Author . Title Imprint . 10—47372-2 GPO / iTTfTi— fflf THE CAMPAIGNS 1 Ten. Robert E. Lee. AN ADDRESS By Lieut. Gex\eral JUBAL A. EARLY, i; I-; 1' R E Wasliiiigtou 1111(1 Lee University, Jammrjy Wih, 7872. Second leuised Edition. t- BAIiTIMORE: Printed and Published by John Murphy & Co. 182 Baltimore Street. Xew York : . . . E. J. Hale & Son, 17 M r n K A V Street. 18 7 2. August, lS7!i. IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT. A Work of Extraordinary Interest and of Permanent Value to the Historian, the Lawyer, the Statesman, the Poli- tician, and Every Intelligent Reader. JtS'TMs Worh tvill he Siit)2>lied to Subscribers Only. I^^WiLL BE Published on the 1st op September, In one volume of nearly TOO pages, Roxjal octavo, printed on fine pajter, Emhellished with a Fine Steel Portrait of the Chief Justice, and Bound in best English cloth bevelled, price, $5, Library style, 3Iarbled edges, $6. Half 3Iorocco, $7. A. ]Si:E:MOIR OF LJJ 1 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Br SAMUEL TYLER, LL. D., or the Maryland Bar. Mr. Tyler was selected by Chief Justice Taney, two years before his death, as his biographer. All his private papers, were from time to time, placed in the hands of Mr. Tyler, by his executors and family. The biography is, for every fact stated, perfectly authentic. The first chapter of the Memoir was written by the Chief Justice. It is of peculiar interest. Some of the then great Lawyers of the Maryland Bar are described in life-like portraits. And topics, which only his memory could re- call from the past, are brought before us in a charming narrative. In the subsequent chapters written by Mr. Tyler, are matters of the highest interest to tfie Historian, the Lawyer, the Statesman, and every class of intel- ligent readers. The life of the Chief Justice extended through such a long period of our history, (born 111*1, his life extended to 1864,) and he occupied so many important posts of honor and responsibility, that to present him as he appeared as an actor in affairs, much of the history of the working of the Federal Government has to be narrated. Many interesting and imposing facts never before disclosed will give a varied interest to the Memoir. Im- portant private acts of the Chief Justice will be disclosed that will, for all time, serve as examples to public men. Altogether, the Memoir is one of extraordinary interest, and will be of permanent value in the History of the United States. j|^° A Portion of the Profits of the Memoir will be for the Benefit of the Family of Chief Justice Taney. ■^^EXPERIENCED AGE NTS,wantedin all parts of the United States, to sell this and other Po^mlar Works. ^^ For xjarticulars, address MURPHY & CO., Publishers, 182 Baltimore street, Baltimore. ^\ ADDRESS Delivered in the Chapel of the University. ,0 Ladies axd Gentlemen : i/» My Friends, Comrades and Countrymen : Though conscious of my inability to discharge, in a suitable manner, the duty assigned me on this occasion, yet, when asked to unite in rendering homage to the memory of the great Confederate Captain, I did not feel at liberty to decline the call. I have real- ized, however, most fully and sensibly, the difficulties of the posi- tion I occupy. All the powers and charms of eloquence and poe- try, combined, have been called into requisition, to commemorate the deeds and virtues of him whose birth-day we celebrate. They are not at my command, and the highest eulogy which I am capa- ble of pronouncing upon the character of our illustrious Chief, must consist of a simple delineation of his achievements, couched in the plain, unadorned language of a soldier, who bore an hum- y-j— ble part in Jioe many events which marked the career to which g¥-*^*^^ your attention will be called. I must, therefore, throw myself upon your kind indulgence, and bespeak your patience, while I attempt to give a sketch of those grand achievements which have placed the name of Robert E. Lee among the foremost of the renowned historic names of the world. I do not propose, my friends, to speak of his youth, his early manhood, or his career prior to our late struggle for liberty and independence. These have been, and will continue to be, far bet- ter portrayed by others, and I will content myself with the remark that, together, they constituted a worthy prelude to the exhibition, on a larger theatre, of those wonderful talents and sublime virtues, which have gained for him the admiration and esteem of the good and true of all the civilized world. Most men seem to have a just appreciation of the domestic vir- tues, the moral worth, the unselfish patriotism and Christian purity of General Lee's character ; but it has occurred to me that very few, comparatively, have formed a really correct estimate of his marvellous ability and boldness as a military commander, however exalted is the merit generally awarded him in that respect. I will, therefore, direct my remarks chiefly to his military career in our late war, though I am unable to do full justice to the subject. I can, however, contribute my mite; and it may, perhaps, not de- tract from the interest of what I have to say, when you know that I was a witness of much of which I will speak. I must, necessarily, go over much of the same ground that has been already explored by others, and repeat something of what I have already said in an address before the " Survivors' Association of South Carolina," and in some published articles. I will, also, have to give you some details and statistics, to show what was really accomplished by our army under the lead and through the inspiration of its great Commander. Flowers and figures of rhet- oric may captivate the imagination, but material facts and figures only can convince the judgment, and the latter I will endeavor to render as little tiresome as possible. The commencement of hostilities in Charleston harbor, the proc- lamation of Lincoln, calling for troops to make an unconstitu- tional war on the seceded States, and the consequent secession of Virginia found General Lee a Colonel in the United States army, with a character and reputation which would have ensured him the highest military honors within the gift of the United States Gov- ernment. Ill fact, it has been said that the command of the army intended for the invasion of the South was tendered him. How- ever, rejecting all overtures made to him, as soon as he learned the action of his native State, in a dignified manner, and without parade or show, he tendered his resignation, with the determination to share the fate of his State, his friends and kindred. The then Governor, at once, with the unanimous consent of the Convention of Virginia, tendered him the command of all the forces of the State. This he accepted, and promptly repaired to Richmond, to enter upon the discharge of his duties, knowing that this act must be attended with a very heavy pecuniary loss to himself on account of the locality of his estates. Those who witnessed his appearance before the Convention, saw his manly bearing, and heard the few grave, dignified and impressive words with whicli he consecrated himself and his sword to the cause of his native State, can never forget tliat scene. All felt at once that we had a leader worthy of the State and the cause. As a member of the military committee of the Convention, and afterwards as a subordinate under him, I was in a condition to witness and know the active energy and utter abnegation of all personal considerations with which he devoted himself to the work of organizing and equipping the Virginia troops for the field. While he bore no activ^e part in the first military operations of the war, yet, I can safely say that, but for the capacity and energy dis- played by General IjCC in organizing and equipping troo{)s to be sent to the front, our army would not have been in a condition to gain the first victory at Manassas. I do not, however, intend, by this statement, to detract from the merit of others. The Confede- rate Government, then recently removed to Richmond, did well its part in bringing troops from the South ; and I take pleasure in bearing testimony to the fidelity and ability with which the then Governor of Virginia cooperated with General Lee in his efforts to furnish men as well as the munitions of war. His first appearance in the field, as a commander, was in West- ern Virginia, after the reverses in that quarter. The expectations formed in regard to his operations there were not realized, and, though he met with no disaster or defeat to his troops, the cam- paign M'as regarded as a failure. The public never thought of inquiring into the causes of that failure, and it is not to be denied that an impression prevailed among those who did not know him well, that General Lee was not suited to be a commander in au active campaign. There were some editors who while safely en- trenched behind the impregnable columns of their newspapers, proved themselves to be as fierce in war as they had been wise in peace, and no bad representatives of the snarling Thersites, and these hurled their criticisms and taunts, with no sparing hand, at the head of the unsuccessful commander. It would be profitless, now, to inquire into the causes of the failures in Western Vir- ginia. It is sufficient to say that they were not attributable to the want of capacity or energy in the commanding General. He was, subsequently, sent to the Southern sea-board, for the purpose of supervising the measures for its defence, and he proved himself a most accomplished engineer, and rendered most valuable services in connection with the sea-board defenses in that quarter. 