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THE CREED OF DEUTSCHTUM 



Books by Morton Prince 



THE NATURE OF MIND AND 
HUMAN AUTOMATISM 

THE DISSOCIATION OF A 
PERSONALITY 



THE UNCONSCIOUS 



THE CREED 
OF DEUTSCHTUM 



AND OTHER WAR ESSAYS, INCLUDING 

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER 

With a Foreword by MARQUIS OKUMA 

(late prime minister of japan) 



BY 

MORTON PRINCE 




BOSTON 

RICHARD G. BADGER 

THE GORHAM PRESS 



COPTRIGHT, 1918, BY RiCHARD G. BaDGER 



All Rights Reserved 



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Made in the United States of America 



The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A. 

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CONTENTS 

PAGE 

CHAPTER , _ 

I. THE CREED OF DEUTSCHTUM ... 9 

II PRUSSIAN MILITARISM AND A LASTING 

PEACE ^^ 

The Demand for the Suppression of 

Prussian Militarism 69 

What Is Prussian Militarism? ... 74 

Prussian Militarism in Practice . . 78 
Peace by Negotiation Impossible at 

This Time ^^ 

A Conflict Between Two Principles of 

Government ^" 

III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER . 103 

Foreword by Marquis Okuma ... 107 

Introduction by Professor Shiosawa . Ill 

The Kaiser's Antipathy 11'7 

The Kaiser's Prerogatives .... 131 

The Kaiser's Divine Right Delusion . 134 

The German Autocracy and the Army 142 

The Kaiser's Sentiments 145 

The Kaiser's Self-Regarding Senti- 
ments 

Aims of the German Democracy . . . 157 
The Real Cause of the Kaiser's Antip- 
athy 16^ 

The Kaiser's Antipathy an Obsession 

and a Defense Reaction .... 169 

The Moral ^'^^ 



4 CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

IV. THE AMERICAN VERSUS THE GERMAN 

VIEWPOINT 175 

French and German Lessons at the 

Front 175 

Songs the Germans Sing . ... 177 

An American Viewpoint .... 178 

Scores Were Shot Down .... 181 

Shot to Defend Sister 182 

Attitude of German Officers . . . 187 

Why Was Louvain Burned.'* . . . 188 

General von Boehn's View .... 190 

Richard Harding Davis' Views . . 192 

Awful Price Belgians Paid .... 193 

Other Pictures Drawn 195 

The German Ideal of Government . 199 

The German Policy of Terrorism . . 201 

Proclamations Threaten .... 203 

The Evidence of German Soldiers' 

Diaries . 206 

The American Way by Contrast . . 208 

War as Taught by the German War 

Book 210 

The Policy of Destroying Merchant- 
men 212 

The Prostitution of Intellectual Hon- 
esty 214 

V. THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, 1914-15 219 

VI. THE DISINTEGRATION OF AN IDEAL . 235 

The Ideal 235 

The Contrast 252 



CONTENTS 5 

CHAPTER PAGE 

VII. THE WAR— A TEST OF THE GERMAN 

THEORY OF MILITARISM .... 265 

VIII. A WORLD CONSCIOUSNESS AND FUTURE 

PEACE 285 

The Individual Consciousness . , . 285 

Personality as Evolved by the Creative 
Force of the Experiences of Life . 288 

The Subconscious as the Dynamic 
Source of Conduct 291 

The Collective Consciousness . . . 293 

Types of Collective Consciousness . 294 

The Development of a Collective Con- 
sciousness 294 

A Common Meaning to Ideals Essential 
to a Collective Consciousness . . 297 

The Social Consciousness as the Regu- 
lator of Society . . ... . . 303 

A World Consciousness 308 



THE CREED OF DEUTSCHTUM 



AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE PHILADELPHIA 
MEDICAL SOCIETY, OCTOBER 19, 1917. 



THE CREED OF 
DEUTSCHTUM 



THE thoughts upon this great war and the 
impressions that I have brought back from 
two visits to the battle front, have not 
had so much to do with the material as- 
pects of the struggle — interesting as these are — 
as with the conflicting ideals for which the war is 
being fought on each side. Let me premise by 
saying that every visitor to England and France 
and to the western battle front has returned im- 
pressed by the gigantic scale on which this war is 
being waged and by the huge military and indus- 
trial organizations by means of which it is carried 
on. Indeed war is now a quasi business, organized 
on a colossal scale, employing millions of workers 
as well as soldiers and embracing nearly every 
sphere of human activity. 

Leaving aside the mobilization of the factories, 
the mines, the railroads and shipping, the food sup- 
plies and hundreds of industries of all sorts, the 
spectacle at the front of the vast numbers of trans- 
port lorries, the hospitals with their million of 



10 The Creed of Deutschturn 

beds, the commissariat supplying millions of men, 
the air service with its thousands of flying ma- 
chines, the extraordinarily developed intelligence 
service with its balloons and lookout posts besides 
its special aeroplanes and personnel; the telegraph 
and telephone service, the engineer service build- 
ing and caring for the railroads and motor roads 
and pipe lines for water — the spectacle of all this 
and much besides staggers the imagination. 

All these material aspects of the war are absorb- 
ingly instructive, but to my mind the most impres- 
sive thing, of which one soon becomes aware, is 
not material. It is the spirit of France and Eng- 
land. It is the national consciousness of the two 
nations. It is the unity of thought and common 
ideal which permeates the collective consciousness 
of the peoples. This ideal is the driving force 
which impels them to go on, and on, and on, and 
make no peace until the common ideal has achieved 
its end. 

You have noticed that every squeal for peace has 
come out of Germany. Every day we hear a new 
squeal. But we hear not a sound from England or 
from France. There one is conscious only of a grim 
determination to go on until the final object is 
achieved. That object is something over and be- 
yond the restoration of territory, and even beyond 
restitution for wanton destruction; and beyond in- 
demnities. 

Belgium must be restored : Yes. 

Serbia — Yes. 



The Creed of Deutschtum 11 

Northern France — Yes. 

Alsace-Lorraine — Yes, if possible. 

The liberation of all the countries now overrun — 
Yes. 

All this as a matter of course. But all this, or 
most of it, they could have had long before this if 
they had been content with going back to the status 
quo ante. 

These objects omit the one supreme and final 
aim that will satisfy the aspirations of the national 
consciousness of England and France. This aim 
is a lasting peace, and therefore the attainment of 
that end which will guarantee a lasting peace. This 
end has been named by Lloyd George and Asquith 
and Bonar Law and Balfour and all the leading 
statesmen of the Allies as the destruction of Prus- 
sian militarism. 

"Prussian militarism" is a convenient, short po- 
litical expression, easily understood and useful as 
a political slogan. But it is far from being accu- 
rate. It is far from representing the meaning of 
the real thing which has menaced the peace and 
liberty of the world for over forty years. Prussian 
militarism is only one manifestation of that thing, 
only the means which that thing employs to ac- 
complish its purposes. 

The real thing is a mystic ideal of the German 
people called Das Deutschtum.f 

I think that if we would understand France — if 
we would understand what France fears, and what 

t Sometimes translated "Germanism." 



12 The Creed of Deutschtum 

England fears; what gives those countries the for- 
titude to go on and refuse to make peace until their 
supreme object is attained, we must grasp the full 
meaning of this Thing. 

I have asked many responsible people in France 
why they are unwilling to make peace, and their 
answer has always been the same. It is the menace 
of Das Deutschtum; not formulated in that term 
it is true, but in the facts that it stands for. It is • 
thoroughly realized that so long as this menace per- 
sists there can be no lasting peace. 

We have heard a great deal of Prussian militar- 
ism, and of the military oligarchy and of the Junk- 
er class, and they alone have been held responsible 
for this war. But we have heard little in the sphere 
of practical politics of Deutschtum (or "German- 
ism") as a creed, as a mystic paranoid ideal which 
has permeated the consciousness of a whole nation, 
and we have heard little of one article of that creed, 
the so-called Mission of the German people. Few 
Americans, probably, have grasped what the Ger- 
mans mean by Deutschtum. 

I do not mean that much has not been written 
on the subject. On the contrary, the English and 
French war literature contains numerous brilliant 
essays and books exhaustively dealing with the sub- 
ject; and there is a complete literature in German 
which has been the source from which most of our 
information has been derived. But in political and 
war speeches and the responsible statements of gov- 
ernment officials little reference has been made to 



The Creed of Deutschtum 13 

these dominating ideals of the German people which 
are the real underlying force behind Prussian mili- 
tarism. As they are the dominating ideals of the 
national consciousness of Germany, so it is the dom- 
inating ideal of the national consciousness of Eng- 
land and of France to destroy them. 

We must keep in mind that Deutschtum repre- 
sents the common ideals not only of the ruling 
classes, of the University professors, historians, sci- 
entists, philosophers, of all the intellectuals, but of 
the people at large. And it is the force — a very 
specific and impelling force — which has urged the 
German people and nation onward in their mad 
drive for world dominion, and for this purpose to 
make use of Prussian militarism. 



II 



It is impossible to define Deutschtum in a 
phrase. The word is untranslatable excepting per- 
haps by ''Germandom/' which is inadequate. Das 
Deutschtum is the national consciousness of Ger- 
many so far as it pertains to conceptions of the 
state, of its power and will, of the character and 
destiny of the German race, and to the aspirations 
and political creeds of the j)eople. It also involves 
an ideal of duty and obligations owed to the state 
by every citizen of the Empire. Hence it has been 
called "a state of mind." It is a system of ideals of 
the social and political consciousness of the people 



14 The Creed of Deutschtum 

as well as of the ruling classes. It comes well nigh 
to being a social insanity. 

Deutschtum or Germandom, then, is a totality of 
ideas and sentiments, a system of mental, moral and 
political ideas organized about two closely con- 
nected central ideas, that of the state and that of 
the German people as a super-race, superior to all 
others. 

In this system there have become evolved and 
organized a number of sentiments (including na- 
tional policies ) which have been postulated as ideals 
of this national consciousness. The driving force 
of these ideals has made the German nation what 
it is and given it the will to impose its dominion 
over the rest of the world and use whatever methods 
it saw fit regardless of the opinions of the rest of 
mankind. And out of these postulates there has 
developed a creed — a creed of Deutschtum. One 
may say that Deutschtmn as a whole is the political 
creed of the German people, which like the Apos- 
tolic and other religious creeds embraces a series of 
postulates. But each postulate dogmatically ex- 
presses or is based upon the lust and the self-glori- 
fication of the German people. 

Through these self-centred ideals Germany has, 
like a paranoiac, interpreted other nations, other 
peoples, and its own relations and obligations to 
them, whether in the domain of national rights and 
morals, or international law and treaties. 

If one would seek the origin and evolution of 
Deutschtum we must go back a century or more to 



The Creed of Deutschtum 15 

the times of Frederick the Great and the immedi- 
ately post-Napoleonic period. For all students of 
Germany are agreed that the root principles and 
philosophy of Deutschtum date hack to the philos- 
ophers Hegel and Kant and Fichte, whose teach- 
ings have impregnated German thought — not only 
that of the so-called intellectuals, but of captains of 
industry, statesmen and even military writers. 

But it is enough for us to take German thought as 
of the present day just as we find it. And as finally 
evolved all are equally agreed that German ideals, 
political, moral and military, as manifested by this 
war, are due to the force of the teachings, in the 
first place, of the political historian Treitschke and 
the unbalanced philosopher Nietzsche; :j: and in the 
second place to the writings and preachings of a 
perfect swarm of university professors and other 
intellectuals who, as propagandists, have deluged 
the German people with their elaborations and sec- 
ondary rationalizations of their masters' teachings. 
A philosophy runs through all this mass of thoughf , 
and it is a fact, that needs to be considered, that 
in no country has philosophy so permeated and de- 
termined the thought of the people, other than the 
professional philosophers, and the national con- 
sciousness as in Germany. That seems incredible 
to us practical Americans. 

It will also seem incredible to many who do not 
know Germany that the scholastic classes — univer- 
sity professors and professional teachers generally, 

t He finally became insane. 



16 The Creed of Deutschtum 

should have such an influence in shaping German 
thought and the views and policies of government. 
But it must be remembered that the German sys- 
tem of education is organized to that end. In the 
first place, the higher schools and universities are 
not only under the control of the state, but, as Pro- 
fessor Dewey,* of Columbia, well says, are a part 
of state life, and the state takes a hand in the selec- 
tion of the teachers in subjects that have a direct 
bearing upon political policies. 

In the second place the professors, being 
appointees of the state, are paid henchmen just as 
much as are the appointees of Tammany in New 
York. They and their subordinates have got to shout 
for the state and its apotheosis, as much as any po- 
litical appointee, or off goes his head, or, at least, 
off goes any chance for preferment if he hopes to be 
a professor. And in the third place, one of the chief 
functions, from the State's point of view, of the 
universities is the preparation of men to become fu- 
ture state officials, members of the bureaucracy. 
We must not forget that the legislative body plays 
little part in the German government ; it is hardly 
included in the State as such. The State is the Ad- 
ministration, responsible to the Kaiser alone; and 
this bureaucracy practically derives its membership 
from the universities. University teaching, there- 
fore, shapes the thought of the Administration, the 
Kaiser, the State. Its philosophy has become inbred 
in the state ideals and the national consciousness. 

* German Philosophy and Politics. 



The Creed of Deutschtum 17 

American and ]:Cnglish professors have some mod- 
esty in inflicting their views on the world and do 
not consider it one of their functions to instruct the 
pubhc on pohtical questions. Indeed the public 
would not lend a very serious ear to their views, with 
the exception of those of a few distinguished repre- 
sentatives who can be counted almost on the fingers 
of the two hands. But in Germany the case is quite 
different. There the professors and their tribe have 
no such modesty. Indeed it is one of their functions 
to lecture the public as well as their students, and the 
public not only listens but looks to them for instruc- 
tion. The professors are the educators of Germany. 
And this is true not only of the university men but 
of the so-called Intellectuals generally. The con- 
sequence has been that during the last twenty or 
thirty years a host of such men have produced a per- 
fect deluge of books and pamphlets and articles on 
the various phases of Deutschtum. They have 
preached and hammered into the ears of the German 
people the doctrines of "Pan-Germanism," — "mor- 
ality of war," and "world dominion" and "power," 
and "the sanctity of the state" and the "chosen peo- 
ple" and the "Divine mission of Germany" and all 
that sort of thing. Since 1897 this has been partic- 
ularly resonant, because in that year this preaching 
and hammering was organized into a propaganda 
which has been going on ever since. Two organi- 
zations were formed : one directed by the professors 
with a publication called Der Kampf um das 
Deutschtum {The struggle for Germandom) ; the 



18 The Creed of Deutschtum 

other, called the Pan- Germanic League^ with a pub- 
lication of that name, directed by a noisy group of 
men who inflamed public opinion by meetings, 
pamphlets, and articles. This latter became the 
Pan-Germanic party. 

Among various other Pan-German organizations 
the Deutsche s Bund was formed in 1894 with two 
important newspapers, the Deutsche Tageszeitung 
and the Deutsche Zeitung as organs. Prince von 
Billow, former Chancellor of the Empire, who 
dates the arrival of Germany as a world power 
from 1897, has given much credit to the Pan-Ger- 
man League for its success in "stimulating" and 
"keeping alive" the sentiments taught in the schools 
and universities. All taught the various doctrines 
of Deutschtum until they became ingrained in the 
national consciousness of Germany, and the people 
became puffed up with self-glorification and came 
to believe they were the "chosen people" and had a 
mission to extend German ideas, German kultur, 
German dominion over the face of the earth; and 
many indeed to believe that they were called upon 
by God to regenerate the world. The result has 
been a most interesting sociological and psychologi- 
cal phenomenon — a quasi social insanity — a sys- 
tematized herd delusion affecting a whole people. 
And the Delusion has become the national con- 
sciousness of Germany. 

Unfortunately the rest of the world did not take 
all this as seriously as should have been done. But 
since the war began attention has been directed to 



The Creed of Deutschtum 19 

the study of these German teachings and the doc- 
trines of Deutschtum. They have been collected by 
English and French writers and quoted extensively 
in many books and pamphlets, f 

After the first shock which the unsophisticated 
receives they make dreary reading, for they are 
but reiteration and reiteration of the same ideas dif- 
fering only in the degree of emotion and extrava- 

t The following are sufRcient: Collection de Documents sur le 
Pangennanisme; public sous le direction de Mr. Charles Andler. 
(Les Origines du Pangermanisme, 1800 k 1888; Le Pangermanisme 
Continental sous Guillaunie II, de 1888 a 1914.) 

Gems (?) of German Thought; Compiled by William Archer. Dou- 
bleday. Page & Co., 1917. (This collection contains 501 Gems, ar- 
ranged by subjects. As the author says, it could easily have been 
made 1001 Gems.) 

German Ideals in 1917 and in 1914; W Andre Chevrillon. (The 
author discusses briefly the ideals with quotations from and refer- 
ences to a large number of German writers.) 

Out of Their Own Mouths [compiled by Munroe Smith]. D. Apple- 
ton, 1917. (A large collection of "utterances" arranged in accord- 
ance with the vocations of the writers — "German Rulers, Statesmen, 
Savants, Publicists, Dramatists, Poets, Businessmen, Party Leaders 
and Soldiers. 

Juges par eux-mem.es ; Paris. Berger-Levrault, 1916. 

Das annexiomstische Deutschland; "A collection of documents pub- 
lished or circulated since August 4, 1914, in Germany"; by S. Grum- 
hach; Paj'or & Co., Lausanne, 1917. (Professor Munroe Smith gives 
a resume of these in a review in The Political Science Quarterly for 
September, 1917.) 

The Kaiser; edited by Asa Don Dickenson, 1914 (contains numerous 
classic quotations from the Kaiser's utterances). 

The Kainer's Speeches; Translated and edited by Wolf von Schier- 
brand, &c. Harper & Brothers, 1903. 

My Ideas and Ideals. Kaiser Wilhelm II. Boston, John W. Luce 
& Co. 1914. (A collection of gems from the Kaisei''s utterances.) 

The War Lord; by J. M. Kennedy: Duffield & Co. 1914 (Another 
collection of the same). 

The German Emperor as Shown in His Public Utterances; by 
Christian Gault. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. 



20 The Creed of Deutschtum 

grance of delusion. They are, however, instructive 
and every American should read them. In no other 
way can one obtain an insight into German thought 
and understand Germany. They are the teachings 
of professors, and scientists, and publicists, and in- 
dustrial magnates and ministers of the Gospel, and 
military writers, and philosophers, and historians, 
and public men, and ethnologists, and travelers, 
and journalists, and poets, and what not. No won- 
der the German people believe in Das Deutschtum! 
Under such constant hammering the thickest skull 
would be penetrated at last. 

A journalist has thus sarcastically but accurately 
summed up this propaganda for Das Deutschtum: 

For a generation before the war modern Germany trav- 
estied Bismarck's calculated violence while incapable of his 
wisdom. Every sedentary professor, puffed up with 
swipes and imitation, imagined himself to be a son of iron 
and a potential man of blood. More and more the speech 
and writing of the whole nation became heavy with pas- 
sionate words and menacing metaphor. Swords, mailed 
fists, and hammers jangled in this clanking vocabulary, 
but, on the whole, the hammers had it. The poet's word 
that one must be 'either hammer or anvil' was repeated 
like a creed. Wagner, the race-worshipping historians, 
the two kinds of Pan-Germans, idealist and materialist, 
and a theatrical Kaiser in a helmet, made mythology a 
worse agent of delirium than alcohol. 

Ill 

I have no intention of covering again this dreary, 
if shocking, ground of German Ideals"; I want 
only to restate one or two of their postulates which 



The Creed of Deutschtuvi 21 

are fundamental and from which as premises are 
derived the most dangerous dehision in the Creed 
of Deutschtum — dangerous for the future peace of 
the world. These postulates are the I, IV and IX 
articles of the creed which itself may be formulated 
without doing violence to the claims of the Ger- 
mans themselves as follows: 

Ten Articles of the Creed of Deutschtum 

I. I believe in the apotheosis of the State, person- 
ified as the supreme Will and idealized as Power, 
above morality, treaties and international law; 
and I believe a State when without physical Power 
ceases to be a State and becomes a community 
without rights. 
II. I believe in militarism as the Pillar of the State 
and the means by which the Will and Power 
of the State shall overcome all resistance and 
rule over all other wills and extend the sover- 
eignty of Germany and Germanism. 

III. I believe that war is sacred and moral; and that 
f rightfulness is a justified method by which mil- 
itarism may effect the aims of Germany when 
resisted. 

IV. I believe the German race to be a biologically su- 
per-race and the Salt of the Earth, the Chosen of 
God. 
V. I believe there are no inherent, inalienable and 
natural rights of mankind which the State is 
obliged to respect and which are reserved to the 
people as in democracies. 

VI. I believe it to be the duty of every individual to 
subordinate his will to the will of the State, which 
is above the will of private and public opinion and 
not responsible to the latter. 

And I believe that every German is a citizen- 
soldier obligated to work and fight in his own 



22 The Creed of Deutschtum 

sphere of activity, not for his own private inter- 
ests but for German greatness and to propagate 
the German idea throughout the world; to the 
end that Germany may in every way — pohtically, 
economically, industrially, intellectually and mili- 
tarily dominate all other races and peoples. 
VII. I believe that Germany has a mission to extend 
her territories and power at the expense of less 
meritorious and inferior people — as all other peo- 
ple are. 
VIII. I believe the German State collaborates with 
God, and in the subjugation of weaker people 
is carrying out the Will of God. 
IX. I believe the State and the German people have 
a mission to extend German kultur and German 
ideas throughout the people of the earth and 
thus regenerate the world. 
X. I believe the Western ideas of Democracy, Liber- 
ty and Liberalism — the "declarations of Rights" 
of the great Western nations (particularly the 
American Declaration of 1774 and the French 
Declaration of 1789), the American doctrine of 
"inherent and inalienable rights" reserved to the 
people and which no government can take away 
— are antiquated, effete and harmful; I believe 
the present war is a conflict between German 
ideals and Western Democratic ideals ; and the 
new Gospel of the autocratic German State is 
to supersede the liberal gospel of liberty and gov- 
ernment by the people of the Western Democ- 
racies. 

Some of these articles are secondary "rationaiiz- 
ings" from the fundamental ideals. I have in 
mind here only to amplify the conception of the 
State (I), the idea of the Germans being a super- 
race (IV) , and particularly the Mission of the Ger- 
man people (IX). 



The Creed of Deutschtum 23 

Article I. The German Conception of the State 

The conception of the State as Power, and hav- 
ing a lot of other metaphysical attributes, has been 
repeated over and over again in parrot fashion so 
many times that it has become a mystic article of 
faith. Its very mysticism lends to it force and ease 
<jf proselytizing, as is the case with a religious dog- 
ma, which this metaphysical notion of State has 
very nearly become. The phrase formulated by 
Treitschke "The State is Power" has become a 
shibboleth. The idea dates back to Lasson, who 
v/rote in 1868, and perhaps it is of earlier date for 
all I know. But Treitschke furnished this formula, 
which tickles the ear. It is made up of words which 
severally have meaning, but when incorporated in 
a phrase have no meaning at all. One might as 
well say that "a civic community is a funded debt" 
or, "a university is an autocratic will." Yet the 
formula has intoxicated Germany into a blind wor- 
ship of Power and the creation of militarism as the 
pillar on which that power shall rest; it has deluded 
them into elevating might above everything else in 
the world and inculcating the mystic belief that in 
this worship of Power is the allegiance owed to the 
State. 

Then, amongst its other attributes, the State is 
an entity, a mystic personality; it is the Absolute; 
the sovereign in everything — morals, will, and 
everything else. Some extremists would even en- 
dow it with Divinity, "The State is God on earth," 



24 The Creed of Deutschtum 

as Prof. Dewey of Columbia sums up the doctrine 
of Hegel who said, "The march of God in history 
is the cause of the existence of States." Indeed 
"history is the movement, the march of God on 
earth through time" (Dewey). Hence, as argued 
by a German, to surrender any territory which Ger- 
many has conquered in the present war would be 
sacrilegious. In this political philosophy Germany 
is conceived, as Professor Durkeim has phrased it, 
as the highest terrestrial incarnation of divine 
power. 

These attributes are of practical importance be- 
cause, for instance, from the dogmas of the sover- 
eignty of the will and in morals are derived the 
axioms that the State can break treaties and in- 
ternational law when it wills, and that in war as 
well as in peace, the State is above the laws of mor- 
ality and humanity, which only apply to individ- 
uals. The sovereignty of the will of the State nec- 
essarily extends to public opinion. This kind of a 
state, conceived of as a mystic personal entity, is 
not, as in democracies, the expression of public 
opinion but something apart from and above it. It 
may or may not, as it pleases, take into considera- 
tion the will of the people, or classes of the people. 
Indeed there can scarcely be a will of the people, 
for absolute obedience to the will of the State is 
the highest duty of the citizens. There is perfect 
freedom of opinion, but the duty of all is to obey. 
This has a different significance from the obliga- 
tion, in democracies, of every citizen to obey the 



The Creed of Deutschtum 2,5 

State. For in Democracies if the "State" adopts 
methods, or pohcies, or morals, or behavior disap- 
proved by the majority, out goes the "State," i. e., 
the administration, bag and baggage. Society gov- 
erns. 

The Kaiser once said, "There is no law but my 
law; there is no will but my will," and the world 
outside Germany first gasped at the audacity, and 
then smiled at what it thought personal, swash- 
buckling, autocratic arrogance. But in reality it 
was only this German conception of the State, for 
the Kaiser symbolized the State in his person. And, 
similarly, his saying, "Considering myself as the 
instrument of the Lord, and without heeding the 
views and opinions of the day, I ^o my way," was 
only another way of asserting, in accordance with 
Articles I, V and VI of the Creed, that the will 
of the State was superior to that of society. 

This dogma that the State is power justifies the 
invasion and rape of Belgium, because, of course 
as logically follows, a State is a State only just so 
far as it has power. "A so-called small state is 
not a state at all, but only a tolerated community 
which absurdly pretends to be a State." . . . "The 
lesser states have rights only in so far as they pos- 
sess a power of resistance that must be taken into 
account." (Lasson.) 

One ideal which has been of wonderful assistance 
to the German Empire, both in its internal de- 
velopment and in its policy of dominating other 
peoples, has logically resulted from this mystic con- 



26 The Creed of Deutschtum 

ception of the State and the duty of obedience to 
the will of the State. But it has had a most malign 
influence upon the welfare of other peoples. It is 
the ideal that every German, on the one hand, should 
subordinate his private interests and rights to the 
interests of the State, and, on the other, that as a 
citizen soldier, he is obligated to work and fight in 
his own sphere of activity to further the ideals and 
policies and aggressions of the Fatherland — the 
ideals of Das Deutschtum. 

This ideal has been taught and fostered by the 
State in the school and university until it has be- 
come ingrained in the personality of every Ger- 
man. It has been the motivating force underlying 
the German propaganda in America and elsewhere, 
and gives the real insidious meaning to the notorious 
Delbriick law which claims a continuing allegiance 
to the Fatherland of every German naturalized in 
a foreign country. Mr. Kuno Francke, who until 
very recently was Professor at Harvard Univer- 
sity, has borne testimony to this devotion of every 
German to the national conception of State and 
the obligations that it entails. I shall have occasion 
to quote him as a witness in several connections, 
as he is one of the most conservative of Americans 
of German birth and education and one who has 
won the respect of the community because of his 
refusal, out of a sense of duty to his adopted coun- 
try, to join at the outset of the war the intriguing 
group of German propagandists in this country of 
which Miinsterberg and Dernberg were leaders. 



The Creed of Deutschtum 27 

Professor Francke, however, has appealed, some- 
what naively, I think, for American approbation 
of German ideals without an apparent thought that 
those ideals which he lavishly extols can only shock 
the American conscience. However that may be, 
his testimony, as that of one who knows his Ger- 
many, is of value. In regard to the solidarity of 
German sentiment regarding the State and duties 
of citizens he has said: 

No doubt there never was a conception of the state 
among any people from Avhich this moral and disciplinary 
view was entirely absent. But not since Plato's time has 
this view anywhere been a national force as truly vital 
and all embracing as it has come to be in modern Prussia 
and Germany. It has imbued the whole German people, 
as no other people is imbued, with the spirit of national 
service and national achievement. The modern German 
mind instinctively^ refuses to accept any of the thousand 
and one private activities that constitute the daily life 
of a people as something really private and isolated. The 
farmer and the miner, the factory hand and the sailor, 
the business man and the preacher, the scholar and the 
artist — they are all soldiers, soldiers for German great- 
ness and progress ; and their spheres of activity, far apart 
as they may seem from cacli other, are in reality on one 
and the same level, t!ie level of the fight for making Ger- 
many in every way, politically, economically, intellec- 
tually, and morally — a self-supporting, self-reljnng, con- 
spicuously healthy and conspicuously productive national 
organism.* 

Professor Francke, it is true, has adroitly nar- 
rowed the conception of the State to "preeminently 

* "The War— A Test of the German Theory of the State" (The 
Problems and Lessons of the War: Clark University Addresses: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons. 1916). 



28 The Creed of Deutschtum 

a moral agency superior to society," "its principal 
mission" being "to raise the individuals that make 
up society to a higher level of public consciousness 
and energy." But the German "conception of the 
state" is too well known to be concealed by this 
camouflage. The solidarity of sentiment and mob- 
ilization of the people is the point. 

Article IV. The Germans a Super-Race 

The inrooted belief that the German race is a 
super-race is a cardinal article of the Deutschtum 
creed. To justify this belief appeal has been made 
to a mythical biological race-type (to which it is 
claimed Germans alone belong) ; to heredity and an- 
thropology, to history and legend, supported by the 
achievements of the much vaunted German kultur. 
The race-type has been claimed to be characterized 
by blue eyes and blond hair and complexion ; and his- 
torians and "race-biologists" have tried to show that 
when men of genius have appeared in other nations 
they were blonds and had blue eyes and therefore 
were descendants of the German race. 

Anthropologists and other scientists and so-called 
"race-biologists" like Houston Chamberlain, have 
not hesitated, as no greater biologist than Profes- 
sor Jacques Loebf of the Rockefeller Institute has, 
amongst others, pointed out, to misrepresent sci- 
entific principles of heredity and evolution and put 
forward a pseudo-science by which they have ap- 

t Biology and War; Science, Jan. 26, 1917. 



The Creed of DeutscJitum 29 

pealed to the vanity, and captivated the self-esteem 
of the people. Running through Pan-Germanic 
literature one finds this idea of a super-race con- 
stantly and frankly stated, or connoted, or assumed. 
The following well known quotations from the 
utterances of important people from the Kaiser 
down are illustrative. They could be multiplied a 
thousand fold ad nauseam. 

We are the salt of the earth. 

We are the chosen people. 

Many are called but few are chosen. 

We are of all the peoples, the most noble, the most 
pure, destined before others to work for the highest 
development of humanity. 

Deutschland is above everything, above everything in 
the world. 

We are indubitably the most martial nation in the 
world. . . . 

We are the most gifted of nations in all the domains of 
science and art. We are the best colonists, the best 
sailors and even the best traders. 

Germany is so far above and beyond all the other 
nations that all the rest of the earth, be they who they 
may, should feel themselves well cared for when they are 
allowed to fight with the dogs for the crumbs that fall 
from her table. 

