JL7 pdlfb ABRAHAM LINCOLN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. (From a War-time Photograph,) V BATTLE¬ FIELD History of the Conflicts and Campaigns of the Great Civil War IN THE UNITED STATES C v ROSSITER JOHNSON, LET). M Author of a “ History of the War Between the United States and Great Britain ; ’ a “ History of the French War," etc. General O. O. HOWARD, U.S.A. General SELDEN CONNOR, U.S.A. WITH SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY General JOHN B. GORDON, C.S.A. General JOHN T. MORGAN, C.S.A. Honorable JAMES TANNER Mrs. L. C. PICKETT (Wife of Gen. Geo. E. Pickett, C.S.A.) And an Introduction by JOHN CLARK RIDPATH, LL.D. Splendidly illustrated with the Original Photographs of the celebrated BRADY COLLECTION in possession of the Government, and loaned for reproduction in this work by special permission of HON. Daniel S. Lamont, Secretary of War. Sold by Subscription only. (2 NEW YORK KNIGHT & BROWN BEFORE THE BOMBARDMENT. Copyright, 1894, by IN '865 —AFTER ITS REDUCTION BY GENERAL GILLMORE. Copyright, 1896, Bryan, Taylor & Co. by KNIGHT & Brown. FORT SUMTER INTRODUCTION. The Civil Wai in the United States made for itself a record vast and varied. Indeed the storv of that conflict is almost infinite. It drew the whole American people into the vortex of commotion. It whirled them around and around with the foice ot a cyclone. It produced on the minds of millions the most vivid pictures ever traced in the consciousness of our race. / lhe\er\ soldieis of our rank and file were writers and observers. A thousand records were made dav by day in a thousand places. Could the entire correspondence of those four immortal years be gathered again as it was when written, touched with the powder smut on boyish hands, wet with tears, stained on a million pages of poor crumpled paper with the blood of young heroes fighting for their country, sending last messages on the eve of deadly battles to as many homes—that record, unedited, unadorned with the graces of composition, untouched with the devices of publishers, would constitute a library of manuscripts that would surpass the Iliad ! Many kinds of histories of the Civil War have been produced. Some of them are large and formal ; others are special and small. Some commemorate the general movements of the epoch ; others celebrate the deeds of particular men and armies. Some are written in the spirit of philosophy ; others, in the spirit of hero worship ; others still, in the spirit of fiction and poetry. The present work is one of many accounts of the Union War; but it constitutes a class by itself. It goes to the original field of the inquiry. Not satisfied with narrative, it adopts the pictorial method, and reinforces the story of the war with a panoramic repro¬ duction of its most heroic incidents and actors. It was the good fortune of our country that at the time of the great conflict the art of photography had come, and that it was used as a means of preserving for after ages a living transcript of the drama. It was also the special fortune of our country that at this time a great photographer came, and that he was inspired with his mission as the pictorial historian of the American Civil War. Matthew Benjamin Brady, the leading photographer of our heroic age, was born in Warren County, New Hampshire, in 1823. Early in life he opened a studio in New York City. In 1851 he took prizes at the first World’s Fair, in London. His photographic work was exhibited all over Europe. He established himself at Washington City, and at the outbreak of the war sent corps of his artists in the wake of every army. During the four years of our national conflict he expended more than a hundred thousand dollars in procuring photographs from the field. He made and preserved the pictures of thousands on thousands of the leading participants. He collected an aggregate of more than thirty thousand photographs of men and events. He spent a fortune in gathering together the materials, which he expected ultimately to transfer to the Govern¬ ment as a pictorial museum of the great tragedy. Late in life he lost the greater part of his property, and became, like other heroes, nearly blind in his old age. But the Government was able to obtain from the residue of his work about eight thousand of his photographic plates; and these now constitute one of the choicest historical treasures that a nation ever possessed. The veteran photographer lived to the age of seventy-three, and died in New York on the nineteenth of January, 1896. The authors and publishers of “ Campfire and Battlefield,” when the work was projected, conceived the idea of getting access to the photographic originals of the Brady gallery, and of illustrating with reproductions of the originals the narrative of this pictorial history of the war. They applied for permission to use the Brady collection to Honorable Daniel S. Lamont, Secretary of War, and received from that official in answer the following communication : “ War Department, “Washington, D. C., April 20, 1894. "Sir : —In reply to your letter of the 28th ultimo, I take pleasure in saying that if either you or your representative will present this letter to the chief clerk of the Department, facilities will be afforded to select such negatives of the Brady collection of war views as you may desire to have printed at your expense. It is preferred that the photographing should be done in this city, and of course it is expected that the negatives when they have served their purpose will be returned in as good condition as received. Very respectfully, Daniee S. Lamont, Secretary of War." Armed with this authority, the publishers of “ Campfire and Battlefield ” succeeded in getting the use of the Brady photographs, and with reproductions of these invaluable original pictures the present work is copiously embellished. The selections from the Brady pictures have been made with great care. As many as possible of this rare and unequaled series have been used in the illustration of these pages. The pictures are contemporaneous with the events described in the narrative, and MATTHEW BENJAMIN BRADY. 4 /NTROD UCTION. are set in such l'elation to the narrative as to brine: the reader face to face with the actual scenery of the war. The whole drama thus revives, and the reader of these pages is able to follow the graphic and picturesque account of the great event with the aid of a pictorial representation of the tragedy passing like a living scene before his eyes. In “ Campfire and Battlefield ” the personal element in the Civil War is strongly delineated. The reader here finds man as an actor at his highest estate. Through the chapters of this work the event does not drag on under the influence of remote and abstract forces, but is led rather to its consummation by heroes and statesmen. The work may well be defined as a history of the Civil War from the heroic point of view. Nothing can be more interesting, nothing more inspiring, than to turn these pictured pages, and to catch with every leaf the shadows of the faces of men who were great in that day and greater afterwards. Here are the war-time features of fully twelve hundred of the immortal actors who counseled in the Cabinet or fought in the field the battle of the Union. Under these photographic reproductions we read the names of men destined to be famous throughout the world. Here they are pictured in their first regimentals, and are designated as captain or colonel! Some we must admit are here preserved as great whom subsequent events and a revised judgment havdf remanded to the category of the small ; but they were then among the great. The reader in all these pages discovers how history relentlessly sifts out the chaff from the wheat, putting the wheat into the bins of immortality and burning the chaff with unquench¬ able fire. To the men who still survive, with a quick memory of our great tragedy, “ Campfire and Battlefield ” is as a vast stage, on which the well-remembered characters come forth again alive in their own persons, as they came forth and performed their parts in the day of battle. The great play is re-enacted here. Here our heroes in blue and in gray, whether with the insignia of command upon them or in the plain uni¬ form of the rank and file, come before us as they did in the years of trial. Here are the pontoon bridges ; the gunboats ; the marching host. Here is the caravan of army wagons, winding on and on. Here is the camp, the bivouac. Here is the picket on duty or “ the picket off duty forever.” Here is the battlefield, not pictured from the resources of an artist’s imagination, but truthfully delineated with the pencil of sunlight through the photographic lens, half obscured with smoke and dust. Here are the negro quarters ; the sutler’s cabin ; the hasty meal by the campfire ; the gen¬ eral and his staff sitting before the tent; the foraging expe¬ dition ; the lines of riflepits ; burning houses on the outskirts of battle; mortars vomiting; shells streaking the midnight sky and bursting over invisible camps ; headquarters and scouting parties ; hospitals and trenches full of dead ; ruin and desolation in one place ; uproar and jubilee in another. Here men are young and strong, that have now grown old and gray. Here faces are flushed with youth and ambition, that have long since paled in death. Here on hillslope and by river¬ side and in sombre forests the battle rages, which is to decide the momentous question of the perpetuity of the Union and the preservation of American institutions. “ Campfire and Battlefield ” is the work of able and well-known authors. Dr. Rossiter Johnson is a leading writer on American history, an eminent man of letters. He has been assisted in his duties by a corps of special contributors, many of whom are characters honored in the annals of our country. Such are Generals O. O. Howard, J. T. Morgan, John B. Gordon and Selden Connor. The other contributors are writers of ability and distinction. One of these is the wife of General Pickett, whose unavailing charge at Gettysburg, history has recorded among the immortal things. The work has been prepared with the greatest care under the supervision of the artists Frank Beard and George Spiel, whose good taste and skill of arrangement are shown on every page. “Campfire and Battlefield,” regarded as a whole, is perhaps the most attractive, as it will be the most popular, publication thus far made of the immortal story which recites the heroism, the sorrow and the glorv of the Civil War in the United States. JOHN CLARK RIOPATH. LL.D. DEFENCES OF WASHINGTON—HEAVY ARTILLERY. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARY EVENTS. CAUSES OF THE WAR—SLAVERY, STATE RIGHTS, SECTIONAL FEELING JOHN BROWN ELECTION OF LINCOLN—SECESSION OF SOUTHERN STATES—“SHOOT HIM ON THE SPOT”—PENSACOLA — MAJOR ROBERT ANDERSON—SUMTER OCCUPIED—THE “STAR OF THE WEST”— SUMTER BOMBARDED AND EVACUATED—THE CALL TO ARMS. On the 9th of January, 1861, the Star of the West , a vessel which the United States Government had sent to convey supplies to Fort Sumter, was fired on by batteries on Morris Island, in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, and was compelled to withdraw. The bombardment of Fort Sumter began on April 12th, the fort was surrendered on the 13th and evacuated on the 14th. On April 19th the Sixth Massachusetts regiment, which had been summoned to the defence of the national capital, was attacked, en route , in the streets of Baltimore. Meanwhile, several Southern States had passed ordinances seceding from the Union, and had formed a new union called the Confederate States of America. Many Government forts, arsenals, and navy yards had been seized by the new Confederacy ; and by midsummer a bloody civil war was in progress, which for four years absorbed the energies of the whole American people. What were the causes of this civil war? The underlying, fundamental cause was African slavery—the determination of the South to perpetuate and extend it, and the determination of the people of the North to limit or abolish it. Originally existing in all the colonies, slavery had been gradually abolished in the Northern States, and was excluded from the new States that came into the Union from the Northwestern Terri¬ tory. The unprofitableness of slave labor might, in time, have resulted in its abolition in the South ; but the invention, at the close of the last century, of Eli Whitney’s cotton-gin, transformed the raising of cotton from an almost profitless to the most profitable of the staple industries, and as a result of it the American plantations produced seven-eighths of all the cotton of the world. African labor was necessary to it, and the system of slavery became a fixed and deep-rooted system in the South. The self-interest thus established led the South, in the face of Northern opposition to slavery which might make an independent government necessary to them, to insist on the sovereignty of the individual States, involving the right to secede from the Union. The Constitution adopted in 1789 did not river gunboat (A converted new york ferryboat), determine the question as to whether the sovereignty of the States or that of WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State. SALMON P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary ot War. MONTGOMERY BLAIR, Postmaster-General. EDWARD BATES, Attorney-General. PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND HIS CABINET. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. the central government was paramount, but left it open, to be interpreted according to the interests involved, and to be set¬ tled in the end by an appeal to the sword. In the earlier history of the country the doctrine of State sovereignty was most advo¬ cated in New England ; but with the rise of the tariff, which favored the manufacturing East at the expense of the agricul¬ tural South, New England passed to the advocacy of national sovereignty, while the people of the South took up the doctrine of State Rights, determined to act on it should a separation seem to be necessary to their independence of action on the issue of slavery. From this time onward there was constant danger that the slavery question would so imbitter the politics and legislation of the country as to bring about disunion. The danger was imminent at the time of the Missouri agitation of 1820-21, but was temporarily averted by the Missouri Compromise. The Nullification Acts of South Carolina indicated the intention of the South to stand on their State sovereignty when it suited them. The annexation of Texas enlarged the domain of slavery and made the issue a vital one. The aggressive¬ ness of the South ap¬ peared in the repeal of the Missouri Com¬ promise in 1854; and the Dred Scott De¬ cision in 1857, giving the slaveholder the right to hold his slaves in a free State, aroused to indignant and deter¬ mined opposition the anti-slavery sentiment of the North. The like two different peoples, estranged, jealous and suspicious. The publica¬ tion of sectional books fostered animosities and perpetuated misjudgments and misunderstandings ; and the interested influ¬ ence of demagogues, whose purposes would be furthered by sectional hatred, kept alive and intensified the sectional differences. There was little feeling of fraternity, then, to stand in the way when the issues SIEGE GUN BEARING ON SUMTER. (Showing Carriage rendered useless before Confederate Evacuation, 1864.) expression in this decision, that the negro had “ no rights which the white man was bound to respect,” brought squarely before the people the issue of manhood liberty, and afforded a text for preaching effectively the gospel of universal freedom. The absence of intercourse between the North and the South, and their radically different systems of civilization, made them MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT ANDERSON. involved seemed to require the arbitra¬ ment of war, and it was as enemies rather than as quar¬ relling brothers, that the men of the North and the South rallied to their respective standards. An episode w h i c h occurred about a year before the war, which was inherently of minor importance, brought to the surface the bitter feeling which was preparing the way for the fraternal strife. John Brown, an enthusiastic abolitionist, a man of undoubted courage, but pos¬ sessing poor judgment, and who had been very prominent in a struggle to make Kansas a free State, in 1859 collected a small company, and, invading the State of Virginia, seized the United States Arsenal at Harper’s Ferry. His expectation was that the blacks would flock to his standard, and that, arming them from the arsenal, he could lead a servile insurrection which would result in ending slavery. His project, which was quixotic in the extreme, lacking all justification of possible success, failed miser¬ ably, and Brown was hung as a criminal. At the South, his action was taken as an indication of what the abolitionists would do if they secured control of the Government, and the secessionist sentiment was greatly stimulated by his attempt. At the North he became a martyr to the cause of freedom ; and although the leaders would not at first call the war for the Union an anti¬ slavery war, the people knew it was an anti-slavery war, and old FORT MOULTRIE, CHARLESTON, WITH FORT SUMTER IN THE DISTANCE. ! INTERIOR OF FORT SUMTER AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT IN 1863—FROM GOVERNMENT PHOTOGRAPH. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . John Brown’s wraith hung over every Southern battlefield. The song, “John Brown’s body lies a-mouldering in the grave, His soul is marching on,” became a battle-cry, sung at every public meeting, sending reciuits to the front, and making the echoes ring around the army campfires. So long as the Democratic party, which was in political alliance with the South, retained control of the Federal Government, there was neither motive nor excuse for secession or rebellion. Had the Free Soil Party elected Fremont in 1856, war would have come then. When the election of i860, through Democratic dissension and adherence to several candidates, resulted in the election of Abraham Lincoln, the candidate of the Free Soilers, the die was cast, and the South prepared for the struggle it was about to precipitate. The day after the election, on November 7th, i860, the Pal¬ metto flag, the ensign of the State of South Carolina, was raised at Charleston, replacing the American flag. High offi¬ cials in the Government, in sympathy with the Southern cause, had stripped the Northern arsenals of arms and ammunition and had sent the m to Southern posts. The little standing army had been so disposed as to leave the city of Wash¬ ington defenceless, except for a few hundred marines and half a hundred men of ordnance. The outgoing Administration was leaving the national treasury bank¬ rupt, and permitted hostile preparations to go on un¬ checked, and hostile demon¬ strations to be made without interference. So little did the people of the North real¬ ize that war was impending, that Southern agents found no diffi¬ culty in making purchases of military supplies from Northern manufacturers. Except for the purchases made by Raphael Semmes in New England, the Confederacy would have begun the war without percussion caps, which were not manufactured at the South. With every advantage thrown at the outset in favor of the South and against the North, the struggle began. The Southern leaders had been secretly preparing for a long time. During the summer and fall of i860, John B. Floyd, the Secre¬ tary of War, had the confederate flag. - Been sending war CHARLESTON HARBOR material South, and he continued his pernicious activity until, in December, complicity in the theft of some bonds rendered his resignation necessary. About the same time the Secretary of the T reasury, Howell Cobb, the Secretary of the Interior, Jacob Thompson, and the Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, with¬ drew from the cabinet. On the election of Lin¬ coln, treasonable preparations became more open and more general. These were aided by President Buchanan’s message to Congress expressing doubt of the constitutional power of the Government to take offensive action against a State. On December 20, an ordinance of secession was passed by the South Carolina Legisla¬ ture; and following this example, Mississippi, Flor¬ ida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas and Vir¬ ginia seceded in the order named. Virginia held on till the last ; and while a popular vote was pending, to accept or reject the action of the Legislature, the seat of government of the Con¬ federate States, established in February at Montgomery, Ala., was removed to Rich¬ mond, the capital of Vir¬ ginia. Governor Letcher turned over to the Confed¬ erates the entire military force and equipment of the State, which passed out of the Union without waiting for the verdict of the people. This State was well punished by becoming the centre of the conflict for four years, and by political dismemberment, loyal West Vir¬ ginia being separated from the original commonwealth and admitted to the Union during the war. During the fall and winter of 1860-61, the Southern leaders committed many acts of treasonable aggression. They seized United States property, acting under the authority of their States, until the formation of the Confederacy, when the central government became their authority. In some of these cases the Federal custodians of the property yielded it in recognition of the right of the State to take it. In some cases they abandoned it, hopeless of being able to hold it against the armed forces that threatened it, and doubtful of support from the Buchanan Administration at Washington. But there were noble excep¬ tions, and brave officers held to their trusts, and either preserved them to the United States Government or released them only when overpowered. In December, i860, the rebels seized Castle Pinckney and 10 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD A SUMTER CASEMATE DURING THE BOMBARDMENT. Fort Moultrie in Charleston Harbor, the arsenal at Charleston, and the revenue cutter William Aiken ; in January, the arsenals at Mount Vernon, Ala., Apalachicola, Fla., Baton Rouge, La., Augusta, Ga., and many forts, hospitals, etc., in Southern ports. By February they had gained such assurance of not being molested in their seizures of Government property, that every¬ thing within their reach was taken with impunity. So many of the officers in active service were in sympathy with the South, that it frequently required only a demand for the surrender of a vessel or a fort—sometimes not even that—to secure it. One of these attempted seizures gave rise to an official utterance that did much to cheer the Northern heart. John A. Dix, who in January, 1861, succeeded Cobb as Secretary of the Treasury, sent W. H. Jones, a Treasury clerk, to New Orleans, to save to the Government certain revenue cutters in Southern ports. Jones telegraphed the secretary that the captain of the cutter McClelland refused to give her up, and Dix thereupon sent the following memorable despatch : “ Tell Lieutenant Caldwell to arrest Captain Breshwood, assume command of the cutter, and obey the order I gave through you. If Captain Breshwood, after arrest, undertakes to interfere with the command of the cutter, tell Lieutenant Caldwell to consider him as a mutineer and treat him accordingly. If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot.” These determined words were among the few that were uttered by Northern officials that gave the friends of the Union any hope of leadership against the aggression of the seceding States ; and they passed among the proverbial expressions of the war, to live as long as American history. The firmness of Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer had prevented the surrender of Fort Pickens, in Pensacola Harbor, Florida, on the Gulf of Mexico, when it was demanded with some show ot force, in January, 1861. Meanwhile, an event was preparing, in which the loyalty, courage, and promptness of a United States officer was to bring to an issue the question of “ bloodless secession ” or war. The seizures ot Government property here and there had excited indignation in the loyal North, but no general, effective sentiment of opposition. But at the shot that was fired at Sumter, the North burst into a flame of patriotic, quenchless fury, which did not subside until it had been atoned for on many a battlefield, and the Confederate “stars and bars” fell, never to rise again. Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner had been in command at Charles¬ ton Harbor, S. C., and when he saw the secessionists preparing to seize the forts there, so early as November, i860, he applied to Washington for reinforcements. Upon this, at the request of Southern members of Congress, Secretary of War Floyd removed him, and sent in his place Major Robert Anderson, evidently sup¬ posing that that officer’s Kentucky origin would render him faith¬ ful to the Southern cause. But his fidelity to the old flag resulted in one of the most dramatic episodes of the war. On reaching his headquarters at Fort Moultrie, Major Ander¬ son at once applied for improvements, which the Secretary of War was now willing and even eager to make, and he appropriated large sums for the improvement of both Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumter, but would not increase the garrison or the ammunition. It soon became apparent that against a hostile attack Fort Moul- CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. ii trie could not be held, as it was commanded from the house-tops on Sullivan’s Island, near by, and Major Anderson decided to move his garrison across the harbor to Fort Sumter, which, unlike Moultrie, was un¬ approachable by land. The secessionists in Charleston were active and watched suspicious¬ ly every movement made by the military, and the latter were con¬ stantly on guard to pre¬ vent surprise and cap¬ ture of the fort. The preparations for re¬ moval to Sumter were made with the greatest caution. So well had Major Anderson kept his purpose secret, that his second in command, Captain Abner Double¬ day, was informed of it only when ordered to have his company ready to co to Fort Sumter in twenty minutes. The families of the officers were sent to Fort John¬ son, opposite Charles¬ ton, whence they were afterward taken North. For the osten¬ sible purpose of removing these non-combatants to a place of safety —a step to which the now well-organized South Carolina militia could make no objection—Anderson’s quar¬ termaster, Lieutenant Hall, had chartered three schooners and some barges, which were ultimately used to transport supplies from Moultrie to Sumter. Laden with these sup¬ plies, the transports started for Fort Johnson, and there awaited the signal gun which was to direct them to land at Sumter. The guns of Moultrie were trained to bear on the route across the harbor, to be used defensively in case the movement was detected and inter¬ fered with. The preparations completed, at sunset on December 26, the troops, who had equipped themselves in the twenty minutes allowed them, were silently marched out of Fort Moultrie and passed through the little vil¬ lage of Moultrieville, which lay between the fort and the point of embarkation. The march was fortunately made without obser¬ vation, and the men took their places in row¬ boats which promptly started on their momentous voyage. After several narrow escapes from being stopped by the omni¬ present guard boats, which were deceived into supposing the troop boats to contain only laborers in charge of officers, the party reached Fort Sumter. Here they found crowds of laborers, who were at work, at the Government’s expense, preparing Sumter to be handed over to the Southern league. These men, most of them from Baltimore, were nearly all secessionists, and had already refused to man the fort as soldiers for its defence. They showed some opposition to the landing of the troops, but were prompt¬ ly driven inside the fort at the point of the bayonet, and were pres¬ ently shipped on board the supply schooners and sent ashore, where they communicated to the secession authorities the news of Major Anderson’s clever ruse. The signal gun was fired from Sumter, the sup¬ plies were landed, and Fort Sumter was in the hands of the loyal men who were to im¬ mortalize their names by their heroic defence of it. Sixty-one artil¬ lerymen and thirteen musicians, under com¬ mand of seven or eight officers, constituted the slender garrison. Many of these officers subsequently rose to distinction in the service of their country, in which some of them died. Major Anderson became a major-general and served for a while in his native Kentucky, but was soon compelled by failing health to retire. Captains Abner Doubleday, John G. Foster and Truman Seymour, Lieut. Jefferson C. Davis and Dr. S. Wiley Crawford, the surgeon, became major-generals, and were in service throughout the war; Lieut. Norman J. Hall became colonel of the Seventh Michigan Volunteers, and was thrice brevetted in the regular army for gallantry, especially at Get¬ tysburg ; Lieuts. George W. Snyder and Theodore Talbot received promotion, but died early in the war; and Edward Moale, a civilian clerk who rendered great assistance, afterward received a commission in the regu¬ lar army. One only of the defenders of Sum¬ ter afterward joined the Confederacy; this was Lieut. Richard K. Meade, who yielded to the tremendous social and family Capt. T. Seymour. ist Lieut. G. W. Snyder, ist Lieut. J. C. Davis. 2d Lieut. R. K. Meade. 1st Lieut. T. Talbot. Capt. A. Doubleday. Major R Anderson. Surg\ S. W. Crawford. Capt. J. G. Foster. MAJOR ANDERSON AND OFFICERS DEFENDING FORT SUMTER. GUSTAVUS V. FOX, Commanding the Relief Expedition to Fort Sumter ; afterward Assistant Secretary of the Navy. 12 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . pressure that carried so many reluctant men to the wrong side when the war began. Commissioned in the rebel army, he died in 1862. At noon on December 27, Major Anderson solemnized his occupancy of Sumter by formally raising the flag of his country, with prayer by the chaplain, Rev. Matthias Harris, and military ceremonies. The sight of the national ensign on Sumter was quickly observed from a troop ship in the harbor, which hastened to the city with the news, not only that Anderson had moved from Moultrie to Sumter, but also that he was heavily reinforced, the sixty soldiers thronging the parapet making so good a show as to give the impres¬ sion of a much larger num¬ ber. At this news Charles¬ ton was thrown into a ferment of rage and excite¬ ment. South Carolina troops were at once sent, on December 27, to take possession of Castle Pinck¬ ney, the seizure of which was perhaps the first overt act of war on the part of the secessionists. This was fol¬ lowed by the rebel occupa¬ tion of Forts Moultrie and Johnson, which were gotten into readiness for action, and shore batteries, some of them iron clad, were planted near Moultrie and on Cum¬ mings Point, an extremity of Morris Island near to Sumter; so that by the time the preparations were completed, Anderson’s gal¬ lant little band was effect¬ ively covered on four differ¬ ent sides. But the rebels were not relying wholly on measures for reducing Sumter in order to secure it. It was diplomacy rather than war which they expected would place in their hands all the gov¬ ernment property in Charleston Harbor. On the very day of Anderson s strategic move across the harbor, three commis¬ sioners arrived in Washington for the purpose of negotiating for the peaceable surrender to South Carolina of all the forts and establishments. But the telegraphic news, which reached Washington with the commissioners, that the loyal Anderson was doing his part, met with such patriotic response in the North as effectively to interfere with the commissioners’ plans. What Buchanan might have released to them under other cir¬ cumstances, he could not give them after Major Anderson had taken steps to protect his trust. Once within the fort, the Sumter garrison set vigorously to work to put it in a defensive condition. The Government work on the fort was not completed, and had the Southerners attacked it at once, as they would have done but for the expectation that the President would order Anderson to return to Moultrie, they could easily have captured it by assault. But they still hoped for “ bloodless secession,” and deferred offensive action. There were no flanking defences for the fort, and no fire-proof quarters for the officers. There was a great quantity of combustible material in the wooden quarters, which ultimately terminated the defence ; for the garri¬ son was rather smoked out by fire, than either starved out or reduced by shot and shell. The engineer officers were driven to all sorts of expedients to make the fort tenable, because there was very little material there out of which to make proper military defences. The workmen had left in the in¬ terior of the unfinished fort a confused mass of building material, unmounted guns, gun-carriages, derricks, blocks and tackle. Only two tiers of the fort were in condition for the mount¬ ing of heavy artillery—the upper and lower tiers. Al¬ though the garrison was severely taxed in perform¬ ing the excessive guard duty, required by their peril¬ ous situation, they yet ac¬ complished an enormous amount of work—mount¬ ing guns with improvised tackle; carrying by hand to the upper tier shot weighing nearly one hundred and thirty pounds each ; pro¬ tecting the casemates with flag-stones ; rigging ten-inch columbiads as mortars in the parade grounds within the fort, to fire on Morris Island ; and making their quarters as comfortable as the circumstances admitted. The guns of the fort were care¬ fully aimed at the various objects to be fired at, and the proper elevation marked on each, to avoid errors in aiming when the smoke of action should refract the light. To guard against a simultaneous attack from many sides, against which sixty men could make only a feeble defence, mines were planted under the wharf where a landing was most feasible, to blow it up at the proper time. Piles of paving stones with charges of powder under them, to scatter them as deadly mis¬ siles among an attacking party, were placed on the esplanade. Metal-lined boxes were placed on the parapet on all sides of the fort, from which musketrv-fire and hand-grenades could be thrown down on the invaders directly beneath. Barrels filled LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT, Commanding U. S. Army, 1861. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 13 HARPER’S FERRY. with broken stone, with charges of powder at the centre, were prepared to roll down to the water's edge and there burst. A trial of this device was observed by the rebels, who inferred from it that Sumter was bristling with “ infernal machines ” and had better be dealt with at long range. The discomforts and sufferings of the garrison were very great. Quarters were lacking in accommodations; rations were short, and fuel was scanty in midwinter. The transition from the posi¬ tion of friends to that of foes was not immediate, but gradual. After the move to Sumter, the men were still permitted to do their marketing in Charleston ; for all that Anderson had then done was to make a displeasing change of base in a harbor where he commanded, and could go where he pleased. Presently market privileges were restricted, and then prohibited altogether; and even when, under the expectation of action at Washington satis¬ factory to the South, the authorities relaxed their prohibition, the secessionist marketmen would sell nothing to go to the fort. Constant work on salt pork, with limited necessaries and an entire absence of luxuries, made the condition of the garrison very hard, and their conduct worthy of the highest praise. Anderson has been criticised for permitting the secessionists to build and arm batteries all around him, and coolly take pos¬ session of Government property, without his firing a shot to prevent it, as he could easily have done, since the guns of Sumter commanded the waterways all over the harbor. But it is easier now to see what should have been done than it was then to see what should be done. Anderson did not even know that he would be supported by his own Government, in case he took the offensive ; and the reluctance to begin hostilities was something he shared with the leaders on both sides, even down to the time of Lincoln’s inaugural, in which the President said to the people of the South : “In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Gov¬ ernment will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors.” The fact of Anderson’s South¬ ern birth, while it did not interfere with his loyalty, did make him reluctant to precipitate a struggle which he prayed and hoped might be averted. Had the issue of war been declared at the time, freeing him to do what he could, he could have saved Sumter. As it was, the preparations for reducing Sumter went on unmolested. Instead of yielding to the demand of the South Carolina com. 14 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. DIX. missioners for Anderson’s return to Moultrie, President Buchanan permitted the organization of an expedition for the relief of Sumter. But instead of sending down a war vessel, a merchant steamer was sent with recruits from Governor’s Island, New York. The Star of the West arrived off Charleston January 9, and as soon as she attempted to enter the harbor, she was fired on from batteries on Morris Island. Approaching nearer, and coming within gun-shot of Moultrie, she was again fired on. At Sumter, the long roll was beaten and the guns manned, but Anderson would not permit the rebel fire to be returned. The Star of the West withdrew and returned to New York. Explana¬ tions were demanded by Anderson, with the result of sending Lieutenant Talbot to Washington With a full statement of the affair, there to await instructions. The tacit truce thus established enabled the preparation of Sumter to be completed, but the rebel batteries also were advanced. Then began a series of demands from Charleston for the sur¬ render of the fort. The secessionists argued with Anderson as to the hopelessness of his case, with the Washington Govern¬ ment going to pieces, and the South determined to have the fort and exterminate the garrison ; and still another commission was sent to Washington, to secure there a settlement of the question, which was invariably referred back to Anderson’s judgment. The winter was passed in this sort of diplomacy and in intense activity, within the fort and around it. The garrison shared the general encouragement drawn from the accessions to the cabinet of strong and loyal men, such as John A. Dix and Joseph Holt, to replace the secessionists who had resigned. The Charleston people continued their loud demands for an attack on Sumter. The affair of the Star of the West, and the organization of the Confederate Government in February, had greatly stimulated the war spirit of the North, and it was felt that the crisis was approach¬ ing. Charleston people began to feel the effects of blockading their own channel with sunken ships, for their commerce all went to other ports. With the inauguration of Lincoln on March 4, the South learned that they had to deal with an Administration which, however forbearing, was firm as a rock. Indications of a vigor¬ ous policy were slow in reaching the anxious garrison of Sumter, for the new President was surrounded with spies, and every order or private despatch was quickly repeated throughout the South, which made him cautious. But the fact that he had determined to reinforce Sumter, and to insist on its defence, did soon become known, both at the fort and in Charleston ; and on April 6, Lieutenant Talbot was sent on from Washington to notify Gov¬ ernor Pickens to that effect. This information, received at Charleston April 8, was telegraphed to the Confederate Gov¬ ernment at Montgomery, and on the 10th General Beauregard received orders from the rebel Secretary of War to open fire at once on Sumter. Instantly there was renewed activity everywhere. The garri¬ son, inspired by the prospect of an end to their long and weari¬ some waiting, were in high spirits. The Confederates suddenly removed a house near Moultrie, disclosing behind it a formidable masked battery which effectually enfiladed the barbette guns at Sumter, which, although the heaviest there were, had to be abandoned. On the afternoon of the nth, officers came from Beauregard to demand the surrender of the fort, which they learned would have to yield soon for lack of provisions. At tceeffiL '/w#' fl, Afwtyy 4 GENERAL DIX'S FAMOUS DESPATCH CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 15 three A.M. of the 12th, General Beauregard sent word that he would open fire in one hour. He kept his word. At four o’clock the first gun of the war was fired from the Cummings Point battery on Morris Island, aimed by the venerable Edmund Ruffin, of Virginia, one of the fathers of secession. It was a good shot, the shell penetrating the masonry of the fort and bursting inside. At this signal, instantly the batteries opened on all sides, and the firing became an almost continuous roar. But, as yet, Sumter made no reply. The artillery duel was not to be a matter of hours, and there was no hurry. Break¬ fast was served to officers and men, and was eaten amid a con¬ tinual peppering of the fort with balls and shells from colum- biads and mortars. After this refreshment the men were told off into firing parties, and the first detachment was marched to the casemates, where Capt. Abner Doubleday aimed the first gun fired on the Union side against the Southern Confederacy. It was fired appropriately against the Cummings Point battery Crawford, who, having no sick in hospital, volunteered his active services, and hammered away on Fort Moultrie. By the middle of the morning the vessels of the relieving fleet, sent in pursuance of Lincoln’s promise, were sighted out¬ side the bar. Salutes were exchanged, but it was impossible for the vessels to enter the unknown, unmarked channel. This expedition was commanded by Capt. Gustavus V. Fox, afterward Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who had fitted it out with the cooperation of patriotic civilians—G. W. Blunt, William H. Aspinwall, morning of April 12th were the war ship Pawnee, under Commodore Rowan, and the transports Baltic and Harriet Lane. The Pocahontas, Captain Gillis, arrived on the 13th. Knowing in advance the impossi¬ bility of entering the harbor with these vessels, a number of launches had been brought, with the intention of running in the reinforcements in these, under cover of night and protected by the guns of Sumter. Except for the delay of the Pocahon¬ tas, which carried the launches, this would have been attempted on the night of the 12th, when the garrison anxiously expected the new arrivals. Postponed until the 13th, it was then too late, as by that time Sumter had been surrendered. The expectation of these reinforcements, the fear of a night LIEUTENANT-GENERAL P G. T. BEAUREGARD, C. S. A. which had begun the hostilities ; and it struck its mark, but did no damage. The heaviest guns in Sumter being useless, the fort was at a disadvantage throughout the fight, from the lightness of its metal. Notwithstanding Major Anderson’s orders that the barbette guns should be abandoned, Sergeant John Carmody, disappointed at the effects produced by the fire of the fort, stole out and fired, one after another, the heavy barbette battery guns. Roughly aimed, they did little mischief; but they scared the enemy, who brought all their weight to bear now on this bat¬ tery. Captains Doubleday and Seymour directed the firing from Sumter, and were assisted by Lieut. J. C. Davis and Surgeon 10 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. ' • 11* mjt. WL- * m yfje /f J53 PC# ir / y ! " Southern sympathies, where, except for the hospitality of the United States Naval Academy, they were most unwelcome. From that point they made their way, at first by train, and then, being obstructed by the destruction of railroads and railroad bridges, by forced marches, until they reached Annapolis Junc¬ tion, where they were met by a regiment sent out from Washing¬ ton to meet them, and thence proceeded by rail again. The strict discipline of Colonel Lef- ferts, to which they owed their successful pioneer work in open¬ ing the way to the capital, took them in review past President Lincoln at the White House be¬ fore they breakfasted, and they had no let-up on the hardship of their service until they were quartered in the House of Rep¬ resentatives, where they were subsequently sworn into the ser¬ vice of the Government. This episode is worth recount¬ ing, since it was the determined advance of these troops—the Eighth Massachusetts, unde r Colonel Hinks, accompanying them—in spite of rumors of a large secessionist force between them and Washington, that made access to the seat of govern¬ ment practicable for the regi- “bunked” all over the city, were quartered so far as practi¬ cable in the Government build¬ ings, and made the national capital festive with the pranks in which they let off the animal MARSHALL HOUSE, ALEXANDRIA. Where Colonel Ellsworth was killed m e n t s that promptly fol¬ lowed them, i n c ’ more men from Pennsyl- vania and Massachu¬ setts, the First Rhode Island, the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Seventy- fi rst New York, the lat¬ ter regiments reaching Annapolis before the Seventh New York and Eighth Massachusetts left, thus keeping the way open. Had the rumored fifteen thousand rebels actually lain between Annapolis and Washington, it would have gone hard with the Government and the fortunes of the Union. Troops continued to pour into Washington, until it really became an embarrassment to know what to do with them. They THE DEATH OF ELLSWORTH. COLONEL ELMER E ELLSWORTH spirits they carried into the grand picnic they seemed to have started on. Among them, a regiment of Zouaves, recruited from the New York Fire Department by Col. Elmer E. Ells¬ worth, was conspicuous. They were the last of the old-time “ toughs,” and they made things lively in the capital. They swarmed over the Capitol building, scaling its walls and running about its cornices in true fire-laddie fashion, and once they rendered a distinct service to the city of Washington by saving a burning building adjoining Willard’s Hotel, display¬ ing a reckless daring that gave the District firemen some new ;as. Ellsworth had attracted much attention in i860 by the admir¬ able work of a company of Chicago Zouaves, with which he had given exhibition drills in the East, and he was early commis¬ sioned a second lieutenant in the regular army. But he resigned this position in order to organize the Fire Zouaves, which he marched down Broadway under escort of the Fire Department, and entered upon active service only to sacrifice his life at the very beginning in a needless but tragic manner. As soon as troops arrived in Washington in sufficient numbers, the Govern¬ ment determined to make Washington secure by seizing its out¬ posts. Among these were Arlington Heights, across the Potomac, on the “ sacred soil of Virginia,” of which this occupation was termed the first “invasion.” Ellsworth’s regiment occupied the city of Alexandria ; and then, discovering a secession flag flying from the Marshall House, the colonel mounted to the roof in person and tore the flag down. Descending, he was met at the foot of the stairs by Jackson, the proprietor of the hotel, who shot him dead with a shot-gun. Ellsworth’s death was promptly avenged by Private Francis E. Brownell, who had accompanied him, and who put a bullet through Jackson’s head; but, as the first death of an officer, it created wide-spread excitement JUDAH P. BENJAMIN, Attorney-General—War—State. JEFFERSON DAVIS AND HIS CABINET REAGAN Postmaster-General. STEPHEN R MALLORY, CHRISTOPHER G. MEMMINGER, ROBERT TOOMBS, Secretary of the Navy. Secretary of the Treasury. Secretary of State. LEROY P. WALKER, Secretary of War. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 2 7 throughout the North, not excelled by that over the Massachu¬ setts men who fell in Baltimore, and royal honors were shown to his remains. They lay in state in the White House, where he had been a great favorite with the President, and were conveyed to their last resting-place with every military distinction. Per¬ haps this incident, more than any that had yet occurred, brought home to the people of the North the reality of the war that was upon them. But it only stimulated recruiting; the death of Ellsworth weighing far less with the generous patriotism of the young men who filled up regiment after regiment, than the glory of Ellsworth, and the honor of Private Brownell. While the levies were coming into Washington, the Southern leaders had not been idle. Re¬ sponse to Jeffer¬ son Davis’s call for troops was general all over the States, and the week that intervened be¬ tween Sumter and the riot in Baltimore was a busy one. In Virginia, the Governor took into' his own hands measures for the defence of his State. As early as April 15 he caused a number of mili¬ tia officers to be summoned to Richmond, and he placed in their hands the execution of a movement to capture the United States Arsenal at Har¬ per’s Ferry, at the junction of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers. Proceeding with a small command through an unfriendly country, these officers, among whom was the afterward famous Confederate general, John D. Imboden, reached their destination in the gray of the early morning of April 18, the day after the Virginia Legislature had passed the ordinance of secession. Instead of the resistance they had looked forward to 011 information that a Massachusetts regiment was guarding Harper’s Ferry, they were welcomed with the sight of buildings in flames, which told them, only too truly, that the United States garrison had abandoned the place on their approach, and had set fire to the arsenal and stores to save them from falling into the hands of the Confederates. Early warning of the attempted seizure of Harper’s Perry had been confided to a messenger who had volunteered to acquaint the Government with the impending peril, and word was sent that heavy reinforcements alone would save this property to the United States. But in those formative days, when many earnest men hesitated between loyalty to the Union and loyalty to their State, when officers like Lee abandoned the old service with re¬ luctance under a sense of paramount duty to their State, a man who was loyal one day would conclude overnight to secede with his State. And from some such cause as this, or through fear of the consequences, the messenger never delivered the message to the War Department, and the reinforcements, though anx¬ iously expected, never came. The arsenal had been left in charge of Lieut. Roger Jones, who had been ordered to Harper’s Ferry from Carlisle Barracks, Penn., with a small force of forty-five men. Hearing nothing from Washington in response to his request for aid, he made up his mind on the evening of April 17, that the only course open to him was to save his garrison by retreat, and de¬ stroy the prop¬ erty thus aban¬ doned. This determ ination w a s confirmed by the n e w s brought to him, by a former su¬ perintendent of the arsenal, of the coming of the Virginia troops. Al¬ though this same man had loyally reported, so long before as January, that an attempt might be made, he now told the workmen en¬ gaged at the arsenal that within twenty- four hours the arsenal would be in the hands of the Virginia forces, and advised them to protect the property, cast their lot with the secessionists, and insure to themselves a continuance of work under the new regime. Lieutenant Jones immediately made secret preparations. He had trains of powder laid through the buildings, and when the force of thirteen hundred Virginians had approached to within a mile of the arsenal, at nine o’clock on the evening of April 17, the torch was applied, and the flames ran through the works, which were quickly burning. Some of the powder trains had been wet by the Southern sympathizers among the workmen, but the result was a practical destruction of nearly all that would have been valuable as munitions of war. The powder that was stored in the buildings exploded from time to time, effectually preventing serious efforts to put out the fire. The garrison was withdrawn gse JEFFERSON DAVIS'S RESIDENCE IN RICHMOND. 28 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. THE CAPITOL AT RICHMOND. across the Potomac and marched back to Carlisle. When the Virginians came up the next morning, they found only the burn¬ ing arsenal buildings to greet them. Enough property was rescued from the destruction to make the capture a useful one to the Confederates, however ; and the possession of Harper’s Ferry gave them command of an import¬ ant line of communication with Washington, by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Anticipating the use of this line for the transportation of Western troops to Washington, Gen. Kenton Harper, commanding the Virginians, stopped the first train through ; but his only capture was the person of Gen. William S. Harney, of the regular army, who was on his way to Wash¬ ington to resign his commission rather than engage in the civil war. Ide was made a prisoner and sent to Richmond, whence he was allowed to proceed on his errand. General Harney did not resign, but was presently sent to Missouri to command the Department of the West. But his conciliating method of deal¬ ing with the enemy, together with his uncertain loyalty, caused him to be relieved very soon. The strategic value of Harper’s Ferry was developed under Col. Thomas J. Jackson (after¬ ward the celebrated “ Stonewall ”), who was made colonel com¬ mandant of all the Virginia forces, superseding all the previously existing militia generals. Robert E. Lee had been given the general command of the State troops, with Jackson as his execu¬ tive officer, and by a legislative ordinance every militia officer above the grade of captain had been relegated to private life unless reappointed by the governor under the new dispensation. The bridge at Point of Rocks, a few miles down the Potomac toward Washington, was seized and fortified against a possible attack by General Butler, who was near Baltimore ; and by a clever ruse a great number of trains on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad were “ bagged,” and the cars and engines side-tracked into Strasburg, greatly facilitating the Confederate train service in Virginia. Horses and supplies were secured from the neigh¬ boring country, and when Gen. Joseph E. Johnston superseded Jackson a month later at Harper’s Ferry, the Confederates were in good shape to confront an advance on their position from Maryland or Pennsylvania, or to send reinforcements, as they did, when the first considerable struggle of the war came at Bull Run, fifty miles south of them. Another destruction of Government property by Government officers, about this time, most un¬ necessary and unfortunate, deprived the Navy Department of ships and material that would have been incalculably precious, and furnished the Con¬ federates with three ships, one of which, the Mer- rimac , was to be heard from later in a signal manner. At the Gosport Navy Yard, opposite Norfolk, Va., there were, besides many munitions of war, no less than eleven fine war ships, a majority of which were armed and ready for sea. The Gov¬ ernment made prompt preparations to secure these after the fall of Sumter; and but for the delay of the commandant, Commodore Charles S. McCauley, in executing his orders, a number of the vessels, with stores, armament, and crews, would have been withdrawn into safe waters. But under the influ¬ ence of his junior officers, most of whom subse¬ quently joined the Confederacy, he deferred action until better prepared. This delay was fatal; for on April 18 he suddenly was confronted by a hostile force, though small in numbers, under General Taliaferro, which had seized Norfolk and threatened the navy yard. The ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS. Vice-President C S A CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 29 action of the latter in waiting one day for expected reinforce¬ ments from Richmond, and Commodore McCauley’s promise not to move a vessel or fire a shot except in defence, gave the Union commander time to do what he could to destroy the prop¬ erty in his charge; and on April 20 he scuttled every ship in the harbor, sinking them just before the arrival of Capt. Hiram Paulding in the Pawnee with orders to relieve McCauley, and to save or destroy the property. Seeing that it would be possible for the enemy to raise the sunken vessels, and that after the ships had been rendered useless he could not hold the place with his small force, Pauld¬ ing decided to com¬ plete the w o rk of destruction as far as possible, and told off his men in detachments for this duty. Ships, ship-houses, barracks, wharves, were at the sig¬ nal (a rocket) set ablaze, and the display was mag¬ nificent as pyrotechnics, and discouraging to the enemy, which had expected to secure a ready-made navy for the taking of it. When to the roar of the flames was added the boom of the loaded guns as the fire reached them, the effect was tremendous. Under cover of all this, the Pawnee drew out of the harbor, accompanied by the steam-tug Yankee towing the Cumberland, which alone of the fleet had not been scuttled, and bearing the loyal garrison and crews. In the haste with which the work of destruction had been undertaken, the result was incomplete. The mine under the dry-dock did-not explode ; and that most useful appliance, together with many shops, cannon, and provisions, was secured by the Confederates, who also succeeded in raising and using three of the sunken and partially burned vessels—the Mcrrimac, Raritan, and Plymouth, under the guns of the first of which, from behind its armored sides, the Climber land afterward came to grief in Hampton Roads. CHAPTER III. THE BEGINNING OF BLOODSHED. Lincoln’s inaugural address—the struggle for Virginia— OPPOSING VIEWS EXPRESSED BY ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS—THE SLAVE-TRADE OF VIRGINIA-VIRGINIA DRAGOONED—THE FIRST CALL FOR TROOPS—LINCOLN’S FAITH IN THE PEOPLE—ORIGIN OF THE WORD “COPPERHEAD.” ABRAHAM Lincoln’s inaugural address was one of the ablest state papers recorded in American history. It argued the question of secession in all its aspects—the constitutional right, the reality of the grievance, the sufficiency of the remedy—and so far as law and logic went, it left the secessionists little or nothing to stand on. But neither law nor logic could change in a single day the . 0 to\nn s£N0, Assis- pre-determined purpose of a powerful combination, or allay the passions that had been roused by years of resentful debate. Some of its sentences read like maxims for statesmen: “ The central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy.” “ Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws ? ” “ Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people ? Is there any better or equal hope in the world ? ” With all its conciliatory messages it expressed a firm and unalterable purpose to maintain the Union at every hazard. “ I con¬ sider,” he said, “ that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken, and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, as the Constitution itself ex¬ pressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the L T nion be faithfully exe¬ cuted in all the States. Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part; and I shall perform it, so far as practicable, un- ess my rightful masters, the American people, shall with¬ hold the requisite means, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary.” And in closing he said: “In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I have the most solemn one to preserve, protect and defend it. . We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic cords of mem¬ ory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.” No such address had ever come from the lips of a Presi- BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM S. HARNEY. I SHERMAN AND HIS GENERALS. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 3i GENERAL GRANTS BODYGUARD dent before. Pierce and Buchanan had scolded the abolitionists like partisans ; Lincoln talked to the secessionists like a brother. The loyal people throughout the country received the address with satisfaction. The secessionists bitterly denounced it. Over¬ looking all its pacific declarations, and keeping out of sight the fact that a majority of the Congress just chosen was politically op¬ posed to the President, they ap¬ pealed to the Southern people to say whether they would “ submit to abolition rule,” and whether they were going to look- on and “ see gallant little South Carolina crushed under the heel of despotism.” In spite of all such appeals, there was still a strong Union sentiment at the South. This sentiment was admirably ex¬ pressed by Hon. Alexander Id. Stephens in a speech delivered on November 14, i860, in the follow¬ ing words : “ This step of seces¬ sion, once taken, can never be recalled ; and all the baleful and withering consequences that must follow will rest on the con¬ vention for all time. GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT, WITH GENERALS RAWLINS AND BOWERS. What reasons can you give the nations of the earth to justify it? What right has the North assailed? What interest of the South has been invaded ? What justice has been denied? And what claim founded in justice and right has been withheld ? Can either of you to-day name one governmental act of wrong, deliberately and purposely done by the Government of Washing¬ ton, of which the South has the right to complain ? I challenge the answer. ... I declare here, as I have often done be¬ fore, and which has been repeated by the greatest and wisest of statesmen and patriots in this and other lands, that it is the best and freest Government—the most equal in its rights, the most just in its decisions, the most lenient in its measures, and the most inspiring in its principles to elevate the race of men—that the sun of heaven ever shone upon. Now, for you to attempt to overthrow such a Government as this, under which we have lived for more than three-quarters of a century, in which we have gained our wealth, our standing as a na- 32 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . tion, our domestic safety while the elements of peril are around us, with peace and tranquillity accompanied with unbounded pros¬ perity and rights unassailed—is the height of madness, folly and wickedness, to which I can neither lend my sanction nor my vote.” In a speech by Mr. Stephens delivered in Savannah, March 22, 1861, he expressed entirely different views; in expounding the new constitution, he said : “ The prevailing idea entertained by him [Thomas Jefferson] and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution was, that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature ; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally and politically. . . . Our new Government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea. Its foundation was laid, and its corner-stone States were becoming uneasy. Said Mr. Gilchrist, of Alabama, to the Confederate Secretary of War: “You must sprinkle blood in the faces of the people! If you delay two months, Alabama stays in the Union ! ” Hence the attack on Fort Sumter, out of which the garrison were in peril of being driven by starvation. This certainly had a great popular effect in the South as well as in the North ; but Virginia’s choice appears to have been deter¬ mined by a measure that was less spectacular and more coldly significant. The Confederate Constitution provided that Con¬ gress should have the power to “prohibit the introduction of slaves from any State not a member of, or Territory not belong¬ ing to, this Confederacy,” and at the time when Virginia’s fate was in the balance it was reported that such an act had been passed THE SIXTH MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT ATTACKED IN THE STREETS OF BALTIMORE, APRIL 19, 1861. rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man , that slavery, in subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition.” Seven slave States had gone out, but eight remained, and the anxiety of the secessionists was to secure these at once, or most of them, before the excitement cooled. The great prize was Virginia, both because of her own power and resources, and because her accession to the Con federacy would necessarily bring North Carolina also. Her governor, John Letcher, professed to be a Unionist; but his conduct after the ordinance of secession had been passed appears to prove that :his profession was insincere. In electing delegates to a conven¬ tion to consider the question of secession, the Unionists cast a majority of sixty thousand votes; and on the 4th of April, when President Lincoln had been in office a month, that convention refused, by a vote of eighty-nine to forty-five, to pass an ordi¬ nance of secession. The leading revolutionists of the cotton by the Congress at Montgomery.* When Virginia heard this, like the young man in Scripture, she went away sorrowful ; for in that line of trade she had great possessions. The cultivation of land by slave labor had long since ceased to be profitable in the border States—or at least it was far less profitable than rais¬ ing slaves for the cotton States—and the acquisition of new territory in Texas had enormously increased the demand. The * It is now impossible to prove positively that such a law was actually passed ; for the officially printed volume of “ Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America” (Richmond, 1861) was evidently mutilated before being placed in the hands of the compositor. The Acts are numbered, but here and there numbers are missing, and in some of the later Acts there are allusions to pre¬ vious Acts that cannot be found in the book. It is known that on the 6th of March, iS&I, the Judiciary Committee was instructed to inquire into the expediency of such prohibition, and it seems a fair conjecture that one of the missing numbers was an Act of this character. In a later edition (1864) the numbering is made consecutive, but the missing matter is not restored. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 35 DEPARTURE OF THE SEVENTH REGIMENT FROM NEW YORK ClTY, APRIL 19, 1861. ■ . ~ greatest part of this business (sometimes estimated as high as one-half) was Virginia’s. It was called “ the vigintal crop,” as the blacks were ready for market and at their highest value about the age of twenty. As it was an ordinary business of bargain and sale, no statistics were kept ; but the lowest estimate of the annual value of the trade in the Old Dominion placed it in the tens of millions of dollars. President Dew, of William and Mary College, in his celebrated pamphlet, wrote: “Virginia is, in fact, a negro-raising State for other States.” The New York Journal of Commerce of October 12, 1835, contained a letter from a Vir¬ ginian (vouched for by the editor) in which it was asserted that twenty thousand slaves had been driven south from that State that year. In 1836 the Wheeling (Va.) Times estimated the number of slaves exported from that State during the preceding year at forty thousand, valued at twenty-four million dollars. The Baltimore Register in 1846 said: “ Dealing in slaves has become a large business; establishments are made in several places in Maryland and Virginia, at which they are sold like cattle.” The Richmond Examiner, before the war, said: “Upon an inside estimate, they [the slaves of Virginia] yield in gross surplus produce, from sales of negroes to go south, ten million dollars.” In the United States Senate, just before the war, Hon. Alfred Iverson, of Georgia, replying to Mr. Powell, of Virginia, said Virginia was deeply interested in secession : for if the cotton States seceded, Virginia would find no market for her slaves, without which that State would be ruined. After Sumter had been fired on, and the Confederate Congress had forbidden this traffic to outsiders, the Vir¬ ginia Convention again took up the ordinance of secession (April 17) and passed it in secret session by a vote of eighty-eight to fifty-five. It was not to take effect till approved by the people ; but the day fixed for their vot¬ ing upon it was six weeks distant, the last Thursday in May. I-ong before that date, Governor Letcher, without waiting for the ver¬ dict of the people, turned over the entire military force and equipment of the State to the Confederate authori¬ ties, and the seat of the Con¬ federate Government was removed from Montgomery to Richmond COLONEL MARSHALL LEFFERTS, Commanding Seventh Regiment David G. Farra- gut, afterwards the famous admiral, who was in Norfolk, Vir¬ ginia, at the time, anxiously watching the course of events, (Showing photographer's outfit) CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . .35 declared that the State “ had been dra¬ gooned out of the Union,” and he refused to be dragooned with her. But Robert E. Lee and other prominent Virginians resigned their commissions in the United States service to enter that of their States or of the Confederacy, and the soil of Virginia was overrun by soldiers from the cotton States. Any other re¬ sult than a vote for secession was there¬ fore impossible. Arkansas followed with a similar ordinance on the 6th of May, and North Carolina on the 21st, neither being submitted to a popular vote. Kentucky refused to secede. For Ten¬ nessee and Missouri there was a pro¬ longed struggle. When Fort Sumter was surrendered, the Confederates had already acquired possession of Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie in Charleston Harbor, Fort Pulaski at Savannah, P'ort Morgan at the entrance of Mobile Bay, Forts Jackson and St. Philip below New Orleans, the navy-yard and Forts McRae and Barrancas at Pensacola, the arsenals at Mount Vernon, Ala., and Little Rock, Ark., and the New Orleans M i n t . 1 he largest force of United States regulars was that in Texas, under com¬ mand of Gen. David E. Twiggs, who surren¬ dered it in February, and turned over to the insurgents one million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars’ worth '%{ military property. On the day w h e n Sumter fell, President Lincoln penned a proc- GENERAL JOSEPH G. TOTTEN. Chief of Engineers. powei go m cry GENERAL ALEXANDER SHALER. MAJOR THEODORE WINTHROP. Killed at Big Bethel. lamation, issued the next day (Monday, April 15), which declared “ that the laws of the United States have been for some time past, and now are, op¬ posed, and the exe¬ cution thereof obstructed, in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisi¬ ana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the mar¬ shals by law,” and called for militia from the several States of the Union to the number of seventy-five thousand. It also called a special session of Congress, to convene on July 4. He appealed “ to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long enough endured.” With regard to the reception of this cele¬ brated proclamation in the South, Alex¬ ander H. Stephens writes as fol¬ lows, in his History of the war: “ The effect of this upon the public mind of the Southern States cannot be described or even estimated. Up to this time, a majority, I think, of even those who favored the policy of secession had done so under the belief and con-, viction that it was the surest way of securing a redress of grievances, and of bringing the Federal Government back to Constitutional principles. This proclamation dispelled all such hopes. It showed that the party in power intended nothing short of complete centralization. The prin¬ ciples actuating the Washington author¬ ities were those aiming at consolidated while the principles controlling the action of the Mont- authorities were those which enlisted devotion and attachment to the Federative system as established by the Fathers in 1778 and 1787. In short, the cause of the Confed¬ erates was States Sovereignty, or the sovereign right of local self- government on the part of the States severally. The cause of their assailants involved the overthrow of this entire fabric, and the erection of a centralized empire in its stead.” The effect of this proclamation in the North has already been referred to. Mr. Lincoln’s faith in the people had always been strong; but the response to this proclamation was probably a surprise even to him, as it certainly was to the secessionists, who had assured the Southern people that the Yankees would not fight. The whole North was thrilled with military ardor, and moved almost as one man. The papers were lively with great head-lines and double-leaded editorials ; and the local poet filled the spare space—when there was any—with his glowing patriotic effusions. The closing passage of Longfellow’s “ Build¬ ing of the Ship,” written a dozen years before, beginning : “ Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State ! Sail on, O Union, strong and great! Humanity with all its fears, With all the hopes of future years, Is hanging breathless on thy fate ! ” 36 CAMPFIRE AND BA TTLEFIELD was in constant demand, and was recited effectively by nearly every orator that addressed a war meeting. Eminent men of all parties and all professions spoke out for the Union. Stephen A. Douglas, who had long been Lincoln’s rival, and had opposed the policy of coercion, went to the White House the day before Sumter fell, had a long interview with the President, and promised a hearty support of the Administration, which was immediately telegraphed over the country, and had a powerful effect. Ex- President Pierce (who had made the direful prediction of blood in Northern streets), ex- President Buchanan (who had failed to find any authority for coercion), Gen. Lewis Cass were occupied every day by platoons of men, most of them not yet uniformed, marching and wheeling and countermarching, and being drilled in the manual of arms by officers that knew just a little more than they did, by virtue of having bought a handbook of tactics the day before, and sat up all night to study it. There was great scarcity of arms. One regiment was looking dubiously at some ancient muskets that had just been placed in their hands, when the colonel came up and with grim humor assured them that he had seen those weapons used in the Mexican War, and more men were killed in front of them than behind them. The boys had great respect for the colonel, but they wanted to be excused from believing his story. J J BURNING OF THE UNITED STATES APRIL (a Democratic partisan since the war of 1812), Archbishop Hughes (the high¬ est dignitary of the Roman Catholic Church in America), and numerous others, all “ came out for the Union,” as the phrase went. The greater por¬ tion of the Democratic party, which had opposed Lincoln’s election, also, as individuals, sustained the Administration in its determination not to permit a division of the country. These were known as “war Democrats,” while those that opposed and reviled the Government were called “ Copperheads,” in allusion to the snake of that name. Some of the bolder ones attempted to take the edge off the sarcasm by cutting the head of Liberty out of a copper cent and wearing it as a scarf-pin ; but all they could say was quickly drowned in the general clamor. Town halls, schoolhouses, academies, and even churches were turned into temporary barracks. Village greens and city squares ARSENAL AT HARPER’S FERRY, VA 18, 1861. BORDER STATES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS. GOVERNORS OF CERTAIN STATES RE¬ FUSE TROOPS-THE GOVERNOR OF MISSOURI DISLOYAL—EVENTS IN ST. LOUIS-LOYALTY OF GERMANS -BATTLE AT CARTHAGE—THE STRUGGLE FOR KENTUCKY, MARY¬ LAND AND TENNESSEE—ACTIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA—BATTLE OF RICH MOUNTAIN—BATTLE OF BIG BETHEL—HARPER’S FERRY. The disposition of the border slave States was one of the most difficult problems with which the Government had to deal. When the President issued his call for seventy-five thousand men, the Governors of Missouri, Kentucky and Tennessee, as well as those of North Carolina and Virginia, returned positive refusals. The Governor of Missouri answered: “It is illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical, and cannot BURNING OF GOSPORT NAVY YARD, NORFOLK, VA., APRIL 21, 1861. CHAPTER IV. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 3/ A BATTERY ON DRILL. be complied with.” The Governor of Kentucky said : “ Ken¬ tucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States.” The Governor of Tennessee: “ Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but fifty thousand, if necessary, for the defence of our rights and those of our brethren.” The Governor of North Carolina: “ I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina.” The Governor of Virginia : “ The militia of Vir¬ ginia will not be fur¬ nished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view.” Every one of these governors was a seces¬ sionist, with a strong and aggressive party at his back; and yet in each of these States the secessionists were in a minority. It was a serious matter to increase the hostility that beset the National arms on what in another war would have been called neutral ground, and it was also a serious matter to leave the Union element in the northernmost slave States without a powerful support and protection. The prob¬ lem was worked out differently in each of the States. At the winter session of the Missouri Legis¬ lature an act had been passed that placed the city of St. Louis under the control of police commissioners to be appointed by the Gov¬ ernor, Claiborne F. Jackson. Four of his appointees were seces¬ sionists, and three of these were leaders of bodies of “ minute- men,” half-secret armed organizations. The mayor of the city, who 3» CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. RECRUITS TO THE FRONT. was also one of the commissioners, was known as a “ conditional Union man.” Other acts showed plainly the bent of the Legislature. One made it treason to speak against the authority of the Governor, and gave him enlarged powers, while another appropriated three million dollars for military pur¬ poses, taking the entire school fund for the year, and the accumulations that were to have paid the July interest on the public .debt. A State convention called to consider the question of secession met in Feb¬ ruary, and proved to be overwhelm¬ ingly in favor of Missouri’s remaining in the Union, though it also expressed a general sympathy with slavery, as¬ sumed that the South had wrongs, deprecated the employment of military force on either side, and repeated the suggestion that had been made many times in other quarters for a national convention to amend the Constitution so as to satisfy everybody. The State convention made its report in March, and adjourned till December. This proceeding appeared to be a great disappointment to Governor Jackson; but he failed to take from it any hint to give up his purpose of getting the State out of the Union. On the contrary, he proceeded to try what he could do with the powers at his command. He called an extra session of the Legislature, to convene May 2d, for the purpose of “ adopting measures to place the State in a proper attitude of defence,” and he called out the militia on the 3d of May, to go into encampment for six days. There was a large store of arms (more than twenty thou¬ sand stand) in the St. Louis arsenal ; but while he was devising a method and a pretext for seizing them, the greater part of them were suddenly removed, by order from Washington, to Spring- field, Illinois. The captain that had them in charge took them on a steamer to Alton, and there called the citizens together by rinsing- a fire-alarm, told them what he had, and asked their assistance in transferring the cargo to a train for Springfield, as he expected pursuit by a force of secessionists. The many hands that make light work were not wanting, and the train very soon rolled away with its precious freight. The Governor applied to the Confederate Gov¬ ernment for assistance, and a quantity of arms and ammunition, including several field-guns, was sent to him in boxes marked “ marble.” He also ordered a general of the State militia to establish a camp of in¬ struction near the city, and gathered there such volun¬ teer companies as were organized and armed. General Scott had anticipated all this by sending rein¬ forcements to the little company that held the arsenal, and with them Capt. Nathaniel Lyon, of the regular army, a man that lacked no element of skill, courage, or patriotism necessary for the crisis. The force was also increased by several regiments of loyal home guards, organized mainly by the exertions of Francis P. Blair, Jr., and mustered into the service of the United States. When the character and purpose of the force that was being concentrated by Jackson became sufficiently evident— rom the fact that the streets in the camp were named for prominent Con¬ federate leaders, and other indications —Lyon determined upon prompt and decisive action. This was the more important since the United States arse¬ nal at Liberty had been robbed, and secession troops were being drilled at St. Joseph. With a battalion of regu¬ lars and six regiments of the home guard, he marched out in the afternoon of May 10th, surrounded the camp, and trained six pieces of artillery on it, and then demanded an immediate sur¬ render, with no terms but a promise of proper treatment as prisoners of war. The astonished commander, a recreant West Pointer, surrendered promptly; and he and his brigade were disarmed CAPTAIN NATHANIEL LYON (Afterwards Brigadier-General.) A VILLAGE COMPANY ON PARADE. