was conducted to the rear of Lowrey, and formed as a second line. The Fourth Louisiana, Colonel Hunter, finding itself opposite an interval between the two regiments of Lowrey's line (caused by Baucum's resting closer upon Granbury on his return from the advance, than he had done at first), under the immediate superintendence of General Quarles, advanced with great spirit into the field, halted, and delivered a very effective fire upon the enemy in his front. After some minutes Quarles withdrew this regiment and formed it behind the field, where they continued their fire across it. General Quarles and his brigade have my thanks. During these movements the battle continued to rage on Granbury's front, and was met with unflagging spirit. About the time of Quarles getting into position night came on, when the combat lulled. For some hours afterward a desultory dropping fire, with short, vehement bursts of musketry, continued, the enemy lying in great numbers immediately in front of portions of my line, and so near it that their footsteps could be distinctly heard. About 10 p. m. I ordered Granbury and Lowrey to push forward skirmishers and scouts to learn the state of things in their respective fronts. Granbury, finding it impossible to advance his skirmishers until he had cleared his front of the enemy lying up against it, with my consent, charged with his whole line, Walthall, with his brigade, from Hindman's division, whom I sent to his support, taking his place in the line as he stepped out of it. The Texans, their bayonets fixed, plunged into the darkness with a terrific yell, and with one bound were upon the enemy, but they met with no resistance. Surprised and panic-stricken, many fled, escaping in the darkness; others surrendered and were brought into our lines. It needed but the brilliancy of this night attack to add lustre to the achievements of Granbury and his brigade in the afternoon. I am deeply indebted to them both. My thanks are also due to General Lowrey for the coolness and skill which he exhibited in forming his line. His successive formation was the precise answer to the enemy's movement in extending his left to turn our

right. Time was of the essence of things, and his movement was the quickest. His line was formed under heavy fire, on ground unknown to him and of the most difficult character, and the stern firmness with which he and his men and Baucum's regiment drove off the enemy and resisted his renewed attacks without doubt saved the right of the army, as Granbury had already done before. . . . I had 85 killed, 363 wounded, carrying into the engagement 4,683 muskets. The enemy's loss was very heavy. The lowest estimate which can be made of his dead is 500. We captured 160 prisoners, exclusive of 72 of his wounded carried to my field hospital. He could not have lost in all less than 3,000 killed and wounded. I took upward of 1,200 small-arms."

This battle was fought at a place known as the "Pickett Settlement," about two miles northeast of New Hope Church. General Howard, who led the Federal assaulting columns, thus describes the conflict: "The advance commenced at 11 a. m. and in an easterly direction. The columns moved forward with very little interruption for nearly a mile. I thought we must have reached the enemy's flank, whereupon General Wood wheeled his command toward the right till he was faced nearly south. A brigade of the Twenty-third Corps, General McLean's, deployed so as to form a junction with General Wood on his right. The latter pressed forward his skirmishers till a large open field was reached. Here it was discovered that the enemy's works were still in our front. Immediately the skirmishers were withdrawn and the column moved rapidly by the left flank at least another mile to the eastward. The ground was carefully reconnoitered by General Wood and myself. We still found a line of works to our right, but they did not seem to cover General Wood's front, and they were new, the enemy still working hard upon them. I gave a little time for the troops of Wood's division to rest, and for Johnson to form a little retired on his (Wood's) left. From the position now occupied by the troops woods more or less open extended up to the enemy's apparent flank. A road skirted the woods opposite our right, running perpendicular to the enemy's lines. Another road ran obliquely toward the left and in rear of Johnson's position. McLean's brigade was sent to a place in

full view of the enemy's works, a little to the right of the point of attack, with a view to attract the enemy's attention and draw his fire. As soon as everything was in readiness, at about 5 p. m., General Wood commenced his advance, Hazen's brigade leading. The entire column marched briskly forward, driving in the enemy's skirmishers and vigorously assaulting his main line. Complaint came immediately that the supporting column under General Johnson was not far enough advanced. General Johnson was directed to push forward a brigade to Hazen's left. He answered that he was doing so, and that it would soon be in position. General Wood became very heavily engaged, so as to necessitate moving forward his supporting lines, and he found strong works to his front, except, perhaps, opposite his two left regiments. Colonel Scribner, who commanded General Johnson's advance brigade, finding his own left fired into from across Pickett's Mills creek, halted and threw some troops across it for his own protection. This delay occurring at precisely the same time with Wood's assault was unfortunate, for it enabled the enemy with his reserves to force back the left of General Wood's line and bring an enfilading and reverse fire upon his troops. Again by some mistake of orders, McLean's troops did not show themselves to the enemy, nor open any fire to attract his attention on General Wood's right, so that the enemy was able to pour a cross-fire of artillery and musketry into his right flank. Under these circumstances it soon became evident that the assault had failed, and the troops must be withdrawn with care in order to bring off our wounded, and to prevent a successful sally of the enemy from his works. General Johnson formed his troops in rear of and to the left of the entire position, while General Wood carefully withdrew his division and formed on a ridge farther to the right. General McLean having been requested to push farther to the right in order to make connection with the rest of the army, disregarded the request and moved off at once by the road, leaving these two divisions isolated. He (McLean) alleged in excuse that his men were entirely without rations. Our losses were very heavy, being upward of 1,400 killed, wounded, and missing in General Wood's division alone. Though the assault was repulsed, yet a position was secured near Pickett's



Mills of the greatest importance to the subsequent movements of the army, and it has been subsequently ascertained that the enemy suffered immensely in the action, and regarded it as the severest attack made during this eventful campaign. Johnson and Wood made strong entrenchments during the night. General Johnson received quite a severe wound from a shell and was obliged to leave his command the next morning. During this movement and fighting on the left, Stanley and Newton made strong demonstrations in their respective fronts. At 4 p. m. the enemy tried their lines, from which he was driven back with a loss."

On the morning of the 28th General Johnston informed Richmond of his situation, as follows: "We are still confronting the enemy here. On the afternoon of the 25th Major-General Stewart was attacked by Hooker's corps, which he repulsed with considerable loss, and yesterday afternoon Howard's corps attacked Major-General Cleburne's position, and was defeated with slaughter. Both these affairs terminated at the close of the day. The Federal army has been approaching the railroad by entrenchments for the last three days at the rate of about a mile a day."

At the same time Sherman wired Washington: "The enemy discovered my move to turn Allatoona, and moved to meet us here. Our columns met about one mile east of Pumpkin Vine Creek, and we pushed them back about three miles to the point where the roads fork to Allatoona and Marietta. Here Johnston has chosen a strong line, and made hasty but strong parapets of timber and earth, and has thus far stopped us. My right is Dallas, center about three miles north, and I am gradually working round by the left to approach the railroad anywhere in front of Acworth. Country very densely wooded and broken. No roads of any consequence. We have had many sharp, severe encounters, but nothing decisive. Both sides duly cautious in the obscurity of the ambushed ground."

Major-General McPherson, who was confronting Lieutenant-General Hardee at Dallas, was ordered by Sherman to work his line to conform to the general movement to the left and connect with Hooker. He was too far away, the line between him and the rest of the army being attenuated and liable to disaster. To carry out this order involved moving his whole corps under



Hardee's guns. In giving the order Sherman remarked: "If the enemy comes out of his works, I understand you can whip him easily." The enemy did come out of his works. Shortly before 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 28th, Hardee, believing that McPherson intended to abandon his position, determined to prevent the movement and moved his whole corps forward to the assault, which was repulsed with much loss on the Confederate side. Hardee's action, however, resulted in the postponement of McPherson's intended movement. The Confederate assault was a terrific one, being mainly directed against the corps of Logan and Dodge. It was thus described in Logan's report:

"The 28th opened with rapid skirmishing, which continued until 3.30 o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy (afterward ascertained to be Hardee's entire command, estimated by prisoners to be 25,000) made determined assaults in columns of regiments, on the most assailable positions along our entire front. The first assault was on Harrow, and was made directly down the line of the Villa Rica road, the weakest point in our whole position. The road there runs directly up the backbone of a ridge, which curved continuously to our right and constantly increased in height. It had been considered impracticable to carry our line far enough forward across this ridge to overcome this objectionable point, without weakening it too much elsewhere in thus adding to its length. The enemy at this point approached within 150 yards, without even having been seen or exposed to our fire. His assault was made in columns of regiments, and with the utmost dash and confidence. Three guns of the First Iowa battery which had been run out on the skirmish line, were temporarily surrounded by the enemy. They cannot be said, however, to have been in his possession, as the few who attempted to lay hands on them were shot down. The fighting at this point was close and deadly. As line upon line of the enemy debouched upon the open plateau, within eighty yards of our works, they were met by a front and flank fire from brave men, who stood unflinchingly to their guns, under the orders of their efficient officers. Colonel Walcutt, commanding the brigade engaged, stood on the parapet, amid the storm of bullets, ruling the fight. Line after line was

sent back broken to their works, and in half an hour the assault was over, their dead and wounded only occupying the ground on which they advanced. The assault on Smith's division commenced a few minutes after that on Harrow, and that on Osterhaus being less favorable for the enemy than that on Harrow's front, they were repulsed very handsomely, and with great loss, though they held on for some time tenaciously, but uselessly. Their dead and severely wounded were mostly left on the field. The engagement, from first to last, lasted about one hour, our troops in many places following the enemy, in their retreat, to their works. My losses were as follows: Killed, 30; wounded, 295; missing, 54; aggregate, 379. We captured 97 prisoners. The loss of the enemy was estimated at 2,000. We buried of the enemy's dead in my front over 300 bodies."

General Dodge said in his report: "Heavy skirmishing was kept up constantly until 4 p. m. of the following day (May 28), when the enemy, massed in heavy columns, under cover of the timber, made a sudden assault upon our line. The first assault was promptly repulsed, but rallying and reforming his lines, he again, with increased force and impetuosity, charged and contested strongly for the possession of the works, many of his dead and wounded being left within fifty yards of our lines, some, indeed, on the works. Three officers and a few enlisted men only succeeded in getting inside the works; they were either killed instantly or captured. This assault, although most desperate and determined, was promptly and gallantly met and repulsed. Welker's battery, Lieut. A. T. Blodgett, Thirty-ninth Iowa Infantry, commanding, being in a position on the front line, did most excellent execution; its constant fire of grape and canister, and the cool, steady fire of the men on the front line, told heavily upon the enemy, causing him to fall back in confusion, leaving his dead and many wounded in our hands. The men of my command engaged, being behind strong works which covered them, my loss was very small, while that of the enemy in my front was very large, especially in killed. One of my regiments (Sixty-sixth Indiana Infantry) having in its front alone, and within a few yards of the works, found and buried 53 dead rebels."

On the 29th General Sherman thus explained the status of affairs to General Halleck at Washington: "Yesterday we pressed

our lines up in close contact with the enemy, who has covered his whole front with breast-works of timber and earth. With the intention of working to my left, toward the railroad, east of Allatoona, I ordered General McPherson, who is in advance of Dallas and forms my right, to send his trains to a point on Pumpkin Vine Creek about four miles north of his present position, and to withdraw his army and take Thomas's present position, while all of General Thomas's and General Schofield's armies will be moved farther to the east, working around the enemy to the left. The enemy, who had observed the movement of the trains from his higher position, massed against General McPherson and attacked him at 4.30 p. m. yesterday, but was repulsed with great slaughter and at little cost to us. The enemy fled back to his breast-works on the ridge, leaving in our hands his dead and wounded. Loss, 2,500 and about 300 prisoners. General McPherson's men being covered by log breast-works, like our old Corinth lines, were comparatively unhurt, his loss being not over 300 in all. I give him to-day (Sunday) to gather in the wounded and bury the dead of both sides, and to-night and to-morrow will endeavor to gain ground to our left three or four miles. General Blair is now supposed to be near Rome. I will order him to march straight for Allatoona, which I infer the enemy has abandoned altogether, or left in the hands of militia. That point gained I will move to the left and resume railroad communications to the rear. I have no doubt Johnston has in my front every man he can scrape, and Mobile must now be at our mercy, if General Canby and General Banks could send to Pascagoula 10,000 men."

On the night of the 28th General Schofield reported that the enemy made several very spirited attacks upon his lines, endeavoring to regain the position for his line of skirmishers from which he was driven during the day. Sherman ordered Schofield to hold firm, even to the hazard of a general engagement, remarking that he could fight an attack there as well as anywhere. He, however, disliked to be thrown upon the defensive, but declared the best policy was to encourage Johnston to attack wherever possible. He proposed to bring McPherson up on the 30th, in order that Thomas might occupy all the front, embracing the

several Allatoona and Acworth roads. Upon leaving for McPherson's front, Sherman said to Thomas: "It is utterly impossible that our enemy can hold his line in strength, and we must work to the left. There is no absolute necessity for undue haste as time will give us the advantage of General Blair's troops. I will go in person to Dallas, and after inspecting the ground, will begin the movement, and see if the enemy will attempt to sally and then judge whether we had not better draw him on and fight him. We must not remain on the defensive."

At the same time Sherman dispatched Halleck: "To move General McPherson up to the center he has to make a retrograde of a mile or so, owing to difficult ground. Every time he attempted to withdraw, division by division, the enemy attacked his whole line, as also points of our main line. It may be on the theory that we wanted to draw off altogether. These assaults were made in the night, and were all repulsed with comparatively small loss to us, but seemingly heavy to the enemy. If we can induce the enemy to attack us, it is to our advantage. Do not expect us to make much progress toward the Chattahoochee till General Blair comes up and moves into Allatoona Pass."

A general battle was planned for the 29th by General Johnston. He places the responsibility for its non-occurrence upon Hood, in the following remarkable statement: "In the afternoon of the 28th Lieutenant-General Hood was instructed to draw his corps to the rear of our line in the early part of the night, march around our right flank, and form it facing the left flank of the Federal lines, and obliquely to it, and attack at dawn—Hardee and Polk to join in the battle successively as the success on the right of each might enable him to do so. We waited next morning for the signal—the sound of Hood's musketry—from the appointed time until 10 o'clock, when a message from that officer was brought by an aide-de-camp to the effect that he had found W. R. Johnson's division intrenching on the left of the Federal line and almost at right angles to it, and asked for instructions. The message proved that there could be no surprise, which was necessary to success, and that the enemy's intrenchments would be completed before we could attack. The corps was therefore recalled. It was ascertained afterward *that after*

*marching eight or ten hours, Hood's corps was then at least six miles from the Federal left, which was little more than a musket-shot from his starting point."*

Sherman declared on the 30th of May: "The use of the Acworth road is what we must fight for." He was disappointed because Blair had not reached Rome with his corps from Huntsville. It was his intention to have him take and garrison Allatoona. He therefore changed his plans, ordering Stoneman and Garrard, two of his most dashing cavalry leaders, to make a raid at once upon Allatoona. In explanation of his plan he wrote McPherson: "As Blair cannot be expected as soon as I contemplated I must use the cavalry to secure Allatoona Pass. It should move by a road outside of the one traveled by Dodge's division, which goes to Owen's Mill. If the enemy follows he will do so cautiously, and I feel no doubt will be easily repulsed. I want Hooker relieved as early in the day as possible to give Schofield time to attack on our extreme left. As soon as the cavalry secures the Allatoona Pass, I will relieve them by infantry and recall the cavalry to our flanks."

On the first of June General Stoneman sent word from Allatoona that he had arrived without molestation and had a strong position which he could hold against any reasonable force. Sherman at once ordered the railroad put in condition for operation between Kingston and Allatoona, intending to make the latter place an impregnable central point of his North Georgia campaign. The same day McPherson succeeded in bringing his corps to New Hope Church, without serious interference on Hardee's part, his divisions occupying the trenches vacated by Hooker and Schofield, who were scheduled to advance upon the Acworth road, supported by McCook's cavalry. The plan was for Schofield to divide Johnston's forces by his movement in the direction of Burnt Hickory. Sherman expected battle to follow out the Acworth road.

On the 2d of June Sherman sent the following information to the war department: "Yesterday General McPherson moved up from Dallas to the point in front of the enemy at New Hope Church, and Generals Schofield and Hooker were shifted to the extreme left. To-day they pushed forward in a heavy rain and



thunder storm, and have advanced about two miles toward Marietta. At the same time I sent General Stoneman's cavalry directly to Allatoona and General Garrard's cavalry to the western end of the pass, both of whom reached their points and secured possession of the pass. So our movement has secured to us that pass which was considered a formidable one. I have ordered the railroad to be repaired, and will gradually move across by the left of the railroad. The country is most difficult, being of dense undergrowth and short steep ridges of flinty stone. Thus far we have had no real battle, but one universal skirmish extending over a vast surface."

Sherman still continued working steadily by the left to reach the railroad without too badly weakening his line. On the 3d Schofield got into the Acworth road, and some of McCook's cavalry were in the town of Acworth. Schofield's orders were to work well around the flank of the enemy to the east, unless it was possible to force it without too heavy loss. Hooker was in close support, and Thomas was ordered to keep up the connection. To McPherson, who was holding the chief attention of the enemy at New Hope Church by a perpetual skirmish, Sherman sent this word: "If you hear sounds of battle, you will know that naturally Johnston will draw from his left (to your front) on the theory that we are there on the defensive. Therefore, when you do hear sounds of battle, hold the enemy there, or take advantage of his weakening that flank." In the meantime, Sherman was growing very impatient about the tardy arrival of Blair. He needed reinforcements to cover the immense scope of territory to be included in his extended lines. The Confederates did not have force enough to begin to keep abreast of his breastworks extension to the left, as it was. Of this unequal condition, which finally resulted in compelling him to make a nearer approach to Atlanta, General Johnston says: "The extension of the Federal intrenchments toward the railroad was continued industriously to cut us off from it or to cover their approach to it. We tried to keep pace with them, but the labor did not prevent the desultory fighting, which was kept up while daylight lasted. In this the great inequality of force compelled us to employ dismounted cavalry."



To General Braxton Bragg, of the war department at Richmond, General Johnston sent this message on the 1st of June: "Since my last dispatch of May 28 our position was unchanged until to-day. To-day the enemy is moving his forces from his right to his left. We are making a corresponding movement to our right. Prisoners and the report of citizens represent his cavalry and transportation animals in a suffering condition. In every respect this army is in a healthy condition. In partial engagements it has had great advantage, and the sum of all the combats amounts to a battle. Reports from several sources represent reinforcements of 7,000 or 8,000 men on their way from Decatur, Ala., to General Sherman. They are said to be of the Seventeenth Army Corps, from the West."

There was comparative inactivity for a day or two, the half-drowned and worn out soldiers exchanging desultory shots in the drenching rain from their muddy rifle-pits. Sherman wired Washington on the 4th: "My left is now well around, covering all roads from the south to the railroad about Acworth. My cavalry has been at Acworth, and occupies in force all the Allatoona Pass, and I have ordered the railroad to be finished across the Etowah up to Allatoona bridge. General Blair is not yet at Rome, but is hourly expected, and I await him to push on to Marietta and the Chattahoochee. It has been raining for three days, making roads bad and swelling all the small mountain creeks, which, however, are easily bridged, and run out very soon. It is still raining. As soon as I hear of General Blair I will swing east by north over to the railroad, leaving Johnston to my right. He is in force, occupying blind and difficult ground, and we continue skirmishing along the whole front, each party inviting the other to attack."

The next day Johnston had made his retrograde movement, and Sherman informed the authorities at the national capital as follows: "The enemy discovering us creeping round his right flank, abandoned his position and marched off last night. We captured about 30 of their pickets at daylight. General McPherson is moving to-day for Acworth, General Thomas on the direct Marietta road, and General Schofield on his right. It has been raining hard for three days, and the roads are very heavy. The

construction party is at work on the Etowah bridge, and should repair it in five days, when I will move on to Marietta. I expect the enemy to fight us at Kennesaw Mountain, near Marietta, but I will not run head on his fortifications. An examination of his abandoned lines here shows an immense line of works, all of which I have turned with less loss to ourselves than we have inflicted on him. The wheat-fields of the country are our chief supply of forage, and we have in camp bread, meat, sugar, and coffee for many days—ample till the railroad will be complete to Acworth."

## CHAPTER XXIII

### INCH BY INCH

For a period of three weeks, from the retirement of Johnston from his position at New Hope Church and Dallas to his greatest battle at Kennesaw Mountain, the movements of the opposing armies are well characterized by the title of this chapter. But little and comparatively unimportant ground was yielded by the Confederates, and that worth having had to be fought for. And all the while it rained to an extent that made operations doubly difficult and painful. The streams were swollen beyond the passage of artillery and wagon trains, necessitating bridging at the fords. It seemed that nature was doing everything in her power to intensify the horrors of war. The soldiers lay day and night in slippery, slimy trenches, wet to the skin and much of the time numbed with cold, for the weather was very raw. As a natural result of such exposure and hardship, hundreds were sent to the hospital. Scurvy was prevalent, and wounds quickly developed gangrene. The woods were seemingly interminable, a natural condition unfavorable to decisive combat. It was a sharpshooters' fight during these weary, dismal days, and many brave men yielded up their lives on the skirmish line.

It being apparent that the invasion of Georgia could only be checked by the rallying of her citizens en masse across the enemy's path, Governor Brown made repeated efforts to aid Johnston by repeated levies of militia, concentrated at Atlanta and the approaches to the city for many miles. On June 4th Johnston received notice from Governor Brown that he had organized a division of 3,000 state troops under Major-General G. W. Smith, which had been placed at the disposal of the Confederate com-

mander. Johnston instructed General Smith to so dispose his force as to most effectually guard the bridges and fords of the Chattahoochee leading to Atlanta. In the meantime, the work of fortifying Atlanta progressed with vigor.

Johnston was badly in need of more regulars to enable him to prolong his lines, but his repeated requests for reinforcements met with discouraging responses from Richmond. His need was more pressing after the arrival of Blair at Kingston on the 6th. As he was situated, he could only retard, not prevent, Sherman's persistent flanking operations. As matters stood, Sherman had only to run out his line beyond his opponent's capacity to meet the move, when flanking could only be prevented by a retrograde movement on the latter's part. Johnston's lines were remarkably thin at New Hope Church, constantly inviting assault in the weakest places. Nothing but a sweeping victory in battle could have prevented the Union general's steady movement to the east. General Bragg appreciated Johnston's situation, but declared himself powerless to help it. He addressed a note to President Davis on June 4th, touching the matter, in which a detailed list of Sherman's strength, present and shortly prospective, was embodied. In this note General Bragg said: "The condition of affairs in Georgia is daily becoming more serious, and though the enemy there has for a few days been quiet, I fear it is only to avail himself of heavy reinforcements. . . . Should all these forces concentrate on the Army of Tennessee we may well apprehend disaster. As the entire available force of the Confederacy is now concentrated with our two main armies, I see no solution of this difficulty but in victory over one of the enemy's armies before the combination can be fully perfected, &c."

As the Federal army moved cautiously toward Acworth, the Confederate army was contracted in a way calculated to best cover the roads leading from that place to Atlanta. In the language of Johnston: "This brought the left of Hardee's corps to Gilgal church, Polk's right near the Marietta and Acworth road, and Hood's corps massed beyond that road."

The movements and purposes of Sherman, after he discovered Johnston had left his front, can better be understood by reproducing his field orders, as follows:

SPECIAL HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,  
 FIELD ORDERS, *In the Field, on Little Allatoona Creek,*  
 No. 18. *Ga., June 4, 1864.*

I. To-morrow, June 5, unless the enemy display more force and activity than now, Major-General McPherson will send his wagons to Burnt Church, on the Allatoona road, by a road to the rear of Major-General Thomas's road, and move with his command by both roads to a point north of and near Burnt Church, ready the next day to move to Acworth, leaving his wagons behind Allatoona Creek.

II. Major-General Thomas will refuse his right behind the creek on which Brown's Mill is located, and will prepare to move across Allatoona Creek to a point of the railroad in front of Acworth, say Big Shanty.

III. Major-General Schofield will strengthen his position and so dispose of his wagons as to follow Major-General Thomas and with his troops cover his movements and occupy the point on Allatoona Creek north and east of his present position.

IV. Allatoona will be the point of supply as soon as the railroad bridge can be completed, and, in the mean time, all trains and detachments at Kingston or Burnt Hickory will be directed to Allatoona, to which end Major-General Thomas will send his pontoons there, to be laid down until the pier and railroad can be rebuilt.

By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Aide-de-Camp.*

At noon of the 6th Sherman telegraphed Halleck: "I am now on the railroad at Acworth station and have full possession forward to within six miles of Marietta."

And on the day following: "I have been to Allatoona Pass, and I find it admirable for our purposes. It is the gate through the last, or most eastern, spur of the Alleghanies. It now becomes as useful to us as it was to the enemy, being easily defended from either direction. My left (General McPherson) now lies on the railroad in front of Acworth, seven miles southeast of Allatoona; center (General Thomas) three miles south, on main

Marietta road; and right (General Schofield) two miles farther, a little refused. The cars now come to the Etowah River and we have sent back to replenish our supplies for a ten-days' move, to commence on Thursday, the 9th instant. Colonel Wright reports it will take him ten days, of which eight yet remain, to have cars come to Acworth. General Blair was at Kingston last night, and will be across the Etowah to-night, and will be up with us to-morrow. We have three pontoon bridges at Etowah. I will leave a brigade in the pass covering the bridge and its eastern *debouché*, and have sent Captain Poe, U. S. Engineers, to lay out the work. The roads here into Georgia are large and good, and the country more open. The enemy is not in our immediate front, but his signals are seen on Lost Mountain and Kennesaw. I have had the cavalry at Allatoona Pass to get forage, but on the 9th will bring it forward. Colonel Long's brigade is with Blair, and will re-enforce our cavalry by 2,000 horses. I send you by mail to-day copies of my orders up to date, with Atlanta papers of the 5th."

On the 8th General Johnston informed Richmond: "Our scouts report the enemy extending to our right and massing on the railroad between Acworth and Big Shanty. We are moving to meet this, and our line, extended across the railroad, runs from Gilgal Church to the north of the Kennesaw Mountain."

On the 10th Johnston ordered Col. M. H. Wright, in command of the ordnance department, at Atlanta, to put the engineers and negro laborers engaged on the fortifications of Atlanta to work on a strong line of defenses on the north bank of the Chattahoochee. These defenses were ready for the defenders of Atlanta before the battle of Kennesaw Mt. was fought, and they were made with much engineering skill and thoroughness of labor. A large force of slaves was employed in the work. The sight of the negroes, stripped to the skin and crooning a quaint refrain as the picks struck and the red dirt flew from their shovels, was a picturesque one. The larger part of them were loyal to "Marse Johnston," and their songs referred to the heroics of war.

Johnston now determined to attempt a diversion, if possible, by attacking the enemy's communications far to the rear with



such cavalry as he could possibly spare from his front or as could be collected from other sources. He urged the importance of such a move in strong force upon the war authorities, suggesting that it promised results that would justify bringing Forrest over for that purpose. This being impossible, he sought to get such outside help as he could. To Major-General S. D. Lee, at Meridian, Miss., he telegraphed: "I respectfully urge the importance to the cause of breaking the railroad between Dalton and the Etowah. Your troops can do no other service so valuable to the country." In the meantime he detached small forces of cavalry, which could ill be spared.

On the 11th Johnston wired Bragg: "Since the last dispatch no change has taken place in our position beyond slight extension to the right to correspond with the movements of the enemy. The enemy's forces seem to be collected around Big Shanty. Scouts inform us that he is rapidly completing the Etowah railroad bridge."

On the 9th Sherman was prepared to move aggressively upon Kennesaw Mountain, as the following field orders show:

SPECIAL

FIELD ORDERS,

HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,

No. 21.

*In the Field, Acworth, Ga., June 9, 1864.*

The armies will move forward to-morrow morning.

I. Major-General Thomas the center, on the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road and such other roads as he may choose between the Acworth and Marietta roads, aiming to strike the northern end of Kennesaw Mountain.

II. Major-General McPherson will move by the Acworth and Marietta road, with a column following the railroad and his cavalry well to the left, after passing Big Shanty.

III. Major-General Schofield will cover his wagons well about Mount Olive Church, and feel well with cavalry and skirmishers down the road past Hardshell Church, to ascertain the enemy's strength about Lost Mountain and the ridge connecting it with Kennesaw Mountain. He will not pass the position about Hardshell Church in force until he is certain Major-General Thomas has reached some point on Kennesaw.

IV. The object will be to develop the enemy's position and strength, and to draw artillery fire from his intrenched works. This army will operate by heads of columns instead of deployed lines of battle, each column covering his head and flanks with good advance and flanking skirmishers, and be prepared to deploy promptly, according to danger. Intrenched positions will not be attacked without orders. Each head of column will have a good battery of heavy rifled artillery, and should use it freely against rail and log barricades, and also to indicate the positions of heads of columns. The flank columns will conform their motions to that of the center. Either column reaching a good military position should intrench it by leaving a brigade, but should not delay its advance.

V. Major-General Stoneman's cavalry will cover the right and Brigadier-General Garrard's the left flanks. Brigadier-General McCook's cavalry should be kept to the rear, or to keep up communications.

VI. The movement will begin at 6 a. m., and continue until some one of the columns reaches Kennesaw Mountain or until the center is checked.

By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,

*Aide-de-Camp.*

The next day Sherman informed Washington that his cavalry had developed the position of the enemy in a line along the hills from Kennesaw to Lost Mountain, and that his army was now marching by three roads, all toward Kennesaw, with the intention of feeling the enemy's position in force, prepared to attack or turn it. At 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 10th, Stanley's brigade, of Howard's division, came into collision with the enemy, and in compliance with field orders, moved straight against his works upon a hill in front. The hill was carried, after a stout resistance, and held against two charges of the Confederates in rapid succession. Learning that Johnston had a small cavalry force up around Calhoun, cutting his telegraph wire and burning railroad ties, Sherman ordered Garrard to move out on the Roswell Factory road, until he had passed Brush Mountain, and then

turn south and threaten, if not attack, the railroad between Marietta and the Chattahoochee river. Three regiments of infantry were ordered down to Resaca from Chattanooga to keep the railroad clear of raiders in that vicinity. The work of developing Johnston's lines went on in the meantime. On the 11th, Sherman informed the war department: "Johnston is intrenched on the hills, embracing Lost Mountain, Pine Hill, and Kennesaw. Our lines are down to him, but it has rained so hard and the ground is so boggy that we have not developed any weak point or flank. I will proceed with due caution and try to make no mistake. The Etowah bridge is done and a construction train has been to our very camps. Supplies will now be accumulated in Allatoona Pass, or brought right up to our lines. One of my chief objects being to give full employment to Johnston, it makes but little difference where he is, so he is not on his way to Virginia."

Of the slow operations during this rainy, discouraging period, General Howard said: "Slowly, with skirmishes and small combats, for the most part in dense woods, we continuously advanced. On my front we seized the skirmish holes of the enemy, made epaulements for batteries there, and little by little extended our deep ditches or log-barricades close up to Johnston's. As we settled down to steady work again, McPherson was near Brush Mountain, having pushed down the railroad. F. P. Blair's corps (the Seventeenth) from Huntsville, Ala., had now joined him, making up for our losses, which were already, from all causes, upward of 9,000. This accession gave heart to us all. Thomas was next, advancing and bearing away toward Pine Top, and Schofield coming up against the salient angle near Gilgal Church. To tell the work of these two opposing hosts in their new position is a similar story to the last. There was gallant fighting here and there all along the lines. Here it was that batteries, opening fire under the direct instruction of Sherman, drove back the enemy from the exposed intrenchments on Pine Top. It was at this time that General Polk was killed. McPherson, by overlapping Hood, skirmished heavily, and captured the Fortieth Alabama regiment entire. Schofield, brushing away the cavalry, penetrated between Lost Mountain and Gilgal Church,

put his artillery on a prominent knoll, and, with rapid discharges, took Hardee in reverse."

The killing of Lieutenant-General Polk cast gloom over the Confederate army. On the morning of the 14th, Generals Johnston, Hardee and Polk, accompanied by a number of staff officers, rode to the summit of Pine Mountain to decide if the outposts there should be maintained. The group, standing out prominently against the sky-line in an open space, attracted the attention of the Union artillerists at once, and the Parrotts of a battery a quarter of a mile in front were trained upon it. The generals had concluded their examination, and after deciding to abandon the hill that night, were turning to leave, when the shots from the battery in question began to pass uncomfortably close to them. At the third shot General Polk reeled in his saddle and fell heavily to the ground without uttering a sound. Death had been instantaneous, the great ball entering his chest from left to right, tearing his lungs out. Major-General W. W. Loring succeeded to the command of Polk's corps. The Union Army learned of Polk's death as soon as the calamity was known to the Confederate Army, the signal from Pine Mountain announcing the tragedy being read by the enemy. During this period the Federals were in possession of the entire Confederate signal code and used the knowledge to the best advantage.

Sherman was carefully studying Johnston's position on Kennesaw and Lost Mountains, with the view to adopt some plan to dislodge or draw him out of his position. He was unwilling to risk the heavy losses of an assault at such a distance from his base, unless as the last alternative. On the 15th, General Hascall, of Schofield's corps, pushed forward his right and succeeded in turning the enemy's left, while Cox advanced his center. Some sharp fighting ensued, and that flank of the Federal Army gained some ground. Pine Mountain had been abandoned during the preceding night, and the ground Schofield took had been left exposed in consequence. McPherson, at the same time, carried a hill to his left front, capturing the Fortieth Alabama regiment, 320 strong. Thomas pushed the enemy back in his front for a distance of a mile and a half, trying to gain possession of the Dallas and Marietta road. Hooker and Howard, his able lieu-

tenants, moved under a hot skirmish fire close up to the main Confederate works and fortified. Severe fighting occurred on the high ridge south of Pine Mountain, connecting Kennesaw with Lost Mountain. General Geary's division conducted the center of the assault at this point, which did not result in breaking the Confederate lines. Geary reported his loss at 519.

On the 16th Sherman telegraphed General Halleck at Washington: "General Thomas did not make the progress last night I expected. He found the enemy strongly intrenched on a line slightly advanced, from a slight line connecting Lost Mountain and Kennesaw. I have been along it to-day, and am pressing up close. Shall study it, and am now inclined to feign on both flanks and assault the center. It may cost us dear, but in results would surpass an attempt to pass around. The enemy has a strong position and covers his roads well, and the only weak part of his game is having the Chattahoochee to his rear. If, by assaulting, I can break his line, I see no reason why it would not produce a decisive effect. I know that he shifts his troops about to meet our supposed attacks and thereby fatigues his men, and the woods will enable me to mask our movements."

On the same day Johnson wired Richmond: "Since my last dispatch the enemy has, as usual, been approaching by fortifying. I can find no mode of preventing this. I repeat the suggestion that the cavalry in Alabama be put in the enemy's rear."

Before daylight on the 17th, Johnston fell back to a new line, prepared in advance, just behind Mud Creek. He did not shift his right wing, however. The Federals lost no time in following. "Just where the old lines joined the new," said General Howard, "I saw a feat the like of which never elsewhere fell under my observation. Baird's division, in a comparatively open field, put forth a heavy skirmish-line, which continued such a rapid fire of rifles as to keep down a corresponding hostile line behind its well-constructed trenches, while the picks and shovels behind the skirmishers fairly flew, till a good set of works was made four hundred yards distant from the enemy's and parallel to it. One of my brigades (Harker's), by a rush, did also a brave and unusual thing in capturing an intrenched and well-



defended line of the enemy's works and taking their defenders captive. Again, another (Kirby's) brigade, having lost Bald Hill in a skirmish, retook it by a gallant charge in line, under a hot fire of infantry and artillery, and intrenched and kept it."

After he discovered Johnston's move, Sherman changed his plans slightly to conform to it. He proposed to have Thomas push the enemy's center and try to get on the Marietta and Vin- ing's Bridge road, to the rear of Marietta. His purpose was to get between Johnston and Atlanta without uncovering his own base. To Thomas he said: "I want you, in case Johnston maneuvers outside of intrenched lines, to press him close up, whilst I cause McPherson and Schofield to strike him in some exposed point."

On the night of the 17th Sherman sent this message to Washington: "By last night we had worked so close to Johnston's center that he saw that the assault must follow. He declined it, and abandoned Lost Mountain, and some six miles of as good field-works as I ever saw. My right and center are, in consequence, swung forward so that my right now threatens his railroad to Atlanta. I worked hard to-day to get over to that road, but the troops seem timid in these dense forests of stumbling on a hidden breast-work. I therefore simply report good progress to-day, some hundred prisoners, and but few lives lost. We begin to find more fields and cleared land. McPherson still faces Kennesaw, covering our railroad. General Thomas is on a curved line from Kennesaw, around to where the Sandtown road forks off from the lower road from Dallas to Marietta, and Schofield is massed on the Sandtown road, head of column at Noyes' Creek. Enemy still holds Kennesaw in force, and lies back of Noyes' Creek, near the Atlanta road."

Promptly the Army of the Cumberland advanced its right about three miles, swinging upon its left as a pivot, and simultaneously the Army of the Ohio, on the extreme right, moved about four miles, across Noyes' Creek. McPherson made heavy demonstrations on Johnston's right to assist the advance of the other two corps. Johnston had lost hold of Lost Mountain and the broken ground between it and Kennesaw Mountain, and Sherman's lines now enveloped the former mountain from north-east to south. Most of the work was being done by artillery.



The following letter, written by General Sherman to General Grant, under date of the 18th, is of unusual interest as bearing on the Atlanta campaign :

IN THE FIELD, *June 18, 1864.*

[General U. S. GRANT:]

DEAR GENERAL: I have no doubt you want me to write you occasionally letters not purely official, but which will admit of a little more latitude than such documents possess. I have daily sent to Halleck telegraphs which I asked him to report to you, and which he says he has done. You, therefore, know where we are and what we have done. If our movement has been slower than you calculated I can explain the reason, though I know you believe me too earnest and impatient to be behind time. My first movement against Johnston was really fine, and now I believe I would have disposed of him at one blow if McPherson had crushed Resaca, as he might have done, for then it was garrisoned only by a small brigade, but Mc. was a little over cautious lest Johnston, still at Dalton, might move against him alone; but the truth was I got all of McPherson's army, 23,000, eighteen miles to Johnston's rear before he knew they had left Huntsville. With that single exception McPherson has done very well. Schofield also does as well as I could ask with his small force. Our cavalry is dwindling away. We cannot get full forage and have to graze, so that the cavalry is always unable to attempt anything. Garrard is over-cautious and I think Stoneman is lazy. The former has 4,500 and the latter about 2,500. Each has had fine chances of cutting in but were easily checked by the appearance of an enemy. My chief source of trouble is with the Army of the Cumberland, which is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a plowed field will stop the whole column, and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried to impress on Thomas that we must assail and not defend; we are the offensive, and yet it seems the whole Army of the Cumberland is so habituated to be on the defensive that, from its commander down to the lowest private, I cannot get it out of their heads. I came out without tents and ordered all to do likewise, yet Thomas has a headquarters camp on the style of Halleck at Corinth; every aide and orderly with a wall-tent, and a

baggage train big enough for a division. He promised to send it all back, but the truth is everybody there is allowed to do as he pleases, and they still think and act as though the railroad and all its facilities were theirs. This slowness has cost me the loss of two splendid opportunities which never recur in war. At Dallas there was a delay of four hours to get ready to advance, when we first met Johnston's head of column, and that four hours enabled him to throw up works to cover the head of his column, and he extended the works about as fast as we deployed. Also here I broke one of his lines, and had we followed it up as I ordered at daylight, there was nothing between us and the railroad back of Marietta. I ordered Thomas to move at daylight, and when I got to the point at 9.30, I found Stanley and Wood quarreling which should not lead. I'm afraid I swore, and said what I should not, but I got them started, but instead of reaching the Atlanta road back of Marietta, which is Johnston's center, we only got to a creek to the south of it by night, and now a heavy rain stops us and gives time to fortify a new line. Still I have all the high and commanding ground, but the one peak near Marietta, which I can turn. We have had an immense quantity of rain, from June 2 to 14, and now it is raining as though it had no intention ever to stop. The enemy's cavalry sweeps all round us, and is now to my rear somewhere. The wires are broken very often, but I have strong guards along the road which make prompt repairs. Thus far our supplies of food have been good, and forage moderate, and we have found growing wheat, rye, oats, etc. You may go on with the full assurance that I will continue to press Johnston as fast as I can overcome the natural obstacles and inspire motion into a large, ponderous, and slow (by habit) army. Of course, it cannot keep up with my thoughts and wishes, but no impulse can be given it that I will not guide.

As ever, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN.

The lines of battle of the contending armies were in close contact night and day, and here and there over the wide field there occurred desperate, though unnamed, engagements. Johnston held his ground stubbornly, risking as little as possible by

coming out of his trenches, which were constantly swept by a storm of Federal projectiles. In places the lines were not more than a pistol shot apart, and either side could hear the other's conversation and slightest movement. The Federals were at a decided disadvantage, crowding up as they were under the strongly posted batteries of the Confederates, and their losses were naturally much heavier than the Confederate's. Frequently they hurled themselves boldly against the works in front, only to find them impossible to be carried by direct assault. Baffled, they dropped back a few feet to their "head-logs" and waited. The while it rained almost without intermission.

On the night of the 18th, Johnston again changed the greater part of his line, still holding Kennesaw Mountain as the apex of his position. He threw back his flank and abandoned all his works in front of that commanding eminence, and the next morning his flanks were behind Noonday and Noyes' Creeks. Straight against him Sherman pressed. Schofield bridged Noyes' Creek and advanced with determination. Hooker and Howard kept hammering away. On the 20th, General Stanley charged a hill in his front and took it, with a number of prisoners. The pioneers had only time to throw up a few rails when the Confederates advanced in strong force to repossess their line. Three times they were charged and were repulsed, the loss on both sides being heavy. The third charge carried a part of the Federal line, but the assailants were compelled to retire before the reinforcements hurried to the breach. Another adjoining hill was carried by the Federal brigade of Kirby, but the Confederates drove him back with loss. The next day the brigade, supported by the advance of General Woods's division, recovered the position. There were some lively cavalry tilts all around the field. Jackson's cavalry made a gallant stand to delay the Federal advance, while the army was shifting its position, and a portion of Wheeler's command worsted a portion of Garrard's command, on the 21st. In the meantime, some spirited raiding was going on in the rear.

Sherman sent the following tidings to General Halleck on the 21st: "This is the nineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of clear weather as far off as ever. The roads are impassable, and

fields and woods become quagmires after a few wagons have crossed, yet we are at work all the time. The left flank is across Noonday and the right across Noyes' Creek. The enemy hold Kennesaw, a conical mountain, with Marietta behind it, and has retired his flank to cover that town and his railroad. I am all ready to attack the moment weather and roads will permit troops and artillery to move with anything like life."

Sherman had an exaggerated idea of the enemy's cavalry operations in his rear, thinking that Wheeler had gone across the Etowah in force. His military sense told him that his opponent's wisest move would be to seriously cripple the Federal communications, and he read the reports of the daily small raids with anxiety. He said to Thomas: "I have an idea that Johnston is holding on to cover the return of his cavalry. I hardly think he will fight us on anything like equal terms with the Chattahoochee behind him." Johnston was holding on with the hope that Richmond would act upon his advice and send a strong force from the west, preferably under command of Forrest, to break Sherman's railroad effectually. And at the same time he was conserving and wisely disposing the force under him. On the 21st he informed Richmond: "The situation is not essentially changed since my last dispatch. The enemy are apparently strengthening and extending their right on a line running generally north and south. On our right Wheeler yesterday, with 1,100 cavalry from Allen's, Anderson's, and Williams's brigades, Harrison's regiment, and a battery of artillery, attacked Garrard's division of cavalry; drove it from the field, killing 30 or 40, capturing as many more. The continued heavy rain has made the roads almost impassable. Military operations off them next to impossible."

On the night of the 21st, Hood, who had been massed opposite McPherson, made a forced march and suddenly appeared on Johnston's other flank, fronting Hooker and Schofield. This move, Johnston afterwards explained, was necessary because of the extension of the Federal line to the south, protected by the swollen condition of Noyes' Creek. General Wheeler was ordered to hold the Confederate right, and his cavalry dismounted and occupied the trenches vacated by Hood. On the 22d, Hood

attacked the enemy in his front. This was the "Battle of Kolb's Farm," speaking of which and Hood, Howard said: "With his know method of charging and firing, he delivered there a desperate attack." This engagement resulted disastrously to the Confederates and failed in its purpose. The orders under which Hooker and Schofield were acting are explained by the following note from Sherman to Thomas, dated on the morning of the battle: "I have ordered Schofield to cross his whole command over Noyes' Creek, and turn the head of his column up toward Marietta, until he reaches Hooker, to support and co-operate on his right, but to keep his cavalry and a part of his rear infantry on the Sandtown road, prepared to regain it in case the enemy show signs of let go. I fear we will get our commands too close, but I suppose Schofield can find room to deploy south of the Powder Springs and Marietta road. You may order Hooker to extend to that road and leave Schofield beyond. If he can get possession of the ground up to Mrs. Kolb's I wish him to do so, and the balance of your line to conform."

It was at the battle of the 22d that Hooker received a reproof from Sherman for signalling that he was uneasy about his right flank, which Schofield had orders to protect, thus inferentially criticising the latter, who was prepared to fully comply with his instructions. Hooker took the reproof very much to heart, and his enmity against his superior officer, then incurred, culminated in his resignation before the fall of Atlanta. Hooker's field report of the conflict at Kolb's Farm, written at midnight after the occurrence, was as follows: "I have the honor to report that the operations of the Twentieth Corps commenced with throwing forward Geary's division and driving away the rebels from some commanding heights about a mile in advance of my center. When this was accomplished batteries were posted to sweep the ground to the left to enable Butterfield to advance about the same distance and take possession of some wooded heights, which were held by the enemy, as it was believed that the possession of them would give us command of the Dallas and Marietta road, and that in rear of the enemy in front of the Fourth Corps. Meanwhile Williams threw forward his right flank, driving the enemy before him, step by step, between two and three



miles, to the Kolb house, on the Powder Springs and Marietta road, his left connecting with Geary. This was the position of the corps at 2 o'clock. Soon after Hascall's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, came up on the Powder Springs road, and as it was yet early an effort was made to push the right still farther forward on the last-named road, as it was thought some advantage would be gained by establishing ourselves on some high ground beyond. General Knipe threw forward a force on the road, and also skirmishers on the left, while Major-General Schofield advanced a similar column from the Twenty-third Corps on the right. Before advancing far they encountered the enemy in force, and in order to gain time to establish our lines and batteries the advanced troops were instructed to make a resolute defense, and only abandon their position when overcome by superior numbers. About 4.30 p. m. the enemy had deployed his lines and commenced throwing his masses forward with great violence on our right and center, which was madly persisted in until after sundown. As often as he made his assaults he was spiritedly repulsed, sometimes with his columns hopelessly broken and demoralized. Our artillery did splendid execution among them. At this hour I have no means of estimating his loss or my own. The enemy's must be severe; ours inconsiderable for the number of men engaged and the heavy blow they gave to the enemy. After his troops were routed it was my desire to pursue, but the smallness of my force available for the service would not justify the movement. The conduct of the troops throughout the day was sublime."

General Schofield's general report refers briefly to Kolb's Farm, as follows: "On the 22d we crossed the creek in force. General Cox advanced on the Sandtown road to the intersection of the Powder Springs and Marietta road, at Cheney's, and intrenched that position. General Hascall moved toward Marietta and connected with the right of the Twenty-third Corps at Kolb's. While reconnoitering with General Hoker, with a view to advancing our troops to a more desirable position, we discovered that the enemy was advancing in heavy force to attack us; our troops were therefore ordered to intrench the position they then held as rapidly as possible, while the Fourteenth Kentucky, of



General Hascall's division, which was covering the reconnaissance, was ordered to hold the enemy in check to gain time for the troops to prepare for defense. This gallant regiment detained the enemy an hour and a half, and only retired to the main line when ordered to do so, contesting stubbornly every foot of ground. The enemy now advanced in mass in front of General Hascall and General Hooker's right, but was quickly repulsed with heavy loss by the fire of our infantry and artillery in position. As soon as the advance of the enemy was discovered General Cox was ordered forward with three brigades, leaving the fourth to hold the position at Cheney's, and took position in reserve upon the right."

Hood dismisses this battle in a report of two or three lines. He said, after relating the experience of his corps at New Hope Church: "Nothing of importance occurred on my line while in this position, save that on the 22d of June the divisions of Stevenson and Hindman attacked the enemy, driving him from two lines of works and capturing some prisoners belonging to Schofield and Hooker."

General Johnston wrote of the affair: "On the 22d, General Hood reported that Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions of his corps, having been attacked, had driven back the Federal troops and had taken a line of breastworks, from which they had been driven by the artillery of the enemy's main position. Subsequent detailed accounts of this affair prove that after the capture of the advanced line of breastworks General Hood directed his two divisions against the enemy's main line. The slow operation of a change of front under the fire of the artillery of this main line subjected the Confederates to a loss of one thousand men—whereupon the attempt was abandoned, either by the general's orders, or by the discretion of the troops."

The report of General Hindman could not be found, but General Stevenson says: "My division had for one or two days previous to the 22d of June been lying in reserve on the extreme left of the infantry of the army, about three miles from Marietta, on the Powder Springs road. About 12 m. I moved the command farther from Marietta and halted it at Mount Zion Church. The enemy, as I moved forward, were driving in the cavalry.

About 2.30 p. m. I was directed to take position on the left of General Hindman's division, about half a mile in advance of the church. I at once advanced my skirmishers, and, driving those of the enemy, established my line under fire of his artillery. Brown's and Cumming's brigades formed the first line, Reynolds's and Pettus's the second. The men hastily constructed breast-works of logs and rails. Soon afterwards I received orders to advance from my position and drive the enemy on the road toward Manning's Mill. The division of General Hindman was also directed to advance on my right. I placed General Cumming in charge of the first line—Brown's and Cumming's brigades, commanded by Cols. Ed. C. Cook (Thirty-second Tennessee) and E. P. Watkins (Fifty-sixth Georgia), respectively, and General Pettus in charge of the second line—Reynolds's and Pettus's brigades, commanded by Cols. R. C. Trigg (Fifty-fourth Virginia) and C. M. Shelley (Thirtieth Alabama), respectively. A good deal of time was occupied in getting and giving instructions and making the necessary preparations. About 5 p. m. we advanced and soon struck the enemy, driving him quickly before us from his advanced works, which consisted of one line of logs and rail works complete, and one partially constructed. The fire under which this was done was exceedingly heavy, and the artillery of the enemy, which was massed in large force and admirably posted, was served with a rapidity and fatal precision which could not be surpassed. The nature of the ground over which we passed was most unfavorable to such a movement—the two right brigades moved for much of the way over open fields, the two left through dense undergrowth. The line thus became more irregular and broken every moment, and when the two right brigades had driven the enemy into their main works the line was so much broken and mixed up that, although the men were in good spirits and perfectly willing to make the attempt, it was not deemed practicable to carry the works by assault. The commands were halted and the best possible line, under the circumstances, formed. Brown's and Trigg's (Reynolds's) brigades lay in a swampy ravine within pistol-shot of the enemy's works; the other two brigades held the road on their left. The dead and wounded were all removed to the rear, and after holding our position for several

hours, in compliance with the orders of General Hood, the division returned to its old position. With perhaps some few exceptions the conduct of the troops was highly creditable.

"My loss was heavy—807 killed and wounded."

While the battle at Kolb's Farm was in progress, Sherman ordered McPherson to leave a light force to cover his flank and throw the remainder rapidly, and as much out of view as possible, to the Federal right. He was told to be prepared for rapid action on the next morning, so disposing matters that the big guns on Kennesaw would do as little mischief as possible. McCook, who had taken a force of his cavalry to the Chattahoochee with the intention of effecting a crossing, if practicable, returned with the report that the fords were all too strongly guarded and that the enemy had a complete chain of defenses clear to the river.

On the evening of the 23d, General Sherman sent this explanation of the situation to Washington: "We continue to press forward, operating on the principle of an advance against fortified positions. The whole country is one vast fort, and Johnston must have full fifty miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finished batteries. We gain ground daily, fighting all the time. On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near the southeast of Kennesaw, from which the enemy attempted in vain to drive him, and the same day General T. J. Wood's division took a hill, which the enemy assaulted three times at night without success, leaving more than 100 dead on the ground. Yesterday the extreme right (Hooker and Schofield) advanced on the Powder Springs road to within three miles of Marietta. The enemy made a strong effort to drive them away, but failed signally, leaving more than 200 dead on the field. Our lines are now in close contact and the fighting incessant, with a good deal of artillery. As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all ready, but I think he will soon have to let go Kennesaw, which is the key to the whole country. The weather is now better, and the roads are drying up fast. Our losses are light, and, notwithstanding the repeated breaks of the road to our rear, supplies are ample."

On the 22d General Johnston asked the assignment of Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell to his army. The following day

word came from Richmond that Major-General A. P. Stewart had been appointed lieutenant-general to command the corps of the late Lieutenant-General Polk. On the 24th Johnston informed Bragg of the engagement at Mrs. Kolb's farm, as follows: "Lieutenant-General Hood, on our left, reports that, being attacked on the afternoon of the 22d, he drove back the enemy, taking one entire line of his breast works. The pursuit was stopped by exposure to fire of fixed batteries. Stevenson's division mainly engaged; Hindman's slightly. Brisk skirmishing on Hardee's front much of the day yesterday, and a good deal of cannonading on Loring's."

It was now on the eve of the bloody battle, or rather, battles, of Kennesaw Mountain. Sherman had intended to evade that impregnable stronghold, and doubtless it was one of his lifetime regrets that he did not do so. He might have broken through Johnston's lines, or made a wide flank movement, as he did in the case of Allatoona. When he did finally reach the Chatahoochee, it was without having carried the heights of Kennesaw. The following note of Sherman to Thomas, dated the 24th, presages the great battle that was to follow: "Schofield reports he can't go ahead for the enemy and his intrenchments, and is far outflanked. I suppose the enemy, with his smaller force, intends to surround us. But I propose to study the ground well, and the day after to-morrow break through, after letting him develop his line as much as possible and attenuate. According to Blair his right is now at Roswell Factory, and according to Schofield his left is more than a mile to his right, across Olley's Creek; so our best chance is to break through. I am just making orders on this subject, which I wish kept to army commanders for the present. Railroad and telegraph again broken between Dalton and Tunnel Hill. McPherson had a column one mile and a half to his left front on the Bell's Ferry road, and is now feeling Kennesaw. Hooker and Schofield will advance along the Powder Springs road as soon as they come."

## CHAPTER XXIV

### KENNESAW MOUNTAIN

Speaking of the conditions immediately preceding the battle of Kennesaw Mountain, General Howard wrote: "Again, by the gradual pressure against Johnston's right and left, Sherman forced him to a new contraction of his lines. This time it was the famous Kennesaw position that he assumed. With his right still at Brush Mountain, he extended a light force over the crest of the Kennesaws, and placed a heavier one along the southern slope, reaching far beyond the Dallas and Marietta road. He drew back his left and fortified. The whole line was stronger in artificial contrivances and natural features than the cemetery at Gettysburg. The complete works, the slashings in front, and the difficulties of the slope toward us under a full sweep of cross-fire, made the position almost impregnable. For reasons similar to those which influenced Lee to strike twice for Little Round Top, Sherman ordered an assault here with the hope of carrying the southern slope of Kennesaw, or of penetrating Johnston's long front at some weak point."

Pending the great battle, both armies drew in their lines, contracting them as closely as possible around Marietta. Their skirmishers were constantly in close contact, each side watching closely for a favorable opening. June 25th, Davis's division, of Palmer's corps, being on the extreme left of Thomas, was relieved by troops from General McPherson's army and moved to a position in reserve, behind the right of Howard's line. This change was effected after dark, and by daylight on the 26th Davis's troops had reached the position assigned them. Baird's division, of Palmer's corps, being relieved by troops of the Army of the Tennessee, was also withdrawn from its position in line in front of Kennesaw Mountain and moved during the night of the

26th to a position in reserve near that occupied by Davis's troops. On the 24th General Logan attempted to gain the summit of the mountain with a double line of skirmishers, the opinion of his superiors being that the position was only held by a strong skirmish line of the enemy. The skirmish line advanced in good order, at each step meeting with stronger resistance, until it had gained a point within 200 yards of the crest, when it was seen that a further advance could not possibly be made without reinforcements. No order being sent him to continue the advance, Logan caused his skirmishers to be withdrawn to a position nearer the main line, where they were protected by skirmish-pits. This movement proved the Confederates to be in possession of the mountain in force, which fact it was intended to develop. Schofield tried in vain to overreach the Confederate left, and was at a deadlock for a time. On the 26th Reilly's brigade of Cox's division, pushed forward from Cheney's, on the Sandtown road, and drove the enemy across Olley's Creek, where the latter had held strong ground, with artillery in position. All the while artillery played freely from the fronts of both armies.

The field orders under which the battle of Kennesaw Mountain was fought were as follows:

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,  
No. 28. *In the Field, near Kennesaw Mountain,*  
*June 24, 1864.*

The army commanders will make full reconnaissances and preparations to attack the enemy in force on the 27th instant, at 8 a. m. precisely. The commanding general will be on Signal Hill, and will have telegraphic communication with all the army commanders.

I. Major-General Thomas will assault the enemy at any point near his center, to be selected by himself, and will make any changes in his troops necessary by night, so as not to attract the attention of the enemy.

II. Major-General McPherson will feign by a movement of his cavalry and one division of infantry on his extreme left, approaching Marietta from the north, and using artillery freely, but will make his real attack at a point south and west of Kennesaw.



III. Major-General Schofield will feel well to his extreme right and threaten that flank of the enemy with artillery and display, but attack some one point of the enemy's line as near the Marietta and Powder Springs road as he can with prospect of success.

IV. All commanders will maintain reserve and secrecy, even from their staff officers, but make all the proper preparations and reconnaissances. When troops are to be shifted to accomplish this attack the movements will be made at night. At the time of the general attack the skirmishers at the base of Kennesaw will take advantage of it to gain, if possible, the summit and hold it.

V. Each attacking column will endeavor to break a single point of the enemy's line, and make a secure lodgment beyond, and be prepared for following it up toward Marietta and the railroad in case of success.

By order of Maj-Gen. W. T. Sherman.

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

General Sherman, on the 25th, thus explained his intentions to the war department: "I have nothing new to report. Constant skirmishing and cannonading. I am making some changes in the disposition of our men, with a view to attack the enemy's left center. I shall aim to make him stretch his line until he weakens it and then break through. Johnston has made repeated attempts to break our road in the rear, and has succeeded in two instances, which were promptly repaired. General Steedman, at Chattanooga, reports that General Pillow approached from the south with 3,000 men, but was met at LaFayette by Colonel Watkins and repulsed. Full details not yet received. I think the arrangements to protect our rear are ample as against any probable danger."

In compliance with the orders heretofore quoted, the storming of the two Kennesaws began promptly at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 27th, the attack being directed against the Confederate center and right. General Thomas was charged with the impossible task of taking the former position, and General McPherson the latter. Thomas commanded two attacks, one opposite General Loring's left, and the other in front of General

Cheatham. Newton's division led Howard's assault, and Davis that of Palmer. Logan's corps, representing McPherson, advanced straight against the mountain. The story of the battle is a thrilling one, and while the reports of the leaders who waged it seem tame, by their simple statement of details, the most important ones are quoted as being more authentic than mere pen-pictures. Before giving the reports of the field officers, the reader will be given an opportunity to graphically comprehend the assault at every stage, while in progress, through the reproduction of a few of the telegrams passed between Generals Sherman and Thomas. Sherman had nearly twenty miles of field telegraph wire stretched from position to position over the wide field at Kennesaw Mountain, and it took but a few minutes to apprise him of every move made in any quarter. Here is the telegraphic story of Thomas's attacks:

Thomas (8 a. m.)—"The movement of my troops against the enemy's works has commenced."

. . . . .

Sherman (8.30)—"Everything moving well on this flank. Schofield reports the same. Push your troops with all the energy possible."

. . . . .

Thomas (9.30)—"General Howard reports that he has advanced and is doing well. I have not yet received report from Palmer."

. . . . .

Sherman (9.50 a. m.)—"All well. Keep things moving."

. . . . .

Thomas (10.45)—"Yours received. General Harker's brigade advanced to within twenty paces of the enemy's breast-works and was repulsed with canister at that range, General Harker losing an arm. General Wagner's brigade, of Newton's division, supporting General Harker, was so severely handled that it is compelled to reorganize. Colonel Mitchell's brigade of Davis's division, captured one line of rebel breast-works, which they still hold. McCook's brigade was also very severely handled, nearly every colonel being killed or wounded. Colonel McCook wound-

ed. It is compelled to fall back and reorganize. The troops are all too much exhausted to advance, but we hold all we have gained."

. . . . .

Sherman (11.45 a. m.)—"McPherson's column reached near the top of the hill through very tangled brush, but was repulsed. It is found almost impossible to deploy, but they still hold the ground. I wish you to study well the position, and if it be possible to break the line, do it; it is easier now than it will be hereafter. Hold fast all you make. I hear Leggett's guns well behind the mountain."

. . . . .

Sherman (1.30 p. m.)—"McPherson and Schofield are at a dead-lock. Do you think you can carry any part of the enemy's line to-day? McPherson's men are up to the abatis and can't move without the direct assault. I will order the assault if you think you can succeed at any point. Schofield has one division close up on the Powder Springs road, and the other across Olley's Creek, about two miles to his right and rear."

. . . . .

Thomas (1.40 p. m.)—"Davis's two brigades are now within sixty yards of the enemy's two entrenchments. Davis reports that he does not think he can carry the works by assault on account of the steepness of the hill, but he can hold his position, put in one or two batteries to-night, and probably drive them out to-morrow morning. General Howard reports the same. Their works are from six to seven feet high and nine feet thick. In front of Howard they have a very strong abatis. Davis's loss in officers has been very heavy. Nearly all the field officers in McCook's brigade, with McCook, have been killed or wounded. From what the officers tell me I do not think we can carry the works by assault at this point to-day, but they can be approached by saps and the enemy driven out."

. . . . .

Sherman (2.25)—"Secure what advantageous ground you have gained; but is there anything in the enemy's present position that if we should approach by saps would hinder him throwing up fresh parapet faster than we could reach him?"

. . . . .

Thomas (2.40)—“Your dispatch of 2.25 received. We still hold all the ground we have gained and the division commanders report their ability to hold it. They also report the enemy’s works exceedingly strong; in fact, so strong that they cannot be carried by assault except by immense sacrifice, even if they can be carried at all. I think, therefore, the best chance is to approach them by regular saps, and if we can find a favorable position to batter them down. We have already lost heavily to-day without gaining any material advantage; one or two more such assaults would use up this army.”

. . . . .

Sherman (6.20)—“Schofield has gained the crossing of Olley’s Creek on the Sandtown road; the only advantage of the day. You may order all ground of value gained to-day to be secured, and prepare batteries in the manner proposed by Davis. I doubt if we can resort to regular approaches.”

. . . . .

Thomas (8.15)—“The assault on the enemy’s works in my front was well arranged, and the officers and men went to their work with the greatest coolness and gallantry. The failure to carry them is due only to the strength of the works and to the fact that they were well manned, thereby enabling the enemy to hold them securely against assault. We have lost nearly 2,000 officers and men, among them two brigade commanders, General Harker, commanding a brigade in Newton’s division, and Col. Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade in Jeff. Davis’s division, both reported to be mortally wounded, besides some 6 or 8 field officers killed. Both General Harker and Colonel McCook were wounded on the enemy’s breastsworks, and all say had they not been wounded we would have driven the enemy from his works. Both Generals Howard and Palmer think that they can find favorable positions on their lines for placing batteries for enfilading the enemy’s works. We took between 90 and 100 prisoners.”

. . . . .

Sherman (8.40)—“Let your troops fortify as close up to the enemy as possible. Get good positions for artillery, and group your command as conveniently as you can by corps and divisions, keeping reserves. Schofield has the Sandtown road within

eleven miles of the Chattahoochee, and we could move by that flank. The question of supplies will be the one. I regret beyond measure the loss of two such young and dashing officers as Harker and Dan. McCook. McPherson lost 2 or 3 of his young and dashing officers, which is apt to be the case in unsuccessful assaults. Had we broken the line to-day it would have been most decisive, but as it is our loss is small, compared with some of those East. It should not in the least discourage us. At times assaults are necessary and inevitable. At Arkansas Post we succeeded; at Vicksburg we failed. I do not think our loss to-day greater than Johnston's when he attacked Hooker and Schofield the first day we occupied our present ground."

. . . . .

Sherman (9 p. m.)—"Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our railroad? It would bring matters to a crisis, and Schofield has secured the way."

. . . . .

Thomas (9.15)—"How far is Fulton from the crossing of Olley's Creek? Will we have to cross any other streams of much size? When do you wish to start?"

. . . . .

Sherman (9.30)—"According to Merrill's map, it is about ten miles. Nickajack the only stream to cross. Time for starting, day after to-morrow."

. . . . .

Thomas (9.40)—"What force do you think of moving with? If with the greater part of the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised."

. . . . .

Sherman (9.45)—"If we move on Fulton, we must move with the whole army, leaving our railroad on the chance of success. Go where we may, we will find the breastworks and abatis, unless we move more rapidly than we have heretofore."

. . . . .

Sherman (9.50)—"Will see you to-morrow. In meantime, make such preparations as you can."

From the foregoing it will be seen that Sherman had decided to abandon his attack on Kennesaw almost while it was in progress, and had determined to dodge Johnston—something he might have done with less hard experience. Upon the night of the 27th the corps commanders received orders to make immediate preparations for the move by the way Schofield had battered open, with ten days' supply of provisions and forage. They were enjoined to adopt every means in their power to move with celerity. Schofield's position was regarded as the key to the proposed movement to the Chattahoochee. He reported that the ground gained by General Cox overlooked the Nickajack valley and seemed to control the ridge between the two creeks, so that the enemy could not extend his line along that ridge without displacing Cox. Schofield wired that his position threatened the enemy's left rear and seemed to be more important than he had at first supposed. He added: "I think it should be held by my whole force, if you propose to operate in that direction." Sherman ordered him to hold fast.

The reports reaching Sherman from McPherson were no more encouraging than those sent by Thomas. Logan had lost some 500 officers and men, much in the manner of Thomas's losses, and his assaulting column, at the close of the day, was much in the situation of Thomas's. During the height of the assault, scores of men were carried to the rear wounded by stones thrown down from the Confederate works.

For a pen-picture of the great battle, the reader cannot find a better one than the following, taken, with acknowledgments, from Joseph M. Brown's "Mountain Campaigns":

"The attempt upon the Confederate right, which lay east of Kennesaw Mountain, running across the Western and Atlantic Railroad, and north of the present station, Elizabeth, to the hills, some hundreds of yards beyond, was by Logan's corps, formed in three lines, and supported by Blair and Dodge, with their respective corps, a position which fronted the mountain also, and made strong demonstrations against it, accompanying them with heavy and constant firing. They fell upon Nelson's (Twelfth Louisiana) regiment, which occupied a strong line of rifle-pits, six hundred yards in front of the main entrenchments. These



held their ground, keeping up a hot fusillade until the first Federal ranks had approached within twenty-five paces, and then hastily retired to the Confederate line of battle.

"The Federal troops advanced steadily, and soon came within musket shot of Featherston's entire front. A destructive fire was here opened upon them from the entrenchments, which compelled a halt; but taking possession of the forest, amid the tangled undergrowth, they kept in return, a furious fire upon the Confederates. The batteries upon the mountain and those located along Featherston's lines poured forth a terrible storm of shot and shell upon their front and flanks. For almost an hour they gamely held their position, unable to advance and reluctant to retreat; but at length, having lost seven commanding officers of regiments and hundreds of men, some of them within thirty feet of the Confederate's principal works, Logan ordered his men to retire to the line of rifle-pits they had first captured.

"During this same time an impetuous assault was made upon Wheeler's troops, and Quarles's brigade of Whitehall's division, in front of and upon the mountain, in the shelter of rifle-pits. A body of Federals charged into Quarles's rifle-pits, where most of them were killed or captured. Many of the Federals also were picked off by the Confederate skirmishers, firing from behind trees, rocks, etc., on the side of the mountain. These were scattered irregularly among the crags and forest growth below the Confederate breastworks, but high enough above the field to command a full view over it and the Federal advance, which is said to have been made by a portion of Blair's corps.

"Against the lesser Kennesaw there was a heavy demonstration and hot fire maintained in front, and a vigorous charge was made upon the western end of the mountain, which was held by French's division.

"The attack upon Cockrell's brigade, which occupied the extreme west of the ridge, on French's left, was very determined and impetuous—the Federal advance driving in the skirmishers, and pressing resolutely forward till within about twenty paces of the Confederate line; but here it was met by a cool steadiness which checked and finally repulsed it. This attempt was princi-

pally by Howard's corps, under the cover of the concentration of about fifty field-pieces, which, bursting forth from battery to battery, were bombarding the Confederate position with terrible fury. The assailing columns likewise advanced rapidly from the west and dashed fiercely through the skirmishers on Walker's right, immediately south of the mountain, taking in reverse those on the right and left, while they were also being attacked in front. Within a few minutes about eighty of Walker's men, it is said, had been bayoneted or captured in their rifle-pits.

"Walker's line was assaulted with great vigor; but here, in addition to the musketry fire from his front, the Federals were enfiladed by that of the Confederate batteries on Little Kennesaw, some of the guns which General French had rolled back and turned upon them. This tempest of bombshells, grape and canister, within a short time drove them back, and relieved Walker from this attack.

"An exciting episode of the battle here occurred when a shrapnel shot, with a smoking fuse, passed under the headlog and fell among the men in the ditch. A stampede instantly commenced, in the midst of which a Georgia sergeant leaped forward, seized the projectile and threw it out of the trenches, where the explosion did no harm.

"But the most determined and powerful assault was made by Palmer's corps of the army of the Cumberland, with Hooker in reserve, and with such other support as could be spared, upon the entrenchments held by Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions, which extended through the rolling country south of the mountain. The Federal troops, several lines deep, conscious of their very decided superiority in numbers, pressed forward with bayonets glistening and banners waving, and with wild cheers, through the forest, which was badly tangled with undergrowth, until they came almost to the Confederate fortifications.

"Here an appalling fire was opened upon them from all along the works, by Cleburne's troops particularly. They were permitted to approach within twenty paces before a gun was fired. Then there burst forth from beneath the headlogs a fearful sheet of flame and smoke, and at one or two points, almost the entire Federal column was prostrated by the volley.

"Succeeding this murderous sweep of death, there arose from behind the entrenchments a wild and piercing sound. It was the 'rebel yell.' Often, ere this, had it been heard on the fields of strife, but never before had it greeted the ears of those whom it now defied with more defiance than in this minute of horror and blood. Above the roar of battle clear and shrill, it rang out, and again, and yet again, was it re-echoed from the mountain crags back to the woody recesses of the plain.

"Like an inspiration from the genii of ruin, it seemed to arouse those from whose throats it leaped forth, to more than mortal energy; and now, from ten thousand muskets, and from a score of cannon there poured forth an incessant blaze, which scattered carnage and death for hundreds of yards around.

"This storm of missiles from the earthworks in front was so destructive that further advance was impossible. The ground and the forest were torn up by musket balls, grape and canister, solid shot and exploding shells. From French's batteries, on the crest of Kennesaw, also, a furious bombardment was directed upon them. So continuous and rapid was this that the mountain seemed literally on fire; and the murky cloud of smoke enveloping its summit, and rising majestically against the heavens, combined with the tumultuous roar from their midst, presented in terrific grandeur the veritable appearance of a volcanic eruption, while the air above and around the assaulting columns was obscured by the puffs of smoke from the bursting shells, which hurled their fragments in a thousand directions among the Federal ranks, screaming through the forest, tore whole trees to pieces, scattering the branches with swaths of destruction on every side.

"The Federal troops, dreadfully scourged, lay down upon the ground, within range of the murderous musketry fire of their enemy, and sought all the shelter possible, in the meantime pouring back volley after volley in return; and finally entrenched themselves, it being safer to remain than to flee.

"Once, under General Harker's leadership, they attempted to renew the assault, but almost at the very parapet Harker fell, mortally wounded, and the whole line was swept back before the awful iron hail which was poured into their faces. At one or two points the charging columns pressed forward to the very

ditches before the breast-works, and some of their dead were found against the works themselves.

"The fall of General Harker was greatly deplored by officers and men alike. Gallant, generous and dashing, he had conspicuously distinguished himself on every field of battle from Chickamauga to Kennesaw, inclusive; and of all the field officers in the Federal army, was probably more admired for plucky courage and more highly esteemed for genial, sociable, personal traits than any of his comrade leaders.

"Just after the repulse of the second assault, the dry leaves, etc., in the forest before the Confederate intrenchments were set on fire by the bomb-shells and gun wadding, and began burning rapidly around the Federal wounded. This horrible scene was observed by the Confederates, who were ordered instantly to cease firing, and one of their commanders called to the Federals and stated as an act of humanity his men would suspend further battle until the assailants could carry off their wounded, who were in danger of being burned alive. The offer was accepted, and the Federal wounded were rescued from the awful fate which threatened them, and then the combat was renewed by the two sides with the most determined zeal."

The report of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, who led Logan's assaulting columns, is in part as follows: "In accordance with General Logan's order, I withdrew my division from its position to the left of the mountain after dark on the night of the 26th instant, and massed it opposite the extreme right of the mountain and a hill, which is a continuation of the same, to the right. This hill was the objective point of the assault, and my division and Colonel Walcutt's brigade, of General Harrow's division, was designated as the assaulting column, and 8 a. m. of the 27th the hour to advance. General Lightburn, commanding Second Brigade, of about 2,000 muskets, was directed to form in two lines and assault through a little orchard, about 400 yards to the right of the hill, and to advance as soon as he heard a brisk fire on the left. General Giles A. Smith, commanding First Brigade, of about the same strength, was directed to move at the same time in two lines directly on the hill. Colonel Walcutt, commanding the brigade of General Harrow's division, of about

1,500 muskets, was directed to move directly for the gorge where the hill joins on to the mountain, lapping the mountain and left of the hill, feel into the gorge as far as possible, and capture the works in his front. As the enemy could not depress their artillery sufficiently to fire on him, he was ordered to advance first, and the opening of the enemy's fire upon him was the signal for the other two brigades to advance. The line moved about 8 o'clock. It advanced steadily, with a strong line of skirmishers, but owing to the extreme density of the underbrush it was impossible for skirmishers to keep in front of their lines. Found the enemy's line of rifle-pits about 400 yards from their main works, and killed or captured most of their skirmishers. After passing a deep, swampy ravine, the line fixed bayonets, advancing, moved steadily and rapidly for the enemy's works, amidst a shower of shot and shell. Officers and men fell thick and fast. In addition to the steepness of the ascent, trees had been felled and brush and rocks piled in such a manner as to make it impossible to advance with any regularity. Officers and men still pushed forward. Reinforcements of the enemy were seen coming in from the right and left. Within about thirty feet of the enemy's main works the line staggered and sought cover as best they could behind logs and rocks. Some of the Fifty-fifth and One Hundred and Eleventh Illinois, of General Giles A. Smith's brigade, fell on and inside the works. General Lightburn, on the right, pressed on through a swamp, where officers and men sank to their knees, and a very dense thicket, but on account of an enfilading fire, was unable to get nearer than 150 yards of the orchard and works beyond. He, however, by coming suddenly out of the thicket and swamp, killed and wounded quite a number of the enemy and captured 2 officers and 36 men.

"Colonel Barnhill, commanding Fortieth Illinois, of Colonel Walcutt's brigade, and [Captain] Augustin, Fifty-fifth Illinois, were killed on the hill near the enemy's works; Colonel Rice, Fifty-seventh Ohio, also wounded on the hill (leg amputated); Colonel Spooner, Eighth-third Indiana, farther to the right of the hill, was wounded (arm amputated at the shoulder); Colonel Parry, Forty-seventh Ohio, severely in the leg."



General Smith placed his total casualties at 317.

Brigadier-General Walcutt, who supported General Smith in the charge, says: "Orders emanating from headquarters Fifteenth Army Corps were received on the night of the 26th, directing me to report, with my brigade, to General Morgan L. Smith, whose division was to assault the enemy's works on the right of Little Kennesaw Mountain, and take part in the assault. By direction of General Smith, my brigade was placed on the left, and ordered to lead the assault, my column to assail the enemy's works commanding the gorge between the two mountains. At 7 a. m. on the 27th I moved to near the left of General Osterhaus, and formed my brigade in two lines, with the Forty-sixth Ohio (Spencer Rifles) deployed in two lines as skirmishers. At 8.15 a. m. I sounded the 'advance.' A column never charged more gallantly or with greater determination. The enemy opened upon me at once with artillery from the mountain and a heavy musketry fire from their skirmishers, who were strongly intrenched. The latter, however, were nearly all killed, wounded, or captured. The main works of the enemy were found to be in a very formidable position on the crest of a gorge, having a steep ascent covered by a heavy abatis. After repeated attempts to reach the enemy's works had been made and failed, it being impossible to force our way through the tangled brush under so terrific a fire, the line was withdrawn and intrenched on the crest of the gorge opposite the one occupied by the enemy. In this assault the officers and men behaved most gallantly, many nearly reached the enemy's works, but it was useless. A line never struggled harder to succeed, but it was not in human power. My loss was very severe; 246 killed and wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnhill, Fortieth Illinois, was killed at the head of his regiment. He was a brave and valuable officer, and died the true soldier. Lieutenant-Colonel Wright, One Hundred and Third Illinois, received a severe wound, which has since disabled him. His bravery was conspicuous. I was relieved about 10 p. m. by troops from General Osterhaus, and returned to my former position."

Polk's old corps, temporarily commanded by Major-General Loring, and Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions of Hood's corps, bore the brunt of the battle of Kennesaw Mountain. The



divisions of French, Walthall and Featherston were in the immediate front of the line of assault. Brigadier-General Cockrell's Missourians were given the warmest employment in French's division. Of their experience that day General Cockrell said: "I have the honor to report that about 8 a. m. to-day a very heavy line of skirmishers, closely followed by two lines of battle, advanced into the skirt of timber in front of the open field at the foot and south of Kennesaw Mountain, just south of the road leading from Marietta to General Johnston's old headquarters, and drove in the extreme right of the line of skirmishers resting on the northwestern corner of said open field, and immediately began to press back the left flank of my skirmishers, which rested in the bottom just north of the road. All the reserves of my skirmish line were thrown out to protect my left flank, and the enemy's skirmishers were held in check until the lines of battle closely following closed in upon them. When this was done the enemy rapidly drove back my left and center, passing along the base of Kennesaw Mountain in front of my main line. The companies on the right of my skirmish line were holding the enemy in check in their immediate front, but the enemy advanced so rapidly against and in the rear of my left that before Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, commanding the skirmishers, ordered the right of the line to fall back the enemy had gained their rear and they were thus exposed to a double fire, and in falling back were compelled to pass through the enemy's lines, and many thus fell into their hands.

"Lieut. Samuel Ross, a most gallant officer, and 41 men are now missing, many of whom are known to be either killed or wounded. My skirmishers fought very stubbornly and were pressed back up the gorge on the right, followed by the enemy at the distant of thirty to forty paces. The enemy appeared in force on the west edge of the open field on my left, but were quickly driven back into the woods by a few volleys from the left of my main line. They also appeared in force at the base of the mountain, in front of my left regiment, but were easily kept back in the woods. In front of Colonel McCown's regiment, the second from my left, they made an assault in force and succeeded in getting within twenty-five paces of the works, and by secreting

themselves behind rocks and other shelter held this position for fifteen or twenty minutes, and were distinctly heard by my officers in the main line to give the command 'fix bayonets.' They advanced up the gorge along the line as far as my right, and succeeded in gaining the spur of the main mountain in front of my right and on General Sears's left at a point higher up than my main line, and for some time had a plunging fire on my works. All attempts on my line were handsomely repulsed with loss to them.

"The bodies of 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, and some 30 soldiers of the enemy were left dead in my front, and so close to my lines that they could not be carried off. A number of their wounded also fell into our hands, and 1 or 2 prisoners.

"My loss in the engagement to-day has been 10 killed, 2 mortally wounded, 27 severely, 28 slightly, and 42 missing, as before stated, making an aggregate of 109. Lieut. A. D. Manning, a minister of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church and a most exemplary Christian, is among the killed. Nine of the killed and 27 of the wounded belong to Colonel McCown's regiment, where the heaviest assault was made."

Major-General Walthall reported: "The division occupied a position in the line with its right resting on the Marietta and Big Shanty road, extending to the left up the Big Kennesaw Mountain and down its western declivity into the gorge between it and the Little Kennesaw, with the brigades in the following order from right to left: Quarles's, Cantey's, Reynolds's, the first commanded by Brig.-Gen. William A. Quarles, the second by Col. E. A. O'Neal, and the last by Brig.-Gen. D. H. Reynolds. About 9 a. m., while I was proceeding to the top of the Big Kennesaw Mountain, accompanied by General Quarles and two of my staff, the enemy commenced quite a brisk cannonade across the eastern slope and top of the mountain, which continuing some hour or more, he commenced an advance of his infantry in my front. From the rugged character of the ground and the thickness of the undergrowth in front of my skirmish line, much of which runs along a bench of the mountain, the alignment of the enemy was so broken on reaching it that it was impossible to

decide clearly whether he advanced with a line of battle or only with a very thick line of skirmishers strongly supported, except in front of General Quarles's brigade, where from the top of the mountain a line of battle of the enemy was clearly seen to approach. This fact, coupled with the double cross-fire from the right and left of his regiment, deployed as skirmishers, directed against the enemy, may explain the greater loss supposed to have been inflicted upon the enemy at this point than elsewhere. The firing from commands both to my right and left could be distinctly heard from the top of the mountain and indicated a very general advance. Between 11 and 12 o'clock a report was made to me that a portion of General Reynolds's skirmish line had given back. I immediately ordered General Reynolds to re-establish it unless a line of battle of the enemy should be occupying it or intervening between him and it. General Reynolds reported to me in less than an hour that his line had been restored without loss or difficulty.

"The loss of Major Noles, of the (Twenty-fifth) Arkansas Regiment, a gallant and useful officer, in command of General Reynolds's skirmish line, occurred at the time of the falling back of a portion of it.

"The lines of General Quarles and Colonel O'Neal were assaulted at the same time, but held their ground firmly, inflicting a heavy loss on the enemy without sustaining a corresponding loss. General Reynolds estimates the enemy's loss in his front at 50 killed and wounded.

"Maj. S. L. Knox, commanding the First Alabama Regiment on skirmish line in front of Quarles's brigade, a fine officer and veteran regiment, reports that the enemy came within thirty yards of his line at almost all points, and that some 28 got into our pits, of whom 16, including Capt. H. B. Wakefield, Fifty-third Indiana, were captured. The rest, seeing that it was only a skirmish line into which they had run, sought safety in flight, but were mostly killed or wounded.

"Major Knox estimates the enemy's loss at 300 killed and wounded. Colonel O'Neil reports the enemy's supposed loss in his front at 30 killed and wounded. For fuller particulars reference is made to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders, herewith forwarded."

General Featherston reported: "The division formed a line of battle running in a northeastern direction from the Big Shanty and Marietta road, at the base of Kennesaw Mountain, to a point between the Bell's Ferry and Canton roads, and were posted as follows: Scott's brigade on the right, Featherston's in the center, and Adams's on the left. Each brigade had some 600 yards in its front on the skirmish line one full regiment, making in the aggregate about 1,100 or 1,200 men in front of the division. About 10 a. m. the enemy advanced in force against the skirmishers of General Scott, on the Bell's Ferry road. They came in one line of skirmishers and three lines of battle. Our whole skirmish line as well intrenched and General Scott's skirmish regiment (Twelfth Louisiana, under command of General Nelson) held their position against this overwhelming force until the enemy had advanced to within twenty-five or thirty yards of their rifle-pits. They poured into the advancing columns repeated volleys of minie-balls, which thinned their ranks and caused them to falter, but did not check them. In this advance the enemy sustained a heavy loss. Colonel Nelson finally withdrew his regiment and fell back to the main line of battle in good order. This regiment not only did good service in inflicting heavy loss upon the enemy, but displayed great coolness, courage and determination during the entire engagement. The skirmish line having been driven in, and the enemy having advanced to within 250 or 300 yards of our main line of works, a concentrated converging fire was directed upon their position by our artillery. Cowan's and Bouanchaud's batteries, of Major Myrick's battalion, and Davis's, of Colonel Hallonquist's regiment, and one of Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson's batteries, of General Wheeler's command, poured into the enemy for the space of one hour a most galling and destructive fire. The artillery was ably and skillfully served, and so terrible was the fire and severe its results that the enemy retired before it, leaving some of their dead upon the field unburied and hastily burying others. The advance of the enemy in force and in three lines of battle was evidently made with the intent and for the purpose of attacking our forces in the main line of battle. At the same time this advance was made

on General Scott's front the enemy also made their appearance with infantry and artillery in front of General Wheeler's command, on the right of this division. General Scott's skirmishers resumed their original position in front of the brigade after the firing of the artillery had ceased, about 4 p. m. At the same time the enemy advanced upon General Scott's skirmish line three of his regiments made their appearance in front of the line of skirmishers of Featherston's brigade. His line of skirmishers was composed of the First Mississippi Battalion of Sharpshooters, commanded by Major Stigler, and the Third Mississippi Regiment, Major Dyer commanding. The three regiments of the enemy made their appearance upon the right of the line, passing through a field and going in the direction of the Bell's Ferry road. They came within easy range of Stigler's battalion, when a destructive fire was poured into them, which caused them to fall back and oblique to the right, bearing from the field several of their dead and wounded.

"The line of skirmishers before this brigade held their position during the day, except on the right, where they were ordered to fall back some distance to guard against a flank movement by the enemy after Scott's pickets had been driven in.

"About 4 p. m. the enemy advanced upon this line of skirmishers on the left and center with a heavy line to within sixty yards of our line. They were met by a galling fire in their advance until they were repulsed in great confusion. Their loss is supposed to be very heavy, as they had no protection except the undergrowth. A brisk fire was kept up on this line during the evening, and both the battalion and Third Mississippi Regiment acted with great coolness, courage and determination.

"The skirmish line of Brigadier-General Adams consisted of the Sixth Mississippi Regiment, under the command of Col. Robert Lowry. About 8 a. m. the enemy charged upon the extreme left of his line, and at the same time advanced upon the line of General Quarles, which connected with that of General Adams on his left. The enemy was handsomely repulsed on the left of General Adams's skirmish line, and from the position our line held it was enabled to cross-fire with two companies upon the enemy moving upon General Quarles. Major Borden, who com-



manded on the left of Colonel Lowry's regiment, reports that he thinks he drove in some 15 or 20 of the enemy to General Quarles's line, where they surrendered. It appeared that after getting to a certain distance in General Quarles's line they were unable to get back, because of the heavy cross-fire of the two left companies. They made an effort, were driven back, and then surrendered. About 10 a. m. the enemy made a charge on Colonel Lowry with a heavy, close line of skirmishers, supported by a strong reserve immediately in rear. They charged rapidly, shouting, etc., and were permitted to get in about 150 paces, when a heavy fire was opened upon them and kept up until they got in some seventy yards of the skirmish line, where they wavered, broke, and fled in much confusion. In this advance, as well as retreat, they received a severe punishment. Two officers were seen to fall, and many privates. This regiment acted with great coolness, courage and determination during the engagement.

"Our whole loss during the engagement was 5 killed and 14 wounded; that of the enemy could not have fallen short of several hundred.

"The action of the artillery was not only highly beneficial to us in its results, but very creditable to the batteries—both officers and men. The infantry of the entire division engaged in the affair could not have behaved better—both officers and men. A heavy fire from the enemy's artillery in our front was directed at our lines during the evening, but, fortunately, without effect, the shot and shell passing a considerable distance beyond our lines."

Sherman sent the following account of the day's events to Washington: "Pursuant to my orders of the 24th, a diversion was made on each flank of the enemy, especially on the Sandtown road, and at 8 a. m. General McPherson attacked at the southwest end of Kennesaw, and General Thomas at a point about a mile farther south. At the same time the skirmishers and artillery along the whole line kept up a sharp fire. Neither attack succeeded, though both columns reached the enemy's works, which were very strong. General McPherson reports his loss about 500, and General Thomas about 2,000; the loss particularly heavy in general and field officers. General Harker is re-



ported mortally wounded, also Col. Dan. McCook, commanding a brigade; Colonel Rice, Fifty-seventh Ohio, very seriously. Colonel Barnhill, Fortieth Illinois, and Captain Augustin, Fifty-fifth Illinois, are killed. The facility with which defensive works of timber and earth are constructed gives the party on the defensive great advantage. I cannot well turn the position of the enemy without abandoning my railroad, and we are already so far from our supplies that it is as much as the road can do to feed and supply the army. There are no supplies of any kind here. I can press Johnston and keep him from reinforcing Lee, but to assault him in position will cost us more lives than we can spare. McPherson took to-day 100 prisoners, and Thomas about as many, but I do not suppose we inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, as he kept close behind his parapets."

Later Sherman modified his statement of the loss at Kennesaw Mountain and outlined his future plans, as follows: "Our loss on the 27th will not exceed 1,500. As usual, the first reports were overstated. General Harker is dead. The wounded are doing well and most are already sent to the rear in cars. Some few of the dead and wounded were left in the enemy's hands close to the parapet. I am accumulating stores that will enable me to cut loose from the railroad for a time and avoid the Kennesaw Hill, which gives the enemy too much advantage. I will aim to get to the railroad below Marietta by a circuit or actually reach the Chattahoochee. Our right flank is now on the Sandtown road below Olley's Creek."

On the evening of the 27th General Johnston sent this message to Richmond: "The enemy advanced upon our whole line to-day. They assaulted French, Cheatham, Cleburne, Stevenson, and Quarles, by whom they were repulsed. On the rest of the line the skirmishing was severe. Their loss is supposed to be great; ours known to be small."

Contrary to public expectations, the battle was not renewed next day. Sherman contented himself with holding the ground he had gained at such a sacrifice, and which could be of no service to him other than to hold Johnston in position until the bulk of the Federal army could be quietly withdrawn down Olley's Creek valley. There was continuous skirmishing on the 28th,

but that was all. The Federal movement by the right flank could not take place for several days, for want of supplies and forage. While the two armies lay on their arms, confronting each other menacingly, scurvy was dangerously prevalent, and a cry went up for greens and vegetables. Johnston complained to Bragg that he was losing three or four hundred men every day from sickness caused by the continual rains and dry diet. At midnight on the 29th the Confederates attacked the Union works at a point in their front where the lines were but eighty yards apart, but were compelled to return to their parapet. The loss was small.

## CHAPTER XXV

### DOWN TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE

There has been much dispute concerning the extent of the Federal loss at Kennesaw Mountain. Even Sherman contradicts himself, somewhat. After the battle he declared that 2,000 would cover his losses, from all causes, and in his *Century* paper, written years after the war, he says: “. . . but we failed, losing 3,000 men, to the Confederate loss of 630.” General Johnston always declared that the Federal loss had been concealed and understated by design. In his *Century* paper, replying to Sherman, he says: “Such statements of losses are incredible. The Northern troops fought very bravely, as usual. Many fell against our parapets, some were killed in our trenches. Most of this battle of two hours and a half was at very short range. It is not to be believed that Southern veterans struck but 3 per cent. of Thomas’s troops in mass at short range, or 1 2-3 per cent. of McPherson’s—and, still less so, that Northern soldiers, injured in battle, should have been defeated in losses so trifling as never to have discouraged the meanest soldiers on record. I have seen American soldiers (Northern men) win a field with losses ten times greater, proportionately. But, argument apart, there is a witness against the estimates of Northern losses in this campaign, in the 10,126 graves in the military cemetery at Marietta, of soldiers killed south of the Etowah. Moreover, the Federal dead nearest to Hardee’s line lay there two days, during which they were frequently counted—at least 1,000; and as there were seven lines within some 300 yards, exposed two hours and a half to the musketry of two divisions and the canister-shot of 32 field-pieces, there must have been many uncounted dead. The counted would alone indicate a loss of at least 6,000.”

Johnston continued to urge upon General Bragg the supreme importance of getting a strong force of cavalry in Sher-

man's rear. While his guns at Kennesaw were still hot, he sent this review of his campaign and recommendations pertaining to his present situation, to Richmond: "I have endeavored by my telegrams to keep you informed of the course of military events in this department. I have not been able, however, in that brief style of correspondence to explain the mode of operating by which we have been pressed back so gradually but continually. I informed the Government, through Brigadier-General Pendleton, that Sherman's army was more than *double* that under my command. I could not prevent such superior forces from turning the position at Dalton, under cover of Rocky Face Ridge, by Snake Creek Gap; so that Dalton was necessarily abandoned. The intrenched position of the enemy before Resaca also threatened our communications. The attempt to hold that place would have compromised the army. It was, therefore, abandoned also. In falling back from that point I intended to take advantage of the first good position to give battle, but hitherto an advantageous opportunity was not presented. By his engineering operations, rendered easy by superior numbers and the character of the country, which is densely wooded, the enemy has pressed us back to a position the right of which is about two miles north of Marietta. The left was at first due west from the town, the extent of the line being five miles. The usual gradual extension of the enemy's intrenched line to his right southwardly has compelled us to lengthen ours on the same side at least three miles.