The Teutons are the aristocracy of Humanity. 

Whosoever has the characteristics of the Teuton race 
is superior . . . the cultural value of a nation is measured 
by the quantity of Tcutonism it contains. 

Immoral, of course, is a policy of power if it is em- 
ployed, as amongst our enemies, to supplant the higher 
German culture and morality by the much lower English, 
French, or Russian culture (or lack of cultui*e). 



30 The Creed of Deutschtum 

The Teutons are the aristocracy of humanity; the 
Latins, on the contrary, belong to the degenerate mob. 

The German people is always right, because it is the 
German people and numbers 87 million souls. 

I want first to make it clear in what sense we may say, 
without extravagance or the least trace of self -exaltation : 
Germany is chosen, for her own good and that of other 
nations, to undertake their guidance. Providence has 
placed the appointed people, at the appointed moment, 
ready for the appointed task. 

Here in America even Prof. Francke has sung 
the same swan song : 

No unprejudiced observer of contemporary Euro- 
pean affairs can get away from the fact that Germany 
during the last fifty years has excelled all other coun- 
tries in eagerness and momentum of private initiative. 
The German schoolboy is more eager to learn, the Ger- 
man university student is more firmly set upon independ- 
ent research, the German workman has a higher level of 
average intelligence, the German farmer is more scien- 
tific in the cultivation of his soil, the German manufac- 
turer is more ready to introduce new methods of produc- 
tion, the German business man is more active in finding 
new outlets for his goods, the German city administrator 
is more keenly alive to civic improvements, the German 
army and navy officer is more fully abreast with every 
new experiment or device of military tactics, all Germans 
are keyed up to a more intense, a more swiftly pulsating 
manner of life than is the case in any one of the nations 
with which Germany is now at war. All this intensity 
of private initiative, I believe, is largely due to the im- 
pelling force exerted upon the individual by the exalted 
views instinctively held by all Germans regarding the 
mission and the functions of the state.;]: 

t Loc. cit. 



The Creed of Deutschturn 31 

Article IX. The Holy Mission of the German 

People 

This belief in race and kultur superiority would 
be harmless and could be laughed at if it had not 
led to calamitous consequences. From this belief 
as one premise, and the mystic conception of the 
State embodied in and taught by Das Deutschtum 
as another, Germany has justified and stimulated 
her lust for power and territory by the conclusion 
that it is the mission of a superior race to extend 
itself at the expense of inferior races over the rest 
of the world. And, therefore, the German people 
have this mission on this earth: to extend Deutsch- 
tum over all other peoples, European, American 
and Asiatic, to regenerate the world for the benefit 
of humanity. It is the same idea that the white 
races have, or have had as to their duties towards 
uncivilized races — "the white man's burden." This 
is the principal theme to which I wish to speak. 

However grotesque the idea may appear, or how- 
ever much of a moral insanity it may be regarded, 
it is real — a real, vital, impelling force and must be 
taken seriously. It is, indeed, the great sociological 
obsessing delusion with which, to state it conserva- 
tively, the dominant classes of Germany have be- 
come affected. It has become a national ideal. 

It is not always easy in analysing a psychologi- 
cal obsession to determine the basic causal root ideas 
from which the obsession has sprung. As a iiile, 
every obsession has its roots in several antecedent 



32 The Creed of Deutschtum 

ideas which cooperate in the final mental state, and 
around which others become systematized through 
processes of rationalizing. Students of German- 
dom, or "Germanism," therefore, differ somewhat 
in their conclusions on this point. But my view 
would be that the main psychological roots of this 
obsession are to be found in the two premises I 
have mentioned. But systematized with them in the 
delusional belief and as cooperative ideas, reached 
by the process of rationalization are the doctrines 
of so-called Prussian militarism, the sanctity of war 
and the justification of f rightfulness as necessary 
methods. 

In the light of this German state of mind with 
all its obsessing ideas, and in the light of German 
world-wide activities and propagandism, the idea 
''Deutschland ilber Alles" so widely popularized in 
song and speech, acquires a deeper and wider mean- 
ing than military and economic sovereignty, or po- 
litical sovereignty over Mittel-Europa and other 
territories belonging to other people. It means in 
addition that the German State is above all other 
states, above international law, above morality, 
above civil society, above all private rights, above 
public opinion; and its will is above the will of 
all individuals (singly or collectively) whose duty 
is to obey. And it means that German ideas, Ger- 
man Kultur, and everything that the German idea 
stands for — world-power, world-markets, world- 
kultur ("Weltmacht, Weltmarht, Welthultur') — 
is to be extended throughout the world. As Prince 



The Creed of Detttschtum 33 

von Billow said, "Germany above everything, ev- 
erything in the world." In this Deutschtum is 
summed up. 

This idea of a world mission is a very old one, 
and has agitated German thought for a century at 
least. At the commencement of the last century 
the philosopher Fichte taught that "the Germans, 
of all the modern nations, had received in special 
measure into their safekeeping the seeds of human 
perfection," and that it had been entrusted to them 
to take the leading part in their development in 
the great confederation of a new humanity. "Since 
then," as Lavisse and Andler remark, "that mag- 
nificent and mystic declaration of haughty pride 
has been repeated a hundred times."* These au- 
thors go on to point out that Heinrich Heine in 
his time had announced that "Not only Alsace and 
Lorraine, but the whole of France and Europe, 
and the world itself will find salvation and become 
ours. Yes, the whole world shall be German. I 
have often dreamed of that mission of the univer- 
sal domination of Germany when I was walking 
in my reveries under the evergreen pines of my 
fatherland." 

A few quotations from more recent writers — 
which I take from various collections and other 
writings — will suffice to present the point of view: 

He who does not believe in the Divine mission of 
Germany had better hang himself, and rather to-day 
than to-morrow. — H. S. Chamberlain. 
* German Theory and Practice of War. 



34 The Creed of DeutscTitum 

We are indeed entrusted here on earth with a 
doubly sacred mission: not only to protect Kultur . . . 
against the narrow-hearted huckster-spirit of a thor- 
oughly corrupted and inwardly rotten commercialism 
(Jobbertum), but also to impart Kultur in its most au- 
gust purity, nobility and glory to the whole of humanity, 
and thereby contribute not a little to its salvation. Ein 
Deut seller: Was uns der Krieg bringen muss. 

Germany is the future of humanity — Pastor W. Leh- 
mann. 

God defend the noble cause of Deutschtum. There is 
no other hope for the future of humanity. — H. S. Cham- 
berlain, 1914. 

We must vanquish, because the downfall of German- 
ism would mean the downfall of humanity. — Pastor K. 
Konig. 

The German people must rise as a master-folk above 
the inferior peoples of the colonies. — Grossdeutschland 
und Mitteleuropa um das Jalir 1950, von einem Alldeuts- 
cJien, 1895. 

A great mission, scarcely comprehensible to other na- 
tions, is unquestionably reserved for the whole German 
character {Anlage) [which is defined as] the spirit of 
pure humanity [and the mission as] the ennoblement 
of the world. — Richard Wagner. 

We hope that a great mission will be allotted to us 
Germans . . . and this German mission is : to look after 
the world {zu sorgen filr die Welt). Is it arrogance to 
write such a phrase? Is it vanity in the disguise of 
a moral idea? No, no, and again no. — Pastor G. 
Traube, 1914. 

It is my firm belief that the country to which God 
gave Luther, Goethe, Bach, Wagner, Moltke, Bismarck 
and William I. has still a great mission before it, to 
work for the welfare of humanity. God has put us 
to a hard probation . . . that we may the better serve 
as His instrument for the saving of mankind; for we 
were on the point of becoming untrue to our old-estab- 



The Creed of Deutschtuin 35 

lished nature (Wesen). He who has imposed upon us 
this ordeal will also help us out of it. — Extract from 
letter of an important personage, but unnamed, to H. S. 
Chamberlain. 

God has in Luther practically chosen the German peo- 
ple, and that can never be altered, for is it not written 
in Romans XI, 29, "For the gifts and calling of God 
are without repentance." — Dr. Preuss. 

We have entered into the war with hearts high and 
pure, permeated with the aspirations of our national fu- 
ture. That future we will fill with the blossoms of our 
culture; it is assured to us by the desire that inspires 
and unites all Germans to raise the world to full noble- 
ness and perfection. — Historian Lamprecht. 

Papacy and Empire are both Teutonic organizations 
for domination, meant to subjugate the world. The Teu- 
tonic race is called to circle the earth with its rule, 
to exploit the treasures of nature and of human labor 
power, and to make the passive races servient elements 
in its cultural development. — Ludwig Woltmann. 

The poet Wolf skehl declares : 

To-day the question is that of the life or death of 
European culture. Your accomplices sin against the 
Holy Ghost of Europe. We make this war for all the 
humanity of Europe. This war comes from God. The 
divine clement in humanity is at stake. 

Professor Mahling announced : 

The hour of the world-mission of the German people 
had struck. . . . Do we desire to be the hammer which 
God wields.'' 

And thus we might go on quoting tediously and 
almost indefinitely from German writers upholding 
the mission of Germany in one or other of its 
aspects. 

And so there has developed this most dangerous 



36 The Creed of Deutschtum 

of the ideals of Das Deutschtum which postulates 
the Mission (sometimes called "divine" and "holy") 
of Germany to expand and regenerate the world 
according to German ideas for the benefit of hu- 
manity. It is not difficult to understand that some 
extremists, holding that the State itself is divine, 
or derives its power from God, or is the instrument 
of God, or collaborator with God, believe that this 
mission is a Holy Mission; and that the "chosen 
people" are called "to live and expand at the ex- 
pense of other less meritorious people." In other 
words, as one American writer, Arthur Bullard, 
phrases it, the Germans believe they have been 
called of God to regenerate the world. Hence 
"Deutschtum is a crusade" — a political religion. 

How widely the notion of a holy authority for 
this mission obtains there is no means of knowing. 
But considering the mystic elevation of the state, 
the almost universality of the belief that every Ger- 
man is obligated to work for the power and domin- 
ion of the state; that his highest duty is his duty 
to the state, subordinating all private rights and 
interests to that end, that the spread of Germanism 
would be for the glory and power and advantage 
of the state and the greatest good of humanity, the 
spiritual force of this mission is almost as great 
under the authority of the State as if it were uni- 
versally felt to be one ordained by God as many 
really do insist. 

The notion of collaboration with God crops out 
in nearly every speech, order or proclamation the 



The Creed of Deutschtum 37 

Kaiser makes, and takes on a fuller meaning when 
the national ideal of a mission is kept in mind. 
When we also bear in mind that the regeneration 
of the world, which the mission of Deutschtum 
would bring about, intends, the supplanting of the 
ideals of the Eastern and the Western world with 
the German ideals of the elevation of the state above 
all moral laws and international law, of the deifica- 
tion of Force, the deification of War as holy, the 
sacred duty of violating treaties, the obligation to 
use Frightfulness, and so on, we realize the danger 
to lasting peace from this ideal of Deutschtum 
which is the inspiring force of the German nation. 



IV 



Notwithstanding all the extensive literature of 
Deutschtum, the thoughtful reader will ask himself 
to what extent its ideals have permeated the 
masses as well as the classes of the German people. 
It is very easy to overwork a fact as well as an 
idea, and the tendency is to overstatement in po- 
litical argument. The very fact that it was thought 
necessary in Germany to organize such extensive 
campaigns and to harangue the German people 
about German and Pan-German ideals suggests at 
least an original general apathy or ignorance and 
need of a propaganda. How far has this been over- 
come? 

We never know until after the votes are counted 



38 The Creed of Deutschtu7n 

what the opinion of the people is. Now the point 
I have in mind is how far does the great silent 
thought of the people share these ideals which have 
been so noisily taught by the classes? Suppose 
that a questionnaire on the creed of Germandom 
were circulated throughout the whole people of 
Germany, how would the masses answer the ques- 
tions ? Probably no one inside or outside Germany 
really knows. But it is probable that as in all coun- 
tries they would follow their leaders when it came 
to action. We know that the Kaiser, the govern- 
ment and the controlled press, the Junkers and the 
commercial and industrial groups represented by 
six of the most important industrial and agricul- 
tural associations, the intellectuals, the military and 
naval castes, the captains of industries, the conser- 
vative and liberal political parties and many other 
class groups are devotees to the creed of Das 
Deutschtum either as a whole or in one or more 
of its articles of faith. According to the concrete 
issues to the front at any time one ideal naturally 
dominates the thought of the day to the exclusion 
of others. Just at present the war has necessarily 
forced into the focus of interest the Pan-Germanic 
idea of extension of territory by annexation of the 
conquered countries. * Opinion on this issue is 

* For an important account and discussion of German opinion on 
tliis point see "German Land Hunger" by Professor Munroe Smith 
in the Political Science Quarterly for September 1917. This article 
is a review of "Das annexionistische Deutschland" (A collection of 
documents published or circulated in Germany since Aug. 4, 1914) by 
S. Grumbach, Payot & Co., Lausanne, 1917. 



Tlie Creed of Deutschtum 39 

necessarily more or less governed or modiified from 
time to time by the requirements of practical poli- 
tics and the changing war situations. It would ap- 
pear, however, from the evidence in hand, that the 
dominant opinion of the classes looks upon the pres- 
ent hour as the golden opportunity to grasp the 
fruits of military victory and thus at last bring to 
fruition this particular long-cherished aspiration of 
Das Deutschtum by annexing Belgium, northern 
France, the Baltic provinces, Poland and large 
slices of Russia. On the other hand, the Social 
Democrats have consistently, since 1914, repudi- 
ated "annexations," but as Munroe Smith! shows 
us, "the majority group did not reject territorial 
guarantees and securities," evidently infected by 
the patriotic hysteria of the war fever. 

The Social-Democrats 

To Das Deutschtum, as a whole the members of 
this large political group have been classed as "dis- 
senters," if not heretics. Indeed it is difficult to 
see how this democratic party — for such it really is 
— can have reconciled some of these articles of faith 
with their own party platforms. Indeed it has been 
opposed to the doctrine of war, a large military 
establishment and colonial expansion. In its last 
jjarty platform of 1912 the social-democrats defi- 
nitely recorded themselves on these points. Then, 
too, the long and bitter struggle which they carried 

t loc. cit. 



40 The Creed of Deutschtum 

on for years against the Government, since the 
time of Bismarck, can only be interpreted as a re- 
pudiation of that conception of the State which has 
been so systematically taught by the schools and 
universities. On the other hand, concrete issues in 
which they have opposed the State have related 
mostly to internal reforms, such as the ballot, and 
have not touched the philosophy of Pan-German- 
ism. But it is also true that the doctrine of a Super- 
Germanic, blue-eyed, and blond-race has infected 
the proletarian socialists as well as the other classes. 
The members of this group are human and Ger- 
mans as well as social-democrats, and the doctrines 
of the superiority of the German race and its mis- 
sion to regenerate the world are not incompatible 
with their platform, and have touched the soft spots 
of egotism and vanity in their personalities. It is 
expecting too much of human nature that they 
should not have accepted the teachings of renowned 
students and historians and "race-biologists" who 
have dinned into their ears their superiority over 
all other races and the great benefit that will come 
to humanity by the "peaceful penetration" of the 
world by German kultur. And so they have shut 
their eyes to the methods of intrigue, and deceit, 
and espionage, by which peaceful penetration was 
being brought about. The "mission" of Germany 
activated largely by the super-race delusion re- 
ceived from them little if any resistance. It is 
only to the militaristic methods of regenerating the 
world that they have taken exception. 



The Creed of Deutschtum 41 

That the majority of the social-democrats have 
largely supported the government afte?' war was 
declared proves nothing. 

We are allowed to know so little of what has 
been going on inside German}^ since war was begun 
that no one outside probably can speak from direct 
knowledge. But there are a few known facts and 
certain general principles that can be offered with- 
out danger of being wrong. 

In the first place, we know that all Germans have 
been made to believe — probably because they want- 
ed to believe — that Germany was attacked, and the 
social-democrats always said they would defend the 
Fatherland if attacked. As Francke who knows 
his Fatherland has testified : 

They [the masses as well as the intellectuals] believe 
that Germany has been the victim of a world-wide coali- 
tion to rob her of the legitimate fruits of her unre- 
mitting toil for national organization and to crush the 
spirit of national solidarity that has led to German 
ascendency in nearly every field of higher activity. What- 
ever may be one's views as to the historical basis for 
this belief, there can be no doubt that it is this belief 
more than anything else which is giving Germany in this 
war an extraordinary heroic strength. . . . Over and 
over again she has been blocked in these enterprises by 
the ill will of her more grasping rivals, and it is hard 
to resist the conclusions that the present war was en- 
tered upon by her enemies with the hope of shutting 
her out once for all from the great stakes of colonial 
expansion.;}: 

Nothing was more naive than the expectation 
that social-democrats would be disloyal to their 

t loc. cit. 



42 The Creed of Deutschtum 

country after war was declared. They were opposed 
to the declaration of war and disavowed all respon- 
sibility therefor. But the Fatherland being en- 
gaged in war it became another matter. 

In the second place, it is a common, everyday 
observation that nearly every person, once in a fight, 
forgets the cause and the principles at issue and 
goes in to win. 

Thirdly, social-democrats are patriots and the 
great mass of patriots in any country are, like all 
bred-in-the~bone Americans, for their country, 
"right or wrong." 

Fourthly, it is a well-known psychological fact 
that persons who have broken away, later in life, 
from the early and deeply inculcated sentiments 
and principles of youth and accepted new points 
of view on intellectual grounds, afterwards in times 
of stress, like war, or misfortune, or danger, tend 
to revert to those earlier ingrained sentiments in 
which feeling is strongly incorporated. And they 
also revert to the influence of the primitive instincts 
which had been brought under control by the social 
education. Striking examples of this principle we 
have seen amongst the hyphenated (German) 
Americans in this country. 

We can safely say, then, in spite of their attitude 
during the war, that most of the ideals of Das 
Deutschtum were not shared on the whole by the 
social-democrats before the war. And there is good 
reason to believe that when the time comes for 
peace, this large group of Germans will be found 



Tlie Creed of Deutschtum 43 

to support the demand of the rest of the world for 
the suppression of Prussian miHtarisni and Prus- 
sian autocracy. With the subsidence of the excite- 
ment of war the principles of democracy will once 
again become dominant in their thoughts. 

As to the mass of the rest of the German "peo- 
ple,"* we have to guide us the information brought 
out of Germany by foreign diplomats and corre- 
spondents of the press and the testimony of neu- 
trals who have resided or travelled in Germany 
after the outbreak of war, and we have the utter- 
ances of so-called representative men and of the 
press, the parliamentary debates of party repre- 
sentatives and a vast mass of writings. Through 
all this there runs a concordance of testimony show- 
ing few discordant notes amongst the Germans 
themselves. Undoubtedly these notes would be 
more strident and more numerous if it were not 
for the official censorship. But, also undoubtedly, 
the intolerant social censorship of the majority pub- 
lic opinion is quite as powerful in suppressing in- 
dividual revolt as the official censorship. That is 
true in all communities. And in Germany, as else- 
where, there must be a large number of the ignorant 
and the uneducated, the "boobs," who are too unin- 
telligent to have any opinions at all on national 
ideals and therefore on the philosophy and the ideals 
of Das Deutschtum. These can be left out of ac- 

* I put aside the Pan-Germanists, Junkers and other groups whose 
sentiments are well known to be those of Das Deutschtum. 



44 The Creed of Deutschtum 

count. It is only the dominants that count. But 
of the dominant intelligent classes, aside from the 
military caste, whether men of business affairs en- 
gaged in manufactures, and commerce, and finance, 
and industry, or of the professions, or agriculture, 
or other vocations, the evidence goes to show, as 
many have pointed out, the vast majority have ac- 
cepted and become inoculated with the teachings 
of the universities and higher schools and of the 
"intellectuals." They have become permeated with 
the ideals of the Creed of Deutschtum until these 
have become habits of thought and second nature. 
Of course one ideal is more controlling in one 
mind and one in another. We have only to look 
about us in this country and note the sentiments of 
Germans and so-called German- Americans, bom 
and educated in Germany but now living in our 
midst. Nearly all these, almost without exception, 
even moderate men like Professor Francke who 
wish to be loyal to American ideals were, before 
we entered the war, dominated by German thought, 
German ideals, and admiration for German kultur. 
These men, under the reactionary impulses awak- 
ened by the war, reverted, as was natural, to the in- 
culcated teaching of their youth. 

But the "state of mind" of Germans in the 
United States is only in part to be ascribed to 
reversion. In large part it was due to systematic 
organized propaganda, begun and carried on for 
years before the war. (Article VI of Creed.) It 
was carried on by a German language press and 



The Creed of Deutschtum 45 

by German societies of different kinds, possibly by 
some unconscious of its deeper purpose. This 
purpose was to spread and inculcate the ideas of 
Das Deutschtum in America as has been done in 
South America and other countries. Indeed, ac- 
counts have been written by German- Americans 
recording the progress of the "German idea" in 
the United States. t 

This invasion has been a part of the "peaceful 
penetration" which the German government and 
nation have persistently carried on in nearly all 
countries in quest of world dominion. The German 
"idea" is so utterly hostile to American ideals that 
its penetration into America can only be regarded 
as a menace to our institutions. And the German 
societies engaged, consciously or unconsciously, in 
spreading Das Deutschtum in the United States 
must be viewed as dangerous elements. 

The upshot of these two forces — reversion and 
propagandism — is that the state of mind of Ger- 
mans in the United States fairly reflects that of 
their countrymen in the Fatherland. If we want 
to understand the dominant state of mind of Ger- 
mans at home we have only to examine that of 
those here in America. 

The situation has been, then, fairly summed up 
by Professor Francke when he said, in December, 

t Notably Dos Deutschtum in den Vereinigten Staaten by Julius 
Goebel, professor in the University of Chicago: and Das Deutschtum 
der Vereinigten Staaten, by Professor Karl Knortz, Superintendent 
of Schools at Evansville, Indiana (1898). 



46 The Creed of Deutschtum 

1915, although possibly without realizing how it 
would sound to American ears : 

With the exception of a few Socialist theorizers, not 
a German has lifted his voice during the last twelve- 
month but to declare that this war is the decisive test of 
German nationality, of everything for which Germans 
have lived and died in the past. American observers 
have frequently expressed surprise that the intellectual 
and spiritual leaders of the Germany of to-day, scien- 
tists like Haeckel and Ostwald, philosophers like Eucken 
and Wundt, philologists like Wilmanowitz and Diels, his- 
torians like Eduard Meyer and Erich Marcks, economists 
like Schmoller and Wagner, theologians like Harnack 
and Troeltzsch, musicians like Humperdinck and Strauss, 
poets like Dehmel and Gerhardt Hauptmann — are all of 
one mind in this crisis, and that in their individual or 
collective utterances they lay much more stress upon 
conviction than argument. The reason, I think, is that 
these men, and with them the masses of the German peo- 
ple, feel that the German cause in this war needs no 
logical defense, that it is impossible to think that the 
most orderly, industrious, intelligent, law-abiding, sober 
and spiritually minded of nations should suddenly become 
insane, and from sheer madness of passion and lust of 
conquest have plunged into a war of aggression against 
the majority of the world's military powers, in other 
words into what to all outward appearances would seem 
certain self-destruction. J 

V 

It is safe, then, to say that the policies, methods 
and utterances of the statesmen and public men 
of Germany, however shocking they have been to 
our ears, have in no way misrepresented the sen- 

t loc. cit. 



The Creed of Deutschtum 47 

timents of the German people as a whole. 

When the Kaiser in a speech in 1905 declared 
"We are the salt of the earth," all the world outside 
of Germany smiled and thought to itself, it is only 
one of the Kaiser's exuberant boastings and vain- 
glorious phrases. But he had not coined the phrase 
although he made it famous. It was only a trite, 
banal exclamation which had been repeated hun- 
dreds of times by others and belonged to the thought 
of Das Deutschtum. It was as commonplace to 
German ears as it would be to Americans, if the 
President had said, "the American flag is the most 
glorious of flags"; or, "America is 'the home of the 
brave and the land of the free.' " 

And likewise, when the Kaiser said, in 1907, at 
Miinster : 

Let all the old and new subjects of this Empire, the 
citizens, the peasants, the working men, unite in one and 
the same sentiment of love and fidelity towards the Fath- 
erland, and the German people will be the block of gran- 
ite, upon which our Lord God will he able to raise and 
perfect the chnlization of the world; it is then that the 
saying of the poet will be made good: "The world some 
day will owe its salvation to Germanism," 

When he said this he was only repeating the 
idea of the collaboration of God and Germany 
which he had learned in the universities and which 
had permeated German thought as well as his own. 

When the German Chancellor, von Bethmann- 
Hollweg, in the stormy interview with the Eng- 
lish Ambassador on August 4, 1914, characterized 



48 The Creed of Deutschtum 

the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium 
as only a "scrap of paper," he said nothing shock- 
ing or even new to the German mind. He did not 
even coin this phrase which dates back to Fred- 
erick William IV ; he only made it historic. Like- 
wise in 1901 an anonymous writer in an important 
publication had used the same expression: "What 
about treaties? In time of war the articles of all 
treaties of neutrality are carried away by wind like 
so many scraps of ijaper." * Although von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg's exclamation was uttered in a mo- 
ment of anger, which temporarily disrupted his dip- 
lomatic self-control, it gave away not only the 
real underlying belief of the man, but one of the 
ideals of German statesmanship long and widely 
inculcated as one of the ideals of Das Deutschtum. 
The doctrine had been current for years and years 
in Germany. And similarly with the claim of the 
right to invade a neutral state under the "law of 
necessity." The demands of statescraft required 
that such principles as, "The German state does 
not consider itself bound by treaties when it is for 
her interest to break them," and, "Small states 
from lack of power are not states at all and there- 
fore have no rights and may be invaded," should 
not be disclosed, but should be repressed in diplo- 
matic intercourse. Under the force of the angry 
emotion of the moment, the lid was lifted and the 
represse'd ideal burst out to the surface. For the 
instant, the mask was removed; the diplomatic ve- 

* German Ideals in 1917 and in 1914 by Andr6 Chevrillon. 



The Creed of Deutschtum 49 

neer, that only imitated the morality of civilization, 
cracked. This is the true significance of the disclo- 
sure which has shocked the conscience of the world. 
The doctrine has been preached and hammered into 
the consciousness of the German people until it 
has become one of the cardinal articles of the Creed 
of Deutschtum. 

When von Biilow, the former Chancellor, said: 
"The King must be at the head of Prussia; Prussia 
at the head of Germany ; and Germany at the head 
of the universe"; and, "Germany above everything, 
everything in the world," he was only giving ex- 
pression to the current thought of the German peo- 
ple, and not merely to that of the military and 
Junker class, or of the autocracy of which he was 
the official representative. 

When General von Moltke wrote in 1880: "Per- 
petual peace is a dream, and it is not even a beau- 
tiful dream. War is part of the eternal order 
instituted by God," he not only made it easy for 
the conscience of any statesman who scrupled to 
declare war, but showed that the army had become 
infected by the sophisticated teachings of the uni- 
versity professors and their ilk, as Bernhardi be- 
came later. And he simply was repeating one of 
the Articles of the Creed of Deutschtum. 

When the German Secretary of State for For- 
eign Affairs, von Jagow, a few months before the 
war, said that "the small states will no longer be 
able to enjoy the independence hitherto perrnitted 
to them ; they are destined to disappear, or to grav- 



50 The Creed of Deutschturrt 

itate into the orbit of the great Powers," he simply 
upheld the doctrine of Deutschtum that Belgium 
and Holland and Serbia and other small states are 
iiot states at all, in the true sense of the word, with 
rights which great states are bound to respect. 
Though the policy of the invasion of Belgium and 
Serbia was that of the government, the force be- 
hind it was the German people. 

We have all laughed at the bombastic painting 
which the Kaiser had made of himself as a Roman 
Emperor mounted on a prancing charger and we 
thought of him, perhaps, as a silly fooL But there 
could be nothing ridiculous in it to a German who 
has been taught to believe that there have been only 
three great periods in history, Hellenism, Roman- 
ism, and Germanism, and that Germanism is the 
only and direct successor of Romanism,* and Wil- 
liam II. the direct successor of the Roman Em- 
perors. The symbolism of the painting represents 
one of the theories of Deutschtum and not only the 
megalomania of William II. 

And so I might run on indefinitely with the ut- 
terances and acts of German statesmen and public 
men. All this explains the solidarity of the Ger- 
man people behind the Kaiser in the war. 

* German Theory and Practice of War: Lavisse & Andler, 1915. 
This idea is summed up in the inscription, quoted by these authors, 
displayed on a restored Roman camp "Trajano, imperatori 
Romanorum, Wiihelmus II imperator Germanorum." 



The Creed of Deutschtum 51 



VI 



The failure of the statesmen of the Entente to 
understand Deutschtum unquestionably caused 
them to fail to realize the aims of Germany in be- 
ginning and pursuing the war; and this failure led 
to mistakes of strategy on their part. 

If the British Foreign Minister, then Sir Ed- 
ward Grey, had understood that the so-called "pun- 
ishment" of Serbia, in July, 1914, for alleged po- 
litical offenses was only an ostensible motive put 
out to blind the world, and that the real aim was 
the long-planned and cherished ideal of Pan-Ger- 
manism to extend its empire through the Balkans, 
he would have also realized that not soft, diplo- 
matic appeals but only the mobilization of the Brit- 
ish fleet, as in 1911, at the time of the Agadir inci- 
dent, would make Berlin "stop, look and listen." 
If he had appreciated that the Serbian incident was 
only the long awaited opportunity and excuse which 
Pan-Germanism sought, he would have seen that 
only the vigorous diplomatic methods of Charles 
Francis Adams in 1863 and Grover Cleveland in 
1895 and Theodore Roosevelt in 1902 might have 
checked Germany's aggression. 

If, later in 1915, the Entente had fully under- 
stood the mighty, pent-up urge of that ideal of Das 
Deutschtum which for twenty j^ears has been ac- 
quiring momentum within the consciousness of the 
nation, they would have realized that the hour had 



52 The Creed of Deutschtujn 

struck when it would make an effort to burst its 
bonds, drive by the Iron Gates on the Danube 
through Serbia and on to Constantinople, and there 
fulfil its ambition. It would have been clear to 
them that this drive was bound to come as soon 
as we Americans had cleaned the country from 
typhus fever.* And they would have sent Gen- 
eral Serrail's army to Belgrade in 1915 when the 
heroic Serbian army stood faithfully, alone, "the 
guardian of the Gate."! Instead they wasted at 
Gallipoli a splendid army that might have barred 
the passage of the Danube, saved Serbia, held 
Greece passive, and isolated Bulgaria, preventing 
her from joining the Central Powers. But they 
did not understand Deutschtum. Too late they 
sent General S err ail to Saloniki, and Germany has 
gained this, her goal of empire, of which she has 
dreamed for twenty years, since the Kaiser's visit 
in 1898 to Palestine where he proclaimed himself 
the "protector of all the Mussulmans." 

And so with Roumania. An understanding of 
Deutschtum would have induced the Entente, un- 
less prepared to give adequate military support, 
to discourage Roumania, long coveted by Pan- 
Germanism, from entering the war, instead of en- 
couraging her to do so, weak as she was. Oppor- 

* This drive was predicted to me in England in the summer of 
1915, by an Englishman who had just returned from Serbia. He 
claimed that the importance of sending forces to Belgrade had been 
urged by Serbia on the Entente. 

t "She is the guardian of the Gate and faithfully has she stood 
to her trust." (Lloyd George.) 