6 In March, 1862, he was called to Richmond, and charged with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy, under the direction of the President. Just before that time, the evacuation of Manassas took place, and, subsequently, the transfer of the bulk of the opposing armies in Virginia to the Peninsula, the evacuation of Yorktosvn and the line of Warwick River, the battle of Williamsburg, and the transfer of the seat of war to the Chickahominy, in the vicinity of Richmond, occurred. On the 31st of May and 1st of June, the battle of Seven Pines was fought, and General Johnston was so severely wounded as to be disabled for duty in the field for some time. Fortunately, the eminent and patriotic statesman, who was at the head of the Government, well knew the merits of General Lee, and at once assigned him to the vacant command ; and then in fact began that career to which I invite your attention. W^hen General Lee assumed command of the army, which before that time had borne the name of the " Army of the Potomac," but was soon re-christened by the name of the " Army of Northern Virginia," he found the Confederate Capital beleaguered by an army of over one hundred thousand men, with a very large train of field and siege guns, while his own force was very little more than half that of the enemy. Nevertheless, he conceived the idea of relieving the Capital of the threatening presence of the besieging army, by one of those bold strategic movements of which only great minds are capable. General Jackson, by his rapid move- ments and brilliant operations in the Valley, had prevented the march of a column of about forty thousand men, under McDowell, from Fredericksburg on Richmond, to unite with the besieging army ; and a part of McDowell's force, and Fremont's army from Northwestern Virginia, had been sent to the Valley, for the pur- pose of crushing Jackson. It was very apparent that Jackson's force, then consisting of his own command proper, Johnson's com- mand from Alleghany Mountain, and Ewell's division, could not long withstand the heavy forces concentrating against it, and that, when it was overwelmed, the enemy's troops operating in the Valley and covering Washington, would be at liberty to move on Richmond ; while the detachment, from the army defending that city, of a force large enough to enable Jackson to contend suc- cessfully, in a protracted campaign, with the forces accumulating against him, would, probably, ensure the fall of the Confederate Capital. Preparations were, therefore, made to attack the besieg- ing array, with the forces covering Richmond and in the Valley, by a combined movement. Some reinforcements were brought from the South, and three brigades were sent to the Valley, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, and facilitating the withdrawal of General Jackson. Fortunately, that able and energetic com- mander had been enabled to prevent the junction of Fremont's army with the troops sent from McDowell's command, and, taking ads^antage of their separation and the swollen condition of the water courses, had defeated both forces in succession, and so bewildered their commanders by the rapidity of his movements, that they retreated down the Valley, under the apprehension that Washington was in danger. Leaving all of his cavalry but one regiment to watch the enemy and mask his own movement. Gen- eral Jackson, on the 17th of June, commenced his march towards the enemy's lines near Richmond, in compliance with the plan and orders of General Lee; and on the 26th of June, less than four weeks after General Lee had been assigned to the command of the army, his attacking columns swung around McClellan's right flank, and fell like an avalanche on the besieging army. Next day, Jackson was up, and then ensued that succession of bril- liant engagements which so much accelerated McClellan's famous " change of base," and sent his shattered army to Harrison's Land- ing under cover of the gun-boats on the James. To give you some idea of the boldness and daring of this move- ment, and the impression it made on the enemy, I will call your attention to some facts and figures. In his report, dated in August, 1863, and printed in 1864, McClellan gives the strength of the troops under his command at Washington, on the Potomac and within reach, on the 1st of March, 1862, as: " Present for duty, one hundred and ninety-three thousand one hundred and forty-two." A portion of this force had been left to operate in the Valley, another to cover Washington ; and he puts the strength of " The Army of the Potomac," which designation his army bore, on the 20th day of June, 1862, just six days before the battles began, at : "Present for duty, one hundred and five thousand eight hun- dred and twenty-five." He further says that he had sixty batteries with his army, aggregating three hundred and forty field pieces. Besides these he had a large train of siege guns. General Lee's whole force, of all arms, including the troops of Magruder, Huger, Holmes and Jackson, when the latter arrived, did not reach eighty thousand etfective men, and of these. Holmes' command, over six thousand strong, did not actively engage in any of the battles. There were thirty-nine brigades of infantry in all engaged on our side in the battles around Richmond, inclusive of Holmes' command. The strength of twenty-three of them is given in the official reports, and was forty-seven thousand and thirty-four, including the batteries attached to a number of them. In these were embraced the very largest brigades in the array, as for instance, Lawton's. The sixteen brigades, whose strength is not given, were four of A. P. Hill's, two of Longstreet's, two of Huger's and eight of Jackson's. Taking the average of those whose strength is given, for the eight brigades of A. P. Hill, Longstreet and Huger, and an average of fifteen hundred for Jackson's eight brigades — which would be a very liberal estimate for the latter, considering the heavy fighting and long and rapid marches they had gone through — and it will give about seventy- five thousand men, including a number of batteries attached to the brigades. The cavalry with the army was less than two brigades, and that, with the artillery not included in the reports of brigades, could not have reached five thousand men. The field guns with our army, which were all that were used, were not near half as many as those of the enemy, and many of them were of inferior metal and pattern. We had not, then, had an opportunity of sup- plying ourselves with the improved guns of the enemy. Much the largest portion of our small arms consisted of the smooth bore musket, while the enemy was well supplied with improved rifle muskets. From the data I have given, you will perceive that I have not underestimated the strength of the forces at General Lee's com- mand; and this was the largest army he ever commanded. The idea of relieving Richmond, by an attack on McClellan's flank and rear, was a masterly conception, and the boldness, not to say audacity, of it, will appear when we take into consideration the relative strength of the two armies, and the fact that, in swinging 9 around the enemy's flank, General Lee left very little over twenty- five thousand men between the Capital and the besieging army. Timid minds might regard this as rashness, but it was tiie very perfection of a j)rofound and daring strategy. Had McClellan advanced to the assault of the city, through the open plains around it, his destruction would have been ensured. As it was, his only chance for escape was in a retreat through the swamps and forests, which concealed and sheltered his columns on their flight to the banks of the James. Notwithstanding the favorable nature of the country for his escape, McClellan's army would have been annihi- lated, had