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 39 THE BATTLE AT PHILIPPI, JUNE 3, 1861. and taken into the city. All the “ marble ” that had come up from Baton Rouge and been hauled out to the camp only two days before was captured and removed to the arsenal, be¬ coming once more the property of the United States. The outward march had attracted attention, crowds had gathered along the route, and when Lyon’s command were returning with their prisoners they had to pass through a throng of people, among whom were not a few that were striving to create a riot. The outbreak came at length ; stones were thrown at the troops and pistol-shots fired into the ranks, when one regiment levelled their mus¬ kets and poured a volley or two into the crowd. Three or four soldiers and about twenty citizens were killed in this beginning of the conflict at the West. William T. Sher¬ man (the now famous general), walking out with his little son that afternoon, found him¬ self for the first time under fire, and lay down in a gully while the bullets cut the twigs of the trees above him. Two days later, Gen. William S. Harney arrived in St. Louis and assumed command of the United States forces. He was a vet¬ eran of long experience; but ex-Governor Sterling Price, commanding the State forces, entrapped him into a truce that tied his hands, while it left Jackson and Price prac¬ tically at liberty to pursue their plans for secession. Thereupon the Government re¬ moved him, repudiated the truce, and gave general b. the command to Lyon, now made a brigadier-general. After an interview with Lyon in St. Louis (June 11), in which they found it impossible to deceive or swerve him, Price and Jackson went to the capital, Jefferson City, burning railway bridges behind them, and the Governor immediately issued a proclamation declaring that the State had been invaded by United States forces, and calling out fifty thousand of the militia to repel the invasion. Its closing passage is a fair specimen of many proclamations and appeals that were issued that spring and summer: “Your first allegiance is due to your own State, and you are under no obli¬ gation whatever to obey the unconstitutional edicts of the military despotism which has introduced itself at Washington, nor submit to the infamous and degrading sway of its wicked minions in this State. No brave- hearted Missourian will obey the one or sub¬ mit to the other. Rise, then, and drive out igqominiously the invaders who have dared to desecrate the soil which your labors have made fruitful and which is consecrated by your homes.” The very next day Lyon had an expedi¬ tion in motion, which reached Jefferson City" on the 15th, took possession of the place, and raised the National flag over the Capitol. At his approach the Governor fled, carrying with him the great seal of the State. Learn¬ ing that he was with Price, gathering a force f. kelley. at Booneville, fifty miles farther up Missouri BOMB PROOF 41 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. River, Lyon at once reembarked the greater part of his com¬ mand, arrived at Booneville on the morning of the 17th, fought and routed the force there, and captured their guns and sup¬ plies. The Governor was now a mere fugitive; and the State convention, assembling again in July, declared the State offices vacant, nullified the secession work of the Legislature, and made Hamilton R. Gamble, a Union man, provisional Governor. Among the citizens whose prompt personal efforts were con¬ spicuous on the Union side were John M. Schofield and Francis L. Blair, Jr. (afterward Generals), B. Gratz Brown (afterward candidate for Vice-President), Rev. Galusha Anderson (afterward President of Chicago University), William McPherson, and Clin¬ ton B. Fisk (afterward founder of Fisk University at Nashville). The puzzling part of the difficulty in Missouri was now over, for the contest was well defined. Most of the people in the northern part of the State, and most of the population of St. Louis (especially the Ger¬ mans), were loyal to the National Government ; but the secession¬ ists were strong in its southern part, where Price succeeded in organizing a considerable force, which was joined by men from Arkansas and Texas, under Gens. Ben. McCulloch and Gideon J. Pillow. Gen. Franz Sigel was sent against them, and at Carthage (July 5) with twelve hundred men encount¬ ered five thousand and inflicted a heavy loss upon them, though he was obliged to retreat. His sol¬ dierly qualities in this and other actions gave him one of the sud¬ den reputations that were made in the first year of the war, but obscured by the greater events that followed. His hilarious popularity was expressed in the common greeting: “You fights mit Sigel ? Den you trinks mit me ! ” Lyon, marching from Springfield, Mo., defeated McCul¬ loch at Dug Spring, and a week later (August 10) attacked him again at Wilson’s Creek, though McCulloch had been heavily reinforced. The national troops, outnumbered three to one, were defeated ; and Lyon, who had been twice wounded early in the action, was shot dead while leading a regiment in a des¬ perate charge. Major S. D. Sturgis conducted the retreat, and this ended the campaign. It was found that General Lyon, who was a bachelor, had bequeathed all he possessed (about thirty thousand dollars) to the United States Government, to be used for war purposes. In the days when personal leadership was more than it can ever be again, while South Carolina was listening to the teach¬ ings of John C. Calhoun, which led her to try the experiment of secession, Kentucky was following Henry Clay, who, though a slaveholder, was a strong Unionist. The practical effect was seen when the crisis came, after he had been in his grave nine Governor Beriah Magoffin convened the Legislature in January, 1861, and asked it to organize the militia, buy muskets, and put the State in a condition of armed neutrality ; all of which it refused to do. After the fall of Fort Sumter he called the Legislature together again, evidently hoping that the popular excitement would bring them over to his scheme. But the utmost that could be accomplished was the passage of a resolution by the lower house (May 16) declaring that Kentucky should occupy “ a position of strict neutrality,” and approving his re¬ fusal to furnish troops for the national army. Thereupon he issued a proclamation (May 20) in which he “ notified and warned all other States, separate or united, especially the United and Confederate States, that I sol¬ emnly forbid any movement upon Kentucky soil.” But two days later the Legislature repudiated this interpretation of neutrality, and passed a series of acts intended to prevent any scheme of secession that might be formed. It appro¬ priated one million dollars for arms and ammunition, but placed the disbursement of the money and control of the arms in the hands of commissioners that were all Union men. It amended the militia law so as to require the State Guards to take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and finally the Senate passed a resolution declaring that “ Kentucky will not sever connection with the National Government, nor take up arms with either belligerent party.” Lovell H. Rousseau (after¬ ward a gallant general in the na¬ tional service), speaking in his place in the Senate, said: “ The politi¬ cians are having their day; the people will yet have theirs. I have an abiding confidence in the right, and I know that this se¬ cession movement is all wrong. There is not a single substantial reason for it; our Government had never oppressed us with a feather’s weight.” The Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge and other prominent citizens took a similar stand ; and a new Legislature, chosen in August, presented a Union majority of three to one. As a last resort, Governor Magoffin addressed a letter to President Lincoln, requesting that Kentucky’s neutrality be respected and the national forces removed from the State. Mr. Lincoln, in refusing his request, courteously reminded him that the force consisted exclusively of Kentuckians, and told him that he had not met any Kentuckian, except himself and the messengers that brought his letter, who wanted it removed. To strengthen the first argument, Robert Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame, who was a citizen of Kentucky, was made a general and given the command in the State in September. Two months later, a-secession convention met at Russellville, in the southern part of the State, organized a pro¬ visional government, and sent a full delegation to the Confeder¬ ate Congress at Richmond, who found no difficulty in being CARING FOR THE DEAD AND WOUNDED. years. BATTLE OF WILSON’S CREEK, NEAR SPRINGFIELD MO., AUGUST 10, 1861. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 43 MAJOR-GENERAL BENJAMIN F. BUTLER AND STAFF. admitted to seats in that body. Being now firmly supported by the new Legislature, the National Government began to arrest prominent Kentuckians who still advocated secession, whereupon others, including ex-Vice-President John C. Breckinridge, fled southward and entered the service of the Confederacy. Ken¬ tucky as a State was saved to the Union, but the line of separa¬ tion was drawn between her citizens, and she contributed to the ranks of both the great contending armies. Like the governor of Kentucky, Gov. Thomas II. Hicks, of Maryland, had at first protested against the passage of troops, had dreamed of making the State neutral, and had even gone so far as to suggest to the Administration that the British Minister at Washington be asked to mediate between it and the Confeder¬ ates. But, unlike Governor Magoffin, he ultimately came out in favor of the Union. The Legislature would not adopt an ordinance of secession, nor call a convention for that purpose; but it passed a bill establishing a board of public safety, giving it extraordinary authority over the military powers of the State, and appointed as such board six secessionists and the governor. A tremendous pressure was brought to bear upon the State. One of her poets, in a ringing rhyme to a popular air, told her that the despot’s heel was on her shore, and predicted that she would speedily “ spurn the Northern scum,” while the Vice- President of the Confederacy felt so sure of her acquisition that in a speech (April 30) he triumphantly announced that she* 1 ' had resolved, to a man, to stand by the South.” But Reverdy John¬ son and other prominent Marylanders were quite as bold and active for the national cause. A popular Union Convention was held in Baltimore ; General Butler with his troops restored the broken communications and held the important centres; and under a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus some of the more violent secessionists were imprisoned. The release of the citi¬ zens was demanded by Chief-Justice Taney, of the United States Supreme Court, who declared that the President had no right to suspend the writ ; but his demand was refused. In May the Governor called for four regiments of volunteers to fill the requi¬ sition of the National Government, but requested that they might be assigned to duty in the State. So Maryland remained in the Union, though a considerable number of her citizens entered the ranks of the Confederate army. In the mountainous regions of western North Carolina and eastern Tennessee, where few slaves were held, there was a strong Union element. In other portions of those States there were many enthusiastic secessionists. But in each State there was a majority against disunion. North Carolina voted on the ques¬ tion of calling a convention to consider the subject, and by a small majority decided for “ no convention.” Tennessee, on a similar vote, showed a majority of fifty thousand against calling a convention. After the fall of Sumter Gov. John W. Ellis, of North Carolina, seized the branch mint at Charlotte and the arsenal at Fayetteville, and called an extra session of the Legis¬ lature. This Legislature authorized him to tender the military resources of the State to the Confederate Government, and called a convention to meet May 20th, which passed an ordinance 44 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. COMMISSARY QUARTERS. of secession by a unanimous vote. The conservative or Union party of Tennessee issued an address on the 18th of April, in which they declared their approval of the Governor’s refusal to furnish troops for the national defence, and condemned both secession and coercion, holding that Tennessee should take an independent attitude. This, with the excitement of the time, was enough for the Legislature. In secret session it authorized Gov. Isham G. Harris, who was a strong secessionist, to enter into a military league with the Confed¬ erate Government, which he immedi¬ ately did. It also passed an ordinance of secession, to be submitted to a pop¬ ular vote on the 8th of June. Before that day came, the State was in the possession of Confederate soldiers, and a majority of over fifty thousand was obtained for secession. East Ten¬ nessee had voted heavily against the H ordinance ; and a convention held at Greenville, June 17, wherein thirty-one of the eastern counties were repre¬ sented, declared, for certain plainly specified reasons, that it “ did not regard the result of the election as expressive of the will of a majority of the freemen of Tennessee.” Later, the people of those counties asked to be separated peaceably from the rest of the State and allowed to remain in the Union ; but the Confederate authorities did not recognize the prin¬ ciple of secession from secession, and the people of that region were sub¬ jected to a bloody and relentless per¬ secution, before which many of them fled from their homes. The most CULINARY DEPARTMENT. prominent of the Unionists were Andrew Johnson and the Rev. William G. Brownlow. That portion of the Old Dominion which lay west of the Alleghany Mountains held in i860 but one- twelfth as many slaves in propor¬ tion to its white population as the remainder of the State. And when Virginia passed her ordinance of secession, all but nine of the fifty- five votes against it were cast by delegates from the mountainous western counties. The people of these counties, having little interest in slavery and its products, and great interests in iron, coal and lumber, the market for which was in the free States, while their streams flowed into the Ohio, naturally ob¬ jected to being dragged into the Confederacy. Like the people of East Tennessee, they wanted to secede from secession, and one of their delegates actually proposed it in the convention. In less than a month (May 13) after the passage of the ordinance, a Union convention was held at Wheeling, in which twenty-five of the western counties were represented; and ten days later, when the election was held, these people voted against seceding. The State authorities sent recruiting officers over the mountains, but they had little success. Some forces were gathered, under the direction of Gen. Robert E. Lee and under the immediate command of Colonel Porterfield, who began burning the bridges CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 45 on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Meanwhile Capt. George B. McClellan had been made a general and placed in command of Ohio troops. With four regiments he crossed the Ohio on the 26th and went in pursuit of the enemy. His movement at first was retarded by the burned bridges; but these were repaired, large reinforcements were brought over, and in small but brilliant engagements—at Philippi and at Rich Mountain- lie completely routed the Confederates. At Philippi the Confederates were completely surprised by Colonels Kelley and Dumont, and beat so hasty a retreat that the affair received the local name of the “ Philippi races.” The victory at Rich Mountain was the first instance of the capture by either side of a military position regularly approached and defended. A pass over this mountain was re¬ garded as so important that all the Confederate troops that could be spared were sent to defend it, under command of Gen. Robert S. Garnett with Colonel Pegram to assist him. The position was so strong that a front attack was avoided, and its speedy capture resulted from a flank attack skilfully planned and successfully executed by Gen. W. S. Rosecrans. On the retreat up the Cheat River Valley General Garnett was killed, and Pegram, with a considerable number of his men, sur¬ rendered to McClellan. The im¬ portance of this Delegates from the counties west of the Alleghanics met at Wheeling (June 11), pronounced the acts of the Richmond convention null and void, declared all the State offices vacant, and reorganized the Government, with Francis H. Pierpont as A legislature, consisting of members that had been governor. GENERAL BEN McCULLOCH, C. S A. ff • a ff a 1 r at Rich Mountain was really slight, not- withstanding it was successful in securing to the Union army a footing on this frontier that was not afterward seriously disturbed. But the significance of the action of July 11, and the campaign which it terminated, lies in the instant popu¬ larity and prominence it gave to General McClellan. lie reported the victory in a Napoleonic despatch, announcing the annihila¬ tion of “ two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their leisure;” and concluding, “Our success is complete, and seces¬ sion is killed in this country.” McClellan’s failure to accomplish more in this campaign has been indicated by military critics, but at the time nothing obscured the brilliancy of the victory. 1 he people took his own estimate of it, and “ Little Mac,” the young Napoleon, became a popular hero. The Government also took his view of it; and after the defeat at Bull Run, a few days later, he was given the command of the Army of the Potomac, and in the autumn succeeded to the command of the Armies of the United States. chosen on the 23d of May, met at Wheeling on the 1st of July, and on the 9th it elected two United States senators. The new State of Kanawha was formally declared created in August. Its constitution was ratified by the people in May, 1862, and in December of that year it was admitted into the Union. But, meanwhile, its original and appropriate name had been exchanged for that of West Virginia. The victory at Rich Moun¬ tain, announced in McClellan’s tri- GENERAL STERLING PRICE, C. S. A. umphant and resounding words, came in good time to arrest the depression caused by an un¬ fortunate affair of a few weeks before, at Big Bethel, on June loth ; though the popular clamor for aggressive warfare did not cease, but was even now driving the army into a premature advance on Manassas and the battle of Bull Run, for which the preparations were inadequate. Big Bethel has been called the first battle of the war, though it was subsequent to the affair of the “ Philippi races,” and at a later day would not have been called a battle at all. But among its few casualties there were numbered the deaths of Major Theodore Winthrop and the youthful Lieut. John T. Greble, and the painful impression caused by these losses converted the affair into a tragic national calamity. The movement was a conception of Gen. B. F. Butler’s, who commanded at Fortress Monroe. Annoyed by the aggressions of a body of Confederates, under General Magruder, encamped at Little Bethel, eight miles north of Newport News, he sent an expedition to capture them. It consisted of Col. Abram Duryea’s Fifth New York Zouaves, with Lieut.-Col. (afterward General) Gouverneur K. Warren second in command (the Confederates greatly feared these “ red-legged devils,” as they dubbed them), Col. Frederick Townsend’s Third New York, Colonel Bendix’s Seventh New York Volunteers, the First and Second New York, and detachments from other regi¬ ments, with two field-pieces worked by regulars under Lieutenant Greble ; Gen. E. W. Pierce in command. Duryea’s Zouaves were sent forward to attack from the rear; but a dreadful mistake of identity led Bendix’s men to fire into Townsend’s regiment, as these commands approached each other, which brought Duryea back to participate in the supposed engagement in his rear, and destroyed the chance of surprising the rebel camp. The Con- BATTLE OF BIG BETHEL VIRGINIA, JUNE 10, 1861. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 47 fedeiates abandoned Little Bethel, and took a strong position at Big Bethel, where they easily repulsed the attack that was made, and pursued the retreating Unionists until checked by the Sec¬ ond New York Regiment. An important preliminary to the battle of Bull Run was the operations about Harper’s Ferry in June and July, resulting, as they did, in the release from that point of a strong Confederate reinforcement, which joined Beauregard at Bull Run at a critical time, and turned the fortunes of the day against the Union army. Harper’s Ferry, as we have seen, had been occupied by a Confederate force under Stone¬ wall Jackson, who became subordinate to the superior rank of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston when that officer arrived on the scene. On both sides a sentimental importance was given to the occupation of Harper’s Ferry, which was not warranted by its significance as a military stronghold. It did, indeed, afford a control of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, so long as the position could be maintained. But it derived its importance in the public mind from the fact that it had been chosen by John Brown as the scene of his projected negro uprising in 1859, and was presumed from that to be a natural fortress, a sort of Gibraltar, which, once gained, could be held forever by a small though determined body of men. The Confederate Government and military staff at Richmond so regarded it, and they warned General Johnston that he must realize, in defending it, that its abandon¬ ment would be depressing to the cause of the South. General Patterson, whose army gathered in Pennsylvania was to attack it, impressed on the War Department the para¬ mount importance of a victory, and predicted that the first great battle of the war, the results of which would be decisive in the contest, would be fought at Harper’s Ferry. He begged for the means of success, and offered his life as the price of a failure on Ids part. The Washington authorities, though they did not exact the penalty, took him at his word as to the men and means required, and furnished him with between eighteen and twenty- two thousand men (variously estimated), sending him such commanders as Major-General Sandford, of New York (who generously waived his superior rank, and accepted a subordinate position), Fitz John Porter, George Cadwalader, Charles P. Stone, and others. Both sides, then, prepared for action at Harper’s Ferry, as for a mighty struggle over an important strategic position. The Confederates were the first to realize that this was an error. However desirable it might be to hold Harper’s Ferry as the key to the Baltimore and Ohio, and to Maryland, General Johnston quickly discovered that, while it was secure enough against an attack in front, across the Potomac, it was an easy capture for a superior force that should cross the river above or below it, and attack it from the Virginia side. For its defence, his force of six thousand five hundred men would not suffice against Patterson’s twenty thousand, and he requested permis¬ sion to withdraw to Winchester, twenty miles to the southwest. This suggestion was most unpalatable to the Confederate author¬ ities, who understood well that the popular interpretation of the movement would be detrimental to the cause. But the fear that McClellan would join Patterson from West Virginia, and that the loss of an army of six thousand five hundred would be even more depressing than a retreat, they reluctantly consented to John¬ ston's plan. He destroyed everything at Harper’s Ferry that could be destroyed, on June 13th and 14th; and when Patterson, after repeated promptings from Washington, arrived there on the 15th, he found no determined enemy and no mighty battle awaiting him, but only the barren victory of an unopposed occupa¬ tion of a ruined and deserted camp. A RAILROAD BATTERY. CHAPTER V. ARMY ORGANIZATION NORTH AND SOUTH. CONFEDERATE ADVANTAGES—THE LEADING GENERAL OFFICERS- GRADUATES OF WEST POINT JOIN THE CONFEDERACY-CAPITAL REMOVED FROM MONTGOMERY—PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S CALL FOR SOLDIERS AND SAILORS—SOUTHERN PRIVATEERS-“ ON TO RICHMOND ! ” ALTHOUGH up to this time no important engagements between the troops had taken place, the war was actually begun. The Sumter affair had been the signal for both sides to throw away sub¬ terfuge and disguise, and it became thenceforth an open struggle for military advantage. The South no longer pleaded State rights, but military necessity, for seizing such Government posts and property as were within reach ; the North no longer acted under the restraint of hesitation to commit an open breach, for the peace was broken irrevocably, and whatever it was possible to do, in the way of defence or offence, was now become politic. The two contending powers were entering on the struggle under very different conditions and with unequal advantages. Before taking up the military operations which ensued, it will be interesting to look at these conditions. » On both sides there were many experienced army and navy officers, who had seen service, had been educated at the United States Military and Naval Academies, and had either remained 48 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. in the service or, having withdrawn to civil life, were prompt to offer their swords to the side to which they adhered. Assuming the number and quality of these officers to have been equally divided, there were sev¬ eral respects in which the Confederates had the advantage in their preliminary organi¬ zation, apart from the studied care with which disloyal cabinet officers had scattered the Federal regular army and had stripped Northern posts of supplies and of trust¬ worthy commandants. President Lincoln / came on from his Western home without knowledge of war, acquaintance with mili¬ tary men, or familiarity with military mat¬ ters, and was immediately plunged into emergencies requiring in the Executive an intimate knowledge of all three. He be¬ came the titular commander-in-chief of an army already officered, but not only ignorant as to whether he had the right man in the right place, but powerless to make changes even had he known what changes to make, by reason of the law and the traditions governing the personnel of the service, in which promotion and personal relations were fixed and established. He found a military establishment that had been running on a peace footing for more than a decade and was not readily adaptable to war con¬ ditions ; and officers in high command, who, as their States seceded, followed them out of the Union, carrying with them the latest official secrets and leaving behind them vacancies which red-tape and tradition, and not the free choice of the commander-in-chief, were to fill. His near advisers, particularly those in whose hands were the details of military administration, were scarcely better informed than himself, possessing political shrewdness and undoubted loyalty, but none of the professional knowledge of which he stood so sorely in need. Th e President of the Southern Confederacy, on the other hand, was Jefferson Davis, a man whose personal instrumentality in bringing about the rebellion gave him both knowledge and authority ; an educated soldier and veteran of the Mexican war, FRANCIS H Governor of . PIERPONT, West Virginia in which he held a high command ; familiar, through long service as Secretary of War and on the Senate Military Committee, not only with all the details of military admin¬ istration, but with the points of strength and weakness in the military establishment of the enemy he was about to grapple with. Placed at the head of a new government, with neither army nor navy, nor law nor tradition for their control, he was free to exercise his superior knowledge of military matters for the best possible use of the men at his command in organizing his mili¬ tary establishment. None of the political conditions surrounding him forced on Presi¬ dent Davis the appointment of political generals—an unavoidable evil which long postponed the effectiveness of President Lincoln’s army administration. Whatever his judgment, guided by his professional military experience, approved of, he was free to do. It was President Lincoln's difficult task to learn something about mili¬ tary matters himself, and then to untie or cut the Gordian knot of hampering conditions; and if, in doing this, an occasional injustice was done to an individual officer, it is a cause for wonder far less significant than that by the exercise of his extraordinary faculty of common-sense he progressed as rapidly as he did toward the right way of accomplishing the ends he had in view. The beffinninu of trouble in 1861 found the administration of o o the War Department in the hands of Secretary Joseph Holt, who had succeeded the secessionist Floyd, and was in turn succeeded by Simon Cameron, the war secretary of Lincoln's first cabinet, who remained there until the appointment of Edwin M. Stanton, the great “ war secretary ” of the remaining years of the struggle. Cameron was a shrewd politician, but was uninformed on military matters, for advice on which President Lincoln relied principally on other members of the cabinet*and on General Scott. The cabinet of 1861 contained also John A. Dix, in the Treasury— whence issued his celebrated “ shoot him on the spot ” despatch CAMP OF THE FORTY-FOURTH NEW YORK INFANTRY, NEAR ALEXANDRIA, VA. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 49 —who took a general’s commission when he retired in favor of Salmon P. Chase, the Secretary of the 1 leasuiy during most of the war. Gideon Welles was Secretary of the Navy. Among the staff officers of the army were Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General; E. D. 1 ownsend, who as Assistant Adjutant-General was identified with this important office throughout the war; Montgomery G. Meigs, Quartermaster-General; and Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers. The general in command of the army was YV infield Scott, whose conduct of the Mexican wai had made him a conspicuous military and political figure, an able officer and a most loval Unionist, but alieady suffering from the infirmities of age, which soon compelled him to relinquish to younger hands the command of the army. But until after the battle of Bull Run, his was the directing mind. His immediate subordinates were Brig.-Gens. John E. Wool, also a veteran in service; William S. Harney, whose reluctance to take part in civil war soon terminated his usefulness; and David E. Twiggs, who surrendered his command to the Confederates in Texas, and soine with the South, was replaced by Edwin V. Sumner. 1 he command of the main Union force, organized from the volun¬ teers who were pouring into Washington, devolved on Irvin McDowell, a major in the regular army, now promoted to be brigadier-general, who established his headquarters at Alexandria, across the Potomac from Washington, there directing the defence of the capital, and thence advancing to Bull Run. In this command he succeeded Gen. Joseph K. E. Mansfield. Under him, during this campaign, were many officers who rose to eminence during the war. 11 is corps commanders at Bull Run were Gens. Daniel Tyler, David Hunter, Samuel P. Heintzelman, Theodore Runyon, and D. S. Miles; and among the brigade com¬ manders were Gens. Erasmus D Keyes, Robert C. Schenck, William T Sherman, Israel B. Rich¬ ardson, Andrew Porter, Ambrose E. Burnside, Wil¬ liam B. Franklin GENERAL SAMUEL P HEINTZELMAN. rr l0^ 5 MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH K MANSFIELD. MAJOR-GENERAL W. B. FRANKLIN. Oliver O. Howard, Louis Blenker, and Thomas A. Davies. Threatening the approach ^ to Richmond from the ] ower Chesapeake, was Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, at Fortress Monroe. Among the Confederate generals who pre¬ pared to defend Virginia, were Robert E. Lee, then in command of the Virginia State troops, Samuel Cooper, Joseph E. Johnston, P. G. T. Beauregard, James Longstreet, Jubal A. Early, Richard S. Ewell, Thomas J. (“Stonewall”) Jackson, Robert S. Garnett, John C. Pegram, Benjamin Huger, John B. Magruder, and others. The seventy-five thousand troops called for in President Lincoln’s proclamation of April 15th, were three-months men. On the 3d of May, 1861, he issued another proclamation, calling for forty- two thousand volunteers for three years, and authorizing the raising of ten new regiments for the regular army. He also called for eighteen thousand volunteer seamen for the navy. The ports of the Southern coasts had been already (April 19th) declared in a state of blockade, and it was not only desirable but absolutely necessary to make the blockade effectual. The Confederate Government had issued letters of marque for privateers almost from the first ; and its Congress had authorized the raising of an army of one hundred thousand volunteers for one year. When Congress convened on the 4th of July, President Lincoln asked for four hundred thousand men and four hundred million dollars, to suppress the insurrection ; and in response he was authorized to call for five hundred thousand men and spend five hundred million dollars. What he had already done was approved and declared valid; and on the 15th of July the House of Representatives, with but five dissenting votes, passed a resolution (intro¬ duced by John A. McClernand, a Democrat) pledging any amount of money and any number of men that might be necessary to restore the authority of the National Government. The seat of the Confederate Government was removed from Montgomery, Ala., to Rich¬ mond, Va., on the 20th of May. 4 BATTLE OF BULL RUN, JULY 21, 1861. BRIGADIER-GENERAL McDOWELL AND STAFF CHAPTER VI. THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. THE ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA—FORTIFICATIONS ON THE POTOMAC—POPULAR DEMAND FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS—CONFEDERATES FORTIFY MANASSAS JUNCTION—THEIR LINE OF DEFENCE AT BULL RUN—McDOWELL'S DEPARTURE FOR BULL RUN — A CHANGE OF PLAN-FIGHTING AT BLACKBURN'S FORD—DETOUR FROM CENTREVII.LE AND FLANK ATTACK FROM SUDLEY FORD—UNION SUCCESS IN THE MORNING— DISASTROUS BATTLE OF THE AFTERNOON—LOSS OF THE BATTERIES—A REAR ATTACK—DISORDER AND RETREAT—RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. TlIE first serious collision of the opposing armies occurred at Bull Run, in Virginia, on July 18 and 21, 1861. It was a battle between raw troops on both sides, and at a later period in the war a few well-led veterans might have turned it at almost any time into a victor)- for the losers and a defeat for those who won it. It developed the strength and weakness of the men, the com¬ manders, and the organization of the army. It opened the eyes of the North to what was before them in this conflict, and it gave 52 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. pause to military operations for a better preparation. Up to Bull Run, the war might have been terminated by a single great battle. After it, the struggle was certain to be a long one. Up to May 24th, the Union troops had been kept strictly on the Washington side of the Potomac. On that date, Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield sent three columns of troops across the river into Virginia, to drive back the Confederate pickets which were within sight of the capital. From Washington to Alexandria, a few miles down the river, a line of fortifications was established, which, with the approaches to Washington from Maryland in Union control, seemed to assure the safety of the city. Troops from all the loyal States had continued to arrive at retrieve the national honor, tarnished and unavenged since Sum¬ ter, and should justify the military establishment, which to the non-military mind seemed already enormous. Brigadiers and gold lace and regiments playing “high jinks” in their camps convenient to the attractions of Washington became a by-word, and “On to Richmond !” became the cry of those who wanted to see some fighting, now there was an army, and wanted to see secession rebuked and rebellion nipped in the bud. Under the stimulus of this public demand, which, however erroneous from a military point of view, could not be ignored, a forward move¬ ment was decided on. The Confederate forces were established on what was known FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE. w ashington. The ninety thousand men who had responded to the first call of the President had enlisted for three months. While these troops predominated in the service it was not the expectation of General Scott to undertake any serious operations. He proposed to utilize these for the defence of Washington; the garrisoning of Fortress Monroe, with possibly the recovery of the Norfolk Navy Yard ; the reinforcement of Patterson at Harper’s Ferry and of McClellan in the Shenandoah ; and the control of the border States. When the half million of three-years men called out in May and July should be equipped with the half billion of dollars voted by Congress, and instructed and drilled during a summer encampment, larger military operations were to ensue ; but not before. But after the mishap to Butler's men at Big Bethel, and the ambushing of a troop train at Vienna, near Washington, there was a public demand for some kind of vigorous action which should as the “ Alexandria line,” with its base at Manassas Junction, about thirty miles east of Alexandria. Early in June, General Beauregard, still wearing the laurels of his Sumter victory, was sent in person to command, relieving the Confederate General Bonham. Manassas Junction stood on a high plateau, dropping off toward the east into the valley of the little stream called Bull Run, running from northwest to southeast some three miles dis¬ tant. The Confederates had begun to intrench and fortify this elevated position ; but Beauregard’s quick and educated military judgment at once decided that a better defence could be made by moving his line forward to Bull Run, where the stream afforded a natural barrier, except at certain fords, where his men could be posted more effectively. Here he established himself, the right of his line being at Union Mills Ford, nearly due east from Manassas, and his left just above Stone Bridge, by which Bull Run is crossed on the Warrenton Turnpike leading from CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 53 Centreville to Gainesville. His commanders (after Johnston’s arrival), from left to right, were: Ewell, supported by Holmes; Jones and Longstreet, supported by Early; Bonham, supported by Jackson; Cocke, supported by Bee, each guarding a ford; and, at Stone Bridge, Evans. The Bull Run line of defence requiring a larger force, Beauregard was liberally reinforced from Richmond, so that his army numbered nearly twenty-two thousand men and twenty-nine guns, before he was joined by John¬ ston with about eight thousand men and twenty- eight guns. Against this force advanced General McDowe who had succeeded Mansfield in com¬ mand of operations south of the Poto¬ mac, with something less than twenty- nine thousand men and forty-nine guns. With his army under the commanders al¬ ready named, he was ready and started from Washington on July 16th, within a week of the date he had planned, not¬ withstanding the slow operations of the Government’s military machinery, rusted by long dis¬ use and not as yet in smooth working order. The departure of his column was a strange spectacle. The novelty of warfare and the general im¬ pression that the war was to be ended with one grand, brilliant stroke—an impression largely derived from the confidence at headquarters that the expedition would be successful—turned the march into a sort of festive picnic. Citizens accompanied the column on foot; Congressmen, newspaper correspondents, sight¬ participation in the four years’ fighting that brought him high rank, great honor, and a distinguished reputation. On July 18th the army arrived in front of the enemy at Bull Run. An army of seasoned campaigners, accustomed to self- denial, would have done better, for they would not have stopped along the way to pick blackberries and change stale water for fresh in their canteens at every wayside well UNITED STATES MILITARY RAILROAD, BULL RUN. spn ne Th e plan agreed upon by Generals Scott and McDowell had been for an attempt to turn the enemy’s right from the south; and to conceal his purpose McDowell ordered an advance, directly along the Warrenton Turnpike, on Centreville, as though that were to be his point of attack. But Washington was full of Confederate spies, and Beauregard was well informed as to what to expect. Tyler, whose division led the way, found Centreville evacuated and the enemy strongly posted along Bull Run, as he could see from his elevated position at Centreville, looking across the Bull Run valley with Manassas looming up beyond. It was McDowell’s intention that Tyler should limit himself to making the feint on Centreville, without bringing on any engagement, while diverging to the left behind him the main army attacked Beauregard’s right. But neither Tyler nor his men were as yet schooled to find an enemy flying before their advance and not yearn to be after them for a fight. Discovering the position of the enemy across the stream at Blackburn’s and Mitchell’s fords, he brought up some field pieces and sent forward his skirmishers; GENERAL AMBROSE E, BURNSIDE. seers, went along in carriages. There was a tremendous turnout of non-combatants, eager to see the finishing stroke to the rebellion. These were destined to share in the general rout that fol¬ lowed and to come pour¬ ing back into the security of Washington, all mixed in with the disorganized and flying troops. One member of Congress, John A. Logan, of Illi¬ nois, a veteran of the Mexican War, followed the army from the House of Representatives, armed with a musket, and began as a civilian a and as the enemy con¬ tinued to retire before his successive increase of both troops and artillery, he presently found that the reconnoissance he had been ordered to make had assumed the proportions of a small engagement with the brigades of Bon¬ ham, Longstreet, and Early, which he drove back in confusion, with a loss of about sixty men on each side. After this engagement, McDowell abandoned his attack from the south in favor of a flank attack from the north, where the roads were better. His GENERAL LOUIS BLENKER. 54 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. army was now concentrated at Ccntreville, whither the com¬ manders had been attracted by the sound of the engagement at Blackburn’s Ford, and there he divulged to his commanders the new plan of attack. Richardson’s brigade was continued at Blackburn’s Ford to keep up the appearance of an attack in front, and the next two days, Friday and Saturday, July 19th and 20th, were occupied in looking for an undefended crossing of Bull Run north of the Confeder¬ ate line, in resting the men, and provisioning them from the sup¬ ply trains, which were slow in reaching the rendezvous at Ccntreville. The engineers reported late on Saturday, the 20th, a practi¬ cable crossing of the stream at Sudley Ford, accessible by a de¬ tour of five or six miles around a bend of Bull Run turninc sharply from the west. McDow¬ ell determined to send Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s divisions to make this flank movement over a route which took them north, then west, and brought them upon the enemy’s left, as they crossed Bull Run at Sudley Ford and moved due south by the Sudley Road toward Man¬ assas. Meanwhile Tyler was ordered to proceed from Centre- villc to the Stone Bridge at Bull Run, there to feign attack until he heard Hunter and Heintzelman engaged, when he would cross and join their attack on the Confederate left, or push on to Gainesville, west of Bull Run, and head off Johnston, who McDowell was certain was com¬ ing from Winchester, with or without “ Patterson on his heels,” as General Scott had promised. But during McDowell’s en¬ forced two days of inactivity at Ccntreville there had been por¬ tentous happenings within the Confederate lines. Johnston had already left Winchester on the 18th ; one detachment of his army had joined Beauregard on the morning of the 20th; John¬ ston in person arrived at noon with a second detachment, and the remainder of his force ar¬ rived on the 21st in time to take part in the battle, the brunt of which was borne by Johnston’s army, which McDowell had hoped not to meet at all ! Johnston, as the ranking officer, assumed command, and lie and Beauregard turned their atten¬ tion to defending themselves against the attack now initiated by McDowell. Hunter and Heintzelman, whose brigades were coiti¬ on THE ROAD TO BULL RUN. CAMPFIRE AND BA 55 LD. manded by Cols. Andrew Porter, Ambrose E. Burnside, W. B. Pranklin, Orlando B. Willcox, and Oliver O. Howard, reached Sudley Ford after an unexpectedly long march, and crossed it unopposed about nine in the morning. Tyler, who had been expected to hold the Confederate Evans at Stone Bridge by a sharp attack, betrayed the incidental character of his demon¬ stration by the feebleness of his operations ; and Evans, suspect¬ ing from this an attack from some other direction, was soon rendered certain of it by the clouds of dust which he saw toward the north. Immediately, of his own motion and in the absence of orders from his superiors, he informed his neighboring com¬ mander, Cocke, of his intention, and leaving only a few com- panics to deceive Tyler at Stone Bridge, he turned his command the advance long enough for Johnston to order a general move¬ ment to strengthen the new line of defence which was then formed on a hill half a mile south of Young’s Branch, under the direction of Jackson, who with his own brigade of Johnston’s army met and rallied the retreating Confederates. It was right here that Stonewall Jackson acquired his sobriquet. To encour¬ age his own men to stop and rally, Bee called out to them : “Look at Jackson’s brigade! It stands there like a stone wall.” And Jackson never was called by his own name again, but only “ Stonewall.” Tyler did send Keyes’ and W. T. Sherman’s brigades across Bull Run by the ford L0 "GSTR Eet G£ne Ral above Stone Bridge in time to join in the pursuit, Sherman pushing toward Hunter and Keyes remaining near Bull Run ; but Schenck’s brigade he did not send across at all. As a result of the morning’s fighting the whole Union line was pushed forward past the Warrenton Turnpike, extending from Keyes’ position on Bull Run to where Porter and Willcox were posted, west of the Sudley Road. The Union troops felt not only that they had the advantage, but that they had won the battle; and this confidence, added to the fact that they were weary with marching and fighting, prepared them ill to meet the really serious work of the day, which was still before them. GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, C. S. A, to the rear and marched it to a strong position on Young’s Branch, where he faced the enemy approaching from his left. This action has commended itself to military critics as the finest tactical movement of the entire battle. Evans was even momentarily successful in repulsing the troops of Burnside’s brigade, which he pursued for a short distance. At the outset, General Hunter was severely wounded. Porter came to Burnside’s support, and Bee and Bartow, of Johnston s army, aligned their brigades with that of Evans. I here was sharp fighting for two hours; but the arrival of fresh supports for Burnside and Porter, including Sykes regiment of regulars and the regular batteries of Griffin and Ricketts, and the exten¬ sion of the Union line by Heintzelman’s division beyond the Sudley Road, proved too much for the Confederates, who re¬ treated downhill out of the Young’s Branch valley before a Union charge down the Sudley Road. But they had checked INTERIOR OF CONFEDERATE FORTIFICATION CAMPFIRE AND BA TTLEFIELD. 57 Johnston and Beaure¬ gard came up in person to superintend the dispo¬ sitions for defence. The line was formed on the edge of a semicircular piece of woods, with the concave side toward the Union ad¬ vance, on an elevation some distance south of the first position. The Confederate artillery commanded both the Warrenton Turnpike and the Sudlcy Road (the latte passing through the woods and the plateau between them was subject to a cross fi Across this plateau the Un advance had to be made, an it was made under great disad¬ vantages. many panies that organization. regiments ion dis effective fighting force reduced by casualties, by the retirement of Burnside’s brigade after a hard morning’s fighting, and by the separa¬ tion from the main army of Keyes’ brigade, which made an ineffectual attempt to cross Young’s Branch and get at the enemy’s right, McDowell was no longer superior in numbers, as in the morning. His weary men had not only to fight, but to advance on an enemy in position—to advance over open ground on an enemy concealed in the woods, invisible even while their sharpshooters picked off his gunners at their batteries. The formation of the ground gave him no comprehensive view of the whole field, except such as lie got by going to the top of the Henry house, opposite the Confederate centre; nor could his subordinate commanders see what the others were doing, and there was a good deal of independence of action among the Union troops throughout the remainder of the day. For his afternoon attack on the new Confederate position McDowell had under his immediate control the brigades of Andrew Porter, Franklin, Willcox, and Sherman, with Howard in reserve, back of the Warrenton Turnpike. These com¬ mands were not available up to their full strength, r or they included a good and corn- had lost their From t h e i 1 sheltered positions along the sunken turnpike and the valley of Young’s Branch he brought them forward for an attack on the centre and left of the enemy. With splendid courage they ad¬ vanced over the open ground and made a succession of determined assaults, which carried a portion of the position attacked. About the middle of the afternoon the regular batteries of Captains Griffin and Ricketts were brought forward to a position near the Henry house. But though their effectiveness from this point was greatly increased, so also was their danger; and after long and courageous fighting by both infantry and artillery, it was the conflict that surged about these guns that finally gave the victory to the Confederates. Two regiments had been detailed to support the batteries, but the inexperience of these regiments was such that they were of little service. The batteries had scarcely taken up their advanced position when the gunners began to drop one by one under the fire of sharpshooters concealed in the woods before them. Sticking pluckily to their work, the artillerymen did effective firing, but presently the temptation to secure guns so inefficiently protected by supporting infantry proved strong enough to bring Confederate regiments out from the cover of the woods; and keeping out of the Ty l-ER. MAJOR-GENERAL CHARLES GR'FFIN. MAJOR-GENERAL O. 0. HOWARD. MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. RICKETTS. STONE HOUSE, WARRENTON TURNPIKE, BULL RUN. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD 59 line of fire, they stole nearer and nearer to the batteries. A Confederate cavalry charge scattered one of the supporting regiments, and a volley from a Confederate regiment, that had gotten up to within seventy yards, sent the other off in con¬ fused retreat. So close an approach had been permitted by Captain Griffin under the mistaken impression, communicated to him by the chief of artillery, that the troops approaching so steadily were his own supports. He realized hfs error too late; and when a volley of musketry had taken off nearly every one of his gunners, had killed Lieutenant Ramsay, and seriously wounded Captain Ricketts, the Confederates rushed in and captured the guns. They had not as yet become machines, as good soldiers must be. “They were not soldiers,” said one officer, “ but citizens—inde¬ pendent sovereigns—in uniform.” It was impossible, of course, to get strong, concerted action out of such a mass-meeting of individual patriots; and the constant disintegration of regiments and brigades gradually reduced the effectiveness of McDowell’s army. Meanwhile the Confederate reinforcements from the lower fords were arriving. The remainder of Johnston’s army from Winchester had already arrived ; and though the Union army did not know that they had been fighting the biggest half of Johnston’s army all day, they realized that they were dealing STAND OF THE UNION TROOPS AT THE HENRY HOUSE. Then ensued a series of captures and recaptures of these same guns, first by one side and then by the other. At the same time there was a general fight all along the line of battle, which did not dislodge the Confederates while it wore out the Union troops. They lacked both the experience and the discipline necessary to keep them together after a repulse. The men lost track of their companies, regiments, brigades, officers, in the con¬ fusion, and little by little the army became disorganized, and that at a time when there was still remaining among them both strength and courage enough to have won after all. It has been said that at one time there were twelve thousand individual soldiers wandering about the field of battle who did not know “ where they belonged.” The strong individuality of the early recruits of the war was in a measure accountable for this. with Johnston now. During the fight of the day the Union right wing had faced around almost to the east, and the com- bined attack of the new Johnston brigades and Early’s re¬ inforcements from the fords was delivered almost squarely on the rear of its right flank. A blow so strong and from such an unexpected quarter had a serious effect on the troops that received it. But not as yet was the conviction of defeat general in the Union army. The contest had been waged with such varying results in different parts of the field, one side successful here, another there, and again and again the local advantage turning the other way under some bold movement of an individual com¬ mand, that neither army realized the full significance of what had happened. The Unionists had begun the afternoon’s work 6o CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . under the impression that the victory was already theirs and that they had only to push on and secure the fruits of it. In some parts of the field their successes were such that it seemed as though the Confederate line was breaking. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, C. S. A. Many of the Confederates had the same idea of it, and Jefferson Davis, coming up from Ma¬ nassas on his way from Rich¬ mond, full of anxiety for the result, found the roads al¬ most impassable by reason of crowds of Confederates escaping to the rear. His heart sank within him.' “ Battles are not won,” he remarked, “ where two or three unhurt men are seen leading away one that is wounded.” But he continued on, only to find that the field from which his men were retreating had been already won, and that McDowell’s army were in full retreat. McDowell himself did not know how the retreat had begun. He had not ordered it, for he inferred from the lull in the fight¬ ing that his enemy was giving way. But it had dawned on the men, first that their victory was in doubt, then that the Con¬ federates had a fighting chance, and finally that the battle was lost; and by a sort of common consent they began to make their way to the rear in retreat. A curious thing happened which dashed McDow¬ ell’s hope of mak- a stand at Stone BRIGADIER-GENERAL BARNARD lUg A - Bridge though the Warrenton Turnpike was open, and Stone Bridge had been freed from the obstructing abattis of trees, offering a straight road from the battlefield to the rendezvous at Centre- ville, the troops all withdrew from the field by the same di¬ rections from which they had approached it in the morn ing. And so, while the bri¬ gades near the Stone Bridge and the ford above it crossed directly over Bull Run, the commands which had made the long detour in the morn¬ ing made the same detour in retreat, adding many miles to the route they had to travel to reach Centreville. McDowell accepted the situation, and made careful disposi¬ tions to protect the rear of his retreating army. Stuart’s pursu¬ ing cavalry found a steady line of defence which they could not break. The rearmost brigades were in such good order that the Confederate infantry dared not strike them. The way over the Stone Bridge was well covered by the reserves cast of Bull Run, under Blenker. But now occurred an incident that greatly re¬ tarded the orderly retreat and broke it into confusion. There had been some fighting during the day between the reserves left east of Bull Run and Con¬ federate troops who sallied out from the lower fords. As a re¬ sult of this a Con¬ federate battery had been posted on an elevation command¬ ing the Warrenton RUINS OF THE HENRY HOUSE. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 61 Turnpike where it crossed Cub Run, a little stream between Bull Run and Centreville, on a suspension bridge. When the retreating brigades which had made the long detour from Sudley Ford reached this bridge they were met with a shower of fire from this battery. Finally, the horses attached to a wagon were killed, and the wagon was overturned right on the bridge, completely obstructing it. The remainder of the wagon train was reduced to ruin, and the thirteen guns which had been brought safely out of the battle were captured. A panic ensued. Horses were cut from wagons, even from ambu¬ lances bearing wounded men, and ridden off. Even while McDowell and his officers were deliberating as to the expediency of making a stand at Centreville, the disorganized men took the decision into their own hands and made a bee-line for Washington. Portions of the army, however, maintained their organization, and partly successful attempts were made to stop the flight. The Confederates had but little cavalry, and were in no condition to pursue. There was a black-horse regiment from Louisiana that undertook it, but came upon the New York Fire Zouaves, and in a bloody fight lost heavily. The retreat was well con¬ ducted; but this was due largely to the fact that the Confeder¬ ates were too exhausted and too fearful to continue the pursuit. It is not to be denied that on both sides, in the battle of Bull Run, there was displayed much bravery, and not a little skill. Never before, perhaps, was such fighting done by comparatively raw and inexperienced men. It was a motley crowd that thronged the highway to the capital. Intermixed were soldiers and civilians, privates and members of Congress, worn-out volunteers and panic-stricken non - combatants, “ red - legged - devil ” Zouaves, gray - coated Westerners, and regular army blue-coats. They pressed right on, fearing the pursuit which, unaccountably, did not follow. Some of the men since morning had marched twenty-five miles, from Centreville and back, and that night they marched twenty miles more to Washington. All the next day the defeated army straggled into Washing¬ ton city—bedraggled, foot-sore, wounded, hungry, wet through with the drizzling rain, exhausted. The citizens turned out to receive and succor them, and the city became a vast soup- house and hospital. On the streets, in the shelter of house- areas, under stoops, men dropped down and slept. FORT LINCOLN, WASHINGTON, D. C. 62 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. EXAMINING PASSES AT THE GEORGETOWN FERRY. CHAPTER VII. EFFECTS OF THE BATTLE OF BULL RLTN. PARALYSIS OF THE UNION CAUSE —FORTIFYING THE APPROACHES TO THE CAPITAL-WHY THE CONFEDERATES DID NOT ATTEMPT THE CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON—EFFECT OF UNION DEFEAT IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE—SLIDELL AND MASON—CAPTURE OF THE “ TRENT ”-HENRY WARD BEECHER IN ENGLAND—SYMPATHY OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE NORTH. The battle of Bull Run was undertaken with precipitation, fought with much valor on both sides, and terminated with present ruin to the Federal cause. For the moment the Union seemed to stagger under the blow. On the Confederate side there was corresponding exultation; a spirit of defiance flamed up throughout the South. It is in the nature of things that the initial battle of a war consolidates and crystallizes the sentiments of both the con¬ testants. After Bull Run there was no further hope of peace¬ able adjustment, but only an increasing and settled purpose to fight out with the sword the great issue which was dividing the Union. For a brief season after the battle there was a paralysis of the Union cause. It was as much as the authorities at Washington could do to make themselves secure against further disaster. Indeed, the Potomac River now gave positive comfort to the Government, since it fur¬ nished in some measure a natural barrier to the north¬ ward progress of the exultant Confederates. Immediate steps were taken to fortify the approaches to the capital; but while this work was in progress the Government seemed to stand, like an alarmed sentry, on the Long Bridge of the Potomac. In the South as well as in the North there was much surprise that the Confederates did not pursue the routed Union forces at the battle of Bull Run and capture Wash¬ ington. Perhaps Gen. Joseph E. Johnston is the best witness on this subject on the Southern side. He says: “ All the military conditions, we knew, forbade an attempt on Washington. The Confederate army was more dis¬ organized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the ob¬ jects of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that they had achieved all their country required of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army—not to return. . . . Exaggerated ideas of the victory, prevailing among our troops, cost us more than the Federal army lost by defeat.” In writing this passage General Johnston probably took no account of the effect produced in Europe. The early narratives sent there, in which the panic of retreat was made the principal figure, gave the impression that the result arose from constitutional cowardice in Northern men and invincible courage in Southerners. They also gave the impression that the Confederates were altogether superior in generalship ; and the effect was deep and long-enduring. The most notable of these was by a correspondent of the London Times , who had apparently been sent across the Atlantic for the express purpose of writing down the Republic, writing up the South, and enlisting the sympathies of Englishmen for the rebellion. In his second letter from Charleston (April 30, 1861) he had written that men of all classes in South Carolina declared to him : “ If we could only get one of the royal race of England to rule over us, we should be content.” “The New Englander must have something to persecute ; and as he has hunted down all his Indians, burnt all his witches, persecuted all his opponents to the death, he invented abolitionism FORT IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD ^3 THE "SAN JACINTO" STOPPING THE "TRENT." as the sole resource left to him for the gratification of his favorite passion. Next to this motive principle is his desire to make money dishonestly, trick¬ ily, meanly, and shabbily. He has acted on it in all his relations with the South, and has cheated and plundered her in all his dealings, by villanous tariffs.” Many an Englishman, counting his worthless Confederate bonds, and try¬ ing to hope that he will yet receive something for them, knows he would, never have made that investment but for such writing as this, and the ac¬ counts from the same pen of the battle of Bull Run. At the North the spectacle of McDow¬ ell’s army streaming back in disorder to the national capital produced first a shock of surprise, then a sense of dis¬ grace, and then a calm determination to begin the war over again. It was well expressed by a Methodist minister at a camp-meeting in Illinois, the Rev. Henry Cox. The news of the battle came while he was preaching, and he closed his sermon with the words: “ Brethren, we’d better adjourn this camp-meeting and go home and drill.” The effect of this over-discussed bat¬ tle upon the more confident and boast¬ ful of the Southerners was perhaps fairly expressed by an editorial utter¬ ance of one of their journals, the Louis¬ ville, Ky., Courier'. “As our Norman kinsmen in England, always a minority, have ruled their Saxon countrymen in political vassalage up to the present day, so have we, the ‘slave oligarchs,’ governed the Yankees till within a twelvemonth. We framed the Consti¬ tution, for seventy years moulded the policy of the government, and placed our own men, or ‘ Northern men with Southern principles,’ in power. On the 6th of November, i860, the Puritans emancipated themselves, and are now in violent insurrection against their former owners. This insane holiday freak will not last long, however; for, dastards in fight and incapable of self- government, they will inevitably again fall under the control of a superior race. A few more Bull Run thrashings will bring them once more under the yoke, as docile as the most loyal of our Ethiopian chattels.” France and England had made all haste to recognize the Con¬ federates as belligerents, but had not granted them recognition as an established nation, and never did. There was a constant fear, however, that they would ; and the Confederate Govern¬ ment did its utmost to bring about such recognition. Messrs. James M. Mason, of Virginia, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, were sent out by that Government, as duly accredited ministers to London and Paris, in 1861. They escaped the blockaders at Charleston, reached Havana, and there embarked on the British mail steamer Trent for Europe. But Capt. Charles Wilkes (who had commanded the celebrated exploring expedition in Antarc¬ tic waters twenty years before) was on the watch for them with the United States steam frigate San Jacinto, overhauled the Trent in the Bahama Channel (November 8), took off the Con¬ federate commissioners, and allowed the steamer to proceed on her way. He carried his prisoners to Boston, and they were incarcerated in Fort Warren. This action, for which Wilkes FORTIFICATION IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. es received the thanks of Congress, was denounced as an outrage on British neutrality. The entire British public bristled up as one lion, and their Government de¬ manded an apology and the libera¬ tion of the prisoners. The Ameri¬ can public was unable to see any way out of the dilemma, and was considering whether it would choose humiliation or a foreign war, when our Secretary of State, William H. Seward, solved the problem in a masterly manner. In his formal reply he discussed the whole ques¬ tion with great ability, showing that such detention of a vessel was justified by the laws of war, and there were innumerable British precedents for it ; that Captain Wilkes conducted the search in a proper manner; that the com¬ missioners were contraband of war ; and that the commander of the Trent knew they were contraband of war when he took them as passengers. But as Wilkes had failed to complete the transaction in a legal manner by bringing the Trent into port for adjudication in a prize court, it must be repudiated. In other words, by his consideration for the interests and conven¬ ience of innocent persons, he had lost his prize. In summing up, Mr. Seward said : “ If I declare this case in favor of my own Government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its most essential policy. We are asked to do to the British nation just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do to us.” The commis¬ sioners were released, and sailed for England in January ; but the purpose of their mission had been practically thwarted. This was a remarkable instance of eating one’s cake and keep¬ ing it at the same time. But though danger of intervention was thus for the time averted, and the relations between the British Government and our own remained nominally friendly, so far as moral influence and bit¬ terness of feeling could go the Re¬ public had no more determined enemies in the cotton States than in the heart of England. The aristocratic classes rejoiced at any¬ thing that threatened to destroy democratic government or make its stability doubtful. They con¬ fidently expected to see our country fall into a state of anarchy like that experienced so often by the Span- ish-American republics, and were willing to do everything they safely could to bring it about. The fore¬ most English journals had been predicting such a disaster ever since the beginning of the century, had announced it as in progress when a British force burned Washington in 1814, and now were surer of it than ever. Almost our only friends of the London press were the Daily News and Weekly Spectator. The commercial classes, in a country that had fought so many commercial wars, were of course delighted at the crippling of a commercial rival whom they had so long hated and feared, no matter what it mi ght cost in the shedding of blood and the destruction of social order. Among the working classes, though they suffered heavily when the supply of cotton was diminished, we had many firm and devoted friends, who saw and felt, however imperfectly, that the cause of free labor was their own cause, no matter on which side of the Atlantic the battlefield might lie. To those who had for years endured the taunts of Englishmen who pointed to American slavery and its tolerance in the Ameri¬ can Constitution, while they boasted that no slave could breathe on British soil, it was a strange sight, when our country was at war over the question, to see almost everything that had power JAMES MURRAY MASON. CAPTAIN CHARLES WILKES, afterward Rear-Admiral.) JOHN SLIDELL 5 66 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. and influence in England arrayed on the side of the slaveholders. A few famous Englishmen—notably John Bright and Goldwin Smith—were true to the cause of liberty, and did much to instruct the laboring classes as to the real nature and significance of the conflict. Henry Ward Beecher, then at the height of his powers, went to England and addressed large audiences, enlightening them as to the real nature of American affairs, concerning which most of them were grossly ignorant, and produced an effect that was prob¬ ably never surpassed by any orator. The Canadians, with the usual narrowness of provincials, blind to their own ultimate interests, were in the main more bitterly hostile than the mother country. Louis Napoleon, then the despotic ruler of France, was unfriendly to the United States, and did his utmost to persuade the English Government to unite with him in a scheme of inter¬ vention that would probably have secured the division of the country. How far his plans went beyond that result, can only be conjectured; but while the war was still in progress (1864) he threw a French force into Mexico, and established there an ephemeral empire with an Austrian archduke at its head. That the possession of Mexico alone was not his object, is suggested by the fact that, when the rebellion was subdued and the seces¬ sion cause extinct, he withdrew his troops from Mexico and left the archduke to the fate of other filibusters. The Russian Government was friendly to the United States throughout the struggle. The imperial manifesto for the aboli¬ tion of serfdom in Russia was issued on March 3, 1861, the day before President Lincoln was inaugurated, and this perhaps created a special bond of sympathy. FORT MONROE. THE FIRST UNION VICTORIES. FEDERAL NAVY-BLOCKADE-RUNNING—BALLS, POW¬ DER, AND EQUIPMENTS BROUGHT FROM ENG¬ LAND FOR CONFEDERATES—THE FIRST HATTERAS EXPEDITION-CAPTURE OF FORT HATTERAS AND FORT CLARK—CAPTURE OF HILTON HEAD AND PORT ROYAL—GENERAL BURNSIDE’S EXPE¬ DITION TO ROANOKE ISLAND—FEDERAL VIC¬ TORY AT MILL SPRINGS, KY.-CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY BY FEDERAL FORCES UNDER GENERAL GRANT—FALL OF FORT DONELSON—BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE. WHEN the war began, the greater part of the small navy of the United States was in h am. er »ard ft ea '-Ad ^nal MAJOR-GENERAL BENJAMIN F. BUTLER. distant waters—off the coast of Africa, in the Mediterranean, on the Asiatic station—and for some of the ships to receive the news and return, many months were required. Twelve vessels were at home—four in Northern and eight in Southern ports. The navy, like the army, lost many Southern officers by resignation or dismissal. About three hundred who had been educated CHAPTER VIII. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 67 for its service went over to the Confederacy; but none of them took with them the vessels they had commanded. The Govern¬ ment bought all sorts of merchant craft, mounting guns on some and fitting up others as transports, and had gunboats built on ninety-day contracts. It was a most miscellaneous fleet, whose principal strength consisted in the weakness of its adver¬ sary. The first purpose was to complete the blockade of often barefoot and ragged, and sometimes hungry, he never lacked for the most improved weapons that English arsenals could pro¬ duce, nor was he ever defeated for want of powder. A very large part of the bullets that destroyed the lives and limbs of National troops were cast in England and brought over the sea in block¬ ade-runners. Clothing and equipments, too, for the Confederate armies came from the same source. Often when a burial party ON BOARD THE FIRST BLOCKADE-RUNNER CAPTURED. Southern ports. Throughout the war this was never made so perfect that no vessels could pass through ; but it was gradu¬ ally rendered more and more effective. The task was simplified as the land forces, little by little, obtained control of the shore% when a few vessels could maintain an effective blockade from within. But an exterior blockade of a port in the hands of the enemy required a large fleet, operating beyond the range of the enemy’s fire from the shore, in a line so extended as to offer occasional opportunities for the blockade-runners to slip past. But blockade-running became exceedingly dangerous. Large numbers of the vessels engaged in it were captured or driven ashore and wrecked. The profit on a single cargo that passed either way in safety was very great, and special vessels for block¬ ade-running were built in England. The Confederate Govern¬ ment enacted a law providing that a certain portion of every cargo thus brought into its ports must consist of arms or ammu¬ nition, otherwise vessel and all would be confiscated. This in¬ sured a constant supply; and though the Southern soldier was went out, after a battle, as they turned over one after another of the enemy’s slain and saw the name of a Birmingham manufact¬ urer stamped upon his buttons, it seemed that they must have been fighting a foreign foe. To pay for these things, the Con¬ federates sent out cotton, tobacco, rice, and the naval stores produced by North Carolina forests. It was obvious from the first that any movement that would shut off a part of this trade, or render it more hazardous, would strike a blow at the insurrection. Furthermore, Confederate privateers were already out, and before the first expedition sailed sixteen captured merchantmen had been taken into the ports of North Carolina. Vessels could enter Pamlico or Albemarle Sound by any one of several inlets, and then make the port of Newbern, Washing¬ ton, or Plymouth ; and the first of several naval and military expeditions was fitted out for the purpose of closing the most useful of these openings, Hatteras Inlet, thirteen miles south of Cape Hatteras. Two forts had been erected on the point at the northern side of this inlet, and the project was to capture 68 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. them ; but, so new was everybody to the art of war, it was not at first intended to garrison and hold them. The expedition, which originated with the Navy Department, was fitted out in Hampton Roads, near Fortress Monroe, and was commanded by Flag-officer Silas H. Stringham. It num¬ bered ten vessels, all told, carrying one hundred and fifty-eight guns. Two were transport steamers, having on board about nine hundred troops commanded by Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, the shot from the fort could not reach them. Afterward the larger work, Fort Hatteras, was bombarded, but with no prac¬ tical effect, though the firing was kept up till sunset. But meanwhile the troops that had landed through the surf had taken possession of the smaller work, Fort Clark. They also threw up a small earthwork, and with their field-pieces fired upon some Confederate vessels that were in the Sound. The next morning (the 28th) the frigates anchored within reach of Fort Hatteras, and began a deliberate and steady bombardment. As before, the shot from the fort fell short of the ships, and neither could that from the smooth-bore broadside guns reach the fort ; but the pivot-guns and the rifled pieces of one vessel wrought great havoc. One plunging shell went down through a ventilator and narrowly missed exploding the magazine. At the end of three hours the fort surrendered. Its defenders, who were commanded by Samuel Barron, formerly of the United States navy, had suf- LAND FORCES STORMING THE FORTIFICATIONS AT FORT CLARK. (Two views.) and two were schooners carrying iron surf-boats. It sailed on the 26th of August, 1861, with sealed orders, arrived at its destination before sunset, and anchored off the bar. Early the next morning an attempt was made to land the troops through the surf, at a point three miles from the inlet, whence they might attack the forts in the rear. But it was not very successful. The heavy surf dashed the clumsy iron boats upon the shore, drenching the men, wetting the powder, and endangering everything. About one-third of the troops, however, were landed, with two field- guns, and remained there under protection of the fire from the ships. The forts were garrisoned by about six hundred men, and mounted twenty-five guns; but they were not very strong, and their bomb-proofs were not constructed properly. Stringham’s flag-ship, the frigate Minnesota , led off in the attack, followed by the Susquehaitna and Wabash, and the guns of the smaller fort were soon silenced. The frigates were at such a distance that they could drop shells into it with their pivot-guns, while about fifty in killed and wounded. They had been reinforced in the night, but a steamer was seen taking away a load of troops just before the surrender. The seven hundred prisoners were sent on board the flag-ship and carried to New York. The victors had not lost a man. There had been some intention of destroying the forts and blocking up the channels of the inlet ; but it was determined instead to leave a garrison and establish a coaling station for the blockading fleet. Two of the frigates remained in the Sound, and within a fortnight half a dozen blockade-runners entered the inlet and were captured. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 69 GUNBOAT “ MENDOTA." A much larger expedition sailed from Hampton Roads on one of the last days of October. It consisted of more than fifty vessels—frigates, gunboats, transports, tugs, steam ferry-boats, and schooners—carrying twenty-two thousand men. The fleet was commanded by Flag-officer Samuel F. Du Pont, the troops by Gen. Thomas W. Sherman (who must not be confounded with Gen. William T. Sherman, famous for his march to the sea). The expedition had been two months in preparation, and though it sailed with sealed orders, and every effort had been made to keep its destination secret, the information leaked out as usual, and while it was on its way the Confederate Secretary of War telegraphed to the Governor of South Carolina and the commander at Hilton Head where to expect it. Bull’s Bay, St. Helena, Port Royal, and Fernandina had all been discussed, and the final choice fell upon Port Royal. A tremendous gale was encountered on the passage ; the fleet was scattered, one COMMANDER C. R. P. RODGERS. (Afterward Rear-Admiral.) COMMANDER JOHN RODGERS. (Afterward Rear-Admiral,) m*- feA- BOMBARDMENT OF FORT WALKER, HILTON HEAD, PORT ROYAL HARBOR, S. C, BY UNITED STATES FLEET, NOVEMBER 7, 1861 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD 7 i transport was completely wrecked, with a loss of seven lives, one gunboat was obliged to throw her broadside battery over¬ board, a transport threw over her cargo, and one store-ship was lost. When the storm was over, only a single gunboat was in sight from the flag-ship. But the fleet slowly came together again, and was joined by some of the frigates that were blockading Charleston Harbor, these being relieved by others that had come down for the purpose. They arrived off the entrance to Port Royal harbor on the 5th and 6th of November. This entrance was protected by two earth¬ works—Fort Walker on Hilton Head (the south side), and Fort Beauregard on St. Helena Island (the north side). These forts were about two and a half miles apart, and were garrisoned by South Carolina troops, commanded by Generals Drayton and Ripley. A brother of General Drayton commanded a vessel in the attacking fleet. On the morning of the 7th the order of battle was formed. The bar was ten miles out from the entrance, and careful soundings had been made by two gunboats, under the fire of three Confederate vessels that ran out from the harbor. The main column consisted of ten vessels, led by the flag¬ ship Wabash, and was ordered to attack Fort Walker. Another col¬ umn of four vessels was ordered to fire upon Fort Beauregard, pass in, and attack the Con¬ federate craft. All were under way soon after breakfast, and were favored by a tranquil sea. The main column, a ship’s length apart, steamed in steadily at the rate of six miles an hour, passing Fort Walker at a distance of eight hundred yards, and delivering a fire of shells and rifled shot. Every gun in the fort that could be brought to bear was worked as rapidly as possible, in a gallant defence. After the line had passed the fort, it turned and steamed out again, passing this time within six hundred yards, and delivering fire from the guns on the other side of the vessels. Three times they thus went around in a long ellipse, each time keep¬ ing the fort under fire for about twenty minutes. Then the Bienville , which had the heaviest guns, and was commanded by Captain Steadman, a South Carolinian, sailed in closer yet, and delivered a fire that dismounted several guns and wrought dreadful havoc. Meanwhile two or three gunboats had taken a position from which they enfiladed the work, and the flag-ship came to a stand at short range and pounded away steadily. This was more than anything at that stage of the war could endure, and from the mast-head the troops were seen streaming out of the fort and across Hilton Head Island as if in panic. A flag of truce was sent on shore, but there was no one to receive it, and soon after two o’clock the National colors were floating over the fort. The flanking column of vessels had attacked Fort Beauregard; and when the commander of that work saw that Fort Walker was abandoned by its defenders, he also retreated with his force. The Con¬ federate vessels escaped by running up a shallow inlet. The loss in the fleet was eight men killed and twenty-three wounded ; that of the Confederates, as re¬ ported by their commander, was eleven killed and fifty-two wounded or missing. General Sherman said : “ Many bodies were buried in the fort, and twenty or thirty were found half a mile distant.” The road across Hilton Head Island to a wharf whence the retreating troops were taken to the mainland was strewn with arms and accoutrements, and two howitzers were abandoned. The surgeon of the fort had been killed by a shell and buried by a falling parapet. The troops were debarked and took possession of both forts, repaired and strength¬ ened the works, formed an intrenched camp, and thus gave the Government a permanent foothold on the soil of South Carolina. Roanoke Island, N. C., lies between Roanoke Sound and Croatan Sound, through which the channels lead to Albemarle Sound, giving access to the interior of the State. This island, therefore, was fortified by the Confederates, in order to com¬ mand these approaches. The island is about as large as that which is occupied by New York City—ten miles long, and some¬ what over two miles wide. In January, 1862, an expedition was fitted out to capture it, and the command was given to Gen. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 72 Ambrose E. Burn¬ side, who had about fifteen thousand men, with a battery of six guns, carried on forty transports. The naval part of the ex¬ pedition, consisting of twenty-eight ves¬ sels, none of them very large, carrying half a hundred guns, was under the imme¬ diate command of C a p t. Louis M . Goldsboro ugh. Among his subordi¬ nate officers were Stephen C. Rowan and John L. Worden. Burnside’s three bri¬ gade commanders— all of whom rose to eminence before the war was over—were John G. Foster, Jesse L. Reno, and John G. Parke. The expedition sailed from Hampton Roads on January 11, and almost immediately encountered a terrific storm, by which the fleet was far scattered, some of the vessels being carried out to sea and others driven ashore. Five were wrecked, and a con¬ siderable number of men were lost. By the 28th, all that had weathered the gale passed through Hatteras Inlet into the sounds. The fortifications on the island mounted forty guns; and in Croatan Sound a Confederate naval force of eight vessels lay behind a line of obstructions across the channel. On February 7th, the National gunboats, advancing in three columns, shelled Fort Bartow—the principal fortification, on the west side of the island—and the Confederate gunboats. The latter were soon driven off, and in four hours the fort was silenced. The transports landed the troops on the west side of the island, two miles south of the fort, and in the morning of the 8th they began their march to the interior, which was made difficult and disagreeable by swamps and a lack of roads, and by a cold storm. On the 9th, the Confederate skirmishers were driven in, and the main line was assaulted, first with artillery, and then by the infantry. The Confederate left wing was turned; and when the national troops had nearly exhausted their ammunition they made a brilliant bayonet charge, led by Hawkins’s New York zouave regiment, and stormed the works, which were hastily abandoned by the Confederates, who at¬ tempted to reach the northeast shore and Cross to Nag’s Head, but more than two thousand of them were captured. Fort Bar¬ tow still held out, but it was soon taken, its garrison surrender¬ ing. In this action the national loss was two hundred and thirty- five men killed or wounded in the army, and twenty-five in the navy. On the 10th, a part of the fleet, under Captain Rowan, pursued the Confederate fleet up Albemarle Sound, and after a short engagement defeated it. The Confederates set fire to their vessels and deserted them, destroying all but one, which was captured. Rowan then took possession of Elizabeth City and Edenton. The flying Confederates had set fire to the former; but Rowan’s men, with the help of the colored people who remained, put out the fire and saved the city. In this naval battle one of the first medals of honor won in the war was earned by a sailor named John Davis. A shell thrown by the Confederates entered one of the vessels and set fire to it. This was near the magazine, and there was an open barrel of powder from which Davis was serving a gun. He at once sat down on the barrel, and remained there covering it until the fire was put out. General Burnside next planned an expedition in the opposite direction, to attack Newbern. His forces, numbering about eight thousand men, sailed from Hatteras Inlet in the morning of March I2th, and that evening landed within eighteen miles of Newbern. The next day they marched toward the city, while the gunboats ascended the river and shelled such fortifications and Confederate troops as could be seen. The roads were miry, and the progress of the troops was slow. After removing elab¬ orate obstructions and torpedoes from the channel, the fleet reached and silenced the forts near the city. The land forces then came up and attacked the Confederates, who were about five thousand strong and were commanded by General Branch. After hard fighting, the works were carried, and the enemy fled. They burned the railroad bridge over the Trent River, and set fire to the city; but the sailors succeeded in extinguishing the flames in time to save the greater part of the town. Burnside’s loss in this battle was about five hundred and fifty killed or wounded; that of the Confederates, including prisoners, was about the same. Fifty-two guns and two steamers were cap¬ tured. Ten days later, Beaufort, N. C., and Morehead City were occu¬ pied by the National troops without opposition. Burnside’s army was now broken up into comparatively small bodies, holding the various places that had been taken, which greatly diminished the facilities for blockade-running on the North Carolina coast. The year 1862 opened with indications of lively and decisive MAJOR-GENERAL AMBROSE E BURNSIDE. BRIGADIER-GENERAL T. F. DRAYTON. C. S. A. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 73 m *JOr JOHN -GENEr al MAJOR-GENERAL JESSE L. RENO. work west of the moun¬ tains, and many move¬ ments were made that cannot be detailed here. One of the most gallant was in the region of the Big Sandy River in eastern Kentucky, where phrey Marshall had gathered a Confederate force of about two thousand five hundred (mostly Ken¬ tuckians) at Paintville. Col. James A. Garfield (afterward President), in command of one thousand eight hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry, drove him out of Paintville, pursued him beyond Prestonburg, came up with him at noon of January p ark £ Hum- ioth, and fou ght him till night, when Marshall his retreated under cover of the darkness, leaving dead on the field. In the autumn of 1861 a Confederate force, under Gen. Felix K. Zollicoffer, had been pushed forward byway of Knoxville to eastern Kentucky, but was defeated at Camp Wildcat, October 21st, by seven thousand men under General Schoepff, and fell back to Mill Springs at the head of steamboat navigation on the Cumberland. Zollicoffer soon crossed to the northern bank, and fortified a position at Beech Grove, in the angle between the river and Fishing Creek. The National forces in the vicinity were commanded by Gen. George H. Thomas, who watched Zollicoffer so closely that when the latter was told by his supe¬ riors he should not have crossed the river, he could only answer that it was now too late to return. As Zollicoffer was only a journalist, with more zeal than military knowledge, Gen. George B. Crittenden was sent to supersede him. Thomas was slowly advancing, through rainy weather, over heavy roads, to drive this force out of the State, and had reached Logan’s Cross-roads, within ten miles of the Confederate camp, when Crittenden determined to move out and attack him. The battle began early on the morning of January 19, 1862. Thomas was on the alert, and when his outposts were driven in he rapidly brought up one detachment after another and threw them into VICE-ADMIRAL S. C. ROWAN. line. The attack was di¬ rected mainly against the National left, where the fighting was obstinate and bloody, much of the firing being at very close quar¬ ters. Here Zollicoffer, thinking the Fourth Ken¬ tucky was a Confederate regiment firing upon its friends, rode forward to correct the supposed mis¬ take, and was shot dead by its colonel, Speed S. Fry. When, at length, the right of the Confederate line had been pressed back and broken, a steady fire hav¬ ing been kept up on the centre, the Ninth Ohio Regiment made a bayonet charge on its left flank, and the whole line was broken and routed. The Confederates took refuge in their intrenchments, where Thomas swiftly pursued and closely invested them, expecting to capture them all the next morning. But in the night they managed to cross the river, leaving behind their wounded, twelve guns, all their horses, mules, and wagons, and a large amount of stores. In the further retreat two of the Confederate regiments disbanded and scattered to their homes, while a large number from other regiments deserted individually. The National loss in killed and wounded was two hundred and forty-six ; that of the Confed¬ erates, four hundred and seventy-one. Thomas received the thanks of the President for his victory. This action is vari¬ ously called the Battle of Fishing Creek and the Battle of Mill Springs. When Gen. Henry W. Halleck was placed in command of the Department of Missouri, in November, 1861, he divided it into districts, giving to Gen. Ulysses S. Grant the District of Cairo, REAR-ADMIRAL LOUIS M. GOLDSBOROUGH. BURNSIDE’S EXPEDITION OFF FORT MONROE. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD 75 OiR/niet (dosed; oh. ATE 'FT HUGER M\2Gup3 , ^ LATE HARD ^ *4 Guns a jh.e P l 15 FORREST ■g CURLEW- JURW^ajT FE.B 8. '^Steamers Sur >kerK\ ess ~7~ BATTEFTY 2 Gutt^T TT FOSTE-R LATE^. FTBARTOW^W ^9 Guns BAT Formed rtB r 8£ Boats Thickly ' "flooded/ Swamp Wood&d Swcunp Fleetwood. P* As/toy's Ht irniy^Tronsports r Baums Cr i —- "Nr- 3 ^ mm. THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION CROSSING HATTERAS BAR. = Oregon, = Inlet/ Due STATUTE. MILES which included Southern Illinois, the counties of Missouri south of Cape Girardeau, and all of Kentucky that lies west of Cumberland River. Where the Tennessee and the Cumberland enter Kentucky from the south they are about ten miles apart, and here the Confederates had erected two considerable works to command the rivers—Fort Henry on the east bank of the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson on the west bank of the Cumberland. They had also fortified the high bluffs at Columbus, on the Mississippi, twenty miles below the mouth of the Ohio, and Bowling Green, on the Big Barren. The general purpose was to establish a military frontier with a strong line of defence from the Alleghany Mountains to the Mississippi. A fleet of iron-clad gunboats had been prepared by the United States Government for service on the Western rivers, some of them being built new, while others were altered freight-boats. After a reconnoissance in force by Gen. C. F. Smith, General Grant asked Halleck’s permission to capture Fort Henry, and, after considerable delay, received it on the 30th of January. That work was garrisoned by three thousand men under Gen. Lloyd Tilghman. Its position was strong, the ravines through which little tributaries reached the river being filled with slashed timber and rifle-pits, and swampy ground rendering approach from ROANOKE ISLAND, N. C., AND CONFEDERATE FORTS. ;6 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD the land side difficult. But the work itself was rather poorly built, bags of sand being largely used instead of a solid earth embankment. On the morning of February 2d the fleet of four iron-clad and two wooden gunboats, commanded by Flag-officer Andrew H. Foote, left Cairo, steamed up the Ohio to Paducah, thence up the Tennessee, and by daylight the next morning were within sight of the fort. Grant’s land force was to cooperate by an attack in the rear, but it did not ar- artillerists; and, after serving a gun with his own hands as long as possible, he ran up a white flag and surrendered. The regret of the victors at the escape of the garrison was more than counterbalanced by their gratification at the behavior of the gunboats in their first serious trial. After the surrender, three of the gunboats proceeded up the Tennessee River to the head of navigation, destroyed the railroad bridge, and captured a large amount of stores. In consequence of the battle of Mill Springs and the fall of Fort Henry, the Confederate Gen. Simon B. Buckner, who was at Bowling Green with about ten thousand men, abandoned that place and joined his forces to those in Fort Donelson. Gen. Ormsby M. Mitchel, by a forced march, promptly took possession of Bowl¬ ing Green with National troops; and General Grant immediately made disposi¬ tions for the capture of Fort Donelson. This work, situ¬ ated at a bend of the river, was on high ground, enclosed about a hundred acres, and had also a strong water- battery on the lower river rive in time. The gunboats moved up to within six hundred yards, and opened a bombardment, to which the guns of the fort immediately responded, and the firing was kept up for an hour. The Essex received a shot in her boiler, by which many men were wounded or scalded, in¬ cluding Capt. William D. Porter, son of Commodore David Porter who had won fame in another Essex in the war of 1812-15. Otherwise the fleet, though struck many times, was not seriously injured. On the other hand, the fire from the gun¬ boats knocked the sand-bags about, dismounted seven guns, brought down the flagstaff, and, together with the bursting of a rifled gun in the fort, created a panic. All but about one hundred of the garrison fled, leaving General Tilghman with the sick and a single company of BURNING OF AMERICAN MERCHANTMAN "HARRY BIRCH" IN BRITISH CHANNEL, BY CONFEDERATE STEAMER "NASHVILLE . 1 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 77 immediate sortie, and so perhaps ultimately saved the victory for Grant. That night a council of war was held within the fort, and it was determined to attack the besiegers in the morning with the entire force, in hopes either to defeat them completely or at least to turn back their right wing, and thus open a way for retreat toward the south. The fighting began early in the morning. Grant’s right wing, all but surprised, was pressed heavily and borne back, the enemy passing through and plunder¬ ing McClernand’s camps. Buckner sallied out and attacked on the left with much less vigor and with no success but as a diversion, and the ___ fighting extended all ^ along the line, while the Confederate cav¬ alry were endeavor- ing to gain the Na¬ tional rear. Grant was imperturbable through it all, and when he saw that the attack had reached its height, he ordered a counter e- front. The land side was protected by slashed timber and rifle- pits, as well as by the naturally broken ground. The gunboats went down the Tennessee and up the Cumberland, and with them a portion of Grant’s force to be used in attacking the water front. The fort contained about twenty thousand men, commanded by Gen. John B. Floyd, who had been President Buchanan’s Secretary of War. Grant’s main force left the neighborhood of Fort Henry on the morning of February 12th, a portion marching straight on Fort Donelson, while the re¬ mainder made a slight detour to the south, to come up on the right, strike the Confederate left, and prevent escape in that A FEDERAL CAVALRY CHARGE direction. They chose positions around the fort un¬ molested that afternoon, and the next morning the fighting began. After an artillery duel, an attempt was made to storm the works near the centre of the line, but it was a failure and entailed severe loss. The gunboats and the troops with them had not yet come up, and the attack was suspended for the day. A cold storm set in, with sleet and snow, and the assailants spent the night without shelter and with scant rations, while a large part of the defenders, being in the trenches, were equally exposed. Next morning the fleet appeared, landed the troops and supplies three miles below the fort, and then moved up to attack the batteries. These were not so easily disposed of as Fort Henry had been. It was a desperate fight. The plunging shot from the fort struck the gunboats in their most vulnerable part, and made ugly wounds. But they stood to the work manfully, and had silenced one battery when the steering apparatus of two of the gunboats was shot away, while a gun on another had burst and the flag-officer was wounded. The flag¬ ship had been struck fifty-nine times, and the others from twenty to forty, when they all dropped down the stream and out of the fight. They had lost fifty-four men killed or wounded. But the naval attack had served to prevent an COLONEL SPEED S. FRY. (Afterward Brigadier-General.) BRIGADIER-GENERAL felix k. zollicoffer, c. s. a. attack and recovery of the lost ground on the right, which was executed by the division of Lew Wallace, while that of C. F. Smith stormed the works on the left. Smith rode beside the color-bearer, and, in the face of a murderous fire that struck down four hundred men, his troops rushed forward over every obstruction, brought up field guns and enfiladed the works, drove out the defenders, and took possession. Another bitterly cold night followed, but Grant improved the time to move up reinforcements to the positions he had gained, while the wounded were looked after as well as circumstances would permit. Within the fort another council of war was held. Floyd declared it would not do for him to fall into the BATTLE OF MILL SPRINGS, LOGAN CROSS ROADS, KENTUCKY, JANUARY 19, 1862. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 79 war: "No terms other than an unconditional and immediate sur¬ render can be accepted. I pro¬ pose to move immediately upon your works.” Buckner, in a pet¬ ulant and ill-considered note, at once surrendered the fort and his entire command. This numbered about fourteen thousand men; and four hundred that were sent to reinforce him were also cap¬ tured. General Pillow estimated the Confederate loss in killed and wounded at two thousand. No undisputed figures are attainable on either side. Grant began the siege with about fifteen thousand men, which reinforcements had increased to twenty-seven thousand at the time of the surrender. Iiis losses were about two thousand, and many of the wounded had perished of cold. The long, artificial line of defence, from the mountains to the Mississippi, was now swept away, and the Confederates abandoned Nashville, to which Grant might have advanced immediately, had he not been forbidden by Halleck. Wher the news was flashed through the loyal States, and bulletins were posted up with enumeration of prisoners, guns, and small arms captured, salutes were fired, joy-bells were rung, flags were displayed, and people asked one another, “ Who is this Grant, and where did he come from ? ”—for they saw that a new genius had suddenly risen upon the earth. Both before and after the defeat and death of General Lyon at Wil¬ son’s Creek (August, 1861), there was irregular and predatory warfare in Missouri. Especially in the western part of the State half-organized COLONEL JAMES A. GARFIELD (Afterward Major-General ) hands of the Government, as he was accused of defrauding it while in office. So he turned over the command to Gen. Gideon J. Pillow. But that general said he also had strong reasons for not wanting to be a prisoner, so he turned it over to Gen. Simon B. Buckner. With as many cf their men as could be taken on two small steamers, Floyd and 1 illow embarked in the darkness and went up the river to Nashville. The cavalry, under Gen. N. B. Forrest, also escaped, and a considerable number of men from all the commands managed to steal away unobserved. In the morning Buckner hung out a white flag, and sent a bands of men would come into existence, sometimes make long marches, and on the approach of a strong enemy disappear, some scattering to their homes and others making their way to and joining the bodies of regular troops In Missouri and northern Arkansas guerilla war¬ fare was extensively car¬ ried on for more than a year. Many terrible stories are told of the engeful spirit with which both sides in this warfare were act¬ uated. It is quite possible these stories were exaggerated, but it is certain that many cold-blooded murders were com¬ mitted. Very few of the guerillas were Unionists. Gen. John C. F r emont, w h o — sN " TH ' commanded the major department, believing that Price was near Springfield, gave orders for the concentration at that place of all the National forces in Missouri. But Price was not there, and in November Fremont was superseded by General Halleck, some of whose subordinate commanders, especially Gen. John Pope, made rapid movements and did good service in capturing newly recruited regiments that were on their way to join Price. CAPTAIN CUSTER, U. S. A., AND LIEUTENANT WASHINGTON, A CONFEDERATE. PRISONER. Late in December Gen. Samuel R. Curtis took com¬ mand of twelve thousand National troops at Rolla, and advanced against Price, who retreated before him to the MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY W. HALLECK. 8 o CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . northwestern corner of Arkansas, where his force was joined by that of General McCulloch, and together they took up a posi¬ tion in the Boston Mountains. Curtis crossed the line into Arkansas, chose a strong place on Pea Ridge, in the Ozark Mountains, intrenched, and awaited attack. Because of serious disagreements between rice and McCulloch, Gen. Earl Van Dorn, who ranked them both, was sent to take command of the Confederate force, arriving late in January. There is no authentic LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIMON B. BUCKNER, C S A BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN B FLOYD C S. A statement as to the size of his army. He himself de¬ clared that he had but fourteen thousand men, while no other estimate gave fewer than twice that num¬ ber. Among them was a large body of Cherokee In¬ dians, recruited for the Con¬ federate service by Albert Pike, who thirty years before had won reputation as rr poet. On March 5, 1862, Van Dorn moved to attack Curtis, who knew of his coming and formed his line on the bluffs along Sugar Creek, facing southward. His divisions were commanded by Gens. Franz Sigel and Alexander S. Asboth and Cols. Jefferson C. Davis and Eugene A. Carr, and he had somewhat more than ten thousand men in line', with forty-eight guns. The Confederates, finding the position too strong in front, made a night march to the west, with the intention of striking the Nationals on the right flank. But Curtis discovered their movement at dawn, promptly faced his line to the right about, and executed a grand left wheel. His army was looking westward toward the approaching foe, Carr’s division being on the right, then Davis, then Asboth, anc> Sigel on the left. But they were not fairly in position when the blow fell. Carr was struck most heavily, and, though reinforced from time to time, was driven back a mile in the course of the day. Davis, opposed to the corps of McCulloch, was more suc¬ cessful ; that general was killed, and his troops were driven from the field. In the night Curtis re-formed and strengthened his lines, and in the morning the battle was renewed. This day Sigel executed some brilliant and characteristic manoeuvres. To bring his division into its place on the left wing, he pushed a battery forward, and while it was firing rapidly its infantry sup¬ ports were brought up to it by a right wheel; this movement was repeated with another battery and its supports to the left of the first, and again, till the whole division had come into line, pressing back the enemy’s right. Sigel was now so far advanced that Curtis’s whole line made a curve, enclosing the enemy, and by a heavy concentrated artillery fire the Confederates w r ere soon driven to the shelter of the ravines, and finally put to rout. The National loss in this action—killed, wounded, and missing— was over thirteen hundred, Carr and Asboth being among the wounded. The Confederate loss is unknown. Generals Mc¬ Culloch and McIntosh were killed, and Generals Price and Slack wounded. Owing to the nature of the ground, any effective pursuit of Van Dorn's broken forces was impracticable. The Confederate Government had made a treaty with some of the tribes in the Indian Territory, and had taken into its service more than four thousand Indians, whom the stories of Bull Run and Wilson’s Creek- had apparently impressed with the belief that they would have little to do but scalp the wounded and rob the dead. At Pea Ridge these red men exhib¬ ited their old-time terror of artillery, and though they took a few- scalps they were so disgusted at being asked to face half a hundred well- servedcannon that they were almost useless to their allies, and thence¬ forth they took no further part in the war. It is a notable fact that BRIGADIER-GENERAL G J. PILLOW. C S A. in the wars on this continent the Indians have only been employed on the losing side. In the French and English struggle major-general bushrod johnson. c. s. a for the country, which ended in 1763, the French had the friendship of many of the tribes, and employed them against the English settlers and soldiers, but the French were conquered nevertheless. In the Revolu¬ tion and the war of 1812, the British employed them to some extent against the Americans, but the Americans were victori¬ ous. In the great Rebellion, the Confederate Government CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 81 VAN DORN, C. S. A. SA.M'-lEA- action, and at first favored neu MAJOR-GENERAL EARL R cnR T ' s ' attempted to use them as allies in the West and Southwest, and in that very section the Confederate cause was first defeated. All of which appears to show that though savages may add to the horrors of war, they cannot determine its results for civilized people; nor can irresponsible guerilla bands, of which there were many at the West, nearly all in the service of the Confederacy. “At the close of Mr. Buchanan’s administration nearly all the United States Indian agents in the Indian Territory were secessionists, and the moment the Southern States commenced passing ordinances of secession, these men exerted their influ¬ ence to get the five tribes committed to the Confederate cause. Occupying territory south of the Arkansas River, and having the secessionists of Arkansas on the east and those of Texas on the south for neighbors, the Choctaws and Chickasaws offered no decided opposition to the scheme. With the Cherokees, the most powerful and most civilized tribes of the Indian Territory, it was different. Their chief, John Ross, was opposed to hasty As Bot a and in the summer of 1861 issued a proclamation enjoining his people to observe a strictly neutral attitude during the war between the United States and the Southern States. In June, 1861, Albert Pike, a commissioner of the Confederate States, and Gen. Ben. McCulloch, command¬ ing the Confederate forces in Western Arkansas and the Depart¬ ment of Indian Territory, visited Chief Ross, with the view of having him make a treaty with the Confederacy. But he declined to make a treaty, and in the conference expressed himself as wishing to occupy, if possible, a neutral position dur¬ ing the war. A majority of the Cherokees, nearly all of whom were full-bloods, were known as Pin Indians, and were opposed to the South.” (Battles and Leaders , Vol. I., pp. 335-336.) After the battle of Wilson’s Creek had been fought, General Lyon killed, and the Union army defeated, Chief Ross was easily convinced that the South would succeed, and entered into a treaty with the Confederate authorities. BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE, MARCH 6, 1662. GALLANT CHARGE ON OUTWORKS OF FORT DONELSON, FEBRUARY 13, 1862. THE FRIGATE •' CUMBERLAND " RAMMED BY THE " MERRIMAC.” CHAPTER IX. THE “MONITOR” AND THE » MERRIMAC.” THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE “MONITOR” AND “MERRIMAC”-EFFECT UPON NAVAL ARMAMENTS OF THE WORLD—IDEA OF REVOLVING TOWER NOT ORIGINAL WITH ERICSSON — DESTRUCTION OF THE “CUMBERLAND”-PUBLIC EXCITEMENT AT PROSPECT OF AN ATTACK ON WASH¬ INGTON—THE “ MONITOR ” SAILS FROM NEW YORK HARBOR MARCH 6TH-GREAT NAVAL BATTLE IN HAMPTON ROADS. WHILE the great naval expedition was approaching New Orleans, the waters of Hampton Roads, from which it had sailed, were the scene of a battle that revolutionized the naval armaments of the world. When at the outbreak of the war the navy yard at Norfolk, Va., was abandoned, with an attempt at its destruction, the steam frigate Merrimac was set on fire at the wharf. Her upper works were burned, and her hull sunk. There had been long hesitation about removing any of the valuable property from this navy yard, because the action of Virginia was uncertain, and it was hoped that a mark of confidence in her people would tend to keep her in the Union. The day that Sumter was fired upon, peremptory orders had been issued for the removal of the Merrimac to Philadelphia, and steam was raised and every preparation made for her sailing. But the officer in command, for some unexplained reason, would not permit her to move, and two days later she was burned. Within two months the Confederates were at work upon her. They raised the hull, repaired the machinery, and covered it with a steep roof of wrought iron five inches thick, with a lining of oak seven inches thick. The sides were also plated with iron, and the bow was armed with an iron ram, something like a huge ploughshare. In the water she had the appearance of a house submerged to the eaves, with an immense gun looking out at each of ten dormer windows. But all this could not be done in a day, especially where skilled workmen were scarce, and it was March, 1862, before she was ready for action. The command was given to Franklin Buchanan, who had resigned a commission in the United States navy. On the 8th of March, accompanied by two gunboats, she went out to raise the blockade of James and Elizabeth Rivers by destroying the wooden war vessels in Hampton Roads. Her first victim was the frigate Cumberland , which gave her a broad- 8 4 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. side that would have riddled a wooden vessel through and through. Some of the shot entered her open ports, killed or wounded nineteen men, and broke two of her guns ; but all that struck the armor bounded off like peas. Rifled shot from the Mcrrimac raked the Cumberland , and then she ran into her so that her iron prow cut a great gash in the side. The Cumberland at once began to settle; but the crew stood by their guns, firing broadside after broadside without producing any impression on the iron monster, and received in return shells and solid shot that made sickening havoc. The commander, Lieutenant Morris, refused to surrender; and at the end of forty-five minutes, when the water was at the gun-deck, the crew leaped overboard and with the help of the boats got ashore, while the frigate heeled over and sank to the bottom. Her topmasts projected above the surface, and her flag was flying. While this was going on, three Confederate steamers came down and attacked the Congress with such effect that her commander tried to run her ashore. Having finished the Cumberland , the Mcr¬ rimac came up and opened a deliberate attack on the Congress , and finally set her on fire, when the crew escaped in their boats. She burned for several hours, and in the night blew up. Of the other Na¬ tional vessels in the Roads, one got aground in water too shallow for the Mcrri¬ mac to approach her, and the others were not drawn into the fight. The next morning the Mcrrimac came down again from Norfolk to fin¬ ish up the fleet in Hamp¬ ton Roads, and after that —to do various unheard-of things. The more sanguine expected her to go at once to Philadelphia, New York, and other seaboard cities of the North, and either bombard them or lay them under heavy con¬ tribution. The National Administration entertained a corresponding apprehension, manding an tugboat. LIEUTENANT G. U. MORRIS JOHN ERICSSON. Inventor of the " Monitor." Commander of the " Cumberland." and expected to see the Mcrrimac ascend the Potomac and attack Washington first. A part of these expectations were well founded, and the rest were such exaggerations as com¬ monly arise from ignorance. The Merrimac could not have reached New York or Philadelphia, because she was not a sea-going vessel. With skilful manage¬ ment and good luck, she might have ascended the Potomac to Washington, but she would have had to run the gantlet of numerous dangers. There is a place in the Potomac called “ the kettle-bottoms,” where a great many conical mounds, composed of sand and oyster-shells, rise from the channel till REAR-ADMIRAL J. SMITH. Commander at the Washington Navy Yard. their peaks are within a few feet of the surface ; and their positions were so imperfectly known at this time that the National vessels frequently ran aground upon them. Several devices were in wait¬ ing; to make trouble for the iron-clad cham¬ pion at this point, perhaps the most dangerous of which was that prepared by Captain Love, corn- armed He pro¬ cured a seine three- quarters of a mile long, took off its floats, and stretched it across the channel in such a way that the Mcrri¬ mac could hardly have passed over it without fouling her propeller, which would have ren¬ dered her helpless. But the dangerous enemy was destined to be disposed of in a more novel and dramatic way. In August, 1861, the Navy Department had advertised for plans for steam batteries, to be iron¬ clad and capable of fighting the Merrimac and other similar armored vessels that the Confederates were known to be constructing. The plan adopted was that presented by Capt. John Ericsson. Its essential features were an iron-clad hull, with an “overhang” to protect the machinery, all of which was below the waterline, sur¬ mounted by a round revolving tower or turret, in which were two heavy guns. The idea of a revolving tower was not Ericsson’s ; it had been put forth by several inventors, especially by Abra¬ ham Bloodgood in 1807. But this special adaptation of it, with the appli¬ cation of steam power, was his. The vessel was built in Brooklyn, and was launched January 30, 1862, one hundred days after the laying of the keel. She was named Monitor , for the obvious significance of the word. The extreme length of her upper hull was one hundred and seventy-two feet, with a breadth of forty-one feet, while her lower hull was one hundred and twenty-two feet long and thirty-four feet broad. Her depth was eleven feet, and when loaded she drew ten feet of water, her deck thus rising but a single foot above the surface. The turret was twenty feet in diameter and nine feet high. The only conspicuous object on the deck, besides the turret, was a pilot-house about five feet square and four feet high. This was built of solid wrought-iron beams, nine by twelve inches, laid 85 CAMPFIRE AND one upon another and bolted together. At a point near the top a slight crack was left between the beams all round, through which the commander and the pilot could see what was SToinp - on outside and get their bearings. The guns threw solid shot eleven inches in diameter. The advantage of presenting so small a surface as a target for the enemy, having all the machinery beyond reach of any hostile shot, carrying two large guns, and being able to revolve the turret that contained them, so as to bring them to bear in any direction and keep the ports turned away from danger except at the moment of firing, is apparent. This novel war-machine sailed from the harbor of New York on March 6, in command of Lieut. John L. Worden, destined for Hampton Roads. She was hardly out at sea when orders BA TTLEFIELD . and then steered straight for the Merrimac, which was now coming down the channel. The Confederates had known about the building of the Moni¬ tor (which they called the Ericsson), just as the authorities at Washington had known all about the Merrimac. When their men first saw her, they described her as “ a cheese-box on a raft,” and were surprised at her apparently diminutive size. Buchanan had been seriously wounded in the action of the pre¬ vious day, and the Confederate iron-clad was now commanded by Lieutenant Jones. Worden stationed himself in the pilot-house, with the pilot and a quartermaster to man the wheel, while his executive officer, Lieut. Samuel D. Greene, was in the turret, commanding BATTLE BETWEEN THE "MONITOR" AND "MERRIMAC," HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA, MARCH 9 1862. came changing her destination to Washington; but fortunately she could not be reached, although a swift tugboat was sent after her. She had a rough passage of three days, the perils of which were largely increased by the fact that her crew did not as yet understand all her peculiarities. They neglected to stop the hawse-hole where the anchor-chain passed out, and large quantities of water came in there, besides what poured down the low smoke-stacks when the waves broke over her. Outriding all dangers, she arrived in Hampton Roads on Saturday evening, March 8, where the mournful condition of things did not diminish the dispiriting effect of the voyage upon her crew. The Cumberland was sunk, the Congress was burn¬ ing, the Minnesota was aground, and everybody was dismayed. But Worden seems to have had no lack of confidence in his ves¬ sel and his crew. He took on a volunteer pilot, and promptly in the morning went out to his work. He first drove away the wooden vessels that were making for the helpless Minnesota, the guns, which were worked by chief engineer Stimers and sixteen men. The total number of men in the Monitor was fifty-seven ; the Merrimac had about three hundred. The Merrimac began firing as soon as the two iron-clads were within long range of each other, but Worden reserved his fire for short range. Then the battle was fairly open, the National vessel firing solid shot, about one in eight minutes, while the Confederates used shells exclusively and fired much more rapidly. The shells struck the turret and made numerous scars, but inflicted no serious damage, except occasionally when a man was leaning against the side at the moment of impact and was injured by the concussion. Worden had his eyes at the sight- hole when a shell struck it and exploded, temporarily blinding him, and injuring him so severely that he turned over the com¬ mand to Lieutenant Greene and took no further part in the action. Each vessel attempted to ram the other, but always without success. Once when the Monitor made a dash at the SSi§ THE FIGHT OF THE "MONITOR” AND " MERRI MAC,” HAMPTON ROADS. FEDERAL FLEET IN THE FOREGROUND. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 87 Times de¬ clared : “ There is not now a ship in the English navy, apait from lieutenant s. dana greene. these two [the . Executive Officer of the “ Monitor." Warrior and the Ironside ], that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little Monitor." The United States Government ordered the building of more monitors, some with two turrets, and they did excellent service, notably in the battle of Mobile Bay. In May, when Norfolk was captured, an attempt was made to take the Merrimac up the James River; but she got aground, and was finally abandoned and blown up. When the Con¬ federates refitted her they rechristened her Virginia , but the original name sticks to her in history. In December of that year the Monitor attempted to go to Beaufort, N. C., towed by a steamer; but she foundered in a gale off Cape Hatteras and went to the bottom, carrying with her a dozen of the crew. Merrimac s stern, to disable her steering-gear, the two guns were discharged at once at a distance of only a few yards. The two ponderous shots, striking close together, crushed in the iron plates several inches, and produced a concussion that knocked over the entire crews of the after guns and caused many of them to bleed at the nose and ears. The officers of the Monitor had received peremptory orders to use but fifteen pounds of powder at a charge. Experts say that if they had used the normal charge of thirty pounds their shots would undoubtedly have pene¬ trated the Merrimac and either sunk her or compelled her surrender. The Monitor had an advantage in the fact that she drew but half as much water as the Merrimac and co-uld move with much greater celerity. The fight con¬ tinued for about four hours, and the Confeder¬ ate iron-clad then returned to Norfolk, and she never came down to fight again till the nth of April, when no battle took place be¬ cause both ves¬ sels had orders to remain on the defensive, each Govern¬ ment being afraid to risk the loss of its only iron-clad in those waters. The indentations on the Monitor showed that she had been struck twenty-two times, but she was not in any way disabled. Twenty of her shots struck the Merrimac, some of which smashed the outer layers of iron plates. It was claimed that the Merrimac would have sunk the Monitor by ramming, had she not lost her iron prow when she rammed the Cumberland the day before; but a description of the prow, which was only of cast iron and not very large, makes this at least doubtful. CAPTAIN JOHN L. WORDEN. (Afterward Rear-Admiral.) Commanding the " Monitor." Just what damage the Merrimac received in the fight is not known. But it was observed that she went into it with her bow up and her stern down, and went out with her bow down and her stern up; that on withdrawing she was at once surrounded by four tugs, into which her men immediately jumped; and she went into the dry-dock for repairs. The significance of the battle was not so much in its immediate result as in its effect upon all naval armaments, and because of this it attracted world-wide attention. The London LOSS OF THE " MONITOR " IN A STORM OFF CAPE HATTERAS, DECEMBER 30, 1862.-GALLANT EFFORTS TO RESCUE THE CREW. CHAPTER X. THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. NEW ORLEANS THE LARGEST SOUTHERN CITY—FORTS ON THE MISSISSIPPI—CAPT. DAVID G. FARRAGUT CHOSEN COMMANDER-GEN. BENJAMIN F. BUTLER IN COMMAND OF LAND FORCES-TERRIFIC BOMBARDMENT OF THE FORTS—CUTTING THE CHAIN ACROSS THE MISSISSIPPI-THE GREAT NAVAL BATTLE IN THE NIGHT-ALL THE FORTS AND THE CONFEDERATE FLEET CAPTURED BY FARRAGUT- SURRENDER OF NEW ORLEANS-GENERAL BUTLER’S CELEBRATED “WOMAN ORDER.” The Crescent City was by far the largest and richest in the Confederacy. In i860 it had a population of nearly one hundred and seventy thousand, while Richmond, Mobile, and Charleston together had fewer than two-thirds as many. In 1860—61 it shipped twenty-five million dollars’ worth of sugar and ninety-two million dollars’ worth of cotton, its export trade in these articles being larger than that of any other city in the world. Moreover, its strategic value in that war was greater than that of any other point in the Southern States. The many mouths of the Mississippi, and the frequency of violent gales in the Gulf, rendered it difficult to blockade commerce between that great river and the ocean ; but the possession of this lowest commercial point on the stream would shut it off effectively, and would go far toward securing possession all the way to Cairo. This would cut the Confederacy in two, and make it difficult to bring supplies from Texas and Arkansas to feed the armies in Tennessee and Virginia. Moreover, a great city is in itself a serious loss to one belligerent and a capital prize to the other. As soon as it became evident that war was being waged against the United States in dead earnest, and that it was likely to be prolonged, these considerations presented themselves to the Government, and a plan was matured for capture of the largest city in the territory of the insurgents. The defences of New Orleans against an enemy approaching from the sea consisted of two forts, on cither side of the stream, PANORAMIC VIEW OF NEW ORLEANS,—FEDERAL FLEET AT ANCHOR IN THE RIVER 90 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD come FROM PENSACOLA TO THE MOUTH OF THE MISSISSIPPI. thirty miles above the head of the five great passes through which it flows to the Gulf. The smaller, Fort St. Philip, on the left bank, was of earth and brick, with flanking batteries, and all its guns were en barbette —on the top, in plain sight. These numbered about forty. Fort Jackson, on the right bank, mounted seventy-five guns, fourteen of which w r ere in bomb¬ proof casemates. Both of these works had been built by the United States Government. They were now garrisoned by about one thousand five hundred Confederate soldiers, com¬ manded by Gen. Johnson K. Duncan. Above them lay a Con¬ federate fleet of fifteen vessels, including an iron-clad ram and a large floating battery that was covered with railroad iron. Just below the forts a heavy chain was stretched across the river— perhaps suggested by the similar device employed to keep the British from sailing up the Hudson during the Revolutionary war. And it had a similar experience; for, at first supported by a row of enormous logs, it was swept away by the next freshet. The logs were then replaced by hulks anchored at intervals across the stream, and the chain ran over their decks, while its ends Avere fastened to great trees. One thing more completed the defence—two hundred sharp-shooters patrolled the banks between the forts and the head of the passes, to give warning of an approaching foe and fire at any one that might be seen on the decks. The idea at Washington, probably originated by Commander (now Admiral) David D. Porter, was that the forts could be reduced by raining into them a sufficient shower of enormous shells, to be thrown high down almost perpendicularly, and explode on king. Accordingly, the first care was to make mortars and shells, and provide the craft to carry them. Twenty-one mortars were cast, which were mounted on twenty-one schooners. They threw shells thirteen inches in diameter, weighing two hundred and eighty- five pounds ; and when one of them was discharged, the con¬ cussion of the atmosphere was so great that no man could stand close by without being literally deafened. Platforms' projecting beyond the decks were therefore provided, for the gunners to step out upon just before firing. The remainder of the fleet, as finally made up, consisted of six sloops-of-war, sixteen gunboats, and five other vessels, besides transports carrying fifteen thousand troops commanded by Gen. B. F. Butler. The flagship Hartford was a wooden steam sloop-of-war, one thousand tons’ burden, with a length of two hundred and twenty- five feet, and a breadth of forty-four feet. She carried twenty- two nine-inch guns, two twenty-pounder Parrott guns, and a rifled gun on the forecastle, while her fore and main tops were furnished with howitzers and surrounded with boiler iron to protect the gunners. The Brooklyn , Richmond , Pensacola, Ports¬ mouth, and Oneida were similar to the Hartford. The Colo¬ rado was larger. The Mississippi was a large side-wheel steamer. This was the most power- ful expedition that had ever sailed under the Amer¬ ican flag, and the man that Avas chosen to command it, Capt. David G. Farragut, was as unknown to the public as Ulysses S. Grant had been. But he Avas not unknown to his fellow- officers sixty years of age, one of the oldest men that took part in the Avar, and he had been in the navy half a century. He sailed the Pacific Avith Commodore Porter years before Grant and Sherman Avere born, and participated in the bloody encounter of the Essex and Phoebe in the liar- commander david d. porter. boi'of Valparaiso, He was (Afterward Rear-Admiral.) Farragut Avas now being C A M P FI RE AND BATTLE ElE L D . 91 especially familiar with the Gulf of Mexico, and had pursued pirates through its waters and hunted and fought them on its islands. There was nothing to be done on shipboard that he could not do to perfection, and he could have filled the place of any man in the fleet—except perhaps the surgeon’s. He was born in Tennessee, and married twice in Virginia; and if there had been a peaceable separation he would probably have made his home in the South. He was at Norfolk, waiting orders, when Virginia seceded, but he considered that his first duty was to the National Government, which had educated him for its service and given him rank and employment. When he said that “Virginia had been dragooned out of the Union,” and that he thought the President was justified in calling for troops after the firing on Sumter, he was told by his angry neighbors that a person holding such sentiments could not live in Norfolk. the United States Government, and shoot down those who war against the Union ; but cultivate with cordiality the first return¬ ing reason which is sure to follow your success.” In a single respect Farragut was not satisfied with his fleet. He had no faith in the mortars, and would rather have gone without them ? but they had been ordered before he was consulted, and were under the command of his personal friend Porter. Perhaps his distrust of them arose from his knowledge that, in 1815, a British fleet had unavailingly thrown a thousand shells into a fort at this very turn of the river where he was now to make the attack. The mortar schooners were to rendezvous first at Key West, and sail then for Ship Island, off Lake Borgne, where the trans¬ ports were to take the troops and the war-vessels were to meet as soon as possible. A considerable portion of March was gone before enough of INGENIOUS METHOD OF DISGUISING COMMANDER PORTER'S MORTAR FLOTILLA. “ Very well, then,” said he, “ I can live somewhere else.” So he made his way North with his little family, and informed the Government that he was ready and anxious for any service that might be assigned to him. This was in April, 1861 ; but it was not till January, 1862, that he was appointed to command the New Orleans expedition and the Western gulf blockading squadron. He sailed from Hampton Roads P'ebruary 2, in the flag-ship Hartford. Some sentences from the sailing-orders addressed to him by the Sec¬ retary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, arc significant and sugges¬ tive. “ As you have expressed yourself perfectly satisfied with the force given to you, and as many more powerful vessels will be added before you can commence operations, the department and the country require of you success. . . . There are other operations of minor importance which will commend them¬ selves to your judgment and skill, but which must not be allowed to interfere with the great object in view, the certain capture of the city of New Orleans. . . . Destroy the armed barriers which these deluded people have raised up against the power of the fleet had reached the rendezvous to begin operations. The first difficulty was to get into the river. The Eads jetties did not then exist, and the shifting mud-banks made constant sound¬ ings necessary for large vessels. The mortar schooners went in by Pass a l’Outre without difficulty ; but to get the Brooklyn, Mississippi , and Pensacola over the bar at Southwest Pass re¬ quired immense labor, and occupied two or three weeks. The Mississippi was dragged over with her keel ploughing a furrow a foot deep in the river bottom, and the Colorado could not be taken over at all. The masts of the mortar schooners were dressed off with bushes, to render them indistinguishable from the trees on shore near the forts. The schooners were then towed up to a point within range, and moored where the woods hid them, so that they could not be seen from the forts. Lieut. F. H. Gerdes of the Coast Survey had made a careful map of that part of the river and its banks, and elaborate calculations by which the mor¬ tars were to be fired with a computed aim, none of the gunners being able to see what they fired at. They opened fire on April 92 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. SHIP ISLAND. 18, and kept up the bombardment steadily for six days and nights. Six thousand enormous shells—eight hundred tons of iron—were thrown high into the air, and fell in and around the forts. For nearly a week the garrison saw one of Porter’s aero¬ lites dropping upon them every minute and a half. They de¬ molished buildings, they tore up the ground, they cut the levee and let in water, and they killed and mangled men ; but they did not render the forts untenable nor silence their guns. The return fire sank one of the mortar boats and disabled a steamer. Within the forts about fifty men were killed or wounded—one for every sixteen tons of iron thrown. While the fleet was awaiting the progress of this bombardment, a new danger appeared. The Confederates had prepared several flat-boats loaded with dry wood smeared with tar and turpentine ; and they now set fire to them one after another, and let them float down the stream. Rut Farragut sent out boats’ crews to meet them, who grappled them with hooks, and either towed them ashore or conducted them past the fleet, and let them float down through the passes and out to sea. In his General Orders, Farragut gave so many minute direc¬ tions that it would seem as if he must have anticipated every possible contingency. Thus: “Trim your vessel a few inches by the head [that is, place the contents so that she will sink a little deeper at the bow than at the stern], so that if she touches the bottom she will not swing head down the river.” “ Have light Jacob-ladders made, to throw over the side for the use of the carpenters in stopping shot-holes, who are to be supplied with pieces of inch-board, lined with felt, and ordinary nails.” “ Have a kedge in the mizzen chains on the quarter, with a hawser bent and leading through in the stern chock, ready for any emergency ; also grapnels in boats, ready to tow off fire¬ ships.” “ Have many tubs of water about the decks, both for extinguishing fire and for drinking.” “You will have a spare hawser ready, and when ordered to take in tow your next astern do so, keeping the hawser slack so long as the ship can maintain her own position, having a care not to foul the propeller.” It was this minute knowledge and forethought, quite as much as his courage and determination, that insured his success. In addition to his own suggestions he called upon his men to exer¬ cise their wits for the occasion, and the crews originated many wise precautions. As the attack was to be in the night, they painted the decks white to enable them to find things. They got out all the spare chains, and hung them up and down the sides of the vessels at the places where they would protect the machinery from the enemy’s shot. Farragut’s plan was to run by the forts, damaging them as much as possible by a rapid fire as he passed, then destroy or capture the Confederate fleet, and proceed up the river and lay the city under his guns. The time fixed upon for starting was just before moonrise (3:30 o’clock) in the morning of April 24. On the night of the 20th two gunboats went up the river, and a boat’s crew from one of them, under Lieut. Charles H. B. Caldwell, boarded one of the hulks and cut the chain, under a heavy fire, making an opening sufficient for the fleet to pass through. Near midnight of the 23d the lieutenant went up again in a gunboat, to make sure that the passage was still open, and this time the enemy not only fired on him, but sent down blazing rafts and lighted enormous piles of wood that they had prepared near the ends of the chain. The question of moonrise was no longer of the slightest importance, since it was as light as day for miles around. Two red lanterns displayed at the peak of the flag-ship at two o’clock gave the signal for action, and at half-past three the whole fleet was in motion. The sloop Portsmouth and Porter’s gunboats moved up to a CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 93 point where they could engage the water-battery of Fort Jack- son while the fleet was coins by. The first division of eight vessels, commanded by Capt. Theodorus Bailey, who was almost as old and as salt as Farragut, passed through the opening in deliberate fashion, unmindful of a fire from Fort Jackson, ran over to the east bank, and poured grape and canister into Fort St. Philip as they sailed by, and ten minutes afterward found themselves en¬ gaged at close quarters with eleven Confederate vessels. Bailey’s flag-ship, the Cayuga. was attacked by three at once, all trying to board her. He sent an eleven-inch shot through one of them, and she ran aground and burst into a blaze. With the swivel gun on his forecastle he drove off the second ; and he was preparing to board the third when the Oneida and Va¬ nina came to his assistance. The Oneida ran at full speed into one Confederate vessel, cutting it nearly in two, and in an instant making it a shape¬ less wreck. She fired into others, and then went to the assistance of the Vanina, which had been attacked by two, rammed by both of them, and was now at the shore, where she sank in a few minutes. But she had done effective work before she perished, crippling one enemy so that she surrendered to the Oneida , driving another ashore, and exploding a shell in the boiler of a third. The Pensacola steamed slowly by the forts, doing great execu¬ tion with her rifled guns, and in turn sustaining the heaviest loss in the fleet — thirty-seven men. In an open field men can dodge a cannon-ball; but when it comes bouncing in at a port-hole unan¬ nounced, it sometimes de¬ stroys a whole gun’s-crcw in the twinkling of an eye. In such an action men are under the highest possible excitement; every nerve is awake, and every muscle tense ; and when a ball strikes one it completely shatters him, as if he were made of glass, and the shreds are scat¬ tered over the ship. The ' ->■ CAPTAIN DAVID (Afterward (Afte^a-d R*« Mississippi sailed up in hand¬ some style, encountered the Confederate ram Manassas, and received a blow that disabled her machinery. But in turn she riddled the ram and set it on fire, so that it drifted away and blew up. The other ves¬ sels of this division, with vari¬ ous fortune, passed the forts and participated in the naval battle. The second division consisted of three sloops of war, the flag¬ ship leading. The Hartford received and returned a heavy fire from the forts, got aground on a shoal while trying to avoid a fire-raft, and a few minutes later had another raft pushed against her, which set her on fire. A portion of the crew was detailed to extinguish the flames, and all the while her guns were loaded and fired as steadily as if nothing had hap¬ pened. Presently she was got afloat again, and proceeded up the river, when, suddenly, through the smoke, as it was lighted by the flashes of the guns, she saw a steamer filled with men bearing down upon her, probably with the inten¬ tion of carrying her by board¬ ing. But a ready gun planted a huge shell in the mysterious stranger, which exploded, and she disappeared—going to the bottom, for aught that anybody knew. The Brooklyn, after get¬ ting out of her course and running upon one of the hulks, finally got through, met a large Confederate steamer, and gave it a broadside that set it on fire, and then poured such a rain of shot into St. Philip that the bastions were cleared in a minute, and in the flashes the gunners could be seen running to shelter. A Confederate gunboat that attacked her received eleven shells from her, all of which exploded, and it then ran ashore in flames. The Richmond sailed through steadily and worked her guns regularly, meeting with small loss, because she was more completely provided w i t h splinter-nettings than her consorts, as well as because she came after them. G. FARRAGUT. Admiral.) Rear-, Ad m, bailey. iral.j PASSAGE OF THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE FEDERAL SQUADRON BY FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD 95 The third division consisted of six gunboats. Two of them became entangled among the hulks, and failed to pass. Another received a shot in her boiler, which compelled her to drop down stream and out of the fight. The other three went through in gallant style, both suffering and inflicting considerable loss from continuous firing, and burned two steamboats and drove another ashore before they came up with the advance divisions of the fleet. The entire loss had been thirty-seven killed and one hundred and forty-seven wounded. Captain Bailey, in the Cayuga, still keeping the lead, found instance of the fatuity that grasps at a shadow after the sub¬ stance is gone. A letter written by Lieutenant Perkins at the time gives a vivid description of this incident, which is interesting in that it exhibits the effect upon the first people of the South who realized the possibility of their being conquered. “Among the crowd were many women and children, and the women were shaking rebel flags and being rude and noisy. As we advanced, the mob followed us in a very excited state. They gave three cheers for Jeff Davis and Beauregard, and three groans for CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. a regiment encamped at Quarantine Station, and compelled its surrender. On the morning of the 25th the Chalmette batteries, three miles below the city, were silenced by a fire from the sloops, and a little later the city itself was at the mercy of their guns. At noon Captain Bailey, accompanied only by Lieut. George H. Perkins, with a flag of truce, went ashore, passed through an excited crowd that apparently only needed a word to be turned into a mob, and demanded of the Mayor that the city be surrendered unconditionally and the Louisiana State flag at once hauled down from the staff on the City Hall. Bailey raised the stars and stripes over the Mint ; but the Mayor at first refused to strike his colors, and set out upon an elaborate course of letter-writing, which was of no consequence except as it furnished another Lincoln. Then they began to throw things at us, and shout, ‘ Hang them ! Hang them ! ’ We reached the City Hall in safety, and there found the Mayor and Council. They seemed in a very solemn state of mind ; though I must say, from what they said, they did not impress me as having much mind about anything. The Mayor said he had nothing to do with the city, as it was under martial law, and we were obliged to wait till General Lovell could arrive. In about half an hour this gentle¬ man appeared. He was very pompous in his manner, and silly and airy in his remarks. He had about fifteen thousand troops under his command, and said he would ‘never surrender,’ but would withdraw his troops from the city as soon as possible, when the city would fall into the hands of the Mayor, and he could do as he pleased with it. The mob outside had by this g6 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. OLD CITY HALL, NEW ORLEANS. WHERE THE SURRENDER OF THE CITY WAS DEMANDED. time become perfectly infuriated. They kicked at the doors, and swore they would have us out and hang us. Every person about us who had any sense of responsibility was frightened for our safety. As soon as the mob found out that General Lovell was not going to surrender, they swore they would have us out any way ; but Pierre Soule and some others went out and made speeches to them, and kept them on one side of the building, while we went out at the other end and were driven to the wharf in a close carriage. The Mayor told the Flag-officer this morning that the city was in the hands of the mob, and was at our mercy, and that he might blow it up or do with it as he chose.” On the night of the 24th, by order of the authorities in the city, the torch was applied to everything, except buildings, that could be of use to the victors. Fifteen thousand bales of cotton, heaps of coal and wood, dry- docks, a dozen steamboats and as many cotton-ships, and an unfinished ironclad ram were all burned. Barrels were rolled out and broken open, the levee ran with molasses, and the poor people carried away the sugar in their baskets and aprons. The Governor called upon the people of the State to burn their cotton, and two hundred and fifty thousand bales were destroyed. Butler had witnessed the passage of the forts, and he now hurried over his troops and invested St. Philip on the land side, while Porter sent some of his mortar-boats to a bay in the rear of Fort Jackson, and in a few days both works were surrendered. Farragut sent two hundred and fifty marines into the city to take formal possession and guard the public buildings. Butler arrived there with his forces on the 1st of May, and it was then turned over to him, and it remained in Federal possession throughout the war. His administration of the captured city, from May to December, was the subject of much angry controversy ; but no one denies that he reduced its turbulence to order, made it cleaner than it had ever been before, and averted a pestilence. He also caused provisions to be issued regularly to many of the needy inhabitants. The most famous incident of his administration was what became known as “ the woman order.” Many of the women of New Orleans, even while they were living on food issued to them by the National commissary, took every possible pains to flaunt their disloyalty and to express contempt for the wearers of the blue uniform. If an officer entered a street car, all the women would immediately leave it. If a detachment of soldiers passed through a residence street, many windows were thrown open and “ Dixie ” or the “ Bonny Blue Flag ” was loudly played on the piano. If the women met an individual soldier on the side¬ walk, they drew their skirts closely around them and passed at its extreme edge. And all the while they took every opportunity to display small rebel flags on their bosoms and to proclaim loudly that their city was “ captured but not conquered.” These things were borne with patience; but when one woman, enraged at the imperturbable calmness of the city’s captors, stepped up to two officers in the street and spat in their faces, General Butler judged that the time for putting a stop to such proceedings had come. Accordingly, he issued General Orders No. 28, which read thus : “As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non¬ interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter when any female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.” This immediately produced two effects. It put an end to the annoyances, and it raised an uproar of denunciation based upon the assumption that the commanding officer had ordered his soldiers to insult and assault the ladies of New Orleans. Of course no such thing was intended, or could be implied from any proper construction of the words of the order; but in war, as in politics, it is sometimes considered good strategy to misrepre¬ sent an opponent. However honest any Confederate THOS. O. MOORE, GOVERNOR OF LOUISIANA. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 97 GROUP OF SAILORS ON A GUNBOAT. citizen or editor may have been in his misconstruction of it, no soldier misunderstood it, and no incivility was offered to the women who were thus subdued by the wit and moral courage of perhaps the most successful man that ever undertook the task of ruling a turbulent city. One other incident attested the firmness of General Butler’s pur¬ pose, and assured the citizens of the presence of a power that was not to be trifled with. After Far- ragut had captured the city and raised the National colors over the Mint, four men were seen to ascend to the roof and tear down the flag, and it was only by a lucky acci¬ dent that the gunners of the fleet were prevented from instantly dis¬ charging a broadside into the streets. The act was exploited in the New Orleans papers, which ostentatiously published the names of the four men and praised their gallantry. General Butler caused the leader of the four, a gambler, to be arrested and tried by a court-martial. He was sentenced to death, and in spite of every solicitation the General refused to pardon him. He was hanged in the presence of an immense crowd of citizens, the gallows being a beam run out from one of the windows of the highest story of the Mint building. At the first news of this achieve¬ ment the people of the North hardly appreciated what had been accomplished ; many of their news¬ papers told them that the fleet “ had only run by the forts.” But as they gradually learned the par¬ ticulars, and saw that in fighting obstructions, fire-rafts, forts, rams, and fleet, and conquering them all, Farragut had done what neither Nelson nor any other great admiral had ever done be- fore, they felt that the country had produced a worthy companion for the victor of Donelson, and was equal to all emergencies, afloat or ashore. GENERAL BUTLER'S HEADQUARTERS, NEW ORLEANS. VIOLENT HURRICANE, APRIL 1, 1862. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 99 CONSTRUCTING MILITARY ROAD THROUGH SWAMP CHAPTER XI. THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH. OPERATIONS AT ISLAND NO. 10 AND NEW MADRID-NAVAL BATTLE ON THE MISSISSIPPI-THE BLOODIEST BATTLE WEST OF THE ALLEGHANIES-COMMENCEMENT OF BATTLE OF SHILOH, SUNDAY, APRIL 6, 1862-TERRIBLE LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES—TRAGIC DEATH OF GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON-GENERALS WALLACE, HINDMAN, AND GLADDEN KILLED—GENERAL GRANT LEADING A REGIMENT-PUBLIC MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING THIS GREAT BATTLE—INTERESTING INCIDENTS OF THE FIGHT —FATE OF CONFEDERACY DETERMINED AT SHILOH. WHEN the first line that the Confederates had attempted to establish from the mountains to the Mississippi was broken by the battle of Mill Springs and the fall of Forts Henry and Don- elson, their forces at Columbus were withdrawn down the river to the historic latitude of 36° 30'. Here the Mississippi makes a great sigmoid curve. In the first bend is Island No. 10 (the islands are numbered from the mouth of the Ohio southward) ; and at the second bend, on the Missouri side, is New Madrid. Both of these places were fortified, under the direction of Gen. Leonidas Polk, who had been Bishop of the Protestant Episco¬ pal diocese of Louisiana for twenty years before the war, but entered the military service to give the Confederacy the benefit of his West Point education. A floating dock was brought up from New Orleans, converted into a floating battery, and anchored near the island ; and there were also eight gunboats commanded by Commodore George N. Hollins. The works on the island were supplemented by batteries on the Tennessee shore, back of which were impassable swamps. Thus the Mis¬ sissippi was sealed, and a position established for the left (or western extremity) of a new line of defence. Early in March, 1862, a National army commanded by Gen. John Pope moved down the west bank of the Mississippi against the position at New Madrid. A reconnoissance in force demon¬ strated that the place could be carried by storm, but could not be held, since the Confederate gunboats were able (the river being then at high water) to enfilade both the works and the approaches. General Pope went into camp two miles from the river, and sent to Cairo for siege-guns, meanwhile sending three regiments and a battery, under Gen. J. B. Plummer, around to a point below New Madrid, where in the night they sunk trenches for the field-guns and placed sharp-shooters at the edge of the bank, and next day opened a troublesome fire on the passing gunboats and transports. Four guns were forwarded promptly from Cairo, being taken across the Mississippi and over a long stretch of swampy ground where a road had been hastily pre¬ pared for the purpose, and arriving at dusk on the 12th. That night Pope’s forces crowded back the Confederate pickets, dug trenches, and placed the guns in position. The enemy’s first intimation of what was going on was obtained from a bombard¬ ment that opened at daylight. The firing was kept up through the day, and some damage was inflicted on both sides ; but the next night, in the midst of a heavy storm, New Madrid was evacuated. The National forces took possession, and immedi¬ ately changed the positions of the guns so as to command the river. On the 16th five Confederate gunboats attacked these batteries; but after one boat had been sunk and some of-the others damaged, they drew off. On the 16th and 17th the National fleet of gunboats, under Commodore Andrew H. Foote, engaged the batteries on Island No. 10, and a hundred heavy guns were in action at once. The ramparts in some places had been weakened by the wash of the river, and the great balls went right through them. But the artillerymen stood to their work manfully, many of them in water ankle deep ; and though enor¬ mous shells exploded within the forts, and one gun burst and another was dismounted, the works were not reduced. A gun that burst in the fleet killed or wounded fourteen men. The attack was renewed from day to day, and one of the batteries was cleared of troops, but with no decisive effect. At the suggestion of Gen. Schuyler Hamilton, a canal was cut across the peninsula formed by the bend of the river above New Madrid. This task was confided to a regiment of engineers commanded by Col. Josiah W. Bissell, and was completed in nineteen days. The course was somewhat tortuous, and the whole length of the canal was twelve miles. Half of the dis¬ tance lay through a thick forest standing in deep water ; but by an ingenious contrivance the trunks of the trees were sawed off four and a half feet below the surface, and a channel fifty feet wide and four feet deep was secured, through which transports could be passed. On the night of April 4th the gunboat Carondelct , Commander Henry Walke, ran down past the batteries of Island No. 10, escaping serious damage, and in the night of the 6th the Pitts¬ burg performed the same feat. With the help of these to silence the batteries on the opposite shore, Pope crossed in force on the 7th, and moved rapidly down the little peninsula. The IOO CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. SURRENDER OF CONFEDERATE FORCES AFTER RETREAT FROM ISLAND No. 10. greater part of the Confeder¬ ate troops that had been hold¬ ing the island now attempted to escape southward, but were caught between Pope’s army and an impassable swamp, and surrendered. General Pope’s captures in the entire campaign were three generals, two hun¬ dred and seventy-three officers, and six thousand seven hundred men, besides one hundred and fifty-eight guns, seven thousand muskets, one gunboat, a float¬ ing battery, six steamers, and a considerable quantity of stores. On the very day of this blood¬ less victory, a little log church in southwestern Tennessee gave name to the bloodiest battle that has been fought west of the Alleghanies—Chickamauga being rather in the mountains. At Corinth, in northern Mississippi, the Memphis and Charleston Railroad crosses the Mobile and Ohio. This gave that point great strategic importance, and it was fortified accordingly and held by a large Confederate force, which was commanded by Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston (who must not be confounded with the Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston). His lieuten¬ ants were Gens. G. T. Beauregard, Braxton Bragg, and William J. Hardee. General Grant, who had nearly forty thousand men under his command, and was about to be joined by Gen. Don REAR -ADMIRAL ANDREW H. FOOTE Carlos Buell com¬ ing from Nashville with as many more, proposed to move against Corinth and capture the place. On Sunday, April 6th, Grant’s m a i n force was at Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee, twenty miles north of Corinth. One division, under Gen. Lew Wal¬ lace, was at Crump’s Landing, five miles far¬ ther north. The advance division of Buell’s army had reached the river, opposite the landings, and the re¬ mainder was a march behind. Lor some days Johnston had been moving northward to attack Grant, and there had been skirmishing between the outposts. Early on the morning of the 6th he came within striking distance, and made a sudden and heavy attack. Grant’s line was about two miles long, the left resting on Lick Creek, an impassable stream that flows into the Tennessee above Pittsburg Landing, and the right on Owl Creek, which flows in below. Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss’s division was on the left, Gen. John A. McClernand’s in the centre, and Gen. William T. Sherman’s on the right. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut’s was in reserve on the left, and Gen. C. F. Smith’s (now commanded by W. H. L. Wallace) on the right. There were no p OLK, CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. IOI intrenchments. The ground was undulating, with patches of woods alternating with cleared fields, some of which were under cultivation and others abandoned and overgrown with bushes. A ridge, on which stood Shiloh church, formed an important key-point in Sherman’s front. General Grant, in his headquarters at Savannah, down the river, heard the firing while he was at breakfast, and hurried up to Pittsburg Landing. He had expected to be attacked, if at all, at Crump’s Landing, and he now ordered Lew Wallace, with his five thousand men, to leave that place and march at once to the right of the line at Shiloh ; but Wallace took the wrong road, and did not arrive till dark. Neither did Gen. William Nelson’s advance division of General Buell's army cross the river till evening. The attack began at daybreak, and was made with tremendous force and in full confidence of success. The nature of the mound o made regularity of movement impossible, and the battle was rather a series of assaults by separate columns, now at one part of the line and now at another, which were kept up all day with wonderful persistence. Probably no army ever went into action with more perfect confidence in itself and its leaders than John¬ ston’s. Beauregard had told them they should sleep that night in the camps of the enemy, and they did. He also told them that he would water his horse in the Tennessee, but he did not. The heaviest attacks fell upon Sherman and McClernand, whose men stood up to the work with unflinching courage and disputed every inch of ground. But they were driven back by overwhelm¬ ing numbers, which the Confederate commanders poured upon them without the slightest regard to losses. The Sixth Missis¬ sippi regiment lost three hundred men out of its total of four hundred and twenty-five, and the Eighteenth Louisiana lost two hundred and seven. Sherman’s men lost their camps in the morning, and retired upon one new line of defence after another, till they had been crowded back more than a mile ; but all the while they clung to the road and bridge by which they were expecting Lew Wallace to come to their assistance. General Grant says of an open field on this part of the line, over which repeated charges were made, that it was “ so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. On our side National and Confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions ; but on the remain¬ der of the field nearly all were Confederates. On one part, which had evidently not been ploughed for several years, bushes had A FEDERAL GUNBOAT, grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. Not one of these was left stand¬ ing unpierced by bul¬ lets. The smaller ones were all cut down.” Many of the troops were under fire for MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER HAMILTON. the first time; but Sherman’s wonderful military genius largely made up for this defi¬ ciency. One bullet struck Sherman in the hand, an¬ other grazed his shoulder, BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE W. CULLUM. another went tllEOUgh llis hat, and several of his horses were killed. A bullet struck and shattered the scabbard of General Grant’s sword. Gen. W. H. L. Wallace was mortally wounded. On the other side, Gens. Adley H. Gladden and Thomas C. Hindman were killed ; at about half-past two o’clock General Johnston, placing himself at the head of a brigade that was reluctant to attempt another charge, was struck in the leg by a minie-ball. The wound need not have been mortal; but he would not leave the field, and after a time bled to death. The command then devolved upon General Beauregard. In the afternoon a gap occurred between General Prentiss’s division and the rest of the line, and the Confederates were prompt to take advantage of it. Rushing with a heavy force through this gap, and at the same time attacking his left, they doubled up both his flanks, and captured that general and two thousand two hundred of his men. On this part of the field the day was saved by Col. J. D. Webster, of General Grant’s staff, who rapidly got twenty guns into position and checked the Confederate advance. They then attempted to come in on the extreme left, along the river, by crossing a ravine. But more guns were brought up, and placed on a ridge that commanded this ravine, and at the same time the gunboats Tyler and Lexing¬ ton moved up to a point opposite and enfiladed it with their fire. The result to the Confederates was nothing but a useless display of valor and a heavy loss. The uneven texture of Grant’s army had been shown when two green colonels led their green regiments from the field at the first fire; and the FINAL STAND OF THE ARMY OF GENERAL GRANT, APRIL 6, 1862, NEAR PITTSBURG LANDING CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 103 stragglers and deserters, having no opportunity to scatter over the country, necessarily huddled themselves together under the bank of the river at the landing, where they presented a pitiful appearance. General Grant says there were nearly five thousand of them. There was about an equal number of deserters and stragglers from Johnston’s army; but the nature of the ground was not such as to concentrate them where the eye could take them all in at one grand review. With the exception of the break when Prentiss was captured, Grant’s line of battle was maintained all day, though it was steadily forced back and thirty guns were lost. Beauregard discontinued the attack at nightfall, when his right was repelled at the ravine, intending to renew it and finish the mainly for the purpose of holding the road that ran by Shiloh church, by which alone he could conduct an orderly retreat. The complete upsetting of the Confederate plans, caused by the death of Johnston, the arrival of Buell, and Grant’s promptness in assuming the offensive, is curiously suggested by a passage in the report of one of the Confederate brigade commanders : “ I was ordered by General Ruggles to form on the extreme left, and rest my left on Owl Creek. While proceeding to execute this order, I was ordered to move by the rear of the main line to support the extreme right of General Hardee’s line. Having taken my position to support General Hardee’s right, I was again ordered by General Beauregard to advance and occupy the crest of a ridge in the edge of an old field. My line was just formed SHILOH LOG CHAPEL, WHERE THE BATTLE OF SHILOH COMMENCED APRIL 6, 1862. victory in the morning. He knew that Buell was expected, but did not know that he was so near. Lew Wallace was now in position on the right, and Nelson on the left, and all night long the boats were plying back and forth across the Tennessee, bringing over Buell’s army. A fire in the woods, which sprang up about dusk, threatened to add to the horrors by roasting many of the wounded alive; but a merciful rain extinguished it, and the two armies lay out that night in the storm. A portion of the Confederates were sheltered by the captured tents, but on the other hand they were annoyed by the shells constantly thrown among them by the gunboats. At daylight Grant assumed the offensive, the fresh troops on his right and left moving first to the attack. Beauregard now knew that Buell had arrived, and he must have known also that there could be but one result; yet he made a stubborn fight, o in this position when General Polk ordered me forward to sup¬ port his line. When moving to the support of General Polk, an order reached me from General Beauregard to report to him with my command at his headquarters.” The fighting was of the same general description as on the previous day, except that the advantage was now with the National troops. Sherman was ordered to advance his command and recapture his camps. As these were about Shiloh church, and that was the point that Beauregard was most anxious to hold, the struggle there was intense and bloody. About the same time, early in the afternoon, Grant and Beauregard did the same thing: each led a charge by two regiments that had lost their commanders. Beauregard’s charge was not successful; Grant’s was, and the two regiments that he launched with a cheer against the Confederate line broke it, and began the rout. 104 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. Beauregard posted a rear guard in a strong position, and with¬ drew his army, leaving his dead on the field, while Grant captured about as many guns on the second day as he had lost on the first. There was no serious attempt at pursuit, owing mainly to the heavy rain and the condition of the roads. The losses on both sides had been enormous. On the National side the official figures are: 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded, 2,885 missing; total, 13,047. On the Confederate side they are: 1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, 957 missing; total, 10,699. General Grant says: “This estimate must be incorrect. We buried, by actual count, more of the enemy’s dead in front of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than are here reported, and four thousand was the estimate of the burial parties for the whole field.” At all events, the loss was large enough to gratify the ill- wishers of the American people, who were looking on with grim satisfaction to see them destroy one an¬ other. The losses were the same, in round numbers, as at the historic battle of Blenheim, though the number of men en¬ gaged was fewer by one-fourth. If we should read in to-morrow’s paper that by some disaster every man, woman, and child in the city of Concord, N. H., had been either killed or injured, and in the next day’s paper that the same thing had happened in Montgomery, Ala., the loss of life and limb would only equal what took place on the mourn¬ ful field of Shiloh. General Grant, in the first article that he ever wrote for publication, re¬ marks that “ the battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more per¬ sistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between National and Confederate troops during the entire rebellion. Correct reports of the battle have been published, but all of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion, and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed.” No battle is ever fought that it is not for some¬ body’s interest to misrepre¬ sent. In the case of Shiloh there were peculiar and compli¬ cated reasons both for inten¬ tional misrepresentation and for innocent error. The plans of the commanders on both sides were to some extent thwarted and changed by unexpected events. One commander was killed on the first day, and his admirers naturally speculate upon the different results that might have been attained if he had lived. The ground was so broken as to divide the engagement practically into several separate ac¬ tions, and what was true of one might gRf\GG mmm ■ ■ GENERAL ALEERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON, C. S. A. br^ toN lew fAM oB g en£ rM - WA U-A cE " not be true of another. The peculiarity of the position also brought to¬ gether in one place, under the river-bank, all who from fright or de¬ moralization fled to the rear of the National army, which produced upon those who saw them an effect altogether different from that of the usual retreating and straggling across the whole breadth of a battle line. Then there was the circumstance of Buell’s army coming up at the end of the first day, and not coming up before that, which could hardly fail to give rise to some¬ what of jealousy and re¬ crimination. And finally this action encounters to an unusual extent that criti¬ cism which reads by the light of after-events, but forgets that this was wanting to the actors whom it criticises. The point on which popular opinion was perhaps most widely and persistently wrong was, that the defeat of the first day arose from the fact that Grant’s army was com¬ pletely surprised. Public opin¬ ion, throughout the war, was formed in advance of the official reports of generals in three ways. There were many press correspondents with every army, and the main purpose of most of them was to construct an interesting story and get it into print as soon as possible. The National Government adopted the wise policy of giv¬ ing the armies in the field such mail facilities as would keep the soldiers in close touch with their homes, and they wrote millions of letters every year. All that a soldier needed was some scrap of paper and some sort of pen or pencil. If he happened to have no postage stamp, he had only to mark his missive “ Soldier’s letter,” and it would be carried in the mails to its destination, and the postage collected on delivery. After a battle every surviving soldier was especially anxious to let his family know that he had escaped any casualty, and he naturally filled up his letter with such particulars as had most impressed him in that small part of the field that he had seen, and sometimes with such exaggerated accounts as in the first excitement had reached MAJOR-GENERAL DON CARLOS BUELL. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 105 0? '^° il A SS TSBEHRS ' f '* eATr y 5 OTCav. 11 .TAYLORS '/,,, OATT ERY SWA R1 3ATT lORESSERS xrO REGULAR CAVALRY. ^Col.Stuert HEAD QUARTERS «f GEIWHURLBUT. VMANNS BAT ^ eOWMANS^CAV'"^ 5 ' him from other parts. Finally, the journalists were not few who assumed to be accomplished strategists, and talked learnedly in their editorial col¬ umns of the errors of generals and the way that battles should' have been fought. And some of them had politi¬ cal reasons for writing up certain gen¬ erals and writing down certain others. A good instance of innocent mis¬ apprehension is probably furnished in what Lieutenant-Colonel Graves, of the Twelfth Michigan, wrote: “On Saturday General Prentiss’s division was reviewed. After the review Major Powell, of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, came to me and said he saw Butter¬ nuts [Confederate soldiers was merely a reconnoissance of the enemy in force, and ordered the company in. About ten o’clock I went with Captain Johnson to the tent of General Prentiss, and the captain told him what he saw. The general remarked that we need not be alarmed, that everything was all right. To me it did not appear all right. Major Powell, myself, and several other officers went to the head¬ quarters of Colonel Peabody, commanding our brigade, and related to him what had transpired. He ordered out two companies from the Twelfth Michigan and two from the Twenty- fifth Missouri, under com¬ mand of Major Powell. About three o’clock in the morning the advance of the enemy came up with this body of men, who fought them till day- iglit, gradually falling MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM J HARDEE, C looking pURDY. Gen Shermans divis¬ ion fe/l back to the rujht.JM c Clernand^p' c,° N A eCS%. S/ _SHILOH S.