The Creed of Deutschtum 53 

tiinity knocked at the door of Berlin. Well might 
Das Deutschtum answer, "The Lord has delivered 
into our hands the lamb for which we have lusted. 
Our chance has come at last." What else could 
the Entente have expected but a mighty German 
drive — for oil wells, wheat, and extension of em- 
j)ire? For what else did Germany originate this 
war? "The sole object of the war," the Kaiser 
announced in a General Order to his troops in 1915, 
"was to enforce the triumph of that Great Ger- 
many which was to dominate all Europe." And so 
the German Empire for the present extends from 
the Baltic to the Dardanelles and on into Asia 
Minor. And all because the Entente failed to 
grasp the need to plug the hole through which the 
central powers poured their armies into Serbia and 
weakly let down the bars of the neutral gate that 
kept them out of coveted Roumania. 

M. Cheradame, through his brilliant writings, 
based on studies of Germany, pursued through 
twenty years and more, has opened the eyes of 
America to the systematically laid plans of Ger- 
many, consistently held to and developed for twen- 
ty years, to weld together under German rule and 
hegemony a "Mittel-Europa," and extend the Ger- 
man Empire from the North Sea to Bagdad and 
the Persian Gulf. The Pan-Germanic propaganda 
should have rendered unnecessary such expositions. 
But we went our way and would not listen to warn- 
ings of students of Germany. M. Cheradame has 
done us great service not only in setting in the 



54 The Creed of Deutschtum 

clear light of day these German designs and im- 
perial policies, pursued unremittingly since 1898, 
the time of the Kaiser's visit to Damascus and the 
then Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Biilow, but 
in getting our attention and making us listen. It 
has now become perfectly clear, as light has been 
thrown from many sources on German activities, 
that the attack on Serbia in 1914 (originally 
planned for 1913) was intended to be the prelim- 
inary and necessary step to accomplish the final 
conquest of "Mittel-Euroxia" and beyond — the 
"Drang nach Osten." Serbia was the block wedged 
in between Austria-Hungary, on the North, and 
Bulgaria and Turkey on the South, and had to 
be eliminated. 

This ambition of a German Mittel-Europa and 
beyond — Hamburg to Bagdad — is the concrete ap- 
plication of the doctrine of Article VII of the 
"Creed," the mission of Germany to extend her 
territories at the expense of less meritorious peo- 
ples. Further the Balkans and Asia Minor are 
only the southeastern extension of Mittel-Europa. 
The full plan included the countries to the north 
— Holland and Belgium. 

But let us not lose sight of the fact, in focussing 
our attention on the territorial hegemony of Ger- 
many, that the extension of territories in Europe 
by force is only one particular expression of 
"Deutschland ueber Alles." It is the result of only 
one of the doctrines of the Creed. And the driving 
force that provides the national will to accomplish 



The Creed of Deutschtum 55 

the purpose by military power is Das Deutschtum. 
If all the states concerned chose voluntarily, by 
their free will and accord (an inconceivable prop- 
osition) to form a single confederation, the rest of 
the world could not righteously interfere. For it 
would be to control the right of free peoples to 
work out their destinies in their own way. The great- 
est danger to the freedom of the world — for which 
democracy is contending — is that great national 
Delusion which conceives the mission of the Ger- 
man State and the German people to be to regener- 
ate the rest of the world, conceived as inferior peo- 
ples, by the domination of German ideas and Ger- 
man kultur, and German power. 

It is Das Deutschtum that has inspired Germany 
and given force to such policies. Without its in- 
sane delusions they could not live one minute. Das 
Deutschtum has made possible the militaristic gov- 
ernment, and given moral support to the military 
oligarchy and the Junker caste. Prussian mili- 
tarism is only a tool — the "hammer. "J Other tools 
have been peaceful commercial penetration of the 
nations and systematic propaganda, open and se- 
cret. These, as we now know, have been most ef- 
fective German measures. 

It was in the event that other nations would re- 

t "In the coming century Germany must be the hammer or the 
anvil" — Speech of von Biilovv, December 11, 1897. This is a favorite 
figure of speech with the Germans. Professor Mahling, Privy Coun- 
cillor of the consistory, in an address asked, "Do we desire to be 
the hammer which God wields?" 



56 The Creed of Deutschtum 

fuse to be peacefully regenerated and to accept 
the Divine Mission of Das Deutschtum that it be- 
came necessary to have ready as a threat the most 
powerful armies and navies in the world; and then 
when the crisis came to resort to the hammer — 
military force and Prussian militarism. 

It is easy, too, to see that under the claim to be 
the chosen of God to do His divine Will, Fright- 
fulness, invented and taught by their great military 
authority Clausewitz and later systematized by the 
German war-staff, is easily justified to themselves 
by the people as it was in the middle ages when 
employed in religious crusades against heretics. 



VII 

That the German people seriously believe, 
or rather have made themselves believe, that 
they believe in the Divine Mission of them- 
selves, just as the Kaiser has made himself 
believe in his divine right to rule, must not 
be ignored if we are to understand the forces that 
we are up against in this war and are to make sure 
of a lasting peace. But that this call, whether di- 
vine or from an exalted State, to regenerate the 
world is the real motive which has impelled the 
German nation to extend its dominion to World 
Empire, no tyro in psychology will believe for one 
moment. 

It is too grotesque. It is accompanied by too 



The Creed of Deutschtum 57 

great ardor and emotion. And the purpose coin- 
cides too closely with the material interest of Ger- 
many. Suppose it was against Germany's inter- 
est, does any one believe that Germany would listen 
to the call of God? Some political writers have 
swallowed this ostensible motive, hook, bait and line. 
Granted it is the motive the Germans have given 
to themselves. Psychology, as well as practical 
politics, teaches us that we must look deeper below 
the surface for the real motive. 

The real motive is nothing but pure greed; the 
desire for material and political power and expan- 
sion, for self-aggrandizement at the expense of 
others — world empire in a material sense. 

"Was wir brauchen wir nehmen"t — what we 
want we take — has been the inner concealed thought 
of the Germans. 

But this sordid motive of self-aggrandizement 
must be made acceptable and be justified to them- 
selves. So, by the well known process of sophis- 
tical rationalizing, it is transformed and made pal- 
atable to a chosen people as a Divine Mission. Psy- 
chologically, that's easy enough. 

Nevertheless, as a phenomenon of social psy- 
chology, bordering on psychiatry, the fact of a 
whole nation being inspired and impelled by a mys- 
tic ideal is of great interest and well worthy of 
study. 

But more important to-day is the recognition of 
the fact that Das Deutschtum is the force behind 

t See pages 78, 79. 



58 The Creed of Deutschtum 

Prussian militarism, behind Prussian frightfulness, 
behind German ideas of State, Power, Empire, be- 
hind the lust for extension of territories and every 
act of Germany responsible for this war and the 
way it has been carried on. 

How superficial, then, is the view that this war 
is not directed against the German people but only 
against the German ruling classes. 

It may be expedient as a matter of political tac- 
tics to separate the people from the Government 
in the responsibility for this war, but the real re- 
sponsibility lies with those who have cultivated the 
ideals of which the Government is only the expo- 
nent. And now, when the war is a fact, that the 
great majority of the German people stand solidly 
behind their Kaiser as their champion in the war, 
no student of Germany has doubted. Nevertheless, 
history has shown that the collectively held ideas 
of a people are capable of undergoing revolution- 
ary transfoiTnation. The government is fighting 
for its own existence, for the perpetuation of its 
own power, and nothing like self -abdication can be 
expected of it. But it is within the bounds of 
possibility that under the influence of a tactfully 
conducted propaganda the masses of the people 
may be made to see that, on the one hand, they were 
misled into believing that Germany was attacked 
from a desire to dismember the Empire, and, on 
the other, that with the object lesson before them 
of British, French, Italian and American efficiency, 
their faith in the divine mission of a blond super- 



The Creed of Deutschtum 59 

race has been nothing but a social delusion. With 
the scales fallen from their eyes they might, quite 
possibly, as peoples have done before, make a 
scapegoat of the Government and its professorial 
and political "machine." It would be an evolution 
and not a revolution. 

Das Deutschtuin then is a state of mind of the 
German people. Unless either the power of Ger^ 
many to wage war be totally destroyed, or unless 
this state of mind is destroyed and the German 
people are awakened out of the delusional state into 
which they have argued themselves, unless they are 
made to face the truth, to see the truth in all its 
horrible nakedness, there can be no lasting peace. 
The German menace will persist. This every one 
in France sees and understands. There are no illu- 
sions, no misunderstandings, no attempt to hide 
from the facts, in spite of a passionate longing for 
2)eace, to escape the misery of war, to save the rem- 
nants of their devastated land, to save further sac- 
rifice of the sons of France. The man in the street 
knows the truth. The poilu in the trenches knows 
the truth. The workman in the factory, the peas- 
ant in the fields, the women of France — all know 
the truth. 

The same is true of the people of England. 
They, one and all, understand, as the people of 
America are only just dimly beginning to under- 
stand, the German state of mind. What use, if a 
lasting peace is to be achieved, only to liberate 



60 The Creed of Deutschtum 

Belgium and France and Serbia and all the other 
countries now within the German war map; and 
even Alsace and Lorraine? What use, if a lasting 
peace is to be achieved, to destroy even the Prus- 
sian autocracy, unless the power to wage war or 
the delusional state of mind, the German national 
consciousness. Das Deutschtum, be destroyed — be 
cured and regenerated? What use to make peace 
now if some day the war is to be fought all over 
again? 

Such, according to my experience, is the one per- 
vading thought shared by substantially all the peo- 
ple of France and England. All are united in 
the belief that to make a peace that shall not be a 
lasting peace is only to shirk the responsibility, to 
transmit to the next generation the task only half 
finished. It would mean that all the sacrifices they 
have made would be in vain. 

And so the people of France and the people of 
Great Britain are ready to go on, and on, and on, 
making untold sacrifices that their children and 
their children's children may not have to endure, 
as the present generation has had to endure, this 
agony and bloody sweat. 

And so out of this deep, silent conviction, and 
this grim determination, there has arisen a spirit 
of self-sacrifice. By this their fortitude is sus- 
tained. This is one of the great lessons of this 
war. One splendid manifestation of this spirit is 
the way the women of France and Great Britain 
have come forward and taken the places of the 



The Creed of Deutschtum 61 

men in the fields and in the workshops. Like the 
men they have responded to the call of country. 
One sees them by the thousands and tens of thou- 
sands; sowing the fields and tilling the harvest; at 
the lathe and forge and furnace; making and fill- 
ing the shells, and doing nearly every sort of work 
in every sphere where work is required of some- 
body. 

It is a wonderful lesson, that of self-sacrifice. 
We, too, are learning it but we have much to 
learn. 

I know no more beautiful expression of this spirit 
than that which I saw in France. It was in a large 
military cemetery at Chalons-sur-Marne. This 
cemetery was dedicated by their comrades to the 
soldiers of the IV army fallen in that sector in the 
great Champagne drive of July- August, 1915. As 
we entered the enclosure, stretched before us were 
endless rows of graves, row on row, each grave 
reverently and beautifully planted with flowers and 
surmounted by a black cross of generous propor- 
tions marked with a white disc inscribed with the 
name of a dead soldier of France. Private and of- 
ficer lay side by side without distinction. The 
aspect and atmosphere of the place were so impres- 
sive of reverence and love that instinctively each of 
us bared his head and spoke in subdued tones. Then 
we read on a monument — a simple shaft erected to 
the memory of the dead, these words: 



62 The Creed of Deutschtum 

"A nos Morts. 

Le mort n'est rien. Vive la tombe 

quand le pays en sort vivant. 

En avant !" J 

Das Deutschtum during long years of prepara- 
tion planned for the dominion of the world by Ger- 
many. It deliberately planned for a world war 
if necessary to carry out its ambitions of lust. For 
this purpose it fostered and encouraged an arro- 
gant, monstrous, military caste and autocracy. It 
created a colossal army ready to strike at a mo- 
ment's notice to enforce its will. It had been build- 
ing a navy for a score of years not for defense 
but to secure conquests in every part of the globe 
and wrest the colonies of other nations from their 
allegiance. It brought on this war against an un- 
suspecting world. It has caused untold misery, 
desolation, the destruction of venerated monuments 
of art and religion, the massacres of hundreds of 
thousands of innocent people and atrocities hith- 
erto inconceivable; it has caused the killing and 
maiming of millions of men; the wasting of the 
accumulated wealth of the world and of the pro- 
ductive activities of generations to come. It has 
forced the people of the United States, as well as 

t To our Dead. 

Death is nothing. Hurrah for the 

tomb when from it springs forth a living nation. 

Forward ! 

On another face of the monument is inscribed: 

"Gloire a notre France 6ternelle 
Glolre a ceux qui sent morts pour elle." 



The Creed of Deutschtum 63 

others, to give over the peaceful pursuits of happi- 
ness and social welfare and sacrifice the lives and 
well-being of its youth in a dreadful war. It has 
forced them to pile up billions of debt and mort- 
gage their future earnings that would have been 
used to make their land better to live in and their 
homes prosperous and happy. 

All this misery and much more has it done. And 
for this the Creed of Das Deutschtum must be de- 
stroyed, renounced forever for the salvation and 
freedom of mankind. 

And so supported by the spirit of self-sacrifice, 
we Americans, too, must go on and on until the 
conflict between the ideals of Germany and the 
ideals of the West is settled for all time. 

"The 'Battle Hymn of the Republic' must be still 
our hymn: 

"In the beauties of the lilies Clirist was born across the 

sea. 
With a glory in his bosom that transfigures you and me : 
As he died to make men holy, let us die to make men free, 

While God is marching on." 

We must go on using all our man power, and 
all our resources, the economic blockade and the so- 
cial boycott, until the Germans have awakened out 
of the temporary obsessions by which they have 
been afflicted for years and years. We must go 
on, ready, like the people of the British Empire 
and the people of France, for every sacrifice, until 
the Germans are prepared to face themselves and 
the ugliness of the doctrines they call ideals. We 



64 The Creed of Deutschtu7n 

must go on until the people of Germany themselves, 
no longer blinded, realize that Das Deutschtum is 
only the delusion of a social insanity and with clear 
vision take the reins of government into their own 
hands. We must go on until they are prepared, 
to make atonement and reparation for the past 
and by accepting the ideals of western democracies 
give guarantees of a lasting peace. Victory will 
come, but it will be the victory of Democracy which, 
though now using the sword, only seeks the free- 
dom of the world. 



PRUSSIAN MILITARISM AND 
A LASTING PEACE 



AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE WORCESTER 
churchmen's club, WORCESTER, FEBRUARY 7, 1917. 



PRUSSIAN MILITARISINI AND 
A LASTING PEACE 

WHEN you did me the honor of mak- 
ing me your guest this evening you 
invited me to si^eak on the subject 
of the war which is now in every 
one's mind and heart. 

Indeed, the time has come when the American 
people are called upon to think long and seriously 
and deeply upon the principles involved in this 
war. For these principles vitally concern Amer- 
ican interests, and we are now likely at any mo- 
ment to be called upon to take part in this war. 
If we are drawn in no one can foresee what lies 
before us, how far we shall go, where or what the 
end shall be. 

Nor can we foresee what will be the final effect 
upon our own institutions, what changes in our own 
policies and system will result. 

During the course of several weeks we were kept 
in a tense condition of suspense while possible terms 
of peace were discussed by the belligerents and our 
Government and it was mooted whether peace 
could be secured without victory or only with vic- 
tory. And now the dramatic events of the past 
week have forced us to take a stand in defense of 
American rights. The President had to face 

67 



68 The Creed of Deutschtum 

squarely a position in which there was no alter- 
native. Only one course was open to him — to keep 
his plighted word. That course he took.f And I 
believe every true American, no matter how severe 
a critic of the Administration he has been hitherto, 
will stand up and support him in the step he has 
taken and in any measures he may take in defense 
of American honor and American rights 

But this action of the President, these latest dra- 
matic events, to which I have referred, have tended 
to push into the background of the mind the gen- 
eral principles underlying the war, and to bring 
out into the focus of attention of the American 
mind only a particular concrete application of these 
principles — viz: the denial of freedom of the seas 
by ruthless submarine warfare. 

It has been difficult to make the people of cer- 
tain sections of this country, particularly the West, 
understand and still more to interest them in the 
principles involved in this war. But now that con- 
crete American rights are avowedly to be attacked^ 
they have become aroused and have rallied with 
gratifying unanimity in defiance of the "mad-man 
of Europe." 

Yet the denial to Americans by Germany of free- 
dom of the seas is not solely a war measure dic- 
tated by the military exigencies of the moment but 
a concrete application, as I shall contend, of prin- 

t Breaking oflf diplomatic relations with Germany. 
t German declaration of ruthless submarine warfare beginning Feb- 
ruary 1, 1917. 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 69 

ciples of Government which are utterly hostile to 
American principles — to the American theory of 
Government. These principles are those of Prus- 
sian Militarism and to these I would like to speak. 

Prussian Militarism as an issue is fundamental 
to terms of peace; it is fundamental to the objects 
of the Allies; it vitally affects American interests; 
it vitally concerns a lasting peace. 

I want to treat the subject from an American 

point of view, for it concerns American ideals, 

American principles and American interests. As 

Daniel Webster said in 1823 when protesting in the 

cause of Greece against Turkish frightfulness and 

the Allied Powers of Europe of his time : 

Let this be then, and as far as I am concerned I hope 
it will be, purely an American discussion ; but let it 
embrace, nevertheless, everything that fairly concerns 
America. Let it comprehend not merely her present ad- 
vantage but her permanent interest, her elevated char- 
acter as one of the free States of the world, and her 
duty toward those great principals which have hither- 
to maintained the relative independence of nations, and 
which have, more especially, made her what she is. 

And so from this same standpoint I want to 
ask if it is true, as the President once said, "Amer- 
ica is not concerned with the causes and objects of 
this war." 

The Demand for the Suppressio7i of Prussian 
Militarism 

Let me prelude what I have to say by calling 
your attention to the fact that the Entente Powers, 



70 The Creed of Deutschtum 

in both their notes in answer to the Central Powers 
and to Mr. Wilson, insisted upon the destruction 
of Prussian militarism as fundamental to all the 
other objects they have in mind and to terms of 
peace. 

This object has been well known to the world for 
a long time. From almost the beginning of the 
war it has been accentuated again and again by 
England, France, Russia and Italy, until it rings 
out as the slogan of the war. This condition of 
peace, they have also said, alone can furnish an 
effectual guarantee for a lasting peace which they 
must have. And therefore, unless this end be ac- 
complished and Prussian militarism be destroyed, 
there is no use in making peace now or at any other 
time for the war would have to be fought sooner 
or later all over again. The demand for a lasting 
peace and the demand for the destruction of Prus- 
sian militarism go hand in hand. We cannot have 
the one without the other. 

This view of the Allies has been repeatedly ex- 
pressed through their responsible chiefs. It is not 
mere rhetoric; it is a state of mind that must be 
taken into consideration in estimating the possibil- 
ity of peace without victory — peace by negotiation. 

"We shall never sheathe the sword," said Mr. 
Asquith, in his historic Guildhall speech, "which 
we have not lightly drawn, until the military dom- 
ination of Prussia be wholly and finally destroyed." 

Mr. Bonar Law, Government leader in the 
House of Commons, defined the peace terms of the 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 71 

Allies as "restitution, reparation and guaranties 
against repetition," and Mr. Lloyd George ampli- 
fied this epigrammatic definition as, "complete res- 
titution, full reparation and effectual guaranties." 
What constitutes effectual guaranties he set forth 
when he said: 

The Allies entered into this war to defend Europe 
against the aggression of Piiissian military domina- 
tion, and they must insist that the end is a most complete 
and effective guarantee against the possibility of that 
caste ever again disturbing the peace of Europe. 

It is an "honorable and lasting peace" that is 
wanted. 

Likewise the Russian Duma lead off in answer 
to the German overtures for peace with the dec- 
laration : 

It [the Duma] considers that a lasting peace will be 
possible only after a decisive victory over the military 
power of the enemy and after definite renunciation by 
Germany of the aspirations which render her responsible 
for the world war and for the horrors by which it has 
been accompanied. 

The official reply of the ten Entente Allies to 
the proposal of the Central Powers for a peace con- 
ference runs: 

Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible 
... so long as they have not brought about a settle- 
ment calculated to end, once and for all, forces which 
have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations, and 
to afford the only effective guarantee for the future se- 
curity of the world. 

Likewise Bonar Law explained the attitude of 



72 The Creed of Deutschtmn 

the British Government. He said in the House of 
Commons : 

What are we fighting for? Not territory, not greater 
strength as a nation. We are fighting for two things — 
for peace now and for security for peace in time to come. 
Let the House remember what happened in this war^ — out- 
rages in Belgium, outrages by sea and land, massacres in 
Armenia which Germany could have stopped by a word 
-T-then realize this: The war will have been fought in 
vain — utterly in vain, unless we can make sure that it 
shall never again be in the power of any State to do 
what Germany has done. 

The Central Powers, it will be remembered, 
wanted to fix up a peace first through a Confer- 
ence and later, after present peace had been agreed 
upon, to enter into arrangements to preserve fu- 
ture peace. 

The great work of preventing future wars, they said, 
can be begun only after the end of the present struggle 
of the nations. (Reply to President Wilson's peace note 
to all the belligerent and neutral Powers, Dec. 18, 1916.) 

And to this Lloyd Gorge replied: 

What guarantee is there that these terrors will not 
be repeated in the future? That, if we enter into a 
treaty of peace, we shall put an end to Prussian mili- 
tarism? 

In the same strain the Russian Duma announced 
that it 

considers that a premature peace would not only be a 
brief period of calm, but would also involve the danger 
of another bloody war and a renewal of the deplorable 
sacrifices by the people. 

The elimination of Prussian militarism, then, 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 73 

has taken on the character of an ultimatum and a 
paramount issue. 

Thus, aside from all other considerations and 
terms and issues, there arose a deadlock. The En- 
tente held that the destruction of Prussian mili- 
tarism was the only guarantee of lasting peace and 
that this must be assured now as one of the terms 
of present peace. The Central Powers took the 
position that international arrangements for future 
peace should be enterd into only after present peace 
is agreed upon by negotiation; and the arrange- 
ments which have been informally suggested by 
them studiously avoid including the ending of Prus- 
sian militarism, or any hint of an admission that 
there is such a thing, much less that it would be sur- 
rendered as a guarantee of future peace. 

In this situation neutrals are bound to ask them- 
selves whether Prussian militarism is such a men-" 
acing thing to the future peace of the world that 
the demand for its abolition in the terms for pres- 
ent peace cannot be compromised; or whether it is 
a matter of such indifference that it can be left 
to future international arrangements. In the lat- 
ter case they must ask themselves if it is likely that 
Germany, after this war is ended by negotiation 
and danger of defeat averted, would accept this 
demand of the Allies as one of the later arrange- 
ments to guarantee future peace. In other words, 
does it matter much one way or the other so long 
as the present conflict is settled? Or is the present 
war an outburst of a long slumbering irreconcilable 



74 The Creed of Deutschtum 

and irrepressible conflict of principles, of ideals, 
that cannot be permanently settled save by military 
conquest — by peace with victory on one side or 
the other. 

Remember that Germany proposes that the Allies 
postpone their paramount object until after the war 
and trust to Germany's satisfying their claim later. 

What Is Prussian Militarism? 

What manner of thing, then, is "Prussian Mil- 
itarism" that the continuation of this terrible war 
can be justified until it is destroyed? Everything 
hangs on the meaning of this abstract term. 

Most people confuse militarism with large armies 
and navies and even with "preparedness" or with 
frightful methods of warfare. But a little consid- 
eration will show that in principle it has nothing to 
do with the size of a nation's army or navy and 
much less with preparedness. A nation might main- 
tain an enormous army and yet this would not be 
militarism. And a nation might have a small army 
and yet be a militaristic nation. 

What, then, is Prussian militarism? 

It is only necessary to turn to German publicists, 
military writers, the speeches of the Kaiser and the 
German press, to learn the German theory of gov- 
ernment and the part the army plays in it, and then 
by correlating these with the avowed policies and 
actual practice during many years of Prussia and 
the Imperial Government, both in internal and for^ 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 75 

eign affairs, to extract the meaning of the Prussian 
system. From all these sources the world has been 
able to obtain an understanding of it which it is safe 
to say the Entente Powers have in mind when they 
say it must be "wholly and finally destroyed." 

Now, according to this conception, the funda- 
mental principle of Prussian militarism is that the 
stability, power and will of the nation rest not on 
public opinion and the will of the people but on 
armed force ; and therefore that it is to such armed 
force that the Imperial Government looks not only 
to maintain itself within the empire but — more im- 
portant to other nations — to enforce its will and its 
policies upon other nations without the empire. 

More concretely, Prussian militarism in its ex- 
ternal relations may be defined as the idea of ex- 
tending the nation's trade and system of govern- 
ment and policies by force. And in its official mili- 
tary code governkig methods of warfare the laws 
of humanity have no place under the exigency of 
"necessity." 

Militarism thus becomes something much more 
than a system of defense against encroachments 
from within and without — it is a mode of, and or- 
ganization for attack in the enforcement of pro- 
gressive policies, of national "evolution" (to use 
von Bethmann Hollweg's phrase), and of the will 
of the State, whatever direction these may take. 
It has even been the boast, not only of the German 
emperor but of a host of German publicists, that 
by the potential power of its army (not, be it noted, 



76 The Creed of Deutschtum 

by respect for the rights of other nations), Ger- 
many has maintained peace itself between the great 
Powers of Europe during the past twenty-five 
years. 

Prussian mihtarism depends, of course, for its 
efficiency, upon the theory, which Germany has ap- 
phed in practice, that, if all the available forces of 
a nation — economic, industrial, man-power, etc. — 
are organized into a military system and that sys- 
tem is developed to its very highest efficiency in 
every one of its multiplicity of parts; and if it be 
placed under the autocratic control of a govern- 
ment not responsible to the people, or public opin- 
ion, or parliament, it will be so powerful as to be 
irresistible against any combination of powers likely 
within human foresight to be brought against it: 
and that therefore no State or likely combination of 
States will dare to attack it, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, it can enforce its will on the world. 
This theory, it may be said in passing, has been 
shown to be fallacious by the present war. 

But this is not the whole, nor perhaps the worst 
part of the Prussian system. The worst has been 
the collective state of mind and certain specific 
ideals instilled in the greater part of the German 
people as a national consciousness. These include 
the worship of military prowess and power, and 
self -subjection to an exalted military caste; and 
they include national desires and a national will — 
a will to bring national desires to fulfilment by 
force; to take what the State wants by force; to ex- 



Prussian Militarism, and a Lasting Peace 77 

tend its policies, whether of trade or empire, by 
force; to gain "a place in the sun" by force; to 
brook no opposition under threat of the sword; to 
disregard international law and treaties and violate 
neutral and weaker nations. Therefore arbitra- 
tion, conciliation, respect for treaties and the nat- 
ural inherent rights of other peoples are not rec- 
ognized by militarism, as they were not recognized 
when Germany in answer to Sir Edward Grey re- 
fused to entertain them to avert this war. 

It is obvious, then, Prussian militarism has noth- 
ing to do with the size of armies excepting so far 
as a relatively superior army may be a necessary 
piece of machinery for enforcing its arbitrary will. 

The United States might maintain a very small 
army and yet adopt militarism as a policy in deal- 
ing with weaker nations, like Mexico and some 
South American republics. Or it might maintain 
a huge army of say 4,000,000 men and yet not es- 
pouse militarism. Japan might adopt a policy of 
militarism against China but not against great 
Powers. 

And the same is true of a great navy. England 
with her mighty navy holds the supremacy of the 
sea, but militarism under the name of "navalism" 
plays no part in her democratic theory of govern- 
ment based on public opinion. To speak seriously 
of British navalism as synonymous with militarism 
is to fall into the confusion of mistaking the size of 
armaments with the military theory of government. 



78 The Creed of Deutschtum 

Prussian Militarisin in Practice 

Now it may be fairly asked, has in practice Prus- 
sian militarism really sought to enforce its theo- 
retic ideals on the world in such a wsiy that the 
Allies are reasonably justified in demanding — sine 
qua non — that it be destroyed as security for future 
lasting peace? Or is it only an unsubstantial fear, 
or political accusation, and this war only an excep- 
tional application? Is it true that "Prussia," as 
Lloyd George has charged, 

since she got into the hands of that caste [the military 
caste] has been a bad neighbor- — arrogant, threatening, 
bullying, shifting boundaries at her will, taking one fair 
field after another from weaker neighbors and adding 
them to her own dominions, ostentatiously piling up 
weapons of offense, ready on a moment's notice to be 
used. 

Or is what Bethmann-Holweg said true? 

As against this aggressive character of the Entente, 
he asserted, the Triple Alliance had always found itself 
in a defensive position. No honorable critic can deny 
that. Not in the shadow of Prussian militarism did the 
world live before the war, but in the shadow of the 
policy of isolation which was to keep Germany down. 

Let us see what the actual practices of Germany 
have been within the memory of the present gener- 
ation. 

In 1864 Prussia wanted the Duchies of Schles- 
wig-Holstein and Lauenburg and so, with true Bis- 
marckian duplicity, she picked a quarrel with Den- 
mark, sent an ultimatum which, because Parlia- 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 79 

ment was not in session, she knew it was physically 
impossible under the constitution to satisfy within 
the 48 hours allowed, and, with Austria as a tool, 
took these provinces by force of arms. And Bis- 
marck, as one historian remarks, regarded it "as 
the diplomatic masterpiece of his career." "Was 
wir brauchen, wir nehmen" — "what we want we 
take" — as a Prussian diplomat once indiscreetly 
boasted. The spoils for the time being were di- 
vided with her co-conspirator, Austria, giving to 
that Empire Holstein as her share. But Prussia 
wanted more. She wanted all the spoils, and 
wanted also for herself the headship of the Ger- 
man Confederation and therefore to get rid of her 
rival Austria. 

So, in 1866, Prussia deliberately brought about 
a war with Austria, and by force of arms the Prus- 
sian octopus grabbed Holstein as well as Schleswig 
and Lauenburg, annexed Hanover and several 
Duchies, excluded Austria from Germany and 
made herself the head of the new North German 
Confederation with its King as the President and 
Commander-in-Chief of all the armies, as he is now 
the Emperor and supreme war-lord of the Imperial 
Federation. "Was wir brauchen, wir nehmen." 

But Prussia wanted still more. She wanted to 
strengthen her power by bringing into the Confed- 
eration which she ruled the South German States. 
This could only be done by a war which would en- 
tangle these states with which an offensive and de- 
fensive military alliance had been made. 



80 The Creed of Deutschtum 

So in 1870, by falsifying a telegram, a quarrel 
was deliberately forced upon France and by force 
of arms Alsace and Lorraine were taken, and the 
South German States fell into the Prussian net — 
the Confederation, which now became the German 
Imperial Federation with the Prussian King as 
Emperor instead of President. "Was wir brau- 
chen, wir nehmen." 