General Lee's orders been promptly and rigidly carried out by his subordinates. The bloody battle of Malvern Hill would not have been fought ; and when it was fought, a crushing defeat would have been inflicted on the enemy, had the plans of the commanding General been carried into execution, as I could demonstrate to you, if it were profitable to enter into such a disquisition. McClellan was glad enough to escape from that field with his shattered forces, though he pretended to claim a victory; and the pious Lincoln gave "ten thousand thanks for it." McClellan always insisted that we had overwhelming numbers against liim, and this hallucination seems to have haunted him until the close of his career, if he is yet rid of it. On the night of the 25th of June, he telegraphed to Stanton, as follows; "I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, including Jack- son and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly supe- rior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position, and repulse any attack." In his report, he says: "The report of the chief of the ^secret service corps' herewith forwarded, and dated the 26th of June, [18(32,] shows the esti- mated strength of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown, to have been from one hundred thousand to one hun- dred and twenty thousand. The same report puts his numbers, on the 26th of June, at about one hundred and eighty tiiousand, and the specific information obtained regarding tlieir organization warrants the belief that this estimate did not exceed his actual strength." 10» He missed it by only one hundred thousand, and his statement shows the impression made on him, by the fighting of our army under General Lee, and which he never got over. All the time he was at his " new base," he was afflicted with this dread phan- tom of overwhelming numbers against him, which, according to his account, were being constantly increased, and he begged most earnestly for reinforcements. Halleck, then lately appointed com- mander-in-chief at Washington, visited Harrison's Landing about the last of July, and after he got back, he reported, in writing, to the Secretary of War, that McClellan and his officers represented our forces, then, at not less than two hundi'ed thousand, and his own force at about ninety thousand. A new commander had now appeared in Virginia, on the north of the Rapidan, in the person of Major-General John Pope, whose head-quarters were in the saddle ; who had never seen anything of the "rebels" but their backs; and who felt no concern whatever about strength of positions, bases of supplies, or lines of retreat. All he wanted to know, was, where the "rebels" were, so that he might " go at them ;" and he left the lines of retreat to take care of themselves, while the " enemy's country " was to be the base of his supplies. His army, according to his own statement, amounted to over forty-three thousand men. General Jackson had been quietly sent up to Gordonsville, with his own and Ewell's divisions, which were soon followed by that of A. P. Hill. While McClellan was trembling at the idea of vastly superior numbers accumulating against him, Pope telegraphed to Halleck : " The enemy is reported to be evacuating Richmond, and fall- ing back on Danville and Lynchburg." General Jackson soon began to show Pope some things that Were entirely new to him. The battle of Cedar Run or Slaughter's Mountain, was fought on the 9th of August, and "a change came over the spirit" of Pope's dream. In fact, he began to see some remarkable sights, with which he was destined to soon become fjimiliar. About this time, McClellan sent a despatch to Halleck, in which is this striking passage : " I don't like Jackson's- movements ; he will suddenly appear when least expected." 11 There were not many, on tliat side, who did like General Jack- son's ways. The authorities at Washington were completely be- wildered by his new eccentricities, and the evacuation of the "new base," which had been assumed with so much ability and celerity, was peremptorily ordered. Burnside soon arrived at Fredericksburg with thirteen thousand men, brought from North and South Carolina, eight thousand of whom, under Ileno, were sent to Pope. In the meantime. General Lee had been watching McClellan's force, and, having become convinced that there was no immediate danger to Richmond, he determined to move against Pope, for the purpose of crushing him before he could be reinforced, and entirely relieving Richmond, by forcing McClellan to go to the defence of Washington. Leav- ing D. H. Hill's and McLaws' divisions, two brigades under J. G. Walker, a brigade of cavalry under Hampton, and some other troops at Drury's and Chaffin's Bluffs, to watch McClellan, General Lee moved with the remainder of his army to the Rapi- dan. Getting wind of the intended movement against him, by the accidental capture of a despatch to Stuart, Pope fell back behind the Rappahannock, and the two armies soon confronted each other on its banks. A raid by Stuart to Pope's rear, resulted in the capture of the latter's head-quarters and his correspondence, which latter showed that McClellan's army was hastening to Pope's assistance. D. H. Hill, McLaws, Walker and Hampton, were ordered forward at once, and while Pope was looking steadily to the front for the " rebels," without thought for his base of sup- plies, and in utter oblivion of any possible line of retreat, General Jackson was sent on that remarkably bold and dashing expedition to the enemy's rear, for the purpose of destroying Pope's commu- nications and preventing the advance of McClellan's army to his assistance. Pope now fouud it necessary to look out for his su^)- plies and his line of retreat, and then ensued that series of engage- ment called " the second battle of Manassas." Pope had already been joined by two corps of McClellan's army. Porter's and Heintzelman's, the one by the way of Fredericksburg and the other over the railroad ; and Jackson's three divisions, numbering less than twenty thousand men, after cutting the railroad, and destroying several trains of cars and immense stores at Manassas, which could not be removed for want of transportation, withstood 12 • for two days, beginning on the 28tli of August, Pope's entire army, reinforced by Reno's eight thousand men and McClellan's two corps, while General Lee was moving up with Longstreet's and Anderson's commands. Never did General Jackson display his leading characteristics more conspicuously than on this occa- sion, and he fully justified the confidence of the commanding General, in entrusting him with the execution of one of the most brilliant and daring strategic movements on record. Every attack by Pope's immense army was repulsed with heavy slaughter, and during the 29th all the fighting on our side was done by Jack- son's corps, except an affair about dusk between a part of McDowell's corps and the advance of Longstreet's command, which began to arrive between eleven and twelve iu the day, but did not become engaged until at the close, when an advance was made, along theWarrenton Pike, by one of McDowell's divisions, under the very great delusion that Jackson was retreating. On the morning of the 30th the attacks on Jackson's position, on the line of an unfinished railroad track, were renewed, and continued until the afternoon, with the same result as the day before. Long- street did not become engaged until late in the afternoon, when, by a combined attack. Pope's army was driven across Bull Run in great disorder and with immense loss. Pope's report and telegraphic correspondence afford a rich fund of amusement for those acquainted with the facts of his brief cam- jjaign in Virginia, but this I must pass over. He claimed to have entirely defeated and routed Jackson on the 29th, and he actually had one corps commander cashiered, for not cutting off the retreat and capturing the whole force, which he claims to have routed. In a despatch to Halleck, dated 5.30 A. M., on the 30th, he says: " We have lost not less than eight thousand men, killed and W'Ounded ; but from the appearance of the field, the enemy lost at least two to one. He stood strictly on the defensive, and every assault was made by ourselves. The battle was fought on the identical field of Bull Run, which greatly increased the enthusiasm of the men. The news just reaches me from the front that the enemy is retiring toward tl>e mountains. I go forward at once to see. We have made great captures, but I am not able, yet, to form an idea of their extent." 