\G O'- ^ GcnM r Cir.mnii 7 hcliarujed 6 - 09 front to mcci the eneitiv([ along this road. T ° COR nth a Col.M Dowell HURLBUT. MAJOR GENERAL m *J0R-ge NERal MAP SHOWING ROADS AND POSITION OF CAMPS BEFORE AND DURING THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. through the underbrush at the parade—about a dozen. Upon the representation of Major Powell and myself, General Prentiss ordered out one company of the Twelfth Michigan as an advance picket. About 8.30 o’clock Captain Johnson reported from the front that he could see long lines of campfires, hear bugle sounds and drums, which I reported to General Prentiss, and he re¬ marked that the company would be taken if left there , that it PRENTISS. back till they met their regi¬ ments, which had advanced about fifty rods. There the met the enemy, and fought till overpowered, when we fell back to our color line and re-formed. General Prentiss was so loath to believe that the enemy was in force, that our divi¬ sion was not organized for defence, but each regiment acted upon its own hook, so far as I was able to observe. The point I wish to make is this: that, had it not been for these four companies which were sent out by Colonel Peabody, our whole division would have been taken in their tents, and the day would have been lost. I shall always think that Colonel Peabody saved the battle of Shiloh.” mk « 0mm -.,AV>W ADVANCE OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS ON CORINTH—GENERAL HURLBUT’S DIVISION FORCING THEIR WAY THROUGH THE MUD. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 107 Such was the testimony and opinion, undoubtedly honest, of an officer of a green regiment which there for the first time participated in a battle. The truth was, the generals of the National forces were not ignorant of the near approach of the enemy. Reconnoissances, espe¬ cially in Sherman’s front, had shown that. They were only waiting for all their forces to come up to make an attack themselves, and when Buell arrived they did make that attack and were successful. General Prentiss’s division, so far from being unorganized, kept its lines, re¬ ceived the shock of battle, and stood up manfully to the work before it until the divisions on both sides of it drew back, leaving its flanks exposed, when the Con¬ federates poured through the gaps, struck it on both flanks at once, and captured a large part of it. On the ground along its line and in its front more men were struck down in an hour than on any other spot of equal extent, in the same time, in the whole war. The Confederates were successful on the first day, not because of any surprise, but simply because they had the greater number of men and persistently hurled them, regardless of cost, against the National lines. There was also one other reason, which would not have existed later in the war. After the first year no army would occupy any position on the field without intrenching. The soldiers on both sides learned how, in a little while, to throw up a simple breastwork of earth that would stop a large propor¬ tion of the bullets that an enemy might fire at them. Grant’s army at Shiloh had its flanks well protected by impassable streams, and if it had had a simple breastwork along its front, such as could have been constructed in an hour, the first day’s disaster might have been averted. As it was, the men fought in the open field, with no protection but the occasional shelter of a tree trunk, and at one point a slightly sunken road. The habit of Grant’s mind was such that he always thought of his army as assuming the offen¬ sive and hence having no use for intrenchments, and his green regiments did not as yet appreciate the power of the spade. Shiloh was a severe lesson to them all. Some of the most interesting incidents of the battle are given by Col. Douglas Putnam, Jr., of the Ninety-second Ohio Infantry, in a paper read be¬ fore the Ohio Commandery of GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT \ the Loyal Legion : “ With the consent of General Grant, I was permitted to accompany him to the field as a volun¬ teer aid. As we approached Crump’s Landing, where the division of Gen. Lew Wallace was stationed, the boat was rounded in and the engines stopped. General Wallace, then standing on the bank, said, ‘ My division is in line, wait¬ ing for orders.’ Grant’s reply was, that as soon as he got to Pittsburg Landing and learned where the attack was, he would send him orders. . . . After getting a horse, I started with Rawlins to find General Grant ; and to my in¬ quiry as to where we would likely find him, Rawlins’s reply, characteristic of the man, was, 1 We’ll find him where the firing is heaviest.’ As we proceeded, we met the increasing signs of battle, while the dropping of the bullets about us, on the leaves, led me in my inexperience to ask if it were not raining, to which Rawlins tersely said, ‘Those are bullets, Douglas.’ When, on meeting a horse through which a cannon-ball had gone, walking along with protruding bowels, I asked permission to shoot him and end his misery, Rawlins said, ‘He belongs to the quartermaster’s department; better let them attend to it.’ We soon found General Grant. He was sending his aids in different directions, as occasion made it necessary, and he himself visited his division commanders one by one. He wore his full uniform, with the major-general’s buff sash, which made him very conspicuous both to our own men and to those of the enemy. Lieut.-Col. J. B. McPherson, acting chief of staff, remonstrated with him, as did also Rawlins, for so unnecessarily exposing himself, as he went just in the rear of our line of battle ; but he said he wanted to see and know what was going on. About eleven o’clock he met General Sherman on what was called Sherman’s drill- ground, near the old peach orchard. The meeting was attended with but few words. Sher¬ man’s stock had be¬ come pulled around until the part that should have been in front rested under one of his ears, while his whole appearance indicated hard and earnest work. The bullets w’ere plente¬ ous here. Sherman told Grant how many horses he had had killed io8 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . under him, showing him also the marks of bullets in his clothing. When Grant left Sherman, I think I was the only aid with him. Riding toward the right, the General saw a body of troops coming up from the direction of Crump’s Landing, and ex¬ claimed with great delight and satisfaction, ‘ Now we are all right, all Wallace.’ He was of course the troops he saw were not those earnestly looked for, and of whose ance he was beginning to feel the need. About two o’clock, at one point were athered G e n e r a l Grant and several of his s t a ff. The group consisted of Grant, Mc¬ Pherson, Raw¬ lins, Webster, and others. This evi¬ dently drew the attention of the enemy, and they re¬ ceived rather more than a due share of the fire. Colonel Mc¬ Pherson’s horse having been shot under him, I gave him mine, and under directions went to the river on foot. The space under the bank was literally packed by thousands, I suppose, of men who had from inexperience and fright ‘lost their grip,’ or were both men¬ tally and physically, as we say, let down —however, only temporarily. To them it seemed that the day was lost, that the deluge was upon them. The Tennessee River in front, swamps to the right and swamps to the left, they could go no farther, and there lay down and waited. I remember well seeing a mounted officer, carry¬ ing a United States flag, riding back and forth on top of the bank, pleading and entreating in this wise: ‘Men, for God’s sake, for your country’s sake, for your own sake, come up here, form a line, and make one more stand.’ The appeal fell on list¬ less ears. No one seemed to respond, and the only reply I heard was some one saying, ‘That man talks well, don’t he?’ But eighteen hours afterward these same men had come to themselves, were refreshed by meeting other troops, and assured that all was not lost, that there was something still left to fight for, and helped also by the magic touch of the elbow, they did valiant service. A group of officers was gathered around Gen¬ eral Grant about dusk, at a smouldering fire of hay just on the top of the grade. The rain was falling, atmosphere murky, and ground covered with mud and water. Colonel McPherson rode up, and Grant said, ‘ Well, Mac, how is it ? ’ He gave him a report of the condition as it seemed to him, which was, in short, that at least one-third of his army was hors de combat, and the rest much disheartened. To this the General made no reply, and MAJOR-GENERAL McPherson continued, ‘Well, General Grant, under this condition of affairs, what do you pro¬ pose to do, sir? Shall I make preparations for retreat?’ The reply came quick and short: ‘Retreat? No! I propose to attack at day¬ light, and whip them.’ ” The same writer tells of a conversation that he held with General Beauregard some years after the war. “To my query that it had always been a mystery why he stopped the battle when he when the advan- the whole, seemed to be with him, and when he had an hour or more of day- ight, General Beauregard re- plied that there were two reasons: first, his men v ere, as he put it, ‘ out of hand,’ had been fighting since early morn, were worn G g.oR G£ ° ~ out, and also demoral¬ ized by the flush of victory in gathering the stores and sutlers’ supplies found in our camps. As one man said, ‘ You fellows went to war with cheese, pigs’ feet, dates, pickles—things we rebs had forgotten the sight of.’ ‘In tne second place,’ he said, ‘ I thought I had Gen¬ eral Grant just where I wanted him, and could John a. mcclernand. finish him up in the morning.’” After the battle, General Halleck took command in person, and proceeded to lay siege to Corinth, to capture it by regular approaches. Both he and Beauregard were reinforced, till each had about one hundred thousand men. Halleck gradually closed in about the place, till in the night of May 29th Beauregard evacuated it, and on the morning of the 30th Sherman’s soldiers entered the town. Some military critics hold that the fate of the Confederacy was determined on the field of Shiloh. They point out the fact that after that battle there was nothing to prevent the National armies at the West from going all the way to the Gulf, or—as they ultimately did—to the sea. In homely phrase, the back door of the Confederacy was broken down, and, however stub¬ bornly the front door in Virginia might be defended, it was only a question of time when some great army, coming in by the rear, should cut off the supplies of the troops that held Richmond, and compel their surrender. Those who are disposed to give history a romantic turn narrow it down to the death of General Johnston, declaring that in his fall the possibility of Southern independence was lost, and if he had lived the result would have been reversed. General Grant appears to dispose of their the¬ ory when he points out the fact that Johnston was killed while CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 109 leading a forlorn hope, and remarks that there is no victory for anybody till the battle is ended, and the battle of Shiloh was not ended till the close of the second day. But, indeed, there is no reason why the fatal moment should not be carried back to the time when the line of defence from the mountains to the Missis¬ sippi was broken through at Mill Spring and Fort Donelson, or even to the time when the Confederates, because of Kentucky’s refusal to leave the Union, were prevented from establishing their frontier at the Ohio. The reason why progress in conquer¬ ing the Confederacy was more rapid at the West than at the East is not to be found so much in any difference in men as in topography. At the West, the armies moving southward fol¬ lowed the courses of the rivers, and their opponents were obliged to maintain artificial lines of defence ; but the Eastern armies were called upon to cross the streams and attack natural lines of defence. Back of all this, in the logic of the struggle, is the fact that no defensive attitude can be maintained permanently. The bellig¬ erent that cannot prevent his own territory from becoming the seat of war must ultimately surrender his cause, no matter how valiant his individual soldiers may be, or how costly he may make it for the invader; or, to state it affirmatively, a belliger¬ ent that can carry the war into the enemy's country, and keep it there, will ultimately succeed. In most wars, the side on whose soil the battles were fought has been the losing side ; and this is an important lesson to bear in mind when it becomes necessary to determine the great moral question of responsibility for prolonging a hopeless contest. CHAPTER XII. MINOR ENGAGEMENTS OF THE FIRST YEAR. LARGE NUMBER OF BATTLES FOUGHT DURING THE WAR—DISASTER AT BALL’S BLUFF ON THE POTOMAC-SMALL ENGAGEMENTS AT EDWARDS FERRY, VA.—BATTLES AT FALLING WATERS AND BUNKER HILL, VA.-BATTLE AT HARPER’S FERRY—GALLANT BAYONET CHARGE AT DRANESVILLE, VA. — OPERATIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA UNDER GENERAL McCLELLAN—BATTLES AT ROMNEY AND BARBOURSVILLE-EFFORTS TO INDUCE KENTUCKY TO SECEDE—CAMP WILD CAT—ENGAGEMENTS AT HODGES- VILLE AND MUMFORDSVILLE AND SACRAMENTO—REASONS WHY MISSOURI DID NOT SECEDE—ENGAGEMENTS AT CHARLESTON, LEXINGTON, AND OTHER PLACES IN THAI- STATE—-A BRILLIANT CHARGE BY GENERAL FREMONT’S BODY GUARD UNDER ZAGONYI—INDIVIDUAL HEROISM- BATTLE OF BELMONT-VAST EXTENT OF TERRITORY COVERED BY WAR OPERATIONS. The enormous number of engagements in the civil war, the extent of country over which they were spread, and the magnitude of many of them, have sunk into comparative insignificance many that otherwise would have become historic. The action at Lexington, Mass., in 1775, was nothing whatever in comparison with any one of the several actions at Lexington, Mo., in 1861; yet every schoolboy is familiarized with the one, and many well-read people have scarcely heard of the other. The casualties in the battle of Harlem Heights, N. Y„ numbered almost exactly the same as those in the battle of Bolivar Heights, Va.; but no historian of the Revolution would fail to give a full account of the former, while one might read a very fair history of the civil war and find no mention whatever of the latter. In the writing of any history that is not a mere chronicle, it is necessary to observe proportion and perspective; but we may turn aside a little from the main course of our narrative, to recall some of the forgotten actions, in obscure hamlets and at the crossings of sylvan streams, where for a few men and those who were dear to them the call of duty was as stern and the realities of war as relentless as for the thousands at Gettysburg or Chickamauga. In the State of Virginia, the most disastrous of these minor engagements in 1861 was at Ball's Bluff, on the Potomac, about thirty-five miles above Washington. It has been known also as the battle of Edwards Ferry, Harrison’s Island, and Leesburg. At this point there is an island in the river, and opposite, on the Virginia side, the bank rises in a bold bluff seventy feet high. A division of National troops, commanded by Gen. Charles P. Stone, was on the Maryland side, observing the cross¬ ings of the river in the vicinity. A Confederate force of un¬ known strength was known to be at Leesburg, about five miles from the river. McCall’s division was at Dranesville, farther toward Washington, reconnoitring and endeavoring to draw out the enemy. At a suggestion of General McClellan to Gen¬ eral Stone, that some demonstration on his part might assist McCall, General Stone began a movement that developed into a battle. On the 21st of October he ordered a portion of his command to cross at the island and at Conrad’s Ferry, just above. They were Massachusetts troops under Col. Charles Devens, the New York Forty-second (Tammany) regiment, Col. Edward D. Baker’s Seventy-first Pennsylvania (called the Cali¬ fornia regiment), and a Rhode Island battery, in all about two thousand men. The means of crossing—two or three boats— were very inadequate for an advance, and nothing at all for a retreat. Several hours were spent in getting one scow from the canal into the river, and the whole movement was so slow that the Confederates had ample opportunity to learn exactly what was going on and prepare to meet the movement. The battery was dragged up the bluff with great labor. At the top the troops found themselves in an open field of about eight acres, surrounded by woods. Colonel Baker was made commander of all the forces that crossed. DELIVERING DAILY PAPERS. IIO CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. The enemy soon appeared, and before the battery had fired more than half a dozen rounds the Confederate sharp-shooters, posted on a hill at the left, within easy range, disabled so many of the gunners that the pieces became useless. Then there was an attack by a heavy force of infantry in front, which, firing from the woods, cut down Baker’s men with comparative safety. The National troops stood their ground for two hours and returned Our entire forces were retreating—tumbling, rolling, leaping down the steep heights ; the enemy following them murdering and taking prisoners. Colonel Devens left his command and swam the river on horseback. The one boat in the Virginia channel was speedily filled and sunk. A thousand men thronged BATTERY WAITING FOR ORDERS. cou' O^' EO' 6A' BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL CHARLES DEVENS. Colonel Baker thought it was General Johnston, and that the enemy would meet us in open fight. Part of our column charged, Baker cheering us on, when a tremendous onset was made by the rebels. One man rode forward, presented a revolver at Baker, and fired all its charges at him. Our gallant leader fell, and at the same moment all our lines were driven back by the over¬ whelming force opposed to them. But Captain Beiral, with his company, fought his way back to Colonel Baker’s body, rescued it, brought it along to me, and then a general retreat com¬ menced. It was sauve qui pejit. I got the colonel’s body to the island before the worst of the rout, and then, looking to the Virginia shore, saw such a spectacle as no tongue can describe. the farther bank. Muskets, coats, and everything were thrown aside, and all were desperately trying to escape. Hundreds plunged into the rapid cur¬ rent, and the shrieks of the drowning added to the horror of sounds and sights. The enemy kept up their fire from the cliff above. A cap¬ tain of the Fifteenth Massachusetts at one moment charged gallantly up the hill, leading two companies, who still had their arms, against the pursuing foe. A moment later, and the same officer, perceiving the hope¬ lessness of the situation, waved a white handkerchief and surrendered the main body of his command.” Gen. Edward W. Hinks (at that time colonel of the Nineteenth Massachusetts Regi¬ ment), who arrived and took command just after the action, wrote in his report: “ The means of transportation, for advance in support or for a retreat, were criminally deficient— especially when we consider the facility for creating proper means for such purposes at our disposal. The place for landing on the Virginia shore was most unfortunately selected, being at a point where the shore rose with great abruptness and was entirely studded with trees, being perfectly impassable to artil¬ lery or infantry in line. The entire island was also commanded by the enemy’s artillery and rifles. Within half a mile, upon either side of the points selected, a landing could have been effected where we could have been placed upon equal terms with the enemy, if it was necessary to effect a landing from the island.” The losses in this action were about a hundred and fifty killed, about two hundred and fifty wounded, and about five hundred captured. Colonel Baker was a lawyer by profession, had been a friend of Lincoln’s in Springfield, Ill., had lived in California, then removed to Oregon, and was elected United States senator from that State just before the war began. He was greatly the fire as effectively as they could ; but the enemy seemed to increase in number, and grew con¬ stantly bolder. About six o’clock, wrote Capt. Francis G. Young, “ a rebel officer, riding a white horse, came out of the woods and beck¬ oned to us to come forward. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. iii beloved as a man ; but though he was brave and patriotic, and had commanded a brigade in the Mexican war, it was evident, from his conduct of the Ball's Bluff affair, that he had little military skill. Among the other minor engagements was one at Edwards Ferry, Va., June 17th, in which three hundred Pennsylvanians, under Captain Gardner, were attacked by a Confederate force that tried to take possession of the ferry. After a fight of three hours the assailants were driven off with a loss of about thirty men. Captain Gardner lost four. On July 2d there was an engagement of six hours’duration at Falling Waters, Va., between the brigades of Abercrombie, Thomas, and Negley, and a Confederate force under General vania, and sections of a New York and a Rhode Island battery. The guns were placed to command approaches of the town, pickets were thrown out, and the whe’ht was removed. On the 16th the pickets on Bolivar Heights, west of the town, were driven in, and this was followed by an attack from a Confederate force, consisting of three regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and seven pieces of artillery. Gen. John W. Geary, command¬ ing the National forces, placed one company for the defence of the fords of the Shenandoah, and with the remaining troops met the attack. Three successive charges by the cavalry were repelled ; then a rifled gun was brought across the river and directed its fire upon the Confederate battery ; and at the same time Geary advanced his right flank, turned the enemy’s left, AN INCIDENT OF CAMP LIFE.-CARD-PLAYING. Jackson. It was a stubborn fignt. 1 he Confederates, who had four regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, with four guns, at length retreated slowly, having lost about ninety men. The National loss was thirteen. At Bunker Hill, near Martinsburg, on July 15th, General Patter¬ son’s division, being on the march, was attacked by a body of about six hundred cavalry, led by Colonel Stuart. When the cavalry charged, the National infantry opened their lines and disclosed a battery, which poured rapid discharges of shells and grape shot into the Confederates, and put them to rout. The Federal cavalry then came up and pursued the fugitives two miles. In October the Thirteenth Massachusetts Regiment crossed the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry, to seize a large quantity of wheat that was stored there for the Confederate Government. A day or two later they were reenforced by three companies of the Third Wisconsin Regiment, four of the Twenty-eighth Pennsyl- and gained a portion of Bolivar Heights. He then ordered a general forward movement, gained the entire Heights, and drove the enemy across the valley toward Halltown. From lack of cavalry he was unable to pursue ; but he planted guns on Boli¬ var Heights, and soon silenced the Confederate guns on London Heights. Before recrossing the Potomac the troops burned the iron foundry at Shenandoah City. In this action the National loss was four killed, seven wounded, and two captured. The Confederate loss was not ascertained, but it was supposed to be somewhat over a hundred men, besides one gun and a large quantity of ammunition. A member of the Massachusetts regiment, in giving an account of this action, wrote: “ There were many side scenes. Stimpson had a hand-to-hand fight with one of the cavalry, whom he bayoneted, illustrating the bayonet drill in which the company had been exercised. Corporal Marshall was chased by a mounted officer while he was assisting one of the wounded Wisconsin boys off. He turned and shot BATTLE OF MU MFORDSVILLE, KENTUCKY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1862 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. his pursuer through the breast. The officer proved to be Col¬ onel Ashby, commander of the rebels, which accounted for the lull in the battle. We have since learned that he was not killed.” On December 20th Gen. E. O. C. Ord, commanding a brigade, moved westward along the chain-bridge road, toward Dranes- vilie, for the purpose of making a reconnoissance and gathering forage. Near Dranesville, when returning, he was attacked by a Confederate force consisting of five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, with a battery. The attack came from the south and struck his right flank. Changing front so as to face the enemy, he found advantageous ground for receiving battle, and placed his artillery so as to enfilade the Centreville road on which the enemy's battery was posted. Leaving his cavalry in the shelter of a wooded hill, he got his infantry well in hand and moved steadily forward on the enemy. His guns were handled with skill, and soon exploded a Confederate caisson and drove off the battery. Then he made a bayonet charge, before which the Con¬ federate infantry fled, leaving on the fie*d their dead and wound¬ ed, and a large quan¬ tity of equipments. His loss was seven killed and sixty wounded. The Con¬ federate loss was about a hundred. That portion of Vir¬ ginia west of the Alle- ghanies (now West Virginia) never was essentially a slavehold- ing region. The num¬ ber of slaves held there was very small, as it always must be in a mountainous country ; and the interests of the people, with their iron mines, their coal mines, and their for¬ ests of valuable tim¬ ber, and their streams flowing into the Ohio, were allied much more closely with those of the free States than with those of the tide-water portion of their own State. When, there¬ fore, at the beginning of the war, before the people of Vir¬ ginia had voted on the question of adopting or rejecting the ordinance of secession as passed by their convention, troops from the cotton States were poured into that State to secure it for the Confederacy, they found no such welcome west of the mountains as east of them; and the task of driving them out from the valleys of the Kanawha and the Monongahela was easy in comparison with the work that lay before the National armies on the Potomac and the James. Major-Gen. George B. McClellan, then in his thirty-fifth year, crossed the Ohio with a small army in May, and won several victories that for the time cleared West Virginia of Confederate troops, gained him a vote of thanks in Congress, and made for him a sudden reputa¬ tion, which resulted in his being called to the head of the army after the disaster at Bull Run. Some of the battles in West Virginia, including Philippi, Cheat River, ^nd Rich Mountain, § 1 13 have already been described. An account of other minor engagements in that State is given in this chapter. There were several small actions at Romney, in Virginia, the most considerable of which took place on October 26th. General Kelly, with twenty-five hundred men, marched on that place from the west, while Col. Thomas Johns, with seven hundred, approached it from the north. Five miles from Romney, Kelly drove in the Confederate outposts, and nearer the town he met the enemy drawn up in a commanding position, with a rifled twelve-pounder on a hill. They also had intrenchments command¬ ing the bridge. After some artillery firing, Kelly’s cavalry forded the river, while his infantry charged across the bridge, where¬ upon the Confederates retreated precipitately toward Winches¬ ter. Kelly captured four hundred prisoners, two hundred horses, three wagon-loads of new rifles, and a large lot of camp equipage. The losses in killed and wounded were small. In this action a Captain Butterfield, of an Ohio regiment, was mounted on an old team horse, which became unmanage¬ able and persisted in getting in front of the field gun that had just been brought up. This embarrassed the gun¬ ners, who were ready and anxious- to make a telling.shot, and fin¬ ally the captain shout¬ ed: “Never mind the old horse, boys. Blaze away ! ” The shot was then made, which drove off a Confeder¬ ate battery ; and a few minutes later, when the charge was ordered, the old horse, with his tail scorched, wheeled into line and participated in it. At the same time when General McClel¬ lan was operating against the Confederate forces in the northern part of West Virginia, Gen. Jacob D. Cox commanded an expedition that marched from Guyandotte into the valley of the Great Kanawha. His first action was at Barboursville, which he captured. At Scarytown, on the river, a detachment of his Ohio troops, com¬ manded by Colonel Lowe, was defeated by a Confederate force under Captain Patton, and lost nearly sixty men. Cox then marched on Charleston, which was held by a force under General Wise. But Wise retreated, crossed Gauley River and burned the bridge, and continued his flight to Lewisburg. Here he was superseded by General Floyd, who brought reinforcements. Floyd attacked the Seventh Ohio Regiment at Cross Lanes, and defeated it, inflicting a loss of about two hundred men. He then advanced to Carnifex Ferry, endeavoring to flank Cox’s force, when General Rosecrans, with ten thousand men, came down from the northern part of the State. Floyd had a strong position on Gauley River, and Rosecrans sent forward a force to reconnoitre. The commander of this, General Benham, pushed it too boldly, and it developed into an engagement (September FEDERAL TROOPS FORAGING. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. ioth), wherein he lost about two hundred men, including Colonel Lowe and other valuable officers. Rosecrans made preparations for giving battle in earnest next day; but in the night Floyd retreated, leaving a large portion of his baggage, and took a position thirty miles distant. Soon afterward General Lee arrived with another force and took command of all the Confed¬ erate troops, numbering now about twenty thousand, and then in turn Rosecrans retreated. On the way, Lee had made a reconnoissance of a position held by General Reynolds at Cheat Mountain (September 12th), and in the consequent skirmishing he lost about a hundred men, including Col. John A. Wash¬ ington, of his staff, who was killed. Reynolds’s loss was about the same, but Lee found his position too strong to be taken. Early in November, Lee was called to Eastern Virginia, and Rosecrans then planned an attack on Floyd ; but it miscarried through failure of the flank movement, which was in¬ trusted to General Benham. But Benham pursued the enemy for fifty miles, de¬ feated the rear guard of cavalry, and killed its leader. On December I2th, General Milroy, who had succeeded ms a largely into the Confederate army, while a greater number entered the National service and were among its best soldiers. The Confederate Government was very loath to give up Ken¬ tucky, admitted a delegation of Kentucky secessionists to seats in its Congress, and made several attempts to invade the State and occupy it by armed force. The more important actions that were fought there are narrated elsewhere. A few of the minor ones must be mentioned here. To protect the loyal mountaineers in the eastern part of the State, a fortified camp, called Camp Wild Cat, was established on the road leading to Cumberland Gap. It was at the top of a high cliff, overlooking the road, and was commanded by a heavily-wooded hill a few hundred yards distant. The force there was commanded by Gen. Albin Schoepff. A force of over seven thousand Confederates, com¬ manded by General Zollicoffer, marched upon this camp and attacked it on the same day that the battle of Ball’s Bluff was fought, October 21st. The camp had been held by but one Kentucky regiment; but on the approach of the enemy it was re¬ inforced by Reynolds, advanced against the Confederates at Buffalo Mountain ; but his attack was badly managed, and failed. He was then attacked, in turn, but the enemy had no better success. Three or four hundred men were disabled in these engagements. On the last day of the year Milroy sent eight hundred men of the Twenty-fifth Ohio Regiment, under Major Webster, against a Confederate camp at Huntersville. They drove away the Confederates, burned six buildings filled with provisions, and returned without loss. Through the natural impulses of a large majority of her peo¬ ple, and their material interests, aided by these military opera¬ tions, small as they were in detail, West Virginia was by this time secured to the Union, and would probably have remained in it even if the war had terminated otherwise. There never was any serious danger that Kentucky would secede, though her governor refused troops to the National Government and pretended to assume a position of neutrality. Such a position being essentially impossible, such of the young men of that State as believed in the institution of slavery went reentn ana seven¬ teenth Ohio, the Thirty- third Indiana, and Stannard’s battery. After a fight with a battalion of Ken¬ tucky cavalry, the Confederate infantry charged up the hill and were met by a withering fire, which drove them back. They advanced again, getting within a few yards of the log breast¬ work, placed their caps on their bayonets and shouted that they were Union men. This gave them a chance to fire a volley at close range ; but it was answered so immediately and so effect¬ ively that they broke and fled down the hill. Then the artillery was brought into play and hastened their flight, besides thwart¬ ing an attack that had been made by a detachment on the flank. In the afternoon the attempt was repeated, by two detachments directed simultaneously against the flanks of the position ; but it was defeated in much the same way that the morning- attack had been. Zollicoffer then drew off his forces, and that night their campfires could be seen far down the valley. The National loss was about thirty men, that of the Confederates was esti¬ mated at nearly three hundred. Two days later there were sharp actions at West Liberty and BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL EDWARD W. MINKS. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD J15 Hodgesville. A regiment of infantry and a company of cavalry, with one gun, marched thirty-five miles between half-past two and half-past nine r. M., in constant rain, making several fords, one of which, across the Licking, was waist deep. The object was to drive the Confederates out of West Liberty and take possession of the town. In this they were successful, with but one man wounded. The Confederates lost twenty, and half a dozen Union men who had been held as prisoners were released. The greatest benefit resulting from the action was the confi- dence that it gave to the Unionists in that region. One corre¬ spondent wrote: “The people had been taught that the Union soldiers would be guilty of most awful atrocities. Several women made their appearance on Thursday, trembling with cold and fear, and said that they had remained in the woods all night after the fight. The poor creatures had been told that the Abolition troops rejoiced to kill Southern babies, and were in the habit of carrying little children about on their bayonets in the towns which they took; and this was actually believed.” A detachment of the Sixth Indiana Regiment made a sudden attack on a Confederate camp near Hodgesville, and after a short, sharp fight drove off the enemy, killing or wounding eight of them, and captured many horses and wagons and a large quantity of powder. Near Munfordville, on December 17th, a portion of the Thirty-second Indiana Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Trebra, was attacked by two regiments of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a battery. The}' maintained a spirited defence until they were reinforced, and then continued the fight till it ended in the retreat of the enemy. General Buell said in his report: “ The attack of the enemy was mainly with his cavalry and artillery. Our troops fought as skirmishers, rallying rap¬ idly into squares when charged by the cavalry—sometimes even de¬ fending themselves singly and kill¬ ing their assailants with the bayonet.” The National loss was eight killed and ten wounded ; the Confederate, thirty-three killed (including Colonel Terry, commanding) and fifty wounded. A Confederate account said: “ All in all, this is one of the most desperate fights of the war. It was hand to hand from first to last. No men could have fought more desperately than the enemy. The Rangers were equally reckless. Colonel Terry, always in the front, discovered a nest of five of the enemy. He leaped in his saddle, waved his hat, and said, ‘Come on, boys! Here’s another bird’s nest.’ He fired and killed two of them. The other three fired at him simultaneously. One shot killed his charger; another shot killed him. He fell headlong from his horse without a moan or a groan. At the same time, Paulding Anderson and Dr. Cowan rode up and despatched the remaining three of the enemy. When Colonel Terry’s fall was announced it at once prostrated his men with grief. The fight ended here. ’ This action is also known by the name of Rowlett’s Station and Woodsonville. On December 28th a small detachment of cavalry, led by Major Murray*left camp near Calhoun, Ky., for a scout across Green River. Near Sacramento they were surprised and attacked by seven hundred cavalry under Colonel Forrest. They sustained an almost hand-to-hand fight for half an hour, and then, as their ammunition was exhausted, retreated. It is impossible to reconcile the accounts of the losses; but it is certain that Capt. A. G. Bacon was killed on the National side, and Lieutenant-Colonel Meriwether of the Confederates. This closed the first year s fight¬ ing in Kentucky. In Missouri there were special and strong reasons against secession. Her slave population was comparatively small, and her soil and climate were suited to crops that do not require labor. She was farthest north of any slave State ; and if she had joined thtg Confederacy, and it had established itself, she would have been bordered on REVIEW OF CONFEDERATE TROOPS EN ROUTE TO THE FRONT, PASSING PULASKI MONUMENT, SAVANNAH, GA. SIEGE OF LEXINGTON, MISSOURI. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. three sides by foreign territory, with noth¬ ing but a surveyed line for the boundary on two of those sides. Moreover, there was a large German element in her population, industrious, opposed to slavery, loving the Union, and belonging, to a considerable extent, to the Republican party. In the presidential election of i860, 26,430 Repub¬ lican votes were cast in slave States (all in border States), and of these 17,028 were cast in Missouri. Delaware gave the next highest number—3,815. Of 148,490 Demo¬ cratic votes cast in Missouri, but 31,317 were for Breckinridge, the extreme pro¬ slavery candidate. Nevertheless, the seces¬ sionists made a strong effort to get Missouri out of the Union. The methods pursued have been described in a previous chapter, together with the results of the first fi slit- o o ing, and the defeat and death of General Lyon in the battle of Wilson’s Creek. A Confederate force—or rather the ma¬ terials for a force, for the men were poorly equipped and hardly drilled at all—commanded by Colonel Hunter, was gathered at Charleston, Mo., in August, encamped about the court-house ; and on the 19th Colonel Dougherty, of the Twenty-second Illinois Regiment, set out to capture it. He arrived at Camp Lyon in the evening with three hundred men, learned of the position of the enemy, and said to Captain Abbott, who had made the reconnoissance: “ We are going to take Charleston to-night. You stay here and engage the enemy > 1 7 till we come back.” Then to his men : “ Battalion, right face forward, march ! ” As they neared the town, double quick was ordered,' and the two companies in the ad¬ vance proceeded rapidly, but the following ones became somehow separated. These two companies drove in the pickets, fol¬ lowed them sharply, and charged into the town, scattering the small detachment of raw cavalry. The second in command then asked of Colonel Dougherty what should be done next. “ Take the court-house, or bust,” he answered ; and at once that build¬ ing was attacked. The Confederates fired from the windows; but the assailants con¬ centrated a destructive fire upon it, and then rushed in at the doors. Some es¬ caped through the windows, some were shot down while attempting to do so, and many were captured. Later in the day a company of Illinois cavalry pursued the retreating Confederates, and captured forty more, with many horses. In this engage¬ ment Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom had a personal encounter with a Confederate officer, who rode up to him and called out: “What do you mean? \ou are killing our own men.”—“I know what I am doing,” answered Ransom. “ Who are you ? ” —“ I am for Jeff Davis,” said the stranger. “ Then you are the man I am after,” said Ransom, and they drew their pistols. The Confederate fired first, and wounded Ransom in the arm, who then fired and killed his antagonist. The National loss COLONEL JAMES A. MULLIGAN. tuauintJI BURYING THE DEAD, CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 118 was one killed and four wounded. The Confederate loss was reported at forty killed ; number of wounded, unknown. Late in August, when it was learned that a movement against Lexington, on Missouri River, was about to be made by a strong Confederate force under General Price, measures were taken to reinforce the small garrison and prevent the place from falling into the hands of the enemy. The Twenty-third Illinois Regi¬ ment, Col. James A. Mulligan, which was called “the Irish Brigade,” was ordered thither from Jefferson City, and other reinforcements were promised. Mulligan, with his command, set out at once, marched nine days, foraging on the country, and on reaching Lexington found there a regiment of cavalry and one of home guards. The next day the Thirteenth Missouri Regiment, retreating from Warrensburg, joined them. This gave Mulligan a total force of about two thousand eight hundred men, who had forty rounds of ammunition, and he had seven field-guns and a small quantity of provisions. He took possession of the hill east of the town, on which stood the Masonic College, and proceeded to fortify. His lines enclosed about eighteen acres, and he had put but half a day’s work on them when, in the evening of September nth, the enemy appeared. In the morning of the 12th the fighting began, when a part of Mulli¬ gan’s men drove back the enemy’s advance and burned a bridge, which compelled them to make a detour and approach the place by another road. Again Mulligan sent out a detachment to check them while his remaining force worked on the intrench- ments, and there was brisk fighting in the cemetery at the edge of the town. In the afternoon there was a lively artillery duel, and the National forces held their own, dismounting a Confeder¬ ate gun, exploding a caisson, and causing the enemy to with¬ draw at dusk to a camp two miles away. The next day the garrison fitted up a small foundry, in which they cast shot for their cannon, obtained powder and made cartridges, and con¬ tinued the work on the intrenchments. The great want was provisions and water. In the next five days the Confederates were heavily reinforced, while the little garrison looked in vain for the promised help. On the 18th a determined attack in force was made. Colonel Mulligan wrote : “ They came as one dark moving mass, their guns beaming in the sun, their banners waving, and their drums beating. Everywhere, as far as we could see, were men, men, men, approaching grandly. Our spies had brought intelligence and had all agreed that it was the intention of the enemy to make a grand rush, overwhelm us, and bury us in the trenches of Lex¬ ington.” Mulligan’s men sustained the shock bravely, and the enemy met such a deadly fire that they could not get to the ’works. But meanwhile they had interposed a force between the works and the river, shutting off the supply of water, and they kept up a heavy bombardment with sixteen pieces of artillery. They also took possession of a large house outside the lines which was used as a hospital, and filled it with sharp¬ shooters. Mulligan ordered two companies—one of home guards and one from the Fourteenth Missouri—to drive them out, but they refused to undertake so hazardous a task. He then sent a company from his Irish regiment, who rushed gallantly across the intervening space, burst in the doors, took possession of the house, and (under an impression that the laws of war had been violated in thus using a hospital for sharp-shooters) killed every Confederate soldier caught inside. Two hours later the Con¬ federates in turn drove them out and again occupied the building. Firing was kept up through the 19th; and on the 20th the besiegers obtained bales of hemp, wet them, and rolling them along before them as a movable breastwork, were enabled to approach the intrenchments. Bullets would not go through these bales, and red-hot shot would not set them on fire. Yet the fight still continued for some hours, until the ammunition of the garrison was all but exhausted. For five days they had had no water except as they could catch rain when it fell, the provis¬ ions were eaten up, and there was no sign of the promised rein¬ forcements. There was nothing to do but surrender. Mulligan had lost one hundred and fifty men killed or wounded ; the Confederate report acknowledged a loss of one hundred, which probably was far short of the truth. A correspondent who was present wrote: “Hundreds of the men who fought on the Confederate side were attached to no command. They came in when they pleased, fought or not as they pleased, left when ready, and if killed were buried on the spot—were missed from no muster-roll, and hence would not be reckoned in the aggre¬ gate loss. The Confederates vary in their statements. One said they lost sixty killed ; another said their loss was at least equal to that of the Federals ; while still another admitted to me that the taking of the works cost them a thousand men. I saw one case that shows the Confederate style of fighting. An old Texan, dressed in buckskin and armed with a long rifle, used to go up to the works every morning about seven o’clock, carry¬ ing his dinner in a tin pail. Taking a good position, he banged away at the Federals till noon, then rested an hour and ate his dinner, after which he resumed operations till six P. M., when he returned home to supper and a night’s sleep.” The privates of Mulligan’s command were paroled, and the officers held as prisoners. In October the National troops stationed at Pilot Knob, Mo., commanded by Col. J. B. Plummer, were ordered to march on Fredericktown and attack a Confederate force there, two thousand strong, commanded by Gen. Jeff. Thompson. They arrived at that place in the evening of the 21st, and found that it had just been evacuated. They consisted of Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin troops, with cavalry and a battery, and numbered about three thousand five hundred. Three thousand more, com¬ manded by Col. W. P. Carlin, marched from Cape Girardeau and joined them at Fredericktown. About half of the entire force was then sent in pursuit of the enemy, who was found just south of the town. An engagement was at once begun with artillery, and then the Seventeenth Illinois Regiment charged upon the Confederate battery and captured one gun. Then followed a running fight that lasted four hours, the Confederates stopping frequently to make a temporary stand and fire a few rounds from their battery. As these positions were successively charged or flanked, and attacked with artillery and musketry, they retired from them. At five o’clock in the afternoon the pursuit was discontinued, and the National forces returned to Fredericktown. They had lost seven men killed and sixty wounded. They had captured two field-pieces and taken sixty prisoners, and the next day they buried a hundred and sixty Confederate dead. Among the enemy’s killed was Colonel Lowe, second in command. A few days later there was a brilliant affair at Springfield, not far from the scene of General Lyon’s defeat and death in August. There w r as a small, select cavalry organization known as General Fremont’s body-guard, commanded by Major Charles Zagonyi, a Hungarian, who had seen service in Europe. On thtr54th Za¬ gonyi received orders to take a part of his command, and Major White’s battalion of prairie scouts, and march on Springfield, fifty miles distant, with all possible haste. It was supposed that the Confederate troops there numbered four hundred. The CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. oidei was obeyed with alacrity, and early the next day he neared the town. Here he captured half a dozen Confederate soldiers of a foraging party, and from them and certain Unionists among the inhabitants, he learned that the enemy in the towm numbered two thousand instead of four hundred. Undaunted by this, he lesolved to push forward. Some of the foraging party who escaped carried the news of his approach, and the Confederates made quick dispositions to receive him. Finding a regiment drawn up beside the road, he avoided it by a detour and came 119 eye-witness wrote : “ Some fled wildly toward the town, pursued by the insatiate guards, who, overtaking them, either cut them down with their sabres or levelled them with shots from their pistols. Some were even chased through the streets of the city and then killed in hand-to-hand encounters with their pursuers.” Zagonyi raised the National flag on the court-house, detailed a guard to attend to his wounded, and then retired to Bolivar. His own account of the fight, given in Mrs. Fremont’s “Story of the Guard,” is quaint and interesting. FORTIFICATIONS AND INTRENCHMENTS AT PILOT KNOB, MO. in on another road, but here also the enemy were ready for him. Placing his own command in the advance, with himself at the head, he prepared to charge straight into the midst of the enemy. For some unknown reason, White’s command, instead of follow¬ ing directly, counter-marched to the left, and Zagonyi with his one hundred and sixty men went in alone. They began with a trot, and soon increased the pace to a gallop, unmindful of the fire of skirmishers in the woods, which emptied several of their saddles. The enemy, infantry and cavalry, was drawn up in the form of a hollow square, in an open field. Zagonyi’s band rode down a lane, jumped a brook, threw down a fence, and then charged rieht across the field into the midst of their foes, spread- ing out fan-like as they neared them, and using their pistols and sabres vigorously. The Confederate cavalry gave way and scattered almost at once ; the infantry stood a little longer, and then retreated. Major White with his command came up just in time to strike them in the flank, completing the rout. An “ About four o’clock I arrived on the highest point on the Ozark Mountains. Not seeing any sign of the enemy, I halted * my command, made them known that the enemy instead of four hundred is nineteen hundred. But I promised them victory if they will be what I thought and expected them to be. If any of them too much fatigued from the fifty-six miles, or sick, or unwell, to step forward ; but nobody was worn out. (Instead of worn out, it is true that every eye was a fist big.) I made them known that this day I want to fight the first and the last hard battle, so that if they meet us again they shall know with who they have to do and remember the Body-Guard. And ordered quick march. Besides, I tell them, whatever we meet, to keep together and look after me ; would I fall, not to give up, but to avenge mine death. To leave every ceremonious cuts away in the battlefield and use only right cut and thrust. Being young, I thought they might be confused in the different cuts, and the Hungarian hussars say ‘Never defend yourselves—better make CHARGE OF FREMONT'S BODY-GUARD UNDER MAJOR ZAGONYI, NEAR SPRINGFIELD, MO. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD 121 your defend himself and you go in. I just mention them that you know very well that I promised you that I will lead you shortly to show that we are not a fancy and only guard- doing-duty soldiers, but fighting men. My despatch meant what I will do. In the hour I get the news my mind was settled. I say, Thank God, if I am to fight, it is not four hundred ! but nineteen hundred ! I halt my men again and say, PURSUIT OF THE ENEMY ‘Soldiers! When I was to recruit you, I told you you was not parade soldiers, but for war. The enemy is more than we. The enemy is two thousand, and we are but one hundred and fifty. It is possible no man will come back. No man will go that thinks the enemy too many. He can ride back. (I see by the glimpsing of their eye they was mad to be chanced a coward.) The Guard that follow me will take for battle-cry, “Fremont and the Union,” and— CHARGE —!’ Running down the lane between the cross-fire, the First Company followed close, but the rest stopped for a couple seconds. I had not wondered if none had come —young soldiers and such a tremendous fire, bullets coming like a rain. “As I arrived down on the creek I said aloud, ‘If I could send somebody back I would give my life for it. We are lost here if they don’t follow.’ My Adjutant, Majthenyi, heari-ng, feared that he will be sent back, jumped down from his horse and busy himself opening the fence. I expected to find the enemy on the other end of Springfield, but, unexpectedly coming out of the woods to an open place, I was fired on in front of mine command. Halted for a minute, seeing that, or a bold forward march under a cross-fire, or a doubtful retreat with losing most of my men, I took the first and commanded ‘March!’ Under a heavy cross-fire (in trot), down the little hill in the lane—-two hundred yards—to a creek, where I ordered the fence to be opened—marched in my command—ordered them to form, and with the war-cry of ‘ Fremont and the Union,’ we made the attack. The First Company, forty-seven strong, against five or six hundred infantry, and the rest against the cavalry, was made so successfully, that, in three minutes, the cavalry run in every direction, and the infantry retreated in the thick wood, and their cavalry in every direction. The infantry we were not able to follow in the woods, so that we turned against the running cavalry. With those we had in different places, and in differing numbers, attacked and dispersed-—not only in one place, but our men were so much emboldened, that twenty or thirty attacked twenty, thirty times their numbers, and these single- handed attacks, fighting here and there on their own hook, did us more harm than their grand first attack. By them we lost our prisoners. Single-handed they fought bravely, specially one—a lieutenant—who, in a narrow lane, wanted to cut him¬ self through about sixty of us, running in that direction. But he was not able to go very far. Firing two or three times, he ran against me, and put his revolver on my side, but, through the movement of the horse, the shot passed behind me. He was a perfect target—first cut down and after shot. He was a brave man ; for that reason I felt some pity to kill him. We went to their encampment, but the ground was deserted, and we returned to the Court¬ house, raised the company-flag, liberated prisoners, and collected my forces together— which numbered not more, including myself, than seventy men on horseback. The rest— without horses, or wounded, and about thirty who had dispersed in pursuit of the enemy— I could not gather up; and it was midnight before they reached me—and some of them next day. I never was sick in my life, Madame, till what time I find myself leaving Springfield, in the dark, with only sixty-nine men and officers—I was the seventy. I was perfectly sick and disheartened, so I could hardly sit in the saddle, to think of so dear a victory. But it ended so that fifteen is dead—two died after—ten prisoners, who was released, and of the wounded, not one will lose a finger. In all seventeen lost.” “The bugler (Frenchman) I ordered him two three time to put his sword away and take the bugle in his hand, that I shall be able to use him. Hardly I took my eyes down, next minute I seen him, sword in the hand, all bloody; and this he done two or three times. Finally, the mouth of the bugle being shot away, the bugler had excuse for gratifying himself in use of the sword. One had a beautiful wound through the nose. ‘ My boy,’ I told him, ‘ I would give any thing for that wound.’ After twenty-four hours it was beautiful—just the mark enough to show a bullet has passed through; but, poor fellow, he cannot even show it. It healed up so as to leave no mark at all. He MAJOR CHARLES ZAGONYI. 122 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. had also five on his leg and shoulder, and the fifth wound he only found after six days; he could not move easy, for that reason he was late to find there was two wounds in the legs.” Early in November, General Grant was ordered to make demonstrations on both sides of the Mississippi near Columbus, to prevent the Confederates from sending reinforcements to General Price, in Southern Missouri, and also to prevent them from interfering with the movements of certain detachments of National troops. On the 6th he left Cairo with three thousand men, on five steamers, convoyed by two gunboats, and passed down the river to the vicinity of Columbus. To attack that place would have been hopeless, as it was well fortified and strongly garrisoned. He landed his troops on the Missouri side on the 7th, and put them in motion toward Belmont, opposite Columbus, deploying skirmishers and looking for the enemy. They had not gone far before the enemy was encountered, and then it became a fight through the woods from tree to tree. After two or three miles of this, they arrived at a fortified camp surrounded with abatis. Grant’s men charged at once, succeeded in making their way through the obstructions, and soon captured the camp with the artillery and some prisoners. But most of the Confederates escaped and crossed the river in their own boats, or took shelter under the bank. The usual result of cap¬ turing a camp was soon seen. The victors laid down their arms and devoted themselves to plundering, while some amused themselves with the captured guns, firing at empty steamers. Meanwhile the defeated men under the bank regained confi¬ dence and rallied, and two steamers filled with Confederate sol¬ diers were sent over from Columbus ; while the guns there, com¬ manding the western bank, were trained and fired upon the camp. To stop the plundering and bring his men to order, Grant had the camp set on fire and then ordered a retreat. The men formed rapidly, with deployed skirmishers, and retired slowly to the boats, Grant himself being the last one to go on board. Some of the wounded were taken on the transports, others were left on the field. The National loss was 485 ; the Confederate loss was 642, including 175 carried off as prisoners. The Unionists also spiked four guns and brought off two. Both sides claimed this action as a victory—Grant, because he had accomplished the object for which he set out, preventing rein¬ forcements from being sent to Price ; the Confederates, because they were left in possession of the field. But it was generally discussed as a disaster to the National arms. There were many interesting incidents. One man who had both legs shot off was found in the woods singing “ The Star Spangled Banner.” An¬ other, who was mortally wounded, had propped himself up against a tree and thought to take a smoke. He was found dead with his pipe in one hand, his knife in the other, and the tobacco on his breast. A Confederate correspondent told this story: “ When the two columns came face to face, Colonel Walker’s regiment was immediately opposed to the Seventh Iowa, and David Vollmer, drawing the attention of a comrade to the stars and stripes that floated over the enemy, avowed his intention of capturing the colors or dying in the attempt. The charge was made, and as the two columns came within a few yards of each other, Vollmer and a young man named Lynch both made a rush for the colors ; but Vollmer’s bayonet first pierced the breast of the color-bearer, and, grasping the flag, he waved it over his head in triumph. At this moment he and Lynch were both shot dead. Captain Armstrong stepped forth to capture the colors, when he also fell, grasping the flagstaff.” Another correspondent wrote: “The Seventh Iowa suffered more severely than any other regiment. It fought continually against fearful odds. Ever pushing onward through the timber, on their hands and knees, they crawled with their standard waving over them until they reached the cornfield on the left of the enemy’s encampment, where their cannon was planted, and drove them from their guns, leaving them still unmanned, know¬ ing that other forces were following them up. Their course was still onward until they entered on the camp-ground of the foe and tore down the flag.” Besides those here described, there were many smaller en¬ gagements in Missouri—at Piketon, Lancaster, Salem, Black Walnut Creek, Milford, Hudson, and other places. There were also encounters in Florida, in New Mexico, and in Texas ; none of them being important, but all together showing that the struggle begun this year had spread over a vast territory and that a long and bloody war was before the people of our country. -W.sft- ■ 'Ahum, ABATIS. T is probable that war songs are the oldest human compositions. In every nation they have sprung into existence at the very dawning of national life. The first Grecian poems of which we have any record are war songs, chanted to inspire or maintain warlike enthusiasm. Not only did they sing martial melodies as they attacked their enemies, but when the conflict was over, and the victory won, they also sang triumphal odes as they returned to camp. Martial odes that were sung in Gaul by the conquering legions of Julius Cmsar have been handed down to the present time. The student of the history and the literature of Spain finds many traces of the war songs that the all-conquering Romans sang as they marched over the mountains or across the valleys of that then dependent nationality. And long before the time of Caesar, Servius Tullius ordered that two whole centuriae should consist of trumpeters, horn-blowers, etc., to sound the charge. In these and subsequent ages, war songs were sung in chorus by a whole army in advancing to the attack. If further proof of the antiquity of military music were needed, a conclusive one is to be found in 2 Chronicles, xx. 21, where it is said that when Jehoshaphat went to battle against the hosts of Ammon “he placed a choir of singers in front of his army.” Wonderful indeed is the war song when studied as to its influence in early times on history. By the power of arms, by the spirit of conquest, did nations arise and continue to exist. The warrior made the nation, and the poet sang and immortalized the warrior’s fame ; and thus it came to pass that great honor was bestowed upon the poets. Among old Arab tribes, fires were lighted and great rejoicings made by their warriors "THE PICKET'S OFF DUTY FOREVER." WAR SONGS. 124 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. when a poet had manifested himself among them, for in his songs they anticipated their own glory. In many ancient countries, the bards that sang of battles were regarded as really inspired, and their poetic productions were considered as the language of the gods. Centuries passed before that admiration bestowed upon the singer of war songs was impaired. The ancient literature of many European countries presents numerous indications that the warrior-poets were treated with great con¬ sideration ; were forgiven by their sovereigns for serious offences on condition that they write a new war song, and were paid what would seem at this day enormous prices for their compositions. It is related that on one occasion King Athelstane, of the Anglo- Saxons, paid a poet sixteen ounces of pure gold for a laudatory song. When the greater value of gold in that distant age is considered, it is probable that no living poet is better paid for his productions than was this old singer whose ballads breathed of bloodshed and slaughter. The marvellous influence of war songs over the ancient Norse¬ men is difficult to understand. They were aroused to a high degree of military enthusiasm, almost to madness, by the mere words of certain songs. That it was this influence which fre¬ quently drove them onward to great deeds, appears in every chapter of their life history. It was the courage and frenzy aroused by Teutonic war songs that led to the destruction of Rome, and shattered the civilization of southern Europe. That the influence of the war song over the minds and the hearts of men did not terminate with the long ago past, is appar¬ ent to every student of modern history. Garibaldi’s warlike Hymn of the Italians, the stirring “ Marseillaise ” of the light-hearted French, the vigorous “ Britannia ” of the sturdy English, have inspired determination and aroused courage on many a bloody battlefield. How frequently during our own civil war was retreat checked, and the tide of battle turned, by the singing of “ We'll Rally round the Flag, Boys,” started at the opportune moment by some brave soldier with a vigorous and melodious voice. It has been saidthat the Portuguese soldiers in Ceylon, at the siege of Colombo, when pressed with misery and the pangs of hunger, during their marches, derived not only consolation but also encouragement from singing stanzas of their national song. It is a singular fact that no great national hymn, and no war song that arouses and cheers, was ever written by a distinguished poet. It would seem that a National Hymn is the sort of mate¬ rial that cannot be made to order. Not one of the best-known songs of our own civil war—in the North or in the South—was written by an eminent poet. Five of the greatest American poets were living during the great conflict, and four of them gave expression to its military ardor, determinate zeal, or pathos, but none of them so sung as to touch the popular heart ; that is to say, so as to secure the attention of those who do not read poetry. The sarr e is true of the composers of the national anthems and great martial ballads of nearly every other country. The thunder roar of the “ Marseillaise,” before which all the other military songs of France are dull and weak, was produced by De l’lsle, who lives in the memory of his countrymen and of the world for this alone. The noble measures of “ God Save the King ” are not the work of any one of the great British poets, but were probably written by Henry Carey ; but this is in dis¬ pute, and innumerable Englishmen sing the anthem without even attempting to learn the name of the composer. The Prussian National Anthem was not written by a Goethe, a Schiller, or even a Koner. The name of the writer, Schnecken- burger, would not be found in books of reference had he not written “ The Watch on the Rhine.” The favorite national song of the Italians, known as the “ Garibaldian Hymn,” is the composition of Mercantini, of whom little is known. Our own country is especially fortunate in the quality of its great national songs. “ The Star Spangled Banner ” breathes the loftiest and purest patriotism. The English National Hymn is but a prayer for blessings on the head of the king—the ruler. The “ Marseillaise ” is calculated to arouse only the spirit of slaughter and bloodshed. Truer than any of these to pure, lofty, and patriotic zeal is our own “ Star Spangled Banner.” From our Civil War we have received at least two war songs which, simply as such, are fit to rank with the best of any coun¬ try—“John Brown’s Body ” and “ Marching through Georgia.” The greatest of the Southern war lyrics—“ My Maryland ”—is equal to these as a powerful lyric. It is said that fully two thousand poems and songs pertaining to the war, both North and South, were written during the first year of this conflict. But most of them are now wholly unknown, except to the special student. Perhaps a score of compositions, the result of the poetic outburst inspired by the Civil War, possess such merit that they will survive through centuries as part of the literary heritage of the nation. Of such we give in this collection about twenty that seem to us the best and most popular. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD 125 NORTHERN SONGS. TRAMP, TRAMP, TRAMP, THE BOYS ARE MARCHING. This is one of the numerous war songs written by Mr. George F. Root. Among his others are “ Just before the Battle, Mother,” and the “ Battle-Cry of Freedom.” It is difficult to say which of these three was the most popular. There was a touch of pathos in “Just before the Battle, Mother,” which made the words impressive and thrilling to the hearts of men away from home and fireside. Many a brave soldier considered death itself preferable to captivity and incarceration in prison pens. How sad, then, must have been the lot of the soldiers who sat in prison cells and heard the “ tramp, tramp, tramp,” of the marching boys! Mr. Root was the composer as well as the author of the three great songs mentioned above. In the prison cell I sit, Thinking-, mother dear, of you, And our bright and happy home so far away And the tears they fill my eyes, Spite of all that I can do, Though I try to cheer my comrades and be f CHORUS Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are marching Cheer up, comrades, they will come, And beneath the starry flag We shall breathe the air again Of the free-land in our own beloved home. In the battle front we stood When their fiercest charge they made, And they swept us off a hundred men or more But before we reached their lines They were beaten back dismayed, And we heard the cry of vict’ry o’er and o’er. So within the prison cell We are waiting for the day That shall come to open wide the iron door; And the hollow eye grows bright, And the poor heart almost gay, As we think of seeing home and friends once more 126 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD ALL QUIET ALONG THE POTOMAC TO-NIGHT. One cool September morning in 1861, a young woman living in Goshen, Orange County, N. Y., read the familiar announce¬ ment from the seat of war near Washington, “All quiet on the Potomac,” to which was added in smaller type, “ A picket shot.” These simple words were the inspiration of a celebrated war song, which is as popular now as when it first appeared. This song was first published in Harper s Weekly for November 30, 1861, and it has had many claimants; but after careful investigation, there appears to be no reason whatever for disputing the claim of Mrs. Ethel Lynn Beers. She died in Orange, N. J., October 10, 1879. All quiet along the Potomac to-night, Where the soldiers lie peacefully dreaming; Their tents in the rays of the clear autumn moon, Or the light of the watch-fire, are gleaming. A tremulous sigh of the gentle night-wind Through the forest leaves softly is creeping; While stars up above, with their glittering eyes, Keep guard, for the army is sleeping. “ All quiet along the Potomac," they say, “ Except now and then a stray picket Is shot, as he walks on his beat to and fro, By a rifleman hid in the thicket. ’Tis nothing—a private or two now and then Will not count in the news of the battle ; Not an officer lost—only one of the men, Moaning out, all alone, the death-rattle." There’s only the sound of the lone sentry’s tread, As he tramps from the rock to the fountain, And thinks of the two in the low trundle-bed Far away in the cot on the mountain. His musket falls slack ; his face, dark and grim, Grows gentle with memories tender, As he mutters a prayer for the children asleep, For their mother—may Heaven defend her! The moon seems to shine just as brightly as then, That night, when the love yet unspoken Leaped up to his lips—when low-murmured vows Were pledged to be ever unbroken. Then drawing his sleeve roughly over his eyes, He dashes off tears that are welling, And gathers his gun closer up to its place, As if to keep down the heart-swelling. He passes the fountain, the blasted pine-tree— The footstep is lagging and weary ; Yet onward he goes, through the broad belt of light, Toward the shade of the forest so dreary. Hark ! was it the night-wind that rustled the leaves ? Was it moonlight so wondrously flashing ? It looked like a rifle . . . “Ha! Mary, good-by!" The red life-blood is ebbing and plashing. All quiet along the Potomac to-night; No sound save the rush of the river; While soft falls the dew on the face of the dead— The picket’s off duty forever ! 'opaiand £ CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 12 ; THE BATTLE HYMN OF THE REPUBLIC Perhaps the “Battle Hymn of the Republic,’’ by Mrs. Julia Ward Howe, may be considered the most lofty in sentiment and the most elevated in style of the martial songs of American patriotism. During the close of the year 1861, Mrs. Howe with a party of friends visited Washington. While there she attended a review of the Union troops on the Virginia side of the Potomac and not far from the city. During her stay in camp she witnessed a sudden and unexpected attack of the enemy. Thus she had a glimpse of genuine warfare. On the ride back to the city the party sang a number of war songs, including “ John Brown’s Body." One of the party remarked that the tune was a grand one, and altogether superior to the words of the song. Mrs. Howe responded to the effect that she would endeavor to write other words that might be sung to this stirring melody. That night, while she was lying in a dark room, line after line and verse after verse of the “ Battle Hymn of the Republic” was composed. In this way every verse of the song was carefully thought out. Then, springing from the bed, she found a pen and piece of paper and wrote out the words of this rousing patriotic hymn. It was often sung in the course of the war and under a great variety of circumstances. Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord ; He is trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored ; He has loosed the fateful lightning of His terrible swift sword ; His truth is marching on. I have seen Him in the watch-fires of a hundred circling camps ; They have budded Him an altar in the evening dews and damps ; I have read His righteous sentence in the dim and flaring lamps ; His day is marching on. I have read a fiery gospel, writ in burnished rows of steel : “ As ye deal with my contemners, so with you my grace shall deal ; Let the hero, born of woman, crush the serpent with his heel, Since God is marching on. He has sounded forth the trumpet that shall never call retreat ; He is sifting out the hearts of men before His judgment seat; Oh, be swift, my soul, to answer Him ! be jubilant, my feet ! Our God is marching on. In the beauty of the lilies Christ was born across the sea, With a glory in His bosom that transfigures you and me ; As He died to make men holy, let us die to make men free, While God is marching on. WHEN THIS CRUEL WAR IS OVER. WITH the English soldiers a popular song in war times is the well known “ Annie Laurie.” It is said that during the Crimean War this sentimental ditty was sung by the English forces more frequently than any other melody. Several songs of similar sentimentality were famous on both sides during the civil war. The boys in gray sang Lorena at the very beginning of the war, and never stopped till the last musket was stacked, and the last campfire cold. The boys in blue sang “Mother, I’ve Come Home to Die,” “Just before the Battle, Mother,” “When this Cruel War is Over,” and other songs of sentiment and affection. “ When this Cruel War is Over was wiitten by Chailes C. Sawyer, of Brooklyn, L. \ ., and was published in the autumn of 1861. More than one million copies of the song have been sold. Some of the other compositions by Mr. Sawyer are “Swinging in the Lane” and “Peeping through the Bars.” Dearest love, do you remember When we last did meet, How you told me that you loved me, Kneeling at my feet ? Oh, how proud you stood before me, In your suit of blue, When you vowed to me and country Ever t<5 be true ! Weeping, sad and lonely, Hopes and fears, how vain ; Yet praying When this cruel war is over, Praying that we meet again. When the summer breeze is sighing Mournfully along, Or when autumn leaves are falling. Sadly breathes the song. Oft in dreams I see you lying On the battle-plain, Lonely, wounded, even dying, Calling, but in vain. If, amid the din of battle, Nobly you should fall, Far away from those who love you, None to hear you call, Who would whisper words of comfort ? Who would soothe your pain ? Ah, the many cruel fancies Ever in my brain ! But our country called you, darling, Angels cheer your way ! While our nation’s sons are fighting, We can only pray. Nobly strike for God and liberty, Let all nations see How we love the starry banner, Emblem of the free ! 128 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD WE ARE COMING, FATHER ABRAHAM. In the dark days of 1862 President Lincoln issued a proclamation asking for three hundred thousand volunteers to fill the stricken ranks of the army, and to make the cry of “ On to Richmond ” an accomplished fact. Immediately after this call, Mr. James Sloane Gibbons, a native of Wilmington, Del., living in New York City, wrote: “ We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more.” This must have contributed largely to the accomplishment of the military uprising which it relates. The stanzas were first published anonymously in the New York Evening Post of July 16,1862. Owing to this fact, perhaps, its authorship was at first attributed to William C. Bryant. Mr. Gibbons joined the aboli¬ tion movement when only twenty years of age, and was for a time one of the editors of the Anti-Slavery Standard. When the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, he illuminated his resi¬ dence in New York City. A short time afterward, during the draft riots, he was mobbed, and only by the assistance of friends was he able to save his life by escaping over the roofs of adjoining houses to another street, where a friend had a carriage waiting for him. He died October 17, 1892. You have called us, and we’re coming, by Richmond’s bloody tide, To lay us down, for Freedom's sake, our brothers’ bones beside; Or from foul treason’s savage grasp to wrench the murderous blade, And in the face of foreign foes its fragments to parade. Six hundred thousand loyal men and true have gone before: We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more! If you look across the hill-tops that meet the northern sky, Long moving lines of rising dust your vision may descry ; And now the wind, an instant, tears the cloudy veil aside, And floats aloft our spangled flag in glory and in pride ; And bayonets in the sunlight gleam, and bands brave music pour: We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more ! If you look all up our valleys where the growing harvests shine, You may see our sturdy farmer boys fast falling into line; And children from their mother’s knees are pulling at the weeds, And learning how to reap and sow, against their country’s needs ; And a farewell group stands weeping at every cottage door: We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more ! We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more, From Mississippi’s winding stream and from New England’s shore ; We leave our ploughs and workshops, our wives and children dear, With hearts too full for utterance, with but a silent tear ; We dare not look behind us, but steadfastly before : We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more ! 129 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. MARCHING THROUGH GEORGIA. All, the great songs of the civil war, with one exception, were written during the first year of the conflict. This exception is “ Marching through Georgia.” It was written to commemorate one of the most remarkable campaigns of the war. Now that the war has been over for nearly thirty years, and the old soldier has no military duty more serious than fighting his battles o’er again, “ Marching through Georgia” has become the song dear¬ est to his heart. At the annual encampments of the Grand Army of the Republic, and at numerous meetings of the members of the Grand Army posts, the writer has heard this sung more fre¬ quently than any other. The words were composed by Mr. Henry C. Work, author of many well-known songs. Among the other best known of his patriotic lyrics are “ Grafted into the Army” and “ Kingdom Come.” Mr. Work was born in Middle- town, Conn., October i, 1832. When he was very young his father removed to Illinois. He was an inventor as well as a song writer, and among his successful inventions are a knitting Machine, a walking doll, and a rotary engine. He died in Hart¬ ford, J une 8, 1884. Bring me the good old bugle, boys ! we’ll sing another song Sing it with that spirit that will start the world along— Sing it as we used to sing it, fifty thousand strong, While we were marching through Georgia. chorus: “ Hurrah, hurrah! we bring the Jubilee ! Hurrah, hurrah! the flag that makes you free!” So we sang the chorus from Atlanta to the sea, While we were marching through Georgia. Yes, and there were Union men who wept with joyful tears, When they saw the honored flag they hadn’t seen for years ; Hardly could they be restrained from breaking out in cheers. While we were marching through Georgia. “ Sherman’s dashing Yankee boys will never reach the coast!" So the saucy rebels said, and ’twas a handsome boast; Had they not forgotten, alas ! to reckon with the host, While we were marching through Georgia? How the darkies shouted when they heard the joyful sound ! How the turkeys gobbled which our commissary found ! How the sweet potatoes even started from the ground ! While we were marching through Georgia. So we made a thoroughfare for Freedom and her train, Sixty miles in latitude—three hundred to the main : Treason fled before us, for resistance was in vain, While we were marching through Georgia. PRAYER IN “STONEWALL" JACKSON'S CAMP CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. i 3 i SOUTHERN SONGS. DIXIE. Halt not till our Federation Secures among earth’s powers its station, Then at peace, and crowned with glory, Hear your children tell the story. The tune “ Dixie " was composed in 1859, by Hr. Dan D. Emmett, for Bryant’s Minstrels, then performing in New York City. It hit the taste of the New York play-going public, and was adopted at once by various bands of wandering minstrels, who sang it in all parts of the Union. In i860 it was first sung in New Orleans. In that city the tune was harmonized, set to new words, and, without the authority of the composer, was published. As from Boston “ John Brown’s Body ” spread through the North, so from New Orleans “Dixie” spread through the South ; and as Northern poets strove to find fitting words for the one, so Southern poets wrote fiery lines to fill the measures of the other. The only version possessing any literary merit is the one given in this collection. It was written by Gen. Albert Pike, a native of Massachusetts. In early life Mr. Pike moved to Little Rock, Ark., editing a paper and studying law in that city. He served in the Mexican war with distinc¬ tion, and on the breaking out of the Rebellion enlisted on the Confederate side a force of Cherokee Indians, whom he led at the battle of Pea Ridge. It is said that President Lincoln requested a band in Washington to play “ Dixie” in 1865, a short time after the surrender of Appomattox, remarking “ that, as we had captured the rebel army, we had captured also the rebel tune.” Southrons, hear your country call you ! Up, lest worse than death befall you ! To arms! To arms ! To arms, in Dixie! Lo ! all the beacon-fires are lighted— Let hearts be now united. To arms ! To arms ! To arms, in Dixie ! Advance the flag of Dixie ! Hurrah ! hurrah ! For Dixie’s land we take our stand, And live or die for Dixie! To arms ! To arms ! And conquer peace for Dixie ! To arms ! To arms ! And conquer peace for Dixie ! Hear the Northern thunders mutter ! Northern flags in South winds flutter. Send them back your fierce defiance ; Stamp upon the accursed alliance. Fear no danger! Shun no labor! Lift up rifle, pike, and sabre. Shoulder pressing close to shoulder, Let the odds make each heart bolder. How the South’s great heart re¬ joices At your cannons’ ringing voices ! For faith betrayed, and pledges broken, Wrongs inflicted, insults spoken. Strong as lions, swift as eagles, Back to their kennels hunt these beagles ! Cut the unequal bonds asunder; Let them hence each other plun¬ der ! Swear upon your country’s altar Never to submit or falter, Till the spoilers are defeated, Till the Lord’s work is completed. BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALBERT PIKE, C. S A. If the loved ones weep in sadness, Victory soon shall bring them gladness, Exultant pride soon banish sorrow, Smiles chase tears away to-morrow. MY MARYLAND. “ Mv MARYLAND ” is regarded by some as the greatest song inspired by the civil war, and if we consider these songs as poems it is the best. Its burning lines, written early in 1861, helped to fire the Southern heart. Its author, Mr. James Ryder Randall, is a native of Baltimore. He was professor of English literature in Poydras College in Louisiana, a short distance from New Orleans, and there in April, 1861, he read the news of the attack on the Massachusetts troops as they passed through Baltimore. Naturally he was greatly excited on read¬ ing this account, and it inspired the song, which was written within twenty-four hours of the time he read of the assault. “My Maryland” is one of a number of songs written by Mr. Randall, but none of the others attained popularity. His “John Pelham,” commonly called “The Dead Cannonneer,” is a much finer poem. After the war he became editor of the Constitutionalist , published in Augusta, Ga., in which city he still resides. The despot’s heel is on thy shore, Maryland! His torch is at thy temple door, Maryland ! Avenge the patriotic gore That flecked the streets of Baltimore, And be the battle-queen of yore, Maryland, my Maryland ! Hark to an exiled son’s appeal, Maryland ! My Mother State, to thee I kneel, Maryland ! For life and death, for woe and weal, Thy peerless chivalry reveal, And gird thy beauteous limbs with steel, Maryland, my Maryland ! Thou wilt not cower in the dust, Maryland ! Thy beaming sword shall never rust, Maryland ! Remember Carroll's sacred trust, Remember Howard’s warlike thrust, And all thy slumberers with the just, Maryland, my Maryland ! Come ! ’tis the red dawn of the day, Maryland ! Come with thy panoplied array, Maryland ! With Ringgold’s spirit for the fray, With Watson’s blood at Monterey, With fearless Lowe and dashing May, Maryland, my Maryland ! Dear Mother, burst the tyrant’s chain, Maryland ! Virginia should not call in vain, Maryland ! 