In 1879 Germany wanted to mobilize the mili- 
taristic forces of the central empires into one great 
machine by forming an offensive as well as a defen- 
sive alliance with Austria — thus holding the threat 
of the Prussianized German machine over the rest 
of Continental Europe to enforce the Prussian 
Will. It is safe to say that without this alliance 
the present war would have been impossible. As 
a reaction to it — a counter-force — this alliance di- 
rectly created the Dual Entente of France and 
Russia. 

In 1883 the dual alliance of Germany. and Aus- 
tria became the triple Alliance, Italy joining for 
defensive purposes only, and England, France and 
Kussia were later compelled to answer it by the 
Triple Entente. 

In 1897 Germany wanted a colony in China; so 
she simply took Kiao-chau by threat of war, claim- 
ing it as an indemnity for — what?, just the murder 
of two missionaries. That was the Prussian Will. 

In 1898 the Kaiser wanted the Philippines, as 
is generally believed. At any rate he sent the 
German Admiral Diedrich to Manila Bay to inter- 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 81 

fere with Dewey in the blockade and attempted to 
form a European coalition against the United 
States to intervene in our war with Spain. In con- 
sequence of Diedrich's interference we were brought 
to the brink of war with Germany. War was pre- 
vented not by notes but by Dewey's threat to fire 
upon the German fleet and by Captain Chichester 
of the English navy ranging his vessel alongside of 
Dewey. The European coalition against the 
United States was blocked by England which re- 
fused to join. 

Germany's ambition was revealed by the Kaiser's 
remark: "If I had had a larger fleet I would have 
taken Uncle Sam by the scrufF of the neck." * 

In 1902 he thought he had another chance to take 
"Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck" and test 
the Monroe Doctrine. But this time Roosevelt 
thwarted the Prussian Will. To collect some 
money claims against Venezuela, Germany, having 
sent war vessels to that country, threatened to bom- 
bard Venezuelan ports and occupy the territory in 
defiance of our Monroe Doctrine. President 
Roosevelt sent for the German Ambassador at 
Washington and told him that unless Germany 
withdrew her fleet in ten days he would send Dewey 
with the American fleet to protect Venezuela 
against German encroachments. At the end of a 
week Germany had made no reply. President 
Roosevelt then said in substance to the Ambassa- 
dor: "I said ten days: I now make it nine." In 

* Cf. The Psychology of the Kaiser, p. 153. 



82 The Creed of Deutschtum 

thirty-six hours the Kaiser withdrew his fleet, t The 
German Will to Conquer came in contact with the 
American will to Defend and the German Will 
succumbed. And it is well for all Americans to re- 
member that there was no war. 

In 1905 Germany entered into a diplomatic con- 
troversy with France demanding an interest in Mo- 
rocco, which really did not concern her excepting 
on the doctrine "Was wir brauchen, wir nehmen." 
A conference known as the Algeciras conference 
was held. Germany's argument was, yield what 
we want or — war ! That meant a general European 
war, just such a war as we have to-day. France 
yielded to save the world from a catastrophy like 
the present one but was left humiliated with the 
resignation of her Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Delcasse, demanded by Germany. 

In 1907 at the Hague conference the United 
States, England and France pledged themselves 
in discussion to the principle of disarmament, but 
Germany let it be known that she would leave the 
conference if the question of disarmament was 
pressed. And the German military machine re- 
mained intact to threaten the world. 

The next year, in 1908, Germany, disregarding 
the treaty of Berlin of 1878 and the treaty of Lon- 
don of 1871, boldly threatened war if Russia did 
not back down and assent to the annexation of Bos- 
nia and Hertzogovina by Austria. Russia, to avoid 

■f Life of John Hay (Vol. II, appendix, 2nd Edition), by W. R. 
Thayer. 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 83 

a European conflagration, as France had done in 
1905, backed down but announced, "never again!" 

Three years later, in 1911, the Morocco question 
was raised again with France, and Germany to en- 
force her wants by threat of war — which again 
meant a general European war, — sent the warship 
Panther to Agadir. But this time England came 
to the support of France and mobilized her fleet. 
The GeiTnan warship Pantlier was withdrawn, 
but Germany never recovered from the humiliation 
to her pride of having to put her mailed fist in her 
pocket and sheathe her shining sword in its scab- 
bard. 

In 1913 Germany made a secret proposal to the 
Prime Minister of Italy, Giolitti, to join her with 
Austria to make the same attack as she did in 1914 
and partition Serbia between the three countries. 
Italy, to her credit, refused. 

In 1914 Germany secretly again entered into a 
conspiracy with Austria to attack little Serbia, re- 
duce her to a condition of vassalage, and extend the 
German hegemony of "JNIittel-Europa" through 
the Balkans to Constantinople. Militarism refused 
arbitration, it refused conciliation, it refused a con- 
ference and it refused peace. Her will alone must 
be accepted. The European war resulted. The 
violation of Belgium I need not refer to. 

These are some of the more blatant examples of 
Prussian methods of domination and extending her 
empire and leadership by military force. For this 



84 The Creed of Deutschtum 

purpose, as every one knows, the most powerful mil- 
itary organization the world has ever seen, perfect 
in every detail, was built up. 

But an army was not enough to enforce the ideals 
of militarism. 

Not satisfied with her Continental aspirations, an 
ambition for colonial possessions and to become a 
World Power was fomented by the Pan-Germans 
with the Kaiser as their agent and became one of 
the ideals of the German national consciousness. 
But it was too late to acquire colonies peacefully 
as the lands of the world, justly or unjustly, had 
already been absorbed. It was necessary therefore 
to take them by force from Great Britain, or 
France, or other nations. So in 1897 a naval pro- 
gram was entered upon, the ulterior design being 
to wrest a "place in the sun" from mbre fortunate 
and forehanded nations, particularly Great Britain. 
And since that date Germany has endeavored to 
outbuild Great Britain, hoping some day — await- 
ing "The Day" when she would take what she 
wanted from the British Empire. "The ocean 
teaches us," said the Kaiser, "that on its waves and 
on its most distant shores no great decision can 
any longer take place without Germany and with- 
out the German Emperor." 

The unremitting pursuance of such policies by 
Bismarck and his successors has been made easy by, 
first, the autocratic constitution and character of 
the Prussian and the Imperial systems of govern- 
ment bordering on absolutism; and second, by the 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 85 

creation of a national consciousness, a political re- 
ligion, brought into being through the systematic 
organized education of the dominant castes and 
classes of Germany. Under the first the Imperial 
system is substantially a continuation of the Prus- 
sian system before the Federalization of the Ger- 
man States in 1871 ; the Imperial Federation is 
dominated by Prussia; the Government is an au- 
tocracy with the power in the hands of the Kaiser; 
the Chancellor, appointed by the Kaiser, is respon- 
sible to him alone and not to the Reichstag, or even 
to the Bundesrath ; the Kaiser may be, and, practi- 
cally, William II. is, his own Chancellor and deter- 
mines the policies of the Empire; the German 
Reichstag, aside from voting supplies, is little more 
than a debating body ; the army, not public opinion, 
is, to use the words of the Kaiser, "the pillar of the 
Empire" ; the government in practice is the Kaiser 
and those responsible to him, not the Parliament; 
the representatives of the people have little or noth- 
ing to say in formulating the policies of the Em- 
pire and, if they had, it would not make much prac- 
tical difference because, owing to the inequitable 
distribution of seats in Parliament without relation 
to the present distribution of the population, the 
voters are deprived of just proportionate represen- 
tation. 

By this system, obviously, power is almost wholly 
in the hands of the administration, while the leg- 
islative bodies are of little account beyond what 
comes from the power of criticism and agitation. 



86 The Creed of Deutschtum 

Democracy has no place in the Geraian system. 

By the second ch'cumstance I have just referred 
to — the systematic education of the people — that 
collective state of mind I mentioned some time back, 
has been created in the dominant classes. This has 
become the imponderable force behind militarism. 
Indeed it may be said that Prussian militarism is 
only the expression of this imponderable, the ma- 
chinery it employs to fulfil its will. This impon- 
derable has become, through a widespread propa- 
ganda, fostered by the Government, a system of 
ideals of the classes known as Das Deutschtum and 
embodied in the policies f oiTnulated by the doctrines 
of Pan-Germanism. It is customary to lay all the 
blame for Prussian militarism upon the Kaiser, the 
ruling classes and the so-called military autocracy. 
But it is difficult to say how far these castes have 
independently determined Gej^"man policies and how 
far they themselves are only puppets and dupes of 
their own propagandism. That the Kaiser is re- 
sponsible for the creation of a military caste by 
which he has surrounded himself, there would seem 
to be no manner of doubt. And it now seems 
equally clear that this creation of his hands — often 
likened to the Frankenstein of story — in the time 
of the world-crisis rose up and overpowered him. 
But beyond and, I think we can with accuracy say, 
above the military caste is that great imponderable 
urge of the dominating consciousness of the Ger- 
manic people — Das Deutschtum: A Will to dom- 
inate all other peoples, to extend the German idea 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 87 

— Weltmacht, Weltmarkt, Weltkultiir — through- 
out the world. A state of mind, originating with 
the philosophers and then taught by the professors 
and intellectuals, under the tutelage or direction 
of the State, the Kaiser himself, his ministers and 
the members of the bureaucracy became first its 
pupils and its victims and then, inspired by its ob- 
sessing delusions, its exponents and administrators. 
The military caste, created for the purpose, became 
the willing instrument of execution. But before 
the world upon the German State alone, in com- 
plete possession of all the functions of govern- 
ment, of administration, of direction of policies and 
power to execute, rests the full responsibility for 
all its actions. Yet in this analysis we see what 
have been in the words of the Allies "the forces 
which have constituted a perpetual menace to the 
nations." 

I have rehearsed all these well-known German 
activities since 1864, the fundamental principles and 
forces of the German system of government and its 
methods of carrying into effect its policies, because 
there is always danger when using an abstract term 
of getting away from the underlying things for 
which it stands, and, in this case, the ugly things 
for which Prussian militarism stands. Prussian 
militarism stands for a theory of government, an 
attitude of mind, political ideals, and very definite, 
concrete political and military forces and methods 
of using them. 



88 The Creed of Deutschtum 

The world has been shocked by the sinking of the 
Lusitania, of the Sussex and a large number of 
other merchant ships without warning; by the bom- 
bardment from the air and sea of open towns; by 
the violation of Belgium and Serbia; by the mas- 
sacre of their inhabitants and of the Armenians; 
by atrocities unspeakable and innumerable; by the 
wanton destruction of monuments of art, religion 
and civilization; by the pillage of the inhabitants 
and forced levying of fines on communities ; by the 
deportation of the civil population for purposes of 
forced labor; by the judicial murder of Miss Cavell 
and Captain Fryatt; by the general methods of 
f rightfulness ; by the adoption of the principle of 
"military necessity," and many other acts repug- 
nant to and destructive of accepted principles of 
civilization. But these, however wrong and shock- 
ing to our sensibilities, are only particular applica- 
tions of the Prussian system of government and its 
principles of militarism. So long as that system, 
in which the rights of small states, international 
law and the laws of humanity have no place, is tol- 
erated by the world there is no logical reason to 
revolt against its application. 

So long as the world recognizes Germany as one 
of the family of civilized nations, holds diplomatic 
and social intercourse with her, trades with her, 
lends to her, makes treaties with her, admits her to 
fellowship in the humane society of mankind know- 
ing her to be what she is, the world cannot in reason 
object to her barbarism. If we accept the system 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 89 

why object to its application? 

In view, then, of all these considerations, the 
meaning of the Allies to every one, who does not 
shut his eyes to facts, is perfectly clear when they 
say, in their answer to the Central Powers, "No 
peace is possible ... so long as they [the Allies] 
have not brought about a settlement calculated to 
end once and for all forces which have constituted a 
perpetual menace to the nations." And must not 
every "honorable critic," to whom Bethmann-Holl- 
weg has appealed, say that Lloyd George told the 
truth when he answered, "Prussia since she got into 
the hands of that caste [the military caste] has been 
a bad neighbor — arrogant, threatening, bullying, 
shifting boundaries at her will, taking one fair field 
after another from weaker neighbors and adding 
them to her own dominions, ostentatiously piling 
up weapons of offense, ready on a moment's notice 
to be used." 

There also can be little doubt left in the mind as 
to what the Allies mean by "Guaranties for a last- 
ing peace," when they demand "a settlement cal- 
culated ... to afford the only effective guarantee 
for the future security of the world." 

To guarantee lasting peace, as well as bring pres- 
ent peace, as has been stated over and over again 
by responsible ministers of the Allied governments, 
by their press, by publicists and by open expres- 
sions of public opinion, Prussian militarism and all 
that it stands for must go. 



90 The Creed of Deutschtum 

Well, that is all very fine, but what guarantees 
then can be given for the elimination of Prussian 
militarism? Neither in answer to Germany or to 
Mr. Wilson have the Allies consented to enter into 
details and state what they demand for its accom- 
plishment. We are left, therefore, to surmise and 
to our own judgment. 

So far as Prussian militarism is a state of mind 
and so far as it is a system of ideals and aspirations 
and will, these being elements of a national con- 
sciousness, and therefore psychological, it must be 
admitted that they cannot be directly destroyed by 
military force. Indirectly, however, such a result 
might ensue from a victorious outcome of the war 
for the Allies. It may well come about that with 
the object lesson of defeat before them a new light 
will come to German statesmen, the military caste 
and the deluded victims of the propaganda for 
"Deutschland iiber Alles." It is quite within the 
bounds of possibility that, without giving up their 
pride of race and Kultur but realizing at last 
whither Prussian militarism has led them — that in- 
stead of a "place in the sun" they have been led 
into the dark shadow of a world hostility, their colo- 
nies gone, their future mortgaged by billions of 
debt, millions of their sons killed or maimed for 
life, morally boycotted by nearly all the people they 
expected to conquer or whose rights they flaunted 
—they will see that their ideals are incapable of 
realization by force of arms and that militarism 
doesn't pay. And in such a situation the will to 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 91 

power may well give way to will to peace. 

However that may be, so far as Prussian mili- 
tarism is a system of government which has cre- 
ated, instigated and put its ideals into effect 
through the autocratic will 'of a limited caste mak- 
ing use of a huge military organization, it can be 
destroyed by destroying the political power of that 
caste and disarming the organization at its disposal. 

It is incredible, therefore, that if the Allies 
achieve military victory — obtain "Peace with Vic- 
tory" — and have the power to impose their will by 
force, they will not, as their first step, insist upon 
the elimination of the House of HohenzoUern. 
Righteousness, justice, the judgment of "the su- 
preme court of civilization," the public opinion of 
the civilized world call aloud for it. That the Ger- 
man Kaiser, the bully of Europe, who for twenty- 
eight years, ever since he came to the throne has 
been the responsible promoter of the war spirit 
and Prussian aggression, the creator and patron of 
the Prussian military caste and militarism, who has 
used his great power to incite ideas of world domin- 
ion and ruthlessness amongst his people — civilians 
and soldiers, who has throttled the aspirations of 
German Democracy, should be permitted to con- 
tinue in his career would be a world calamity. 

If in the event of victory the Allies shall use 
their military force to rid the world of the power 
for evil of the House of HohenzoUern they would 
be supported by the gratitude of the world. 

A New England Puritan divine once delivered 



92 The Creed of Deutschtum 

himself of this prayer in the Old South Meeting 
House of Boston, "Oh, Lord, it is not for us to 
advise; but if a storm should come, and should de- 
stroy the enemy's fleet, Thine would be the glory 
and we should be satisfied." * And so we along 
with the rest of the neutral world may say to the 
Entente Allies, "It is not for us to advise, but if 
in your power and military victory you should rid. 
the world of the House of HohenzoUern and its 
military caste, thine would be the glory and we 
should be satisfied." 

That this is one of the purposes of the Allies and 
that it is one of those "details" which they have very 
respectfully said to our Government "will not be 
made known," one does not need to be very deep 
seeing to guess. Probably another of those details 
included in their laudable object is to see to it that 
there shall be brought about a limitation of the pre- 
rogatives of the future Kaiser so that he would be 
reduced to a position in the government similar to 
that of the King of England and the sovereigns of 
other parliament arily governed states; that is, a 
true democratic government, with a ministry re- 
sponsible to parliament and the people. 

It would seem to be useless, when expecting a 
guaranty of lasting peace, to change only the per- 

* It may interest the curious to know that this was a historical epi- 
sode commemorated by Longfellow in his "Ballad of the French 
Fleet — October, 1746." It so happened that a storm did come and did 
destroy the enemy's fleet; and the good people of Boston were satis- 
fied, believing it to be a Divine intervention in response to their 
worthy's prayer. 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 93 

sonnel of a government and leave unmolested the 
autocratic system of which any particular ruler is 
the exponent. It is the system that is the menace 
to the world. Only in the democratization of the 
imperial system does the future hold out a hope of 
a will to peace. 

To the objection that to impose by force a form 
of government upon the German people is to in- 
terfere in the internal affairs of a people and vio- 
lates one of the very principles for which the Allies 
are contending — the right of each people to gov- 
ern themselves and work out their own destinies 
in their own way — the answer is obvious. Such 
measures as I have imagined need not be brought 
to fulfilment by direct forceful imposition. In the 
event of military victory the Allies owe to those 
who have died and those who have suffered in the 
cause of Liberty that they shall not have died and 
suffered in vain; and they owe to the generations 
that are to come that they shall not have to undergo 
the terrible sacrifices which this generation has ex- 
perienced. They may rightly, therefore, insist that 
they will make no terms until the German people 
themselves come to the council chamber of peace 
with a form of government which shall in itself of- 
fer the same guaranty for the future that the de- 
mocracy of the world offers to them. The guaran- 
ties must be mutual and equal on both sides, and 
they are not mutual and equal when on the one 
side the terms are guaranteed by a democracy based 
on and seeking the "natural and inherent rights of 



94 The Creed of Deutschtum 

mankind," and on the other by a Prussian autoc- 
racy recognizing no such rights, nor international 
law, the sanctity of treaties and the laws of human- 
ity, but only Absolute Power and Will to conquest. 
No terms of peace agreed upon between Powers 
with such different ideals can be lasting. The En- 
tente Allies may well insist, they owe it as an ob- 
ligation to the dead and to the living, to the great 
cause of civilization to insist, that there shall be no 
peace until Germany can enter the council chamber 
and say, "We have put our house in order, we have 
reconstructed our government and are prepared to 
be admitted to the democracy of the world." Amer- 
ica, although at the moment still a neutral in war 
but, having broken off diplomatic relations with 
Germany, not a neutral in spirit, can not only sym- 
pathize with but is interested in this insistence. 

In principle this was the stand taken by the 
North after the defeat of the armies of the South in 
our civil war. As a guaranty of the maintenance 
of the principles for which the war was fought vol- 
untary "reconstruction" of State constitutions was 
required for admission to the family of states united 
on terms of equality. 

In a world of democracy we may not impose 
upon our neighbor how he shall order his own house, 
but we may say to him we will not enter his home 
nor shall he enter ours, we will boycott him, isolate 
and ostracize him until he chains up his bulldog, 
gives us the same guaranties for safe conduct that 
we give to him. 



Prussian 3Iilitarism and a Lasting Peace 95 

Peace by Negotiation Impossible at This Time 

When, then, you come to ask what do the Allies 
mean when they demand that Germany shall give 
assurances for future peace, when they declare they 
will not make peace "so long as they have not 
brought about a settlement calculated to end once 
and for all forces which have constituted a perpet- 
ual menace to the nations and to afford the only 
effective guarantee for the future security of the 
world," we can only think along the lines the pres- 
ent situation imposes upon us. We must, however, 
remember that the Allies cannot be asked in the 
present uncertain stage of the war to define con- 
cretely and explicitly the exact character and de- 
tails of the "settlement" they broadly outline. Tac- 
tical considerations forbid, before victory is actu- 
ally achieved, and it would be foolish to cross the 
bridges before they are reached. But if such "as- 
surances" as I have imagined be required, is it con- 
ceivable that, at a conference to negotiate peace 
around a table, the House of Hohenzollern and the 
Prussian military caste will agree to eliminate them- 
selves? Or, if this demand be waived, that they 
would or could surrender their ideals and will and 
state of mind and policies of militarism, much less 
their military organization? 

Here seems to be an insuperable difficulty to 
peace without victory — to peace by negotiation. 
In the midst of negotiation there emerges the irrec- 
oncilable conflict of ideals^ — the ideals of Prussian 



96 The Creed of Deutschtum 

autocracy and Prussian militarism manifesting 
themselves through the Will to dominate the world 
by force, on the one hand, and the ideals of democ- 
racy with respect for the rights and privileges and 
independence of all nations, great and small, on the 
other. One of these must give way, or else all na- 
tions must continue to live armed against one an- 
other as in the past. For the democratic ideals to 
give way means the regression of democracy and 
the return to that order of things out of which civ- 
ilization has been progressively but slowly emerg- 
ing during the past one hundred years. For the 
Prussian ideals to give way means the self-elim- 
ination of the ruling classes in Germany and sub- 
ordinating themselves to the will of a reconstructed 
German people. It would seem then that the set- 
tlement of this conflict can only come by the arbi- 
trament of the sword, if it is to come at all out of 
this war. 

A Conflict Between Two Principles of 
Government 

It is well for us to face the fact, for all neutrals 
to face the fact, that in this great European war 
we have a conflict between two principles of gov- 
ernment, between two civilizations: One founded 
upon the principle of the inherent and natural rights 
of mankind; the other founded on the principle of 
militarism. 

According to the one, all men possess natural 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 97 

and inlierent rights which no government and no 
majorities can take away; it maintains, besides, that 
the rights and privileges of all nations and all peo- 
ples shall be respected by all others ; that all nations 
and all peoples shall be allowed peacefully to work 
out their destinies in their own way so long as they 
do not infringe upon the rights of others ; that they 
shall not be dominated and menaced by the aggres- 
sive covetousness of another nation determined to 
impose its arbitrary will by military force. 

According to the other, the will of the state is 
the supreme will and the state that has the will and 
the power has the right to take what it wants by 
force and to use any methods which it deems neces- 
sity requires. 

This war is undoubtedly the culmination of an 
irrepressible conflict of ideals that has been brew- 
ing for years. 

So long as these two ideals, behind which were 
mighty forces, persisted, those forces sooner or later 
were bound to clash in war. We can see now that 
the Serbian question was only the occasion that 
brought them into conflict. Lincoln said that this 
American government could not "endure peiTQa- 
nently half slave and half free. ... It will be- 
come all one thing or all the other." Likewise I do 
not believe that the nations of the world can en- 
dure permanently half militaristic and half peace- 
ful. They will become all one thing or all the other. 
If one or more hold to the principles of militarism, 
the war has shown that all the others must create 



08 The Creed of Deutschturrt 

and maintain mighty military establishments to 
enforce their rights. Limitation of armaments and 
a league to enforce arbitration and conciliation be- 
fore a declaration of war (for that is what the pro- 
posed "League to Enforce Peace" really is) can 
modify the evil of militarism but cannot cure it. 

Is America, then, "not concerned with the causes 
and objects of the war" as has been said? On the 
contrary, America cannot, I believe, look with in- 
difference on the outcome of this war, as to which 
ideal shall triumph. If the Prussian ideal shall sur- 
vive, we shall of course have to maintain great arm- 
aments in our own defense. But that is only a ma- 
terial interest. What concerns us greatly more 
are the moral principles involved — ^the possible tri- 
umph of principles utterly hostile and abhorrent to 
our system of government and the principles upon 
which it is founded. 

The fundamental principle underlying this con- 
flict of ideals is one of right and wrong. The real 
issue is a moral one. And I do not believe that this 
government or our people can be indifferent to that 
issue. I do not believe that when it is thoroughly 
understood our people will be indifferent. 

I am not referring to the methods of carrying 
on the war pursued by Germany and her allies — 
methods which have broken the international laws 
of nations and the moral laws of humanity. These 
are, I repeat, but particular applications of the 
Prussian system of government and therefore of a 
militarism which does not accept the laws of hu- 



Prussian Militarism and a Lasting Peace 99 

manity. 

From the American point of view that system 
is morally wrong because it violates the natural and 
inherent rights of mankind. And therefore this 
government and the American people cannot be in- 
different as to how this war is settled, whether Prus- 
sian militarism is left free or whether it is destroyed. 
If it be left free the conflict of ideals and princi- 
ples will still remain to threaten civilization. Lin- 
coln's great antagonist, Douglas, said that he did 
not "care whether slavery be voted up or voted 
down" so long as the political conflict over the ex- 
tension of slavery into the territories was settled. 
But Lincoln refused to follow Douglas and accept 
a policy as a settlement which was not based upon 
the principle that slavery was wrong. For he held 
that we could not justifiably withhold the legal 
right of the South to extend their system excepting 
on the ground that it was wrong. So now, I believe, 
that we cannot logically oppose the applications 
of the Prussian system, when they affect only the 
lives and property and material rights of other na- 
tions, excepting on the ground that the Prussian 
system is morally wrong. Our Government, there- 
fore, cannot be indifferent to the terms on which 
peace is made. To paraphrase the words of Lin- 
coln: we want and must have a national policy as 
to Prussian militarism which deals with it as being 
a wrong. Whoever would prevent militarism be- 
coming international and perpetual yields all when 
he yields to a policy which treats it either as being 



100 The Creed of Deutschtum 

right or as being a matter of indifference. 

The people of the Allied Nations have set them- 
selves the noble task of destroying Prussian mili- 
tarism. So long as they are willing to make the aw- 
ful sacrifices necessary to this end, we, who, so long 
as we are neutral, are not called upon to make any 
but insignificant sacrifices of a material nature, 
should see to it that we do not hamper them in their 
noble purpose; and, if we shall be drawn into the 
war and become one of the allies, should lend all our 
resources and all our power towards the accom- 
plishment of that task. We would not be human if 
we did not shrink from the spectacle of the appal- 
ling loss of human life that this purpose entails, but 
we should not forget the admonition of a celebrated 
humane and manly divine, James Martineau: 

The reverence for human life is carried to an immoral 
idolatry when it is held more sacred than justice and 
right, and when the spectacle of blood becomes more 
horrible than the sight of desolating tyrannies and tri- 
umphant hypocrisies. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER* 

[This essay has been published also in French, German 
and Japanese translations and an incomplete edition was 
published independently in England. The Japanese 
translation was undertaken by the personal direction of 
Marquis Okuma, when Prime Minister of Japan in 1916. 
This distinguished statesman, becoming interested in some 
of the political questions raised, brought the book to the 
attention of His Majesty the Emperor and His Highness 
the Crown Prince, as noted in the Japanese edition, 
and wrote a foreword for the same. Professor Shiozawa, 
whom I had the pleasure of meeting, also wrote an 
introduction further amplifying, as he himself explains, 
Marquis Okuma's views on German polity and the con- 
trasting differences between Japanese and Geraian prin- 
ciples of government. I have thought that this statement 
presenting the Japanese viewpoint on some of the funda- 
mental principles of government would be of interest to 
Americans and the Western mind coming, as it does, from 
such an authoritative source and one so qualified to ex- 
plain Japanese thought and polity. Therefore a trans- 
lation of Professor Shiosawa's introduction with Vicount 
Okuma's foreword is included here with the original essay. 

Of particular interest is the statement made by the 
distinguished Japanese statesman, that "the spirit of 
our [Japan's] national polity is fundamentally different 
from that of Germany," although both are monarchical, 
for that of Japan has been "the harmonious cooperation 
of the Sovereign and the Subject." And what will, I be- 
lieve, be surprising to Americans, "the Imperial House- 
hold has, since the days of the gods (i.e., the prehistoric 

* First printed in the New York (Sunday) Times, May 9, 1915. 
Later published in book form, Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1915; re- 
produced in this volume in lieu of a second edition. 

103 



104 The Creed of Deutscktum 

age), considered it its mission to practice, and has con- 
tinually and consistently been practisinj^ what the occi- 
dentals would term 'democratic principles'. . . . The 
will of the people has always been made the wall of the 
Imperial Household." 

Marquis Okuma's criticisms of the Kaiser and Germany 
and his general views will also be found to have great 
interest particularly at this time. 

I trust that the complimentary allusions to the Amer- 
ican author, probably written only for the Japanese 
public, will be understood by the reader as only ex- 
pressions characteristic of that Japanese etiquette which 
is one of the charms of a people noted for their courtesy. 
To delete them would be an ungraceful use of the edi- 
torial prerogative and so I let them stand as they were 
writ. 

January, 1918.— M. P.] 



FOREWORD BY 

MARQUIS OKUMA 

AND INTRODUCTION BY 

PROFESSOR SHIOSAWA 







This book had the honor of being read by His 
Majesty the Emperor. 




IS sir 



This book had the honor of being read by His 



Highness the Crown Prince. 



FOREWORD BY MARQUIS OKUMA 

Criticizing the life of Napoleon the Great, the 
Kaiser once aptly remarked, "Alas for him! He 
knew the enemy he had to deal with, but he did not 
know himself. That was the cause of his final de- 
feat." Napoleon himself confessed that he had 
overestimated his own powers in believing that he 
was equal to the task of achieving world domina- 
tion and of making himself master of a great em- 
pire. His pride, however, seemed to have entered 
the marrow of his life, for he said in the same 
breath, "The world shall never look upon my like 
again." The well known adage that there was 
no such word as impossible in his dictionaiy, was 
uttered by him when he was at the height of his 
self-confidence. Taking advantage of the golden 
opportunity of the French Revolution, Bonaparte, 
a native of Corsica, came to command the popu- 
larity of the whole French nation. The fame of his 
army was such that it resounded throughout the 
length and breadth of the entire world and made 
the whole of Europe tremble with fear. Indeed his 
genius seemed to have bordered on the divine. Who 
would have thought that he would have to bury his 
bones in the lonely isle of St. Helena? Such, how- 
ever, was his lot. Does not this show that any at- 
tempt at world domination must necessarily end 

107 



108 The Creed of Deutschtum 

in an empty dream? 

Having been born in the royal family of the Ho- 
henzollerns, and having been brought up according 
to the traditional, teachings of Frederick the Great, 
Kaiser Wilhelm came to believe that he was a hero 
beyond parallel. It is doubtful, however, whether 
his genius can ever compete with that of Napoleon. 
Nevertheless he came to entertain the ambition of 
world domination, and piu'sued the traditional mil- 
itaristic policy of Frederick. Especially for the 
last sixteen or seventeen years the Kaiser has de- 
voted himself assiduously to the construction of a 
world empire, and he has brought about the present 
world war. Who can say that his fate will be dif- 
ferent from that of his French predecessor? 

Pride goes before a fall, and pride is, after all, 
a sort of mental derangement. It is no wonder that 
Dr. Prince should have directed his attention to 
this phase of the Kaiser's psychology. To be proud 
of one's powers, and to imagine the impossible as 
within the bounds of the possible is a case of insan- 
ity. It is as if a drunken man misbehaves himself 
under the influence of liquors. A monarch with 
but a brief history behind him, he had the arro- 
gance to proclaim to the people: "The Imperial 
throne is divinely ordained. The Hohenzollerns 
alone are entitled to it by the special appointment 
of Heaven." He not only tried eternally to pre- 
serve his autocratic government within his own do- 
minion but also attempted to realize the traditional 
ambitions of Frederick the Great by bringing the 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 109 

whole world to his feet. Is not this a sign of his 
mental derangement ? 