13 He went forward, and saw more tlian was agreeable to liim, and found that he liad captured a " Tartar." In a despatch dated 9.45 P. M., on the 30th, after the great battle of tliat day was over, he said : "The battle was most furious for hours without cessation, and the losses on both sides were very heavy. The enemy is badly whipped, and we shall do well enough. Do not be uneasy. We will hold our own here." To this Halleck replied on the morning of the 31st: " You have done nobly. Don't yield another inch if you can avoid it. All reserves are being sent forward." Yet, after all of McClellan's troops, except one division left at Yorktown, had arrived, and before another gun had been fired. Pope telegraj)hed to Halleck, at 10.45 A. M., on the 31st: " I should like to know whether you feel secure about Wash- ington, should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work." The army that had been so badly whipped on the 30th, was soon advancing against I'ope again. Jackson, by another flank movement, struck the retreating army at Chantilly or Ox Hill, and the shattered remains of it, now reinforced by two fresh corps and a division of McClellan's army, were hurled into the fortifica- tions around Washington. Major General John Pope had now seen as much of the " rebels" as he cared to look upon, and he disappeared from the scene of action, in many respects, "a wiser if not a better man." To get him as far as possible from the dangerous proximity, he was sent to the extreme Northwest, to look after the red men of the plains. When we recollect the bombastic proclamations and orders of Po])e, at the beginning of his brief campaign, and the rapidity with which he was brought to grief, there appears so much of the ludicrous in the whole, that we are almost tempted to overlook the fiendish malignity which characterized some of his orders and acts. In his report, after saying : " Every indication, during the night of the 29th, and up to 10 o'clock on the morning of 30th, pointed to the retreat of the enemy from our front." ll He further says : "During the whole night of the 29th and the morning of the 30th, the advance of the main army, under Lee, was arriving on the field to reinforce Jackson, so that, by 12 or 1 o'clock in the day, we were confronted by forces greatly superior to our own ; and these forces were being, every moment, largely increased by fresh arrival of the enemy in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap." So that this was another case of overwhelming numbers on our side. Pope's array was originally, according to his statement, forty- three thousand, and, according to Halleck, forty thousand. He had been reinforced by eight thousand men under Reno; a body of troops from the Kanawha Valley, under Cox ; another from Washington, under Sturgis, and all of McClellan's army, except one division, say eighty-five thousand men. General Lee had then between one hundred and thirty-five thousand and one hun- dred and forty thousand men to deal with on this occasion. The whole of McClellan's force was not up at the battle of the 30th, but all of it, except the one division of Keyes' corps, left at York- town, was up by the time of the affair at Ox Hill, on the 1st of September. General Lee's whole force, at second Manassas, did not exceed fifty thousand men. Neither D. H, Hill's, nor McLaws', nor Walker's division of infantry, nor Hampton's brigade of cav- alry had arrived, and neither of them got up until after the affair at Ox Hill. We had only twenty-nine brigades of infantry and two of cavalry present at second Manassas, one of the latter being very weak. One of the infantry brigades, Starke's Louisiana brigade, had been formed of regiments attached to other brigades at the battles around Richmond, and another had arrived from the South during July. This latter brigade constituted all the reinforcements, except men returned from convalescence, received after these battles, and was twenty-two luindred strong, the last of July. The whole force in the department of Northern Vir- ginia, on the 31st of July, 1SG2, was sixty-nine thousand five hundred and fifty-nine for duty. Deduct, rateably, for the twelve infantry brigades, with their proportion of artillery, and the one cavalry brigade absent, besides troops on detached duty at various points, and you will see how General Lee's army must have been under fifty thousand at second Manassas. Yet it had sent the 15 combined armies of Pope and McCIclIan into the defences of Washington, in a very crippled condition, and thrown the Gov- ernment there into a great panic in regard to the safety of that city. Fredericksburg had been evacuated, and the remainder of Burnside's corps brought to AVashington, while a call had been made for three hundred thousand new troops. Notwithstanding the exhaustion of his troops from the heavy tax on all their energies, the heavy losses in battle, and the want of commissary stores, General Lee now undertook the bold scheme of crossing the Potomac into Maryland, with his army reinforced by the eleven brigades of infantry, under D. H. Hill, McLaws and Walker, and Hampton's cavalry, which were coming up. On the 3d of September, our army was put in motion, and, passing through Leesburg, it crossed over and concentrated at and near Frederick city, by the 7th of the month. This movement threw the authori- ties at Washington into great consternation and dismay. McClel- lan had been assigned to the command of all the troops in and around AVashington, and the correspondence between himself and Halleck, conducted mostly by telegraph, shows how utterly bewil- dered they were. Both of them were firmly impressed with the conviction that our numbers were overwhelming, and they did not know where to look for the impending blow. McCIellan moved out of the city with great caution, feeling his way grad- ually towards Frederick, while a considerable force, which was constantly augmented by the arrival of new troops, was retained at Washington, for fear that city should be captured by a sudden couj) from the South-side. A considerable force had been isolated at Harper's Ferry, and General Lee sent Jackson's corps, McLaws', Anderson's and AValker's divisions, in all twenty-six brigades of infantry, with the accompanying artillery, to invest and capture that place, retaining with himself only fourteen brigades of infan- try, with the accompanying and reserve artillery, and the main body of the cavalry, with which he crossed to the AVest side of the South Mountain. The order directing these movements, by some accident, fell into McClellan's hands on the 13th, and he hurried his troops forward to attack the small force with General Lee, and relieve Harper's Ferry if possible. A sanguinary engage- ment occurred at Boonsboro' Gap, on the 14th, between D. H. Hill's division, constituting the rear guard of the column with If General Lee, and the bulk of McClellan's army, and Hill, after maintaining his position for many hours, was compelled to retire at night with heavy loss, the troops sent to his assistance not hav- ing arrived in time to repulse the enemy. That night. Long- street's and Hill's commands crossed the Antietam to Sharpsburg, where they took position on the morning of the 15th. In the meantime. Harper's Ferry had been invested, and surrendered on the morning of the 15th — our victory being almost a bloodless one, so far as the resistance of the garrison was concerned ; but McLaws and Anderson had had very heavy fighting, on the Mary- land side, with a part of McClellan's army. As soon as General Lee heard of the success at Harper's Ferry, he ordered all the troops operating against that place to move to Sharpsburg as soon as practicable. Leaving A. P. Hill, with his division, to dispose of the prisoners and property captured at Harper's Ferry, General Jackson, late in the afternoon of the 15th, ordered his own division and Ewell's, the latter now under Lawton, to Sharpsburg, where they arrived early on the morning of the 16th. Walker's two bri- gades came up later in the day. The ten brigades brought by Jackson and Walker made twenty-four brigades of infantry, with the fourteen already on the ground, which General Lee had with him when the battle of Sharpsburg opened on the morning of the 17th of Septcniber, Jackson's division was placed on the left flank, and Hood's two brigades, which were next to it on the right, were relieved by two brigades of Ewell's division during the night of the 16th, and these were reinforced by another very early the next morning. General Jackson's whole force on the field consisted of five thousand infantry and a very few batteries of his own division. One brigade, my own, numbering about one thou- sand men and officers, was detached, at light, towards the Poto- mac on our left, to support some artillery with which Stuart was operating; so that General