"Since May 7 in almost daily skirmishes and the attacks upon different points of our lines (which have been reported to you by telegraph), we have lost about 9,000 men in killed and wounded. Long and cold, wet weather, which ended five days ago, produced a great deal of sickness. Our superior officers think that we have inflicted a loss on the enemy treble our own, as our men have almost always fought under cover or under favorable circumstances. The Federal army has received no other reinforcements, I believe, than Blair's troops, estimated at from 5,000 to 7,000, and garrison and bridge guards relieved by 100-days' men.

"I have been unable so far to stop the enemy's progress by gradual approaches on account of his numerous army and the

character of the country, which is favorable to that method. Our best mode of operating against it would be to use strong parties of cavalry to cut his railroad communications. Our own cavalry is so weak compared with that of the Federal army that I have been unable to do it. If you can employ cavalry in that way quickly great benefit must result from it—probably Sherman's speedy discomfiture."

Bragg replied that he had no cavalry in East Tennessee, and that in Mississippi was fully occupied by the enemy in superior force. He stated that the Fourth Georgia cavalry had been ordered to join Johnston, from near Savannah, and declared there was no other force available. There was much correspondence between Johnston and the war department regarding the matter of reinforcements and cavalry support in the rear, and it is probable that the differences of opinion, then manifested, were the inception of the disagreement that a fortnight later resulted in the deposition of Johnston from the command of the Army of the Tennessee. In this connection, it is interesting to examine the effective strength of Johnston's army at this time. The following note of General Bragg to President Davis throws much light on the situation :

HDQRS. ARMIES OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES,  
*Richmond, June 29, 1864.*

His Excellency the PRESIDENT :

Mr. PRESIDENT: I return you the dispatch of Governor Brown. Every available man, subject to my control, has been sent to General Johnston, and he has retained several commands deemed absolutely necessary elsewhere, after receiving orders to move them. No doubt he is outnumbered by the enemy, as we are everywhere, but the disparity is much less than it has ever been between those two armies. Morgan is not available for any service, being beyond our lines and not within communication. General Lee in Mississippi, where Forrest is serving, is in proportion to the enemy confronting him much weaker than General Johnston, and needs his troops now with Johnston more than the latter can need Forrest.

General Johnston's last return, 10th of June, shows 45,282 infantry, 12,231 cavalry, 4,259 artillery; total, 61,772 effectives.

The rolls show eleven brigades of cavalry, aggregate 27,390, though with only 12,231 effective total. General Johnston's return shows an aggregate present and absent, 137,931. Besides the army in the field General Johnston has at Atlanta a supporting force of reserves and militia, estimated at from 7,000 to 10,000 effective men. I see no way in which he can be reinforced, and he has been informed so several times. Certainly not from Mississippi, where it would be more proper to return a part of what he has received than to remove more.

I am, sir, very respectfully, etc.,

BRANTON BRAGG.

P. S.—From the above estimate I accidentally omitted two additional regiments of Georgia cavalry recently ordered to General Johnston, one of which has already joined him and the other en route, making jointly 1,500 effectives. These have not yet been taken up on the return.

B. B.

The only safe course left for Sherman to pursue was the one he had so quickly decided on, viz., to send his left army, under McPherson, to follow up the right, under Schofield, across Olley's Creek, and force his cavalry to Sandtown and the Chattahoochee, far below Johnston. In the meantime, Johnston was not asleep. Thomas's presence in his front did not decoy him into keeping behind his intrenchments on the field of Kennesaw Mountain. His admirable foresight had anticipated Sherman's next move, and he attempted to forestall it. There was never a more provident commander. Schofield's successes had given Johnston his cue. His scouts reported McPherson starting, which was the sign for the abandonment of Kennesaw Mountain. At fair daylight on the morning of July 3d, Sherman turned his field-glass upon the summits of the two Kennesaws and saw his pickets "crawling up the hill cautiously." Johnston's strong works were reported deserted. Johnston thus explained this, almost his last, move in the famous Atlanta campaign: "As the extension of the Federal intrenched line to their right had brought it nearer to Atlanta than was our left, and had made our position otherwise very dangerous, two new positions for the army were chosen, one nine or ten miles south of Marietta, and the other on the high



ground near the Chattahoochee. Colonel Pressman was desired to prepare the first for occupation, and Brigadier-General Shoup, commander of the artillery, was instructed to strengthen the other with a line of redoubts devised by himself." On the morning of the 3d, while the Federals were reconnoitering the heights of Kennesaw, the Confederates were settling down behind their new works south of Marietta, near Smyrna Camp Ground. At the same time General Logan's command marched into Marietta, capturing 200 prisoners on the road. The Twenty-fifth Iowa regiment was left as a provost guard in the town when the army moved on. The next day, the Fourth of July, it is said that the national salute fired by Sherman's guns in honor of the day, was heard with emotions that can be imagined, by the citizens of Atlanta.

Thomas followed at once, as soon as he knew positively that Johnston had fallen back, and on the 3d Howard's division skirmished at every step almost up to the Smyrna works. At this point a little anecdote told by General Howard is highly interesting. "The next day Sherman paid us a Fourth of July visit," said General Howard. "He could not at first believe that Johnston would make another stand north of the river. 'Howard,' he said to me, 'you are mistaken; there is no force in your front; they are laughing at you!' We were in a thinnish grove of tall trees, in front of a farm house. 'Well, General,' I replied, 'let us see.' I called Stanley, whose division held the front. 'General, double your skirmishers and press them.' At once it was done. The lines sped forward, capturing the outlying pits of the enemy, and took many prisoners; but a sheet of lead instantly came from the hidden works in the edge of the wood beyond us, and several unseen batteries hurled their shot across our lines, some of them reaching our grove and forcing us to retire. Sherman, as he rode away, said that I had been correct in my report."

After the battle of Kennesaw Mountain the state militia began to figure in the military operations at the front. The following order was sent Major-General G. W. Smith, commanding the Georgia troops at Atlanta, just after the great battle: "General Johnston wishes that you would concentrate at some convenient point (say Turner's Ferry) as large an infantry force as

can be gathered in your command, with a battery, at short notice (leaving some force at the railroad bridge), and cross the river, moving up so as to place yourself in communication with Brigadier-General Jackson. The object is to show an infantry force in connection with Jackson's cavalry as a demonstration calculated to deter the enemy from any further attempt to extend his right flank toward the river. It is not intended nor desired that your troops should become engaged, but simply threaten the right and rear of the enemy without losing your direct communication with the river between Turner's Ferry and Sandtown." The cavalry of the Confederate left was well supported by General Smith, in accordance with the foregoing order.

About this time the Confederates changed their signal code, which for weeks had been interpreted by the Federals. The fact that the enemy was reading his signals was made known to Johnston by a correspondent of the New York Herald, through his correspondence in that paper. This was an important secret, betrayed in a very thoughtless manner, and when Sherman learned of the newspaper man's mischievous work he was greatly incensed. Thomas first saw the correspondence containing the disclosure of the important secret and sent a copy of the paper containing the same to Sherman, with the recommendation that the correspondent, by name DeB. Randolph Keim, be at once executed as a spy. The man was arrested at the headquarters of the Army of the Tennessee, and upon Sherman's orders, turned over to General Thomas, of the Army of the Cumberland, with the suggestion that he (Thomas) carry out his original recommendation. Keim had a narrow escape from being shot as a spy. But Thomas weakened when the responsibility was placed directly upon himself. He banished Keim North, and in explanation of his leniency said: "He (Keim) appears to be an honest looking man, and as he has not been with my army, I will have him sent north of the Ohio river, with orders not to return to this army during the war."

While the Union army was lying in position around Marietta, reports came from north of the Etowah that torpedoes were being used by the small bands of Confederate raiders on Sherman's line of communication, some cars and a section of the

railroad track having been destroyed by that means. Sherman's orders in the premises were certainly drastic. To Major-General J. B. Steedman, at Chattanooga, commanding the District of the Etowah, he sent these instructions:

"As the question may arise, and you have a right to the support of my authority, I now decide that the use of the torpedo is justifiable in war in advance of an army, so as to make his advance up a river or over a road more dangerous and difficult. But after the adversary has gained the country by fair warlike means, then the case entirely changes. The use of torpedoes in blowing up our cars and the road after they are in our possession, is simply malicious. It cannot alter the great problem, but simply makes trouble. Now, if torpedoes are found in the possession of an enemy to our rear, you may cause them to be put on the ground and tested by wagon-loads of prisoners, or, if need be, citizens implicated in their use. In like manner, if a torpedo is suspected on any part of the road, order the point to be tested by a carload of prisoners, or citizens implicated, drawn by a long rope. Of course an enemy cannot complain of his own traps."

Johnston had now despaired of Richmond accepting his recommendations regarding a movement in force against Sherman's rear with cavalry, and was preparing for a grand stand at Atlanta, which he had fortified for a determined siege. That Johnston's views were shared by many able men in Georgia is certain. Howell Cobb, while in Athens early in July for the purpose of organizing a local defense force, wrote to the Confederate secretary of war, Hon. James A. Seddon:

"Allow me, in this unofficial letter, to express to you an opinion which I feel so strongly that I desire to express it to yourself and the President. While I know too little of the condition of our different armies in the field to express an opinion worthy of much consideration, yet there is a conviction upon my mind so strong and overwhelming that I cannot throw it off, that the defense of Atlanta and Georgia, and the certain defeat and destruction of Sherman's army, are involved in some movement to be made by Forrest (if possible) or some other cavalry on Sherman's line of communication. Unless it is done, I see no end to the slow process of Sherman's advance through Georgia. If his communication

was cut for ten days his army would be destroyed, and Georgia, as well as Alabama and Mississippi, saved, and Tennessee recovered. To effect such a result could we not afford to uncover for a short time the country protected by Forrest? It does seem to me that the object to be accomplished makes the proposition worthy of consideration. It is proper I should say that our people are in the best spirits, hopeful and confident. They have the utmost confidence in General Johnston, which has not been shaken by his falling back, and they believe that the President will do all that any man can do. I trust you will pardon the liberty I take in making these suggestions, and be assured that I only do so because I feel a conviction that impresses me with the idea that it is the only certain solution of the present impending danger."

Johnston remained but two days in his defenses at Smyrna Camp Ground. Sherman's plans did not contemplate a general engagement north of the Chattahoochee, and it was soon evident that he meant to give his adversary a wide berth, crossing the river before serious opposition could be interposed. Enough force was kept in Johnston's front, however, to attempt to cover the real movement, and the artillery was never silent. The greatest activity was among the cavalry. Hostile troops, scattered over a wide scope of country, came constantly in collision. In the afternoon of the 4th, Brigadier-General Ross, of Jackson's division of cavalry, reported that his command had repulsed a heavy column of Federal infantry, at least one brigade, nearly capturing a battery. From every road leading to the river came reports of the enemy's resistless advance. General Wheeler was ordered to find the enemy's left and what force confronted the Smyrna works. It was a critical time, fraught with fatal possibilities, but the Confederate army was kept well in hand by its cautious commander. Satisfied that Sherman was not advancing to attack him, but pushing his way to the Chattahoochee, Johnston, on the morning of the 5th, fell back to his strong line of intrenchments on the immediate river bank, and from that position wired Richmond: "In consequence of the enemy's advance toward the river below our left we this morning took this position, which is slightly intrenched. A division of cavalry on the southeast side of the river is guarding the ferries below. The gallant Brigadier-

General Vaughan lost his left foot yesterday by a shell. We greatly need the general officers asked for."

To this dispatch President Davis replied: "The announcement that your army has fallen back to the Chattahoochee renders me more apprehensive for the future. That river, if not fordable, should not be immediately in your rear, and if you cross, it will enable the enemy without danger to send a detachment to cut your communications with Alabama, and, in the absence of the troops of that department, to capture the cities, destroy the mines and manufactories, and separate the States by a new line of occupation. At this distance I cannot judge of your condition or the best method of averting calamity. Hopeful of results in Northern Georgia, other places have been stripped to reinforce your army until we are unable to make further additions, and are dependent on your success. Efforts have been made and are still making to organize the reserves as an auxiliary force for State defense. You well know what progress has been made in Georgia and Alabama."

General Johnston's answer to this message of the Confederacy's chief executive was forwarded on the 8th, the day before his army crossed the Chattahoochee, as follows:

"I have received your dispatch of yesterday. Our falling back was slow. Every change of position has been reported to General Bragg. We have been forced back by the operations of a siege, which the enemy's extreme caution and greatly superior numbers have made me unable to prevent. I have found no opportunity for battle except by attacking intrenchments. It is supposed in the army that Sherman's immediate object is the capture of Atlanta. A part of our troops is on the north side of the river intrenched, and, having six bridges behind it, so that we do not think it exposed. It is believed here that there are 16,000 cavalry for defense of Mississippi and Alabama, and, therefore, that the enemy cannot make a detachment able to invade that department. Might not 4,000 of this cavalry prevent the danger by breaking up the railroad between the enemy and Dalton, thus compelling Sherman to withdraw?"

Before he crossed the river, General Johnston took occasion to pay high compliments to the state militia in a letter addressed



to Governor Brown, in which he said: "According to all accounts their conduct in the presence of the enemy was firm and creditable. Such Federal parties as approached the crossing-places of the Chattahoochee guarded by them have been driven back. These proofs of their valor make me anxious that their number be increased. Is it possible? You know that the distinguished officer at their head is competent to high command."

Sherman's move was a bold one, but not attended with as much risk as would appear on the surface, taking into consideration his superior force, its wonderful equipment, and *esprit de corps*. Kennesaw had not even left a solemn impression on his army. Despite the heavy loss there, and the fact that the enemy was not dislodged or appreciably weakened, the Union soldiers regarded the victory as theirs and turned their faces to the Chattahoochee with exultation. In leaving Marietta Sherman deliberately cut loose from his long line of railroad communication with his base at Chattanooga, taking with him only ten days' supplies in wagons. This act in itself indicates his supreme confidence of his superiority over Johnston, or of his certainty of being able to crowd his enemy across the river. It must not be inferred that Sherman was bent on crossing the Chattahoochee without regard to the fate of his railroad. He had left it strongly defended from Allatoona north, and he took good care to see that Johnston himself did not undertake a grand flanking movement, by crowding him hard at every point. He declared he was literally pushing Johnston across the river, and at the same time preventing interference with the passage of the Federal army. It was his hope that he could compel Johnston to cross in great confusion. A clear idea of his intentions can be gathered from the following note to Thomas, written on the night of July 3d:

"The more I reflect the more I know Johnston's halt is to save time to cross his material and men. No general, such as he, would invite battle with the Chattahoochee behind him. I have ordered McPherson and Schofield to cross Nickajack at any cost and work night and day to get the enemy started in confusion toward his bridges. I know you appreciate the situation. We will never have such a chance again, and I want you to impress on Hooker, Howard, and Palmer the importance of the



most intense energy of attack to-night and in the morning and to press with vehemence at any cost of life and material. Every inch of his line should be felt and the moment there is a give, pursuit should be made—by day with lines, but by night with a single head of column and section of artillery to each corps following a road. Hooker should communicate with McPherson by a circuit if necessary and act in concert. You know what loss would ensue to Johnston if he crosses his bridges at night in confusion with artillery thundering at random in his rear. I have reason to know that if our head of column had marched for Ruff's instead of Marietta we would have cut off 2,000 men and 300 wagons. But still we have now the best chance ever offered, of a large army fighting at a disadvantage with a river to his rear. Send copies of this to Hooker, Palmer, and Howard. I have instructed Schofield, McPherson and Garrard."

On the 4th of July there were skirmishes at Ruff's Mill, Neal Dow Station and Rottenwood Creek that approached the proportions of engagements. Stoneman made a dash across the Chattahoochee near Campbellton, and Garrard was ordered to Roswell to capture the place. The Federal troops and trains thronged the Sandtown road, and every road leading to the river on each side of the position held by the Confederate army was being explored by strong advance columns of Sherman's three army corps. On the 5th Sherman telegraphed Halleck:

"On the 3d we pursued the enemy by all the roads south till we found him in an intrenched position which had been prepared in advance, its salient on the main Marietta and Atlanta road about five miles south of Marietta, and the wings behind the Nickajack and Rottenwood Creeks. During the 4th General Thomas pressed the salient, and McPherson and Schofield moved against Nickajack by pressing close and threatening the Chattahoochee at Sandtown and below. Johnston again retreated in the night and now has his main force and wagons across the Chattahoochee, with Hardee's corps on this side, strongly intrenched in a sort of *tete-de-pont* on a ridge of hills beginning at the railroad bridge and extending down the river to the mouth of the Nickajack. We have worked hard, and now Thomas's left is on the Chattahoochee, three miles above the railroad bridge at

Pace's Ferry. Stoneman has been most active with the cavalry about Sweet Water, and is now on the Chattahoochee about Sandtown, and Garrard started this morning for Roswell Factory. I have no report from him yet. I am now far ahead of my railroad and telegraph and want them to catch up, and may be here some days. Atlanta is in plain view, nine miles distant. We have had continual skirmishing, but our losses are small, while we have inflicted more to the enemy. Our prisoners taken in the last two days will not fall short of 2,000. The extent of the enemy's parallels already taken is wonderful, and much of the same sort confronts us yet, and is seen beyond the Chattahoochee."

On the morning of July 5th the head of General Howard's column swept into Vinning's Station, on the railroad close to Pace's Ferry, where it encountered a body of dismounted Confederate cavalry. A short and sharp encounter followed, resulting in the Confederates being driven to the Ferry, where they had barely time to cross on a pontoon bridge, attempting to destroy it as soon as they were over. The bridge was cut on the north bank and swung out into the middle of the river before the pursuing Federals could secure it. Howard held his side of the ferry and threw his troops in a strong position on a ridge running almost parallel with the river. On the morning of the 6th General Schofield followed Garrard's cavalry on the extreme left of the Federal army, expecting to secure a crossing in the vicinity of Roswell. He pushed his way to the river, brushing aside the slight opposition he encountered, and stationed his corps at a ford near the mouth of Soap Creek, which he reported practicable for the passage of his army. He was ordered to prepare at once to throw a bridge over. The same day General Garrard captured Roswell. The few hundred Confederates guarding the place, mostly state troops, fell back as his cavalry advanced, burning the excellent bridge across the Chattahoochee as they retired. Garrard destroyed the factories at Roswell that had been operated by the Confederate government since the beginning of the war. In this connection a part of his report to Sherman is worth quoting. He said: "There were some fine factories here, one woolen factory, capacity 30,000 yards a month, and has fur-

nished up to within a few weeks 15,000 yards per month to the rebel government, the government furnishing men and material. Capacity of cotton factory 216 looms, 191,086 yards per month, and 51,666 pounds of thread, and 4,229 pounds of cotton rope. This was worked exclusively for the rebel government. The other cotton factory, one mile and a half from town, I have no data concerning. There was six months' supply of cotton on hand. Over the woolen factory the French flag was flying, but seeing no Federal flag above it I had the building burnt. All are burnt. The cotton factory was worked up to the time of its destruction, some 400 women being employed. There was some cloth which had been made since yesterday morning, which I will save for our hospitals (several thousand yards of cotton cloth), also some rope."

Sherman's answer was characteristic. Apropos of the French flag incident, he said: "I will see as to any man in America hoisting the French flag and then devoting his labor and capital in supplying armies in open hostility to our government and claiming the benefit of his neutral flag. Should you, under the impulse of anger, natural at contemplating such perfidy, hang the wretch, I approve the act beforehand." With regard to the operatives of the factories, Sherman ordered: "Arrest all people, male and female, connected with those factories, no matter what the clamor, and let them foot it, under guard, to Marietta, whence I will send them by cars to the North. The poor women will make a howl. Let them take along their children and clothing, providing they have the means of hauling or you can spare them."

On the evening of the 6th Sherman sent this message to Washington: "Johnston made two breaks in the railroad, one above Marietta and one near Vining's Station. The former is already done, and Johnston's army has already heard the sound of our locomotives. The telegraph is done to Vining's, and the field wire is just at my bivouac, and will be ready to convey this to you as soon as translated into cipher. I propose to study the crossings of the Chattahoochee, and when all is ready to move quick. As a beginning I keep the wagons and troops well back from the river, and display to the enemy only the picket-line, with

a few batteries along at random. Have moved General Schofield to a point whence he can in a single march reach the Chattahoochee, at a point above the railroad bridge, where there is a ford. At present the waters are turbid and swollen by the late rains; but if the present hot weather lasts the water will run down very fast. We have pontoons enough for four bridges, but as our crossing will be resisted, we must maneuver some. All the regular crossing-places are covered by forts, apparently of long construction; but we shall cross in due time, and instead of attacking Atlanta direct, or any of its forts, I propose to make a circuit, destroying all its railroads. This is a delicate movement and must be done with caution. Our army is in good condition and full of confidence; but the weather is intensely hot, and a good many men have fallen with sunstroke. This is a high and healthy country, and the sanitary condition of the army is good."

On the evening of the 6th General Stoneman reported to General McPherson that he had covered upward of twelve miles of the river with his cavalry pickets and scouts, on the Campbellton flank. While the right and left wings of his army were thus early in possession of the north bank of the Chattahoochee, Sherman's center demonstrated strongly in Johnston's front, threatening to assault him in his works. The Confederate army lay from the mouth of Nickajack Creek to beyond Harris's Ferry, stretching along the banks of the river and across the railroad, its strongest batteries being posted at the entrance to the railroad bridge. When the army first took its station behind the earthworks prepared long in advance of its coming, each of the three corps threw two pontoon bridges behind it across the river, thus affording six avenues of retreat. Johnston did not propose to be pushed helter-skelter across the Chattahoochee, "at night in confusion, with artillery thundering at random in his rear," and he was not. He retired with deliberation, in military order, his guns bristling in the face of the enemy until the last soldier was across. The corps of Hood and Stewart began to cross as soon as it was discovered that Schofield had succeeded in throwing his bridge over, toward Roswell. Why Johnston did not meet this movement in its inception with strong resistance from his regulars can only be explained from the fact that Sherman kept him

fully employed in other quarters—in too many quarters at once. Sherman was nothing if not ubiquitous. His great army poured down upon the Chattahoochee, forty miles from wing to wing, like the flood from a bursted dam. In the center of its course it foamed against a wall of rock in the shape of the concentrated Confederate army, but, like rushing water encountering natural obstructions, divided and rushed on at either side. On the night of the 8th Schofield effected a lodgment on the south side of the river with opposition so weak that it was positively insignificant. Howard, in reporting Schofield's success, which he had witnessed, declared that "the enemy fired but two guns—one discharge from each, and these canister—and two musket-shots." On the 9th only Hardee's corps held the north bank of the river in the face of the foe. But Cheatham, Cleburne, Walker and Bate, with earth-works in front and a river at their backs, were equal to the armies of the world. They stood at bay, and Sherman did not attempt a repetition of his Kennesaw experience. On the night of the 9th this last corps fell back across the river, burning the bridges behind it.

Many an old Confederate soldier who was last to leave Sherman's front that eventful night, will have thrilling memories awakened in him by reading the orders for Hardee to cross the Chattahoochee. Here they are:

CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS HARDEE'S CORPS,  
*July 9, 1864.*

The corps will move across the Chattahoochee to-night, and, wherever precedence is necessary, in the following succession: Cheatham, Bate, Walker, Cleburne.

First. The artillery will be withdrawn across the river at dusk.

Second. The infantry will be withdrawn from the intrenchments at 10 p. m.

Third. The skirmishers will be withdrawn at 1 a. m.

Fourth. Bate's division will cross at the upper of the two pontoon bridges assigned this corps, and Walker and Cleburne at the lower one.

Fifth. All the skirmishers of this corps will cross at the upper pontoon bridge.



Sixth. The divisions of this corps will move on the road southwest of the railroad, and will halt at the place indicated to division commanders.

Seventh. Major-General Cleburne will leave Polk's brigade and a battery of artillery, and Major-General Walker will leave Mercer's brigade and a battery at points to be indicated by the lieutenant-general.

Eighth. The lower pontoon bridge will be taken up by the engineer corps as soon as the rear of Cleburne's infantry has passed, notification of which will be given by a staff officer of Lieutenant-General Hardee. Major-General Cleburne will leave detail of seventy-five men to assist in taking up the bridge.

Ninth. The skirmishers of this corps, after having passed the upper pontoon bridge, will be formed to protect the bridge until it is burned.

By command of Lieutenant-General Hardee:

T. B. Roy,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

On the 10th Johnston informed the war department of his retirement south of the Chattahoochee as follows: On the night of the 8th the enemy crossed at Isham's, or Cavalry Ford; intrenched. In consequence we crossed at and below the railroad, and are now about two miles from the river, guarding the crossings."

This move practically terminated Johnston's career as commander of the Army and Department of Tennessee. The forces and circumstances that had been at work for weeks to effect his removal, awaited only the formal order from Richmond. Many of his rank and file felt that it was coming. President Davis's advisory messages had a warning tone. Between the lines it was easy to read dissatisfaction and disappointment. Professional jealousy and political intrigue were at work for the great soldier's undoing. Hood was telling Bragg and Davis what might have been done and what ought to be done. Perhaps Johnston was not self-confident. Cautiousness was always his marked trait. On the 11th he wired Richmond: "I strongly recommend the distribution of the U. S. prisoners, now at Andersonville, immediately."



On the 11th President Davis sent Johnston this message: "Your telegram of the 8th received. You know what force you left in Alabama and Mississippi, and what part of it has, since you left that department, been transferred to reinforce you in Georgia. You were, therefore, in condition to judge of the value of the belief that there are now for the defense of those States 16,000 cavalry, and of the conclusion drawn from that belief. The proposition to send 4,000 cavalry from that department to break up the railroad between the enemy and Dalton suggests the inquiry, Why not so employ those already sent to you from that department, or others of equal number, for the proposed operation, the importance of which has long been recognized, and the immediate execution of which has become a necessity? If it be practicable for distant cavalry, it must be more so for that which is near, and former experiences have taught you the difference there would be in time, which is now of such pressing importance. Will write to you and give information in relation to the condition of General S. D. Lee's department, which, I perceive, you cannot possess."

Replying to Johnston's telegram regarding the distribution of the Andersonville prisoners, President Davis said: "Your telegram received. You have all the force that can be employed to distribute or guard prisoners; know the condition of the country and prospects of military operations. I must rely on you to advise General Winder as to the proper and practicable action in relation to U. S. prisoners."

General Braxton Bragg was then on his way to Atlanta. His coming was highly significant.

Johnston sent this message to Richmond on the 12th: "The enemy holds several fords from eight to twelve miles above, where he has troops intrenched on this side. Elsewhere everything quiet, except a little occasional skirmishing at long range across the river, and artillery firing by the enemy, principally near railroad, ineffective."

Bragg arrived in Atlanta on the 13th and reported at once that indications seemed to favor an entire evacuation of the city. This before he had seen Johnston. The next day he telegraphed President Davis: "The enemy are reported by General Wheeler

as having crossed two corps to this side of the river about nine miles above the railroad bridge. An official report has just reached General Wright that the enemy's cavalry, accompanied by artillery, crossed the Chattahoochee this evening nine miles from Newnan. Were at last accounts advancing on that place. Our army is sadly depleted, and now reports 10,000 less than the return of 10th June. I find but little encouraging."

On the 14th Senator Ben Hill wired Johnston from Richmond: "You must do the work with your present force. For God's sake, do it!"

It took Sherman a full week to get his entire army across the Chattahoochee. He was not ready to move upon Atlanta from the south side of the river until the 17th of July, the day that General Johnston was ordered to turn over the command of the Confederate army to General Hood. In the meantime, Sherman was meeting with no formidable opposition in crossing. He controlled several good fords and was laying bridges at will, while Johnston was making ready his line of defense at Peachtree Creek. At first, of course, there was much show of opposition by the Confederates on the immediate river bank, but in reality only a demonstration. The real stand was to be made back on the high land north of Atlanta. McPherson demonstrated for three days, as if intending to cross at Turner's Ferry, or below, and General Thomas did the same at the site of the burned railroad bridges. The intention of these maneuvers was to compel Johnston to weaken his center or one of his flanks. When the crossing was finally effected, McPherson had swung clear around to Roswell, beyond Schofield. In the language of General Howard: "Our armies made a right wheel—Thomas, on the pivot, taking the shortest line to Atlanta; McPherson on the outer flank, coming by Roswell to Decatur, with Schofield between." While this maneuvering was going on, the pickets exchanged shots across the river, and at intervals the hostile batteries belched iron hail at each other. Sherman's first intention, after getting across the river, was to take possession of the Augusta railroad between Decatur and Stone Mountain. The air was full of idle rumors, one to the effect that Johnston did not intend to seriously defend Atlanta, but would make his grand stand at Stone Mountain.

Before passing on to the operations of the hostile armies south of the Chattahoochee, some of Sherman's dispatches pending his crossing, are full of interest. This one was sent to General Halleck on the day that Johnston crossed:

"I telegraph to you, and Mr. Secretary Stanton answers. Drop me a word now and then of advice and encouragement. I think I have done well to maintain such an army in such a country for sixty days, and yet my losses are made up by the natural increase. The assault I made was no mistake; I had to do it. The enemy and our own army and officers had settled down into the conviction that the assault of lines formed no part of my game, and the moment the enemy was found behind anything like a parapet, why everybody would deploy, throw up counter-works and take it easy, leaving it to the 'old man' to turn the position. Had the assault been made with one-fourth more vigor mathematically, I would have put the head of George Thomas's whole army right through Johnston's deployed lines on the best ground for go-ahead, while my entire forces were well in hand on roads converging to my then object, Marietta. Had Harker and McCook not been struck down so early the assault would have succeeded, and then the battle would have all been in our favor on account of our superiority of numbers, position, and initiative. Even as it was, Johnston has been much more cautious since, and gives ground more freely. His next fighting line, Smyrna Camp-Ground, he only held one day. I have got General Schofield across the Chattahoochee with two good pontoon bridges, without loss, and momentarily wait the news of my cavalry being across at Roswell Factory, where is the best ford on the whole river, but before going ahead I will add there a good pier or trestle bridge and will at some point intermediate, convenient to roads, put down two more pontoon bridges, making five bridges and three fords, before I put the army across the Chattahoochee."

On the 15th General Grant telegraphed General Halleck from City Point, Va.: "There is every indication now, judging from the tone of the Southern press, that unless Johnston is reinforced, Atlanta will not be defended. They seem to calculate largely upon driving Sherman out by keeping his lines of communication cut. If he can supply himself once with ordnance

and quartermaster's stores, and partially with subsistence, he will find no difficulty in staying until a permanent line can be opened with the south coast. The road from Chattanooga to Atlanta will be much more easily defended than that north of the Tennessee. With the supplies above indicated at Chattanooga, with, say sixty days' provisions there, I think there will be no doubt but that the country will supply the balance. Sherman will, once in Atlanta, devote himself to collecting the resources of the country. He will take everything the people have, and will then issue from the stores so collected to rich and poor alike. As he will take all their stock, they will have no use for grain further than is necessary for bread. If the enemy do not detach from here against Sherman, they will, in case Atlanta falls, bring most of Johnston's army here with the expectation of driving us out, and then unite against Sherman. They will fail if they attempt this programme. My greatest fear is of their sending troops to Johnston first. Sherman ought to be notified of the possibility of a corps going from here, and should be prepared to take up a good defensive position in case one is sent—one which he could hold against such increase."

Referring to the foregoing dispatch, Sherman said to Halleck on the 16th: "I have yours and General Grant's dispatches. I had anticipated all possible chances and am accumulating all the stores possible at Chattanooga and Allatoona, but I do not fear Johnston with reinforcements of 20,000 if he will take the offensive; but I recognize the danger arising from my long line and the superiority of the enemy's cavalry in numbers and audacity. I move to-morrow from the Chattahoochee toward Decatur and Stone Mountain, east of Atlanta. All well."

Sherman evidently did not think much of negro troops and lent no encouragement to recruiting in Southern states. While preparing to cross the Chattahoochee he had this to say on the subject to Halleck: "Before regulations are made for the States to send recruiting officers into the rebel States, I must express my opinion that it is the height of folly. I cannot permit it here, and I will not have a set of fellows here hanging about on any such pretenses. We have no means to transport and feed them. The Sanitary and Christian Commissions are enough to eradicate all

traces of Christianity out of our minds, much less a set of unscrupulous State agents in search of recruits. All these dodges and make-shifts but render us ridiculous in our own estimation. I must protect my army, and I say beforehand, I have no means to transport recruiting parties south of Nashville, or to feed them, if they come here in spite of me."

## CHAPTER XXVI

### CLOSING IN ON ATLANTA

On the 17th, promptly at sunrise, the great Federal army moved across the Chattahoochee river, General Thomas crossing the Army of the Cumberland at Powers's and Pace's Ferries, General Schofield crossing the Army of the Ohio at Phillips's, and General McPherson crossing the Army of the Tennessee at Roswell. There was no opposition worthy of the name. Thomas at once took position out from the river, until he was in possession of the country from Island Creek to Kyle's Bridge over Nancy's Creek. Schofield moved out toward Cross Keys, controlling the ridge between Island and Nancy's Creek and the road leading from Roswell to Buck Head. McPherson moved out over the Cross Keys road, in the direction of Stone Mountain, until he was abreast of Schofield. The whole army thus formed a concave line behind Nancy's Creek, extending from Kyle's Bridge to Buchanan's. General McCook's cavalry was disposed in Thomas's rear, with infantry detachments, to watch the old railroad crossing and vicinity. General Stoneman, returning from his reconnaissance below Campbellton, disposed his cavalry so as to watch the river at Turner's Ferry and about the mouth of Nickajack Creek, connecting with McCook by patrols. General Garrard's cavalry scouted from McAfee's Bridge toward Pinckneyville and covered McPherson's left, near Buchanan's. Stoneman had orders to throw a pontoon bridge across at Howell's or Sandtown, if the opportunity presented, and make a raid upon the Atlanta and West Point railroad and telegraph. Garrard was charged with breaking the Augusta railroad effectually between Stone Mountain and Decatur. All wagons or incumbrances not absolutely needed for battle were left at Marietta and the Chattahoochee.

Allatoona was made a veritable fortress. Of his new base, Sherman said: "I regard Allatoona of the first importance in our



future plans. It is a second Chattanooga; its front and rear are susceptible of easy defense, and its flanks are strong." He ordered the commander of that post to be vigilant, and as opportunity arose, send small raiding bands to all the small towns in northwest Georgia, seizing everything in the nature of grain, forage and vegetables. He was ordered to send north any family against whom he entertained "a bare suspicion," wherever found, and to "shoot without mercy" anyone troubling the railroad or telegraph. Another strong Union post was established at Kennesaw.

On the night of the 17th, Sherman wired Halleck: "To-day we have moved out from the Chattahoochee to Nancy's Creek, General Thomas on the right from Pace's Ferry, toward Atlanta; General Schofield in the center, near Cross Keys, and General McPherson on the left near General Schofield. To-morrow I propose to advance General Thomas to Peachtree Creek, about Buck Head; General Schofield on the Decatur road, and General McPherson to the vicinity of the railroad east of Decatur and his cavalry division, under Garrard, will break the railroad. If we can break the railroad I propose to place the left wing across it, near Decatur, and break up the railroad eastward as far as cavalry can operate with prudence. To-day we encounter nothing but cavalry."

At the same time the Confederate army was making stronger its earth-works, beyond Peachtree Creek, northeast of Atlanta, its long line extending in a crescent from near Decatur to a short distance from where the Western and Atlanta railroad crossed the Chattahoochee. This was the outer line. The inner works, which were even stronger, encircled the city near the suburbs, and were defended by the militia, which was constantly being reinforced. At this time Governor Brown was calling out the old men and boys.

The following dispatch sent by General Hood to General Bragg, under date of the 14th, is very significant: "During the campaign from Dalton to the Chattahoochee river it is natural to suppose that we have had several chances to strike the enemy a decisive blow. We have failed to take advantage of such opportunities, and find our army south of the Chattahoochee, very much

decreased in strength. Our loss cannot be less than 20,000, without having fought a decisive battle. I deem it of the greatest importance that General Kirby Smith should be ordered at once, with at least half, if not a larger portion, of his army, on this side of the Mississippi River. Our success west of the Mississippi River has proven a disadvantage to us, since the enemy has reinforced his army on this side, and we have failed to do so. The strength of the Army of Tennessee is such at this time as to render it necessary to have aid from General Kirby Smith—allowing that we should gain a victory over Sherman—to follow up our success and regain our lost territory. Our present position is a very difficult one, and we should not, under any circumstances, allow the enemy to gain possession of Atlanta, and deem it excessively important, should we find the enemy intends establishing the Chattahoochee as their line, relying upon interrupting our communications and again virtually dividing our country, that we should attack him, even if we should have to recross the river to do so. I have, general, so often urged that we should force the enemy to give us battle as to almost be regarded reckless by the officers high in rank in his army, since their views have been so directly opposite. I regard it as a great misfortune to our country that we failed to give battle to the enemy many miles north of our present position. Please say to the President that I shall continue to do my duty cheerfully and faithfully, and strive to do what I think is best for our country, as my constant prayer is for our success."

General Bragg was then on his way to Atlanta. On the 15th, Bragg sent the two following messages to President Davis:

"The enemy were driven back across the Chattahoochee near Newnan this morning by our cavalry before they reached the West Point railroad. Another corps of infantry has crossed above. Nearly all available stores and machinery are removed, and the people have mostly evacuated the town."

. . . . .

"I have made General Johnston two visits, and been received courteously and kindly. He has not sought my advice, and it was not volunteered. I cannot learn that he has any more plan for the future than he has had in the past. It is expected that he will

await the enemy on a line some three miles from here, and the impression prevails that he is now more inclined to fight. The enemy is very cautious, and intrenches immediately on taking a new position. His force, like our own, is greatly reduced by the hard campaign. His infantry now very little over 60,000. The morale of our army is still reported good."

On the same day Johnston sent this report to Bragg in Atlanta: "General Wheeler reported only this morning that the enemy's corps at Isham's Ferry advanced eastwardly three or four miles in the afternoon and intrenched. I did not give you this information sooner because I expected to see you here. I have not visited you because absolutely afraid to leave my quarters."

On the 16th, Jefferson Davis telegraphed General Johnston: "A telegram from Atlanta of yesterday announces that the enemy is extending intrenchments from river toward railroad to Augusta. I wish to hear from you as to present situation, and your plan of operations so specifically as will enable me to anticipate events."

"To which Johnston replied: "Your dispatch of to-day received. The slight change in the enemy's dispositions made since my dispatch of the 14th to General Cooper was reported to General Bragg yesterday. It was a report from General Wheeler that Schofield's corps had advanced eastwardly about three miles from Isham's Ford and intrenched. As the enemy has double our number, we must be on the defensive. My plan of operations must, therefore, depend upon that of the enemy. It is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. We are trying to put Atlanta in condition to be held for a day or two by the Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider."

On the 17th the blow fell in the form of the following dispatch:

RICHMOND, *July 17, 1864.*

General J. E. JOHNSTON:

Lieut.-Gen. J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary rank of general under the late law of Congress. I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that as you have

failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, far in the interior of Georgia, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you will immediately turn over to General Hood.

S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector-General.*

[Indorsement.]

Received night of July 17, 1864. Headquarters, three miles from Atlanta, at Nelson's house, on Marietta road.

On the same day Secretary of War Seddon sent this message to the new commander-in-chief, General John B. Hood: "You are charged with a great trust. You will, I know, test to the utmost your capacities to discharge it. Be wary no less than bold. It may yet be practicable to cut the communication of the enemy or find or make an opportunity of equal encounter whether he moves east or west. God be with you."

On the morning of the 18th the Confederate army before Atlanta was surprised, and in most instances grieved, to hear read the following order:

GENERAL ORDERS,

No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,

*July 17, 1864.*

In obedience to orders of the war department, I turn over to General Hood the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee. I cannot leave this noble army without expressing my admiration of the high military qualities it has displayed. A long and arduous campaign has made conspicuous every soldierly virtue, endurance of toil, obedience to orders, brilliant courage. The enemy has never attacked but to be repulsed and severely punished. You, soldiers, have never argued but from your courage, and never counted your foes. No longer your leader, I will still watch your career, and will rejoice in your victories. To one and all I offer assurances of my friendship, and bid an affectionate farewell.

J. E. JOHNSTON,

*General.*

The Atlanta papers published the foregoing order and commented regretfully on General Johnston's removal, at the same time expressing great confidence in the known boldness and hard fighting reputation of General Hood. It was a case of "The king is dead—God save the king!" Johnston's reply to the order deposing him from command ended with a sentence that may or may not have been aimed at Hood. He said:

"Your dispatch of yesterday received and obeyed. Command of the Army and Department of Tennessee has been transferred to General Hood. As to the alleged cause of my removal, I assert that Sherman's army is much stronger, compared with that of Tennessee, than Grant's compared with that of Northern Virginia. Yet the enemy has been compelled to advance much more slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta than to that of Richmond and Petersburg, and penetrated much deeper into Virginia than into Georgia. Confident language by a military commander is not usually regarded as evidence of competence."

Hood does not seem to have relished the responsibility of defending Atlanta. At any rate, he wired the war department at Richmond on the 18th: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of my appointment as general of the Army of Tennessee. There is now heavy skirmishing and indications of a general advance. I deem it dangerous to change the commanders of this army at this particular time, and to be to the interest of the service that no change should be made until the fate of Atlanta is decided."

President Davis replied as follows: "Your telegram of this date received. A change of commanders, under existing circumstances, was regarded as so objectionable that I only accepted it as the alternative of continuing in a policy which had proved so disastrous. Reluctance to make the change induced me to send a telegram of inquiry to the commanding general on the 16th instant. His reply but confirmed previous apprehensions. There can be but one question which you and I can entertain—that is, what will best promote the public good; and to each of you I confidently look for the sacrifice of every personal consideration in conflict with that object. The order has been executed, and I cannot suspend it without making the case worse than it was before the order was issued."

Upon the receipt of this dispatch, Hood wired back: "I have assumed command of the Army and Department of Tennessee." To General Johnston Hood sent this note: "Much to my surprise I received the appointment you refer to. I accept your congratulations and without its concomitants it would have been more agreeable. I desire to have a conversation with you, and for that purpose will be over early in the morning."

General Hood issued the following address to his soldiers on the 18th:

"SOLDIERS: In obedience to order from the war department I assume command of this army and department. I feel the weight of the responsibility so suddenly and unexpectedly devolved upon me by this position, and shall bend all my energies and employ all my skill to meet its requirements. I look with confidence to your patriotism to stand by me, and rely upon your prowess to wrest your country from the grasp of the invader, entitling yourselves to the proud distinction of being called the deliverers of an oppressed people."

That night General Hood reported to the secretary of war: "The enemy advanced to-day on all the roads leading from Isham's Ford and Roswell, and established his line on Peachtree Creek, his right resting on the Chattahoochee in the vicinity of the railroad, his left at Buck Head; our army about four miles from Atlanta, the creek intervening between the armies."

The next thing Richmond heard from Hood was the same cry Johnston had been trying to impress upon deaf ears for weeks. He wanted outside assistance to isolate Sherman by cutting his railroad far to the rear. On the 19th Hood telegraphed the secretary of war:

"I thank you for your kind expressions in your dispatch of the 17th. If General S. D. Lee can co-operate with me by breaking the enemy's communication, I ask that it may be done with the least possibly delay. I shall at all times be glad to receive any advice or suggestions from the authorities at Richmond."

Hood seems to have seen no cause to change Johnston's plans relative to the first step to be taken in the defense of Atlanta. Indeed, he fought the battle of Peachtree Creek on the 20th on precisely the lines outlined by the retiring commander. What those lines were Johnston tells in his *Century* paper as follows:



“General Hood came to my quarters early in the morning of the 18th and remained there until nightfall. Intelligence was soon received that the Federal army was marching toward Atlanta, and at his urgent request I gave all necessary orders during the day. The most important one placed the troops in the position already chosen, which covered the roads by which the enemy was approaching. After transferring the command to General Hood, I described to him the course of action I had arranged in my mind. If the enemy should give us a good opportunity in the passage of Peachtree Creek, I expected to attack him. If successful, we should obtain important results, for the enemy’s retreat would be on two sides of a triangle and our march on one. If we should not succeed, our intrenchments would give us a safe refuge, where we could hold back the enemy until the promised state troops should join us; then, placing them on the nearest defenses of the place (where there were, or ought to be, seven sea-coast rifles, sent us from Mobile by General Maury), I would attack the Federals in flank with the three Confederate corps. If we were successful, they would be driven against the Chattahoochee below the railroad, where there are no fords, or away from their supplies, as we might fall on their left or right flank. If unsuccessful, we could take refuge in Atlanta, which we could hold indefinitely; for it was too strong to be taken by assault, and too extensive to be invested. This would win the campaign, the object of which the country supposed Atlanta to be.”

Having extended to his successor such aid as he could in the way indicated, General Johnston left immediately for Macon, silently smarting under a sense of injustice.

Public opinion as to the merits of this unfortunate controversy was and has remained divided. It is certain that the Federal generals fighting in front of Johnston from Ringgold to Atlanta entertained a high respect for his soldierly qualities and regarded him as anything but a mean opponent on the embattled field. Sherman himself said of Johnston: “No officer or soldier who has served under me will question the generalship of Joseph E. Johnston. His retreats were timely, in good order, and he left nothing behind.” General Howard said: “Just at this time, much to our comfort and to his surprise, Johnston was removed.

. . . . Johnston had planned to attack Sherman at Peachtree Creek, expecting just such a division between our wings as we made." Congratulations were expressed among the Federal officers when they learned they were to face Johnston no more. They were anxious for an attack by the enemy in the open. Johnston's prudence and caution made him more to be feared than Hood's dashing gallantry.

In his "Memoirs" General Sherman says that on July 21st while he (Sherman) was at the head of Schofield's troops, expecting that the enemy would evacuate, McPherson rode up with his staff. "We went back," he continued, "to the Howard House, a double frame building with a porch, and sat on the steps discussing the chances of battle and Hood's general character. McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood, Schofield and Sheridan. We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious, and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined and rash man."

Probably the character of a man was never more mirrored in his face than was that of Hood. He did not look intellectual. He did not look like a long-headed planner, full of mental resources. Had he been one of Cromwell's Roundheads, doubtless he would have been zealous to the point of fanaticism. But he did look like a very bull-dog of war. He had the ear marks of a man who would fight any and all comers, and not know when he was whipped. And that was Hood.

Before dismissing this famous incident and continuing the narration of the military movements immediately preceding Hood's first great battle in his capacity of chief, it might be well to quote General Johnston a little in his own defense. Said he in his *Century* article, from which the foregoing extract was taken:

"In his telegram of the 17th, Mr. Davis gave his reasons for removing me, but in Vol. II., pp. 556 to 561, of the 'Rise and Fall,' he gave many others, most of which depend on misrepresentations of the strength of the positions I occupied. They were not stronger than General Lee's; indeed, my course was as like his as the dissimilarity of the two Federal commanders permitted. As

his had increased his great fame, it is not probable that the people, who admired his course, condemned another similar one. As to Georgia, the state most interested, its two most influential citizens, Governor Joseph E. Brown and General Howell Cobb, remonstrated against my removal.

"The assertions in Mr. B. H. Hill's letter (of October 12th, 1878), quoted by Mr. Davis ('R. and F.,' Vol. II., p. 557) do not agree with those in his oration delivered in Atlanta in 1875. Mr. Hill said in the oration: 'I know that he (Mr. Davis) consulted General Lee fully, earnestly and anxiously before this perhaps unfortunate removal.' That assertion is contradicted by one whose testimony is above question—for in Southern estimation he has no superior as gentleman, soldier and civilian—General Hampton. General Lee had a conversation with him on the subject, of which he wrote to me:

"'On that occasion he expressed great regret that you had been removed, and said that he had done all in his power to prevent it. The secretary of war had recently been at his headquarters near Petersburg to consult as to this matter, and General Lee assured me that he had urged Mr. Seddon not to remove you from command, and had said to him that if you could not command the army, we had no one who could. He was earnest in expressing not only his regret at your removal, but his entire confidence in yourself.'

"Everything seen about Atlanta proved that it was to be defended. We had been strengthening it a month, and had made it, under the circumstances, impregnable. We had defended Marietta, which had not a tenth of its strength, twenty-six days. General Sherman appreciated its strength, for he made no attack, although he was before it about six weeks.

"I was a party to no such conversations as those given by Mr. Hill. No soldier above idiocy would express the opinions he ascribes to me.

"Mr. Davis condemned me for not fighting. General Sherman's testimony and that of the military cemetery at Marietta refute the charge. I assert that had one of the other lieutenant-generals of the army (Hardee or Stewart) succeeded me, Atlanta would have been held by the Army of Tennessee."

Much bitterness resulted from Johnston's removal in Confederate army and governmental circles, and its effect on the morale of the rank and file at Atlanta was not good. In Hardee's corps, particularly, the discontent was outspoken. There was a feeling that, if Johnston had to go, Hardee, as Hood's senior, was entitled to the command. Hardee felt aggrieved and expressed his determination to send in his resignation at once. He did not do so, however, at that time. Hood explains the reason thus: "In consequence, I have no doubt, of my application to President Davis to postpone the order transferring to me the command of the army, he (Hardee) altered his decision and concluded to remain with his corps." The crimination and recrimination resultant from the change of commanders filled volumes after the war.

Hood assigned Major-General Cheatham to the command of his old corps, temporarily, averring to the war department that he had no major-general in the corps whom he deemed suitable for the position. This, too, caused ill-feeling among Hood's former associate generals. Hood wrote the department: "It is my opinion that if the Department has no more fitting person in view and no strong objections thereto, that Major-General Mansfield Lovell might be assigned here for the purpose, to the great advantage of this army. If a lieutenant-general is to be appointed and sent to me, I know of no one that I would prefer to Maj.-Gen. Wade Hampton or S. D. Lee."

The Federal army continued to advance steadily and cautiously, some sections of it covering five miles on the 18th. Sherman was not certain that the enemy meant to defend Atlanta. To Thomas he said: "It is hard to realize that Johnston will give up Atlanta without a fight, but it may be so. Let us develop the truth." He cautioned his generals to be momentarily prepared for heavy battle. There was a sharp little skirmish early on the morning of the 18th on Nancy's Creek, an outpost of Confederates, opening with artillery on Howard's command, from the opposite side of the creek. They had burned the bridge, and their position being an elevated one, they succeeded in holding that part of Sherman's army in check until formidable artillery was brought to bear on them. The bridge was reconstructed and

the army pressed on to Buck Head, skirmishing with Williams's cavalry at every step. Although the large bodies of cavalry of the two armies were constantly near together, they did little but watch each other. His army accomplished what Sherman expected of it the 18th. General Thomas reached Buck Head and occupied the ridge between Nancy's Creek and Peachtree Creek, gaining possession of the roads leading to Atlanta in that direction. Schofield passed through Cross Keys and occupied the Peachtree road where it intersected the road from Cross Keys to Decatur. McPherson occupied strong ground four miles to the left of Schofield, not far from Decatur. His cavalry was successful in its raid on the Augusta railroad between Decatur and Stone Mountain. It was assisted in the work of destruction by Lightburn's brigade of infantry, and some three miles of the railroad entirely demolished. General Logan, who supervised the raid on the railroad, was somewhat facetious in his report to McPherson that night. He said: "In the march to and from the railroad to my present position no resistance was met anywhere that I could hear of. One prisoner was captured. He was quite unwell. I think quite a number would have been captured if we had found them, and all been in the same condition as this one. The loss in the whole command, so far as I can learn, is one horse with pains in his belly from eating green corn."

From his headquarters at Sam House's brick house, near Old Cross Keys, Sherman telegraphed Halleck on the night of the 18th: "We moved to-day rapidly and General McPherson reached the Atlanta and Augusta road at a point seven miles east of Decatur and four miles from Stone Mountain. General Garrard's cavalry at once set to work to break up road and was reinforced by Brig.-Gen. Morgan L. Smith's division of infantry, and they expect by night to have five miles of road effectually destroyed. Thus far we have encountered only cavalry with light resistance, and to-morrow will move on Decatur and Atlanta. I am fully aware of the necessity of making the most of time and shall keep things moving."

The field orders of Sherman's army for the 19th of July will show its position and intentions immediately before the battle of Peachtree Creek:



SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,  
No. 37      *In the Field, near Cross Keys, Ga., July 18, 1864.*

The movements of the army to-morrow, July 19, will be as follows:

I. Major-General Thomas will press down from the north on Atlanta, holding in strength the line of Peachtree, but crossing and threatening the enemy at all accessible points to hold him there, and also taking advantage of any ground gained, especially on the extreme right.

II. Major-General Schofield will move direct on Decatur and gain a footing on the railroad, holding it, and breaking the railroad and telegraph wire.

III. Major-General McPherson will move along the railroad toward Decatur and break the telegraph wires and the railroad. In case of the sounds of serious battle he will close in on General Schofield, but otherwise will keep every man of his command at work in destroying the railroad by tearing up track, burning the ties and iron, and twisting the bars when hot. Officers should be instructed that bars simply bent may be used again, but if when red hot they are twisted out of line they cannot be used again. Pile the ties into shape for a bonfire, put the rails across, and when red hot in the middle, let a man at each end twist the bar so that its surface become spiral. General McPherson will dispatch General Garrard's cavalry eastward along the line of the railroad to continue the destruction as far as deemed prudent.

IV. All the troops should be in motion at 5 a. m., and should not lose a moment's time until night, when the lines should be closed on General Schofield about Pea Vine and Decatur.

By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

In Sherman's field correspondence is found evidence that he thought he was going to be able to take possession of Atlanta within forty-eight hours after his army was in motion south of the Chattahoochee. To Thomas he wrote: "My belief is we can approach from the east with certainty of getting within cannon reach of the town, in which case it cannot be held. . . .



If Hood fights behind forts close to the town, I will swing in between Atlanta and the river; but if he fight outside we must accept battle." Sherman thought, by swinging around by Decatur, away from the direct roads from the river to Atlanta, that he would avoid the enemy's forts. He said further to Thomas: "With McPherson, Howard and Schofield, I would have ample to fight the whole of Hood's army, leaving you to walk into Atlanta, capturing guns and everything. At all events, now that I feel satisfied you can get across Peachtree, and as I think the opportunity the best, I will order the universal movement on Atlanta at daylight" (of the 20th). The following supplementary orders will give the reader some idea of the situation as pertains to the advancing Federals:

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS,      HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,  
No. 39.      *In the Field, near Decatur, Ga., July 19, 1864.*

The whole army will move on Atlanta by the most direct roads to-morrow, July 20, beginning at 5 a. m., as follows:

I. Major-General Thomas from the direction of Buck Head, his left to connect with General Schofield's right about two miles northeast of Atlanta, about lot 15, near the houses marked as 'Hu.' and "Col. Hoo."

II. Major-General Schofield by the road leading from Doctor Powell's to Atlanta.

III. Major-General McPherson will follow one or more roads direct from Decatur to Atlanta, following substantially the railroad.

Each army commander will accept battle on anything like fair terms, but if the army reach within cannon-range of the city without receiving artillery or musketry fire he will halt, form a strong line, with batteries in position, and await orders. If fired on from the forts or buildings of Atlanta no consideration must be paid to the fact that they are occupied by families, but the place must be cannonaded without the formality of a demand.

The general-in-chief will be with the center of the army, viz., with or near General Schofield.

By order Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*


## CHAPTER XXVII

### BATTLE OF PEACHTREE CREEK

Had the battle of Peachtree Creek been fought several hours earlier, and had Hood's plans been carried out to the letter by his subordinate generals, there might have been a different tale to tell. There were delays and "hitches." The mechanism of the army in battle array (for an army is merely a fighting machine) did not work smoothly. The long lines of attack were full of gaps left by commands that were not pushed forward in time, and the brave men who rushed upon the enemy were not supported. What they gained they had to relinquish at a time and in a manner that made retreat a slaughter. Hood intimates that it was Hardee who threw the machinery out of gear.

It was a sorry beginning for Hood, in point of casualties, at least. The dead and wounded he was compelled to leave upon the field officially reported by the enemy who buried them and dressed their wounds to number 4,796 officers and men. The entire Union loss was reported to be 1,710. Where the fight raged fiercest, whole Confederate brigades were almost annihilated. In his report, for example, Brigadier-General Featherston, of Loring's division, Stewart's corps, said that out of an effective total of 1,230, 616 were killed, wounded and missing. Loring and Walthall, of Stewart's division, did most of the fighting on the part of the Confederates, and Geary and Williams, of Hooker's corps, on the part of the Federals. The battle endured from 4 o'clock in the afternoon until dark of a midsummer day.

Hood's attack on Sherman's right wing on the 20th of July, 1864, was eminently characteristic of that commander. It was an avalanche of battle. For weeks the Federals had been claiming that they only wanted a fair shot at their enemy, away from breastworks and forests. They were given their opportunity



Where Capt. E. P. Howell's Battery was placed July 20, '64  
Peachtree road near Peachtree Creek Battlefield

now. Much of the fighting at Peachtree Creek was done in the open fields, and was almost hand-to-hand. The Confederates advanced in fine fettle, confident of victory, and as they rushed upon the Federal earthworks—mere scratches along the ground, as yet—their well-known yell was never more defiant. They fought like furies upon the very top of long stretches of these incomplete trenchheaps, bayoneting and clubbing the Federals who did not flee. In places, as has been stated, they fairly carried the hostile works and broke the hostile lines, but everywhere the victors were flanked and enfiladed because they were wholly unsupported. Except, perhaps, to teach Sherman to move more slowly, Peachtree Creek profited Hood nothing. He could not hold the line there and drew back to his Atlanta defenses.

General Howard thus describes the battle: "They came surging on through the woods, down the gentle slope, with noise and fury like Stonewall Jackson's men at Chancellorsville. As to our men, some of them were protected by piles of rails, but the most had not had time to barricade. Stewart's masses advanced successively from his right, so Newton was first assailed. His rifles and cannon, firing incessantly, and with the utmost steadiness, soon stopped and repulsed the front attack; but whole battalions went far east of him into the gap before described. Thomas, behind the creek, was watching. He turned some reserved batteries upon those Confederate battalions, and fired his shells into the thickets that bordered the deep creek, sweeping the creek's valley as far as the cannon could reach. This was sufficient. In his own words, "it relieved the hitch." The hostile flankers broke back in confusion. In succession, Ward, Geary, Williams and Palmer received the on-coming waves, and though their ranks were shaken in places, they each made a strong resistance and soon rolled the Confederates back, shattered and broken."

The most graphic account of Hood's attack is in the report of General Geary, from which the following extract is taken:

"This battle was a very remarkable one as a test of the discipline and valor of our troops, and as the first defeat of the newly appointed commander of the rebel army it was glorious in its results. The field everywhere bore marks of the extreme severity of the contest, and recalled to my mind, in appearance, the scene

of conflict where the same division fought at Gettysburg. Not a tree or bush within our entire range but bore the scars of battle. The appearance of the enemy as they charged upon our front across the cleared field was magnificent. Rarely has such a sight been presented in battle. Pouring out from the woods they advanced in immense brown and gray masses (not lines), with flags and banners, many of them new and beautiful, while their general and staff officers were in plain view, with drawn sabers flashing in the light, galloping here and there as they urged their troops on to the charge. The rebel troops also seemed to rush forward with more than customary nerve and heartiness in the attack. This grand charge was Hood's inaugural, and his army came upon us that day full of high hope, confident that the small force in their front could not withstand them, but their ardor and confidence were soon shaken. My artillery, served with the utmost rapidity, even while receiving volleys from the rear, poured out steady discharges of canister and shell, and we could see the great gaps in that compact mass of human beings as each shot tore through their ranks. Those masses of the enemy that charged upon my right and rear reached at one time within a few yards of Bundy's battery, but by the cool bravery of my officers and men were driven back."

Hood tells the story of Peachtree Creek as follows:

"Accordingly, on the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th, I formed line of battle facing Peachtree Creek; the left rested near Pace's Ferry road, and the right covered Atlanta. I was informed on the 19th that Thomas was building bridges across Peachtree Creek; that McPherson and Schofield were well over toward, and even on, the Georgia railroad, near Decatur. I perceived at once that the Federal commander had committed a serious blunder in separating his corps or armies by such distance as to allow me to concentrate the main body of our army upon his right wing, whilst his left was so far removed as to be incapable of rendering timely assistance. General Sherman's violation of the established maxim that an army should always be held well within hand, or its detachments within easy supporting distance, afforded one of the most favorable occasions for complete victory which could have offered; especially as it presented an opportu-



nity, after crushing his right wing, to throw our entire force upon his left. In fact, such a blunder affords a small army the best, if not the sole, chance of success when contending with a vastly superior force.

"Line of battle having been formed, Stewart's corps was in position on the left, Hardee's in the center, and Cheatham's (formerly Hood's) on the right. Orders were given to Generals Hardee and Stewart to observe closely and report promptly the progress of Thomas in the construction of bridges across Peachtree Creek and the passage of troops. General Cheatham was directed to reconnoiter in front of his left; to erect upon that part of his line batteries so disposed as to command the entire space between his left and Peachtree Creek, in order to completely isolate McPherson's and Schofield's forces from those of Thomas; and, finally, to intrench his line thoroughly. This object accomplished, and Thomas having partially crossed the creek and made a lodgment on the east side within the pocket formed by Peachtree Creek and the Chattahoochee river, I determined to attack him with two corps—Hardee's and Stewart's, which constituted the main body of the Confederate army—and thus, if possible, crush Sherman's right wing, as we drove it into the narrow space between the creek and the river.

"Major-General G. W. Smith's Georgia state troops were posted on the right of Cheatham, and it was impossible for Schofield or McPherson to assist Thomas without recrossing Peachtree Creek in the vicinity of Decatur, and making on the west side a detour which necessitated a march of not less than ten or twelve miles, in order to reach Thomas's bridges across this creek. I immediately assembled the three corps commanders, Hardee, Stewart and Cheatham, together with Major-General G. W. Smith, commanding Georgia state troops, for the purpose of giving orders for battle on the following day, the 20th of July.

"The three corps commanders, together with General G. W. Smith, were assembled not only for the purpose of issuing to them orders for battle, but with the special design to deliver most explicit instructions in regard to their respective duties. I sought to 'make assurance doubly sure' by direct interrogatory; each was asked whether or not he understood his orders. All replied in



the affirmative. I was very careful in this respect, inasmuch as I had learned from long experience that no measure is more important, upon the eve of battle, than to make certain, in the presence of the commanders, that each thoroughly comprehends his orders. The usual discretion allowed these officers in no manner diminishes the importance of this precaution.

"I also deemed it of equal moment that each should fully appreciate the imperativeness of the orders then issued, by reason of the certainty that our troops would encounter hastily constructed works, thrown up by the Federal troops which had been foremost to cross Peachtree Creek. Although a portion of the enemy would undoubtedly be found under cover of temporary breastworks, it was equally certain a larger portion would be caught in the act of throwing up such works, and in just the state of confusion to enable our forces to rout them by a bold and persistent attack. With these convictions, I timed the attack at 1 p. m., so as to surprise the enemy in their unsettled condition.

"The charge was unfortunately not made till about 4 o'clock p. m., on account of General Hardee's failure to obey my specific instructions in regard to the extension of the one-half division front to the right in order to afford General Cheatham an advantageous position to hold in check McPherson and Schofield. The result was not, however, materially affected by this delay, since the Federals were completely taken by surprise.


"General Stewart carried out his instructions to the letter; he moreover appealed in person to his troops before going into action, and informed them that orders were imperative they should carry everything, at all hazards, on their side of Peachtree Creek; he impressed upon them that they should not halt before temporary breastworks, but charge gallantly over every obstacle and rout the enemy. It was evident that, after long-continued use of intrenchments, General Stewart deemed a personal appeal to his soldiers expedient.

"General Stewart and his troops nobly performed their duty in the engagement on the 20th. At the time of the attack his corps moved boldly forward, drove the enemy from his works, and held possession of them until driven out by an enfilade fire of batteries placed in position by General Thomas.

“Unfortunately, the corps on Stewart’s right, although composed of the best troops in the army, virtually accomplished nothing. In lieu of moving promptly, attacking as ordered, and supporting Stewart’s gallant assault, the troops of Hardee—as their losses on that day indicate—did nothing more than skirmish with the enemy. Instead of charging down upon the foe as Sherman represents Stewart’s men to have done, many of the troops, when they discovered they had come into contact with breastworks, lay down, and consequently their attempt at pitched battle proved abortive.”

If the feeling between Hardee and Hood had not been of the most cordial nature before the battle of Peachtree Creek, it was not improved by the blame that the latter laid at the former’s door for the failure of the charge that day. Hood had been Johnston’s scapegoat, and now Hardee became Hood’s.

While the battle of Peachtree Creek was in progress, and for some hours before, another battle was being fought on the extreme left of the Federal army, on and close to the Georgia railroad, between Decatur and Atlanta. McPherson, in accordance with his orders, sought to turn the Confederate right flank, Sherman’s belief being that the enemy was weak enough in that quarter to enable the Army of the Tennessee to walk right into Atlanta, or, at least, to march around to the Macon and Western railroad and cut off Hood’s principal line of communication. That quarter was weak, comparatively speaking, but Hood had not relaxed his vigilance there. General Wheeler’s dismounted cavalry had been posted in the trenches defending the railroad and the eastern approaches to the city, and General G. W. Smith’s Georgia militiamen were there in support. McPherson did not deal a blow that represented more than a moiety of his great strength. Had he done so, there might have been no siege of Atlanta for the historian to recount. He “felt forward” with the extreme left of the Fifteenth Army Corps, the leading brigade being commanded by Brigadier-General Walter Q. Gresham. The Federals advanced diagonally toward Atlanta, slowly sweeping Wheeler’s skirmishers before them past the railroad, and skirmishing up against an open knob called Bald Hill, a very important Confederate outpost. General Gresham was severely wounded in the leg



Scene on Peachtree Creek battleground, two miles northwest of Atlanta, Ga.



and had to be carried off the field. Wheeler held his ground with great gallantry, repulsing Blair's attack. In the evening Cleburne's division was hurried around to that position from the Peachtree Creek battle ground, and Sherman's hope of making an easy flank movement in that direction was dissipated.

As Lieutenant-General A. P. Stewart's corps practically fought the battle of Peachtree Creek, his report is of chief importance. He said in part: "On the morning of the 20th it was decided at army headquarters that at 1 p. m. that day an attack should be made on the enemy by this corps and Hardee's. The plan was for the divisions (commencing on Hardee's right) to move forward successively in echelon at intervals of some 200 yards, to attack the enemy, drive him back to the creek, and then press down the creek to the left. Should the enemy be found intrenched his works were to be carried, everything on our side of the creek was to be taken, and our crossing to the other side of the creek was to depend on our success. Such were the instructions of the commanding general to General Hardee and myself. I was to hold a division in reserve. It seems a division had been withdrawn from the lines on the right of Hardee's corps. His corps and mine were to close to the right far enough to cover the space vacated by this division, the space to be divided between the two corps. This would have shifted my line a half division front to the right—perhaps at most half a mile. The division and brigade commanders were notified of the work to be done, and directed to reconnoiter the ground in front of their lines as far as practicable. At 1 o'clock I found the left of Hardee's corps just beginning to shift to the right. Feeling that this change was not important, and that not a moment should be lost in making the attack contemplated, a staff officer was dispatched to the commanding general to inform him of the fact, and requesting an order to stop the movement to the right and commence the forward movement. The result was, however, that to keep up connection with the other corps my line moved fully a mile and a half or two miles to the right, and my right division (Loring's) did not move forward, following the one on its right in the prescribed order, until near 4 o'clock. My instructions to division commanders, and through them to commanders of brigades and regiments, were: to move

forward and attack the enemy ; if found intrenched to fix bayonets and carry his works ; to drive him back to the creek and then press down the creek ; that we were to carry everything in our front on our side of the creek. Loring's division was on the right, Walthall's in the center, and French's, the reserve division, on the left. The instructions given were obeyed promptly and with alacrity. Loring's division moved forward and carried the works in their front, but were compelled to fall back by an enfilade fire from the right, because the left division of the other corps had not moved up to the attack. Walthall's division also engaged the enemy with great spirit, while French's was moved so as to cover the left and be in supporting distance. Learning the cause of the check to Loring's and Walthall's divisions, an officer [was] dispatched to request General Hardee to allow his left division to co-operate with Loring in carrying the line in its front. Before an answer was received a staff officer from the commanding general brought me an order to retire to the intrenched line from which we had advanced, and the conflict terminated.

"The loss in Loring's and Walthall's divisions, especially the former, was heavy. These commanders, their subordinates, and men behaved entirely to my satisfaction, and I cannot but think, had the plan of the battle, as I understood it, been carried out fully, we would have achieved a great success."

Major-General Loring, whose division gave and took the hardest blow, that day, says of his gallant charge :

"I was informed at an early hour of the intention of fighting a battle on that day, and was requested, in company with my brigadiers, to examine the topography of the country in front for that purpose. The enemy was reported to be crossing Peachtree Creek and extending his line on our front. The reconnaissance was thoroughly made, the enemy being about two miles distant. The lieutenant-general informed me that the movement was to be made at 1 p. m. in echelon by division, at 200 yards distance, the corps on my right (Hardee's) to take the advance. At 1 o'clock the lieutenant-general notified me that General Hardee would move to the right the distance of half a division front, and I must follow the movement with my division and connect with his left. The order was obeyed, but instead of General Hardee's corps halt-

ing at the distance indicated, it continued to move to the right, which fact I communicated to the lieutenant-general, who ordered me to follow on with my division until that corps halted, and connect with its left, which I did, after moving near a mile to the right. After the lines were halted and connection made a staff officer from General Hardee stated that it was not the intention of General Hardee for Stewart's corps to move beyond the distance first indicated, and that a line of skirmishers from Hardee's corps was expected to fill the separation between the main lines of the two corps, and that General Hardee left a staff officer behind to designate the point where the right of Stewart's corps should halt, but through some misunderstanding the staff officer failed to give the information, and an officer had just been dispatched to General Hardee to inform him of it. It was now about 3 p. m., too late. General Stewart thought, to make any change. It was subsequently ascertained that beyond the thick forest in our immediate front several large fields opened out, through which we were compelled to charge, giving my division the most exposed position on the whole line. My orders were as soon as the division on my right had gained the distance of 200 yards mine was to follow in single line of battle without reserve; that we must not stop for any obstacle, and if we came to breastworks to fix bayonets and charge them. Each division was to incline gradually to the left as it advanced and press down Peachtree Creek. It was further stated that commanders on my right had received similar orders.

"Featherston's and Scott's brigades, numbering 2,700 men, composed my present force. Adams's brigade had been detached several days before for picket duty on the Chattahoochee River, and had not yet been returned. The division on my right having gained the prescribed distance, my division at the word of march moved forward with alacrity and great spirit. After marching about half a mile the enemy's pickets were encountered, but fled after firing a few scattering shots. We here merged into the open fields before mentioned. The enemy was in plain view about 700 yards distant on the opposite side of the field, occupying a ridge running east and west, and marked by a line of red earth, which plainly told the work that was before us. The division was here halted and the lines rectified. Perceiving the left of Cheatham's



division, on my right, to be advancing through the woods with less than the prescribed 200 yards distance between us my command was still delayed for that division to get its full distance. It was again ordered forward, and the men moved with bold confidence and resolute step in face of the enemy's works and his two lines of battle, when, arriving within 400 or 500 yards of the enemy's works, a terrible fire from his batteries and small-arms opened upon us, but the command moved forward with quickened step and a deafening yell, driving the enemy from his position and not stopping until our colors were planted on different points of the breastworks from right to left in a distance of half a mile, and capturing a number of prisoners. On my left the Thirty-fifth, Twenty-seventh, and Forty-ninth Alabama Regiments, consolidated, of Scott's brigade, captured the colors of the Thirty-third New Jersey Regiment and twice captured a 4-gun battery. This brilliant charge of my gallant division was made so rapidly and with such intrepidity that up to this time we had sustained but comparatively a small loss. As the enemy fled in confusion from his works the steady aim of the Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana marksmen of my command produced great slaughter in his ranks. All accounts agree that his loss was very heavy; the enemy's official reports estimating those engaged with my division at 2,500 killed and wounded."

The futile resistance of the assaulting column after it had gained possession of a part of the Federal intrenched line, is best told by Brigadier-General Featherston, whose command paid most dearly for its bravery. General Featherston, after describing the charge across the open field, says:

"My brigade drove them from the works and held them for several minutes, but was exposed to so destructive and galling a fire not only from the front, but also from the right flank, that it was compelled to retire to the strip of timber 250 or 300 yards in their rear, where it was protected by the crest of the hill and the timber. Here it was again formed in line, the right forming in the open space between the strip of timber and the woods on the right of the brigade, where it was protected to some extent by the rising ground in its front. In this position the fight was continued until after dark, the parties being in easy range. The attack by

the division on my right was not made as soon as I expected, nor as soon as I thought was contemplated by the order of battle. Had the attack by that division been made before, or even at the same time, my brigade engaged the enemy, I think we could have held his works, driven him further back, captured his batteries, and probably a large number of prisoners. The division on my right did not engage the enemy (or, at least, the left brigade did not) until my command had retired to the strip of timber, or second line, which it held until ordered to withdraw. What caused this delay on the part of the division on my right in making the attack I am unable to state, as I had no conversation with the division or brigade commanders either before or since the battle. I was ordered by the major-general commanding to withdraw my brigade to the trenches at 9 o'clock on that night, leaving my skirmishers on the field until 11 o'clock, which order was obeyed. I succeeded in removing my dead and wounded, except those who fell in, near, and beyond the enemy's works. Brigadier-General Scott's brigade, on my left, advanced with me and attacked the enemy at the same time. The two brigades were in one line and had no support or reserve. Brig.-Gen. John Adams's brigade was relieved from picket duty at a late hour in the evening, and came to our support after a rapid march of four miles, arriving just before night.

"The conduct of my brigade from the beginning to the end of the engagement was highly commendable and praiseworthy. Both officers and men manifested great eagerness for the fight, and behaved with coolness and courage. Both the advance and the charge were made over very rough ground with great alacrity upon what appeared to be an intrenched position of the enemy in heavy force, under a well-directed fire from his batteries as well as small-arms."

. . . . .

"Owing to the absence of every regimental commander (either killed or wounded), with one solitary exception, it is impossible to do justice to the command in this report, and to mention the many instances of individual daring which should receive special notice. Some few, however, have been brought to my knowledge without the official reports of the regimental com-

manders. Adj. W. J. Van de Graaff, of the Thirty-first Mississippi Regiment, a gallant and accomplished officer, a young man of promise and great moral worth, seized the colors of his regiment and bore them to the front after two or three color-bearers had been shot down, and following their example shared their fate. He fell with the colors in his hand. Adj. C. V. H. Davis, Twenty-second Mississippi Regiment, a gallant and excellent officer, and a young man of ability and promise, seized the colors of his regiment after three color-bearers had been shot down, advanced with them beyond the enemy's works, and fell dead while calling upon his regiment to dash forward on the enemy's columns."

The following is an extract from Major-General Walthall's report:

"The enemy had no works where we first encountered him, and was easily driven back to his intrenched line near Peachtree Creek, but from this it was impossible to dislodge him. At several points along the works in my front my troops carried the line, but for want of general co-operation and equal success at other points, these lodgments had to be abandoned, the detachments effecting them retiring to the line occupied by the main body near the enemy's intrenchments, in every case bringing with them prisoners captured within them. Support being required on my right I made known the fact to the lieutenant-general commanding, who ordered the Twenty-fourth South Carolina Regiment, commanded by its lieutenant-colonel, to report to me. Before this regiment arrived Colonel O'Neal, commanding Cantey's brigade, reported to me that his center was broken, and when the regiment came up I gave Colonel O'Neal control of it to restore and strengthen his line. Just then Col. J. R. White, of Fifty-third Tennessee Regiment, division officer of the day, came up with the skirmishers who had covered my front when the advance was made, whom he had been instructed to form, when needed no longer as skirmishers, and hold in readiness to move to any point where support might be needed. I directed him also to report to Colonel O'Neal.

"When we first struck the enemy in his intrenchments it was discovered that his right extended far beyond our line, and the

left of Reynolds's brigade was subjected to a galling fire from a force that fell upon his flank, which was firmly endured with order undisturbed till Selden's battery, under the immediate command of Lieutenant Lovelace, was gotten into an advantageous position, where it was so skillfully and rapidly served that the flanking force was soon driven off in confusion.

"Maj. W. C. Preston, the gallant and accomplished officer who commanded the battalion of artillery attached to my division, was with me on the field, and lost his life by a cannon shot from the enemy while personally superintending in an exposed position the firing of a section of Selden's battery directed against the force which had turned my left.

"Between sunset and dark Brigadier-General Quarles, whom a short time before Lieutenant-General Stewart directed should be withdrawn from the position he had occupied, arrived with his command and took position in rear of Cantey's brigade, and there remained till after dark. Firing had now ceased, and soon I was directed to withdraw to the position I held in the morning."

Brigadier-General Newton, who was first to receive Hood's assault, describes his command's experience thus: "With a heavy skirmish line the ridge, one-half [mile] wide, in front of our works, was taken. General Kimball's brigade moved up to the skirmish line and formed on the right-hand side of the road, Colonel Blake on the left; Colonel Bradley was along the road perpendicular to their position in order of march. As soon as Kimball's and Blake's brigades reached the top of the ridge they commenced naturally to throw up log and rail barricades, and, as the result proved, providentially. When my line of battle was formed and my troops well in hand, I ordered the skirmish line forward. They had not advanced over 150 yards before they met the enemy in front. At the same time the enemy threw one division around my left and rear. This attack was repulsed, the details of which I will give hereafter. The fire had scarcely subsided on my left and rear when it broke out on my front and right flank where Kimball held. The enemy came completely around his right front. He made a return of his flank and drove them laterally in front of the Twentieth Corps, one division of which was then advancing to connect with me. From this time

until sundown it was a succession of attacks on my right, left, and center, so rapid that I could not keep account of them, showing that the enemy were in strong force and well handled. The only thing that troubled me was that I did not have half men enough to hold the ground assaulted, even in one line, and I was obliged to move regiments from place to place as the attack was made, and several times strong attacks were repulsed by artillery and a few stragglers collected to support them. I had but 2,700 men in line. I had several regiments on the north side of Peachtree Creek which did good service in preventing the enemy crossing the creek and capturing our trains. From the best and most reasonable accounts I can gather, we were attacked as follows: Bate's division on my left and rear, Walker's on my left front, and Cleburne to the right and rear. The position I held was a key point, which accounts for the vigorous attack made upon me. If I had been driven across the creek Hooker's left flank would have been entirely exposed and serious consequences ensued. The enemy were completely astonished to find half completed barricades on the hill which we had just taken and which they imagined was only occupied by a skirmish line."

Brigadier-General Ward, whose command figured prominently in receiving Stewart's assault, had this to report: "About 3 p. m. Colonel Coburn reported to me that the enemy was advancing upon us in strong force. I immediately dispatched staff officers to order the brigade commanders to move their commands rapidly to the high ground in our front. The division moved at once in splendid order. The skirmish line, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bloodgood, of the Twenty-second Wisconsin, behaved most gallantly, refusing to fall back until sorely pressed by the rebel line of battle, and then only they retreated slowly, reluctantly yielding ground, disputing every foot they gave up. They had fallen back to the ridge covering the division, followed closely by the rebel line. When my line of battle reached them Colonel Bloodgood drew his men to the rear of the main line, and the battle began in earnest. The first line of the rebels was shattered in a few minutes, my advance was hardly checked a minute, the enemy had evidently believed themselves in a gap between General Geary and the Fourth Army Corps.



Meeting my line of battle seemed to completely addle their brains. Their first line broke, mixing up with the second line; they were now in the wildest confusion, firing in all directions, some endeavoring to get away, some undecided what to do, others rushing into our lines. I still advanced my men, keeping up a steady fire, crossed a deep ravine to gain the next hill to make good my connections with General Newton on my left and General Geary on my right, and also to gain a position which commanded the open country for 600 yards in advance. Once they had made a feeble effort to rally, but they were too badly broken. They succeeded in making a slight attack, but it was not a concerted movement; it commenced on the left, running at intervals toward the right. It only resulted in giving up more prisoners, 2 more battle flags, and swelling the already frightful number of rebel dead and wounded. They then fled to the woods, leaving dead, wounded, and arms in our possession. I took up the chosen position and commenced to fortify it. The enemy was rallying his men in the woods, keeping up a constant fire on our lines, and made several attempts to charge. We returned the fire vigorously, repulsed the charges before they got far out of the woods."

At 11 o'clock on the night of the 20th, General Hood sent the following dispatch to the secretary of war at Richmond, which, in the light of the result of the battle, is a very inadequate report: "At 3 o'clock to-day a portion of Hardee's and Stewart's corps drove the enemy into his breast-works, but did not gain possession of them. Our loss slight. Brigadier-General Stevens severely wounded. On our extreme right the enemy attacked Wheeler's cavalry with infantry, and were handsomely repulsed."

A message of Sherman to Halleck, sent at 9 o'clock on the same night, is so inadequate as to leave the reader to wonder where the battle of Peachtree Creek comes in. He said: "To-day we moved on Atlanta and have been fighting all day. Our line now extends from a point on the railroad two miles and a half east of Atlanta, and extends around by the north to the mouth of Peachtree Creek. We find the enemy in force, but will close in to-morrow. By the Atlanta papers we learn that Johnston is relieved and Hood commands; that Rousseau is on the



railroad at Opelika, and that most of the newspapers and people have left Atlanta. General Thomas is on my right, General Schofield the center, and General McPherson on the left, General Garrard's cavalry on the left rear of General McPherson, and Generals Stoneman and McCook on the west bank, guarding our right flank. The enemy still clings to his intrenchments. If General Grant can keep Lee from reinforcing this army for a week, I think I can dispose of it. We have taken several hundred prisoners, and had some short severe encounters, but they were partial; but we have pressed the enemy back at all points until our rifle-shot can reach the town. If he strengthens his works I will gradually swing around between him and his only source of supplies, Macon."

The Federal telegrapher, at 10 o'clock on the same night, sent his chief at Washington the following slight reference to the battle: "Our left has pushed forward to-day to within two miles of Atlanta. Reports that the right has remained nearly in position of last night, thus developing the enemy's line and proving that our information was very nearly correct as regarded it. Enemy has assaulted several times to-day, and has been severely repulsed each time. Our casualties light, and everything favorable."

Hood's unsuccessful assault on Hooker, Howard and Palmer, of Thomas's army, terminated hostile operations along the line of Peachtree Creek. The enemy pressed closer to Atlanta in that quarter, and on the 21st began the siege. Of his operations immediately following the battle of Peachtree Creek, General Thomas says: "During the 21st there was considerable skirmishing along the entire line, our forces in the meantime crowding up to the rebel main line of works, which were quite formidable. During the night of the 21st the enemy fell back to the fortifications immediately encircling the city of Atlanta, and at an early hour on the 22d I had disposed my troops confronting the new line of defenses taken up by him. Palmer's corps still held the right of my line, with his left resting near the Western and Atlantic Railroad, two and a half miles northwest of Atlanta, connecting at that point with General Hooker's corps, which latter continued the line around to the main Buck Head

and Atlanta road, where Howard's corps took it up. Howard's left connecting with General Schofield's army near Colonel Howard's house, on a road leading to Atlanta about one and a half miles southeast of the main Buck Head road. The position chosen by us was a strong one, and by nightfall of the 22d had been greatly strengthened by earth-works, and it having been ascertained that from several points Atlanta could be reached with rifled artillery, orders were given to keep up a steady fire upon the town night and day. McCook's division of cavalry was crossed to the east side of the river and posted on the right of my army, along Proctor's Creek, extending over toward Mason and Turner's Ferry, on the Chattahoochee."

Bald Hill, unsuccessfully assaulted by Blair, on McPherson's extreme left, late in the afternoon of the 20th, was the center of active hostilities on the 21st. This strong position was taken by Blair early in the morning and held. In describing the situation of the army on that day, and particularly in that quarter, General Howard says: "The 21st, a fearfully hot day, was spent by all in readjustment. Thomas brought his three corps forward, near to the enemy. The gap in my lines was closed as we neared the city. Schofield filled the space between the Fourth (mine) and Logan's corps. McPherson, to get a better left, ordered Blair to seize Bald Hill. General Force, of Leggett's division, supported by Giles A. Smith, who now had Gresham's place, charged the hill and carried it, though with a heavy loss. No time ran to waste till this point was manned with batteries protected by thick parapets and well secured by infantry supports."

General Wheeler, it will be remembered, had successfully held Bald Hill against Gresham's assault. After describing briefly his successful defense, General Wheeler's report continues: "About daylight the following morning (July 21) General Cleburne with his division of infantry came, pursuant to General Hood's orders, to relieve me, while I was ordered to extend my line to the right. General Cleburne placed his troops so closely together that only a little more than half my line was occupied by General Cleburne's troops. While changing position, and before my troops had faced toward the enemy, a general attack was

made on my own and General Cleburne's front. General Ferguson, who was on the right, reported a force turning his right flank, when, at the same moment, a general assault of several lines of battle was made by the enemy. Ferguson gave way in some confusion, which exposed the right of Allen's brigade, which, with the Georgia brigade, nevertheless, fought brilliantly, repulsing a desperate assault and killing the enemy in hand-to-hand conflicts. On the enemy's second assault both the Georgia and Alabama brigades, with the right brigade of Cleburne's division, were forced from their works by an overwhelming force. After falling back a short distance the Georgia and part of the Alabama brigades, rallied, charged the enemy, and retook the works, with 2 officers and 20 privates, beside a number of the enemy's dead and wounded, some of whom were killed in our rifle-pits. This was a most brilliant feat, and the Georgia brigade deserves great credit for its conduct upon that day."

General Leggett, whose division captured Bald Hill on the morning of the 21st, says in his report: "In pursuance of orders from Major-General Blair, I moved my division upon the enemy's works on the hill which I now occupy about sunrise on the 21st instant. The rebels made a stubborn resistance, but my command moved at a quick step until the enemy opened fire, and then struck a double-quick and took possession of their works and several prisoners. The enemy rallied and made repeated efforts to drive us from the hill, but were unsuccessful. In this fight the First Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. M. F. Force, was particularly conspicuous and did great honor to themselves and the cause for which they fought. Before 9 a. m. of that day I had a battery in position and threw shells into Atlanta. During the day the enemy were discovered moving to the left, and the Fourth Division moved to my left flank, and our flanks were as well guarded by pickets and outposts as possible in our position and with our limited force. The balance of the day and the following night were used in intrenching and fortifying."

At midnight after the battle of Peachtree Creek, Sherman sent an order to General Garrard to leave at once with his cavalry for a raid on Covington, striking the Georgia railroad at or near Lithonia, from which point he was ordered to destroy the track

clear to Covington, and especially the Yellow River bridge. At Covington he was to destroy all stores and capture whatever could be utilized by the army, especially cattle and mules; also to send a detachment to burn the rail and road bridges over the Ulfauhachee, east of there.

On the night of the 21st Sherman sent a more detailed report of Peachtree Creek to Washington, as follows: "Yesterday at 4 p. m. the enemy sallied from his intrenchments and fell suddenly and heavily on our line in the direction of Buck Head. The blow fell upon General Newton's division, of General Howard's corps, and General Johnson's, of General Palmer's. For two hours the fighting was close and severe, resulting in the complete repulse of the enemy with heavy loss in dead and wounded. He left his dead and many wounded in our possession, we retaining undisputed possession of all the ground fought over. General Newton reports he has buried 200 of the enemy's dead, and is satisfied he wounded at least 1,200. His entire loss is only 100, as his men were partially covered by a rail barricade. At the time of the attack General Hooker was in the act of advancing his lines, so that he fought his corps uncovered, in comparatively open ground and on fair terms with the enemy. The contest was very severe. He has buried about 400 of the rebel dead, took 7 colors, and has collected many of the wounded and other prisoners. Hooker thinks the rebel wounded in his front fully equal to 4,000; but I don't like to make guesses in such matters. His own loss will be covered by 1,500. On the whole the result is most favorable to us. To-day we have gained important positions, so that Generals McPherson and Schofield, on the east, have batteries in position that will easily reach the heart of the city, and General Howard, on the north, also has advanced his lines about two miles, being within easy cannon-range of the buildings in Atlanta. He compelled the enemy to give up a long line of parapets, which constituted an advance line of intrenchments. The city seems to have a line all round it, at an average distance from the center of the town of one mile and a half, but our shot passing over this line will destroy the town, and I doubt if General Hood will stand a bombardment; still he has fought hard at all points all day. I will open on the town from the

east and northeast to-morrow, and General Thomas will advance his right from the mouth of Peachtree Creek, so as to cross the railroad to the northwest of the town. I have sent General Garrard's cavalry eastward to Covington to break railroad and destroy the bridges on Yellow River and the Ulcofauhatchee Creek. In the action yesterday the rebel generals O'Branan [?] and Stevens were killed, and among the dead were 3 colonels and many officers. Brigadier-General Gresham was severely wounded yesterday, but is in no danger of life or limb."

General Hood's version of the result of the fighting that centered at Bald Hill, as telegraphed to Richmond on the 21st, follows: "This morning the enemy attacked Cleburne's division, of Hardee's corps, and a portion of General Wheeler's cavalry, upon our extreme right, but were handsomely repulsed. Colonel Adams, Thirty-third Alabama, was killed."



## CHAPTER XXVIII

### THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA

The battle of Atlanta, fought the 22d of July, 1864, closely approached in proportions and casualties the tremendous Virginia conflicts and was by odds the heaviest battle of Sherman's famous campaign. In results it was anything but decisive, though the largest benefits accrued to the Confederate arms. Probably, without this battle, the fall of Atlanta would have been a matter of days where it necessarily became a matter of weeks. It prevented the Federal army striking a vital blow on the eastern side of the city, the first and most practicable point aimed at, and it taught Sherman that, however overwhelming his army numerically, it could not trust to brute strength to vanquish the small, though intrepid and skillfully handled, army of Hood. Sherman advanced upon Atlanta rather loosely and without strict regard to the greatest degree of military security. After the battle of Atlanta he trusted more to science than force. It had the effect of deferring his hopes and changing his plan of campaign. In this battle each side lost one of its ablest and bravest commanders—the Federals Major-General James B. McPherson, commander of the Army of the Tennessee, and the Confederates Major-General W. H. T. Walker, commander of a division in Hardee's corps. The combined losses from all causes on this bloody field were upward of 10,000, slightly over half of which was suffered by the Confederates. About one-third of Sherman's and one-half of Hood's army was engaged.

A clearer and more comprehensive statement of the objects of this battle and narrative of its events, from a Confederate standpoint, cannot be found or prepared than Hood's own story. It is certainly an admirable defense of his conduct of operations and gives an insight into his indomitable character and military genius. He says:

"The failure on the 20th rendered urgent the most active measures in order to save Atlanta even for a short period. Through the vigilance of General Wheeler I received information, during the night of the 20th, of the exposed position of McPherson's flank; it was standing out in air, near the Georgia railroad between Decatur and Atlanta, and a large number of the enemy's wagons had been parked in and around Decatur. The roads were in a good condition, and ran in the direction to enable a large body of our army to march, under cover of darkness, around this exposed flank and attack in rear.

"I determined to make also necessary preparations for a renewed assault; to attack the extreme left of the Federals in rear and flank and endeavor to bring the entire Confederate army into united action.

"Accordingly, Hardee's and Stewart's corps resumed their former positions. Colonel Presstman, chief engineer, was instructed to examine at once the partially completed line of works toward Peachtree Creek, which General Johnston had ordered to be constructed for the defense of Atlanta, and to report, at the earliest moment, in regard to their fitness to be occupied by Stewart's and Cheatham's corps, together with the Georgia state troops, under General G. W. Smith. The report was received early on the morning of the 21st, to the effect that the line established by Johnston was not only too close to the city and located upon too low ground, but was totally inadequate for the purpose designed; that Sherman's line, which extended from the vicinity of Decatur, almost to the Dalton railroad, north of Atlanta, rendered necessary the construction of an entirely new line, and upon more elevated ground.

"The chief engineer was thereupon directed to prepare and stake off a new line, and to employ his entire force, in order that the troops might occupy the works soon after dark of the night of the 21st, and have time to aid in strengthening their position before dawn of next morning. The task was soon executed through the skill and energy of Colonel Presstman and his assistants. Generals Stewart, Cheatham and G. W. Smith were instructed to order their division and brigade commanders to examine before dark the ground to be occupied by their respective

troops, so as to avoid confusion or delay at the time of the movement.

"General Hardee, who commanded the largest corps, and whose troops were comparatively fresh, as they had taken but little part in the attack of the previous day, was ordered to hold his forces in readiness to move promptly at dark that day—the 21st. I selected Hardee for this duty, because Cheatham had, at that time, but little experience as a corps commander, and Stewart had been heavily engaged the day previous.

"The position of the enemy the 21st remained, I may say, unchanged, with the exception that Schofield and McPherson had advanced slightly toward Atlanta. To transfer after dark our entire line from the immediate presence of the enemy to another line around Atlanta, and to throw Hardee, the same night, entirely to the rear and flank of McPherson—as Jackson was thrown in a similar movement, at Chancellorsville and Second Manassas—and to initiate the offensive at daylight, required no small effort upon the part of the men and officers. I hoped, however, that the assault would result not only in a general battle, but in a signal victory to our arms.