132 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. She meets her sisters on the plain,— “ Sic semper!" 'tis the proud refrain That baffles minions back amain, Maryland ! Arise in majesty again, Maryland, my Maryland! Come ! for thy shield is bright and strong, Maryland ! Come ! for thy dalliance does thee wrong, Maryland ! Come to thine own heroic throng Stalking with Liberty along, And chant thy dauntless slogan-song, Maryland, my Maryland ! I see the blush upon thy cheek, Maryland ! For thou wast ever bravely meek, Maryland ! But lo ! there surges forth a shriek, » From hill to hill, from creek to creek, Potomac calls to Chesapeake, Maryland, my Maryland ! Thou wilt not yield the vandal toll, Maryland ! Thou wilt not crook to his control, Maryland 1 Better the fire upon thee roll, Better the shot, the blade, the bowl, Than crucifixion of the soul, Maryland, my Maryland ! I hear the distant thunder-hum, Maryland ! The Old Line’s bugle, fife, and drum, Maryland ! She is not dead, nor deaf, nor dumb; Huzza ! she spurns the Northern scum— She breathes ! She burns ! She’ll come ! She’ll come ! Maryland, my Maryland ! REBELS. First published in the Atlanta Confederacy. The author is unknown. Rebels ! ’tis a holy name ! The name our fathers bore When battling in the cause of Right, Against the tyrant in his might, In the dark days of yore. Rebels ! ’tis our family name ! Our father, Washington, Was the arch-rebel in the fight, And gave the name to us—a right Of father unto son. Rebels ! ’tis our given name ! Our mother, Liberty, Received the title with her fame, In days of grief, of fear, and shame, When at her breast were we. Rebels ! ’tis our sealed name ! A baptism of blood ! The war—ay, and the din of strife— The fearful contest, life for life— The mingled crimson flood. Rebels ! ’tis a patriot’s name ! In struggles it was given ; We bore it then when tyrants raved, And through their curses ’twas engraved On the doomsday-book of heaven. Rebels ! ’tis our fighting name ! For peace rules o’er the land Until they speak of craven woe, Until our rights receive a blow From foe’s or brother’s hand. Rebels ! ’tis our dying name ! For although life is dear, Yet, freemen born and freemen bred, We’d rather live as freemen dead. Than live in slavish fear. Then call us rebels, if you will— We glory in the name ; For bending under unjust laws, And swearing faith to an unjust cause. We count a greater shame. CALL ALL. THIS Southern war song, which was first published in the Rockingham, Va., Register in 1861, became quite popular with the boys in gray. It is published here because of its peculiarities rather than on account of its literary merit. Whoop ! the Doodles have broken loose. Roaring round like the very deuce ! Lice of Egypt, a hungry pack— After ’em, boys, and drive ’em back. Bull-dog, terrier, cur, and fice, Back to the beggarly land of ice ; Worry ’em, bite ’em, scratch and tear Everybody and everywhere. Old Kentucky is caved from under, Tennessee is split asunder, Alabama awaits attack, And Georgia bristles up her back. Old John Brown is dead and gone ! Still his spirit is marching on— Lantern-jawed, and legs, my boys, Long as an ape’s from Illinois ! Want a weapon ? Gather a brick, Club or cudgel, or stone or stick ; Anything with a blade or butt, Anything that can cleave or cut ; Anything heavy, or hard, or keen— Any sort of slaying machine ! Anything with a willing mind And the steady arm of a man behind. Want a weapon ? Why, capture one ! Every Doodle has got a gun, Belt, and bayonet, bright and new ; Kill a Doodle, and capture two ! Shoulder to shoulder, son and sire ! All, call all! to the feast of fire ! Mother and maiden, and child and slave, A common triumph or a single grave. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 133 THE BLACK FLAG. The raising of the black flag means death without quarter. It means that prisoners taken should be slaughtered at once. It is contrary to the spirit of modern warfare. General Sher¬ man, in his celebrated letter to the Mayor of Atlanta, says, “War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it.” War arouses the fiercest, most tiger-like passions of mankind. Were it not so, the poet who wrote “ The Mountain of the Lovers ” could never have written “ The Black Flag.” Paul Hamilton Hayne was born in Charleston, S. C., in 1830. He abandoned the practice of law for literary pursuits. He contributed to the Southern Literary Messenger, and for a while edited the Charles¬ ton Literary Gazette. He entered the Southern army at the outbreak of the civil war, and served until obliged to resign by failing health. His house and all his personal property were destroyed at the bombardment of Charleston. He wrote extensively both in poetry and prose. Like the roar of the wintry surges on a wild, tempestuous strand, The voice of the maddened millions comes up from an outraged land ; For the cup of our woe runs over, and the day of our grace is past, And Mercy has fled to the angels, and Hatred is king at last! CHORUS: Then up with the sable banner ! Let it thrill to the War God’s breath, For we march to the watchword—Vengeance ! And we follow the captain—Death ! In the gloom of the gory breaches, on the ramparts wrapped in flame, ’Mid the ruined homesteads, blackened by a hundred deeds of shame ; Wheresoever the vandals rally, and the bands of the alien meet, We will crush the heads of the hydra with the stamp of our armed feet. They have taught us a fearful lesson ! ’tis burned on our hearts in fire, And the souls of a host of heroes leap with a fierce desire ; And we swear by all that is sacred, and we swear by all that is pure, That the crafty and cruel dastards shall ravage our homes no more. We will roll the billows of battle back, back on the braggart foe, Till his leaguered and stricken cities shall quake with a coward’s throe ; They shall compass the awful meaning of the conflict their lust begun, When the Northland rings with wailing, and the grand old cause hath won. LORENA. This doleful and pathetic song of affection was very popular among- the Confederate soldiers. It started at the start, and never stopped till the last musket was stacked and the last camp-fire cold. It was, without doubt, the song nearest the Confederate soldier’s heart. It was the “Annie Laurie” of the Confederate trenches. “ Each heart recalled a different name, But all sang ‘Annie Laurie.’” The years creep slowly by, Lorena, The snow is on the grass again ; The sun’s low down the sky, Lorena, And frost gleams where the flowers have been. But the heart throbs on as warmly now As when the summer days were nigh. Oh ! the sun can never dip so low Adown affection's cloudless sky. One hundred months have passed, Lorena, Since last I held that hand in mine ; I felt that pulse beat fast, Lorena, But mine beat faster still than thine. One hundred months! 'Twas flowery May, When up the mountain slope we climbed, To watch the dying of the day, And hear the merry church bells chime. We loved each other then, Lorena, More than we ever dared to tell ; And what we might have been, Lorena, Had but our loving prospered well— But then, 'tis past, the years have flown ; I’ll not call up their shadowy forms ; I’ll say to them, “Lost years, sleep on— Sleep on, nor heed life’s pelting storms.” f It matters little now, Lorena, The past is the eternal’ past; Our heads will soon lie low, Lorena, Life’s tide is ebbing out so fast. But there’s a future, oh ! thank God—■ Of life this is so small a part. ’Tis dust to dust beneath the sod ; But there, up there, 'tis heart to heart." CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. “ OLD FOLKS AT HOME.” Mr. F. G. DE Fontaine, a celebrated Southern war corre¬ spondent, writes that the most popular songs with the soldiers of the Confederate armies were negro melodies, such as “ Old Folks at Home’’and “My Old Kentucky Home.” This is our reason for publishing the pacific and kindly words of the most celebrated negro melody, among songs that breathe threatening and slaughter. It is not difficult to understand why such songs were popular with men raised in the South. They would bring forcibly to mind the distant home, and the dear associations of early life on the old plantations. “ Old Folks at Home” was written by Stephen Collins Foster. He wrote between two and three hundred popular songs—more than any other American. Among the most familiar of his compositions are “Old Uncle Ned,” “ Massa’s in the Cold, Cold Ground,” “Old Dog Tray,” and “My Old Kentucky Home.” Mr. Foster was finely educated, was proficient in French and German, was an amateur painter of ability, and a talented musician. It is- said that he received fifteen thou¬ sand dollars for “ Old Folks at Home.” Way down upon de Swanee libber, Far, far away, Dere’s wha my heart is turning ebber, Dere’s wha de old folks stay. STEPHEN COLLINS FOSTER. All up and down de whole creation Sadly I roam, Still longing for de old plantation, And for de old folks at home. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD CHORUS: CHORUS: All de world am sad and dreary, Ebrywhere I roam ; Oh, darkies, how my heart grows weary Far from de old folks at home ! All de world am sad and dreary, Ebrywhere I roam ; Oh, darkies, how my heart grows weary, Far from de old folks at home ! One little hut among de bushes, One dat I love, Still sadly to my mem’ry rushes, No matter where I rove. When will I see de bees a-humming All round de comb ? When will I hear de banjo tumming, Down in my good old home ? All round de little farm I wandered When I was young ; Den many happy days I squandered, Many de songs I sung. When I was playing wid my brudder, Happy was I ; Oh, take me to my kind old mudder ! Dere let me live and die. 136 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD THE RONNIE BLUE FLAG. Tl-IE most popular war songs of the South were “Dixie” and “ The Bonnie Blue Flag.” Like “ Dixie,” the “ Bonnie Blue Flag ” began its popular career in New Orleans. The words were written by an Irish comedian, Mr. Harry McCarthy, and the song was first sung by his sister, Miss Marion McCarthy, at the Variety Theatre in New Orleans in 1861. The tune is an old and popular Irish melody, “ The Irish Jaunting Car.” It is said that General Butler, when he was commander of the Na¬ tional forces in New Orleans in 1862, made it very profitable by fining every man, woman, or child, who sang, whistled, or played this tune on any instrument, twenty-five dollars. It has also been said that he arrested the publisher, destroyed the stock of sheet music, and fined him five hundred dollars. We are a band of brothers, and native to the soil, Fighting' for the property we gained by honest toil ; And when our rights were threatened, the cry rose near and far : Hurrah for the Bonnie Blue Flag that bears a single star! Hurrah ! hurrah ! for the Bonnie Blue Flag That bears a single star ! As long as the Union was faithful to her trust, Like friends and like brothers, kind were we and just; But now when Northern treachery attempts our rights to mar, We hoist on high the Bonnie Blue Flag that bears a single star. First, gallant South Carolina nobly made the stand ; Then came Alabama, who took her by the hand ; Next, quickly Mississippi, Georgia, and Florida- All raised the flag, the Bonnie Blue Flag that bears a single star. Ye men of valor, gather round the banner of the right ; Texas and fair Louisiana join us in the fight. Davis, our loved President, and Stephens, statesmen are; Now rally round the Bonnie Blue Flag that bears a single star. And here’s to brave Virginia ! The Old Dominion State With the young Confederacy at length has linked her fate. Impelled by her example, now other States prepare To hoist on high the Bonnie Blue Flag that bears a single star. Then here’s to our Confederacy ! Strong we are and brave ; Like patriots of old we’ll fight, our heritage to save ; And rather than submit to shame, to die we would prefer. So cheer for the Bonnie Blue Flag that bears a single star. Then cheer, boys, cheer, raise the joyous shout, For Arkansas and North Carolina now have both gone out ; And let another rousing cheer for Tennessee be given. The single star of the Bonnie Blue Flag has grown to be eleven. Hurrah ! hurrah ! for the Bonnie Blue Flag That bears a single star ! NORTHERN SONGS. JOHN BROWN’S BODY. JOHN Brown was hanged in December, 1859, anc ^ a little more than a year after this time the celebrated marching-tune, “John Brown’s Body,” came into being. It is a singular fact that the composer of the stirring and popular air of this song is unknown. Possibly it had no composer, but, like Topsy, “ it was not born, but just growed.” This seems to be the most reasonable theory of its origin. The words of the song, as given in this collection, with the exception of the first stanza, were written by Charles S. Hall, of Charlestown, Mass. “ John Brown’s Body ” was the most popular war song among the Northern soldiers on the march and around the campfire. In fact, it became the marching song of the armies of the Nation. It was equally popular in the cities, villages, and homes of the North. The Pall Mall Gazette , of October 14, 1865, said : “ The street boys of London have decided in favor of ‘J°Im Brown’s Body’ against ‘My Maryland’ and ‘The Bonnie Blue Flag.’ The somewhat lugubrious refrain has excited their admiration to a wonderful degree.” John Brown’s body lies a-mouldering in the grave ; John Brown’s body lies a-mouldering in the grave; John Brown's body lies a-mouldering in the grave ; His soul is marching on. Glory, halle—hallelujah ! Glory, halle—hallelujah ! Glory, halle—hallelujah ! His soul is marching on ! He’s gone to be a soldier in the army of the Lord ! (thrice.) His soul is marching on ! John Brown’s knapsack is strapped upon his back ! (thrice.) His soul is marching- on ! His pet lambs will meet him on the way ; (thrice.) As they go marching on ! They will hang Jeff Davis to a sour apple tree ! (thrice ) As they march along! Now, three rousing cheers for the Union ! (thrice.) As we are marching on ! Glory, halle—hallelujah ! Glory, halle—hallelujah ! Glory, halle—hallelujah ! Hip, hip, hip, hip, hurrah ! WHEN JOHNNY COMES MARCHING HOME. Another army song that became almost as popular in England as in this country is “When Johnny Comes Marching Home.” It was written and composed by Mr. Patrick S. Gil¬ more, leader of the celebrated Gilmore’s Band. The words do not amount to much, but the tune is of that rollicking order which is very catching. Without doubt the author built up the words of this song to suit the air, on the same principle that in Georgia they build a chimney first and erect the house against it. This rattling war song has kept its hold on the ears of the people to the present time. Mr. Gilmore afterward composed an ambitious national hymn which has never attained the popu¬ larity of his war song. When Johnny comes marching home again. Hurrah ! hurrah ! We'll give him a hearty welcome then, Hurrah ! hurrah ! The men will cheer, the boys will shout, The ladies they will ail turn out, And we’ll all feel gay, When Johnny comes marching home. The men will cheer, the boys will shout. The ladies they will all turn out, And we’ll all feel gay, When Johnny comes marching home. The old church-bell will peal with joy, Hurrah ! hurrah ! To welcome home our darling boy, Hurrah ! hurrah ! CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. The village lads and lasses say, With roses they will strew the way ; And we’ll all feel gay, When Johnny comes marching home. Get ready for the jubilee, Hurrah ! hurrah ! We'll give the hero three times three, Hurrah! hurrah! The laurel wreath is ready now To place upon his loyal brow ; And we’ll all feel gay, When Johnny comes marching home. Let love and friendship on that day, Hurrah! hurrah! Their choicest treasures then display, Hurrah-! hurrah ! And let each one perform some part, To fill with joy the warrior’s heart ; And we'll all feel gay, When Johnny comes marching home. The men will cheer, the boys will shout. The ladies they will all turn out, And we'll all feel gay, When Johnny comes marching home. GRAFTED INTO THE ARMY. By Henry C. Work. Our Jimmy has gone to live in a tent, They have grafted him into the army ; He finally puckered up courage and went, When they grafted him into the army. I told them the child was too young—alas ! At the captain’s forequarters they said he would pass— They’d train him up well in the infantry class— So they grafted him into the army. CHORUS: O Jimmy, farewell ! Your brothers fell Way down in Alabarmy ; I thought they would spare a lone widder's heir, But they grafted him into the army. Drest up in his unicorn—dear little chap ! They have grafted him, into the army; It seems but a day since he sot on my lap, But they have grafted him into the army. And these are the trousies he used to wear— Them very same buttons—the patch and the tear— But Uncle Sam gave him a bran new pair When they grafted him into the army. Now in my provisions I see him revealed— They have grafted him into the army ; A picket beside the contented field, They have grafted him into the army. He looks kinder sickish—begins to cry— A big volunteer standing right in his eye ! Oh, what if the duckie should up and die, Now they’ve grafted him into the army 1 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 13S THE BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM. George F. Root was born in Sheffield, Mass., August 30, 1820, and he was the founder of the music-publishing firm of Root & Cady. His celebrated “Battle Cry of Freedom” was first sung by the Hutchinson family at a mass meeting in New York City. It is said that during the terrible fight in the Wilderness, on May 6, 1864, a brigade of the Ninth Corps, having broken the enemy’s line by an assault, became exposed to a flank attack and was driven back in disorder with heavy loss. They retreated but a few hundred yards, however, re-formed, and again confronted the enemy. Just then some gallant fellows in the ranks of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania began to sing: “ We’ll rally round the flag, boys, rally once again, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom.” The refrain was caught up instantly by the entire regiment and by the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts, next in line. There the grim ranks stood at bay in the deadly conflict. The air was filled with the smoke and crackle of burning underbrush, the pitiful cries of the wounded, the rattle of musketry, and shouts of men ; but above all, over the exultant yells of the enemy, rose the inspiring chorus; “ The Union forever, hurrah ! boys, hurrah ! Down with the traitor, up with the star.” This song was often ordered to be sung as the men marched into action. More than once its strains arose on the battlefield. With the humor which never deserts the American, even amid the hardships of camp life and the dangers of battle, the gentle lines of “Mary Had a Little Lamb” were fitted to the tune of the “Battle Cry of Freedom,” and many a regiment shortened a weary march, or went gayly into action, singing: ‘ Mary had a little lamb, Its fleece was white as snow, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom. And everywhere that Mary went, The lamb was sure to go, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom.” Yes, we’ll rally round the flag, boys, we'll rally once again, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom ; We will rally from the hillside, we’ll gather from the plain, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom. The Union forever, hurrah! boys, hurrah! Down with the traitor, up with the star ; While we rally round the flag, boys, rally once again, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom. We are springing to the call of our brothers gone before, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom; And we’ll fill the vacant ranks with a million freemen more, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom. We will welcome to our numbers the loyal true and brave, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom ; And although they may be poor, not a man shall be a slave. Shouting the battle cry of Freedom. So we’re springing, to the call from the East and from the West, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom; And we’ll hurl the rebel crew from the land we love the best,' Shouting the battle cry of Freedom. The Union forever, hurrah ! boys, hurrah ! Down with the traitor, up with the star ; While we rally round the flag, boys, rally once again, Shouting the battle cry of Freedom. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD 139 TENTING ON THE OLD CAMP-GROUND. The author of “Tenting on the Old Camp-Ground ” is Walter Kittridge, who was born in the town of Merrimac, N. H., October 8, 1832. lie was a public singer and a composer, as well as a writer of popular songs and ballads. In the first year of the civil war he published a small original “ Union Song-Book.” In 1862 he was drafted, and while preparing to go to the front he wrote in a few minutes both words and music of “Tenting on the Old Camp-Ground.” Like many other good things in literature, this song was at first refused publication. But when it was published, its sale reached hundreds of thou¬ sands of copies. We’re tenting to-night on the old camp-ground, Give us a song to cheer Our weary hearts, a song of home And friends we love so dear. CHORUS: Many are the hearts that are weary to-night, Wishing: for the war to cease ; Many are the hearts looking for the right, To see the dawn of peace ; Tenting to-night, tenting to-night, Tenting on the old camp-ground. We’ve been tenting to-night on the old camp-ground. Thinking of the days gone by ; Of the loved ones at home, that gave us the hand, And the tear that said, Good-by ! We are tired of war on the old camp-ground ” Many are dead and gone Of the brave and true who’ve left their homes ; Others have been wounded long. We've been fighting to-day on the old camp-grounU : Many are lying near ; Some are dead, and some are dying, Many are in tears ! 0 O’ 140 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. CHAPTER XIII. THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN. COMMAND GIVEN TO McCLELLAN—HIS PLANS—APPOINTMENT OF SECRETARY STANTON-ON THE PENINSULA—BATTLE OF WIL¬ LIAMSBURG—ON THE CHICKAHOMINY—THE BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS—EFFECT OF THE SWAMPS—LEE IN COMMAND—STUART’S RAID-NEAREST APPROACH TO RICHMOND—ACTION AT BEAVER DAM CREF.K—BATTLE OF GAINES'S MILLS—BATTLE OF SAVAGE’S STATION-BATTLE OF CHARLES CITY CROSS-ROADS-BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL—CRITICISMS OF PENINSULA CAMPAIGN. WITHIN twenty-four hours after the defeat of McDowell’s army at Bull Run (July 21, 1861), the Administration called to Washington the only man that had thus far accomplished much or made any considerable reputation in the field. This was Gen. George B. McClellan. He had been graduated at West Point in 1846, standing second in his class, and had gone at once into the Mexican war, in which he acquitted him¬ self with distinction. After that war the young captain was employed in engineering work till 1855, when the Government sent him to Europe to study the move¬ ments of the Crimean war. He wrote a report of his observations, which was published under the title of “ The Armies of Europe,” and in 1857 resigned his commis¬ sion and became chief engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad, and afterward president of the St. Louis and Cincinnati. He had done good work in Northwestern Virginia in the early summer, and now, at the age of thirty-five, was commissioned major-general in the regular army of the United States, and given command of all the troops about Washington. For the work immediately in hand, this was probably the best selection that could have been made. Washing¬ ton needed to be fortified, and he was a master of engin¬ eering; both the army that had just been defeated, and the new recruits that were pouring in, needed organiza¬ tion, and he proved preeminent as an organizer. Three months after he took command of fifty thousand uni¬ formed men at the capital, he had an army of more than one hundred thousand, well organized in regiments, brigades, and divisions, with the proper proportion of artillery, with quartermaster and commissary departments going like clockwork, and the whole fairly drilled and dis¬ ciplined. Everybody looked on with admiration, and the public impatience that had precipitated the disastrous “On to Richmond” movement was now replaced by a marvellous patience. The summer and autumn months went by, and no movement was made; but McClellan, in taking command, had promised that the war should be “ short, sharp, and decisive,” and the people thought, if they only allowed him time enough to make thorough preparation, his great army would at length swoop down upon the Confederate capital and finish everything at one blow. At length, however, they began to grow weary of the daily telegram, “All quiet along the Potomac,” and the monotonously repeated information that “General McClellan rode out to Fairfax Court-House and back this morning.” The Confederacy was daily growing stronger; the Potomac was being closed to navigation by the erec¬ tion of hostile batteries on its southern bank; the enemy’s flag was flying within sight from the capital, and the question of foreign interference was becoming exceedingly grave. On the 1st of November General Scott, then seventy-five years of age, retired, and McClellan succeeded him as General-in-Chief of all the armies. Soon after this his plans appear, from subsequent revelations, to have undergone important modification. He had undoubt¬ edly intended to attack by moving straight out toward Manassas, where the army that had won the battle of Bull Run was still encamped, and was still commanded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. He now began to think of moving against Richmond by some more easterly route, discussing among others the extreme east¬ erly one that he finally took. But, whatever were his thoughts and purposes, his army appeared to be taking root. The people began to murmur, Congress began to question, and the President began to argue and urge. All this did not signify; nothing could move McClellan. He wanted to wait till he could leave MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B, McCLELLAN AND WIFE. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 141 x PTJI# o °7 jjgL HARPERS ferrw®^ VyjU.I AMS PORT 0 J CBN: #■# fVXAAX CHARLESTOWN^"""/^ - //ttjr " %/m#' -o o S\'" N to - 4 moorefield/ of ^/lWCHESTERo^CV^^>/ ^E R RYV 0 °// #lei: J* - / BALTIMORE.. RELAY h7'>v-' :V ' AN NAP 0 LI ^JUNCTION #4T |fpiMSURG^,< SBURG ( oDARNEST/OWN ys. - X / iy KViu : /f i #^ vvV ANNAPOLIS* .. A Qjs. "-3° I aO/|/u 4#y | #5 #4? / #^Rocks:gap t#%i 4 L# “Jackson 4 NEW MARKET^ ‘SSk' .^4T ROYAL --iimfo ^^SALEIVJ fauqu°ii:r /// ^ % a:# gf \WARRENTON 4' 4#^ O. 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SCOTTVILLE CUMBERLAND C.H. o 0 0 ^p~AMr Ns\f 4:hesterfield ck I AMELIA.#'' o>""" ''rM v X ,#’ v0 X C LOVER •O' ^ #X"" FARM V. \ X / fl__ SUTHERLANDS RICHMQN C H ESTER X. 7# WHITE l-lOUSE iuiih'| ,i 'C^" i1,i '"H;i,„ ■% WEST POINT TJ'IEW KENT C.H. •Tp . ,.Qp.lSON SjtlAND//VG v ^' CI-IARLESCITY ^.GLOUCES CK 2 . X WILUAMSByna TER PR EDWARD V/ MARYSVILLEC.H. p / ,, ' 0m .'' , ' ,,,1 '^Y% ^cwv.4'4>" ^\j' . Pt tt' y c.H, V SCALE OF MILES /P 30 40 SURRY C.Hp Xx SMITI-IFIELDc TS’AC/C ft. FT. MONROE 1 IEWPORT NEWS P0RTSM0U1 SUFF oL'Kq""""""""""## MAP SHOWING THE SEAT OF WAR FROM HARPER'S FERRY TO SUFFOLK, VA. an enormous garrison in the defences of Washington, place a strong corps of observation along the Potomac, and then move out with a column of one hundred and fifty thousand men against an army that he believed to be as numerous as that, though in truth it was then less than half as large. It is now known that, from the beginning to the end of his career in that war, General McClellan constantly overestimated the force opposed to him. On the 10th of January, 1862, the President held a long consultation with Generals McDowell and Franklin and some members of his cabinet. General McClellan was then confined to his bed by an illness of a month’s duration. At this con¬ sultation Mr. Lincoln said, according to General McDowell’s memorandum : “ If something was not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not want to use the army, he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it could be made to do something.” Immediately upon McClellan’s recovery, the President called him to a similar council, and asked him to disclose his plan for FOREIGN OFFICERS AND STAFF AT GENERAL McCLELLAN’S HEADQUARTERS. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. M3 a campaign, which he declined to do. Finally the President asked him if he had fixed upon any particular time for setting out ; and when he said he had, Mr. Lincoln questioned him no further. A few days later, in a letter to the President, he set forth his plan, which was to move his army down the Potomac on transports, land it at or near hort Monroe, march up the peninsula between \ ork and James rivers, and attack the defences of Richmond on the north and cast sides. The Presi¬ dent at first disapproved of this plan, largely for the reason that it would require so much time in preparation ; but when he found that the highest officers in the army favored it, and con¬ sidered the probability that any general was likely to fail if sent to execute a plan he did not originate or believe in, he finally gave it his sanction, and once more set himself to the difficult task of inducing McClellan to move at all. And yet the Presi¬ dent himself still further retarded the opening of the campaign by delaying the order to collect the means of transportation. Meanwhile General Johnston quietly removed his stores, and on the 8th of March evacuated Centreville and Manassas, and placed his army before Richmond. This reconciled the President to McClellan's plan of campaign, which he had never liked. The order for the transportation of McClellan’s army was issued on the 27th of February, and four hundred vessels were required ; for there were actually transported one hundred and twenty-one thousand men, fourteen thousand animals, forty-four batteries, and all the necessary ambulances and baggage-wagons, pontoons and telegraph material. Just before the embarkation, the army was divided into four corps, the commands of which were given to Generals McDowell, Edwin V. Sumner, Samuel P. Heintzelman, and Erasmus D. Keyes. High authorities say this was one of the causes of the failure of the campaign ; for the army should have been divided into corps long before, when McClellan could have chosen his own lieutenants instead of hav¬ ing them chosen by the President. General Hooker said it was impossible for him to succeed with such corps commanders. But his near approach to success rather discredits this criticism. Another element of the highest importance had also entered into the problem with which the nation was struggling. This was the appointment (January 21, 1862) of Edwin M. Stanton to succeed Simon Cameron as Secretary of War. Mr. Stanton, then forty-seven years of age, was a lawyer by profession, a man of great intellect, unfailing nerve, and tremendous energy. He had certain traits that often made him personally disagreeable to his subordinates ; but it was impossible to doubt his thorough loyalty, and Ins determination to find or make a way to bring the war to a successful close as speedily as possible, without the slightest regard to the individual interests of himself or anybody else. He was probably the ablest war minister that ever lived— with the possible exception of Carnot, the man to whom Napo¬ leon said, “ I have known you too late.” It is indicative of Mr. Lincoln’s sagacity and freedom from prejudice, that his first meeting with Mr. Stanton was when he went to Cincinnati, some years before the war, to assist in trying an important case. He found Mr. Stanton in charge of the case as senior counsel, and Stanton was so unendurably disagreeable to him that he threw up the engagement and went home to Springfield. Yet he afterward gave that man the most important place in his cabinet, and found him its strongest member. One division of the army embarked on the 17th of March, and the others followed in quick succession. General McClellan reached Fort Monroe on the 2d of April, by which time fifty- eight thousand men and one hundred guns had arrived, and immediately moved with this force on Yorktown, the place made famous by the surrender of Cornwallis eighty years before. The Confederates had fortified this point, and thrown a line of earthworks across the narrow peninsula to the deep water of War¬ wick River. These works were held by General Magruder with thirteen thousand effective men. General Johnston, who was in command of all the troops around Richmond, says he had no expectation of doing more than delaying McClellan at Yorktown till he could strengthen the defences of the capital and collect more men ; and that he thought his adversary would use his transports to pass his army around that place by water, after destroying the batteries, and land at some point above. McClellan, supposing that Johnston’s entire army was in the defences of Yorktown, sat down before the place and con¬ structed siege works, approaching the enemy by regular parallels. As the remaining divisions of his army arrived at Fort Monroe, they were added to his besieging force ; but McDowell’s entire corps and Blenker’s division had been detached at the last moment and retained at Washington, from fears on the part of the Administration that the capital was not sufficiently guarded, though McClellan had already left seventy thousand men there or within call. The fears were increased by the threatening movements of Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, where, however, he was defeated by Gen. James Shields near Winchester, March 23. General Johnston had to contend with precisely the same difficulty that McClellan complained of. He wanted to bring together before Richmond all the troops that were then at Nor¬ folk and in the Carolinas and Georgia, and with the large army thus formed suddenly attack McClellan after he should have marched seventy-five miles up the peninsula from his base at Fort Monroe. But in a council of war General Lee and the Secretary of War opposed this plan, and Mr. Davis adopted their views and rejected it. Johnston therefore undertook the campaign with the army that he had, which he says consisted of fifty thousand effective men. McClellan spent nearly a month before Yorktown, and when he was ready to open fire with his siege guns and drive out the enemy, May 3d, he found they had quietly departed, leaving “ Quaker guns ” (wooden logs on wheels) in the embrasures. There was no delay in pursuit, and the National advance came up with the Confederate rear guard near Williamsburg, about twelve miles from Yorktown. Here, May 4th, brisk skirmishing began, which gradually became heavier, till reinforcements were hurried up on the one side, and sent back on the other, and the skirmish was developed into a battle. The place had been well fortified months before. The action on the morning of the 5th was opened by the divisions of Generals Hooker and William F. Smith. They attacked the strongest of the earthworks, pushed forward the batteries, and silenced it. Hooker was then heavily attacked by infantry, with a constant menace on his left wing. He sustained his position alone nearly all day, though losing one thousand seven hundred men and five guns, and was at length relieved by the arrival of Gen. Philip Kearny’s division. The delay was due mainly to the deep mud caused by a heavy rain the night before. Later in the day, Hancock’s brigade made a wide circuit on the right, discovered some unoccupied redoubts, and took possession of them. When the Confederates advanced their left to the attack, they ran upon these redoubts, which their commanding officers knew nothing about, and were repelled with heavy loss. Hancock’s one thousand six hundred men suddenly burst over the crest of the works, and bore down 144 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. CAMP OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AT CUMBERLAND LANDING. upon the enemy with fixed bayonets, routing and scattering them. McClellan brought up reinforcements, and in the night the Confederates in front of him moved off to join their main army, leaving in Williamsburg fqur hundred of their wounded, because they had no means of carrying them away, but taking with them about that number of prisoners. The National loss had been about two thousand two hundred, the Confederate about one thousand eight hundred. This battle was fought within five miles of the historic site of Jamestown, where the first permanent English settlement in the United States had been made in 1607, and the first cargo of slaves landed in 1619. Gen. William B. Franklin’s division of McDowell’s corps had now been sent to McClellan, and immediately after the battle of Williamsburg he moved it on transports to White House, on the Pamunkey, where it established a base of supplies. As soon as possible, also, the main body of the army was marched from Williamsburg to White House, reaching that place on the 16th of May. From this point he moved westward toward Rich¬ mond, expecting to be joined by a column of forty thousand men under McDowell, which was to move from Fredericksburg. On reaching the Chickahominy, McClellan threw his left wing across that stream, and sweeping around with his right fought small battles at Mechanicsville and Hanover Junction, by which he cleared the way for McDowell to join him. But at this critical point of time Stonewall Jackson suddenly made another raid down the Shenandoah Valley, and McDowell was called back to go in pursuit of him. Johnston resolved to strike the detached left wing of the National army, which had crossed the Chickahominy, and ad¬ vanced to a point within half a dozen miles of Richmond, and his purpose was seconded by a heavy rain on the night of May 30th, which swelled the stream and swept away some of the bridges, thus hindering reinforcement from the other wing. The attack, May 31st, fell first upon Gen. Silas Casey’s division of Keyes’s corps, which occupied some half-finished works. It was bravely made and bravely resisted, and the Confederates suffered heavy losses before these works, where they had almost surprised the men with the shovels in their hands. But after a time a Confederate force made a detour and gained a position in the rear of the redoubts, when of course they could no longer be held. Reinforcements were very slow in comme up, and Keyes’s men had a long, hard struggle to hold their line at all. They could not have done so if a part of John¬ ston’s plan had not miscarried. He intended to bring in a heavy flanking force between them and the river, but was delayed several hours in getting it in motion. Meanwhile McClellan ordered Sumner to cross the river and join in the battle. Sumner had anticipated such an order as soon as he CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD 145 heard the firing, and when the order came it found him with his corps in line, drawn out from camp, and ready to cross instantly. He was the oldest officer there (sixty-six), and the most energetic. 1 here was but one bridge that could be used, many of the supports of this were gone, the approaches were under water, and it was almost a wreck. But he unhesitatingly pushed on his column. The frail structure was steadied by the weight of the men ; and though it swayed and undulated with their movement and the rush of water, they all crossed in safety. Sumner was just in time to meet the flank attack, which was commanded by Johnston in person. The successive charges of the Confederates were all repelled, and at dusk a counter-charge cleared the ground in front and drove off the last of them in confusion. In this fight General Johnston received wounds that compelled him to retire from the field, and laid him up for a long time. The battle—which is called both Fair Oaks and Seven Pines—cost the National army over five thousand men, and the Confederate nearly seven thousand. It was a more destructive battle than any that, up to that time, the Eastern armies had fought. A participant thus describes the after appearance of the field: “Monday, June 2d, we visited the battlefield, and rode from place to place on the scene of conflict. We have often wished that we could efface from our memory the observations of that day. Details were bury¬ ing the dead in trenches or heaping the ground upon them where they lay. The ground was saturated with gore; the in- teers first formed, was filled with our dead and wounded ; and far¬ ther to the right, near the station, beside an old building, lay thir¬ teen Michigan soldiers with their blankets over them and their names pinned on their caps. Near the railroad, by a MAJOR-GENERAL E. W. GANTT, C. S. A. MAJOR-GENERAL R. E. RODES, C. S. A. 10 REVIEW IN WASHINGTON, UNDER McCLELLAN, OF EIGHT BATTERIES OF ARTILLERY AND THREE REGIMENTS OF CAVALRY, BY LINCOLN AND HIS CABINET. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 147 COMTE DE PARIS. DUC OE CHARTRES. log house, the dead and wounded were packed to¬ gether. Both were motionless ; but you could dis¬ tinguish them by the livid blackness of the dead. We could trace the path of our regiment, from the wood-pile around by the intrenchments to its camp, by the dead still unburied. Those that died im¬ mediately could not be touched, but were covered with ground where they lay; the wounded, who crawled or were carried to the barns, tents, and houses, and who died subsequently, were buried in trenches. Our little tent was still standing, though prerced by several bullets. Beside it lay two dead men of the Ninety-eighth, whom we could not identify; for the sun, rain, and wind had changed their countenances. On the bed lay a dead Confederate. At the left of our camp, in the wood, where the Eighty-first, Eighty-fifth, and Ninety- second New York volunteers and Peck’s brigade fought with Huger, the dead were promiscuously mixed together, and lay in sickening and frightful proxim¬ ity ; strong and weak, old and young, officer and private, horse and man— dead, or wounded in the agonies of death, lay where they fell, and furnished, excepting the swaths on the Williamsburg road, the darkest corner on that day’s panorama.” Col. William Kreutzer, of the Ninety-eighth New York Regiment, which went into that battle with three hundred and eighty-five men, and lost eighty-five, gives some interesting particulars of the action : “ The whole of Company A went to work on the road near the Grapevine bridge. Details were made for men to make abatis and work on the breastworks. Company A left its rifles in r-’ COLONEL B. S ALEXANDER (ENGINEER CORPS). .3 PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITING GENERAL McCLELLAN. 148 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD TABBS HOUSE, YORKTOWN. t-O/Vtv '-A/Vn CONTRABANDS.-AT FOLLER'S HOUSE. Camp, and lost them. When it rejoined the regiment, on the 1st of June, it appeared like a company of pioneers, or sappers and miners, carrying axes, shovels, and picks. . . . Soon after one o’clock our pickets begin to come in sight, retiring through the woods and slashing before the enemy. The skir¬ mish line of the enemy pursued them. We could see both parties jumping over the logs and making their way through the brush and bushes, and hear at intervals the sharp report of their rifles. A little later a dense mass of men, about two rods wide, headed by half a dozen horsemen, is seen marching toward us on the Williamsburg road. They move in quick time, carry their arms on their shoulders, have flags and ban¬ ners, and drummers to beat the step. Our three batteries open simultane¬ ously with all their power. Our regi¬ ment pours its volleys into the slashing and into the column as fast as it can load and fire. The One Hundred and Fourth Pennsylvania vol¬ unteers aims at the column and at the skirmishers approaching its right front and flank. Unlike us, that regiment has no slashing in its front. The cleared field allowed the enemy to concentrate his fire upon it; too near the approaching column of attack, it interfered with the range and efficiency of our batteries behind. Its position was unfortunate. As the light troops pressed upon it, Colonel Davis ordered it to charge them at the double-quick. The regiment rushed forward with spirit, jumped over a rail fence in its front, with a shout and yell; but it was met so reso- i$o CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. MAJOR-GENERAL W. B. FRANKLIN. lutcly and with such a galling fire by the foe, that it fell back in disorder, and did not appear on the field as an organization again during the day. Colonel Davis was wounded, and his ‘ Ringgold Regiment ’ fought its first battle as we have seen. “The One Hundred and Fourth falling back, cleared the field opposite the advancing column, and gave the Ninety-eighth better opportunity to fire upon it as it moved deliberately on. The charging mass staggers, stops, resumes its march again, breaks in two, fills up its gaps; but sure and steady, with its flags and banners, it moves like the tramp of fate. Thinned, scattered, broken, it passes our right, and presses for the batteries. As it ad¬ vances and passes, we pour our volleys into it with no uncertain aim, no random fire. The gaps we make, the swaths we mow, can be seen in the column, for we are only ten or fifteen rods away. The men behind press on those before. The head final¬ ly reaches the redoubt. One of the mounted leaders ascends the parapet and is shot with a pistol by an artillery officer. The whole col¬ umn, from the fort back, severed, broken, staggers, sinks into the earth. The rifle-pits, breast-works, and the Ninety-eighth have cleared the road. “To this time the Ninety-eighth has not lost a man by the enemy ; but our batteries behind have killed and wounded of it half a score. There is a lull in the battle ; the coast looks clear; the foe may not appear again. We look at the main road—it is one gray swath of men. Down along the railroad by Fair Oaks station, we hear but a few reports. Smith has had farther to march along the Nine-mile road, and has not struck our right flank yet; on our left, Palmer has not been attacked; Huger is not on time. Casey’s division has driven back those of Longstreet and Hill. . . . Our batteries open. High over our heads, around us, beside us, the lead is whistling, and the iron is whizzing, hissing, whirling. Every mo¬ ment has a new terror, every instant a new hor¬ ror. Our men are fall¬ ing* fast. We leave the dead and the dying, and send the wounded to the rear. Palmer’s regi¬ ments have all fallen back; the enemy is on our left and rear. Colo¬ nel Durkee tries to move the regiment by the left flank back to the rifle- major-general Joseph hooker pits ; a part only receive the order. The enemy is getting so near, our experience in battle is so limited, our drill is so imperfect, that many of us will not, cannot, stand upon the order of our going. Durkee passes the rifle-pits with what follows him, and goes to our old camp. The writer rallies a part of the regiment around the flag at the half- deserted intrenchments. There we use, officers and men, the sharp-shooter’s practice against the enemy. We can mark the effect of our fire ; no rifle was dis¬ charged in vain. Many of the men could pick a squirrel from the tallest ^ trees of Wayne and Franklin, and MAJOR-GENERAL E. 0. KEYES. BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL O. H. HART. they load and fire with infinite merri¬ ment and good-nature.’’ For some time after the battle of Fair Oaks, heavy rains made any movement almost impossible for either of the armies that confronted each other near Richmond. Gen. Alexander S. Webb says: “The ground, which consisted of alternate layers of reddish clay and quicksand, had turned into a vast swamp, and the guns in battery sank into the earth by their own weight.” McClellan kept his men at work, intrenching and strengthening his position, while he himself seems to have been constantly oc¬ cupied in writing despatches to the President and the Secretary of War, alternately promising an almost immediate advance on Richmond, and calling for reinforcements. He wanted McDowell’s corps of forty thousand men, and the authorities wanted to give it to him if it could be sent by way of Fredericksburg, and united with his right wing in such a way as not to uncover Washington. But in one despatch he declared he would rather not have it at all unless it could be placed absolutely under his command. In several respects his position was very bad. The Chickahominy was bordered by great swamps, whose malarial influences robbed him of almost as many men as fell by the bullets of the enemy. His base was at White House, on the Pamunkey; and the line thence over which his supplies must come, instead of being at right angles with the line of his front and covered by it, was almost a prolongation of it. It was im- CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. possible to maintain permanent bridges over the Chickahominy, and a rain of two or three days was liable at any time to swell the stream so as to sweep away every means of crossing. He could threaten Richmond only by placing a heavy force on the right bank of the river ; he could render his own communications secure only by keeping a large force on the left bank. When it first occurred to him that his true base was on the James, or how long he contemplated its removal thither, nobody knows ; but he received a startling lesson on the 12th of June, which seems to have determined his apparently indeter¬ minate mind. When Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was wounded at Fair Oaks, the com¬ mand devolved upon Gen. G. W. Smith ; but two days later Gen. Rob¬ ert E. Lee was given the McClellan s total effective force, including every man that drew pay the last week in June, was ninety-two thousand five hun¬ dred. His constant expectation of reinforcements by way of Fredericksburg was largely, if not wholly, what kept him in his false position, and it is fair to presume that but for this he would have swung across the peninsula to the new base on the James much sooner and under more favorable circumstances. Wishing to know the extent of McClellan’s earthworks on the right wing, Lee, on June 12th, sent a body of twelve hundred cavalry, with two light guns, to reconnoitre. It was commanded by the dashing Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, commonly called “Jeb Stuart,” who used to dress in gay costume, •MrfV BATTERY No. 4 IN FRONT OF YORKTOWN. (Three Views.) command of the Confederate forces in Virginia, which he re¬ tained continuously till his surrender brought the war to a close. The plan that he had opposed, and caused Mr. Davis to reject, when Johnston was in command—of bringing large bodies of troops from North Carolina, Georgia, and the Shenandoah Valley, to form a massive army and fall upon McClellan—he now adopted and proceeded at once to carry out. Johnston enumerates reinforcements that were given him aggregating fifty-three thousand men, and says he had then the largest Confederate army that ever fought. The total number is given officially at eighty thousand seven hundred and sixty-two. This probably means the number of men actually carrying muskets, and excludes all officers, teamsters, musicians, and mechanics; for the Confederate returns were generally made in that way. with yellow sash and black plume, wore gold spurs, and rode a white horse. He was only ordered to go as far as Hanover Old Church ; but at that point he had a fight with a small body of cavalry, and as he supposed dispositions would be made to cut him off, instead of returning he kept on and made the entire circuit of McClellan’s army, rebuilding a bridge to cross the lower Chickahominy, and reached Richmond in safety. The actual amount of damage that he had done was small; but the raid alarmed the National commander for the safety of his communications, and was probably what determined him to change his base. In this expedition Stuart lost but one man. In the encounter at Hanover Old Church a charge was led by the Confederate Captain Latane and received by a detachment commanded by Captain Rovall. The two captains J52 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. QUAKER GUNS. fought hand to hand, and Latane was shot dead, while Royall received severe sabre wounds. Stonewall Jackson, if not Lee’s ablest lieutenant, was cer¬ tainly his swiftest, and the one that threw the most uncertainty into the game by his rapid movements and unexpected appear¬ ances. At a later stage of the war his erratic strategy, if per¬ sisted in, would probably have brought his famous corps of “ foot cavalry” (as they were called from their quick marches) to sudden destruction. An opponent like Sher¬ idan, who knew how to be swift, brilliant, and audaciou s, without transgressing the funda¬ mental rules of warfare, would have been likely to finish him at a blow. But Jackson did not live to meet such an opponent. At this time the bugbears that haunt imaginations not inured to war were still in force, and the mas¬ sive thimble-rigging by which he was made to appear before Richmond, and presto ! sweeping down the Shenandoah Valley, served to paralyze large forces that might have been added to Mc- major-general s.las casey. Qellan’s army. The topography of Virginia is favorable to an army menac¬ ing Washington, and unfavor- major-general e. v. sumner. able to one menacing Rich¬ mond. The fertile valley of the Shenandoah was inviting ground for soldiers. A Confederate force advancing down the valley came at every step nearer to the National capital, while a National force advancing up the valley was carried at every step farther away from the Confed¬ erate capital. The Confederates made much of this advantage, and the authorities at Washington were in constant fear of the capture of that city. Soon after Stuart’s raid, Lee began to make his dispositions to attack McClellan and drive him from the peninsula. He wrote to Jackson: “Unless McClellan can be driven out of his intrenchments, he will move by positions, under cover of his BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES SHIELDS. BURNING OF STORES AND MUNITIONS OF WAR AT WHITE HOUSE. VA.—DEPARTURE OF THE FEDERAL FLOTILLA FOR THE JAMES RIVER *54 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. heavy guns, within shelling distance of Richmond.” To convey the impression that Jackson was to move in force down the valley, Lee drew two brigades from his own army, placed them on the cars in Richmond in plain sight of some prisoners that were about to be exchanged, and sent them off to Jackson. Of course the released prisoners carried home the news. Rut Jack- son returned with these reinforcements and Ewell’s division of his corps, joined Lee, and on the 25th of June concerted a plan for immediate attack. Secre¬ tary Stanton appears to have been the only one that saw through the game ; for he tele¬ graphed to McClellan that while neither Banks nor McDowell nor Fremont could ascertain anything about Jackson’s movements, his own belief was that he was going to Richmond. Yet the impression was not strong enough in the mind of the Secretary of War (or else the Secretary could not have his own way) to induce the appropriate counter-move of im¬ mediately sending McDowell’s whole corps to McClellan. McCall’s division of that corps, however, had been forwarded, and on the 18th took a strong position on McClellan’s extreme right, near Mechanicsvillc. Admiral Phelps, of the navy, then a lieu¬ tenant commanding the gunboat Corwin , and serving in the waters about the peninsula, writes: “About ten o’clock one evening my emissary notified me that a certain man, who had caused much trouble, would leave Centreville about midnight, in a buggy, with letters for ‘ Queen Caroline ’ and Richmond, in violation of orders. Soon after daylight the following morning both man and mail were in my possession. Only one letter in the package was of any value (the others were sent to their destination), and that one—written by an adjutant-general in the Confederate army, informing his father that, ‘on a certain night,’ mentioning the date, ‘one hundred thousand men from Beauregard’s army at Shiloh would be in Richmond, after detach¬ ing thirty thousand to reinforce Stonewall Jackson, who was doing for the enemy in the mountains ’—was placed in General McClel¬ lan’s hands about five P.M. the following day by one of his aids, to whose care I had in¬ trusted it.” On the 25th McClellan had pushed back the Confederates on his left, taken a new posi¬ tion there, and advanced his outposts to a point only four miles from Richmond. But he began his movements too late, for the Confederates were already in motion. Leav¬ ing about thirty thousand men in the immedi¬ ate defences of Richmond, Lee crossed the Chickahominy with about thirty-five thousand under Generals A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and Longstreet, intending to join Jackson’s twenty- PROFESSOR T, S. C. LOWE, BALLOONIST. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. IS? five thousand, and with this enormous force make a sudden attack on the twenty thousand National troops that were on the north side of the river, commanded by Gen. Fitz-John Porter, destroy them before help could reach them, and seize McClellan’s communications with his base. Jackson, who was to have appeared on the field at sunrise of the 26th, was for once behind time. The other Confederate commanders became nervous and impatient; for if the movement were known to McClellan, he could, with a little boldness and some fighting, have captured Richmond that day. Indeed, the inhabitants of the city expected nothing else, and it is said that the archives of the Confederate Government were all packed and ready for instant removal. At midday Gen. A. P. Hill’s corps drove the small National force out of Mechanicsville, and advanced to Mc¬ Call’s strong position on Beaver Dam Creek. This they dared not attack in front; but they made desperate attempts on both flanks, and the result was an afternoon of fruitless fighting, in which they were literally mown down by the well-served artil¬ lery, and lost upward of three thousand men, while McCall maintained his position at every point and lost fewer than three hundred. That night, in pursuance of the plan for a change of base, the heavy guns that had thwarted Lee in his first attack were car¬ ried across the Chickahominy, together with a large part of the bag¬ gage train. On the morning of the 27th Porter fell back some¬ what to a position on a range of low hills, where he could keep the enemy in check till the stores were removed to the other side of the river, which was now BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. J. PETTIGREW, C. S. A. ST. PETER'S CHURCH, NEAR WHITE HOUSE. AGeorge Washington was married in this church.) MAJOR-GENERAL BENJAMIN HUGER, C. S. A his only object. McClellan sent him five thousand more men in the course of the day, being afraid to send any greater number, because he believed that the bulk of the Confederate army was in the defences on his left, and a show of activity there still further deceived them. On the morning of the 27th Porter had eighteen thousand infantry, two thousand five hundred artillerymen, and a small force of cavalry, with which to meet the attack of at least fifty-five thousand. Longstreet and the Hills had followed the retreat closely, but, warned by the ex¬ perience of the day before, were not willing to attack until Jackson should join them. The fighting began about two o’clock in the afternoon, when A. P. Hill assaulted the centre of Porter’s position, and in a two hours’ struggle was driven back with heavy loss. Two attacks on the right met with no better success. The effect on the new troops that had been hurried up from the coast was com¬ plete demoralization. The Confederate General Whiting says in his report: “ Men were leaving the field in every direction, and in great disorder. Two regiments, one from South Carolina and one from Louisiana, were actually marching back from the fire. Men were skulking from the front in a shameful manner.” But at length Jackson’s men arrived, and a determined effort was made on all parts of the line at once. Even then it seemed for a time as if victory might rest with the little army on the hills; and in all probability it would, if they had had such intrenchments as the men afterward learned how to construct very quickly; but their breastworks were only such as could be made from hastily felled trees, a few rails, and heaps of knap-sacks. The Confederates had the advantage of thick woods in which to form and advance. As they emerged and came on in heavy masses, with the Confederate yell, they were answered by the Union cheer. Volley responded to volley, guns were taken and re-taken, CAMPFIRE AJVD BATTLEFIELD. 156 and cannoneers that remained after the infantry supports re¬ tired were shot down; but it was not till sunset that the National line was fairly disrupted, at the left centre, when the whole gave way and slowly retired. Two regiments were captured, and twenty-two guns fell into the hands of the enemy. In the night Porter crossed the river with his remaining force, and destroyed the bridges. This was called by the Confederates the battle of the Chickahominy; but it takes its better known name from two mills (Gaines’s) near the scene of action. The total National loss was six thousand men. The Confederate loss was never properly ascertained, which renders it probable that wagons, and two thousand five hundred head of cattle. Gen. Silas Casey’s division, in charge of the stores at White House, loaded all they could upon transports, and destroyed the re¬ mainder. Trains of cars filled with supplies were put under full speed and run off the tracks into the river. Hundreds of tons of ammunition, and millions of rations, were burned or otherwise destroyed. Rear Admiral Thomas S. Phelps, United States Navy, gives a vivid description of the scene when the transports and other vessels fled down the river in panic : “ Harassing the enemy and protecting the worthy fully occupied my time until the BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.—LEE S ATTACK. it was much larger. Some of the wounded lay on the field four days uncared for. This action is sometimes called the first battle of Cold Harbor. The armies under Grant and Lee fought on the same ground two years later. Lee and Jackson believed that they had been fighting the whole of McClellan’s forces, and another mistake that they made secured the safety of that army. They took it for granted that the National commander, driven from his base at White House, would retreat down the peninsula, taking the same route by which he had come. Consequently they remained with their large force on the left bank of the Chickahominy, and even advanced some distance down the stream, which gave McClellan twenty-four hours of precious time to get through the swamp roads with his immense trains. He had five thousand loaded afternoon of June 27, [862, when Quartermaster-General Ingalls came down the river on a boat provided especially for his use, and after directing an assistant to abandon the Point, imme¬ diately continued on his way to Yorktown. Soon afterward the Pamunkey, as far as the eye could reach, appeared crowded with a confused mass of side-wheel boats, propellers, brigs, and schooners, and as they dashed past my vessel there appeared to be as complete a stampede as it has ever been my misfortune to witness. In answer to the hail, ‘What is the trouble?’ I was greeted with, ‘ The rebels are coming! The whole country is full of them ; go to the mast-head and you will see thousands of them ! ’ Eliciting nothing further of a satisfactory nature, and seeing nothing but empty fields, I directed a count to be made of the fleeing vessels, and by evening’s dusk six hundred BATTLE OF CHARLES CITY CROSS-ROADS, JUNE 30, 1862. I5& > / CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL A. P. HILL, C. S. A. left in the defences of Richmond, found that the National army was retreating to the James, he moved out to attack it, and struck the rear guard at Allen’s farm. His men made three assaults, and were three times repelled. Magruder complained that he lost a victory here because Lee had left him but thirteen thousand men. The National troops fell back to Savage’s Station, where later in the day Magruder attacked them again. He had a rifled can¬ non mounted on a platform car, with which he expected to do great execution. But there was an ample force to oppose him, and it stood unmoved by his successive charges. About sunset he advanced his whole line with a desperate rush in the face of a continuous fire of cannon and musketry, but it was of no avail, and half an hour later his own line was broken by a counter charge that closed the battle. He admitted a loss of four thou¬ sand men. Sumner and Franklin, at a cost of three thousand, had thus maintained the approach to the single road through White Oak Swamp, by which they were to follow the body of the army that had already passed. But it was found necessary to burn another immense quantity of food and clothing that LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART. moving up steadily in the face of batteries that tore great gaps through them at every discharge, crossed bayonets, and clubbed muskets. Only on that part of the line held by McCall did the Confederates, with all their daring, succeed in breaking through. McCall, in his report, describes the success¬ ful charge: “A most determined charge was made on Randol’s battery by a full bri¬ gade, advancing in wedge shape, without order, but in perfect recklessness. Some¬ what similar charges had been previously made on Cooper’s and Kern’s batteries by single regiments, without success, they having recoiled before the storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randol’s battery, and the Fourth Regiment was requested not to fire until the battery had done with them. Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did indeed mow down the advancing host; but still the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzles of his guns. It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his bat¬ tery before the guns could be removed.” General McCall him¬ self, endeavoring to rally his men at this point, was captured and carried off to Richmond. In Kearney’s front a similar charge was made three times ; but every time a steady musketry fire drove back the enemy that had closed up its gaps made by the artillery. Darkness put an end to the fighting, and that night McClellan’s army continued its retreat to Malvern Hill, where BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAS. E. RAINS, C. S. A. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL D. H. HILL, C. S. A. and eighty were reported as having passed, not counting several schooners left behind, which on touching the bottom had been abandoned, their crews escaping to more fortunate companions.” On the following day the gunboats returned to West Point, tow¬ ing the derelict schooners which they had floated, and also the half of a regiment which in the hurry of the previous day had been forgotten and left behind. At the last moment Casey embarked his men, and with what he had been able to save steamed down the Pamunkey and York Rivers, and up the James to the new base. At the close of a long despatch to the Secre¬ tary of War, on the 28th, General McClellan said: “If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.” When Gen. John B. Magruder, who had been could not be removed, and to leave behind two thousand five hundred sick and wounded men. Jackson, after spending a day in building bridges, crossed the Chickahominy and attempted to follow McClellan’s rear guard through White Oak Swamp ; but when he got to the other side he found a necessary bridge destroyed and National batteries commanding its site, so that it was impossible for his forces to emerge from the swamp. But meanwhile Hill and Longstreet had crossed the river farther up stream, marched around the swamp, and struck the retreating army near Charles City Cross- Roads, on the 30th. There was terrific fighting all the afternoon. There were brave charges and bloody repulses, masses of men mp 1 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 159 his advance guard had taken up the strongest position he had yet oc¬ cupied. The battle just described has several names — Glendale, Fra¬ zier’s Farm, Charles City Cross-Roads, New¬ market, Nelson’s Farm. McClellan here lost ten guns. The losses in men cannot be known exact¬ ly, as the reports group the losses of several days before they work, a fire Longstreet BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN G. BARNARD. and the two Hills re¬ ported a loss of twelve thousand four hundred and fifty-eight in the fighting from the 27th to the 30th. The last stand made by McClellan for delivering battle was at Malvern Hill. This is a plateau near Turkey Bend of James River, having an elevation of sixty feet, and an extent of about a mile and a half in one direction and a mile in the other. It is so bordered by streams and swamps as to leave no practicable ap¬ proach except by the narrow northwest face. Here McClellan had his entire army in posi¬ tion when his pursuers came up. It was disposed in the form of a semicircle, with the right wing “ refused ” (swung back) and prolonged to Haxall's Landing, on the James. His position was peculiarly favorable for the use of artillery, and his whole front bristled with it. There were no intrenchments to speak of, but the natural inequalities of the ground afforded considerable shelter for the men and the guns. It was as complete a trap as could be set for an army, and Lee walked straight into it. Under or¬ dinary circumstances, both commander and men would properlyhesi- tate to attack an enemy so posted. But to the confidence with which the Southerners be¬ gan the war was now added the peculiar elation produced by a week’s pursuit of a retreating army; and apparently it did not occur to them that they were all mortal. In the first contact seven thousand Confed BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. J. ABERCROMBIE. erates, with six guns, struck the left of the position. They boldly advanced their artillery to within eight hun¬ dred yards of the cliff; but could get at of twenty or thirty guns was concentra¬ ted upon their battery, which knocked it to pieces in a few minutes; and at the same time some huge shells from a gunboat fell among a small detachment of cavalry, threw it into confusion, and turned it back upon the infantry, breaking up the whole at¬ tack. Lee was not ready to as¬ sault with his whole army till the afternoon of July 1st. An artillery duel was kept up during the forenoon, but the Confederate commander did not succeed in destroying the National batteries, as he hoped to ; on the contrary, he saw his own disabled, one after another. The signal for the infantry attack was to be the usual yell, raised by Armi- stead’s division on the right and taken up by the successive divisions along the line. But the Confederate line was separated by thick woods ; there was long waiting for the signal ; some of the generals thought they heard it, and some advanced without hear¬ ing it. The consequence was a series of separate attacks, some of them repeated three or four times, and every time a con¬ centrated fire on the attacking column and a bloody repulse. The men themselves be¬ gan to see the hopelessness of it, while their officers were still urging them to re¬ newed efforts. “Come on, come on, my men,” said one Confederate colonel, with the grim humor of a soldier ; “ do you want to live for¬ ever ? ” There were some brief counter-charges, in one of w h i c h the colors were taken from a North Caro¬ lina regiment; but in general the National troops only maintained r ground, and though fighting was kept up till nine o’clock in the evening, the line—as Gen- PA t-MEK 160 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. eral Webb, then assistant chief of artillery, tells us—was never for one instant broken or the guns in danger. This battle cost Lee five thousand men, and at its close he gave up the pursuit. The National loss was less than one-third as great. That night McClellan withdrew his army to Harrison’s Landing, on the James, where he had fixed his base of supplies and where the gunboats could protect his position. This retreat is known as the Seven Days, and the losses are figured up at fifteen thousand two hundred and forty-nine on the National side, and somewhat over nineteen thousand on the Confederate. and a commander that could think. There can be no doubt that the Administration was over-anxious about the movements in the Shenandoah, and should have sent McDowell s corps to McClellan at once; but neither can there be much doubt that if Little Mac, the Young Napoleon, as he was fondly called, had been a general of the highest order, he would have destroyed Lee’s army and captured the Confederate capital with the ample forces that he had. It was not General McClellan alone that was in a false position when his army was astride the Chicka- hominy, but the Administration and the people of the loyal GRAPEVINE BRIDGE. From that time there was an angry controversy as to the military abilities of General McClellan and the responsibility for the failure of the campaign, and partisanship was never more violent than over this question. The General had won the highest personal regard of his soldiers, and they were mostly unwilling or unable to look at the matter in the cold light of the criticism that simply asks, What was required? and What was accomplished? The truth appears to be, that General McClellan, like most men, possessed some virtues and lacked others. He organized a great army, and to the end of its days it felt the benefit of the discipline with which he endowed it. But with that army in hand he did not secure the purpose of its creation. He was an accomplished engineer, and a gigantic adjutant, but hardly the general to be sent against an army that could move States as well. Their grand strategy was radically vicious, for they stood astride of the great central question of the war itself. To a student of the art of war, this disastrous campaign and the many criticisms that it evoked arc exceedingly interesting. Nearly every military problem was in some way presented in it. Two or three quotations from the best sources will indicate its importance and the complicated questions that it involved. General McClellan himself says in his report: “It may be asked why, after the concentration of our forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a large part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond, upon the opposite side, I did not, instead of striking for James River fifteen miles below that place, at once march directly on Richmond. It will be remembered that at this juncture the enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason 5a if if £11 GENERAL McCLELLANS ARMY BETWEEN BIG BETHEL AND YORKTOWN. l62 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. to believe that he would sever our communications with our supply depot at the White House. We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if we had advanced directly on Richmond it would have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our men would have been destitute of food ; and even if Richmond had fallen before our arms, the enemy could still have occupied our supply communications between that place and the gunboats, and turned their disaster into victory. If, on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated all his forces at Richmond during the progress of our attack, and we had been defeated, we must in all probability have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla. The battles which continued day after day in the progress of our flank movement to the James, with the exception of the one at Gaines’s Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing engage¬ ment at Malvern Hill was the most decisive of all.” One of General McClellan’s severest critics, Gen. John G. Barnard, in an elaborate review of the campaign, wrote : “ It was a blunder unparalleled to expose Porter’s corps to fight a battle by itself on the 27th against overwhelming forces of the enemy. With perfect ease that corps might have been brought over on the night of the 26th, and, if nothing more brilliant could have been thought of, the movement to the James might have been in full tide of execution on the 27th. A more propitious moment could not have been chosen, for, besides Jackson’s own forces, A. P. Hill’s and Longstreet’s corps were on the left bank of the Chickahominy on the night of the 26th. Such a movement need not have been discovered to the enemy till far enough advanced to insure success. At any rate, he could have done no better in preventing it than he actually did afterward. ... He has spent weeks in building bridges which establish a close connec¬ tion between the wings of his army, and then fights a great battle with a smaller fraction of his army than when he had a single available bridge, and that remote. He, with great labor, con¬ structs ‘ defensive works ’ in order that he ‘ may bring the greatest possible numbers into action,’ and again exhibits his ability to utilize his means by keeping sixty-five thousand men idle behind them, while thirty-five thousand, unaided by ‘ defen¬ sive works’ of any kind, fight the bulk of his adversary’s forces, and are, of course, overwhelmed by ‘superior numbers.’ We believe there were few commanding officers of the Army of the Potomac who did not expect to be led offensively against the enemy on the 26th or 27th. Had such a movement been made, it is not improbable that, if energetically led, we should have gone into Richmond. Jackson and A. P. Hill could not have got back in time to succor Magruder’s command, if measures of most obvious propriety had been taken to prevent them. We might have beaten or driven Magruder’s twenty-five thousand men and entered Richmond, and then, reinforced by the great moral acquisition of strength this success would have given, have fought Lee and reestablished our communications. At any rate, something of this kind was worth trying. . . . Our army is now concentrated on the James ; but we have another day’s fighting before us, and this day we may expect the concen¬ trated attack of Lee’s whole army. We know not at what hour it will come—possibly late, for it requires time to find out our new position and to bring together the attacking columns—yet we know not when it will come. Where, this day, is the com¬ manding general? Off, with Captain Rodgers, to select ‘the final positions of the army and its depots.’ He does not tell us that it was on a gunboat, and that this day not even ‘ signals ’ would keep him in communication with his army, for his journey was ten or fifteen miles down the river ; and he was thus absent till late in the afternoon. This is the first time we ever had reason to believe that the highest and first duty of a general, on the day of battle, was separating himself from his army to re¬ connoitre a place of retreat! ... If the enemy had two hundred thousand men, it was to be seriously apprehended that, leaving fifty thousand behind the ‘strong works ’ of Richmond, he would march at once with one hundred and fifty thousand men on Washington. Why should he not? General McClellan and his eulogists have held up as highly meritorious strategy the leaving of Washington defended by less than fifty thousand men, with the enemy in its front estimated to be one hundred and twenty thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand strong, and moving off to take an eccentric line of operations against Richmond ; and now the reverse case is presented, but with an important difference. The enemy at Manassas, on learning General McClellan’s movement, could either fly to the defence of Richmond or attack Washington. General McClellan says that this latter course was not to be feared. McClellan on the James, on learning that Lee with one hundred and fifty thousand men is marching on Washington, can only attack Richmond ; by no possibility can he fly to the defence of Washington. Besides, he is inferior in numbers (according to his own estimate) even to Lee’s marching army. Here, in a nutshell, is the demonstration of the folly of the grand strategic movement on Richmond, as given by its own projector.” An English military critic thus analyzes the great campaign : “As regards the value of the plan, in a merely military point of view, three faults may be enumerated : It was too rash ; it violated the principles of war; its application was too timid. (1) An army of one hundred and thirty thousand volunteers should not be moved about as if it were a single division. (2) The choice of Fort Monroe as a secondary basis involved the neces¬ sity of leaving Washington, or the fixed basis, to be threatened, morally at least, by the enemy. The communications also between these two places were open to an attack from the Merrimac, an iron-plated ship, which lay at Norfolk, on the south side of Hampton Roads. The first movement to Fort Monroe was the stride of a giant. The second, in the direction of Rich¬ mond, was that of a dwarf. When the army arrived in front of the lines at Yorktown, it numbered, probably, one hundred thousand men, and here there was no timid President to inter¬ fere with the command ; nevertheless, McClellan suffered himself to be stopped in the middle of an offensive campaign by Magru- der and twelve thousand men. . . . The hour of his arrival in front of the lines should have been the hour of his attack •upon them. Two overwhelming masses, to which life and energy had been communicated, should have been hurled on separate points. Magruder not only defeated but destroyed! The morale of the Federal army raised ! The result of the campaign, although it might not have been decisive, would have been more honorable.” On the Confederate side the criticism was almost as severe, because, while claiming the result of the six days as a Con¬ federate success, it was also claimed that the campaign should have resulted in the complete destruction of McClellan’s army. The use of balloons for reconnoitring the enemy’s position formed a picturesque feature of this campaign. T. S. C. Lowe, J. H. Stiner, and other aeronauts were at the National head¬ quarters with their balloons, and several officers of high rank accompanied them in numerous ascents. But it seems to have been demonstrated that the balloon was of little practical value. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . ‘^3 MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN POPE. CHAPTER XIV. POPE’S CAMPAIGN. FORMATION OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA—HALLECK MADE GENERAL- IN-CHIEF— McClellan leaves the peninsula — battle of CEDAR MOUNTAIN-POPE AND LEE MANCEUVRE — BATTLE OF GROVE TON — THE SECOND BULL RUN—BATTLE OF CHANTILLY- THE PORTER DISPUTE—GENERAL GRANT’S OPINION—COMPLI¬ CATED MOVEMENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN—INTERESTING INCIDENTS. While McClellan was before Richmond, it was determined to consolidate in one command the corps of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell, which were moving about in an independent and ineffectual way between Washington and the Shenandoah Val¬ ley. Gen. John Pope, who had won considerable reputation by his capture of Island No. 10, was called from the West and given command (June 26, 1862) of the new organization, which was called the Army of Virginia. Frdmont declined to serve under a commander who had once been his subordinate, and consequently his corps was given to General Sigel. General Pope, on taking command of this force, which numbered all told about thirty-eight thousand men, and also of the troops in the fortifications around Washington, had the bad taste to issue a general order that had three capital defects: it boasted of his own prowess at the West, it underrated his enemy, and it con¬ tained a bit of sarcasm pointed at General McClellan, the com¬ mander of the army with which his own was to cooperate. Pope says, in his report, that he wrote a cordial letter to McClellan, asking for his views as to the best plan of campaign, and offer¬ ing to render him any needed assistance ; and that he received but a cold and indefinite reply. It is likely enough that a courteous man and careful soldier like McClellan would be in no mood to fall in with the suggestions of a commander that entered upon his work with a gratuitous piece of bombast, and seemed to have no conception of the serious nature of the task. When it became evident that these two commanders could not act sufficiently in harmony, the President called Gen. Henry W. Ilalleck from the West to be General-in-Chief, with headquar¬ ters at Washington, and command them both. Halleck had perhaps more military learning than any other man in the coun¬ try, and his patriotic intentions were unquestionably good ; but in practical warfare he proved to be little more than a great obstructor. He had been the bane of the Western armies, pre¬ venting them from following up their victories, and had almost driven Grant out of the service ; and from the day he took com¬ mand at Washington (July 12) the troubles in the East became more complicated than ever. McClellan held a strong position at Harrison’s Landing, where, if he accomplished nothing else, he was a standing menace to Richmond, so that Lee dared not withdraw his army from its defence. He wanted to be heavily reinforced, cross the James, and strike at Richmond’s southern communications, just as Grant actually did two years later; and he was promised rein¬ forcements from the troops of Burnside and Hunter, on the coast of North and South Carolina. Lee’s anxiety was to get McClellan off from the peninsula, so that he could strike out toward Washington. He first sent a detachment to bombard McClellan’s camp from the opposite side of the James; but McClellan crossed the river with a sufficient force and easily swept it out of the way. Then Lee sent Jackson to make a demonstration against Pope, holding the main body of his army ready to follow as soon as some erratic and energetic movements of Jackson had caused a sufficient alarm at Washington to deter¬ mine the withdrawal of McClellan. The unwitting Halleck was all too swift to cooperate with his enemy, and had already determined upon that withdrawal. Burnside’s troops, coming up on transports, were not even landed, but were forwarded up the Potomac and sent to Pope. McClellan marched his army to Fort Monroe, and there embarked it by divisions for the same destination. Pope’s intention was to push southward, strike Lee’s western and northwestern communications, and cut them off from the Shenandoah Valley. He first ordered Banks (July 14) to push his whole cavalry force to Gordonsville, and destroy the railroads and bridges in that vicinity. But the cavalry commander, General Hatch, took with him infantry, artillery, and a wagon train, and consequently did not move at cavalry speed. Before he could get to Gordonsville, Jackson’s advance reached it, and his movement was frustrated. He was relieved of his command, and it was given to Gen. John Buford, an able cavalry leader. As soon as Jackson came in contact with Pope’s advance, he called upon Lee for reinforcements, and promptly received them. On the 8th of August he crossed the Rapidan, and moved toward Culpeper. Pope, who had but recently taken the field in person, having remained in Washington till July 29th, attempted to con¬ centrate the corps of Banks and Sigel at Culpeper. Banks arrived there promptly on the 8th ; but Sigel sent a note from Sperryville in the afternoon, asking by what road he should march. “ As there was but one road between those two points." 164 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. ¥ about eigh¬ teen hundred. ‘ ‘ Besides which,” says Gen e r a 1 Pope, “ fully one thousand says Pope, “ and that a broad stone turnpike, I was at a loss to understand how General Sigel could entertain any doubt as to the road by which he should march.” On the morning of the 9th Banks’s corps went out alone to meet the enemy at Cedar Mountain. Banks had eight thousand men (Pope says he had supposed that corps numbered fourteen thousand), and attacked an enemy twice as strong. He first struck Jackson’s right wing, and afterward furiously attacked the left, rolled up the flank, opened a fire in the rear, and threw Jackson’s whole line into confusion. It was as if the two commanders had changed characters, and Banks had suddenly assumed the part that, according to the popular idea, Jackson was always supposed to play. If Sigel had only known what road to take, that mi gilt have been the last of Jackson. But Banks’s force had become somewhat broken in its advance through the woods, and at the same time the Confederates were reinforced, so that Jackson was able to rally his men and check the movement. Banks in turn was forced back a short distance, where he took up a strong position. Sigel’s corps arrived in the evening, relieved Banks’s corps, and made immediate preparations for a renewal of the fight in the morning. The dead were buried, the wounded carried forth, and through the night trains were moving and everything being put in readiness, but at daylight it was discovered that the enemy had fallen back two miles to a new position. Partly because of the strong position held by each, and partly because of the very hot weather, there was little further disposition to renew the fight, and two days later Jackson fell still further back to Gor- donsville. In this action, which for the numbers engaged was one of the fiercest and most rapid of the war, the Con federates lost about thir¬ teen hundred men and the National army POPE'S BAGGAGE-TRAIN IN THE MUD. men strag¬ gled back to Culpeper Court House and beyond, and never entirely re- turned to their com¬ mands.” On the other hand, the cavalry under view in culpeper. Buford and Bayard pursued the enemy and captured many stragglers. The Confederate Gen. Charles S. Winder was struck by a shell and killed while leading his division. Immediately after this action the cavalry resumed its former position along the Rapidan from Raccoon Ford to the moun¬ tains. On the 14th of August General Pope was reinforced by eight thousand men under General Reno, whereupon he pushed his whole force forward toward the Rapidan, and took up a posi¬ tion with his right on Robertson’s River, his centre on the slopes of Cedar Mountain and his left near Raccoon Ford. From this point he sent out cavalry expeditions to destroy the enemy’s communications with Richmond, and one of these captured General Stuart’s adjutant, with a letter from Lee to General Stuart, dated August 15th, which to a large extent revealed Lee’s plans. The incident that resulted in this important capture is thus related by Stuart’s biographer, Major H. B. McClellan : “ Stuart reached Verdiersville on the evening of the 17th, and hearing nothing from Fitz Lee, sent his adjutant, Major Norman R. Fitz Hugh, to meet him and ascertain his position. A body of the enemy’s cavalry had, however, started on a reconnoissance on the previous day, and in the darkness of the night Major Fitz Hugh rode into this party and was captured. On his person was found an auto¬ graph letter from the commanding general to Stuart which disclosed to General Pope the design of turning his left flank. The fact that Fitz H ugh did not return aroused no apprehension, and Stuart and his staff imprudently passed the night on the porch of an old house on the Plank Road. At daybreak he was aroused by the noise of approaching horsemen, and sending Mosby and Gibson, two of his aides, to ascertain who was coming, he himself walked out to the front gate, bareheaded, to greet Fitz Lee, as he supposed. The result did not justify his expectations. In another instant pistol shots were heard, and Mosby and Gibson were seen running back, pursued by a party of the enemy. Stuart, Von Borcke, and Dabney had their horses inside of the inclosure of the yard. Von Borcke gained the gate and the CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 165 CONFEDERATE DEAD LAID OUT FOR BURIAL. road, and escaped unhurt after a long and hard run. Stuart and Dabney were compelled to leap the y a r d fence and take across the fields to the nearest woods. They were pur¬ sued but a short distance. Re¬ turning to a post of observation, Stuart saw the enemy depart in triumph with his hat and cloak, which he had been compelled to leave on the porch where he had slept. He bore this mortification with good nature. In a letter of about that date he writes : ‘ I am greeted on all sides with congratula¬ tions and “ Where’s your hat ? ” I intend to make the Yankees pay for that hat.’ And Pope did cancel the debt a few nights afterward at Catlett’s Station.” The captured despatch revealed to Pope the fact that Lee intended to fall upon him with his entire army and crush him before he could be reinforced from the Army of the Potomac. Pope says : “ 1 held on to my position, thus far to the front, HENRY AND ROBINSON HOUSES, BULL RUN. (.From photograph taken in 1884.) for the purpose of affording all time possible for the arrival of the Army of the Potomac at Acquia and Alexandria, and to embarrass and delay the move¬ ments of the enemy as far as practica¬ ble. On the 18th of August it became apparent to me that this advanced posi¬ tion, with the small force under my com¬ mand, was no longer tenable in the face of the overwhelm¬ ing forces of the enemy. I deter¬ mined, accordingly, to withdraw behind the Rappahannock with all speed, and, as I had been in¬ structed, to defend, as far as practicable, the line of that river. I directed Major- General Reno to send back his trains, on the morning of the 18th, by the way of Stevens- burg, to Kelly’s or Burnett’s Ford, and, as soon as the trains had gotten several hours in advance, to follow them with his whole corps, and take post behind the Rappahannock, MAJOR-GENERAL G. W. C. LEE. GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, C. S. A. COLONEL WALTER TAYLOR GO*e" c CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 166 leaving all his cavalry in the neighborhood of Raccoon Ford to cover this movement. General Banks’s corps, which had been ordered, on the 12th, to take position at Culpeper Court House, I directed, with its trains preceding it, to cross the Rappahan¬ nock at the point where the Orange and Alexandria railroad crosses that river. General McDowell’s train was ordered to pursue the same route, while the train of General Sigel was directed through Jefferson, to cross the Rappahannock at War- renton Sulphur Springs. So soon as these trains had been suffi¬ ciently advanced, McDowell's corps was directed to take the route from Culpeper to Rappahannock Ford, whilst General Sigel, who was on the right and front, was instructed to follow the movements of his train to Sulphur Springs. These move¬ ments were executed during the day and night of the 18th, and the day of the 19th, by which time the whole army, with its trains, had safely recrossed the Rappahannock and was posted behind that stream, with its left at Kelly’s Ford and its right about three miles above Rappahannock Station.” The Con¬ federates followed rapidly, and on the 20th confronted Pope at Kelly’s Ford, but with the river between. For two days they made strenuous efforts to cross, but a powerful artillery fire, which was kept up contin¬ uously for seven or eight miles along the river, made any crossing in force impos¬ sible. Lee therefore sent Jackson to make a flank march westward along that stream, cross it at Sulphur Springs, and come down upon Pope’s right. But when Jackson arrived at the crossing, he found a heavy force occupying Sulphur Springs and ready to meet him. Meanwhile Gen. James E. B. Stuart, with fifteen hundred cavalrymen, in the dark and stormy night of August 22d, had ridden around to the rear of Pope’s position, to cut the railroad. He struck Pope’s headquarters at Catlett’s Station, captured three hundred prisoners and all the personal baggage and papers of the commander, and got back in safety. These papers informed Lee of Pope’s plans and dispo¬ sitions. Jackson, being thwarted at Sulphur Springs, moved still farther up the south bank of the Rappahannock, crossed the headwaters, and turned Pope’s right. He passed through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains on the 26th, destroyed Bristoe Station on the Orange and Alex¬ andria railroad, and sent out Stuart to Manassas Junction, where prisoners were taken and a large amount of commissary stores fell into his hands. Pope knew exactly the size of Jackson’s force, and the direction it had taken in its flank march; for Col. J. S. Clark, of Banks’s staff, had spent a day where he had a plain view of the enemy’s moving columns, and carefully counted the regiments and batteries. But from this point the National commander, who had hitherto done reasonably well, seemed suddenly to become bewildered. He explains in his report that his force was too small to enable him to extend his right any further without too greatly weakening his line, and says he telegraphed the facts repeatedly to Washington, saying that he could not extend further West without losing his connections with Fredericksburg. He de¬ clares he was assured on the 21st, that if he could hold the line of the river two days longer he should be heavily rein¬ forced, but that this prom¬ ise was not kept, the only troops that were added to his army during the next four days being seven thou¬ sand men under Generals Reynolds and Kearny. Lee, whose grand strat¬ egy was correct, had here blundered seriously in his manoeuvres, dividing his army so that the two parts were not within supporting distance of each other, and the united enemy was be¬ tween. An ordinarily good general, standing in Pope’s boots, would naturally have fallen in force upon Jack- son, and could have com¬ pletely destroyed or cap¬ tured him. But Pope out-blundered Lee, and gave the victory to the Confederates. He began by sending forty thousand men under McDowell, on the 27th, toward Thoroughfare Gap, to occupy the road by which Lee w i t h Long- street’s division was march¬ ing to join Jackson ; and at the same time he moved with the remainder of his army to strike Jackson at Bristoe Station. This was a good beginning, but was immediately ruined by his own lack of steadiness. The advance guard had an engagement at that place THE SEAT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1862. C A MPFI RE AND BATTLEFIELD. 167 with Jackson’s rear while his main body retired to Manassas Junction. Pope became elated at the prospect of a great success, and ordered a retrograde movement by McDowell, telling him to march eastward on the 28th, adding: “If you will march promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn upon Manassas Junction, we shall bag the /hole crowd.” McDowell obeyed, the way was thus left open for Jackson to move out to meet his friends, and Jackson promptly took advantage of the opportunity and planted himself on the high land around Grovcton, near the battlefield of Bull Run. Here King’s division of McDowell’s corps came suddenly in contact with the enemy, and a sharp fight, with severe loss on either side, ensued. Among the Confederate wounded was Gen. Richard S. Ewell, one of their best commanders, who lost a leg. In the night, King’s men fell back to Manas¬ sas; and Ricketts’s division, which Mc¬ Dowell had left to delay Longstrect when he shou1d attempt to pass through Thorough¬ fare Gap, was also retired. All apprehen¬ sions on the part of the lucky Jackson were now at an end. Elis enemies had removed every ob¬ struction, and he was in possession of the Warrenton Turnpike, the road by which Longstreet was to join him. The cut of an abandoned railroad formed a strong, ready-made intrenchment, and along this he placed his troops, his right flank being on the turnpike and his left at Sudley Mill. General Pope says of his forces at this time: “From the of the 27th the troops under my command had been continuously marching and fighting night and day, and during the whole of that time there was scarcely an interval of an hour without the roar of artillery. The men had had little sleep, were greatly worn down with fatigue, had had little time to get proper food or to eat it, had been engaged in constant battles and skirmishes, and had per¬ formed services laborious, dangerous, and excessive be¬ yond any previous experience in this country. As was to be expected under such cir¬ cumstances, the numbers of the army under my command have been greatly reduced by deaths, by wounds, by sick¬ ness, and by fatigue, so that on the morning of the 27th of August I estimated my brevet brigadier-general geo. w. gill. whole effective force (and I CAMPblRE and battlefield. 16B MAJOR-GENERAL FRANZ SIGEL. think the estimate was large) as follows: Sigel’s corps, nine thousand men ; Banks’s corps, five thousand men ; McDowell’s corps, including Reynolds’s division, fifteen thousand five hun¬ dred men ; Reno’s corps, seven thousand men; the corps of Heintzelman and Porter (the freshest by far in that army), about eighteen thousand men—making in all fifty-four thou¬ sand five hundred men. Our cavalry numbered on paper about four thousand men ; but their horses were completely broken down, and there were not five hundred men, all told, capable of doing such service as should be expected from cavalry. The corps of Heintzelman had reached Warrenton Junction, but it was without wagons, without artillery, with only forty rounds of am¬ munition to the man, and without even horses for the general and field officers. The corps of Porter had also reached Warren¬ ton Junction with a very small supply of provisions, and but forty rounds of ammunition for each man.” Longstreet reached the field in the forenoon of the 29th, and took position at Jackson’s right, on the other side of the turnpike, coverin also the Manassas Gap railroad. He was confronted by Fitz John Porter’s corps. McDowell says he ordered Porter to move out and attack Longstreet; Porter says he ordered him simply to hold the ground where he was. At three o’clock in the afternoon Pope or¬ dered Hooker to attack Jackson directly in front. Hooker, who was never loath to fight where there was a prospect of success, remonstrated; but Pope insisted, and the attack was made. Hook¬ er’s men charged with the bay¬ onet, had a terrific hand-to-hand fight in the cut, and actually ruptured Jackson’s seemingly im¬ pregnable line; but reinforcements were brought up, and the assail¬ ants were at length driven back. Kearny’s division was sent to sup¬ port Hooker, but too late, and it also was repelled. An hour or two later, Pope, who did not know that Longstreet had arrived on the field, sent orders to Fitz John Porter to attack Jackson’s right, supposing that was the right of the whole Confederate line. There is a dis¬ pute as to the hour at which this order reached Porter. But it was impossible for him to obey it, since he could not move upon Jackson’s MAJOR-GENERAL PHILIP KEARNY. flank without exposing his own flank to Longstreet. About six o’clock, when he imagined Porter’s attack must have begun, Pope or¬ dered another attack on the Confederate left. It was gallantly made, and in the first rush was success¬ ful. Jackson’s extreme left was doubled up and broken by Kearny’s men, who seized the cut and held it for a time. At this point a Confederate regiment that had exhausted its am¬ munition fought with stones. There were plenty of fragments of rock at hand, and several men were killed by them. Again the Confederates, undisturbed on their right, hurried across reinforcements to their imperilled left; and Kearny’s division, too small to hold what it had gained, was driven back. This day’s action is properly called the battle of Groveton. Pope’s forces had been considerably cut up and scattered, but he got them together that night, re-formed his lines, and pre¬ pared to renew the attack the next day. Lee at the same time drew back his left somewhat, advanced and strengthened his right, and prepared to take the offensive. Each intended to attack the other’s left flank. When Pope moved out the next day (August 30th) to strike Lee’s left, and found it withdrawn, he imagined that the enemy was in retreat, and immediately ordered McDowell to follow it up and “ press the enemy vigorously the whole day.” Porter’s corps—the advance of McDowell’s force—had no sooner begun this movement than it struck the foe in a strong position, and was subjected to a heavy artillery fire. Then a cloud of dust was seen to the south, and it was evident that Lee was pushing a force around on the flank. McDowell sent Reynolds to meet and check it. Porter then attempted to obey his orders. He advanced against Jackson’s right in charge after charge, but was met by a fire that repelled him every time with bloody loss. Moreover, Long¬ street found an eminence that commanded a part of his line, promptly took advan¬ tage of it by placing a battery there, and threw in an enfilading fire. It was impos¬ sible for anything to withstand this, and Porter’s corps in a few minutes fell back defeated. The whole Confederate line was C A M PE IR E AJvn EAITLEFIELD. 169 \i • \ MILL AND HOTEL AT SUDLEY SPRINGS. advanced, and an attempt was made, by still further extending their right, to cut off retreat; but key-points were firmly held by Warren’s brigade and the brigades of Meade and Seymour, and the army was withdrawn in order from the field whence it had retired so precipitously a year before. After dark it crossed the stone bridge over Bull Run, and encamped on the heights around Centreville. The corps of Sumner and Frank¬ lin here joined Pope, and the whole army fell back still further, taking a position around Fairfax Court House and Germantown. Lee meanwhile ordered Jackson to make another of the flank marches that he was so fond of, with a view of striking Pope’s right and per¬ haps interrupting his communica¬ tion with Washington. It was the evening of September 1st when he fell heavily upon Pope’s flank. He was stoutly resisted, and finally repelled by the commands of Hooker and Reno, and a part of those of McDowell and Kearny. General Stevens, of Reno’s corps, was killed, and his men, having used up their ammunition, fell back. General Kearny sent Bir- ney’s brigade into the gap, and brought up a battery. He then rode forward to reconnoitre, came suddenly upon a squad of Con¬ federates, and in attempting to ride away was shot dead. Kearny was one of the most experi¬ enced and efficient soldiers in the service. He had lost an arm in the Mexican war, was with Napoleon III. at Solferino and Magenta, and had just passed through the peninsula campaign with McClellan. Lee made no further attempt upon Pope’s army, and on Sep¬ tember 2d, by Halleck’s orders, it was withdrawn to the fortifica¬ tions of Washington, where it was merged in the Army of the Poto¬ mac. In this campaign, both the numbers engaged on either side and the respective losses are in dispute, and the exact truth never will be known. Lee claimed that he had captured nine thousand prisoners and thirty guns, and it is probable that Pope’s total loss numbered at least fifteen thou¬ sand. Pope maintained that he would have won the battle of Groveton and made a successful campaign if General Porter had obeyed his orders. Porter, for this supposed disobedience, was court-martialed in January, 1863, and was condemned and dismissed from the service, and forever dis¬ qualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Gov¬ ernment of the United States. Thousands of pages have been written and printed to prove or MAP OF SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN, SHOWING IMPORTANT POSITIONS OCCUPIED FROM AUGUST 27th TO SEPTEMBER 1st. 170 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. SECOND BATTLE (From a. disprove his innocence, and the evidence .has been reviewed again and again. It appears to be established at last that he did not disobey any order that it was possible for him to obey, and that he was blameless—except, perhaps, in having exhibited a spirit of personal hostility to General Pope, who was then his superior officer. A bill to relieve him of the penalty was passed by the Forty-sixth Congress, but was vetoed by President Arthur. Substantially the same bill was passed in 1886 and was signed by President Cleveland. It restored him to his place as colonel in the regular army, and retired him with that rank, but with no compensation for the intervening years. General Grant, reviewing the case in 1882, came to the con¬ clusion that Porter was innocent, and gave his reasons for it in a magazine article, significantly remarking that “ if he was guilty, the punishment awarded was not commensurate with the offence committed.” But some other military authorities still believe that his sentence was just. Grant seems to make the question perfectly clear by drawing two simple diagrams. This, he says, is what Pope supposed to be the position of the armies when he ordered Porter to attack : JACKSON POPE But this is what the situation really was: „K,r.*TREET _ JACKSON POPE The movements of this campaign were more complicated than those of any other during the war, and it appears to have been CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 171 OF BULL RUN. War-Time Sketch.) carried on with less of definite plan and connected purpose on either side. It is not probable that its merits, if it had any merits, will ever be satisfactorily agreed upon. On the part of Pope’s army, whether by his fault or not, it was a disastrous failure. On the part of Lee’s, while it resulted in tactical suc¬ cesses, it did not seriously menace the safety of Washington, and it led him on to his first great failure in an attempted inva¬ sion of the North. It is only fair to give General Pope’s last word on the subject, which we quote from his article in “ Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.” “ At no time could I have hoped to fight a successful battle with the superior forces of the enemy which confronted me, and which were able at any time to out-flank and bear my small army to the dust. It was only by constant movement, incessant watchfulness, and hazardous skirmishes and battles, that the forces under my command were saved from destruction, and that the enemy was embarrassed and delayed in his advance until the army of General McClellan was at length assembled for the defence of Washington. I did hope that in the course of these operations the enemy might commit some imprudence, or leave some opening of which”! could take such advantage as to gain at least a partial success. This opportunity was presented by the advance of Jackson on Manassas Junction; but although the best dispositions possible in my view were made, the object was frustrated by causes which could not have been foreseen, and which perhaps are not yet completely known to the country.” From Capt. Henry N. Blake, of the Eleventh Massachusetts regiment, we have these interesting incidents of the campaign : “ Matches were very scarce upon this campaign, and a private who intended to light one gave public notice to the crowd, who surrounded him with slips of paper and pipes in their hands. Some soldiers were in a destitute condition, and suffered from blistered feet, as they had no shoes, and others required a pair of pants or a blouse ; but all gladly pursued Jackson, and his capture i;2 CAMPFIRE AND was considered a certain event. The column cheered General Pope when he rode along, accompanied by a vast body-guard, and he responded : ‘ I am glad to see you in such good spirits to-day.’ . . . The stream was forded, and the graves and bones of the dead, the rusty fragments of iron, and the weather¬ beaten ddbris of that contest reminded the men that they were again in the midst of the familiar scenes of the first battle of Bull Run. The cannonading was brisk at intervals during the day. Large tracts of the field were black and smoking from the effect of the burning grass which the shells ignited, and a small BA TTLEEIELD. range of the artillery from which they had so cowardly fled. A member of the staff, dressed like an officer of the day, immedi¬ ately arrived and gave a verbal order to the brigade commander, after which the regiments were formed and marched, unmindful of the cannon-balls, toward the right of the line, and halted in the border of a thick forest in which many skirmishes had taken place. ‘ What does the general want me to do now ? ’ General Grover asked the aide who again rode up to the brigade. ‘ Go into the woods and charge,’ was the answer. ‘ Where is my sup¬ port ? ’ the commander wisely inquired, for there were no troops RUINS OF THE STONE BRIDGE ON THE WARRENTON TURNPIKE (From a War Department photograph.) force was occasionally engaged upon the right, but there was no general conflict. The brigade took the position assigned to it, upon a slope of a hill, to support a battery which was attached to Sigel’s corps, and no infantry was visible in any direction, although the land was open and objects within the distance of half a mile were readily seen. There was no firing, with the ex¬ ception of the time when the troops debouched from the road in the morning, and the soldiers rested until four P.M. At this moment the enemy opened with solid shot upon the battery, which did not discharge one piece in response. The drivers mounted their horses ; all rushed pell-mell through the ranks of the fearless and enraged support, and did not halt within the near the position. ‘ It is coming.’ After waiting fifteen minutes for this body to appear, the officer returned and said that ‘ the general was much displeased ’ because the charge had not been made, and the order was at once issued : ‘ Fix bayonets.’ Each man was inspired by these magical words; great enthusiasm arose when this command was ‘passed’ from company to com¬ pany, and the soldiers, led by their brave general, advanced upon a hidden foe through tangled woods which constantly interfered with the formation of the ranks. ‘ Colonel, do you know what we are going to charge on ? ’ a private inquired. ‘ Yes ; a good dinner.’ The rebel skirmishers were driven in upon their reserve behind the bank of an unfinished railroad, and detachments from CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 17 .? five brigades were massed in three lines, under the command of Ewell, to resist the onset of the inferior force that menaced them. The awful volleys did not impede the storming party that pressed on over the bodies of the dead and dying ; while the thousands of bullets which flew through the air seemed to create a breeze that made the leaves upon the trees rustle, and a shower of small boughs and twigs fell upon the ground. The balls penetrated the barrels and shattered the stocks of many muskets ; but the soldiers who carried them picked up those that had been dropped upon the ground by helpless comrades, and al¬ lowed no slight accident of the animal, mad with pain, dashed into the ranks of the enemy. The woods always concealed the movements of the troops, and at one point a portion of the foe fell back while the others remained. The forces sometimes met face to face, and the bayonet and sword—weapons that do not pierce soldiers in nine-tenths of the battles that are fought —were used with deadly effect in several instances. A corporal exclaimed in the din of this combat, ‘ Dish ish no place for de mens,’ and fled to the rear with the speed of the mythical Flying Dutch¬ man. In one company of the regiment a son was killed by the side of his father, who continued to perform his duty with the firmness of a stoic, and remarked to his amazed comrades, in a tone which showed how a strong patriotic ardor can triumph —— --—,-j— as GATHERING UP DEBRIS OF POPE'S RETREAT AFTER THE SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN. (From a War Department photograph.) strength. this character to interrupt them in the noble work. The railroad bank was gained, and the co umn with cheers passed over it, and advanced over the groups of the slain and mangled rebels who had rolled down the declivity when they lost their The second line was broken ; both were scattered through the woods, and victory appeared to be certain until the last sup¬ port, that had rested upon their breasts on the ground, sud¬ denly rose up and delivered a destructive volley which forced the brigade, that had al¬ ready lost more than one- third of its number in killed and wounded, to retreat. Ewell, suffering from his shattered knee, was borne to the rear in a blanket, and his leg was amputa¬ ted. The horse of General Grover was shot upon the railroad bank while he was encouraging the men to go forward, and he had barely time to dismount before GENERAL HANCOCK AND FRIENDS. (From a War-Time photograph.) ' over the deepest emo¬ tion of affection : ‘ I had rather see him shot dead he was than see him run away.’ . . . The victors rallied the fugitives after this repulse, and their superior force enabled them to assault in front and upon both flanks the line which had been contracted by the severe losses in the charge, and the brigade fell back to the first position under a fire of grape and canister which was added to the musketry. The regimental flag was torn from the staff by un¬ friendly limbs in passing through the forest, and the eagle that surmounted it was cut off in the contest. The commander of the color-company saved these precious emblems, and earnestly shouted, when the lines were re-formed : ‘ Eleventh, rally round the pole ! ’ which was then, if possible, more honored than when it was bedecked in folds of bunting. General Grover, who displayed the gallantry throughout this action that he had ex¬ hibited upon the peninsula, waved his hat upon the point of his sword to ani¬ mate his brigade and pre¬ pare for a renewal of the fight. Many were scarcely able to speak on account of hoarseness caused by in¬ tense cheering, and some officers blistered the palms of their hands by waving swords when they charged with their commands.” HARPER’S FERRY IN POSSESSION OF THE CONFEDERATE FORCES. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 175 AWAITING THE CHARGE. CHAPTER XV. THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN. CONFEDERATE ADVANCE INTO MARYLAND-THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC SENT AGAINST THEM—LEE’S PLANS LEARNED FROM A LOST DESPATCH—CAPTURE OF HARPER’S FERRY—-BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN—BATTLE OF ANTIETAM—TERRIFIC FIGHTING AT THE DUNKERS’ CHURCH AND THE SUNKEN ROAD-PORTER’S INACTION—FIGHTING AT THE BRIDGE—GENERAL CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE-THE RESULTS. AFTER his success in the second battle of Manassas, and the retirement of Pope’s army to the defences of Washington (Sep¬ tember 2, 1862), General Lee pushed northward into Maryland with his whole army. His advance arrived at Frederick City on the 8th, and from his camp near that place he issued a procla¬ mation to the people of Maryland, in which he recited the wrongs they had suffered at the hands of the National Govern¬ ment, and told them “the people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen and restore the inde¬ pendence and sovereignty of your State.” At the same time he opened recruiting-offices, and appointed a provost-marshal of Frederick. The reader of the classics will perhaps be reminded of the shrewd advice that Demosthenes gave the Athenians, when he counselled them not to ask the assistance of the Thebans against Philip of Macedon, but to bring about an alliance by offering to help them against him. But the Confederate chief¬ tain was sadly disappointed in the effect of his proclamation and his presence. When his army marched into the State singing “ My Maryland,” they were received with closed doors, drawn blinds, and the silence of a graveyard. In Frederick all the places of business were shut. The Marylanders did not flock to his recruiting-offices to the extent of more than two or three hundred, while on the other hand he lost many times that num¬ ber from straggling, as he says in his report. Several reasons have been assigned for the failure of the people to respond to his appeal, in each of which there is probably some truth. One was, that it had always been easy enough for Marylanders to go to the Confederate armies, and those of them that wished to enlist there had done so already. Another—and probably the principal one—was, that Maryland was largely true to the Union, especially in the western counties; and she fur¬ nished many excellent soldiers to its armies—almost fifty thou¬ sand. Another was, that the appearance of the Southern vet¬ erans was not calculated either to entice the men or to arouse the enthusiasm of the women. The Confederate General Jones says : “ Never had the army been so dirty, ragged, and ill-provided for as on this march.” General Lee complained especially of their want of shoes. It is difficult to understand why an army that claimed to have captured such immense supplies late in August should have been so destitute early in September. On the 2d of September the President went to General McClellan’s house in Washington, asked him to take command again of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope’s army had now been merged, and verbally authorized him to do so at once. The first thing that McClellan wanted was the with¬ drawal of Miles’s force, eleven thousand men, from Harper’s Ferry—where, he said, it was useless and helpless—and its addition to his own force. All authorities agree that in this he was obviously and unquestionably right, for Harper’s Ferry had no strategic value whatever ; but the marplot hand of Halleck intervened, and Miles was ordered to hold the place. Halleck’s principal reason appeared to be a reluctance to abandon a place where so much expense had been laid out. Miles, a worthy subordinate for such a chief, interpreted Halleck’s orders with absolute literalness, and remained in the town, instead of hold¬ ing it by placing his force on the heights that command it. As soon as it was known that Lee was in Maryland, McClellan set his army in motion northward, to cover Washington and Baltimore and find an opportunity for a decisive battle. He arrived with his advance in Frederick on the 12th, and met with a reception in striking contrast to that accorded to the army that had left the town two days before. Nearly every house displayed the National flag, the streets were thronged with people, all the business places were open, and everybody wel¬ comed the Boys in Blue. But this flattering reception was not the best fortune that befell the Union army in Frederick. On his arrival in the town, General McClellan came into possession of a copy of General Lee’s order, dated three days before, in which the whole campaign was laid out. By this order, Jackson was directed to march through Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac, capture the force at Martinsburg, and assist in the capture of that at Harper’s Ferry; Longstreet was directed to halt at Boonsborough with the trains; McLaws was to march to Harper’s Ferry, take possession of the heights commanding it, and capture the force there as speedily as possible ; Walker was 1/6 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. to invest that place from the other side and assist Me Laws ; D. H. Hill’s division was to form the rear guard. All the forces were to be united again at Boonsborough or Hagerstown. General Lee had taken it for granted that Martinsburg and Harper’s Ferry would be evacuated at his approach (as they should have been); and when he found they were not, he had so far changed or sus¬ pended the plan with which he set out as to send back a large part of his army to capture those places and not leave a hostile force in his rear. On the approach of Jackson’s corps Gen¬ eral White evacuated Martinsburg, and with his garrison of two thousand men joined Miles at Harper’s Ferry. That town, in the fork of the Poto¬ mac and Shenandoah rivers, can be bombarded with the greatest ease from the heights on the opposite sides of those streams. Miles, instead of taking possession of the heights with all his men, sent a feeble detach¬ ment to those on the north side of the Potomac, and stupidly remained in the trap with the rest. McLaws sent a heavy force to climb the mountain at a point three or four miles north, whence it marched along the crest through the woods, and attacked three or four regiments that Miles had posted there. This force was soon driven away, while Jackson was approach¬ ing; the town from the other side, and a bombardment the next day compelled a surrender when Jackson was about to at¬ tack. General Miles was mortally wound¬ ed by one of the last shots. About eleven thousand men were included in the capitu¬ lation, with seventy-three guns and a con¬ siderable amount of camp equipage. A body of two thousand cavalry, commanded by Colonel Davis, had been with Miles, but had escaped the night before, crossed the Potomac, and by morning reached Greencastle, Pa. On the way they captured Longstreet’s ammunition train of fiftv wagons. Jackson, leaving the arrange¬ ments for the surrender to A. P. Hill, hurried with the greater part of his force to rejoin Lee, and reached Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th. The range known as the South Moun¬ tain, which is a continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, is about a thousand feet high. The two principal gaps are Turner’s and Crampton’s, each about four hundred feet high, with the hills towering six hundred feet above it. When McClellan learned the plans of the Confederate commander, he set his army in motion to thwart them. He ordered Franklin’s corps to pass through Crampton’s Gap and press on to relieve Harp¬ er’s Ferry ; the corps of Reno and Hooker, under command of Burnside, he moved to Turner’s Gap. The movement was quick for McClellan, but not quite quick enough for the emergency. He might have passed through the Gaps on the 13th with little or no opposition, and would then have had his whole army be¬ tween Lee’s divided forces, and could hard¬ ly have failed to defeat them disastrously and perhaps conclusively. But he did not arrive at the passes till the morning of the 14th ; and by that time Lee had learned of his movement and recalled Hill and Longstreet, from Boonsborough and beyond, to defend Turner’s Gap, while he ordered McLaws to look out for Crampton’s. Turner’s Gap was flanked by two old roads that crossed the mountain a mile north and south of it; and using these, and scrambling up from rock to rock, the National troops worked their way slowly to the crests, opposed at every step by the Confederate riflemen behind the trees and ledges. Reno as¬ saulted the southern crest, and Hooker the northern, while Gib¬ bon’s brigade gradually pushed along up the turnpike into the Gap itself. Reno was opposed by the Confederate brigade of Garland, and both these commanders were killed. There was stubborn and bloody fighting all day, with the Union forces slowly but constantly gaining ground, and at dark the field was won. The Con¬ federates withdrew during the night, and in the morning the victorious columns passed through to the western side of the mountain. This battle cost McClellan fif¬ teen hundred men, killed or wounded. Among the wounded was the lieutenant- colonel in command of the Twenty-third Ohio regiment—Rutherford B. Hayes, afterward President—who was struck in the arm by a rifle-ball. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was about fifteen hundred, and in addition fifteen hundred were made prisoners. The fight at Cramp¬ ton’s Gap—to defend which McLaws had sent back a part of his force from Harper’s Ferry—was quite similar to that at Turn¬ er’s, and had a similar result. Franklin reached the crests after a fight of three hours, losing five hundred and thirty-two men, inflicting an equal loss upon the enemy, and capturing four hundred prison¬ ers, one gun, and three battle-flags. These two actions (fought September 14, 1862) BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. C. KELTON. (Adjutant-General to General Halleck.) CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 177 aie generally designated as the battle of South Mountain, but are sometimes called the battle of Boonsborough. In that the enemy was driven away, the ground held, and the passes used, it was a victory, and a brilliant one, for McClellan. But in that Lee, by delaying the advance of his enemy a whole day, thereby gained time to bring together his own scattered forces, it was strategically a victory, though a costly one, for him. But then again it might be argued that if Lee could have kept the four thousand good troops that McClellan deprived him of at South Mountain, it might have fared better with him in the struggle at Antietam three days later. When Lee retired his left wing from Turner’s Gap, he with¬ drew across the Antietam, and took up a position on high ground between that stream and the village of Sharpsburg. His right, under McLaws, after detaining Franklin till Harper’s Ferry was surrendered, crossed the Potomac at that place, recrossed it at Shepherdstown, and came promptly into position. Lee now had his army to¬ gether and strongly flowed in front, was advantageous. The creek was crossed by four stone bridges and a ford, and all except the northernmost bridge were strongly guarded. The land was occupied by mead¬ ows, cornfields, and patches of forest, and was much broken by outcropping ledges. McClellan only reconnoitred the position on the 15th. On the i6th he developed his plan of attack, which was simply to throw his right wing across the Antietam by the upper and unguarded bridge, assail the Confederate left, and when this had sufficiently engaged the enemy’s attention and drawn his strength to that flank, to force the bridges and cross with his left and centre. Indeed, this was obviously almost the only practicable plan. All day long an artillery duel was kept up, in which, as General Hill says, the Confederate batteries proved no match for their opponents. It was late in the after¬ noon when Hooker s corps crossed by the upper bridge, advanced through the woods, and struck the left flank, which was held by two brigades of Hood s men. Scarcely more than a skirmish ensued, when darkness came on, and the lines rested for the night where they MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN G. WALKER, C. S. A. COBB uoWEU- Major -^nz Ral LA FAYETTF CLAW'S n , MO R-GEN £RM ' posted. But it had been so reduced by losses in battle and straggling, that it numbered but little over forty thousand com¬ batants. The effect upon the army itself of invading a rich country with troops so poorly supplied had probably not been anticipated. Lee complained bitterly that his army was “ ruined by straggling,” and General Hill wrote in his report : “ Had all our stragglers been up, McClellan’s army would have been com¬ pletely crushed or annihilated. Thousands of thievish poltroons had kept away from sheer cowardice.” General Hill, in his anger, probably overestimates the effect; for McClellan had somewhat over seventy thousand men, and though he used but little more than half of them in his attacks, there is no reason to suppose he would not have used them all in a defence. The men that Lee did have, however, were those exclusively that had been able to stand the hard marching and resist the tempta¬ tion to straggle, and were consequently the flower of his army; and they now awaited, in a chosen position, a battle that they knew would be decisive of the campaign, if not of the war. The ground occupied by the Confederate army, with one flank resting on the Potomac, and the other on the Antietam, which were. If I ^ee could have been in any doubt before, he was now told plainly what was to be the form of the contest, and he had all night to make his dispositions for it. The only change he thought it necessary to make was to put Jackson’s fresh troops in the position on his left. Before morning McClellan sent Mansfield’s corps across the Antietam to join Hooker, and had Sumner’s in readiness to follow at an early hour. Meanwhile, all but two thousand of Lee’s forces had come up. So the 17th of September dawned in that peaceful little corner of the world with everything in readiness for a great struggle in which there could be no surprises, and which was to be scarcely anything more than wounds for wounds and death for death. In the vicinity of the little Dunker church, the road running northward from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown was bordered on both sides by woods, and in these woods the battle began when Hooker assaulted Jackson at sunrise. There was hard fighting for an hour, during which Jackson’s lines were not only heavily pressed by Hooker in front, but at length enfiladed by a fire from the batteries on the eastern side of the Antietam. This broke them and drove them back ; but when Hooker attempted 178 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. to advance his lines far enough to hold the road and seize the woods west of it, he in turn was met by fresh masses of troops and a heavy artillery fire, and was checked. Mansfield’s corps was moving up to his support when its commander was mortally wounded. Nevertheless it moved on, got a position in the woods west of the road, and held it, though at heavy cost. At this moment General Hooker was seriously wounded and borne from the field, while Sumner crossed the stream and came up with his corps. His men drove back the defeated divisions of the enemy without much difficulty, and occupied the ground around the church. His whole line was advancing to apparent victory, when two fresh divisions were brought over from the concentrated upon that spot, that when the woods were cut down, years afterward, and the logs sent to a saw-mill, the saws were completely tom to pieces by the metal that had penetrated the wood and been overgrown. A short distance south and east of the Dunker church there was a slightly sunken road which crossed the Confederate line at one point and was parallel with it for a certain distance at other points. A strong Confederate force was posted in this sunken road, and when the National troops approached it there was destructive work on both sides ; but the heaviest loss here fell upon the Confederates, because some batteries on the high ground east of the Antietam enfiladed portions of the road. THE CHARGE ACROSS THE BURNSIDE BRIDGE. Confederate right, and were immediately thrust into a wide gap in Sumner’s line. Sedgwick, whose division formed the right of the line, was thus flanked on his left, and was easily driven back out of the woods, across the clearing, and into the eastern woods, after which the Confederates retired to their own posi¬ tion. Fighting of this sort went on all the forenoon, one of the episodes being a race between the Fifth New Hampshire Regiment and a Confederate force for a commanding point of ground, the two marching in parallel lines and firing at each other as they went along. The New Hampshire men got there first, and, assisted by the Eighty-first Pennsylvania Regiment, from that eminence threw a destructive fire into the ranks of the regiment they had out-run. The fighting around the Dunker church was so fierce, and so much artillery fire was This sunken road, which was henceforth called Bloody Lane, has made some confusion in many accounts of the battle, which is explained by the fact that it is not a straight road, but is made up of several parts running at different angles. While this great struggle was in progress on McClellan’s right, his centre and left, under Porter and Burnside, did not make any movement to assist. Porter’s inaction is explained by the fact that his troops were kept as the reserves, which McClellan refused to send forward even when portions of his line were most urgently calling for assistance. He and Porter agreed in cling¬ ing to the idea that the reserves must under no circumstances be pushed forward to take part in the actual battle. This con¬ duct was in marked contrast to that of the Confederate com¬ mander, who in this action had no reserves whatever. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. i /9 At noon Franklin arrived from Crampton’s Gap, and was sent over to help Hooker and Sumner, being just in time to check a new advance by more troops brought over from the Confederate right. At seven o’clock in the morning Burnside was ordered to have his corps in readiness for carrying the bridge in his front, cross¬ ing the stream, and attacking the Confederate right, which order he promptly obeyed. An hour later the order for this move¬ ment was issued by McClellan, but it did not reach Burnside till nine o’clock. The task before him was more diffi¬ cult than his commander realized or than would be supposed from most de¬ scriptions of the action. The bridge is of stone, hav¬ ing three arches, with low stone parapets, and not very wide. On the eastern side of the stream, where Burnside’s corps was, the land is comparatively low. The road that crosses the bridge, when it reaches the western bank has to turn immediately at a right angle and run nearly par¬ allel with the stream, be¬ cause the land there is high and overhangs it. As a matter of course, the bridge was commanded by Con¬ federate guns advanta- geously placed on the he ights. The problem be¬ fore Burnside was therefore exceedingly difficult, and the achievement expected of him certain in any case to be costly. The task of first crossing the bridge fell upon Crook’s brigade, which moved forward, mis¬ took its way, and struck the stream some distance above the bridge, where it immediately found itself under a heavy fire. Then the Second Maryland and Sixth New Hampshire regiments were ordered to charge at the double quick and carry the bridge. But the fire that swept it was more than they could stand, and they were obliged to retire unsuccessful. Then another attempt was made by a new storming party, consisting of the Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania regiments, led by Col. Robert B. Potter and Col. John F. Hartranft. By this time two heavy guns had been got into position where they could play upon the Con¬ federates who defended the bridge, and with this protection and assistance the two regiments just named succeeded in crossing it and driving away the immediate opposing force, and were imme¬ diately followed by Sturgis’s division and Crook’s brigade. The fighting at the bridge cost Burnside about five hundred men. The Fifty-first New York lost eighty-seven, and the Fifty-first Pennsylvania one hundred and twenty. At the same time other troops crossed by a ford below the bridge, which had to be searched for, but was at length found. These operations occupied four hours, being completed about one o’clock P.M. Could they have been accomplished in an hour or two, the destruction or capture of Lee’s army must have resulted. But by the time that Burnside had crossed the stream, captured a battery, and occupied the heights over- looking Sharpsburg, the fighting on McClellan’s right was over. This left Lee at liberty to strengthen his imperilled right by bringing troops across the short interior line from his left, which he promptly did. At the same time the last division of his forces (A. P. Hill’s), two thou¬ sand strong, arrived from Harper’s Ferry; and these fresh men, together with those brought over from the left, assumed the offen¬ sive, drove Burnside from the crest, and retook the battery. Here ended the battle; not because the day was closed or any apparent victory had been achieved, but because both sides had been so severely punished that neither was inclined to resume the fight. Every man of Lee’s force had been actively engaged, but not more than two-thirds of McClellan’s. The reason why the Confederate army was not annihilated or cap¬ tured must be plain to any intelligent reader. It was not because Lee, with his army divided for three days in presence of his enemy, had not invited destruc¬ tion ; nor because the seventy thousand, acting in concert, could not have over¬ whelmed the forty thousand even when they were united. It was not for any lack of courage, or men, or arms, or oppor¬ tunity, or daylight. It was simply because the attack was made in driblets, instead of by heavy masses on both wings simultaneously; so that at any point of actual contact Lee was almost always able to present as strong a force as that which assailed him. In a letter written to General Franklin the evening before the battle of South Mountain, General McClellan, having then received the lost despatch that revealed Lee’s plans and situation, set forth with much particularity his CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. t So purposes for the next few days, and summed up by saying: “My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail.” No plan could have been better or more scientific; but curiously enough. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN GIBBON. Ma JOR Na Ft Pat *IC K when it came to actual battle General McClel¬ lan’s conduct was the exact opposite of this. By unnecessary and unaccountable delays he first gave the enemy time to con¬ centrate his forces, and then made his attacks piecemeal, so that the en¬ emy could fight him in detail. Whatever had been the straggling on the march, none of the commanders complained of any flinching after the fight began. They saw veterans taking, relinquishing, and retaking ground that was soaked with blood and covered with dead ; and they saw green regiments “ go to their graves like beds.” There had been a call for more troops by the National Administration after the battles on the peninsula, which was responded to with the greatest alacrity, men of all classes rushing to the recruiting- offices to enroll themselves. It was a common thing for a regiment of a thousand men to be raised, equipped, and sent to the front in two or three weeks. Some of those new regiments were suddenly introduced to the realties of war at Antietam, and suffered frightfully. For example, the Sixteenth Connecticut, which there fired its muskets for the first time, went in with 940 men, and lost 432. On the other side, Lawton’s Confederate brigade went in with 1,150 men, and lost 554, including five out of its six regimental commanders, while Hays’s lost 323 out of 550, including every regimental com¬ mander and all the staff officers. An officer of the Fiftieth Georgia Regiment said in a published letter: “ The Fiftieth were posted in a narrow path, washed out into a regular gully, and were fired into by the enemy from the front, rear, and left flank. The men stood their ground nobly, returning their fire until nearly two-thirds of their number lay dead or wounded in that lane. Out of 210 carried into the fight, over 125 were killed and wounded in less than twentv minutes. The slaughter was horrible ! When ordered to retreat, I could hardly extricate myself from the dead and wounded around me. A man could have walked from the head of our line to the foot on their bodies. The survivors of the regiment retreated very orderly back to where General Anderson s brigade rested. The brigade suffered terribly. James’s South Carolina battalion was nearly annihilated. The Fiftieth Georgia lost nearly all their com¬ missioned officers.” The First South Carolina Regiment, which went into the fight with 106 men, had but fifteen men and one officer when it was over. A Confederate battery, being largely disabled by the work of sharp-shooters, was worked for a time, at the crisis of the fight, by General Longstreet and members of his staff acting as gunners. Three generals on each side were killed. Those on the National side were Generals Joseph K. Mansfield, Israel II. Richardson, and Isaac P. Rodman ; those on the Confederate side were Generals George B. An¬ derson, L. O'B. Branch, and William E. Starke. The wounded generals included on the one side Hooker, Sedgwick, Dana, Crawford, and Meagher; on the other side, R. II. Anderson, Wright, Lawton, Armistead, Ripley, Ransom, Rhodes, Gregg, and Toombs. General McClellan reported his entire loss at 12,469, of whom ,010 were killed. General Lee reported his total loss in the Maryland battles as 1,567 killed and 8,724 wounded, saying nothing of the missing ; but the figures given by his division commanders foot up 1,842 killed, 9,399 wounded, and 2,292 miss¬ ing—total, 13,533. If McClellan’s re¬ port is correct, even this statement falls short of the truth. He says: “ About 2,700 of the enemy’s dead were counted and buried upon the battlefield of Antietam. A portion of their dead had been previously buried by the enemy.” If the wounded were in the usual propor¬ tion, this would indicate Confede¬ rate casualties to the extent of at least 15,000 on that field alone. But whatever the exact number may have been, the battle was bloody enough to produce mourn- MAJOR .GENERA- G '**' morecl. ing and lamentation from Maine to Louisiana. It was the bloodi¬ est day’s work of the whole war. The bat¬ tles of Shiloh, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania were each more costly, but none of them was fought in a single day. Nothing was done on the 18th, and when McClellan deter¬ mined to renew the attack on the 19th he found that his enemy had withdrawn from the field and crossed to Virginia by the ford at Shepherdstown. The National commander reported the cap¬ ture of more than six thousand prisoners, thirteen guns, and thirty-nine battle-flags, and that he had not lost a gun or a 'color. As he was also in possession of the field, where the enemy left all their dead and two thousand of their wounded, and had ren¬ dered Lee’s invasion fruitless of anything but the prisoners carried off from Harper’s Ferry, the victory was his. THE PRIMARY CAUSES OF THE WAR-THE NEGRO AND COTTON. CHAPTER XVI. EMANCIPATION. This Chapter is illustrated with portraits of early abolitionists , and Virginia officials at the time of the celebrated John Brown Raid. Lincoln’s attitude toward slavery—McClellan’s attitude—the democratic party’s attitude—predictions by the poets SLAVES DECLARED CONTRABAND—ACTION OF FREMONT—HUNTER’S PROCLAMATION—BLACKS FIRST ENLISTED-DIVISION OF SENTIMENT IN THE ARMY-MARYLAND ABOLISHES SLAVERY-THE PRESIDENT AND HORACE GREELEY CORRESPOND ON THE SUBJECT-EMANCIPATION PROCLAIMED-AUTUMN ELECTIONS—ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN DELAWARE, KENTUCKY, AND MISSOURI-THE FINAL PROCLAMATION_ THE RIGHT OF THE PRESIDENT TO DECLARE THE SLAVES FREE. The war had now (September, 1862) been in progress almost a year and a half; and nearly twenty thousand men had been shot dead on the battlefield, and upward of eighty thousand wounded, while an unknown number had died of disease contracted CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 182 in the service, or been carried away into captivity. The money that had been spent by the United States Government alone amounted to about one billion dollars. All this time there was not an intelligent man in the country but knew the cause of the war, and yet more than a hundred thousand American citizens were killed or mangled before a single blow was de¬ livered directly at that cause. General Fremont had aimed at it; General Hunter had aimed at it; but in each case the arm was struck up by the Administration. One would naturally suppose, from the thoroughness with which the slavery question had been discussed for thirty years, that when the time came for action there would be little doubt or hesitation on either side. On the Confederate side there was neither doubt nor hesitation. On the National side there was both doubt and hesitation, and it took a long time to arrive at a determination to destroy slavery in order to preserve the Union. The old habit of compromise and concili¬ ation half paralyzed the arm of war, and thousands of well-meaning citi¬ zens were unable to comprehend the fact that we were dealing with a question that it was useless to com¬ promise and a force that it was im¬ possible to conciliate. Mr. Lincoln had hated slavery ever since, when a young man, he made a trip on a flat-boat to New Orleans, and there saw it in some of its more hideous aspects. That he realized its nature and force as an organized institution and a power in politics, appears from one of his celebrated speeches, delivered in 1858, wherein he declared that as a house divided against itself cannot stand, so our Government could not endure per¬ manently half slave and half free. “ Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.” Why, then, hating slavery personally, and understanding it politically, and knowing it to be the cause of the war, did he not sooner declare it abolished ? On the one hand, he was not, like some of our chief magis¬ trates, under the impression that he had been placed in office to carry out irresponsibly a personal policy of his own ; and, on the other, he was shrewd enough to know that it would be as futile for a President to place himself far in advance of his people on a great question, as for a general to precede his troops on the battlefield. Hence he turned over and over, and presented again and again, the idea that the war might be stopped and the question settled by paying for the slaves and liberating them. It looked like a very simple calculation to figure out the cost of purchased emancipation and compare it with the probable cost of the war. The comparison seemed to present an unanswerable argument, and in the end the money cost of the war was more than one thousand dollars for every slave emancipated, while in the most profitable days of the institution the blacks, young and old together, had not been worth half that price. The fallacy of the argument lay in its blindness to the fact that the Confeder¬ ates were not fighting to retain possession of their actual slaves, but to perpetuate the institution itself. The unthrift of slavery as an economic system had been many times demonstrated, notably in Helper’s “ Impending Crisis,” but these demonstra¬ tions, instead of inducing the slaveholders to seek to get rid of it on the best attainable terms, appeared only to excite their anger. And it ought to have been seen that a proud people with arms in their hands, either flushed with victory or confident in their own prowess, no matter where their real interests may lie, can never be reasoned with except through the syllogisms of lead and steel. Perhaps Mr. Lincoln did know it, but was waiting for his people to find it out. The Louisville (Ky.) Courier , in a paragraph quoted on page 63 of this volume, had told a great deal of bitter and shameful truth ; but when it entered upon the prophecy that the North would soon resume the yoke of the slaveholders, it was not so happy. And yet it had strong grounds for its confident prediction. Not only had a great Peace Conven¬ tion been held in February, 1861, which strove to prevent secession by offering new guaranties for the protection of slavery, but the chief anxiety of a large number of North¬ ern citizens and officers in the mili¬ tary service appeared to be to mani¬ fest their desire that the institution should not be harmed. The most eminent of the Federal generals, McClellan, when he first took the field in West Virginia, issued a proclamation to the Unionists, in which he said : “ Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce you to believe our advent among you will be signalized by an interference with your slaves, under¬ stand one thing clearly: not only will we abstain from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand crush any attempt at insurrection on their part.” In pursuance of this, he returned to their owners all slaves that escaped and sought refuge within his lines. It was an every-day occurrence for slaveholders who were in active rebellion against the Government that he was serving, to come into his camps under flag of truce and demand and receive their runaway slaves. The Hutchinsons, a family of popular singers, by permission of the Secretary of War, visited his camp in the winter of 1861-62, to sing to the soldiers. But when the general found them singing some stanzas of Whittier’s that spoke of slavery as a curse to be abolished, he forthwith issued an order that their pass should be revoked and they should not sing any more to the troops. And even after his retreat on the penin¬ sula, McClellan wrote a long letter of advice to the President, in the course of which he said: “Neither confiscation of JOHN BROWN. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 183 property . . . nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. . . . Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder.” In all this General McClellan was only clinging blindly and tenaciously to the idea that had underlain the whole administra¬ tion of the government while it was in the hands of his party : that the perpetuation of slavery, whether against political oppo¬ sition or against the growth of civilization and the logic of polit¬ ical economy, was the first purpose of the Constitution and the most imperative duty of the Government. Democratic politi¬ cians had never formulated this rule, but Democratic Presidents had always followed it. President Polk had obeyed it when with one hand he secured the slave State of Texas at the cost of the Mexican War, and with the other relinquished to Great Britain the portion of Oregon north of the forty-ninth parallel, but for which we should now possess every harbor on the Pacific coast. President Pierce had obeyed it when he sent troops to Kansas to assist the invaders from Missouri and overawe the free-State settlers. President Buchanan had obeyed it when he vetoed the Homestead Bill, which would have accelerated the development of the northern Territories into States. And innumerable other instances might be cited. The exist¬ ence of this party in the North was Whenever the National armies met with a reverse, if an election was pending, this party was the gainer thereby ; if they won a victory, it became weaker. Whenever a new measure was proposed, Congress and the President were obliged to consider not only what would be its legitimate effect, but whether in any way the Democratic press could use it as a weapon against them. Hence the idea of emancipation, though not altogether slow in conception —for many of the ablest minds had leaped at it from the be¬ gin n i n g— was tardy in execution. As early as 1836John Quincy Adams, speaking COLONEL ROBERT E. LEE. Commanding Virginia troops that captured John Brown. WISE h on Gove rno< 0 , Virg' nia ANDREW HUNTER. Prosecuting Attorney at the trial of John Brown. the most seri¬ ous embarrass¬ ment with which the Ad- ministration had to contend in the conduct of the war—not even excepting the border States. As individuals, its members were undoubt¬ edly loyal to the Constitution and Government as they under¬ stood them, though they wofully misunderstood them. As a party, it was placed in a singular dilemma. It did not want the Union dissolved ; for without the vote of the slave States it would be in a hopeless minority in Congress and at every Presi¬ dential election ; but neither did it wish to see its strongest cohesive element overthrown, or its natural leaders defeated and exiled. What it wanted was “the Union as it was,” and for this it continued to clamor long after it had become as plain as daylight that the Union as it was could never again exist. in Congress, had said : “ From the instant that your slaveholding States become the theatre of war, from that instant the war- powers of the Constitution extend to interference with the institution of slav¬ ery in every way in which it can be interfered with.” And in 1842 he had expressed the idea more strongly and fully: “ Whether the war be civil, ser¬ vile, or foreign, I lay this down as the aw of nations—I say that the military authority takes for the time the place of all municipal institutions, slavery among the rest. Under that state of things, so far from its being true that the States where slavery exists have the exclusive man¬ agement of the subject, not only the President of the United States, but the commander of the army has power to order the universal emancipation of the slaves.” The poets, wiser than the politicians, had long foretold the great struggle and its re¬ sults. James Russell Lowell, before he was thirty years of age, wrote: “Out from the land of bondage ’tis decreed our slaves shall go, And signs to us are offered, as erst to Pharaoh ; If we are blind, their exodus, like Israel’s of yore, Through a Red Sea is doomed to be, whose surges are of gore.” Twenty years later he saw his prediction fulfilled. But generally the anticipation was that the institution would be extinguished through a general rising of the slaves themselves. Thus Henry W. Longfellow wrote in 1841 : ORIGIN OF THE WORDS, “CONTRABAND OF WAR,” APPLIED TO SLAVES—FIRST USED BY GENERAL BUTLER CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD i «5 “There is a poor, blind Samson in this land, Shorn of his strength, and bound in bonds of steel, Who may, in some grim revel, raise his hand, And shake the pillars of this commonweal. Till the vast temple of our liberties A shapeless mass of wreck and rubbish lies.” It seems a singular fact that throughout the war there was no insurrection of the slaves. They were all anxious enough for liberty, and ran away from bondage whenever they could ; but, except by regular enlistment in the National army, there never was any movement among them to assist in the emancipation of their race. The first refusal to return fugitive slaves was made as early as May 26, 1861, by Gen. B. F. Butler, commanding at Fort Monroe. Three slaves, who had belonged to Colonel Mallory, commanding the Confederate forces near Hampton, came within Butler’s lines that day, saying they had run away because they were about to be sent South. Colonel Mallory sent by flag of truce to claim their rendition under the Fugitive Slave Law, but was informed by General Butler, that, as slaves could be made very useful to a belligerent in working on fortifications and other labor, they were contraband of war, like lead or powder or any other war material, and therefore could not and would not be delivered up. He offered, however, to return these three if Colonel Mallory would come to his headquarters and take an oath to obey the laws of the United States. This declaration— at once a witticism, a correct legal point, and sound common sense—was the first practical blow that was struck at the institu¬ tion; and it gave us a new word, for from that time fugitive slaves were commonly spoken of as “ contrabands.” They came into the National camps by thousands, and commanding officers and correspondents frequently questioned the more intelligent of them, in the hope of eliciting valuable information as to the movements of the enemy ; but so many apocryphal stories were thus originated that at length “ intelligent contraband ” became solely a term of derision. The next step was the passage of a law by Congress (approved August 6, 1861), wherein it was enacted that property, including slaves, actually employed in the service of the rebellion with the knowledge and consent of the owner, should be confiscated, and might be seized by the National forces wherever found. But it cautiously provided that slaves thus confiscated were not to be manumitted at once, but to be held subject to some future decision of the United States courts or action of Congress. Gen. John C. Fremont, the first Republican candidate for the Presidency (1856), who has had a romantic life, and in whose administration, instead of Lincoln’s, the war would have occurred if he had been elected, was in Europe in 1861, and did the Gov¬ ernment a timely service in the purchase of arms. Hastening home, he was made a major-general, and given command in Mis¬ souri. On the 30th of August he issued a proclamation placing the whole State under martial law, confiscating the property of all citizens who should take up arms against the United States, or assist its enemies by burning bridges, cutting wires, etc., and adding, “their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared free men.” The President called General Fremont’s attention to the fact that the clause relating to slaves was not in conformity with the act of Congress, and requested him to modify it ; to which Fremont replied by asking for an open order to that effect—in plain words, that the President should modify it himself, which Mr. Lincoln did. On the 6th of March, 1862, the President, in a special message to Congress, recommended the adoption of a joint resolution to the effect that the United States ought to cooperate with, and render pecuniary aid to, any State that should enter upon a gradual abolition of slavery ; and Congress passed such a reso¬ lution by a large majority. Gen. David Hunter, who commanded the National forces on the coast of South Carolina, with headquarters at Hilton Head, issued a general order on April 12, 1862, that all slaves in Fort Pulaski and on Cockspur Island should be confiscated and thenceforth free. On the 9th of May he issued another order, wherein, after mentioning that the three States in his depart¬ ment—Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina—had been declared under martial law, he proceeded to say: “ Slavery and martial law, in a free country, are altogether incompatible. The per¬ sons in these three States heretofore held as slaves are therefore declared forever free.” On the 19th of the same month the President issued a proclamation annulling General Hunter’s order, and adding that the question of emancipation was one that he reserved to himself and could not feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field. General Hunter also organized a regiment of black troops, designated as the First South Carolina Volunteers, which was the first body of negro soldiers mustered into the National service during the war. This proceeding, which now seems the most natural and sensible thing the general could have done, created serious alarm in Congress. A representative from Kentucky intro¬ duced a resolution asking for information concerning the “ regi¬ ment of fugitive slaves,” and the Secretary of War referred the inquiry to General Hunter, who promptly answered: “No regiment of fugitive slaves has been or is being organized in this department. There is, however, a fine regiment of persons whose late masters are fugitive rebels, men who everywhere fly before the appearance of the National flag, leaving their servants behind them to shift as best they can for themselves. In the absence of any fugitive-master law, the deserted slaves would be wholly without remedy, had not their crime of treason given the slaves the right to pursue, capture, and bring back these persons of whose protection they have been so suddenly bereft.” Fremont’s and Hunter’s attempts at emancipation created a great excitement, the Democratic journals declaring that the struggle was being “turned into an abolition war,” and many Union men in the border States expressing the gravest appre¬ hensions as to the consequences. The commanders were by no means of one mind on the subject. Gen. Thomas Wil¬ liams, commanding in the Department of the Gulf, ordered that all fugitive slaves should be expelled from his camps and sent beyond the lines ; and Col. Halbert E. Paine, of the Fourth Wisconsin Regiment, who refused to obey the order, on the ground that it was a “violation of law for the purpose of returning fugitives to rebels,” was deprived of his command and placed under arrest. Col. Daniel R. Anthony, of the Seventh Kansas Regiment, serving in Tennessee, ordered that men coming in and demanding the privilege of searching for fugitive slaves should be turned out of the camp, and that no officer or soldier in his regiment should engage in the arrest and delivery of fugitives to their masters ; and for this Colonel Anthony received from his superior officer the same treatment that had been accorded to Colonel Paine. The division of sentiment ran through the entire army. Soldiers that would rob a granary, or cut down trees, or reduce fences to firewood, without the slightest compunction, still recognized CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. HORACE GREELEY. the ancient taboo, and expressed the nicest scruples in regard to property in slaves. On the 14th of July the President recommended to Congress the passage of a bill for the payment, in United States interest- bearing bonds, to any State that should abolish slavery, of an amount equal to the value of all slaves within its borders ac¬ cording to the census of i860; and at the same time he asked the Congressional representatives of the border States to use their influence with their constituents to bring about such action in those States. The answer was not very favorable; but Maryland did abolish slavery before the close of the war, in October, 1864. On the very day in which the popular vote of that State decided to adopt a new constitution without slavery, October 12th, died Roger B. Taney, a native of Mary¬ land, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, who had been appointed by the first distinctly pro-slavery President, and from that bench had handed down the Dred-Scott decision, which was calculated to render forever impossible any amelio¬ ration of the condition of the negro race. On July 22, 1862, all the National commanders were ordered to employ as many negroes as could be used advantageously for military and naval purposes, paying them for their labor and keeping a record as to their ownership, “ as a basis on which compensation could be made in proper cases.” Thus events were creeping along toward a true statement of the great problem, without which it could never be solved, when Horace Greeley, through the columns of his Tribune , addressed an open letter to the President (August 19), entitling it “The Prayer of Twenty Millions.” It exhorted Mr. Lincoln, not to general emancipation, but to such an execution of the existing laws as would free immense numbers of slaves be¬ longing to men in arms against the Government. It was im¬ passioned and powerful; a single passage will show its character: “ On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined, intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that all attempts to put down the rebellion, and at the same time uphold its exciting cause, are preposterous and futile ; that the rebellion, if crushed out to-morrow, would be renewed within a year if slavery were left in full vigor; that army officers who remain to this day devoted to slavery can at best be but half-way loyal to the Union ; and that every hour of deference to slavery is an hour of added and deepened peril to the Union.” Any one less a genius than Mr. Lincoln would have found it difficult to answer Mr. Greeley at all, and his answer was not one in the sense of being a refutation, but it exhibited his view of the question, and is perhaps as fine a piece of literature as was ever penned by any one in an official capacity: “ If there be percepti¬ ble in it [Mr. Greeley’s letter] an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right. . . . As to the policy I ‘ seem to be pursuing,’ as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. . . . My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could save it by free¬ ing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. I have here stated my purpose according to my views of official duty ; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.” In truth, the President was already contemplating emancipa¬ tion as a war measure, and about this time he prepared his preliminary proclamation ; but he did not wish to issue it till it could follow a triumph of the National arms. Pope’s defeat in Virginia in August set it back; but McClellan’s success at Antietam, though not the decisive victory that was wanted, appeared to be as good an opportunity as was likely soon to present itself, and five days later (September 22, 1862) the proclamation was issued. It declared that the President would, REV. HENRY WARD BEECHER. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. .87 at the next session, renew his sugges¬ tion to Congress of pecuniary aid to the States disposed to abolish slavery gradually or otherwise, and gave notice that on the 1st of January, 1863, he would declare forever free all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof should then be in rebellion against the United States. On that day he issued the final and decisive proclamation, as promised, in which he also announced that black men would be received into the military and naval service of the United States, as follows : “ Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord 1862, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, con¬ taining, among other things, the fol¬ lowing, to wit: “ ‘ That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord 1863, all per¬ sons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the peo¬ ple whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Execu¬ tive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, orany of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual free¬ dom.’ “ ‘ That the Executive will, on the first day of January afore¬ said, by proc- 1 a m a t i o n , designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respec- t i v e 1 y shall then be in re¬ bellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people th ereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States, by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testi¬ mony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people there¬ of, are not then in rebellion against the United States.’ “ Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lin¬ coln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and neces¬ sary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of Janu¬ ary, in the year of our Lord one thou¬ sand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full james g. birney. period of one hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: “Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Ber¬ nard, Plaquemine, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Mar- t i n , and Or¬ leans, includ¬ ing the city of New Orleans), Mississ i p p i, Alabama,Flor¬ ida, Georgia, South Caro¬ lina, North Carolina, and Virginia (ex¬ cept the forty- eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Ac- comac, North¬ ampton, Eliza- b e t h City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, in¬ cluding the THE SALE OF A SLAVE. cities of Nor- THE BROKEN SHACKLES. CAMTEIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . (L.S.) “ Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord 1863, and of the Independence of the United States the 87th. “ By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN. “William H. Seward, Secretary of State.” The immediate effect of this action was what had been expected. The friends of liberty, and supporters of the Admin¬ istration generally, rejoiced at it, believing that the true line ot combat had been drawn at last. Robert Dale Owen probably expressed the opinion of most of them when he wrote, “ The true and fit question is whether, without a flagrant violation of official duty, the President had the right to refrain from doing it.” The effect in Europe is said to have been decisive of the question whether the Confederacy should be recognized as an established nation ; but as to this there is some uncertainty. It is certain, however, that much friendship for the Union was won in England, where it had been withheld on account of our attitude on the slavery question. In Manchester, December 31, a mass-meeting of factory operatives was held, and resolutions of sympathy with the Union, and an address to President Lincoln, were voted. The full significance of this can only be understood when it is remembered that these men were largely out of work for want of the cotton that the blockade prevented the South from exporting. The Confederate journals chose to interpret the proclamation as nothing more than an attempt to excite a servile insurrection. The Democratic editors of the North assailed Mr. Lincoln with every verbal weapon of which they were masters, though these had been somewhat blunted by previous use, for he had already been freely called a usurper, a despot, a destroyer of the Constitution, and a keeper of Bastiles. They declared with horror (doubtless in some cases perfectly sincere) that the proclamation had changed the whole character of the war. And this was true, though not in the sense in which they meant it. When begun, it was a war for a temporary peace ; the proclamation converted it into a war for a permanent peace. But the autumn elections showed how near Mr. Lincoln came to being ahead of his people after all; for they went largely against the Administration, and even in the States that the Democrats did not carry there was a falling off in the Republican majorities; though the result was partly due to the failure of the peninsula campaign, and the escape of Lee’s army after Antietam. Yet this did not shake the great emancipator’s faith in the justice and wisdom of what he had done. He said on New Year’s even¬ ing to a knot of callers : “ The signature looks a little tremulous, for my hand was tired, but my resolution was firm. I told them in September, if they did not return to their allegiance and cease murdering our soldiers, I would strike at this pillar of their strength. And now the promise shall be kept, and not one word of it will I ever recall.” If we wonder at the slowness with which that great struggle arrived at its true theme and issue, we shall do well to note that it has a close parallel in our own history. The first bat¬ tle of the Rev- o 1 u t i o n was fought in April, 1775, but the Dec¬ laration of Independence was not made till July, 1776 —a period of nearly fifteen months. The first battle in the war of secession took place in April, 1861, and the Emancipation Proclamation was issued in September, 1862—seven- charles sumner. folk and Ports- mouth), and which except¬ ed parts are, for the pres¬ ent, left pre¬ cisely as if this proclamation w ere not issued. “ And, by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and de¬ clare that all persons held as slaves with¬ in said desig¬ nated States and parts of States are and henceforward shall be free ; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. “And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence ; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. “ And I further declare and make known that such persons, of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. “And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God. “ In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my name, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 190 or seventeen months, however slow for an individual, is perhaps for an entire peo¬ ple as rapid development of a radical pur¬ pose as we could have any reason to ex¬ pect. In the District of Columbia there were three thousand slaves at the time the war began. In December, 1861, Henry Wilson, senator from Massachusetts, afterward Vice- President, introduced in the Senate a bill for the immediate emancipation of these slaves, with a pro¬ vision for paying to such owners as were loyal an average compensation of three hundred dollars for each slave. The bill was opposed violently by senators and representatives from Kentucky and Maryland, and by some others, conspicuous among whom was Mr. Vallandig- ham. Nevertheless, it passed both houses, and the President signed it April 16, 1862. HENRY W. LONGFELLOW. JOHN G. WHITTIER. stanch supporters of the Union, and Mr. Wickliffe offered resolu¬ tions declaring that the Presi¬ dent has no right whatever to interfere with slavery even during a rebellion. The whole subject was treated in a masterly way by the Hon. William Whiting in his book entitled “ War Powers under the Constitution of the United States.” He says: “The liberation of slaves is looked upon as a means of em¬ barrassing or weakening the enemy, or of strengthening the military power of our army. If slaves be treated as contraband of war, on the ground that they may be used by their masters to aid in prosecuting war, as employees upon military works. teen months. In the one case, as in the other, the interval was filled with doubt, hesitation, and divided counsels; and Lincoln’s reluctance finds its match in Washington’s confession that when he took command of the army (after Lexington, Con¬ cord, and Bunker Hill had been fought) he still abhorred the idea of independence. And again, as the great Proclamation was preceded by the attempts of Fremont and Hunter, so the great Declaration had been preceded by those of Mendon, Mass., Chester, Penn., and Mecklenburg, N. C., which anticipated its essential propositions by two or three years. A period of fifteen In Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri slavery continued until it was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment to the National Constitution, which in December, 1865, was declared ratified by three-fourths of the States, and consequently a part of the fundamental law of the land. The President’s right to proclaim the slaves free, as a war measure, was questioned not only by his violent political opponents, but also by a considerable number who were friendly to him, or at least to the cause of the Union, but whose knowl¬ edge of international law and war powers was limited. Among these were Congressman Crittenden and Wickliffe, of Kentucky, who were WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND DAUGHTER CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . or as laborers furnishing by their industry the means of carry¬ ing on hostilities; or if they be treated as, in law, belligerents, following the legal condition of their owners; or if they be deemed loyal subjects having a just claim upon the Government to be released from their obligations to give aid and service to disloyal and belligerent masters, in order that they may be free to perform their higher duty of allegiance and loyalty to the United States ; or if they be regarded as subjects of the United States, liable to do military duty ; or if they be made citizens of the United States, and soldiers; or if the authority of the masters over their slaves is the means of aiding and comforting the enemy, or of throwing impediments in the way of the Gov¬ ernment, or depriving it of such aid and assistance, in successful prosecution of the war, as slaves would and could afford if re¬ leased from the control of the enemy ; or if releasing the slaves would embarrass the enemy, and make it more difficult for them to collect and maintain large armies ; in either of these cases, the taking away of these slaves from the ‘ aid and service’ of the enemy, and putting them to the aid and service of the United States, is justifiable as an act of war. The ordinary way of depriving the enemy of slaves is by declaring emancipation.” He then cites abundant precedents and authorities from Brit- I 9 i ish, French, South American, and other sources, one of the most striking of which is this quotation from Thomas Jefferson’s letter to Dr. Gordon, complaining of the injury done to his estates by Cornwallis : “ He destroyed all my growing crops and tobacco ; he burned all my barns, containing the same articles of last year. Having first taken what corn he wanted, he used, as was to be expected, all my stock of cattle, sheep, and hogs for the sustenance of his army, and carried off all the horses capable of service. He carried off also about thirty slaves. Had this been to give them freedom, he would have done right. From an esti¬ mate made at the time on the best information I could collect, I suppose the State of Virginia lost, under Lord Cornwallis’s hands, that year, about thirty thousand slaves.” Whiting says in conclusion : “ It has thus been proved, by the law and usage of modern civilized nations, confirmed by the judgment of emi¬ nent statesmen, and by the former practice of this Government, that the President, as commander-in-chief, has the authority, as an act of war, to liberate the slaves of the enemy ; that the United States have in former times sanctioned the liberation of slaves— even of loyal citizens—by military commanders, in time of war, without compensation therefor, and have deemed slaves captured in war from belligerent subjects as entitled to their freedom.” MAJOR-GENERAL AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE AND STAFF. CHAPTER XVII. BURNSIDE’S CAMPAIGN. McClellan’s inaction—visit and letters of Lincoln to him—superseded by burnside—the position at Fredericksburg— ATTACK UPON THE HEIGHTS—THE RESULT GENERAL BURNSIDE’S LACK OF JUDGMENT—PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S NATURAL APTITUDE FOR STRATEGY-BRAVERY OF THE SOLDIERS—THRILLING INCIDENTS OF THE BATTLE-GALLANTRY OF THE IRISH BRIGADE. AFTER the battle of the Antietam, Lee withdrew to the neigh¬ borhood of Winchester, where he was reinforced, till at the end of a month he had about sixty-eight thousand men. McClellan followed as far as the Potomac, and there seemed to plant his army, as if he expected it to sprout and increase itself like a field of corn. Ten days after he defeated Lee on the Antietam, he -wrote to the President that he intended to stay where he was, and attack the enemy if they attempted to recross into Maryland ! At the same time, he constantly called for unlimited reinforcements, and declared that, even if the city of Washing¬ ton should be captured, it would not be a disaster so serious as the defeat of his army. Apparently it did not occur to General McClellan that these two contingencies were logically the same. For if Lee could have defeated that army, he could then have marched into Washington; or if he could have captured Wash¬ ington without fighting the army whose business it was to defend it, the army would thereby be substantially defeated. On the ist of October the President visited General McClellan at his headquarters, and made himself acquainted with the con¬ dition of the army. Five days later he ordered McClellan to 192 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD “ cross the Potomac, and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south.” The despatch added, “ Your army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reinforced with thirty thousand men.” Neverthe¬ less, McClellan did not stir. Instead of obeying the order, he inquired what sort of troops they were that would be sent to him, and how many tents he could have, and said his army could not move without fresh supplies of shoes and clothing. While he was thus paltering, the Confederate General Stuart, who had ridden around his army on the peninsula, with a small body of cavalry rode entirely around it again, eluding all efforts for his capture. On the 13th the President wrote a long, friendly letter to General McClellan, in which he gave him much excel¬ lent advice that he, as a trained soldier, ought not to have needed. A sentence or two will suggest the drift of it : “Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing ? . you In coming to us, outlined a plan of campaign, but characteristic of Lincoln’s modesty he [the enemy] tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. . . . It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it.” The letter had it closed with the words, in military matters, “ This letter is in no sense an order.” Twelve days more of fine weather were frittered away in renewed complaints, and such in¬ quiries as whether the President w i s h e d him MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN NEWTON. to move at once or wait for fresh horses, for the general said his horses were fatigued and had sore tongue. Here the Presi¬ dent began to show some impatience, and wrote: “Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?” The gen¬ eral replied that they had been scouting, picketing, and making reconnoissances, and that the Presi¬ dent had done injustice to the cavalry. Where¬ upon Mr. Lincoln wrote again : “ Most certainly I intend no injustice to any, and if I have done any I deeply regret it. To be told, after more than five weeks’ total inaction of the army, and during which period we had sent to that army every fresh horse we possibly could, amounting in the whole to 7,918, that the cavalry horses were too much fa¬ tigued to move, pre¬ sented a very cheer¬ less, almost hopeless, prospect for the future, and it may have forced some¬ thing of impatience into my despatches.” That day, October 26, McClellan began to cross the Potomac; but it was ten days (partly owing to heavy rains) before his army was all on the south side of the river, and meanwhile he had brought up new ques¬ tions for discussion and invented new excuses for delay. He wanted to know to what extent the line of the Potomac was to be guarded ; he wanted to leave strong garrisons at certain points, to prevent the army he was driving southward before him from rushing northward into Maryland again ; he discussed the position of General Bragg’s (Confederate) army, which was four hundred miles away beyond the mountains; he said the old regiments of his command must be filled up with recruits before they could go into action. McClellan was a sore puzzle to the people of the loyal States. But large numbers of his men still believed in him, and—as is usual in such cases—intensified their personal devotion in pro¬ portion as the distrust of the people at large was increased. After crossing the Potomac, he left a corps at Harper’s Ferry, and was moving southward on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, while Lee moved in the same direction on the western BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL J. J. BARTLETT. CONFEDERATE SHARP-SHOOTERS ON THE HEIGHTS OF FREDERICKSBURG, CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. side, when, on November 7> the President solved the riddle that had vexed the country, by relieving him of the command. The successor of General McClellan was Ambrose E. Burnside, then in his thirty-ninth year, who was graduated at West Point fifteen years before, had commanded cavalry during the Mexican war, had invented a breech-loading rifle which was commercially unsuccessful, and at the breaking out of the rebellion was treasurer of the Illinois Central Railroad. When the First Rhode Island Regiment went to Washington, four days after the President s first call for troops, Burnside was its colonel. He commanded a brigade at the first battle of Bull Run ; led an expedition that captured Roanoke Island, New Berne, and Beau- 193 These two generals were warm personal friends, and McClellan remained a few days to put Burnside in possession, as far as possible, of the essential facts in relation to the position and condition of the forces. At this time the right wing of Lee’s army, under Longstreet, was near Culpeper, and the left, under Jackson, was in the Shenandoah Valley. Their separation was such that it would require two days for one to march to the other. McClellan said he intended to endeavor to get between them and either beat them in detail or force them to unite as far south as Gordons- ville. Burnside not only did not continue this plan, but gave up the idea that the Confederate army was his true objective, ATTACK ON FREDERICKSBURG, DECEMBER, 1862. fort, N. C., in January, 1862 ; and commanded one wing of Mc¬ Clellan’s army at South Mountain and Antietam. Whether he was blameworthy for not crossing the Antietam early in the day and effecting a crushing defeat of Lee’s army, is a disputed question. It might be worth while to discuss it, were it not that he afterward accepted a heavier responsibility and incurred a more serious accusation. The command of the Army of the Potomac had been offered to him twice before, but he had refused it, saying that he “ was not competent to command such a large army.” When the order came relieving McClellan and appointing him, he consulted with that general and with his staff officers, making the same objection ; but they took the ground that as a soldier he was bound to obey without question, and so he accepted the place, as he says, “ in the midst of a violent snow-storm, with the army in a position that I knew little of.” assumed the city of Richmond to be such, and set out for that place by way of the north bank of the Rappahannock and the city of Fredericksburg, after consuming ten days in reorganizing his army into three grand divisions, under Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin. On the 15th of November he began the march from Warrenton ; the head of his first column reached Falmouth on the 17th, and by the 20th the whole army was there. By some blunder (it is uncertain whose) the pontoon train that was to have met the army at this point, and afforded an immediate crossing of the river, did not arrive till a week later ; and by this time Lee, who chose to cover his own capital and cross the path of his enemy, rather than strike at his communications, had placed his army on the heights south and west of Fredericks¬ burg, and at once began to fortify them. His line was about five and a half miles long, and was as strong as a good natural 13 FROM A WAR DEPARTMENT PHOTOGRAPH CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 195 position, earthworks, and an abundance of artillery could make it. He could not prevent Burnside from crossing the river ; for the heights on the left bank rose close to the stream, com¬ manding the intermediate plain, and on these heights Burnside had one hundred and forty-seven guns. What with waiting for the pontoons and establishing his base of supplies at Acquia Creek, it was the 10th of December before the National com¬ mander was ready to attempt the passage of the stream. He planned to lay down five bridges—three opposite the city and the others two miles below—and depended upon his arti lery to protect the engineers. Before daybreak on the morning of the nth, in a thick fog, the work was begun ; but the bridges had not spanned more than half the distance when the sufficiently to reveal of Mississippi rifle- sun had risen and the fog lifted what was going on. A detachment men had been posted in cellars, be¬ wails, and at every point where a man could be sheltered on the south bank; and now the inces¬ sant crack of their weapons was heard, picking off the men that were laying the bridges. One after another of the blue-coats reeled with a bullet in brain, fell into the water, ai was carried down by the cu rent, till the losses were sc serious that it was impos¬ sible to continue the work. At the lower bridges the sharp-shooters, who there had no shelter but rifle- pits in the open field, were dislodged after a time, a n d by noo n those bridges were completed. But /?/ c ' along the front of the town they had better shelter, the National guns could not be depressed enough to shell them, and the work on the three upper bridges came to a standstill. Burnside tried bombarding the town, threw seventy tons of iron into it, and set it on fire ; but still the sharp-shooters clung to their hiding places, and when the engineers tried to renew their task on the bridges, under cover of the bombardment, they were destroyed by the same mur¬ derous fire. At last General Hunt, chief of artillery, suggested a solution of the difficulty. Three regiments that volunteered for the service—the Seventh Michigan, and the Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts—crossed the river in pontoon boats, under the fire of the sharp-shooters, landed quickly, and drove them out of their fastness, capturing a hundred of them, while the remainder escaped to the hills. The bridges were then completed, and the crossing was begun ; but it was evening of the 12th before the entire army was on the Fredericksburg side of the river. On the morning of the 13th Burnside was ready to attack, and Lee was more than ready to be attacked. He had concentrated his whole army on the fortified heights, Longstreet’s corps form- W ing his left wing and Jackson’s his right, with every gun in posi¬ tion, and every man ready and knowing what to expect. The weak point of the line, if it had any, was on the right, where the ground was not so high, and there was plenty of room for the deployment of the attacking force. Here Franklin commanded, with about half of the National army; and here, according to Burnside’s first plan, the principal assault was to be made. But there appears to have been a sudden unaccountable change in the plan ; and when the hour for action arrived Franklin was ordered to send for¬ ward a division or two, and hold the remainder of his force ready for “ a rapid movement down the old Richmond road,” while Sum¬ ner on the right was ordered to send out two divisions to seize the heights back of the city. Exactly what Burnside ex¬ pected to do next, if these movements had been suc¬ cessful, nobody appears to know. The division chosen to lead Franklin’s attack was Meade’s. This advanced rapidly, preceded by a heavy skirmish line, while his batteries firing over the heads of the troops shelled the heights vigorously. Meade’s men crossed the railroad under a heavy fire, that had been withheld till they were within close range, penetrated between two divisions of the first Confederate line, doubling back the flanks of both and taking many pris¬ oners and some battle-flags, scaled the heights, and came upon the second line. By this time the mo¬ mentum of the attack was spent, and the fire of the second line, delivered on the flanks as well as in front, drove them back. The divisions of Gibbon and Doubleday had followed in support, which re¬ lieved the pressure upon Meade; and when all three were returning unsuccessful and in considerable confusion, Birney’s moved out and stopped the pursuing enemy. Sumner’s attack was made with the divisions of French and Han¬ cock, which moved through the town and deployed in columns under the batteries. This was very destructive, the men had to meet. and MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT RANSOM, JR., C. S. A. thing that fire of the Confederate but was not the deadliest Marye’s Hill was skirted near its base by an old sunken road, at the outer edge of which was a stone wall; and in this road were two brigades of Confederate infantry. It could hardly be seen, at a little distance, that there was a road at all. When French’s charging columns had rushed across the open ground under an artillery fire that ploughed through and through their ranks, they suddenly confronted a sheet of flame and lead from the rifles in the sunken road. The Confederates here were so 196 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. numerous that each one at the wall had two or three behind to load muskets and hand them to him, while he had only to lay them flat across the wall and fire them as rapidly as possible, exposing scarcely more than his head. Nearly half of French’s men were shot down, and the remainder fell back. Hancock’s five thousand charged in the same manner, and some of them approached within twenty yards of the wall; but within a quarter of an hour they also fell back a part of the distance, leaving two thousand of their number on the field. Three other divisions advanced to the attack, but with no better result ; and all of them remained in a position where they were just out of reach of the rifles in the sunken road, but were still played upon by the Confederate artillery. Burnside now grew frantic, and ordered Hooker to attack. That officer moved out with three divisions, made a reconnois- sance, and went back to tell Burnside it was useless and persuade him to give up the attempt. But the commander insisted, and so Hooker’s four thousand rushed for¬ ward with fixed bayonets, and presently came back like the rest, leaving seven¬ teen hundred dead or wounded on the field. The entire National loss in this battle was twelve thousand six hundred and fifty-three in killed, wounded, or missing, though some of the missing afterward rejoined their commands. Hancock’s division lost one hundred and fifty-six officers, and one of his regiments lost two-thirds of its men. The Confederate loss was five thousand three hundred and seventy-seven. Four brigadier-gen¬ erals were killed in this battle ; on the National side, Generals George D. Bay- to the north bank of the Rappahannock, and the sorry campaign was ended. If it had been at all necessary to prove the courage and discipline of the National troops, Fredericksburg proved ic abundantly. There were few among them that De¬ cember morn¬ ing who did not look upon it as hopeless to assault those fortified slopes ; yet they obeyed their orders, ■ COLONEL ROBERT NUGENT. (Afterward Brevet Brigadier-General.) ard and Conrad F. Jackson; on the Confed¬ erate, Generals Thomas R. R. Cobb and Max- cy Gregg. In the night the Union troops brought in their wounded and buried some of their dead. Severe as his losses had been, Burnside planned to make a fresh attempt the next day, with the Ninth Corps (his old command), which he proposed to lead in person ; but General Sumner dissuaded him, though with difficulty. In the night of the 15th, in the midst of a storm, the army was withdrawn BRIGADIER-GENERAL T. F. MEAGHER. BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. A. DE RUSSEY. and moved out to the work as if they expected victory, suffering such frightful losses as bodies of troops are seldom called upon to endure, and retiring with little disorder and no panic. The English cor¬ respondent of the London Times , writing from Lee’s headquarters, exultingly pre¬ dicted the speedy decline and fall of the American Republic. If he had been shrewd enough to see what was indicated, rather than what he hoped for, he would have written that with such courage and discipline as the Army of the Potomac had displayed, and superior resources, the final victory was certain to be theirs, however they might first suffer from incompetent commanders ; that the Republic that had set such an army in the field, and had the material for several more, was likely to contain somewhere a general worthy to lead it, and was not likely to be overthrown by any insurrection of a minority of its people. There never was any question of the gallantry or patriotism of General Burnside, but his woful lack of judgment in the con¬ duct of the battle of Fredericksburg (or perhaps it should be said, in fighting a battle at that point at all) has ever remained inexplicable. His own attempt to explain it, in his official report, is brief, and is at least manly in the frankness with which he puts the entire blame upon himself. He wrote : “ During my preparations for crossing at the place I had first selected, I discovered that the enemy had thrown a large portion of his force down the river and elsewhere, thus weakening his defences in front, and also thought I discovered that he did not anticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg; and I hoped by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place to CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 197 A HASTY MEAL. street, who says : “ General Lee became uneasy when he saw the attacks so promptly renewed and pushed forward with such persistence, and feared the Federals might break through our lines. After the third charge he said to me, ‘ General, they are massing very heavily, and will break your line, I am afraid.’ ” Longstreet represents himself as having no such fears whatever, but it further appears from his testimony that when in the night they captured an officer on whom they found an order for renewal of the battle the next day, General Lee immediately gave orders for the construction of a new line of rifle-pits and the placing of more guns in position. General Lee, instead of following up his good fortune by counter attack, went off to Richmond to suggest other opera¬ tions. No such fierce criticism for not reaping the fruits of victories has ever been expended upon him as some of the National commanders have had to endure for this fault, though many of his and their opportunities were closely parallel. In Richmond he was told by Mr. Davis that the Administration considered the war virtually over, but he knew better. The story of the battle, so far as its strictly military aspect is concerned, is extremely simple, and makes but a short though dreadful chapter in the history of the great struggle. But it was full of incidents, though mostly of the mournful kind, and the reader would fail to get any adequate conception of what was done and suffered on that field without some accounts written at the time by participants. General Meagher, com¬ manding the Irish brigade, made an interesting report, in which he pictured graphically the manner in which that organization went into the action and the treatment that it received. A few extracts will include the most interesting passages. “ The brigade never was in finer spirits and condition. The arms and accoutrements were in perfect order. The required amount of ammunition was on hand. Both officers and men were comfort¬ ably clad, and it would be difficult to say whether those who were to lead or those who were to follow were the better pre¬ pared or the more eager to discharge their duty. A few minutes separate, by a vigorous attack, the forces of the enemy on the river below from the forces behind and on the crest in the rear of the town, in which case we could fight him with great advantage in our favor. To do this we had to gain a height on the extreme right of the crest, which height commanded a new road lately made by the enemy for purposes of more rapid communica¬ tion along his lines, which point gained, his positions along the crest would have been scarcely tenable, and he could have been driven from them easily by an attack on his front in connection with a movement in the rear of the crest. . . . Failing in accomplishing the main object, we remained in order of battle two days—long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his strongholds to fight us with infantry—after which we recrossed to this side of the river unmolested, with¬ out the loss of men or property. As the day broke, our long lines of troops were seen marching to their differ¬ ent positions as if going on parade—not the least de¬ moralization or disorganization existed. To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing the river in the face of the enemy, I owe everything. For the failure in the attack I am respon¬ sible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them was never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been possible. The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on to this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the only one responsible.” When Burnside’s plan was submitted to the President and General Halleck, there was considerable opposition to it, and when finally Halleck informed Burnside that the President con¬ sented to that plan, he added significantly: “ He thinks it will succeed if you move rapidly; otherwise, not.” Though Mr. Lincoln was not a soldier, his natural aptitude for strategy has been much discussed, and it is therefore interesting to remember this saving clause in his consent to the experiment of Freder¬ icksburg. How near the National troops, with all their terrible disadvantages, came to piercing the lines of the enemy on Marye’s Hill, we know from the testimony of General Long- RELIEF FOR THE WOUNDED. 198 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. after four o’clock P.M., word was conveyed to me that a gallant body of volunteers had crossed the river in boats and taken possession of the city of Fredericksburg. Immediately on the receipt of this news, an order reached me from Brigadier-General Hancock to move forward the brigade and take up a position closer to the river. In this new position we remained all night. At seven o’clock the following morning we were under arms, and in less than two hours the head of the brigade presented itself on the opposite bank of the river. Passing along the edge of the river to the lower bridge, the brigade halted, coun¬ termarched, stacked arms, and in this position, ankle-deep in mud, and with little or nothing to contribute to their comfort, in complete subordination and good heart, awaited further orders. An order promulgated by Major-General Couch, com¬ manding the corps, prohibited fires after nightfall. This order was uncomplainingly and manfully obeyed by the brigade. Officers and men lay down and slept that night in the mud and frost, and without a murmur, with heroic hearts, composed them¬ selves as best they could for the eventualities of the coming day. A little before eight o’clock A.M., Saturday, the 13th inst., we received orders to fall in and prepare instantly to take the field. The brigade being in line, I addressed, separately, to each regiment a few words, reminding it of its duty, and exhorting it to acquit itself of that duty bravely and nobly to the last. Im¬ mediately after, the column swept up the street toward the scene of action, headed by Col. Robert Nugent, of the Sixty-ninth, and his veteran regiment—every officer and man of the brigade wearing a sprig of evergreen in his hat, in memory of the land of his birth. The advance was firmly and brilliantly made through this street under a continuous discharge of shot and shell, several men falling from the effects of both. Even whilst I was addressing the Sixty-ninth, which was on the right of the brigade, three men of the Sixty-third were knocked over, and before I had spoken my last words of encouragement the mangled remains of the poor fellows—mere masses of torn flesh and rags —were borne along the line to the hospital of French’s division. Emerging from the street, having nothing whatever to protect it, the brigade encountered the full force and fury of the enemy’s fire, and, unable to resist or reply to it, had to push on to the mill-race, which may be described as the first of the hostile de- ZOUAVE COLOR-BEARER AT FREDERICKSBURG. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 199 fences. Crossing this mill-race by means of a single bridge, the brigade, diverging to the right, had to deploy into line of battle. This movement necessarily took some time to execute. The Sixty-ninth, under Colonel Nugent, being on the right, had to stand its ground until the rest of the brigade came up and formed. I myself, accompanied by Lieutenant Emmet of my staff, crossed the mill-race on foot from the head of the street through which the column had debouched. Trudging up the ploughed field as well as my lameness would permit me, to the muddy crest along which the brigade was to form in line of battle, I reached the fence on which the right of the Sixty-ninth rested. I directed Colonel Nugent to throw out two companies of his regiment as skirmishers on the right flank. This order was being carried out, when the other regiments of the brigade, coming up with a brisk step and deploying in line of battle, drew down upon themselves a terrific fire. Nevertheless the line was beautifully and rapidly formed, and boldly advanced, Colonel Nugent leading on the right, Col. Patrick Kelly, commanding the Eighty-eighth, being next in line, both displaying a courageous soldiership which I have no words, even with all my partiality for them, adequately to describe. Thus formed, under the unabating tempest and deluge of shot and shell, the Irish brigade advanced against the rifle-pits, the breastworks, and batteries of the enemy. The next day, a little after sunrise, every officer and man of the brigade able again to take the field, by order of Brigadier-General Hancock, recrossed to Fredericksburg and took up the same position, on the street nearest the river, which we had occupied previous to the advance, prepared and eager, notwithstanding their exhausted numbers and condition, to sup¬ port the Ninth Corps in the renewal of the assault of the pre¬ vious day, that renewal having been determined on by the general-in-chief. Of the one thousand two hundred I had led into action the day before, two hundred and eighty only appeared on that ground that morning. This remnant of the Irish brigade, still full of heart, still wearing the evergreen, inspired by a glow-- ing sense of duty, sorrowful for their comrades, but emboldened and elated by the thought that they had fallen with the proud bravery they did—this noble little remnant awaited the order that was once more to precipitate them against the batteries of the enemy.” Gen. Aaron F. Stevens (afterward member of Congress), who at that time commanded the Thirteenth New Hampshire Regi¬ ment, made an interesting report, in the course of which he said : “ Just after dark we moved to the river, and crossed without opposition the pontoon-bridge near the lower end of the city. My regiment took up its position for the night in Caroline Street, one of the principal streets of the city, and threw out two companies as pickets toward the enemy. At an early hour on Saturday morning, the eventful and disastrous day of the battle, we took up our position with the brigade under the Hill on the bank of the river, just below the bridge which we crossed on Thursday night. Here we remained under arms the entire day, our position being about a mile distant from the line of the enemy’s batteries. Occasionally, during the day, fragments of shell from his guns reached us or passed over us, falling in the river and beyond, doing but little damage. One of our own guns, however, on the opposite bank of the river, which threw shells over us toward the enemy, was so unfortunately handled as to kill two men and wound several others in our brigade. As yet all the accounts which I have seen or read, from Union or rebel sources, approach not in delineation the truthful and ter¬ rible panorama of that bloody day. Twice during the day I rode up Caroline Street to the centre of the city toward the point where our brave legions were struggling against the terrible com¬ bination of the enemy’s artillery and infantry, whose unremitting fire shook the earth and filled the plain in rear of the city with the deadly missiles of war. I saw the struggling hosts of free¬ dom stretched along the plain, their ranks ploughed by the merciless fire of the foe. I saw the dead and wounded, among them some of New Hampshire’s gallant sons, borne back on the shoulders of their comrades in battle, and laid tenderly down in the hospitals prepared for their reception, in the houses on either side of the street as far as human habitations extended. I listened to the roar of battle and the groans of the wounded and dying. I saw in the crowded hospitals the desolation of war ; but I heard from our brave soldiers no note of triumph, no word of encouragement, no syllable of hope that for us a field was to be won. In the stubborn, unyielding resistance of the enemy I could see no point of pressure likely to yield to the repeated assaults of our brave soldiers, and so I returned to my command to wait patiently for the hour when we might be called to share in the duty and danger of our brave brethren engaged in the contest. By stepping forward to the brow of the hill which covered us, a distance of ten yards, we were in full view of the rebel stronghold—the batteries along the crest of the ridge called Stansbury Hill and skirting Hazel Run. For three-fourths of an hour before we were ordered into action, I stood in front of my regiment on the brow of the hill and watched the fire of the rebel batteries as they poured shot and shell from sixteen different points upon our devoted men on the plains below. It was a sight magnificently terrible. Every discharge of enemy’s artillery and every explosion of his shells were visible in the dusky twilight of that smoke-crowned hill. There his direct and enfilading batteries, with the vividness, intensity, and almost the rapidity, of lightning, hurled the messengers of death in the midst of our brave ranks, vainly struggling through the murder¬ ous fire to gain the hills and the guns of the enemy. Nor was it any straggling or ill-directed fire. The arrangement of the enemy’s guns was such that they could pour their concentrated and incessant fire upon any point occupied by our assailing troops, and all of them were plied with the greatest skill and animation. During all this time the rattle of musketry was incessant. “ About sunset there was a pause in the cannonading and musketry, and orders came for our brigade to fall in. Silently but unflinchingly' the men moved out from under their cover, and, when they reached the ground, quickened their pace to a run. As the head of the column came in sight of the enemy, at a distance of about three-fourths of a mile from their batteries, when close to Slaughter’s house, it was saluted with a shower of shell from the enemy’s guns on the crest of the hill. It moved on by r the flank down the hill into the plain bey'ond, crossing a small stream which passes through the city and empties into Hazel Run, then over another hill to the line of railroad. We moved at so rapid a pace that many of the men relieved them¬ selves of their blankets and haversacks, and in some instances of their great-coats, which in most cases were lost. By' counter¬ march, we extended our line along the railroad, the right resting toward the city', and the left near Hazel Run. The words, ‘ Forward, charge ! ’ ran along the lines. The men sprang for¬ ward, and moved at a run, crossed the railroad into a low muddy swamp on the left, which reaches down to Hazel Run, the right moving over higher and less muddy ground, all the time the batteries of the enemy concentrating their terrible fire and pour- 200 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. ing it upon the advancing lines. Suddenly the cannonading and musketry of the enemy ceased. The shouts of our men also were hushed, and nothing was heard along the line save the command : ‘ Forward, men—steady—close up.’ In this way we moved forward, until within about twenty yards of the cele¬ brated stone wall. Before we reached the point of which I have been speaking, we came to an irregular ravine or gully, into which, in the darkness of night, the lines plunged, but immediately gained the opposite side, and were advancing along the level ground toward the stone wall. Behind that wall, and in rifle- pits on its flanks, were posted the enemy’s infantry—according to their statements—four ranks deep ; and on the hill, a few yards above, lay in ominous silence their death-dealing artillery. It was while we were moving steadily forward that, with one startling crash, with one simultaneous sheet of fire and flame, they hurled on our advancing lines the whole terrible force of their infantry and artillery. The powder from their musketry burned in our very faces, and the breath of their artillery was hot upon our cheeks. The ‘ leaden rain and iron hail’ in an instant forced back the advancing lines upon those who were close to them in the rear; and before the men could be rallied to renew the charge, the lines had been hurled back by the irresistible fire of the enemy to the cover of the ravine or gully which they had just passed. The enemy swept the ground with his guns, kill¬ ing and wounding many—our men in the meantime keeping up a spirited fire upon the unseen foe.” MARCHING THROUGH TENNESSEE. GENERAL grant directing the disposition of troops. CHAPTER XVIII. WAR IN THE WEST. CONSCRIPTION ACT PASSED BY CONFEDERATE CONGRESS - GENERAL BRAGGS S OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY AND EAST TENNESSEE—BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE— GRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF THE CONFEDERATE CHARGE-BATTLE OF IUKA—BATTLE OF STONE RIVER, OR MUR¬ FREESBORO’-ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN GRANT AND ROSECRANS— BATTLE OF CORINTH-CONFEDERATE RETREAT-HEAVY LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES. The Confederate Congress in 1862 passed a sweeping conscrip¬ tion act, forcing into the ranks every man of military age. Even boys of sixteen were taken out of school and sent to camps of instruction. This largely increased their forces in the field, and at the West especially they exhibited a corresponding activity. General Beauregard, whose health had failed, was succeeded by Gen. Braxton Bragg, a man of more energy than ability, who, with forty thousand men, marched northward into eastern Ken¬ tucky, defeating a National force near Richmond, and another at Munfordville. He then assumed that Kentucky was a State of the Confederacy, appointed a provisional governor, forced Ken- CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 201 tuckians into his army, and robbed the farmers not only of their stock and provisions, but of their wagons for carrying away the plunder, paying them in worthless Confederate money. He carried with him twenty thousand muskets, expecting to find that number of Kentuckians who would enroll themselves in his command; but he confessed afterward that he did not even secure enough recruits to take up the arms that fell from the hands of his dead and wounded. With the supplies collected by his army of “ liberators,” as he called them, in a wagon- train said to have been forty miles long, he was moving slowly back into Tennessee, when General Buell, with about fifty-eight thousand men (one-third of them new recruits), marched in pursuit. Bragg turned and gave battle at Perryville (October 8), and the fight lasted nearly all day. At some points it was desperate, with hand-to-hand fighting, and troops charging upon batteries where the gunners stood to their pieces and blew them from the very muzzles. The National left, composed entirely of raw troops, was crushed by a heavy onset; but the next portion of the line, commanded by Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, not only held its ground and repelled the assault, but followed up the retiring enemy with a counter attack. Gooding’s brigade (National) lost five hundred and forty-nine men out of fourteen hundred and twenty-three, and its commander became a prisoner. When night fell, the Confederates had been repelled at all points, and a portion of them had been driven through Perryville, losing many wagons and prisoners. Buell prepared to attack at day¬ light, but found that Bragg had moved off in the night with his whole army, continuing his retreat to East Tennessee, leaving a thousand of his wounded on the ground. He also abandoned twelve hundred of his men in hospital at Harrodsburg, with large quantities of his plunder, some of which he burned, and made all haste to get away. Buell reported his loss in the battle as forty-three hundred and forty-eight, which included Gens. James S. Jackson and William R. Terrill killed. Bragg’s loss was probably larger, though he gave considerably smaller figures. The battle of Perryville is more noteworthy for its fierce fighting and numerous instances of determined gallantry than for any importance in its bearing on the campaign. It was especially notable for the work of the artillery, and the struggles to capture or preserve the various batteries. One National battery of eight guns was commanded by Capt. Charles C. Parsons, and the Confederates making a fierce charge upon it captured seven of the pieces, but not without the most des¬ perate hand-to-hand fighting, in the course of which Parsons at one time was lying on his back under the guns and firing his revolver at the assailants. Sixteen years afterward this man, who in the meantime had become a clergyman, sacrificed his life in attending to the victims of yellow fever on the Mississippi. When Sheridan was heavily pressed by the enemy and his right was in special danger, the brigade of Colonel Carlin was sent to his relief. Carlin’s men, reaching the brow of a hill, dis¬ covered the advancing enemy, and immediately charged at the double quick with such impetuosity that they not only drove back the Confederates, but passed entirely through their lines where they were in momentary danger of being captured en masse. But, during the confusion which they caused, they skilfully fell back, carrying with them a heavily loaded ammuni¬ tion train which they had captured with its guard. Pinney’s Fifth Wisconsin battery was worked to its utmost capacity for three hours without supports, and withstood several charges, piling its front with the bodies of the slc.in. In the Third Ohio Regiment six color sergeants were shot in succession, but the flag was never allowed to touch the earth. That regiment lost two hundred out of five hundred men. A correspondent of the Cin¬ cinnati Gazette , who was on the field, thus relates one of the many interesting incidents of the battle: “The Tenth Ohio were lying upon their faces to the left of the Third, near the summit of the same hill, and upon the other side of a lane. The retreat of the Third Ohio and Fifteenth Kentucky had left the right wing of the Tenth uncovered, and a whole brigade of the enemy, forming in mass, advanced toward them over ground of such a nature that if the Tenth did not receive warning from some source the rebel column would be upon them, and annihilate them before they could rise from their faces and change front. Colonel Lytle was expecting the enemy to appear in his front, over the crest of the hill, and had intended to have the gallant Tenth charge them with the bayonet. And they still lay upon their faces while the enemy was advancing upon their flank, stealthily as a cat steals upon her prey. Nearer and nearer they come. Great heavens! Will no one tell the Tenth of their fearful peril? Where is the eagle eye which ought to overlook the field and send swift-footed couriers to save this illustrious band from destruction? Alas, there is none! The heroes of Carnifex are doomed. The ma^s of Confederates, which a rising ground just to the right of the tent has hitherto concealed from view, rush upon the hapless regiment, and from the distance of a hun¬ dred yards pour into it an annihilating fire even while the men are still upon their faces. Overwhelmed and confounded, they leap to their feet and vainly endeavor to change front to meet the enemy. It is impossible to do it beneath that withering, murderous fire; and for the first time in its history the Tenth Regiment turns its back upon the enemy. They will not run ; they only walk away, and they are mowed down by scores as they go. The noble, gifted, generous Lytle was pierced with bullets and fell where the storm was fiercest. One of his ser¬ geants lifted him in his arms, and was endeavoring to carry him from the field. ‘You may do some good yet,’ said the hero ; ‘ I can do no more; let me die here.’ He was left there, and fell into the hands of the enemy.” On hearing of this disaster to the Tenth Ohio Regiment, which formed the right of Lytle’s Seventeenth Brigade, General Rous¬ seau immediately rode to the scene of it. He says in his report: “Whilst near the Fifteenth Kentucky, I saw a heavy force of the enemy advancing upon our right, the same that had turned Lytle’s right flank. It was moving steadily up in full view of where General Gilbert’s army corps had been during the day, the left flank of which was not more than four hundred yards from it. On approaching, the Fifteenth Kentucky, though broken and shattered, rose to its feet and cheered, and as one man moved to the top of the hill where it could see the enemy, and I ordered it to lie down. I then rode up to Loomis’s battery, and directed him to open upon the enemy. He replied he was ordered by General McCook to reserve what ammunition he had for close work. Pointing to the enemy advancing, I said it was close enough, and would be closer in a moment. He at once opened fire with alacrity, and made fearful havoc upon the ranks of the enemy. It was admirably done, but the enemy moved straight ahead. His ranks were raked by the battery, and terribly thinned by the musketry of the Seventeenth Brigade; but he scarcely faltered, and finally, hearing that reinforcements were approaching, the brigade was ordered to retire and give place to them, which it did in good order. The reinforcements BATTLE OF STONE RIVER—THE DECISIVE CHARGE OF THE FEDERAL TROQPS ACROSS THE RIVER. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 203 MAJOR-GENERAL PHILIP H. SHERIDAN. west. There are two roads running south from Iuka, about two miles apart, and Grant intended that Rosecrans should approach by both of these roads, so as to cut off the enemy’s retreat. But Rosecrans marched only by the westernmost road, leaving the eastern, known as the Fulton road, open. Hamilton’s division was in advance, and at four o’clock in the afternoon, at a point two miles from Iuka, the head of his column, ascending a long hill, found the enemy deployed across the road and in the woods a few hundred yards beyond its crest. Hamilton had thrown out a heavy skirmish line, which for four or five miles had kept up a running fight with sharp-shooters. The enemy, in force, occupied a strong line along a deep ravine, from which they moved forward to attack as soon as Hamilton’s men appeared on the crest. Hamilton himself, being close to the skirmish line, saw the situation with its dangers and its advantages, and made haste to prepare for what was coming. He deployed his infantry along the crest, got a battery into position under heavy fire where it could command the road in front, placed every regiment personally, and gave each regimental commander orders to hold his ground at all hazards. As the remainder of his forces came up, he placed them so as to extend his flanks and prevent them from being turned. But while he was doing this, the enemy was advancing and the battle was becoming very serious. The enemy came on in heavy masses against his centre, charging steadily up to his guns, which fired canister into them at short range, until nearly every man and horse in the battery was disabled, and it was captured. Brig.-Gen. Jere¬ miah C. Sullivan then gathered a portion of the right wing, which had been thrown into some disorder, and retook the battery, driving the Confederates back to their line; but rally¬ ing in turn they captured it a second time, and a second time it was recaptured. General Stanley’s division was now brought up to the assistance of Hamilton’s, and the Confederates were driven back once more. They then made an attempt by march- were from Mitchell’s divi¬ sion, as I understood, and were Pea Ridge men. I wish I knew who com¬ manded the brigade, that I might do him justice; I can only say that the brigade moved directly into the fight, like true soldiers, and opened a terrific fire and drove back the enemy. After repuls¬ ing the enemy, they re¬ tired a few hundred yards into a piece of woods to encamp in, and during the night the enemy advanced his pickets in the woods on our left front and captured a good many of our men who went there believing we still held the woods.” General Hal leek, at Washington, now planned for Buell’s army a cam¬ paign in East Tennessee ; but as that was more than two hundred miles away, and the communications were not provided for, Buell declined to execute it. For this reason, and also on the ground that if he had moved more rapidly and struck more vigorously he might have destroyed Bragg’s army, he was removed from command, and Gen. William S. Rosecrans succeeded him. In September, when Bragg had first moved northward, a Confederate army of about forty thousand men, under Generals Price and Van Dorn, had crossed from Arkansas into Missis¬ sippi with the purpose of capturing Grant’s position at Corinth, and thus breaking 'the National line of defence and cooperat- ing with Bragg. Price seized Iuka, southeast of Cor¬ inth, and Grant sent out against him a force under Rose¬ crans, consisting of about nine thousand men, which included the divisions of Gens. David S. Stan¬ ley and Charles S. Hamilton, and the cavalry under Col. John K. Mizner. It was Grant’s inten¬ tion that while this force moved toward Iuka from the south, Gen. E. O. C. Orel’s command, consisting of eight thousand men, should move upon it from the COLONEL WILLIAM P. CARLIN. (Afterward Brevet Major-General.) 204 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. ing through a ravine to fall upon the National left in heavy force; but their movement was discovered, and the Tenth Iowa Regiment, together with part of a battery, met them with such a reception that they quickly withdrew. The front on which the troops could be deployed was not long enough to permit more than three thousand men of the Nationals to be in action at once ; but along this line the fighting was kept up until dark, when the enemy retired, and in the morning, when Rosecrans prepared to attack him, it was found that he was gone. The losses in the National army in this battle were 141 killed, 613 wounded, and 36 missing. On the Confederate side, where not many more men could be engaged at once than on the National, the losses were reported as 85 killed, 410 wounded, and 40 miss¬ ing, the killed including Brig.-Gen. Henry Little. But these figures are probably altogether too small. General Hamilton reported that 263 Confederates were buried on the field. General Rosecrans, in a congratulatory order to his troops a few days later, said : “ You may well be proud of the battle of Iuka. On the 18th you concentrated at Jacinto ; on the 19th you marched twenty miles, driving in the rebel outposts for the last eight; reached the front of Price’s army, advantage ously posted in unknown woods, and opened the action by four P.M. On a narrow front, in¬ tersected by ravines and covered by dense under¬ growths, with a single battery, Hamilton’s di¬ vision went into action against the combined rebel hosts. On that unequal ground, which permitted the enemy to outnumber them three to one, they fought a glorious battle, mowing down the rebel hordes, until, night closing in, they rested on their arms on the battleground, from which the enemy retired during the night, leaving us masters of the field. The general commanding bears cheerful testimony to the fiery alacrity with which the troops of Stanley’s division moved up, cheering, to support the third division, and took their places to give them an opportunity to replenish their ammunition ; and to the mag¬ nificent fighting of the Eleventh Missouri under the gallant Mower. To all the regiments who participated in the fight, he presents congratulations on their bravery and good conduct. He deems it an especial duty to signalize the Forty-eighth Indiana, which, posted on the left, held its ground until the brave Eddy fell, and a whole brigade of Texans came in through a ravine on the little band, and even then only yielded a hundred yards until relieved. The Sixteenth Iowa, amid the roar of battle, the rush of wounded artillery horses, the charge of the rebel brigade, and a storm of grape, canister, and musketry, stood like a rock, holding the centre; while the glorious Fifth Iowa, under the brave and distinguished Matthias, sustained by Boomer with part of his noble little Twenty-sixth Missouri, bore the thrice defeated charges and cross-fires of the MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM S. ROSECRANS. rebel left and centre with a valor and determination seldom equalled, never excelled, by the most veteran soldiery. . . . The unexpected accident which alone prevented us from cutting off the retreat and capturing Price and his army only shows how much success depends on Him in whose hands are the accidents as well as the laws of life.” As the conduct of this battle began a series of causes that resulted in an unfortunate estrangement between Grant and Rosecrans, the bitterness of which was exhibited by the latter in his place in Congress even when Grant was in his dying days, it is interesting to note what Grant says of it. In his official report, written the day after the battle, he said : “ I cannot speak too highly of the energy and skill displayed by General Rose¬ crans in the attack, and of the endurance of the troops under him.” In his “ Memoirs ” he wrote : “ General Rosecrans had previously had his head¬ quarters at Iuka. While there he had a most ex¬ cellent map prepared, showing all the roads and streams in the sur¬ rounding country. He was also personally fa¬ miliar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to him in my plans for the approach. . . . Ord was on the north¬ west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that direc¬ tion it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have carried Price's army to the rear of the National forces and isolated it from all support. It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iuka until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable. On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by rail to Burnsville, and there left the cars and moved to perform his part of the programme. He was to get as near the enemy as possible during the day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next morning. Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two roads, and the attack was to be from all three quarters simultaneously. ... I remained at Burnsville with a detachment of nine hundred men from Ord’s command and communicated with my two wings by courier. Ord met the advance of the enemy soon after leaving Burnsville. Quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer killed. He maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight the next morning. I was very much disappointed at receiving a despatch from Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty miles from Iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of his column was not yet up as far as Jacinto. He said, however, that he would still be at Iuka by two o'clock the next day. I did not believe this possible, because of the distance and condition of the roads. I immedi¬ ately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans’s despatch and ordered him to MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN PEGRAM, C. S. A. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD 205 be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound of guns to the south or southeast. During the 19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound, either toward the point where Ord was or to Burnsville where I remained. [This appears to be the “ unexpected accident ” to which General Rosecrans refers in his congratulatory order.] A couple of hours before dark, on the 19th, Rosecrans arrived with the head of his column at Barnets. He here turned north without sending any troops to the Fulton road. While still moving in column up the Jacinto road, he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main road. In this short engagement his loss was consider¬ able for the number engaged, and one battery was The wind was still blowin hard, and in the wrong direction to trans¬ mit sound toward either Ord or me. Neither he nor I nor any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battlefield. After the engagement Rosecrans sent me a de spatch announcing the 1 suit. The courier bearing the message was compelled to move west nearly to Jacinto be¬ fore he found a road leading to Burnsville. This made it a late the enemy had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road during the night. I rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans’s command, and went on with him a few miles in person. He followed only a few miles after I left him, and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka, but I had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I MAJOR-GENERAL LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU. hour of the night before I learned of the battle that had taken place during the after¬ noon. I at once notified Ord of the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. The next morning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with but little resistance. Ord also went in according to orders, without hear¬ ing a gun from the south of the town, but supposing the troops coming from the southwest must be up before that time. Rose¬ crans, however, had put no troops upon the Fulton road, and found no fault at the time.” General Grant says that the plan of the battle, which included the occupation of the Fulton road, was suggested by Rosecrans himself. A Confederate soldier, who participated in the engagement, gave a graphic account of it in a let¬ ter, a few extracts from which are interesting and suggestive. “ I wrote you a short communication from Iuka, announcing its peaceable capture on the 4th, by the army under General Price. I believe I was a little congratulatory in my remarks, and spread out on the rich fruits of the bloodless capture. Indeed, it was a sight to gladden the heart of a poor soldier whose only diet for some time had been unsalted beef and white leather hoe-cake—the stacks of cheese, crackers, preserves, mackerel, coffee, and other good things that line the shelves of the sutlers’ shops, and fill the commissary stores of the Yankee army. But, alas ! The good 206 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . things which should have been distributed to the brave men who won them were held in reserve for what purpose I know not, unless to sweeten the teeth of those higher in authority (whilst the men were fed on husks), and I suppose were devoured by the flames on the day of our retreat. We held peaceable pos¬ session of Iuka one day, and on the next day were alarmed by the booming of cannon, and called out to spend the evening in battle array in the woods. How on earth, with the woods full of our cavalry, they could have approached so near our lines, is a mystery! They had planted a battery sufficiently near to shell General Price’s headquarters, and were cracking away at the Third Brigade in line of battle under General Herbert when our brigade (the Fourth) came up at a double quick and formed on their left. And then for two hours and fifteen min¬ utes was kept up the most terrific fire of musketry that ever dinned my ears. There was one continuous roar of small arms, while grape and canister howled in fearful concert above our heads and through our ranks. General Little, our division commander, whose bravery and kindness had endeared him to the men under his command, was shot through the head early in the action, and fell from his horse dead. He was sitting by General Price and conversing with him at the time. The Third Brigade was in the hottest of the fire. They charged and took the battery, which was doing so much damage, after a desperate struggle, piling the ground with dead. The Third Louisiana Regiment, of this brigade, entered the fight with two hundred and thirty-eight men, and lost one hundred and eight in killed and wounded. The Third Texas fared about as badly. The troops against which we were contending were Western men, the battery manned by Iowa troops, who fought bravely and well. I know this, that the events of that evening have considerably increased my appetite for peace, and if the Yankees will not shoot at us any more I shall be perfectly satis¬ fied to let them alone. All night could be heard the groans of the wounded and dying of both armies, forming a sequel of hor¬ ror and agony to the deadly struggle over which night had kindly thrown its mantle. Saddest of all, our dead were left unburied, and many of the wounded on the battlefield to be taken in charge by the enemy. . . . During the entire retreat we lost but four or five wagons, which broke down on the road and were left. Acts of vandalism disgraceful to the army were, however, per¬ petrated along the road, which made me blush to own such men as my countrymen. Cornfields were laid waste, potato-patches robbed, barn-yards and smoke-houses despoiled, hogs killed, and all kinds of outrages perpetrated in broad daylight and in full view of officers. I doubted, on the march up and on the retreat, whether I was in an army of brave men fighting for their coun¬ try, or merely following a band of armed marauders who are as terrible to their friends as foes. The settlements through which we passed were made to pay heavy tribute to the rapacity of our soldiers. This plunder, too, was without excuse, for rations were regularly issued every night.” Early in October the combined forces of Price and Van Dorn attempted the capture of Corinth, which had been abandoned by Beauregard in May, and from that time had been held by Grant’s forces. Grant was now in Jackson, Tenn., where he had been ordered to make his headquarters, and Rosecrans was in immediate command at Corinth with about twenty thousand men. The place was especially tempting to the Confederates because of the enormous amount of supplies in store there, and also for other reasons, which are well stated in Van Dorn’s report made after the battle: “Surveying the whole field of operations before me, the conclusion forced itself irresistibly upon my mind, that the taking of Corinth was a condition precedent to the accomplishment of anything of importance in West Tennessee. To take Memphis would be to destroy an immense amount of property without any adequate military advantage, even admitting that it could be held without heavy guns against the enemy’s gun and mortar boats. The line of fortifications around Bolivar is intersected by the Hatchie River, rendering it impossible to take the place by quick assault. It was clear to my mind that if a successful attack could be made upon Corinth from the west and north¬ west, the forces there driven back on the Tennessee and cut off, Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall, and then, upon the arrival of the exchanged prisoners of war (about nine thousand), West Tennessee would soon be in our possession, and communication with General Bragg effected through middle Tennessee. I determined to attempt Corinth. I had a reason¬ able hope of success. Field returns at Ripley showed my strength to be about twenty-two thousand men. Rosecrans at Corinth had about fifteen thousand, with about eight thou¬ sand additional men at outposts from twelve to fifteen miles distant. I might surprise him and carry the place before these troops could be brought in. It was necessary that this blow should be sudden and decisive. The troops were in fine spirits, and the whole Army of West Tennessee seemed eager to emu¬ late the armies of the Potomac and Kentucky. No army ever marched to battle with prouder steps, more hopeful counte¬ nances, or with more courage, than marched the Army of West Tennessee out of Ripley on the morning of September 29th, on its way to Corinth.” Rosecrans had several days’ notice of the attack, and had placed the main body of the troops in an inner line of intrench- ments nearer the town than the old Confederate fortifications. Skirmishing began on the 3d of October, when the Confederates approached from the north and west. The skirmishers were soon driven in, and the advance troops, under McArthur and Oliver, made a more determined resistance than Rosecrans had intended ; his idea in thrusting them forward being that they should merely develop the enemy’s purpose, find out what point he intended to attack, and then fall back on the main body. In the afternoon this advanced detachment had been pushed back to the main line, and there the fighting became very obstinate and bloody. General Hamilton’s division was on the right, Davies’s next, Stanley’s in reserve, and McKean on the left. The force of the first heavy blow fell upon McKean and Davies. As the Confederates overlapped Davies a little on his right, General Rosecrans ordered Hamilton to move up his left and connect with Davies, then to swing his right around the enemy’s left and get in his rear. Hamilton asked for more definite in¬ structions than he had received verbally from the staff officer, and Rosecrans sent him a written order, which he received at five o’clock. Hamilton says : “ A simple order to attack the enemy in flank could have reached me by courier from General Rosecrans any time after two P. M. in fifteen minutes. I con¬ strued it [the written order] as an order for attack, and at once proceeded to carry it out.” A somewhat similar misunderstand¬ ing arose between General Hamilton and his brigade com¬ manders, in consequence of which Buford’s brigade went astray and a precious hour was lost. During that time the battle was apparently going in favor of the Confederates, although they were purchasing their advantages at heavy cost. Each com. mander believed that if he could have had an hour more of sua* CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 207 light the victory would have been his that day. In the evening Rosecrans assembled his division commanders and made his dispositions for a renewal of the battle on the morrow. At half-past four o’clock in the morning the Confederates opened the fight with their artillery, to which that of Rosecrans promptly replied, and extended their infantry lines farther to the north of the town. Here, on their extreme left, they formed behind a low hill, and then suddenly advanced in line of battle only three hundred yards distant from the National intrench- ments. They were soon subjected to a cross-fire from the bat¬ teries, their line was broken, and only fragments of it reached the edge of the town, from which they were soon driven away by the reserves. Rosecrans then sent forward one of Hamilton’s brigades to attack the broken enemy, which prevented them from re-forming and drove them into the woods. At the most ad¬ vanced point of the National line, which was a small work called Battery Robinett, the heaviest fight¬ ing of the day took place. Here for more than two hours the roar of ar¬ tillery and small arms was in¬ cessant and the smoke was in thick clouds. Through this heavy smoke the Confeder¬ ates made three determined charges upon Battery Robin¬ ett, and the troops on either side of it, all of which were re¬ pelled. The heavy assaulting columns were raked through and through by the shot, but they persistently closed up and moved forward until, in one instance, a colonel carrying the colors actu¬ ally planted them on the edge of the ditch, and then was im¬ mediately shot. After this the Confederates gave up the fight and slowly withdrew. At sunset General McPherson arrived from Jackson with reinforcements for the Nationals, and Gen¬ eral Idurlbut was on the way with more. General Rosecrans says : “ Our pursuit of the enemy was immediate and vigorous, but the darkness of the night and the roughness of the country, covered with woods and thickets, made movement impracticable by night, and slow and difficult by day. General McPherson s brigade of fresh troops with a battery was ordered to start at daylight and follow the enemy over the Chewalla road, and Stan¬ ley’s and Davies’s divisions to support him. McArthur, with all of McKean’s division except Crocker’s brigade, and with a good battery and a battalion of cavalry, took the route south of the railroad toward Pocahontas; McKean followed on this route with the rest of his division and Ingersoll’s cavalry; Hamilton followed McKean with his entire force.” But General Grant says in his “ Memoirs ” : “ General Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. He did not do so, and I repeated the order after the battle. In the first order he was notified that the force of four thousand men which was going to his assist¬ ance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued. General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th, and, being senior, took command of his troops. This force encountered the head of Van Dorn’s retreating column just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten miles out from Corinth. The bottom land here was swampy and bad for the oper¬ ations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. Ord attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a panic. Many were killed, and others were drowned by be¬ ing pushed off the bridge in their hurried re¬ treat. Ord fol¬ lowed, and met the main force. He was too weak in num¬ bers to assault, but he held the bridge and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher up the stream. Ord was wounded in this engage¬ ment, and the command devolved on Hurlbut. Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th, and then took the wrong road. Moving in the enemy’s country, he travelled with a wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. His march was therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving toward his supplies. Two or three hours’ pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been. Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp, with a stream in front and Ord holding the only bridge ; but he took the road leading north and toward Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved to MAJOR-GENERAL EDWARD O. C. ORD AND STAFF. (FROM A PAINTING BY WILLIAM T. TREGO.! CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 2og get to the Hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he started. Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as Van Dorn’s if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he might have been in great peril. I now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past, and after Rosecrans reached Jones¬ boro’ I ordered him to return.” General Grant considered that General Rosecrans had made the same serious mistake twice, at Iuka and at Corinth ; and for this reason Rosecrans was soon relieved from further service in that department. The Confederate authorities also were dis¬ satisfied with their general, for they accounted the defeat at Corinth a heavy disaster, and Van Dorn was soon superseded by Gen. John C. Pemberton. Rosecrans superseded Buell October 24th, when his army— thenceforth called the Army of the Cumberland—was at Bowling Green, slowly pursuing Bragg. Rosecrans sent a portion of it to the relief of Nashville, which was besieged by a Confederate force, and employed the remainder in repairing the railroad from Louis¬ ville, over which his supplies must come. This done, about the end of November he united his forces at Nashville. At the same time Bragg was ordered to move forward again, and went as far as Murfreesboro’, forty miles from Nashville, where he fortified a strong position on Stone River, a shallow stream fordable at nearly all points. There was high festivity among the secessionists in Murfreesboro’ that winter, for Bragg had brought much plunder from Kentucky. No one dreamed that Rosecrans would attack the place before spring, and several roving bands of guerilla cavalry were very active, and performed some exciting if not important exploits. The leader of one of these, John H. Morgan, was married in Murfreesboro’, the cere¬ mony being performed by Bishop and Gen. Leonidas Polk, and Jefferson Davis being present. It is said that the floor was car¬ peted with a United States flag, on which the company danced, to signify that they had put its authority under their feet. The revelry was rudely interrupted when Rosecrans, leaving Nashville with forty-three thousand men, in a rain-storm, the day after Christmas, encamped on the 30th within sight of Bragg’s intrenchments. A correspondent of the Louisville Journal, who went over the ground at the time and witnessed the battle, gave a careful description of its peculiarities, which is necessary to a complete understanding of the action: “As the road from Nashville to Murfreesboro’ approaches the latter place, it suddenly finds itself parallel to Stone River. The stream flowing east crosses the road a mile this [west] side of Murfreesboro’. Abruptly chang¬ ing its course, it flows north along the road, and not more than four hundred yards distant, for more than two miles. It is a considerable stream, but fordable in many places at low water. The narrow tongue of land between the turnpike road and the river is divided by the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, which, running down the centre of the wedge-like tract, bisects the turnpike half a mile this side of where the latter crosses the river. CHARGE OF THE FEDERALS AT CORINTH. 