Although the Kaiser criticized Napoleon as hav- 
ing been ignorant of himself, yet it is doubtful 
whether the Kaiser is himself free from such a 
charge. The Book of Tactics says: "If one knows 
both oneself and one's opponent, one is sure to win. 
If one knows oneself but not the opponent, one may 
win or lose. If one knows neither oneself nor the 
opponent one is sure to suffer a defeat." If the 
Kaiser failed to calculate the strength of England, 
France, and Russia, the Kaiser did not know the 
opponent. If the Kaiser failed to perceive that the 
strength of Germany was unequal to meet the com- 
bined forces of the Allies, he did not know himself. 
Thus if he knew neither himself nor the enemy, how 
could he escape the inevitable result as predicted 
by the Chinese tactician? 

It was his pride that brought him to his present 
extremity. His blind ambitions deprived him of his 
intelligence. Fighting, as he does, for no justifiable 
cause, he has defiled the dignity of his army. The 
German people who have been enjoying glorious 
prosperity since Frederick the Great by mobilizing 
the forces of the whole Empire, are now dissipating 
all their resources, human as well as material, by 
the mistaken policy of their leader. He is not only 
bringing pain and misery into the lives of the peo- 
ple of all nationalities, but has brought his German 
people to the verge of ruin. Is this the way to be 
the father of a nation? We shall not wonder if the 



110 The Creed of Deutschtwm 

people desert him. The present war will not only 
leave an uneffaceable wound on the life and civili- 
zation of the world at large, but it may also lose the 
Kaiser the confidence of his people. This can by 
no means be said to be conducive to the interests 
of the Kaiser and of the Hohenzollerns. If the 
Kaiser fails to observe these plain truths, he is 
justly open to the charge of insanity. 

I sincerely hope that this translation of Dr. 
Prince's work will serve as a good lesson to the 
proud and arrogant. 

Marquis Okuma. 

December, 1916. 



INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR SHIOSAWA 

Last summer Dr. Morton Prince, a noted Amer- 
ican psychologist, visited our shores. One day, 
through the introduction of Mr. Miyaoka, he had 
an interview with Marquis Okuma at his Waseda 
residence. I was present and had the privilege of 
listening to the interesting conversation that passed 
between the host and the guest. After a hearty 
discussion of various subjects, such as the present 
world politics, government, science, and psychol- 
ogy, individual and racial, the doctor directed his 
topics to the discussion of the conditions in Ger- 
many, and especially of the Kaiser and his mili- 
tarism. . . . We can well imagine the acuteness 
of his observation, that penetrates into the very sore 
spot in the personality he dissects. Incidentally 
it will vouch for the value of his work on the psy- 
chology of the Kaiser, of which he was kind enough 
to send us a copy soon after through Mr. Miyaoka. 
I then read the book to the Marquis and we dis- 
cussed the subject. 

The Marquis commented minutely on this work; 
among other things he pointed out the fundamental 
differences that exist between the spirit of our pol- 
ity and that of Germany as elucidated by Dr. 
Prince, the gist of which was as follows: 

"The form of German polity, especially with 

111 



112 The Creed of Deutschtum 

regard to the basis and powers of the Imperial 
throne, seems to resemble ours at first sight, but if 
we look a little closer into its substance we shall 
find that the two are diametrically opposed. We 
can well understand when an American gentleman 
like Dr. Prince in reviewing the present German 
monarchial system from his democratic standpoint 
points out the incompatibility of monarchial gov- 
ernment with democratic principles. For there is 
no denying the fact that the present German mon- 
archial principle has a tendency to come into con- 
flict with democratic principles. We must not for- 
get, however, that the spirit of our national polity 
is fundamentally different from that of Germany. 
With us the Imperial Household has since the days 
of the gods (i. e., the pre-historic age) considered 
it its mission to practice, and has continually and 
consistently been practicing, what the Occidentals 
would term 'democratic principles.' Thus the in- 
terests of the Imperial Household and the interests 
of the nation have been inseparably one, and have 
never been known to come in conflict with each 
other. Clear and unequivocal evidence may be said 
to be scattered throughout every page of our his- 
tory. Especially noteworthy are the cases of Em- 
peror ISTintoku and Emperor Daigo, the former 
shedding tears over the scanty smoke that ascended 
from the roofs, the latter taking off his coat on a 
chilly night to share the pain and suffering of the 
poor. To say nothing of older examples which 
abound in our history, the life and works of Em- 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 113 

peror Meiji, the Founder of New Japan, are just a 
case in point. The traditional spirit of our Imper- 
ial Household is well revealed in a letter to the peo- 
ple accompanying the famous Five Articles, a part 
of which was as follows: 'If any one of Our sub- 
jects does not get his due at this reconstruction of 
the entire government, it will be Our fault. We 
can be true to Our heavenly mission and to the glor- 
ious precedents of Our forefathers, only when We 
devote Our body and soul to meet the present na- 
tional diffilculties, and at the head of Our people at- 
tain meritorious works in the footsteps of Our an- 
cestors.' 

"Thus the harmonious co-operation of the sov- 
ereign and the subject having been the fundamental 
basis of our national polity, no such thing has ever 
existed in our history as a strife between the Im- 
perial Household and the people. Look at Euro- 
pean history and you will find a series of bitter 
strifes between Kings and subjects, which some- 
times unfortunately led to bloodshed. The absence 
of such separation of the will of the people from 
that of the sovereign, and the absence of any con- 
flict of interests between the two, shows the supe- 
riority of our polity in this respect. In other words, 
with us the Imperial Household has always prac- 
ticed democratic principles, and the will of the peo- 
ple has always been made the will of the Imperial 
Household. This is radically different from the 
present autocratic government of Germany, which 
governs in accordance not with the will of the peo- 



114 The Creed of Deutschtum 

pie but with the will of the Imperial Household. 
As pointed out by Dr. Prince, the prerogatives of 
the Kaiser aim at the protection of the interests 
of the Imperial Household against the aggression 
of the people, but the power of our Imperial 
Household proceeds from the fundamental idea 
that the interests of the sovereign and the subject 
are inseparably one. There can be no interest of 
the Imperial Household apart from the interest of 
the people. What Dr. Prince says in criticism of 
the prerogatives of the Kaiser is just and adequate 
in the case of Germany, but you cannot justly ap- 
ply his criticisms to the powers of our Imperial 
Household because of this basic difference. 

"Dr. Prince, starting from his strong American 
democratic standpoint, and reviewing the selfish 
government of Germany, expresses deep sympathy 
with the German social democrats. That is nat- 
ural enough for an American gentleman. But we 
must remember that each country has its own his- 
tory, its own manners and customs, and its own 
complex elements of national life. Just as the 
plants differ according to the soil in which they are 
cultivated, so the government of each people must 
differ in its form and its workings. What an 
American thinks fit and proper may not necessa- 
rily be so in another country, any more than what 
the Germans think best can be imposed upon other 
nations. The statement of Dr. Prince in this re- 
spect must not be applied without reservation to 
our social conditions. 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 115 

"If the reader reads this work with these points 
in mind, he will find it very interesting and instruc- 
tive. Erudite scholar as Dr. Prince is, he wields 
his sharp dissecting knife so skilfully that it never 
fails to touch the sore spot of personality. In one 
passage especially he delineates the process by 
which an ambition based on selfish pride finally re- 
sults in bringing a nation into ruin and throwing 
the whole world into trouble. This is a good moral 
not only to emperors and Kings but to anybody 
who has the welfare of a people at heart. His quo- 
tation in one passage of an arrogant nobleman 
makes the story highly dramatic." 

The above is a mere outline of the Marquis' 
remarks on this book. Later I personally visited 
Dr. Prince and explained the Marquis' view to him, 
and especially the passage of the Emperor Meiji 
above quoted. The learned doctor nodded assent 
and said, "Since I came to Japan I have carefully 
studied the relation of the Imperial Household to 
the people, and have come to share the view of Mar- 
quis Okuma that in Japan the nation practices dem- 
ocratic principles under the leadership of the Im- 
perial Household, and that in that respect the Im- 
perial Household of Japan is different from that 
of Germany." 

In short, this work attempts to dissect the psy- 
chology of the Kaiser with the political conditions 
of Germany as its background. The discussion is 
always to the point. It reveals the true position of 
the Kaiser and lays bare political conditions in Ger- 



116 The Creed of Deutsclitum 

many. It shows clearly the antagonism prevalent 
in Germany between the autocratic and democratic 
ideas, the understanding of which is the only key 
to the German political relations. As was pointed 
out by Marquis Okuma, the discussion is not for- 
mally in accord with our line of thought. Strip it 
of its outer garments, however, and you find that 
the spirit in which it was written is in harmony 
with ours. It will undoubtedly serve as the pro- 
verbial stone of another mountain to polish our own 
gems. 

As Dr. Prince has consented to the translation 
of his book by any competent translator, I asked 
my friend, Mr. Yuya Goma, to do the work, and 
I have revised the manuscript with utmost care. 
We hope that the present translation is enough to 
convey the idea of the author to our public. 

Shotei Shiosawa, 
Hogakuhakushi. 

December, 1916. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER 



THE KAISER S ANTIPATHY 

IN the consciousness of the Kaiser there is noth- 
ing that is more dominant than his increasing 
and virulent antipathy to a great body of citi- 
zens constituting no less than one-third of his 
empire^ — the Social Democrats. 

We have all read of the Kaiser's hatred of the 
party known as the Social Democratic Party. We 
have read the epithets which he has constantly 
hurled at them, and of his antipathy to their creeds. 
"Traitors," "a plague that must be exterminated," 
"a horde of men unworthy to bear the name of Ger- 
mans," "foes to the country and empire," "people 
without a country and enemies of religion," he has 
called them. 

To a delegation of striking miners he said: 

For me every Social Democrat is synonymous with an 
enemy of the empire and of his country. If, therefore, I 
believe that there are any Socialist tendencies in the move- 
ment [the strike of 100,000 men], stirring up to unlawful 
resistance, I shall act with merciless rigor and bring to 
bear all the power at my disposal — which is great. 

Again: 

117 



118 The Creed of Deutschtum 

The doctrines of the Social Democrats are not only 
opposed to the commandments of God and Christian 
morality but are also altogether unpractical, being equally 
injurious to the individuals and the whole community. 

So violent is the hatred of the Kaiser toward this 
party that he even has thought it might come to 
suppressing it by the army. He said to the young 
soldiers at Potsdam: 

For you there is only one foe, and that is my foe. In 
view of our present Socialist troubles, it may come to 
this, that I command you to shoot down your own rela- 
tives, brothers, and even parents, in the streets, which 
God forbid; but then you must obey my orders without 
a murmur. 

Why so much feeling? Why such recurrent out- 
bursts of anger and hatred against a political party 
which in numbers is twice as large as any other 
single party in the empire, a party which in 1912 
cast 4,250,000 votes * and which was represented 

* The total vote cast was 12,207,000. The number of Social Demo- 
crats elected was not fairly proportionate to the voting strength of 
the party owing to the inequality of representation of the urban and 
rural districts. The distribution of seats in the Reichstag has not been 
changed since 1871, more than forty years ago, when the constitution 
under Bismarck was adopted. During this time the population of 
Germany has increased from approximately 40,000,000 to about 68,- 
000,000 and the cities and industrial centres have gained enormously 
in population, relatively to the rural districts, and what were agri- 
cultural towns have become industrial centres and manufacturing com- 
munities. Consequently, one result of the election laws is that the 
cities and industrial and manufacturing centres where the Social 
Democrats preponderate have very small representation, while the 
rural districts where the conservatives (Junkers) are a majority have 
a disproportionately large representation. Thus greater Berlin with 
850,000 voters, where the Social Democrats are in a vast majority, is 
represented in the Reichstag by only eight members while the same 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 119 

in the German parliament in 1912 by 110 members, 
the representatives of over 21,000,000 people, 
nearly one-third of the population ? 

number of voters in the small rural districts are represented by forty- 
eight members. 

The inequalities of representation in the State Legislatures and city 
governments are due to the peculiar election laws existing in the 
different states of Germany. In Prussia, for example, there is what 
is called the "three-class system." The voters are divided into three 
classes according to the amount of taxes paid, the total taxes being 
divided into three equal parts. "Then, starting with the highest tax- 
payers, those voters whose taxes total the first third of taxes paid 
constitute the first class of electors. They are the wealthiest men and 
naturally are smallest in numbers. 

"The second class is made up of those electors who pay taxes equal 
to the second division. Their number is a little larger. The third 
class is made up of all the rest of the voters. 

"Each class elects the same number of deputies to the [Prussian] 
Reichstag [Diet]. Obviously the respectable middle class composed 
of that element in Continental politics known as the bourgeoisie 
throws its vote with that of the aristocracy against the people at 
large. In one careful analysis of this system the ratio in the division 
was roughly as follows: one voter in the first class; thirty-two voters 
in the second class; three hundred and fifty voters in the third 
class. 

"Now the exclusive gentleman in the first class elected just as many 
members of the Reichstag [Diet] as did the 350 workingmen in the 
third class, or the thirtj'-two well-to-do business men in the second 
class." (The Kaiser, edited by Asa Don Dickenson, p. 105.) 

Again: The city of Berlin in 1910 with a population of 2,000,000 
was governed by 33,063 persons, owing to the three-class system of 
voting. 

S. P. Orth (Socialism and Democracy in Europe) gives various 
instances of the inequality which appears in the cities. "In Berlin 
in one precinct one man paid one-third of the taxes and consequently 
possessed one-third of the legislative influence in that precinct. In 
another precinct the president of a large bank paid one-third of the 
taxes, and two of his associates paid another third. ITiese three men 
named the member of the Diet from that precinct." 

In Saxony the electorate is divided into four classes according to 
their income. The members of each class have respectively 1, 2, 3, 



120 The Creed of Deutschtum 

These are strong words of the Kaiser's I have 
quoted. They are not mere invectives uttered dur- 
ing the heat of a political campaign. They are not 
to be classed with those emotional castigations with 
which political stump-speech orators, working 
themselves up to a state of passionate indignation, 
flay their adversaries, and which are promptly for- 
gotten as soon as the campaign is ended — albeit the 
Kaiser is essentially a stump-speech orator. 

We have all learned not to take seriously the 
ephemeral indignation of the political orator. But 
the Kaiser's denunciation of the Social Democrats 
is the expression of an antipathy which is fixed, 
deep-rooted, persistent, and is a part of his person- 
ality, for it has manifested itself in the form of 
recurrent attacks of anger and hatred ever since 
he came to the throne, twenty-seven years ago. It 
is like unto an obsessing idea, common enough, 
which, fixed deep down in the mind, rises in con- 
sciousness whenever its object presents itself. 

Fixed antipathies are always, for the psycholo- 
gist, objects of interesting study, but for others, 
even in an Emperor, they are little more than mat- 

and 4 votes. Consequently, in 1909, 18,491 voters of the fourth class, 
having 4 votes each, cast 73,964 votes, while 39,567 voters of the 
first class cast only 32,567. 

Corresponding inequalities of representation necessarily followed. 
In consequence of all these conditions ballot reform was the prin- 
cipal immediate issue of the Social-Democratic party before the war. 

It may also be pointed out that the 4,250,000 votes cast by the 
Social Democrats in 1912 do not represent the whole opposition to 
the autocracy, inasmuch as certain liberal groups, the progressives and 
the people's party cast together 1,506,000 votes. 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 121 

ters of intellectual curiosity unless the antipathy 
is one of practical political import, one that affects 
the policies of Government and the course of his- 
tory. 

If the antipathy of the Kaiser were only of that 
trivial kind common to many people, which is mani- 
fested as a dread of snakes, or of death, or other 
banal object, its study would be of little practical 
interest excepting for its victim, William II. him- 
self, although the revelation of its origin and mean- 
ing would give an insight into one component, how- 
ever unimportant, of an exalted personality. 

The periodical recurrence of the antipathy and 
the psychological reactions to which it gave rise 
would probably affect the happiness of no one but 
himself and the unhappy members of his family 
who would have to bear the brunt of it. No one is 
interested in other people's symptoms. 

But it is different when such a recurring antipa- 
thy is of a political nature. Then by a study of 
the underlying causes of this obsessing idea we not 
only can obtain an insight into important compon- 
ents of the personality of a great historical char- 
acter, but we should expect to find the true motives 
which have determined those policies of Govern- 
ment and the course of history which have been the 
direct result of the antipathy. 

The Kaiser's hatred of the Social Democrats has 
had momentous practical consequences. It is safe 
to say that it has been more than any other single 
factor the motive which has determined him to 



122 The Creed of Deutschtum 

maintain, against the progressive spirit of modern 
civilization, the present autocratic system of gov- 
ernment, to resist all liberal attempts to change the 
Constitution so as to give responsible representa- 
tive government to the people and to defend what 
he claims as his prerogatives. It has determined 
other tyrannous measures which have suppressed 
freedom of speech and the press and banefully op- 
pressed the liberty of the German people. I re- 
fer to the law of lese-majeste. 

This law, a return to the feudalism of the Mid- 
dle Ages, is the means the Kaiser employs to punish 
those who talk back. He may insult his subjects, 
call them all manner of names, misrepresent their 
principles, their purposes and ideals, excite animos- 
ity against them "as enemies to the country and 
religion," but if they answer back they are met by 
the law of lese-majeste, and this law is enforced, as 
every one knows, with merciless severity to sup- 
press political opponents. 

Against the Democrats the law has been used 
as a weapon of suppression, though without suc- 
cess. Under this law statistics showed that up to 
1898, during only the first decade of William II. 's 
reign, more than 1,000 years of imprisonment had 
been inflicted upon offenders. A recent responsible 
writer asserts that up to 1914 the sentences had 
reached 30,000 years, but I do not know upon what 
authority these figures are based. 

It is not surprising that editors of Social Demo- 
cratic newspapers, many political leaders of the 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 123 

party, and writers for the Democratic press have 
been among those who have served terms in prison 
for lese-majeste, or offense against the press law. 

There have been times when scarcely a week 
passed without three or four trials. But against 
the Social Democratic members of the Reichstag 
when making use of their prerogatives as elected 
representatives of the people, this law has not been 
sufficient to satisfy the Kaiser's animosity. So on 
one occasion when they refused to rise and cheer 
him, in response to a demand, the Kaiser had intro- 
duced, through his Chancellor, a bill to permit the 
criminal prosecution of these delegates. To its 
credit, be it said, the majority refused to permit 
this encroachment upon its rights. 

It is safe to say that such a criminal law as lese- 
majeste and its abuse for political purposes in Eng- 
land would cost the King his crown. 

To this antipathy of the Kaiser may also be 
traced in large part responsibility for the consoli- 
dation of the autocratic and military party in Ger- 
many. For, by suppressing the political power of 
the only militant party that has opposed this autoc- 
racy, the Kaiser has been enabled to solidify his 
power and intrench himself with his army as the 
dominating political force which has determined the 
foreign policies of the empire. 

It is safe to say that if the democracy had been 
in power, or if the constitutional system of govern- 
ment had been such that the Social Democratic 
Party, in and out of the Reichstag, could have made 



124 The Creed of Deutschtum 

its influence felt, the foreign and military policies 
and methods of the Government would have been 
far different and there would have been no war. 
GeiTXianism and Pan-Geimanism would not have 
threatened the world, t 

t Surprise has been expressed that the Social Democrats, in view 
of their avowed principles and tlieir platform, did not in the begin- 
ning throw their influence against the war, but are patriotically sup- 
porting the government. In other words, that there is a United 
Fatherland. There is no question that the Social Democrats were 
bitterly opposed to this war and yet they cast their 111 votes in the 
Reichstag unanimously in favor of the war budget, but it was after 
war had been declared by the Upper House and the Emperor. 

This seems on the face of the facts a complete reversal of the 
Party policy and yet it is easily understood. 

The Social Democrats, though opposed to militarism and war, are 
first and all the time patriots. They have always declared that if 
the Fatherland were attacked they would rally to its defense, and 
all the world knows that the German people as a whole have been 
made to believe that the Fatherland was attacked. 

In 1907 Bebel, then leader of the Party, declared in a debate in 
the Reichstag that if the Fatherland were attacked even he, in his 
old age, would "shoulder a musket" in its defense. And in the next 
Party Convention he declared: 

"I said, if the Fatherland really must be defended, then we will 
defend it. Because it is our Fatherland. It is the land in which 
we live, whose language we speak, whose culture we possess. Be- 
cause we wish to make this, our Fatherland, more beautiful and 
more complete than any other land on earth. We defend it, thei'e- 
fore, not for you but against you." 

Likewise Von VoUmar later said in the Bavarian Diet: 
"If the necessity should arise for the protection of the realm 
against foreign invasion, then it will become evident that the Social 
Democrats love their Fatherland no less than do their neighbors; 
that they will as gladly and heroically offer themselves to its de- 
fense. On the other hand, if the foolish notion should ever arise to 
use the army for the support of a warring class prerogative, for the 
defense of indefeasible demands, and for the crushing of those 
just ambitions which are the product of our times, and a necessary 
concomitant of our economic and political development, — then we 
are of the firm conviction that the day will come when the army will 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 125 

More than this, it is impossible, I believe, for 
any one to study the internal politics of Germany 
without arriving at tlie firm conviction that the 

remember that it sprcing' from the people, and that its own in- 
terests are those of tlie masses." 

As S. P. Orth, from whose work I take these quotations, says, 
"This makes their position very clear." 

When war was declared tlie position which the Social Democrats 
were obliged to take was also clear. It was not a question of oppos- 
ing the war. As Patrick Henry declared, in his famous speech at 
the beginning of our own Revolution, "Gentlemen may cry 'Peace ! 
Peace !' But there is no Peace. The war has actually begun." And 
so with the Social Democrats, it was only a question of voting sup- 
plies. The Social Democrats disclaimed all responsibility for the 
war. As Deputy Haase said in the Reichstag in explanation of the 
vote of his colleagues: 

"The responsibility for this calamity falls upon those who are 
responsible for the imjierial policies that led to it. We absolutely 
decline all responsibility. The Social Democrats fought this policy 
with all their might. At this moment, however, the question before 
us is not war, or no war. The war is here. The question now is one 
of defence of the country. Our nation and the future of its liberty 
are jeopardized by a possible victory of Russian despotism, the 
hands of which are stained with blood of the best of its own nation. 
Against this danger it is our duty to secure the culture and in- 
dependence of our land." 

And the Vonixierln, the official organ of the Social Democrats, on 
July 30th, just before the declaration of war, announced: 

"We are opposed to militarism, and we reaffirm our opposition 
to monarchism, to which we have always been opposed, and always 
will be. We have been compelled from the first to lead a bitter 
.struggle against the temperamental wearer of the crown. We 
recognize, however, and we have stated it repeatedly, that William 
II. has proved himself to be a sincere friend of peace among the 
nations, particularly in later years. . . . But even the strongest 
character is not entirely free from influence, and we regret to say 
that proofs are accumulating in abundance that the clique of war 
shouters have been at work again to influence the government in 
favor of the devastation of the whole of Europe. . . . 

"In England it is the general opinion that the German Kaiser in 
his capacity as the ally and adviser of Austria was the arbiter in 



126 The Creed of Deutschtum 

elimination of German militarism, for which the 
war is being waged, and therefore the hope of per- 
manent world's peace, must rest upon the German 
Democratic Party. From this viewpoint, the study 
of the Kaiser's antipathy for the Social Demo- 
crats offers a most fruitful psychological study. 

Why, then, I repeat, so much feeling when the 
Kaiser thinks of the Social Democratic Party? 
Why such hatred of it? Why such anger? Why 
such a personal attitude? 

To explain it on the ground of differences in 
political principles, as a political antipathy intensely 
expressed in terms of an intense emotional per- 
sonality, is a superficial and inadequate psycholog- 
ical explanation, although it is commonly satisfying 
as a political explanation. The two are not synony- 
mous. The reasons for this distinction will appear 
as we proceed. 

If the party represented only a small band of 
criminal agitators, of militant anarchists, let us 
say, who sought by assassination and terrorism to 
destroy the existing Government, such an attitude 
of mind would be easily comprehensible and would 
need no analysis. But the Social Democratic Party 

this trouble and had it in his power to let peace or war fall from 

the folds of his royal robes. And England is right. As conditions 

are, William II. has the decision in his hands." 

It will thus be seen that although the Social Democrats feel that 
the Kaiser and the military party are to blame for the war, they 
also necessarily feel that as patriots they must support the Fatherland 
as would be the case with any party in any country. But it also 
follows that if the Democracy had been in control of the govern- 
ment of Germany there would have been no war. 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 127 

in 1888, on the accession of William II, on the 
basis of one voter in every five of the population, 
represented less than 4,000,000 subjects, and in 
1912 over 21,000,000, a third of the total popula- 
tion.J It is, therefore, representative of a large 
part of the public opinion of the empire, and, above 
all, of the working classes. Indeed, it is the largest 
political party in the empire. Criminal agitation 
is, therefore, out of the question. 

In other countries political feeling in times of 
crises often runs high, and at times statesmen, 
rulers, leaders of political parties generally, have 
strong political bias and feel intensely hostile to 
their political opponents; but they do not regard 
them as foes of their country, and God, and religion, 
to be crsuhed by every force in the power of the 
Government; and they rarely carry their hostility, 
and anger, and hatred into social and industrial life, 

:{: The steady growth of the Social Democratic Party has been 
phenomenal and is of importance in the bearing it has upon the 
future. In 1871 the party cast only 134,000 votes and from that time 
to 1912 there has been an almost continuous increase, as may be 
seen from tlie following table: 

1871 124,000 

1874 • 352,000 

1877 493,009 

1878 437,000 

1881 312,000 

1884 550,000 

1887 763,000 

1890 1,427,000 

1893 1,787,000 

1898 2,107,000 

1903 3,011,000 

1907 3,259,000 

1912 4,250,000 



128 The Creed of Deutschtum 

as has been the case with the German Emperor. 

Furthermore, the persistency of the Emperor's 
antipathy is remarkable. It is hke an obsession. He 
has retained, undiminished, his hatred of the Social 
Democrats from his accession to the outbreak of the 
war, and has never ceased to angrily stigmatize 
them with such emotional epithets as I have cited. 

Now it is probable, owing to a psj'-chological law, 
that when strong emotion, out of all apparent pro- 
portion to the cause, is excited by some object, that 
object has struck some sentiment, a "complex" of 
ideas and emotions deeply rooted in the personal- 
ity, but not squarely admitted and faced by con- 
sciousness. Examples of this we see every day. 

A strong protectionist inveighs with intense anger 
against the principle of free trade and the political 
party that advocates this principle in its platform. 
The reason he consciously gives is the economic dis- 
advantage which, he apprehends, will result to the 
country at large. But though this may be the rea- 
son, or rather one reason for his political opinion, 
it is not the real reason for his emotion — his anger 
and his invectives. 

These are due to the fact that the free-trade doc- 
trine strikes a chord within him which resonates with 
selfish fear for his own business interests, and the 
reaction of this chord is anger. In other words, 
to use a homely phrase, while apparently speaking 
from the viewpoint of political principles, he is real- 
ly "talking out of his pocket." But he does not 
squarely face and perhaps is only half conscious 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 129 

or entirely unconscious of this fact. This selfish 
viewpoint is his "unconscious attitude of mind." 

Now, is the Kaiser's antipathy to the Social Dem- 
ocrats merely the expression of an academic dis- 
belief in the INIarxian principles of Socialism and a 
disbelief in the practicability of such principles if 
applied by the State to political government? Or 
are these only ostensible reasons for his antipathy? 
If the latter, a study of the Kaiser's mind ought to 
reveal deep-rooted sentiments of another kind which 
will explain his emotional reaction. But in that case, 
for a complete explanation, we must inquire what 
there is that is peculiar in the political tenets of 
the Social Democracy that touches these sentiments 
and excites the reaction. In other words, it is a 
question of the Why. 

These questions rise above a banal curiosity to 
inquire into a peculiar personal dislike of an Em- 
peror, however that might be justified by the exalted 
world-position which he occupies. They are im- 
portant in that, if pursued, they may lead to a 
deeper understanding of his personality, and they 
may unfold both his viewpoint of government as 
exemplified by the German system and the antag- 
onistic viewpoint of the German Democracy, which 
for many years has been striving against the power 
of the Emperor to force its ideals and aspirations 
upon the autocracy that rules Germany. 

All these questions are involved in the psychology 
of the personality of the Kaiser. The political 
questions are involved, for no personality can be 



130 The Creed of Deutschtum 

understood apart from its environment to which it 
reacts, and which is largelj^ responsible for the for- 
mation of "sentiments." 

The sentiments are of prime and fundamental 
importance in the formation of a personality. I use 
the term "sentiments" in a restricted psychological 
sense and not in accordance with popular usage. I 
shall have occasion later to explain how sentiments 
are formed after we have become acquainted with 
some of the Kaiser's mental attitudes. 

Meanwhile I would simply explain in justifica- 
tion of this inquiry, that character depends upon 
the psycho-physiological organization of ideas, de- 
rived in the broadest sense from life's experiences, 
with the innate primitive instinctive dispositions to 
behave or react to given situations (i. e., to react 
to the environment). 

Thus, on the one hand, sentiments are formed 
which characterize our attitude toward life, includ- 
ing therein our personal, social, political, and indus- 
trial relations to the world about us; and, on the 
other, the inborn natural instincts of man are har- 
nessed, controlled, and repressed, or cultivated and 
given free rein. Upon the development of senti- 
ments, therefore, not only the behavior of the in- 
dividual depends, but the whole social organization. 
Of course, in a brief article of this kind we shall be 
obliged to limit ourselves to a few of the sentiments 
involved in the questions placed before us and there- 
fore to a very limited study of the Kaiser's per- 
sonality. 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 131 



II 



THE KAISER S PREROGATIVES 

Let US go back to the year 1888, when the Kaiser 
came to the throne. In his very first speech to the 
Prussian Diet he proclaimed with noticeable em- 
phasis that he was "firmly resolved to maintain in- 
tact and guard from all encroachment the char- 
tered prerogatives of the Crown." (The Kaiser, 
edited by Asa Don Dickenson, page 113.) It was 
noticed that he laid marked stress on these words, 
so that it was publicly commented upon by those 
who heard him. This intention to defend his pre- 
rogatives the Kaiser has consistently maintained 
ever since, and more than once has proclaimed. 
What are the "prerogatives" about which the Kaiser 
took the very first opportunity to warn Germany 
and about which he has been so tenacious? They 
can be briefly stated. 

In the first place, we must know it is the Kaiser's 
prerogative not to be responsible to the people or 
to Parliament, but only to himself. He does not 
derive his power from either, but he reigns by his 
own right. This is his prerogative. Furthermore, 
he not only reigns, but it is his prerogative to gov- 
ern. The King of England reigns, but, as has so 
often been said, he does not govern. In England 
the responsibility for governing rests entirely with 
the Ministry, which in principle is only a select com- 



132 The Creed of Deutschtum 

mittee of Parliament. It is the English Parlia- 
ment, therefore, and practically the elected House 
of Commons that governs. 

In the second place it is the Kaiser's prerogative 
to appoint a Chancellor to help him govern. He 
has no Cabinet, nor Board of Advisors. The Chan- 
cellor is responsible only to the Emperor. Par- 
liament may be entirely opposed to him, but in such 
case he does not necessarily resign, as would the 
British Prime Minister, nor is it the customary 
usage. He may not have been a member of Par- 
liament when appointed. The Kaiser alone may 
dismiss him, as he dismissed Bismarck. The Em- 
peror may disregard him and his advice, if he likes ; 
so that in practice he may be his own Chancellor, 
as it is commonly said in Germany he has been ever 
since Bismarck's dismissal and as Bismarck fore- 
told would be the case. 