"It was absolutely necessary these operations should be executed that same night, since a delay of even twenty-four hours would allow the enemy time to intrench further, and afford Sherman a chance to rectify, in a measure, his strange blunder in separating Thomas so far from Schofield and McPherson.

"I well knew he would seek to retrieve his oversight at the earliest possible moment; therefore I determined to forestall his attempt and to make another effort to defeat the Federal army. No time was to be lost in taking advantage of this second unexpected opportunity to achieve victory and relieve Atlanta.

"I was convinced that Schofield and McPherson intended to destroy not only the Georgia railroad, but likewise our main line of communication, the railroad to Macon. It is now evident the blow on the 20th checked the reckless manner of moving which had so long been practiced by the enemy, without fear of molestation, during the Dalton-Atlanta campaign. The rap of warning received by Thomas, on Peachtree Creek, must have induced the Federal commander to alter his plan.

"Thus was situated the Federal army at the close of night, on the 21st: it was but partially intrenched; Schofield and McPherson were still separated from Thomas, and at such distance as to compel them to make a detour of about twelve miles, in order to reach the latter in time of need.

"The Confederate army occupied the same position, at dark, as prior to the attack on the 20th. The new line around the city, however, had been chosen; each corps commander fully advised of the ground assigned to him, and the special duty devolving upon him; working parties had been detailed in advance from the corps of Stewart and Cheatham, and from the Georgia state troops; rations and ammunition had been issued, and Hardee's corps instructed to be in readiness to move at a moment's warning.

"The demonstrations of the enemy upon our right, and which threatened to destroy the Macon railroad—our main line for receiving supplies—rendered it imperative that I should check, immediately, his operations in that direction; otherwise Atlanta was doomed to fall at a very early day. Although the attack of the 20th had caused Sherman to pause and reflect, I do not think he would have desisted extending his left toward our main line of communication had not the events occurred which I am about to narrate.

"As already stated, every preparation had been carefully made during the day of the 21st. I had summoned, moreover, to my headquarters, the three corps commanders, Hardee, Stewart and Cheatham, together with Major-General Wheeler, commanding cavalry corps, and Major-General G. W. Smith, commanding Georgia state troops. The following minute instructions were given in the presence of all assembled, in order that each might understand not only his own duty, but likewise that of his brother corps commanders. By this means I hoped each officer would know what support to expect from his neighbor in the hour of battle.

"Stewart, Cheatham, and G. W. Smith were ordered to occupy soon after dark the positions assigned them in the new line round the city, and to intrench as thoroughly as possible. General Shoup, chief of artillery, was ordered to mass artillery

on our right. General Hardee was directed to put his corps in motion soon after dusk; to move south on the McDonough road, across Entrenchment Creek at Cobb's Mills, and completely to turn the left of McPherson's army and attack at daylight, or as soon thereafter as possible. He was furnished guides from Wheeler's cavalry, who were familiar with the various roads in that direction, was given clear and positive orders to detach his corps, to swing away from the main body of the army, and to march entirely around and to the rear of McPherson's left flank, even if he was forced to go to or beyond Decatur, which is only about six miles from Atlanta.

"Major-General Wheeler was ordered to move on Hardee's right with all the cavalry at his disposal, and to attack with Hardee at daylight. General Cheatham, who was in line of battle on the right and around the city, was instructed to take up the movement from his right as soon as Hardee succeeded in forcing back, or throwing into confusion, the Federal left, and to assist in driving the enemy down and back upon Peachtree Creek, from right to left. General G. W. Smith would, thereupon, join in the attack. General Stewart, posted on the left, was instructed not only to occupy and keep a strict watch upon Thomas, in order to prevent him from giving aid to Schofield and McPherson, but to engage the enemy the instant the movement became general, i. e., as soon as Hardee and Cheatham succeeded in driving the Federals down Peachtree Creek and near his right.

"Thus orders were given to attack from right to left, and to press the Federal army down and against the deep and muddy stream in their rear. These orders were carefully explained again and again, till each officer present gave assurance that he fully comprehended his duties.

"At dawn on the morning of the 22d, Cheatham, Stewart, and G. W. Smith had, by alternating working parties during the night previous, not only strongly fortified their respective positions, but had kept their men comparatively fresh for action, and were in readiness to act as soon as the battle was initiated by Hardee, who was supposed to be at that moment in the rear of the adversary's flank.

"I took my position at daybreak near Cheatham's right, where I could observe the left of the enemy's intrenchments,



which seemed to be thrown back a short distance on their extreme left. After awaiting nearly the entire morning, I heard, about 10 or 11 o'clock, skirmishing going on directly opposite the left of the enemy, which was in front of Cheatham's right and Shoup's artillery. A considerable time had elapsed when I discovered, with astonishment and bitter disappointment, a line of battle composed of one of Hardee's divisions advancing directly against the intrenched flank of the enemy. I at once perceived that Hardee had not only failed to turn McPherson's left, according to positive orders, but had thrown his men against McPherson's breastworks, thereby occasioning unnecessary loss to us, and rendering doubtful the great result desired. In lieu of completely turning the Federal left and taking the intrenched line of the enemy in reverse, he attacked the retired wing of their flank, having his own left almost within gunshot of our main line around the city. I then began to fear that his disregard of the fixed rule in war, that one danger in rear is more to be feared than ten in front—in other words, that one thousand men in rear are equal to ten thousand in front—would cause us much embarrassment and place his corps at great disadvantage, notwithstanding he had success within easy grasp. It had rested in his power to rout McPherson's army by simply moving a little farther to the right, and attacking in rear and flank instead of assaulting an intrenched flank. I hoped, nevertheless, this blunder would be remedied, at least in part, by the extreme right of his line lapping round, during the attack, to the rear of McPherson. I anxiously awaited tidings from the scene of action while listening attentively to what seemed a spirited engagement upon that part of the field. This sound proceeded from the guns of the gallant Wheeler, in the direction of Decatur, whence I hoped, momentarily, to hear a continuous roar of musketry, accompanied by the genuine Confederate shout from Hardee's entire corps, as it advanced and drove the enemy down Peachtree Creek between our general line of battle and that formidable stream. Although the troops of Hardee fought, seemingly, with determination and spirit, there were indications that the desired end was not being accomplished. The roar of musketry occurring only at intervals strengthened

this impression, and a staff officer was dispatched to General Hardee to know the actual result.

"During the early afternoon I received information that the attack had been, in part, successful, but had been checked in consequence of our troops coming in contact with different lines of intrenchments, several of which they had carried and held. Fearing a concentration of the enemy upon Hardee, I commanded General Cheatham, about 3 p. m., to move forward with his corps and attack the position in his front, so as to, at least, create a diversion. The order was promptly and well executed, and our troops succeeded in taking possession of the enemy's defenses in that part of the field. A heavy enfilade fire, however, forced Cheatham to abandon the works he had captured.

"Major-General G. W. Smith, perceiving that Cheatham had moved out on his left, and having thoroughly comprehended all the orders relative to the battle, moved gallantly forward with his state troops in support of Cheatham's attack, but was eventually forced to retire on account of superiority of numbers in his front.

"Hardee bore off as trophies eight guns and thirteen stands of colors, and, having rectified his line, remained in the presence of the enemy. Cheatham captured five guns and five or six stands of colors.

"Notwithstanding the non-fulfillment of the brilliant result anticipated, the partial success of that day was productive of much benefit to the army. It greatly improved the morale of the troops, infused new life and fresh hopes, arrested desertions, which had hitherto been numerous, defeated the movement of McPherson and Schofield upon our communications in that direction, and demonstrated to the foe our determination to abandon no more territory without at least a manful effort to retain it.

"It became apparent almost immediately after the battle of the 22d that Sherman would make an attack upon our left, in order to destroy the Macon railroad; and, from that moment, I may say, began the siege of Atlanta. The battles of the 20th and 22d checked the enemy's reckless manner of moving about, and illustrated effectually to Sherman the danger of stretching out his line in such a manner as to form extensive gaps between his corps or armies, as he admits he did at Rocky Face Ridge and New Hope Church."


It would seem that Hood is unjustly severe against Hardee. While the latter general may not have got as far around McPherson's flank as he was expected to, Hood takes no account, apparently, of the fact that the Federal general, Dodge, was in the act of moving to strengthen McPherson's extreme left, when Hardee's corps, behind the Federal left flank, began the charge, and that Dodge, by the fortune of accident, was directly in Hardee's front and had but to face his men in that direction to meet the oncoming enemy with an admirable line of battle. Dodge had plenty of artillery with him and happened to be in a good position to post it where it could be used with effect. He saw Hardee's advance from the rear in plenty of time to form to meet it, and the Confederate charging column was at the disadvantage of having to cross a wide cultivated space of ground before it could reach Dodge's line of battle. It is this circumstance that minimized the success of Hood's grand coup, which was really brilliantly planned and otherwise would have no doubt been much more successful.

No Federal general gives a fairer account of this skillfully planned battle than General Oliver O. Howard, who succeeded McPherson to the command of the Army of the Tennessee. He explains Dodge's fortuitous situation and describes the killing of McPherson. General Howard says:

"Hardee, however, was destined to a special duty. About midnight he gathered his four divisions into Atlanta; Bate led the way; Walker came next; Cleburne, having now left the vicinity of Bald Hill (for he was soon to go beyond it), followed; then came Maney in rear. They pushed out far south and around Gresham's sleeping soldiers; they kept on eastward till Hardee's advance was within two miles of Decatur, and his rear was nearly past Sherman's extreme left. There, facing north, he formed his battle front; then he halted on rough ground, mostly covered by forest and thicket. He had made a blind night march of fifteen miles; so he rested his men for a sufficient time, when, slowly and confidently, the well-disciplined Confederates in line took up their forward movement. Success was never more assured, for was not Sherman's cavalry well out of the way, breaking a railroad and burning bridges at and beyond Decatur? And thus

far no Yankee except a chance prisoner had discovered this Jacksonian march! The morning showed us empty trenches from Bald Hill to the right of Thomas. We quickly closed again on Atlanta, skirmishing as we went. McPherson's left was, however, near enough already, only a single valley lying between Blair's position and the outer defensive works of the city. The Sixteenth corps (Dodge), having sent a detachment under General Sprague, to hold Decatur, support the cavalry and take care of sundry army wagons—a thing successfully accomplished—had marched, on the 21st, toward Atlanta. Dodge remained for the night with head of column a mile or more in rear of Blair's general line. Fuller's division was nearest Blair's left, and Sweeney's not far from the Augusta railroad, farther to the north. McPherson spent the night with Sweeney. His hospitals and main supply trains were between Sweeney and the front. About mid-day McPherson, having determined to make a stronger left, had set Dodge's men in motion. They marched, as usual, by fours, and were in a long column pursuing their way nearly parallel to Hardee's battle front, which was hidden by the thick trees. Now danger threatened: at the first skirmish shots Dodge's troops halted and faced to the left and were in good line of battle. The Confederate divisions were advancing. Fortunately for Dodge, after the firing began, Hardee's approaching lines nearing him had to cross some open fields. McPherson was then paying a brief visit to Sherman near the Howard house. The attack was sudden, but Dodge's veterans, not much disturbed, went bravely to their work. It is easy to imagine the loud roar of artillery and the angry sounds of musketry that came to Sherman and McPherson when the sudden assault culminated and extended from Dodge to Blair's left. McPherson mounted and galloped off toward the firing. He first met Logan and Blair near the railway; then the three separated, each to hasten to his place on the battle-line. McPherson went at once to Dodge; saw matters going well there; sent off aides and orderlies with dispatches, till he had but a couple of men left with him. He then rode forward to pass to Blair's left through the thick forest interval. Cheatham's division was just approaching. The call was made, "Surrender!" But McPherson, probably without a thought save to





McPherson Monument

Where Maj.-Gen. McPherson was killed in Battle of Atlanta, July 22, 1864, one mile east of city



escape from such a trap, turned his horse toward his command. He was instantly slain, and fell from his horse. One of his orderlies was wounded and captured; the other escaped to tell the sad news. Our reinforcements were on the way, so that Cheatham was beaten back. While the battle raged, McPherson's body was brought to Sherman at the Howard house. . . . Logan immediately took the Army of the Tennessee, giving his corps to Morgan L. Smith. As soon as Hood, from a prominent point in front of Atlanta, beheld Hardee's lines emerging from the thickets of Bald Hill, and knew by the smoke and sound that the battle was fully joined, he hurried forward Cheatham's division to attack Logan all along the east front of Atlanta. At the time I sat beside Schofield and Sherman near the Howard house, and we looked upon such parts of the battle as our glasses could compass. Before long we saw the line of Logan broken, with parts of two batteries in the enemy's hands. Sherman put in a cross-fire of cannon, a dozen or more, and Logan organized an attacking force that swept away the bold Confederates by a charge of double-quick. Blair's soldiers repulsed the front attack of Cheatham's and Maney's divisions, and then, springing over their parapets, fought Bate's and Maney's men from the other side. The battle continued till night, when Hood again yielded the field to Sherman and withdrew. The losses on both sides in this battle of Atlanta were probably nearly even—about four thousand each. Our gain was in morale."

Major W. H. Chamberlin, of Dodge's command, who by the latter's order rode to McPherson for reinforcements after Hardee began his attack, gives an interesting description of the opening of the battle of Atlanta. He says Dodge's division was not actually in motion at the time the enemy's skirmishers opened, but had halted at the noon hour. General Dodge had been invited by General Fuller to lunch with him, and was in the act of dismounting to accept the latter's hospitality when the danger signals in the direction of Decatur caught his ear. Major Chamberlin's narrative continues: "He saw in an instant that something serious was at hand. He gave General Fuller orders to form his division immediately facing southeasterly, and galloped off toward Sweeney's division. He had hardly reached that command when Hardee's

lines came tearing wildly through the woods with the yells of demons. As if by magic, Sweeney's division sprang into line. The two batteries of artillery (Loomis's and Laird's) had stopped on commanding ground, and they were promptly in service. General Dodge's quick eyes saw the proper disposition to be made of a portion of Colonel Mersy's brigade, and cutting red tape, he delivered his orders direct to the colonels of the regiments. The orders were executed instantly, and the enemy's advance was checked. This act afterward caused trouble. General Dodge was not a West Point graduate, and did not revere so highly the army regulations as did General Sweeney, who had learned them as a cadet. Sweeney was much hurt by General Dodge's action in giving orders direct to regimental commanders, and pursued the matter so far as to bring on a personal encounter a few days after the battle, in which he came near losing his life at the hands of a hot-tempered officer.

"The battle of General Dodge's corps on this open ground, with no works to protect the troops of either side, was one of the fiercest of the war. General Dodge's troops were inspired by his courageous personal presence, for he rode directly along the lines, and must have been a conspicuous target for many a Confederate gun. His sturdy saddle-horse was worn out early in the afternoon, and was replaced by another. There was not a soldier who did not feel that he ought to equal his general in courage and no fight of the war exhibited greater personal bravery on the part of an entire command than was shown here. Nor can I restrain a tribute to the bravery of the enemy. We had an advantage in artillery; they in numbers. Their assaults were repulsed, only to be fearlessly renewed, until the sight of dead and wounded lying in their way, as they charged again and again to break our lines, must have appalled the stoutest hearts. So persistent were their onslaughts that numbers were made prisoners by rushing directly into our lines."

Lieutenant-Colonel Strong, McPherson's chief-of-staff, describes the scene that he and his chief saw, just before McPherson rode off to his death:

"The enemy, massed in columns three or four lines deep, moved out of the dense timber several hundred yards from

Dodge's position, and, after gaining fairly the open fields, halted and opened fire rapidly on the Sixteenth corps. They, however, seemed surprised to find our infantry in line of battle, prepared for attack, and, after facing for a few minutes the destructive fire from the divisions of Generals Fuller and Sweeney, fell back in disorder to the cover of the woods. Here, however, their lines were quickly re-formed, and they again advanced, evidently determined to carry the position. The scene at this time was grand and impressive. It seemed to us that every mounted officer of the attacking column was riding at the front or at the right or left of the first line of battle. The regimental colors waved and fluttered in advance of the lines, and not a shot was fired by the rebel infantry, although their movement was covered by a heavy and well-directed fire of artillery which was posted in the woods and on higher ground, and which enabled the guns to bear upon our troops with solid shot and shell, by firing over the attacking column. It seemed impossible, however, for the enemy to face the sweeping, deadly fire from Fuller's and Sweeney's divisions, the guns of whose batteries fairly mowed great swaths in the advancing columns. They showed great steadiness, and closed up the gaps and preserved their alignments; but the iron and leaden hail which was poured upon them was too much for flesh and blood to stand, and before reaching the center of the open fields the columns were broken and thrown into great confusion. Taking advantage of this, a portion of Fuller's and Sweeney's divisions, with bayonets fixed, charged the enemy and drove them back to the woods, taking many prisoners. General McPherson's admiration for the steadiness and determined bravery of the Sixteenth corps was unbounded."

While Hardee did not accomplish what he set out to, he made a gallant assault all along his lines, carrying some portions of the enemy's position and capturing a few stands of colors and guns, as well as several hundred prisoners. On the night following the battle he fortified and held most of his ground for four days. Wheeler's cavalry fought a brisk battle at Decatur at the same time, charging the enemy's line of defenses there and carrying the works after a stubborn resistance. Wheeler took 225 prisoners, a 12-pound gun, many small arms and other trophies, pur-

suing the enemy beyond the town. He was called to Hardee's assistance late in the afternoon and helped the latter most effectively. The following day he was sent after the Covington raiders.

Unfortunately, few of the Confederate reports have been preserved for the historian's use, and some of the most interesting details of Hardee's assault cannot be presented in official form. The Federal reports, on the contrary, are full to the minutest detail. This will account for a preponderance of the official testimony pertaining to the battles of the Atlanta campaign being taken from Federal sources.

The part taken by Cheatham's corps in co-operating with Hardee from its position on the Confederate right furnishes another thrilling chapter in the battle of Atlanta. The chief interest in Cheatham's operations centers in the struggle for the possession of Bald Hill and the capture and recapture of DeGress's Federal battery posted close to the track of the Georgia railroad, in the same vicinity. Here the fighting was as fierce as any of the war, and but for timely reinforcements hurried up by Logan, who temporarily succeeded McPherson in command of the Army of the Tennessee, the Fifteenth corps of that army, and the Seventeenth corps as well, would have been routed by the Confederates. As it was, these two corps were very severely handled. Cheatham succeeded in breaking the Federal lines and holding some of their positions for a short time, but was driven out by a heavy enfilade fire and compelled to fall back to his own works. Both sides lost heavily and many prisoners were taken. At a critical moment in the battle, the Seventeenth corps, occupying a line between Bald Hill and the McDonough road, was in imminent peril of being captured entire. The Confederates attacked it in rear, flank and front. When it is considered that Hardee concentrated most of his force against the extreme Federal left, having his own left, as Hood says, almost within gunshot of the lines of Cheatham, the dangerous position of the Federal corps caught between the hostile lines will be readily understood.

General Logan gives a very detailed account of the battle, from which the following important extracts are taken: "The rebel force, Hardee's corps, advancing rapidly, forced back the pickets of Giles A. Smith's division, and struck the left flank ex-

actly perpendicularly to his line of battle. At the same time a heavy fire was opened from batteries posted on a ridge in their rear, the fire being directed upon the rear of the Seventeenth Corps. Simultaneously with this attack the enemy emerged from the timber, in front and to the right of the Sixteenth Corps in three columns. It was evident that the movement was intended to strike the Seventeenth Corps on the flank and rear at the same time, and that the rebel commander was not aware of the presence of General Sweeney's division in that part of the field. General Dodge had at the first skirmishing put his Second Division, with two batteries of artillery, into line of battle, with Fuller's brigade on its right. The enemy moved upon the rear and right of the command of General Dodge. This movement exposed the flank of the enemy's column. General Dodge at once pushed forward two regiments, the Twelfth Illinois and Eighty-first Ohio, that delivered so destructive a fire on the enemy's flank that his column gave way. A charge was made, and the enemy fell back to the woods. General Dodge then withdrew his line a short distance to the rear. Colonel Wangelin's brigade, of the Fifteenth Corps, about this time came up on the double-quick, and was at once engaged with the head of a column through the interval between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, with the evident intention of striking the Seventeenth Corps in the rear of Leggett's division. Wangelin, although his brigade was small, threw it into line of battle, and, moving under a heavy fire, steadily pushed the enemy back and gained a slight elevation of ground, and constructed a breastwork of rails. The Second Brigade, of the Fourth Division, Fifteenth Corps, was on the right of General Leggett's division, of the Seventeenth Corps. Being satisfied, from the direction of the firing, that the enemy was pushing a column through the interval before mentioned, as well as by the movement of wagons and artillery from that direction, General Walcutt, commanding the brigade, changed his front to the left rear. The brigade was scarcely in position when a force of the enemy appeared in its front. The brigade became at once engaged, and repulsed the advancing line. The enemy re-formed and attacked the division of General Leggett. This gave General Walcutt an enfilading fire upon them, which he made very effective by opening



fire from a section of 24-pounder howitzers, belonging to the Seventeenth Corps. A 20-pounder Parrott, belonging to the Seventeenth Corps, which was also abandoned, was retaken by the Forty-sixth Ohio, under heavy fire. The division of Gen. Giles A. Smith, attacked on the flank and rear, was at once moved to the opposite side of their works. Its flank was partially driven in, and the enemy, by the rapidity of his assault and the heavy force with which it was made, swept away guns and several hundred prisoners. General Smith, although his flank was developed by the rebel mass thrown upon it, and in great danger from the heavy columns thrown upon his rear, succeeded in forming his men on the reverse of his works, and, in conjunction with the operations of General Dodge, General Walcutt, and Colonel Wangelin, in checking the advance of the enemy. The attacking columns of the enemy advanced as far around as the rear of General Leggett's line. The division was at once placed on the outside of the works, and received and checked the assault successfully."

General Logan, after giving an account of the fighting in Dodge's front, turns to the situation of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth corps, attacked by Cheatham. He ordered Blair to hold Bald Hill at all hazards. He said he at once perceived that the greatest danger to the Union lines was from the wide interval between the Seventeenth and Sixteenth corps, which he attempted to fill at once by ordering up troops from another part of the field. He describes the repeated assaults made by the Confederates before this weak line could be made secure, and the heroic resistance of the Seventeenth corps, particularly the division commanded by Gen. Giles A. Smith. He then describes the assaults upon the Fifteenth corps, later in the afternoon, and the hazardous position of Lightburn's division. It was during one of these assaults upon Lightburn that DeGress lost his famous Parrott battery. Logan says: "At this point was a deep railroad cut, on the right of which four guns of Battery A, First Illinois Artillery, were in position, and firing by the right oblique at the broken line of the enemy. Under the smoke of Battery A a rebel column marched rapidly by the flank up the main dirt road and through the deep cut of the railroad and was in rear of our lines before the officers or men were aware of their intention. The division at once fell back, the greater

part halting in a ravine between the two lines, some, however, retreating to the old line. Battery A and the 20-pounder guns at Battery H, First Illinois Artillery, were left in the hands of the enemy. The officers and men of both batteries fought with the greatest gallantry, serving their guns while they were surrounded by the enemy. At that time I was giving orders to General Dodge, having just ridden to his left, where General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, for which I had asked, had gone into position, covering the Decatur road. The command of General Dodge was not engaged. I ordered Colonel Martin to move at double-quick back to his division, and also ordered General Dodge to send a brigade of the Sixteenth Corps to the assistance of the right of our line, at the same time directing him that in the event he needed support, to call upon General Cox, commanding the division of the Twenty-third Corps on his left. The Second Brigade of the Second Division of the Sixteenth Corps, Colonel Mersy commanding, moved promptly out, and I conducted it to the rear of the old works of the Second Division of the Fifteenth Army Corps, where it deployed on the right of the railroad. When I arrived, General Morgan L. Smith and General Lightburn were re-forming the lines of the Second Division, in a ravine between the two lines of works. I ordered General Smith, so soon as he could re-form his lines, to retake the position and the batteries which had been lost. General Woods, commanding the First Division, which was on the right of the Second Division, finding his position untenable, the enemy occupying a position 300 or 400 yards to his left and rear, threw back his left and rear, forming a line facing the enemy's flank, his right resting at the Howard house. At the same time, Major Landgraeber, chief of artillery of the First Division, who had six guns in position, moved them into the open field and opened fire upon the enemy, compelling him to seek shelter, killing the horses of De Gress's battery, and preventing the enemy from removing the guns. General Woods then moved his First Brigade forward, attacking the enemy in flank and rear, and his Second Brigade attacking in flank and front. At the same time the Second Division, followed at a short distance by Colonel Mersy's brigade, advanced upon the enemy's front. The movement was successful. Woods's division striking

the enemy's flank, it began to break, and soon afterward the Second Division charging his front, the line of works, DeGress's battery, and 2 guns of Battery A were recaptured. General Woods swung his left around, and the whole line of the First and Second Divisions was reoccupied with no opposition, except a fierce assault upon the Fourth Iowa, which was repulsed.

"While this was occurring on the center and right of the Fifteenth Corps, the enemy appeared in the rear of Colonel Williams's (First) brigade, of the Fourth Division. Being threatened in front and rear, Colonel Williams retired his brigade to the lines held in the morning. Colonel Oliver withdrew the Third Brigade. Major Hotaling, of my staff, ordered General Harrow to retake the position which had been abandoned. The line was reoccupied about the same time with the reoccupation of the works of the Second Division. It was now nearly 5 o'clock, and, with the exception of two regiments' front on the extreme left, the whole of the main line of the Army of Tennessee was in its possession, notwithstanding the repeated and desperate assaults of the enemy. His last and final efforts were made upon the Fourth Division of the Seventeenth Corps. His assault is described by the officers engaged as the fiercest and most persistent engagement of the day. The attack was made from the east. The enemy formed in, and moved through, the woods, which covered their approach at some points within twenty yards of our breast-works. The men again fought from the reverse of their works. Under a most destructive fire from the Fourth Division and two detached regiments from the Third Division, the enemy moved directly up to our works, and a deadly battle took place. 'Regimental commanders, with their colors, with such men as would follow them, would not infrequently occupy one side of the works, and our men the other. Many individual acts of heroism occurred. The flags of opposing regiments would meet on the opposite sides of the same work, and would be flaunted by their respective bearers in each other's faces; men were bayoneted across the works, and officers, with their swords, fought hand to hand with men with bayonets.' The colonel of the Forty-fifth Alabama was pulled by his coat collar over the works and made a prisoner. This terrible contest lasted for three-quarters of an hour, and the division

still held nearly the whole of its ground. About 6 another force advanced from the direction of Atlanta. General Smith had scarcely changed position to the east side of his works, when the enemy opened upon his left and rear a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and he was compelled to abandon another portion of his works. Falling back a short distance, he formed a line perpendicular to his line of works. The column moving from the west enfiladed this line, and he was compelled to swing his right still farther back. General Leggett moved out his Second Brigade in a line parallel to that which General Smith then held. Colonel Wangelin's brigade, of the First Division of the Fifteenth Corps, moved forward, and a new line was formed with the Second Brigade of the Third Division, Seventeenth Corps, on the right, the Fourth Division of the Seventeenth Corps the center, and the Third Brigade of the First Division of the Fifteenth Corps on the left. This was the line I had indicated in my orders to General Blair. It extended to the crest of Bald Hill, which two regiments of the Seventeenth Corps, the Eleventh Iowa and Sixteenth Wisconsin, held behind an angle of the works, the enemy holding the same works a little below, four of their colors planted within a stone's throw of the Eleventh Iowa. Upon this line the enemy made an attack in very heavy force. The battle was very severe. Colonel Wangelin moved his left around, advanced upon the enemy's flank, and gave the enemy a decided check. The battle at this point closed after dark, and our troops held the field. The enemy retired in the night, after removing the greater part of their wounded. Their dead were left on the field.

"General Hood's tactics seem to have been to concentrate during the afternoon and night of the 21st the corps of Hardee and Cheatham near the position of the Army of the Tennessee, and at an early hour in the morning to withdraw from the works in its front to his main intrenchments, and, while the Army of the Tennessee was being advanced to his abandoned line, and before the works could be reversed, to attack our left and rear with one corps, and with the other one right from the front. That he did not succeed was due, in my judgment, to the lateness of the hour at which the attack was made, a lack of concert in his movements, the opportune presence of a portion of the Sixteenth Corps in the

rear of the left of our line, but more than all these to the splendid bravery and tenacity of the men and the ability and skill of the officers of the Army of the Tennessee."

Logan places the losses of the Army of the Tennessee in this engagement at 3,722, divided as follows: Fifteenth Corps, 1,067; Sixteenth, 854; Seventeenth, 1,801. He reported the loss of 12 pieces of artillery, and the capture of 18 stands of colors, 5,000 stands of small arms, and, in addition to a large number of wounded left on the field, including 33 officers of rank, 1,017 prisoners. General Logan reported more than 3,000 dead Confederates found upon the field and either buried by the Union soldiers or turned over under a flag of truce to the enemy. By his estimate, the number of Confederate wounded was enormous.

Captain Francis De Gress tells of the operations of his battery on the 22d of July, as follows: "Advanced on the 20th, taking up position several times during the day and engaging rebel batteries. At 1 o'clock fired three shells into Atlanta at a distance of two miles and a half, the first ones of the war. On the 21st went into position (under protest) with a range of only ten yards, and in front of our line of works, by order of Brig.-Gen. M. L. Smith. July 22, advanced again, and occupying the works evacuated by the enemy the night previous. I went into position at the extreme right of our division to engage three rebel batteries which were firing at our advancing columns; was ordered to keep up a continuous fire. There was a gap of at least 800 yards between my battery and the First Division, which fact I reported several times. The enemy charged our works about 4 p. m.; was repulsed in my front, but broke through our center, and changing front charged my battery, which I was obliged to leave after spiking the guns, and after all my support had left me. As soon as my battery was recaptured I had the guns unspiked and fired again at the retreating enemy. One of my guns, injured since the 25th of June, burst at the third round. My losses on that day were very heavy—14 men, 39 horses, 1 limber, ambulance, and harness. Replaced lost horses and harness from Battery A, and had battery in marching order by 9 o'clock the following day."

DeGress's guns were with the Second Brigade, Second Division, Fifteenth Army Corps, at the time they were lost. Colonel



Wells S. Jones was in command of the brigade. His report tells of the capture of the guns by intimation rather than assertion. He says: "My instructions from General Lightburn were that I would soon be attacked, and that I could either retire to the main line of works there or wait until I was compelled to retreat. I gave orders to the two regiments under my command, the Fifty-third Ohio and One Hundred and Eleventh Illinois Volunteers, together with the section of artillery, to remain in the position they then occupied until our skirmishers were driven in, and then to open fire on the enemy, and hold their position until the enemy appeared to be flanking us. We had fired but a short time when I saw the enemy to our left and rear advancing in heavy force. I ordered the artillery to fall back to the main works and followed it with the infantry. When I entered our works I found the Second Brigade in the works on the north side of the railroad, with its left resting on the railroad. All the regiments were placed in the front line but seven companies of the Fifty-third and two companies of the Forty-seventh Ohio, which were placed in reserve. Very soon the entire front line became engaged. The enemy were found to be steadily approaching our works and the reserve companies were all ordered forward into the works. The enemy soon seemed to fall back from the right and center of the brigade, but about this time moved a heavy force up the road, and got another column into the railroad cut. The smoke from our battery, it being near the road, entirely hid them now from our view until they were crossing the works on each side of the battery. Soon after this the head of their column began to emerge from the railroad cut, about seventy-five yards in our rear. The men near the road being no longer able to hold their position fell back in considerable confusion. I attempted to form a line on my right, but I could not succeed. After failing in that I tried to form line in the low ground, about 400 yards from the works, but could succeed in getting but a few men together. I determined then to not attempt to re-form until we reached the works we had left in the morning. I gave orders accordingly. After gathering up all men we could find we advanced again to retake our works. I advanced part of my line nearly to the works, but was driven back some 400 yards. We soon again advanced and retook our

works, turning the artillery that the enemy had taken from us on them, and capturing some 80 prisoners. Our loss is as follows: Commissioned officers killed, 1; enlisted men, 20; commissioned officers wounded, 4; enlisted men, 90; commissioned officers missing, 6; enlisted men, 204. Most of the missing were undoubtedly taken prisoners. About 600 muskets were picked up by my brigade in its front."

Technically, however, Colonel Jones did not retake his own guns. The honor belongs to Colonel Mersy's brigade of General Sweeney's division of the Sixteenth Corps, which had been ordered from Dodge's line of battle and personally conducted by General Logan to the cut in the railroad near where DeGress's battery was posted. Colonel Mersy was wounded just before his command made the charge, and turned over the command to Colonel R. N. Adams. The following extract is taken from Colonel Adams's report: "At 2 p. m. the regiment was ordered, with the brigade, to a position on the right of the Augusta and Atlanta Railroad. Moving in double-quick time a distance of one mile and a quarter, the brigade was then formed in line of battle, Sixty-sixth Illinois on the right, Eighty-first Ohio in the center, and the Twelfth Illinois on the left, resting on the railroad. A charge was then ordered and made by the entire brigade, resulting in the retaking of a line of works from which the Second Brigade, Second Division, Fifteenth Army Corps, had been previously driven, and the recapture of four 20-pounder Parrott guns, of Captain DeGress's battery, and a large number of small arms. In this charge the Eighty-first Ohio captured 29 prisoners, making the total number of prisoners captured by the regiment during the day 255."

There was considerable controversy over the honor of recapturing this battery, as several brigades charged simultaneously and jointly drove the Confederates away. Colonel Adams, in a newspaper letter, after the war, gave this account of his work that day: "I at once gave the command, 'Forward!' The brigade crossed the fence, and at 'trail arms' advanced under a moderate fire toward the line to be taken. On emerging from the ravine, and beginning the ascent of the hill, the enemy opened anew upon us, whereupon I gave the order, 'Charge!' and in apparently less

than half a minute the line was ours. We captured some of the men who were manning the DeGress guns, and about fifty men in the works, who fired until they were captured. Among these was the only colored man I saw during the war shooting the wrong way. He was game; he fired till he was taken. I detailed men at once to man the recovered guns, but found them partly disabled. I am not sure, but my impression is that this detail succeeded in discharging one of the pieces. At any rate, they were endeavoring to use them when Captain DeGress and some of his men came and took charge of the recovered guns."

Brigadier-General M. D. Leggett, who held Bald Hill against repeated attempts to take it on the 22d, describes his operations as follows: "About noon of the 22d I discovered that the enemy had got to our rear and were engaging the Sixteenth Army Corps, while making efforts to close upon the left of our corps, while still a gap of half a mile on the left of the Fourth Division was only guarded by a skirmish line. The enemy broke through this gap and in a few moments came in heavy force (Cleburne's division, of Hardee's corps) upon my rear, moving over the same ground and in the same direction that I had on the day before. I immediately put my men upon the other side of their works, their faces to the east and their backs toward Atlanta. The enemy came upon us with demoniac yells, but were met with a cool, deliberate, and well-aimed fire that soon checked their advance, caused them to stagger, and then retire in confusion. Those who reached our works were made prisoners. They soon rallied, re-formed, and again advanced upon us in the same direction and with the same results. In these two attacks they were punished very severely, leaving a very large number of killed and wounded on the ground. A lull of some twenty minutes occurred at this time, after which our skirmishers toward Atlanta were driven in, followed closely by a heavy force which advanced with yells. My men were placed upon the east side of their works and met the charge as they had the others and repulsed the rebels beautifully. They were rallied and again advanced and again repulsed. Soon a heavy column (Cheatham's division, Hardee's corps) moved directly upon the left flank of the Fourth Division, which compelled it to change front and leave its works. As the approaching column advanced

and reached to the vicinity of my left, I caused the Second Brigade of my command to follow the movements of the Fourth Division, but with the positive injunction that 'the hill must be retained at all hazards and at whatever cost.' The Second Brigade was then formed with its right resting upon the hill and its left upon the Fourth Division, facing south. This change of front was executed under a heavy fire of musketry, and of grape and canister, and in the face of a rapidly advancing force of fresh troops, composed probably of the enemy's best fighting men—Cheatham's division. Our men were greatly fatigued with about five hours' hard fighting, and were now obliged to meet the enemy in the open field without protecting works of any kind whatever, except a portion of the First Brigade, on the hill. In this part of the day our troops showed their true soldierly qualities. They stood like rocks of adamant, and received the repeated charges of the enemy without yielding an inch. The engagement here became finally a hand-to-hand conflict, the sword, the bayonet, and even the fist, were freely and effectively used, and the enemy repulsed with a slaughter I never before witnessed. This conflict ended the day. My officers and men behaved with determined bravery."

General Blair, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, occupying Sherman's extreme left, said of the grand assault by Hood upon that wing: "It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole army that the Sixteenth Corps occupied the position I have attempted to describe at the moment of the attack, and although it does not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the officers and men of that corps, still I cannot withhold my expressions of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy."

It is with regret that the present editor acknowledges his inability to reproduce Confederate reports touching the most notable achievements of Hardee's and Cheatham's gallant troops in the battle of Atlanta. Very little official data was available on that side. Almost the sole exception is the following extract from the report of Brigadier-General Govan, of Cleburne's Division, Hardee's Corps, which narrates one of the most brilliant charges of the day, which resulted in the capture of a Federal battery and line of works:

"We now soon came upon our skirmishers, who had halted under fire from the enemy's works, and the engagement began at 1 p. m. The intrenchments of the enemy facing Atlanta extended along the road upon which we advanced. Contrary to our expectation and information we encountered other works almost perpendicular to these, and designed to protect him from the very movement we were then making. These consisted of two lines of breast-works—the first about 200 yards in length, the second in its rear and reaching farther to our right, each having in front an almost impassable abatis, formed by cutting down the thick undergrowth of small oaks. A line of battle occupied the ground in front of my right upon the extension of the line of works. The two Napoleon guns before alluded to were upon the right of the first work, and swept the road and the woods upon either side. My left, the First and Fifteenth, the Second and Twenty-fourth, and half of the Fifth and Thirteenth Arkansas Regiments, came full upon these formidable intrenchments. The men charged to within thirty paces of them, and sustained for fifteen or twenty minutes the withering fire which was poured upon them, at the same time making their way through the abatis to the enemy. At length the enemy ceased firing and called upon my men to stop also, saying they surrendered, while some of them aimed their guns and were only prevented from firing by their comrades, who preferred to end the fighting. At this juncture, a portion of the Second and Twenty-fourth Arkansas advanced to the works to receive the surrender, when the Federals, who filled the trenches, seeing the fewness of their numbers, took them prisoners. The enemy made a dash upon my center and for a moment checked the advance, when Colonel Murray, Fifth Arkansas, collected his men and gallantly charged them back. Meanwhile the right, consisting of half the Fifth and Thirteenth, the Eighth and Nineteenth, and the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas Regiments, had advanced beyond the flank of the enemy's works, and had driven before it the line there opposed, the Sixth and Seventh and the Eighth and Nineteenth capturing a battery of 6 Napoleon guns, which before that time had been vigorously used against us.

"Perceiving that the right had passed on, and that the work was not yet done upon the left, where my small force was liable



to be overpowered by the large number whom they thought to capture, I directed the right to change direction to the left, in order to take them in flank and rear. This was promptly and opportunely done, and compelled the immediate surrender of all who did not take flight in the confusion. This timely success rescued those of the Second and Twenty-fourth Arkansas who had been entrapped, and the officers of this command now received the swords of their late captors. In making the movement to the left a portion of the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas swept around and reached the open field across which the brigade charged later in the evening. The First and Fifteenth Arkansas took the 2 guns which were placed upon the road. The whole affair was gallantly, brilliantly executed, and has never been excelled in dash and spirit by any previous action of these veteran soldiers."

Few of the citizens of Atlanta know to this day that an evacuation of the city by the Confederate troops was contemplated on the night before the battle of Atlanta was fought. Brigadier-General Wright, commanding Atlanta, received the following orders from Hood's headquarters, dated July 21st: "I am directed to inform you that you must be prepared to-night for an evacuation of Atlanta, should it become necessary. You will, therefore, without saying anything about it, be prepared to move when Lieutenant-General Stewart's troops move into town, should the evacuation take place."

On the night of the 22d General Hood sent the following dispatch to Richmond: "The army shifted its position last night, fronting Peachtree Creek, and formed line of battle around the city with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps. General Hardee, with his corps, made a night march and attacked the enemy's extreme left at 1 o'clock to-day; drove him from his works, capturing 16 pieces of artillery and 5 stands of colors. Major-General Cheatham attacked the enemy at 4 p. m. with a portion of his command; drove the enemy, capturing 6 pieces of artillery. During the engagements we captured about 2,000 prisoners, but loss not fully ascertained. Major-General Walker killed; Brigadier-Generals Smith, Gist, and Mercer wounded. Our troops fought with great gallantry."

On the 23d Hood sent the following supplementary dispatch : "In the engagement of yesterday we captured 18 stands of colors instead of 5, and 13 guns instead of 12, as previously reported. Brigadier-General Mercer not wounded. All quiet to-day except skirmishing, and the enemy occasionally throwing shell into the city. The army is in good spirits."

The battle of Atlanta was at first regarded as a great Confederate victory throughout the Confederacy. In a letter to President Davis on the 23d, General Lee refers to it with exultation. There was great rejoicing throughout Dixie and Hood became a popular hero. On the 23d Hood wired Governor Brown at Macon : "The state troops under Major-General Smith fought with great gallantry in the action of yesterday." To which Governor Brown replied :

"I am proud to hear of the gallant conduct of the state troops. Thousands of others have now assembled in response to my call, and will be armed and sent forward as rapidly as possible, who upon the soil of their beloved state will strike with equal valor for the defense of their wives and their children, their homes and their altars. I assure you of the most energetic co-operation with all the aid in my power. May God grant you success and aid to drive the invaders from the soil of the Confederacy."

General Hood replied : "I need all the aid Georgia can furnish. Please send me men with muskets as fast as possible."

General Braxton Bragg, who had returned to Atlanta from Alabama, sent this message to President Davis on the 25th : "The moral effect of our brilliant affair of the 22d has been admirable on our troops, and I am happy to say our loss was small in comparison to the enemy's. He was badly defeated and completely failed in one of his bold flank movements, heretofore so successful. Lieutenant-General Lee will probably arrive to-morrow, when I may return to Montgomery to see General Maury and hear from General Smith."

On the morning of the battle of Atlanta, Sherman, discovering the trenches that had been occupied by Hardee to be unoccupied, jumped to the conclusion that Atlanta had been evacuated. Schofield was first to make this erroneous report, and word was passed to the grand divisions of the army that Schofield was in

possession of the enemy's main line of works around the city. Sherman was so sure that Atlanta was his that he ordered his corps commanders to pursue Hood south without delay. He sent word to Howard not to enter the city, but to join in the pursuit. In view of the momentous events on the 22d, the extent to which this mistake was carried is remarkable. It nearly resulted in the whole Federal army shifting its position and beginning a wild goose chase away from Atlanta. The following order to Logan from McPherson, sent at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 22d, when Hardee was preparing to fall upon the Army of the Tennessee from the rear, will show how near the Federals came to serious disaster as a result of their misinformation: "The enemy having evacuated their works in front of our lines, the supposition of Major-General Sherman is that they have given up Atlanta and are retreating in the direction of East Point. You will immediately put your command in pursuit, passing to the south and east of Atlanta, without entering the town. You will keep a route to the left of that taken by the enemy, and try to cut off a portion of them while they are pressed in rear and on our right by Generals Schofield and Thomas. Major-General Sherman desires and expects a vigorous pursuit."

The army telegrapher reported to his chief at the war department, Washington, on the night of the 22d, as follows: "At daylight to-day it was found that the rebels had gone from entire front, and General Sherman announced the occupation of Atlanta by Schofield, and ordered pursuit by Thomas and McPherson. Vigorous pursuit was made, and the enemy was found in the fortifications of Atlanta, and not Schofield. We hold road to within two miles and a half of center of place, and that is about the average distance of whole line, though Schofield and Dodge are nearer. Fighting has been severe, and we have lost General McPherson, killed by shot through lungs while on a reconnaissance. It is thought that enemy will be gone in the morning, as they have attacked and been repulsed since dark. Hood fights his graybacks desperately."

On the morning of the 23d Sherman sent the following report of the great battle to Washington:

"Yesterday morning the enemy fell back to the intrenchments proper of the city of Atlanta, which are in a general circle

of a radius of one mile and a half, and we closed in. While we were forming our lines and selecting positions for batteries, the enemy appeared suddenly out of the dense woods in heavy masses on our extreme left, and struck the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair's) in flank, and was forcing it back, when the Sixteenth Corps (General Dodge's) came up and checked the movement, but the enemy's cavalry got well to our rear and into Decatur, and for some hours our left flank was completely enveloped. The fighting that resulted was continuous until night, with heavy loss on both sides. The enemy took one of our batteries (Murray's, of the Regular Army) that was marching in its place in column on the road unconscious of danger. About 4 p. m. the enemy sallied against the division of General Morgan L. Smith, which occupied an abandoned line of rifle-trenches near the railroad, east of the city, and forced it back some 400 yards, leaving in his hands for the time two batteries, but the ground and batteries were immediately after recovered by the same troops, reinforced. I cannot well approximate our loss, which fell heaviest on the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, but count it 3,000; but I know that, being on the defensive, we have inflicted equally heavy loss on the enemy. General McPherson, when arranging his troops, about 11 a. m., and passing from one column to another, unconsciously rode upon an ambuscade without apprehension and at some distance ahead of his staff and orderlies and was shot dead. His body was sent in charge of his personal staff back to Marietta and Chattanooga. His loss at that moment was most serious, but General Logan at once arranged the troops, and had immediate direction of them during the rest of the day. Our left, though refused somewhat, is still within easy cannon-range of Atlanta. The enemy seems to man his extensive parapets and, at the same time, has to spare heavy assaulting columns; but to-day we will intrench our front lines, which will give me troops to spare to meet these assaults. I cannot hear of the loss of more than a few wagons, taken by the enemy's cavalry during his temporary pause in Decatur, whence all the trains had been securely removed to the rear of the main army, under cover of a brigade of infantry, commanded by Colonel Sprague. During the heavy attack on the left, the remainder of the line was not engaged."

## CHAPTER XXIX

### THE MOVEMENT TO THE WEST

Sherman says that his only motive in swinging the Army of the Tennessee around to the east of Atlanta was to effectually break the Augusta railroad. There are reasons to believe that originally he intended accomplishing much more on his left, believing, as he stated in so many words, that Atlanta could be entered by his troops from that quarter in a few days, and its evacuation compelled. Besides, there is abundant evidence that Sherman had his eye on the Macon railroad when McPherson was extending his left, and meant to gradually swing around on that flank and envelop it, or at least make himself so strong there that Garrard could swing to the south of Atlanta, upon his return from his raid on Covington, and break the Macon road as well. The battle of the 22d of July dashed these hopes to the ground. Hardee still held the Union army in check by strengthening the position he had secured by his "Jacksonian march," and Wheeler lost no time in taking Garrard's trail. Whatever Sherman's real intentions, there was no gainsaying that he had accomplished the destruction of the Augusta railroad for a distance of thirty or forty miles. Had the battle of Atlanta been fought a day earlier, Hood might possibly have succeeded in saving that road and diverted operations to the vicinity of Decatur for some weeks. He had intended for Hardee to make his night march on the night following the battle of Peachtree Creek, but that commander reported his troops too fatigued to leave their position until the following night.

There was much activity among the several cavalry commands of the Federals. General Rousseau made a raid on the Atlanta and West Point railroad in Alabama, reporting on his arrival at Marietta on the 22d that he had destroyed the Confed-



erate depot of stores at Opelika and thoroughly broken 30 miles of the road toward Montgomery, three miles toward Columbus, and two toward West Point. He captured a number of prisoners and 700 horses and mules. General Garrard's raid on Covington was successful, Wheeler having been relieved from his position on Hardee's flank too late to enable him to overtake the Federal raider. Garrard's work is best described by reproducing a portion of his report, as follows: "My dispositions were such as to enable me to take every point by surprise and insure my safe return, with a loss of only two killed. Results: Three road bridges and one railroad bridge (555 feet in length) over the Ulcofauhatchee, were burned. Six miles of railroad track between the rivers were well destroyed. The depot and considerable quantity of quartermaster and commissary stores at Covington were burnt. One train and locomotive captured at Conyers and burnt. On train (platform) was burnt at Covington, and a small train (baggage) at station near the Ulcofauhatchee captured and burnt. The engine to the last train was detached across the river. Citizens report a passenger train and a construction train, both with engines, cut off between Stone Mountain and Yellow River. Over 2,000 bales of cotton were burnt. A large new hospital at Covington, for the accommodation of 10,000 patients from this army and the Army of Virginia, composed of over 30 buildings besides the offices, just finished, were burnt, together with a very large lot of fine carpenters' tools used in their erection. In the town of Oxford, two miles north of Covington, and in Covington was over 1,000 sick and wounded in buildings used for hospitals. The convalescents able to walk scattered through the woods while the firing was going on in town, and I did not have time to hunt them up before dark. Those in hospital, together with their surgeons, were not disturbed."

Garrard brought back some 200 prisoners and several hundred negroes. He was gone but two days, covering in that time 90 miles of road. After Garrard's return, Stoneman was sent on an expedition to break the Macon road in the vicinity of McDonough. Inasmuch as Stoneman's raid on Macon furnishes one of the most lively incidents of the Atlanta campaign, some of his correspondence with Sherman before setting out on his ill-fated

expedition will prove of interest. He was anxious to be allowed to raid Andersonville before returning to Atlanta and release the large body of Federal prisoners held in the historic stockade there. His note to Sherman asking permission, and the latter's consent, both dated the 26th of July, follow. Stoneman wrote:

"In case we succeed in carrying out your wishes will it meet your approbation, should I see a good opening, if I should with a portion of the command make a dash on Macon and by a vigorous stroke release the prisoners (officers) now at that point, and afterward to go on to Americus and release those (privates) there? I would like to try it, and am willing to run any risks, and I can vouch for my little command. Now is the time to do it before the rebel army falls back and covers that country, and I have every inducement to try it. If we accomplish the desired object it will compensate for the loss as prisoners of us all, and I should feel compensated for almost any sacrifice."

Sherman replied: "I have received your letter of July 26, asking permission after breaking good the railroad below McDonough to push on [to Macon], release the officers there, and afterward to go to Anderson [ville] and release the men confined there. I see many difficulties, but as you say, even a chance of success will warrant the effort, and I consent to it. You may, after having fulfilled my present orders, send General Garrard back to the left flank of the army, and proceed with your command proper to accomplish both or either of the objects named. I will keep the army busy, so that you shall have nothing to contend with but the cavalry, and if you can bring back to the army any or all those prisoners of war it will be an achievement that will entitle you and the men of your command to the love and admiration of the whole country. Be careful to break telegraph wire and railroad when and where you go, especially the telegraph, as it will prevent the enemy following your movement."

On the morning of the 25th General Sherman sent to Washington what he considered to be the results of the battle of Atlanta. He said: "I find it difficult to make prompt report of results coupled with some data or information without occasionally making some mistakes. General McPherson's sudden death, and General Logan succeeding to the command, as it were, in the

midst of battle, made some confusion on our extreme left, but it soon recovered and made sad havoc with the enemy, who had practiced one of his favorite games of attacking our left when in motion and before it had time to cover its weak end. After riding over the ground and hearing the varying statements of the actors on that flank, I directed General Logan to make me an official report of the actual results, and I herewith inclose it. Though the number of dead rebels seems excessive, I am disposed to give full credit to the report that our loss, though only 3,521 killed, wounded, and missing, the enemy's dead alone on the field nearly equal that number, viz., 3,240. Happening at that point of the line when a flag of truce was sent in to ask permission for each party to bury its dead, I gave General Logan authority to permit a temporary truce on that flank alone, while our labors and fighting proceeded at all others. I also send you a copy of General Garrard's report of the breaking of railroad toward Augusta. Now I am grouping my command to attack the Macon road, and with that view will intrench a strong line of circumvallation and flanks, so as to have as large an infantry column to co-operate as possible with all the cavalry to swing round to the south and east to control that road at or below East Point."

While Stoneman moved out to protect Garrard on his return from Covington, Rosseau and McCook took his place on Thomas's right. Sherman ordered Thomas to relieve the pressure on Logan's left by an actual attack or strong demonstration against the north side of Atlanta, on the morning of the 23d. He said he supposed Hood would keep up his attack in Logan's front so long as Garrard remained out. When Sherman was satisfied that Hood would not renew the battle, he sent this message to Logan: "I have this moment returned from an examination of our entire line. You know your own. The balance extends in a circle at about 1,000 yards distant from the enemy's lines, as far as Proctor's Creek, the whole of Palmer's corps being east and south of the railroad. All have covered parapets so that the enemy will not attempt a sally. The question now is, What next? I will in person explain all that is necessary to produce the result aimed at as soon as General Garrard returns. You need not apprehend a renewal of the attack on the part of the enemy,

but should, on the contrary, begin to feel out with skirmishers and supports into the woods east of Giles Smith's division and Dodge's corps. In the morning early let Woods's division move into Decatur, stay awhile, and return. Let details of men and pioneers begin at your very front and break up and destroy the railroad absolutely back to and including Decatur. Until we conclude upon the best manner of reducing Atlanta we cannot be better employed than in rendering the Atlanta and Augusta road useless; especially have the iron rails heated and twisted. I want your skirmishers to feel out early to-morrow in front of Dodge for a double purpose—to hold on that flank the cavalry of Wheeler, while we operate on Thomas's flank and create a diversion for Garrard, now on his return from his expedition."

The necessity for a strong demonstration or attack by Thomas not arising by reason of the inactivity of the enemy toward Decatur, that commander contented himself with menacing the works in his front by strong skirmish lines. He demonstrated the presence of the Confederates in force in the position held by Stewart's corps. Sherman's next proposed move was a radical one, and awaited only the return and readiness of his cavalry to put it in execution. His plan was to move the Army of the Tennessee from its position on the left to the right of Thomas, from where it was to gradually press to the south of Atlanta and gain possession of the Macon road at or near East Point. In order that the reader may get an adequate idea of Sherman's purpose, his own words to Logan on the 24th are quoted below:

"The only object in placing the Army of the Tennessee on that flank was to reach and destroy the railroad from Atlanta toward Augusta. This is partially done, and the work of destruction should be continued as far as possible. I wish to keep one division or more employed day and night breaking and burning the road until General Garrard returns. I feel no doubt but that he has succeeded in breaking the bridges across the Yellow River and the Ucofauhatchee, but he may have to fight his way back, and to relieve him I wish you to push your skirmishers out from General Dodge's front of General Blair's left, as though you were going to push your way to the east of Atlanta toward

the Augusta road. To keep up this delusion, you should send a column cautiously down one of those roads or valleys southeast, and engage the enemy outside his works, but not behind his trenches. As soon as General Garrard is back you can discontinue all such demonstrations and prepare for your next move. I propose to give you timely notice to send your wagons behind General Thomas and then to move your army behind the present line to the extreme right, to reach, if possible, the Macon road, which you know to be the only road by which Atlanta can be supplied. This will leave General Schofield the left flank, which will be covered by the works he has constructed on his front, and he can use the abandoned trenches of the enemy to cover his left rear. You will no longer send your wagons by Roswell, but by Buck Head and Pace's Ferry, and when you change you will draw from the railroad bridge, to which our cars now run, and at which point we are making a pier bridge, as also two of pontoons. General Stoneman will surely be at Decatur to-day, and we will have two divisions of cavalry on our right, viz., General McCook's and [Colonel] Harrison's (General Rousseau's). Act with confidence. Know that the enemy cannot budge you from your present ground, and act offensively to show him that you dare him to the encounter. You can understand that being on the defensive he cannot afford to sally unless at great peril. General Schofield has so strengthened his front that I feel no uneasiness about that flank, and only study now to make the next move so quickly that we may reach East Point or vicinity with as little loss as possible."

On the 25th Sherman sent this message to Grant at Petersburg: "Your dispatch of the 21st did not come until to-day. Johnston is relieved and Hood commands. Hood has made two attempts to strike hard since we crossed the Chattahoochee, and both times got more than he bargained for. No doubt he expects to cut to my rear, but I have already cut to his rear, having broken his Augusta road out for fifty miles, and his Southern road at Opelika. None remains to him but the Macon road, and I think I will have that soon. I should rather that Hood should fight it out at Atlanta than to retreat farther toward Macon. If you can keep away reinforcements all well. My army is all in hand, and rear well guarded."



On the 26th General Howard was assigned to command the Army of the Tennessee, vice McPherson, deceased. This appointment somewhat disgruntled Logan, who amply deserved the honor. He felt that he should have been allowed to hold the temporary command until the end of the campaign. General Logan's conduct during the battle of Atlanta, and no less during the subsequent battle of Ezra church, won great admiration. General Hooker, the hero of the battle of Lookout Mountain, and one of the most gallant fighters in the whole Union army, took Howard's appointment over his head so much to heart that he asked to be relieved of his command of the Twentieth corps of Sherman's army. Hooker was Howard's senior, but did not enjoy the latter's "pull" at Washington and with Sherman. In asking to be relieved Hooker declared that "justice and self-respect alike require my removal from an army in which rank and service are ignored." Sherman let Hooker go willingly enough and appointed General Slocum, then at Vicksburg, Miss., in his place. The controversy which resulted in Hooker's leaving Sherman was a celebrated national incident, engendering much bitter feeling in army and political circles. Hooker went North and bitterly denounced the "war clique."

Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee arrived with reinforcements for the Confederates and took command of Hood's old corps. General Bragg, still in Atlanta, wired Richmond on the 26th: "Leave to-morrow to confer with Major-General Maury in Montgomery, and urge matters beyond. Lieutenant-General Lee arrived and goes on duty to-day. He is most favorably received. Tone of army fine, and strength increasing daily. The death of Brigadier-General Stevens, the wounding of Gist, and inability and sickness of Mercer and Stovall leave four brigadiers vacant, and the material to select from inferior. Accordingly, ordered Henry R. Jackson from Savannah. All quiet to-day."

Logan's first movement to change his position was instantly discovered by Hood, and he ordered Wheeler to relieve Hardee in his position confronting the Federal left flank, in order that the latter might quietly withdraw into Atlanta to hold his troops within striking distance when Sherman's intentions were fully developed. At the same time Wheeler was ordered to put Kelly's

division in motion toward Campbellton, to meet a raid in that vicinity by McCook, who had designs on Fayetteville and Fairburn. There were cavalry skirmishes every day. Jackson was very active on the Confederate left. Ross, commanding a brigade in his command, reported the following incident on the 26th, which illustrates one of the phases of war:

"Captain Wright and Lieutenant McClatchey, who charged on one of the roads this evening with their companies, inform me that they ran over and captured within 200 yards of the enemy's works more of the enemy trying to escape on foot than they could take care of. Captain Wright turned them back to the rear as rapidly as possible, but they showed much reluctance to going, and just then the enemy opened with canister from their works, regardless of their own men in Captain Wright's possession, and all the prisoners fell on the ground and refused to run, whereupon Captain Wright and his men commenced killing them. They fired all their loads from pistols and guns into them and then retired for shelter from the artillery."

Sherman's orders shifting the Army of the Tennessee to the opposite flank and completely changing his plan of attack were as follows:

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 42.	HQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS., <i>In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga.,</i> <i>July 25, 1864.</i>
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I. The several armies and bodies of cavalry will watch the enemy closely to their respective fronts, and in case the enemy retreats toward the southeast General Schofield will follow directly through Atlanta, General Thomas by roads on his right, and General Logan on his left. Generals Stoneman's and Garrard's cavalry will move by a circle to the left toward McDonough, break the railroad, and strike the enemy in front or flank, and General McCook's and Colonel Harrison's cavalry will move rapidly on Fayetteville and the railroad beyond, breaking it, if possible, in advance of the enemy, and striking the enemy in flank.

II. Should the enemy remain as now, on the defensive, inside of the fortifications of Atlanta, the Macon road must be

attacked by cavalry beyond Fayetteville and McDonough, and the infantry must cover the line from the Howard house, General Schofield's present center, to General Davis's position on the right, and the line extended east and south so as to reach or threaten the railroad toward East Point. To this end Generals Stoneman and Garrard will call in all detachments and send to-morrow to Roswell or in rear of the infantry all crippled stock and incumbrances, prepared to move at daylight the next morning by a circuit to the left, so as to reach the railroad below McDonough. General Stoneman will command this cavalry force, but will spare General Garrard's fatigued horses as much as possible, using that command as a reserve, and his own as the force with which to reach and break the railroad. In like manner General McCook will command the joint cavalry command, his own, and of Colonel Harrison's, but will use Colonel Harrison's fatigued command as a reserve, and his own to reach the road and break it. The railroad when reached must be substantially destroyed for a space of from two to five miles, telegraph wires pulled down as far as possible and hid in water or carried away.

III. Major-General Schofield will prepare to draw back his left division to the old rebel line, extending back from the Howard house toward the road by which General Stanley advanced, and be prepared on the withdrawal of the Army of the Tennessee to hold that line as the left flank of the grand army.

IV. Major-General Logan will to-morrow send all his trains, and sick, and impediments to the rear of General Thomas to any point near the mouth of Peachtree Creek, and during the early morning by moonlight of the next day, viz., Wednesday, July 27, withdraw his army, corps by corps, and move it to the right, forming on General Palmer, and advancing the right as much as possible.

V. Major-General Thomas having strongly fortified his front will hold it by an adequate force and hold the reserves at points most convenient to move to the right, from which point he will strike and destroy the railroad, or so occupy the attention of the enemy that the cavalry may do its work completely and effectually.

VI. The cavalry will, unless otherwise ordered, move out at daylight of Wednesday, 27th instant, and aim to reach and

break the railroad during the day or night of the 28th, and having accomplished this work will return to their proper flanks of the army, unless the enemy should be discovered in retreat, when each force described will hang on the flanks of the retreating enemy and obstruct his retreat by all the energy in their power.

VII. All commanders will arrange that their trains be moved behind the Chattahoochee, or behind the center of the army during the time the cavalry is absent in the execution of this duty.

By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

Before McPherson's old troops moved from the scene of his death an impressive ceremony took place before the soldiers of the Seventeenth corps, one of his privates being honored by the public presentation of a gold medal for the part he took in recovering the body of the fallen commander. The order issued in this connection throws some additional light on the manner of McPherson's death, the report that he was instantly killed being generally accepted. The order in question read:

GENERAL ORDERS,                      HDQRS. 17TH ARMY CORPS,  
No. 8.                      DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
   *Before Atlanta, Ga., July 26, 1864.*

During the bloody battle of the 22d instant, in which this corps was engaged, Private George J. Reynolds, D Company, Fifteenth Iowa Infantry Volunteers, was, while in the performance of his duty on the skirmish line, severely wounded in the arm. In attempting to evade capture he came to the spot where the late beloved and gallant commander of this army, Major-General McPherson, was lying mortally wounded. Forgetting all considerations of self, Private Reynolds clung to his old commander, and, amid the roar of battle and a storm of bullets, administered to the wants of his gallant chief, quenching his dying thirst, and affording him such comfort as lay in his power. After General McPherson had breathed his last, Private Reynolds was chiefly instrumental in recovering his body, going with two of his staff officers, pointing out the body, and assisting in putting

it in an ambulance, under a heavy fire from the enemy, and while his wound was still uncared for. The noble and devoted conduct of this soldier cannot be too highly praised, and is commended to the consideration of the officers and men of this command. In consideration of this gallantry and noble, unselfish devotion, the gold medal of honor will be conferred upon Private George J. Reynolds, D Company, Fifteenth Iowa Infantry Volunteers, in front of his command. This order will be read at the head of every regiment, battery and detachment in this corps.

By command of Maj.-Gen. F. P. Blair:

A. J. ALEXANDER,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

On the 25th Sherman telegraphed Halleck: "To-morrow we begin the move against Atlanta, having strongly intrenched our front from the railroad east of Atlanta to a hill on the south of Proctor's Creek. I move the whole Army of the Tennessee to the right, extending the line south, threatening East Point, and forcing, as I think, Hood to abandon Atlanta, or allow us, at small cost, to occupy the railroad south of the town, that to the east being well destroyed. At the same time I send by the right a force of about 3,500 cavalry, under General McCook, and round by the left about 5,000 cavalry, under Stoneman, with orders to reach the railroad about Griffin. I also have consented that Stoneman (after he has executed this part of his plan), if he finds it feasible, may, with his division proper (about 2,000), go to Macon and attempt the release of our officers, prisoners there, and then to Anderson[ville] to release the 20,000 of our men, prisoners there. This is probably more than he can accomplish, but it is worthy of a determined effort. While these are in progress I will, with the main army, give employment to all of the rebel army still in Atlanta."

General Hood became aware of Sherman's intentions before the latter had time to get the Army of the Tennessee well in position west of Atlanta. Putting Hardee in the trenches occupied by Cheatham's, now Lee's corps, Hood moved Lee across Atlanta to head Howard off in the possession of the Lick Skillet road, and sent such cavalry force as he could spare from Hardee's old line



and the outlying defenses and posts, to head off Stoneman, Garrard and McCook. Wheeler and Jackson were handicapped by having to divide their forces and do double duty, but they gave a good account of themselves in the subsequent cavalry operations around Atlanta. At this time Hood issued the following brief address to his army:

"Soldiers: Experience has proved to you that safety in time of battle consists in getting into close quarters with your enemy. Guns and colors are the only unerring indications of victory. The valor of troops is easily estimated, too, by the number of these secured. If your enemy be allowed to continue the operation of flanking you out of position, our cause is in great peril. Your recent brilliant success proves the ability to prevent it. You have but to will it, and God will grant us the victory your commander and your country expect."

At 1.30 o'clock on the afternoon of the 27th, Hood sent the following order to Lee, who was to meet Sherman's new move: "As soon as relieved by General Hardee, General Hood directs that you move Brown's and Clayton's divisions to the left, under cover, so that the movement may not be observed by the enemy. Let these divisions rest in rear of the line between the Peachtree and Marietta roads, and be in readiness to move at any moment. Supply them with sixty rounds of ammunition, if practicable. After making these dispositions please report in person to these headquarters. F. A. SHOUP.

"P. S.—That part of Stevenson's division to the left of the Peachtree road will not be withdrawn. Your left will rest near the Marietta road."

At 4 o'clock on the same afternoon the following order was sent to General Stewart: "From present appearances the enemy is preparing to attack our left. Please have everybody on the alert and in readiness. As soon as Lee gets into position in your rear the general thinks you had better move Walthall's division a little farther to the left."

Later in the evening both Lee and Stewart were ordered to hold their commands in readiness to move that night, and the former was directed to send support to the latter should he send

to him for troops. Everybody was ordered to the lines and the greatest activity was manifested in the threatened quarter. General Hood telegraphed General Winder, in command at Andersonville:

"The raid toward Covington is stronger than at first reported. Destination still unknown. We have a heavy force in pursuit."

While Howard was massing on the right, prepared to assume the aggressive, Schofield was making a demonstration in force in his front, to see whether Hood had weakened his right to strengthen his left. He reported to Sherman that he had found the enemy alert and apparently in force. At the same time Thomas pressed hard against the defenses of Atlanta to the north, but found Stewart and the state troops ready to receive him.

Hood says of Sherman's move to the west of Atlanta: "On the 26th of July the Federals were reported to be moving to our left. This movement continued during the 27th, when I received the additional information that their cavalry was turning our right, in the direction of Flat Rock, with the intention, as I supposed, of interrupting our main line of communication, the Macon railroad. We had lost the railroad to Augusta previous to the departure of General Johnston on the 18th, and, by the 22d, thirty miles or more thereof had been utterly destroyed.

"The Federal commander continued to move by his right flank to our left, his evident intention being to destroy the only line by which we were still able to receive supplies. The railroad to West Point, because of its proximity to the Chattahoochee river, was within easy reach of the enemy whenever he moved far enough to the right to place his left flank upon the river. Therefore, after the destruction of the Augusta road, the holding of Atlanta—unless some favorable opportunity offered itself to defeat the Federals in battle—depended upon our ability to hold intact the road to Macon.

"General Wheeler started on the 27th of July in pursuit of the Federal cavalry which had moved around our right, and General W. H. Jackson, with the brigades of Harrison and Ross, was ordered, the following day, to push vigorously another body of the enemy's cavalry which was reported to have crossed the river, at

Campbellton, and to be moving, via Fairburn, in the direction of the Macon road. On the 28th it was apparent that Sherman was also moving in the same direction with his main body. Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee was instructed to move out with his corps upon the Lick Skillet road, and to take the position most advantageous to prevent or delay the extension of the enemy's right flank."

## CHAPTER XXX.

### BATTLE OF EZRA CHURCH

The third serious threat of Sherman was promptly and boldly met by a third battle with Hood on the aggressive. General Howard, in command of the Federal troops engaged at the battle of Ezra Church, writes of that bloody conflict as follows:

"Sherman now drew his half-circle closer and closer, and began to maneuver with a view to get upon the railroads proceeding southward. The Army of the Tennessee (late McPherson's) was assigned to me by the president, and I took command on the 27th of July, while it was marching around by the rear of Schofield and Thomas, in order to throw itself forward close to Atlanta on the southwest side, near Ezra Church. Skirmishing briskly, Dodge was first put into line facing the city; next Blair, beside him; last, Logan, on the right, making a large angle with Blair. He was not at night quite up to the crest of the ridge that he was to occupy. In the morning of the 28th he was moving slowly and steadily into position. About 8 o'clock Sherman was riding with me through the wooded region in the rear of Logan's forces, when the skirmishing began to increase, and an occasional shower of grape cut through the tree-tops and struck the ground beyond us. I said: 'General, Hood will attack me here.' 'I guess not—he will hardly try it again,' Sherman replied. I said that I had known Hood at West Point, and that he was indomitable. As the signs increased, Sherman went back to Thomas, where he could best help me should I need reinforcement. Logan halted his line and the regiments hurriedly and partially covered their front with logs and rails, having only a small protection while kneeling or lying down. It was too late for intrenching. With a terrifying yell, Hood's men charged through the forest. They were met steadily and repulsed. But in the impulse a few Confederate regi-

ments passed beyond Logan's extreme right. To withstand them four regiments came from Dodge; Inspector-General Strong led thither two from Blair, armed with repeating rifles; and my chief of artillery placed several batteries so as to sweep that exposed flank. These were brought in at the exact moment, and after a few rapid discharges, the repeating-rifles being remarkable in their execution, all the groups of flankers were either cut down or had to seek safety in flight. This battle was prolonged for hours. We expected help from Morgan's division of Palmer's corps, coming back from Turner's Ferry; but the Confederate cavalry kept it in check. Our troops here exhibited nerve and persistency; Logan was cheerful and hearty and full of enthusiasm. He stopped stragglers and sent them back, and gave every needed order. Blair was watchful and helpful, and so was Dodge. After the last charge had been repelled, I went along my lines and felt proud and happy to be intrusted with such brave and efficient soldiers. Hood, having again lost three times as many as we, withdrew within his fortified lines. Our skirmishers cleared the field, and the battle of Ezra Church was won; and with this result I contented myself. One officer, who was a little panic-stricken, ran with the first stragglers to Sherman, and cried substantially, as I remember, 'You've made a mistake in McPherson's successor. Everything is going to pieces!' Sherman said, 'Is General Howard there?' 'Yes; I suppose he is.' 'Well, I'll wait before taking action till I hear from him.' So Sherman sustained and trusted me, and I was content."

The wisdom of Hood in ordering this third assault on the Union lines at that place and time has been questioned. There was logical strategy in the battles of Peachtree Creek and Atlanta, but the battle of Ezra Church gave more ground for the charge that Hood was merely a blind fighter, who counted no cost and hesitated at no consequences. Hood's chances of successfully withstanding the attack upon his sole line of communication were strengthened, after the battle of the 22d, by a cautious defensive attitude. The odds against him in an ordinary assault were too great to be risked after such losses as he had suffered. The policy adopted after the affair at Ezra Church, which resulted in keeping Sherman from accomplishing his purpose for five weeks, was the



correct one, under the circumstances. The battle of Ezra Church was a succession of fierce charges by nearly half of Hood's army upon the Army of the Tennessee, constituting in that position Sherman's right. The Federals held an exceedingly strong line topographically, though they had not had time to fortify it to any great extent. The Confederate masses were hurled against them with great determination, and in some quarters with superior force, only to be broken and beaten back with a terrible sacrifice of blood. Lee's corps and a part of Stewart's made the attack, charge after charge in rapid succession, throughout the afternoon, the darkness ending the struggle. The brunt of the assaults was borne by Logan, supported by Dodge and Blair. The entire Confederate losses in this sanguinary and fruitless battle have been placed by Confederate authority at between four and five thousand, while the Federal generals engaged insisted that the Confederate loss could not be below 7,000. The entire Federal loss was officially given as less than 1,000. Hood asserts that the object of the battle of Ezra Church was to gain possession of the Lick Skillet road, which was accomplished.

A more interesting account of the battle of Ezra Church cannot be given than to reproduce the reports of the leading officers engaged on both sides. Fortunately the Confederate reports are, in large part, available.

General Logan says of the battle: "Immediately after resuming command of the corps, commenced to move it into the position assigned it, on the right of the Seventeenth Corps, and extreme right of the army, with Woods's division on the left, Harrow's in the center, and Smith's on the right. My command was thus moving forward in line of battle when the skirmishers became very actively engaged, and just as my command had gained the ridge upon which was situated Ezra Chapel, the enemy suddenly and with the greatest fury assaulted the right and center of my line. The troops had not had a moment to construct even the rudest defenses. The position we occupied, however, at the moment of attack was one of the most favorable that could have been chosen by us, it being the crest of a continuous ridge, in front of the greatest portion of which a good and extensive fire line was opened. The enemy moved forward rapidly and in good order,

evidently intending to and confidently believing they would break our lines at the first onset, which happily they did not do, nor even compel a single portion of it to waver, but all stood firm alike, and repelled the assault handsomely, after about one hour's terrific fighting, in which the enemy's loss was greater than ours in the ratio of 10 to 1. The enemy soon re-formed again, and made a desperate assault, which was repeated four successive times with like result of the first. During temporary lulls in the fighting, which did not at any time exceed from three to five minutes, the men would bring together logs and sticks to shield themselves from the bullets of the enemy in the next assault. The engagement lasted from 11.30 a. m. until darkness compelled a cessation. The enemy used one battery of artillery. We used none whatever. It was an open field fight, in which the enemy exceeded us in numerical strength, and we exceeded him in determination and spirit to continue the contest. During the engagement I received from Major-General Blair two regiments of infantry, under command of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Belknap, and four regiments from General Dodge, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, in all about 1,000 men. These troops were received at a time when I much needed them, and under the skillful management of the officers who commanded them, acted gallantly until the battle was ended.

. . . . .  
"My losses were 50 killed, 439 wounded, and 73 missing. Aggregate, 562. General Harrow's division captured 5 battle-flags from the enemy. Between 1,500 and 2,000 muskets were captured, and 106 prisoners (not including 73 wounded). Over 600 of the enemy's dead were buried in my front. A large number were supposed to be carried away during the night, as the enemy did not withdraw until nearly daylight. The enemy's loss in this battle could not, in my judgment, have been less than 6,000 or 7,000. Rebel papers subsequently read admit their loss very heavy, and say the fighting was the most desperate of the campaign.

"During the night, by my direction, the strongest defensive line that could be established was completed, and the next day (the enemy having in the night retired beyond the reach of my fire)

was occupied in burying the enemy's dead and removing the wounded from the field to the hospitals in the rear."

Brigadier-General C. R. Woods, who held an important part of Logan's line, says: "On the 27th of July this division moved, with the remainder of the Fifteenth Army Corps, from the left of the army to the right, a distance of from eight to ten miles, and went into bivouac in rear of the Seventeenth Army Corps at 10 p. m. At 2 a. m. on the 28th of July I commenced forming line of battle on the right of General G. A. Smith's division, Seventeenth Army Corps, and shortly after daylight had the line formed. This line was at right angles to the general direction of the main line. As soon as General G. A. Smith commenced to swing around into the line, I moved, conforming to his movements and keeping connected with his right. When the movement was completed my right rested near Ezra Chapel, the general direction of the line being nearly north and south. As soon as I had got into position I directed brigade commanders to throw up a temporary barricade of rails, which was done in about half an hour. The Fourth and Second Divisions, Fifteenth Army Corps, were placed in position at right angles to the First Division. Shortly after getting into position the enemy opened with artillery on the Fourth and Second Divisions. A little after 12 o'clock the enemy made an attack on the Second and Fourth Divisions in heavy force, but were repulsed with great loss. A little after 1 p. m. they made a determined attack on the left of the Fourth Division and the right of the First. The assaults were several times repulsed, but after each repulse the enemy charged in greater numbers and with greater determination, but finding, however, that they could not break the lines, they finally withdrew. This attack lasted something over an hour. They did not attack again in front of the First Division. Only between 300 and 400 men of the Third Brigade were engaged, and there were buried in front of the division of the enemy's dead, [*sic*] including 1 colonel, 1 major, and several company officers. At a fair estimate there must have been at least one rebel killed or wounded for every man engaged on my side."

Brigadier-General Harrow, whom Logan commended highly, has this to say of Ezra Church: "During the night of the 26th

July the division moved to the right, reaching on the evening of the 27th a point near the Green's Ferry road, and early the following morning moved forward, maintaining a position at a right angle with the command of Brigadier-General Woods, commanding First Division; the Third Brigade, Colonel Oliver, forming the connection with the First and Second Brigades moving within the lines, and parallel to the Third. This order of march was continued; our lines facing east and south until 11 a. m., when the enemy's skirmishers began to dispute farther progress. Everything indicating the enemy to be near, our lines were rapidly formed along a wooded crest facing nearly south, the First Brigade on the right, the Third on the left, and the Second in reserve. The line was not entirely formed before the enemy attacked in large force and with great desperation. After a brief struggle their first line gave way; a second was moved forward, but after a severe struggle met a like fate. The woods in our front afforded the enemy an opportunity of re-forming his broken lines unperceived. The assault upon my lines was repeated six times between 12 m. and 5 p. m., and in every instance were met and repulsed with great slaughter, until finally sundown greeted us as victors upon the most stubbornly contested and bloodiest battlefield of the campaign. The battle was fought by the Fifteenth Corps against four times their numbers, without the advantage of works on either side. If the soldiers of the Fifteenth Corps had no other claim to consideration than their efforts on that day, it would be enough to entitle them to the lasting gratitude of their country."

General Howard was disappointed in not receiving reinforcements at a critical juncture, and had to send to Sherman the second time. He says in his report: "The enemy's assaults exhibited so much pertinacity that I feared he might finally, by continually throwing in fresh troops, wear our men out and burst through the line at some point. I therefore sent to General Sherman for reinforcements, at least a brigade. The general felt so sure that General Morgan's division, of the Fourteenth Corps, that had gone toward Turner's Ferry, would soon appear on my right flank, that he was contented to send me word to that effect. But as Morgan did not arrive I again sent Lieutenant-Colonel

Howard to ask at least a brigade. General Sherman ordered it forward at once. It did not arrive, however, until the battle was over. Adding the losses of Generals Blair and Dodge, which were small, the entire loss of killed and wounded will not exceed 600. In a letter to General Sherman, July 29, I stated that we had counted 642 rebel dead, and that I estimated the rebel loss at not less than 5,000. From subsequent rebel accounts, and from between 100 and 200 more rebel bodies afterward discovered, I believe the enemy's loss much larger, certainly not less than 7,000. We captured 5 battle-flags, upward of 1,500 muskets, and nearly 200 prisoners. After the battle of the 28th of July the enemy seemed satisfied to stand on the defensive as long as he held Atlanta."

Lieutenant-General Lee, of the Confederate army, gives the following account of the battle: "I assumed command of Hood's old corps, consisting of Stevenson's, Clayton's, and Hindman's divisions (the latter commanded by Brigadier-General John C. Brown), on July 27, 1864. The army was then in position and intrenched around Atlanta, daily shifting its position to meet the flank movements of the enemy. On the 27th Hindman's and Clayton's divisions were withdrawn from the trenches and massed on the Lick Skillet road. On the 28th, about 11 a. m., I received orders to move out on the Lick Skillet road and check the enemy, who was then moving to our left, as it was desirable to hold that road, to be used for a contemplated movement. I soon found that the enemy had gained the road, and was gradually driving back our cavalry. Brown's division was at once formed on the left of and obliquely to the road, and Clayton's division on the right, connecting by a line of skirmishers with the main works around the city. As soon as Brown was formed he moved forward, handsomely driving the enemy across the road and to a distance half a mile beyond, where he encountered temporary breast-works, from which he was driven back with considerable loss. Clayton's division moved forward as soon as formed, and about ten minutes after Brown's advance, and met with similar results. I found it difficult to rally Brown's division and move it against the enemy a second time. The consequence was that one or two brigades of this division, as also of Clayton's division, sustained heavy losses



because of the failure in the attack of portions of their lines. Walthall's division, of Stewart's corps, had moved out on the Lick Skillet road, while Brown's and Clayton's divisions were engaging the enemy. At my suggestion this division was thrown against the enemy where Brown had attacked. The enemy was still within easy range of the Lick Skillet road, and I believed that he would yield before a vigorous attack. The effort, however, was a failure, and the troops were formed on the road, and during the night were withdrawn, by order of the commanding general, to a more suitable position, connecting with the works immediately around Atlanta. The enemy had two corps engaged in this affair; still I am convinced that if all the troops had displayed equal spirit we would have been successful, as the enemy's works were slight, and besides they had scarcely gotten into position when we made the attack."

Brigadier-General John C. Brown, in temporary command of Hindman's division, reported: "On the afternoon of the 27th I moved from the position on the Augusta railroad, which I had fortified and held since the investment of the city, and marched to the left of Peachtree street almost to the Marietta road, and was going into position near night-fall, when I received orders to march immediately to the Lick Skillet road, reaching which point after dark I was ordered into bivouac, where I remained until 10 o'clock next morning (28th), when the lieutenant-general commanding corps gave me verbal orders to move with the utmost dispatch upon the Lick Skillet road until I reached the Poor-House, a mile in front of our line of intrenchments, where I would find General Jackson's division of cavalry. I preceded the advance of my column, and arriving at the point indicated learned from General Jackson that his command was being rapidly pressed back to the road, and that his information indicated the enemy's infantry to be small. The lieutenant-general commanding arrived almost simultaneously with the head of the column, and directed me to form rapidly in rear of a commanding position in the road in advance of the Poor-House, so that my right might rest upon and at an angle of about forty-five degrees with the road, holding one brigade in reserve. I was directed to attack and drive the enemy to Ezra Church and hold that position. I formed, with Johnston's

(formerly Deas's) brigade on the right, Brantly's on the left, and Sharp's in the center, with Manigault in reserve, and instantly moved forward. The enemy's skirmishers were encountered at the road and his advance line a little beyond, moving rapidly to possess the road. It was routed and driven 500 or 600 yards and took refuge behind intrenchments. The woods were so dense that these works were not discovered until my line was upon them. In many places the works were carried, but the enemy reinforced so rapidly and with such an immensely superior force, that my troops were driven with great slaughter from them. Brigadier-General Johnston in the first onset was severely wounded. Colonel Coltart, upon whom the command devolved, was in a few moments afterward also wounded, and Colonel B. R. Hart, Twenty-second Alabama regiment, the next in command, was wounded immediately after assuming command. The command then passed to Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. Toulmin. At this juncture I relieved it with my supporting brigade, but behaving badly, its demoralization was so great it could not be made effective. My left brigade being outflanked was compelled to retire, which made the withdrawal of the center indispensable. I succeeded in rallying a greater portion of the division on a ridge, when it again became necessary to charge the enemy, who, becoming emboldened by our failure to hold his works, was advancing upon us. The effort, as before, resulted in only partial success, and the enemy pouring fresh troops upon our front and flanks compelled us again to retire. After this we were content to rally and form line on the crest of the ridge between the Lick Skillet road and the enemy's position, so as to hold that road. Temporary defenses of rails, &c., were constructed and the position held until the arrival of Stewart's corps, when we were relieved by Walthall's division and retired to the right and rear to support Clayton. About midnight we moved and took position on the prolongation of the defenses of Atlanta, about two miles west of the Lick Skillet road."

General Clayton, commanding a division of Lee's corps, says of the part taken by his command: "Early on the morning of the 28th of July this division, with the exception of Stovall's brigade, was ordered to move from its position in the trenches

on the northeast of Atlanta through the city to the west. Here it was halted until near the middle of the day, when, having been preceded by Brown's division, it moved out upon the Lick Skillet road about a mile and went into line of battle on the right of the road, facing to the north. I had placed Gibson's brigade on the left, and was superintending the formation of Holtzclaw's brigade upon the right—having directed Brigadier-General Baker to form his brigade in rear as a reserve—when I learned that without the knowledge of Brigadier-General Gibson or myself, his brigade had been ordered forward by Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, assistant inspector-general of the corps. This brigade soon struck the enemy, whose skirmishers, with the line supporting them, were promptly driven back on the main line. Moving Holtzclaw's brigade forward, with instructions to look well to the right (my formation having been from the left on Brown's division), I hastened to where Gibson's brigade was engaged. This brigade had struck the salient in the enemy's works and had suffered severely. I was informed by Brigadier-General Gibson that he needed support. The troops on his left had been driven back in confusion. I immediately ordered up Baker's brigade, which renewed the attack with spirit, but was in time driven back with great loss. I then ordered Holtzclaw's brigade to move by the left flank and take a position out of view of the enemy, but near their works, and covering the ground over which the other two brigades had passed, in order to meet an advance of the enemy should one be made. Hastily forming Gibson's and Baker's brigades (both of which had fought with gallantry and lost one-half of their original numbers) in rear, the firing upon my left having ceased, I notified Lieutenant-General Lee, commanding corps, of my position, and awaited orders. I had found the enemy in strong works and upon ground well chosen. Had my right brigade advanced to the attack it would have done so by changing direction to the left and moved through an extensive open field. I had also been instructed not to make the attack beyond the branch in my front, and which this brigade had then crossed. Soon after dark the troops were moved back through the breastworks near the city, and to a new position on the left of the army."

Major-General Walthall, who, when Lieutenant-General Stewart was wounded, assumed command of his corps, says of his operations that day: "Reynolds's brigade was on the right and Cantey's on the left, while Brigadier-General Quarles was directed to remain in reserve near the road and to watch closely the left flank. These dispositions made, and after being informed that my right would be protected by troops of another command, I moved forward shortly after 2 o'clock and attacked the enemy with orders to drive him to Ezra Church. I found him in strong position and large force on a hill a short distance in front, and failed to dislodge him after a vigorous and persistent effort, in which I lost 152 officers and nearly 1,000 men, considerably over one-third my force. The enemy occupied a line of great natural strength, and had thrown up temporary works for their protection. As far as the trees and undergrowth would permit us to see beyond my left, his line deflected to protect his right flank, extended, and soon after my command became engaged it was discovered by Brigadier-General Reynolds, commanding the right brigade, that there were no troops connected with him on the right, and he deployed two companies to cover the wooded space between him and the nearest brigade of Lee's corps, some distance to his right. Having met Lieutenant-General Lee on the field, I brought to his attention the gap on my right, and sent a staff officer to notify Lieutenant-General Stewart of it also, and in reply received from the latter a message to the effect that Lieutenant-General Lee would send a brigade to that point. Thereupon I ordered Quarles's brigade to be moved up on my left, except Forty-second and Forty-ninth Tennessee Regiments, under command of Col. W. F. Young, which I retained in rear of my center for its support and for the protection of a section of Darden's artillery, which was then being employed. Brigadier-General Quarles, seconded by Yates's battery, which was so posted as to aid him, made a bold and bloody assault, but his command was checked by the strong force in his front and the unopposed troops which lapped his left and poured into it a damaging flank fire.

"If it had been possible for the daring of officers and the desperate fighting of the men to have overcome such odds in

numbers and strength of position as we encountered that day all along my whole line, the enemy must have been beaten, but double the force could not have accomplished what my division was ordered to undertake. Seeing this a staff officer was dispatched to Lieutenant-General Stewart, who was near by, to notify him of my situation and to say that my command, now greatly reduced by losses sustained in assaulting this superior force in strong position, could not drive it from the works it held without assistance. He sent me instructions to hold the position I then occupied till Major-General Loring's command was in position on the Lick Skillet road and then to withdraw to his rear, and soon after he notified me to withdraw, Loring's line being complete. Before this order was executed, the lieutenant-general commanding having been wounded, his command devolved on me, and I directed Brigadier-General Quarles, to whom the command of my own division then passed, to complete the execution of the order for withdrawal, but to form on the left of Loring's division instead of going to its rear, the movements of the enemy making this change necessary. This was accomplished about 4 o'clock, and from that time there was slight skirmishing along the front of both divisions till night, and about 10 o'clock we moved, by orders from the general commanding, within the line of works around the city."

Colonel O'Neal, commanding Cantey's Brigade, which did its full share of the fighting, reported: "About 2 p. m. the command to advance was given and the brigade moved forward in perfect order through an open field, exposed at every step to the fire of the enemy, who were posted on the crest of a hill, sheltered by a skirt of dense woods. The advance was continued some 300 yards, and until we had passed down and across the declivity intervening between the open field and the position occupied by the enemy, when the fire became so hot and galling the men sought shelter behind a fence, from which they opened on him a heavy fire along the whole line. Besides the protection which the hill and woods afforded him the enemy had some slight and hastily constructed field-works. For more than two hours the sanguinary conflict raged with great fury and slaughter, and finding it impossible to dislodge him from his position, I sent to the ma-




jor-general commanding for assistance. General Quarles was ordered up. He obeyed the order with alacrity. His troops came up in splendid style, and at once opened on the enemy a heavy fire; but even with this additional force it was found impossible to break his line, although at one time some parts of our line gained a footing in forty or fifty yards of the enemy. The regimental commanders having informed me that their ammunition was exhausted, the brigade was ordered back to the point from which it had advanced, and ammunition distributed to the men shortly afterward. General Quarles was compelled to fall back, and the command of the corps having devolved on the major-general, in consequence of the wounding of General Stewart, General Quarles took command of the division, and I was ordered by him to move to the left some 300 or 400 yards, where line of battle was formed, and where we remained till night, when we fell back to the trenches and bivouacked for the night."

Brigadier-General Reynolds says of the part he took in the battle: "Major Youngblood's battalion was attached to my brigade on 26th of July, and General Gholson's brigade, under command of Col. John McGuirk, was temporarily assigned to my command at 12 m. on 28th, and but a short time before we moved out to meet the enemy. About 1 p. m. the division, moving left in front (with my command on the right, with Gholson's brigade on the left, Youngblood's battalion in center, and my own brigade on the right), moved out the Lick Skillet road about one mile and a half from our works, and at the Poor-House formed in line of battle in the road and on the right of General Cantey's brigade, General Quarles's brigade being in reserve. We moved forward over an open field some 200 yards wide, and on the opposite side of the field encountered the enemy's skirmishers and drove them into their works. Youngblood's battalion got in some confusion, and many of them left the field, though a number of them acted very well. The order to charge was given, and the command pressed forward to within thirty or forty yards of the enemy's works, where they were met with a terrific fire from the front, and were enfiladed on my right (there being no support on my right), and the command was compelled to fall back some forty or fifty yards, where some protection was

afforded by rails, &c. This position was held for some three hours under a most galling and destructive fire. Having no support on my right, and the enemy's left extending some distance beyond my right, I had two companies of my right regiment deployed and extended some 300 yards to the right of my line, where they afterward connected with the skirmish line from General Holtzclaw's brigade, of Clayton's division. Colonel McGuirk, without orders from me, but from some field officer, ordered a second charge on the enemy's works, but was compelled to fall back after suffering considerable loss. General Quarles's brigade was ordered forward to support General Cantey's, and to fill up the space in my command between Gholson's brigade and my own brigade, at first occupied by Youngblood's battalion. The battle continued to rage with great fury until 5 p. m., when it abated to some extent, and shortly after we received orders to leave a skirmish line and withdraw our forces to the road. The command was withdrawn in good order and moved up to the left some half a mile, where temporary defensive works of rails were erected."