Jackson had only four thousand infan- try in line, and D. H. Hill was immediately on his right, holding the centre and left centre with his division, then three thousand strong. General Lee's whole infantry force on the field, at the beginning of the battle, did not exceed fifteen thousand men, including Jackson's and .Walker's commands. On the left and left centre, McClellan hurled, in succession, the four corps of Hooker, Mansfield, Sumner and Franklin, numbering, in the 17 aggregate, fifty-six thousand and ninety-five men, according to his rej)ort; and a sanguinary battle raged for several hours, dur- ing which, Hood's two brigades, my brigade. Walker's two bri- gades, Anderson's brigade of D. R. Jones' division, and McLaws' and Anderson's divisions, successively went to the support of the part of the line assailed, at different points, the last two divisions having arrived late in the morning, during the progress of the battle. And all the troops engaged, from first to last, with the enemy's fifty-six thousand and ninety-five men, on that wing, did not exceed eighteen thousand men. At the close of the fighting there, our left was advanced beyond where it rested in the morn- ing, while the centre had been forced back some two hundred yards. In the afternoon, Burnside's corps, over thirteen thousand strong, attacked our right, and, after gaining some advantage, was driven back with the aid of three of A. P. Hill's brigades, which had just arrived from Harper's Ferry. At the close of the battle, we held our position firmly, with the centre slightly forced back, as I have stated. We continued to hold the position during the 18th, and McClellau did not venture to renew the attack. In the mean- time, heavy reinforcements were moving to his assistance, two divi- sions of which. Couch's and Humphrey's, fourteen thousand strong, arrived on the 18th, while General Lee had no possibility of being reinforced except by the stragglers who might come up, and they constituted a poor dependence. The Potomac was immediately in his rear, and as it would have been folly for him to have waited until an overpowering force was accumulated against him, he very properly and judiciously retired on the night of the 18th, and re- crossed the river early on the morning of the 19th. A very feeble effort at pursuit by one corps, was most severely punished by A. P. Hill's division on the 20th. This was one of the most remarkable battles of the war, and has been but little understood. You will, therefore, pardon me for going somewhat into detail in regard to it. When General Lee took his position on the morning of the 15th, he had with him but fourteen brigades of infantry, besides the artillery and cavalry. The official reports show that D. H. Hill's five brigades numbered then only three thousand men for duty, and six brigades under D. R. Jones only two thousand four hundred and thirty 2 men. The strength of three brigades is not given, but they were not more than of an average size — and estimating their strength in that way, it would give less than seven thousand five hundred infantry with which, and the artillery and cavalry with him. General Lee confronted McClellan's army during the whole of the 15th and part of the 16th. The arrival of Jackson's and Walker's commands, did not increase the infantry to more than fifteen thousand men, and they brought very little artillery with them. During the day, McLaws, Anderson and A. P. Hill came up with thirteen brigades, making thirty-seven brigades which participated in the battle. The official reports give the strength of twenty-seven of these, amounting in the aggregate to sixteen thousand nine hundred and twenty-three men. Taking the average for the other ten — and they were not more than aver- age brigades, if that — and it would give about twenty-three thou- sand infantry engaged on our side from first to last. The cavalry, consisting of three brigades, which were not strong, was not en- gaged and merely watched the flanks. A very large portion of our artillery, which had been used against Harper's Ferry, had not arrived, and did not get up until after night-fall, when the battle was over. We had in fact comparatively few guns engaged, and the enemy's guns were not only very numerous, but of heavier metal and longer range. Taking the whole force, including the cavalry and the artillery, when all of the latter had arrived, and we had less than thirty thousand men of all arms at this battle, from first to last. General Lee, in his report, says that he had less than forty thousand men ; but, for reasons that can be well understood, he never did disclose his own weakness at any time, even to his own officers. When our army started for Maryland, after the affiiir at Ox Hill, it was out of rations, badly clothed, and worse shod. At the time of the battle of Sharpsburg, it had been marching and fighting for near six Aveeks, and the straggling from exhaustion, sore feet, and in search of food, had been terrible, before we crossed the Potomac. When it is recollected that the entire force at the end of July, in all the Department of Northern Virginia, was only a very little over sixty-nine thousand men, of which sixty thousand, including D. H. Hill's, McLaws' and Walker's divisions, would be a liberal estimate for all that were carried into . 19 the field, you will see that a loss of thirty thousand in battle, from Cedar Kun to South Mountain, inclusive, and from the other causes named, is not an unreasonable estimate. In fact, at the end of September, when the stragglers had been gathered up, and many of the sick and wounded had returned to duty, with the additions from the conscripts, the official returns show only fifty- two thousand six hundred and nine for duty in the whole Depart- ment of Northern Virginia. McClellan, in his report, gives his own force at eighty-seven thousand one hundred and sixty-four in action, and he gives an estimate of General Lee's army, in detail, in which he places our strength at ninety-seven thousand four hundred and forty-five men and four hundred guns at this battle. Truly, our boys in gray had a wonderful faculty of magnifying and multiplying themselves in battle ; and McClellan could not have paid a higher compliment to their valor, and the ability of our com- mander, than he has done by this estimate of our strength, as it appeared to him. In giving his reasons for not renewing the battle on the 18th, he says : " One division of Sumner's corps, and all of Hooker's corps, on the right, had, after fighting most valiantly for several hours, been overpowered by numbers, driven in great disorder and much scat- tered, so that they were for the time somewhat demoralized." I have shown how they were outnumbered. Burnside, in his testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war, said : " I was told at General McClellan's headquarters, that our right had been so badly broken that they could not be got together for an attack, and they would have to wait for reinforcements ; and that General Sumner advised General McClellan not to renew the attack, because of the condition of his corps ; and it was also stated that very little of General Hooker's corps was left." This was on the night of the 17th, after the battle was over. On the 27th, McClellan wrote to Halleck as follows : " In the last battles the enemy was undoubtedly greatly supe- rior to us in numbers, and it was only by hard fighting that we gained the advantage we did. As it was, the result was at one time very doubtful, and we had all we could do to win the day." 20-. Win the day, indeed ! He liad not dared to renew the attack on the 18th, and he did not ventnre to claim a victory until the 19th, when he found General Lee had re-crossed the Potomac, and then he began to breathe freely and to crow, at first feebly, and then more loudly. Who ever heard of a victory by an attack- ing array in an open field, and yet the victor was unable to ad- vance against his antagonist who stood his ground? To give you some idea of the immense difficulties General Lee had to encounter in this campaign, and the wonderful facility the enemy had for raising men, and reinforcing his armies after defeat, through the agencies of the telegraph, railroads and steam-power, let me tell you that a certified statement compiled from McClel- lan's morning report of the 20th of September, 1862, contained in the report of the committee on the conduct of the war, shows a grand total present for duty, in the Array of the Potomac, on that day, of one hundred and sixty-four thousand three hundred and fifty-nine, of which seventy-one thousand two hundred and ten were in the defences of Washington, under Banks, leaving ninety- three thousand one