A third prerogative is to appoint the Ministers, 
the heads of the great departments — Navy, Foreign 
Affairs, Colonies, etc., who are under the Chancel- 
lor. Thus all executive power resides in the Kaiser. 
Parliament has none. We may say it is the Kaiser's 
prerogative to be the administration. 

A fourth prerogative is to be Commander in 
Chief of the Army and to have absolute authority 
over the forces of the army both in peace and in 
war. (Art. 63 of the Constitution.) It is his pre- 
rogative to "determine the numerical strength, the 
organization, and the divisional contingents of the 
imperial army"; also to appoint all superior offi- 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 133 

cers. (Art. 64*. ) That the Kaiser regards this as 
one of his most cherished prerogatives the world well 
knows. 

A fifth and exceedingly powerful prerogative is 
to appoint and control the seventeen members of 
the upper house — the Bundesrath, or Federal Coun- 
cil: — the most powerful upper house in the world. 
The Kaiser thus has the votes— only fourteen being 
required — to defeat any amendment to the Consti- 
tution, and in practice he has always controlled a 
majority of the Council, which has been the creature 
of the Kaiser throughout its history. With the con- 
sent of the Council he can declare war, but, as the 
Council is a lady of easy consent, this limitation 
need not bear hardly and the wooing need be but 
short and light. 

A sixth prerogative is to initiate all legislation, 
although indirectly, through his controlled Federal 
Council, of which the Chancellor is President. The 
lower house, the Reichstag, elected by the people, 
cannot initiate legislation, so well did Bismarck fix 
the Constitution for the benefit of Prussia and the 
Kaiser. 

All measures must originate in the upper house, 
which can also veto them when amended in the 
Reichstag, and can dissolve the latter (with the 
Kaiser's consent) if it doesn't like its ways. (Think 
of the House of Lords dissolving the Commons!) 
The Kaiser has thus very great power in controlling 
legislation. (With almost innumerable parties, 
none of which has a majority, in the House, log- 



134 The Creed of Deutschtum 

rolling under an astute Chancellor has been raised 
to a fine art that would make an American State 
Legislature blush like a neophyte. ) 

The Reichstag, however, can refuse to vote sup- 
plies and to pass measures favored by the Kaiser. 
The elected representatives of the people can thus 
talk, resolve and criticise, and refuse to follow the 
Kaiser and thus create a public opinion which he 
may or may not dare to oppose, but they can do 
little more. 



Ill 



THE KAISER S DIVINE RIGHT DELUSION 

Finally, the Kaiser claims that his prerogative to 
govern is derived from God, granted by the Al- 
mighty to his House, the House of Hohenzollern. 
This is far from being meant as a figure of speech 
or mere rhetoric, or an allegorical expression of re- 
ligious responsibility for duties to be performed. 
It is a deep, all-abiding belief and principle of ac- 
tion. 

It is difficult for us Americans of the twentieth 
century fully to grasp this belief in a present-day 
man of boasted culture, from whom we expect com- 
mon sense. We may laugh at it, but in its prac- 
tical consequences it is no laughing matter. It is 
fundamental to the Kaiser's viewpoint and to an 
understanding of his attitude toward his subjects 



The Psycliology of the Kaiser 135 

and the world. Another sovereign derives his right 
to reign, if not to govern, from the Constitution of 
his country, which means in the last analysis by 
contract with his people. 

But the German Emperor refuses to acknowledge 
any responsibility to the people, or any dependence 
upon the people, or the Constitution, or contract, 
for his right to govern. He derives this right di- 
rectly from God. Whatever rights and powers the 
people possess descend from the Kaiser, who grants 
them through the Constitution ; the rights and pow- 
ers of the Kaiser do not ascend from the people, 
as in a democracy. 

The concentration of irresponsible hereditary 
power in one man and those appointed by him is 
plainly an autocracy. "The Divine right of Kings 
to rule" is a doctrine dating back to the Middle 
Ages, and is by Americans naively supposed to 
have ended nearly a century ago with the dissolu- 
tion of the "Holy Alliance," whose designs upon 
South America gave rise to our Monroe Doctrine 
in 1823. 

This doctrine of Divine right, then, is one of the 
prerogatives, if not in his mind the great preroga- 
tive, which the Kaiser announced he was resolved 
to defend. And it does not belong to the present 
Kaiser alone, but was possessed, as he claims, by 
his long line of ancestors of the House of Hohen- 
zollern, and will descend to his successors of this 
house. It is the prerogative of his house. Thus he 
announced : 



136 The Creed of Deutschtum 

It is the tradition of our house that we, the Hohenzol- 
lerns, regard ourselves as appointed by God to govern 
and to lead the people whom it is given us to rule, for 
their well-beina; and the advancement of their material 
and intellectual interests. 

And again: 

I look upon the people and nation handed on to me as a 
responsiblity, conferred upon me by God: and that it is, 
as is written in the Bible, my duty to increase this heri- 
tage, for which one day I shall be called upon to give an 
account ; those who try to interfere with my task I shall 
crush. 

And again: 

I regard my whole position as given to me direct from 
heaven, and that I have been called by the Highest to 
do His work, by One to Whom I must one day render an 
account. 

This claim as German Emperor, or as King of 
Prussia, has been announced again and again by the 
Kaiser, and his words have been quoted by the 
press, by magazine writers and pamphleteers and 
bookmakers unto weariness of the reader. 

The prerogatives we have briefly simimarized are 
imperial, but be it noted they are double-headed in 
that — mutatis mutandis — they also belong to Wil- 
liam II as King of Prussia so far as the constitu- 
tional relations of the kingdom to the empire make 
them applicable. 

The odd notion of Divine right the Kaiser picked 
up from his grandfather, William I, who, when he 
was crowned King of Prussia at Konigsberg, to 
show he was above the Constitution which his pred- 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 137 

ecessor had granted the people, raised with his own 
hands the crown from the altar, "set it on his own 
head, and announced in a loud voice, 'I receive this 
crown from God's liand and from none other.' " 

And, referring to this historical incident, the pres- 
ent Kaiser, William II., in a speech, now historic, 
at the same place, said: 

And here my grandfather, again, by his own right, set 
the Prussian crown upon his head, once more distinctly 
empliixsizing the fact that it was accorded him by the will 
of God alone, and not by Parliament or by any assem- 
blage of the people or by popular vote, and that he thus 
looked upon himself as the chosen instrument of Heaven, 
and as such performed his duties as regent and sovereign. 

From a psychological point of view, it does not 
matter — any more than it signified anything to the 
Kaiser and his grandfather — that, as a matter of 
fact, the first ruling Hohenzollern of Branden- 
burg, Elector Frederick I., acquired his title to the 
Electorate by taking from King Sigismund of 
Hungary, in 1411, a mortgage on the province (the 
nucleus of modern Prussia) as security for a loan 
to that hard-up potentate of about one hundred 
thousand gulden. A little later he foreclosed the 
mortgage and took title — a rather poor title at that, 
as there was already a mortgage on the property 
which it was convenient for Sigismund to repudiate. 
Perhaps royal second mortgages — like marriages — 
are made in Heaven, and thus they become "Divine 
Rights."* 

* In 1701 Elector Frederick III. took the title of (first) King of 
Prussia as Frederick I. 



138 The Creed of Deutschtum 

What does psychologically matter is that the pres- 
ent Kaiser has persuaded himself, forgetting all 
about this business transaction, that his early 
Hohenzollern Shylock (in foreclosing the mort- 
gage) "felt within himself the call to journey to 
this land" of Brandenburg — plainly a Divine call 
— and "was convinced that the task [of governing] 
was given him from above." (Kaiser's speech, Feb. 
3, 1899.) 

What counts psychologically is that the Kaiser 
believes that a Divine right to rule is his preroga- 
tive. How, in this age, a man who has shown such 
marked ability in certain directions can be such a 
fool — I mean psychologically, of course — as to per- 
suade himself to believe such stuff, is another story 
that would make an interesting psychological study 
in itself, and in the last analysis could probably be 
traced to subconscious wishes which have produced 
this conscious delusion, just as such subconscious 
processes determine the delusions of insane peo- 
ple. 

Our conscious thoughts are much more deter- 
mined by subconscious processes, of which we are 
unaware, than we realize. 

One great popular delusion is that our minds are 
more exact logical instruments than they really are, 
and we stand in awe of the minds of great men, 
thinking that because they are superior in certain 
directions, therefore they are superior in all other 
directions of their activities where they claim su- 
periority; whereas, as a matter of fact, a man may 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 139 

be eminently superior in certain fields of mental 
activity and psychologically a perfect fool-thinker 
and fool-performer in other fields. 

Helmholtz said of the eye that it was such an 
imperfect optical instrument that if an instrument 
maker should send him an optical instrument so 
badly made he would refuse to accept it and return 
it forthwith. He might have said the same thing of 
the human mind. It is a very imperfect instrument 
of thought. All we can say of it is that though a 
poor thing it is the best we can get. The deeper 
insight we get into the mechanism of the human 
mind, the poorer thing it appears as an instrument 
of precision. 

This Divine Right delusion is psychologically in- 
teresting in that it very closely resembles and be- 
haves like the delusions characteristic of the mental 
disease paranoia. This is not to say — indeed it 
would be absurd to say as some have said — that the 
Kaiser is afflicted with paranoia. But it is true 
that in normal people we find the prototypes of 
mental processes observed in abnormal mental con- 
ditions. The essential characteristic of paranoia is 
a systematized delusion: that is, some belief into 
which all sorts of facts of the environment are in- 
terwoven and through which such events, casual ac- 
tions of other people and their motives are inter- 
preted. Thus, an insane person may imagine he is 
the object of persecution and then proceed to in- 
terpret any kind of act of others, really unrelated 
to himself, through this belief, imagining that it is 



140 The Creed of Deutschtum 

directed towards the end of persecuting him. Or a 
paranoiac may imagine that he is the divine emissary 
of God and then interpret one hundred and one 
everyday events of Ufe as divine messages to him- 
self. 

In normal people we see the prototype of such 
a delusion in the form of a mildly fixed idea which 
leads a person to wrongly interpret other people's 
motives and acts. You may say, if you like, that 
he believes such and such a thing because he wishes 
to, or because of some firmly fixed belief through 
which he interprets it. The difference between the 
normal and abnormal person is that the former can, 
if he desires and the truth is properly presented, 
change his belief ; the abnormal person cannot. 

It would be an extravagance to say that the Kai- 
ser's delusion is anything more than a normal fixed 
idea which he could change if he wished to. But 
this fixed idea is so strong, so deeply rooted in his 
personality, and so directly the expression of a 
cherished and cultivated wish, conscious or subcon- 
scious, that it dominates his interpretation of facts 
which to an ordinary person flatly contradict it. It 
leads him to entirely ignore both palpable facts, 
such as the purchase with cold cash, by his ancestor, 
of the throne, or more exactly, electorate of Bran- 
denburg, and universally accepted understandings 
of the relation of God to the worldly affairs of men 
— so universally accepted that they have passed into 
the common-sense of mankind. We may say, para- 
phrasing the words of a subconscious personality 



Tlie Psychology of the Kaiser 141 

known as "Sally" in a case of multiple personality 
describing the attitude of mind of one of her other 
selves: "There are so many things he cannot or 
will not see. He holds to certain beliefs and ideas 
with unwearying patience. It makes no difference 
that the facts are all against him. He still ignores 
the facts, still idealizes himself and his preroga- 
tives." 

The Kaiser's fixed idea is, according to psycho- 
logical laws, determined by wishes — his wish to be 
sole and autocratic ruler of Prussia and the 
Empire, his wish to be the sole arbiter and di- 
rector of the imperial destinies, his wish, "con- 
sidering himself the instrument of the Lord, 
without heeding the views and opinions" and 
will of his subjects to "go his way"; his wish to 
decide everything, like a patriarch for the people, 
and to treat them like children ; his wish to be looked 
up to as the supreme power — all these desires de- 
termine in him the belief that he is the "anointed of 
the Lord," a ruler by Divine authority. For only 
by such authority could he logically find justifica- 
tion for the assimiption of such powers and the ful- 
fillment of his desires. In other words, through the 
acceptance of the Divine Right Delusion he finds 
a means for the fulfillment of his wishes. And cu- 
riously enough, but still according to psychological 
laws, this fixed idea with its powerful instinct of 
self-assertion has awakened in his Junker and mil- 
itaristic supporters sentiments of self-abasement 
through which they yield submissively to this as- 



142 The Creed of Deutschtum 

sumed prerogative of the Kaiser and adopt an atti- 
tude of Divinity Worship. Thus we have a politico- 
religious cult in which the Kaiser is the Godhead. 
And thus we have wishes conscious and subcon- 
scious, but working subconsciously, making a fool — 
psychologically speaking — of the Kaiser. 

The most curious part of this whole Divine Right 
business is that in Germany, with all its "Kultur," 
there has been scarcely one single voice among all 
the people of Germany publicly to deny this claim, 
excepting the voice of the Social Democracy; or, 
if there has, it has been like a voice crying in the 
wilderness — or perhaps from behind prison bars, 
where such rashness brought the prisoner, con- 
demned under the feudal law of lese-majeste. We 
shall presently see what the German democracy 
thinks about it. 



IV 



^THE GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND THE ARMY 

The practical upshot of this whole German sys- 
tem of government, in which imperial prerogatives 
and an impotent opera bouffe Reichstag are essen- 
tial ingredients, is that the Kaiser with his Chan- 
cellor and the Ministers of the several departments 
(Foreign Affairs, Navy, Post Office, etc.), a bu- 
reaucracy responsible only to the Kaiser, constitute 
an autocracy independent of Parliament and the 
voters. Consequently the Government is intended 



i 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 143 

to be and is for the State, by the State, not of the 
people, by the people. 

The Kaiser's point of view as to his own place 
in the State is shown by some of his sayings: "There 
is only one master in this country — I am he and 
I will not tolerate another." "There is no law but 
my law; there is no will but my will," he told his 
soldiers, and, "The King's will is the highest law," 
he wrote in the Golden Book of Munich. 

And so, as a German Professor, Ludwig Gur- 
litt, has said: 

He regards his people, the masses, as children not yet 
of age, and thinks the Government competent to prescribe 
the course of their social and cultural development — a 
profound and fatal mistake ... a mediaeval idea ! 

Autocracy makes for efficiency, but it also makes 
for the suppression of the aspirations of the people 
and self-government. But if the Kaiser, the bu- 
reaucracy, and an emasculated Parliament were the 
whole system of goverimient, autocracy would be 
incomplete. The system would crumble away as 
by an earthquake when democracy became success- 
ful at the polls. 

The system, therefore, must be supported by 
power of some kind. Without power behind the 
throne, or behind any government, autocratic, mon- 
archical, or republican, that goveiTiment would fall 
at the first shock of internal conflict. In a real 
republic that power is the will of the people — com- 
monly called public opinion. But we have seen that 
the German system does not rest upon public opin- 



144 The Creed of Deutschtum 

ion. Upon what, then? William II., indeed, as the 
"instrument of the Lord," has flaunted his own 
defiance of public sentiment. 
Five years ago he said : 

Considering myself as the instrument of the Lord, and 
without heeding the views and opinions of the day, I go 
my way. 

Behind the German autocracy is the army, under 
the absolute conti^ol of the Kaiser. Upon the army 
the Kaiser depends for the security of his rule. 
The army is the power behind the throne. 

As one writer remarks: 

"The army is the foundation of the social structure of 
the empire." 

The Kaiser, on one occasion, declared: 

With grave anxiety I placed the crown upon my head. 
Everywhere I met doubt, and the whole world misjudged 
me. But one had confidence in me ; but one believed in 
me — that was the army. And relying upon the army, and 
trusting in God, I began my reign, knowing well that the 
army is the main tower of strength for my country, the 
main pillar supporting the Prussian throne, to which 
God in His wisdom had called me. 

He said in 1891 : 

The soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities 
and decisions, have welded together the German Empire. 
My confidence is in the army— as my grandfather said 
at Coblenz : "These are the gentlemen on whom I can 
rely." 

And again, asserting his belief in military force 
as the means upon which the empire must rely to 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 145 

accomplish its ends at home and abroad, he quoted 
the saying of Frederick WilHam I.: 

If one wishes to decide something in this world, it is not 
the pen alone that will do it if unsupported by the power 
of the sword. 

In his first official act as Emperor (June 15, 
1888), he declared: 

The absolutely inviolable dependence upon the war lord 
(Kriegsherr) is, in the army, the inheritance which 
descends from father to son, from generation to gener- 
ation. ... So we are bound together, I and the army. 
Thus we are born for one another, and thus we will hold 
together in an indissoluble bond, in peace or storm, as 
God wills. 

This close connection between the army and the 
Prussian Kings, as Professor Gauss points out, is 
a tradition which William II. has sedulously main- 
tained, just as we have seen he has maintained the 
traditions of a Divine right to rule. 



V 

THE kaiser's sentiments 

With the meaning of all these prerogatives in 
mind, let us look a bit more closely into the psychol- 
ogy of the Kaiser. In doing so let us bear in mind 
that in the doctrine of Divine right we see devel- 
oped in the Kaiser a strong sentiment of the most 
personal kind, of birthright, of self-interest. And, 



146 The Creed of Deutschtum 

besides this, in all the other prerogatives which the 
Kaiser has so defiantly resolved to defend against 
all encroachments, we also have sentiments of self- 
interest — sentiments of possession, of rights per- 
taining to self. 

All these sentiments are bound up with a con- 
sciousness of his own personality (a "self -regard- 
ing" sentiment), with his ego. And there is a 
great deal of ego, of consciousness of his ego, in his 
personality. Perhaps his enemies would say, as was 
said of the great orang-utan, Bimi, in Kipling's 
tale— Bimi, who also wished to crush his enemies 
in furious outbursts of jealous rage — "there is too 
much ego in his cosmos." 

Now, as a matter of psychology, "sentiments," 
as I have already said, are of tremendous impor- 
tance as factors in personality and as forces which 
determine attitudes of mind, reactions of the per- 
sonality to the environment and conduct. 

Upon the formation of "sentiments" the charac- 
ter of a person and his social behavior fundamen- 
tally depend. And by the formation of sentiments 
in the course of the individual's mental development 
the primitive innate instincts of human nature are 
harnassed and brought under control and their im- 
pulses given proper direction. Thus these primitive 
impulses are repressed or cultivated according to 
the ideals of society. Otherwise, driven by the im- 
pulses of our innate instincts, we should all run 
amuck through society. 

We must understand, then, a little more pre- 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 147 

cisely what, psychologically and technically speak- 
ing, a sentiment is. I am not using the word 
in the popular sense. Without going into the psy- 
chology deeply, we may say that a sentiment is an 
idea of something, as its object, organized or asso- 
ciated with one or more instinctive emotions which 
give the idea impulsive force. 

In the personality of every human being — and 
the same is true of animals — there are a number 
of emotional instincts. These instincts are char- 
acterized by a particular emotion which each pos- 
sesses, and miay be named indifferently, for our 
present purposes, either after the emotion itself or 
after the biological aim which the instinct serves. 

Every person, for instance, possesses a pugnacity 
instinct of which the emotion is anger. Other such 
instincts are fear, parental feeling, disgust, curi- 
osity, self-assertion, self-abasement, reproduction, 
and so on. All such instincts have a biological func- 
tion in that they serve either to protect, like anger 
and fear, the individual (and the species) from 
danger against its enemies and prevent its extinc- 
tion, or, like the parental and reproductive instincts, 
serve to perpetuate the species, or, like the curios- 
ity instinct, to acquire knowledge and learn by ex- 
perience, and so on. Emotion, as the very word 
itself indicates, moves us — i. e., it is a force that 
impels toward some end and the emotion of each 
instinct carries it to fulfillment. 

When an emotion — i. e., instinct — has been ex- 
cited by some object, whether it be a material thing, 



148 The Creed of Deutschtum 

like a snake, or another person, or something mental 
— an idea of a material object, or a thought as of a 
possible danger to the individual, or of a political 
principle — the emotion may become so associated 
with and bound to the object that whenever the ob- 
ject is presented in consciousness the emotion is 
excited. This particularly happens when the emo- 
tion has been frequently excited by the same ob- 
ject. 

Thus a person may acquire a fear of snakes, or 
thunderstorms, or hatred of a person. Two or more 
emotional instincts may be organized in this way 
into a system about a given idea as their object. 

Now, when an idea always excites one or more 
emotions, so that the idea is always accompanied 
by the same emotional reaction, the whole is called 
a sentiment. Thus we have the sentiment of love 
of a mother for her child, of hatred of a tyrant, 
of disgust for a vicious person, of pride of self, 
and so on. 

Practically, psychological analysis shows that the 
organization of a sentiment is more complicated 
than such a simple arrangement would make it, 
and that the sentiment is deeply and widely rooted 
in a number of ramifying, previous mental experi- 
ences and innate emotions. This is expressed by 
popular language when we say a given sentiment 
is deeply rooted in a person's personality. The emo- 
tions serve to give their ideas great intensity and 
driving force for action. 

It is held by some psychologists that a sentiment 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 149 

always includes innately organized systems of sev- 
eral emotions so that a different emotion is neces- 
sarily excited according to the situation in which 
the object presents itself. Thus a hated person 
will awaken in us joy, or sorrow, or anger, or fear, 
according to whether he suffers injury, or escapes 
destruction, or prospers, or is likely to get the bet- 
ter of us. 

In accordance with this view a sentiment is an 
organized system of emotions centred about an idea 
of an object. The mechanism, as I have stated it, 
however, is sufficiently accurate for our purpose. 

With these general principles in mind, one has 
only to read the Kaiser's speeches to recognize that 
his ideas of himself and of his prerogatives, which 
he jealously defends, are organized with instinctive 
emotions of great intensity — emotions belonging to 
greed of possession, and pride, and self-assertion 
(or self-display ) , and pugnacity, and vengeful emo- 
tion, and jealousy. These ideas are therefore sen- 
timents deeply fixed and organized in his person- 
ality, and given great driving force by their emo- 
tions, which tend to carry them to activity and frui- 
tion. 

Hence it is that the Kaiser's sentiments of him- 
self and his prerogatives exhibit great intensity of 
feeling and determine his conduct to assert his rights 
and to exercise and enjoy them by being his own 
Chancellor and ruling the army and empire, and, 
if need be, to defend them most vigorously. 



150 The Creed of Deutschtum 

VI 

THE kaiser's self-regarding SENTIMENT 

But we must leave these traits of the Kaiser's 
personality for the immediate issue of our study. 
One sentiment, however, ought to be considered 
more intimately if certain of his most notorious pe- 
culiarities are to be understood. I refer to what 
has been called the "self -regarding" sentiment. 

Every person possesses such a sentiment, al- 
though it varies according to the ingredients that 
enter into it. Professor William McDougall, one 
of the most eminent of contemporary psychologists, 
has analyzed this sentiment, and attributes it to the 
biological instincts of self-assertion and self-abase- 
ment compounded in varying proportions with the 
idea of self. (These instincts are common to an- 
imals as well as men and have a biological end.) 
We thus get different types of self. 

When the first instinct of self-assertion — also 
called self-display — with its emotion of positive 
self -feeling is the chief instinct, then we have a type 
in which pride is the main characteristic of the idea 
of self. When the second instinct (with the emo- 
tion of negative self- feeling) is happily blended in 
the sentiment, we have a type of self-respect. 

To illustrate the former type, Professor McDou- 
gall (Social Psychology) draws the character of an 
imaginary Prince in whom the first instinct is the 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 151 

dominating one. It is interesting to see how per- 
fectly his picture represents the Kaiser: 

Imagine the son of a powerful and foolish Prince to be 
endowed with great capacities and to have in great 
strength the instinct of self-display with its emotion of 
positive self-feeling. Suppose that he is never checked, 
or corrected, or criticised, but is allowed to lord it over 
all his fellow-creatures without restraint. The self- 
regarding sentiment of such a child would almost neces- 
sarily take the form of an unshakable pride, a pride 
constantly gratified by the attitudes of deference, grati- 
tude, and admiration of his social environment ; the only 
dispositions that would become organized in this senti- 
ment of pride would be those of positive self-feeling or 
elation and of anger (for his anger would be invariabl}^ 
excited when any one failed to assume toward him the 
attitude of subjection or deference). 

His self-consciousness might be intense and very prom- 
inent, but it would remain poor in content; for he could 
make little progress in self-knowledge ; he would have 
little occasion to hear, or to be interested in, the judg- 
ments of others upon himself ; and he would seldom be led 
to reflect upon his own character and conduct. The 
only influences that could moralize a man so endowed and 
so brought up would be either religious teaching, which 
might give him the sense of a power greater than himself 
to whom he was accountable, or a very strong natural en- 
dowment of the tender emotion and its altruistic impulse, 
or a conjunction of these two influences. 

A man in whom the self-regarding sentiment had 
assumed this form would be incapable of being humbled — 
his pride could only be mortified ; that is to say, any dis- 
play of his own shortcomings or any demonstration of 
the superiority of another to himself could cause a pain- 
ful check to his positive self-feeling and a consequent 
anger, but could give rise neither to shame nor to humilia- 
tion, nor to any affective state, such as admiration, grati- 
tude, or reverence, in which negative self-feeling plays 



152 The Creed of Deutschtum 

a part. And he would be indifferent to moral praise or 
blame; for the disposition of negative self- feeling would 
have no place in his self-regarding sentiment; and nega- 
tive self-feeling, which renders us observant of the atti- 
tude of others toward ourselves and receptive toward 
their opinions, is one of the essential conditions of the 
influence of praise and blame upon us. 

The inordinate cultivation in the Kaiser of the 
self -regarding sentiment with the unalloyed instinct 
of self-display also explains, psychologically, the 
manifestations of certain traits which have amazed 
the world. I mean his colossal vanity as mani- 
fested by his fondness for dressing himself up in 
all sorts of uniforms and constantly changing his 
costumes — on occasions as often as five or six times 
in a single day, and even during the course of a 
Court reception — his fondness for having himself 
photographed or painted, or his portrait made as 
busts, lithographs, medals, and bas-reliefs, always 
posing in heroic attitudes for the purpose. 

It is interesting to compare the snap-shots of the 
Kaiser with the posed photographs (there are thou- 
sands of photographs of him ) , and not only as him- 
self, but in the heroic character of a Roman Em- 
peror mounted on a charger, and again in imitation 
of the Emperor Charlemagne. 

It explains his self-assumption to be an artist — 
a painter, a musician, a composer, an architect, an 
art critic, a preacher, and Heaven knows what else. 
It also gives a psychological explanation of his 
inability to stand personal criticism, and for his 
vain obtuseness in not being able to understand how 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 153 

any one should not look upon him excepting with 
reverent awe. One of the authors of "The Kaiser" 
cites the following two incidents. 

One of his subjects had been sentenced to prison 
for hinting something disrespectful about his sov- 
ereign : 

William was genuinely amazed that such an unnatural 
crime could ever have been committed. He "read and 
reread the papers in the case with the closest attention" ; 
and finally said to the waiting official: "It would seem 
that this man hitherto has not been a crimnal — son of 
respectable parents, himself in a respectable walk of life, 
with a good education. And yet- — how do you explain 
this — this insult to the Anointed of the Lord? Strange! 
Strange !" 

On another occasion: 

After reading a speech of the Socialist leader Bebel, 
containing some animadversion upon himself, he turned 
to the officer in attendance with clouded brow and flash- 
ing eye, and remarked in a voice trembling with passion: 
"And all this to me! To me! What is the country 
coming to?" 

This self -regarding sentiment is also at the bot- 
tom of that .dominating trait — love of power — 
which has led him to aspire to world power and to 
believe that with his army and with a stronger navy, 
toward the upbuilding of which he has directed un- 
tiringly his energies, he could conquer the world. It 
even led him to think of conquering the United 
States, for when we were engaged in war with 
Spain he declared, as I have authority for saying, 
"If I had had a larger fleet I would have taken 



154 The Creed of Deutschtum 

Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck."* 

That this saying of the Kaiser's meant more than 
mere momentary ebullition of petulant feeling or 
a thoughtless boast becomes manifest when we bear 
in mind that it was made towards the end of June, 
1898, after the arrival of Vice- Admiral von Died- 
rich and his fleet at Manila on June 12. It is sig- 
nificant that von Diedrich, when asked by Dewey 
why so large a German naval force — five ships, a 
more powerful force than that of the American 
fleet — was present, replied, "I am here by order 
of the Kaiser, sir," and the same explanation has 
been given since. We know now that there was 
an attempt made to form a coalition of Continental 
monarchies against the United States to intervene 
in the war in favor of Spain, but that it was blocked 
by England who, there is evidence to show, threat- 

* In a letter to the author, July 7, 1898, Joseph Chamberlain, then 
Colonial Secretary of Great Britain, wrote: 

"Of course you will win, and will be able to dictate terms to Spain. 
The Continental Powers will not interfere because England will not 
join them. I am certain that if opinion here had been different to 
what it is, j'^ou would have had to face a European coalition. 

"A fortnight ago {do not quote me as the authority) the German 
Emperor said to a friend of mine, 'If I had had a large fleet I 
would have taken Uncle Sam b}^ the scruff of the neck' — and this 
represents the view of the older monarchies who begin to desire a 
Monroe Doctrine for Europe. But, in view of the attitude of this 
country, they dare not move. 

"You are therefore free to work out your destiny." 

I have now been fully authorized to publish this letter. It was 
printed in full in the New York Tribune of April 28, 1917. There is 
much other corroborative evidence, which is undoubtedly accessible, 
of this attempt to form a European coalition against the United 
States and of its being blocked by England. (See letter of Mr. G. 
Creighton Webb, in the New York Times, June, 2, 1915.) 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 155 

ened to place her navy on the side of this country. 
Consequently Germany and the other Powers dared 
not move. As it was we came to the brink of war 
in July through the action of von Diedrich in inter- 
fering, after the battle of Manila, May 1, with the 
blockade by Dewey.* 

The remark of the Kaiser that he "would have 
taken Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck" must 
be taken in connection with all .the events of the 
time and particularly with the attempt to form a 
European coalition against the United States which 
probably would have been successful had it not 
been for the action of England. 

And so this same self-regarding sentiment, dis- 
torted and unbalanced, in co-operation with other 
sentiments, led him in 1914 to have contempt for 
the other Powers and to believe that he had a strong 
enough ai-my to terrify Russia and her ally, France, 
into submission, and so he gave Austria authority 
to take Servia "by the scruff of the neck"; to feel, 
in case the gleam of the "shining armour" and the 
clang of the rattling sabre did not suffice, that he 
had a strong enough army to take Russia "by the 

* It has come to light that events went so far that a German ship, 
it has been reported, cleared for action and Dewey, in the famous 
choleric interview (July 10) with the German Admiral's representa- 
tive, Flag-Lieutenant v. Hintzer, threatened war if Germany wanted 
it. This part of the interview was thus reported to Mr. John Barrett 
by "one of the officers of the Olympia who heard the conversation": 
"If the German Government" (said Dewey) "has decided to make 
war on the United States, or has any intention of making war, and 
has so informed your Admiral, it is his duty to let me know. . . . 
But whether he intends to fight or not I am ready." {Admiral George 
Dewey, by John Barrett: 1899: p. 115.) 