Brigadier-General Manigault reported as follows: "The brigade advanced through a dense wood, then through an open wood, and halted for a minute or two to correct the alignment, its front here covered by a skirt of wood, beyond which was another open field, on the edge of which was a deep ravine, and a steep and high wooded ridge rising beyond this. On the slope of the ridge the enemy were posted, but in what force I believe was not known at the time. I was now ordered to move forward and carry the heights. The brigade advanced in good order, passing through the first wood, and immediately on reaching the field, came under a heavy fire poured in from the height in its immediate front, and extending to the right and left for a space of more than 300 yards. In spite of this galling fire, the open field was crossed in fair order, though many fell killed and wounded. The wood was reached, ravine crossed, and ascent commenced. The enemy were now to be seen behind their breastworks, and from which they kept up a steady and well-directed fire. The regiments on the right and left here suffered from a heavy flank fire, and the enemy, seeing that our front was but a



Confederate Monument

This monument was erected in 1891 by the Fulton County Confederate Veterans' Association, on a beautiful plot in West View Cemetery, donated to the association by the West View Cemetery Company. The statue thereon represents a Confederate soldier, and was carved in Carrara, Italy, at a cost of \$1,800, and was imported free of duty by the U. S. Government. Mrs. John Walton had the supervision of the structure and its total cost was \$8,640. It was intended to stand as an enduring memorial of the patriotism, bravery, devotion, self-sacrifice and suffering of the "men who wore the Gray."

short one, brought troops upon the right of the brigade, forcing the men back. Many of the enemy's troops were driven back by our fire, but fresh troops being immediately thrust forward, the opposition could not be overcome, and the brigade was forced back along its entire front, leaving many of their dead and wounded within a few feet of the enemy's intrenchments. The brigade was again rallied and a second attempt made, but with like want of success. A third time they were ordered to make the effort; formed and moved forward some distance, when the order was countermanded, and they retired to a point along an old road immediately in rear of the position where they were halted to rectify the alignment before their first advance upon the enemy. While remaining here two efforts were made by other commands to carry the same point, resulting in each instance in failure. During the remainder of the day we were moved to several positions both in the front and rear line, but were not again actually engaged, although experiencing some loss from stray balls, &c."

While Howard had his hands full with Lee on the Federal right, Schofield was making a strong demonstration on the left, thinking he had mainly militia in front of him and might be able to break through without a serious conflict. He soon discovered that the enemy's lines had not been weakened materially. At nightfall on the 28th he wrote Sherman: "I have kept up my demonstration during the day, and extended it about a mile beyond the railroad. The enemy has continually moved troops to his right, and met me in strong works with a great deal of artillery and men enough to resist a heavy assault." General Thomas held himself in readiness to detach to Howard's support, at the same time making strong threats along his front with heavy skirmish lines and his artillery. Early in the morning, at Sherman's order, he sent General Jeff. C. Davis's division to Turner's Ferry, from which point it was to move toward East Point, feeling forward cautiously for Howard's right. Davis being sick, the command devolved on General Morgan. The failure of this division to reach Howard's right was the source of much anxiety to him during the battle. Its march was delayed by Jackson's cavalry.

Before the battle of Ezra Church, there was much dissatisfaction in the Army of the Tennessee over Howard's appoint-



ment to succeed the lamented McPherson. The effect of the battle was to firmly instate the new commander in the affections of his soldiers, according to the following note from Sherman to Schofield, after the battle:

"General Howard's conduct to-day had an excellent effect on his command. After the firing had ceased he walked the line, and the men gathered about him in the most affectionate manner, and he at once gained their hearts and confidence. I deem this a perfect restoration to confidence in themselves and leader of that army."

Sherman's report to Washington on the night of the 28th was as follows: "The enemy again assaulted to-day; this time on our extreme right, to which flank I had shifted the Army of the Tennessee, to gain ground toward the railroad. The blow fell upon the Fifteenth Corps, which handsomely repulsed it, capturing four regimental flags. The attack was kept up for five hours. Our men were partially covered, while the enemy was exposed. Our loss is comparatively small, while that of the enemy is represented as heavy. I will give approximate figures to-morrow. The cavalry has now been out two days, and to-morrow should show the effect. I feel confident they will reach the Macon road. Our right is about a mile distant from the railroad, but the ground is very difficult. I may be forced to extend still farther to command it. We have had heavy cannonading all day, the enemy using ordnance as heavy as 6-inch rifled guns. Bragg has been to Atlanta on a second visit."

In General Hardee's report, which will be found at the conclusion of this history of the Atlanta campaign, occurs a reference to the battle of Ezra Church that is a good deal in the nature of unwritten history. According to Hardee, Hood was almost stampeded by the day's developments, and requested that well-known corps commander to leave his command and go at once to the Lick Skillet road to take charge of the hostile operations on that flank. Hardee went, but the field was lost before his arrival. During his absence, his division commanders were ordered by Hood to hold themselves in readiness to change position that night.

On the evening of the 28th Hood advised Richmond of the situation, as follows: "The enemy commenced extending his



right about 8 this morning, driving in our cavalry. Lieutenant-Generals Stewart and Lee were directed to hold the Lick Skillet road for the day with a portion of their commands. About 1.30 o'clock a sharp engagement ensued with no decided advantage to either side. We still occupy the Lick Skillet road. I regret to say that Lieutenant-General Stewart and Major-General Loring were wounded. In my dispatch of yesterday I should have mentioned that Brigadier-General Ector was severely wounded during that day."

The same night Hood wired General Howell Cobb, in command of the state troops at Macon: "Let the militia remain at Andersonville for the present. Raiders reported across South river; one column moving toward McDonough."

To Governor Brown he sent this message: "Raid on our right checked at Flat Rock. Enemy reported as crossing at Campbellton and at Varner's for raid. Cavalry sent to meet it. Send troops to Griffin."

## CHAPTER XXXI

### CAVALRY RAIDS AND STONEMAN'S CAPTURE.

After the battle of Ezra Church Sherman ordered the utmost activity on his flanks. Howard's line was made very strong on the night of the 28th, and he was satisfied with its position. Thomas was ordered to take Davis's and Williams's divisions and operate from Howard's right to East Point in the nature of a reconnaissance to threaten the Macon road. Schofield was ordered to do the same on the left.

In compliance with Sherman's order, Thomas reported on the night of the 29th: "I have just returned from the right. I have intrenched Morgan on the Howell's (or Green's) Ferry road, to the right and southwest of Logan. He has complete control of that road, and has his skirmishers out half a mile to his front. They have driven the rebels into intrenched rifle-pits, and report intrenched lines heavily manned a short distance in rear of their skirmish rifle-pits. I also directed Ward to take position on Morgan's right and refuse his right, so as to make a strong right flank. Ward fronts the Howell's Ferry road, and runs along it toward the Chattahoochee for half a mile and then falls back this way. If, after intrenching, Howard will thin out and extend to his right, Morgan and Ward can move still farther to the right, and might perhaps overlap the enemy. Whilst Morgan and Ward made their advances, I had Williams, Johnson, and Baird make strong reconnaissances to their fronts. They all report their belief that the enemy has either retired altogether, or has withdrawn the greater part of his forces, and only now has a weak skirmish line covering his fortifications around the city. I have directed them to feel strongly to-night, and determine whether the enemy has retired or not.

. . . . .

"I take great pleasure in announcing the capture, this morning, of an entire rebel regiment—115 officers and men—by the First Division, Twentieth Corps, whilst advancing its lines in obedience to my orders of last night. The position gained is very advantageous to us also, as it will enable me to shorten my lines considerably and have a better view of the ground in front."

Schofield reported at the same time: "Colonel Reilly has just returned from his reconnaissance to the left. He passed the left of the line occupied by the Army of the Tennessee during the battle of the 22d, and struck the rebel intrenchments about six miles from Atlanta, and three miles from the Decatur road. He drove before him a considerable force of cavalry, mostly militia, and found a brigade or more of regular infantry in the intrenchments. He kept up his demonstrations during the day and retired at night with slight loss."

On the 29th General Howard extended his lines to the right quite considerably, and Thomas's two divisions moved on further toward East Point. Sherman wanted great activity manifested as a diversion until his two cavalry forces, one on each side of the Macon road, had time to make a swoop upon the track. He said to Howard: "I think we can draw the enemy out of Atlanta or force him to the attack, which is to be desired." The Federals met with little opposition in extending their right toward the railroad, at first, and Howard reported that the country between him and Turner's Ferry was clear of Confederates. As early as the 30th Sherman gave Schofield an intimation that he would probably transfer his entire army to the west of Atlanta. He said: "Our troops are on the Sandtown road. The enemy must follow that movement, and if they hold a force on your left front, it is only for effect. They will weaken about General Stanley. I hope to hear of our cavalry to-morrow. When it is back, I will probably shift you over to the right."

On the 30th the Federal line on the west was extended two miles down the Sandtown road, and the new position thoroughly intrenched. Slowly but surely it was reaching out to the Macon railroad. On the 31st of July Sherman telegraphed Halleck: "No change since my last. Weather has been intensely hot, and to-day it is raining hard. General Garrard's cavalry is back.

General Stoneman placed it at Flat Rock to cover his movement south. General Garrard reports the enemy's cavalry all round him for two days, when he charged out and went to Latimer's, where he heard that General Stoneman had passed Covington, so he got two full days' start for Macon. I will not hear of him for some days. From rumors among the people, I think he struck the road, for it is reported broken at Jonesboro. Tomorrow night I will move General Schofield to the extreme right and draw the enemy out to East Point. His works are too strong for an assault, and we cannot spare the ammunition for a bombardment."

On the 29th some important assignments were made in the Confederate army, owing to the casualties of battle. Major-General B. F. Cheatham was placed in command of Stewart's corps; Major-General Patton Anderson in command of Hindman's division, Lee's corps, and Brigadier-General Henry R. Jackson assigned to command Stevens's brigade, Bate's division. On the same day Sherman's cavalry raiders struck the Macon road about four miles below Jonesboro, tearing up a couple of miles of track before strong opposition was made to them. Besides the cavalry sent in pursuit, a trainload of infantry was sent to the scene by General Hood.

General Hood says of the cavalry operations during and after the battle of Ezra Church: "Whilst these operations were in progress, Wheeler and Jackson were in hot pursuit of the Federal cavalry; General Lewis's infantry brigade having been sent to Jonesboro, the point about which I supposed the raiders would strike our communications.

"At an early hour on the 29th dispatches were received from various points upon the Macon road to the effect that General Wheeler had successfully checked the enemy at Latimer's, and was quietly awaiting developments. On our left, the Federals succeeded in eluding our cavalry, for a time, by skirmishing with our main body, whilst their main force moved round to the rear and cut the telegraph lines at Fairburn and Palmetto. General Jackson, however, soon discovered the ruse, and marched rapidly toward Fayetteville and Jonesboro, the direction in which the Federals had moved. The enemy succeeded in de-

stroying a wagon-train at the former place, in capturing one or two quartermasters who afterward made their escape, and in striking the Macon railroad about four miles below Jonesboro, where the work of destruction was begun in earnest.

"General Lewis, within three hours after having received the order, had placed his men on the cars and was in Jonesboro with his brigade ready for action. Meantime Jackson was coming up with his cavalry, when the Federals became alarmed and abandoned their work, but not without having destroyed about a mile and a half of the road, which was promptly repaired.

"While Jackson followed in pursuit and Lewis returned to Atlanta, Wheeler moved across from Latimer's, with a portion of his command, in rear of this body of the enemy, leaving General Iverson to pursue General Stoneman, who, after somewhat further damaging the Augusta railroad and burning the bridges across Walnut Creek and the Oconee River, had moved against Macon.

"These operations had been ordered by General Sherman upon a grand scale; picked men and horses had been placed under the command of Generals McCook and Stoneman, with the purpose to destroy our sole line of communication, and to release at Andersonville 34,000 Federal prisoners.

"These raiders, under McCook, came in contact with General Roddey's cavalry at Newnan, and were there held in check till Wheeler's and Jackson's troops came up; whereupon the combined forces, directed by General Wheeler, attacked the enemy with vigor and determination, and finally routed them. Whilst these operations were progressing in the vicinity of Newnan, General Cobb was gallantly repelling the assault of Stoneman at Macon, when Iverson came up and engaged the enemy with equal spirit and success.

"The flanks of the Federal army were at this juncture so well protected by the Chattahoochee and the deep ravines which run down into the river, that my antagonist was enabled to throw his entire force of cavalry against the Macon road; and but for the superiority of the Confederate cavalry he might have succeeded to such extent as to cause us great annoyance and subject our troops to short rations for a time.



"After the utter failure of this experiment, General Sherman perceived that his mounted force, about 12,000 in number, in concert with a corps of infantry in support, could not so effectually destroy our main line of communication as to compel us to evacuate Atlanta."

General Wheeler's report gives a complete and very interesting account of the great Confederate cavalry successes. The following is taken from it: "About this time I discovered that General Stoneman, with 2,200 men, had moved early that morning on toward Covington with the intention, according to statements of prisoners, of continuing his march toward Macon. I felt unauthorized with my orders to pursue Stoneman's force of 2,200 men in person, particularly as I had received a dispatch from General Shoup, chief of staff, that the left of the army was also threatened by a raid. I, therefore, ordered General Iverson, with his own, General Allen's, and Colonel Breckinridge's brigades to follow Stoneman rapidly and attack him wherever found. While this order was being executed I received additional dispatches from General Shoup stating that a large cavalry force, estimated at over 3,000, had crossed the Chattahoochee near Campbellton, and was making its way toward the Macon railroad. General Shoup further stated that he feared Brigadier-General Jackson could not check its movements, and that General Hood desired me to move immediately to oppose this force with such troops as could be spared. I immediately ordered Ashby's brigade, under General Humes, which was then on the march to join me, to move rapidly to Jonesboro. I ordered General Kelly to remain and hold Garrard's division in check with Dibrell's brigade, and to send Anderson's brigade after me on the Jonesboro road. By riding rapidly I arrived at Jonesboro with Ashby's brigade, 500 strong, which I had overtaken on the march. I here learned that the enemy had struck the railroad some six miles south of that point. I arrived at that point about dark and found the enemy had moved off on the Fayetteville road. A courier with a dispatch, and a staff officer whom I had sent to communicate with General Jackson, met me with a message from General Jackson to the effect that if I would press the enemy's rear he would gain their front

and thus secure his capture. I immediately replied to General Jackson, agreeing to the proposition.

“Upon arriving at Fayetteville about midnight I learned that the enemy has passed through that place without meeting any opposition whatever, and was then not more than an hour in advance of me. I pressed on rapidly and overtook his rear at Line Creek. The enemy had destroyed the bridge and were holding the opposite side with troops in strong barricades. With great difficulty the enemy was dislodged and driven from the bank. After an hour's hard labor a bridge was constructed and my command passed over. I had with me at this time about 400 men, having traveled so rapidly that a number of my horses had been absolutely unable to keep up with the column, and General Anderson, whom I had ordered to follow me, had not, on account of the rapidity of my march, been heard from. After crossing the bridge I pressed on rapidly, in the extreme darkness encountering barricades every few hundred yards, the first intimation of the enemy being a volley from their small-arms.

“At daylight I struck the enemy's line of battle. I immediately attacked and drove him from his position, routing the entire line and capturing 200 prisoners with their horses, equipments and arms. In this engagement and the running fight which ensued more than 40 of the enemy were left dead on the field. My entire force, including my reserves, which were not engaged, did not exceed 500 men. I pushed on, continually engaging the enemy's rear guard, until about 9 a. m., when they succeeded by a rapid movement in gaining some two miles upon my advance. Upon reaching a point two miles from Newnan I again overtook him and captured 20 prisoners in the engagement which ensued. My command had up to this time traveled about seventy miles without having halted.

“About this time Colonel Cook, with a portion of his regiment, and General Ross, with two small regiments, each about 100 strong, reported to me, increasing my force to about 700 men. I here found that on the head of McCook's column approaching town he had observed that Confederate troops were in

the town, and without engaging them, turned off, leaving the town to the right. Feeling certain he would attempt to come into the LaGrange road below the town, I ordered Colonel Ashby to move through Newnan and down the LaGrange road to gain his front if possible. I then sent scouts and pickets out upon all roads by which the enemy could approach the town, and moved with the remainder of my command, now less than 300 men, down between the railroad and the main LaGrange road in the hope that I might strike the enemy's flank. After marching about three miles I discovered the enemy in a dense wood forming a line, the right flank of which was scarcely fifty yards in my front. Almost at the same moment I received a dispatch from Colonel Ashby, informing me that he had struck the head of the enemy's column just as it was entering the main LaGrange road, three miles and a half below Newnan, and that the enemy was forming a line of battle dismounted. Feeling that I was upon the flanks of the force to which he referred, I determined to attack immediately, notwithstanding the great disparity of numbers, the enemy having fully ten times my force. I immediately sent orders to Colonel Ashby to engage the enemy in his front, while with the remainder of my troops I attacked with great vigor. I met with a strong resistance at first, but in a few moments the enemy gave way, when with a shout and a gallant charge, the entire line was thrown into confusion and commenced a disorderly retreat. We pursued rapidly, capturing a great number of prisoners, and divided the enemy's forces.

"While pursuing the enemy, I heard firing in my rear, when I was surprised to learn that General Ross had left his horses where he had first dismounted. Feeling convinced that they were being attacked, I immediately recalled the line, returned, and drove off the enemy, capturing a number of prisoners and horses. Immediately after this success, and before I had re-established my lines, the enemy made a most determined charge, driving back a portion of my line and throwing the whole of it into temporary confusion. In a moment my troops were rallied and the enemy repulsed. The fight had now lasted two hours. We had driven the enemy from every position and captured 400 prisoners, including three brigade commanders, one of whom lay

wounded upon the field. At this moment General Anderson came up with his brigade, 400 strong, which was thrown into position. While doing so, General Anderson was wounded, and the brigade left under command of Colonel Bird.

"Upon advancing my line, I ascertained that the enemy had fallen back and taken a strong position in the edge of a wood, with a large field in front, and a deep ravine, only passable at certain points, intervening between my troops and the enemy's position. The enemy had thrown up strong barricades and was using his artillery freely. General Roddey, who had been in the town, and had not been engaged, came up with about 600 men, and was placed in position on my left. He advised strongly against attacking the position. I immediately moved my troops to the right and pressed down upon the enemy's left flank. Upon discovering this movement, the enemy commenced retreating. I pressed rapidly down the road upon their flank, cutting off nearly two entire regiments, which surrendered in a body with all their artillery, wagons and ambulances. The entire column was thrown into disorder, and a number of prisoners, arms, horses, and 2 stands of colors were captured in the pursuit which ensued. Some 300 prisoners, mostly quartermasters, commissaries and other non-combatants whom the enemy had captured the previous day, were also captured by our troops. General Roddey, on account of the fatigued condition of his men, had been authorized by me to retire to Newnan before this movement commenced. After pursuing about four miles I found the enemy had become very much scattered through the woods and fields, and that the only party claiming organization had been severed nearly equally. One column, estimated at about 400 men, under General McCook in person, had moved at a gallop toward the mouth of New River, and the other party, under Colonel Brownlow, had moved on by-roads toward the Chattahoochee River, near Franklin. I ordered Colonel Bird, commanding Anderson's brigade, to pursue the party with McCook vigorously. In anticipation that the enemy would take the direction pursued by the other party, I had some time previously sent Colonel McKenzie, with his own and the Third Arkansas Regiment, to gain the front of the enemy moving toward Franklin.

"I omitted to state that a short time before dark General Jackson arrived, but his troops, numbering only about 300 men, remained in rear and did not come up to engage the enemy. After dark I ordered General Jackson to take his entire command to the battle-field and take charge of all the prisoners which had not been sent to the rear, to gather up the arms, wagons, horses, artillery, and all other public property, and take them to Newnan and await my orders. The balance of my command left with me I ordered to search the woods and gather together the straggling parties of the enemy who had been cut off and were scattered over the country. Colonel McKenzie was very fortunate in his movement and succeeded in capturing between 200 and 300 prisoners. Colonel Bird was not so successful. His instructions from me were to press on rapidly after the enemy, and to report by courier to me his progress and the force he found himself following. It was full daylight before I heard from him at all, and then I learned that he had fallen asleep and allowed the demoralized mass to escape to the river.

"On my arrival at that point in the morning I found that some 400 of the enemy had succeeded in crossing after abandoning some 200 horses and equipments, throwing away most of their arms. These were still pursued on the other side of the river and a number captured, thus completing the entire destruction of the entire command. This proved to be a picked body of cavalry, and its destruction destroyed the flower of General Sherman's vast cavalry organization. General Iverson had been equally successful in his pursuit of General Stoneman, whom he met, defeated, and captured, with 500 of his command, some twenty miles from Macon. The remainder of Stoneman's command was much demoralized and scattered. Colonel Breckinridge pursued and, in successive engagements, defeated and captured the only organized party which attempted escape.

"Thus ended in most ignominious defeat and destruction the most stupendous cavalry operation of the war. As was acknowledged by the brigade commanders captured, their plan was to unite these columns on the railroad north of Macon, destroy the railroad, then move rapidly upon and release the 30,000 prisoners of war we held at Andersonville. In this he was thoroughly



thwarted at the cost of about 5,000 men, with their horses, arms, equipments, colors, cannon, etc. The force which was sent on this expedition numbered as follows, all picked cavalry :

Garrard's division.....	4,000
McCook's division.....	3,200
Stoneman's division.....	2,200
<hr/>	
Total .....	9,400

"Garrard returned to the army without sustaining much damage except the morale of defeat. McCook, according to the enemy's own accounts, only succeeded in returning with 500 men, most of whom were dismounted and unarmed, while none but a few stragglers from Stoneman's column ever returned, making their entire loss over 5,000 men. Of these I am informed 3,200 were lodged in prison, and the remainder killed, wounded, or scattered through the country. McCook's column was a picked body of men selected from his own division and a division a short time previously brought from Tennessee by Major-General Rousseau. All this was accomplished by a force of cavalry not exceeding an aggregate of 3,800 men."

It is not necessary to read Confederate reports to learn the extent of the defeat of the Union cavalry. The Federal reports show that the blow administered by Wheeler and Iverson was a crushing one, sorely crippling that arm of Sherman's forces, as he himself admits. The reports of the opposite sides differ as to figures and somewhat as to details, but agree pretty well on the main result. The reader was no doubt struck by the remarkable smallness of Wheeler's force, according to his statement, and astonished at the tremendous numerical odds he alleges he overcame. The Federal cavalry officers who escaped from the Newnan disaster, notably Colonel Brownlow, commander of a brigade, declared that Wheeler's forces were "overwhelming," numerically. Iverson's report of the defeat and surrender of Stoneman was not available, but the report of Stoneman himself, transmitted to Sherman through the courtesy of his captors, is reproduced as follows :

MACON, GA., *August 6, 1864.*

GENERAL: In regard to the operations of my command from the time I left the army up to the time I turned back from near this place, I will only say now that I feel assured, when you know what was done and why it was done, you will be satisfied with reasons and results. All I wish to say now, through the medium of flag of truce, is solely in regard to how I and a small portion of my command became prisoners of war. Before I had completed what I desired to accomplish I learned that a force of the enemy's cavalry was close upon my rear, and the only course for me to pursue to get out was to turn upon and, if possible, whip this force. This I think we might have done had my command fought as it ought to and as I hoped it would have done. Without entering now into particulars, we were whipped, and this principally on account of the bad conduct of the Kentucky brigade in the attack during the morning, and in fact throughout the day. In the afternoon the enemy attacked us, when Capron's brigade gave way at once and was followed by Adams's (Kentucky) brigade, leaving me with Biddle's (Indiana) brigade and the section of artillery to contend against the whole force of the enemy, and cover the retreat of the remainder of my force. A portion of this brigade I sent to hold a cross-road and keep the enemy from getting between me and the main force, pack train, etc. This also gave way and followed the rest, so that near the end of the day I found myself with about 200 of the Fifth Indiana Cavalry and the section of artillery. This regiment had been engaged nearly the whole of the day previous. I insisted on continuing the contest and, if taken prisoners at all, upon being taken fighting, but the officers with me protested that, being without ammunition and surrounded, our escape was next to impossible; that there was no use in fighting longer; that we had accomplished our object in covering the retreat of the rest of the command until it was well under way, and that in justice to all concerned we should surrender. To extricate the section of artillery and the men with it was impossible. My own horse had been shot under me and I was scarcely able to mount the worn-down one and the only one I could find to replace the one I had lost, and our chances of escape were so small that I consented to

be taken prisoners of war, and as such our treatment has been everything that could have been expected. Our loss in killed and wounded was quite large.

I understand from captured fugitives that they were informed that I had surrendered the whole command, and that the order was given for every one to save himself. I have not heard from the Kentucky brigade since it left. Capron's brigade I learn was considerably cut up, and several hundred of it captured. I feel better satisfied with myself to be a prisoner of war, much as I hate it, than to be amongst those who owe their escape to considerations of self-preservation.

I am, general, very respectfully, etc.,

GEORGE STONEMAN.

*Maj.-Gen. U. S. Army, Prisoner of War.*

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN.

Colonel Adams brought most of the Kentucky brigade back safely to Atlanta, after many narrow escapes, but Colonel Capron did not fare as well with his Illinois brigade, which was practically annihilated. Capron, with a handful of followers, is said to have crept into Atlanta afoot. The best account of Stoneman's unsuccessful raid on Macon, from a Union standpoint, is that of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert W. Smith, assistant inspector-general of cavalry, Department of the Ohio, who accompanied Stoneman and made his escape back to Sherman's army with Adams's brigade. After narrating the rather uneventful journey of the cavalry as far as Clinton, Colonel Smith proceeds:

"July 30th, column moved at 4 a. m. Colonel Adams's brigade was again sent to the right to strike the river at some point above Macon, sound it for fords or examine for ferries or other means of crossing, and feel the enemy as he advanced down the river and drive him in if found. A detachment of the Fourteenth Illinois, under command of Major Davidson, was sent to the left with instructions to strike the Macon and Milledgeville railroad as near the latter point as possible and destroy it. When the column was within five miles of Macon, another detachment was sent to the left to strike the same railroad at or near Gordon. Both these parties reached the railroad with little interruption,

and each burned some small bridges and culverts and tore up the road at these points for a distance of two or three miles. They also destroyed three trains of cars, and three engines that happened to be upon the road at the time, between the points above named. There were twenty-two box-cars loaded with commissary and quartermaster stores, and some stock and three passenger coaches with citizens and soldiers aboard. All the cars and engines were completely destroyed. The main column advanced in the meantime on the main road toward Macon, and met the enemy's pickets about three miles out. Colonel Adams had moved down the river, and when about one mile above Macon met the enemy in force, and gave him battle, driving him back until he fell in cover of his own battery on the hill near the river, and about half a mile above Fort Hawkins. Colonel Adams was then unable to advance any farther, but continued to engage the enemy at this point, until his withdrawal was ordered at 3 p. m. In the meantime Capron's and Biddle's brigades were engaging the enemy in front, and to the left of Macon, but with little success, the enemy being protected in his works and lines by the battery in Fort Hawkins. Our battery could get no position from which it could operate effectively against that of the enemy in Fort Hawkins. We threw a few shells into the city. At 3 p. m. General Stoneman, finding it impossible to reach the railroad bridge with the force he had, ordered a withdrawal of all the forces, and directed the march to commence southward, sending Colonel Adams's brigade in advance, with a view to cross over the river and railroad south of Macon, some seven or eight miles, and continue on in that direction, as, I suppose, with a view to strike down through this State, and out at Pensacola or other favorable point. When the head of the column, with the pack train, had advanced in this direction some two miles, a scout reported a large column of rebel cavalry coming into Macon, estimated at from 1,000 to 1,500 strong. Fearing that this column would reach the ferry, where it was designed we would cross, and intercept our column, the general ordered a countermarch, and started back on the road we had gone, designing at that time, I know, to strike out in an easterly course, in the direction of Milledgeville, as soon as practicable, for he thus expressed himself to

me personally, and I do not yet know why this course was not pursued. We came on in the direction of Clinton, on the same route we had gone down, arriving at Clinton just at dark. Here the advance drove in a picket of the enemy, supposed to be fifty strong, some of them retreating west from Clinton, and the remainder north, along the route we had pursued as we advanced toward Macon. The general ordered the column to advance north along our old route, and about 9 p. m. the advance began to skirmish with the enemy, which was kept up, we advancing very slowly, until about 1 o'clock at night, when the skirmishing became so heavy in our front, as to prevent any further advance. We had now got some six miles north of Clinton, and a halt was ordered.

July 31, our advance kept up a heavy skirmish with the enemy until daylight, when an advance was ordered. We had gone about one mile and a half, when very general and heavy skirmishing commenced. A line of battle was at once formed, and the enemy strongly felt, which resulted in the development that the enemy was there in force, upon ground of his own selection, with strong works and barricades, on an elevation in the road in our front, with his lines of battle extending out from this point in the shape of a V, completely covering and enfilading our right and left flanks. General Stoneman at once prepared his command for a vigorous attack upon the enemy, advancing himself with the skirmish line. We were repulsed almost along our whole line. The enemy charged upon our left, and were in turn temporarily checked, but still kept gaining ground upon us, and using his battery with most wonderful effect and accuracy. The fight thus continued, with doubtful results, until about 2 p. m., when it became apparent that the enemy was being reinforced directly in our rear by the force that we had fought the day before at Macon. The fight then became general all along the line, and from that time until the surrender we lost heavily in killed and wounded, but the enemy suffered none the less. About 4 p. m. General Stoneman, his staff, and most of the brigade commanders, held a consultation, and it was thought best to make a desperate effort to cut our way out to our right rear, as this seemed to be the weakest part of the enemy's lines. Just as the



general had given his directions for this movement, and the respective officers were starting to their commands, the enemy opened a battery on our right and left flank, and continued their fire from the one in front, followed by a general charge. Our lines gave way, and fell back. I was ordered to a certain point to rally a line. Whilst doing this I became separated from the general. The line soon gave way again, the enemy then being within fifty yards, both in front and on the left flank. I at that moment met Colonel Adams, who had just come from General S[toneman] with permission to cut out if he could, stating, moreover, that the general was about to surrender, but that he desired all to get out who could, and he would remain in person and engage the enemy as long as possible, so as to give those making their escape as much start as possible. This we know he did, for we could still hear cannonading when we were out some two or three miles from the battle-field. I came out with Colonel Adams and his brigade. Colonel Capron had escaped a few minutes before, with a part of the Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, Eighth Michigan Cavalry, and the First Ohio Squadron. Lieutenant-Colonel Matson came out with most of the Sixth Indiana Cavalry, all striking out in a northeasterly direction. There thus escaped about 1,200 or 1,300 men, at least two-thirds, if not three-quarters, of the command that was left at the time the battle closed. Colonel Adams came by way of Eatonton, passing it some five miles before we halted, being then about thirty-five miles from the battle-field. Colonel Capron came farther to the left, but getting out about as far as Colonel Adams.

"August 1, to-day Adams's brigade was joined about noon by a detachment of the Eighth Michigan, under command of Major Buck, and the Sixth Indiana, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Matson, came through Madison about 2 p. m., and here destroyed a large amount of commissary and quartermaster stores. Burnt some coffee and 50,000 pounds of bacon. The march was continued until dark, when we were joined by Colonel Capron and his command, and the column then moved on until about midnight, when we stopped twelve miles from the bridge crossing the Oconee River, near Athens, Ga.

"August 2, to-day we approached the Oconee River, near Watkinsville, hoping to be able to cross at this point and destroy

the armory and other government works at Athens. Adams's brigade was in the advance, and when within five miles of the river captured 6 of the enemy's pickets, and within three miles, captured all the reserve picket, consisting of about 20 men. On his approach to the river at the bridge, he was opened upon by a rifled battery. It was then thought impracticable to attempt a crossing there, as we were not in a situation to bring on a fight that might last for some time, for we were very nearly out of ammunition. It was then agreed to follow up the Oconee river in the direction of Jefferson, and this intention communicated to Colonel Capron, who was then in reserve two miles to the rear. For some reason, not yet known, Colonel Capron did not come on the road after us, but got off farther to the left. We came that night to a point about sixteen miles northeast of Lawrenceville, and halted at midnight, the command lying to horse, unsaddled, without going into camp. Our command was very much exhausted and worn out, but few having had any sleep or rest for four days and nights. August 3d started early, had gone about two and a half miles, when a soldier came galloping through the woods shouting, "Capron has been attacked and cut all to pieces!" Adams went on double-quick to the road on which we learned Capron's command had been attacked, and there soon discovered the evidences of a routed and defeated command. Learning the direction they had gone, Adams, with his advance, charged after the rebels, overtaking the rear of their column half a mile distant. He charged them, driving them in great confusion, and wounding and killing, he thinks, some 40; but knowing his ammunition was nearly expended, and that there was still a rebel brigade pushing on to strike our left and cut us off from the river, we turned at right angles to the left, and came in the direction of the Chattahoochee, knowing that our only hope was to cross it at some point before night. All the information we could in the meantime get from anyone was that General Sherman had fallen back north of the river, and if this was true, our situation was still more perilous. We struck the Chattahoochee about twenty-three miles northeast of Marietta; sun an hour high; found an old but difficult ford, and succeeded in getting the command all over about 9 p. m., and went into camp.

August 4th started at daylight and arrived at Marietta at 11 a. m. Colonel Adams returned with about 490 men, having lost some 40 on the 31st ultimo in killed, wounded, and captured, about 20 during the march here. Most of them were lost at night by getting behind, and falling asleep from exhaustion, and who, no doubt, became lost or were picked up by the enemy."

That portion of Colonel Capron's report which refers to his hard experience after becoming separated from Adams, is given as follows: "The whole command now moved forward toward Watkinsville, arriving there the morning of the 2d instant, and, after consultation with Colonel Adams, it was thought best to attempt to cross the Oconee River at Athens. Colonel Adams was to make a demonstration on the town, with the understanding that if he could not effect a crossing at the bridge he was to send a courier and guide, and I was to join his command and cross the river at a ford two and a half miles above the town. The courier and guide reported after it was found that we could not cross the bridge, as it was protected with artillery. The guide mistook the road, leading me six miles away from the route agreed upon. After a delay of six hours in trying to open communication with Colonel Adams, and learning that a heavy body of cavalry and infantry was approaching me from the right, I moved forward on the Hog Mountain road to Jug Tavern, eighteen miles, when I halted and fed, and again moved forward on the same road until I passed the Jefferson and Lawrenceville road. Finding my men and animals completely exhausted, having marched fifty-six miles in twenty-four hours, and in their saddles almost constantly since the battle of the 31st ultimo, I concluded to go into camp and rest for two hours. For several hours previous to going into camp I found it necessary to have a rear guard to bring up the men, who were constantly falling out by the roadside fast asleep on their horses, being so worn out for want of rest. I also ascertained that I had passed all the roads from which I was liable to be flanked. Selecting my camping-ground, I placed the Eighth Michigan Cavalry on picket in my advance and Major Davidson's battalion, of the Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, in my rear, they being the only men who had arms and ammunition in the command. A large body of negroes,

who had followed the command, and who had been ordered away to prevent confusion if I was attacked, fell in the rear and lay between rear pickets and the main body.

Just before daylight, the morning of the 3d instant, a body of the enemy's cavalry came up in my rear, and, as near as I can ascertain, passed around the main body of the pickets on both flanks, striking the road where the negroes lay. The negroes became panic-stricken and rushed into the camp of my men, who were yet asleep (we having been in camp about one hour and a half), throwing them into confusion. The enemy now charged into my camp, driving and scattering everything before them. Every effort was made by the officers to rally the men and check the enemy's charge, but it was found impossible to keep them in line, as most of them were without arms and ammunition. Partial lines were formed, but, owing to the confusion which ensued in the darkness, they soon gave away. A stampede now took place, a portion of the men rushing for the woods and the balance running down the road and attempting to cross a bridge over the Mulberry River, in our front. The enemy still continued to charge my men, killing, wounding, and capturing a large number. In their rush across the bridge it gave way, precipitating many of them into the river. The men now scattered in every direction. I became separated from my command, and made my escape through the woods, arriving at this place on the morning of the 7th instant."

Sherman sent this explanation of his cavalry misfortunes to Halleck, on the 7th: "In order that you may have a proper understanding of the recent cavalry operations from this army that terminated somewhat unsuccessfully, I will explain. On the 25th of July I had driven the enemy to his inner intrenchments of Atlanta, and had by Garrard's division of cavalry broken the road leading to Augusta about the branches of the Ocmulgee, forty miles east, and had by McPherson's army taken up two sections of rails of about five miles east, near Stone Mountain and Decatur. I then proposed to throw the Army of the Tennessee rapidly round by the right, so as to approach the only remaining railroad left to the enemy, leading due south for six miles, and then branching to Macon on the one hand and West

Point, on the Chattahoochee, on the other. To accomplish this I placed General Stoneman with his own division of cavalry, 2,300 strong, and Garrard's division, 3,500, on my left near Decatur, and on the right General McCook with a small division of about 1,300, and a part of Harrison's, just arrived under Rouseau, from the road to Opelika. This force was about 1,700. Both expeditions started punctually on the 27th, and acted under my written orders, No. 42, a copy of which is enclosed. The day before starting, General Stoneman addressed me a note, a copy of which is enclosed, asking leave, after fulfilling his orders, to push on and release our prisoners known to be confined at Macon and Andersonville. I gave my consent in a letter, a copy of which is also enclosed. Nothing but the natural and intense desire to accomplish an end so inviting to one's feelings would have drawn me to commit a military mistake, at such a crisis, as that of dividing and risking my cavalry, so necessary to the success of my campaign. Stoneman ordered Garrard to move to Flat Rock, doubtless to attract the attention of the enemy, while he passed behind him and on to McDonough and the railroad about Lovejoy's, where he would have met McCook, but for some reason he did not go to McDonough, but to Covington, and down on the east side of the Ocmulgee to Clinton, when he sent detachments that burned the Oconee bridge, seventeen locomotives, over 100 cars, tore down telegraph wire, and damaged the railroad east of Macon considerably. He attempted to get into Macon; shelled the town, but fell back to Clinton. Finding the enemy gathering in too large a force, he seems to have turned back, but the roads were obstructed, and he fought till his ammunition was exhausted, and he seems to have given up. He told his brigade commanders, Adams and Capron, he would with 700 men engage the attention of the enemy, while they might escape. Adams has come in with his brigade, 900 strong; Capron is not in, and I think the bulk of his command were captured. About forty stragglers of it have got in. I have no doubt Stoneman surrendered in the manner and at the time described by the Macon paper I sent you yesterday. Garrard remained at Flat Rock until the 29th, and hearing nothing of Stoneman he came in without loss or serious opposition. McCook crossed the



Chattahoochee at Rivertown, below Campbellton, by a pontoon bridge, which he sent back, intending to come in by a circuit east and north. At 2 p. m. of the 28th he left the banks of the Chattahoochee and struck the West Point branch at Magnolia Station, which he burned and tore up track. He then by a rapid night march pushed for Fayetteville, where he found the roads and byways full of army wagons belonging to the army in Atlanta, embracing the headquarters teams of all the generals. All were burned good, and about 800 mules sabered. He then pushed on for the railroad at Lovejoy's, where he destroyed full two miles of track, the depot, a lot of cotton and stores, and carried off five miles of telegraph wire. Up to that time he had not encountered any opposition, for Stoneman's and Garrard's movements out from Decatur had attracted the enemy's cavalry. Having, as he supposed, broken the road enough, and supposing his best way back was by Newnan, he turned in that direction. He had 73 officers and 350 men prisoners, mounted on all sorts of horses and mules; still he reached Newnan, where the enemy began to gather about him and oppose him. He thinks two brigades of dismounted cavalry, acting as infantry, had been stopped en route from Mississippi for Atlanta by the break he had made in the railroad and happened there. These, in addition to two divisions of cavalry, headed him off whichever way he turned. He fought hard for five hours, until he exhausted his artillery ammunition, when he chopped up the wheels, spiked and plugged the guns. He then kept Harrison's brigade, and directed the smaller ones, commanded by General Croxton and Colonel Torrey, to cut out. He continued to fight until near night, when he dashed through an infantry line, reached the Chattahoochee, crossed his men, and got in. Harrison is a prisoner, I think; of Croxton I can hear nothing. But nearly all the men not killed and wounded are in. McCook left his prisoners free, and his wounded in charge of his surgeons. His management was all that could be expected throughout."

## CHAPTER XXXII

### REACHING FOR THE MACON ROAD.

Disappointed at the failure of his attempts to seriously interrupt traffic on the Macon railroad by cavalry raids, Sherman determined to inaugurate a flank movement with his whole army from the west side of Atlanta, gradually working around until he was in possession of the coveted railroad. In doing this he did not propose to relinquish his lines around the city to the north and northeast, but to hold them with light reserves, as he knew the enemy would concentrate his fighting corps in front of his flanking operations and leave the old lines to be held by militia supporting the batteries. After the battle of Ezra Church, when Schofield was transferred to the right of Howard, the Union line of battle around Atlanta measured thirteen miles, studded with artillery. To every portion of this line Sherman had run his field telegraph, and from his headquarters kept in close touch with every movement of his troops, transmitting and receiving replies to his orders in a few moments. When he first began to feel toward East Point from the Ezra Church battlefield, the Federal commander was confident of "getting astride of the railroad" in a few days and compelling Hood to evacuate Atlanta from lack of supplies, or force his antagonist to a general engagement. But things did not move as rapidly or as easily as Sherman had planned and anticipated. Hood made no more sallies, but stood doggedly on the defensive, meeting every move of his opponent with a counter-play calculated to delay, if not balk, him. The long operations from Ezra Church to Jonesboro, where Sherman finally got upon the railroad, were like a game of chess, involving science rather than force. Every foot of the way was traversed with pick and shovel, and the Confederate veterans renewed their Johnstonian practice of "backing and dig-

ging." While there was no battle of note until the 31st of August, nearly every day witnessed a fierce skirmish, and on several occasions the encounters were heavier than could properly be designated as skirmishes. General Blair aptly described the situation in both armies when he dismissed this whole period in his general report with two or three lines, as follows: "The command was occupied for 28 days in making approaches, digging rifle-pits, and erecting batteries, being subjected day and night to a galling fire of artillery and musketry."

To Generals Thomas and Howard, Sherman imparted his intentions as follows: "I have ordered General Garrard in on our left, and to-morrow night will let him fill with a skirmish line General Schofield's position, and move all of General Schofield to the right of General Howard, and wish the divisions of Generals Davis and Ward in reserve on the right to strike a blow beyond our new right flank when intrenched. Our right flank must be advanced in close and absolute contact with the enemy, and with General Schofield on that flank we can break through somewhere, the same as our Kennesaw move. Study the road so that Generals Schofield and Howard may have a line close up to the enemy, as close as possible."

Hood lost no time in meeting Sherman's new movement. At the risk of weakening his line in front of Atlanta, he sent his best troops to the southwest approaches of the city and far down on the Macon road, determined to resist to the last extremity the enemy's designs upon his line of communication. With a force so inferior to Sherman's numerically, he would have stood little show in this game had it not been for the state troops sent by Governor Brown to help him hold Atlanta. The militia answered very well in the old trenches and had demonstrated that they would fight on occasion. A detailed account of the services rendered by the Georgia militia at Atlanta will be found further on in this volume.

On the night of the first of August the Army of the Ohio, under Schofield, was quietly transferred from its position on the extreme left to a position on the extreme right of the Federal army. General Thomas extended his lines to the left to cover the line vacated by Schofield, the ground being occupied by Gen-

eral Stanley's corps, supported by Garrard's cavalry. The orders covering this important movement are given below :

SPECIAL  
FIELD ORDERS,  
No. 48.

HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,  
*In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga.,*  
*August 1, 1864.*

I. During the next series of operations General Thomas will be the left, General Howard center, and General Schofield the right army. The two divisions of Generals Davis and Ward will continue to be held in reserve toward the right, and in case the enemy attack that flank, these divisions will report to and during the action obey General Schofield's orders. When not engaged General Thomas will post them so as to cover his communications from the southeast.

II. Brigadier-General Garrard's cavalry will relieve General Schofield on the left and occupy in part his trenches, patrol the roads about Decatur, and picket toward Roswell. He will report to General Thomas, and be prepared to sally out as cavalry from his trenches, in case of necessity.

III. All trains of wagons going to and from the depots of Vining's and Marietta will follow roads converging at the railroad bridge, and never go north of Buck Head or south of Turner's.

IV. General Thomas will cause a new infantry flank to be prepared on his left, north of the Buck Head road, connecting General Stanley's front lines with the old rebel parapet near Peachtree Creek.

By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman :

L. M. DAYTON,  
*Aide-de-Camp.*

As he extended his line, Sherman felt the need of a larger army. He requested the adjutant-general to put negro regiments in front of Nashville and other points held by the Federals in the rear, and send to the front the veterans who had been left behind to do guard duty. He exhibited impatience at the slowness with which recruits were being sent to him. "Could not," he asked, "some general order be made for white recruits to be sent from

the states as fast as they are made, to be put in with our old men? Losses in battle and sickness from work and weather is beginning to tell on the strength of the army." Sherman realized that his operations before Atlanta had been handicapped by the reverses of his cavalry, and no sooner learned Stoneman's fate than he called for more cavalry. He was disappointed in not being able to supply his losses in that arm of the service promptly. He was told that there was a great scarcity of horses.

General Hood suffered from a lack of ammunition and informed the war department that he was not equipped, in this regard, for another battle. His commanders were ordered to use every means to reduce the expenditure of ammunition, skirmishers even being ordered not to fire, except in cases of actual necessity. Hood felt encouraged, now that Sherman's cavalry was crippled, to undertake extensive cavalry operations against Sherman's railroad communication. He telegraphed to Richmond: "As soon as I can get the dismounted cavalry General Bragg is to send and the militia here I hope to strike the enemy with my main force. The recent raids have caused delay in receiving the reinforcements referred to. I hope in a few days to send Wheeler, with his cavalry, to break Sherman's communications. The two recent engagements have checked his extension on both flanks."

Schofield's troops were well intrenched on the night of the 2d. He prolonged Howard's line along the branch of Utoy Creek about a mile and a half, and reported that he had a good flank. His nearest point to the railroad was about a mile and a half. The Confederate works were extended parallel with Schofield and Howard, on the opposite side of the creek, and as fast as Sherman crept south, Hood kept pace with him. It was evident that Sherman's game was to outstretch Hood and finally reach the railroad, or to so attenuate the latter's line that it could be easily broken through. After he had taken his new position, Schofield wrote Sherman: "The force in front of my right appears to be cavalry. To seriously threaten the enemy's flank and railroad communication it will be necessary to cross the creek in front of my right and reach the Sandtown road, which is about a mile beyond the creek. If this move can be made with a sufficiently large force, the result must be very decisive."



The next move was to cross the branch of Utoy Creek and reach the Sandtown road. A partial crossing of the creek was effected on the 3d, in the face of a hot skirmish and artillery fire. That night Sherman sent a message to Washington which showed that he was not yet aware of the fate of Stoneman, and that McCook had not been as badly cut up as Wheeler's report would indicate. He said :

"We have had pretty lively times to-day generally, closing in, taking some 200 or 300 prisoners. Under the pressure I got two divisions across the head of Utoy Creek, well toward the railroad, and to-morrow will push still more on that flank. General McCook, after all, has got in, bringing 1,200 of his men. He reports that on July 29 he broke the West Point road at Palmetto, and then crossed over to the Macon road, at Lovejoy's, where he took up 2 miles of track, burned 2 trains, 100 bales of cotton, and 5 miles of telegraph. He fell upon the rebel wagon train and burned over 500 wagons and killed 800 mules. He captured 72 officers and 250 men, but his progress eastward and north, according to the plan, was stopped by a superior force of cavalry and he turned toward Newnan, where he was completely surrounded. He ordered two of his small brigades to make their way to the Chattahoochee while he held the enemy. About 500 of them are in, but the balance, about 1,000, are doubtless captured or killed. He then with 1,200 men charged through in column, riding down Ross's (Texas) brigade and capturing Ross, the commander; but he had to drop all prisoners and incumbrances to save his command. He crossed the Chattahoochee below Franklin and up by Dallas to Marietta. The plan was for him to meet General Stoneman at Lovejoy's, but he did not meet him. Prisoners report that Yankee cavalry were shelling Macon on the 1st instant, so I think General Stoneman has a chance of rescuing those prisoners. It was a bold and rash adventure, but I sanctioned it, and hoped for its success from its very rashness. I think that all Georgia is now in my front, and he may meet but little opposition and succeed in releasing those prisoners. The difficulty will then commence for them to reach me. My lines are very strong, and cover well all our bridges across Chattahoochee. I will use my cavalry hereafter to cover the railroad,

and use infantry and artillery against Atlanta. A large part of Hood's army is militia, that cannot be trusted in the open field, and I think we have crippled the three fighting corps now commanded by Stewart, Stephen D. Lee, and Hardee. It is even whispered that Hardee has resigned; but this is as yet but the story of deserters."

While Schofield was trying to push on south, the Federals made a strong demonstration all along their front, only to find that the Confederates had not perceptibly weakened their lines. All day on the 3d Logan fought briskly with artillery and picket-lines. He carried a line and took fifty prisoners. Later the Confederates retook the pits, but the Federals holding them managed to get back with slight loss. Again Logan assaulted with a redoubled skirmish line, a second time capturing the enemy's pits, this time taking 150 prisoners. To Thomas, Sherman wired: "I think that to-morrow we can force the rebels to attack our right or be in a tight place. . . . Schofield will so threaten the railroad that I think the enemy will so far weaken the defenses of Atlanta that a bold dash might make a lodgment about Wood's front; at all events, make the attempt with a strong line of skirmishers." Wood commanded a division of the Fourth (Stanley's) corps, stationed at the point where the battle of Atlanta was fought. On the evening of the 3d Stanley reported to Sherman: "At 4.30 p. m. I advanced the reinforced skirmish lines of Grose's, Wood's, and Newton's divisions. I carried the rebel picket lines on the whole corps front excepting in front of Gibson's brigade, of Wood's division. Gibson met a destructive fire of musketry and canister. Newton's men went within 100 yards of the star fort. The rebels opened upon us at least twenty pieces of artillery. After Hazen had taken the enemy's skirmish rifle-pits, about three-quarters of a mile from our works and about 100 yards from the enemy's works, the rebels sallied out and drove his skirmishers back. We have taken about 40 prisoners. Three of Cheatham's brigades are in our front. The prisoners report that Cleburne's division is on the rebel right. We could see troops move in and occupy the works during the fight. We lost about 30 killed and wounded. My belief is that the rebel force is quite strong in my front yet. The rebels' right, as

pointed out by the deserter you sent to me, rests on the Augusta railroad, with their right thrown back."

On the 4th, while the Federals were on the point of making a heavy movement on their right for the purpose of gaining the Sandtown road, General Palmer became piqued because he was thrown in a position where it became necessary for him to co-operate with Schofield, under the latter's orders. He declined to act under Schofield's orders, on the ground that he was the latter's senior. Palmer, who commanded the Fourteenth corps, had been temporarily detached from Thomas's army, it will be remembered, to extend and support Howard's right, immediately after the battle of Ezra Church, before Schofield's army was transferred from the left to the right. In the crossing of Utoy Creek and the fighting that was expected to follow the forward movement, Thomas's command was expected to move with the Army of the Ohio. The case fell under the Article of War: "When two or more commands happen together, the officer highest in rank commands the whole." The point was on the relative rank of Palmer and Schofield. Both were major-generals, appointed to that rank on the same day by congress, but Schofield's commission was not confirmed by the senate, while Palmer's was. Schofield's appointment remained hung up until it had expired by constitutional limitation. The president re-appointed him, and his confirmation did not take place until after the opening of the Atlanta campaign, quite a while after Palmer had received his commission. Sherman decided that Schofield ranked Palmer, and the latter flatly declined to receive orders from Schofield. To the latter he said: "I did not claim to command your troops from motives of delicacy. I will not obey either General Sherman's order or yours, as they violate my self-respect." While Palmer was holding out thus, his troops remained inactive, much to Sherman's indignation. Sherman wrote to Palmer on the night of the 4th:

"The movements for to-morrow are so important that the orders of the superior on that flank should be minutely followed. General Schofield's orders for movement to-morrow must be regarded as military orders and not in the nature of co-operation. I did hope that there was no necessity of making this decision,

but it is better for all parties interested that no question of rank should occur during active battle. The Sandtown road and the railroad, if possible, must be gained to-morrow if it costs half your command. I regard the loss of time this afternoon as equal to the loss of 2,000 men."

Palmer asked that he be relieved of the command of the Fourteenth Army Corps. Sherman placated him, or thought he had, and the co-operation of the two generals in the important forward movement was expected to proceed satisfactorily on the 5th. The orders under which this movement was to have been made on the 4th were as follows:

I. Major-General Schofield with his own command and General Palmer's corps will move directly on the railroad which leads south out of Atlanta, at any point between White Hall and East Point, and will not stop until he has absolute control of that railroad, but must not extend more to the right than is absolutely necessary to that end.

II. Major-Generals Thomas and Howard will press close on the enemy at all points, and reinforce well the points of the line where the enemy is most likely to sally, viz., on the Decatur, Buck Head, and Turner's Ferry roads, but more especially watch the outlet along the railroad, viz., General Williams's front.

III. On the right we must assume the offensive and every man be prepared to fight, leaving knapsacks, etc., in the present trenches. Wagons will not be taken east of Utoy Creek until General Schofield has secured position on the railroad or so near it that it can be reached by musket balls and canister. If necessary to secure this end ordinary parapets must be charged and carried, and every hour's delay enables the enemy to strengthen. Therefore let it be done to-day.

The 5th passed and the movement was not made. Schofield complained that the trouble was in the Fourteenth corps, whose commander was sulking. Sherman was angry and asked Thomas to name Palmer's successor. To the commander of the Army of the Cumberland he wrote on the evening of the 5th: "Colonel Warner, one of my inspectors-general, who was on the right all day, reports nothing done or would be done. Will General Johnson be any better than General Palmer? I would

prefer to move a rock than to move that corps. On the defensive it would be splendid, but for offensive it is of no use. It must have a head that will give it life and impulse. I was ashamed yesterday and kept away on purpose to-day to see if orders would not move it (but if an enemy can be seen by a spy-glass the whole corps is halted and intrenched for a siege). Unless it will attack I must relieve it in orders and state the reason. I will call for official reports and act to-night."

Thomas named Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis as his best material for Palmer's successor, but Brigadier-General Johnson was his senior. To obviate this difficulty, Sherman wired Washington to have General Davis promoted to the rank of major-general. Some tart correspondence passed between Sherman and Palmer, the latter protesting indignantly that he was not responsible for his corps' unsatisfactory action, and declaring that he had exerted himself more on both the 4th and 5th than any officer on that flank. Palmer continued in his warm rejoinder to Sherman: "I am to blame, however, in this, that I have not done as you obviously intend doing in my case—hold some one responsible for the failures. I think I could select the proper objects of responsibility more accurately than you have done in selecting me. I am so well convinced that this campaign has been lengthened out by the negligence and inattention of officers, and will be hereafter lengthened and drawn out from the same cause, that I accept your intimation to me not as offensive (though I think unjust), but as a sign of a purpose on your part, in future, to inquire into the causes of our almost daily failures to meet your avowed expectations, and when the cause is discovered to apply the correction. If you will do this justly, without favor or affection, I will venture my life that you will be astonished at the result."

Palmer's resignation was accepted, and temporarily General Johnson commanded his corps, which was withdrawn from activities and given a position in support of Schofield. The army telegrapher sent this account of the day's failure to his chief in Washington: "Operations to-day complete failure, or worse. Schofield and Palmer were ordered to carry a point which would command railroad south of Atlanta, while the other corps made



active diversions in favor of the movement. The attacking force moved early, and the whole line was engaged, but when Schofield and Palmer found the enemy they stopped and intrenched. There they stay yet, while they make no progress, and the rebels have time to mass men and throw up earth-works, or to evacuate as they choose. They are very actively doing one or the other now; which it is, daylight will tell. Had we done anything to-day I should think they were on the wing."

On the morning of the 6th Schofield, being relieved of Palmer, set to work to accomplish what was expected of him. He moved out of his works early and attempted, by a wide circuit to the right, to pass around the Confederate left flank. He found no flank. Hood was as strongly intrenched there as he was before the position Schofield had left, awaiting an assault. Schofield assaulted. Reilly's brigade threw itself with great spirit against the Confederate position, which was protected by the inevitable head-logs and abatis. The Federals did not even reach the Confederate parapet. They were met by a withering fire from the resolute men of Bate's division and compelled to seek cover as best they could in the woods through which the Confederate shells shrieked and thundered. A second time they were formed and pushed up close to the blazing Confederate lines, only to repeat their failure. Reilly's loss was very heavy, and upon being ordered to withdraw, he did so in a badly shattered condition. Believing that he could yet find the enemy's flank and turn it, Schofield detached Haskell's division and had it make a wide detour across the main Utoy Creek, more than a mile further on, where the Confederate left was found resting on the creek. Haskell had sharp fighting with the enemy's cavalry, which fell back slowly before him. Haskell made no attack, night being at hand, but held his advanced position and intrenched. A more adequate idea of Schofield's operations can be formed by reading the following extract from his report: "During the 4th and 5th no movement of consequence was made. In the night of the 5th General Johnson's division was sent to relieve General Hascall's in the trenches, and the latter was brought to the extreme right. I was satisfied that the enemy's line which had held our right in check for two days was only an outer line

and not held in strong force, and that from the character of the ground and the necessities of the enemy's position the salient of his main line was opposite General Morgan's center. This position was, however, a strong one, being a rough and broken ridge along the east bank of a small branch of the Utoy Creek. I determined to make the attempt to carry this outer line by assault near its point of junction with the main line, in the hope of cutting off the force to our right of the point of attack, and thus being able to gain the enemy's main line before his troops could retire into it. General Reilly's brigade, supported by the whole of Cox's division, was ordered to make the assault. The order was gallantly executed. Some of the men actually reached the enemy's parapet in spite of all obstructions, but the abatis and entanglements were such as to render success impossible, and the gallant brigade was compelled to retire with heavy loss. Being compelled to abandon this plan and content myself with a smaller measure of success, Hascall's division was detached from the right and ordered to find and turn the enemy's left. He crossed the main Utoy Creek about a mile and a half to our right, drove back a large force of the enemy's cavalry, and swept around opposite the point where the enemy's left rested on Utoy Creek, but darkness and a heavy rain-storm rendered further operations impossible. The next morning developed the fact that the enemy had abandoned his position in the night and drawn back his left into his main works. We now pushed forward our whole line from Morgan's center, intrenched our lines confronting those of the enemy, and extended them as much as possible, preparatory to an effort to turn the flank of the enemy's main line near East Point. The line of the Fourteenth Corps was extended to Utoy Creek, about two and a half miles from East Point, and the Twenty-third Corps crossed the creek and reconnoitered toward the railroad, between East Point and Red Oak. It was ascertained that the enemy's line, strongly fortified and protected by abatis, extended beyond the railroad and far beyond the reach of a single corps, unless it were detached to an unsafe distance from the main army. The Twenty-third Corps was intrenched upon the south bank of the Utoy, forming a strong right flank for the army, and a safe pivot upon which the grand movement then contemplated could be made."

The army operator sent this dispatch to Washington on the night of the 6th: "Palmer was relieved this morning of the command of the Fourteenth Corps, which has been handled to-day by Brigadier-General Johnson, under direction of General Schofield. Some ground has been gained on right, but not enough to enable us to command railroad yet. An attack by Schofield's corps on enemy's earthworks was repulsed with loss of 1,000 men in all. Farther extension to railroad found rebel flank; too late for further operations, but there is promise of success at daylight. Something done; prospects brighten a little. Our line of battle thirteen miles long. Generals report operations and receive orders by telegraph."

While Schofield was making his advance, the artillery of Howard and Thomas was playing upon the long line of Confederate intrenchments from beyond the Augusta railroad to Ezra Church, and at regular intervals the great siege guns threw shells far above the hostile lines into the city of Atlanta. While this demonstration was being made, a battle came near being precipitated on the extreme Federal left while Stanley was feeling forward with his skirmishers. Maney's brigade of Cheatham's division made a sally, forcing back the Union line and inflicting some loss on the enemy before it relinquished the ground. Sherman said to Thomas on the night of the 6th: "Though our line is extended, we cannot do better than to control and strengthen by defenses our present front, and let General Schofield work so as to threaten East Point. I do not believe the enemy can defend so long a line, and he may be forced to choose between the two, Atlanta and East Point. Unless he has repaired the Augusta road, of which there are no signs, or unless he can drive back General Johnson's flank, which controls that road, he will be compelled to give up Atlanta to secure East Point."

Sherman sent the following explanation to Washington of the operations above described: "The line assaulted yesterday was an incomplete one. By feeling its left, Bate's division evacuated and fell back to the real line, which is nearer the railroad. I ordered the skirmishers to be pushed in and the strength demonstrated, and developed heavy musketry fire and artillery. We have gained valuable ground and full possession of the real Sand-

town road. Our lines are close up and by morning will be intrenched, so we will keep on working by that flank, but I want the whole line advanced whenever it be possible, and that General Thomas bring from Chattanooga two 30-pounder Parrotts on siege carriages and batter the town. The closer we press our lines we contract and strengthen. General Schofield's right does not yet really threaten the railroad, though a full mile nearer East Point than last night."

Secretary of War Stanton telegraphed Sherman these words of encouragement: "Do not imagine that we are impatient of your progress; instead of considering it slow, we regard it rapid, brilliant, and successful beyond our expectations. Take your time, and do your work in your own way. This Department is only anxious to afford you every assistance within its power."

Grant, who was in Washington at the time, joined with Stanton in commending Sherman's work, saying: "Your progress, instead of appearing slow, has received the universal commendation of all loyal citizens, as well as of the president, war department, and all persons whose commendation you care for."

On the night of the 7th Sherman sent the following dispatch to Washington, showing Schofield's continued activity on the right:

"Have received to-day the dispatches of the Secretary of War and Lieutenant-General Grant, which are very satisfactory. We keep hammering away here all the time, and there is no peace inside or outside of Atlanta. To-day General Schofield got round the flank of the line assaulted yesterday by General Reilly's brigade, turned it, and gained the ground where the assault was, with all our dead and wounded. We continued to press on that flank, and brought on a noisy but not a bloody battle. We drove the enemy behind his main breastworks, which cover the railroad from Atlanta to East Point. We captured a good many of the skirmishers, which are of their best roops, for the militia hug the breastworks close. I do not deem it prudent to extend more to the right, but will push forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta too hot to be endured. I have sent to Chattanooga for two 30-pounder Parrotts, with which we can pick out almost any house in the city."

To Grant's dispatch of commendation Sherman sent a reply so characteristic of the man that a part of it is quoted, as follows: "I am glad you have given General Sheridan the command of the forces to defend Washington. He will worry Early to death. Let us give those southern fellows all the fighting they want, and when they are tired we can tell them we are just warming to the work. Any signs of let up on our part is sure to be falsely construed, and for this reason I always remind them that the siege of Troy lasted six years, and Atlanta is a more valuable town than Troy. We must manifest the character of dogged courage and perseverance of our race. Don't stay in Washington longer than is necessary to give impulse to events, and get out of it. It is the center of intrigue. I would like to have General Mower made a major-general. He is a real fighter."

On the 7th the bridge across the Chattahoochee at Roswell was destroyed and the Federal guard withdrawn from that town. Sherman began the reorganization of his cavalry at Marietta, and being displeased with Garrard, McCook and the other leaders of his cavalry, proposed to place his main reliance on Kilpatrick, who was known as a dashing officer. Hascall, at the outpost on Utoy Creek, reported that he had Hobson's brigade on Bald Hill, a commanding eminence that had been the bone of contention on Bate's left, and that Bate had fallen back to the main Confederate line, near the railroad, to intercept a flank movement on East Point. Howard advanced his lines slightly on the 7th, his skirmishers taking a number of prisoners. The Confederate cavalry under Jackson hovered continually on Schofield's right and rear, preventing any great degree of activity on his part. Sherman determined to attempt a diversion to draw off his cavalry. He proposed to have Schofield develop well the enemy's flank on the 9th, and to enable him to do so, ordered a general cannonading on that day, and Garrard to send a brigade of cavalry out to and beyond Decatur, while Kilpatrick moved down to Sandtown and feigned as though intending to cross the Chattahoochee. To Thomas, Sherman said: "We are now as much extended as possible and must test the strength of our flanks and line." On the 8th Hascall discovered that he did not have a clear field in front of him, by any means. That evening Schofield informed Sherman:



"Hascall only succeeded in getting one brigade across the creek and intrenched. The enemy is pretty strong in front of that brigade, and has used artillery freely. Hascall is making good roads and bridges across the creek. It seems clear that we are as near to the railroad as we can get on this side of the creek without breaking the rebel lines. To cross the creek takes us around below East Point. Whether one division is sufficient force to make that move with, seems extremely doubtful. Possibly the demonstration may be sufficient to make Hood let go of Atlanta. I am satisfied Cox's right is not more than a mile from East Point."

Later that night Schofield was given a scare by a marching column of Confederates, supported by a strong body of cavalry, trying to get around his flank, evidently with the intention of destroying his trains. Prompt steps were taken to head off the flankers, Howard ordering Lightburn's division's reserves into the old line of works on the Green's Ferry road. The enemy turned back at the creek. The night of the 8th the army operator wired Washington:

"No fighting since last communication. Armies both stretching toward right, striving to turn a flank, and so far rebels have the best of it. Attempted to-day to get in our rear by crossing Utoy Creek, but were stopped by destroying the bridge. Line of battle now sixteen miles long."

There was, however, a movement made by General Corse, commanding a division of Dodge's corps, Howard's army, on the 8th, that deserves passing notice. Sherman was anxious to gain possession of a high hill, looking up the valley of Proctor's Creek and overlooking Atlanta. From this position he thought he could shell the city with fine effect. The coveted position was held by the Confederate line, in considerable strength, and against it Corse moved all day long with his skirmishers, meeting determined resistance. His losses were heavy, in his own words, the movement "produced a list of casualties expected only from an extensive engagement." He effected a lodgment, foot by foot, close up to the enemy's parapet, and eventually occupied the abandoned Confederate line on the crest of the hill.

Hood met Sherman's flanking tactics with skill and caution. He managed to so dispose his forces that his line was extended

to parallel the enemy's without seriously weakening it, which was no small task. On the 7th Cleburne was brought around to the left, and Hardee resumed command of that and Bate's division, which had been under Lee's and Cheatham's orders. The defenses of East Point were greatly strengthened, and there was no spot in the entire line to that place which invited an assault by reason of its obvious weakness. It began to look as if Sherman was not going to be able to "outstretch" Hood. The elasticity of the Confederate army was something wonderful. The Confederates had, as yet, no reason to feel discouraged on their left. The sharp rap Bate had given Schofield on the 6th made the entire army jubilant. Lee's men were further enthused by a general order celebrating the victory, which read :

GENERAL ORDERS,

No. 62.

HEADQUARTERS LEE'S CORPS,

*In the Field, August 7, 1864.*

The lieutenant-general commanding takes pleasure in announcing to the officers and men of this corps the splendid conduct of a portion of Bate's division, particularly Tyler's brigade, in sustaining and repulsing on yesterday three assaults of the enemy, in which his loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was from 800 to 1,000 men, 2 colors, and 300 or 400 stand small-arms, and all of his intrenching tools. Our loss was from 15 to 20 killed and wounded. Soldiers who fight with the coolness and determination that these men did will always be victorious over any reasonable number.

By command of Lieutenant-General Lee :

J. W. RATCHFORD,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Hood had dispatched Wheeler to Sherman's rear and awaited with anxious hope the news of a successful dash upon the Western and Atlantic railroad. If he could but effectually break that road, while Sherman's cavalry was in a depleted and rather demoralized condition, he thought the siege of Atlanta might temporarily, at least, be raised. Colonel M. H. Wright, who had so long been in charge of the ordnance department of Atlanta, was transferred to Macon. President Davis felt that Hood was

giving a good account of his stewardship, and sent him encouraging messages occasionally. Relative to Wheeler's raid in Sherman's rear, the president of the Confederacy said: "I concur in your plan, and hope your cavalry will be able to destroy the railroad bridges and depots of the enemy on the line to Bridgeport, so as to compel the enemy to attack you in position or to retreat. The loss consequent upon attacking him in his intrenchments requires you to avoid that if practicable. The enemy have now reached a country where supplies can be gathered by foraging expeditions, and a part of your cavalry will be required to prevent that. If he can be forced to retreat for want of supplies, he will be in the worst condition to escape or resist your pursuing army. General Hardee's minute knowledge of the country, and his extensive acquaintance with the officers and men of the command, must render his large professional knowledge and experience peculiarly valuable in such a campaign as I hope is before you."


General Hood wired President Davis as follows on the morning of the 9th: "The Nineteenth Army Corps having gone to Virginia or Washington City, the infantry force threatening Mobile cannot be more than 7,000 at the most, after leaving a garrison at New Orleans and in Louisiana. All that is necessary at Mobile is 7,000 men, as 6,000 will man the trenches. The reserve and militia of Alabama are thought to be ample. None but small boats can get near to Mobile, and the heaviest batteries are near the city. This information in regard to Mobile I got from Lieutenant-General Lee. The force at Holly Springs is the same or less than Lee compelled to retreat. I suggest that the Trans-Mississippi troops come here. If they, or a part of them, are retained in Mississippi Forrest should go to Middle Tennessee, as the force at Holly Springs cannot march to Mobile with Forrest or a part of the Trans-Mississippi troops to oppose them. To march the Trans-Mississippi troops to Middle Tennessee may be too late, as they have to equip themselves with transportation. To hold Atlanta I have to hold East Point. The enemy are gradually extending to East Point, and hope to force me to give up Atlanta or to fight him at great disadvantage to us. I am making dispositions which will, I hope, enable me to hold both East Point and Atlanta."

## CHAPTER XXXIII

### SHELLING ATLANTA

It is the purpose of the present writer to leave for a time the narration of events before the defenses of Atlanta and dwell somewhat upon life within the city during the siege, and the experiences of the citizens of the beleaguered city while Sherman was approaching and after he had arrived. Before doing so, the date at which this narrative has arrived is embraced as the most fitting time to devote a chapter to the subject indicated by the foregoing head. There are many who do not believe that Sherman bombarded Atlanta in the sense of training his guns on the buildings of the city with the intention of reducing the city to ruins, just as there are many who do not believe that Atlanta was willfully burned by Sherman's army. It is needless to say that these skeptics were not in Atlanta at the time, and that most of them reside above Mason and Dixon's line. A remarkably large number of shells fell in all parts of Atlanta, to have been unintentionally fired there. Buildings were struck right and left, women and children were killed, and for a month or more non-combatants who had clung to their homes or property experienced a veritable reign of terror from this cause. And yet, when Confederate officers, under a flag of truce, protested in the name of common humanity against bombarding a city whose defenses were far enough removed to make unnecessary the demolition of

the city itself, they were coolly told that Sherman was not willfully firing into Atlanta. Chance shots, the Federals admitted, might endanger life and property, but no bombardment of the city, they declared, was occurring or designed. That the shelling of Atlanta was deliberately planned and executed to the best of Sherman's ability, is shown by the field orders and correspondence of that general, embodied in the records of the war pub-



Lamp Post, corner Alabama and Whitehall sts.  
Showing fracture caused by Yankee shell during Sherman's raid



lished by the United States government. A number of these orders and letters chronologically arranged, will be reproduced here to show what Sherman's action in this regard really was.

When Sherman perceived that his designs upon the Macon and Western railway in the neighborhood of East Point were likely to be thwarted by Hood, he turned in fury upon Atlanta and sought, in his own language, to "make it a desolation." Up to that time he had "put in his spare time" firing into the city, but after that he practically discontinued maneuvering his army for a fortnight and devoted all his energy and ammunition to bombarding Atlanta. For that purpose he sent to Chattanooga for a battery of 30-pounder Parrott's, designed especially for long-range siege work. The shelling of Atlanta began in deadly earnest on the 9th of August, 1864, while Schofield, on the extreme Federal right, was practically deadlocked. Of this particular day, and of the subsequent bombardment of Atlanta, Hood says:

"The 9th was made memorable by the most furious cannonade which the city sustained during the siege. Women and children fled into cellars, and were forced to seek shelter a greater length of time than at any period of the bombardment. . . . The bombardment of the city continued till the 25th of August. It was painful, yet strange, to mark how expert grew the old men, women and children in building their little underground forts, in which to fly for safety during the storm of shell and shot. Often mid the darkness of night were they constrained to seek refuge in these dungeons beneath the earth; albeit, I cannot recall one word from their lips expressive of dissatisfaction or willingness to surrender."

Below will be found a number of direct orders and references to the bombardment of Atlanta by Sherman:

Sherman to Schofield, Thomas and Howard—August 1:

"You may fire from ten to fifteen shots from every gun you have in position into Atlanta that will reach any of its houses. Fire slowly and with deliberation between 4 p. m. and dark. I have inquired into our reserve supply and the occasion will warrant the expenditure."

. . . . .

Corse to Sherman—August 1:

"The artillery fire from this division front resulted in developing a 20-pounder battery immediately adjoining the siege piece that had opened so frequently on our lines during the past three days. Also assured the chief of artillery of the fact that with the 3-inch ordnance he can shell the center of the city of Atlanta with tolerable accuracy."

. . . . .

Sherman to Thomas—August 7:

"Telegraph to Chattanooga and have two 30-pounder Parrott's sent down on the cars, with 1,000 shells and ammunition. Put them into your best position, and knock down the buildings of the town. Slow progress here."

. . . . .

Thomas to Sherman—August 8:

"The 4½-inch guns have not yet arrived. They are not due until to-morrow. I have selected a very good point for them on Geary's left, where you can get a fair view of the town, and half a mile nearer than any other position. It was reported that they were to leave Chattanooga at 8 a. m. to-day. The position selected enfilades White Hall street, upon which is General Hood's headquarters, and the battery is being built to-night."

. . . . .

Sherman to Howard—August 8:

"There is a wooded hill to General Corse's left and front, on which I was told General Williams's skirmishers were yesterday. It seemed to be on the south of Proctor's Creek. That hill would be a strong left flank to you. In front of General Corse's left center seemed an orchard near to a rebel work, and it may be within the re-entrant of their salients, but if we could get a battery near there it would make sad havoc in Atlanta."

. . . . .

Sherman to Howard—August 8:

"I did not learn if General Corse got that hill on his left front. I would like to get a good battery as near it as possible that will reach the heart of Atlanta and reduce it to ruins, and to keep up a fire that will prevent wagon supply trains from coming into town. There is little use of your firing from the right of your line, as that end of town is of little depth or importance."

. . . . .

Sherman to Thomas—August 8:

"Orders for to-morrow, August 9: All the batteries that can reach the buildings of Atlanta will fire steadily on the town to-morrow, using during the day about fifty rounds per gun, shell and solid shot. General Schofield will, during the cannonading, completely develop the enemy's strength and position on his left flank."

. . . . .

Sherman to Halleck—August 9:

"Schofield developed the enemy's position to below East Point. His line is well fortified, embracing Atlanta and East Point, and his redoubts and lines seem well filled. Cavalry is on his flanks. Our forces, too, are spread for ten miles. So Hood intends to stand his ground. I threw into Atlanta about 3,000 solid shot and shell to-day, and have got from Chattanooga four 4½-inch rifled guns, and will try their effect. Our right is below Utoy Creek. I will intrench it and the flanks and study the ground a little more before adopting a new plan."

. . . . .

Sherman to Thomas—August 9:

"Send me word when the 4½-inch guns come, as I want to come over and watch the effect of a few of the first shots."

. . . . .

Sherman to Thomas—August 9:

"Get your guns well into position, and the moment the ammunition comes, let them open slowly, and with great precision, making all parts of the town unsafe. Guns of that caliber with good shells have a better effect than any I ever used."

. . . . .

Lieutenant Hopkins, Signal Officer—August 9:

"The most noticeable effect of the shelling was in front of General Geary's division at a fort and house. This fort was struck; also the works near it, and the house had quite a large hole knocked in it besides being riddled. Shells burst over the works here and in the woods to rear of them. The shells, which were few, I saw burst along to south, were in rear of enemy's works. Shells exploded over the city and in it, judging from the sound. A small piece was knocked off top of brick smoke-stack in

town. The rebels who have usually been lounging around their works went into the ditches, seldom showing themselves, and this evening could be seen coming out for their rations, but a shell bursting near soon dispersed them. Horses which have been daily grazing around large redoubt were led off."

. . . . .

Sherman to Thomas—August 10:

"I have your last dispatch. I hear the guns and the shells also. The enemy's battery of 32-pounders rifled are firing on us here from the White Hall fort to draw off or divert our fire. Keep up a steady, persistent fire on Atlanta with the 4½-inch guns and 20-pounder Parrotts, and order them to pay no attention to the side firing by which the enemy may attempt to divert their attention. I think those guns will make Atlanta of less value to them as a large machine-shop and depot of supplies. The inhabitants have, of course, got out.

. . . . .

Sherman to Grant—August 10:

"I cannot extend more without making my lines too weak. We are in close contact and skirmishing all the time. I have just got up four 4½-inch rifled guns with ammunition, and propose to expend about 4,000 rifled shot in the heart of Atlanta. We have already commanded it with our lighter ordnance. Since July 28 General Hood has not attempted to meet us outside of his parapets. In order to possess and destroy effectually his communications I may have to leave a corps at the railroad bridge, well intrenched, and cut loose with the balance and make a desolating circle around Atlanta. I do not propose to assault the works, which are too strong, or to proceed by regular approaches."

. . . . .

Sherman to Schofield—August 10:

"I have your dispatch. I am deliberating what to do next, but despair of making a quick move. It takes two days to do what ought to be done in one. We are now bombarding the town of Atlanta, and I will await its effect, but rather prefer to cast loose from our base altogether to extending any more."

. . . . .

Sherman to Thomas—August 10:

"I hear Brannan's guns at Geary's battery, and hear the shells burst in Atlanta. Send word to the battery to work all night and not limit themselves to 5-minute guns, but to fire slowly and steadily each gun as it is ready; also order the gun on Williams's front to be got ready and put to work with similar orders to-night. Howard will get his 20s near the same point, which he pronounces much better than that at Geary's, which he visited with me to-day. Williams's right and Howard's left are on Proctor's Creek, from which you look up the valley to what seems the heart of Atlanta, the ridge on which are the railroad and White Hall being plainly visible, as also that by which the Marietta road enters the town, the intervening angle being cleared ground giving a fine field of fire. I think the 4½-inch gun on Williams's right can demolish the big engine-house."

. . . . .

Sherman to Howard—August 10:

"I want to expend 4,000 heavy rifle-shots on the town before doing anything new, and then will be prepared to act quick. General Schofield has been reconnoitering the right all day."

Van Duzer, Cipher Operator, to Washington—August 10:

"Still extending our line to the right, and find enemy on our front everywhere. Have got four 4½-inch Rodman guns into position to-day, which burst their shells in Atlanta, and will keep that city awake. No other news."

. . . . .

Sherman to Stanton—August 11:

"Glorious news of Mobile just received. I have the same news, embracing the capture of Mobile City, through deserters. Now, if General Canby can follow it up by the capture of the Alabama river, my position would be much improved. All well here. I am knocking Atlanta with 4½-inch rifle-shells."

. . . . .

Sherman to Thomas—August 18:

"The shots that go so deep into the city are from 10-pounder Parrotts in General Ransom's front, which is the second division to the right of General Williams; he is well in the re-entrant be-



tween Atlanta and White Hall, looking up Proctor's Creek. The 4½-inch gun of General Corse has an equally good position."

. . . . .

Sherman to Thomas—August 18:

"General Barry says our big guns were ordered to stop firing as soon as the ammunition then on hand was exhausted. You understand of course that I have suspended the movement contemplated for to-night until General Kilpatrick tries his hand. Keep the big guns going, and damage Atlanta all that is possible."

. . . . .

Chief of Artillery Brannan—August 18:

"The movement of the army which involves the sending to the rear the 4½-inch siege guns having been temporarily suspended (of which fact Major-General Thomas has been advised), Major-General Sherman directs me to say that the fire of the three 4½-inch guns on Geary's front will be resumed and will be continued at the same rate as heretofore as long as possible. Captain Baylor informs me that there are upward of 1,500 rounds of ammunition for these guns at Chattahoochee railroad bridge depot."

. . . . .

Captain Hopkins, Signal Officer—August 24:


"I have the honor to report that at least three houses, two frame and one brick, were destroyed by the fire in Atlanta this afternoon. Our shells burst in the city to right and left of brick stack."

. . . . .

So much for the official Union testimony. The reader will have noted that in one of the foregoing orders Sherman remarks: "The inhabitants have, of course, got out." Sherman was well aware that the inhabitants had not got out. His spies were in Atlanta every day, bringing him minute reports of conditions inside the city. As soon as the Federals began to throw shells into the city, immediately after the battle of Atlanta, General Hood addressed a letter to General Sherman, calling his attention to the fact that there were thousands of women, children and old men in the city, who had not been able to or would not refugee, and whose lives were in deadly peril from a bombardment that the situation of Atlanta's defenses did not justify. Hood said that

the line of parapet was a mile from the town, practically, on all sides, and that the destroying of it ought not to involve the destruction of private property to any great extent, or the taking of innocent lives. He protested that the deliberate bombardment of Atlanta was unwarranted by the usages of civilized warfare and barbarous in the extreme. Sherman's reply was characteristic in its frank brutality. He reminded Hood, as a professional soldier, that he well knew that war was the very science of barbarism, and that its object did not end with the killing, and maiming, and capturing of an armed enemy. It had also, Sherman declared, to desolate and devastate the enemy's country, rendering it unfit for human habitation by destroying the means of sustenance and shelter. He explained that Atlanta, the general principles of war aside, could not be classed as a peaceable community peopled by non-combatants, but was one of the enemy's chief military depots and manufactories of the equipments of war, and outlawed by all the ethics of war. He said women, children and old men had no business in such a place, and that if they were there, Hood was responsible for their presence and must accept the responsibility for their safety. Sherman charged his antagonist with cowardice in seeking the shelter of a city full of defenseless non-combatants for the protection that their helplessness afforded, and then appealing to his enemy for mercy for them. He took the position that Hood knew he was conducting an unjustifiable and hopeless struggle, and was well aware that Atlanta could not be successfully defended against the Federal army. Nevertheless, Sherman declared that he loved the South as an integral part of the union of states, and seemed to regard himself as an instrument in the hand of the Almighty to chastise a forward and erring people and turn them from following after false and demagogic leaders.

The first shell fell in the streets of Atlanta on the morning of July 20th, the day of the battle of Peachtree Creek, and resulted in one of the saddest fatalities of which war is capable—the death of a little child. This particular shell, the harbinger of the murderous rain that was to fall upon Atlanta, fell at the junction of East Ellis and Ivy streets. The child killed was walking with its parents at the time. In the afternoon of the same day,



Collier Residence, corner of Nelson and Chapel Streets

Showing a shell, which, fired by Federals during the siege of Atlanta, fell through the house into a feather bed which had recently been vacated by a member of the family. The shell did not explode

while the battle of Peachtree Creek was raging, two other shells fell in the same vicinity. Sherman was shelling Atlanta in a desultory and wanton sort of a way from that time until the bombardment was begun as an important part of the red business of war on the 9th of August. During this period of comparatively light shelling, the citizens went about their daily affairs with little precaution against the danger, but that there was danger is attested by the following record of damage done by shells in the heart of Atlanta up to the second week in August, kept by I. B. Pilgrim, who seems to have been about the only Atlantan who kept a diary :

“A shell entered the house of Mr. Goldsburg, at the corner of Hunter and Loyd streets, exploding amidst the family, wounding Dr. Gates’s wife and child. Another shell entered Mr. Hackett’s house on Pryor street, and one entered the carpenter shop of Sherwood and Demerest. Mr. Kelly’s house was struck, but not materially damaged. Thomas Kile’s building on Peachtree street was struck by a shell, which exploded in one of the rooms, and the house adjoining Mr. Kile was struck by a shell which passed through the roof and came out at the gable end. Every building on Cherokee block was struck, and each one considerably damaged. Five shells passed through Wesley chapel from the rear end of the building, and three from the front. One shell passed through ten seats. Four shells struck the parsonage, doing to it considerable damage. Judge Ezzard’s house had a visit from one of the shells, and was pretty badly battered. The state commissary building on Peachtree street was struck by one shell. A shell burst at the window of Joseph Winship’s residence, breaking the glass and otherwise damaging the building. The house of J. F. Trout, and also that of Mr. Sieglewitch were each struck by a shell, but neither was much damaged. A shell entered Dr. C. Powell’s house and passed through the roof of Mr. Hairlow’s house, and another passed through an unoccupied house at the corner of Ivy and Peachtree streets, tearing it up considerably. About one-third of the houses on Peachtree street were struck and more or less injured. Three shells struck the female college building, one tearing away one-half of the belfry. Two shells struck Mr. Trout’s private house on the street leading



from the 'Trout House.' L. B. Davis's house was struck by two shells, one in the garret and the other in the cellar. John H. Seals's house was struck by five or six shells. Charles Bohnfield's coffin shop was struck, and also Major Shackelfield's house on Spring street. Mr. McLendon's house was struck, and also the bridge on Broad street. Several houses on Ivy street were struck, near Colonel Wallace's and John Glenn's residences. Mrs. Dr. D. B. Smith's house on Peachtree street was badly damaged. A shell burst inside of St. Luke's chapel. Tallulah engine house was penetrated by a shell, as was also Mrs. Dr. Coe's stable. A shell exploded inside of Dr. Willis Westmoreland's house, and another exploded in a room in the house of Dr. Goodman. A solid shot struck the house of Rev. J. S. Wilson, and two shots struck John Weaver's house on Walton street, one of them passing through the parlor, tearing up the furniture and piano. A shell passed through a room of the brick house of Mr. Smith, on Walton street, went down into the cellar and exploded. A solid shot tore out one side of Mrs. Frank Grubb's house on Walton street. Every house on Marietta street to the gas works was struck, and damaged in various degrees. A shell passed through Peter Huges's house, wounding Mrs. Flake, Mrs. Coons, and a child of Mrs. Callahan. Mrs. Rhodes's house, in the rear of the State Road House, was struck by a shell. About twenty shots struck the Western and Atlantic round-house, and three or four struck the State depot. Concert Hall was struck by three shots, and John H. Flynn's house was struck three or four times. Dr. Harrison Westmoreland's house was struck, as were Mrs. Coolsey's and Mrs. Anderson's boarding houses. The African church on Collins street, and Mr. Henderson's house at the corner of Church and Collins streets, were also visited. John McGhee's house was entered by a shell, which burst in a room where Mrs. McGhee was engaged in cutting up meat, but she was not injured. John Butler's house on Collins street was entered by a shell, as were also Dr. Downs's house, Mrs. Schnatt's, Marcus A. Bell's, Mr. Willis's, and Mrs. William Barnes's. The Trout House was hit by one shell, as also was John Neal's house, which stood near the corner of Mitchell and Calhoun streets. One shell entered the house of the Misses Durham, but did no damage. The store



of Mr. Kantrawitch, on Whitehall street, was entered by two shells, which exploded and tore everything to pieces. 'Old Man Houghton's' eating saloon was entered. A solid shot passed through the dining room of J. M. P. Calvo's house, when the table was set for supper. Dr. Geutebruck's house, near the mineral spring, was entered. The Appeal building, the only building in the city occupied by a newspaper at the time, was hit. The Intelligencer office was entered through an open window by a shell which did not explode. Rawson's store on the corner of Whitehall and Hunter streets was hit, as were Wood's jewelry store, and Mrs. Valentino's store. A shell entered the city market house and burst inside where some thirty persons were engaged in marketing, but, happily, none of them were injured. The First Presbyterian church was struck. Mr. Warner's house was struck and he and his only child killed. A lady refugee from Rome was killed the same evening, on Peachtree street, while ironing. John Peel's house on Spring street was struck by five shells. A militiaman picked up a twenty-four-pound shell, and was picking away at it with a rock, when it exploded, killing him instantly. August 4th was the fifteenth day of the shelling of the city, yet, on that day, as before and afterward, women and children would walk about the streets as though there were no army within a hundred miles, and nearly, if not quite, two-thirds of the houses in the city were still occupied by the inhabitants, many of them the oldest people in the place."

It is strange that so many civilians remained in Atlanta after it was understood that Sherman was bombarding the place and doing his best to reduce it to ruins by this means. At first the dropping shells filled the people with terror, and they spent much of their time in underground refuges not unlike the "cyclone cellars" of the western prairie. Nearly every tenanted residence had one of these "bomb-proofs" in the yard close beside it, its location being marked by a mound of earth and an entrance hole, which could be closed after the refugees were inside. Some of these bomb-proofs were entered through the cellar of the house. When the familiar music (?) of a shell was heard in the air, a frantic scramble was made for shelter. Some nights the bombardment proceeded as industriously as in the daytime, and many citizens

removed their beds to their underground refuges and slept there in security, if not comfort. Some ludicrous sights were to be witnessed when a break was made for cover, and as people became accustomed to the ever-present danger, the humor of such incidents was not lost on them. Sometimes dignified and courageous men who affected indifference to the iron hail in the daytime and scorned to join their families underground at night, would tumble precipitately into the family bomb-proof, minus their wearing apparel, when a shell struck uncomfortably close to them. A common peril made all men in Atlanta brothers. Strangers who happened to be in the neighborhood when a shell swooped down, were as welcome as a next-door neighbor when they applied at the door of a cave for shelter. The apparent fearlessness of even many women and children was remarkable. In many cases the danger was foolishly underestimated. True, a shell did not always explode when it struck. The majority of the shells were exploded by percussion caps and were as apt as not to strike on the wrong end and do no harm. The fuse-shells would sometimes go out. The latter presented a beautiful sight as they went blazing through the heavens at night, sometimes exploding in midair. There were certain parts of the city more dangerous to live in than others. As a general thing the Federal gunners singled out a factory chimney, a church steeple, the cupola of a public building, the roof of the depot, or some conspicuous object for a target, and the people living or walking in the vicinity of such buildings had the greatest need of bomb-proofs. Sometimes the fire in the vicinity of Atlanta's most prominent and important structures was so hot that nobody ventured near. The vicinity of the railroad was a dangerous place. The enemy was particularly desirous of damaging the trains that daily brought supplies into the city, and became expert in reaching the line of railroad and the warehouses along it.

On the 9th of August, the day that Sherman gave his undivided attention to making it hot for the citizens of Atlanta, it was a foolhardy person who did not keep in a bomb-proof. The skies rained iron that day. The whizzing, screaming noise of the projectiles descending upon the town, accompanied by the distant roar of the big guns, was calculated to strike terror to the stoutest

hearts and cause redoubled vigilance and caution. As Wallace P. Reed expressed it, "all the fires of hell and all the thunders of the universe seemed to be blazing and roaring over Atlanta." It was a one-sided duel. The Confederates well understood that Sherman was endeavoring to mask his attempt at a flank movement over on Utoy Creek by a deal of noise. They had no ammunition to waste in pyrotechnics and mere sound, and their batteries returned the challenge only at intervals. They held themselves in readiness for an assault along every foot of Atlanta's defenses, particularly in Schofield's front. A pall of sulphurous smoke hung low over the city, obscuring to the eyes of the citizens who ventured to look out the glare of a midsummer sun. The impact and detonation of the shells was heard in every quarter of the city from daylight to dark, mingled with falling plaster and crushing timber. Great gaps were made in brick walls and whole sides of roofs were torn away. The streets were filled with debris. Some buildings were total wrecks at the close of that terrible day. To add to the universal terror, fires broke out frequently, and the gallant firemen and citizens who rushed to the scene to extinguish the incipient blaze were in as much danger as though they were soldiers in the heat of battle. A number of buildings were destroyed by fire after they had been riddled with shot and shell. Blackened ruins appeared in nearly every square. Despite the caution of the inhabitants, there were a number of fatalities. Superintendent Warner, of the gas company, and his six-year-old daughter, were killed while lying on a bed together in their home at the corner of Elliott and Rhodes streets. Their bodies were frightfully mangled by a huge bombshell. A lady who was trying to reach the depot to escape from the city on an out-going train was shot through the back and fatally wounded. A woman who was ironing clothes in a basement, in fancied security, was killed by a shell that came crashing through the floor above her head. Sol Luckie, a well-known local barber, was standing at the James bank corner, Whitehall and Alabama streets, when a shell exploded against a lamp post hard by, a fragment of the engine of destruction striking the unfortunate man on the leg. He was carried to the Atlanta Medical College, where it was found necessary to make an amputation. Luckie

survived the operation but a few hours. At a house on Forsyth street a soldier was standing in the front yard, bidding adieu to a lady in the doorway. The lady's little boy had accompanied the soldier to the gate. A shell dashed upon the sidewalk, at the very feet of the man and child, killing both before the mother's eyes. There were other minor disasters. The following day Sherman got his big Parrott siege guns that had arrived from Chattanooga in position, and for the next two weeks the danger to life and property in Atlanta was greatly increased. It would be impossible to enumerate the casualties of that fearful fortnight. Scores of people were killed and maimed, and the buildings of the city were very much in the condition that Sherman wanted to see them.

After the Confederates were restricted to one line of railroad for their supplies, it was extremely hard to leave the city by rail and exceedingly dangerous to leave otherwise. This probably accounts for so many women and children remaining in the city during the period of the fiercest bombardment. At any moment the railroad to Macon was likely to be raided by the enemy's cavalry or gained by his assaulting columns. The facilities of transportation were inadequate for strictly military needs, and Hood complained to the president of the road that his wounded were often seventy hours on the way to Macon. Under these circumstances it is not likely that refugees would receive much consideration from the military authorities. The citizens were told to hang to their bomb-proofs until the fate of Atlanta was determined.