hundred and forty-nine with McClellan in the field on that day. A very large portion of this force had been accumulated, by means of the railroads, after the defeat of Pope. You may understand, now, how it was that our victories could never be pressed to more decisive results. It was genius, and nerve, and valor, on the one side, against numbers and mechanical power on the other; even the lightning of the heavens being made subservient to the latter. You raay also form sorae conception of the boldness of General Lee's movement across the Potomac, the daring of the expedition against Harper's Ferry in the face of so large a force, and the audacity with which he confronted and defied McCIellan's army on the 15th and 16th, and then fought it on the 17th, with the small force he had. Sharpsburg was no defeat to our arms, though our army was retired to the South bank of the Potomac from prudential con- siderations. Some persons have been disposed to regard this campaign into Maryland as a failure, but such was not the case. It is true that we had failed to raise Maryland, but it was from no disaster to our arms. 21 In a military point of view, however, the whole campaign, of which the movement into Maryland was an integral part, had been a grand success, though all was not accomplished which our fond hoj)es caused us to expect. When General Lee assumed command of the army at Richmond, a besieging army of immense size and resources, was in sight of the spires of the Confederate Capital — all Northern Virginia was in possession of the enemy — the Valley overrun, except when Jackson's vigorous and rapid blows sent the marauders staggering to the banks of the l*otomac for a brief interval ; and Northwestern Virginia, including the Kanawha Valley, was subjugated and in the firm grasp of the enemy. By General Lee's bold strategy and rapid and heavy blows, the Capital had been relieved ; the besieging army driven out of the State; the enemy's Capital threatened; his country invaded ; Northern Virginia and the Valley cleared of the enemy ; the enemy's troops from Northwestern Virginia and the Kanawha Valley had been drawn from thence for the defence of his own Capital ; a Confederate force had penetrated to Charleston, Kana- wha; our whole army was supplied with the improved fire-arm in the place of the old smooth bore musket; much of our inferior field artillery replaced by the enemy's improved guns; and, in addition to our very large captures of prisoners and the munitions of war elsewhere, the direct result of the march across the Potomac was the capture of eleven thousand prisoners, seventy-three pieces of artillery, and thirteen thousand stand of excellent small arms, and immense stores at Harper's Ferry. And at the close of the cam- paign, the Confederate commander stood proudly defiant on the extreme northern border of the Confederacy, while his opponent had had "his base" removed to the Northern bank of the Potomac, at a point more than one hundred and seventy-five miles from the Confederate Capital, in a straight line. In addition, the immense army of McClellan had been so crippled, that it was not able to resume the otfensive for six weeks. Such had been the moral effect upon the enemy, that the Con- federate Capital was never again seriously endangered, until the power of the Confederacy had been so broken in other quar- ters, and its available territory so reduced in dimensions, that the enemy could concentrate his immense resources against the Capital. 22 All tin's had been the result of that plan of operations, of which the invasion of Maryland formed an important part. Look at the means placed at the command of General Lee, and the immense numbers and resources brought against him, and then say if the results accomplished by him were not marvellous? If his Gov- ernment had been able to furnish him with men and means, at all commensurate with his achievements and his conceptions, he would, in September, 1862, have dictated the terms of peace in the Capital of the enemy. But all the wonderful powers of the mechanic arts and physical science, backed by unlimited resources of men and money, still continued to operate against him. A certified statement from McClellan's morning report of the 30th of September, contained in the document from which I have already quoted, showed, in the Army of the Potomac, a grand total of one hundred and seventy-three thousand seven hundred and forty-five present for duty on that day, of which seventy- three thousand six hundred and one were in the defences of Washington, and one hundred thousand one hundred and forty- four, with him in the field ; and a similar statement showed, on the 20th of October, a grand total of two hundred and seven thousand and thirty-six present for duty on that day, of which seventy-three thousand five hundred and ninety-three were in the defences of AVashington, and one hundred and thirty-three thou- sand four hundred and forty-three with McClellan in the field. At the close of October, according to the official returns, now on file at the "Archive Office." in Washington, the whole Con- federate force for duty, in the department of Northern Virginia, amounted to sixty-seven thousand eight hundred and five. A con- siderable portion of this force was not with General Lee in the field. At the close of October, McClellan commenced a new move- ment with his immense army, across the Potomac, East of the Blue Ridge, while General Lee was yet in the Valley. As this movement was developed, Longstreet's corps, and the cavalry under Stuart, were promptly moved to intercept it, Jackson's corps being left in the Valley. McClellan was soon superseded in the command by Burnside, and when the latter turned his steps towards the heights opposite Fredericksburg, Jackson was ordered to rejoin the rest of the army. In the meantime, Burn- 23 side's attempt to approach Richmond on the new line had been checkmated, and he soon found himself confronted on the Eappa- hannock by the whole of General Lee's army. That army had to be stretched out, for some thirty miles, up and down the river, to watch the different crossings. The enemy began his movement to cross at and near Fredericksburg, on the morning of the 11th of December, and the crossing was resisted and delayed for many hours, but owing to tiie peculiar character of the country imme- diately on the South bank, and the advantage the enemy had in liis commanding position on the North bank, from whence the wide plains on the South bank, and the town of Fredericksburg, were completely commanded and swept by an immense armament of heavy artillery, that crossing could not be prevented. Our army was rapidly concentrated, and took its position on the heights and range of hills in rear of the town and the plains below ; and when the heavy columns of the enemy advanced to the assault on the 13th, first on our right, near Hamilton's crossing, and then on our left, in rear of Fredericksburg, they were hurled back, with immense slaughter, to the cover of the artillery on the opposite heights, and every renewal of the assault met the same fate. In this battle, we stood entirely on the defensive, except once, when the enemy penetrated an interval in our line near the right flank, and three of my brigades advanced, driving and pursuing the enemy into the plains below, until he reached the protection of his artillery and the main line. Burnside's loss was so heavy^ and his troops were so worsted in the assaults which had been made, that his principal officers protested against a renewal of the attack, and on the night of the 15th, he re-crossed to the North bank. In this battle, he had all of McClellan's army, except the twelfth corps, which was eight or ten thousand strong and had been left at Harper's Ferry, and in lieu of that he had a much larger corps, the third, from the defences of Washington. In his testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war, he says he had one hundred thousand men across the river, and he was doubtful which had the superiority of numbers. In reply to a question as to the causes of the failure of the attack, he frankly said : " It was found to be impossible to get the men up to the works. The enemy's fire was too hot for them." Our whole force present was not much more than half that of the enemy, which crossed over to the South side of the river. This signal victory, in which the enemy's loss was very heavy and ours comparatively light, closed the operations for the year 1862. Some newspaper critics and fireside Generals were not satisfied with the results of this victory, and thought Burnside's army ought to have been destroyed before it went back ; and there were some absurd stories about propositions