156 The Creed of Deutschtum 

scruff of the neck," and so he declared war against 
that country; to feel that he had a strong enough 
army to take France "by the scruff of the neck," 
and so he declared war against France; to feel 
that he had a strong enough army to take Belgium 
"by the scruff of the neck," and so he invaded that 
country with his army; and it led him more than 
twenty years ago to believe that some day he would 
have a strong enough navy to take England "by 
the scruff of the neck," and so he builded and build- 
ed his navy and drank to "Der Tag." 

Of course, the Kaiser's hypertrophied and one- 
sided self -regarding sentiment was not the sole psy- 
chological factor in determining his attiude of mind 
towards the United States and the other Powers. 
There were many factors, but it was one; and it 
accounts for his notorious contempt for other na- 
tions and at that time, particularly, for the United 
States. There were also sentiments of World- 
power and Empire, of German Kultur and War- 
Worship; a desire to have a "place in the sun," to 
possess colonies and, in particular, the Philippines 
and those of England and France; and to extend 
the German Empire to the ^gean Sea on the south 
and the North Sea on the north. 

The self-regarding sentiment, obviously, has 
played also a large part in the Divine Right De- 
lusion, in co-operation with the wishes we have con- 
sidered, forming a large ego-centric complex. 

Such, and other manifestations of the Kaiser's 
self -regarding sentiment, due to the impulsive force 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 157 

of its highly developed instinct of self -display (self- 
assertion), would make this element of his person- 
ality an interesting psychological study by itself. 
I merely wish now to point out that it is the extreme 
type of this sentiment that is responsible for many 
of his extravagances of speech and action, and that 
it plays a part, as we shall see, in his reactions to 
democracy. 



VII 



AIMS OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRACY 

Now let us return to the Kaiser's hatred of 
democracy. This also is a sentiment organized with 
several emotional instincts, etc., which we need not 
bother about here. That he has a hatred of de- 
mocracy is obvious. 

But why? 

To know that he has a hatred is not enough. We 
want it explained, to know why. It is not a suf- 
ficient explanation to say that he disbelieves in the 
principles of democracy. That would not be suffi- 
cient to account for the development of the senti- 
ment of hatred and for the reaction of anger which 
democracy excites. What created the hatred? For 
so much emotion there must be a deeper-lying cause 
— some hidden sentiment which, we may suspect, 
conflicts with the sentiments of his cherished pre- 
rogatives and his self-regarding sentiment. 

We want to know the Why. With this object 



158 The Creed of Deutschtum 

let us consider the object of the hatred — the aims 
of the party of democracy, one of the great pohti- 
cal forces in Prussia and the empire; one with 
which, as we have seen, the Emperor has been pas- 
sionately in conflict since his accession to the throne. 
We cannot understand the psychological reaction 
of the Emperor without understanding the aims and 
the potential power of this political force. For this 
purpose I shall have to ask the reader to bear for 
a moment with a slight digression, keeping in mmd 
what has been said about the Kaiser's sentiments 
until we return to our main theme. 

What does the Social Democratic Party stand 
for and in what respect are its aims antagonistic 
to the Emperor's prerogatives and the German sys- 
tem of government ? The party is widely regarded 
in the United States, I am constrained to believe, 
as the party of socialism. But this idea needs con- 
siderable modification. Indeed, so much so that 
the party would, if its aims were understood, re- 
ceive the moral support of Americans. 

Socialism has an ominous sound to American 
ears. The word has a stigma for many and is cal- 
culated to repel. At one time in its early history 
Marxian Socialism, formulated by Marx himself 
as "the social ownership of the means of production 
and distribution," was the dominating aim of the 
German Socialist Party. 

But times have changed. The aims of the party 
have undergone various metamorphoses as the re- 
sult of conflicts of factions within, fusions and po- 



The PsycJiology of the Kaiser 159 

litical evolution. Since the Kaiser came to the 
throne in 1888 a revolution has taken place in the 
aims, methods, tactics, and programs of the party. 
In accordance with this change, in 1890, the name 
was changed to the Social Democratic Party. So- 
cialism has been relegated to the background and 
democracy has become the paramount aim and is- 
sue. 

In other words, the principles of the socialist, 
Marx, have given place to those of the brilliant 
democratic leader, Lassalle. Both men are dead, 
but democracy survives. As one authority (S. P. 
Orth) puts it, "Marx is a tradition, democracy is 
an issue." 

To-day one hears very little of Marx and a great 
deal of "legislation" based on democratic princi- 
ples: 

The last election (1912), with its brilliant victory for 
Social Democracy, was not won on the general issues of 
the Erfurter program, but on the particular issue of 
the arrogance of the bureaucracy and ballot reform. 

Marxian propagandism has been sloughed off. 
But even if the Democratic Party still stood for 
socialism as its paramount aim this fact would not 
necessarily make it antagonistic to the Emperor's 
prerogatives or the German system of government. 
The State might become engaged in all sorts of 
individual enterprises without the fundamental 
structure of Government becoming altered. As a 
matter of fact, Germany is to-day the most so- 
cialized nation in the world. 



160 The Creed of DeutscJitiim 

We will not stop to inquire into the origin of this 
State Socialism. It does not matter for our pur- 
poses that these State socialistic measures were of- 
fered as a "bribe," to use Bismarck's term, to the 
Social Democrats to cease agitation against the gov- 
ernment, and that the Emperor long ago dropped 
this policy when he found that the Social Demo- 
crats would not be bribed. They would have none 
of these measures. They wanted political rights, 
political freedom of thought and speech, and the 
right to manage their own government just as we 
do ours in the United States. 

The German State owns railroad, canal and river 
transportation, telegraph and telephone systems, 
harbors and a parcel post. It conducts banks, in- 
surance, savings banks, and pawnshops. It admin- 
isters sick and accident insurance and old-age pen- 
sions. The municipalities own public utilities of 
all kinds, theatres, markets, and warehouses. 

The State, or municipality, obviously might go 
further and administer iron, coal, and manufactur- 
ing enterprises; it might undertake all sorts of so- 
cialistic functions without altering one whit the pre- 
rogatives of the Crown, or of Parliament, or of the 
relations of the Government to the people. Gov- 
ernmental autocracy would still exist and very 
likely would administer these industrial enterprises 
with the same satisfying efficiency with which it ad- 
ministers everything else it has taken hold of. 

The intense anger and hatred with which the Em- 
peror reacts to the Social Democrats cannot, there- 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 161 

fore, be explained by the principles of socialism 
per se, although he may disbelieve in extreme Marx- 
ian socialism. Even if these were still the aim of 
the party, there must be some other explanation 
that a Social Democrat should be stigmatized as an 
enemy of the empire, of religion and God, to be 
shot down by the army if his party became too 
strong. 

Let us examine then the demands as given in the 
latest program (1912) of the Social Democrats and 
some of the legislation for which they have fought. 
The demands are given in fourteen articles. 

Number one demands equal opportunities for all, 
special privileges to none — good American doc- 
trine. Number two relates to reform of the ballot 
laws and has been the main immediate issue. "Uni- 
versal, direct, equal, secret ballot" is demanded — 
also American doctrine. Owing to the present in- 
equality of the ballot the Democrats have been bad- 
ly handicapped in that they cannot elect their pro- 
portionate number of representatives. 

Number three relates to the existing system of 
government. A true Parliamentary Government 
is demanded, and a Ministry, like that of England, 
responsible to Parliament, instead of the present 
autocratic system by which the Ministry is respon- 
sible only to the Emperor. Also, it is demanded 
that "the power to declare war or mmntain peace" 
he given to the lower house (Reichstag). Consent 
of the Reichstag to all State appropriations (as 
with the House of Commons and the American 



162 The Creed of Beutschtum 

Congress). 

Numbers four and five relate respectively to the 
organization of the army and reform of adminis- 
trative justice, abolishing class privilege at law, etc. 
Number six demands the "right to combine, meet, 
and organize." Number seven relates to the estab- 
lishment of a national Department of Labor, fac- 
tory inspection, and a legalized universal eight- 
hour day, etc. Number eight relates to reform of 
the industrial insurance laws, and lowering the age 
of old-age pensions from 70 to Q5, etc. 

Number nine: complete religious freedom. Sep- 
aration of Church and State. No support of any 
kind for religious purposes from public funds — 
good American doctrine again. Number ten de- 
mands universal free schools. Number eleven re- 
lates to reform of taxation demanding abolition of 
indirect taxes and taxes on necessities of life and 
reduction of tariif on those schedules which encour- 
age trusts. 

Number twelve supports "measures that tend to 
develop commerce and trade." Number thirteen: 
"A graduated income, property and inheritance 
tax" in order to dampen "the ardor of the rich for 
a constantly increasing army and navy." Number 
fourteen: "Internal improvements and coloniza- 
tion"; but the "cessation of foreign colonization 
now done for the purpose of exploiting foreign peo- 
ples for the sake of gain." 

The first thing that will strike the reader is the 
absence of anything essentially socialistic in the 



The Psijcliology of the Kaiser 163 

principles formulated in this program. They are 
rather what we in this country would call "Repub- 
lican," "Progressive," and "Democratic." They 
are not nearly as socialistic as many of the functions 
now undertaken by the German State. With the 
exception of those articles that relate exclusively to 
German conditions (such as numbers four and 
eight) and the abolition of indirect taxation, they 
express good American doctrine and are, for the 
most part, axiomatic in this country. 

No American and no Englishman would see any- 
thing in them to get excited about, although he 
might hold a different opinion about the expedi- 
ency of one or the other demand. Undoubtedly the 
spirit of German democracy goes further than the 
program, especially in particular parts of Ger- 
many ; nevertheless this program formulates the de- 
mands of the national party. 

Between the American Republic and German 
democracy there is, or should be, a bond of common 
sympathy, the bond of common political ideals and 
common purpose — the love of political and relig- 
ious liberty, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, 
and freedom of the press without fear of imprison- 
ment or punishment under "lese-majeste" or any 
power of the State; the emancipation of mankind 
from the tyranny of autocracy; the "right to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" according 
to the dictates of the individual conscience ; the rule 
of the people and not of an autocracy, the subor- 
dination of the State to the will of the people — 



164 The Creed of Deutschtum 

and to this end government based not upon an 
army, but upon public opinion as expressed by the 
votes of the people. 

When these ideals and purposes of the German 
democracy are realized in the United States, Amer- 
ican public opinion will have the strongest ties of 
sympathy with the great masses of Germany, strug- 
gling for these ends against an intrenched "State." 

Between German democracy and American pub- 
lic sentiment there can be no conflict. It is only 
with the autocratic classes that there can be an- 
tagonism, but the autocratic classes mean the State 
as an artificially created entity isolated from and 
distinct from the masses of the people. 

Why, then, does the Emperor almost alone, even 
among Germans, react to the ideals of democracy 
with such passion, such anger, and such hatred ? On 
psychological grounds we can anticipate that such 
emotion must be for personal reasons and because 
they strike some intense emotional sentiment. 

We find the key to the puzzle when we come to 
examine Articles 3 and 4. Number three has been 
the paramount issue of the democracy — it is its 
foundation stone. Number two, the reform of the 
ballot, while the main political issue of the day, is 
only a means to this end. 

The fundamental issue is (1) a true Parliamen- 
tary Government, with parliamentary power in con- 
formity with modern democratic ideas, such as ob- 
tains in England; and (2) the abolition of a Chan- 
cellor and Ministry appointed by the Kaiser and 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 165 

responsible only to the Kaiser and the substitution 
of a Government responsible to Parliament. Thus 
the Government and the army would be responsible 
to the people and rest upon public opinion. 

This democratic principle seems to our ideas not 
only harmless enough, but a matter of course and 
only the expression of the age we live in. But to 
the Kaiser it means a personal cataclysm. It means 
the abolition of the greatest of the Kaiser's pre- 
rogatives; it means the denial of the Divine Right 
of Kings; it means the downfall of the House of 
Hohenzollern, in that it means the reduction of 
the prerogatives of the house to reigning without 
governing. 

He could be no longer his own Chancellor, as 
he is recognized generally to be to-day in fact. His 
wings would be clipped. He would be shorn of 
autocratic power. He could no longer dictate pol- 
icies of government. The will of the people would 
rule. What would be the use of a ''divine right" 
to sit as a social ornament upon a throne and watch 
the people rule? 

Furthermore, his "self-regarding sentiment," 
characterized by the instinct of self-assertion and 
the emotion of pride, would receive an unbearable 
rebuff. He would no longer be the central figure 
in Europe, overlording all other rulers by his per- 
sonality, his autocratic power, and his prerogatives. 
The conflict between the Kaiser and the democracy 
thus becomes a personal conflict on his part. 



166 The Creed of Deutschtum 



VIII 

THE REAL CAUSE OF THE KAISER's ANTIPATHY 

Gathering together the facts which we have col- 
lated, we have found in the Kaiser intensely strong 
sentiments of his prerogatives, an almost abnormal 
self -regarding sentiment, and a powerful, steadily 
growing political party acting in antagonism to 
those sentiments and threatening in case of success 
to rob him of his prerogatives. 

Now, with these facts in mind, let us analyze the 
antecedent contents of the Kaiser's mind a little 
more intimately. If he has been a thinking being 
at all, we know, in view of the political and his- 
torical facts we have studied — any assertion to the 
contrary would meet with incredulous skepticism — 
there have been thoughts, however fleeting, of what 
would happen to himself and his house if the demo- 
cratic reforms should prevail; thoughts of being 
robbed of his prerogatives, robbed of his power to 
rule the Kingdom of Prussia, to rule the Imperial 
Bundesrat by his power as King of Prussia, to rule 
the Reichstag through the Bundesrat; thoughts of 
being robbed of the prerogatives to be his own 
Chancellor, to appoint his own Ministry, to control 
the army, to be independent of Parliament and pub- 
lic opinion and the public will — in short, robbed of 
being an autocratic ruler of the Kingdom of Prus- 
sia and the German Empire by Divine Right. 



The Psijchologii of the Kaiser 167 

And there has been a full realization of the in- 
creasing power of democracy, steadily growing in 
numbers, and rising, swelling, year by year, like a 
great irresistible tidal wave, threatening sooner or 
later to carry all before it and overwhelm the sys- 
tem of autocracy. And against this growing ava- 
lanche of ballots of the democracy he sees no de- 
fense for himself save the army, and so he calls 
upon his soldiers to be prepared to "shoot down 
your own relatives, brothers, and even parents in 
the streets," when he shall give the word of com- 
mand. 

Such thoughts and such realizations of future 
danger could not but excite the biological defensive 
instinct of fear. And this instinct, being associated 
with its object, the idea of democracy, forms a sen- 
timent, the fear of democracy. This sentiment is 
further associated with or ciystallized about other 
egoistic sentiments of self and his House and his 
prerogatives. Hence it may be described as a fear 
of democracy because of the danger to himself and 
his House of Hohenzollern, a fear of being deprived 
by the hands of the democracy of his prerogative to 
be an autocrat. It is a fear of democracy, not for 
Germany but for himself. He fears for his own 
life, so to speak, for, if you rob him of his preroga- 
tives, do you not take away that which to him is 
his life? 

This does not mean that he is aware of this very 
personal egoistic or egocentric fear-sentiment. He 
undoubtedly would not admit it to others, nor is it 



168 The Creed of Deutschtum 

likely that he could, even if he would, admit it to 
himself, because it has not been squarely faced, but 
has been thrust aside, repressed bj^ the pride of his 
self -regarding sentiment and not allowed to come 
to the full light of consciousness. Though not rec- 
ognized by himself, it is there all the same, repressed 
into the subconscious, or, if you prefer, in the back- 
ground of the mind (which, after all, is a part 
of the subconscious ) . 

Repressed into the subconscious, it is there neces- 
sarily intimately systematized with, and has deep 
roots in, the many associated antecedent thoughts 
that, as we have seen, gave rise to it. So long as 
these so-called psycho-genetic thoughts are there 
unmodified — conserved also, like a phonographic 
record, in the subconscious — ^he could not get rid 
of his fixed fear of the democracy if he would. 

In this light his famous declaration of his pre- 
rogative, "I am the Supreme War Lord," receives 
deeper meaning when at the same time we remem- 
ber he is the head of that autocracy that wields the 
power. We can see into the background of his 
mind. He sees the danger, we see the fear. We 
see, too, in the background of his mind a realiza- 
tion of a growing democracy, and we find there 
upon what methods he relies if the German democ- 
racy should win at the polls and change the Con- 
stitution. To oppose the will of the people he has 
the army. And we see into his inner consciousness 
when he prepared (as already quoted) the minds 
of his young soldiers for "the day." 



The Psychology of the Kaiser 1()9 

IX 

THE KAISER^S ANTIPATHY AN OBSESSION AND A DE- 
FENSE REACTION 

Now let US go one step further. Although this 
egocentric sentiment of fear for himself and his 
dynasty is repressed into the subconscious, it is not 
for that reason inert and incapable of affecting his 
conscious processes. On the contrary, as we are 
forced to believe from the result of psychological 
investigations into such conditions of personality, it 
determines many of his conscious processes of 
thought, of his political principles and his activities 
against his most dangerous political enemy. 

In the first place, it induces a defense reaction 
of an intensely emotional character which aims to 
direct his activities in a direction that will protect 
him against the dangers of democracy. This de- 
fense reaction is anger and the sentiment of hatred. 

It should be explained that psychological analy- 
sis of the emotions goes to show that the sentiment 
of hatred is made up of several emotions associated 
with its object, of at least fear and anger and venge- 
ful emotions,' which last also includes anger besides 
that most conspicuous trait of the Kaiser — the self- 
regarding sentiment. 

The way the defense reaction comes into play is 
this: The instinctive emotions and their sentiments 
are awakened and recur from time to time when- 



170 The Creed of Deutschtum 

ever the subconscious egoistic sentiment or any of 
its associated psychogenetic thoughts — those of his 
possible fall from power — is touched. The senti- 
ments of fear he will not admit to himself, and 
they are repressed as such; but the fear-emotion 
appears in consciousness disguised as hatred, of 
which it is a component. Anger against and hatred 
of democracy he is prepared to admit. They are 
fully faced and rise into the full light of conscious- 
ness, although their real underlying cause is hid- 
den. 

Such an intensely fixed emotional idea (hatred), 
recurring whenever its object is presented to con- 
sciousness, is, in principle, an obsession, although 
it may not be so beyond control as to be pathologi- 
cal. But, as in the Kaiser's case, it may be only 
the apparent obsession, i. e., a defense reaction to 
the real obsession hidden in the subconscious. The 
Kaiser's real obsession is a subconscious phobia^ a 
fear of democracy for himself and his House. 

It is interesting to notice in this connection how 
the national hatred of one nation for another is rec- 
ognized by popular language as a phobia or fear. 
We speak of an Anglo-phobia, of a Russo-phobia, 
to describe the hatred of, let us say, Germany for 
England and Russia. Though the nation would 
not admit being afraid, nevertheless, by the very 
term employed, it is popularly recognized that the 
hatred is really though unconsciously the expression 
of a fear. 

In the case of the Kaiser's phobia of democracy, 



The Psijchologii of the Kaiser 171 

the impulsive forces of the biological instincts of 
pugnacity (anger), fear, self-assertion, etc., pro- 
vide the energy of the fighting spirit and carry to 
fruition his political ideas aimed at repressing the 
Social Democrats. This is exemplified by the 
Kaiser's exhortations, threats, and epithets hurled 
in his speeches at these alone of his political ene- 
mies, and by the laws enacted and the use of the 
lese-majeste to suppress them. By suppressing the 
Social Democracy he is defended from his peril. 
Hence, as I have said, anger and hatred is a defense 
reaction. 

There are other ways in which the Kaiser's sub- 
conscious phobia unconsciously determines his men- 
tal behavior — by this I mean his modes or reason- 
ing, his political principles and activities. As is well 
recognized not only by psychologists but by popu- 
lar notions, such a repressed, unadmitted sentiment 
becomes a motivating force, a subconscious motive 
that directs our conscious reasonings. 

Thus the Kaiser rationalizes, as psychologists say, 
his political objections to democracy — that is, un- 
willing to admit his real objections, he finds and 
formulates logical reasons why democracy is wrong 
and why his own opinions are right, really believing 
in them, perhaps, as God-given. Saving the intro- 
duction of the Deity, this is nothing more than what 
every one does who is unconsciously influenced by 
subconscious motives of which he is unaware. 

When we say that a person is unconsciously in- 
fluenced by this or that, unconsciously governed 



172 The Creed of Deutschtum 

by a prejudice or sentiment like jealousy or fear or 
ambition or what not, we mean that he is governed 
by a motive which is subconscious, which he will 
not admit to himself, and of which he is therefore 
unaware. It determines his thoughts just as the 
hidden works of a clock determine the movements 
of the hands and chimes. 

THE MORAL 

What is the moral of all this? Surely the insight 
into the Kaiser's mind whioh a study of his senti- 
ments and his phobia has given us reveals some- 
thing more important than the mere personality of 
an exalted personage — exalted in the eyes of the 
world. It gives us an insight into the political forces 
which are wrestling within the German Empire for 
those ideals for which humanity has been striving 
through all the ages. It reveals the forces which 
for years have been striving with might and main 
to suppress these ideals. And it reveals the forces 
upon which the world must depend to overthrow 
Germanism. 

The Kaiser and his House of HohenzoUern and 
all that they stand for have become Civilization's 
World-Problem. 

If the Powers of Europe want lasting peace 
through the overthrow of autocracy and militarism, 
i. e., Germanism, the obsession of the Kaiser points 
the way — look to the democracy of Germany ! 



THE AMERICAN VERSUS THE GER- 
MAN VIEWPOINT 



THE AMERICAN VERSUS THE GER- 
MAN VIEWPOINT* 



FRENCH AND GERMAN LESSONS AT THE FRONT 

SINCE the war began numerous articles by 
organized German propagandists have ap- 
peared scattered through the press and mag- 
azines of this country, and in pamphlets. 

These articles have given us the German view- 
point of government, of the causes of and respon- 
sibility for the war, of the manner in which war 
should be carried on, of German ideals and other 
matters. 

With the exception possibly of Dr. Dernburg, 
Dr. von Mach stands out as the most prolific writer 
among these propagandists. Furthermore, a few 
days ago he presided in Washington at the propa- 
gandist meeting of "German Americans," which 
passed resolutions demanding unneutral action by 
our government. 

What, then, is the German viewpoint? 

I turn to Dr. von Mach for the above reasons 
and because he has instructed us in a long series 
of articles specifically entitled the ''German View- 
point." These cover about every aspect of German 

* Printed in the Boston Sunday Post, February 7 and 14, 1915. 

175 



176 The Creed of Deutschtum 

thought and activity. With only one of these view- 
points am I interested here, that of the German 
army's method of carrying on war. I will cite only 
so much as will enable one who has not read the 
original article to understand this viewpoint. 

Dr. von Mach begins by quoting the following 
words of the great von Moltke, written in 1880: 

"Nobody, I think, can deny that the general soft- 
ening of men's manners has been followed by a more 
humane way of waging war. The introduction in 
our generation of universal service in the army has 
marked a long step in the direction of the desired 
aim, for it has brought also the educated classes into 
the army." 

"The truth of this statement," Dr. von Mach 
contends, "is fully borne out by the reports which 
have reached Germany from the front." 

He then goes on to illustrate for our edification 
this "viewpoint" by a series of pictures of German 
army life constructed to show "the humaiie way of 
waging war" under the influence of the educated 
classes in the army. 

These pictures are drawn from an account writ- 
ten by Professor von Hartmann, now serving as 
a lieutenant in the army. The first picture is of an 
incident which, we were told, "may well form the 
basis on which to construct a picture of the German 
army in the field to-day." It is called a "French 
Lesson at the Front. Place — A Stubble Field in 
Belgium. Time — Autumn, 1914." 



American Versus German Viewpoint 177 

Songs the Germans Sing 

The soldiers, halted after a forced march, "are 
lounging in the field, talking and laughing" in an- 
imated groups. Breakfast finished, they "are in 
excellent humor." Some splendid fellows from the 
country have lighted their pipes and we hear them 
"singing the beautiful home and soldier songs" 
which we are told (though not in italics) "often 
soften for the time being even the hardest hearts of 
warriors" 

One sample of these beautiful, softening songs, 
expressive, we may suppose, of German sympathy 
for the enemy, is this : 

"France, poor France, how will you fare 
When our German militaire 
Visits you? Colors: Black and white and red. 
Poor little France, it is too bad!" 

Sympathetic songs like these are heard all over 
the field. 

Then follows the French lesson. Here we see 
the German soldier passing his leisure, not in the 
rough, uncouth pastimes proverbial of soldiers of 
other lands, but in the higher intellectual pastime 
of acquiring culture. 

On an order from the commanding officer "at- 
tention" is called, and the whole company is gath- 
ered about the professor-lieutenant who proceeds to 
give a lesson in French to men eager for "kultur" 
that will be of use when in a few weeks they will be 
in Paris. Then the army takes up its march again. 



178 The Creed of Deutschtum 

Then we have another picture — that of the 
marching soldiers, with softened hearts, singing a 
touching song of comradeship. This song I shall 
refer to later. Once more the picture changes. 

"The song died away, the thunder of the cannon 
grew louder;" the soldiers are going into battle. 
Now we have a picture constructed to show us 
the religious culture, the deep, reverent spirituality 
of the soldiers: their "grand conception of God and 
man;" they sing Koerner's "Prayer During Bat- 
tle," beginning "Father, I call to Thee." The very 
air seemed purified. 

"Whatever selfish train of thought the individual 
soldier or ofiicer had been following fell into insig- 
nificance before the grand conception of God and 
man." 

An American Viewpoint 

Thus we see in a succession of emotional pictures 
how von Moltke's dream — if I may call it a dream 
— has come true. 

These are delightful idyls, charming pictures of 
a Christian army, of an "army of the Lord," of 
the softening of men's manners, and of the humane 
German way of waging war. It is the German 
viewpoint. But there is an American viewpoint; 
let us contrast them. 

Dr. von Mach has given his pictures as drawn 
by an eye witness. Professor Hartmann, a German. 
Let me, too, draw some pictures, and let me, too, 
take my pictures from an eye witness in Belgium ; 



American Versus German Viewpoint 179 

but he shall be a neutral witness, an American, Mr. 
E. Alexander Powell, who had unusual opportuni- 
ties to observe what he describes in his book, re- 
cently published, "Fighting in Flanders." He was 
one of the few correspondents on the firing line.f 

If any one has not read that book let him do so 
at once if he wants to realize the manner of the 
German invasion and of the heroic defense of their 
country by the Belgians. He lets you understand, 
too, how war is actually fought. 

I cite this account because I wish to disregard all 
ex parte testimony. All the Belgian accounts are 
those of interested witnesses. We shall see the war 
as waged in Belgium not from the Belgian or the 
German viewpoint, but from the American view- 
point. 

Dr. von Mach's first picture is entitled: 

"A French Lesson at the Front." 
Let me call mine: 
"A German Lesson at the Front." 
It is a triptych in three scenes: 

t At the time this article \vas written, February 1915, we did not 
have the report of Lord Bryce's Commission and the mass of inde- 
pendent testimony to German atrocities later given to the world on 
the evidence of eye-witnesses. The official Belgian statements of the 
time were ex parte but they have been fully corroborated. I there- 
fore required a neutral American witness. Mr. Powell's testimony 
has since been supported bj' many witnesses, amongst them Mr. Hugh 
Gibson, whose evidence is appended as footnotes to the text further on. 



180 The Creed of Deutschtum 

SCENE I 

PLACE AERSCHOT TIME AUGUST, 1914 

{To understand the picture we must remember that orders had 
been deliberately given to burn and pillage Aerschot by the Germ,am 
com,mander after the German troops had entered the town. This, the 
commander himself told Mr. Powell, was in retaliation for the shoot- 
ing of the chief of staff by a boy, 15 years of age, the son of the 
burgom,aster. "What followed," Mr. Poioell was given to understand 
— the execution of the burgomaster, his son and several score of the 
leading townsmen, the giving over of the xoomen to a lust-mad 
soldiery, the sacking of the houses, and the final burning of the town 
— "was the punishm,ent which would always be meted out to towns 
whose inhabitants attacked Qerm,an soldiers.") 

My picture is of what Mr. Powell saw: 

In many parts of the world I have seen many terrible 
and revolting things, but nothing so ghastly, so horrify- 
ing as Aerschot. Quite two-thirds of the houses had been 
burned and showed unmistakable signs of having been 
sacked by a maddened soldiery before they were burned. 

Everywhere were the ghastly evidences. Doors had 
been smashed in with rifle-butts and boot heels ; windows 
had been broken ; pictures had been torn from the walls ; 
mattresses had been ripped open with bayonets in search 
of valuables ; drawers had been emptied upon the floors ; 
the outer walls of the houses were spattered with blood and 
pock-marked with bullets ; the sidewalks were slippery 
with broken bottles ; the streets were strewn with women's 
clothing. 

It needed no one to tell us the details of that orgy of 
blood and lust. The story was so plainly written that 
any one could read it. 

For a mile we drove the car slowly between the 
blackened walls of fire-gutted buildings. This was no 
accidental conflagration, mind you, for scattered here 
and there were houses which stood undamaged, and in 
every such case there were scrawled with chalk upon the 
doors, 'Good People. Do not burn. Do not plunder,' 



American Versus German Viewpoint 181 

The Germans went about the work of house-burning 
as systematically as they did everything else. They had 
various devices for starting conflagrations — all of them 
effective. 

Despite the scowls of the soldiers, I attempted to talk 
with some of the women huddled in front of a bakery 
waiting for a distribution of bread, but the poor crea- 
tures were too terror-stricken to do more than stare at 
us with wide, beseeching eyes. Those eyes will always 
haunt me. 

I wonder if they do not sometimes haunt the Germans. 
But a little episode that occurred as we were leaving the 
city did more than anything else to bring home the 
horror of it all. We passed a little girl of 9 or 10 and 
I stopped the car to ask the way. Instantly she held 
both hands above her head and began to scream for 
mercy. When we had given her some chocolate and 
money and had assured her that we were not Germans, 
but Americans and friends, she ran like a frightened deer. 
That little child, with her fright-wide eyes and her hands 
raised in supplication, was in herself a terrible indictment 
of the Germans. 

Scores Were Shot Down 

Do you like the picture. Dr. von Mach? Quite 
a picture, isn't it? Let us complete it in order 
that we may study all the details in justice to Ger- 
man art. 

Piecing together the stories told by those who did sur- 
vive that night of horror, we know that scores of towns- 
people were shot down in cold blood, and that, when the 
firing squads could not do the work of slaughter fast 
enough, the victims were lined up and a machine gun was 
turned upon them. 

We know that young girls were dragged from their 
homes and stripped naked and violated by soldiers — 



182 The Creed of DeutscJitum 

many soldiers — in the public square in the presence of 
officers. 

We know that both men and women were unspeakably 
mutilated, that children were bayoneted, that dwellings 
were ransacked and looted, and that finally, as though to 
destroy the evidences of their horrid work, soldiers went 
from house to house with torches, methodically setting 
fire to them. 

Is this the "humane way of waging war" which 
the great Moltke thought had followed "the general 
softening of men's manners," and the bringing of 
"the educated classes into the army" through uni- 
versal service? Wouldn't he be proud of German 
"kultur" if he were alive to-day? 