## CHAPTER XXXIV

### INSIDE ATLANTA DURING THE CAMPAIGN

The faith of Atlantans in General Johnston's ability to lure Sherman far from his base and destroy him before he encompassed the Gate City did not waver perceptibly until that ominous day in mid-July when news came that the Confederate army had fallen back across the Chattahoochee and was choosing its ground for another stand at the very portals of the Gate City. True, there was here and there a Doubting Thomas from the time of the first retreat from Dalton, and now and then apologetic expressions of apprehension were to be read in the local papers, but these were the exception. The vast majority of the citizens believed Johnston's army to be invincible and its successive retrograde movements entirely strategic. Tiding of no Confederate reverses met their ears and eyes. Resaca was in Johnston's favor; New Hope Church a Yankee charnel; Kenesaw Mountain all but a Yankee rout. The abundant signs around them that Atlanta was to be defended were regarded as precautionary. Few foresaw that the city was to become a vast battlefield where civilian lives and property were at the mercy of contending hosts.

Patriotism was at fever heat. Volunteer relief committees were organized to go to the front to care for the wounded. Thousands of dollars were contributed to buy medicines and comforts for the field hospitals. The ladies worked night and day sewing for the soldiers. Nearly every night some enthusiastic local orator or some passing political celebrity appealed to the martial passions of the populace on street hustings or hall platforms. Tumultuous mass meetings assembled at every call. Home guards were organized in each ward, and Confederate gray was the prevailing color to be seen on the streets. The local press, numerous represented at the outbreak of the war, was



filled with bitter invective against the North and the armed enemy, and the most extravagant words of praise and confidence were lavished upon the Confederacy and its brave defenders.

On the 23d of May the mayor of Atlanta issued the following proclamation :

Atlanta, Ga., May 23, 1864.

In view of the dangers which threaten us, and in pursuance of a call made by General Wright and General Wayne, I require all the male citizens of Atlanta capable of bearing arms, without regard to occupation, who are not in the Confederate or State service, to report by 12 m., on Thursday, the 26th instant, to O. H. Jones, marshal of the city, to be organized into companies and armed, and to report to General Wright when organized. And all male citizens who are not willing to defend their homes and families are requested to leave the city at their earliest convenience, as their presence only embarrasses the authorities and tends to the demoralization of others.

JAMES M. CALHOUN, *Mayor*.

The reference to the non-combatant variety of citizens was probably directed more to the Unionists in Atlanta than to the cowardly and worthless element. There were quite a number of people in Atlanta, for the most part former residents of the North or of Northern antecedents, who remained quietly in the city, making themselves, it is needless to say, as unobtrusive as possible. Some of these were among Atlanta's most substantial citizens. Atlanta, having been so enterprising and of such rapid growth, was the most cosmopolitan city, in an interstate sense, in the South, perhaps, and naturally had attracted as permanent residents many people not exactly homogeneous, politically. Not a few Germans were Union sympathizers, and there were Southerners to the manor born who regarded secession as a political crime, foredoomed to failure in its purpose, and who still entertained a sentimental feeling toward the flag that stood for the Union. Known Unionists had a hard row to hoe. They were ostracized and boycotted, as a matter of course, and at the breaking out of the war quite a number of them lost no time in making for the North. After Atlanta had been evacuated by Hood, some

of the most intolerant Confederate citizens were the first to push the few Union citizens forward to make fair weather with Sherman in the city's behalf. Such is human nature.

After the military authorities took charge of Atlanta, public regulations were exceedingly rigid. Every male above the age of sixteen had to show a pass when he walked the streets or attempted to leave town. The conscript officers were busy, and men who were not too old or physically disqualified to bear arms, had to exercise their wits to keep out of the army. Some of them were ingenious in this regard. Here the Union sympathizer found himself in trouble. When Governor Brown called out the old men and boys, almost no one was exempt, and no pretext availed.


When it was certain that Atlanta was to be besieged, and perhaps her very streets turned into a battle ground, hundreds of the wealthy class hurried their families away while yet the railroads were open. Patriotism induced some families to remain in Atlanta, but poverty more. Business was in a sadly demoralized condition and most of the stocks of merchandise were removed to place of safety. Parties who owned slaves regarded the proximity of the Union army as especially menacing to that class of property, and negroes were sent away in cases where their services were not contracted to the Confederate government, or they had not been taken by impressment. This applied more particularly to house and body servants. Black laborers were in too great demand on the intrenchments to be spared.

When the boom of Sherman's guns echoed across the Chattahoochee, practically all of the emigrants had left Atlanta and the remaining citizens prepared to make the best of a bad situation. One by one the newspapers dropped out as the siege progressed, but so long as they could get paper to print their editions on they voiced the self-sacrificing and defiant spirit of the community. Now and then one of them mildly criticised the policy of the Richmond authorities as pertained to Atlanta. On the 7th of July, the day that Roswell was captured and Schofield forced a passage of the Chattahoochee river, the *Intelligencer*, the leading daily, said:

"The enemy still continues to press forward to reach his coveted prize. General Johnston is ready to give him battle,

should forward be his word, and Atlanta, directly, be his object. The responsibility that has rested on General Johnston in resisting the advance of the enemy upon Atlanta, from Dalton to Chattahoochee, had been skillfully and ingeniously met. His strategy commanded the admiration of his officers, his courage that of his men, his successful retiring before the enemy, the order preserved, the cheerfulness and the high state of discipline, that of the country. It cannot be forgotten that come weal or come woe to the Confederacy, from its retention or from its loss of Atlanta, that the Army of Tennessee had retired before an army largely superior in numbers, so large, indeed, that with the force at General Johnston's command, open as the enemy's rear has been for hundreds of miles to him, he could make no demonstration upon it. The flanking operations of Sherman forbade such attempts, and to General Johnston was attributed no responsibility for the failure to assail Sherman's rear. That rests elsewhere, and where does it rest? The answer was most emphatically upon President Davis. Had a competent force been ordered to obstruct Sherman's rear, had General Forrest, with ten thousand men, been ordered to co-operate with General Johnston by making such a demonstration, or had General Johnston been reinforced so as to have been able to assail Sherman's rear himself, Atlanta would not have been in such peril, nor the danger then threatening her have been so imminent.

"Why has the geographical center of the Confederacy, the loss of which is fearful to contemplate, been left so exposed, when the vigorous efforts of a few thousand cavalry or mounted infantry, directed on the long line of Sherman's rear, would have resulted in his retreat, if not in his defeat or rout? Has there ever been, in civilized warfare, seen what is now presented to the eye of man, and has been for some time past—a line of railroad communication kept free by the enemy, extending from Louisville, Ky., to within twelve miles of Atlanta, without an effort being made to break it, and this, too, when the safety, the occupancy of the great center of the Confederacy, its very backbone, would have been assured by it? A line of more than five hundred miles, over which the enemy has been left to transport his supplies unmolested, without an effort being made to cut them off! It is



Thomas S. Powell, M. D.

During the Civil War this distinguished physician devoted himself to the care of the wounded soldiers in the Confederate hospitals located in Atlanta.

indeed marvelous that this has been done, and the responsibility must rest upon President Davis. Should Atlanta fall, fearful indeed will be the responsibility. There is more than one Richmond in the field to-day. The Richmond in Virginia is the political Richmond; but the Richmond of Georgia is Atlanta, which to the Confederacy is a more important point than the capital of the Old Dominion. Failing to maintain this point, the maintenance of Richmond will become doubtful; maintaining it, Richmond will be safe."

The vast majority of the people of Georgia and the soldiers in Johnston's army subscribed earnestly to such views. The feeling was little short of insubordination, and Jefferson Davis was openly and roundly denounced. Johnston was upheld and praised by nine men out of ten, even though he brought a carnival of blood and fire upon Atlanta. It was considered that his Fabian tactics had been forced upon him, and he made the most of the means at hand to hamper and cripple Sherman.

For all its criticism of Richmond, the *Intelligencer* was no pessimist. It had faith in the invincibility of the Confederate arms under Joe Johnston, and in the same issue in which the foregoing appeared, declared: "Brave and unconquerable men present a defiant front between the center of the Confederacy, Atlanta, and the enemy. We have the utmost confidence that if battle is made before the city, we will scatter the enemy like leaves before an autumnal frost. If battle is not made, what then?"

Just prior to Sherman's advent, Atlanta was the newspaper center of the Confederate States. The leading dailies of cities that had fallen into the hands of the enemy, compelling their unceremonious departure, found refuge for many months in Atlanta. Chief among these refugee newspapers was the *Memphis Appeal*, noted for its enterprising war correspondence. The last heard of the *Appeal* before its renaissance after the unpleasantness, its editor was captured by a troop of Federal cavalry in the mountains of North Alabama, fleeing upon a mule, with all that was left of the newspaper plant stuffed in his saddlebags. The *Chattanooga Rebel* was another fiery journalistic refugee, edited by Henry Watterson, then little known, but none the less a forceful writer. His pugnacious independence as a writer came near



getting him into serious trouble with the soldiers, on account of criticisms he had made on the conduct of the campaign, and led to his retirement from view and the paper. Later Watterson was a member of the Southern Confederacy's editorial staff. The Knoxville Register was another prominent Southern daily that sought a safe place of publication in Atlanta. There were five home dailies in Atlanta—the *Intelligencer*, the *Southern Confederacy*, the *Gate City Guardian*, the *Commonwealth* and the *Reveille*. With the exception of the first named, which was a pioneer of Atlanta journalism, the local papers were distinctively the product of the troublous times, as their names would indicate. The *Intelligencer* was the Constitution of its day. It was owned by Judge Jared I. Whittaker, one of Atlanta's most aggressive publicists, and its editor was Major John H. Steele. The *Intelligencer* hung to Atlanta until the Macon railroad was likely to be cut any day, and then established itself in the Central City. The *Southern Confederacy*, though a new journal, was a formidable rival of the *Intelligencer*. It was owned by a joint stock company of well-known Atlantans, including George W. Adair and J. Henley Smith, and its active business management and excellence as a newspaper resulted in a large circulation. Besides Watterson, it had as editorial writers Asa R. Watson, Mr. Cardozo and E. W. Marsh. The Confederacy found refuge in Columbus when Sherman wound his mailed tentacles about Atlanta. The *Commonwealth* was a lively evening sheet, edited by J. S. Peterson. It exhibited a world of enterprise during the siege, and like the famous Vicksburg Citizen, frequently had to serve the news to its readers on the reverse side of wall paper. The *Reveille* and *Gate City Guardian* did not long survive the investement of Atlanta. The makeshifts resorted to by the local press to "get out" were an indication of the city's dire extremity. Sometimes printers could not be had and editors and proprietors picked laboriously over the cases to set a fraction of a column of type announcing some important piece of news. Sometimes even the *Intelligencer*, whose resources were the best, came out on a narrow proof slip, containing barely a column of matter. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the newspapers were in very active demand and numbered among their purchasers thousands of Con-


federate soldiers and militiamen. On special occasions there was a scramble in front of the newspaper offices for the first papers off the press. Any kind of a paper sold for fifty cents. News of the movements of the army, and detailed accounts of the damage done in the city by Sherman's shells, were prohibited by the military authorities, and, as a matter of fact, the reader was but little better informed as to what was going on inside and before the defenses of Atlanta than as though he had not read the paper. This rigorous censorship was necessary, as Sherman's spies brought him copies of the city papers daily and he often referred to their contents in his reports. Whenever there was a battle or a movement of troops in force in any quarter before the city, the local paper invariably announced a glorious Confederate victory or a decided advantage to the Confederate arms. After the battle of the 22d July the papers of Atlanta announced that Sherman was so hard hit that he would do well to save his line of retreat and escape into Tennessee. The operations of Lee's army in Virginia were closely followed, always to the effect that Grant was being annihilated, Washington on the point of evacuation, and large reinforcements about to start for Hood's relief. Most of the "telegraphic news" was clipped from Southern exchanges, the Richmond papers being most heavily drawn on. Wallace Reed tells a good story in connection with siege journalism in Atlanta:

"Of course, the editors and printers were exempt from conscription. This was a great thing, and the newspaper offices always had all the men they needed, and some that were mere hangers-on. Once there was a prospect of serious trouble. The printers struck for higher wages. Several editors put their heads together and decided upon the cutest plan imaginable. They visited the conscript officer in a body, stated the case, and requested him to conscript the printers, as they were out of a job, and, therefore, no longer entitled to exemption. The conscript officer had a long head and knew his duty. 'Gentlemen,' he said, 'you are undoubtedly right. I will go to work at once, and as you are here I will conscript you to begin with.' 'Conscript us!' exclaimed the editors. 'Certainly. As you have no printers, you can't get out your papers. So you no longer belong to the ex-

empted class.' This was an unexpected result. The editors asked time for consultation with their printers. All differences were harmoniously arranged, and in less than fifteen minutes the editors were turning out copy for their employees, who had again taken their stand at the cases."

Reliable information of events transpiring outside the breastworks was impossible. The soldiers were non-communicative or told tales that on their face were highly colored in favor of the citizens' sympathies. The individual who assumed to enjoy "inside tips" was largely in evidence. He kept an open-mouthed group of listeners in constant terror of their lives with his relation of what Sherman proposed to do that day to the city. An hundred 50-pounder cannon with a range of ten miles had just arrived from Chattanooga and were being put in position to blow Atlanta off the earth. One of their shells would destroy a whole brick block and tear up the ground to such an extent that bomb-proofs could afford no safe retreat. Hood was about to surrender to Sherman, or blow up his factories and stores and march out while yet an avenue of escape remained, leaving the people to their horrible fate. And like stories.

Toward the last there was little left for money to buy in the way of merchandise and provisions, and prices were so high, measured by the depreciated currency of the Confederacy, that to mention the figures at which common necessities sold would sound fabulous. A great many of the citizens had no money, plentiful as it was, and looked to the lean commissary department of the Confederate government to keep them from starving. Bacon was a luxury and corn meal furnished the staple article of diet. It is superfluous to say that gardening inside the city limits was attended with a great deal of danger. The sacrifices made by the people, under the stress of war, and the hardships and positive dangers endured, were greater in no community in the South than in Atlanta. To go into details would be a threadbare story. The women were especially heroic. Hundreds of them ministered to the wounded, and some of the most palatial homes in the city were turned into hospitals, the mother and daughters of the family devoting their entire time to such labors of patriotism and mercy. The residence of Judge John Collier, on Nelson street, was one



Atlanta College of Physicians and Surgeons  
The main building was formerly used for a Confederate hospital

of the best known of these private hospitals. During the battles around Atlanta many of the Federal wounded fell into the hands of the Confederates and were taken to the Atlanta Medical College, which had been converted into a hospital, where they were given the same treatment as was received by the wounded Southerners. The college building, under a hospital flag, was several times hit by Sherman's shells.

All the time Atlanta was being bombarded, the immense Confederate factories, foundries and machine shops in the city were running full blast, employing hundreds of operatives, mechanics and laborers. It was easy, with such complete machine shops and iron works as Atlanta possessed, for Hood to speedily repair such slight breaks of the railroads within the Confederate lines as Sherman could make with cavalry. In addition to these valuable industrial establishments, Atlanta was a cotton center, and cotton was gold. As Johnston's base during his long mountain campaign, Atlanta was well supplied with army stores and provisions. For these reasons, as well as its importance geographically and as a railroad center, the Confederacy had every incentive to make a last-ditch fight to hold Atlanta, and did hold it to the last extremity.

When it is considered that Atlanta was a small city during the war, occupying but a fraction of the ground it now covers, and that its line of defenses was a mile or more from the carshed, it will be understood, from the nature of the ground, that the non-combatant residents had slight opportunity of learning what was going on at the embattled front. To stand at an upper window of one of the modern city skyscrapers and look over the old battlefields of Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, Ezra Church, and the long line of operations from the latter point to Jonesboro, one can but be struck by the immensity of the field included in the siege from first to last, and will the better realize how the little Atlanta of nearly forty years ago could feel but not see the dangers without her gates. It might at least nerve one for the blow to see his executioner and the fatal instrument. Atlanta saw nothing, and but indistinctly heard the sullen boom of Sherman's distant guns. The fiery bolts that smote her to the very heart fell like the wrath of the gods mysteriously from the heavens. People hid in under-



ground bomb-proofs and ran from the death-zone of exploding shells, who never saw a puff of smoke from a Yankee battery or caught sight of a blue blouse until after Sherman's men entered the town. This dense personal ignorance of the situation, as has meant to be shown, increased its terrors and made people doubly credulous.

Peachtree street was far out in the suburbs then, and sometimes, when it was unusually quiet on the picket lines and the artillery in that direction seemed weary, citizens who were very brave and very influential, would go in company of an officer, very much as gentle folk go "slumming," to see how things looked behind the earthworks. The works were closest in on the end of Peachtree street, and where now is located the home of Mr. Clifford Anderson, then in the front of the suburban home of Mr. Columbus Pitts, was excavated a sharpshooters' pit locally known as the "dead-hole." Visitors looked with a grewsome sense of awe into this hole, in which seventeen men were killed during the progress of the siege. It looked safe enough, with its red clay walls, from behind, but the sharpshooters had to expose their faces a trifle in taking aim, and the sharpshooters of the enemy, armed with their unerring telescope rifles, frequently "got their man." A similar pit, an outpost of the Federal lines, was scarcely more than a thousand yards away.

It will prove interesting, if the knowledge thus obtained is not wholly accurate, to read what the Federals believed to be the situation inside the Atlanta earthworks, as reported by their spies, Confederate deserters and talkative citizens. The following detailed statement of the position of the Confederate army and the situation in the city of Atlanta was made to the Federals by J. B. Jordan, a deserter, who represented himself as captain of Company G, Thirty-sixth Alabama Infantry:

*"Near Atlanta, Ga., August 14, 1864.*

"Captain Jordan says he came into our lines of his own accord yesterday evening. His regiment belongs to Holtzclaw's brigade, Clayton's division, of Lee's corps, numbers about 250 men, and is the strongest regiment in the brigade. Says their division is about 2,500 strong,

is in front of the Fourteenth Corps, the left resting on the Sandtown road and the right a little to the left, in front of General R. W. Johnson's headquarters. Brigadier-Generals Stovall, Baker, Holtzclaw, and Gibson are the brigade commanders and are in position from right to left in the order named. Holtzclaw and Baker have Alabama troops; Gibson has Louisiana troops, and his is counted the best fighting brigade in the corps; Stovall has Georgia troops, and his men are very much demoralized, won't fight, and are constantly deserting. Clayton's division is on the left of the corps (Lee's). Hindman's division, now commanded by General Brown, of Tennessee, is in the center, and Stevenson's is on the right. Thinks their division, Clayton's, is fully as strong as either of the others. All the regiments of their corps are very much extended, in many places the line being one rank and the men three feet apart. Gibson's brigade, the left flank of their division, is one rank, with no reserves, and covers at least half a mile. Has not been to the left of their army and can give no particulars about position of troops there, except that Hardee's corps (except Cheatham's division) is on the left of Lee's, and holds the left flank of the army; thinks the extreme left is near the river. Stewart's corps is on Lee's right; says Stewart's divisions are much stronger than theirs; when he first came to them at Resaca some of his regiments numbered 1,500 men; thinks the right of Stewart's corps is about half a mile from the Augusta railroad. The militia are on Stewart's right and are about 5,000 or 6,000 strong. Cheatham's division, of Hardee's corps, holds the right flank of the army and pickets the front of the militia; thinks Cheatham's division is about 3,000 strong. Does not know of any reserves in rear of the line at any point, and is pretty confident that there are none. No reinforcements have been received except militia and men from convalescent camps and hospitals; says a large number of men have been added to the army from these sources; thinks the aggregate number since Hood has been in command, including cooks, teamsters, and other detailed men, will reach 15,000 men. His own company, Jordan's, numbered 14 men at Kennesaw, and yesterday mustered 34 guns; has received 12 men since the fight on the 22d. All that he can say about the cavalry is that it is on the flanks; says Wheeler's

command numbers 25,000 men; has not heard of any raid contemplated by him. The whole army is said to be 75,000 men. With regard to its morale Captain Jordan says it is greatly demoralized, both officers and men feel that they are whipped. The officers will not acknowledge it, but the men feel that there is no longer any chance of success, and, although they will fight desperately if attacked in their works, they would refuse to make a general charge; says he is confident that if the men could be made to know how they would be treated after coming over the majority of Hood's soldiers would desert him, and that if the practice of the picket-lines agreeing to a truce for a few hours at a time was encouraged a great many men would desert them every day. Their men have great confidence in the honor of our soldiers, and a proposition to cease firing is at once accepted. It was during one of these armistices along the picket-lines that he questioned our pickets as to the kind of treatment he would receive in case he deserted, and was told that he would be sent North. Their men are taught to believe that the government would force them into the army as soon as they came over; says he has been looking for an opportunity to desert during the whole campaign and improved the first opportunity after being assured that he would be sent North and allowed to stay there. Since the 20th of July only about one-quarter rations have been issued. There are no supplies of any kind in Atlanta. They are shipped from below as they are needed by the troops, two or three days' supply being issued at a time. The ration consists of bacon and corn bread and occasionally beef; has often seen his men eat a day's supply at a meal and then not be satisfied. Officers draw rations with their men. The supply of ammunition is very small; men are ordered not to fire when upon picket duty or when acting as sharpshooters unless sure of their mark, and whenever an assault is ordered or an attack expected an order is issued cautioning the men to be saving of the cartridges. Our artillery is often not replied to because of the scarcity of ammunition. One-third of the men in the trenches are kept up all night, and at 3 o'clock the whole force is ordered under arms until daylight.

"Captain Jordan describes the breastworks as being very strong, and protected by abatis constructed with great care and



Confederate Breastworks, made in '64, located on Marietta st.



extending along the whole line ; thinks the weakest part of the line is that portion held by the militia. The works there are the same, and were constructed by old troops, but the militia will not stand ; does not know what damage was done to the railroad by Stoneman, but learned that all bridges south of Macon for a distance of thirty miles were burned, together with some engines and cars at or near Griswold Station ; states that one of his men who was sick at Montgomery came over the Atlanta and West Point Railroad, and that about three miles at each end of the break was repaired. Parties were employed repairing the road at each end of the break. Has not heard anything in regard to the Augusta railroad, whether it is being repaired or not. States that supplies are scattered from Atlanta to Macon, no great quantity at any one point."

The following statement was made to the Federal provost-marshal-general by J. M. Glass, one of Sherman's most reliable scouts, who was almost constantly in Atlanta in disguise :

*"Near Atlanta, Ga., August 7, 1864.*

"Says he left Atlanta, Ga., yesterday morning about 10 o'clock ; says the right of the enemy's line is held by militia supported by one brigade of Hardee's corps ; with this exception all the old troops are on the center and on the left. Hardee's corps is on the left flank of the army. From the best information he could get thinks there are at least 15,000 militia. One brigade of militia came in from some point below on the 4th instant. Learned that 1,700 of General Stoneman's command were captured ; heard a rumor to the effect that General Wheeler will be relieved of his command because he did not capture the whole of Generals Stoneman's and McCook's commands. Two brigades of Wheeler's corps were sent to Flat Shoals on the 5th instant. An orderly on duty at General Hood's headquarters told him, Glass, that General Lee was expected from Virginia, also that General Ewell was looked for at Atlanta with his corps, said to be 32,000 strong. Same orderly said that he believed from the manner in which things were going on about headquarters that preparations were being made for a sudden flank movement of



some kind. The large guns have all been removed from the fort east of the cemetery. Do not think Hood is accumulating supplies in Atlanta; think they only arrive as they are needed by the troops. Trains are running regularly on the Macon and Atlanta road. Two hundred prisoners were sent below on the 5th instant. Our wounded prisoners are kept in the southeast portion of the town. Says he came out of Atlanta past the cemetery, thence on the Decatur road south of the Augusta railroad to Decatur. Says there are no troops in Decatur or to the right. Says there are no rebel works nor troops between our works and the railroad. South of the railroad the enemy has two lines of works held by militia. The right of the enemy's line of infantry is within one mile of Decatur. The two brigades of cavalry sent to Flat Shoals are from Martin's division, which was camped in the rear of the infantry between Atlanta and Decatur; only one brigade there now. Glass thinks that from the hint he received from General Hood's inspector-general, viz., to come over last night, that they did not want him there to-day."

W. H. Gates, a citizen, presumably of Union proclivities, made the following statement to the provost marshal-general:

*"Near Atlanta, Ga., August 9, 1864.*

"Left Atlanta on the evening of the 8th inst. and came with his wife to Decatur. Saw no pickets on the way who halted him until within three miles of Decatur; saw but few troops on the road, and those he saw were cavalry. Thinks there are no troops east of the cemetery except cavalry pickets. There is a camp of cavalry three miles south of Decatur. The State troops occupy the trenches on the north and northeast side of town, and their front is picketed by Cheatham's troops. The State troops number about 20,000. The whole rebel force is estimated at 60,000. There is one heavy gun located north of the female college. All business in Atlanta is suspended; the goods have been removed to other points in the State. There is but one grocery running in Atlanta and no stores or other business places. Hotels are closed. Most of the shells from Federal guns strike in the vicinity of the depot, the larger part of them south of the depot. Seven shells

have been sent through the Western and Atlantic Depot. In order for the gun firing from Marietta street to strike the commissary depot it should be depressed a little and the aim taken about 100 yards to the left of its usual range; the shells go about sixty feet over the commissary stores. No buildings have been burned by the shells. The subsistence on hand amounts to about six days. There have been several rumors of a new commander for the rebel army. One report was that Lee was coming to Atlanta and Jeff. Davis was going to command the Eastern army. The last report was that Beauregard was going to relieve Hood. A report came into Atlanta on or about the 5th instant from Brigadier-General Page, commanding Fort Morgan, in Mobile Bay, to General Higgins, that three gunboats and fourteen ships had passed Fort Morgan into the bay. The rebel gun-boat Tennessee surrendered after a terrific fight, the Gaines was beached, the Selma was captured. The Tecumseh sunk under the guns of the water battery. Federal troops were landed on Dauphin Island; city in great excitement. General Maury called all citizens to arms."

Glass, the spy, brought in the following report on August 12th:

"Reports that he left Atlanta about 9 o'clock this morning; was not allowed to visit the lines while there. Saw four large pieces of artillery moving down the Macon railroad toward East Point. Day before yesterday shells passed over General Hood's headquarters and struck 300 or 400 yards beyond; Hood's headquarters are near where White Hall street intersects Faith's alley. These shells appeared to come from the Fifteenth Corps. This morning shells from the Twentieth and Fourth Corps struck at the corner of McDonough street and Faith's alley. The supply trains belonging to Hardee's corps are camped to the right of the cemetery between First street and the Augusta railroad, near Elmore street; can be easily reached by batteries in Fourth Corps. Says no change has taken place in the position of the enemy's corps except that they are strengthening their left by artillery. The buildings in the fair-grounds are used as hospitals for their wounded. Says when he went into town yesterday he was not

halted nor asked for a pass till he got into town; went into town from Paul Jones's, southeast from Decatur two miles, and returned same way. Says the works from the Augusta railroad are held by militia and dismounted cavalry in small force and without artillery."

On the 18th Glass made another report, as follows:

"Went into Atlanta past our left flank on 13th instant; saw one brigade of Martin's division of cavalry between the cemetery and Decatur. Strahl's brigade, of Cheatham's division, holds the extreme right of the enemy's infantry line and is in position about one mile from the cemetery toward Decatur on the south side of the railroad. Says the militia commences on the left of Strahl's brigade. Lee's corps is on the left of the militia and Stewart on his left. Hardee is on the extreme left; Cleburne's division holds the left flank and is in position, the left resting opposite Mims's, five or six miles southwest of East Point. Says he rode along the lines from Atlanta to East Point on Monday; left East Point yesterday morning and went to Fairburn. Did not see or hear of any reserves along their lines; says their lines are very thin. The country between the enemy and Fairburn is open; nothing there but a few cavalry pickets and scouts. Saw large squads of negroes along the railroad from East Point to Fairburn, felling timber and throwing up breast-works. General Toombs arrived there about one week ago with some militia; was told at the Camp of Direction that Toombs was second in command of the militia, and that there were 30,000 of them, including the troops brought up some time ago by Generals Roddey and Lee. Was told also that these troops, the 30,000, were to be organized into two corps. Says this Camp of Direction is a sort of headquarters for guards and couriers. Says that Wheeler started from Covington with about 6,000 men, and that Lewis with about 800 Kentuckians crossed the Chattahoochee below Campbellton and passed our right flank. Thinks it was Lewis's brigade that cut the railroad at Acworth. Says the enemy was very anxious to learn from him what force was after Wheeler. Heard that Morgan was to form a junction with Wheeler some place near Cleveland in East Tennessee. Reports the Atlanta and West Point Railroad in running order. Trains passed through Fairburn yesterday

morning for Atlanta. Reports the depot buildings and car sheds destroyed by Kilpatrick. Says that a large block of buildings near the corner of Marietta and Woodley streets was fired by our shells on Saturday night and destroyed. The buildings contained cotton and a large drug store; another building in same part of town was destroyed Sunday evening. Visited several camps; the men appear to have plenty of rations and forage from day to day, but there is no supply on hand; supplies are all brought from Macon. Says there are six strong forts at East Point all ready for artillery; none in them yet. On the evening of the 15th instant a train of fifteen cars loaded with infantry went down the Macon road; did not learn to what point; and on the 16th another train full of troops, about 1,000 men, went down same road. Says no train came up from Macon on 16th and that the cause of detention was not known at headquarters. Thinks Wheeler has all their mounted force off with him, except the brigade on their right near Decatur, and about two small brigades picketing and scouting between East Point and Fairburn."

Many of the reports of signal officers are interesting. From their elevated stations overlooking Atlanta they were able to discern some of the movements of Hood's troops and note the effect of some of Sherman's shells. Here is a signal report to General Logan, dated August 24th:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following as my report of to-day. Lieutenant Fish, of this detachment, took position on lookout station at 8 a. m. and reports the following:

"At 11.30 a. m. I discovered a column of smoke rising from Atlanta. I examined it closely, but could not determine from what it originated. The fire emitted black smoke for a space of five minutes, then white smoke, something like steam. Heated air could be seen to rise in thick white clouds. It was still burning at dark. At 11.40 a. m. a train of eighteen box-cars left town; doors closed; could not tell if loaded or not. At 4.30 p. m. a train of eighteen box-cars and one passenger-car arrived, all empty. At 4.50 p. m. a train of eight box-cars, loaded with boxes, bundles of clothing or bedding, and other articles, left town, also about thirty-five men on board. The six-gun fort in front of the Seventeenth Army Corps has part of the embrasures

casemated. A battery in the Seventeenth Army Corps almost destroyed one of the casemates to-day; their firing was very good.

Lieutenant Wirick, of this detachment, reports from Captain De Gress's battery:

"I notice the following changes on the rebel lines in front of Fifteenth Army Corps: During the last twenty-four hours considerable timber has been cut in front of their main lines. They have extended and completed some of their advance skirmish pits and pitched some additional tents or flies in rear of main works, apparently officers' quarters; otherwise their lines appear unchanged.

At 12 m. I received information from General O. O. Howard that it was currently reported that the rebels were evacuating Atlanta. I therefore proceeded to the lookout station and examined entirely the enemy's lines, but could see nothing to justify the report. A large fire appeared in Atlanta that I could tell but very little about. The smoke appeared like that of burning grain. I then proceeded to Captain De Gress's battery; while there I discovered considerable movements along the rebel line. They appeared to be fixing up their equipments; most of them moved back to a camp or new line in rear of the one in sight. At 5 p. m. I returned to the lookout on tree and discovered a few men leaving the rifle-pits in front of Twentieth Corps with their equipments; they appeared to be militia. At 6 p. m. I saw four old citizens, well dressed, come out on the big work in front of town. They appeared to be agitated and excited. It is evident from their motion and downcast appearance that there is some move about to take place. Two more large fires occurred, one in the evening and the other at about dark; appeared to be large buildings of some kind. From my observations this afternoon I am satisfied that the enemy are about to make a grand move of some sort. The rebels fired their big gun three times, once before dark and twice after. Very few pieces of artillery in sight.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL EDGE,

*First Lieutenant and Chief Acting Signal Officer.*



## CHAPTER XXXV

### OPERATIONS NEAR EAST POINT AND WHEELER'S RAID

While Sherman's guns were battering down Atlanta and the two armies practically deadlocked because stretched to their utmost numerical capacity, two important moves were attempted, one by Sherman and the other by Hood, the former being unsuccessful and the latter measurably successful. Sherman proposed by a bold detachment of a division from Schofield's army corps to break the West Point road, which was again in running order into Alabama, at a point as near as possible to East Point. Hood proposed to send Wheeler, with about one-half of his cavalry, upon the long talked of raid upon the Western and Atlantic railway, north of the Etowah, to or beyond the Tennessee line.

The following communication from Sherman to Schofield, under date of August 11th, is quoted as explanatory of the former's desires and purpose: "I do want to know where our right flank is, how far from one of the two roads south of Atlanta; and as we cannot reach the Macon road I would like to say at least we had found out where the West Point road is. When reached, it should be torn up for a couple of miles, and then the force employed should return to the right flank of the army. I don't limit you to one division, but you can take the whole five, or only such part as you may deem sufficient to accomplish the end. We believe the enemy has his three corps distributed—Hardee, right; Lee, left; and Stewart, center; old troops on picket and in rear; militia in trenches. The right is three miles east of Atlanta, center about railroad, and left about East Point. I believe a skirmish line can hold any part of our front, but in making a detachment due caution should be exercised. It appeared to me far more prudent to vacate or thin out your line; in other words, to extend the Fourteenth Corps and send out two divisions, say General Has-

call's and Baird's, with your cavalry as vedettes, and a good engineer officer to sketch the country. But as you already have a better knowledge of the country than I, I leave it to you. It does seem to me with an enemy besieged we should be a little more enterprising."

Schofield seemed to regard the proposed movement as very hazardous and was evidently loth to undertake it. However, he said that if Sherman thought the object to be gained worth the risk, he would start Hascall's division early the next morning. Sherman's reply showed him to be undecided in his further plans. He said: "If it involves extra hazard I don't want it done, because I have not yet made up my mind whether to swing round Atlanta by the east or south, but I want to fight Hood the earliest possible moment he will come out of his trenches, and would risk a good deal to draw him out. There is no doubt of it, our movements are all too slow to be productive of good results. I feel mortified that he holds us in check by the aid of his militia."

Schofield answered: "I take it for granted that any attack upon Hascall in his movement would not come from the enemy's line in my front but from his reserves, which might be nearly the whole of his veteran troops. I would not hesitate to fight all of those with my two corps, but I would want all my troops concentrated and prepared in advance. I have not the slightest hesitation in making the effort to strike and break the railroad, though I may fail in the attempt, but I did think you expected me to do more than I could safely attempt in the event of my meeting unexpected resistance, and I am free to say I felt not a little chagrined at your imputation of want of enterprise."

Sherman had received information of Wheeler's departure for the North Georgia mountains and regarded the time as peculiarly opportune for another railroad raid on his own part. He expressed much impatience at the inactivity of his army, particularly of the cavalry. "We all know," he declared, "that the enemy holds us by inferior force, and I may have to let go our parapets altogether, for it seems we are more besieged than they. Send General Hascall to feel for that road in the morning, and have all your command, if necessary, ready to let go their parapets and engage the enemy, and if that be not sufficient, I will

order General Howard to do the same." He said, in another of the frequent dispatches exchanged with Schofield about the matter: "Colonel Garrard's cavalry passed along the flank to-day unopposed, and I do not think the West Point road more than two miles from General Hascall's present flank. You will, therefore, make the expedition with one division, the other either placed intermediate or ready to act. Of course without abandoning our present base or dividing our forces into two equal parts I have no other corps to give you. You may consider it a reconnaissance in force not to go over three miles from General Cox's present right. I know a full proportion of the enemy is on our left and center, and if any change occurs in the night I will be sure to advise you. Our heavy ordnance, playing for the past thirty hours from the Buck Head road into Atlanta, has kept to the parapets a full proportion of the enemy all the way round to your old position and beyond, and if I am to give weight to the testimony from official sources the enemy at this moment exhibits most force on his present right. I have no idea that he can throw on you even a third of his reserve force, because he will look upon the movement as a decoy to weaken his line somewhat that we may break in. Besides, we know his line as well as ours is so stretched out that his reserves are not over 1,000 men per mile, for his infantry line three miles east of the Howard house round to the Macon road below East Point is full fifteen miles long, requiring at his parapets 40,000 men, leaving him no reserve on that flank that can disturb two divisions. We must act. We cannot sit down and do nothing because it involves risk. Being on the offensive we must risk, and that is the flank on which we calculated to make the risk, indeed have been maneuvering to that end ever since the Army of the Tennessee shifted from left to right."

Before Schofield started Hascall, Sherman, to make sure he was right in his conclusion that the enemy was still as strong on his right as left, ordered General Stanley, occupying the battlefield of July 22d, to make a sharp dash against the enemy's works on a hill to the left of the distillery, and report the result. Stanley doubled his skirmish line and did as ordered, with the result that the enemy met him with redoubled skirmishers and a



Confederate Breastworks, Grant Park, made to defend the City of Atlanta in 1864



display of the usual force and artillery behind his intrenchments. Satisfied that he was right in his conclusion in this regard, Sherman ordered Schofield to go ahead. A brigade of Cox's division was taken out of the line held by the Fourteenth corps and placed in reserve near Hascall's right to protect his hazardous movement and look after his surplus artillery and wagons. The following were General Hascall's orders, dated the 11th: "Early to-morrow General Hascall will move forward and endeavor to reach the West Point railroad, as near as practicable to East Point, thoroughly destroy the road for a distance of two or three miles, and return to the rear of his present line. General Johnston will thin out his line to-night and relieve General Cox's division at daylight in the morning. General Cox will occupy General Hascall's works as soon as vacated, and will support General Hascall in his operations, if necessary; especially in case of an attack or threatened attack upon his left. Colonel Garrard will operate upon General Hascall's right, and endeavor to clear the enemy's cavalry from his flank. He will scout and picket all roads leading from General Hascall's right to the Chattahoochee. The pickets should be very vigilant during the day, so as to detect at once any movement of troops about the enemy's lines. In case of the withdrawal of troops from any portion of the lines in his front General Johnson will endeavor to secure possession of them."

The morning the reconnoitering and road-breaking expedition started, Sherman ordered Thomas and Howard to "keep things lively, that no concentrating or massing may be made as against General Schofield." The inhabitants of Atlanta were given ample reason to believe that Sherman's injunction was faithfully carried out. The 12th was another "red day" in the history of the bombardment. During Thomas's fierce artillery practice, two of his 20-pounder Parrott guns bursted.

A great surprise was in store for Hascall and Cox. They thought their intended movement could be made without serious opposition, and had been assured by their cavalry scouts that the vicinity where they intended reaching the West Point road was free of Confederates, save for a few wandering videttes and stray pickets. They started off in high hopes, but had proceeded



but a short distance when they were confronted by the seemingly endless parapet of the enemy. Hood appeared to be infinite in his elastic resources, stretching along the road to West Point as well as the road to Macon. If the former railway was to be broken by infantry, it was evident it had to be done at a greater distance from the Federal right flank than it would be safe to venture; so nothing came of the movement upon which Sherman had counted so much and had so elaborately prepared to execute.

On the night of the 12th the army telegrapher wired to his chief in Washington: "General Schofield felt forward again to-day for West Point railroad, south of East Point, but without success, finding enemy in earthworks on his front. It is evident that there are more rebels before us than we had supposed. Our artillery annoys them severely, causing their troops to remain in the trenches, as our shells reach over their camp near Atlanta. I have neglected to mention that the bridge over the Chattahoochee is done, and trains run to our position."

On the 12th Sherman was informed of his appointment as major-general in the regular army. It is evident that the Federal commander-in-chief before Atlanta was greatly discouraged on account of his failure to either turn the enemy's left flank or seriously damage his least important railroad without cutting loose from his base, and there is evidence that he was seriously meditating the latter alternative. In view of the short time which elapsed until Sherman was in possession of Atlanta, the following dispatch of his to Halleck, under date of August 13th, sounds like half a confession of failure and is the more remarkable: "We have now pressed the enemy's lines from east around to East Point on the south. The nature of ground, with its artificial defenses, makes it too difficult to assault, and to reach the Macon road by a farther extension will be extra hazardous. I have ordered army commanders to prepare for the following plan: Leave one corps strongly intrenched at the Chattanooga bridge in charge of our surplus wagon trains and artillery; with 60,000 men, reduced to fighting trim, to make a circuit of devastation around the town, with a radius of fifteen or twenty miles. To do this I go on the faith that the militia in Atlanta are only good for the defense of its parapets and will not come

out. I want a good corps commander for the Fourteenth Corps, in place of General Palmer, and Jeff. Davis is the best officer in that corps. I prefer him much to General Bramman. I would like the utmost activity to be kept up in Mobile Bay, and, if possible, about the mouth of Appalachicola. Also, to be assured that no material reinforcements have come here from Virginia. If I should ever be cut off from my base, look out for me about Saint Mark's, Fla., or Savannah, Ga."

. . .

"In making the circuit of Atlanta, as proposed in my dispatch of to-day, I necessarily run some risk. If there be any possibility of Admiral Farragut and the land forces of Granger taking Mobile (which rebel prisoners now report, but the report is not confirmed by rebel papers of the 11th, which I have seen), and, further, of pushing up to Montgomery, my best plan would be to wait awhile as now, and at the proper time move down to West Point and operate into the heart of Georgia from there. Before cutting loose, as proposed, I would like to know the chances of our getting the use of the Alabama River this campaign. I could easily break up the railroad back to Chattanooga and shift my whole army down to West Point and Columbus, a country rich in corn, and make my fall campaign from there. I know Fort Morgan must succumb in time."

On the 13th, in front of Howard's extreme right, a hot skirmish fight took place in which General Woods captured a line of Confederate rifle-pits, bringing back 65 prisoners, four of whom were commissioned officers. At the same time the Fourteenth corps got 27 prisoners. The captured pits were reversed and strongly held.

General Bate was wounded while Schofield was pressing his front, and his command turned over to Major-General Brown. Lieutenant-General Stewart, wounded at Ezra Church, returned to duty on the 13th. At this time desertions were frequent among the Confederates, and some of the regiments had to be kept under close surveillance. The men had not been paid for a long time, were half fed and ill-clad, and many of them were thoroughly dispirited. There were numerous instances where soldiers pretended to be captured on the skirmish line, while in

reality going over to the enemy voluntarily, with the expectation of being sent North and turned loose. Every effort was made by the Confederate officers to enthuse their men and inspire them with fear to desert. In Lee's corps the following inspiring general orders were issued on the 12th: "The lieutenant-general commanding is gratified with the gallantry and determination displayed by the skirmishers of this corps in resisting the numerous attacks upon them. In one of the charges of the enemy some of Deas's and Brantly's skirmishers allowed themselves to be bayoneted in the pits rather than be driven back. The skirmishers of Gibson's brigade on the 5th, and of Baker's on the 7th, permitted half of their number to be killed, wounded, and captured before the others would leave their position. These few instances of heroism out of many are mentioned with the hope that they may be imitated rather than permit the enemy to approach our main line."

In the same corps the following circular was published the same day: "Hereafter, instead of arousing the men in the trenches at 3 a. m., it will not be done until 3.45, when only half of them will be awakened. The other half will be allowed to sleep unless movements of the enemy make it necessary to awaken them. The attention of commanding officers is called to the number of men killed and wounded in the trenches. Every effort will be taken to prevent the loss of life by building traverses and using every means that may suggest themselves."

As an illustration of the condition of affairs in Lee's corps, the following circular, dated August 13th, is reproduced: "It has been reported to these headquarters that, contrary to orders, intercourse between our pickets and those of the enemy is still kept up, and in some instances it has been agreed that they shall not fire at each other with intent to kill, but to shoot over each other's heads. A stop must be put to these proceedings, and any one found so offending will be sent to these headquarters. Artillery officers and men in the trenches are directed to fire upon any man, or group of men, who are discovered holding communication with the enemy."

These picket-line truces grew to be such an evil along the whole front, and resulted in so many desertions, that General

Hood issued general orders against the practice, on the 16th, threatening dire punishment against the soldiers found guilty, and holding responsible their officers. To his general officers Hood sent this admonition: "General Hood desires that you impress upon your officers and men the absolute necessity of holding the lines they occupy, to the very last. He feels perfectly confident that, with the obstructions in their front, and the artillery to break his masses, the enemy cannot carry our works, however many lines he may advance against them, and however determined may be his assaults, so long as the men occupy the trenches, and use their rifles. Let every man remember that he is individually responsible for his few feet of line, and that the destiny of Atlanta hangs upon the issue."

Now Wheeler began to be heard from. The first sign Sherman had that the redoubtable cavalry leader was upon his line of communication North was the interruption of the telegraph. Immediately afterward a message came from Marietta saying that the road had been broken near Acworth by a small band of raiders, but could soon be repaired. Thereafter tidings from Wheeler multiplied. Every post commander north of the Etowah added his voice to the chorus of alarm. From Calhoun came the report that Wheeler had captured over a thousand head of beef cattle belonging to Sherman's commissary. Sherman wired General J. E. Smith, at Cartersville, to look well to the security of the Etowah bridge and Allatoona. He was ordered to collect as strong a force as possible at Rome and the other military stations at Dalton, to intercept the captured cattle without delay and prevent their being driven to Atlanta. Confident that General Steedman, commanding the Department of the Etowah, had force enough to take care of Wheeler, Sherman proposed to take advantage of what he regarded as a rare opportunity to break the Macon road with his own cavalry. Pinning his faith to Kilpatrick, this time, he ordered that brigadier to take two of Garrard's brigades to reinforce his own command and sweep down the Sandtown road from the west, while Garrard, with the remainder of his command, moved south from Decatur to co-operate with Kilpatrick from the east side of the railroad. Over 500 cavalymen of McCook's division were at Calhoun, four

miles from where the cattle were captured. On the 15th word came from Resaca that Dalton was invested by Wheeler, the enemy using artillery; that the surrender of the place had been demanded.

On the 17th Hood was made glad by the following message from General Wheeler: "Colonel Thompson destroyed the railroad near Big Shanty for one mile on Friday night. Colonel Hannon, commanding brigade, destroyed the railroad near Calhoun on Saturday night, capturing 1,020 beef cattle and a few wagons. Allen's brigade and Humes's and Kelly's divisions destroyed the railroad for several miles between Resaca and Tunnel Hill, and Kelly's and parts of Humes's commands captured Dalton Sunday evening with a considerable amount of stores, 3 trains of cars, and 200 fine mules. The train and part of the stores were destroyed and the remainder appropriated.

"Prisoners report reinforcements at Chattanooga, said to be part of A. J. Smith's troops. On Monday morning we were attacked by General Steedman with about 4,000 infantry, and obliged to leave Dalton. Our entire loss up to this time about 30, most of them still with the command.

"The most violent rains have embarrassed me very much, and made some of the roads very bad. The large force sent from Chattanooga prevented our working at the tunnel. I have several parties still working at the railroad."

The capture of Dalton by Wheeler furnishes an interesting chapter in the history of the Atlanta campaign. Humes's and Kelly's commands took possession of the place, appropriating to the use of the Confederacy a considerable amount of United States army stores and property. The Union garrison at Dalton, while unable to prevent the town falling into the hands of Wheeler's cavalry, made a determined and successful resistance behind their earthworks on the outskirts of Dalton, holding their fort until reinforcements drove the enemy away. Colonel Laidolt, who commanded the Federal garrison at Dalton, sent in the following report of the affair:

"About 4 p. m. on Sunday, the 14th, a part of Wheeler's force, at the lowest estimate 5,000 strong, surrounded the town of Dalton, and after some picket-firing the following demand for surrender was sent to me under flag of truce:



HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,  
OFFICER COMMANDING U. S. FORCES, DALTON :

To prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood, I have the honor to demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the forces under your command at this garrison.

Respectfully, yours, etc.,

JOS. WHEELER,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

To which I answered :

OFFICER COMMANDING CONFEDERATE FORCES IN FRONT OF  
DALTON :

I have been placed here to defend this post, but not to surrender.

B. LAIBOLDT,  
*Colonel Second Missouri Volunteers, Commanding Post.*

"After receiving my answer General Wheeler sent word to me that he would wait sixty seconds for my surrender, of which no notice was taken. He again requested to see me personally, but though an old acquaintance by the Charleston, Tenn., thrashing I gave him, I declined the honor and let him know that he would have to take me first before he could see me personally. After skirmishing with the enemy for about two hours, my men were driven back to the earthworks erected by me on a hill east of the railroad depot and commanding the city, but unprotected by artillery. General Wheeler made forthwith a charge, which was gallantly repulsed, and a line of skirmishers thrown immediately after, which advanced about 100 yards from the fortifications. General Wheeler again sent a flag of truce, which I refused to accept, having the bearer notified that at another advance of such a flag it would be fired upon, which, under my orders, was done accordingly when a third attempt to approach me in that manner was made. At about 8 o'clock in the evening the enemy brought up two pieces of artillery and fired several rounds at a brick house inside of my breast-works, which firing, however, did not interfere in the least with my skirmishers, who kept up their firing continually during the night. At about 11 o'clock the enemy's artillery fire was renewed, and solid shot and shell

thrown into my breast-works and the before mentioned brick house until about 12 p. m. From that time to daybreak the sharpshooters and advanced skirmishers picked at each other lively, when, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, I saw the head of Wheeler's column move out of town toward Tunnel Hill, and an hour or two afterward heard heavy firing in that direction. Knowing then that reinforcements had arrived, my men were ordered to charge toward the Spring Place road, and with an uncommon cheering they rushed out of the works and drove the enemy, with a severe loss to him, out of sight."

The day after Wheeler entered Dalton, Kilpatrick swooped down on the West Point road at Fairburn, doing considerable damage before he returned to Sandtown, but this expedition was really superfluous, so far as the importance of that railroad to Hood was concerned. It had been decided to abandon it. Kilpatrick reported on the 16th: "I succeeded in reaching and destroying the depot and public buildings at Fairburn, telegraph wire and railroad track for about three miles. Drove Ross's brigade, of Jackson's division, out of his camp, situated on Camp Creek, about three miles from the railroad, and went into camp late last evening near that point. I marched at an early hour this morning, crossing Camp Creek, and moved to attack Jackson's division, said to be situated on Camp Creek road, near East Point, but I was unable to find any force of the enemy. I scouted the entire country between Camp Creek and the railroad to within one mile and a half of East Point. I was informed that the enemy had here a considerable force of infantry, and a part of Jackson's division of cavalry, dismounted and in the trenches. The enemy seemed to make but little or no effort to prevent me from reaching the railroad at any point below East Point Station. I infer from this that the road is to be abandoned. The enemy's cavalry has certainly all been withdrawn from this portion of his line save two brigades, of Jackson's division, which force is not at all formidable."

Sherman was nevertheless elated. To General Elliott, chief of cavalry, he wrote: "I believe General Kilpatrick, with his own and General Garrard's cavalry, could go straight for Rough and Ready, and break the Macon road all to pieces." Of

Garrard he had a poor opinion. He regarded him as over-cautious and too slow for a cavalry chief. When Sherman heard Garrard had returned to Decatur without even having had a brush with the enemy, he became enraged and determined to remove him from command, telling Thomas he would put Garrard on his staff and send him to Nashville to supervise the equipment and armament of cavalry. He recommended the appointment of Colonel Long as a brigadier, in order that he might be eligible to succeed General Garrard. Thomas interceded for Garrard, reminding Sherman that he had done good work on his Roswell and Covington raids, and that his caution saved his cavalry to the army, where in command of a mad-cap it would soon share the fate of Stoneman. Sherman replied petulantly: "I am willing to admit that General Garrard's excessive prudence saves his cavalry to us, but though saved, it is as useless as so many sticks. Saving himself, he sacrifices others operating in conjoint expeditions. I am so thoroughly convinced that if he can see a horseman in the distance with a spy-glass he will turn back, that I cannot again depend on his making an effort, though he knows a commander depends on him. If we cannot use that cavalry now, at this moment, when can we? Wheeler is out of the way, and when shall we use cavalry, if not now? If we wait till Wheeler returns, of course an opportunity is lost, which never is repeated in war."

With the ironical humor that was so much his nature, Sherman reported Garrard's return to Generals Schofield and Howard, as follows: "General Garrard is back; went seven miles; saw some horsemen and came back. General John E. Smith is at Resaca, and the enemy is at Spring Place. I think Generals Smith and Steedman can so manage that Wheeler will be driven north." Garrard's removal was held in abeyance, however, through Thomas's influence. Sherman determined to lose no time in striking hard at the Macon road with cavalry. He ordered Kilpatrick and Garrard to fit up a formidable expedition to break the road effectually near Jonesboro. "If Wheeler interrupts our supplies," Sherman remarked, "we can surely cut off those of Hood, and see who can stand it best." To McCook he wired: "Remain with General Smith and help him all you

can. If you can keep Wheeler up about Spring Place and Cleveland, do so. Telegraph to Colonel Donaldson, Nashville, to send down cavalry by cars, and also call for all cavalry you can hear of that is within reach. I want Wheeler dogged, the prisoners and plunder rescued, and his force damaged all that is possible."

In the meantime, Wheeler was a source of great vexation to Sherman. Before he crossed the Tennessee line, in obedience to Hood's orders, he kept the Federal communications interrupted for the better part of two weeks. After he vacated Dalton, Wheeler detached marauding parties to harry the enemy in every way possible, and during the whole month of August Sherman was in almost daily receipt of messages apprising him of minor injuries to his telegraph and railroad. Wheeler says he only abandoned North Georgia because he could get no fit forage for his horses, which were in a pitiable condition and lining the roads with their emaciated carcasses. He sought the fertile valleys of the Oconee and Hiwassee to save his command from being dismounted. Wheeler did not return to Hood until after the fall of Atlanta, rejoining the army at Cedartown, when Hood was about to set out on his grand expedition against Sherman's line of communication. His long raid was a severe one on his command, but in many respects highly successful. He labored to cut the enemy off from obtaining forage in southeast Tennessee, destroyed the railroad from Cleveland to Charleston, crossed the Hiwassee and captured Athens, where were stored many Federal supplies, and broke the railroad on to Loudon. Small Federal garrisons were attacked and captured by Wheeler as he passed through a wide section of Tennessee, together with many horses, mules, cattle, and miscellaneous stores and supplies. He had a hot brush with a column of Federal cavalry while crossing the Holston river above Knoxville, which he repulsed with considerable loss. Wheeler was greatly embarrassed by the detachment of two brigades from his command under Williams, who had undertaken an unsuccessful expedition against Strawberry Plains. Williams took off half the artillery, and being unable to rejoin Wheeler, the latter was compelled to make his extensive raid across Tennessee, nearly to Nashville, without him. Much

damage was done to the railroad between Chattanooga and Nashville, including rolling stock. Near the latter city General Rousseau came out to oppose Wheeler with a superior force of infantry and cavalry, but unsuccessfully. In this engagement Harrison's brigade charged the Federals, driving them two miles, capturing 3 stand of colors, a number of prisoners, arms, etc. Wheeler dashed upon the Nashville and Decatur road, breaking it very badly. Several loaded trains were destroyed. Wheeler says: "During these movements Major-Generals Rousseau and Steedman and Brigadier-Generals Croxton and Granger had concentrated their forces and had attacked me at Franklin, Lynnville, Campbellville, and other points. In every instance they were repulsed, although their troops outnumbered mine fourfold." From the Alabama border Wheeler was ordered to return east and do mischief to Sherman's railroad south of Chattanooga, Forrest being in position to look after Tennessee. Wheeler again got upon the Western and Atlantic, and says of his execution: "I moved with the balance of my command to the railroad near Dalton, captured and destroyed a train of cars, and destroyed the railroad to such an extent that, with the additional effect of a heavy rain, no train passed over the road for a period of thirteen days. I here received an order to return immediately to the army which I joined near Cedartown."

Wheeler reported his losses on the entire expedition as 150 men killed, wounded and missing, while he brought out more than 2,000 recruits for his own and other commands and returned 800 absentees to the army. He brought off all his wounded who could bear transportation, and fully 100 captured wagons. He sums up the result of the expedition:

"First. Causing the enemy to send to their rear to reinforce their garrisons, troops several times as strong as my force.

"Second. The destruction of the enemy's line of communication for a longer period than any cavalry expedition, however large, has done.

"Third. The capture, destruction, or appropriation of stores.

"Fourth. Breaking up depots and fortified posts in Tennessee and Georgia.



"Fifth. Capture of 1,000 horses and mules, 200 wagons, 600 prisoners, and 1,700 head of beef-cattle.

"Sixth. Capture and destruction of over 20 trains of cars loaded with supplies.

"Seventh. Bringing into the service of the Confederate States over 3,000 recruits.

"All this was accomplished behind the enemy's line with a loss of but 150 men killed, wounded and missing. In every engagement with the enemy's cavalry we were in all respects victorious, capturing prisoners, colors, and arms.

"During the time embraced in this report my command has averaged twenty-five miles a day in direct marching, either swam or forded twenty-seven rivers, and has captured, killed or wounded three times the greatest effective strength it has ever been able to carry into action. Besides this it has captured and turned over to the government an amount of property of more value than the entire expense of my command has been to the Confederate States."

Referring to the cavalry operations of this period, particularly to Sherman's attempt to do damage to his line of communication while Wheeler was absent, General Hood says: "The 19th, high two weeks after Wheeler's departure with about one-half of our cavalry force, General Sherman took advantage of the absence of these troops and again attempted a lodgment on the Macon road with cavalry. At 3.30 a.m., General Kilpatrick was reported to be moving via Fairburn, in the direction of Jonesboro. General Jackson quickly divined his object, moved rapidly in pursuit, overtook him at an early hour, attacked and forced him to retreat after sustaining considerable loss in killed, wounded and prisoners. The Federals had previously destroyed a mile and a half of the Macon road, and they had cut the wires and destroyed the depot at Jonesboro.

"Our cavalry also drove a brigade of the enemy from the Augusta road on the 22d, which affair, together with the happy results obtained in the engagement with Kilpatrick, demonstrated conclusively that the absence of one-half of our mounted force notwithstanding, we had still a sufficient number, with Jackson, to protect not only the flanks of the army, but likewise

our communications against similar raids, and, moreover, to defend our people against pillaging expeditions.

"The severe handling by Wheeler and Iverson of the troops under Stoneman and McCook, together with Jackson's success, induced me not to recall Wheeler's 4,500 men, who were still operating against the railroad to Nashville. I had, moreover, become convinced that our cavalry was able to compete successfully with double their number. Our cavalry were not cavalrymen proper, but were mounted riflemen, trained to dismount and hold in check or delay the advance of the enemy, and who had learned by experience that they could without much difficulty defeat the Federal cavalry."

The story of Kilpatrick's cavalry raid against Jonesboro on the 19th of August is an interesting one. He was partially successful. His attack on the Macon road had a very vital bearing on Sherman's subsequent movement of his entire army around to the west and south of Atlanta, and the final battle of Jonesboro. Kilpatrick assured Sherman of his confidence in his ability to do what was expected of him, and Sherman set the night of the 18th as the date for setting out from Sandtown. Sherman said to Thomas: "I do not want to move this vast army and its paraphernalia round Atlanta unless forced to do so, and it does seem the enemy has offered us the very opportunity we seek. We know positively that Wheeler is above Dalton, and that he must have taken the very flower of his cavalry. He has, and may do us harm, but that we cannot help. I do not think he can carry any point of our road that he can maintain, and his own necessities will force him back soon with jaded and worn-out horses. Now, ours can be moved quickly to Sandtown at a walk, and according to General Kilpatrick can reach Red Oak or any point below the enemy's infantry, and by a single dash can beat the remaining cavalry of the enemy and break up many miles of that railroad. General Garrard with one brigade could amuse those on the east, and General Kilpatrick with his own and two brigades of General Garrard, under Colonel Long, could make in a single move a break that would disturb Hood seriously. The risk will be comparatively small, as General Schofield can act in support with his whole command. I am perfectly alive to the fact that

the loss of our cavalry would be most serious, but I do think such an opportunity if neglected will never again appear."

Sherman sent to Thomas the following instructions for Kilpatrick: "I beg you will convey the following orders to govern General Kilpatrick in his movement on the Macon road. It is not a raid, but a deliberate attack for the purpose of so disabling that road that the enemy will be unable to supply his army in Atlanta. He will have his own division of cavalry and two good brigades from General Garrard's division. With these he will move to-morrow night, aiming to cross the West Point road between Red Oak and Fairburn. If he has time he should remove a small section of the road without using fire, simply to lessen the chances of an infantry force being sent to intercept his return. He should then move in force to the nearest point of the Macon road, about Jonesboro, and should destroy as much of that road as he possibly can do, working steadily until forced to take to his arms and horses for battle. He should avoid battle with infantry or artillery, but may safely fight any cavalry he encounters, because we know that the enemy has sent Wheeler with full 6,000 cavalry up into East Tennessee. I leave the extent of the break to General Kilpatrick, but will only say that he cannot destroy too much. Having fulfilled his task he will return and resume his post on the right flank of the army and send General Garrard's brigades back to their division on the left. General Schofield will be instructed to move to his right as far as prudent the day after to-morrow and all the army should so engage the attention of the enemy that he cannot detach infantry as against General Kilpatrick. Instruct the general to advise us at the earliest possible moment of his success."

The day before Kilpatrick started Sherman received word from Allatoona that 700 of the cattle captured by Wheeler had been recaptured by his own cavalry, and that the broken railroad would be speedily repaired. Steedman reported that the Federal loss at Dalton was 10 killed and 55 wounded, to 200 of the enemy killed and wounded. Two surgeons and 40 of Wheeler's wounded were captured.


The following instructions were given General Garrard by Thomas to aid Kilpatrick while making his attempt to break the

Macon road: "To facilitate the success of General Kilpatrick as much as possible, I wish you to be in Decatur by daylight to-morrow morning (19th) with the effective force you have with you. Then move in the direction of Flat Rock and Atlanta, and so attract the enemy's attention by skirmishing and threatening as to induce him to believe that you are about to attack his flank, then by moving off toward Stone Mountain, draw him after you as far as possible, and swing round toward your present position in the direction of Peachtree road. This movement should be continued throughout the day, and the enemy should be threatened again early on the morning of the 20th instant by a similar movement as the one above directed. By this means it is hoped you will be able to hold all the cavalry the enemy now has on his right flank, and thereby give General Kilpatrick at least twelve hours on the Macon road."

On the 17th General Grant sent the following dispatch to General Sherman from City Point: "Richmond papers of the 17th give it as the opinion of military men that Atlanta can hold out one month yet. In the meantime, like Micawber, they expect something to turn up. If you can hold fast as you are now and prevent raids upon your rear you will destroy most of that army. I never would advise going backward even if your roads are cut so as to preclude the possibility of receiving supplies from the North, but would recommend the accumulation of ordnance stores and supplies while you can, and if it comes to the worst move south as you suggested."

On the 18th Sherman sent this information to Halleck: "We have been hammering away at Atlanta, and I was going to put a corps (intrenched) at the railroad bridge, and with the balance swing round by the south and east; but Hood has sent off his cavalry, which touched our road at two or three points, which are already repaired, and that cavalry has gone up into East Tennessee, leaving me now superior in cavalry, and I hope the opportunity thus given me will save me the risk and excessive labor of making a wide circuit in this hot weather. To-night General Kilpatrick will start for the Macon road with five brigades of cavalry, which can whip all the enemy's cavalry present, and to-morrow I will demonstrate along my whole line to give





Entrance to Oakland Cemetery

Where many of Atlanta's gallant defenders who fell in the engagements around the city lie buried



General Kilpatrick time to make a good break in that road, so vital to Hood. We all feel confident we can succeed, and for that reason I do not regret that Wheeler has gone up to East Tennessee. I think we have force enough at Knoxville, the Gap, and Kingston to hold vital points until necessity will force Wheeler to come back; but I will leave him to be attended to by those in my rear."

On the 18th Sherman expressed a fear that Hood might attempt to pass around his left flank in the direction of Roswell, following the movement of Wheeler's cavalry. In such a contingency he proposed to move Schofield, and, if need be, Howard, in that direction. During Kilpatrick's absence of four days, the entire Federal army made extraordinary demonstrations to hold Hood in his trenches, and especially to hold his cavalry on his flanks. Schofield threatened to make a lodgment against the Macon road near East Point, and Stanley, on the extreme Federal left, threatened to get around the Confederate flank near Decatur. The commanders reported the enemy in as great force as ever, apparently expecting an attack. In the meantime, Sherman went ahead with his preparations to swing his army astride of the Macon road, if such a course was necessary by Kilpatrick's failure. He had already promulgated his orders for the purpose, but deferred their execution until Kilpatrick had had time to act. His plan will be thoroughly explained in the following chapter. On the 22d Kilpatrick got back with what was left of his command, and that night Sherman wired Halleck:

"General Kilpatrick is back. He had pretty hard fighting with a division of infantry and three brigades of cavalry. He broke the cavalry into disorder and captured a battery, which he destroyed, except one gun, which he brought in in addition to all his own. He also brought in 3 captured flags and 70 prisoners. He had possession of a large part of Ross's brigade, but could not encumber himself with them. He destroyed three miles of the road about Jonesboro, and broke pieces for about 10 miles more, enough to disable the road for ten days. I expect I will have to swing across to that road in force to make the matter certain. General Kilpatrick destroyed 2 locomotives and trains. It has been very quiet with us here. Wheeler is about Athens,

Tenn., and General Steedman will move out against him from Chattanooga."

General Kilpatrick's story of his hazardous expedition follows: "I left my camp at Sandtown on the evening of the 18th instant with the Third Cavalry Division, and two brigades of the Second and two batteries of artillery, numbering 4,500 men, to attack and destroy the enemy's communications. Pickets from the Sixth Texas were met and driven across Camp Creek, and the regiment routed from its camp a mile beyond at 10 o'clock in the evening, and at 12.30 a. m. General Ross's brigade, 1,100 strong, was driven from my front in direction of East Point, and held from the road by the Second Brigade, Third Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Jones), while the entire command passed. The West Point railroad was reached, and a portion of the track destroyed at daylight. Here General Ross attacked my rear. He was repulsed, and I moved on the Fayetteville road, where I again found him in front. He slowly retired in the direction of Jonesborough, and crossed Flint river at 2 p. m., destroying the bridge. Under cover of my artillery Colonels Minty and Long, commanding detachments from their brigades, crossed the river and drove the enemy from his rifle-pits. The bridge was repaired, and the entire command crossed and occupied Jonesboro at 5 p. m., driving the enemy's cavalry in confusion from the town. I now learned that the telegraph and railroad had been destroyed at Bear Creek Station at 11 a. m. by a portion of my command, under Lieutenant-Colonel Klein, and that General Armstrong had passed through Jonesboro in that direction at 1 p. m. For six hours my entire command was engaged in destroying the road. At 11 o'clock in the evening Colonel Murray's division was attacked one mile below the town and driven back. I now suspended operations upon the road and attacked the enemy and drove him one mile and a half. Fearing an attack from the direction of Atlanta, I moved before daylight, in direction of Covington, five miles, and halted and allowed the enemy to come up; left one brigade to engage his attention, and moved rapidly in direction of McDonough, six miles, thence across the country to the Fayetteville road, and reached the railroad one mile above Lovejoy's Station at 11 a. m. on the 20th instant. On attempting to move on the station I encountered a brigade of infantry—was

repulsed; I and my command only saved by the prompt and daring [bravery] of Colonels Minty and Long, and Captain Estes, my assistant adjutant-general.

"The enemy were finally checked and driven back with heavy loss. We captured 1 battle-flag. At this moment a staff officer from Colonel Murray informed me that a large force of cavalry, with artillery, had attacked his rear. In twenty minutes I found that I was completely enveloped by cavalry and infantry, with artillery. I decided at once to ride over the enemy's cavalry and retire on the McDonough road. A large number of my people were dismounted, fighting on foot, and it took some time to mount them and form my command for the charge. During the delay the enemy constructed long lines of barricades on every side. Those in front of his cavalry were very formidable. Pioneers were sent in front of the charging columns to remove obstructions. Colonel Minty, with his command in three columns, charged, broke, and rode over the enemy's left. Colonel Murray, with his regiments, broke his center, and in a moment General Jackson's division, 4,000 strong, was running in great confusion. It was the most perfect rout any cavalry has sustained during the war. We captured 4 guns (3 were destroyed and 1 brought off); 3 battle-flags were taken; his ambulances, wagons, and ordnance train captured, and destroyed as far as possible; many prisoners were taken, and his killed and wounded is known to be large. My command was quickly reformed, thrown into position, fought successfully the enemy's infantry for one hour and forty minutes, and only retired when it was found that we had left only sufficient ammunition to make sure our retreat. We swam Cotton Indian Creek and crossed South River on the morning of the 21st and reached our lines near Decatur, by way of Lithonia, without molestation, at 2 p. m. August 22. We effectively destroyed four miles of the Macon road, from Jonesboro to Bear Creek Station, a distance of ten miles. One train of cars was fully, and a second partially, destroyed. We brought into camp 1 gun, 3 battle-flags, and a large number of fresh horses and mules and about 50 prisoners. My entire loss in killed, wounded and missing will not exceed 300 men. Two hundred of this number were killed and wounded. Only the dangerously wounded were left with the enemy."

## CHAPTER XXXVI

### SHERMAN'S GRAND FLANK MOVEMENT

In order thoroughly to understand the grand flank movement that landed practically all of Sherman's army "astride of the Macon road," compelling Hood to give Sherman battle and abandon Atlanta, the publication of the special field orders governing the movement will be found of service. It was Sherman's purpose to execute this movement a week before he did so, but he concluded to await the result of Kilpatrick's cavalry raid against the Macon railroad in the vicinity of Jonesboro, hoping that sufficient damage would be done the enemy's single line of communication to render unnecessary the abandonment of his original lines to the north and west of Atlanta. It took several days for Kilpatrick to make his expedition and return, and several days longer for Sherman to learn that the damage he had done had been overestimated. The following orders, therefore, are substantially as carried out, with the modification of the dates caused by the delay :

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS,    HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,  
No. 57                    *In the Field, near Atlanta, August 16, 1864.*

The movement of the army against the Macon railroad will begin Thursday night, August 18, and will be continued on the following general plan :

I. All army commanders will send across the Chattahoochee River and within the old rebel works at the bridge and down as far as Turner's Ferry all surplus wagons, horses, men, and materials not absolutely necessary to the success of the expedition, and will collect in their wagons with best teams bread, meat, sugar, coffee, etc., for fifteen days after the 19th, and ammunition, and park them near Utoy Creek.

First move: General Kilpatrick's cavalry will move to Camp Creek; General Schofield will cover the Campbellton road, and General Thomas will move one corps (General Williams's) to the Chattahoochee bridge, with orders to hold it, Pace's Ferry bridge, and a pontoon bridge (Captain Kossak's), at Turner's Ferry, ready to be laid down if necessary. The other corps, General Stanley's, will move south of Proctor's Creek, to near the Utoy, behind the right center of the Army of the Tennessee, prepared to cover the Bell's Ferry road. General Garrard's cavalry will fall behind Peachtree Creek, and act against the enemy should he sally against General Williams's or General Stanley's corps during the movement.

Second move: The Army of the Tennessee will withdraw, cross Utoy Creek, and move by the most direct road toward Fairburn, going as far as Camp Creek. General Thomas will mass his two corps, Generals Stanley's and Johnson's, below Utoy Creek, and General Garrard's cavalry will join General Thomas by the most direct road or by way of Sandtown bridge, and act with him during the rest of the move. General Schofield will advance abreast of and in communication with the Army of the Tennessee as far as Camp Creek.

Third move: The Armies of the Ohio and Tennessee will move direct for the West Point road, aiming to strike it between Red Oak and Fairburn. General Thomas will follow well closed up in two columns, the trains between. General Kilpatrick will act as the advance, and General Garrard will cover the rear, under direction of General Thomas. The bridges at Sandtown will be kept and protected by a detachment of cavalry detailed by General Elliott, with a section of guns or four-gun battery.

II. During the movement, and until the army returns to the river, the utmost care will be taken to expose as little as possible the trains of cars and wagons. The depots at the bridge, at Allatoona and Marietta will be held against any attack, and communications kept up with the army as far as possible by way of Sandtown. On reaching any railroad, the troops will at once be disposed for defense, and at least one-third put to work to tear up track and destroy iron, ties, and all railroad materials.

By order of Major-General Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.



While Sherman was awaiting Kilpatrick's return and completing his arrangements to move his army to the south of Atlanta the news of Wheeler's activities was not calculated to improve his patience. Nearly every day his telegraph and railroad communications with Chattanooga or Nashville were interrupted, and the forces under Steedman did not seem able to effectually prevent the enemy's small raids or to inflict any appreciable degree of punishment upon the raiders. General McCook, commanding the chief cavalry force operating against Wheeler in North Georgia, made the following suggestion on the 22d of August: "I am satisfied that the recent attacks on the road south of the Etowah have been encouraged and assisted by citizens. If some terrible lesson is not taught them now, our line of communication will suffer through the whole campaign. If they learn that when they destroy our railroad we will destroy their houses, I think they will be willing to quit. The experiment is worth trying, at any rate." On the 23d Sherman wired his commanders that "as near as I can make out the rebels have repaired the Macon road, and we must swing across it." Kilpatrick had returned but the day before, making a report that Sherman thought justified the belief that the road was broken for ten days at least. On the same day Sherman wired Halleck:

"All well. Give currency to the idea that I am to remain quiet till events transpire in other quarters, and let the idea be printed, so as to reach Richmond in three days. You understand the effect."

On the 24th General Garrard took a brigade of his cavalry to Stone Mountain and broke a stretch of five miles of the Augusta railroad that had been left intact by former breaking expeditions. That Sherman had counted on the contingency of being cut off from his communications at the Chattahoochee river bridge and a movement to exactly the opposite side of Atlanta, is shown by the following message to Thomas:

"Have your signal corps provided with rockets and agree upon signals by rockets or signal smoke for a few simple messages such as 'All well,' 'Send boats to Campbellton,' 'Send a brigade, division, or regiment to Campbellton,' also 'Look out for us at Roswell.' These signals may be of use to us when we get beyond safe distance for couriers via Sandtown."

The commander at Dalton informed Sherman on the 23d that a company sent from Resaca to engage the enemy's cavalry near Spring Place had been repulsed and well nigh all captured. On the 24th Sherman wired Halleck:

"Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery. I will be all ready and will commence the movement round Atlanta by the south to-morrow night, and for some time you will hear little of me. I will keep open a courier line with Chattahoochee bridge by way of Sandtown. The Twentieth Corps will hold the bridge, and I will move with the balance of the army, provisioned for twenty days."

From the Chattahoochee bridge Sherman sent this message to Thomas on the 24th: "You had better order down the pioneers and working parties with Lieutenant Ludlow, engineer department, and prepare the bridge-head before the troops come down; the two small redoubts here on this side are inefficient and of little account. It may be the troops will not have time to cover themselves and the bridge before Hood may strike them, as his first impression may and will be that our whole army is retiring."

It is certain that Kilpatrick's raid did not disconcert Hood to any great extent, though inconveniencing him somewhat. He referred to the incident in a six-line dispatch to Richmond, stating that the damage done was slight and that the enemy's cavalry had been completely routed at Lovejoy's Station and many prisoners, two stands of colors and one piece of artillery captured.

On the night of the 24th Sherman accomplished the first stage of his grand movement according to programme, and in the morning the Confederates discovered his withdrawal from their immediate front. They moved their skirmishers into the old Federal works, but offered no opposing movement. The Federal lookouts reported from their signal stations: "The enemy could be seen, gathered in groups, looking intently toward our late lines." This at 7.30. "At 11 a. m. a few straggling rebels could be seen rambling about the works lately held by the Twentieth Army Corps. These stragglers picked up a few of our men that straggled behind, probably from the Fourth Army Corps, as a portion of that corps were in that vicinity."

On the evening of the 25th the army telegrapher wired Washington: "Armies finally in motion. Headquarters Army

of the Cumberland struck camp at 9 a. m. his day, and my front office is now at Chattahoochee, near the railroad bridge, where Stanley, with his Fourth Corps, is intrenched. General Steedman telegraphs from Charleston, Tenn., that Wheeler has crossed the Little Tennessee, and is crossing Holston, going to Middle Tennessee or Kentucky, probably the former, to destroy railroads."

On the 26th Sherman informed Halleck: "I have moved the Twentieth Corps to the Chattahoochee bridge, where it is intrenched, and with the balance of the army am moving for Jonesboro on the Macon road. Last night we made the first move without trouble; to-night I make the second, and the third will place the army massed near Fairburn. If Hood attacks he must come out, which is all we ask. All well thus far."

Hood wired the secretary of war at Richmond as follows on the 26th: "Last night the enemy abandoned the Augusta railroad and all the country between that road and the Dalton railroad. His left now rests on the Dalton railroad. He has not extended his right at all. We received to-day 1,000 head of cattle, captured by a portion of Major-General Wheeler's command."

On the 27th General Slocum, lately arrived from the Mississippi to succeed Hooker in command of the Twentieth Army Corps, sent Sherman the following message from his station at the bridge: "I have the honor to report that I have to-day assumed the command of the Twentieth Corps. The corps is in position as directed, at Pace's, Montgomery's, and Turner's Ferries, and intrenched. Yesterday afternoon Geary's division, at Pace's Ferry, had some sharp skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry, capturing a few prisoners. My headquarters are near the railroad bridge."

Hood sent another message to the secretary of war on the 27th, saying: "Last night the enemy continued [to] change their position by their left and center. They have drawn back so that their left is now on the Chattahoochee at the railroad bridge; their right is unchanged, and they appear to be moving troops in that direction. They have no troops nearer than four miles of Atlanta."

Sherman's plan was to break the West Point railroad thoroughly with infantry before moving over to the Macon railroad at or near Jonesboro. He accomplished the second stage of his movement without opposition and wired Washington on the 28th: "Army of Tennessee is on the West Point railroad near Fairburn; Army of the Cumberland is on the same road at Red Oak; and that of the Ohio will be to-night at Camp Creek. Enemy has made no serious opposition to our movement."

Sherman spent the 29th in breaking the West Point railroad in the most approved military fashion. His mode of procedure, as given in his instructions to Thomas, may interest the reader. He said: "Let the destruction be so thorough that not a rail or tie can be used again. My own experience demonstrates the proper method to be: To march a regiment to the road, stack arms, loosen two rails opposite the right and two opposite the left of the regiment, then to heave the whole track, rails and ties, over, breaking it all to pieces, then pile the ties in the nature of crib work and lay the rails over them, then by means of fence rails make a bonfire, and when the rails are red-hot in the middle let men give the rail a twist, which cannot be straightened without machinery. Also fill up some of the cuts with heavy logs and trunks of trees and branches and cover up and fill with dirt."

The Confederates made a demonstration upon General Cox's right, Schofield's corps, about noon of the 28th, but got back into their works without fighting upon finding the Federals in force. Cox then withdrew and followed the rest of the army without annoyance. After Sherman had completed his work of destroying the West Point road and was ready to resume the direct offensive against Hood at Jonesboro, he instructed Slocum at the Chattahoochee bridge: "The major-general commanding directs that you assume command of and collect together all stragglers who are to be found in your vicinity. Those that are armed, organize for the defense of the *tete-de-pont*; those that are unarmed put to work upon the defenses. The same will apply to detachments of convalescents, etc., en route to join their regiments. He also directs that you keep out pickets and watch well the movements of the enemy, and should he leave Atlanta, to occupy the place by, say, one division, if you can do so without endangering the safety

of the *tete-de-pont*. It seems impossible that the rebels should be able to carry away all their artillery and ammunition, and if you cannot hold the place you may possibly destroy this artillery and ammunition."

On the 30th the movement against the Macon road began in earnest. The Army of the Tennessee moved direct for Jonesboro, the other two grand divisions heading to strike the road north of Howard. During the march the Federals were greatly annoyed by the Confederate cavalry under Jackson, and as they approached the Macon railroad their skirmishers came constantly in contact with the enemy's pickets. General Stanley, commanding the Fourth Army Corps, had quite a brush with the enemy on the Flat Shoals road. While the army was thus advancing to the south of Atlanta, General Slocum cautiously reconnoitered with a brigade to the very gates of Atlanta, finding only cavalry outside the city's defenses.


Early on the morning of the 31st General Sherman sent this dispatch to Washington: "At this time I would not suggest a change in the geographical lines of the Departments of the Ohio and the Cumberland because Generals Thomas and Schofield are now in actual battle and cannot give their attention to the necessary details. I will see both of them to-day and will then communicate my opinion. We reached the West Point railroad and broke up twelve miles of it thoroughly; then marched on a big left wheel for the Macon road, General Schofield on the left, aiming for Rough and Ready, General Thomas center, and General Howard right, aiming for Jonesboro. The left and center as yet have met little or no opposition, but General Howard has fought two brigades of cavalry all the way from Fairburn. Last night darkness overtook him within a mile of Jonesboro, having pushed the cavalry so close that he secured the Flint River bridge. To-day I press at all points, but expect to make a lodgment on the road at or below Jonesboro, when I propose to swing the whole army upon it and break it all to pieces. I expect, and am prepared for, hard fighting, and have the army well in hand."

In the meantime the Confederates were not inactive. Reynolds's and Lewis's brigades had been early sent to Jonesboro, and



General Hardee, with his fine corps at Rough and Ready, was ready at a moment's notice to march to the point first threatened. General Howell Cobb, at Macon, was telegraphed: "General Hood desires the militia to come up. If necessary organized troops had better be sent to General Winder." On the 30th, Hardee received orders to move his corps to Jonesboro that night, and General Lee was ordered to follow up the movement with his corps. Brigadier-General Lewis, at Jonesboro, was ordered to co-operate with General Armstrong's cavalry in preventing the enemy crossing Flint river before Hardee and Lee could get in position at Jonesboro. To Lewis Hood wired on the evening of the 30th: "Hold your position at all hazards. Help is ordered to you." In the afternoon of that day it seems that Hood was not advised fully as to the magnitude of Sherman's movement. To General Jackson at Rough and Ready he wired: "General Hood does not think there can be a large force advancing upon Jonesboro. Please ascertain from Armstrong what infantry it is, if possible."

General Howard speaks as follows of the grand flank movement to Jonesboro: "Sherman now having his supplies well up, beginning on the night of the 25th of August, intrenched Slocum's strong corps across his railroad communication to defend it; then made another grand wheel of his army. Schofield this time clung to the pivot. My command described an arc of 25 miles radius aiming at Jonesboro, while Thomas followed the middle course. Both southern railways were to be seized, and the station and road destroyed. Preceded by Kilpatrick, we made the march rapidly enough, considering the endless plague of the enemy's horse artillery supported by Wheeler's cavalry, and the time it took us to break up the West Point railroad. At Renfro Place we were to encamp on the night of the 30th of August. Finding no water there, and also hoping to secure the Flint River bridge, six miles ahead, I called to Kilpatrick for a squadron. He sent me a most energetic young man, Captain Estes, and the horsemen needed. I asked Estes if he could keep the enemy in motion. He gave a sanguine reply, and galloped off at the head of his men. Wheeler's rear guard was surprised, and hurried toward the river. Hazen's infantry followed, forgetting



Confederate Monument, Oakland Cemetery

their fatigue in the excitement of pursuit. We reached the bridge as it was burning, extinguished the fire, crossed over in the dusk of the evening under an increasing fire from hostile cavalry and infantry, but did not stop until Logan had reached the wooded ridge beyond, near Jonesboro. The command was soon put into position and worked all night and during the next morning to intrench and build the required bridges. Hood had sent Hardee by rail, with perhaps half of his command, to hold Jonesboro. My Confederate classmate, S. D. Lee, who had had the immediate assault at Ezra Church, here appeared again, commanding Cheat-ham's corps."

Sherman expected to throw his army upon the Macon and Western railroad at or near Jonesboro before Hood could reach the latter point with a large body of troops. He was aware that Hardee was at Rough and Ready, but thought he would be afraid to venture further from Atlanta when the entire Federal army was aiming at the railroad between Rough and Ready and Jonesboro. If heavy battle was to follow, Schofield, who was to strike nearest to Rough and Ready, was expected to bear the brunt. With this idea of the situation, Sherman sent Schofield a message on the morning of the 31st, telling him how to handle Hardee. Among other things he said: "I do not think the enemy will attack now, because Howard is within 200 yards of the railroad at Jonesboro, intrenched. He has three bridges and feels strong, but the darkness of night prevented him reaching the road, but he was to resume operations at daylight. I have ordered one of Davis's divisions down to Renfro's, and expect to send the whole to Howard's flank, but will keep Stanley near him, but will soon send him to the right and let you stand the brunt if Hardee comes out of Rough and Ready. He has some works about the Mount Zion Church, and likely has his corps there. It is not as good as yours. I don't wish you to attack it in position, but to hold it, and as much more as possible, for the other, which is the real attack. After selecting your ground feel the enemy with skirmishers, and if possible you may push in a strong party by Thames's Mill, aiming to reach the railroad about two miles below Rough and Ready. This can only be done, of course, in case of what I want to prevent—Hood fronting Howard with all

his combined force. Relieve Howard all you can, but prepare to take advantage of all successes. I want Garrard's cavalry the moment you can spare him, and you can spare him the moment you have a good flank."

But Hardee and Lee had got to Jonesboro. However, Schofield arrived upon the railroad soon enough to cut off some of their troops. A long train heavily loaded was turned back to Atlanta as his troops took possession of the railroad. Schofield informed Sherman of his success as follows:

"I struck the railroad a mile below Rough and Ready at 3 o'clock. Have Cox's division in position fortifying and breaking track. Stanley is now coming in on my right, and we will soon be abundantly strong. The enemy was running cars down with troops up to the moment we reached the road. They held a pretty good position, well fortified, but we pushed in a strong force at once, and drove them out before they had time to reinforce very much. The enemy retreated toward Rough and Ready."

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 31st Howard reported to Sherman: "Kilpatrick made an attempt to get upon the railroad, but met with so strong a resistance that he gave it up for daylight. He says Logan's center is about 800 yards from the depot. The town is to our right and the depot in the direct front. The Sixteenth Corps is on the west side of the river, and prolonging the line of Logan. The Seventeenth Corps did not get up; is three miles back. I intended to place it in position facing north, virtually prolonging Logan's left; it will move at daylight in the morning. My only exposure is in that direction. If you will push hard enough to prevent the enemy from striking me this side of Flint River it will be all right; my officers apprehend it more than I do. My information is that the enemy had here four brigades of infantry on our arrival, and more are coming. I understand your anxiety to get the road; no exertion will be spared as soon as we can see. The Seventeenth Corps will move up at daylight."

Sherman ordered Howard to order Kilpatrick to reach well to the right, break the telegraph and take up a few rails, while Howard got possession of and fortified some point commanding

the railroad. Sherman said: "We must have that road and it is worth to us a heavy battle. . . . I will see that you are supported either by direct help or by auxiliary attacks above and below you; but understand that my hope of success rests mainly with you. I am in the dead certainty of having heavy masses in close support, which are soon to be intrenched."

Howard replied that the enemy's position was such that an assault did not promise success. He said that the indications were that the Confederates would attack before the day was over, and that, in the meantime, he would intrench as strongly as the ground would permit. He said he had a position commanding the railroad station at Jonesboro, which he would batter down, and would make it impossible for the road in range of his guns to be used.

Sherman's reply to Howard is interesting in showing how unconscious he was of the near success of his long campaign against Atlanta. Atlanta was to be his on the following day, and yet he talks about transferring the scene of hostilities to Macon. He said:

"Your dispatch is received. Of course, now an attack by you on Jonesboro is out of the question, but you can make that position impregnable, and we can operate beyond. Baird is now moving toward the road four miles north of you, and Schofield about the mills, which of course is the strongest part of the enemy's works. I expect Garrard's cavalry can be relieved of guarding Schofield's trains to-day, and I will send it to Kilpatrick. The enemy is too smart for us, and we may have to maneuver thus down to Macon. It may be that some accident will happen, of which we can take advantage. Get your guns in position and damage trains passing, but it is useless to waste ammunition on the depot already reported burned by Kilpatrick. I cannot move the troops 100 yards without their stopping to intrench, though I have not seen an enemy. I have got Baird across Flint River, about due east of this point. Thomas is at Renfro's, and will come to your aid if you need him, but I think you have as many men as can operate at that point, and as soon as I can hear from Schofield further I will commence to move toward Griffin, the next accessible point. I have no idea that Hardee will attack



you, if you have any cover whatever. Get as many guns in as possible, so that by a simultaneous discharge you can knock a train to pieces at one discharge. It is only on condition that you can get on the road that I would put all of Thomas's troops on that side of the Flint."

To General Thomas Sherman wrote: "Inasmuch as I have already given orders to Schofield, based on the idea that he and Stanley move down the railroad, breaking it, till they come to Baird and Davis, near Jonesboro, I think we had better adhere to that plan till we develop the first step in the enemy's game, after he knows we are between him and Atlanta. I wish you to order Kilpatrick the moment he learns the enemy has gone south to hurry to Fayette Station and Griffin, hang on the flanks of the enemy while we push him to the rear. I propose to go as far as Griffin, utterly destroying the road, and then act according to circumstances. I would rather you should follow the enemy as he retreats, leaving the Army of the Tennessee to swing by the right, and that of the Ohio by the left. I am glad to hear that Baird also is on the railroad, and now the sooner we get all our army together in close order the better. You may put Davis in on the left of Howard, ready for Baird and Stanley to come up along the railroad. If Hood remains in Atlanta and Hardee commands at Jonesboro the latter may attempt to get back to Atlanta, in which event he may to-night run up against Baird, who should be put on his guard. You may give all the necessary orders that will bring your command together to attack and pursue that part of the Confederate army now at Jonesboro by whatever road it takes, and I will give directions to the armies to operate on its flanks. As soon as it is demonstrated on what road it retreats we can arrange to head it off. My own impression is that Hardee will try to join Hood in Atlanta. May send Schofield to-night, and I am anxious that Howard should keep in close contact."

Stanley's corps encountered strong Confederate intrenchments near Morrow's Mill, but occupied only by dismounted cavalry. After a brisk exchange of volleys, the Federals occupied the works and passed on toward the railroad, which they gained with no opposition, coming upon it immediately below Schofield.

General Baird made a strong demonstration against the railroad between Stanley's position and Jonesboro. These movements threw nearly the whole of Sherman's army between Rough and Ready and Jonesboro, dividing Hood with his one corps and the state troops from Hardee and Lee. Sherman believed that he could keep the two armies of the enemy apart, forcing Hardee and Lee to go to Macon, when he could turn upon Hood's attenuated lines and force his way into Atlanta. Sherman gave Thomas this order respecting the movements of Slocum, holding his base at the Chattahoochee bridge: "I wish you would instruct General Slocum at the bridge to feel forward to Atlanta, as boldly as he can, by the direct road leading from the bridge, and to send any cavalry force he can raise over toward Decatur to watch the movements of the enemy in that quarter. Advise him fully of the situation of affairs here, and assure him that we will fully occupy the attention of the rebel army outside of Atlanta."

Sherman was disappointed at Howard's failure to get upon the railroad at Jonesboro, and while the latter was momentarily expecting to be attacked, determined to assume the aggressive against the enemy in every quarter. To Thomas he wrote: "I send you for perusal Howard's letter of 3 a. m. He did not get the road, though I doubt not he is too close for the comfort of the enemy. He must not fail in this. Order one of Davis's divisions down at once to Renfro's, and move all your trains well to your right, so that you can rapidly fling your whole command over to Jonesboro. Then let Davis send out from his front, obliquely to the right front, a strong skirmish line with supports, as though to reach the railroad three or four miles above Jonesboro. Have Stanley do the same toward, but below Rough and Ready. Impress upon these commanders that it is not so necessary to have united lines, but rather columns of attack. We are not on the defensive, but offensive, and must risk everything rather than dilly-dally about. We must confuse the enemy. As soon as Schofield gets up I will put him against Rough and Ready till he meets formidable resistance."

General Hood gives the following description of the situation immediately preceding the decisive battle of Jonesboro: "Sherman had now been over one month continuously moving toward

our left and thoroughly fortifying, step by step, as he advanced in the direction of the Macon railroad. On the night of the 25th he withdrew from our immediate front; his works, which at an early hour the following morning we discovered to be abandoned, were occupied at a later hour by the corps of Stewart and Lee.

"On the 27th General G. W. Smith's division was ordered to the left to occupy the position of Stevenson's division which, together with Maury's command, was held in reserve. Early the following morning the enemy were reported by Armstrong in large force at Fairburn, on the West Point road. It became at once evident that Sherman was moving with his main body to destroy the Macon road, and the fate of Atlanta depended upon our ability to defeat this movement.

"Reynolds's and Lewis's brigades were dispatched to Jonesboro to co-operate with Armstrong. General Adams, at Opelika, was directed to guard the defenses of that place with renewed vigilance, while General Maury was requested to render his assistance, if necessary. The chief quartermaster, ordnance officer, and commissary were given most explicit instructions in regard to the disposition of their respective stores. All surplus property, supplies, etc., were ordered to the rear, or to be placed on cars in readiness to be moved at any moment that the railroad became seriously threatened. Armstrong was instructed to establish a line of couriers to my headquarters, in order to report every hour, if requisite, the movements of the enemy. In fact, every precaution was taken not only to hold our sole line of communication unto the last extremity, but also, in case of failure, to avoid loss or destruction of stores and material.