alleged to have been made by General Jackson, for driving the enemy into the river. That great soldier did begin a forward movement, about sunset, whicb I was to have led, but just as ray men were moving off, he coun- termanded the movement, because the enemy opened such a ter- rific artillery fire from the Stafford Heights and from behind the heavy embankments on the road leading through the bottoms on the South side of the river, that it was apparent that nothing could have lived in the passage across the plain of about a mile in width, over which we would have had to advance, to reach the enemy massed in that road. According to the statements of himself and officers, before the committee on the conduct of the war, Franklin, who commanded the enemy's left, had, confronting our right, from fifty-five to sixty thousand men, of whom only about twenty thou- sand had been under fire. The bulk of that force was alonij the Bowling Green road, running parallel to the river through the middle of the bottoms, and behind the very compact and thick embankments on each side of that road. He had taken over with him one hundred and sixteen pieces of artillery, and there were sixty-one pieces on the North bank, some of which were of very large calibre, so posted as to cover the bridges on that flank and sweep the plain in his front. Some of these were also crossed over to him, and General Hunt, Burnside's chief of artillery, says, fifty or sixty more pieces could have been spared from their right, if necessary. The attempt to drive this force into the river, would have, therefore, ensured our destruction. Franklin had eight divisions with him, while at Fredericksburg, confronting our left, were ten divisions, fully as strong, certainly, as Franklin's eight, and there were quite as many guns on that flank. It is true the enemy's loss there had been double that in front of our right, but he still had a large number of troops on that flank which had not been engaged. The character of the 25 ground in front of our position, on that flanic, was such tliat our troops could not be moved down the rugged slopes of the hills in any order of battle, and any attempt to advance them must have been attended with disastrous' consequences. Burnside's troops were not so demoralized, as to prevent him from being anxious to renew the attack on the 14th, and the objection of his officers was not on account of the condition of their troops, but on account of the strength of our position. Nothing could have gratified him and his officers more, than for us to have surrendered our advan- tage and taken the offensive. General Lee, ever ready to strike when an opportunity offered, knew better than all others when it was best to attack and when not to attack. It is a notable fact about all those people who favored such blood- thirsty and desperate measures, that they were never in the army, to share the dangers into which they were so anxious to rush others. About the close of the winter or beginning of the spring of 1863, two of Longstreet's divisions, one-fourth of our army, were sent to the South side of James River; and, during their absence. Hooker, who had succeeded Burnside in the command, commenced the movement which resulted in the battle of Chancellorsville, in the first days of May. Throwing a portion of his troops across the river just below Fredericksburg, on the 29th of April, and making an ostentatious demonstration with three corps on the North bank, he proceeded to cross four others above our left flank to Chancellorsville. Having accomplished this. Hooker issued a gasconading order to his troops, in which he claimed to have General Lee's army in his power, and declared his purpose of crushing it. Leaving my division, one brigade of another, and a portion of the reserve artillery, in all less than nine thousand men, to confront the three corps opposite and near Fredericksburg, General Lee moved with five divisions of infantry and a portion of the artillery to meet Hooker, the cavalry being employed to watch the flanks. As soon as General Lee reached Hooker's front, he determined to take the offensive, and, by one of his bold stra- tegic movements, he sent Jackson around Hooker's right flank, and that boastful commander, who was successively reinforced by two of the corps left opposite Fredericksburg, was so vigorously assailed, that he was put on the defensive, and soon compelled to provide for the safety of his own defeated army. 28 In the meantime, Sedgwick, whose corps numbered about twenty-four thousand men, and who had a division of another corps with him, making his whole force about thirty thousand, had crossed the river, at and below Fredericksburg, with the portion of his troops not already over, and, by concentrating three of his divisions on one point of the long line, of five or six miles, held by my forces, had, on the 3d of May, after repeated repulses, broken through, immediately in the rear of Frederickburg, where the stonewall was held by one regiment and four companies of another, the whole not exceeding five hundred men. General Lee was preparing to renew the attack on Hooker, whose force at Chancellorsville had been driven back to an interior line, when he was informed that Sedgwick was moving up in his rear. He was then compelled to provide against this new danger, and he moved troops down to arrest Sedgwick's progress. This was suc- cessfully done, and on the next day, (the 4th,) three of the bri- gades of my division, all of which had been concentrated and had severed Sedgwick's connection with Fredericksburg and the North bank, fell upon his left flank, and drove it towards the river in confusion, while other troops of ours, which had come from above, closed in on him and forced his whole command into the bend of the river. His whole command would now have been destroyed or captured, but night came on and arrested our progress. During the night, he made his escape over a bridge which was laid down for him. General Lee then turned his attention again to Hooker, but he also made his escape, the next night, under cover of a storm. Thus another brilliant victory was achieved, by the genius and boldness of our commander, against immense odds. It is a little remarkable that Hooker did not claim, on this occasion, that we had the odds against him ; but when he went back, under compulsion, he issued an order, in which he stated, that his army had retired for reasons best known to itself, that it was the custodian of its own honor and advanced when it pleased, fought when it pleased, and retired when it pleased. In his testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war, he made this curious statement : "Our artillery had alw'ays been superior to that of the rebels, as was also our infantry, except in discipline ; and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, never did equal Lee's army. With a 27 rank and file vastly inferior to our own, intellectually and pliysi- cally, that army has, by discipline alone, acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency unsurpassed, in my judgment, in ancient or modern times. "We have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation to it in the other rebel armies." This was the impression made by that army under the insjiira- tion of its great leader on " fighting Joe," as he was called. The impression made on Lincoln, at that time, may be gathered from a telegram sent to Butterfield, Hooker's chief-of-staif, who was on the North of the river. The telegram was sent, when Hooker had taken refuge in his new works in rear of Chancellorsville, and Sedgwick was cut off' in the bend of the river, and is as follows, in full : "Where is General Hooker? Where is Sedgwick? AVhere is Stoneman ? A. Lincoln." Hooker had with him what was left of the army of Burnside, except the ninth corj)s, which had been sent off*; but two other corps, the eleventh and twelfth had been added, besides recruits ; and hi.s whole force was largely over one hundred thousand men. General Lee's army, weakened by the absence of Longstreet's two divisions, was very little if any over fifty thousand men, inclusive of my force at Fredericksburg. As glorious as was this victory, it, nevertheless, shed a gloom over the whole army and country, for in it had fiillen the great Lieutenant to whom General Lee had always entrusted the execu- tion of his most daring plans, and who had proved himself so worthy of the confidence reposed in him. It is not necessary for me to stop here, to delineate the character and talents of General Jackson. As long as unselfish patriotism, Christian devotion and purity of character, and deeds of heroism shall command the admi- ration of men, Stonewall Jackson's