14 210 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. Just in rear of the spot where the third milestone from Mur¬ freesboro’ stands, the turnpike and railroad—at that point about sixty yards apart—run through a slight cut, and this a few rods farther on is succeeded by a slight fill. The result is to convert both railroad and turnpike for a distance of two or three hundred yards into a natural rifle-pit. On each side of the road at this point there are open fields. That on the left extends to a cur¬ tain of timber which fringes the river, and also half a mile to the front along the road, where it gives place to an oak wood of no great density or extent. To the left and front, however, it opens out into a large open plain, which flanks the wood just mentioned, and extends up the river in the direction of Mur¬ freesboro’ for a mile. In the field on the left of the railroad there is a hill of no great height sloping down to the railroad and commanding all the ground to the front and right. It was here that Guenther’s and Loomis’s batteries were posted in the terrible conflict of Wednesday. The open field on the right of the turnpike road, three hundred yards wide, is bounded on the west by an almost impenetrable cedar forest. Just in rear of the forest, and marking its extreme northern limit, is a long, narrow opening, containing about ten acres. There is a swell in the field on the right of the road, corresponding with the one on the left. The crest of this hill is curiously concave. From its beginning point at the corner of the cedars, the northern end of the crest curves back upon itself, so that after fortifying the front of the position it renders the right flank well-nigh impreg¬ nable.” Rosecrans intended to attack the next day; but Bragg antici¬ pated him, crossed the river before sunrise, concealed by a thick fog, reached the woods on the right of the National line, and burst out upon the bank in overwhelming force. McCook’s command, on the extreme right, was crumbled and thrown back, losing several guns and many prisoners. Sheridan’s command, MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. McPHERSON. next in line, made a stubborn fight till its ammuni¬ tion was nearly exhausted, and then slowly re¬ tired. General Thomas’s com¬ mand, w h i c h formed the cen¬ tre, now held the enemy back till Rosecrans estab¬ lished a new line, nearly at right angles to the first, with artillery ad- van tageou sly posted, when Thomas fell back to this and main¬ tained his ground. Through the fore¬ noon the Confed¬ erates had seemed to have everything their own way, and they had inflicted grievous loss upon Rosecrans, besides sending their restless cavalry to annoy his army in the rear. But here, as usual, the tide was turned. The first impetuous rush of the Southern soldier had spent itself, and the superior staying quali¬ ties of his Northern opponent began to tell. Bragg hurled his men again and again upon the new line ; but as they left the cedar thickets and charged across the open field they were mercilessly swept down by artillery and musketry fire, and every effort was fruitless. Even when seven thousand fresh men were drawn over from Bragg’s right and thrown against the National centre, the result was still the same. The day ended with Rosecrans immovable in his position ; but he had been driven from half of the ground that he held in the morning, and had lost twenty-eight guns and many men, while the enemy’s cavalry was upon his communications. Finding that he had ammunition enough for another battle, he determined to remain where he was and sustain another assault. His men slept on their arms that night, and the next day there was no evidence of any dis¬ position on either side to attack. Both sides were correcting their lines, constructing rifle-pits, caring for their wounded, and preparing for a renewal of the fight. This came on the second day of the new year, when there was some desultory fighting, and Rosecrans advanced a division across the stream to strike at Bragg’s communications. Breck- enridge’s command was sent to attack this division, and drove it back to the river, when Breckenridge suddenly found himself subjected to a terrible artillery fire, and lost two thousand men in twenty minutes. Following this, a charge by National infantry drove him back with a loss of four guns and many prisoners, and this ended the great battle of Stone River, or Murfreesboro’. After the repulse of Breckenridge, Rosecrans advanced his left again, and that night occupied with some of his batteries high ground, from which Murfreesboro’ could be shelled. The next day there was a heavy rain-storm, and in the ensuing night the Confederate army quietly retreated, leaving Murfreesboro' to its fate. Rosecrans reported his loss in killed and wounded as eight thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight, BRIGADIER-GENERAL FRANK C. ARMSTRONG, C. S. A. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 211 and in prisoners as somewhat fewer than twenty-eight hundred. Bragg acknowledged a loss of over ten thousand, and claimed that he had taken over six thousand prisoners. The number of men engaged on the National side was about forty-three thousand, and on the Confederate about thirty-eight thousand, according to the reports, which are not always reliable. The losses on the National side included Brig.-Gens. Joshua W. Sill and Edward N. Kirk among the killed, while on the Confederate side Brig.-Gens. James E. Rains and Roger W. Hanson were killed. The incidents of this great and complicated battle were very numerous, and have been related at great length by different correspondents and participants. The cavalry fighting that pre¬ ceded the infantry engagement was severe, and in some respects brilliant. This arm of the service was commanded on the National side by Gen. David S. Stanley, and on the Confederate by Gen. Joseph Wheeler. Col. R. H. G. Minty, commanding the First Bri¬ gade of the National cavalry, says in his account of the first day’s battle : “Crossing Overall’s Creek, I took up position parallel to and about three-quarters of a mile from 1 Murfreesboro’ and Nashvil pike ; the Fourth Michigan fori: inc a line of dismounted ski 1 mishers close to the edge o the woods. My entire force at this time numbered nine hun¬ dred and fifty m e n . The enemy advanced rapidly with twenty-five hundred cavalry, mounted and dismounted, and three pieces of artillery. They drove back the Fourth Michigan, and then attacked the Seventh Pennsylvania with great j OH fury, but met with a de¬ termined resistance. I went for¬ ward to the line of dismounted skirmishers, and endeavored to move them to the right to strengthen the Seventh Pennsylvania; but the moment the right of the line showed itself from behind the fence where they were posted, the whole of the enemy’s fire was directed on it, turning it completely round. At this moment the Fifteenth Pennsylvania gave way and retreated rapidly, leaving the battalion of the Seventh Pennsylvania no alternative but to retreat. I fell back a couple of fields and re-formed in the rear of a rising ground, d he rebel cavalry followed us up promptly into the open ground, and now menaced us with three strong lines. General Stanley ordeied a chaige, and he himself led two companies of the Fourth Michigan, with about fifty men of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, against the line in front of our left. He routed the enemy, and cap¬ tured one stand of colors. At the same time I charged the A correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial , in an account of the battle written on the field, says: “Colonel Innes with the Ninth Michigan engineers, posted at Fa Vergne to protect the road, had just been reinforced by several companies of the Tenth Ohio, when Wheeler’s cavalry brigade made a strong dash at that position. Colonel Innes had protected himself by a stockade of brush, and fought securely. The enemy charged several times with great fury, but were murderously repulsed. About fifty rebels were dismounted, and nearly a hundred of the horses were killed. Wheeler finally withdrew, and sent in a flag of truce demanding surrender. Colonel Innes replied, ‘ We don’t surrender much.’ Wheeler then asked permission to bury his dead, which was granted. . . . General Rose- crans, as usual, was in the midst of the fray, directing the movement of troops and the range of batteries.” Some of the things that soldiers have to endure, which are not often mentioned among the stirring events of the field, are indicated in the report of Col. Jason Marsh of the Seventy- fourth Illinois Regiment. He says: “My com¬ mand was formed in line of battle close behind a narrow strip of cedar thicket, nearly covering our front, and skirting a strip of open level ground about twenty rods wide to the cornfield occupied by the enemy’s pickets. Being thus satisfied of the close proximity of the enemy in strong force, and appre- an attack at any moment, I deemed it first line in our front with the Fourth Michigan Tennessee, and drove them from the field. The second line was formed on the far side of a lane with a partially de¬ stroyed fence on each side, and still stood their ground. I re¬ formed my men and again charged. The enemy again broke and were driven from the field in the wildest confusion.” MAP OF THE BATTLEFIELDS OF STONE RIVER, OR MURFREESBORO'. 212 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. necessary to use the utmost precaution against surprise, and, in addition to general instructions to biv¬ ouac without fires, and to maintain a cautious, quiet vigi¬ lance, I ordered my command to stack arms, and each man to rest at the butt of his musket without using his shelter tent. Although the night was dark, chilly, and somewhat rainy, and the men cold, wet, weary, and hungry, I deemed it objection¬ able to use their shel¬ ter tents, not only because of the hin¬ drance in case of a sudden attack, but even in a dark night they would be some guide to the enemy to trace our line. At a little before four o’clock A. M., our men were quietly waked up, formed into line, and remained standing at their arms until moved by subsequent orders. As soon as it became sufficiently light to observe ob¬ jects at a distance, I could plainly discern the enemy moving in three heavy columns across my front, one column striking out of the cornfield and moving defiantly along the edge of the open ground not more than eighty rods from my line. It was plainly to be seen that the fire of my skirmishers took effect in their ranks, and in emptying their saddles; to which, however, the enemy seemed to pay no attention.” Some of the most stubborn fighting of the day was done by Palmer’s division, and especially by Hazen’s brigade of that division, on the National left, in the angle between the rail¬ road and the turnpike. When the right of Rosecrans’s army had been driven back, heavy columnsvaf the Confederates were directed against the exposed flank of his left, which was also sub¬ jected to a fierce artillery fire. Palmer’s men formed along the railroad and in the woods to the right of the pike, with Cruft’s brigade nearest to the enemy, and several batteries were hastily brought up to check the advancing tide. The Confederates moved steadily onward, apparently sure of a victory, overpowered Cruft and drove him back, and were still advancing against Hazen, some of whose regiments had expended their ammuni¬ tion and were simply waiting with fixed bayonets, when Grose’s brigade came to the relief of Hazen, and all stood firm and met the enemy with a terrific and unceasing fire of musketry, to which Parsons’s remarkable battery added a rain of shells and canister. The ranks of the Confederates were thinned so rapidly that one regiment after another gave up and fell back, until a single regiment was left advancing and came within three hun¬ dred yards of the National line. At this point, when every one of its officers and half its men had been struck down, the re¬ mainder threw themselves flat upon the ground, and were unable either to go forward any farther or to retreat. In the afternoon the Confederates made two more similar attempts, but were met in the same way and achieved no success. Rousseau’s division, which had been held in reserve, was brought into action when the fight became critical, and per¬ formed some of the most gallant work of the day. A par¬ ticipant has given a vivid description of some of the scenes in Rousseau’s front: “ The broken and dispirited battalions of our right wing, retreating by the flank, were pouring out of the corn¬ fields and through the skirts of the woods, while from the far end of the field rose the indescribable crackle and slowly curling smoke of the enemy’s fire. The line of fire now grew rapidly nearer and nearer, seeming to close in slowly, but with fatal cer¬ tainty, around our front and flank; and presently the long gray lines of the enemy, three or four deep, could be seen through the cornstalks vomiting flame on the retreating host. The right of Rousseau’s division opened its lines and let our brave but unfortunate columns pass through. The gallant and invincible legion came through in this way with fearfully decimated ranks, drawing away by hand two pieces of our artillery. When all the horses belonging to the battery, and all the other guns, had been disabled, the brave boys refused to leave these two behind, and drew them two miles through fields and thickets to a place of safety. It was a most touching sight to see these brave men, in that perilous hour, flocking around Rousseau like children, with acclamations of delight, and every token of love, as soon as they recognized him, embracing his horse, his legs, his clothes. Fly¬ ing back to the open ground which was now to be the scene of so terrific a conflict, Rousseau galloped rapidly across it, and read with a single eagle glance all of its advantages. Guenther’s and Loomis’s batteries were ordered to take position on the hill on the left of the railroad, and Stokes’s Chicago battery, which had got with our division, was placed there also. History furnishes but few spectacles to be compared with that which now ensued. The rebels pressed up to the edge of the cedar forest and swarmed out into the open field. I saw the first few gray suits that dotted the dark green line of the cedars with their contrasted color thicken into a line of battle, and the bright glitter of their steel flashed like an end¬ less chain of lightning amid the thick and heavy green of the thicket. This I saw before our fire, open¬ ing on them around the whole extent of our line, engirdled them with a belt of flame and smoke. After that I saw them no more, nor will any human eye ever see them more. Guen¬ ther, Loomis, and Stokes, with peal after peal, too rapid to be counted, mowed them down with double- shotted canister; the left of our line of infantry poured a lieutenant-general Joseph wheeler, c. s. a. W rr ' i BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL D. S. STANLEY. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 213 continuous sheet of flame into' their front, while the right of our line, posted in its remarkable position by the genius of Rousseau, enveloped their left flank and swept their entire line with an enfilading fire. Thick smoke settled down upon the scene; the rim of the hill on which our batteries stood the secessionists at the failure of Lee’s invasion of Maryland and Bragg’s of Kentucky. Pollard, the Southern historian, wrote, “No subject was at once more dispiriting and perplexing to the South than the cautious and unmanly reception given to our armies both in Kentucky and Maryland.” They seemed unable ~-- z c BURYING A COMRADE. seemed to be surrounded by a wall of living fire ; the turnpike road and the crest of the hill on the right were wrapped in an unending blaze; flames seemed to leap out of the earth and dance through the air. No troops on earth could withstand such a fire as that. One regiment of rebels, the boldest of their line, advanced to within seventy-five yards of our line, but there it was blown out of exist¬ ence. It was utterly destroyed ; and the rest of the rebel line, broken and decimated, fled like sheep into the depths of the woods. The terrific firing ceased, the smoke quickly rolled away, and the sun shone out bright and clear on the scene that was lately so shrouded in smoke and mortal gloom. How still everything was! Every¬ body seemed to be holding his breath. As soon as the firing ceased, General Rousseau and his staff galloped forward to the ground the rebels had advanced over. Their dead lay there in frightful heaps, some with the life-blood not yet all flowed from their mortal wounds, some propped upon their elbows and gasp¬ ing their last. The flag of the Arkansas regiment lay there on the ground beside its dead bearer. Every depression in the field was full of wounded, who had crawled thither to screen themselves from the fire, and a large number of prisoners came out of a little copse in the middle of the field and surrendered themselves to General Rousseau in person. Among them was one captain. They were all that were left alive of the bold Arkansas regiment that had undertaken to charge our line.” There was great disappointment and dissatisfaction among BRIGADIER-GENERAL OBERT B. VANCE, C. S to comprehend how there could be such a thing as a major-general john c. Breckinridge, c. s. a. slave State that did not want to break up the Union. Pollard, in his account of the response of the people of Maryland to Lee’s proclamation, says, “ Instead of the twenty or thirty thousand recruits which he had believed he would obtain on the soil of Maryland, he found the people content to gaze with wonder on his ragged and poorly equipped army, but with little disposition to join his ranks.” DELAWARE INDIANS ACTING AS SCOUTS FOR THE FEDERAL ARMY IN THE WEST. A SUTLER'S CABIN. CHAPTER XIX. MINOR EVENTS OF THE SECOND YEAR. LARGE ARMIES IN THE FIELD BOMBARDMENT AND CAPTURE OF FORT PULASKI BATTLE OF BLUE’S GAP, VA.—MARCHING OVER THE SNOW -OPERATIONS IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY BATTLES OF WINCHESTER AND McDOWELL CAPTURE OF NORFOLK, VA., BY GEN. JOHN E. WOOL-WEST VIRGINIA CLEAR OF CONFEDERATES-FIGHTING WITH BUSHWHACKERS-OPERATIONS UNDER GENERAL BURNSIDE ON THE NORTH CAROLINA COAST-UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE CHARLESTON—ENGAGEMENTS IN EASTERN KENTUCKY-GUERILLA RAID UNDER THE COMMAND OF GEN. JOHN H. MORGAN—EAST TENNESSEEANS LOYAL TO THE UNION-OPERATIONS IN EAST TENNESSEE UNDER GENERAL NEGLEY AND COLONEL BUFORD—RAPID AND DARING RAIDS BY GENERAL FOREST-BATTLES AROUND NASHVILLE- FIGHTING GUERILLAS IN MISSOURI-FIGHTING IN NEW MEXICO—INDIAN OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHWEST. In the second year of the war, though the struggle did not then culminate, some of the largest armies were gathered and some of the greatest battles fought. At the East, McClellan made his Peninsula campaign with Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, and the Seven Days, and Pope his short and unfortunate campaign known as the Second Bull Run, followed by the moderate victory of Antietam and the horror of Fredericksburg. At the West, with smaller armies, the results were more brilliant and satisfactory. Grant had electrified the country when he captured Fort Donelson and received the first surrender of a Confederate army; and this was followed in April by the battle of Shiloh, which was a reverse on the first day and a vic¬ tory on the second, and still later by the capture of Corinth. Thomas had gained his first victory at Mill Springs, and Buell had fought the fierce battle of Perryville, where the genius of Sheridan first shone forth. Two great and novel naval engage¬ ments had taken place—the fight of the iron-clads in Hampton Roads, and Farragut’s passage of the forts and capture of New Orleans. Amid all this there were hundreds of minor engagements, subsidiary expeditions and skirmishes, all costing something in destruction of life and property. Some of them were properly a portion of the great campaigns ; others were separate actions, and still others were merely raids of Confederate guerillas, which had become very numerous, especially at the West. This chapter will be devoted to brief accounts of the more important and interesting of these, generally omitting those occurring 216 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. in the course and as a part of any great campaign. While they had little to do with the results of the struggle, some account of them is necessary to any adequate idea of the condition of the country and the sufferings of that generation of our people. On the 6th of January a force of about 2,500, principally Ohio and Indiana troops, was sent out by General Kelly, under com¬ mand of Colonel Dunning, to attack a Confederate force of about 1,800 men strongly posted at Blue’s Gap, near Romney, Va. They marched over the snow in a brilliant moonlight night, and as they neared the Gap fired upon a small detach¬ ment that was attempting to destroy the bridge over the stream that runs through it. The Gap is a natural opening between high hills with very precipitous sides, and was defended with two howitzers and rifle-pits. There were also entrenchments on the hills. The Fourth Ohio Regiment was ordered to carry those on the one hill, and the Fifth Ohio those on the other, which they did with a rush. The advance then ran down the hills on the other side and quickly captured the two pieces of artillery. After this the soldiers burned Blue’s house and mill, and also a few other houses, on the ground that they had been used to shelter the enemy, who had fired at them from the windows. In this affair the Confederates lost nearly 40 men killed and about the same number captured. There was no loss on the other side. The fertile Shenandoah Valley, between the Blue Ridge and the Alleghenies, was important to both sides, strategetically, and to the Confederates especially as a source of supplies. In 1861 Gen. Thomas J. Jackson (commonly called “Stonewall Jackson ”) was given command there with a Confederate force of about 11,000 men. But he did nothing of consequence dur¬ ing the autumn and winter. The National forces there were com¬ manded at first by General Fremont, and afterward by General Banks. The first serious conflict was at Winchester, March 23, 1862. Winchester was important for military purposes because it was at the junction of several highroads. Jackson’s army during the winter and spring had been reduced about one-half, but when he learned that the opposing force was also being reduced by the withdrawal of troops to aid General McClellan, he resolved to make an attack upon the force of General Shields at Winchester. His cavalry, under Turner Ashby, a brilliant leader who fell a few months later, opened the engagement with an attack on Shields's cavalry aided by other troops, and was driven back with considerable loss. In this engagement General Shields was painfully wounded by a fragment of shell. The next day at sunrise the battle was renewed at Kernstown, a short distance south of Winchester, and lasted till noon. About 6,000 men were engaged on the Confederate side, and somewhat more than that on the National. The Confederates were driven back half a mile by a brilliant charge, and there took a strong position and posted their artillery advantageously. Other charges followed, with destructive fighting, when they retired, slowly at first, and afterward in complete rout, losing three guns. They were pursued and shelled by a detachment under Colonel Kimball until they had passed Newtown. The National loss in this action was nearly 600; the Confederate, a little over 700. The next important engagement in this campaign took place, May 8th, near McDowell. After a slow retreat by the Con¬ federates, which was followed by the National forces under Gen¬ eral Schenck, the former turned to give battle, and in heavy force, probably about 6,000, attacked General Milroy’s brigade and the Eighty-second Ohio Regiment, numbering in all about 2,300. Milroy’s advance retired slowly, one battery shelling the advanc¬ ing enemy upon his main body, and the next day it was dis¬ covered that the Confederates had posted themselves on a ridge in the Bull Pasture Mountain. Milroy’s force went out to attack him, and when two-thirds of the .way up the mountain began the battle. It was soon found that this was only the advance of the Confederates, which slowly fell back upon the main body posted in a depression at the top of the mountain. One regiment after another was pushed forward, and the fighting was pretty sharp for two or three hours, when Milroy’s men gave up the contest as hopeless and fell back. An incident of this fight that illustrates the humors of war is told of Lieut.-Col. Francis W. Thompson of the Third West Virginia Regiment in Milroy’s command. He was writing a message, holding the paper against the trunk of a tree, when a bullet struck it and fastened it to the bark. “ Thank you,” said he; “ I am not post¬ ing advertisements, and if I were I would prefer tacks.” The National loss in this action was reported at 256, and the Con¬ federate at 499. General Fremont’s army, moving up the valley, reached Harrisonburg June 6th, and there was a spirited action between a portion of his cavalry and that of the Confederates. The fight fell principally upon the First New Jersey cavalry regiment, which, after apparently driving the enemy a short dis¬ tance, fell into an ambuscade, where infantry suddenly appeared on both sides of the road, protected by the stone walls, and fired into the regiment, which sustained considerable loss, including the capture of Colonel Wyndham. Other forces, under Colonel Cluseret and General Bayard, were then pushed forward, and the enemy, which was the rear guard of Jackson’s army, commanded by Gen. Turner Ashby, was driven from the field. During this action each side successively suffered from an enfilading fire, and General Ashby was killed. Three Confederate color sergeants were shot, and a considerable number of officers either fell or were captured. Capt. Thomas Haines of the New Jersey cavalry, who was one of the last to retire from the ambush, was approached and shot by a Virginia officer in a long gray coat, who sat upon a handsome horse ; and the next moment a com¬ rade of the captain’s, rising in his saddle, turned upon the foe shouting, “ Stop,” and shot the Virginian. While Fremont’s force was thus following up Jackson directly, General Shields’s division was moving southward on the eastern flank of the Shenandoah, expecting to intercept him. Jackson’s purpose was rather to get away than to fight, for by this time he was very much wanted before Richmond. Two days after the affair at Harrisonburg, Fremont overtook, at Cross Keys, Ewell's division, which Jackson had left there to delay Fremont’s ad¬ vance, while he should prepare to cross the Shenandoah with his whole force. Fremont attacked promptly and met a spirited resistance, which he gradually overcame, although at consider¬ able loss. Stahel’sbrigade,on his left, was the heaviest sufferer. At the close of the action Ewell retired, and Fremont’s troops slept on the field. Fremont had lost nearly 700 men. The Confederate loss is unknown. The next day Shields, coming up east of the river, encountered Jackson’s main force at Port Republic, and was attacked by it in overwhelming numbers. His men, however, stood their ground and made a brilliant fight, even capturing one gun and a considerable number of prisoners, but were finally routed, and lost several of their own guns. Fremont was prevented from crossing to the aid of Shields by the fact that Jackson had promptly burned the bridge. In this engagement Shields lost about 1,000 men, half of whom were captured. Jackson’s loss in the two engage¬ ments together was reported at 1,150, and his loss in the entire CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 217 campaign at about 1,900. After this battle he hurried away to join Lee before Richmond, while Fremont and Shields received orders from Washington to give up the pursuit, and thus ended the campaign in the valley. On the 10th of May, Gen. John E. Wool, with 5,000 men, landed at Willoughby’s Point, Va., and marched on Norfolk. UNITED STATES MILITARY TLLEGRAPH As he approached the city he was met by the mayor and a portion of the Common Council, who formally surrendered it. On taking possession, he appointed Gen. Egbert L. Vielc military governor, and a little later he occupied Norfolk and Portsmouth. His capture of Norfolk caused the destruction of the Mcrrimac , which the Confederates blew up on the nth. The navy yard, with its workshops, storehouses, and other buildings, was in ruins ; but General Wool’s captures included 200 cannon and a large amount of shot and shell. The Norfolk Day Book , a violent secession journal, was permitted to continue publication until it assailed Union citizens who took the oath of allegiance, and then it was suppressed. West Virginia had been pretty effectively cleared of Confeder¬ ates during the first year of the war, but a few minor engage¬ ments took place on her soil during the second year. One of the most brilliant of these was an expedition to Blooming Gap under Gen. Frederick W. Lander, in February. General Lander crossed the Potomac with 4,000 men, marched southward, and bridged the Great Cacapon River. This bridge was one hundred and eighty feet long, and was built in four hours in the night. It was made by placing twenty wagons in the stream, using them as piers, and putting planks across them. General Lander then, with his cavalry, pushed forward seven miles to Blooming Gap, expecting to cut off the retreat of a strong Confederate force that was posted there and hold it until his infantry could come up. He found that they had already taken the alarm and moved out beyond the Gap, but by swift riding he came up with a portion of them. Bringing up the Eighth Ohio and Seventh Virginia regiments of infantry for a support, he ordered a charge, which he lead in person, against a sharp fire. With a few followers he overtook a group of Confederate officers, cut off their retreat, and then dismounted, greeted them with, “ Surrender, gentlemen,” and held out his hand to receive the sword of the leader. Five of the officers surrendered to him, and MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT H. M1LROY. four to members of his staff. Meanwhile the Confederate infantry had rallied and made a stand. At this point Lander’s cavalry became demoralized and would not face the fire ; but he now advanced his infantry, which cleared the road, cap¬ tured many prisoners, and pursued the flying enemy eight miles. The total Confederate loss was near 100. The National loss was seven killed and wounded. Among the latter was Fitz-James O’Brien, the brilliant poet and story writer, who died of his wound two months later. The Eighth Ohio Regiment was commanded by Col. Samuel S. Car- roll, who received special praise for his gallantry in this affair, and two years later, at the request of General Grant, was pro¬ moted to a brigadier-generalship for his brilliant services in 2 l8 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. the Wilderness. General Lander, who was especially complimented for this affair in a letter from President Lincoln, died in March from the effects of a wound received the previous year. He was one of the most patriotic and earnest men and promising officers in the service, and, like his staff officer who fell here, was himself somewhat of a poet. There were many little bands of bush¬ whackers in the mountainous portions of the territory covered by the seat of war. Commonly they occupied themselves only in seeking opportunities for murder and robbery of Union citizens, but occasionally they made a stand and showed fight when the bluecoats appeared. Early in May one company of the Twenty-third Ohio infantry had a fight with such a band at Clark’s Hol¬ low, W. Va. Under command of Lieutenant Bottsford they scouted the hills until they found the camp of the bushwhack¬ ers, which had just been abandoned. Resting for the night at the only house in the hollow, Bottsford’s men were attacked at daybreak by the gang they had been hunting, who outnum¬ bered them about five to one. They took possession of the house, made loop-holes in the chinking between the logs, and, being all sharp-shooters, were able to keep the enemy at bay. The leader of the bushwhackers called to his men to follow him in a charge upon the house, assuring them that the Yankees would quickly surrender; but as he immediately fell, and three of his men, endeavoring to get to him, had the same fate, the remainder retreated. Soon afterward the rest of the regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Rutherford B. Hayes, came up and made pursuit. The flying bushwhackers set fire to the little village of Princeton and disappeared over the mountain. In this affair the National loss was one killed and 21 wounded ; of the bushwhackers, 16 were killed and 67 wounded. On the 10th of September, at Fayetteville, the Thirty-fourth Ohio Regiment, under command of Col. John T. Toland, looking for the enemy near Fayetteville, W. Va., found more of him than they wanted. The Confederates were in heavy force, commanded by Gen. William W. Lor- ing, and were posted in the woods on the summit of a steep hill. After three hours of fighting Toland was unable to gain the Avoods or to flank the enemy, and was obliged to retire, while the Confeder¬ ates fired upon him from the heights as he passed. He had lost, in killed, wounded, and missing, 109 men. The loss of the Con¬ federates was not ascertained, but was probably very slight. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. FREMONT. After Burnside had estab¬ lished a basis of operations on COLONEL percy wyndham the North Carolina coast there were numer¬ ous small expeditions thence to the interior. These were partly for the purpose of for- aging, partly for observation to detect any movements of large bodies of Confederate troops, and partly to give protection and encouragement to Union citizens, of whom were many in that State. On June 5th a reconnoissance in force was made from Washington, N. C., for the purpose of test¬ ing the report that a considerable force of cavalry and infantry had been gathered near Pactolus. The expedition was commanded by Colonel Potter of the First North Caro¬ lina (National) volunteers, and was accom¬ panied by Lieutenant Avery of the Marine artillery with three boat-howitzers. The day was oppressively hot, and the march labori¬ ous. All along the route slaves came from their work in the field, leaned upon the fences, and gave the soldiers welcome in their characteristic way. The enemy were first found at Hodge’s Mills, where they were strongly posted between two swamps with the additional protection from two mills. They had cut away the flooring of the mill flumes to prevent the cavalry from reaching them, and on the approach of the National advance they opened fire. The artillery was at once ordered forward within half musket range, and opened such a sharp and accurate fire that in forty-five minutes it completely riddled the buildings and brought down many Confederate sharp-shooters from the trees. When the main body of the troops rushed forward to charge the position, it was found that the Confederates had disappeared. The National loss was 16 men killed or wounded ; the Confederate loss was unknown, but was supposed to be nearly a hundred, including the colonel commanding. In their flight they left behind them large num¬ bers of weapons and accoutrements. This action is known as the battle of Tranter’s Creek. On the 2d of September it became known to the commander of the Federal force occupying Plymouth, N. C., that a detach¬ ment of about 1,400 Confederates was march¬ ing on that town with the avowed intention of burn¬ ing it. Hastily bringing together a company of Hawkins’s Zouaves, a com¬ pany of loyal North Caro¬ linians, and a few civilians who were willing to fight in defence of their homes, making in all about 300 men, the captain in com¬ mand sent them out under the charge of Orderly-Ser¬ geant Green. Three miles from the town they met the enemy, which consisted of in¬ fantry and cavalry commanded by Colonel Garrett. They were bivouacked in the woods, and Green’s force, making a sudden dash, surprised them Julius h. stahel "" an d fought the whole force for m *JOR-general CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD . 219 an hour, when they broke and fled. Colonel Garrett and 40 of his men were captured, and about 70 were killed or wounded. Green lost three men. The civilians who had joined the ex¬ pedition proved to be among the most efficient of the volun¬ teers. Four days later (September 6th) the Confederates attempted a similar enterprise against Washington, N. C. Early in the morning three companies of the National cavalry, with three guns, had gone out on the road toward Plymouth, when the Confederate cavalry dashed in at the other end of the town, fol¬ lowed by a body of about 400 infantry. The troops remaining in the town were surprised in their barracks, and a special effort was made to capture the loyal North Carolinians. But the men quickly rallied, the Confederate cavalry was driven back, and a slow street fight ensued. The troops that had gone toward Plymouth were recalled, and guns were planted where they could sweep the streets. The National gunboats attempted to aid the land forces, but were largely deterred by a heavy fog. When, however, they got the range of the houses behind which the Confederates were sheltered, the latter quickly retreated, carrying off with them four pieces of artillery. During the fight the gunboat Picket was destroyed by the explosion of her mag¬ azine. The National loss was about 30, and the Confederate considerably larger. at daybreak. The orders were that the advance should be made in silence, with no firing that could be avoided. Stevens’s men pushed forward, captured the Confederate picket, and approached the works through an open field. But the enemy were not sur¬ prised, and a heavy fire of musketry and artillery was opened upon them almost from the first. It was found that the front presented by the work was too narrow for proper deployment of much more than a regi¬ ment, and the assailants suffered accordingly. There was also a line of abatis to be broken through, and a deep ditch ; and yet a portion of the assaulting forces actually reached the parapet, but, of course, found it impossible to carry the works. The Eighth Michigan, which was in the advance, lost 182 men out of 534, including 12 of its 22 officers. Col. William M. Fenton, who commanded this regiment, says : “ The order not to fire, but use the bayonet, was obeyed, and the advance companies reached the parapet of the works at the angle on our right and front, engaging the enemy at the point of the bayonet. During our advance the enemy opened upon our lines an exceedingly de¬ structive fire of grape, canister, and musketry, and yet the regi¬ ment pushed on as veterans, divided only to the right and left by a sweeping torrent from the enemy’s main gun in front. The enemy’s fire proved so galling and destructive that our men on the parapet were obliged to retire under its cover. The field was furrowed across with cotton ridges, and many of the men lay there, loading and firing as deliberately as though on their hunting grounds at home.” Even had they been able to carry the work, they could not have held it long, for its whole inte¬ rior was commanded by elaborate rifle-pits in the rear. Artil¬ lery was brought up and well served, but made no real impres¬ sion upon the enemy. When it became evident that no success was possible, General Stevens withdrew his command in a slow and orderly manner. General Beauregard says: “ The point attacked by Generals Benham and I. I. Stevens was the strong¬ est one of the whole line, which was then unfinished and was designed to be some five miles in length. The two Federal commanders might have overcome the obstacles in their front had they proceeded farther up the Stone. Even as it was, the fight at Secessionville was lost, in a great measure, by lack of tenacity on the part of Generals Benham and Stevens. It was saved by the skin of our teeth.” The National loss in this action was 683 men, out of about 3,500 actually engaged. The Confed¬ erates, who were commanded by Gen. N. G. Evans, lost about 200. In October an expedition was planned to set out from Flilton Head, S. C., go up Broad River to the Coosahatchie and destroy the railroad and bridges in that vicinity, in order to sever the communications between Charleston and Savannah. It was under the command of Brig.-Gen. J. M. Brannan, and included about 4,500 men. Ascending Broad River on gunboats Throughout the war there was a strong desire to capture or punish the city of Charleston, which was looked upon as the cradle of secession, and also to close its harbor to blockade run¬ ners. Elaborate and costly operations on the seaward side were maintained for a long time, but never with any real success. The lowlands that stretch out ten or twelve miles south of the harbor are cut by many winding rivers and inlets, and broken frequently by swamps. At a point a little more than four miles south of the city was the little village of Secessionville, which was used as a summer resort by a few planters. It is on com¬ paratively high ground, and borders on a deep creek on the one side and a shallow one on the other. Across the neck of land between the two was an earthwork about two hundred yards long, known as Battery Lamar. There were similar works at other similar points in the region between Secessionville and the southern shore of the harbor. The Nation¬ al forces on these islands in 1862 were commanded by Gen. H. W. Benham, who in June planned an advance for the pur¬ pose of carrying the works at Secession¬ ville and getting within striking dis¬ tance of the city. The division of Gen. Isaac I. Stevens was to form the assault¬ ing column, an d Wright’s division and Williams’s brigade to act as its support. The movement was made on June 16th, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RUTHERFORD B. HAYES. (Afterward Brevet Major-General.) 220 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD and transports, October 22d, they landed at the junction of the Pocotaligo and Tullafiny, and immediately pushed inland toward Pocotaligo bridge. They marched about five miles before they encountered any resistance, but from that point were fired upon by batteries placed in commanding positions. As one after another of these was bombarded or flanked, the Confederates retired to the next, burning the bridges behind them, and in some places the pursuing forces were obliged to wade through swamps and streams nearly shoulder deep. At the Pocotaligo there was a heavy Confederate force well posted behind a swamp, with artillery, commanded by General Walker, and here Brannan’s artillery ammunition gave out. As the day was now nearly spent, and there seemed no probability of reaching the railroad, Brannan slowly retired and returned to Hilton Head. A detachment which he had sent out under Col. William B. Barton, of HILTON NEGRO Q UAR the Forty, eighth New York Regi¬ ment, had marched directly to the Coosahatchie and poured a destructive fire into a train that was filled with Confederate sol¬ diers coming from Savannah to the assistance of General Walker. He then tore up the railroad for a considerable distance, and pushed on toward the town, but there found the enemy in a posi¬ tion too strong to be carried, and, after exchanging a few rounds, retired to his boats. The National loss in this expedition was about 300; that of the Confederates was probably equal. The situation of Fort Pulaski relatively to Savannah was quite similar to that of Fort Sumter relatively to Charleston. It stood on an island in the mouth of Savannah River and protected the entrance to the harbor. Just one year after the bombardment and reduction of Sumter by the Confederate forces, Fort Pulaski was bombarded and reduced by the National forces. This work was of similar construction with Fort Sumter, having brick walls seven and a half feet thick and twenty-five feet high. It was on Cockspur Island, which is a mile long by half a mile wide, and commanded all the channels leading up to the harbor. At the A NORTH CAROLINA SWAMP. opening of the war it was seized by the Confederate authorities, and it was garrisoned by 385 men, under command of Col. Charles H. Olmstead. It mounted forty heavy guns, which protected blockade-runners and kept out National vessels. Soon after the cap¬ ture of Port Royal, Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore was ordered to make a reconnoissance of this work and the ground on Tybee Island southeast of it, with a view to its reduction. He reported that it was possible to plant batteries of rifled guns and mortars on Tybee Island, and also on Jones Island, with which he believed the work could be reduced. Jones Island is northwest of Cockspur Island. The Forty-sixth New York Regiment, commanded by Colonel Rosa, was sent to occupy Tybee Island, and a passage was opened between the islands and the mainland north of Savannah, so that guns could be brought through and placed on Jones Island. This was done with tremendous labor, the mortars weighing more than eight tons each and having to be dragged over deep mud on plank platforms, most of the work being done at night. The Seventh Connecticut Regiment was now sent to join the Forty-sixth New York on Tybee, and the construction of batteries and magazines CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD 221 BATTLE OF SECESSIONVILLE, JAMES ISLAND, S. C. on that island was begun. Here, also, the guns had to be carried across spongy ground, 250 men being required for the slow movement of each piece, and all the work being done at night and in silence; for the batteries were to be erected within easy reach of the guns of the fort. Their construction occupied about two months, and screens of bushes were contrived to conceal from the Confederates what was going on. There were eleven batteries ranged along the northern edge of Tybee Island, mounting twenty heavy guns and sixteen thirteen-inch mortars. When all was ready, the fort was summoned to surrender by Gen. David Hunter, who had recently been placed in command of the department. Colonel Olmstead replied : “ I can only say that I am here to defend the fort, not to surrender it.” There¬ upon the batteries opened fire upon the fort, and a bombard¬ ment of thirty hours ensued—April 10 and II. At the end of that time ten of the fort’s guns were dismounted, and, as the fire of the rifled guns was rapidly reducing its masonry to ruins, it was evident that it could not hold out much longer; whereupon Colonel Olmstead surren¬ dered. The only casualties were one man killed on the National side, and three wound¬ ed in the fort. It was found that the mortars had produced very little effect, the real work being done by the rifled guns. General Hun¬ ter said in his report: “ The result of this bombardment must cause, I am convinced, a chanee in the construction of fortifications as radical as that foreshadowed in naval archi¬ tecture by the conflict between the Monitor and the Mcrrimac. No works of stone or brick can resist the impact of rifled artillery of heavy calibre.” And General Gillmore said : “ Mortars are unavailable for the reduction of works of small area like Fort Pulaski. They cannot be fired with sufficient accuracy to crush the casemate arches.” A fortnight later, the attempt to reduce Forts Jackson and St. Philip led Farragut to the same con¬ clusion concerning the use of mortars. One who participated in the bombardment relates an amusing incident. The batteries were under the im¬ mediate command of Lieut, (afterward General) Horace Porter, who went artrund to every gun to ascertain whether its captain was provided with everything that would be necessary when the firing should begin. At one mortar battery fuse plugs were’ wanting, and the officer was in despair. This battery had the position nearest to the fort, and its four mortars were useless without the plugs. Finally he remembered that there was a Yankee regiment on the island, and remarked, “All Yankees are whittlers. If this regiment could be turned out to-night, they might whittle enough fuse plugs before morning to fire a thou¬ sand rounds.” Thereupon he rode out in the darkness to the camp of that regiment, which was immediately ordered out to whittle, and provided all the fuse plugs that were needed. The first gun was fired by Lieut. P. H. O’Rourke, who afterward fell at the head of his regiment at Gettysburg. It is said that the first gun against Sumter had been fired by a classmate of his. One who was in the fort says: “At the close of the fight all the parapet guns were dismounted except three. Every casemate gun in the southeast section of the fort was dismounted, and the casemate walls breached in almost every instance to the top of the arch. The moat was so filled with brick and mortar that one could have passed over dry shod. The parapet walls on the Tybee side were all gone. The protection to the maga¬ zine in the northwest angle of the fort had all been shot away, the entire corner of the magazine was shot off, and the powder ex¬ posed. Such was the condition of affairs when Colonel Olmstead called a council of offi¬ cers in the casemate, and they all acquiesced in the necessity of a capitulation in order to save the garrison from destruction by an ex¬ plosion, which was momentarily threatened.” On the 16th of April the Eighth Michi¬ gan Regiment, Col. William M. Fenton, with a detachment of Rhode Island artillery, was BRIGADIER-GENERAL EGBERT L. VIELE. FORT PULASKI DURING BOMBARDMENT, APRIL 11, 1852. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 223 sent from Tybee Island, Ga., to make a reconnoissance of Wilmington Island. On landing, they marched inland by three different roads, and soon discovered the enemy in some force. They took up a position for defence and were attacked by the Thirteenth Georgia Regiment. When Colonel Fenton ordered the bugler to sound the charge for his main body, his advance mistook it for retreat, fell back, and threw his line into confusion. At this moment the enemy advanced and began firing. Order was soon restored, and through the vigorous efforts of Lieut. C. IT Wilson one company was carried to the right, through the woods, and made a flank attack upon the enemy’s left. Thereupon the Confederates slowly retired, leav¬ ing their dead and wounded on the field. The National loss was 45 men; Confederate loss, unknown. On the 10th of January an expedition consisting of 5,000 men •—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—set out from Cairo to make an extended reconnoissance in the neighborhood of Columbus, Ky., and in the direction of Mayfield. It was led by John A. McClernand, who was temporarily in command of that district. Nearly every point of any consequence within fifteen or twenty miles was visited, roads were discovered that had not been laid down on any map, the position of the enemy at Columbus was correctly ascertained, and much information was obtained re¬ garding the disposition of the inhabitants toward the Govern¬ ment. The march of about one hundred and forty miles was made over icy and miry roads with considerable difficulty, and proved useful for future operations, although it was not enlivened by any conflict. On the 15th of February Bowling Green, which had been con¬ sidered an important point in the line of defence that was first broken by General Grant at Fort Henry, was evacuated by the Confederates, who went to join their comrades at Fort Donel- son. The National troops under General Buell, marching forty miles in twenty-eight hours, took possession of the place in the afternoon. Many of the gaps in the Alleghenies were strategically impor¬ tant because they were the natural places for the crossing of the road that connected the States east and west of that range, and there were frequent expeditions and small actions at these gaps by which one side or the other sought to clear them of the enemy. One of these took place in March, 1862, when it was discovered that a somewhat irregular Confederate force of about 500 men had taken possession of Pound Gap, Eastern Kentucky, built huts, and gathered supplies for a permanent occupation. A road to Abingdon, Va., passes through this gap. General James A. Garfield, whose defeat of Humphrey Marshall on the Big Sandy has been recorded in an earlier chapter, set out a month later, March 13th, with a force of 900 men to clear the Gap. It was a laborious march of two days in snow and rain and mud, with roads obstructed by felled trees, and streams whose bridges had been destroyed. Arriving at Elkton Creek, two miles below the Gap, Garfield sent out his cavalry to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, and himself with the infantry climbed the mountain a mile or two below the Gap, and thence moved along the summit to attack them in the flank. When this force arrived at the Gap, the enemy were found deployed on the summit at its opposite side. Garfield deployed his own force down the eastern slope, and then ordered them to charge through the ravine and up the hill held by the enemy, which they promptly did. But before they could ascend the southern slope the whole Confederate force disappeared. Nothing was left for the National troops to do but to ransack the captured camp, pack up what they could of the large quantity of supplies, burn the remainder, and return whence they came. When Kentucky was invaded by the Confederate forces of Bragg, Humphrey Marshall, and Kirby Smith, the movement was accompanied and assisted by a raid from a large band of guerillas, or partisan rangers as they called themselves, led by a bold rider named John H. Morgan. The principal resistance to Morgan was at Cynthiana, July 17th, about fifty miles south of Cincinnati. The National troops occupying that town were commanded by Lieut.-Col. J. J. Landrum, and numbered about 340, a part of them being home guards not very well armed or disciplined, with one field gun. Morgan’s men approached the town suddenly, drove in the pickets, and began shelling the place without giving any notice for the women and children to be removed. Landrum immediately placed his one gun in the public square, where it could be turned so as to sweep almost any of the roads entering the town, and posted all of his force except the artillery in the outskirts where he supposed the enemy were approaching, putting most of them at the bridge overlooking. But to his surprise Morgan’s force was very large in comparison with his own, and entered the town from a differ¬ ent direction. In a little while Landrum’s men found themselves practically surrounded, and subjected to a sharp fire both front and rear, the guerillas having the shelter of the houses. The artillerymen in the square were subjected to so hot a fire from the riflemen that they were obliged to abandon their gun. Colonel Landrum writes: “ I rode along the railroad to Rankin’s Hotel to ascertain what position the enemy was taking. Here I met an officer of the rebel band, aid to Colonel Morgan, who demanded my surrender. I replied, ‘ I never surrender,’ and instantly discharged three shots at him, two of which took effect in his breast. He fell from his horse, and I thought him dead ; but he is still living, and will probably recover, notwithstanding two balls passed through his body.” A portion of Landrum’s force, posted north of the town, was overpowered and forced to surrender. With another portion he attempted to drive the enemy from the bridge and take their battery, but found them so strong there as to render this hopeless, while all the time he was subjected to a fire from the rear. Finally he determined with the remainder of his men to cut his way through and escape. He emerged from the town in a southeast direction, met and routed a small detachment of the enemy, and was pursued by another detachment when he made a stand, posting his men behind the fences, and for a considerable time held them in check. When his ammunition was exhausted he gave orders for every man to save himself as he could, and thus his command was dispersed. In this affair the National forces lost about 70 men killed or wounded. The loss of the guerillas is unknown, but they left behind them a considerable number of wounded, and the capture of the town must have cost them about 100 men. In this raid Morgan is said to have commanded from 900 to 1,200 men, to have ridden over 1,000 miles, captured 17 towns, and paroled nearly 1,200 prisoners. The smaller guerilla raids in Kentucky that year were more numerous than any popular history could find space to record. Some of them, however, were spiritedly met and severely pun¬ ished. On the 29th of July a band of over 200 attacked the village of Mt. Sterling. The provost-marshal of the place, Capt. J. J. Evans, at once put every able-bodied man in the village under arms, and posted them on both sides of the street by which the guerillas were about to enter. He had hardly done this when in came the enemy, yelling wildly and demanding 224 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. their surrender. The answer was a well-aimed volley which brought down the whole of their front rank, and which was rapidly followed by other volleys that soon put them to flight. In their retreat they met a detachment of the Eighteenth Ken¬ tucky Regiment, under Major Bracht, which had been in pursuit of them, and when these troops charged upon them they scat¬ tered in the fields and woods, leaving horses, rifles, and other material. Their loss was about ioo. On the 23d of August the Seventh Kentucky cavalry, a new regiment commanded by Col. Leonidas Metcalfe, had a fight with Confederate troops at Big Hill, about fifteen miles from Richmond. With 400 of his men he set out to attack the enemy, and near the top of the hill dismounted to fight on foot. He says: “We moved forward amid a shower of bullets and shells, which so terrified my raw, undisciplined recruits, that I could not bring more than IOO of them in sight of the enemy. The great majority mounted their horses and fled, without even getting a look at the foe. It was impossible to rally them, and they continued their flight some distance north of Richmond.” The hundred men who stood their ground fought the enemy for an hour and a half and finally compelled them to fall back. Soon afterward a new attack was made upon Metcalfe’s men by about 100 Confederates who dashed down the road expect¬ ing to capture them. But he had placed 200 men of a Tennes¬ see infantry regiment in the bushes by the roadside, and their A WOUNDED ZOUAVE. (From a War Department photograph.) fire brought down many of the enemy and dispersed the remain¬ der. A few minutes later still another attack was made by another detachment, and, as before, the Tennesseeans met it with a steady fire and drove them off. Metcalfe’s men then retired to Richmond, whither the Confederates pursued them and de¬ manded a surrender of the town. Metcalfe replied that he would not surrender but would fight it out, and, as he presently received reinforcements, the enemy departed. He lost in this affair about 50 men. The Confederate loss is unknown. On the same days when the great battle of Groveton or second Bull Run was fought in Virginia (August 29th and 30th, 1862), one of the severest of the engagements consequent upon Kirby Smith’s invasion took place at Richmond, Ky. The National forces numbered about 6,500, largely new troops, and were com¬ manded by Brig.-Gen. M. D. Manson. Kirby Smith had a force at least twice as large. Early in the afternoon of the 29th the Confederates drove in Manson’s outpost, and he, having had early information of their approach, marched out to meet them. About two miles from the town he took possession of a high ridge commanding the turnpike, and formed his line of battle with artillery on the flank. The enemy soon attacked in some force, and were driven off by the fire from the guns. Manson then advanced another mile, where he bivouacked, and sent out his cavalry to reconnoitre. Early in the morning of the 30th the enemy advanced again, when Manson’s men drove them back and formed on a piece of high wooded ground near Rogersville. Here the en¬ emy attacked him in earnest and in great force, attempt¬ ing to turn his left flank, which faced about and fought stubbornly. More of his forces were now brought to the front and placed in line, and the battle became quite severe. At length the enemy, with largely superior numbers, succeeded in breaking his left wing, which retreated in disorder. “ Up to this time,” says General Man- son, “ I had maintained my first position for three hours and forty minutes, during all of which time the artil¬ lery, under command of Lieutenant Lamphere, had kept up a constant fire, ex¬ cept for a very short time when the ammunition had become exhausted. The Fifty-fifth Indiana, the Six¬ teenth Indiana, the Sixty- ninth Indiana, and the Sev¬ enty-first Indiana occupied pro m inent and exposed positions from the com¬ mencement of the engage- ment, and contended against the enemy with a determina- CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 225 BRIGADIER-GENERAL HUMPHREY MARSHALL, C. S. A. driven back in confusion. Manson succeeded in or¬ ganizing a rear guard which assisted the escape of his main force, but was itself defeated and broken to pieces in a later encounter. Manson, attempting to escape through the enemy’s lines, was fired upon, and his horse was killed, he being soon afterward taken prisoner. His loss in this engage¬ ment was about 900 killed or wounded, besides many prisoners. The Confederate loss was reported at about 700. On the 9th of October a National force, commanded by Col. E. A. Parrott, marched out and met the enemy at a place called Dogwalk, near Lawrenceburg. Parrott placed his men in an GENERAL E. KIRBY SMITH, C. S. A. cavalry, under Gen. N. B. Forrest, captured Lexington, Tenn. The town was defended by the Eleventh Illinois cavalry, commanded by Col. Robert G. Ingersoll, which withstood the enemy in a fight of three hours, and was then compelled to re¬ treat, leaving two guns in the hands of the Confederates, who had lost about 40 men. The State of Tennessee, like some others of the Southern States, had its mountain region and its lowland ; and, as was generally true in such cases in the Confederacy, the people of the mountain regions were more inclined to be true to the Union, while those of the lowlands favored secession. This fact, together with the position it occu¬ pied, made Tennessee a debatable ground almost throughout the war. Besides the great battles that were fought on her soil —Shiloh, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Franklin, and Nashville— there were innumerable minor engagements of varying severity and importance. On the 24th of March, 1862, a regiment of loyal Tennesseeans, commanded by Col. James Carter, left their camp at Cumberland Ford and made a march of forty miles through the mountains to Big Creek Gap, where they fought and defeated a body of Confederate cavalry, and captured a considerable supply of tents, arms, provisions, wagons, and horses. Union City, Term., was a small village at the junction of the tion and bravery worthy of older soldiers. The three remaining regiments of General Cruft’s brigade arrived just at the time when our troops were in full retreat and the rout had become general. The Eighteenth Kentucky was immediately deployed into line, and made a desperate effort to check the advance in the enemy, and contended with him, single-handed and alone, for twenty minutes, when after a severe loss they were compelled to give away before overwhelming numbers.” Deploying his cavalry as a rear guard, and placing one gun to command the road, Manson retreated to his position of the evening before and again formed line of battle. Here the enemy soon attacked him again, advancing through the open fields in great force. At this moment he received an order from his superior, General Nelson, directing him to retire if the enemy ad¬ vanced in force ; but it was then too late to obey, for within five minutes the battle was in progress along the whole line. The right of the Confed¬ erates was crushed by Manson’s artillery fire, and the enemy then made a determined effort to crush Manson’s right, which, after being several times gal¬ lantly repelled, they at length succeeded in doing. General Nelson now appeared upon the field, and by his orders Manson’s men fell back and took up a new position very near the town. Here they sustained another attack for half an hour, and then were broken and once more advantageous position, with two pieces of artillery, and soon saw the Confederate skirmishers advancing toward it. He sent out his own skirmishers to meet them, and placed his guns to command the road. The artillery was used very effectively, especially in driving the enemy from a dwelling-house where they had opened a severe fire on the line after a fight that lasted from eight A. M. till federates retired, leaving a portion of their dead and wounded on the field. Parrott lost fourteen men. On the 18th of Decem¬ ber a force of Confederate of skirmishers, and afternoon the Con- 15 226 CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. railroads from Columbus and Hickman, and on the 30th of March an expedition was sent out from Island No. 10, under Col. Abram Buford, to make a reconnoissance there. Buford had four regiments of infantry, with two companies of cavalry and a detachment of artillery. They made a forced march of twenty-four hours, and discovered a body of Confederate troops drawn in line of battle across the road near the town. The flanks of the Confederate line were protected by woods, and Buford sent off his cavalry to make a detour and get in their rear. In a wheat field at the right of the road he found an eminence suitable for his artillery, and it went into position at a gallop. Almost in one moment the Confederates were sub¬ jected to a fire from rifle-guns, saw a line of bayonets coming straight at them in front, and discovered that hostile horsemen with drawn sabres were in their rear. Naturally (and perhaps properly) they immediately turned and fled without firing a gun. They numbered about 1,000 men, infantry and cavalry. A few prisoners were taken, together with the camp and all that it contained. The tents and people in that part of the State. Crossing the mountains to the Sequatchie Valley, the expedition first met the enemy at Sweeden’s Cove. They were soon put to flight, however, by Negley’s guns, and were then pursued by his cavalry, who over¬ took them after a chase of two or three miles, rode among them, and used their sabres freely until the Confederates were dispersed. The next day the expedition proceeded toward Chattanooga, where they found a large Confederate force with intrenchments and several guns in position. In the afternoon the Con¬ federates opened fire with rifles and artil¬ lery, to which Neg- * barracks were now burned, and the National forces marched to Hick¬ man. Early in June an expedition commanded by Brig.-Gen. James S. Negley, setting out from Columbia, marched eastward and southward toward Chattanooga, for the pur¬ pose of reconnoitring and threatening that place, bringing some relief to the perse¬ cuted Unionists of East Tennessee, and ascertaining the truth of a report that the Confederates were about to make a strong movement to recapture Nashville. Their first capture was at Winchester, of a squad of cavalry¬ men, including a man who was at once a clergyman, principal of a female seminary, and captain in the Confederate service. This man had made himself notorious by capturing and bring¬ ing in Union men to the town, where they were given the alternative of enlisting as Confederate soldiers or being hanged. Andrew Johnson, military-governor of Tennessee, who had him¬ self suffered much persecution at the hands of the secessionists, and was very bitter toward them, had declared that rich rebels should be made to pay for the depredations of the roving Confederate bands upon Union men. In accordance with this, General Negley arrested a considerable number of well-known secessionists in Marion County and assessed them two hundred dollars apiece, appropriating the money to the relief of Union MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM NELSON. ley’s guns made reply, and the can¬ nonading was kept up for two hours, during which the National gunners exhibited the greater skill and final¬ ly silenced the enemy’s batteries. These were repaired during the en¬ suing night, and the next day were bombarded again, until it was dis¬ covered that the town had been evacuated. It is related that dur¬ ing this fight a man appeared on the Confederate intrenchments dis¬ playing a black flag, and was instant¬ ly shot down. In his report General Negley said: “The Union people in East Tennessee are wild with joy. They meet us along the road by hun¬ dreds. I shall send you a number of their principal persecutors from the Sequatchie valley.” About this time the roving Confederate cavalry, commanded by Gen. N. B. Forrest, who two years later obtained such an unenviable reputation for his conduct at Fort Pillow, began to attract special attention by the rapidity and daring of its move¬ ments. On the 13th of July he made an attack on Murfreesboro’ at the head of about 3,000 men. The town was garrisoned by about 800, not very skilfully disposed or very well disciplined. The attack fell principally on the Ninth Michigan Regiment, which fought courageously hand to hand for twenty minutes and put the enemy to flight, losing about 90 men. The attack was soon renewed by a larger force, and finally resulted in the defeat of the Michigan men. Meanwhile another portion of Forrest’s command had attacked the court-house, where a portion of the garrison took shelter and kept up a destructive fire from the windows. Being unable to drive them out, the MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES S. NEGLEY. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 227 Confederates set fire to the building, when the garrison were, of course, compelled to retire. The Confederates captured and pa¬ roled most of the garrison, packed up and carried off what they could of plunder, and burned a large quantity of camp equipage and clothing. The garrison was commanded by Brig.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, who was severely censured for the mismanage¬ ment that made the disaster possible. Early in August Colonel De Courcey went out with his brigade from Cumberland Gap southward toward Tazewell on a foraging expedition. Near that town they were at¬ tacked by four Confederate regiments under Colonel Rains, and the advance regiment of De Courcey’s force was immediately deployed across the road with artillery on the flank. The enemy charged in columns, and was re¬ ceived in silence until he had approached within two hundred and fifty yards, when a terrible fire was opened upon him and threw him into disorder. In the meanwhile a battery of six guns, unobserved by the Confederates, had gained an eminence in their rear, and when it began firing they at once turned and fled. The National loss in this short but brilliant action was 68, 50 of whom were prisoners, being two companies who were out on detached service and were suddenly surrounded. The Confederate loss was about 200. Brig.-Gen. R. W. Johnson, setting out with a force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery to pursue the raider Morgan and his men, found them (August 21st) at Galletin, and ordered an attack. All seemed to be going well for a time, until confusion be¬ gan to appear in his command, and soon a panic arose and half of his men ran away. He and some of his officers tried in vain to rally them, and final¬ ly he was obliged to order a re¬ treat of such of his men as had stood their ground. He then marched for Cairo on the Cum¬ berland, but, before reaching that place, found the enemy pressing so closely in his rear that he was obliged to form line of battle to receive them. Again, when the firing became brisk, most of his men broke and fled, while with the re¬ mainder of his command he held the enemy in check until the fugitives were enabled to cross the river, when he and his little band were surrounded and captured. He had lost 30 men killed, and 50 wounded, and 75 were made prisoners. On the 31st of August there was a severe skirmish near Bolivar, between two regiments of infantry and two detach¬ ments of cavalry, and a large Confederate force, which lasted about seven hours, and was brought to a close by an artillery fire and a gallant charge from the National troops. In this charge Lieutenant-Colonel Hogg, of the Second Illinois cavalry, fell in a hand-to-hand fight with Colonel McCullough. The next day, two regiments of infantry, with two companies of cavalry and a battery, com¬ manded by Colonel Dennis, moving to at¬ tack this Confederate force in the rear, en¬ countered them at Britton’s Lane, near Denmark. Dennis, who had about 800 men, selected a strong position and awaited attack in a large grove surrounded by cornfields. The Confederates, commanded by Brigadier- General Armstrong, numbered at least 5,000, and were able merely to surround the little band. They soon captured the transporta¬ tion train and two guns, but before the fight was over Dennis’s men recaptured them. For four hours the Confederates persisted in making successive charges, all of which were gallantly repelled, when they retired, leaving Dennis in possession of the field. Their loss in killed and wounded was about 400. Dennis lost 60 men. In October General Negley, commanding at Nashville, learning that a considerable Confederate force under Generals Anderson, Harris, and Forrest was being concentrated at La Vergne, fifteen miles eastward, for the purpose of assaulting the city, sent out a force of about 2,500 men, under command of Gen. John M. Palmer, to attack them. A portion of this force marched directly by the Murfreesboro’ road, while the remainder made a detour to the south. The Confederate pickets and vi- dettes were on the alert, and made a skirmish for several miles, enabling the main body to prepare for the attack. The battle was opened by fire of the Confederate artillery, but this was soon silenced when a shell exploded their ammunition chest. Almost at the same moment the detachment that had made a detour came up and struck the Confederates on the flank, at the same time de¬ ploying skilfully so as to cut off tlfeir retreat. In this difficult situation the Confederates held their ground and fought for half an hour before they broke and retreated in confusion. They had lost about 80 men killed or wounded, and 175 were captured, besides three ANDREW JOHNSON. Military Governor of Tennessee, afterward President. A SONG AROUND THE CAMPFIRE. GOING TO THE FRONT—REGIMENTS PASSING THE ASTOR HOUSE, NEW YORK. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 229 guns, a considerable amount of stores, stand of colors, etc. General Palmer lost 18 men. On the 18th of November 200 men of the Eighth Kentucky Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel May, was guarding a sup¬ ply train bivouacked on an old camp-meeting ground at Rural Hills, seventeen miles southeast of Nashville. While they were at breakfast the next morning the crack of rifles was heard, and in a moment two columns of Confederate cavalry were seen rushing upon them from their front and their right. The boys in blue seized their muskets, fell into line, ai;d in a moment met the enemy with a sharp and continuous fire. Presently a section of National artillery was brought into action, and not only played upon the enemy immediately in front, but also upon a larger body that w r as discovered somewhat more than a mile away. This was answered by two or three Confederate guns, and the fight was continued for half an hour, when the assailants with¬ drew, leaving a dozen dead men on the field. Colonel May lost no men. A similar affair took place on the 6th of December, at Lebanon, where the Ninety-third Ohio Regiment, under Col. Charles Anderson, was guarding a forage train. Seeing an enemy in front, who were evidently preparing to intercept the train, he marched his regiment in double-quick time through the fields skirting the road, in order to get ahead of the train and prevent an attack upon it. By the time he got there the Con¬ federates were in position to receive him, and a sharp fight ensued, which ended in the flight of the Confederates. In these little affairs there was often displayed a dash and courage by individual soldiers, which in a war of less gigantic dimensions * would have immortalized them. Every historian of the Revolu¬ tionary war thinks it necessary to record anew the fact that when the flagstaff of Fort Moultrie was shot away Sergeant Jasper leaped down from the parapet and recovered it underfire. Without disparaging his exploit, it may be said that it was sur¬ passed in hundreds of instances by men on both sides in the civil war. In the little action just described, William C. Stewart, a color-bearer, was under fire for the first time in his life. Col¬ onel Anderson says he “ stood out in front of his company and of the regiment with his tall person and our glorious flag elevated to their highest reach ; nor could he be persuaded to seek cover or to lower his colors.” At Hartsville on the Cumberland, about forty miles from Murfreesboro’, 1,900 National troops, under command of Col. Absalom B. Moore, were encamped in a position which would have been very strong if held by a larger force, but was danger¬ ous for one so small. Against this place Morgan the raider, at the head of 4,000 men, marched on the 7th of December. He crossed the river seven miles from Hartsville, at a point where nobody supposed it could be crossed by any such force, on account of the steepness of the banks. With a little digging he made a slope, down which he slid his horses, and at the water’s edge his men remounted. Coming up unexpectedly by a by¬ road, they captured all the National pickets except one, who gave the alarm and ran into the camp. The Nationals formed quickly in line of battle, but at the first fire the One Hundred and Eighth Ohio broke, leaving the flank exposed. The Con¬ federates saw their advantage, seized it, and quickly poured in a cross-fire, which compelled the remainder of Moore’s forces to fall back, though they did not do it without first making a stubborn fight. Soon afterward Colonel Moore, considering it sufficiently evident that further resistance was useless, raised a white flag and surrendered his entire command. A similar surrender took place at Trenton, December 20th, when Forrest’s cavalry attacked that place for the purpose of breaking the railroad and cutting off General Grant’s supplies. Col. Jacob Fry, who was in command there, had been notified by Grant to look out for Forrest, as he was moving in that direc¬ tion. He got together what force he could, consisting largely of convalescents and fugitives, and numbering but 250 in all, and prepared to make a defence. He had a few sharp-shooters, whom he placed on two buildings commanding two of the principal streets, and when in the afternoon the enemy appeared, charging in two columns, they were met by so severe a fire from these men that they quickly moved out of range. Forrest then planted a battery of six guns where it could command the position held by the Nationals, and opened fire with shells. Colonel Fry says: “Seeing that we were completely in their power, and had done all the damage to them we could, I called a council of officers. They were unanimous for surrender. . . . The terms of the surrender were unconditional; but General Forrest admitted us to our paroles the next morning, sending the Tennessee troops immediately home, and others to Columbus under a flag of truce.” Thus far in his raiding operations General Forrest had had things mainly his own way, but in the closing engagement he was not so fortunate. While he was marching toward Lexington a force of 1,500 men, commanded by Col. C. L. Dunham, was sent out to intercept him, and came upon a portion of his troops at Parker’s Cross Roads, five miles south of Clarksburg, on the 30th of December. After some preliminary skirmishes Dunham, seeing that he was soon to be attacked, placed his men in readi¬ ness, and with two pieces of artillery opened fire. This was replied to by the Confederates with six guns, and Dunham then retreated some distance to a good position on the crest of a ridge, placing his wagon train in the rear. The enemy in heavy column soon emerged from the woods, and made a movement evidently intended to gain his flank and rear; whereupon he promptly changed his position to face them, and opened fire. But the Confederate artillery gained a position where it could enfilade his lines, and at the same time he was attacked in the rear by a detachment of dismounted cavalry. Again he promptly changed his position, facing to the rear, and drove off the enemy with a considerable loss, completing their rout by a brilliant bayonet charge. A detachment of cavalry also made two charges upon him from another direction, and both times was repelled. This was the end of the principal fighting of the day. A few minutes later Forrest sent in a flag of truce demanding an unconditional surrender, to which Colonel Dun¬ ham replied: “You will get away with that flag very quickly, and bring me no more such messages. Give my compliments to the general, and tell him I never surrender. If he thinks he can take me, come and try.” In the course of the battle Dunham’s wagon train was captured, and he now called for volunteers to retake it. A company of the Thirty-ninth Iowa offered them¬ selves for this task and quickly accomplished it, not only recap¬ turing the train but bringing in also several prisoners, including Forrest’s adjutant-general and three other officers. Reinforce¬ ments for Dunham now approached, and the Confederates departed. The National loss, in killed, wounded, and missing, was 220. The Confederate loss is unknown. Another instance of peculiar individual gallantry is here mentioned by the colonel in his report. “ As our line faced about and pressed back in their engagement of the enemy in our rear, one of the guns of the battery was left behind in the eage of the woods. All the 230 CAMEFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. horses belonging to it had been killed but two. After everybody had passed and left it, Private E. A. Top- liff, fearing that the enemy might capture it, alone and under a smart fire disen¬ gaged the two horses, hitched them to the piece, and took it safely out.” Although the struggle to determine whether Mis¬ souri should remain in the Union or go out of it had been decided in the first year of the war, her soil was by no means free from contention and bloodshed in the second year. The brigadier-general Justus Mckinstry. earliest conflict took place in Randolph County, Janu¬ ary 8th, where 1,000 Confederates, under Colonel Poindexter, took up a strong position at Roan’s Tanyard, on Silver Creek, seven miles south of Huntsville. Here they were attacked by about 500 men under Majors Torrence and Hubbard, and after half an hour’s fighting were completely routed. Their defeat was owing mainly to the inefficiency of their commander. The victors burned the camp and a considerable amount of stores. In February Captain Nolen, of the Seventh Illinois cavalry, with 64 men, while re- connoitring near Charleston, struck a small detachment of Confederate cavalry under Jeff Thompson. Nolen pursued them for some distance, and when Thompson made a stand and brought up his battery to com¬ mand the road, the Illinois men promptly charged upon it, cap¬ tured four guns, and put the Confederates to flight. The most infamous of all the guerilla lead¬ ers was one Quantrell, who seemed to take delight in murdering prisoners, whether they were combatants or non-combatants. His band moved with the usual celerity of such, and, like the others, was exceeding¬ ly difficult to capture, or even find, when any considerable force set out to attack it. On the 22d of March a detachment of the Sixth Kansas Regiment overtook Quantrell near Independence, killed seven of his men, and caused the remainder to retreat precipi¬ tately, except eleven of them who were captured. Another encounter with Quantrell’s guerilla band was had at Warrensburg, March 26, where he attacked a detachment of a Mis¬ souri regiment commanded by Major Emery Foster. Although Quantrell had 200 men, and Foster but 60, the latter, skilfully using a thick plank fence for protection, succeeded in inflicting so much loss upon the guerillas that they at length retired. Nine of them were killed and 17 wounded. The National loss was 13, including Major Foster wounded. The -same night about 500 guerillas attacked four companies of militia at Humonsville, but were defeated and driven off with a loss of 15 killed and a large number wounded. On the 26th of April the Confederate general John S. Marma- duke attacked the town.of Cape Girardeau, but after a smart action was driven off, with considerable loss, by the garrison, under Gen. John McNeil. In the evening of the next day the cavalry force that formed the advance guard on his retreat was surprised and attacked near Jackson by the First Iowa cavalry and other troops. Two howitzers, loaded with musket balls, were fired at them when they were not more than thirty yards away, and the next instant the Iowa cavalry swooped down upon them in a spirited charge, from which not one of the Confederates escaped. All that were not killed were cap¬ tured, together with a few guns, horses, etc. One of the most desperate fights with guerillas took place near Memphis, Mo., on the 18th of July. A band of 600 had chosen a strong position for their camp, partly concealed A MILITARY PONTOON BRIDGE. CAMPFIRE AND BATTLEFIELD. 231 by heavy brush and timber, when they were attacked by a force of cavalry and militia, commanded by Major John Y. Clopper. Clopper first knew their location when they fired from concealment upon his advance guard, and he immediately made dispositions for an attack. His men made five successive charges across open ground, and were five times repelled ; but, nothing disheartened, and having now learned the exact posi¬ tion of the concealed enemy, they advanced in a sixth charge, and engaged him hand to hand. The result of the fight was the complete defeat of the ^ guerillas, who fled, leaving their dead and wounded in the woods. Clopper 83 men. In these affairs the guerillas were by no means always defeat¬ ed. When in Augusi a band of 800 had been gathered by one Hughes, it was determined to make an attack upon the small National gar¬ rison at Inde¬ pendence, prin¬ cipally for the purpose of ob¬ taining addi¬ tional arms. The gueril¬ las surprised, captured, and murder- 40 l "