"On the 29th the Federals marched slowly in the direction of Rough and Ready and Jonesboro. A portion of Brown's division was directed to take position at the former place and fortify thoroughly, in order to afford protection to the road at that point. General Hardee, who was at this juncture in the vicinity of East Point, was instructed to make such disposition of his troops as he considered most favorable for defense; and, in addition, to hold his corps in readiness to march at the word of command. Jackson and Armstrong received orders to report the different positions of the corps of the enemy at dark every night.

"The morning of the 30th found our general line extended farther to the left—Hardee being in the vicinity of Rough and Ready, with Lee's corps on his right, near East Point. Information from our cavalry clearly indicated that the enemy would strike our road at Jonesboro. After consultation with the corps commanders, I determined upon the following operations as the last hope of holding on to Atlanta.

"A Federal corps crossed Flint river, at about 6 p. m., near Jonesboro, and made an attack upon Lewis's brigade, which was gallantly repulsed. This action became the signal for battle. General Hardee was instructed to move rapidly with his troops to Jonesboro, whither Lieutenant-General Lee, with his corps, was ordered to follow during the night. Hardee was to attack with the whole force early on the morning of the 31st, and drive the enemy, at all hazards, into the river in their rear. In the event of success, Lee and his command were to be withdrawn that night back to Rough and Ready; Stewart's corps, together with Major-General George W. Smith's state troops, were to form a line of battle on Lee's right, near East Point, and the whole force move forward the following morning, attacking the enemy in flank, and drive him down Flint river and the West Point railroad. In the meantime, the cavalry was to hold in check the corps of the enemy stationed at the railroad bridge across the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Peachtree Creek, whilst Hardee advanced from his position near Jonesboro, or directly on Lee's left.

"Such were the explicit instructions delivered. I impressed upon General Hardee that the fate of Atlanta rested upon his ability, with the aid of two corps, to drive the Federals across Flint river, at Jonesboro. I also instructed him, in the event of failure—which would necessitate the evacuation of the city—to send Lee's corps, at dark, back to or near Rough and Ready, in order to protect our retreat to Lovejoy Station."

The following dispatches sent by Hood to Hardee just before the battle of Jonesboro show his deep anxiety in this critical moment when the fate of Atlanta hung trembling in the balance:

August 31, 3 a. m.—"Have dispatch from Pickett. He says Cleburne and Brown are within three miles of Jonesboro. Have directed him to push them forward. As soon as you can get your

troops in position, the general says you must attack and drive the enemy across the river."

. . . . .

3.10 a. m.—"You must not fail to attack the enemy so soon as you can get your troops up. I trust that God will give us the victory."

. . . . .

3.20 a. m.—"General Hood desires you to say to your officers and men that the necessity is imperative. The enemy must be driven into and across the river."

. . . . .

10 a. m.—"General Hood desires the men to go at the enemy with fixed bayonets, determined to drive everything they may come against."

. . . . .

12.15 p. m.—"General Morgan reports enemy in strong force advancing against Clinch at Mount Gilead Church."

. . . . .

2 p. m.—"General Morgan says enemy drove Clinch from breastworks at Mount Gilead church about 11 a. m.; were in considerable force. This sent you to show that enemy have not all his troops in your front."



## CHAPTER XXXVII

### BATTLE OF JONESBORO

The battle of Jonesboro was very similar to the other battles around Atlanta. It consisted of fierce charges on the part of the Confederates, Hood believing that by aggressive action at the opportune moment he could drive the Federals back upon Flint river, and while Howard's army was in rout, hurl the remainder of his regulars in Atlanta around Schofield's flank, compassing the enemy's complete overthrow in much the manner that Johnston planned to destroy Sherman's army in the angle of Peachtree Creek. The plan was put into attempted execution too late. There is reason to believe that Hood was not sufficiently advised as to the movements of Sherman on the 29th and 30th of August. From his dispatches, and above that, from the movement of his troops, he seems to have not understood that the last grand movement of the enemy had as its object the complete severance of his railroad communication. When the truth dawned upon him, it was beyond his power to interpose his troops effectively between Sherman and the Macon road. The vital point was not Jonesboro alone. Two-thirds or more of his army was hurried to the latter place at the last moment, while the long line of railroad between there and Rough and Ready was equally exposed—indeed, in more imminent danger. When Schofield and Thomas swarmed down upon the railroad north of Jonesboro, they were surprised to meet with almost no resistance. Had Hardee and Lee succeeded in keeping Howard off the railroad at Jonesboro, the result would not have been altered. Two-thirds of the Federal army was already in possession of the Macon road several miles nearer Atlanta than Jonesboro, and in a position to hold what it had gained. The battle of Jonesboro, therefore, was a useless and illogical battle, because fought too late and without

the necessary connecting strength being retained with Atlanta. Atlanta would have been lost if Howard had been whipped at Jonesboro, or if no battle had been fought at Jonesboro.

It seems to have been reserved for General Logan to fight and win three of the four great battles around Atlanta. In the battle of Atlanta on the bloody 22d of July his splendid generalship went far toward saving the day to the Federals; at Ezra Church his corps bore the brunt of the most terrific charges of which the flower of the Confederate army was capable, and at Jonesboro he practically fought the whole battle on the part of the Federals. The fighting at Jonesboro extended through a part of two days—the 31st of August and the 1st of September—the second day's fighting on the part of the Federals being largely done by the Fourteenth Army Corps, commanded by Brevet Major-General Jeff. C. Davis.

A more comprehensive and accurate description of this battle cannot be given than to quote from the reports of the leading officers engaged on both sides. General Hardee's report, which deals largely with the bitter controversy between himself and General Hood, which culminated at the battle of Jonesboro, will be found in the chapter at the close of this volume containing the most important general reports. The report of General Howard, who commanded the portion of the Federal army engaged at Jonesboro, is in part as follows:

"I had really expected an attack all day (31st) on account of the saucy position we occupied, since our artillery, and even musketry, reached the enemy's principal line of communication. I was not, therefore, at all surprised when, about 3 p. m., a heavy assault was made, extending all along the Fifteenth corps, and one division of the Sixteenth.


"In the morning, before the action, I directed General Blair to send a brigade to General Logan's left. Colonel Bryant, of General Woods's division, was promptly sent. Fearing lest the enemy should turn that flank between Hazen's left and the river, I directed General Blair to send the rest of Woods's division the moment the action opened. This he did, with instructions to hold his command well in hand, and charge the enemy if he attempted such a movement. The enemy made two or three assaults in all,

but neither approaching so near nor exhibiting so much spirit as the battle of the 28th of July.

“General Logan estimates in front of his corps 500 killed, and not less than 5,000 wounded, and 241 prisoners. His own loss was 154 killed, wounded, and missing. General Ransom reports 57 dead and 92 prisoners taken in front of General Corse’s division, estimating enemy’s loss at 500 killed, wounded, and missing. His corps suffered the incredibly small loss of 18 killed and wounded. Colonel Bryant, of General Blair’s corps, reports the enemy’s loss in his front 262 killed, wounded, and prisoners. The latter number may be included in General Logan’s estimate, as this brigade fought in conjunction with the troops on Hazen’s left. I believe the enemy’s loss in this battle of the 31st, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, will not vary far from 6,000. General Woods, Seventeenth Corps, and Generals Corse and Fuller, Sixteenth Corps, receive high commendation from their corps commanders for gallantry in this action.

“By reference to the report of General Kilpatrick, it will be seen that his force on the morning of the 31st moved to Anthony’s Bridge, a mile and a half below my position. He crossed the river, constructing a bridge, pushed a small force to the railroad, and took up a threatening position. The enemy doubtless fearing an attempt to turn his left flank in force, attacked Kilpatrick with infantry. After stout resistance he withdrew to the western bank, and the enemy followed him up, crossing with a part of his force. As soon as I got news of this, about the middle of the afternoon, General Blair moved by my direction a division, General G. A. Smith’s, to the right of General Ransom, prolonging his line and covering the wagon train. General Carlin’s division, of the Fourteenth Army Corps, also moved to the vicinity of that flank. The enemy was, however, too much crippled to attempt any further offensive movement. The force of the enemy opposed to us, judging from the prisoners taken, were the corps of Hardee and S. D. Lee, under command of General Hardee. While these events were transpiring at Jonesborough, Major-Generals Thomas and Schofield had struck the railroad at several points intervening between me and Atlanta.

“The work for the next day was for me to hold where I was,



Memorial Day Parade, April 26, 1901

while the rest of the military division concentrated upon my left, the troops on the railroad destroying it completely en route.

"On the afternoon of September 1, in accordance with instructions, my command made frequent and strong demonstrations to prevent the enemy from reinforcing against General Thomas, whilst one of his corps (Fourteenth, Major-General Davis commanding) made its remarkable and gallant charge between Hazen's left and the railroad. My left corps, General Blair's, being relieved by this movement, was dispatched to Anthony's Bridge with instructions to do what he could to worry the enemy from that flank. I sent Lieutenant Hall, of the cavalry, to guide the column, believing that he knew the shortest route, but he took it by a more circuitous route, and consumed all the time from 3 p. m. till dark in reaching the bridge, so that General Blair simply effected a crossing of the Flint River, skirmishing heavily with the enemy. That night the rebels withdrew from Jonesboro, as also the remaining garrison from Atlanta."

General Logan's report is more detailed and graphic. He says:

"Our position being isolated from the main army, and threatening the enemy's communication, we were exposed greatly, and liable to attack at any moment. Considering these facts, I caused my lines to be intrenched with great care, under the supervision of Captain Klostermann, who is one of the most thorough engineer officers I have met in the service. The positions obtained for all the batteries of the corps were the best that could have been selected, and division commanders were very active in their efforts to establish their lines with a view to hold them at all hazards, and inflicting the severest punishment on the enemy should they attack us. At about 3 p. m. August 31st the enemy opened artillery in front of my entire line, keeping up continual fire for about fifteen minutes, when they uncovered their lines and made a sudden and desperate assault on all parts of my line, approaching at points on the left of General Hazen's line (which was the left of my position) within thirty paces. The most determined part of the assault was maintained by General Hazen, the enemy, perhaps, thinking if they could create confusion at that point they would compel my whole line to retire beyond the



river. The assault raged severely in front of Harrow and Osterhaus, the enemy approaching their lines at the average distance of 50 and 100 paces. The artillery firing of the enemy had prepared my troops for what followed, and when the assault commenced every man was in the trenches and ready for the fray. The most terrible and destructive fire I ever witnessed was directed at the enemy, and in less than one hour he was compelled to retire discomfited and in confusion. The rebel general, Patton Anderson, and his staff, rode fearlessly along his lines in front of the Second Division, and did all that a commander could do to make the assault a success. But few of those who rode with him in that perilous performance of duty returned from the field. Himself, with many of his staff, were seen to fall by the unerring and steady fire of my troops. Prisoners, captured subsequently, state that General Anderson was shot through the abdomen and carried off the field by his troops. I could not help but admire his gallantry, though an enemy. The enemy made two more assaults, but evidently with far less spirit and determination than the first. The withering and destructive fire which they had received in the first onset had dampened their zeal, and destroyed their confidence in being able to defeat us, and they were, consequently, easily repulsed, though not without severe punishment being inflicted on them.

"The enemy's loss was greater than in any former engagement, except on the 28th day of July, near Atlanta. In front of the Second Division 186 bodies of the enemy were buried between our picket-lines. General Hazen captured 99 prisoners, not including 79 wounded, and captured 2 stands of colors. General Hazen estimated their wounded at 1,000, though subsequent facts ascertained places it beyond even that. General Harrow reports 56 prisoners captured, not including 60 wounded, and the burial of 12 dead bodies. General Osterhaus estimates their loss in his front at from 400 to 500.

"After the enemy had evacuated on the night of the 1st, a staff officer of General Osterhaus discovered, immediately in rear of the point where the most desperate fighting occurred in his front, the graves of 131 bodies, which bore evidence of quite recent interment, and who had evidently been buried with the view

to our not discovering them. From the reports of division commanders I do not hesitate to place their loss at 500 killed and from 3,000 to 5,000 wounded, with a loss of 241 prisoners, not including the wounded who fell into our hands. This engagement virtually gave us possession of the railroad at Jonesborough, for it established the fact that our position, within half a mile of the depot and the town, was secure against successful assault. After nightfall the enemy remained quiet. My loss in this engagement was only 154 killed, wounded, and missing.

"The enemy's force in the assault was ascertained from prisoners captured to be the corps of Hardee and Lee.

"On the 1st of September the Fourteenth Corps being ordered to take position on my left, I was directed to make a demonstration in its favor. I accordingly, at the appointed time, caused all my artillery to open on the intrenched position of the enemy, and made feints at different points on my line as if I intended to assault them in their works. These feints, I think, resulted satisfactorily, as it kept their trenches full in my front, while the Fourteenth Corps charged the enemy on my left. These demonstrations often, through the day, resulted in slight actions, which in every instance resulted in our favor. On the night of the 1st of September the enemy evacuated their position. At daydawn on the morning of the 2d, such had been their watchfulness, the pickets were in the town and skirmishing with those of the enemy just moving out. A great many stragglers from the enemy were picked up and sent to our rear."

Major-General Osterhaus, who held a position in Logan's line where the assault of the Confederates was most severe, says of the experience of his command: "The infantry, however, had not as yet completed their intrenchments, and at 2.30 p. m. there was still a considerable gap in the work connecting them with the refused line on the right. While I was still engaged in pushing forward this part of the work, considerable movement was observed on the rebel side. Colonel Wangelin, commanding Third Brigade, reported that very heavy columns of rebel infantry had sallied from their left and advanced in double-quick around our line of skirmishers, evidently with the intention of passing to our right and rear. The rebels had to pass over an

open field to the right of Colonel Wangelin's front, and this gallant officer opened a most withering fire on them, but was unable to prevent their flanking maneuver. Lieutenant Haug's shells exploded with terrible precision among the enemy, but with no better success. Regardless of this destructive fire, the enemy's columns rushed forward, and I, of course, directed Lieutenant Haug to withdraw his pieces, while Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Eicks were ordered to hold their position at all hazards until the guns were withdrawn. These two officers gallantly held their position while Lieutenant Haug removed his section with admirable precision; when I brought this party back into our main work, the rebel avalanche was at our very heels. I placed Lieutenant Haug's section of artillery and the supporting infantry, under Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Eicks, in position on the left of the rifle-pits occupied by the Sixteenth Army Corps and Lieutenant Hust's pieces. They all opened at once a most deadly fire on the rebels (the artillery with canister), whose front line was now within 100 yards of ours; at the same time the troops of Colonel Williamson's brigade, who formed the connection with the refused line, poured their fire into the assaulting column. Here I cannot omit to mention the splendid conduct of the officers and men of the Fourth Iowa Infantry, who were ordered to occupy that portion of this connecting line where as yet no breastworks had been thrown up; they whirled in and held the place most gallantly. The effect of our fire was immediate and terrible; the enemy's line, compact until now, broke and dispersed in all directions. A number came over into our lines; the masses, however, fell back into the timber on their right and rear to find protection from our fire. The enemy formed again several times under cover of this timber, and attacked again, though very feebly, showing their first repulse to have been a very severe and decided one."

The fighting on the 1st of September was very severe, this time the Union forces assuming the offensive. While Logan was making strong demonstrations along his entire line for the purpose of holding Hardee in position, General Davis, commanding the Fourteenth corps, advanced to Howard's assistance, by Sherman's order. He advanced straight upon the enemy's

works, which were carried after a stout resistance. General Davis says of his assault, which along portions of his line was a fierce bayonet charge: "From information believed to be reliable, I was satisfied the enemy's works had not been extended to the railroad at a late hour in the forenoon, and that a well-directed attack would rout this part of his lines and turn his position completely. Morgan's division, and the two brigades of Carlin's, were to form the attacking forces, and were deployed in two lines as near continuous to each other as the rough and difficult ground over which the advance had to be made would permit. One brigade, of Baird's division, was deployed in rear of Carlin's left, in close support. The distance to be passed in front of Morgan's, where the enemy's works could be seen, was about 1,000 yards. Where the enemy might be found in Carlin's front, owing to the dense thicket before him, could not be determined without an advance, which I ordered about 4 p. m. The troops moved promptly, but owing to the thick undergrowth of brush in Carlin's front, swampy ground and ditches in Morgan's, the troops necessarily moved slow, and with great difficulty observed alignments and direction. These obstacles were as speedily overcome as could be expected, and the whole line advanced to the slope of the hill, in the open field, within from 300 to 400 yards of the enemy's position. Here the ground offered some protection to the troops, and a momentary halt was made, and the lines rectified. Up to this point the effect of the enemy's fire had been but lightly felt, generally along the line, except by Edie's brigade, which was some distance in advance of the general line, and had struck a projecting flank of the enemy's works, charged, and carried it, with considerable loss. The position thus gallantly gained was only partially held, owing to the impossibility of supports getting up in time. Este's brigade, of Baird's division, was ordered to report to General Carlin as a support to this part of the line, and was promptly placed in position so as to relieve this brigade in the following attack. The other two brigades of Baird's division were held close in reserve in rear of the left of the corps, with a view to pushing our success on this flank after the position had been carried. At a quarter to 5 o'clock I ordered the lines, as now formed and represented by the accompanying map, to ad-

vance and attack. The desultory fire which had been kept up by the enemy during the temporary pause in the advance, did but little damage, but served to locate the enemy's lines more definitely, which, owing to the dense thicket intervening, could not be well defined. The attack was promptly and vigorously made along the whole line. The enemy, self-confident and exultant at our audacity in attacking lines thus defended, made a most determined resistance. The fight was short and bloody. The entire line of works was carried, except the extreme left, formed of Moore's brigade. Here from natural obstructions, heavy timber, and underbrush, as well as a severe fire from the left, coming from the opposite side of the railroad, this brigade operated under great disadvantage, and was for awhile held in check, notwithstanding the troops fought with great gallantry and were well handled. Elsewhere, at all points, the assault was decisive and complete along the entire line. Eight hundred and sixty-five officers and men surrendered themselves in the works. About 1,000 more were captured, or surrendered themselves to different commands during the night and the following day, which should be credited to the assault, as a result of it. Two field batteries, consisting of four guns each, were captured complete. The troops charged these batteries, under a murderous fire of canister, and took them in the works. Seven battle-flags and 14 officers' swords were captured, and have been forwarded, as required by existing orders, to department headquarters."

Brigadier-General Carlin says of the operations of his command at Jonesboro: "On the 1st day of September I received orders to move to the support of General Baird and take position on his right, which was then on the Atlanta and Jonesborough road, east of Mrs. Evans's. Before going into position there I received orders to proceed about two and a half miles toward Jonesborough, and take a position facing the town. Having marched till within two miles of that place and reached the pickets of the Seventeenth Corps, I took position parallel to the road and facing the Macon railroad, one and a half miles distant. I have omitted to state above that the First Brigade and Nineteenth Indiana Battery were detached at Mrs. Evans's and sent to Renfroe's to protect the train of the army in accordance with orders received. From



the point designated above I sent the Third Brigade on a reconnaissance toward the railroad, with also one regiment of the Second Brigade as skirmishers. The skirmishers of both brigades soon encountered the enemy at a creek near the road and drove them back to a strong position, where they contested the ground obstinately with infantry or dismounted cavalry and one or two pieces of artillery. The position of the enemy was soon taken by the Third Brigade and the Sixteenth U. S. Infantry, and one caisson, filled with ammunition, captured. The Second Brigade was immediately moved up to the right of the Third and the skirmishers pushed onto the railroad. While here Captain Edmonds, of my staff, pointed out a very fine position for a battery, and I immediately ordered Prescott's battery to take position there. Prescott moved to it as rapidly as his horses could go, unlimbered, and opened his guns, which created great havoc among the rebels. It may here be stated that much of the success later in the day was due to the execution of this battery, both on the infantry and artillery of the rebels, as Prescott was almost immediately on the right flank of the enemy facing Morgan's division, of the Fourteenth Corps, and of the Army of the Tennessee. While occupying the position last described I sent out a regiment on the front to open communication with the Fourth Corps, which was accomplished by Lieutenant-Colonel McMahon, commanding the Twenty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry. I then changed the front of my division again to the right, the left of the Third Brigade resting on the railroad, and formed line of battle, when I received orders from General Davis to move forward toward Jonesborough till I should find the works of the enemy. Moving through a dense forest to an open field the enemy was encountered in a thicket beyond. I ordered an assault, which was made with great energy and gallantry by both brigades. The Second Brigade reached the works at the first dash and captured many prisoners. They would have held the works and gone on but for the unfortunate loss of Capt. L. M. Kellogg, commanding the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, who was on the extreme right. He was badly wounded while crossing the works. The enemy brought up reinforcements and compelled the right to fall back about 100 yards. A portion of this brigade gallantly clung to the works till over-

powered and captured. When preparing to re-form the Second Brigade for another charge, I received information from General Davis that he had ordered Colonel Este's brigade, of Baird's division, to support me. As it was fresh and well formed I placed it in position for a charge, when General Baird arrived and gallantly led it himself. It is an agreeable duty that I perform in saying that the conduct of this brigade was truly admirable, and that they deserved the success they achieved. Colonel Este deserves promotion for his gallantry and good management. The Third Brigade continued the fight till every rebel was driven or dragged from the works. The Thirty-eighth Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Griffin commanding, deserves great credit in this part of the fight, as they had to contend almost alone against a very obstinate foe strongly intrenched. The enemy having lost his works, brought infantry and artillery on the road still farther toward Jonesborough, and opened so heavy a fire that no farther advance could be made. Darkness closed the fight. The two brigades captured about 300 prisoners and many small-arms. The Second Brigade lost in killed, wounded, and missing, 168; the Third Brigade, killed, wounded, and missing, 203; total, 371."

General Baird, who took an important part in the attack, makes the following interesting report: "The order to move forward was given at 4.45 p. m., when the lines moved off handsomely. Attended by a single staff officer, Captain Acheson, assistant adjutant-general, and two orderlies, I accompanied Colonel Este, so as to be ready to give him any assistance which he might require. Our men passing over the lines of the regular brigade soon reached the crest in front, and at about 100 yards from the works began to receive a murderous fire of musketry and canister. They were immediately put at the charge, and without faltering the whole line moved splendidly into the woods. On the right the success was immediate and complete. The Tenth Kentucky, followed by the Seventy-fourth Indiana, struck upon the short projecting point of rifle-pit called the first line, and carried it, as well as the main line, extending thence to the right. A single dash, after entering the woods, gave them the victory. The rebel troops, confident in themselves and in their ability to hold their works, were totally unprepared for a

charge of this kind, and were taken completely by surprise. They delivered a single volley, and before they could reload found our men in the trenches with them, bayoneting all who did not surrender.

“Three companies on the right of the Seventy-fourth Indiana, which overlapped the Tenth Kentucky, obliquing to the right, entered the woods at the east end of the battery of four guns on the angle, and driving the enemy out took possession of the guns. They belonged to a battery of the consolidated Eighth and Nineteenth Arkansas Regiments, and Lieutenant Kuder, of the Seventy-fourth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, capturing the battery flag, brought it away with him. After holding this battery for some minutes, until the troops of the next brigade on the right came up in the rear and entered it, these companies closed to the left on their own regiment, leaving the guns with the newcomers. As the only material evidence of the capture brought away was the flag, the guns themselves being left with the Second Division, Colonel Este has procured statements from several of his officers and men who were present, and forwards them with his report. On the left our men were not immediately so successful. The Thirty-eighth and Fourteenth Ohio Regiments, after entering the woods, formed a line extending from the short projecting work to the left, but the distance to the rebel main work being greater than on the right, and the approach to it more obstructed by fallen trees, they could not at once reach it. They remained in this position, subjected to a most terrible fire coming obliquely down the works from the rebel right, for some minutes after the right wing had achieved its success. Colonel Este, who was at this point of the line, finding that the troops on our left did not or could not move forward with us as we had been led to expect that they would, began to fear that his men could not hold on where they were, and sent for reinforcements. Seeing at the same time a regiment of Brigadier-General Morgan’s left brigade, the Seventeenth New York, marching up to go into place in rear of our right, where it was no longer needed, Colonel Este appealed to the commanding officer, requesting him to put in his regiment on our left where it could be most useful, and guided him to the

place. The fire of the enemy at this point was most destructive, yet the gallant Colonel [Grower] carried his regiment into position with a heroic bravery challenging the highest admiration, and was himself almost the first to fall before it. The regiment seeing this, for a moment faltered, but was at once reassured, and the order to charge being given, rushed forward along with the Fourteenth and Thirty-eighth Ohio, and captured not only the works, but nearly all in them. This ended the battle, as all that followed was desultory firing or shots from distant artillery. This charge of my Third Brigade—one of the most magnificent on record, and the first during this campaign in which works upon either side have been assaulted and carried—was productive of the greatest results in opening the way for the advance of the troops on our right and left, and destroying the morale of the boldest and most confident troops in the rebel army. The losses sustained attest the severity of the struggle. Out of 1,100 officers and men who went into the action 75 were killed and 255 wounded; nearly 1 out of every 3 being hit, and all in a space of thirty minutes' time."

General Morgan refers to the part taken by his troops in the fight of September 1st as follows: "General Carlin having moved his command to his left, opened a large gap between his right and my left. The First Brigade (Colonel Lum) was ordered to move immediately from its reserved position to the left and front. This brigade was formed upon the left of Colonel Mitchell in two lines. Having very bad ground to move over was hardly in position before the advance of the whole line was ordered forward. Silently and steadily the line moved up the ridge, and disappeared in the woods, under cover of which the rebels had constructed their works, and in a few moments a shout was heard that told of victory and success, which was soon made certain by hundreds of rebels coming from the woods and seeking safety by retreating to the rear. The charge was gallantly and successfully made, and the results commensurate—2 4-gun batteries taken (1 by the First and 1 by the Second Brigade), 394 prisoners (1 brigadier-general and 24 commissioned officers), over 1,000 stands small-arms, and 6 battle-flags. Never was a command better entitled to the thanks of its officers and

the nation. Men who can steadily move upon strong works, covered with acknowledged fighting men (infantry and artillery), and carry them are truly soldiers. I am under obligations to brigade commanders for the manner their commands were moved upon the enemy's lines and the tenacity with which they were held and pursuit made until darkness ended the conflict. My right was heavily pressed for two or three hours, but finally succeeded in clearing its front. My picket-line was soon established, and by daylight had advanced to Jonesborough. My loss was heavy in officers and men; over 500 killed and wounded."

Lieutenant-General Lee's report of the operations of his corps at Jonesboro is as follows: "My corps was formed almost parallel to the railroad and immediately to the right of Jonesboro, connecting with the right of Hardee's corps, which extended toward Flint River, and making almost a right angle with the railroad. It was found that Hardee's corps did not cover as much ground as was expected, and I was instructed to extend my troops so as to fill up the interval, and my command was moved almost two divisions front to the left. The instructions given me were to attack as soon as Cleburne, who commanded Hardee's corps, should become hotly engaged, he being ordered to swing to his right and my corps to advance directly against the enemy, and, if possible, swing to the left. The firing to my left (on Cleburne's line) did not indicate a serious engagement until the right division of Hardee's corps became engaged. Being satisfied that the battle had commenced in earnest, I at once gave orders for my corps to move against the enemy. The attack was not made by the troops with that spirit and inflexible determination that would insure success. Several brigades behaved with great gallantry, and in each brigade many instances of gallant conduct were exhibited by regiments and individuals; but generally the troops halted in the charge when they were much exposed, and within easy range of the enemy's musketry, and when they could do but little damage to the enemy behind his works, instead of moving directly and promptly forward against the temporary and formidable works in their front. The attack was a feeble one and a failure, with a loss



to my corps of about 1,300 men in killed and wounded. The enemy being behind works, and apparently no impression having been made upon him by the attack on my left, where his line was supposed to be weakest, and Brigadier-General Ross, commanding a cavalry brigade on my immediate right, having reported the enemy moving to my right, I was induced not to renew the attack.

"During the night of the 31st, about 1 p. m., I received an order from Lieutenant-General Hardee to march at once to Atlanta. My corps was at once put in motion, and was halted by Maj.-Gen. M. L. Smith, chief engineer of the army, about six miles from Atlanta, and there put in position to cover the evacuation of the city."


Major-General Patton Anderson, commanding Hindman's old division, gives the following account of his part in the battle: "At about 2.20 p. m. the quick and heavy rattle of musketry on Cleburne's line, mingled with the rapid discharges of artillery in the same direction, indicated the time appointed for our advance. The order was given and the troops moved forward deliberately and with resolution. The enemy's line of skirmishers was pushed back upon his main line at the top of the ridge before alluded to, and our first line was soon under a heavy fire from his breastworks. There was but little cover for our assaulting lines, and the ascent in some places was moderately steep, but not rugged, affording the enemy great advantages in the ground in addition to those derived from his breastworks. The troops, however, moved forward with a spirit and determination that threatened, in spite of all odds, to crown the hill and drive the enemy from his place. Slowly but resolutely they advanced up the ascent to within pistol-shot of the enemy's works. At this point under a deadly fire a few wavered and the rest lay down. The line was unbroken, and although the position was a trying one, every inch of ground gained was resolutely maintained. A staff officer was sent to request the reserve line to be pushed forward without delay. After waiting some time for the reserves to come up—perhaps not so long as it appeared to those exposed to this deadly fire at such close range—another staff officer was sent back with an

urgent appeal for them to be brought up immediately. In the meantime both men and officers in the front line were suffering severely. Each moment brought death and wounds into their ranks. On every part of the line officers were constantly falling while engaged in encouraging and urging the men to remain firm until assistance should arrive, and by their conduct setting examples of heroism and courage seldom equaled and still more rarely surpassed. The second line came up in rear of Deas and Brantly, but the ranks of the latter had been so thinned by the fire to which they had been exposed that the two lines combined were unable to make any farther advance. Unwilling to abandon the attack while a reasonable hope of success remained, and believing that with the assistance of a couple of good brigades the enemy's left could be forced back, a staff officer was sent to General Lee to ascertain if the necessary assistance could be spared from other portions of the field. In the meantime every effort was made to hold the ground already gained. Stragglers were pushed up to the front and the slightly wounded were encouraged to remain there. While engaged in these efforts a color-bearer was discovered some short distance behind the front line, with a number of men scattered about through the pines near him. On inquiry he reported himself as color-bearer of the Thirteenth Louisiana Regiment, and stated that he had tried to get the men to follow him to the front, but could not prevail on them to do so. The officers of the regiment were then called for, but none responded. The color-bearer expressed great desire to carry the colors forward, and upon my directing him to do so, he did advance them gallantly, calling upon his comrades to follow. I regret to say that but few responded. When the conduct of officers or troops justifies it, I deem it to be a duty no less imperative to censure than to praise, and it is under a sense of this duty that I relate this circumstance. I would not be understood as imputing reprehensible conduct to the whole regiment, whose color-bearer I have alluded to, for I know that on other fields that regiment has acquitted itself with the highest honors, but I do say that if the men in question did belong to the Thirteenth Louisiana Regiment, as represented to me, they are unworthy comrades of a gallant color-bearer, and that they re-

flect discredit upon a gallant regiment from as gallant a State as shines in the Southern constellation.

"Regarding the extreme right of my line as in great danger, and desiring to hold our position there until assistance might arrive, I now proceeded along the line from Brantly's right toward Sharp's position. At this time the troops of the front line were lying down within sixty yards of the enemy's breast-works, and at many points much nearer, keeping up a hot fire upon everything that appeared above the defenses. From these defenses the enemy, too, poured an unremitting fire upon the assailants. Though at a distance from them, Sharp's gallant Mississippians could be seen pushing their way in small parties up to the very slope of the enemy's breast-works. Officers could be plainly observed encouraging the men to this work. One on horseback, whom I took to be General Sharp, was particularly conspicuous. After having ridden along the line from Brantly's right, urging the officers and men to stand a little longer, when I had reached a point near Sharp's left I received a wound, which compelled me to leave the field, and which has resulted in my absence up to the present time. This occurred about 4.30 p. m."

General Gibson, commanding a brigade of Clayton's division which was heavily engaged, reports: "I supported Brigadier-General Deas's brigade, and in the charge followed his line at the distance of forty yards. His line struck the enemy's works and recoiled. My line moved forward with great enthusiasm and went beyond the fence into the thicket in which the enemy's rifle-pits were, when a few men, halting at the fence and lodging in the skirmish pits, began to fire, and soon the whole line fired, halted, and finally gave way. A few of the men got to the breast-works of the enemy and some inside of them, where they found the enemy being reinforced while their own commands were retiring, and they had consequently to abandon the posts they had won. I never saw a more gallant charge, or one that so fully promised success. The officers and men all behaved with great intrepidity in charging through an open field under a very heavy and well-directed fire. \* I can only account for the failure to take the position held by the enemy by the halt-



Confederate Soldiers' Home of Georgia

ing to destroy the fence [and] by the obstacles encountered in the dense growth of small trees causing a few to fire and breaking up the impetus with which they had been hurled upon the charge, and which should have carried them over the works. It is true the loss had been heavy in passing the open field, and the line had on this account grown thin, and there were no supports. I re-formed a portion of the brigade near the enemy, but finally drew up in our works and prepared to go forward again. Brigadier-General Deas, commanding first line, ordered me to remain in the works until, by order of Major-General Clayton, I took position near the railway from which I had moved originally. I never saw a better spirit manifested than when called upon to re-form for the purpose of making a second attack. Every officer and man was in his place and ready to advance. My loss was very heavy in this assault. In fifteen minutes I lost nearly half my command in killed and wounded."

Govan's brigade of Arkansas troops was severely handled at Jonesboro, General Govan himself, together with more than 500 of his men, being captured. Colonel Green, of the Fifth Arkansas infantry, who led the remnant of the brigade back to the Confederate lines, made the following report of its operations on the 1st of September: "On the morning of the 1st instant the brigade was aroused at 3 o'clock and immediately moved by the right flank through Jonesboro and about one mile beyond and northwest of the town, and were placed in position on the extreme right of our line. We arrived in rear of our position about daybreak, but, owing to the unsettled condition of the brigade on our left, did not commence work until between the hours of 8 and 9. We had just succeeded in throwing up works of sufficient strength to protect against minie-balls, when we were ordered to build a work running from the right of the brigade to the railroad, almost perpendicular to the first line. About this time a heavy artillery fire was opened upon us from points opposite the right, left, and center with such effect that Colonel Smith, Sixth Arkansas Regiment, who had supervision of the work, deemed it advisable to suspend the work temporarily on account of the exposure to which the men were subjected, several having been killed and wounded. In the meantime the enemy were engaged in massing their troops in



front of our right, and at 3 p. m. drove in the pickets along my entire front, in half an hour advancing in heavy column upon the front of the right of the brigade, also upon the flank. They charged to within from thirty to sixty yards of the works and were repulsed, with heavy loss, the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas Regiments capturing about 20 prisoners. The enemy retired in great confusion beyond the brow of the hill and re-formed, and being heavily reinforced charged again from three directions, converging upon the angle formed by the two lines above mentioned, and carried the works occupied by the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas Regiments, and, forming a line at right angle with the works, advanced square down the back and rear of the brigade. Although the odds were very great, the men gallantly contested their advance, fighting the enemy with clubbed guns and at the point of the bayonet, and thus a great many lost the opportunity for escaping. The advance of the enemy was so rapid, and the woods on the right being so dense as to screen their movements, it was impossible to form any combinations to resist it. Thus it was that our gallant Brig.-Gen. D. C. Govan and his equally gallant assistant adjutant-general (Capt. G. A. Williams) were captured almost before aware that the enemy had broken the line. In this way, advancing down the works, they arrived in rear of the Third Confederate Regiment, which was on the right of the Fifth and Thirteenth Arkansas Regiments, and which was engaging a line of battle 100 yards in their front, [and] it was forced to surrender almost en masse."

The report of Holtzclaw's brigade is in part as follows: "About 3 p. m. the brigade was in line of battle in the edge of the woods, being the right brigade of the second line, and overlapping the front line nearly the entire brigade front. The right wing of the brigade and its right flank were protected by a line of skirmishers. At the appointed signal for the advance, the order of the major-general, the men and officers generally moved forward with spirit and enthusiasm and in very good order. After advancing about 200 yards I met the first line, repulsed with disorder and confusion after a very short contest, and then an open space of about 300 yards intervened between the brigade and the works of the enemy. The line continued to advance with good order and much enthusiasm. Unfortunately,

just as the line arrived at a line of rail piles, about forty yards in front of the enemy's line, the line halted without orders, and the men sought shelter behind these piles, throwing the line in disorder. In a few minutes I saw the line on my left give way and retire in disorder. The men were in the regiment immediately on my left. I hastened to the left, fearing the example would cause the left regiment of the brigade to retire also, but soon saw they maintained their position without any encouragement from me. I then used every effort in my power to re-form the line and to urge the men forward to take the works in front, but without effect. I held this advanced position until all the troops within sight on my left had been repulsed, and until I saw that it was useless to make any more efforts to carry the position—probably about a half hour. I then ordered the brigade to retire in order, and re-formed the line at the first line of works from which we advanced at the beginning of the battle.

"I regret to say that the conduct of the brigade after halting at the picket-line of the enemy was not satisfactory. The men seemed possessed of some great horror of charging breast-works, which no power, persuasion, or example could dispel, yet I must say that the officers generally did their duty."

The Confederate reports of Jonesboro at the disposal of the compiler of these records were very meagre and the most important ones altogether lacking. In many of them the officers complain of the conduct of their men, averring that they lacked spirit and the desperate courage necessary to accomplish results in such a dangerous situation. On the evening of the 31st of August General Hardee sent this message to President Davis at Richmond: "Fought the enemy at Jonesboro today, but without decisive results. Cleburne, commanding my corps, carried the enemy's intrenchments on the left and holds them. Lieutenant-General Lee carried a part of the enemy's works, but was in the end badly repulsed. No loss in material. Generals Anderson and Cumming badly wounded. Telegraph communication with Atlanta broken. I can hold this place unless the enemy cross Flint River below me. My aim will be to keep my command between the enemy and Macon."

On the night of September 1st, while Atlanta was being evacuated, General Hardee withdrew his corps from Jones-

boro, after having sent Lee's corps back to Atlanta to rejoin Hood, and fell back to Lovejoy's Station, some five miles south of Jonesboro, where he intrenched in a naturally strong position and awaited Sherman's pursuit. On the 2d of September Hardee wired Richmond: "The enemy attacked my whole line fiercely at Jonesboro yesterday, turning my right flank at the same time. The assault was everywhere repulsed, except upon Lewis's and Govan's brigades, which gave way, but re-formed about 150 yards in rear of their original line, and maintained their position steadily. I was occupying in single rank the line of both Lee's corps and my own of the day previous. My own reserves had to be thrown on my right flank to prevent the enemy from turning my position. I lost a few prisoners, including Brigadier-General Govan, and 8 pieces of artillery. My loss not heavy in killed or wounded. The loss of the enemy believed to be greater than in any previous engagement of the campaign. Prisoners report that General Sherman commanded in person, and that there were six corps in my front. The enemy reached the Decatur road before dark, compelling me to retire to this place, four miles and a half in rear of my position of yesterday."

Before he had abandoned Jonesboro, Hardee telegraphed President Davis: "Last night Lee's corps was ordered back to Atlanta by General Hood. I recommended that he should evacuate Atlanta while it was practicable. He will be compelled to contract his lines, and the enemy has force enough to invest him. My instructions are to protect Macon."

Hood cautioned Generals Morgan and Scott at East Point to be on their guard for a momentary attack from Schofield and not to let the enemy get between them and Atlanta. The McDonough road was open, and over it Lee hurried his troops to the doomed city. Hood still had hope of doing Sherman injury in the rear. On the day the battle of Jonesboro was fought he sent this message to General Wheeler, operating in Tennessee: "Sherman faces Atlanta from the west, crossing the Chattahoochee at Sandtown. His wagon trains must be greatly exposed. General Hood thinks you had better move this way, destroying as you come, to operate upon them."

## CHAPTER XXXVIII

### THE FALL OF ATLANTA

On the 1st of September it was evident to the dullest soldier in Hood's army that Atlanta could not be held with safety to the Confederate forces for twenty-four hours longer. Deserters and stragglers pouring into the city from Jonesboro soon acquainted even the citizens with the fact that the battle had gone against them and that Sherman's army was in complete possession of the Macon and Western railroad. All that day, and especially during the afternoon, it was apparent that the situation was most critical by the movements of the troops still clinging to the defenses of Atlanta. The guns in the embrasures were one by one withdrawn and dragged to the southeastern part of the city, where the artillery and a vast number of army wagons were parked in readiness to be moved when the army took up its line of march. Military discipline seemed to be relaxed, in so far as the citizens were governed by it. People who ventured out of their houses to see what was going on were no longer stopped on the street and asked to exhibit their passes. Soldiers hurried hither and thither, too busy or forbidden to answer questions, and Atlantans could only guess what was about to transpire. With the majority the idea prevailed that Hood was massing his forces for a great battle on the very threshold of the city, and ears were strained anxiously for the sound of cannonading to the south, from which direction Sherman was believed to be advancing in force. The most imminent danger from the enemy was at that time from the north, where Slocum's corps was watching its opportunity to break into Atlanta, but the citizens did not know it.

Night fell—a hot summer night, with sheet lightning and thunder mutterings in the heavens. Citizens barred their doors

and watched cautiously from their upper windows the black figures of marching soldiers moving in long columns through the streets. The measured tread of thousands of feet, the heavy rumble of wagons, the clatter of horses' hoofs and the rattle of artillery carriages filled with ominous sounds the early hours of the night, and then, after the city seemed deserted of soldiers, there was a short space of breathless silence. "Sherman is coming!" was the expression first on every tongue and the thought uppermost in every heart. Suddenly a series of explosions, deafening in volume of sound and terrifying beyond description, seemed to rock the city like an earthquake. The inky sky became luminous with a lurid light in the direction of the railroad shops and the great army warehouses. It looked as though a million rockets and Roman candles were being set off with a medley of terrifying noises. Then everybody knew the truth. Atlanta was abandoned, and the last act in the stern drama of war on the part of the Confederates was being performed—the ammunition and war material that the army could not carry away with it was being destroyed. Seventy carloads of ammunition were blown up by the cavalry force left behind for the purpose, and it was nearly sunrise of the 2d before the last explosion reverberated through the desolated city. The work of destruction was not completed until this great mass of ammunition, every locomotive and car in Atlanta, and every army wagon and cannon that could not be moved in the hurry of flight, had been set on fire. The flames were communicated to several buildings and for a time it looked as if a great conflagration would rage over the city. Happily such a calamity was averted by the deathly stillness of the night. The very air seemed to hold its breath.

In the morning when the citizens ventured out to view the wreckage down on the Georgia railroad, they found conditions more menacing to life and property than at any time during the siege. The streets were full of prowlers bent on looting, and a host of strange negroes waiting for Sherman's arrival in a spirit of new-found freedom that threatened to break out at any moment in riotous demonstrations and crime. Something very much like a vigilance committee was formed by common con-



sent by the property-holders, and well-known citizens patrolled the streets with arms in their hands. But for the precautions taken to prevent pillage and arson, Atlanta would have experienced a wild reign of anarchy upon the eve of the Union occupation.

Hood, with the corps of Stewart and the state troops, marched out of Atlanta by the McDonough road to join Hardee at Lovejoy's Station, the corps of Lee remaining to cover the movement and then forming the rear guard on the march. Ferguson's brigade of cavalry was last to leave the city, some of the troopers lingering behind long enough to exchange shots with Sherman's advance column as it entered the city on the Marietta road.

The destruction of the vast amount of war material and stores by the Confederates upon evacuating Atlanta caused much criticism of Hood by the press of the South, as it was believed that he had had ample time to get everything to the rear before his communciation with Macon was interrupted. Hood declared that he was not responsible for the loss, and caused a court of inquiry to be held at Lovejoy's Station, on the 5th of September, to fix the responsibility. The court, having considered the evidence advanced, submitted the following facts and opinions: "Upon the evacuation of Atlanta upon September 1 and 2, 1864, there were destroyed a small amount of quartermaster's and medical stores, some subsistence stores, 13 heavy guns and carriages, 28 carloads of ordnance, 81 cars, and 5 engines. A detailed account of said stores is contained in the exhibits attached to these proceedings. It is the opinion of the court that the subsistence stores and the heavy guns were unavoidably lost, and that the quartermaster's stores, medical stores, ordnance stores, cars, and engines were unnecessarily lost. As to the culpability of the parties asking the investigation, they are of the opinion that as Brigadier-General Shoup, chief of staff, gave his orders specially and fully to the various chiefs of departments, and to 12.30 a. m. of August 31 used every effort to see that his instructions were executed, no blame attaches to him to that time; but that between that time and 8 a. m. of the 31st he, not having displayed sufficient energy, or

used all the means in his possession to see that there was a compliance with his instructions, is censurable. The twenty-eight car-loads of ammunition, the quartermaster's stores, and the cars and engines were destroyed principally in consequence of the failure of Lieutenant-Colonel McMicken, chief quartermaster, to comply with the specific and repeated instructions from the chief of staff to have all such stores removed by daylight; that Lieutenant-Colonel McMicken had at his disposal sufficient cars and engines to move all trains as ordered, and they were not so moved because proper instructions were not given by him to the railroad agents. We consider him highly culpable for not having promptly complied with said orders from the chief of staff. We do not consider him responsible for the loss of the medical stores, as requisitions made upon him failed to state the amount of transportation required for the removal of said stores. As to Lieutenant-Colonel Kennard, chief of ordnance, the court are of the opinion that no blame attaches to him, as he notified the chief of staff and chief quartermaster in ample time that the ordnance stores were in readiness to move."

Fortunately for the people who remained in Atlanta, the stocks of liquor in the place had been removed or destroyed, and those who would have defied law and order under the influence of strong drink were held in check by the determined attitude of the citizens who essayed to protect life and property until Sherman took formal possession. Before the Confederates left the city they distributed among the more destitute citizens quite a quantity of provisions from the stores that could not be removed. This action no doubt had a tendency to restrain any of the people thus relieved from plundering after the army had been withdrawn. However, as a matter of fact, there was little left in the city worth plundering, outside the private residences. The stocks of merchandise, and especially groceries, had long since disappeared.

Early on the morning of September 2d a group of the leading citizens of Atlanta met in the office of the mayor to discuss the best course of action under the circumstances. A majority of those present thought that the safety of the city would be best

subverted by its speedy occupation by the Union army, and as there seemed then no certainty that the enemy would come in at once, the suggestion that a committee ride to the headquarters of the nearest Federal commander and apprise him of the state of affairs in Atlanta, met with favor. Mayor Calhoun thought it would perhaps be best to head the committee himself and in his official capacity formally tender the surrender of the city. The idea met with universal concurrence, and by 10 o'clock Mayor Calhoun, E. E. Rawson, Thomas G. Crusselle, J. E. Williams, Thomas Kile, William Markham, Julius Hayden and a number of other prominent citizens met at the site of the artesian well mounted on about all the horses that had been left in riding condition in Atlanta. It was known that a part of the Federal army was holding the bridge across the Chattahoochee, and with the belief that that was the point at which the Federals could most quickly be reached, the little party of horsemen moved briskly in that direction, out Marietta street. A considerable gathering of citizens assembled to see them off, but no cheers followed them. One of the party held aloft a white flag, and there was no mistaking from the appearance of the citizens that their mission was one of peace. No arms were carried, each gentleman having been careful to leave his pistol at home.

Nobody in Atlanta knew where Sherman had his headquarters since he had left the Howard house, but the peace committee thought the great general would be found at his base and it was to him that Mayor Calhoun expected to surrender Atlanta. The deserted works of the Confederates were passed just at the northern outskirts of the city. Not a soul was in sight. After the long weeks of continued cannonading, and the terrible explosions of the previous night, it seemed strange that such a Sabbath stillness prevailed. A few hundred yards beyond the Confederate works stretched the parallel line of Federal earthworks. The cannon had been withdrawn from the embrasures and the parapet seemed as devoid of life behind it as the works just passed. Suddenly, along a road leading across the old Union lines, a small squad of cavalry came slowly feeling toward Atlanta. The citizens' committee caught the eye of the mounted squad of soldiers instantly, and they moved down toward the civilians carrying the white flag with an air of curious interest.



James M. Calhoun

Mayor of Atlanta at the time of its sur-  
render to General Sherman

The leader, with the bars of a captain on his shoulder-straps, rode up to the party, which had halted, and politely inquired what was wanted. Mayor Calhoun introduced himself and made known the mission of himself and fellow-citizens. "I am looking for General Sherman," he said.

"General Sherman is twenty miles from here, sir; down about Jonesboro," returned the Federal captain. "If you want to reach the commanding officer of this department, you will have to see General Slocum, at the bridge. He will shortly be in command in Atlanta."

At this juncture a larger body of Federal soldiers advanced along the same road, and excusing himself for a moment, the captain rode to the side of an officer in advance of the newcomers, whom he escorted to the mayor of Atlanta.

"This is Colonel Coburn, commanding the Second Brigade," said he. "He will receive your communication." With that the captain rode away with his men toward Atlanta.

Colonel Coburn advised Mayor Calhoun to formally write a note embodying his desire to surrender the city, addressed to Brigadier-General Ward, the nearest general officer, which he said he would see reached him without delay. Taking a memorandum book from his pocket, Mayor Calhoun tore out a blank page and wrote thereon the following message, which could hardly be termed a "surrender":

ATLANTA, GA., September 2, 1864.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WARD,

*Comdg. Third Division, Twentieth Corps:*

SIR: The fortune of war has placed Atlanta in your hands. As mayor of the city I ask protection to non-combatants and private property.

JAMES M. CALHOUN,  
*Mayor of Atlanta.*

Attest:

H. M. SCOTT,  
*Capt. and Actg. Asst. Insp. Gen., 3d Div., 20th Army Corps.*

J. P. THOMPSON,  
*Lieut. and Actg. Aide-de-Camp, 3d Div., 20th Army Corps.*

Colonel Coburn handed the note to a courier with instructions to carry it to General Ward, and Mayor Calhoun and party



turned their horses' heads toward Atlanta, riding into the city in the rear of Coburn's command. There is a picturesque but not true story to the effect that Mayor Calhoun and his committee rode to Sherman's headquarters, where the city was surrendered and a conversation had with Sherman relative to the protection of private property in Atlanta. The chroniclers of this interesting incident, after elaborating on the appearance of Sherman, taciturn and grim, as usual, assume to give his conversation, embellished, as usual, with vehement expletives. It is a pity to spoil a pretty fancy sketch, but the truth of history must be preserved. General Sherman was near Howard's corps, two miles from Jonesboro, when Mayor Calhoun rode out the west road to seek him, and it was some days before he appeared in person in Atlanta. When he formally established his headquarters in the city, General Slocum was in full possession and martial law in force. In order that the facts in connection with this incident may be clearly established, the reports of Captain Scott and Colonel Coburn, the officers with whom Mayor Calhoun conversed as narrated in the foregoing, are here given. Following is what Captain H. M. Scott says of the circumstances:

HDQS. THIRD DIVISION, TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS,  
*Atlanta, Ga., September 3, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of reconnaissance made yesterday, which resulted in the occupation of Atlanta by our forces:

The troops composing this expedition consisted of 900 infantry from Second and Third Brigades, under command of Col. John Coburn, and about 25 cavalry from Colonel Capron's brigade. Taking the advance with cavalry, I proceeded out Turner's Ferry road, and, scouting country thoroughly to right and left, advanced without opposition to the works in front of Atlanta formerly occupied by our division. Here we halted a few moments for the purpose of taking some observations, and, accompanied by Captain Smith, Battery I, First Michigan Artillery; Lieut. J. P. Thompson, provost-marshal, Third Division, Twentieth Army Corps; Lieut. F. C. Crawford, acting assistant adjutant-general, Second Brigade, Third Division, and two cavalry-

men, I went on to the hill formerly occupied by the former officer with his battery, and from which we could see the city. As no indication of there being troops at Atlanta was seen, I sent an orderly to communicate the fact to Colonel Coburn, and to bring up the rest of the cavalry, while myself and party advanced still farther upon a road which led into the city to our right. After entering the works of enemy a few rebels were seen retiring toward the place, and we immediately gave pursuit. A few moments later, however, rebel cavalry formed in line across each of the streets leading toward us, and fired upon us. As the rest of my cavalry had not yet made its appearance, we drew out, taking with us 1 prisoner. I then communicated with you by courier, and also reported to Colonel Coburn how matters stood. Taking all of the cavalry with me, I then moved to the left and rear of the position occupied by the body of rebel cavalry reported above as having opened fire upon us, and took another road leading into the city. Soon after passing through the works formerly occupied by our army a body of men was observed coming out from the city. Advancing rapidly toward them, I discovered that they were citizens bearing a flag of truce. Going forward, I asked them what propositions they had to make. One of them then made himself known as the mayor, and said he had come to surrender the city and ask protection for non-combatants and private property. In answer to further interrogatives he said that General Ferguson's brigade was just retiring from the city, and that the general had agreed to withdraw without offering us resistance in order to insure the safety of non-combatants. I notified you immediately by courier of the surrender, and then escorted Colonel Coburn to the place where the mayor and citizens were assembled. I then rejoined the cavalry, who were pushing forward into the city. Notwithstanding the assurance of the mayor that resistance would not be offered us, we had scarcely entered the city before we were fired upon and a spirited skirmish ensued. I notified some of the citizens that we considered this a violation of good faith, and that if the rebels continued to fire from behind houses they need expect no protection for persons or property, and that they had better communicate this fact to the enemy. The mayor afterward went out and endeavored to stop the firing, but came

back reporting that he could do nothing with the men, that it was but a few drunken stragglers, and that they had come very near shooting him. The infantry skirmishers were then pushed forward and with the cavalry cleared the city. We captured in all over 100 prisoners, and found in City Hall about 100 stand of small-arms and 5,000 percussion caps. The latter were afterward destroyed, as were many of the records of the clerk's office, by some men who came in at a later hour of the day. The rebels also left a number of pieces of heavy artillery and a quantity of ammunition. The men of this command behaved excellently. There was no disposition to straggle or commit depredations manifested. We first entered the city at about 9 a. m., and about one hour afterward the surrender was made. Attached hereto find copy of capitulation. About 2 p. m. part of the First and Second Divisions came up, and soon after General Slocum arrived and took command. I have no casualties to report. Where all behaved so gallantly it would be invidious to make any distinctions. I feel, however, that it is due to Lieutenant Boren, Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, commanding the cavalry, to say that both he and his men behaved splendidly.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. M. SCOTT,

*Capt. 70th Ind. Vol. Infy., and A. A. I. G., 3d Div., 20th A. C.*

[BRIG.-GEN. W. T. WARD,

*Commanding Third Division.]*

The part of Colonel Coburn's report which refers to the meeting with Mayor Calhoun and party and the first hours of the Federal occupation of Atlanta, is reproduced as follows:

"On the 2d of September, at 6 a. m., under orders from Brigadier-General Ward, I marched on a reconnaissance from Turner's Ferry to find the position of the enemy toward Atlanta. I had under my command 900 infantry, composed of 500 men of my brigade, commanded by Captain Crawford, Eighty-fifth Indiana; Captain Baldwin, Nineteenth Michigan; Captain May, Twenty-second Wisconsin, and Lieutenant Freeland, Thirty-third Indiana, and 400 of the Third Brigade, under command of Major Wickham, Fifty-fifth Ohio, together with 40 mounted

men under Captain Scott, Seventieth Indiana. Two hundred and forty men were thrown forward as skirmishers and flankers, and so advanced without opposition until we reached the earth-works recently abandoned by us near Atlanta. Here, after a short delay, occasioned by a slight skirmish with a few mounted men and sentinels, we proceeded through the lines of the enemy's works, finding them abandoned. A brigade of the enemy's cavalry was found to be in the city and we advanced cautiously. I was met in the suburbs by Mr. Calhoun, the mayor, with a committee of citizens bearing a flag of truce. He surrendered the city to me, saying 'he only asked protection for persons and property.' This was at 11 a. m. I asked him if the rebel cavalry was yet in the city. He replied that Ferguson's brigade was there, but on the point of leaving. I replied that my force was moving into the city and that unless that force retired there would be a fight in which neither person nor property would be safe, and that if necessary I would burn the houses of citizens to dislodge the enemy; that I did not otherwise intend to injure persons or property of the citizens unless used against us. I ordered my skirmishers to advance, and they proceeded through the city, the cavalry rapidly evacuating the place. I at once sent dispatches to Brigadier-General Ward, at Turner's Ferry, and to Major-General Slocum, at the railroad bridge, of the occupation of the city by my command. General Slocum came at once to the city. Immediately preceding him came a portion of the First and Second Divisions of the Twentieth Corps. General Ward directed a portion of my brigade to move up from Turner's Ferry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bloodgood, Twenty-second Wisconsin, which reached Atlanta about sunset, and the remainder, under Major Miller, the next morning. Soon after General Slocum's arrival he directed me to move my command, which then occupied the works of the enemy on the southeastern part of the city, to the right of the Augusta railroad. This was done, and General Knipe's brigade was posted on the left of the road in single line, deployed at intervals of three paces. Here the brigade has remained in camp until this date. The command captured 123 prisoners, including those in hospital. Some 200 small-arms were found in the City Hall, and about 16 pieces of

artillery abandoned in the works and burned with the train of cars. The ammunition abandoned had been fired in the night and continued to explode with loud reports after we had entered the city in the forts and among the ruins of the burning shops and buildings where it had been deposited. The works of the enemy were left almost perfect, and there seemed to have been no attempt at destruction of anything but of the material of war. As we passed through the streets many of the citizens ran gladly out to meet us, welcoming us as deliverers from the despotism of the Confederacy; others regarded us with apprehension and begged to be spared from robbery. I assured them they would be safe from this. Many of the buildings were found to be much injured by our artillery, but such as will be needed for public use can be taken at once with slight repairs. My command on the reconnaissance behaved with remarkable promptness and energy, and deserved to be first, as they were, of our army to enter the city. The losses in this time are 5 killed and 22 wounded."

General Slocum's message to his chief, General Thomas, telling of the occupation of Atlanta, follows:

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH CORPS,  
*Atlanta, Ga., September 3, 1864.*

GENERAL: I sent out a reconnoitering party early on the morning of the 2d (as I had done on each previous day). They arrived near Atlanta about 10 a. m., and were met by the mayor, and the city was surrendered to them. On entering, however, a portion of Ferguson's cavalry were found in the city and a few shots were exchanged with them. I at once moved forward all of my command that could safely be spared from the bridge-heads and occupied the city, and now feel that our position is safe, both at this point as well as at the bridges. We occupy the entire line of rebel works at this place. We have captured about 100 prisoners, 14 pieces of artillery, and several thousand stand of small-arms. The rebels before leaving the city destroyed 7 locomotives, 81 cars loaded with ammunition, small-arms, and stores. The railroad is repaired and in working order to this place. I have ordered the ammunition and a large portion of the



subsistence stores now at the bridge to be sent here. The enemy that occupied the city moved out apparently very much demoralized. They moved on the McDonough road with the intention of joining their main army. General Hood left here on the night previous to our entrance. On our arrival here I telegraphed to the War Department all the information in my possession. The telegraph line will be completed to this point this afternoon. It is reported that Wheeler has cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad at Tanton, and also the Nashville and Huntsville Railroad. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. SLOCUM,

*Major-General, Commanding.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WHIPPLE,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

About noon September 2d the whole line of Marietta street was blue with "Sherman's dashing Yankee boys," and the citizens of Atlanta were hailing the conquerer with mixed emotions. Some, tired of the war, or now feeling free to express long concealed Union sentiments, greeted the Federals with a show of enthusiastic welcome; others took little pains to conceal the fact that they regarded the Northern host as "vandal invaders," on conquest bent, and sometimes even the small boys of staunch "Secesh" families whistled "Dixie" and "The Bonnie Blue Flag" for the benefit of the blue-bloused patrols. A number of shots were exchanged on Decatur street with the retiring Confederate cavalymen, resulting in several fatalities on both sides. In their zeal to show their defiance to the last, a few of these Confederate troopers lingered too long in the city and found their avenue of retreat cut off, being taken prisoners by the Federal skirmish column. Soon the desultory firing ceased and heavy columns of Federal infantry came marching in, one of them preceded by a brass band which had a penchant for "Yankee Doodle." One of the first columns to enter halted in front of the city hall while its color-guard climbed to the cupola and ran the stars and strips to the top of the empty flag staff. By the middle of the afternoon the heavy army wagons were rolling in, wreathed in clouds of dust, and by sundown the irrepressible

sutler had his wares displayed in some vacant store in a good location and was driving a thriving trade with the citizens. Yankee newsboys cried well-known Northern papers and periodicals in the streets, a news agent of Sherman's army took possession of the post-office and converted it into a news emporium, and the United States Sanitary Commission opened a supply depot. The quartermasters occupied the best stores on Whitehall street, and the general officers took possession of the best residences for headquarters. The soldiers got along very well with the citizens. After the first fright or feeling of resistance on the part of the latter was over, matters settled down amicably and smoothly enough. There was no pillaging, and not a woman was offered insult. On the contrary, Sherman's men seemed to want to make their enemies feel that they were there to protect them. In cases where families were destitute of the means of subsistence, their wants were supplied from the commissary stores.

General Geary, who was among the first to enter Atlanta, gives the following account of how his command raised "Old Glory" over the city hall and formally took possession of the town:

"Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, accompanied by the cavalry, preceded his infantry and entered the outskirts of the city, where he met Colonel Coburn, commanding the reconnaissance of the Third Division, who had also preceded his troops. Discovering that, with the exception of Ferguson's brigade, there were no troops in the city, it was agreed that their commands should enter at the same time, which was done, the enemy's cavalry retiring before them. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's command was the first to reach the City Hall, upon which the colors of the Sixtieth New York and One Hundred and Eleventh Pennsylvania Volunteers were immediately hoisted. To these two regiments, representing my division, belongs the immortal honor of placing upon the rebel stronghold the first Union flags, and to give the first practical announcement that the long campaign had ended in glorious victory—that the Gate City of the South was ours. Receiving the intelligence of the evacuation of the city, I immediately ordered forward the Second and Third Brigades and

Bundy's battery, preceding them in person, thus leaving the entire line of works at the ferry to be held by the First Brigade, under command of Col. Arlo Pardee. The troops arrived during the evening and were massed on McDonough and Whitehall streets. September 3, early in the morning, my two brigades were placed in position in the fortifications, the Third Brigade in southwestern portion of the line from the East Point railroad to the McDonough road, the Second Brigade on the left of the McDonough road and south of the city. September 4, the First Brigade being ordered from the Chattahoochee, arrived in the city at 3 o'clock and was placed in position in the works on the right of the Third Brigade, west of the city. The Second Brigade was relieved toward evening by the Third Brigade, Third Division, and moved to the right of the McDonough road, the line of the Third Brigade having been shortened. The One Hundred and Eleventh Pennsylvania Volunteers was to-day detached for provost duty, and reported to Colonel Cogswell, commanding post. Orders were received from Major-General Sherman announcing the accomplishment by the army of its undertaking in the complete reduction and occupation of Atlanta, and indicating that the spring campaign was closed."

When Sherman received the news of the fall of Atlanta, he was near Lovejoy's Station, whither he had followed his army in pursuit of Hardee. He lost no time in assaulting the Confederate works, which were very strong, but with small success. The 3d of September would have witnessed a desperate battle at Lovejoy's Station had not the evacuation of Atlanta taken place when it did. On the night of the 2d Sherman said to Thomas: "Until we hear from Atlanta the exact truth, I do not care about your pushing your men against breast-works. Destroy the railroad well up to your lines; keep skirmishers well up, and hold your troops in hand for anything that may turn up. As soon as I know positively that our troops are in Atlanta I will determine what to do. I have ordered General Schofield to feel for the McDonough road, to prevent reinforcements coming to the enemy from that direction."

Perhaps his inability to prevent Hood and Hardee making a junction at Lovejoy's Station had something to do with Sher-

man's decision to terminate the campaign with the enemy in line of battle awaiting his assault. Hood brought the rest of his army up before daylight on the 3d and prepared to give the Federals a warm reception behind head-logs. To leave his enemy thus, practically as well prepared for resistance as ever, must have been galling to Sherman and made him feel deeply the incompleteness of his victory, but he had good reasons to offer for his retirement to Atlanta, and subsequent events bore out his good judgment. While waiting for the confirmation of the rumor that Slocum was already in Atlanta, Sherman said to Howard: "If it be so (the occupation of Atlanta), we don't care about pushing the enemy any further at this time. Had we prevented him making intrenchments, it would have been well, but, as he has a strong line, I do not wish to waste lives by an assault. You may therefore order the skirmishers close up, but hold your lines so as not to suffer much." Pending the receipt of a message from Slocum, announcing the capture of Atlanta, Sherman contented himself with breaking the Macon railroad down to the range of Hood's guns at Lovejoy's.

On the morning of the 3d Hood wired the Confederate authorities at Richmond: "On the evening of the 30th the enemy made a lodgement across Flint River, near Jonesboro. We attacked them on the evening of the 31st with two corps, failing to dislodge them. This made it necessary to abandon Atlanta, which was done on the night of September 1. Our loss on the evening of the 31st was so small that it is evident that our effort was not a vigorous one. On the evening of September 1 General Hardee's corps, in position at Jonesboro, was assaulted by a superior force of the enemy, and being outflanked was forced to withdraw during the night to this point, with the loss of 8 pieces of artillery. The enemy's prisoners report their loss very severe. I send a bearer of dispatches to-morrow."

At intervals throughout the same day he sent the following messages to Richmond:

"For the offensive, my troops at present are not more than equal to their own numbers. To prevent this country from being overrun reinforcements are absolutely necessary."

. . . . .

"My telegram in cipher this morning is based upon the supposition that the enemy will not content himself with Atlanta, but will continue offensive movements. All the lieutenant-generals agree with me."

. . . . .

"I again urge the importance of removing the prisoners from Andersonville."

. . . . .

And on the 4th:

"Should the enemy move to the east or west I shall endeavor to strike him with my entire force on his flank and rear. I think his move will be down the west of Flint River."

. . . . .

"Owing to the wanton neglect of the chief quartermaster of this army a large amount of ammunition and railroad stock had to be destroyed at Atlanta. He had more than ample time to remove the whole and had repeated instructions. I am reliably informed that he is too much addicted to drink of late to attend to his duties. Am greatly in want of an officer to take his place. Can you not send one?"

. . . . .

"I think the officers and men of this army feel that every effort was made to hold Atlanta to the last. I do not think the army is discouraged."

. . . . .

On the same day General Hardee telegraphed President Davis:

"Unless this army is speedily and heavily reinforced Georgia and Alabama will be overrun. I see no other means to avert this calamity. Never in my opinion was our liberty in such danger. What can you do for us?"

. . . . .

Following are President Davis's replies to Hood and Hardee:

*Richmond, September 5, 1864.*

(Received 6th.)

GENERAL J. B. HOOD:

Your dispatch to General Bragg of the 3d instant has been referred. To reinforce your army all available troops were sent,



and realizing the necessity for a further increase, the reserves, detailed men, and militia were called out. General Cobb informs me that you have ordered the troops sent from Augusta and other points to Macon to return to their posts. I cannot reconcile this with your declaration that reinforcements are absolutely necessary, or with the necessity for a prompt and vigorous movement upon the enemy before his divided forces could make a junction, or reinforcements be sent him from Tennessee or Mississippi.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

*Richmond, September 5, 1864.*

GENERAL W. J. HARDEE:

Your dispatch of yesterday received. The necessity for reinforcements was realized, and every effort was made to bring forward reserves, militia, and detailed men for the purpose. Polk, Maury, S. D. Lee, and Jones had been drawn on to fullest extent; E. K. Smith had been called on. No other resource remains. It is now requisite that absentees be brought back, the addition required from the surrounding country be promptly made available, and that the means in hand be used with energy proportionate to the country's need. JEFFERSON DAVIS.

After hearing from Slocum, Sherman announced the capture of Atlanta in the following dispatch to General Halleck at Washington, dated September 3d:

"As already reported, the army drew from about Atlanta, and on the 30th had made a good break of the West Point road and reached a good position from which to strike the Macon railroad, the right (General Howard's) near Jonesboro, the left (General Schofield's) near Rough and Ready, and the center (General Thomas's) at Couch's. General Howard found the enemy in force at Jonesboro, and intrenched his troops, the salient within a half a mile of the railroad. The enemy attacked him at 3 p. m., and was easily repulsed, leaving his dead and wounded. Finding strong opposition on the right, I advanced the left and center rapidly to the railroad, made a good lodgment, and broke it all the way from Rough and Ready down to Howard's left, near Jonesboro, and by the same movement I interposed my whole army between Atlanta and the part of the



of war, also all surplus wheels not needed for a five days' stay in front, ready to start to-morrow morning at 6 o'clock from Jonesboro for Atlanta. Each army will send a regiment to escort these wagons, and General Thomas will send an experienced colonel to conduct the train into Atlanta, there to await further orders.

II. The army will be prepared to move back to-morrow or next day, the Army of the Cumberland to Atlanta and Chattahoochee bridge, the Army of the Tennessee to East Point, and the Army of the Ohio to Decatur. Major-General Thomas will have General Garrard's cavalry ready to act as the rear guard.

By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

## CHAPTER XXXIX

### THE UNION OCCUPATION

On the morning of September 4th, before issuing the final orders for the occupation of Atlanta, General Sherman sent this supplemental message to the War department at Washington:

"The Twentieth Corps now occupies Atlanta and the Chattahoochee bridges. The main army is now here (near Lovejoy's Station), grouped below Jonesboro. The enemy holds a line facing us, with front well covered with parapets, and flanks by Walnut Creek on the right and a confluent of Flint River on the left. His position is too strong to attack in front, and to turn it would carry me too far from my base at this time. Besides, there is no commensurate object, as there is no valuable point to his rear till we reach Macon, 103 miles from Atlanta. We are not prepared for that and I will gradually fall back and occupy Atlanta, which was and is our grand objective point, already secured. For the future I propose that of the drafted men I receive my due share, say 50,000; that an equal or greater number go to General Canby, who should now proceed with all eneregy to Montgomery and the reach of the Alabama River above Selma; that when I know he can move on Columbus, Ga., I move on LaGrange and West Point, keeping to the east of the Chattahoochee; that we form a junction, repair roads to Montgomery, and open up the Appalachicola and Chattahoochee Rivers to Columbus, and move from it as a base straight on Macon. This campaign can be made in the winter, and we can safely rely on the corn of the Flint and Chattahoochee to supply forage. If the Tensas Channel of the Alabama can be used, General Gardner, with the rebel garrison, could continue to hold Mobile for our use when we want it. I propose to remove all the inhabitants of Atlanta, sending those committed to our cause to the rear, and the rebel families to the

front. I will allow no trade, manufactories, nor any citizens there at all, so that we will have the entire use of the railroad back, as also such corn and forage as may be reached by our troops. If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty I will answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they want peace they and their relatives must stop war."

The special field orders issued the same day are reproduced below :

SPECIAL                      HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
FIELD ORDERS,                      *In the Field, near Lovejoy's,*  
No. 64.                                      *September 4, 1864.*

The army having accomplished its undertaking in the complete reduction and occupation of Atlanta will occupy the place and the country near it until a new campaign is planned in concert with the other grand armies of the United States.

I. The Army of the Cumberland will occupy the city and its communications with Chattanooga, the Army of the Tennessee will occupy East Point and the right flank, and the Army of the Ohio the town of Decatur and the left flank; the cavalry will occupy Sandtown, Roswell, and other points on the flanks and along our line of communication.

II. To withdraw to the posts herein designated, the Army of the Cumberland will withdraw, first, to Jonesboro; second, to Rough and Ready, and third, to Atlanta, leaving the cavalry to bring up the rear in the manner herein described.

III. The Army of the Tennessee will move in concert with that of the Cumberland, first, to its old position near Jonesboro; second, across the Flint River to about Morrow's Mill, and third, to East Point and the head of Camp Creek.

IV. The Army of the Ohio will also move in concert with that of the Cumberland, first, to a point near Jonesboro; second, to some point within two miles and east of Rough and Ready, and last to Decatur.

V. General Kilpatrick's cavalry will cover the left rear of the Army of the Tennessee, and that of General Garrard the right rear of the Army of the Ohio until they reach the positions assigned in this order, when the cavalry commands will move to the points designated, viz., Sandtown and Roswell.



VI. The general-in-chief will give notice when the movement will begin, and after reaching Atlanta will establish headquarters in Atlanta, and afford the army an opportunity to have a full month's rest, with every chance to organize, receive pay, replenish clothing, and prepare for a fine winter's campaign.

By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

The Army of the Cumberland did not take up its position in Atlanta until the 8th of September, when it camped on the north-eastern outskirts of the city, near the position it held after Schofield had been moved beyond Ezra Church. Slocum's corps remained in the city, that general commanding Atlanta. Sherman's march back to Atlanta was exceedingly slow, and his dispositions were made with a view of meeting any unexpected movement on Hood's part. To Schofield he said: "We have gained too much to lose it by scattering and risking anything."

On the 6th, after notifying Richmond of Sherman's "retreat" back to Atlanta, Hood said: "I shall make dispositions to prevent the enemy, as far as possible, from foraging south of Atlanta, and at the same time endeavor to prevent his massing supplies at that place. I deem it important that the prisoners at Andersonville should be so disposed of as not to prevent this army from moving in any direction it may be thought best. According to all human calculations we should have saved Atlanta had the officers and men of the army done what was expected of them. It has been God's will for it to be otherwise. I am of good heart and feel that we shall yet succeed. The army is much in need of a little rest. After removing the prisoners from Andersonville, I think we should, as soon as practicable, place our army upon the communications of the enemy, drawing our supplies from the West Point and Montgomery railroad. Looking to this, I shall at once proceed to strongly fortify Macon. Please do not fail to give me advice at all times. It is my desire to do the best for you and my country. May God be with you and us."

Replying to congratulatory telegrams from Secretary of War Stanton and General Grant, Sherman wired:

IN THE FIELD,

*Near Jonesboro, Ga., September 6, 1864—3 p. m.*

HON. E. M. STANTON,

(Received 11.05 p. m. 8th.)

*Secretary of War.*

I have just received your telegram, and shall announce it to the whole army, preceded by the expression, "The general commanding announces to the army with pride and satisfaction," and followed by "All corps, regiments, and batteries may, without further notice, inscribe 'Atlanta' on their colors." We are moving back to Atlanta slowly, making good use of the corn-fields, which our animals needed, and to prevent a boast of the enemy that we were in hurry. I have burned a good deal of cotton, but will save enough to pay the expenses of the salute.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

. . . . .

IN THE FIELD,

*Near Jonesboro, Ga., September 6, 1864—3 p. m.*

LIEUT.-GEN. U. S. GRANT,

(Received 8th.)

*City Point, Va.*

I have your dispatch and will announce it to the troops in general orders. We are gradually falling back to Atlanta, feeding high on the corn-fields of the Confederacy. I will be in Atlanta in a day or two and will communicate fully with you. I always felt that you would personally take more pleasure in my success than in your own, and I appreciate the feeling to its fullest extent.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

The congratulatory field orders which embodied the dispatches above referred to, follow :

SPECIAL  
FIELD ORDERS,  
No. 66.

HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISS.,  
*In the Field, near Jonesboro, Ga.,*  
*September 6, 1864.*

I. The general-in-chief communicates with a feeling of just pride and satisfaction the following orders of the President of the United States, and telegram of Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant, on hearing of the capture of Atlanta :

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
*Washington, D. C., September 3, 1864.*

The national thanks are tendered by the President to Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability, courage, and perseverance displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor, has resulted in the capture of the city of Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges, and other military operations that have signalized the campaign, must render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated therein to the applause of the nation.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN,  
*President of the United States.*


EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
*Washington City, September 3, 1864.*

Ordered:

First. That on Monday, the 5th day of September, commencing at the hour of 12 noon, there shall be given a salute of 100 guns at the Arsenal and Navy-Yard, Washington, and on Tuesday, the 6th day of September, or on the day after the receipt of this order, at each arsenal and navy-yard in the United States, for the recent brilliant achievements of the fleet and land forces of the United States in the harbor of Mobile, and in the reduction of Fort Powell, Fort Gaines, and Fort Morgan. The Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy will issue the necessary directions, in their respective Departments, for the execution of this order.

Second. That on Wednesday, the 7th day of September, commencing at the hour of 12 noon, there shall be fired a salute of 100 guns at the arsenal at Washington, and at New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburg, Newport, Ky., Saint Louis, New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, Hilton Head, and New Berne, or the day after the receipt of this order, for the brilliant achievements of the army under command of Major-General Sherman in the State of Georgia, and the capture of Atlanta. The Secretary of War will issue directions for the execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.  
*President of the United States.*



The Kontz Residence, Marietta st.

Military headquarters for the South, under Generals Pope, Meade and Terry, from 1865 to 1871



City Point, Va., September 4, 1864—9 p. m.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have just received your dispatch announcing the capture of Atlanta. In honor of your great victory I have ordered a salute to be fired with shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the enemy. The salute will be fired within an hour amidst great rejoicing.

U. S. GRANT,

*Lieutenant-General.*

II. All the corps, regiments, and batteries composing this army may, without further orders, inscribe "Atlanta" on their colors.

By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp.*

Accompanying the foregoing field orders, Sherman issued an address to his troops, praising their valor and fidelity and expressing his pride at being the commander of such a superb body of soldiers. In this address he expressed the view that the fall of Atlanta was brought about by Hood's detaching Wheeler's cavalry from his army and sending it on a fruitless railroad breaking expedition far to the rear.

On the 7th of September, Sherman had established his headquarters in Atlanta. On that day he wrote to General Tyler, the commandant at Louisville, Ky., giving him a description of the capture of Atlanta, and saying: "We have as the result of this quick and, as I think, well-executed movement, 27 guns, over 3,000 prisoners; have buried over 400 rebel dead, and left as many wounded that could not be moved. The rebels have lost, besides the important city of Atlanta, immense stores, at least 500 dead, 2,500 wounded, and 3,000 prisoners, whereas our aggregate [loss] will not foot up 1,500. If that is not success, I don't know what is."

Sherman had decided to drive all civilians out of Atlanta, and he no sooner got in the town than he set about his preparations to carry into effect that extraordinary determination. He communicated his intentions to Mayor Calhoun, asking him to send a committee of citizens to General Hood, bearing the following letter, which was done under protest:



HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., September 7, 1864.*

GENERAL HOOD,

*Commanding Confederate Army.*

GENERAL:—I have deemed it to the interest of the United States that the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, those who prefer it to go South and the rest North. For the latter I can provide food and transportation to points of their election in Tennessee, Kentucky, or farther north. For the former I can provide transportation by cars as far as Rough and Ready, and also wagons; but that their removal may be made with as little discomfort as possible it will be necessary for you to help the families from Rough and Ready to the cars at Lovejoy's. If you consent I will undertake to remove all families in Atlanta who prefer to go South to Rough and Ready, with all their movable effects, viz., clothing, trunks, reasonable furniture, bedding, etc., with their servants, white and black, with the proviso that no force shall be used toward the blacks one way or the other. If they want to go with their masters or mistresses they may do so, otherwise they will be sent away, unless they be men, when they may be employed by our quartermaster. Atlanta is no place for families or non-combatants and I have no desire to send them North if you will assist in conveying them South. If this proposition meets your views I will consent to a truce in the neighborhood of Rough and Ready, stipulating that any wagons, horses, or animals, or persons sent there for the purposes herein stated shall in no manner be harmed or molested, you in your turn agreeing that any cars, wagons, carriages, persons, or animals sent to the same point shall not be interfered with. Each of us might send a guard of, say, 100 men to maintain order, and limit the truce to, say, two days after a certain time appointed. I have authorized the mayor to choose two citizens to convey to you this letter and such documents as the mayor may forward in explanation, and shall await your reply.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major-General, Commanding.*

(Sent by Messrs. Ball and Crew.)

To this communication Hood made prompt reply as follows :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AND DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE,  
*Lovejoy's Station, Ga., Sept. 8, 1864.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN :

GENERALS—Your letter of yesterday's date, borne by James M. Ball and James R. Crew, citizens of Atlanta, has been received. You say therein that you deem it to be best for the interests of the United States for the citizens residing in Atlanta to be removed, etc. I do not consider that I have any alternative in the matter. I accept the proposition to declare a truce for ten days, or such time as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose mentioned, and shall render all the assistance in my power to expedite the transportation of citizens in this direction. I suggest that a staff officer be appointed by you to superintend the removal to Rough and Ready, and I will appoint a like officer to control the removal further South; that a guard of 100 men be sent by each party as you propose, to maintain order at that place, and that the removal begin next Monday.

And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of this war. In the name of God and humanity, I protest, and believe you will find yourself wrong in thus expelling from their homes and firesides the wives and children of a brave people. I have the honor to be, general,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD.

Immediately upon receipt of Hood's reply, Sherman issued the following field orders, which involved the exile of the people of Atlanta and subsequently the destruction of the city :

SPECIAL HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
FIELD ORDERS, *In the Field, Atlanta, Ga.,*  
No. 67. *September 8, 1864.*

I. The city of Atlanta, being exclusively required for war-like purposes, will at once be vacated by all except the armies of

the United States and such civilian employes as may be retained by the proper departments of government.

II. The chief quartermaster, Colonel Easton, will at once take possession of buildings of all kinds, and of all staple articles, such as cotton, tobacco, etc., and will make such disposition of them as is required by existing regulations, or such orders as he may receive from time to time from the proper authorities.

III. The chief engineer will promptly reconnoiter the city and suburbs, and indicate the sites needed for the permanent defense of the place, together with any houses, sheds, or shanties that stand in his way, that they may be set apart for destruction. Colonel Easton will then, on consultation with the proper officers of the ordnance, quartermaster, commissary, medical, and railroad departments, set aside such buildings and lots of ground as will be needed for them, and have them suitably marked and set apart. He will then, on consultation with Generals Thomas and Slocum, set apart such as may be necessary to the proper administration of the military duties of the Department of the Cumberland and of the post of Atlanta, and all buildings and materials not thus embraced will be held subject to the use of the government as may hereafter arise, according to the just rules of the quartermaster's department.

IV. No general, staff, or other officers, or any soldier will on any pretense occupy any house or shanty, unless it be embraced in the limits assigned as the camp of the troops to which such general or staff belongs, but the chief quartermaster may allow the troops to use boards, shingles, or materials of buildings, barns, sheds, warehouses, and shanties, not needed by the proper departments of government, to be used in the reconstruction of such shanties and bivouacs as the troops and officers serving with them require, and he will also provide as early as practicable the proper allowance of tents for the use of the officers and men in their encampments.

V. In proper time just arrangements will be made for the supply to the troops of all articles they may need over and above the clothing, provisions, etc., furnished by government, and on no pretense whatever will traders, manufacturers, or sutlers be allowed to settle in the limits of fortified places, and if these manage to come in spite of this notice, the quartermaster will

seize their stores and appropriate them to the use of the troops, and deliver the parties or other unauthorized citizens who thus place their individual interests above that of the United States, in the hands of some provost-marshal, to be put to labor on the forts or conscripted into one of the regiments or batteries already in service.

VI. The same general principles will apply to all military posts south of Chattanooga.

By order of Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, *Aide-de-Camp*.

The same day Mayor Calhoun, acting upon Sherman's request, issued a proclamation to the citizens of Atlanta, notifying them of the removal orders and informing them of the arrangements made for their transportation North or South, as individuals might elect. This proclamation was printed on hand bills and put in every house in the city and pasted on every dead wall and in public places. It read, under the head of "Notice" in large type:

Atlanta, Ga., September 8, 1864.


To the Citizens of Atlanta:

Major-General Sherman instructs me to say to you that you must all leave Atlanta; that as many of you as want to go North can do so, and that as many as want to go South can do so, and that all can take with them their movable property, servants included, if they want to go, but that no force is to be used, and that he will furnish transportation for persons and property as far as Rough and Ready, from whence it is expected General Hood will assist in carrying it on. Like transportation will be furnished for people and property going North, and it is required that all things contemplated by this notice will be carried into execution as soon as possible.

All persons are requested to leave their names and number in their families with the undersigned as early as possible, that estimates may be made of the quantity of transportation required.

JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor.

As might be expected, every effort that could be made by persuasion was exerted by the leading citizens to induce Sher-



Edward E. Rawson



man to modify his harsh orders. It was pointed out to him that much suffering and hardship would result from their execution, particularly among the women, children, aged and invalids. Mayor Calhoun joined earnestly in the protest, he and two of the councilmen, E. E. Rawson and L. C. Wells, addressing a communication to General Sherman, pleading that the citizens be allowed to remain, or that, at least, the orders of expatriation be modified more in the interest of humanity. Sherman replied in a kindly vein, but did not yield to the prayers of the people in any particular. He said he would see that nobody suffered any hardship or mistreatment of any kind while under his jurisdiction, and that the removal would be made in an orderly and comfortable way. He declared to revoke his orders was out of the question; that they had been issued in view of the humanities of the situation, but to prepare for the continuance of the great struggle at arms, in which "millions of people were interested—millions of good people outside of Atlanta." Sherman's answers went on: "We must have peace; peace not only in Atlanta, but in all America; to secure peace we must stop the war, and to stop the war we must defeat the rebel armies that keep up the war. To defeat the rebel armies we must prepare to meet them in their fastnesses, and provide ourselves with arms and instruments which will enable us to accomplish our purpose. Now," he continued, "I know the vindictive character of our enemy, and that we may have many years for military operations from this quarter, and therefore deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce or agriculture here for their support, and sooner or later want would compel the inhabitants to go; and why not go now when all the arrangements are completed for their transfer, instead of waiting until the plunging shot of contending armies should renew the scenes of the past month? Of course, I do not apprehend anything of this kind at the present moment, but do you suppose that this army will be here till the war is over? I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what I propose to do, but I assert that my military plans make it neces-

sary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into this country, deserve all the curse and maledictions that a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you, to secure peace; but you cannot have peace by a division of our common country. If the United States submits to a peace now, it will not stop, but will go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, and have eternal war."

There was nothing to do but move, and beginning on the 12th, the citizens of Atlanta, consisting mainly of women, children and old men, bundled their belongings into Sherman's army wagons and were driven to Rough and Ready. For several days the roads leading south were lined with wagons loaded with household goods and families. Pathetic scenes were witnessed as people born and reared in Atlanta, or who had spent the best years of their lives there, turned their backs on home and the sacred associations that clustered around it, to face unknown privations, poverty, and in many instances actual vagabondage. Most of the families, of course, went south. The Union element in Atlanta was small after the war had begun. As might be supposed, the number of people who had remained in Atlanta during the siege was comparatively small. Thousands had taken flight during the terrible summer months just passed. The official records show that 446 families were moved to Rough and Ready, consisting of 705 adults and 860 children. But 75 negro servants were taken along, nearly all of the negroes in the city, irrespective of age or sex, preferring to remain with "Marse Lincum's sojers." The average amount of baggage transported with each family was 1,654 pounds. There was little friction or irregularity in the transfer of the emigrants from the Union to the Confederate lines, the truce being honorably maintained by the detachments sent by both armies to Rough and Ready. The soldiers, lately at bayonet's point, laughed and joked with each other and vied with each other in their efforts to be of service to the women and children. The

utmost good humor prevailed, but it is unnecessary to add that no great degree of happiness was manifested by the exiles. Few eyes among the women were not red from weeping and clouded with anxiety. As evidence of the harmonious relations between the "Yankees" and "Johnnies" conducting the removal at Rough and Ready, Major Clare, the staff officer conducting General Hood's part of the agreement, addressed the following courteous note, days later, to Colonel Warner, Sherman's officer in charge at Rough and Ready:

*Rough and Ready, September 22, 1864.*

COLONEL: Our official communication is about to cease. You will permit me to bear testimony to the uniform courtesy you have shown on all occasions to me and my people, and the promptness with which you have corrected all irregularities arising in our course. Hoping at some time to be able to reciprocate your positive kindness, I remain with respect,

Your obedient servant,

W. T. CLARE,

*Major and A. G. Lt.-Gen. Hood's Staff.*

TO LIEUT.-COL. WILLIAM WARNER.

For a fortnight after Sherman took possession of Atlanta, he was much concerned about Wheeler's movements in Tennessee and daily urged Steedman and his other commanders to the rear to make short work of the dashing little cavalry chief of the Confederates. They do not seem to have made much headway against him. The news of the killing of General John Morgan, at Greenville, Tenn., and the capture of a small part of his command, was commented on with great gratification by Sherman. On the 9th of September he wired General Halleck: "All our troops are now in position, comfortable and well. In a day or two I will have telegraphic communication from Roswell round to Sandtown, and can act promptly. A few of the enemy's cavalry followed us as far as Rough and Ready, and last evening General Hood sent in a flag of truce asking to exchange prisoners. I have about 2,000 in hand, and will exchange if he will make a fair deal. I have sent out my inspec-

tor-general to confer and agree, and to make arrangements for the exodus of citizens. I am not willing to have Atlanta encumbered by the families of our enemies. I want it a pure Gibraltar, and will have it so by October 1. I think Generals Rousseau and Steedman are stirring Wheeler up pretty well, and hope they will make an end of him, as Gillem has of Morgan. I have ordered renewed activity, and to show no mercy to guerillas or railroad breakers. It makes a world of difference if 'my bull gores your ox, or yours mine.' Weather beautiful and all things seem bright."

The Federal army at Atlanta settled down to make itself comfortable for a few weeks. Scores of houses, some of them among the handsome mansions of the city, were torn down and the lumber used for constructing shanties for the soldiers. The quarters were built in quite a regular and neat manner, on vacant spaces and the public square and park. The generals and other important officers made themselves exceedingly comfortable in the best buildings of the place, being waited on like princes by the negroes. Generals Logan and Blair returned to their homes on leave of absence, and many furloughs were granted. The defenses of Atlanta had been strengthened as soon as the Union army came up, and the lines were held ready for an assault from any quarter. The roads leading south were strongly picketed almost to the Confederate camps. What would Hood do next? That was the question that Sherman was asking himself as he kept close watch on his dogged antagonist at Lovejoy's. The next blow was expected to be directed against the rear, and to make himself doubly strong in that quarter, Sherman sent Thomas to Chattanooga to take command of that important district, and General Corse was placed in command at Rome.

While Hood was preparing for his winter campaign, he had Macon put in a better state of defense and exerted every effort to receive reinforcements. Few were available, however, Wheeler was ordered to return to the army, after paying his farewell respects to Sherman's railroad in North Georgia. The bitterest feeling existed between Hood and Hardee, and the latter renewed his repeated applications to be relieved. On the 8th of

September Hood telegraphed Bragg: "I suggest that all the reserves of Georgia, under General Cobb, be ordered to this army and the prisoners removed; that Lieutenant-General Taylor be ordered to relieve General Hardee, bringing with him all the troops he can."

In connection with the removal of the citizens of Atlanta, the report of Major Clare, of General Hood's staff, who superintended the work on the part of the Confederates, is interesting, and it is hereto appended:

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE, ARMY OF TENNESSEE.

*September 22, 1864.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report in reference to the removal of the families from Atlanta under Major-General Sherman's (Federal Army) order of expulsion:

Receiving verbal orders from General Hood on the evening of the 11th to conduct the truce agreed upon between himself and Major-General Sherman, I started as soon as possible, reaching Rough and Ready at 7.30 on the morning of the 12th of September. Shortly after reaching there I met the commanding officer of the Federal guard, and soon after Colonel Warner, of General Sherman's staff, the Federal truce officer. Having established with these officers the preliminaries of the truce and the manner in which it should be carried out, and made arrangements in regard to the guards, I awaited the arrival of the trains from Atlanta. (The inclosed report of the names of the families arriving, their number and the date of their arrival, will give all the information on these points.) Some delays or irregularities in regard to the arrival of the trains having occurred, I demanded of the Federal officer in charge the reason thereof and their correction. He informed me that every means of transportation were placed at the disposal of the citizens for the purpose of removing their families and effects. On sending for Mayor Calhoun and the committee of citizens charged with removing the people of Atlanta, I ascertained that his statement was correct. I had then only to urge upon the people, through the mayor, to come during the early days of the truce to guard against the accident of having too little transportation when the



truce was about to close. This advice they disregarded, and the consequence was suffering and inconvenience. This was, however, to no great extent. From Rough and Ready to Lovejoy's Station, I think I can safely say, under my orders, were moved as comfortably and safely as possible the unfortunate people who were driven from their homes.

Receiving information from you that the government was being embarrassed by the heavy demands made upon the acting commissary of subsistence at Lovejoy's, I arranged with the Federal authorities to supply the exiles with five days' rations on their application to Colonel Le Duc, quartermaster Twentieth Army Corps, at Atlanta. This, I was informed, was done. The apportionment of transportation among the different corps was made as you directed. On receiving your order I sent for Major Mason, the quartermaster in charge of the transportation reporting to me, and read the first as well as the supplemental order to him, and directed him to carry it out literally. This he, as well as Capt. John McLaughlin, his assistant, informed me had been done.

Having been informed that six teamsters belonging to Captain Clark's train had deserted while the train was at Rough and Ready, I made a formal demand for them of the Federal flag of truce officer. He assured me that they should be returned if found, at the same time stating to me that thirteen of the Federal guard and teamsters had deserted to our lines.

Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon Colonel Anderson, in command of the guard from our army on duty at Rough and Ready, for the rigid discipline he at all times maintained.