name and fame will be rever- enced. Of all who mourned his death, none felt more acutely the loss the country and the army had sustained than General Lee. General Jackson had always appreciated, and sympathized with the bold conceptions of tiie commanding General, and entered upon their execution with the most cheerful alacrity and zeal. General Lee never found it necessary to accompany him, to see that his plans were carried out, but could always trust him alone; 28 and well might he say, when Jackson fell, that he himself had lost his " right arm." After General Jackson's death, the army was divided into three corps of three divisions each, instead of two corps of four divi- sions each, the ninth division being formed by taking two brigades from the division of A. P. Hill and uniting them with two others which were brought from the South. These two brigades consti- tuted all the reinforcements to our army, after the battle of Chan- cellorsville, and previous to the campaign into Pennsylvania. Longstreet's two absent divisions were now brought back and moved up towards Culpeper C. H., and General Lee entered on a campaign of even greater boldness than that of the previous year. While Hooker's army yet occupied the Stafford heights, our army was put in motion for Pennsylvania, on the 4th of June, Hill's corps being left for a while to watch Hooker. This move- ment Mas undertaken because the interposition of the Rappahan- nock, between the two armies, presented an insurmountable ob- stacle to offensive operations on our part, against the enemy in the position he then occupied, and General Lee was determined not to stand on the defensive, and give the enemy time to mature his plans and accumulate a larger army for another attack on him. The enemy was utterly bewildered by this new movement, and while he was endeavoring to find out what it meant, the advance of our army, Swell's corps, composed of three of Jackson's old divisions, entered the Valley and captured, at Winchester and Martinsburg, about four thousand prisoners, twenty-nine pieces of artillery, about four thousand stand of small arms, a large wagon train, and many stores. It then crossed the Potomac, and two divisions went to Carlisle, while another went to the banks of the Susquehanna, through York. The two other corps soon followed, and this movement brought the whole of Hooker's army across the Potomac in pursuit. The two armies concentrated, and en- countered each other at Gettysburg, east of the South Mountain, in a battle extending through three days, from the 1st to .the 3d of July, inclusive. On the first day, a portion of our army, com- posed of two divisions of Hill's corps, and two divisions of Ewell's corps, gained a very decided victory over two of the enemy's corps, which latter were driven back, in great confusion, through Gettys- 29 burg, to the Heiglits, ininiediatcly South and East of the town, known as Cemetery Hill. On the second and third days, we assaulted the enemy's position at different points, but failed to^ dislodge his army, now under Meade, from its very strong position on Cemetery and the adjacent hills. Both sides suffered very lieavy losses, that of the enemy exceeding ours. Our ammunition had drawn short, and we were beyond the reach of any supplies of that kind. General Lee therefore desisted from his efforts to carry the position, and, after straightening his line, he confronted Meade for a whole day, without the hitter's daring to move from his position, and then retired towards the Potomac, for the purpose of being within reach of suppplies. AVe halted near Hagerstown, Maryland, and when Meade, who had followed us very cautiously, arrived, battle was offered him, but he went to fortifying in our front. We confronted him for several days, but as he did not venture to attack us, and heavy rains had/ set in, we retired across the Potomac^to avoid having an impassable river in our rear. The campaign into Pennsylvania, and the battle of Gettysburg, have been much criticized, and but little understood. The mag- nanimity of General Lee caused him to withhold from the public the true causes of the failure to gain a decisive victory at Gettys- burg. Many writers have racked their brains to account for that failure. Some have attributed it to the fact that the advantage gained on the first day was not pressed immediately; and among them is a Northern historian of the war, (Swinton,) who says: " Ewell was even advancing a line against Gulp's Hill when Lee reached the field and stayed the movement." There is no founda- tion for this statement. When General Lee, after the engagement, reached the part of the field where Ewell's command had fought, it was near dark, and no forward movement was in progress or contemplated. Two fresh corps of the enemy, Slocum's and Sickels', had arrived at 5 o'clock, at least two hours before Gen- eral Lee came to us after the engagement. There was a time, as we know now, immediatety after the enemy was driven back, when, if we had advanced vigorously, the heights of Gettysburg would probably have been taken, but that was not then apparent. I was in favor of the advance, but I think it doubtful whether it would have resulted in any greater advantage than to throw back 30 the two routed corps on the main body of their army, and cause the great battle to be fought on other ground. Meade had already selected another position, on Pipe Clay creek, where he would have concentrated his army, and we would have been compelled to give him battle or retire. Moreover, it is not impossible that the arrival of the two fresh corps may have turned the fate of the day against the^troops we then had on the field, had we pressed our advantage. ^General Lee had ordered the concentration of his army at Cashtown, and the battle on this day, brought on by the / advance of the enemy's cavalry, was unexpected to him. When he ascertained the advantage that had been gained, he determined to press it as soon as the remainder of his army arrived. In a conference with General Ewell, General Rhodes and myself, Avhen he did reach us, after the enemy had been routed, he expressed his determination to assault the enemy's position at daylight on the next morning, and wished to know whether we could make the attack from our flank — the left — at the designated time. We in- formed him of the fact that the ground immediately in our front, leading to the enemy's position, furnished much greater obstacles to a successful assault than existed at any other point, and we con- curred in suggesting to him that, as our corps (Ewell's) constituted the only troops then immediately confronting the enemy, he would manifestly concentrate and fortify against us, during the night, as proved to be the case, according to subsequent information. He then determined to make the attack from our right on the enemy's left, and left us for the purpose of ordering up Longstreet's corps in time to begin the attack at dawn next morning. That corps was not in readiness to make the attack until four o'clock in the afternoon of the next day. By that time, Meade's whole army had arrived on the field and taken its position. Had the attack been made at daylight, as contemplated, it must have resulted in a brilliant and decisive victory, as all of Meade's army had not then arrived, and a very small portion of it Mas in position. A con- siderable portion of his army did not get up until after sun-rise, one corps not arriving until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and a prompt advance to the attack must have resulted in his defeat in detail. The position which Longstreet attacked at four, was not occupied by the enemy until late in the afternoon, and Round Top Hill; Avhich commanded the enemy's position, could have been i\ 31 taken in the morning withont a .stru "^ sion in such gallant style, there was again a miscarriage, in not properly supporting it according to the plan and orders of the commandino- General. You must recollect that a commandiney- r»er«i.lssIon. to Mirs. Xj'E E Deoicatort Pbei'ace. — My Dear Mrs. Lee: — With your permission I dedicate to you this life of our beloved hero, [t may seem darini!; in one so unpractieed to attempt a theme so lofty. But I have hoped that the love and admiration I felt for Gen. Leo, would inspire me with ability to present him to others as I knew him. Other writers will exhibit his public life, his genius and magnanimity. I wish to show more of his domestic character and private virtues; his unwearied industry, his self-control and self-denial, his ■nselfish toinper; his generous kindness, his gentle manners; his modesty and moderation in suc- cess ; his patience in clitruniltlos and disappointments, anlislie