W. CLARE,

*Major and Assistant Inspector-General.*

COL. E. J. HARVIE, Inspector-General.

## CHAPTER XL

### THE DESTRUCTION OF ATLANTA

Hood was ready in a fortnight. On the morning of the 18th of September his army began to move in the direction of the West Point railroad, which the advance reached the following day. For several days the army remained near Palmetto, in line of battle, but Sherman did not accept the challenge. By the 1st of October the army had effected a passage of the Chattahoochee at Moore's Ferry. The advance was continued to near Lost Mountain, the scene of the hard campaign under Johnston. In the meantime detachments had operated against the Western and Atlantic railroad, destroying some ten or fifteen miles between Acworth and Big Shanty. On the 4th the garrison at the latter place, consisting of 170 officers and men, was surrendered to General Stewart, and the garrison at Acworth, numbering 250, surrendered to General Loring. Hood believed that large Federal stores were at Allatoona, and on the 5th General French confronted that stronghold, which was commanded by General Corse in person, and demanded its surrender. Corse refused, telling French he was prepared for the "needless effusion of blood" that the latter had expressed himself as desiring to avoid. The assault upon Allatoona and its brave defense by General Corse is a part of the heroic in history. It was during the unequal fight, when Corse was being pressed to the last extremity, that his eyes caught the signal of Sherman from Kenesaw Mountain: "Hold the fort; I am coming." The popular hymn of this title was based on the incident.

Sherman followed close behind Hood with nearly all of his army, excepting Slocum's corps, which was left behind to hold Atlanta. Of the movements of his army during the next few days, General Hood says: "On the 6th my army reached Dal-

las; our right rested at New Hope Church, where intelligence was received that the enemy was advancing from Lost Mountain. From Dallas we marched to Coosaville, ten miles southwest of Rome, via Van Wert, Cedartown, and Cave Spring. At the latter place Major-General Wheeler, with a portion of his command, joined me from Tennessee. We arrived at Coosaville on the 10th."

The rest of the movements of the opposing armies, as they concern the Atlanta campaign, is thus briefly told by General Sherman: "I followed Hood, reaching Kennesaw Mountain in time to see in the distance the attack on Allatoona, which was handsomely repulsed by Corse. Hood then moved westward, avoiding Rome, and by a circuit reached Resaca, which he summoned to surrender, but did not wait to attack. He continued thence the destruction of the railroad for about twenty miles to the tunnel, including Dalton, whose garrison he captured. I followed up to Resaca, then turned west to intercept his retreat down the valley of Chattooga; but by rapid marching he escaped to Gadsden, on the Coosa, I halting at Gaylesville, whence to observe his further movements. Hood, after a short pause, crossed the mountains to Decatur, on the Tennessee river, which point, as it was defended by a good division of troops, he avoided, and finally halted opposite Florence, Alabama, on the Tennessee river. Divining the object of his movements against our communications, which had been thus far rapid and skillful, I detached by rail General Schofield and two of my six corps to Nashville, all the reinforcements that Thomas deemed necessary to enable him to defend Tennessee, and began my systematic preparations for resuming the offensive against Georgia. Repairing the broken railroads, we collected in Atlanta necessary food and transportation for 60,000 men, sent to the rear all impedimenta, called in all detachments, and ordered them to march for Atlanta, where by November 4th were assembled four infantry corps, one cavalry division, and 65 field-guns, aggregating 60,598 men. Hood remained at Florence, preparing to invade Tennessee and Kentucky, or to follow me. We were prepared for either alternative."

The remainder of Hood's operations belong to the Nashville campaign, which ended more disastrously for the Confed-

erate cause than the Atlanta campaign, so far as the destruction of the Southern army was concerned. Sherman, with about one-half of his original army, returned to Atlanta and began his preparations for his famous march to the sea, which was begun as soon as he was certain that Hood's plans contemplated the invasion of Tennessee and had little further to do with Georgia. When all was ready, Sherman moved out of Atlanta, leaving



View from the Capitol dome  
From an old photo

Slocum's corps to bring up his rear after it had destroyed well nigh all that was left of Atlanta. On the crisp, clear day of mid-November that the last blue-coat filed out of the city, the countrymen for miles in the vicinity watched a dense pillar of smoke ascending high above Atlanta and obscuring the heavens. There was no exploding of ammunition, as on the occasion of

Hood's evacuation, but it was evident the work of ruin being done was infinitely greater. In truth, the torch had been applied to the practically depopulated city. Having no further use for the place as a military base, Sherman was determined that it should be of no use to the Confederacy, and to make certain that no incentive remained to reoccupy it, he left it in ruins. It has been denied that Sherman burned Atlanta, as it has been denied that he bombarded Atlanta. There were a number of citizens still lingering in the city who witnessed the work of incendiarism.

General W. P. Howard, of the Georgia state troops, who entered Atlanta immediately after its evacuation by the Federals, made the following report to Governor Brown, descriptive of the work of ruin left in Sherman's wake:

"Every species of machinery that was not destroyed by fire was most ingeniously broken and thus made worthless. And of all the steam boilers, switches, frogs, etc., nothing escaped. In the angle of Hunter street commencing at the city hall, and running east, and on McDonough street, running south, all houses were destroyed. The jail and calaboose were burned. All business houses, except those on Alabama street, commencing with the City Hotel, running east to Loyd street, were burned. All the hotels except the Gate City Hotel were burned. The estimate was that out of 3,800 houses only 400 were left standing within the city limits, and when those outside the corporate limits of the city were taken into account it was estimated that the Federal army destroyed in and about Atlanta about 4,500 houses.

"Two-thirds of the shade trees in the city park and of the timber in the suburbs were destroyed. The Masonic Hall was not burned, but the corner-stone was marred. The city hall was damaged but not destroyed. The Second Baptist, Second Presbyterian, Trinity M. E., and the Catholic churches and all the residences adjacent, between Mitchell and Peters streets, running southeast, and between Loyd and Washington streets, running southeast, were safe. The saving from destruction of this large block of property was all attributed to Rev. Father O'Reilly, of the Roman Catholic Church, there being a large number of Roman



Catholics in the Federal army, who sympathized with their fellow Catholics in Atlanta, who were in danger of losing their fine property here, and who used their efforts toward saving it, and as to destroy any property in the vicinity would endanger the existence of the Roman Catholic Church and parsonage, all the above described property was left unharmed. The Protestant Methodist, the African, and the Christian Churches were all destroyed. All other churches were saved. The Atlanta Medical College was saved by Dr. D'Alvigney, who was left in charge of the wounded. The Female College was torn down for the brick with which it was designed to erect winter quarters. All institutions of learning were destroyed. Roderick Badger, the negro dentist, and his brother, Robert Badger, a train hand on the West Point and La Grange Railroad, both of whom were well known to the citizens of Atlanta, were assistant professors to three philanthropic northmen in the instruction of the African race in the African Church, which had been converted into an institution of learning. Many of the finest houses which were left standing were occupied by people who had never lived in such elegant style. They had fine furniture, carpets, pianos, mirrors, etc., etc., to which they had always heretofore been wholly unaccustomed. There were about fifty families that remained in the city during its occupancy by the Federal army.

"Peachtree street was burned from the center of the city to Wesley Chapel. Hunnicutt's drug store was a heap of ruins, as was the commission house that stood beside it. In Johnson's marble works there was left but one small wooden shed. Proceeding northward, where there had stood a number of buildings that were three stories high above the cellars, in which most of the business had been transacted before the war, there was nothing but a mass of ruins. On this street the second building left standing was a wooden one owned by Dr. Tucker of Penfield. The mansions of Sasseen and Judge Ezzard were left standing. Wesley Chapel remained, but it was horribly desecrated. Above Wesley Chapel, Peachtree street had suffered but little. From Rall's store, to the residence of Mrs. Luckie, all the dwellings remained except Mr. Ripley's, Mr. Grubb's, Rev. Mr. Pinkerton's, and a house belonging to J. R. Wallace. On Marietta street,

all the business houses were destroyed, but after leaving these no house on either side was completely destroyed for an entire block, and as far as the residence of Mr. Goode, which was standing. After passing this house, the torch had been applied to all the buildings on the street, its entire length, with the exception of the residences of Rean, Mills, and Mrs. Sower's, and a few insignificant structures in the neighborhood of the sword factory, which was destroyed, as were the button factory and the grist-mill.

"Whitehall street in its entire length, from Roak's corner to Captain Gaskill's residence, which was left standing, was entirely destroyed. Fully one-half of the business houses of Atlanta were included in this space, and the ruin was complete. It was at first a matter of surprise that the block on Whitehall street, bounded on the north by Mitchell street and on the south by Peters street, should have escaped destruction; but an old man named Baker was at the time in the agonies of death, and this fact being reported to the proper authorities, saved the block. The Masonic Hall was saved by the mystic signs and the symbols of the brotherhood. For three hundred yards on Decatur street, beginning where stood the Christian church, and ending with the spot where the government armory stood, all the private residences were left standing. After passing this space and proceeding in the direction of Decatur for some three miles, all the houses were burned with two or three trifling exceptions. Among these destroyed was the fine residence of General L. J. Gartrell.

"On the street in the rear of the Trout house every house was burned. On Butler street only one or two houses were destroyed, and on Calhoun street all were left standing except Joseph Barnes's and a brick house adjoining. On Houston street every house was destroyed from Mrs. Williamson's east, which remained, except Bob Yancey's, Colonel Whitaker's and Mr. Johnson's. From Mrs. Williamson's to Peachtree all were left standing. On Ivy street the destroyed houses were A. M. Wallace's, and all the rest on the same block, E. B. Walker's, Joseph Wyly's, Cleveland's and the house on the corner of Ivy and Houston streets. On Pryor street all were left standing from Alabama to Rawson's, except the Kilby boarding-house and

a house C. C. Henley lived in. From Rawson's all were destroyed except the one built by Mr. Coleman. On Washington street all were left standing except that of Mr. D. F. Inman, the one adjoining and the two opposite. On Crew street all were standing except that built by E. E. Rawson, one occupied by T. M. Richardson, one owned by T. S. Stoy, one by Mrs. Enright, and one built by E. Buice. On MacDonough street, from the city hall to Bell's house, all were standing, except those of J. M. Clark, James Morris, and William and B. T. Lamb. From Mr. Ball's all out were destroyed. On Hunter street all were standing except Reed's, Browning's and an old house occupied as a hospital. On Fair street all were standing except two owned by Marshal Jones and J. R. Jones and the offices of Dr. Hardin and Mr. Grant."

The charred walls of Atlanta were yet warm when scores of her exiled citizens returned to set manfully to work to restore the city to its former greatness. Among the early arrivals were Mayor Calhoun, Marshal Jones, Dr. Alexander, Colonel J. W. Duncan, Colonel Cowart, Judge Butt, Perino Brown, Major Thompson, Major Bacon, Er Lawshe, Dr. Simmons, Messrs. L. S. Salmon, Peck, Purtell and J. T. Porter. The foregoing arrived before December 10th. Judge Jared I. Whitaker, publisher of the *Intelligencer*, arrived with his family December 15th. Of the others who returned during December were Col. N. J. Hammond, Rev. H. C. Hornady, A. K. Seago, Colonel G. W. Lee, W. W. Roark, Judge C. M. Strong, Captain Hubbard, W. P. Howard, and others. Mr. Howard had been sent to Atlanta by Governor Brown to take charge of the valuable property in the city belonging to the state. On the 25th of December the first sermon after the destruction of the city was preached in the First Baptist Church by Rev. H. C. Hornady.

Speaking of the condition of Atlanta after Sherman had passed on, Historian E. Y. Clarke says: "November 16th Sherman commenced his march to the sea. Before doing so, however, the destruction of the city was completed. What could not be consumed by fire was blown up, torn down, or otherwise destroyed. No city during the war was so nearly annihilated. The center of the city, or business locality, was

an entire mass of ruins—there being but a solitary structure standing on the main street, Whitehall, between its extreme commercial limits. At least three-fourths of the buildings in the city were destroyed, the remaining number consisting chiefly of dwelling houses. The very few buildings of any consequence spared in the general ruin were saved through intercession, contingency or accident. Rev. Father O'Reilly was instrumental in saving the Catholic and several Protestant church edifices, and



The old Slave Market, war time view

(Picture shows west side of Whitehall st., where is now located the Whitehall-Peachtree Viaduct)

also the city hall. The medical college was saved through the efforts of Dr. N. D'Alvigny. Atlanta was thus left a scene of charred and desolate ruins, the home of half-starved and half-wild dogs, and of carrion fowls feasting upon refuse, and the decaying carcasses of animals. Such was the spectacle that greeted the eyes of Er Lawshé and other citizens who returned to the city in December, 1864."

A small detachment of Confederate and state troops occu-

pied Atlanta early in December. The following orders issued by the officers on assuming command in the city are interesting:

PROVOST-MARSHAL'S OFFICE,  
*Atlanta, Ga., December 5th, '61.*

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 1.

In pursuance of Special Orders No. 4, headquarters military district of Georgia, I have assumed the duties of provost-marshal of this post.

THOMAS L. DODD, *Captain and Provost-Mar.*

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*Macon, Ga., November 26, 1864.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Luther J. Glenn, of Cobb's Legion, is assigned to the command of the post of Atlanta, Ga. This order to date from the 24th instant.

MAJOR-GENERAL HOWELL COBB.

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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY POST,  
*Atlanta, Ga., Dec. 2, 1864.*

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 1.

In obedience to the above order, the undersigned hereby assumes command of this post.

L. J. GLENN, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Command.*

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The commander of the Fulton county militia issued the following order:

*Atlanta, December 8, 1864.*

In obedience to the proclamation of Governor Brown of the 19th ultimo, all persons in Fulton county between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five are subject to military duty, except those who are exempted in the proclamation. All who are subject will report at the city hall without delay, at Judge Manning's office for further orders.

Z. A. RICE,

*Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding.*

As the winter advanced and it was seen that there was very little likelihood of the Federals returning to northwest Georgia, the banished Atlantans returned in increasing numbers, and by spring a steady stream of people was pouring into the city, in-



cluding a great many strangers. The people lost no time in repining. The ruin that confronted them was calculated to depress the spirits and discourage effort, but it only served to spur Atlanta's builders with renewed energy and enterprise. Gentlemen of the old régime who never knew what it was to perform manual labor, stripped their coats and set to knocking the dead mortar off the bricks in the debris that was once their buildings, preparatory to rebuilding. Men like Judge John Collier mixed mortar and laid brick. There were no idlers in the Phoenix-



Marshal "Tim" Murphy

Er Lashe

First building erected on Whitehall st. after Gen. Sherman's departure in 1865

Built for Er Lawshe, using lumber previously utilized by Federal army for soldiers' huts on one of Mr. Lawshe's vacant lots, where now are Southern R. R. shops

like city, and no labor was too hard or menial for any Atlantan to set his hand to. The men were no pluckier than the women. Deprived of their servants, in the majority of instances, society ladies performed their duty with right good will in kitchen and garden. This spirit of never-say-die brought about the restoration of the Gate City in a remarkably short time. At first, of course, the houses were cheaply and temporarily constructed, hundreds of mere shanties springing up on the business thoroughfares. Almost any kind of a structure answered for a

place of shelter and in which to do business for the first few months after the fiery passing of Sherman. The Atlantans had not lost their commercial instinct, by any means, and it is surprising what a lively business town Atlanta was by the first of January, 1865, in spite of Confederate currency and universal poverty. Nearly all of the former merchants returned with their stocks which had been shipped to places of safety, or bought new stocks, and many new enterprises were started. On the first Sunday in April church services were being held regularly in five of the leading churches, and several Sunday-schools had nearly their usual quota of pupils.

Then came the sad tidings of Lee's surrender. Nobody believed the news at first, and when it was confirmed, many pluckily declared they were glad Atlanta was not in Lee's department and had not yet been surrendered. But Johnston's surrender to the Sherman that Atlanta knew so well occurred on the 26th of April, and Atlanta was in the department commanded by Johnston. It was but a few days until the well-remembered blue coats of United States regulars were to be seen on the streets of Atlanta, and the stars and stripes had replaced the stars and bars on the public buildings.

Apropos of the return of Atlanta to United States jurisdiction, the following official orders will interest many readers:

*Kingston, Ga., May 4, 1865.*

All officers and soldiers of my command, and all officers of the Confederate army in North Georgia who have not been paroled, will report to me at this place by the 12th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of receiving their paroles.

The utmost limit being the 20th, all officers and soldiers enumerated above who shall not have reported by that time, will be considered as refusing to comply with this order, and will be regarded and treated as outlaws by the authorities of the United States, as will be seen by reference to the following communication addressed to me by General Judah, commanding United States forces:

W. T. WOFFORD,

*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

. . . . .

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,

*Resaca, Ga., May 2, 1865.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. T. WOFFORD, Commanding Confederate Forces, North Georgia:

GENERAL:—Under the surrender of yourself and forces of this date, I will parole all Confederate officers and soldiers whom



Peachtree Street, from the R. R. tracks

(Supposed to have been photographed after the war)

you report to me as such, and all within your jurisdiction who do not report to you for that purpose will be regarded by the United States authorities as outlaws, and treated as such.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

H. M. JUDAH.

. . . . .

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.

*Macon, Ga., May 3, 1865.*

SPECIAL ORDER No. 68.

Under the provisions of the convention agreed upon between Major-General Sherman and Lieutenant-General Johnston, Colonel B. H. Eggleston, First Ohio Cavalry, is designated to receive the surrender of the Confederate troops at Atlanta, Ga. He will proceed to that point without delay, to carry out the terms of the convention. By command of

BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL WILSON.

E. B. BEAUMONT, *Major and A. A. G.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY POST,

*Atlanta, Ga., May 4, 1865.*

SPECIAL ORDER No. 32.

In conformity with the convention made by General Johnston, C. S. A., and Major-General Sherman, U. S. A., and in compliance with the order of the former, I this day turn over the command of this military post to Colonel B. B. Eggleston, U. S. A.

L. J. GLENN, *Lt. Col., C. S. A.*

SPECIAL ORDER No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,

*Atlanta, Ga., May 4, 1865.*

In obedience to special orders No. 68, headquarters C. C. M. D. M., Macon, Ga., May 3, 1865, I hereby assume command of the military post at Atlanta, Ga.

B. B. EGGLESTON, *Col. O. P. C.,*

*Commanding Post.*

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,

*Atlanta, Ga., May 5, 1865.*

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 2.

All persons in and about Atlanta, Ga., in possession of intoxicating liquors of any kind, are hereby prohibited from selling or giving the same to any soldier, whatever, under penalty of forfeiture of all liquors found in their possession.

By Order of B. B. EGGLESTON.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,

*Atlanta, Ga., May 5, 1865.*

Captain William G. Lawder, First Ohio Cavalry, is hereby assigned as provost-marshal of this post, and he will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

B. B. EGGLESTON.

The people of Atlanta accepted the situation philosophically. They were too busy to talk politics or exhibit resentment. The Federal authorities got along very well with the citizens and did nothing to incur their displeasure. On May 11th the *Intelligencer* said editorially:

"Colonel Eggleston, commandant of this post, and Captain Lawder, provost-marshal, perform their duties in a highly satisfactory manner. No soldier, of either Lee's or Johnston's army, has any complaint to make. All that they need from the post commissary or quartermaster's departments are freely given, and more than they ask. Deportment like this is too commendable to pass unnoticed, and it is hoped that the citizens will know how to appreciate and demean themselves accordingly."

On the 13th Colonel Eggleston issued an order to the effect that any negro found within the limits of the city without a pass would be arrested and placed in confinement. Former owners or employers of negroes were required to furnish them with the necessary passes.

Some well-known ladies of Atlanta made a beautiful silk United States flag, which was for the first time raised over the city at half-mast in respect to President Lincoln, assassinated on the 14th of April by John Wilkes Booth. After the flag was swung to the breeze, the Fifth Iowa band played the Star-Spangled Banner in front of the post headquarters. Universal regret was expressed in Atlanta over the tragic fate that befell Lincoln. It was regarded as a sad blow to the South.

With the ending of the war, hope actuated every arm to Herculean efforts for the upbuilding of the new Atlanta. How well the people of Atlanta succeeded in their cherished ambition to make the Gate City even a greater city than it had been before its destruction by the ruthless hand of Mars, will be seen in the succeeding volume.



# Appendix

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## CHAPTER XLI

### SHERMAN'S REPORT

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Atlanta, Ga., September 15, 1864.*

General: I have heretofore from day to day by telegraph kept the War Department and General-in-Chief advised of the progress of events, but now it becomes necessary to review the whole campaign which has resulted in the capture and occupation of the city of Atlanta.

On the 14th day of March, 1864, at Memphis, Tenn., I received notice from General Grant, at Nashville, that he had been commissioned Lieutenant-General and Commander in Chief of the Armies of the United States, which would compel him to go East, and that I had been appointed to succeed him as commander of the Division of the Mississippi. He summoned me to Nashville for a conference and I took my departure the same day and reached Nashville, via Cairo, on the 17th, and accompanied him on his journey eastward as far as Cincinnati. We had a full and complete understanding of the policy and plans for the ensuing campaign, covering a vast area of country, my part of which extended from Chattanooga to Vicksburg. I returned to Nashville, and on the 25th began a tour of inspection, visiting Athens, Decatur, Huntsville, and Larkin's Ferry, Ala.; Chattanooga, Loudon and Knoxville, Tenn. During this visit I had interviews with General McPherson, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, at Huntsville; Major-General Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga, and General Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, at Knoxville. We arranged in general terms the lines of communication to be guarded, the strength of the several columns and garrisons, and fixed the 1st day of May as the time when all things should be ready.

Leaving these officers to complete the details of organization and preparation, I returned again to Nashville on the 2d of April, and gave my personal attention to the question of supplies. I found the depots at Nashville abundantly supplied, and the railroads in very fair order, and that steps had already been taken to supply cars and locomotives to fill the new and increased demand of the service, but the impoverished condition of the inhabitants of East Tennessee, more especially in the region around about Chattanooga, had forced the commanding officers of the post to issue food to the people. I was compelled to stop this, for a simple calculation showed that a single railroad could not feed the armies and the people too, and of course the army had the preference, but I endeavored to point the people to new channels of supply. At first my orders operated very hard, but the prolific soil soon afforded early vegetables, and ox-wagons hauled meat and bread from Kentucky, so that no actual suffering resulted, and I trust that those who clamored at the cruelty and hardships of the day have already seen in the results a perfect justification of my course. At once the store-houses at Chattanooga began to fill so that by the 1st of May a very respectable quantity of food and forage had been accumulated there, and from that day to this stores have been brought forward in wonderful abundance, with a surplus that has enabled me to feed the army well during the whole period of time, although the enemy has succeeded more than once in breaking our road for many miles at different points.

During the month of April I received from Lieutenant-General Grant a map, with a letter of instructions, which is now at Nashville, but a copy will be procured and made a part of this report. Subsequently I received notice from him that he would move from his camp about Culpeper, Va., on the 5th of May, and he wanted me to do the same from Chattanooga. My troops were still dispersed, and the cavalry, so necessary to our success, was yet collecting horses at Nicholasville, Ky., and Columbia, Tenn.

On the 27th of April I put all the troops in motion toward Chattanooga, and on the next day went there in person. My aim and purpose was to make the Army of the Cumberland 50,000 men, that of the Tennessee 35,000, and that of the Ohio 15,000. These figures were approximated, but never reached, the Army of the Tennessee failing to receive certain divisions that were still kept on the Mississippi River, resulting from the unfavorable issue of the Red River expedition. But on the 1st of May the effective strength of the several armies for offensive purposes was about as follows:

Army of the Cumberland, Major-General Thomas commanding: Infantry, 54,568; artillery, 2,377; cavalry, 3,828; total, 60,773. Guns, 130.

Army of the Tennessee, Major-General McPherson command-

ing: Infantry, 22,437; artillery, 1,404; cavalry, 624; total, 24,465. Guns, 96.

Army of the Ohio, Major-General Schofield commanding: Infantry, 11,183; artillery, 679; cavalry, 1,697; total, 13,559. Guns, 28.

Grand aggregate: Troops, 98,797; guns, 254.

About these figures have been maintained during the campaign, the number of men joining from furloughs and hospitals about compensating for the loss in battle and from sickness.

These armies were grouped on the morning of May 6 as follows: That of the Cumberland at and near Ringgold; that of the Tennessee at Gordon's Mills, on the Chickamauga; and that of the Ohio near Red Clay, on the Georgia line, north of Dalton. The enemy lay in and about Dalton, superior to me in cavalry (Wheeler's), and with three corps of infantry and artillery, viz: Hardee's, Hood's, and Polk's, the whole commanded by General Joe Johnston, of the Confederate Army. I estimated the cavalry under Wheeler at about 10,000, and the infantry and artillery about 45,000 to 50,000 men. To strike Dalton in front was impracticable, as it was covered by an inaccessible ridge known as the Rocky Face, through which was a pass between Tunnel Hill and Dalton known as the Buzzard Roost, through which lay the railroad and wagon road. It was narrow, well obstructed by abatis, and flooded by water caused by dams across Mill Creek. Batteries also commanded it in its whole length from the spurs on either side, and more especially from a ridge at the farther end like a traverse directly across its *débouché*. It was, therefore, necessary to turn it. On its north front the enemy had a strong line of works behind Mill Creek, so that my attention was at once directed to the south. In that direction I found Snake Creek Gap, affording me a good practicable way to reach Resaca, a point on the enemy's railroad line of communication, eighteen miles below Dalton. Accordingly I ordered General McPherson to move rapidly from his position at Gordon's Mills, via Ship's Gap, Villanow, and Snake Creek Gap directly on Resaca, or the railroad at any point below Dalton, and to make a bold attack. After breaking the railroad well he was ordered to fall back to a strong defensive position near Snake Creek, and stand ready to fall on the enemy's flank when he retreated, as I judged he would. During the movement General Thomas was to make a strong feint of attack in front, while General Schofield pressed down from the north. General Thomas moved from Ringgold on the 7th, occupying Tunnel Hill, facing the Buzzard Roost Gap, meeting with little opposition, and pushing the enemy's cavalry well through the gap. General McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap on the 8th, completely surprising a brigade of

cavalry which was coming to watch and hold it, and on the 9th General Schofield pushed down close on Dalton from the north, while General Thomas renewed his demonstration against Buzzard Roost and Rocky Face Ridge, pushing it almost to a battle. One division (General Newton's) of the Fourth Corps (General Howard's) carried the ridge, and turning south toward Dalton found the crest too narrow and too well protected by rock epaulements to enable him to reach the gorge or pass. Another division (General Geary's) of the Twentieth Corps (General Hooker's) also made a bold push for the summit to the south of the pass, but the narrow road as it approached the summit was too strongly held by the enemy to be carried. This, however, was only designed as a demonstration, and worked well, for General McPherson was thereby enabled to march within a mile of Resaca almost unopposed. He found Resaca too strong to be carried by assault, and although there were many good roads leading from north to south, endangering his left flank, from the direction of Dalton, he could find no road by which he could rapidly cross over to the railroad, and accordingly he fell back and took strong position near the east end of Snake Creek Gap. I was somewhat disappointed at the result, still appreciated the advantage gained, and on the 10th ordered General Thomas to send General Hooker's corps to Snake Creek Gap in support of General McPherson, and to follow with another corps (the Fourteenth, General Palmer's), leaving General Howard with the Fourth Corps to continue to threaten Dalton in front, while the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake Creek Gap.

On the same day General Schofield was ordered to follow by the same route, and on the 11th the whole army excepting General Howard's corps and some cavalry left to watch Dalton, was in motion on the left side of Rocky Face Ridge for Snake Creek Gap and Resaca. The next day we moved against Resaca, General McPherson on the direct road, preceded by General Kilpatrick's cavalry, General Thomas to come up on his left, and General Schofield on his. General Kilpatrick met and drove the enemy's cavalry from a cross-road within two miles of Resaca, but received a wound which disabled him, and gave the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray, who according to his orders, wheeled out of the road, leaving General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca and drove them within their fortified lines, and occupied a ridge of bald hills, his right on the Ostenaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, and his left abreast the town. General Thomas came up on his left facing Camp Creek, and General Schofield broke his way through the dense forest to General Thomas' left. Johnston had left Dalton and General Howard entered it and pressed his rear. Nothing

saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of troops across the valley almost impossible. This fact enabled his army to reach Resaca from Dalton along the comparatively good road, constructed beforehand partly from the topographical nature of the country and partly from the foresight of the rebel chief. At all events, on the 14th of May, we found the rebel army in a strong position behind Camp Creek, occupying the forts at Resaca and his right on some high chestnut hills, to the north of the town. I ordered a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry in the direction of Calhoun; a division of the Sixteenth Corps, commanded by General Sweeny, to cross and threaten Calhoun; also, the cavalry division of General Garrard to move from its position at Villanow down towards Rome, to cross the Oostenaula and break the railroad below Calhoun and above Kingston, if possible, and with the main army I pressed against Resaca at all points. General McPherson got across Camp Creek, near its mouth, and made a lodgement close up to the enemy's works on hills that commanded, with short-range artillery, the railroad and trestle bridge, and General Thomas pressing close along Camp Creek Valley threw General Hooker's corps across the head of the creek to the main Dalton road and down it close to Resaca. General Schofield came up close on his left, and a heavy battle ensued during the afternoon and evening of the 15th, during which General Hooker drove the enemy from several strong hills, captured a 4-gun battery and many prisoners. That night Johnston escaped, retreating south across the Oostenaula, and the next morning we entered the town in time to save the road bridge, but the railroad bridge was burned. The whole army started in pursuit, General Thomas directly on his heels, General McPherson by Lay's Ferry, and General Schofield by obscure roads to the left. We found in Resaca another 4-gun battery and a good lot of stores.

General McPherson during the 16th got across at Lay's Ferry. General Thomas had to make some additional bridges at Resaca, but General Schofield had more trouble, and made a wide circuit to the left by Fite's and Field's Ferries across the Conesauga and Coosawatee Rivers, which form the Oostenaula.

On the 17th all the armies moved south by as many different roads as we could find, and General Thomas had sent by my orders a division (General Jeff. C. Davis) along the west bank of the Oostenaula to Rome. Near Adairsville we again found signs of the rebel army and of a purpose to fight, and about sunset of that day General Newton's division in the advance had a pretty sharp encounter with his rear guard, but the next morning he was gone, and we pushed on through Kingston to a point four miles beyond, where we found him again in force on ground comparatively open and well adapted



to a grand battle. We made the proper dispositions, General Schofield approaching Cassville from the north, to which point General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's corps, and I had drawn General McPherson's army from Woodland to Kingston to be in close support.

On the 19th the enemy was in force about Cassville with strong forts, but as our troops converged on him he again retreated in the night-time across the Etowah River, burning the road and railroad bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in complete possession of the most valuable country above the Etowah River. Holding General Thomas' army about Cassville, General McPherson's about Kingston, and General Schofield's at Cassville Depot and toward the Etowah bridge, I gave the army a few days' rest and also time to bring forward supplies for the next stage of the campaign.

In the mean time General Jeff. C. Davis had got possession of Rome with its forts, some eight or ten guns of heavy caliber, and its valuable mills and foundries. We also secured possession of two good bridges across the Etowah River near Kingston, giving us the means of crossing toward the south. Satisfied that the enemy could and would hold us in check at the Allatoona Pass, I resolved, without even attempting it in front, to turn it by a circuit to the right, and, having supplied our wagons for twenty days' absence from our railroad, I left a garrison at Rome and Kingston, and on the 23rd put the army in motion for Dallas. General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the mouth of Connasene Creek, near Kingston, and moved from his position to the south of Dallas via Van Wert. General Davis' division moved directly from Rome for Dallas via Van Wert. General Thomas took the road via Euharlee and Burnt Hickory, while General Schofield moved by other roads more to the east, aiming to come upon General Thomas' left. General Thomas' head of column skirmished with the enemy's cavalry about Burnt Hickory, and captured a courier with a letter of General Johnston's showing he had detected the movement and was preparing to meet us about Dallas. The country was very rugged, mountainous, and densely wooded, with few and obscure roads.

On the 25th May General Thomas was moving from Burnt Hickory for Dallas, his troops on three roads, General Hooker having the advance. When he approached the Pumpkin Vine Creek, on the main Dallas road, he found a respectable body of the enemy's cavalry at a bridge to his left. He rapidly pushed them across the creek, saving the bridge, though on fire, and followed out eastward about two miles, where he first encountered infantry, whose pickets he drove some distance, until he encountered the enemy's line of battle, and his leading division, General Geary's, had a severe encounter. General Hooker's two other divisions were on other

roads and he ordered them in, although the road he was then following by reason of the presence of the enemy, led him north of Dallas about two miles. It was near 4 p. m. before General Hooker got his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed two divisions, and by my orders made a bold push to secure possession of a point known as the New Hope Church, where three roads met from Acworth, Marietta, and Dallas. Here a hard battle was fought, and the enemy was driven back to New Hope Church, but, having hastily thrown up some parapets and a stormy, dark night having set in, General Hooker was unable to drive the enemy from these roads. By the next morning we found the enemy well entrenched substantially in front of the road leading from Dallas to Marietta. We were consequently compelled to make dispositions on a larger scale. General McPherson was moved up to Dallas, General Thomas was deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield was directed toward our left, so as to strike and return the enemy's right. General Garrard's cavalry operated with General McPherson, and General Stoneman with General Schofield. General McCook looked to our rear. Owing to the difficult nature of the ground and dense forests it took us several days to deploy close to the enemy, when I resolved gradually to work toward our left, and when all things were ready to push for the railroad east of Allatoona. In making our developments before the enemy about New Hope many severe, sharp encounters occurred between parts of the army, details of which will be given at length in the report of the subordinate commanders.

On the 28th General McPherson was on the point of closing to his left on General Thomas, in front of New Hope Church, to enable me with the rest of the army to extend still more to the left, and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy made a bold and daring assault on him at Dallas. Fortunately our men had erected good breast-works, and gave the enemy a terrible and bloody repulse. After a few day's delay for effect, I renewed my orders to General McPherson to move to his left about five miles, and occupy General Thomas' position in front of New Hope Church, and Generals Thomas and Schofield were ordered to move a corresponding distance to their left. This move was effected with ease and safety on the first of June, and by pushing our left well around we occupied the roads leading back to Allatoona and Acworth, after which I pushed General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly into Allatoona, at the east end of the pass. Both of these commands reached the points designated without trouble, and we thereby accomplished our real purpose of turning the Allatoona Pass. Ordering the railroad bridge across the Etowah to be at once rebuilt, I continued working by the left, and on the 4th of June had resolved to leave Johnston in his entrenched position at New Hope Church, and move to the rail-

road about Acworth, when he abandoned his intrenchments, after which we moved readily to Acworth, and reached the railroad on the 6th of June. I at once examined in person the Allatoona Pass, and found it admirably adapted to our use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defense and garrison, and as soon as the railroad bridge was finished across the Etowah, our stores came forward to our camp by rail.

At Acworth General Blair overtook us on the 8th of June with two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps that had been on furlough, and one brigade of cavalry, Colonel Long's, of Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses at Columbia. This accession of force about compensated for our losses in battle, and the detachments left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona.

On the 9th of June our communications to the rear being secure and supplies ample, we moved forward to Big Shanty. Kenesaw, the bold and striking twin mountain, lay before us, with a high range of chestnut hills trending off to the northeast, terminating to our view in another peak called Brush Mountain. To our right was a smaller hill, called Pine Mountain, and beyond it in the distance Lost Mountain. All these, though linked in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain form a triangle. Pine Mountain, the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountain the base, covering perfectly the town of Marietta, and the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal station, the summits were crowned with batteries, and the spurs were alive with men busy in felling trees, digging pits, and preparing for the grand struggle impending. The scene was enchanting; too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamor of war; but the Chattahoochee lay beyond, and I had to reach it. On approaching close to the enemy, I found him occupying a line full twelve miles long, more than he could hold with his force. General McPherson was ordered to move toward Marietta, his right on the railroad, General Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountain, and General Schofield off toward Lost Mountain; General Garrard's cavalry on the left, and General Stoneman on the right, and General McCook looking to our rear and communications. Our depot was at Big Shanty.

By the 11th of June our lines were closed up, and we made dispositions to break the line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. General Hooker was on its right and front, General Howard on its left and front, and General Palmer between it and the railroad. During a sharp cannonading from General Howard's right, or General Hooker's left, General Polk was killed on the 14th, and on the

morning of the 15th Pine Mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals Thomas and Schofield advanced and found him again strongly entrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. At the same time General McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantage on the left. Pushing our operations on the center as vigorously as the nature of the ground would permit, I had again ordered an assault on the center, when, on the 17th, the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain and the long line of admirable breast-works connecting it with Kenesaw. We continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber and across most difficult ravines, until we found him again, strongly posted and entrenched, with Kenesaw as his salient, his right wing thrown back so as to cover Marietta, and his left behind Noyes' Creek, covering his railroad back to the Chattahoochee. This enabled him to contract his lines and strengthen them accordingly. From Kenesaw he could look down upon our camps and observe every movement, and his battery thundered away, but did us little harm on account of their extreme height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over our heads, as we lay close up against his mountain town. During our operations about Kenesaw the weather was villainously bad, the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, rendering our narrow wooded roads mere mud gullies, so that a general movement would have been impossible, but our men daily worked closer and closer to the entrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket-firing galling him. Every opportunity was taken to advance our general lines closer and closer to the enemy—General McPherson watching the enemy on Kenesaw and working his left forward; General Thomas swinging as it were, on a grand left wheel, his left on Kenesaw, connecting with General McPherson, and General Schofield all the time working to the south and east, along the Sandtown road.

On the 22d, as General Hooker had advanced his line, with General Schofield on his right, the enemy (Hood's corps with detachments from the others) suddenly sallied and attacked. The blow fell mostly on General Willaims' division, of General Hooker's corps, and a brigade of General Hascall's division, of General Schofield's army. The ground was comparatively open, and although the enemy drove in the skirmish line and an advanced regiment of General Schofield sent out purposely to hold him in check until some preparations could be completed for his reception, yet when he reached our line of battle he received a terrible repulse, leaving his dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. This is known as the affair of the Kolb House. Although inviting the enemy at all times to commit such mistakes, I could not hope for him to repeat them after the example of Dallas and the Kolb House, and upon

studying the ground I had no alternative in my turn but to assault his lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers, and I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into the conviction that I would not assault fortified lines. All looked to me to outflank.

An army to be efficient must not settle down to a single mode of offense, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I wanted, therefore, for the moral effect to make a successful assault against the enemy behind the breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory. The general point selected was the left center, because if I could thrust a strong head of column through at that point by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and one-half miles, it would reach the railroad below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right and center from its line of retreat, and then by turning on either part it could be overwhelmed and destroyed. Therefore, on the 24th of June, I ordered that an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw on the 27th, giving three days' notice for preparation and reconnaissance, one to be made near Little Kenesaw by General McPherson's troops, and the other about a mile farther south by General Thomas' troops. The hour was fixed and all the details given in Field orders, No. 28, of June 24.

On the 27th of June the two assaults were made at the time and in the manner prescribed and both failed, costing us many valuable lives, among those of Generals Harker and McCook, Colonel Rice and others badly wounded, our aggregate loss being nearly 3,000, while we inflicted comparatively little loss to the enemy, who lay behind his well-formed breastworks. Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault and that boldly. And we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them. It would not do to rest long under the influence of a mistake or failure, and accordingly General Schofield was working strong on the enemy's left, and on the 1st of July I ordered General McPherson to be relieved by General Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw, and rapidly to throw his whole army by the right down to and threaten Nickajack Creek and Turner's Ferry, across the Chattahoochee, and I also pushed General Stoneman's cavalry to the river below Turner's.

General McPherson commenced his movement the night of July 2d, and the effect was instantaneous. The next morning Kenesaw was abandoned, and with the first dawn of day I saw our skirmishers appear on the mountain top. General Thomas' whole line was then moved forward to the railroad and turned south in



pursuit toward the Chattahoochee. In person I entered Marietta at 8:30 in the morning, just as the enemy's cavalry vacated the place. General Logan's corps, of General McPherson's army, which had not moved far, was ordered back to Marietta by the main road, and Generals McPherson and Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack and attack enemy in flank and rear, and if possible to catch him in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochee. But Johnston had foreseen and provided against all this, and had covered his movement well. He had intrenched a strong *tete-de-pont* at the Chattahoochee, with an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna Camp-Meeting Ground, five miles below Marietta. Here General Thomas found him, his front covered by a good parapet and his flanks behind the Nickajack and Rottenwood Creeks. Ordering a garrison for Marietta and General Logan to join his own army near the mouth of Nickajack, I overtook General Thomas at Smyrna.

On the fourth of July we pushed a strong skirmish line down the main road, capturing the entire line of the enemy's pits, and made strong demonstrations along Nickajack Creek and about Turner's Ferry. This had the desired effect, and the next morning the enemy was gone and the army moved to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas' left flank resting on it near Pace's Ferry, General McPherson's right at the mouth of Nickajack, and General Schofield in reserve. The enemy lay behind a line of unusual strength, covering the railroad and pontoon bridges and beyond the Chattahoochee.

Heavy skirmishing along our whole front during the 5th demonstrated the strength of the enemy's position, which alone could be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochee River, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage by the means of bridges, except one or two very difficult fords. To accomplish this result I judged it would be more easy of execution before the enemy had made more thorough preparation or gained full confidence, and accordingly I ordered General Schofield across from his position on the Sandtown road to Smyrna Camp Ground and next to the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Soap Creek, and to effect a lodgement on the east bank. This was most successfully and skillfully accomplished on the 7th of July, General Schofield capturing a gun, completely surprising the guard, laying a good pontoon bridge and a trestle bridge, and effecting a strong lodgement on high and commanding ground with good roads leading to the east.

At the same time General Garrard moved rapidly on Roswell, and destroyed the factories which had supplied the rebel armies with cloth for years. Over one of these, the woolen factory, the nominal owner displayed the French flag, which was not respected, of course. A neutral surely is no better than one of our own citizens, and we do not permit our own citizens to fabricate cloth for hostile uses.

General Garrard was then ordered to secure the shallow ford at Roswell and hold it until he could be relieved by infantry, and as I contemplated transferring the Army of the Tennessee from the extreme right to the left, I ordered General Thomas to send a division of his infantry that was nearest up to Roswell to hold the ford until General McPherson could send up a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack. General Newton's division was sent and held the ford until the arrival of General Dodge's corps, which was soon followed by General McPherson's whole army. About the same time General Howard had also built a bridge at Powers' Ferry, two miles below. General Schofield had crossed over and taken position on his right. Thus during the 9th we had secured three good and safe points of passage over the Chattahoochee above the enemy, with good roads leading to Atlanta, and Johnston abandoned his tete-de-pont, burned his bridge, and left us undisputed masters north and west of the Chattahoochee at daylight of the 10th of July. This was one, if not the chief, object of the campaign, viz., the advancement of our lines from the Tennessee to the Chattahoochee; but Atlanta lay before us, only eight miles distant, and was too important a place in the hands of the enemy to be left undisturbed, with its magazines, stores, arsenals, workshops, foundries, &c., and more especially its railroads, which converged there from the four great cardinal points, but the men had worked hard and needed rest and we accordingly took a short spell. But in anticipation of this contingency I had collected a well appointed force of cavalry, about 2,000 strong, at Decatur, Ala., with orders on receiving notice by telegraph to push rapidly south, cross the Coosa at the railroad bridge, or the Ten Islands, and thence by the most direct route to Opelika.

There is but one stem of finished railroad connecting the channels of trade and travel between Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, which runs from Montgomery to Opelika, and my purpose was to break it up effectually and thereby cut off Johnston's army from that source of supply and re-enforcements. General Rousseau, commanding the District of Tennessee, asked permission to command the expedition and received it. As soon as Johnston was well across the Chattahoochee, and as I had begun to maneuver on Atlanta, I gave the requisite notice, and General Rousseau started punctually on the 10th of July. He fulfilled his orders and instructions to the very letter, whipping the rebel General Clanton en route. He passed through Talladega and reached the railroad on the 16th, about twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and broke it well up to that place, also three miles of the branch toward Columbus, and two toward West Point. He then turned north and brought his command safely to Marietta, arriving on the 22d, having sustained a trifling loss, not to exceed 30 men.

The main armies remained quietly in the camps on the Chattahoochee until the 17th of July, but the time was employed in collecting stores at Allatoona, Marietta and Vining's Station, strengthening the railroad guards and garrisons, and in improving the pier bridges and roads leading across the river. Generals Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry had scouted well down the river to draw attention in that direction, and all things being ready for a general advance, I ordered it to commence on the 17th, General Thomas to cross at Powers' and Pace's Ferry bridges, and to march to Buckhead. General Schofield was already across at the mouth of Soap Creek, and to march to Cross Keys; and General McPherson to direct his course from Roswell straight against the Augusta road at some point east of Decatur near Stone Mountain. General Garrard's cavalry acted with General McPherson, and Generals Stoneman and McCook watched the river and roads below the railroads.

On the 17th the whole army advanced from their camps and formed a general line along the old Peachtree road. Continuing on a general right-wheel, General McPherson reached the Augusta railroad on the 18th, at a point seven miles east of Decatur, and with General Garrard's cavalry and General Morgan L. Smith's infantry division, of the Fifteenth Corps, broke up a section of about four miles, and General Schofield reached the town of Decatur.

On the 19th General McPherson turned along the railroad into Decatur and General Schofield followed a road toward Atlanta, leading off by Colonel Howard's house and the distillery, and General Thomas crossed Peachtree Creek in force by numerous bridges in the face of the enemy's intrenched line; all found the enemy in more or less force and skirmished heavily.

On the 20th all the armies had closed in, converging towards Atlanta, but as a gap existed between Generals Schofield and Thomas, two divisions of General Howard's corps, of General Thomas' army, was moved to the left to connect with General Schofield, leaving General Newton's division of the same corps on the Buckhead road. During the afternoon of the 20th, about 4 p. m., the enemy sallied from his works in force and fell in line of battle against our right center, composed of General Newton's division of General Howard's corps, on the main Buckhead road, of General Hooker's corps, next south, and General Johnson's division of General Palmer's corps. This blow was sudden and somewhat unexpected, but General Newton had hastily covered his front by a line of rail piles, which enabled him to meet and repulse the attack on him. General Hooker's whole corps was uncovered and had to fight on comparatively open ground, and it too, after a severe battle, drove the enemy back to his entrenchments, and the action in front of General Johnson was comparatively light, that division being

well entrenched. The enemy left on the field over 500 dead, about 1,000 wounded, 7 stand of colors, and many prisoners. His loss could not have fallen short of 5,000, whereas ours was covered by 1,000 killed, wounded and missing. The greater loss fell upon General Hooker's corps from its exposed condition.

On the 21st we felt the enemy in his entrenched position, which was found to crown the heights overlooking the comparatively open ground of the valley of Peachtree Creek, his right beyond the Augusta road to the east, and his left well toward Turner's Ferry, on the Chattahoochee, at a general distance from Atlanta of about four miles. On the morning of the 22d somewhat to my surprise this whole line was found abandoned, and I confess I thought the enemy had resolved to give us Atlanta without further contest, but General Johnston had been relieved of his command and General Hood substituted. A new policy seemed resolved on, of which the bold attack on our right was the index. Our advancing ranks swept across the strong and well-finished parapets of the enemy and closed in upon Atlanta until we occupied a line in the form of a general circle of about two miles radius, when we again found him occupying in force a line of finished redoubts which had been prepared for more than a year, covering all the roads leading into Atlanta, and we found him also busy in connecting those redoubts with curtains, strengthened by rifle-trench abatis and chevaux-de-frise.

General McPherson, who had advanced from Decatur, continued to follow substantially the railroad, with the Fifteenth Corps, General Logan; the Seventeenth, General Blair, on its left; and the Sixteenth, General Dodge, on its right, but as the general advance of all the armies contracted the circle, the Sixteenth Corps, General Dodge, was thrown out of line by the Fifteenth connecting on its right with General Schofield, near the Howard house. General McPherson the night before had gained a high hill to the south and east of the railroad, where the Seventeenth Corps had, after a severe fight, driven the enemy, and it gave him a most commanding position within easy view of the very heart of the city. He had thrown out working parties to it and was making preparations to occupy it in strength with batteries. The Sixteenth Corps, General Dodge's, was ordered from right to left to occupy this position and make it a strong general left flank. General Dodge was moving by a diagonal path or wagon track leading from the Decatur road in the direction of General Blair's left flank. About 10 a. m. I was in person, with General Schofield, examining the appearance of the enemy's line opposite the distillery, where we attracted enough of the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry to satisfy me the enemy was in Atlanta in force and meant to fight, and had gone to a large dwelling close by, known as the Howard house, where General McPher-

son joined me. He described the condition of things on his flank and the disposition of his troops. I explained to him that if we met serious resistance in Atlanta, as present appearances indicated, instead of operating against it by the left, I would extend to the right, and that I did not want him to gain much distance to the left. He then described the hill occupied by General Leggett's division, of General Blair's corps, as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the Augusta railroad on account of its commanding nature. I therefore ratified his disposition of troops, and modified a previous order I had sent him in writing to use General Dodge's corps, thrown somewhat in reserve by the closing up of our line, to break up railroad, and I sanctioned its going, as already ordered by General McPherson, to his left, to hold and fortify that position. The general remained with me until near noon, when some reports reaching us that indicated a movement of the enemy on the flank, he mounted and rode away with his staff.

I must here also state that the day before I had detached General Garrard's cavalry to go to Covington, on the Augusta road, forty-two miles east of Atlanta, and from that point to send detachments to break the two important bridges across the Yellow and Ucofauhatchee Rivers, tributaries to the Ocmulgee, and General McPherson had also left his wagon train at Decatur, under a guard of three regiments, commanded by Colonel (now General) Sprague. Soon after General McPherson had left me at the Howard house, as before described, I heard the sound of musketry to our left rear, at first mere pattering shots, but soon they grew in volume, accompanied with artillery, and about the same time the sound of guns was heard in the direction of Decatur. No doubt could be longer entertained of the enemy's plan of action, which was to throw a superior force on our left flank while he held us with his forts in front, the only question being as to the amount of force he could employ at that point. I hastily transmitted orders to all points of our center and right to press forward and give employment to all the enemy in his lines, and for General Schofield to hold as large a force in reserve as possible, awaiting developments.

Not more than half an hour after General McPherson had left me, viz., about 12:30 of the 22d, his adjutant-general, Lieutenant-Colonel Clark, rode up and reported that General McPherson was either dead or a prisoner; that he had ridden from me to General Dodge's column, moving as heretofore described, and had sent off nearly all his staff and orderlies on various errands and himself had passed into a narrow path or road that led to the left and rear of General Giles A. Smith's division, which was General Blair's extreme left; that a few minutes after he had entered the woods a sharp volley was heard in that direction, and his horse had come out rider-



less having two wounds. The suddenness of this terrible calamity would have overwhelmed me with grief, but the living demanded my whole thoughts. I instantly dispatched a staff officer to General John A. Logan, commanding the Fifteenth Corps, to tell him what had happened; that he must assume command of the Army of the Tennessee, and hold stubbornly the ground already chosen, more especially the hill gained by General Leggett the night before. Already the whole line was engaged in battle. Hardee's corps had sallied from Atlanta, and by a wide circuit to the east had struck General Blair's left flank, enveloped it, and his left had swung around until it hit General Dodge's in motion. General Blair's line was substantially along the old line of rebel trench, but it was fashioned to fight outward. A space of wooded ground of nearly half a mile intervened between the head of General Dodge's column and General Blair's line, through which the enemy had poured, but the last order ever given by General McPherson was to hurry a brigade (Colonel Wangelin's) of the Thirteenth Corps across the railroad to occupy this gap. It came across on the double-quick and checked the enemy. While Hardee attacked in flank, Stewart's corps was to attack in front directly out from the main works, but fortunately their attack was not simultaneous. The enemy swept across the hill which our men were then fortifying, and captured the pioneer company, its tools, and almost the entire working party, and bore down on our left until he encountered General Giles A. Smith's division, of the Seventeenth Corps, who was somewhat in "air" and forced to fight first from one side of the old rifle parapets and then from the other, gradually withdrawing regiment by regiment so as to form a flank to General Leggett's division, which held the apex of the hill, which was the only point deemed essential to our plans. General Dodge had caught and held well in check the enemy's right, and punished him severely, capturing many prisoners. General Giles A. Smith had gradually given up the extremity of his line and formed a new one, whose right connected with General Leggett and his left refused, facing southeast. On this ground and in this order the men fought well and desperately for near four hours, checking and repulsing all the enemy's attacks. The execution on the enemy's ranks at the angle was terrible, and great credit is due both Generals Leggett and Giles A. Smith and their men for their hard and stubborn fighting. The enemy made no farther progress on that flank, and by 4 p. m. had almost given up the attempt.

In the mean time Wheeler's cavalry, unopposed (for General Garrard was absent from Covington by my order), had reached Decatur and attempted to capture the wagon trains, but Colonel (now General) Sprague covered them with great skill and success, sending them to the rear of Generals Schofield and Thomas, and not draw-

ing back from Decatur until every wagon was safe, except three, which the teamsters had left, carrying off the mules. On our extreme left the enemy had taken a complete battery of 6 guns with its horses (Murray's) of the regular army as it was moving along unsupported and unapprehensive of danger in a narrow wooded road in that unguarded space between the head of General Dodge's column and the line of battle on the ridge above, but most of the men escaped to the bushes; he also got 2 other guns on the extreme left flank that were left on the ground as General Giles A. Smith drew off his men in the manner heretofore described.

About 4 p. m. there was quite a lull, during which the enemy felt forward on the railroad and main Decatur road, and suddenly assailed a regiment which, with a section of guns, had been thrown forward as a kind of picket, and captured the 2 guns. He then advanced rapidly and broke through our lines at this point, which had been materially weakened by the withdrawal of Colonel Martin's brigade sent by General Logan's order to the extreme left. The other brigade, General Lightburn's, which held this part of the line, fell back in some disorder about 400 yards to a position held by it the night before, leaving the enemy for a time in possession of two batteries, one of which, a 20-pounder Parrott battery of four guns, was most valuable to us, and separating General Woods' and General Harrow's divisions, of the Fifteenth Corps, that were on the right and left of the railroad. Being in person close by the spot, and appreciating the vast importance of the connection at that point, I ordered certain batteries of General Schofield's to be moved to a position somewhat commanding it by a left-flank fire, and ordered an incessant fire of shells on the enemy within sight and the woods beyond to prevent his re-enforcing. I also sent orders to General Logan, which he had already anticipated, to make the Fifteenth Corps regain its lost ground at any cost, and instructed General Woods, supported by General Schofield, to use his division and sweep the parapet down from where he held it until he saved the batteries and regained the lost ground. The whole was executed in superb style, at times our men and the enemy fighting across the narrow parapet; but at last the enemy gave way, and the Fifteenth Corps regained its position and all the guns, excepting the two advanced ones, which were out of view and had been removed by the enemy within his main works.

With this report terminated the battle of the 22d, which cost us 3,722 killed, wounded and prisoners. But among the dead was Major-General McPherson, whose body was recovered and brought to me in the heat of battle, and I had sent it in charge of his personal staff back to Marietta on its way to its Northern home. He was a noble youth, of striking personal appearance, of the highest profes-

sional capacity, and with a heart abounding in kindness that drew to him the affections of all men. His sudden death devolved the command of the Army of the Tennessee on the no less brave and gallant General Logan, who nobly sustained his reputation and that of his veteran army and avenged the death of his comrade and commander.

The enemy left on the field his dead and wounded and about a thousand well prisoners. His dead alone are computed by General Logan at 4,240, of which number 2,200 were from actual count, and of these he delivered to the enemy under flag of truce sent in by him (the enemy) 800 bodies. I entertain no doubt that in the battle of July 22d the enemy sustained an aggregate loss of full 8,000 men.

The next day General Garrard returned from Covington, having succeeded perfectly in his mission, and destroyed the bridges at Ulcofauhatchee and Yellow Rivers, besides burning a train of cars, a large quantity of cotton (2,000 bales) and the depot of stores at Covington and Conyers Station, and bringing in 200 prisoners and some good horses, losing but two men, one of whom was killed by accident. Having, therefore, sufficiently crippled the Augusta road, and rendered it useless to the enemy, I then addressed myself to the task of reaching the Macon road, over which of necessity came the stores and ammunition that alone maintained the rebel army in Atlanta. Generals Schofield and Thomas had closed well up, holding the enemy behind his inner entrenchments. I first ordered the Army of the Tennessee to prepare to vacate its line, and to shift by the right below Proctor's Creek, and General Schofield to extend up to the Augusta road. About the same time General Rousseau had arrived from his expedition to Opelika, bringing me about 2,000 good cavalry, but, of course, fatigued with its long and rapid march, and ordering it to relieve General Stoneman at the river about Sandtown, I shifted General Garrard to our left flank, and ordered all my cavalry to prepare for a blow at the Macon road simultaneous with the Army of the Tennessee toward East Point. To accomplish this I gave General Stoneman the command of his own and General Garrard's cavalry, making an effective force of full 5,000 men, and to Gen. McCook I gave his own and the new cavalry brought by Gen. Rousseau, which was commanded by Colonel Harrison, of the Eighth Indiana Cavalry, in the aggregate about 4,000. These two well appointed bodies were to move in concert, the former by the left around Atlanta to McDonough, and the latter by the right on Fayetteville, and on a certain night, viz., July 28th, they were to meet me on the Macon road near Lovejoy's and destroy it in the most effectual manner. I estimated joint cavalry could whip all of Wheeler's cavalry, and could otherwise accomplish its task, and I think so still. I had the officers in command to meet me, and

explained the movement perfectly, and they entertained not a doubt of perfect success. At the very moment almost of starting General Stoneman addressed me a note asking permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking the road, to be allowed with his command proper to proceed to Macon and Andersonville and release our prisoners of war confined at those points. There was something most captivating in the idea, and the execution was within the bounds of probability of success. I consented that after the defeat of Wheeler's cavalry, which was embraced in his orders, and breaking the road he might attempt it with his cavalry proper, sending that of General Garrard back to its proper flank of the army.

Both cavalry expeditions started at the time appointed. I have as yet no report from General Stoneman, who is a prisoner of war at Macon, but I know he dispatched General Garrard's cavalry to Flat Rock for the purpose of covering his own movement to McDonough, but for some reason unknown to me he went off toward Covington and did not again communicate with General Garrard at Flat Rock. General Garrard remained there until the 29th, skirmishing heavily with a part of Wheeler's cavalry and occupying their attention, but hearing nothing from General Stoneman he moved back to Conyers, where, learning that General Stoneman had gone to Covington and south on the east side of the Ocmulgee, he returned and resumed his position on our left. It is known that General Stoneman kept to the east of the Ocmulgee to Clinton, sending detachments off to the east, which did a large amount of damage to the railroad, burning the bridges of Walnut Creek and Oconee, and destroying a large number of cars and locomotives, and with his main force appeared before Macon. He did not succeed in crossing the Ocmulgee at Macon, nor in approaching Andersonville, but retired in the direction from whence he came, followed by various detachments of mounted men under a General Iverson. He seems to have become hemmed in, and gave consent to two-thirds of his force to escape back, while he held the enemy in check with the remainder, about 700 men and a section of light guns. One brigade, Colonel Adams', came in almost intact; another, commanded by Colonel Capron, was surprised on the way back and scattered. Many were captured and killed, and the balance got in mostly unarmed and afoot, and the general himself surrendered his small command and is now a prisoner in Macon. His mistake was in not making the first concentration with Generals McCook and Garrard near Lovejoy's, according to his orders, which is yet unexplained.

General McCook in the execution of his part went down the west branch of the Chattahoochee to near Rivertown, where he laid a pontoon bridge with which he was provided, crossed his command and moved rapidly on Palmetto Station of the West Point Railroad,

where he tore up a section of track, leaving a regiment to create a diversion toward Campbellton, which regiment fulfilled its duty and returned to camp by way of and escorting back the pontoon bridge train. General McCook then rapidly moved to Fayetteville, where he found a large number of the wagons belonging to the rebel army in Atlanta. These he burned to the number of about 500, killing 800 mules and carrying along others, and taking 250 prisoners, mostly quartermasters and men belonging to the trains. He then pushed for the railroad, reaching it at Lovejoy's Station at the time appointed. He burned the depot, tore up a section of the road, and continued to work until forced to leave off to defend himself against an accumulating force of the enemy. He could hear nothing of General Stoneman, and finding his progress east too strongly opposed he moved south and west and reached Newnan, on the West Point road, where he encountered an infantry force coming from Mississippi to Atlanta, which had been stopped by the break he had made at Palmetto. This force with the pursuing cavalry hemmed him in and forced him to fight. He was compelled to drop his prisoners and captures, and cut his way out, losing some 500 officers and men, among them a most valuable officer, Colonel Harrison, who, when fighting his men as skirmishers on foot, was overcome and made prisoner, and is now at Macon. He cut his way out, reached the Chattahoochee, crossed, and got to Marietta without further loss. General McCook is entitled to much credit for thus saving his command, which was endangered by the failure of General Stoneman to reach Lovejoy's. But on the whole the cavalry raid was not deemed a success, for the real purpose was to break up the enemy's communications, which though done was on so limited a scale that I knew the damage would soon be repaired.

Pursuant to the general plan, the Army of the Tennessee drew out of its lines near the Decatur road during the night of July 26, and on the 27th moved behind the rest of the army to Proctor's Creek and south to prolong our line due south and facing east. On that day, by appointment of the President of the United States, Major-General Howard assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee and had the general supervision of the movement, which was made en echelon, General Dodge's corps (Sixteenth) on the left nearest enemy, General Blair's corps (Seventeenth) next to come up on its right, and General Logan's corps (Fifteenth) to come up on its right and refused as a flank, the whole to gain as much ground due south from the flank already established on Procter's Creek as was consistent with a proper strength. General Dodge's men got into line in the evening of the 27th, and General Blair's came into line on his right early on the morning of the 28th, his right reaching an old meeting-house called Ezra Church near some large open fields by



the poor-house on a road known as the Bell's Ferry road or Lick Skillet road. Here the Fifteenth Corps (General Logan's) joined on and refused along a ridge well wooded, which partially commanded a view over the same fields. About 10 a. m. all the army was in position and the men were busy in throwing up the accustomed pile of rails and logs, which after awhile assumed the form of a parapet. The skill and rapidity with which our men constructed these is wonderful and is something new in the art of war. I rode along this whole line about this time, and as I approached Ezra Church there was considerable artillery firing, inflading the road in which I was riding, killing an orderly's horse just behind my staff. I struck across an open field to where General Howard was standing in rear the Fifteenth Corps and walked up the ridge with General Morgan L. Smith to see if the battery which infladed the main road and rail piles could not be disposed of, and heard General Smith give the necessary orders for the deployment of one regiment forward and another to make a circuit to the right, when I returned to where General Howard was, and remained there until 12 o'clock. During this time there was nothing to indicate save the shelling by one or at most two batteries from beyond the large field in front of the Fifteenth Corps.

Wishing to be well prepared to defeat the enemy if he repeated the game of the 22d, I had the night before ordered Gen. Davis' division of Gen. Palmer's corps, which by the movement of the Army of the Tennessee had been left as it were in reserve, to move down to Turner's Ferry and thence toward Whitehall or East Point, aiming to reach the flank of General Howard's new line. Hoping that in case of an attack this division would in turn catch the attacking force in flank or rear at an unexpected moment, I explained it to General Howard and bade him to expect the arrival of such a force in case of battle. Indeed, I expected to hear the fire of its skirmishers by noon. General Davis was sick that day, and Brigadier-General Morgan commanded the division which had marched early for Turner's Ferry, but many of the roads laid down on our maps did not exist at all, and General Morgan was delayed thereby. I rode back to make more particular inquiries as to this division, and had just reached General Davis' headquarters at Proctor's Creek when I heard musketry open heavily on the right. The enemy had come out of Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry road and formed his masses in the open fields behind a swell of ground, and after the artillery firing I have described advanced in parallel lines directly against the Fifteenth Corps, expecting to catch that flank in "air." His advance was magnificent, but founded on an error that cost him sadly, for our men coolly and deliberately cut down his men, and, in spite of the efforts of the rebel officers, his ranks broke and fled.

But they were rallied again and again, as often as six times at some points, and a few of the rebel officers and men reached our line of rail piles only to be killed or hauled over as prisoners. These assaults occurred from noon until about 4 p. m., when the enemy disappeared, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. As many as 642 dead were counted and buried, and still others are known to have been buried which were not counted by the regularly detailed burial parties. General Logan on this occasion was conspicuous as on the 22d, his corps being chiefly engaged, but General Howard had drawn from the other corps (Sixteenth and Seventeenth) certain reserves, which were near at hand but not used. Our entire loss is reported at less than 600, whereas that of the enemy was in killed and wounded not less than 5,000.

Had General Davis' division come up on the Bell's Ferry road as I calculated at any time before 4 o'clock, what was simply a complete repulse would have been a disastrous rout to the enemy, but I cannot attribute the failure to want of energy or intelligence, and must charge it, like many other things in the campaign, to the peculiar, tangled nature of the forests and absence of roads that would admit the rapid movement of troops.

This affair terminated all efforts of the enemy to check our extensions by the flank, which afterward proceeded with comparative ease, but he met our extensions to the south by rapid and well constructed forts and rifle-pits built between us and the railroad to and below East Point, remaining perfectly on the defensive. Finding that the right flank of the Army of the Tennessee did not reach, I was forced to shift General Schofield to that flank also, and afterward General Palmer's corps, of General Thomas' army. General Schofield moved from the left on the 1st of August, and General Palmer's corps followed at once, taking a line below Utoy Creek, and General Schofield prolonged it to a point near East Point. The enemy made no offensive opposition, but watched our movement and extended his lines and parapets accordingly.

About this time several changes in important commands occurred which should be noted. General Hooker, offended that General Howard was preferred to him as the successor of General McPherson, resigned his command of the Twentieth Corps, to which General Slocum was appointed; but he was at Vicksburg, and until he joined the command of the corps devolved upon General A. S. Williams, who handled it admirably. General Palmer also resigned the command of the Fourteenth Corps, and General Jeff. C. Davis was appointed to his place. Maj. Gen. D. S. Stanley had succeeded General Howard in the command of the Fourth Corps.

From the 2d to the 5th we continued to extend to the right, demonstrating strongly on the left and along our whole line. Gen-

eral Reilly's brigade, of General Cox's division, General Schofield's army, on the 5th tried to break through the enemy's line about a mile below Utoy Creek, but failed to carry the position, losing about 400 men, who were caught in the entanglements and abatis, but the next day the position was turned by General Hascall, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close up to and facing the enemy below Utoy Creek. Still he did not gain the desired point on either the West Point or Macon road. The enemy's line at that time must have been near fifteen miles long, extending from Decatur to below East Point. This he was enabled to do by use of a large force of State militia, and his position was so masked by the shape of the ground that we were unable to discover the weak parts.

I had become satisfied that to reach the Macon road and thereby control the supplies for Atlanta, I would have to move the whole army, but before beginning I ordered down from Chattanooga four 4½-inch rifle guns to try their effect. These arrived on the 10th and were put to work night and day and did execution on the city, causing frequent fires and creating confusion. Yet the enemy seemed determined to hold his forts even if the city was destroyed.

On the 16th of August I made my Orders, No. 57, prescribing the mode and manner of executing the grand movement by the right flank to begin on the 18th. This movement contemplated the withdrawal of the Twentieth Corps, General Williams, to the entrenched position at the Chattahoochee bridge and the march of the main army to the West Point Railroad near Fairburn, and afterward to the Macon road, at or near Jonesborough, with our wagons loaded with provisions for fifteen days. About the time of the publication of these orders, I learned that Wheeler, with a large mounted force of the enemy, variously estimated from 6,000 to 10,000 men, had passed around by the east and north and had made his appearance on our line of communication near Adairsville, and had succeeded in capturing 900 of our beef-cattle and had made a break of the railroad near Calhoun. I could not have asked for anything better, for I had provided well against such a contingency, and this detachment left me superior to the enemy in cavalry. I suspended the execution of my orders for the time being and ordered General Kilpatrick to make up a well appointed force of about 5,000 cavalry, and to move from his camp about Sandtown during the night of the 18th to the West Point road and break it good near Fairburn, then to proceed to the Macon road and tear it up thoroughly, but to avoid as far as possible the enemy's infantry, but to attack any cavalry he could find. I thought this cavalry would save the necessity of moving the main army across, and that in case of his success it would leave me in better position to take full advantage of the result. General Kilpatrick got off at the time appointed and broke the West Point road

and afterward reached the Macon road at Jonesborough, where he whipped Ross' cavalry and got possession of the railroad, which he held for five hours, damaging it considerably, but a brigade of the enemy's infantry, which had been dispatched below Jonesborough in cars, was run back and disembarked, and with Jackson's rebel cavalry made it impossible for him to continue his work. He drew off to the east and made a circuit and struck the railroad about Lovejoy's Station, but was again threatened by the enemy, who moved on shorter lines, when he charged through their cavalry, taking many prisoners, of which he brought in 70, and captured a 4-gun battery, which he destroyed, except one gun, which he brought in. He estimated the damage done to the road as enough to interrupt its use for ten days, after which he turned by a circuit north and east, reaching Decatur on the 22d.

After an interview with General Kilpatrick I was satisfied that whatever damage he had done would not produce the result desired, and I renewed my orders for the movement of the whole army. This involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta, taking the field with our main force and using it against the communications of Atlanta instead of against its intrenchments. All the army commanders were at once notified to send their surplus wagons, incumbrances of all kinds, and sick back to our intrenched position at the bridge, and that the movement would begin during the night of the 25th. Accordingly, all things being ready, the Fourth Corps (General Stanley) drew out of its lines on our extreme left and marched to a position below Proctor's Creek. The Twentieth Corps (General Williams) moved back to the Chattahoochee. This movement was made without loss, save a few things left in our camps by thoughtless officers and men. The night of the 26th the movement continued, the Army of the Tennessee drawing out and moving rapidly by a circuit well toward Sandtown and across Camp Creek, the Army of the Cumberland, below Utoy Creek, General Schofield, remaining in position. This was effected with the loss of but a single man in the Army of the Tennessee, wounded by a shell from the enemy. The third move brought the Army of the Tennessee on the West Point railroad above Fairburn, the Army of the Cumberland about Red Oak, and General Schofield close in near Diggs' and Mimms'. I then ordered one day's work to be expended in destroying that road, and it was done with a will. Twelve and one-half miles were destroyed, the ties burned, and the iron rails heated and twisted by the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with the trunks of trees, logs, rocks, and earth, intermingled with loaded shells prepared as torpedos to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out.

Having personally inspected this work and satisfied with its execution, I ordered the whole army to move the next day eastward by

several roads, General Howard on the right toward Jonesborough, General Thomas the center by Shoal Creek Church to Couch's, on the Decatur and Fayetteville road, and General Schofield on the left, about Morrow's Mills. An inspection of the map will show the strategic advantage of this position. The railroad from Atlanta to Macon follows substantially the ridge, or "divide" between the waters of Flint and Ocmulgee Rivers, and from East Point to Jonesborough makes a wide bend to the east. Therefore the position I have described, which had been well studied on paper, was my first objective. It gave me "interior lines," something our enemy had enjoyed too long, and I was anxious for once to get the inside track and therefore my haste and desire to secure it. The several columns moved punctually on the morning of the 29th; and General Thomas, on the center, encountered little opposition or difficulty save what resulted from narrow roads, and reached his position at Couch's early in the afternoon. General Schofield being closer to the enemy, who clung to East Point, moved cautiously on a small circle around that point and came into position toward Rough and Ready, and General Howard, having the outer circle, had a greater distance to move. He encountered cavalry, which he drove rapidly to the crossing of Shoal Creek, where the enemy also had artillery. Here a short delay occurred and some cannonading and skirmishing, but General Howard started them again and kept them moving, passed the Renfrow place, on the Decatur road, which was the point indicated for him in the orders of that day, but he wisely and well kept on and pushed on toward Jonesborough, saved the bridge across Flint River, and did not halt until darkness compelled him, within half a mile of Jonesborough. Here he rested for the night and in the morning of August 31, finding himself in the presence of a heavy force of the enemy, he deployed the Fifteenth Corps and disposed the Sixteenth and Seventeenth on its flanks. The men covered their front with the usual parapets and soon prepared to act offensively or defensively as the case called for. I was that night with General Thomas at Couch's, and as soon as I learned that General Howard had passed Renfrow's, I directed General Thomas to send to that place a division of General Jeff. C. Davis' corps, to move General Stanley's corps in connection with General Schofield toward Rough and Ready, and then to send forward due east a strong detachment of General Davis' corps to feel for the railroad. General Schofield was also ordered to move boldly forward and strike the railroad near Rough and Ready.

These movements were progressing during the 31st, when the enemy came out of his works at Jonesborough and attacked General Howard, as described. General Howard was admirably situated to receive him and repulsed the attack thoroughly. The enemy



attacked with Lee's and Hardee's corps, and after a contest of two hours withdrew, leaving over 400 dead on the ground, and his wounded, of which about 300 were left in Jonesborough, could not have been much less than 2,500. Hearing the sounds of battle at Jonesborough about noon, orders were renewed to push the other movements on the left and center, and about 4 p. m. the reports arrived simultaneously that General Howard had thoroughly repulsed the enemy at Jonesborough; that General Schofield had reached the railroad a mile below Rough and Ready and was working up the road, breaking it as he went; that General Stanley, of General Thomas' army, had also got the road below General Schofield and was destroying it, working south, and that General Baird, of General Davis' corps, had struck it still lower down within four miles of Jonesborough. Orders were at once given for all the army to turn on Jonesborough. General Howard to keep the enemy busy while General Thomas should move down from the north, with General Schofield on his left. I also ordered the troops as they moved down to continue the thorough destruction of the railroad, because we had it then, and I did not know what events might divert our attention. General Garrard's cavalry was directed to watch the roads to our rear and north. General Kilpatrick was sent south, down the west bank of the Flint, with instructions to attack or threaten the railroad below Jonesborough. I expected the whole army would close down on Jonesborough by noon on the 1st of September. General Davis' corps having the shorter distance to travel was on time and deployed facing south, his right in connection with General Howard and his left on the railroad. General Stanley and General Schofield were coming down along the Rough and Ready road and along the railroad, breaking it as they came. When General Davis joined to General Howard, General Blair's corps, on General Howard's left, was thrown in reserve, and was immediately sent well to the right below Jonesborough to act against that flank, along with General Kilpatrick's cavalry. About 4 p. m. General Davis was all ready and assaulted the enemy's lines across open fields, carrying them very handsomely and taking as prisoners the greater part of Govan's brigade, including its commander, with two 4-gun batteries.

Repeated orders were sent to Generals Stanley and Schofield to hurry up, but the difficult nature of the country and the absence of roads are the reasons assigned why these troops did not get well into position for attack before night rendered further operations impossible. Of course the next morning the enemy was gone and had retreated south.

About two o'clock that night the sounds of heavy explosions were heard in the direction of Atlanta, distant about twenty miles.

with a succession of minor explosions and what seemed like the rapid firing of cannon and musketry. These continued about an hour, and again about 4 a. m. occurred another series of similar discharges apparently nearer us, and these sounds could be accounted for on no other hypothesis than of a night attack on Atlanta by General Slocum or the blowing up of the enemy's magazines. Nevertheless at daybreak, on finding the enemy gone from his lines at Jonesborough, I ordered a general pursuit south, General Thomas following to the left of the railroad, General Howard on its right, and General Schofield keeping off about two miles to the east. We overtook the enemy again near Lovejoy's Station in a strong intrenched position, with his flanks well protected behind a branch of Walnut Creek to the right and a confluent of the Flint River to his left. We pushed close up and reconnoitered the ground and found he had evidently halted to cover his communication with the McDonough and Fayetteville road. Rumors began to arrive, through prisoners captured, that Atlanta had been abandoned during the night of September 1; that Hood had blown up his ammunition trains, which accounted for the sounds so plainly heard by us, and which were yet unexplained; that Stewart's corps was then retreating toward McDonough, and that the militia had gone off toward Covington. It was then too late to interpose and prevent their escape, and I was satisfied with the substantial success already gained. Accordingly I ordered the work of destroying the railroad to cease and the troops to be held in hand ready for any movement that further information from Atlanta might warrant.

General Jeff. C. Davis' corps had been left above Jonesborough, and General Garrard's cavalry was still farther back, and the latter was ordered to send back to Atlanta and ascertain the exact truth and the real situation of affairs. But the same night, viz., September 4, a courier arrived from General Slocum reporting the fact that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta; blown up seven trains of cars, and had retreated on the McDonough road. General Slocum had entered and taken possession on the 2d of September. The object of my movement against the railroad was therefore already reached and concluded, and as it was idle to pursue our enemy in that wooded country with a view to his capture, I gave orders on the 4th for the army to prepare to move slow, back to Atlanta. On the 5th we drew back to the vicinity of Jonesborough, five miles, where we remained a day. On the 7th we moved to Rough and Ready, seven miles, and the next day to the camps selected, viz., the Army of the Cumberland grouped around about Atlanta, the Army of the Tennessee about East Point, and that of the Ohio at Decatur, where the men now occupy clean and healthy camps.

I have not yet received full or satisfactory accounts of Wheeler's operations to our rear, further than he broke the road

about Calhoun and then made his appearance at Dalton, where Colonel Laiboldt held him in check until General Steedman arrived from Chattanooga and drove him off. He then passed up into East Tennessee and made quite a stay at Athens, but at the first show of pursuit he kept on north across the Little Tennessee, and crossing the Holston near Strawberry Plains, reached the Clinch near Clinton, and passed over towards Sequatchie and McMinnville. Thence he seems to have gone to Murfreesborough and Lebanon, and across to Franklin. He may have committed damage to the property of citizens, but has injured us but little, the railroads being repaired about as fast as he broke them. From Franklin he has been pursued toward Florence and out of the state by Generals Rousseau, Steedman, and Grainger, but what amount of execution they have done to him has not been reported.

Our roads and telegraphs have all been repaired, and the cars run with regularity and speed.

It is proper to remark in this place that during the operations of this campaign expeditions were sent out from Memphis and Vicksburg to check any movements of the enemy's forces in Mississippi upon our communications. The manner in which this object was accomplished reflects credit upon Generals A. J. Smith, Washburn, Slocum, and Mower, and although General Sturgis' expedition was less successful than the others, it assisted in the main object to be accomplished.

I must bear the full and liberal testimony to the energetic and successful management of our railroads during the campaign. No matter when or where a break has been made, the repair train seemed on the spot, and the damage was repaired generally before I knew of the break. Bridges have been repaired with surprising rapidity, and the locomotive whistle was heard in our advanced camps almost before the echo of the skirmish fire had ceased. Some of these bridges—those of the Oostenaula, the Etowah, and Chatahoochee—are fine, substantial structures, and were built in an inconceivably short time, almost out of material improvised on the spot.

Col. W. W. Wright, who has charge of the construction and repairs, is not only a most skillful, but a wonderfully ingenious, industrious, and zealous officer, and I can hardly do him justice. In like manner the officers charged with running the trains have succeeded to my entire satisfaction, and have worked in perfect harmony with the quartermasters and commissaries, bringing forward abundant supplies with such regularity that at no one time have we wanted for provisions, forage, ammunition, or stores of any essential kind.

Col. L. C. Easton, chief quartermaster, and Col. A. Beckwith, chief commissary, have also succeeded in a manner surprising to all

of us in getting forward supplies. I doubt if ever an army was better supplied than this, and I commend them most highly for it, because I know that more solicitude was felt by the lieutenant-general commanding, and by the military world at large, on this than any other one problem involved in the success of the campaign. Capt. T. G. Baylor, chief ordnance officer, has in like manner kept the army supplied at all times with every kind of ammunition. To Capt. O. M. Poe, chief engineer, I am more than ordinarily indebted for keeping me supplied with maps and information of roads and topography, as well as in the more important branch of his duties in selecting lines and military positions.

My own personal staff has been small, but select. Brig. Gen. W. F. Barry, an officer of enlarged capacity and great experience, has filled the office of chief of artillery to perfection, and Lieut. Col. E. D. Kittoe, chief medical inspector, has done everything possible to give proper aid and direction to the operations of that important department. I have never seen the wounded removed from the fields of battle, cared for, and afterward sent to proper hospitals in the rear, with more promptness, system, care, and success than during this whole campaign, covering over 100 days of actual battle and skirmish. My aides-de-camp, Maj. J. C. McCoy, Capt. L. M. Dayton, and Capt. J. C. Audenried, have been ever zealous and most efficient, carrying my orders day and night to distant parts of our extended lines with an intelligence and zeal that insured the proper working of machinery covering from ten to twenty-five miles of ground, when the least error in the delivery and explanation of an order would have produced confusion; whereas, in a great measure, owing to the intelligence of these officers, orders have been made so clear that these vast armies have moved side by side, sometimes crossing each other's tracks, through a difficult country of over 138 miles in length, without confusion or trouble. Captain Dayton has also filled the duties of my adjutant-general, making all orders and carrying on the official correspondence. Three inspector-generals completed my staff: Brig. Gen. J. M. Corse, who has since been assigned the command of a division of the Sixteenth Corps at the request of General Dodge; Lieut. Col. W. Warner, of the Seventy-sixth Ohio, and Lieut. Col. Charles Ewing, inspector-general of the Fifteenth Corps and captain Thirteenth U. S. Regulars. These officers, of singular energy and intelligence, have been of immense assistance to me in handling these large armies.

My three armies in the field were commanded by able officers, my equals in rank and experience—Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield, and Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard. With such commanders, I had only to indicate the object desired and they accomplished it. I cannot overestimate their services to the country,

and must express my deep and heartfelt thanks that coming together from different fields, with different interests, they have co-operated with a harmony that has been productive of the greatest amount of success and good feeling. A more harmonious army does not exist.

I now inclose their reports and those of the corps, division, and brigade commanders, a perusal of which will fill up the sketch which I have endeavored to make. I also submit tabular statements of our losses in battle by wounds and sickness; also list of prisoners captured, sent to the rear, and exchanged; also of the guns and materials of war captured, besides the important country towns and arsenals of the enemy that we now occupy and hold.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Major-General, Commanding.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

*Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*

NOTE—The following extract from letter of Sherman to Halleck is well worth printing in connection with Sherman's report:

HEADQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

*In the Field, near Lovejoy's, twenty-six miles south of Atlanta,*

*September 4, 1864.*

General HALLECK:

MY DEAR FRIEND: I owe you a private letter, and believe one at this time will be acceptable to you. I appreciate your position and the delicate responsibilities that devolve on you, but believe you will master and surmount them all. I confess I owe you all I now enjoy of fame, for I had allowed myself in 1861 to sink into a perfect "slough of despond," and do believe if I could I would have run away and hid from the dangers and complications that surrounded us. You alone seemed to be confident, and opened to us the first avenue of success and hope, and you gradually put me in the way of recovering from what might have proved an ignoble end. When Grant spoke of my promotion as a major-general of the regular army, I asked him to decline in my name till this campaign tested us. Even when my commission came, which you were kind enough to send, I doubted its wisdom, but now that I have taken Atlanta as much by strategy as by force, I suppose the military world will approve of it.

Through the official bulletins you are better acquainted with all the steps of our progress than any other man in the country, but I will try and point out to you more clearly the recent achievement. By the rapid falling off of my command, by expiration of service, I found myself reduced in number, close up against Atlanta, which was so protected by earth-works that I dared not assault. For-



unately Hood detached 6,000 of his best cavalry to the rear, and I quickly sent my cavalry to break the Macon road, over which his provisions and supplies came. I knew my cavalry was the superior to his, but he managed skillfully to send a brigade of infantry, which, in connection with his cavalry, about 4,000, managed so to occupy mine that though Kilpatrick reached the road he could work but little. The damage was soon repaired, and nothing was left me but to raise the siege, and move with my army. I moved one corps by night back to the bridge, which had been intrenched, using mostly old rebel works, then withdrawing from the left I got my whole army over on the West Point road, from Red Oak to Fairburn, with the loss of but one man. There I spent one day and broke twelve miles of that road good. I then moved rapidly so that my right flank was within half a mile of the Macon road at Jonesborough, and the left two miles and a half from Rough and Ready. Hood had first sent Lee's corps to Jonesborough and Hardee's to Rough and Ready, but the Army of the Tennessee (my right) approached Jonesborough so rapidly that Hardee's corps was shifted at night also to that flank. Seeing his mistake I ordered Howard rapidly to intrench and hold his position, "threatening," and threw the balance of my army on the road from Rough and Ready to within four miles of Jonesborough. The moment that was done, I ordered Thomas and Schofield to rapidly break up that road, and without rest to turn on Jonesborough and crush that part. My plan was partially, but not thoroughly executed. Hardee assaulted Howard, but made no progress; left his dead, about 400, and wounded in our hands, and fell behind his own works. I expected Thomas to be ready by 11 a. m., but it was near 4 when he got in; but one corps, Davis', charged down and captured the flank with 10 guns and many prisoners, but for some reason Stanley and Schofield were slow, and night came to Hardee's relief, and he escaped to the south. Hood finding me twenty miles below him on his only railroad, and Hardee defeated, was forced to abandon Atlanta, and retreated eastward, and by a circuit has got his men below me on the line to Macon. I ought to have reaped larger fruits of victory. A part of my army is too slow, but I feel my part was skillful and well executed. Though I ought to have taken 10,000 of Hardee's men, and all his artillery, I must content myself with 500 dead, 2,000 wounded, 2,000 prisoners, 10 guns on the field and 14 in Atlanta, 7 trains of cars captured and burned, many stragglers fleeing in disorder, and the town of Atlanta, which, after all, was the prize I fought for.

The army is in magnificent heart, and I could go on, but it would not be prudent. Wheeler is still somewhere to my rear, and every mile costs me detachments which I can ill spare. This country is so easily fortified that an enemy can stop an army every few miles.

All the roads run on ridges, so that a hundred yards of parapet, with abatis, closes it, and gives the wings time to extend as fast as we can reconnoiter and cut roads. Our men will charge the parapet without fear, but they cannot the abatis and entanglements, which catch them at close range. I stay here a few days for effect, and then will fall back and occupy Atlanta, giving my command some rest. They need it. The untold labor they have done is herculean, and if ever you pass our route you will say honestly that we have achieved success by industry and courage. I hope the administration will be satisfied, for I have studied hard to serve it faithfully.

I hope anything I may have said or done will not be construed unfriendly to Mr. Lincoln or Stanton. That negro letter of mine I never designed for publication, but I am honest in my belief that it is not fair to our men to count negroes as equals. Cannot we at this day drop theories, and be reasonable men? Let us capture negroes, of course, and use them to the best advantage. My quartermaster now could give employment to 3,200, and relieve that number of soldiers who are now used to unload and dispatch trains, whereas those recruiting agents take them back to Nashville, where, so far as my experience goes, they disappear. When I call for expeditions at distant points, the answer invariably comes that they have not sufficient troops. All count the negroes out. On the Mississippi, where Thomas talked about 100,000 negro troops, I find I cannot draw away a white soldier, because they are indispensable to the safety of the river. I am willing to use them as far as possible, but object to fighting with "paper" men. Occasionally an exception occurs, which simply deceives. We want the best young white men of the land, and they should be inspired with the pride of freemen to fight for their country. If Mr. Lincoln or Stanton could walk through the camps of this army and hear the soldiers talk they would hear new ideas. I have had the question put to me often: "Is not a negro as good as a white man to stop a bullet?" Yes, and a sand-bag is better; but can a negro do our skirmishing and picket duty? Can they improvise roads, bridges, sorties, flank movements, &c., like the white man? I say no. Soldiers must and do many things without orders from their own sense, as in sentinels. Negroes are not equal to this. I have gone steadily, firmly, and confidently along, and I could not have done it with black troops, but with my old troops I have never felt a waver of doubt, and that very confidence begets success. I hope to God the draft will be made to-morrow; that you will keep up my army to its standard, 100,000 men; that you will give Canby an equal number; give Grant 200,000, and the balance keep on our communications, and I pledge you to take Macon and Savannah before spring, or leave my bones. My army is now in the very condition to be supplied with recruits. We have good corporals and

sergeants, and some good lieutenants and captains, and those are far more important than good generals. They all seem to have implicit confidence in me. They observe success at points remote, as in this case of Atlanta, and they naturally say that the old man knows what he is about. They think I know where every road and by-path is in Georgia, and one soldier swore that I was born on Kenesaw Mountain. George Thomas, you know, is slow, but as true as steel; Schofield is also slow and leaves too much to others; Howard is a Christian, elegant gentleman, and conscientious soldier. In him I made no mistake. Hooker was a fool. Had he staid a couple of weeks he could have marched into Atlanta and claimed all the honors. I therefore think I have the army on which you may safely build.

## CHAPTER XLII

### JOHNSTON'S REPORT.

*Report of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Tennessee, of operations December 27, 1863-July 17, 1864.*

VINEVILLE, GA., October, 20, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Army of the Tennessee while it was under my command. Want of the reports of the lieutenant-generals, for which I have waited until now, prevents me from being circumstantial:

In obedience to the orders of the President, received by telegraph at Clinton, Miss., December 18, 1863, I assumed command of the Army of Tennessee at Dalton on the 27th of that month.

Letters from the President and Secretary of War, dated, respectively, December 23 and 20, impressed upon me the importance of soon commencing active operations against the enemy. The relative forces, including the moral effect of the affair of Missionary Ridge, condition of the artillery horses and most of those of the cavalry, and want of field transportation, made it impracticable to effect the wishes of the Executive.

On December 31 the effective total of the infantry and artillery of the army, including two brigades belonging to the Department of Mississippi, was 36,826. The effective total of the cavalry, including Roddey's command at Tuscumbia, was 5,613. The Federal force in our front, exclusive of cavalry, and the Ninth and Twenty-third Corps at Knoxville, was estimated at 80,000. The winter was mainly employed in improving the discipline and equipment of the army and bringing back absentees to the ranks. At the end of April more than 5,000 had joined their regiments.

The horses of the cavalry and artillery had been much reduced in condition by the previous campaign. As full supplies of forage could not be furnished them at Dalton, it was necessary to send about half of each of these arms of service far to the rear, where the country could furnish food. On that account Brigadier-General Roddey was ordered with about three-fourths of his troops from Tuscumbia to Dalton, and arrived at the end of February. On April 2, however, he was sent back to his former position by the Secretary of War.

On January 15 and 16 Baldwin's and Quarles' brigades returned to the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, to which they belonged. His Excellency Joseph E. Brown added to the army two regiments of State troops, which were used to guard the railroad bridges between Dalton and Atlanta.

On February 17 the President ordered me by telegraph to detach Lieutenant-General Hardee with the infantry of his corps, except Stevenson's division, to aid Lieutenant-General Polk against Sherman in Mississippi. This order was obeyed as promptly as our means of transportation permitted. The force detached was probably exaggerated to Major-General Thomas, for on the 23d the Federal army advanced to Ringgold, on the 24th drove in our outposts, and on the 25th skirmished at Mill Creek Gap and in Crow's Valley, east of Rocky Face Mountain. We were successful at both places. At the latter, Clayton's brigade, after a sharp action of half an hour, defeated double its number. At night it was reported that a U. S. brigade was occupying Dug Gap, from which it had driven our troops. Granbury's (Texas) brigade, returning from Mississippi, had just arrived. It was ordered to march to the foot of the mountain immediately and to retake the gap at sunrise next morning, which was done. In the night of the 26th the enemy retired. On February 27 I suggested to the Executive by letter through General Bragg that all preparations for a forward movement should be made without further delay.

In a letter dated 4th of March General Bragg desired me "to have all things ready at the earliest practicable moment for the movement indicated." In replying, on the 12th, I reminded him that the regulations of the War Department do not leave such preparations to commanders of troops, but to officers who receive their orders from Richmond. On the 18th a letter was received from General Bragg sketching a plan of offensive operations, and enumerating the troops to be used in them under me. I was invited to express my views on the subject. In doing so, both by telegraph and mail, I suggested modifications, and urged that the additional troops named should be sent immediately, to enable us, should the enemy advance, to beat him and then move forward; or should he not advance, do so ourselves. General Bragg replied by telegraph on the 21st:

"Your dispatch of 19th does not indicate acceptance of plan proposed. Troops can only be drawn from other points for advance. Upon your decision of that point further action must depend."

I replied by telegraph on the 22nd:

"In my dispatch of the 19th I expressly accept taking offensive. Only differ with you as to details. I assume that the enemy will be prepared for advance before we will, and will make it, to our ad-



vantage. Therefore I propose, both for offensive and defensive, to assemble our troops here immediately."

This was not noticed. Therefore, on the 25th, I again urged the necessity of re-enforcing the Army of the Tennessee, because the enemy was collecting a larger force than that of the last campaign, while ours was less than it had been then.

On the 3d of April Lieut.-Col. A. H. Cole arrived at Dalton to direct the procuring of artillery horses and field transportation to enable the army to advance. On the 4th, under orders No. 32 of 1864, I applied to the chief of the conscript service for 1,000 negro teamsters. None were received. On the 8th of April Col. B. S. Ewell, assistant adjutant-general, was sent to Richmond to represent to the President my wish to take the offensive with proper means and to learn his views. A few days afterward Brigadier-General Pendleton arrived from Richmond to explain to me the President's wishes on that subject. I explained to him the modification of the plan communicated by General Bragg (which seemed to me essential), which required that the intended reinforcements should be sent to Dalton. I urged that this should be done without delay, because our present force was not sufficient even for defense, and to enable us to take the offensive if the enemy did not.

On the 1st of May I reported the enemy about to advance. On the 2d Brigadier-General Mercer's command arrived—about 1,400 effective infantry. On the 4th I expressed myself satisfied that the enemy was about to attack with his united forces, and again urged that a part of Lieutenant-General Polk's troops should be put at my disposal. I was informed by General Bragg that orders to that effect were given. Major-General Martin, whose division of cavalry, coming from East Tennessee, had been halted on the Etowah to recruit its horses, was ordered with it to observe the Oostenaula from Resaca to Rome; and Brigadier-General Kelly was ordered, with his command, from the neighborhood of Resaca, to report to Major-General Wheeler. The effective artillery and infantry of the Army of the Tennessee after the arrival of Mercer's brigade amounted to 40,900; the effective cavalry to about 4,000. Major-General Sherman's army was composed of that of Missionary Ridge (then 80,000), increased by several thousand recruits; 5,000 men under Hovey; the Twenty-third Corps (Schofield's), from Knoxville; and two divisions of the Sixteenth, from North Alabama. Major-General Wheeler estimated the cavalry of that army at 15,000. On the 5th of May this army was in line between Ringgold and Tunnel Hill, and, after skirmishing on that and the following day, on the 7th pressed back our advanced troops to Mill Creek Gap. On the same day Brigadier-General Cantey reached Resaca with his brigade, and was halted there. On the 8th, at 4 p. m., a division of Hooker's

corps assaulted Dug Gap, which was bravely held by two regiments of Reynolds' (Arkansas) brigade and Grigsby's brigade of Kentucky cavalry, fighting on foot, until the arrival of Lieutenant-General Hardee with Granbury's brigade, when the enemy was put to flight. On the 9th five assaults were made on Lieutenant-General Hood's troops on Rocky Face Mountain. All were repulsed. In the afternoon a report was received that Logan's and Dodge's corps were in Snake Creek Gap. Three divisions under Lieutenant-General Hood, were therefore sent to Resaca. On the 10th Lieutenant-General Hood reported the enemy retreating. Skirmishing, to our advantage, continued all day near Dalton. Major-General Bate repulsed a vigorous attack at night. On the 11th Brigadier-General Cantey reported that the enemy was again approaching Resaca. Lieutenant-General Polk arrived there in the evening with Loring's division, and was instructed to defend the place with those troops and Cantey's. The usual skirmishing continued near Dalton. Rocky Face Mountain and Snake Creek Gap, at its south end, completely covered for the enemy the operation of turning Dalton. On the 12th the Federal army, covered by the mountain, moved by Snake Creek Gap toward Resaca. Major-General Wheeler, with 2,200 of ours, attacked and defeated more than double that number of Federal cavalry near Varnell's Station. At night our artillery and infantry marched for Resaca. The cavalry followed on the 13th. On that day the enemy, approaching on the Snake Creek Gap road, was checked by Loring's troops, which gave time for the formation of Hardee's and Hood's corps, just arriving. As the army was formed, the left of Polk's corps was on the Oostenaula and the right of Hood's on the Connesauga. There was brisk skirmishing during the afternoon on Polk's front and Hardee's left. On the 14th the enemy made several attacks, the most vigorous on Hindman's division (Hood's left). All were handsomely repulsed. At 6 p. m. Hood advanced with Stevenson's and Stewart's divisions, supported by two of Walker's brigades, driving the enemy from his ground before night. He was instructed to be ready to continue the offensive next morning. At 9 p. m. I learned that Lieutenant-General Polk's troops had lost a position commanding our bridges, and received from Major-General Martin a report that Federal infantry was crossing the Oostenaula, near Calhoun, on a pontoon bridge. The instructions to Lieutenant-General Hood were revoked, and Walker's division sent to the point named by Major-General Martin. On the 15th there was severe skirmishing on the whole front. Major-General Walker reported no movement near Calhoun. Lieutenant-General Hood was directed to prepare to move forward, his right leading, supported by two brigades from Polk's and Hardee's corps. When he was about to move informa-

tion came from Major-General Walker that the Federal right was crossing the river. To meet this movement Lieutenant-General Hood's attack was countermanded. Stewart's division not receiving the order from corps quarters in time, attacked unsuccessfully. The army was ordered to cross the Oostenaula that night, destroying the bridges behind it. On the 16th the enemy crossed the Oostenaula. Lieutenant-General Hardee skirmished with them successfully near Calhoun. The fact that part of Polk's troops were still in the rear, and the great numerical superiority of the Federal army, made it expedient to risk battle only when position or some blunder on the part of the enemy might give us counterbalancing advantages. I, therefore, determined to fall back slowly until circumstances should put the chances of battle in our favor, keeping so near the United States army as to prevent its sending re-enforcements to Grant, and hoping, by taking advantage of positions and opportunities, to reduce the odds against us by partial engagements. I also expected it to be materially reduced before the end of June by the expiration of the terms of service of many of the regiments which had not re-enlisted. In this way we fell back to Cassville in two marches.

At Adairsville (about midway), on the 17th, Polk's cavalry, under Brigadier-General Jackson, met the army, and Hardee after severe skirmishing checked the enemy. At this point, on the 18th, Polk's and Hood's corps took the direct road to Cassville, Hardee's that by Kingston. About half the Federal army took each road. French's division having joined Polk's corps on the 18th, on the morning of the 19th, when half the Federal army was near Kingston, the two corps at Cassville were ordered to advance against the troops that had followed them from Adairsville, Hood's leading on the right.

When this corps had advanced some two miles one of his staff officers reported to Lieutenant-General Hood that the enemy was approaching on the Canton road, in rear of the right of our original position. He drew back his troops and formed them across that road. When it was discovered that the officer was mistaken, the opportunity had passed by the near approach of the two portions of the Federal army. Expecting to be attacked, I drew up the troops in what seemed to me an excellent position—a bold ridge immediately in the rear of Cassville, with an open valley before it. The fire of the enemy's artillery commenced soon after the troops were formed, and continued until night. Soon after dark Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hood together expressed to me decidedly the opinion formed upon the observation of the afternoon, that the Federal artillery would render their position untenable the next day, and urged me to abandon the ground immediately and cross the Etowah. Lieutenant-General Hardee, whose position I thought weakest, was

confident he could hold it. The other two officers were so earnest, however, and so unwilling to depend on the ability of their corps to defend the ground, that I yielded, and the army crossed the Etowah on the 20th, a step which I have regretted ever since. Wheeler's cavalry was placed in observation above and Jackson's below the railroad. On the 22nd Major-General Wheeler was sent with all his troops not required for observation to the enemy's rear, and on the 24th, beat a brigade at Cassville and took or burned 250 loaded wagons. In the meantime the enemy was reported by Jackson's troops moving down the Etowah, as if to cross it near Stilesborough, and crossing on the 23d. On the 24th Polk's and Hardee's corps reached the road from Stilesborough to Atlanta, a few miles south of Dallas, and Hood's four miles from New Hope Church, on the road from Allatoona. On the 25th the enemy was found to be entrenched near and east of Dallas. Hood's corps was placed with its center near New Hope Church, and Polk's and Hardee's ordered between it and the Atlanta road, which Hardee's left was to cover. An hour before sunset Stewart's division, at New Hope Church, was fiercely attacked by Hooker's corps, which it repulsed after a hot engagement of two hours. Skirmishing was kept up on the 26th and 27th. At 5.30 p. m. on the 27th Howard's corps assailed Cleburne's division, and was driven back about dark with great slaughter. In these two actions our troops were not entrenched. Our loss in each was about 450 killed and wounded. On the 27th the enemy's dead, except those borne off, were counted 600. We therefore estimated their loss at 3,000 at least. It was probably greater on the 25th, as we had a larger force engaged then, both of artillery and infantry. The usual skirmishing was kept up on the 28th. Lieutenant-General Hood, finding the Federal left covered by a division which had entrenched itself in the night, thought it expedient to attack, so reported and asked for instructions. As the resulting delay made the attack inexpedient, even if it had not been so before, by preventing the surprise which success in a great degree depended, he was recalled.

Skirmishing continued until the 4th of June, the enemy gradually extending his entrenched line toward the railroad at Acworth. On the morning of the 5th the army was formed with its left at Lost Mountain, its center near Gilgal Church, and its right near the railroad. On the 7th the right, covered by Noonday Creek, was extended across the Acworth and Marietta road. The enemy approached under cover of successive lines of intrenchments. There was brisk and incessant skirmishing until the 18th. On the 14th the brave Lieutenant-General Polk, distinguished in every battle in which this army had fought, fell by a cannon-shot at an advanced post. Major-General Loring succeeded to the command, which he held until the 7th of July with great efficiency.

On the 4th of June a letter from Governor Brown informed me that he had organized a division of infantry and placed it under my orders. These troops, when ready for service—about the middle of the month, under Maj.-Gen. G. W. Smith—were employed to defend the crossings of the Chattahoochee, to prevent the surprise of Atlanta by the Federal cavalry. On the 19th a new line was taken by the army, Hood's corps with its right on the Marietta and Canton road, Loring's on the Kenesaw Mountain, and Hardee's with its left extending across the Lost Mountain and Marietta road. The enemy approached as usual under cover of intrenchments. In this position there was incessant fighting and skirmishing until July 3, the enemy gradually extending his intrenched right toward Atlanta.

On the 20th of June Wheeler, with 1,100 men, routed Garrard's division of Federal cavalry on our right. On the 21st Hood's corps was transferred from right to left, Wheeler's cavalry taking charge of the position which it left. On the 22d Lieutenant-General Hood reported that Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions, of his corps, being attacked, drove back the enemy, taking a line of his breastworks, but were compelled to withdraw by the fire of fortified artillery. On the 24th Hardee's skirmishers repulsed a line of battle, as did Stevenson's, of Hood's corps, on the 25th. On the 27th, after a furious cannonade of several hours, the enemy made a general advance, but was everywhere repulsed with heavy loss. The assaults were most vigorous on Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions, of Hardee's corps, and French's and Featherston's, of Loring's. Lieutenant-General Hardee reports that Cheatham's division lost in killed, wounded, and missing 195; the enemy opposed to it, by the statement of a staff officer subsequently captured, 2,000. The loss of Cleburne's division, 11; that of the enemy in his front, 1,000. Major-General Loring reported 236 of his corps killed, wounded, and missing, and the loss of the enemy, by their own estimates, at between 2,500 and 3,000, which he thinks very small.

On the 1st of July Major-General Smith's division was ordered to support the cavalry on our left. Their effective total was about 1,500. On the 2d, the enemy's right being nearer to Atlanta by several miles than our left, the army fell back during the night to Smyrna Church. On the 4th Major-General Smith reported that he should be compelled to withdraw on the morning of the 5th to the line of intrenchments covering the railroad bridge and Turner's Ferry. The army was therefore ordered to retire at the same time to that line to secure our bridges. The cavalry crossed the Chattahoochee, Wheeler observing it for some twenty miles above, and Jackson as far below. The enemy advanced as far as usual covered by intrenchments. Skirmishing continued until the 9th. Our infantry and artillery were brought to the southeast side of the river



that night because two Federal corps had crossed it above Powers' Ferry on the 8th and intrenched. Lieutenant-General Stewart took command of his corps on the 7th.

The character of Peachtree Creek and the numerous fords on the Chattahoochee above its mouth prevented my trying to defend that part of the river. The broad and muddy channel of the creek would have separated the two parts of the army. It and the river above its mouth were therefore taken as our line. A position on the high ground south of the creek was selected for the army which was to attack the enemy while crossing. The engineer officers, with a large force of negroes, were set to work to strengthen the fortifications of Atlanta, and mount on them seven heavy rifles borrowed from Major-General Maury. The chief engineer was instructed to devote his attention first to the works between the Decatur and Marietta roads: to put them in such condition that they might be held by the State troops, so that the army might attack the enemy in flank when he approached the town. This in the event that we should be unsuccessful in attacking the Federal army in its passage of Peachtree Creek. After the armies were separated by the Chattahoochee skirmishing became less severe.

On the 14th a division of Federal cavalry crossed the river by Moore's bridge, near Newnan, but was driven back by Armstrong's brigade, sent by Brigadier-General Jackson to meet it. On the 15th Governor Brown informed me orally that he hoped to reinforce the army before the end of the month with nearly 10,000 State troops. On the 17th the main body of the Federal army crossed the Chattahoochee between Roswell and Power's Ferry. At 10 p. m., while I was giving Lieutenant-Colonel Prestman, chief engineer, instructions in regard to his work of the next day on the fortifications of Atlanta, a telegram was received from General Cooper informing me, by direction of the Secretary of War, that as I had failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and expressed no confidence that I could defeat or repel him, I was relieved from the command of the army and department of Tennessee, which would immediately be turned over to General Hood. This was done at once. On the morning of the 18th the enemy was reported to be advancing, and at General Hood's request I continued to give orders until afternoon, placing the troops in the position selected near Peachtree Creek.

In transferring the command to General Hood I explained my plans to him: First to attack the Federal army while crossing Peachtree Creek. If we were successful great results might be hoped for, as the enemy would have both the creek and the river to intercept his retreat. Second, if unsuccessful, to keep back the enemy by intrenching, to give time for the assembling of the State troops

promised by Governor Brown, to garrison Atlanta with those troops, and when the Federal army approached the town attack it on its most exposed flank with all the Confederate troops. These troops, who had been for seventy-four days in the immediate presence of the enemy—laboring and fighting daily, enduring toil, exposure, and danger with equal cheerfulness, more confident and high-spirited than when the Federal army presented itself near Dalton—were then inferior to none who ever served the Confederacy.

Under the excellent administration of Brigadier-General Mackall, chief of staff, the troops were well equipped and abundantly supplied. The draft animals of the artillery and quartermaster's department were in better condition on the 18th of July than on the 5th of May. We lost no material in the retreat except the four field pieces mentioned in the accompanying report of General Hood.

I commenced the campaign with General Bragg's army of Missionary Ridge, with one brigade added (Mercer's) and two taken away (Baldwin's and Quarles'). That opposed to us was Grant's army of Missionary Ridge, then estimated at 80,000 by our principal officers, increased, as I have stated, by two corps, a division, and several thousand recruits—in all, at least 30,000 men. The cavalry of that army was estimated by Major-General Wheeler at 15,000. The re-enforcements which joined our army amounted to 15,000 infantry and artillery and 4,000 cavalry. Our scouts reported much greater numbers joining the United States army—garrisons and bridge guards from Tennessee and Kentucky, relieved by 100-days' men, and the Seventeenth Corps, with 2,000 cavalry.

The loss of our infantry and artillery from the 5th of May had been about 10,000 in killed and wounded, and 4,700 from all other causes, mainly slight sickness produced by heavy cold rains, which prevailed in the latter half of June. These and the slightly wounded were beginning to rejoin their regiments.

For want of reports I am unable to give the loss or the services of the cavalry, which was less under my eye than the rest of the army. Its effective strength was increased by about 2,000 during the campaign. The effective force transferred to General Hood was about 41,000 infantry and artillery and 10,000 cavalry.

According to the opinions of our most experienced officers, daily reports of prisoners, and statements of Northern papers, the enemy's loss in action could not have been less than five times as great as ours. In the cases in which we had the means of estimating it, it ranged from 7 to 1 to 91 to 1, compared with ours, and averaged 13 to 1. The Federal prisoners concurred in saying that their heaviest loss occurred in the daily attacks made in line of battle upon our skirmishers in their rifle-pits. Whether they succeeded in dislodging our skirmishers or not, their loss was heavy and ours almost nothing.

At Dalton the great numerical superiority of the enemy made the chances of battle much against us, and even if beaten they had a safe refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold and in the fortress of Chattanooga. Our refuge in case of defeat was in Atlanta, 100 miles off, with three rivers intervening. Therefore, victory for us could not have been decisive, while defeat would have been utterly disastrous. Between Dalton and Chattahoochee we could have given battle only by attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that the only result of success to us would have been his falling back into them, while defeat would have been our ruin. In the course pursued our troops, always fighting under cover, had very trifling losses compared with those they inflicted, so that the enemy's numerical superiority was reduced daily and rapidly, and we could reasonably have expected to cope with the Federal army on equal ground by the time the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on this side of that river would have been its destruction. We, if beaten, had a place of refuge in Atlanta too strong to be assaulted and too extensive to be invested. I had also hoped that by the breaking of the railroad in its rear the Federal army might be compelled to attack us in a position of our own choosing, or to a retreat easily converted into a rout. After we crossed the Etowah five detachments of cavalry were successively sent with instructions to destroy as much as they could of the railroad between Dalton and the Etowah. All failed because too weak. We could never spare sufficient body of cavalry for this service, as its assistance was absolutely necessary in the defense of every position we occupied. Captain Harvey, an officer of great courage and sagacity, was detached on this service with 760 men on the 11th of June, and remained for several weeks near the railroad, frequently interrupting (although not strong enough to prevent) its use.

Early in the campaign the statements of the strength of the cavalry in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana given me by Lieutenant-General Polk, just from the command of that department, and my telegraphic correspondence with his successor, Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee, gave me reason to hope that a competent force could be sent from Louisiana and Alabama to prevent the use of the railroad by the United States army. I therefore suggested it to the President directly on the 13th of June and 16th of July, and through General Bragg on the 3rd, 12th, 13th, 14th and 26th of June, and also to Lieutenant-General Lee on the 10th of May and 3d, 11th and 16th of June. I did so in the belief that the cavalry would serve the Confederacy better by causing the defeat of Major-General Sherman's army than by repelling a raid in Mississippi.

Besides the causes of my removal alleged in the telegram announcing it, various other accusations have been made against me;

some published in newspapers, in such a manner as to appear to have official authority, and others circulated orally in Georgia and Alabama, and imputed to General Bragg. The principal are, that I persistently disregarded the instructions of the President; that I would not fight the enemy, that I refused to defend Atlanta; that I refused to communicate with General Bragg in relation to the operations of the army. I had not the advantage of receiving the President's instructions in relation to the manner of conducting the campaign, but as to the conduct of my predecessor in retreating before odds less than those confronting me had apparently been approved, and as General Lee, in keeping on the defensive and retreating toward Grant's objective point under circumstances like mine, was adding to his great fame, both in the estimation of the administration and people, I supposed that my course would not be censured. I believed then as I do now, that it was the only one at my command which promised success.

I think that the foregoing narrative shows that the Army of Tennessee did fight, and with at least as much effect as it did before. The proofs that I intended to hold Atlanta are, the fact that under my orders the work of strengthening its defenses was going on vigorously, the communication made by me to General Hood, and the fact that my family was in the town. That the public workshops were removed and no large supplies deposited in the town, as alleged by General Bragg, were measures of common prudence, and no more indicated an intention to abandon the place than the sending of wagons of an army to the rear on a day of battle proves a foregone determination to abandon the field.

While General Bragg was at Atlanta, about the middle of July, we had no other conversation concerning the army than I introduced. He asked me no questions regarding its operations, past or future; made no comments upon them nor suggestions, and had not the slightest reason to suppose that Atlanta would not be defended. He told me that the object of his journey was to confer with Lieutenant-General Lee and communicate with General E. K. Smith in relation to reinforcements for me. He talked much more of affairs in Virginia than in Georgia, asserting, what I believed, that General Sherman's army outnumbered Grant's, and impressed me with the belief that his visits to me were unofficial.

A copy of a brief report by General Hood accompanies this.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON,

*General.*

*Report of General John B. Hood, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Tennessee, of operations July 18-September 6.*

RICHMOND, VA., February 15, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Army of the Tennessee while commanded by me, from July 18, 1864, to January 23, 1865:

The results of a campaign do not always show how the general in command has discharged his duty. The inquiry should be not what he has done, but what he should have accomplished with the means under his control. To appreciate the operations of the Army of Tennessee it is necessary to look at its history during the three months which preceded the day on which I was ordered to its command. To do this it is necessary either to state in this report all the facts which illustrate the entire operations of the Army of Tennessee in the recent campaign, or to write a supplemental or accompanying report. I deem the former more appropriate, and will, therefore, submit in a single paper all the information which seems to me should be communicated to the Government.

On the 6th of May, 1864, the army lay at and near Dalton awaiting the advance of the enemy. Never had so large a Confederate army assembled in the West. Seventy thousand effective men were in the easy direction of a single commander, whose good fortune it was to be able to give successful battle and redeem the losses of the past. Extraordinary efforts had been used to secure an easy victory. The South had been denuded of troops to fill the strength of the Army of Tennessee. Mississippi and Alabama were without military support, and looked for protection in decisive battle in the mountains of Georgia. The vast forces of the enemy were accumulating in the East, and to retard their advance or confuse their plans, much was expected by a counter-movement by us in the West. The desires of the Government expressed to the Confederate commander in the West were to assume the offensive. Nearly all the men and resources of the West and South were placed at his disposal for the purpose. The men amounted to the number already stated, and the resources for their support were equal to the demand. The re-enforcements were within supporting distance. The troops felt strong in their increased numbers, saw the means and arrangements to move forward and recover (not abandon) our own territory, and believed that victory might be achieved. In such condition was that splendid army when the active campaign fairly opened. The enemy, but little superior in numbers, none in organization and discipline, inferior in spirit and confidence, commenced his advance. The Confederate forces, whose faces and hopes were to the North, almost simultaneously commenced to retreat. They soon reached positions favorable for resistance. Great ranges of mountains running



across the line of march and deep rivers are stands from which a well-directed army is not so easily driven or turned. At each advance of the enemy the Confederate army, without serious resistance, fell back to the next range or river in the rear. This habit to retreat soon became a routine of the army, and was substituted for the hope and confidence with which the campaign opened. The enemy soon perceived this. With perfect security he divided his forces, using one column to menace in front and one to threaten in rear. The usual order to retreat, not strike in detail, was issued and obeyed. These retreats were always at night; the day was consumed in hard labor. Daily temporary works were thrown up, behind which it was never intended to fight. The men became travelers by night and laborers by day. They were ceasing to be soldiers by the disuse of military duty. Thus for seventy-four days and nights that noble army—if ordered to resist, no force that the enemy could assemble could dislodge from the battle field—continued to abandon their country, to see their strength departing, and their flag waving only in retreat or in partial engagements. At the end of that time, after descending from the mountains where the last advantage of position was abandoned, and campaigning without fortifications on the open plains of Georgia, the army had lost 22,750 of its best soldiers. Nearly one-third was gone, no general battle fought, much of our State abandoned, two others uncovered, and the organization and efficiency of every command, by loss of officers, men and tone, seriously diminished. These things were the inevitable result of the strategy adopted. It is impossible for a large army to retreat in the face of the pursuing enemy without such a fate. In a retreat the losses are constant and permanent. Stragglers are overtaken, the fatigued fall by the wayside and are gathered by the advancing enemy. Every position by the rear guard, if taken, yields its wounded to the victors. The soldiers, always awakened from rest at night to continue the retreat, leave many of their comrades asleep in trenches. The losses of a single day are not large. Those of seventy-four days will embrace the strength of an army. If a battle be fought and the field held at the close, however great the slaughter, the loss will be less than to retreat in the face of an enemy. There will be no stragglers. Desertions are in retreat; rarely, if ever, on the field of battle. The wounded are gathered to the rear and soon recover, and in a few weeks the entire loss consists only of the killed and permanently disabled, which is not one-fifth of the apparent loss on the night of the battle. The enemy is checked, his plans deranged, territory saved, the campaign suspended or won. If a retreat still be necessary it can be done with no enemy pressing and no loss following. The advancing party loses nothing but its killed and permanently disabled. Neither straggler or deserter thins its ranks.

It reaches the end stronger for battle than when it started. The army commanded by General Sherman and that commanded by General Johnston, not greatly unequal at the commencement of the campaign, illustrates what I have written. General Sherman in his official report states that his forces, when they entered Atlanta, were nearly the same in number as when they left Dalton. The Army of Tennessee 22,750 men less, nearly one-third of its strength. I have nothing to say of the statement of losses made by General Johnston in his official report, except to state that by his own figures he understates the loss some thousands; that he excludes the idea of any prisoners, although his previous official returns show more than 7,000 under the head "absent without leave," and that the returns of the army while he was in command, corrected and increased by the records of the army, which has not been fully reported to the Government, and the return signed by me, but made up under him as soon as I assumed command, show the losses of the Army of the Tennessee to be what I have stated, and a careful examination of the returns with the army will show the losses to be more than stated.

This statement of the previous conduct of the campaign is necessary, so as to show what means I had to retrieve the disasters of the past, and if the results are not such as to bring joy to the country, it is not the first time that the most faithful efforts of duty were unable to repair the injury done by others. If, as is untruly charged, the Army of Tennessee ceased to exist under my command, it is also true that it received its mortal wound when it turned its back in retreat in the mountains of Georgia, and under different management it lingered much longer than it would have done with the same daily loss occurring when it was placed under my direction.

The army was turned over to me, by order of the President, at Atlanta, on the 18th of July, 1864. Its effective strength was: Infantry, 33,750; artillery, 3,500; cavalry, 10,000, with 1,500 Georgia militia, commanded by Maj.-Gen. G. W. Smith, making a total effective of 48,750 men. The enemy was in bivouac south of the Chattahoochee River, between Atlanta and that river, and was advancing, the right near Pace's Ferry and the left near Roswell. On the evening of the 18th our cavalry was principally driven across Peach Tree Creek. I caused line of battle to be formed, the left resting near the Pace's Ferry road and the right covering Atlanta. On the morning of the 19th the dispositions of the enemy were substantially as follows: The Army of the Cumberland, under Thomas, was in the act of crossing Peach Tree Creek. This creek, forming a considerable obstacle to the passage of an army, runs in a north-westerly direction, emptying into the Chattahoochee River near the railroad crossing. The Army of the Ohio, under Schofield, was also about to cross east of the Buck Head road. The Army of the

Tennessee, under McPherson, was moving on the Georgia Railroad at Decatur. Feeling it impossible to hold Atlanta without giving battle, I determined to strike the enemy while attempting to cross this stream. My troops were disposed as follows: Stewart's corps on the left, Hardee's in the center, and Cheatham's on the right, intrenched. My object was to crush Thomas' army before he could fortify himself, and then turn upon Schofield and McPherson. To do this Cheatham was ordered to hold his left on the creek, in order to separate Thomas' army from the forces on his (Thomas) left. Thus I should be able to throw two corps (Stewart's and Hardee's) against Thomas. Specific orders were carefully given these generals in the presence of each other, as follows: The attack was to begin at 1 p. m., the movement to be by division in echelon from the right, at the distance of about 150 yards, the effort to be to drive the enemy back to the creek, and then toward the river into the narrow space formed by the river and creek, everything on our side of the creek to be taken at all hazards, and to follow up as our success might permit. Each of these generals was to hold a division in reserve. Owing to the demonstrations of the enemy on the right, it became necessary to extend Cheatham a division front to the right. To do this Hardee and Stewart were each ordered to extend a half division front to close the interval. Foreseeing that some confusion and delay might result, I was careful to call General Hardee's attention to the importance of having a staff officer on his left to see that the left did not take more than half a division front. This unfortunately was not attended to, and the line closed to the right, causing Stewart to move two or three times the proper distance. In consequence of this the attack was delayed until nearly 4 p. m. At this hour the attack began as ordered, Stewart's corps carrying the temporary works in his front. Hardee failed to push the attack, as ordered, and thus the enemy, remaining in possession of his works on Stewart's right, compelled Stewart by an enfilade fire to abandon the position he had carried. I have every reason to believe that our attack would have been successful had my order been executed. I am strengthened in this opinion by information since obtained through Brigadier-General Govan, sometime a prisoner in the enemy's hands, touching the condition of the enemy at the time. The delay from 1 to 4 p. m. was unfortunate, but would not have proved irretrievable had the attack been vigorously made. Ascertaining that the attack had failed, I caused the troops to retire to their former positions.

The positions and demonstration of McPherson's army on the right threatening my communications made it necessary to abandon Atlanta or check his movements. Unwilling to abandon, the following instructions were given on the morning of the 21st: The chief

engineer was selected to select a line of defence immediately about Atlanta, the works already constructed for the defense of the place being wholly useless from thier position; Stewart's and Cheatham's corps to take position and construct works to defend the city, the former on the left, the latter on the right. The artillery, under the command of Brigadier-General Shoup, was massed on the extreme right. Hardee was ordered to move with his corps during the night of the 21st south of the McDonough road, crossing Intrenchment Creek at Cobb's Mills, and to completely turn the left of McPherson's army. This he was to do, even should it be necessary to get to or beyond Decatur. Wheeler, with his cavalry, was ordered to move to Hardee's right, both to attack at daylight, or as soon after as possible. As soon as Hardee succeeded in forcing back the enemy's left, Cheatham was to take up the movement from his right and continue to force the whole from right to left down Peachtree Creek, Stewart in like manner to engage the enemy as soon as the movement became general. Hardee failed to entirely turn the enemy's left as directed, took position and attacked his flank. His troops fought with great spirit and determination, carrying several lines of intrenchments, Wheeler attacking on the right. Finding Hardee so hotly engaged, and fearing the enemy might concentrate upon him, I ordered Cheatham forward to create a diversion. Hardee held the ground he gained, Cheatham carried the enemy's entrenchments in his front, but had to abandon them in consequence of the enfilade fire brought to bear upon him. Cheatham captured five guns and five or six stand of colors, and Hardee eight guns and thirteen stand of colors. While the grand results desired were not accomplished, the movement of McPherson upon my communications were entirely defeated, and no further effort was made in that direction at any time. This engagement greatly inspired the troops and revived their confidence. Here, I regret to say, the brave and gallant Maj.-Gen. W. H. T. Walker was killed. The enemy withdrew his left to the Georgia Railroad and strongly intrenched himself, and here probably began the siege of Atlanta. It became apparent immediately that it would attempt our left. He began to mass his forces in that quarter. On the 28th it became manifest that the enemy desired to place his left (right) on Utoy Creek. I desired to hold the Lick Skillet road, and accordingly ordered Lieutenant-General Lee—who on the 25th (26th?) had relieved Major-General Cheatham from the command of the corps formerly commanded by himself—to move his forces so as to prevent the enemy from gaining that road. He was ordered to hold the enemy in check on a line nearly parallel with the Lick Skillet road, running through to Ezra Church. General Lee, finding that the enemy had already gained that position, engaged him with the intention to recover that

line. This brought on the engagement of the 28th. General Stewart was ordered to support General Lee. The engagement continued until dark, the road remaining in our possession.

On the 27th of July I received information that the enemy's cavalry was moving round our right with the design of interrupting our communication with Macon. The next day a large cavalry force also crossed the Chattahoochee River at Campbellton, moving round our left. Major-General Wheeler was ordered to move upon the force on the right, while Brigadier-General Jackson, with Harrison's and Ross' brigades, was sent to look after those moving on the left. I also dispatched Lewis' brigade of infantry down the Macon railroad to a point about where they would probably strike the road. The force on the left succeeded in reaching the road, tearing up an inconsiderable part of the track. It was the design of the enemy to unite his forces at the railroad, but in this he was defeated. The movement was undertaken by the enemy on a grand scale, having carefully picked his men and horses. A Federal force, under General Stoneman, moved farther south against Macon. He was defeated by our forces under Brigadier-General Iverson. General Wheeler, leaving General Kelly to hold the force on the right, moved against that already at the railroad. He succeeded in forcing them to give battle near Newnan on the 30th, and routed and captured or destroyed the whole force. Too much credit cannot be given General Wheeler for the energy and skill displayed. He captured two pieces of artillery, 950 prisoners, and many horses, equipments, etc. Brigadier-General Iverson captured two pieces of artillery and 500 prisoners. Believing the enemy's cavalry well broken, and feeling myself safe from any further serious operations of a like nature, I determined to dispatch a force of cavalry to the enemy's rear, with the hope of destroying his communications. I accordingly ordered Major-General Wheeler, with 4,500 cavalry, to effect this object. He succeeded in partially interrupting the enemy's communications by railroad. This still left sufficient cavalry to meet the necessities of the army. This is sufficiently shown by the fact that several determined cavalry movements were subsequently attempted and successfully met by our cavalry. From this time till the 26th of August there is nothing of any particular moment to mention. The enemy gradually extended his right, and I was compelled to follow his movement; our entire front was covered with a most excellent abatis and other obstructions. Too much credit cannot be given the troops generally for the industry and endurance they displayed under the constant fire of the enemy. On the 26th of August the enemy abandoned his works on the extreme right and took up a line, the left resting in front of our works on the Dalton railroad and extending to the railroad crossing the river. Again he withdrew, on the night



of the 27th, across the Utoy Creek, throwing one corps across the river to hold the railroad crossing and the intermediate points. His left then rested on the Chattahoochee River, strongly fortified and extending across the West Point Railroad. The corps defending the crossing of the Chattahoochee, his works on this side of the river, and the obstacle formed by the Utoy and Camp Creeks, rendered it impossible for me to attack him with any possibility of success between the river and the railroad. On the 30th it became known that the enemy was moving on Jonesborough with two corps. I determined upon consulting with the corps commanders to move two corps to Jonesborough during the night, and to attack and drive the enemy at that place across Flint river. This I hoped would draw the attention of the enemy in that direction, and that he would abandon his works on the left, so that I could attack him in flank. I remained in person with Stewart's corps and the militia in Atlanta. Hardee's and Lee's corps moved accordingly, Hardee in command. It was impressed upon General Hardee that the fate of Atlanta depended upon his success. Six hours before I had any information of the result of his attack I ordered Lee to return in the direction of Atlanta, to be ready to commence the movement indicated in the event of success, and if unsuccessful to cover the evacuation of Atlanta, which would thus be compelled. As it turned out unsuccessful it allowed the enemy the opportunity either to strike us as we moved out of Atlanta or to concentrate on Hardee. Lee's corps constituted a guard against the former, and I did not fear the destruction of Hardee before Stewart and Lee could join him, as his position on a ridge between two rivers I thought strong in front, and want of time would prevent the enemy from attacking him in flank. The small loss in Hardee's corps, and the much greater loss of the enemy, show my views to be correct. The attack at Jonesborough failed, though the number of men on our side greatly exceeded the enemy. The vigor of the attack may be in some sort imagined when only 1,400 were killed and wounded out of the two corps engaged. The failure necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta. Thirty-four thousand prisoners at Andersonville, Ga., in my rear, compelled me to place the army between them and the enemy, thus preventing me at that time from moving on his communications and destroying his depot of supplies at Marietta. A raid of cavalry could easily have released those prisoners, and the federal commander was ready to furnish them arms. Such a body of men, an army of itself, could have overrun and devastated the country from West Georgia to Savannah. The subsequent removal of the prisoners, at my request, enabled me to make a movement on the enemy's communications at a later period. On the night of the 1st of September we withdrew from Atlanta. A train of ordnance stores and some railroad stock had to be de-

stroyed in consequence of the gross neglect of the chief quartermaster to obey the specific instructions given him touching their removal. He had ample time and means, and nothing whatever ought to have been lost.

On the first of September Hardee's corps was attacked in position at Jonesborough. The result was the loss of eight guns and some prisoners. Hardee then retired to Loveoy's Station, where he was joined by Stewart's and Lee's corps. The militia, numbering about 3,000, under Maj.-Gen. G. W. Smith, was ordered to Griffin. It is proper to remark here that this force rendered excellent and gallant service during the siege of Atlanta. The enemy followed and took position in our front.

On the 11th of September, however, he abandoned his works and returned to Atlanta. Here properly ended the operations about Atlanta. Of the forces turned over to me nearly two months before, and since that day daily engaged in battle and skirmishes with a greatly superior enemy, there were remaining effective, as shown by the return of the 20th of September: Infantery, 27,004; cavalry, 10,543; artillery, 2,766. There had been sent to Mobile one brigade of infantry, 800 strong, and to Macon three battalions of artillery, 800 strong. The militia had increased, as stated, but counting it at the same as originally turned over, we have, against the aggregate turned over, 48,750—present, 40,403; sent off, 3,100, making an aggregate of 43,503, thus giving a total loss of all arms of 5,247 men.

And now, lest an opportunity should not be again presented, I trust I may be pardoned for noticing in self-defense one or two statements in General Johnston's report of the previous operations of this army, which has just been given to the public, in which the action of Lieutenant-General Polk and myself has been impugned. I thoroughly understand that it is not the part of an officer to state what may have occurred from time to time in council, but a charge publicly made ought certainly to be publicly met.

In General Johnston's report he says:

"On the morning of the 19th (May), when half of the Federal army was near Kingston, the two corps at Cassville were ordered to advance against the troops that had followed them from Adairsville, Hood's leading on the right. When the corps had advanced some two miles one of his staff officers reported to Lieutenant-General Hood that the enemy was approaching on the Canton road, in rear of the right of our original position. He drew back his troops and formed them across that road. When it was discovered that the officer was mistaken, the opportunity had passed, by the near approach of the Federal army. Expecting to be attacked I drew up my troops in what seemed to me an excellent position—a bold ridge

immediately in the rear of Cassville, with an open valley before it. The fire of the enemy's artillery commenced soon after the troops were formed, and continued until night. Soon after dark Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hood together expressed to me decidedly the opinion formed upon the observation of the afternoon, that the Federal artillery would render their positions untenable the next day, and urged me to abandon the ground immediately and cross the Etowah. Lieutenant-General Hardee, whose position I thought weakest, was confident that he could hold it. The other two officers, however, were so earnest and so unwilling to depend upon the ability of their corps to defend the ground that I yielded, and the army crossed the Etowah on the 28th [20th]—a step which I have regretted ever since."

For myself and the good and great man, now deceased, with whom I am associated in this stricture, I offer a statement of the facts in reply: After the army had arrived at Cassville I proposed to General Johnston, in the presence of Generals Hardee and Polk, to move back upon the enemy and attack him at or near Adairsville, urging as a reason that our three corps could move back, each upon a separate road, while the enemy had but one main road upon which he could approach at that place. No conclusion was obtained. While Generals Polk and Hardee and myself were riding from General Johnston's headquarters the matter was further discussed: General Polk enthusiastically advocated, and General Hardee also favoring, the proposition. It was then suggested that we should return and still further urge the matter on General Johnston. We, however, concluded to delay till the morning. The next morning, while we were assembled at General Johnston's headquarters, it was reported that the enemy was driving in the cavalry on the Adairsville road in front of Polk's position. Polk's corps was in line of battle, and my corps was in bivouac on his right. We all rode to the right of Polk's line, in front of my bivouac. Hardee soon left and went to his position, which was on the left, there being some report of the enemy in that direction. General Johnston said to me:

"You can, if you desire, move your corps to the Canton road, and if Howard's corps is there you can attack it."

My troops were put in motion. At the head of the column I moved over to this road and found it in possession of our own dismounted cavalry and no enemy there. While in motion a body of the enemy, which I supposed to be cavalry, made its appearance on the Canton road, in rear of the right of my original position. Major-General Hindman was then in that direction with his division to ascertain what force it was keeping the other two divisions in the vicinity of the Canton road. It was not a mistake (as General Johnston states) that the force appeared, as is shown from the fact that Major-General Hindman had men wounded from the small-arms and artill-

lery fired from this body. Maj. James Hamilton, of my staff, was sent to report to General Johnston the fact that the enemy had appeared on the Canton road. During Major Hamilton's absence Brigadier-General Mackall, chief of staff, rode up in great haste and said that General Johnston directed that I should not separate myself so far from General Polk. I called his attention to where General Polk's right was resting, and informed him that I could easily form upon it, and orders were given to that effect, throwing back my right to look after this body, which turned out to be the enemy's cavalry. Feeling that I had done all which General Johnston had given me liberty to do, I then rode to his headquarters, where General Johnston decided to take up his line on the ridge in rear of the one occupied by General Polk, a line which was enfiladed by heights, of which the enemy would at once possess himself, as was pointed out to General Johnston by Brigadier-General Shoup, commanding the artillery. In a very short time thereafter the enemy placed his artillery on these heights and began to enfilade General Polk's line. Observing the effect upon the troops of this fire, I was convinced that the position was unsuited for defense. Accordingly, General Polk and myself said to General Johnston that our positions would prove untenable for defense, but that we were in as good position to advance upon the enemy as could be desired. We told him that if he did not take the offensive he had better change our position. He accordingly ordered the army across the Etowah.

It will thus be seen that I received no order to give battle, and I believe that had General Polk received such an order he would have mentioned it to me. Were General Polk now alive he would be astounded at the accusation made against him.

Again General Johnston says:

"That the usual skirmishing was kept up on the 28th (May). Lieutenant-General Hood was instructed to put his corps in position during the night to attack the enemy's left flank at dawn the next morning, the rest of the army to join in the attack successively from right to left. On the 29th (May) Lieutenant-General Hood, finding the Federal left covered by a division which had intrenched itself in the night, thought it inexpedient to attack; so reported and asked for instructions. As the resulting delay made the attack inexpedient, even if it had not been so before, by preventing surprise upon which success in a great measure depended, he was recalled."

The enemy on the 28th had extended his left flank across Allatoona Creek and along the Acworth road. At my own suggestion General Johnston directed me to move my corps and strike the enemy's left. Upon arriving the next morning, and while moving to accomplish this, I found that the enemy had retired his flank a mile and strongly fortified it. The opportunity having thus passed

by the act of the enemy and not by my delay, I reported the fact to General Johnston, deeming it best that the attack should not be made, and the instructions to me were countermanded.

My operations are now fully stated. It may not be improper to close with a general resume of the salient points presented. I was placed in command under the most trying circumstances which can surround an officer when assigned to a new and important command. The army was enfeebled in number and in spirit by long retreat and by severe and apparently fruitless losses. The Army of Tennessee between the 13th and 20th of May, two months before, numbered 70,000 arms-bearing men, as the report shows. It was at that time in most excellent condition and in full hope. It had dwindled day by day in partial engagements and skirmishes, without an action which could be properly called a battle, to 47,250, exclusive of 1,500 militia, which joined in the interim. What with this constant digging and retreating from Dalton to Atlanta, the spirits of the army were greatly depressed and hope had almost left it. With this army I immediately engaged the enemy, and the tone constantly improved and hope returned. I defended Atlanta, a place without natural advantages (or rather with all the advantages in favor of the enemy), for forty-three days. No point, of all passed from Dalton down, was less susceptible of defense by nature. Every preparation was made to retreat. The army lay in bivouac a short distance from town, without attempting to construct works of defense in front of the camps, ready to resume the line of march as soon as the enemy pressed forward. I venture the statement that there was neither soldier or officer in that army who believed that in the open plain between Atlanta and the river battle would be offered, which had so often been refused in strong positions on the mountains. My first care was to make an entrenched line, and the enemy, despairing of success in front, threw his army to the left and rear, a thing he never could have done had it not been for the immense advantages the Chattahoochee River gave him. I arrived at Lovejoy's Station, having fought our battles, and the official reports of the army on the 20th of September show an effective total of 40,403 present, giving a total loss in all this time of 5,247 men.

I invite special attention to the report of Maj.-Gen. G. W. Smith of the operations of the Georgia militia in the vicinity of Atlanta, the reports of Lieutenant-General Stewart and his subordinate officers, herewith submitted. Maps of the campaign accompany this report.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, General.

GENERAL S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.



## CHAPTER XLIV

### HARDEE'S REPORT

NEAR LOVEJOY'S STATION, *September 3, 1864.*

The enemy approached my position cautiously from Jonesborough yesterday and about sunset attacked a portion of Cleburne's line. The attack was easily repulsed and with considerable loss to the enemy.

W. J. HARDEE,  
*Commanding General.*

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP NEAR SMITHFIELD, N. C., *April 5, 1865.*  
*Hon. John C. Breckenridge, Secretary of War, Richmond:*

GENERAL: I have just concluded and will to-day forward to General Cooper a report of the operations of my corps about Atlanta, and intended merely as an answer to the misrepresentations contained in General Hood's report respecting myself. You will oblige me by authorizing its publication, which I consider due alike to the truth and history and to my own reputation.

With high respect, your obedient servant,

W. J. HARDEE,  
*Lieutenant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS HARDEE'S CORPS,  
CAMP NEAR SMITHFIELD, N. C., *April 5, 1865.*

GENERAL: The want of subordinate reports has hitherto prevented me from making an official report of the operations of my corps, of the Army of the Tennessee, from the opening of the campaign at Dalton to the time of my transfer from that army on the 28th of September, 1864. Many of the general officers in that corps were killed, wounded or captured in the recent Tennessee campaign, without having made their reports, and this obstacle, therefore, still exists; but the official publication of General Hood's report makes it a duty to place at once on record a correction of the misrepresentations which he has made in that report with respect to myself and the corps which I commanded. It is well known that I felt unwilling to serve under General Hood upon his succession to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, because I believed him, though a tried and gallant officer, to be unequal in

both experience and natural ability to so important a command, and soon afterward, with the knowledge and approval of General Hood, I applied to his excellency the President to be relieved from duty with that army. The President replied that it was my duty to remain where I was. I accepted the decision and gave to the commanding general an honest and cordial support. That in the operations about Atlanta I failed to accomplish all that General Hood thinks might have been accomplished, is a matter of regret. That I committed errors is very possible, but that I failed in any instance to carry out in good faith his orders I utterly deny; nor during our official connection did General Hood ever evince a belief that I had in any respect failed in the execution of such parts of his military plans as were entrusted to me. On the contrary, by frequent and exclusive consultation of my opinions, by the selection of my corps for important operations, and by assigning me on several occasions to the command of two-thirds of his army, he gave every proof of implicit confidence in me. The publication of this official report with its astonishing statements and insinuations was the first intimation of his dissatisfaction with my official conduct. Referring to the attack of the 20th of July at Peach Tree Creek, he says:

"Owing to the demonstrations of the enemy on the right, it became necessary to extend Cheatham a division front to the right. To do this Hardee and Stewart were each ordered to extend a half division front to close the interval. Foreseeing that some confusion and delay might result, I was careful to call General Hardee's attention to the importance of having a staff officer on his left to see that his left did not take more than half a division front. This, unfortunately, was not attended to and the line closed to the right, causing Stewart to move two or three times the proper distance. In consequence of this the attack was delayed until nearly 4 p. m. At this hour the attack began as ordered, Stewart's corps carrying the temporary works on its front. Hardee failed to push the attack as ordered, and thus the enemy, remaining in possession of his works on Stewart's right, compelled Stewart by an enfilade fire to abandon the position he had carried. I have every reason to believe that our attack would have been successful had my orders been executed."

I was ordered, as above stated, to move half a division length to the right, but was directed at the same time to connect with the left of Cheatham's corps. The delay referred to by General Hood was not caused by my failure to post a staff officer to prevent my command from moving more than half a division length to the right, for Major Black, of my staff, was sent to the proper point for that purpose; but it arose from the fact that Cheatham's corps, with which I was to connect, was nearly two miles to my right instead of a division length. Had General Hood been on the field the alternative of de-

laying the attack or leaving an interval between Cheatham's command and my own could have been submitted to him for decision. He was in Atlanta, and in his absence the hazard of leaving an interval of one mile and a half in a line intended to be continuous, and at a point in front of which the enemy was in force and might at any time attack, seemed to me too great to be assumed. The attack thus delayed was, therefore, made at 4 instead of 1 p. m. My troops were formed as follows: Bate's division on the right, Walker's in the center, Cheatham's (commanded by Brigadier-General Maney) on the left, and Cleburne's in reserve. The command moved to the attack in echelon of division from the right. Walker's division, in consequence of the circular formation of the enemy's fortifications, encountered them first, and was repulsed and driven back. Bate, finding no enemy in his immediate front, was directed to find, and, if practicable, to turn, their flank, but his advance through an almost impenetrable thicket was necessarily slow. Expecting but not hearing Bate's guns, I ordered Maney and Cleburne, whose divisions had been substituted for Walker's beaten troops, to attack. At the moment when the troops were advancing to the assault I received information from General Hood that the enemy were passing and overlapping the extreme right of the army, accompanied by an imperative order to send him a division at once. In obedience to this order I immediately withdrew and sent to him Cleburne's division. The withdrawal of a division at the moment when but two were available compelled me to countermand the assault, and the lateness of the hour, which made it impossible to get Bate in position to attack before dark, left no alternative but to give up the attack altogether.

These movements and their causes were fully explained to General Hood at the time, and seemingly to his entire satisfaction. No mention is made in General Hood's report of the fight made by Cleburne on the 21st, which he described as the "bitterest of his life;" but it was the well known and often-expressed opinion of that noble and lamented officer that but for the withdrawal of his division, which prevented the assault on the 20th, and its timely arrival on the right, the enemy would on the morning of the 21st have succeeded in gaining the inner works of Atlanta.

On the 21st of July General Hood decided to attempt on the following day to turn the enemy's left flank. The original plan was to send my corps by a detour to Decatur to turn the enemy's position, but my troops had been marching, fighting, and working the night and day previous, had had little rest for thirty-six hours, and it was deemed impracticable to make so long a march in time to attack on the following day. This plan was therefore abandoned, and General Hood decided to strike the enemy in flank. General Hood says:

"Hardee failed to entirely turn the enemy's flank, as directed; took position and attacked his flank."

In proof that General Hood's instructions were obeyed I have only to mention that when my dispatch informing him of the position I had taken and the dispositions I had made for the attack was received he exclaimed to Brigadier-General Mackall, his chief of staff, with his finger on the map, "Hardee is just where I wanted him."

I will not in this report enter into the details of the engagement of the 22nd of July, one of the most desperate and bloody of the war, and which won the only decided success achieved by the army at Atlanta.

In the afternoon of the 28th of July, when the corps of Stewart and Lee, on the left, had been badly repulsed in an attack upon the enemy's right, and were attacked in turn, a serious disaster was apprehended. General Hood sent several couriers in quick succession and great haste to summon me to his headquarters, which were between my own and the then battle-field, and a mile and a half nearer to it. He there directed me to proceed to the field, and, if necessary, to assume command of the troops engaged.

If I failed of my duty in any respect on the 20th and 22nd of July, it is a little singular that on the 28th General Hood, remaining at his headquarters in Atlanta, should have sent me to take command on a field where there was no portion of my own corps, and where nearly two-thirds of his army were engaged. Upon my arrival on the field the fighting had nearly ceased, and I found it unnecessary to take command. This fight of the 28th is mentioned by General Hood in terms to leave an impression of its success, but it was well known throughout the army that so great was the loss in men, organization and morale in that engagement that no action of the campaign probably did so much to demoralize and dishearten the troops engaged in it. It was necessary, in order to cast upon me the onus of the general failure at Atlanta, to cover up any want of success on the part of others. But if strange that General Hood should have placed me in command of two-thirds of his army on the 28th, after my failures of the 20th and 22nd, it is not less remarkable that in the following month, remaining himself in Atlanta, nearly thirty miles from the scene of action with one corps of his army, he should have sent me in command of the other two corps to make an attack on Jonesborough, on which he says so much depended.

On the 26th of August the enemy drew in his left on the north front of Atlanta, in pursuance of a plan to turn our position and move upon our railroad communications. Wheeler had cut the railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga, and General Hood believed the

enemy retreating for want of supplies. He even ordered General W. H. Jackson, then commanding the cavalry of the army, to harass the rear of the retreating enemy. General Jackson endeavored to convince him of his error, but to no purpose. The days occupied in the movement from Atlanta to Jonesborough were neglected and lost. It was not until the 30th of August, in the evening of which day the enemy actually reached the vicinity of Jonesborough, that General Hood was convinced, by information sent him by myself from Rough and Ready, that the enemy were moving upon that place. He then determined to attack what he believed to be only two corps of the enemy at Jonesborough. The enemy had reached Jonesborough before the order was given to move against him. I was telegraphed at Rough and Ready in the evening of August 30 to come to Atlanta, and an engine was sent for me. I arrived in the night. General Hood ordered me to move with Lee's corps and my own, commanded by Major-General Cleburne, to Jonesborough, attack the enemy, and drive him, if possible, across Flint River. The troops were in the vicinity of East Point and were put in motion at once. I left Atlanta by rail and reached Jonesborough by daylight, expecting to find Lee and Cleburne there. To my disappointment I learned that Cleburne, who was in advance, had encountered the enemy in force on the road he had been instructed to take, and had been compelled to open another road. This occasioned great delay. Cleburne got into position about 9 o'clock on the morning of the 31st, and Lee, who was in rear, at about 11 o'clock. Three brigades of Lee's corps, which had been left on picket, did not get up until about 1.30 p. m. Foreseeing that the attack would not be made before the afternoon, and that the enemy would have time by entrenching himself to add strength of position to superiority of numbers, I telegraphed these facts to General Hood early in the day and urged him to come to Jonesborough and take command. Communication with Atlanta by rail was still open, but he did not come. As soon as the lines could be adjusted I ordered the attack. Lee's corps was on the right, Cleburne's on the left. Cleburne had orders to turn the enemy's right flank, and Lee began the attack on our right when he heard Cleburne's guns. Lee, mistaking the guns of Cleburne's skirmishers for the main attack, began the movement before Cleburne became seriously engaged. He encountered formidable breast-works, which he was unable to carry, and after considerable loss was driven back in confusion. Cleburne had carried the temporary works of the enemy, and a portion of his command had crossed Flint River and captured two pieces of artillery, which he was unable, however, to bring over the river. He was now moving upon the enemy's main works. I sent my chief of staff (Colonel Roy) to Lieutenant-General Lee to ascertain whether his troops were



in condition to renew the attack. General Lee expressed the decided opinion that they were not. Immediately after this I was informed by another staff officer (Colonel Pickett) that the enemy were preparing to attack Lee. In view of the demoralized condition of Lee's troops, as reported by the same officer, I withdrew a division from Cleburne to support Lee.

It now became necessary for me to act on the defensive, and I ordered Cleburne to make no further attempt upon the enemy's works. It is proper to state that the enemy were strongly intrenched and had one flank resting on Flint River and both well protected. Their fortifications were erected during the day and night preceding the attack, and were formidable. Two corps were in position, with a third corps in reserve. Three other corps were in supporting distance, between Jonesborough and Rough and Ready. The Twentieth Corps alone, of Sherman's army, had been left in front of Atlanta. These facts were obtained from Captain Buel, a captured officer of Major-General Howard's staff. On the night of the 31st the following dispatch was received in duplicate from General Hood:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF,

*August 31, 1864—6 p. m.*

*Lieutenant-General Hardee, Commanding, etc.:*

General Hood directs that you return Lee's corps to this place. Let it march by 2 o'clock to-morrow morning. Remain with your corps and the cavalry, and so dispose your force as best to protect Macon and communications in rear. Retain provision and ordnance trains. Please return Reynolds' brigade, and, if you think you can do so and still accomplish your object, send back a brigade or so of your corps also. There are some indications that the enemy may make an attempt upon Atlanta to-morrow.

Very respectfully, etc.,

F. A. SHOUP,

*Chief of Staff.*

Lee's corps proceeded to Atlanta, in obedience to this order, and I remained at Jonesborough with my own corps and a body of cavalry under Brigadier-General Jackson.

It will be seen from the above order that Lee's corps was not recalled, as General Hood states, with a view of attacking the enemy in flank, but to protect Atlanta from an apprehended attack by Sherman's army, which General Hood, with a marvelous want of information, evidently still believed to be in front of Atlanta.

On the morning of September 1 the situation was as follows: General Hood was at Atlanta with Stewart's corps and the Georgia militia; my corps was at Jonesborough, thirty miles distant, and Lee's corps on the road from Jonesborough to Atlanta, fifteen miles

from each place, and in supporting distance of neither. The Federal commander, on the other hand, had concentrated his whole army upon my corps at Jonesborough, except the one corps left in front of Atlanta, and was now in position to crush in detail the scattered corps of his unwary antagonist. My position at Jonesborough had been taken up on the failure of the attack on the day previous. It was not strong naturally, and there had been little time to strengthen it by art; but it was absolutely necessary to hold the position through the day to secure the evacuation of Atlanta, which had now become a necessity. To add to my embarrassment, I was encumbered by the immense subsistence and ordnance trains of the army, which had been sent for safety from Atlanta to Jonesborough, and could not now be sent farther to the rear, because the superiority of the enemy in cavalry made it indispensable to their safety that they should remain under the protection of the infantry. It is difficult to imagine a more perplexing or perilous situation; yet it is this engagement, fought under such circumstances, which General Hood disposes of in two contemptuous sentences: an engagement in which my corps was attacked by six corps, commanded by General Sherman in person, and where upon my ability to hold the position through the day depended the very existence of the remainder of the army, for it is not too much to say that if the enemy had crushed my corps, or even driven it from its position at Jonesborough on the 1st of September, no organized body of the other two corps could have escaped further destruction. Through the splendid gallantry of the troops the position was held against fierce and repeated assaults of the enemy. At night the object of the stand (which was to secure the successful retreat of the two corps in Atlanta) having been gained, I retired about four miles and took up a position in front of Lovejoy's station, which was maintained against the renewal of the attack on the following day, and until the remainder of the army formed a junction with my corps and Sherman withdrew to Atlanta.

General Hood sums up the loss of the entire army from the date of his assuming command, on the 18th of July, to the Jonesborough fight, inclusive, at 5,427. The casualties in my corps alone during that time considerably exceeded 7,000 in killed, wounded and captured.

General Hood says:

"The vigor of the attack (on the 31st of August) may be in some sort imagined when only 1,400 were killed and wounded out of the two corps engaged."

This attack was made principally by Lee's corps, and the loss was chiefly in that corps. It is true that the attack could scarcely be called a vigorous one, nor is it surprising that troops who had for two months been hurled against breastworks only to be repulsed or

to gain dear-bought and fruitless victories, should now have moved against the enemy's works with reluctance and distrust. But dispositions were made to renew the attack with both corps, which would probably have resulted bloodily enough to have satisfied even the sanguinary expectations of the commanding general but for development of the enemy's movements and forces, which made it necessary for me to assume the defensive. I now consider this a fortunate circumstance, for success against such odds could at best have only been partial and bloody, while defeat would have been almost inevitable destruction of the army.

The fall of Atlanta does not date from the result of the battle of Jonesborough, but of General Hood's misconceptions of his adversary's plans.

After the 30th of August General Hood's whole plan of operations was based on the hypothesis that Sherman was moving only a detachment to Jonesborough, whereas in reality he was moving his army. He divided his forces to attack a concentrated enemy. He in effect sent a detachment of his army to attack an enemy who was superior in numbers to his whole army.

Had it been possible with two corps to dislodge three corps of the enemy from a chosen position on the 31st, I should still to have met three fresh corps on the following morning with my own corps alone, for be it remembered that Lee's corps was withdrawn by General Hood before he knew the result of the fight on the 31st.

The fate of Atlanta was sealed from the moment when General Hood allowed an enemy superior in numbers to pass unmolested around his flank and plant himself firmly upon his only line of railroad. If, after the enemy reached Jonesborough, General Hood had attacked him with his whole army instead of with a part of it, he could not reasonably have expected to drive from that position an army before which his own had been for four months retiring in the open field.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. J. HARDEE,  
*Lieutenant-General.*

GENERAL S. COOPER, *Adjt. and Insp. Gen., Richmond, Va.*

## CHAPTER XLV

### SMITH'S REPORT

*Report of Major-General Gustavus W. Smith, C. S. Army, commanding Georgia Militia, of Operations June 1-September 15, 1864.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, GEORGIA MILITIA,  
MACON, GA., *Sept. 15, 1864.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Georgia Militia under my command during the operations at and near Atlanta:

My appointment was dated the 1st of June. I took command a few days thereafter, relieving Major-General Wayne, who returned to the duties of his office as adjutant and inspector-general of the State. The force then in the field was composed entirely of State officers, civil and military. They had been formed into two brigades of three regiments each and one battalion of artillery, numbering in all a little over 3,000 men. The officers of the militia not needed for these regiments took their places in the ranks as privates with the civil officers. The command had reported to General J. E. Johnston for duty, and had been ordered to guard the crossings of the Chattahoochee River from Roswell bridge to West Point, which duty they continued to perform until ordered by General Johnston to cross the Chattahoochee and support the cavalry upon the left wing of his army, the right wing then being at Kenesaw Mountain.

In the execution of this order the militia were twice brought in conflict with largely superior forces of the enemy's infantry. They behaved well—thoroughly executed the part assigned them, and when the army fell back to the Chattahoochee they were the last infantry withdrawn to the fortified position. General Johnston in a letter to Governor Brown paid a handsome, and, I think, well-deserved compliment to them for their conduct beyond the river and their services in beating back the enemy in their attempts upon the various crossings.

The day we reached the Chattahoochee we were assigned to your corps of the army. You soon placed us in reserve, which it was

thought would give some opportunity for drilling and disciplining the command, no opportunity for this having previously occurred.

In the meantime the reserve militia of Georgia were ordered out by Governor Brown, and I was ordered to Poplar Springs, near the Atlanta and West Point Railroad, for the purpose of reorganizing, arming the reserves, etc. We had not been there three days before you found it necessary to order us into the trenches on the east side of Atlanta. You had in the meanwhile been assigned to the command of the army and instructed me to report to you direct, instead of through a corps commander. There were at this time about 2,000 effective muskets in the command. We guarded over two miles of lines, having on them, however, some eighty pieces of Confederate artillery.

On the 22nd of July, while Hardee was attacking the enemy on our extreme right in the direction of Decatur, you ordered the troops on my left to advance. Without waiting for orders I closed the intervals in my line, formed line of battle in the trenches, and moved the militia forward over the parapet more than a mile against the enemy's strong works in our front. They were directed upon a battery which had annoyed us very much. Captain Anderson, who had served with my command beyond the Chattahoochee, volunteered to move his battery with us. He took position in clear, open ground within about 400 yards of the embrasure battery of the enemy, supported by the militia upon his right and left. Within ten minutes the effective fire of the enemy was silenced in our front, and after this they only occasionally ventured to show themselves at the embrasures or put their heads above the parapet. My troops were eager to be allowed to charge the battery, but the brigade upon my left had given way, and though falling back, was extending still far to the left. Hardee's fire, on my right, had ceased just after we moved out of the trenches. I considered it useless to make an isolated attack, and therefore held the position, awaiting further developments. In about two hours I received orders from you directing me to withdraw to the trenches. We lost only about 50 men killed and wounded.

The officers and men behaved admirably. Every movement was promptly and accurately made. There was not a single straggler.

A few days after this affair of the 22nd of July I was ordered again to Poplar Springs, but was scarcely established in camp there before we had again to be placed in the trenches on the left of the Marietta road, and from this time until the end of the siege continued under close fire night and day. We had to move from one portion of the lines to another, and had our full share of all the hardest places, extending from the left of the Marietta road across the Peach Tree road to our extreme right.



The militia, although but poorly armed—very few having proper equipments, more than two-thirds of them without cartridge-boxes—almost without ambulances or other transportation, most of the reserves never having been drilled at all, and the others but a few days—all performed well every service required during an arduous and dangerous campaign. They have been in service about 100 days, during the last fifty of which they have been under close fire of the enemy mostly night and day. They have always shown a willing spirit, whether in camp, on the march, working at fortifications, guarding trenches, or upon the open battle-field. They have done good and substantial service in the cause of their country, and have established the fact that Georgia is willing and able to do something effective in her own name beyond furnishing more than her quota to the Confederate armies proper. The greatest number of effective muskets in the trenches at any one time was about 5,000.

When Atlanta was evacuated the reserve artillery of the army passed out through my lines, and my men were formed as a rear guard. The whole was safely brought to Griffin under your orders.

The march from Atlanta to Griffin satisfied me that men over fifty are not as a class fitted for military duty. I have therefore strongly advised the Governor to withdraw them from continuous active service. There being a lull in active operations the Governor has, with my recommendation and your concurrence, temporarily withdrawn the militia from Confederate service and furloughed them for thirty days. This report is hastily written without access to the detailed records and papers of my adjutant-general's office, but all omissions can be readily supplied by the returns, etc., already forwarded to your office.

Before closing I cannot refrain from alluding to a subject which, under ordinary circumstances, forms no part of reports of subordinates to their commanders. I allude to the outcry from the press and the people against yourself because of the evacuation of Atlanta.

Unsolicited by me, without my consent or knowledge, the civil and military officers of the State of Georgia, when called upon to take up arms in defense of their homes, almost unanimously elected me their leader, and as their leader I wish in this report to say to you and place officially on record this opinion, viz.: Had your orders been properly executed either upon the 20th of July at Peach Tree Creek, the 22d of July on our right, or on the 30th of August at Jonesborough, Sherman would have been foiled and Atlanta saved, at least for some time to come, and I am not alone in this opinion. Commanding a peculiar organization, the ranking officer in the forces of the State within which you were operating, I was invited to and participated in your councils. I had every opportunity of knowing what was going on. Your plans were fully explained to your lieutenant-

generals, your chief of artillery, chief engineer and myself. Opinions and views were called for and then specific orders given. I have never known one of them to express dissent to any executed, never a doubt expressed as to the meaning of your orders, nor a suggestion made by them of a plan they supposed would be better than that you ordered. If they are not now unanimous, there is but one, if any, who dissents from the opinion expressed above, viz. : Sherman would have been beaten had your orders been obeyed on the 20th and 22nd of July, or 30th of August. Whatever the press or the people may say, the militia of Georgia are more than satisfied with you as their Confederate general, and when they again enter that service in defense of their homes will be glad to hail you as their Confederate chief.

G. W. SMITH,

*Major-General.*

GENERAL J. B. HOOD,

*Comdg. Army of Tennessee, near Lovejoy's Station.*

# *Index*

- Adair, George W., 80  
     W. F., 27  
 Alexander, J. F., Dr., 42, 162  
 Allatoona, defense of, by Gen. Corse, 629  
 Anderson, G. W., 162  
 Andrews's railroad raid, narrative of, 177-201  
 Angier, N. L., Dr., 42, 71, 79  
 Appendix, 643-709  
 Armies, status of the, after the fall of Atlanta, 629-631  
     the, at the beginning of the campaign of 1864, 202, 203  
 Arms, Fred, 27  
 Atlanta, a deserter's report of the condition of, during the siege, 518-522  
     accident at pole-raising in, 128  
     act incorporating the city of, 67  
     after the Federal evacuation, 636-641  
     Alexander H. Stephens in, in March, 1861, 168  
     "Amateurs, The," relief association, 172  
     and West Point Railroad, completion of, 108  
     arrival of the Macon and Western Railroad at, 40  
     at the opening of the war, 164  
     battles and movements around, after Peachtree Creek fight, 388-390  
     board of health, 1853, 110  
     bonded debt of, in 1859, 143  
     called into being by embryo railroads, 20  
     Capt. Scott's report of the surrender of, 598-600  
     capture and recapture of De Gress's battery at the battle of, 412-415  
     Atlanta, celebration at, on the completion of the State road, 25, 26  
     celebration of Washington's birthday in 1861 in, 167  
     city government of, 1849-50, 94  
     election of 1850 in, 88; of 1852, 106; of 1853, 109; of 1854, 116; of 1855, 122-124; of 1856, 127; of 1857, 135; of 1858, 139; of 1859, 143; of 1861, 164  
     committee appointed to surrender, 595  
     completion of the Georgia Railroad to, 32  
     condition of, after Sherman's departure, as stated by E. Y. Clarke, 635, 636  
     conscription and a strike of printers in, 514  
     council, early proceedings of, 70, 71  
     council proceedings, 1849-50, 94, 99; 1850, 104, 105; 1853, 110, 111; 1859, 143-145  
     crushing of outlawry in, 1850, 80, 93  
     destruction of, by Sherman, 632-636  
     detailed account of the effects of Sherman's bombardment of, 499-506  
     early prominent business men of, 34  
     election of the first officers of, 68, 69  
     environments of the site of, before its birth, 2  
     establishment of the city government, 60, 70  
     evacuation of, by Gen. Hood, 591-594  
     fall of, 591-610

- Atlanta, fire companies in 1859, 152  
   fire department, organization of, 1850, 100-103  
   fire limits established in, 137  
   first birth in, 25  
   first board of health of, 71  
   first church and school building in, 33  
   first fire in, 100  
   first frame building in, 25  
   first male child born in, 34  
   first newspaper in, 33  
   first settler of, 19  
   first Sunday school of, 43  
   Gen. Govan's report of his work at the battle of, 417, 418  
   Gen. Howard's account of the battle of, 400-403  
   Gen. Leggett's defense of Bald Hill at the battle of, 415, 416  
   Gen. Logan's story of the battle of, 406-412  
   Gen. Sherman's movement to the west of, 422-435  
   Gen. Sherman's report to Washington of battle of, 420-421  
   Gen. Slocum's message upon his occupation of, 602, 603  
   Gen. W. P. Howard's report of the condition of, after the Federal evacuation, 632-635  
   genesis of, compared with that of other Southern cities, 1  
   genesis of the name of, 38  
   Grays, election of officers of, in January, 1861, 165  
   growth and progress of, 1849-50, 88, 89  
   growth of, in 1854, 114-121  
   Hood's story of the battle of, 394-399  
   Hotel, the, 45  
   improvements in, in 1856, 128; in 1858, 141-142  
   in 1842, 27; in 1849 and 1850, 88-99; in 1859, as described in first city directory, 146-151  
   inside of the city of, during Sherman's investiture of, 507-527  
   Intelligencer, The, birth of, 89  
   Jefferson Davis in, 167  
   made a military post in 1862, 173  
   medical college, 118, 127  
   minor accounts of the battle of, 403-406
- Atlanta, new undertakings in, in 1848, 74  
   occupation of, by the Federals, 603-605, 611-617  
   orders and references relative to the bombardment of, 493-498  
   ordinance creating police force in, 110  
   placed under martial law, 173-175  
   population of, in 1856, 128  
   prosecution of the rowdy element in, 70  
   relinquishment of a portion of Pryor street to railroad companies by, 105  
   removal of all civilians from, by Sherman, 618-628  
   report of Col. Coburn upon the surrender of, 600-602  
   reports and messages of Confederate commanders after the surrender of, 606-608  
   reports of the condition of, during the siege, by one of Sherman's scouts, 522-526  
   results of the battle of, 419  
   "Rifles," organization of the, 172  
   second settler on the site of, 23  
   shelling of, by Sherman, 491-500  
   Sherman's investment of, 357-370  
   Sherman's orders after occupying, 608-610  
   Sherman's statement of the results of the battle of, 424, 425  
   site of, selected as a railroad terminal and junction point, 20, 21  
   statement of a citizen of, regarding the condition of the city during the siege, 523, 524  
   statistics of, in 1859, 152, 153  
   street lighting in, 111, 117, 119, 125, 126, 135-137  
   substantial citizens of, in 1850, 103, 104  
   surrender of, 594-603  
   survey of the corporate limits, 70  
   (Terminus), the only residents of, in 1839, 23  
   the battle of, 33-421  
   the naming of, 66  
   visit of President Fillmore to, 121

- Atlanta, vital statistics of, 1853, 111  
 when it was Marthasville, 29-39  
 wretched condition of streets of,  
 in 1852, 107, 108
- Bailey John, 30  
 Baker Joseph, Rev., 30, 42, 89  
 Baldwin, W. W., 101, 102, 116, 122  
 Ballard, James M., 43  
 R. W., 43
- Banks, 152  
 and banking agencies, 104
- Baptist church, First, 46
- Barnes, William, 101, 122, 156, 162
- Bell, W. T., 43
- Berkele, John, 103
- Biggers, S. T., 94
- Bleckley, Logan E., 25, 43, 161
- Bonar, Benjamin F., 42, 43, 69, 89,  
 94
- Boring, James, 71
- Boudinot, Elias, Cherokee leader, 2
- Boyd, Hugh M., 43, 94, 95
- Brown, Joseph E., 73
- Browne, R. J., 44  
 R. M., 43
- Buell, W., 43, 71, 94
- Bullard, Robert W., 42, 69
- Burns, J. T., 43
- Butt, William M., 109, 116
- Cain, R., 71
- Calhoun, James M., 118  
 John C., allusion to Atlanta in  
 address by, 73
- Capital, removal of, to Atlanta
- Carlisle, Willis, 25, 30, 32
- Cemetery, measures to establish, 95,  
 96, 98
- Chandler, C. H., 162
- Chapman, W. B., 43
- Chattahoochee, from Kennesaw  
 Mountain to the, 336-356
- Cherokee country, lawless element  
 attracted to the, by the existence  
 of gold therein, 13, 14  
 problem, importance of the, to  
 the State of Georgia, 8
- Cherokees, efforts of the State to  
 force the, from their lands, 3-6  
 final eviction of the, 6  
 sufferings of the, during their  
 hegira, 7  
 the, characteristics of, 2
- Church building, the first school and,  
 33
- Churches, 46, 104, 109, 151
- City directory, the first, 145
- City hall, measures to erect a, 106  
 plan for raising funds to erect  
 the, 110
- City limits, extension of, 117
- Clapp, Joseph B., 71
- Clarke, E. Y., Col., 29, 40, 108, 164  
 John M., 38  
 Lewis H., 35, 49  
 Robert M., 43, 70  
 Thomas M., 120
- Cleburne's, General, account of his  
 part in the New Hope Church bat-  
 tles, 278-283
- Collier, Edwin G., 68, 69  
 George, 70  
 John, 42, 71, 79, 118  
 Wash, 27, 38
- Collins, James, 38  
 James A., 32, 42, 43, 69, 71  
 & Loyd, 34
- Companies and regiments, formation  
 of, in 1861, 171
- Cone, Reuben, 42, 80
- "Confederate Continentals," organ-  
 ization of the, 171  
 field orders after the evacuation  
 of Resaca, 250
- "Guards," organization of the,  
 172
- "Volunteers," organization of  
 the, 170
- Conscription, activity in, 175
- Cook, George W., 43
- Cooper, Thomas L., 161, 162
- Covington, Garrard's raid to, 423
- Cowart, R. L., 118
- Crawford, J. R., 44  
 Robert, 164  
 William, 35
- Crew, James F., 164
- Crusselle, Thomas G., 35, 42, 49, 51,  
 54, 55
- Currier, H. L., 116
- "Cussing out," 81
- Dalton, evacuation of, 215-225  
 operations around, 206-214
- Daniel, David G., Rev., 42, 43, 82
- Darnall, T. M., 122
- "Davis Infantry," organization of,  
 167
- Decatur and Atlanta, McPherson's  
 battle between, 377
- Diehl, George, 103



- Demby, J. W., 43  
 Doane, John A., 42, 43  
 Dodd, Green T., 120  
 Doonan, Terence, 42, 79  
 Dougherty, David, 27, 38  
 Douglas, Stephen A., at Atlanta, 157, 158  
 Downs, S. T., 43  
  
 East Point, operations near, 528-536  
 Eddleman, A. M., 155  
 Editorial, specimen, in January, 1861, 165  
 Ellsworth, J. H., 103  
 Emmel, Jacob and Mike, 103  
 Erskine, William, 103  
 Evans, J. W., 43  
 Ezra Church, battle of, 436-453  
     Col. O'Neal's report of Cantey's brigade at, 447, 448  
     Gen. Clayton's report of the work of his division at, 444, 445  
     Gen. Harrow's report on the fight at, 440, 441  
     Gen. Howard's story of the operations at, 436, 437  
     Gen. John C. Brown's report of his division at, 443, 444  
     Gen. Lee's account of the battle at, 442, 443  
     Gen. Logan's report on the battle of, 438-440  
     Gen. Manigault's report of his work at, 449, 451  
     Gen. Reynolds's report of his work at, 448, 449  
     Gen. Walthall's report of battle at, 446, 447  
     Gen. Wood's account of his work at the battle of, 440  
     operations of Sherman's army following the battle of 454-456  
 Ezzard, William, 135  
  
 Farrar, John, 116, 122  
 Federal movements in pursuit of Johnston from Resaca to the Etowah, 251-264  
 Fernerden, W. H., Dr., 42, 43  
 Financial panic of 1857 and its results, 133-135  
 Fire wells and cisterns, 105  
 Formwalt, Moses, 42, 48, 68, 78  
 Forsyth, Ambrose B., 32, 34, 38, 43, 71, 94  
 Forsyth, William G., 42  
 Fowler, N. R., 162  
 Frankford, S., 101  
 Fraser, H. A., 43  
 Frazer, G. R., 101  
 Fuller, W. A., 120  
 Fulton county and Atlanta, presidential vote of, in 1860, 161  
     county, erection of, 119  
     "True Blues," organization of the, 172  
  
 Gannon, L. V., 30  
 Gardner, Reuben, 101  
 Gartrell, L. J., Gen., 118, 120, 161  
 Gate City Guards, departure of, for duty in April, 1861, 168  
     organization of, 137  
 Geary's, General, account of his operations in the Resaca campaign, 241-244  
 Georgia Air Line Railroad, 135, 140, 141  
     "Railroad Guards," organization of the, 175  
     "Volunteers," organization of, January, 1861, 165  
 Gibbs, I. F., 106  
 Gilbert, Joshua, Dr., 71, 79  
     William, 162  
 Gilmer, Governor, 7, 9  
 Glenn, Luther J., 120, 139, 143, 161, 162  
 Goodall, Solomon, 43, 71  
 Grant, L. P., Col., 38, 42, 51, 118  
 Gray, Francis M., 68, 69  
  
 Hack & Bryant, 35  
 Hamilton, John L., Dr., 156  
 Hammond, Amos W., 161  
 Haney, Henry, 103  
     "Uncle Tom," 103  
 Hauleiter, C. R., Col., 42, 43, 82, 83  
 Hardeman, Felix, 164  
 Harp, W. A., 43  
 Harris, John L., 71, 94, 95  
 Hayden, Julius A., 42, 71, 80, 94, 104, 109, 118  
 Haygood, F. M., Rev., 38  
     Green B., 116, 118, 161  
 Haley, Thomas G., 42  
 Heinz, Charles, 103  
     Charles, jr., 103  
     John M., 103  
 Herring, William, 42, 71, 156  
 Hight, F. F., 43

- Hodge, Patterson M., 94, 68, 69  
 Holcomb, Elias, 162  
 Holcombe, Henry C., 41, 43, 71, 94, 109, 116  
 Holland Edward, 42  
     E. W., 115  
 Hood, Gen., assumption of command by, 303  
     report of, of cavalry operations following the battle of Ezra Church, 456-458  
     report of, on the operations around Jonesboro, 564-566  
 Hospitals, 173  
 Hotels, 45  
 House, F. C., 164  
     Paschal, 104, 109, 116  
 Houston, A. L., 43  
     Oswald, 43, 69, 94, 95, 101, 104, 116  
     Washington J., 43, 74  
 Howard, General, description of the battle at New Hope Church by, 283-285  
     Thomas C., 161  
 Hoyt, S. B., 42, 156  
 Hulsey, Eli, 42  
 Humphries, John T., 94, 104  
 Hunnicutt, Calvin, 81  
     C. W., 101  
     E. T., 71, 116, 162  
 Hunt, John J., Rev., 104  
  
 Immell, J. P., 101  
 Immigrants, two noteworthy classes of, 18  
 "Independent State Road Guards," organization of the, 176  
 Ivey, M. J., 44  
 Ivy, Hardy, the pioneer, 19, 21, 23, 34  
     Socrates, first male child born in Atlanta, 34  
  
 Johnson, Allen E., 42, 43, 53, 115  
     Jacob, 42  
     & hrasher, first merchants in Atlanta, 23  
 Johnston and Hood, estimate of, 364-367  
     General, conflict of opinion between War Office and, 203, 204  
     Gen., removal of, from command, 360-363  
 Johnston's and Davis's dispatches relative to the movement to the Chattahoochee, 343, 344  
  
 Johnston's crossing of the Chattahoochee, 349-352  
     movement to the Etowah, 251-264  
 Jones, Adam N., 104  
     B. O., 122  
     John, 104  
     S. W., 162  
 Jonesboro, battle of, 568-590  
     Gen. Baird's statement of his part in the attack upon, 579-581  
     Gen. Carlin's story of his work at, 577-579  
     Gen. Govan and most of his brigade captured at, 587  
     Gen. Hardee's withdrawal from, 589, 590  
     Gen. Howard's account of the battle of, 569-572  
     Gen. Jeff. Davis's report of the work of his corps at, 575-577  
     Gen. Lee's report of the operations of his corps at, 582, 583  
     Gen. Logan's report of the battle of, 572-574  
     Gen. Osterhaus's report of the work of his command at the battle of, 574, 575  
     report of Gen. Anderson on the battle of, 583-585  
     report of Gen. Gibson on the work of his brigade at, 585, 587  
     report on the work of Holtzclaw's brigade at, 588, 589  
  
 "Kansas Question," agitation and effects of, 129-132  
 Kelsey, Joel, 94  
 Kennesaw Mountain, Gen. Featherston's report on, 331-333  
     Gen. Johnston's review of the operations at, 336-338  
     Gen. Morgan L. Smith's report of his division's work at, 325, 326  
 inch by inch struggle from New Hope Church to, 294-313  
 J. M. Brown's account of the battle of, 321-325  
 operations at, 314-335  
 report of Gen. Cockrell on, 328, 329  
 report of Gen. Walcutt on his operations at, 327

- Kennesaw Mountain, report of Gen.  
   Walthall on, 329, 330  
   to the Chattahoochee, from, 336-  
     356  
   from, 336-356  
 Kershaw, John, 101  
 Kicklighter, F., 43  
 Kile, John, sr., 30  
   Thomas, 38, 42, 122, 164  
   William, 38  
 Kilpatrick's raid against Jonesboro,  
   544-550  
 King, John P., 62, 108  
 Klassett, Charles, 103  
 Knights of the Golden Circle, 156,  
   157  
 Kuhrt, Henry, sr., 103  
  
 Lamb, B. T., 101  
 Land conditions in Georgia at the  
   time of the Cherokee exodus, 11  
 Lanier, T. B., 118  
 Lawless characters attracted to the  
   Cherokee country by the gold  
   mines, 13, 14  
 Lawshe, Er., 42, 103  
   Lewis, Rev., 44, 83  
 Lester, German M., 60, 94, 95  
 "Lewis and Phillips Rifles," organ-  
   ization of the, 171  
   J. T., 162  
 Linn, J. H., 83  
 Linthicum, J. C., 43  
 Locomotive, an overland journey of  
   a, 26  
 Logan, Joseph P., 120, 162  
 Logan's, General, report of the as-  
   sault on his corps at New Hope  
   Church, 286, 287  
   report of his engagement at Re-  
   saca, 235-238  
 Long, Stephen H., engineer, 20-22  
 Lovejoy, J. H., 162  
 Loyd James, 32, 42, 45, 71, 76  
 Luckie, Alexander, 82  
   A. F., 43  
   T. S., 43  
 Luminry, The, the first newspaper, 33  
 Lumpkin, Governor, 29  
 Lynch, James, 164  
   Patrick, 42  
   Peter, 103  
   the five brothers, 103  
  
 McBride, A. J., 120  
 McConnell, William, 104  
  
 McDaniel, I. O., 42, 48, 53, 79, 89, 94,  
   106, 109, 118  
   P. C., 48  
 McDaniels, the, 38  
 McGinty, J. T., 109  
 McNaught, William, 156  
 McPherson, Gen., death of, 401, 403  
   James, 43  
 McSheffrey, D., 104  
 Macon and Western Railroad, effects  
   of the completion of, upon Mar-  
   thasville, 40, 42  
   road, Sherman's operations to  
   secure the, 474-490  
 Malone, J. S., 101  
   T. J., 101  
 Mangum, R. E., 107  
 Markham, William, 111, 118  
 Marthasville, active business men of,  
   1845-47, 42  
   completion of the Georgia Rail-  
   road to, 32  
   completion of the Macon and  
   Western Railroad to, 40  
   conditions at, at opening of  
   Georgia Railroad, 35  
   description of, in 1845, 36-39  
   description of, about 1847, by W.  
   P. Reed, 44  
   enterprising citizens of, 34  
   extracts from the incorporating  
   act of, 30  
   first church and school building  
   in, 33  
   first lawyer in, 43  
   first newspaper in, 33  
   first Sunday school of, 43  
   increase in population of, after  
   advent of Georgia Railroad, 40  
   Masonry in, 46  
   newspapers of, in 1845-47, 43  
   notes of business enterprises in,  
   48, 49  
   personal recollections of, related  
   by Dr. George G. Smith, 56-65  
   personal reminiscences of, 49-51  
   post-office and postmaster, 48  
   primitive calaboose, 47  
   reminiscences of, 53-65  
   the Beckman-Mitchell-Johnson  
   land imbroglio, 52-56  
   vicious and criminal element in,  
   46-48  
   weakness of the government of,  
   30  
 Matheson, H., 43

- May, Benjamin, 162  
     P. L. J., 156  
 Mayer, David, 51  
 Meade, Joseph, 42  
 Mecaslin, John H., Major, 103, 164  
 "Mechanics Rifles," organization of  
     the, 172  
 Medical infirmary, 119  
 Mims, John F., 71, 109, 118  
 Minute Men Association, organiza-  
     tion of, 158-161  
 Mitchell, A. W., 42, 53  
     H. M., 101  
     Samuel, 56  
 Mountaineers, home life and char-  
     acteristics of the, 16, 17  
 Muhliubrink, H., 101, 103  
 Mullin, James A., 117  
 Municipal history, events of, 122-132  
  
 Nelson, Allison, 118, 122  
     Mayor, resignation of, 126  
 New Hope Church, bloody campaign  
     of, 265  
     conflicting testimony regarding  
     the fighting and forces at, 274  
     to Kennesaw Mountain, from,  
     294-313  
 Newspaper, the first, 33  
 Newspapers in 1845-47, 43  
 Norcross, Jonathan, 34, 38, 42, 43, 76,  
     78, 89, 94, 107, 109, 115, 120  
  
 Oliver, J. S., 116  
 "Ordnance Guards," organization of  
     the, 175  
 Orme, F. C., 35, 66  
     William P., 43, 108  
 Orr, A. M., 162  
 Oslin, Mrs., 35  
 Overby, B. H., 118  
  
 Pace, Lewis J., 114  
 Palmer, Gen., resignation of, 482  
 Parham, Louis L., 28  
 Parr, L. J., 101  
 Payne, Edwin, 42, 43, 48, 116  
     "Uncle Neddy," 80  
 Peachtree Creek, details of the bat-  
     tle of, 371-392  
     Gen. A. P. Stewart's report on  
     the fight at, 379, 380  
     Gen. Featherston's part in the  
     battle of, 382-384  
     Gen. Geary's account of Hood's  
     attack at, 373, 374  
  
 Peachtree Creek, Gen. Hood's story  
     of, 374-377  
     Gen. Howard's account of  
     Hood's attack at, 373  
     Gen. Loring's account of his en-  
     gagement at, 380-382  
     Gen. Newton's account of the  
     assault at, 385, 386  
     Sherman's brief dispatch of the  
     battle at, 391  
     Gen. Walthall's report of the  
     battle of, 384, 385  
     Gen. Ward's story of Stewart's  
     assault at, 386, 387  
 Peck, J. B., 116, 156  
     Willis F., 116  
 Perryman, G. M. Troup, 43  
 Peters, Richard, 42, 49, 66, 79, 109,  
     115  
 Pilgrim, G. A., 116  
 Pioneer citizens, recollections of, by  
     Rev. George G. Smith, 76-83  
     residents, Col. Hanleiter's list  
     of, 112, 113  
 Pittman, Daniel, 120  
 Planter element, the, and the moun-  
     taineers compared, 17  
 Police, 117  
 Political campaign of 1848, 74  
 Powell, Chapman, Dr., 83, 122  
 Printup, William, 43  
 Proposed to boycott Northern  
     wholesale merchants, 154  
 Pulliam, A. C., 101  
  
 Quinn, Patrick, 30  
     Rev. Father, 104  
 Railroad building, effects of the  
     opening of the Cherokee lands  
     upon, 15  
     building, opposition to, 22  
     celebrating the second, 32  
     enterprises the germ of Atlanta's  
     birth, 19, 20  
     opening of the first, into Atlanta,  
     25, 26  
     plans and conventions in 1836,  
     20  
     structure, a historic, 25  
 Railroads, effect of, upon small  
     towns and the wagon traffic, 22  
 Reed, Wallace Putnam, 44, 49, 83,  
     133, 176  
 Regiment, volunteer, organized in  
     Atlanta, 171

- Religious services in early times, 82  
 Resaca, battles around and evacuation of, 226-247  
 Resolutions relative to discrimination in railroad freight rates, 155, 156  
 Reynolds, J. F., 101  
 Rhodes, C. C., 101  
   J. R., 162  
   J. V. W., 43  
 Rice, Z. A., 42, 43, 89  
 Ridge, John, Cherokee leader, 5  
 Roark, B. W., 94  
   W. R., 104  
 Robson, S. B., 156, 164  
 Rogers, Gresham C., 82  
 Root, Sidney, 156, 161, 162  
 Ross, John, Cherokee leader, 2, 4, 5  
 Royal & Yarborough, 43  
 Ruggles, W. B., 116  
 Rusk, Thomas, 43  
  
 "Safe Guards," the, 171  
 School building, the first church and, 33  
 Scott, Isaac, 74  
 Seago, A. K., 42, 156  
   E. M., 156  
 Secession convention, delegates to the, 164  
   demonstrations and resolutions in 1860, 162, 163  
   of Virginia, reception of news of, 170  
 Secret societies, early, 83  
 Settlers of Northwest Georgia and their antecedents, 11-13  
 Shaw, George, Major, 42, 83  
 Sherman's crossing of the Chattahoochee, 353-355  
   field orders after capture of Resaca, 249  
   flank movement to the Macon road, 551-567  
   investment of Atlanta, 357-370  
   operations to secure the Macon road, 474-490  
   opposition to negro enlistments, 355  
   plan of campaign from Ringgold, 205  
 Shivers, Thomas I., 69  
 Sickles's, General, message on the Resaca battles, 248  
 "Silver Grays," organization of the, 170  
 Silvey, John, 42, 103  
 Simpson, L. C., 42, 69, 89, 90, 107, 109, 116, 122  
 Sloan, D. N., Col., reminiscences of, 84-87  
 Smith, B. M., 162  
   George G., Dr., 34, 38; personal recollections of, relating to Marthasville, 56-65; recollections of pioneer citizens by, 76-83, 116  
   Jonas, 42  
   Jonas J., 43, 94  
   Jonas S., 69, 71  
   Painter, 35; anecdote of, 80  
   S. S., Dr., 71  
 South Central Agricultural Association, 125  
 Southern Agricultural Association and the city council, 96-98  
 Spafford, W. B., 118  
 Springs, mineral and other, 75  
 Spullock, J. M., 118  
 State and Federal entanglement over the gold mines of the Cherokee country, 1  
   rights, as exemplified in the Cherokee expulsion, 9  
 "Stephens Rifles," organization of the, 170  
 Stoneman's disastrous Macon raid, 424, 464-473  
 Street names, 82  
 Strong, C. H., 122  
 Sunday school, the first, 43  
 Swift, J. K., 116  
  
 Terminus, arrival of the railroad builders in, 25  
   as a business point, after the opening of the railroad to Marietta, 26  
   becomes Marthasville, 29  
   completion of the State road between Marietta and, 25, 26  
   first child born in, 25  
   futile attempt to create a speculative interest in, 27  
   names of first streets in, 27  
   need of an eastern outlet for, 27  
   school and church facilities of, 28  
   the name given to the new settlement, 23  
 Terry, Stephen, 32, 34, 70, 81, 106  
 Thomasson, George W., 43



- Tomlinson, George, 43  
 Thompson, Joseph, Dr., 35, 38, 42, 43,  
     76  
     J. Edgar, 38, 66  
     J. W., 122  
     Mary J., 43  
     M. A., 43  
 Thurman, David, 43  
 Thrasher, John, 23, 34, 38, 79  
 Trout, I. F., 116  
  
 Ulare, A. G., 118  
  
 Venable, W. R., 43  
 Volunteer Relief Association, 173  
  
 Wagon trade, the, 16  
 Walker, Frank, 162  
     Samuel, 80  
 Wallace, John R., 42, 43, 156  
 Walthall's, General, account of his  
     engagement at Resaca, 232-234  
 Walton, Anderson W., 42, 43, 69  
 Washington Hall, 45  
 Water works, 118  
 Weaver, John, 42  
     John K., 103  
 Wells, J., 43  
     Samuel, 43  
  
 Wesley Chapel, 46  
 Westmoreland, W. F., 162  
 Whaley, C. A., 101, 164  
 Wheat, A. W., 43  
 Wheeler Gen., report of, relative to  
     his success against Stoneman, 458-  
     463  
 Wheeler's raid to Sherman's rear,  
     536-543  
 Whitaker, Jared I., 116, 161, 164  
     "Volunteers," organization of  
         the, 172  
 White, A. R., 164  
 Williams, F., 162  
     James E., 116, 162  
     W. M., 156  
 Williford, Benjamin N., 104, 109,  
     116, 162  
 Wilson, John S., Rev., 34, 82, 109  
     W. H., 43  
 Wingfield, W. L., 44  
 Winship, Joseph, 109, 116  
 Wooding, A., 44  
 Wright, U. L., 74  
     W. L., 43, 78  
  
 Yarborough, C. H., 44  
 Young, D., Dr., 155  
 Young Men's Christian Association,  
     organization of, 139







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