Perhaps you think I ought to give the reason 
why the 15 -year-old son of the burgomaster shot 
the German officer. Well, I will. 

Shot to Defend Sister 

The Germans claimed it was, or looked like, a 
prearranged plan on the part of the townspeople, 
who, it is asserted, opened fire upon the troops. 
The Belgians give another reason for the boy's ac- 
tion. It was in defense of his sister's honor. You 
can read the detailed story if you wish to know 
it, in Mr. Powell's book. 

I do not know if that story is true; Mr. Powell 
does not know. But there must have been some rea- 
son, or perhaps the boy was a fanatic, or half-witted. 
Surely no sane man, and surely no man holding 
the responsible position of burgomaster, would give 
a dinner party to German officers and arrange to 



American Versus German Viewpoint 183 

have his own son shoot one of them, knowing that 
there was no escape from the consequences of such 
an act committed in his own home. 

But accept either story you hke, what do you 
think of a commanding officer, of the mode of con- 
ducting war that executes several score of the lead- 
ing townsmen, that shoots down women and chil- 
dren, that gives over the women to the soldiery, that 
orders the sacking of the houses and, finally, the 
burning down of the town, house by house, be- 
cause a boy shot an officer? 

Is this the German idea of a "humane way of 
waging war"? 

If you think this mode quite justified, let me tell 
you how it impressed an American, one, remember, 
accustomed to the sights of war in many lands: 

It was with a feeling of repulsion amounting almost to 
nausea that we left what had once been Aerschot be- 
hind us. 

But the Belgians nevertheless learned their Ger- 
man lesson at the front. 

Here is the second panel of the triptych. Please 
look at it. It represents a second "German lesson 
at the front": 

SCENE II 
PLACE LOUVAIN TIME SAME 

The Germans had entered the city. The inhab- 
itants had evacuated it before their arrival. Yet, 
in spite of that fact, the Germans destroyed it. 



184 The Creed of Deutschtum 

They used a motor car, equipped with a large tank 
for petrol, a pump, a hose and a spraying nozzle. The 
car was run slowly through the streets, one soldier work- 
ing the pump and another spraying the fronts of the 
houses. Then they set fire to them. Oh, 3'^es, they were 
very methodical about it, those Germans.* 

* Mr. Hugh Gibson, Secretary of the American Legation in Brus- 
sels, has recently published (Nov. 1917) his absorbingly interesting 
"private journal" giving his observations from day to day during 
those savage times from the invasion of. Belgium to the execution of 
Miss Cavelle (Aug. 1915). He was able to get into Louvain during 
the shooting-up and burning of the city. I am now able to give 
further "pictures" of Louvain and evidence of German methods from 
this neutral diary of an eye-witness. (I quote by permission.) 

"We ... set off on foot down the Rue de la Station, . . . The 
houses on both sides were either partially destroyed or smouldering. 
Soldiers were systematically removing what was to be found in the 
way of valuables, food, and wine, and then setting fire to the 
furniture and hangings. It was all most businesslike. The houses 
are substantial stone buildings, and fire will not spread from one 
to another. Therefore the procedure was to batter down the door 
of each house, clean out what was to be saved, then pile furniture 
and hangings in the middle of the room, set them afire, and move 
on to the next house. 

"It was pretty hot, but we made our way down the street, show- 
ing our passes every hundred feet or so to soldiers installed in com- 
fortable armchairs, which they had dragged into the gutter from 
looted houses, till we came to a little crossing about half way to 
the Hotel de Ville. Here we were stopped by a small detachment 
of soldiers, who told us that we could go no farther; that they 
were clearing civilians out of some houses a little farther down 
the street, and that there was likely to be firing at any time. 

"The officer in command spoke to us civilly and told us to stick 
close to him so that we could know just what we ought to do at any 
time. He was in charge of the destruction of this part of the town 
and had things moving along smartly. His men were firing some 
houses near by and he stood outside smoking a rank cigar and 
looking on gloomily. ... 

"Machine guns were at work near by, and occasionally there was 
a loud explosion when the destructive work was helped with dyna- 
mite. 

"A number of the men about us were drunk and evidently had 
been in that state for some time. Our ofBcer complained that they 



Avierican Versus German Viewpoint 185 

Wlmt was the excuse for all this? I wonder. 
That is not as pretty a picture as the one you 

had had very httle to eat for several days, but added glumly that 
there was plenty to drink. . . . 

"He (the officer) was rabid against the Belgians and had an 
endless series of stories of atrocities they had committed — though he 
admitted that he had none of them at first hand. He took it as 
gospel, however, that they had fired upon the German troops in 
Louvain and laid themselves open to reprisals. To his thinking 
there is nothing bad enough for them, and his chief satisfaction 
seemed to consist in repeating to us over and over that he was 
going the limit. Orders had been issued to raze the town — 'till not 
one stone was left on another,' as he said. 

"Just to see what would happen I inquired about the provision of 
The Hague Conventions, prescribing that no collective penalty can 
be imposed for lawless acts of individuals. He dismissed that to his 
own satisfaction by remarking that: 

" 'All Belgians are dogs, and all would do these things unless 
they are taught what will hajjpen to them.' 

"Convincing logic ! 

"With a hard glint in his eye he told us the purpose of his work; 
he came back to it over and over, but the burden of what he had 
to say was something like this: 

" 'We shall make this place a desert. We shall wipe it out so 
that it will be hard to find where Louvain used to stand. For 
generations people will come here to see what we have done, and 
it will teach them to respect Germany and to think twice before they 
resist her. Not one stone on another, I tell you — kein Stein auf 
einander !' 

"I agreed with him when he remarked that people would come 
here for generations to see what Germany had done — but he did 
not seem to follow my line of thought. . . . 

"We went on into the freight yards and were greeted by a num- 
ber of officers with hopeful talk about a train coming from Brus- 
sels with food. We were given chairs . . . settled down and lis- 
tened to the stories of the past few days. It was a story of clear- 
ing out civilians from a large part of the town; a systematic routing 
out of men from cellars and garrets, wholesale shootings, the gen- 
erous use of machine guns, and the free application of the torch — 
the whole story enough to make one see red. And for our guidancp 
it was impressed on us that this would make people respect Ger- 
many and think twice about resisting her." Pp. 159-165. 



186 The Creed of Deutschtum 

draw of the happy, animated groups of German 
soldiers, "lounging oil the field, laughing and talk- 
ing"; with lighted pipes, "singing the beautiful 
home and soldier songs which often soften for the 
time being, even the hardest hearts of warriors." 

But would you like an idyl of that kind? Here 
is one; it is the third panel of our triptych, a third 
German lesson at the front. 

SCENE III 
PLACE TERMONDE TIME SAME 

Our American had made his way with difficulty 
from Aerschot to Louvain. 

From the windows of the plundered and fire-blackened 
houses which lined the road from Aerschot to Louvain, 
still hung white flags made from sheets and tablecloths 
and pillowcases — pathetic appeals for the mercy which 
was not granted. 

At Louvain we came upon another scene of destruction 
and desolation. Nearly half the city was in ashes. Most 
of the principal streets were impassable from fallen 
masonry. The splendid avenue and boulevards were lined 
on either side by the charred skeletons of what had once 
been handsome buildings. The front of many of the 
houses were smeared with crimson stains. 

Li comparison to its size, the Germans had wrought 
more wide-spread destruction in Louvain than did the 
earthquake and fire combined in San Francisco. 

The looting had evidently been unrestrained. The roads 
for miles in either direction were littered with furniture 
and bedding and clothing. Such articles as the soldiers 
could not carry away they wantonly destroyed. Hang- 
ings had been torn down, pictures on the walls had been 
smashed, the contents of drawers and trunks had been 



American Versus German Viewpoint 187 

emptied into the streets, literally everything breakable 
had been broken. This is not from hearsajs remember ; 
I saw it with my own eyes. And the amazing feature of 
it all was that among the Germans there seemed to be no 
feeling of regret, no sense of shame. Officers in immacu- 
late uniforms strolled about among the ruins, chatting 
and laughing and smoKing. 

Attitude of German Officers 

Mr. Hugh Gibson, secretary of the American le- 
gation in Brussels, was in Louvain on the second 
day and this is what he saw: 

.... The Germans had dragged chairs and a dining 
table from a nearby house into the middle of the square in 
front of the station. . . . Some officers, already consid- 
erably the worse for drink, insisted that the three diplo- 
matists join them in a bottle of wine. And this while the 
city was burning and rifles were cracking, and the dead 
bodies of men and women lay sprawled in the streets. 

Indeed, their "beautiful home and soldier songs" 
as you say, had softened their hearts, but the scene 
is a different one, isn't it? 

But we have the same happy soldiers "lounging, 
talking and laughing," just as your professor de- 
scribes them, and smoking and drinking (though 
it is beer and wine instead of coffee) and "every- 
body is elated," just as you say. 

But the Belgian townspeople, what of them? 
Do the happy soldiers see them? I don't know. 

Louvain was not destroyed by bombardment or 
in the heat of battle. The Germans had entered it 
unopposed and had been in undisputed possession 



188 The Creed of Deutschtum 

for several days. Why did they burn the city house 
by house and shoot down the townspeople, men, 
women and children? 

As with Aerschot, there are two versions, con- 
tradictory and irreconcilable. 

The Germans say that in accordance with a con- 
spiracy they were attacked by the townspeople; 
what we called "sniping" in Vera Cruz. The 
townspeople say that in the inky blackness of night 
the German garrison, mistaking for Belgians a 
body of their own troops retreating and falling back 
upon Louvain, opened fire upon them, and so what 
approximates a massacre of civilians followed, and 
the city was deliberately burned. 

It doesn't matter. Even if the Germans were 
attacked (though it be denied) were they justified 
in shooting down, indiscriminately, civilians? 

Why Was Louvain Burned? 

But "why did you burn Louvain at all?" That 
was the question which Mr. Powell asked the com- 
manding general, von Boehn. 

" 'Because,' replied the general, 'the townspeople 
fired on our troops. We actually found machine 
guns in some of the houses. And,' smashing his 
fist down upon the table, 'whenever civilians fire 
upon our troops we will teach them a lasting lesson. 
If women and children insist on getting in the way 
of bullets so much the worse for the women and 
children.' " 



American Versus German Viewpoint 189 

Yes, as General von Nieher officially notified the 
citizens of Wavre, "without distinction of persons 
the innocent will suffer with the guilty," and, as 
was announced by proclamation to the citizens of 
Hazzelt in the case of sniping, "a third of the male 
population will be shot." 

And so, as Mr. Powell, in another place, says, 
"the citizens had attacked them and they would 
teach the citizens, both of Louvain and of other 
cities which they might enter, a lasting lesson. They 
did. No Belgian will ever forget — or forgive — 
that lesson. The orgy of blood and destruction 
lasted for two days." 

It was a German lesson at the front, a lesson 
in German viewpoints. Not so charming as the 
French lesson you picture, Dr. von Mach, but it 
was better taught and learned — taught to the world, 
was it not?t 

t "Many subsequent visits to Louvain, and conversations with people 
who were there when the trouble began, have only served to strengthen 
the impression that the whole affair was part of a cold-blooded 
and calculated plan to terrorise the civilian population. 

"While we were there, it was frankly stated that the town was 
being wiped out; that its destruction was being carried out under 
definite orders. When the German Government realised the horror 
and loathing with which the civilized world learned of the fate of 
Louvain, the orders were cancelled and the story sent out that the 
German forces had tried to prevent the destruction, had fought the 
fire, and by good fortune had been able to save the Hotel de Ville. 
Never has a government lied more brazenly. When we arrived, the 
destruction of the town was being carried on in an orderly and 
systematic waj^ that showed careful preparation. The only thing 
that saved the Hotel de Ville was the fact that the German troops 
had not progressed that far with their work when the orders were 
countermanded from Berlin. 



190 The Creed of Deutschtum 



General von Boehn's View 

The interview between Mr. Powell and General 
von Boehn is destined to become classic. It had 
been sought by the general, who had expressed a 
wish to have an opportunity to talk with Mr. Pow- 
ell, to give him the German version of the treat- 
ment of the Belgian civil population for the en- 
lightenment of the American public. Mr. Powell 
was accordingly invited to dine with the general. 
Here is more of the conversation as given by the 
former as "nearly verbatim" as he could remember 
it. 



"It was only when he learned how civilization regarded his crimes, 
that the Emperor's heart began to bleed. 

"The true facts as to the destruction of Louvain will startle the 
world— hardened though it has become to surprise at German crimes. 
Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to publish the details at this 
time without endangering the lives of people still in Belgium under 
German domination. But these people will speak for themselves 
when the Germans have been driven from Belgian soil, and they are 
once more free to speak the truth." Gibson's Journal, etc., pp. 171-2. 

"One of the officers I saw to-day told me that the Germans were 
deliberately terrorizing the country through which they passed. It 
is a perfectly convincing explanation of German doings in this coun- 
try, but I did not think they were prepared to admit it so frankly. 
This frank fellow made no claim that civilians had attacked the Ger- 
man troops; his only observation was that they might do so unless 
they were so completely cowed that they dared not raise their hands. 
He emphasized the fact that it was not done as a result of bad 
temper, but as part of the scheme of things in general. For my 
information, he remarked that in the long run this was the most 
humane manner of conducting war, as it discouraged people from 
doing things that would bring terrible punishment upon them. And 
yet some of these Belgians are ungrateful enough to complain at 
being murdered and robbed." Ibid., p. 190. 



American Versus German Viewpoint 191 

"But why wreak your vengeance on women and chil- 
dren?" I asked, 

"None have been killed," the general asserted positively. 

"I am sorry to contradict you, general," I asserted, with 
equal positiveness, "but I have myself seen their bodies. 
So has Mr. Gibson, the secretary of the American lega- 
tion in Brussels, who was present during the destruction 
of Louvain." 

"Of course," replied General von Boehn, "there is al- 
ways danger of women and children being killed during 
street fighting if they insist on coming into the streets. 
It is unfortvinatc, but it is war !" 

"But how about a woman's body I saw with the hands 
and feet cut off? How about the white-haired man and 
his son whom I helped to bury outside of Sempst who had 
been killed merely because a retreating Belgian soldier 
had shot a German soldier outside their house? 

"There w^ere 22 bayonet wounds in the old man's face. 
I counted them. How about the little girl, two years 
old, who was shot while in her mother's arms by an Uhlan 
and whose funeral I attended at Heyst-op-den-Berg? 
How about the old man near Vilvorde who was hung by 
his hands from the rafters of his house and roasted to 
death by a bonfire being built under him?" 

The general seemed taken aback by the exactness of my 
information. 

"Such things arc horrible if true," he said. "Of course, 
our soldiers, like soldiers in all armies, sometimes get 
out of hand and do things which we would never tolerate 
if we knew it. At Louvain, for example, I sentenced 
two soldiers to 12 years' penal servitude each for assault- 
ing a woman." 

"Apropos of Louvain," I remarked, "why did you de- 
stroy the library?" 

"We regretted that as much as any one else," was the 
answer. "It caught fire from burning houses and we 
could not save it." 

General von Boehn is as good as a guide book in ex- 
plaining German war pictures, is he not? 



192 The Creed of Deutschtum 

Richard Harding Davis' Views 

I have refrained from quoting the Belgian ac- 
count of what happened because it is ex parte tes- 
timony. But another American eye witness, Rich- 
ard Harding Davis, writes : 

For many miles we saw procession after procession of 
peasants fleeing from one burning village, which had been 
their home, to other villages, to find only blackened walls 
and smouldering ashes. 

"Fifty Germans were killed and wounded," said Gen- 
eral von Ludwitz, the military governor of Louvain, "and 
for that Louvain must be wiped out — so !" In pantomime 
with his fist he swept the papers across the table. . . . 
Were he telling us his soldiers had destroyed a kitchen 
garden his tone could not have expressed less regret. 
Davis watched the scene from the windows of the train 
in which he was held at the station. The Germans that 
night "crowded the windows of the train, boastful, gloat- 
ing, eager to interpret." 

Outside the station in the public square the people of 
Louvain passed in an unending procession, women bare- 
headed, weeping, men carrying the children asleep on 
their shoulders, all hemmed in by the shadowy arm of 
gray wolves. Once they were halted, and among them 
was marched a line of men. These were on their way to be 
shot. And, the better to point the moral, an officer halted 
both processions and, climbing to a cart, explained why 
the men were to die. He warned others not to bring down 
upon themselves a like vengeance. 

As those being led to spend the night in the fields looked 
across to those marked for death they saw old friends, 
neighbors of long standing, men of their own household. 
The officer bellowing at them from the car was illuminated 
by the headlights of an automobile. He looked like an 
actor held in a spotlight on a darkened stage. 

At Louvain that night the Germans were like men alter 
an orgy. 



American Versus German Viewpoint 193 

Awful Price Belgians Paid 

If the Belgian civilians sniped the German sol- 
diery the latter were undoubtedly justified in shoot- 
ing offenders but, Dr. von Mach, do you think they 
were justified in shooting the citizens indiscrim- 
inately, the innocent with the guilty? 

And, if you do, do you think they were justified 
in systematically burning and pillaging the homes 
and workshops and other buildings of the guilt- 
less? 

You have imagination; think what that means: 
the poor and the rich, the sick and the well, the 
old and the young, the helpless and the strong, the 
bread winners and their dependents, all made des- 
titute without a place wherein to live or to work, 
without means of support, the innocent and the 
guilty, thrown helpless upon the world to be fed 
by American charity, and later — what? And all 
this because, if you believe the allegation, some 
rash hotheads sniped a chivalrous, humane soldiery. 

In every large city there are hotheads and men- 
tal defectives and fanatics. It was a policy of ter- 
rorism and intimidation. Do you think this the 
only policy that would suffice to overcome resistance 
to the conquerors? Could they not, for instance, 
have been satisfied with temporarily rounding up 
the inhabitants in concentration camps to stop snip- 
ing? 

We Americans did not sack and burn Vera Cruz, 
though they sniped us. No, as Mr. Powell says, 



19.4 The Creed of Deutschtum 

"The bombardment of cities, the destruction of his- 
toric monuments, the burning of villages and, in 
many cases, the massacre of civilians was the price 
which the Belgians were forced to pay for resisting 
the invader." 

You ask us to imagine (with your kindly pro- 
fessor) the "iron line" after the French lesson he 
describes, again on the march and singing "Ich hatt 
emen Kameraden." After each verse rang the re- 
frain : 

"The birds in the woods are singing, 

Are singing to warm your heart. 
At home, ah, at home, your dear ones. 

We'll meet and never will part. 
Gloria ! Gloria ! Victoria ! 

With heart and hand for the Fatherland ! 

Listen once more. Do you hear the song of 
those same humane German soldiers? 

Do you see them again marching, but now drunk 
with the orgies of sackings and burnings and kill- 
ings of Aerschot, of Vise, of Tirlemont, of Liege, of 
Termonde, of Malines, of Louvain and God knows 
how many towns and villages and hamlets ? In the 
glare of the flames you see them; and again with 
light hearts they sing: 

"The birds in the woods are singing, 
Are singing to warm your heart. 

At home, ah, at home, your dear ones. 
We'll meet and never will part." 

It is the same refrain. And as they sing you 
see, too, by the same light of the burning towns 



American Versus German Viewpoint 195 

and villages, the long lines of panic-stricken Bel- 
gians fleeing from their "homes," and you see, near 
by, the condemned — ^husbands, sons, brothers, "dear 
ones" — being led away to the place of their killing. 

Other Pictures Drawn 

There are other pictures of other scenes which I 
might draw; the picture of the people — innocent — 
non-combatants, women and men — killed in their 
beds in Antwerp by bombs thrown by a Zeppelin 
in the attempt to assassinate the royal family. 

This picture, one that Mr. Powell saw, would 
include among the killed and wounded a child man- 
gled by a shell; a woman leaning out of her win- 
dow, her head blown off; another woman blown to 
fragments splotching the floor, the walls, the ceil- 
ing with . . . and then fill in the picture with tot- 
tering walls and skeletons of houses wantonly 
blown to pieces.* 

* Mr. Hugh Gibson besides being in Louvain had the good fortune 
to be in Antwerp the night of the Zeppelin raid. His Journal (above 
mentioned) gives a detailed description from his own observation of 
the destruction and murder wrought. From it I take the following 
bits to substantiate Mr. Powell's statements: 

"The first bomb was in a little street around the corner from the 
hotel, and had fallen into a narrow four-story house, which had 
been blown into bits. . . . The street itself was filled with debris 
and was impassable. From this place we went to the other points 
where bombs had fallen. As we afterwards learned, ten people 
were killed outright; a number have since died of their injuries 
and a lot more are injured, and some of these may die. A number 
of houses were completely wrecked and a great many will have to 
be torn down. Army officers were amazed at the terrific force of 
the explosions. The last bomb, dropped as the Zeppelin passed 



196 The Creed of Deutschtum 

I pass over the destruction of works of art that 
never can be replaced; but to complete Dr. von 
Mach's pictures of the "German viewpoint," let me 
mention only one of the many he has omitted, that 
of Malines Cathedral. 

over our heads, fell in the centre of a large square — la Place du 
Poids Publique. It tore a hole in the cobblestone pavement, some 
twenty feet square and four or five feet deep . . . many of the 
houses were expected to fall at any time. . . . Another bomb fell 
not far from the houses of the Consul General and the Vice Consul 
General, and they were not at all pleased. . . . 

"The line of march [of the Zeppelin] was straight across the town, 
on a line from the General Staff, the Palace where the Queen was 
staying with the royal children, the military hospital of Ste. Eliza- 
beth, filled with wounded, the Bourse, and some other buildings. It 
looks very much as though the idea had been to drop one of 
the bombs on the Palace. The Palace itself was missed by a narrow 
margin, but large j^ieces of the bomb were picked up on the roof 
and shown me later in the day by Inglebleek, the King's Secretary. 
The room at the General Staff, where I had been until half an 
hour before the explosion, was a pretty ruin, and it was just as 
well for us that we left when we did. . . . 

"Inglebleek, the King's Secretary . . . said that the Queen was 
anxious I should see what had been done by the bombs of the night 
before. He wanted me to go right into the houses and see the 
horrid details. I did not want to do this, but there was no getting 
out of it under the circumstances. 

"We drove first to the Place du Poids Publique and went into 
one of the houses which had been partially wrecked by one of the 
smaller bombs. Everything in the place had been left as it was 
until the police magistrate could make his examination and report. 
We climbed to the first floor, and I shall never forget the horrible 
sight that awaited us. A poor policeman and his wife had been 
blown to fragments, and the pieces were all over the walls and 
ceiling. Blood was everywhere. Other details are too terrible even 
to think of. I could not stand any more than this one room. There 
were others which Inglebleek wanted to show me, but I could not 
think of it. And this was only one of a number of houses where 
peaceful men and women had been so brutally killed while they 
slept." Pp. 140-144. 



American Versus German Viewpoint 197 

Picture a deserted and undefended city, "as si- 
lent and deserted as a cemetery ; not a human being 
to he seen." That city, Malines, bombarded by the 
Germans, although not a Belgian soldier in it. 

And picture a splendid cathedral looming high 
above that silent city; and then imagine shells de- 
liberately aimed at that wonderful cathedral until 
it was little more than a heap of debris; and then, 
the cathedral destroyed, imagine, in that city of the 
dead, shells bursting with a shattering crash in 
deserted buildings, the whole front of those build- 
ings crashing down about you in a cascade of brick 
and plaster! That was what Mr. Powell saw. Is 
this wanton bombardment of a deserted city and 
of a great work of art, a cathedral of religion, "the 
German viewpoint"? And is this that effect of 
bringing "the educated classes into the army" — of 
German kultur — for which the great von Moltke 
hoped? 

Dr. von Mach in his "German viewpoint" goes 
on to tell of the German soldiers when going into 
battle singing, during "the thunder of the cannon/' 
Koerner's battle hymn, company after company 
joining in the magnificent song: 

"Father, I call to Thee. 
The roaring artillery's clouds thicken round ine, 
The hiss and the glare of the loud bolts confound me. 

Ruler of battles, I call on Thee; 

O Father, lead Thou me!" 

Shall we picture the soldiers again amidst these 
"roaring artillery's clouds," "the thunder of the can- 



198 The Creed of Deutschtum 

non;" and again singing, while they bombarded the 
cathedral dedicated to their God, "Father, I call 
to Thee?" and did "the very air seem purified" "be- 
fore the grand conception of God and man" ? Per- 
haps, after all, it is only a matter of viewpoint. 

No, Dr. von Mach, you and your fellow propa- 
gandists, Dr. Dernburg and Dr. Miinsterberg, Dr. 
Albert and others, appeal in vain to the American 
people. You do not know the true full-blooded 
American of the twentieth century. Americans are 
governed by feelings of humanity, of pity, of mercy, 
of fair play. 

Those are the ideals of our national conscience. 
Americans believe in a government for the people 
and by the people, not in a government by an auto- 
cratic military caste, without pity, without mercy, 
without regard for the rights of mankind. 

If I read the signs of public opinion aright, if I 
correctly understand American ideals of human 
rights, Germany stands condemned by American 
opinion. America cares nothing for the "necessi- 
ties of war," whether argued as an excuse for crimes 
against humanity by a German General Staff in 
1914, or a "Spanish Butcher" in Cuba in 1898; she 
cares nothing for fine-spun specious arguments as 
to why Germany was not to blame for the invasion 
of Belgium. She sees only a peaceful, unoffending 
nation defending her inalienable rights to her own 
soil. And she sees the inhabitants for this offence 
shot down, and their houses, one by one, put to 
the torch ; she sees tens of thousands of homes deso- 



American Versus German Viewpoint 199 

late, and hundreds of thousands of inhabitants driv- 
en into exile, or starving and dependent upon 
American charity — all this, mind you, not as a 
sporadic instance in one city, but repeatedly, day 
by day, in many cities and towns; and not as un- 
avoidable accidents from the shelling of the enemy 
in battle, but deliberately and systematically and 
unnecessarily, after the capture and occupation of 
the city, for the sole purpose of revenge, to over- 
come resistance by terrorism, as officially proclaimed 
and officially justified. It is for these reasons, if 
for no others, that Germany appeals in vain to 
American sympathy. 

The German Ideal of Government 

Before closing let me say a word upon one of 
the German ideals of government. This ideal is, 
the responsibilities of government should he under- 
taken for the people by the state. 

The "state" stands for an abstract conception 
of authority, an entity. In practice it is an auto- 
cratic caste, at the head of which is the Kaiser, who, 
as he has time and again proclaimed, rules by '*di- 
vine right." 

"We, the Hohenzollerns, regard ourselves as ap- 
pointed by God to govern and lead the people whom 
it is given us to rule, for their well-being and ad- 
vancement of their national and intellectual inter- 
ests," announced the Kaiser. 

And again: "Those who are willing to help me 



200 The Creed of Deutschtum 

I heartily welcome whoever they may be; those 
who oppose me m this task I will crush." In such 
a state we have the embodiment of "efficiency" 
or kultur. 

As Professor Francke has told us, the German 
people, in every class (with the exception of the 
party with democratic ideals) consider it an "obli- 
gation," a duty, to subordinate self, all individual 
interests, all individual desires and welfare to this 
state. 

It is the conception of "state" and citizenship," 
of Plato and Socrates. The German state gov- 
erns for the people. And as the basis of efficiency 
is power to impose, the army and militarism become 
the foundation of the state, and the autocratic caste 
that governs in the name of the state becomes a 
military caste. "We belong to each other. I and 
the army. Thus we are born for one another, and 
thus we will stand together in an indissoluble bond 
in peace or storm, as God will it," proclaimed the 
Kaiser. 

The authority of the state rests on the Kaiser 
and the army, not on the will of the people, as in the 
American republic, England and France. 

From the American viewpoint we are forced, 
however unwillingly, to the conclusion (in consid- 
eration of German warfare and German ideals of 
government) that Germany must be regarded in 
mar as the enemy of civilization, and in peace as 
the enemy of democracy. 

Between the autocratic German viewpoint and 



Arnericaii Versus German Viewpoint 201 

the democratic American viewpoint there is an ir- 
reconcilable conflict — a conflict of ideals that can- 
not be settled by argument, by citation of facts, by 
appeals to logic or to moral judgment. 

It can only be settled by the arbitrament of arms. 
If the allies win, we may expect that the ideals of 
the democratic viewpoint will receive a world-wide 
acceptance. It was thus that the conflict between 
the ideals of freedom and slavery was settled in this 
country only by the acceptance of the arbitrament 
of war. 

If, on the other hand, Germany wins, the United 
States of America still remains to be settled with, 
and that conflict of viewpoints, between American 
democratic ideals and German autocratic ideals, 
will still exist, to be settled some day in the future 
by the arbitrament of the sword. 

II 

THE GERMAN POLICY OF TERRORISM 

In my first article I contrasted the methods of 
the German army in carrying on war in Belgium, 
as seen from the American viewpoint, and as seen 
from the German viewpoint. 

And I pointed out why, in consequence of this 
difference in viewpoints, Germany had lost the sym- 
pathy of real Americans. 



There are numerous other policies, both military 
and political, in regard to which the two viewpoints 



202 The Creed of Deutschtum 

are radically antagonistic. These differences have 
produced that irreconcilable conflict of opinion upon 
which I dwelt. 

Some of these I discuss to-day ; but before doing 
so let me point out and insist, as emphatically as I 
can, that it was not the German soldier that was 
responsible for the inhuman atrocities in Belgium, 
and the laying waste of the cities and towns. 

The soldier must obey. The responsibility lies 
wholly upon the men "higher up," upon the govern- 
ment which ordered the policy and gave the com- 
mands. The German soldier is not to be blamed. 

That it was the government policy to overcome 
resistance of the civilian population by a policy of 
terrorism — by exacting money tribute from cap- 
tured cities, by taking hostages to be killed in case 
of resistance by civilians, by shooting a large num- 
ber of unoffending citizens in retaliation for offences 
committed by others, and to deter further resistance 
by burning wholesale the houses and turning out 
the inhabitants destitute, and by many other ruth- 
less acts that were a revival of the middle ages — 
needs no argument. 

The policy was publicly announced to the world 
through proclamations issued by such commanding 
generals as von Buelow, von Emmich, von Boehn, 
von der Goltz, von Nieher, von Luetwitz and Major 
Dieckmann. 

It is only by reading these proclamations that 
we can fully realize this policy, a relic of the middle 
ages, and comprehend the viewpoint from which 



American Versus German Viewpoint 203 

the Germans ordered the atrocities committed. For 
example, the following were issued: 

First, two general proclamations of August 4 
and August 9, by Generals von Emmich and von 
Buelow respectively, to the Belgian nation, an- 
nouncing the German policy and demanding a "free 
passage." 

That in the absence of resistance the population 
would be treated kindly, but that "we will act se- 
verely on any attempt by the population to show 
resistance to the German troops or to do injury 
to the military interests." 

That "the destruction of bridges, tunnels and 
railway lines will be regarded as hostile acts." 

That Belgians "will have to choose" and 

That "it depends on your wisdom and under- 
standing patriotism to avoid for your country the 
horrors of war." 

Proclamations Threaten 

Accordingly, on August 17, a proclamation from 
the German viewpoint to the citizens of Hasselt an- 
nounced: "In the case of civilians shooting on 
the German army, a third of the male population 
will he shot'' 

On August 22, a proclamation by von Buelow 
announced to citizens at Liege that: 

"It was with my consent that the general had 
the whole place (Andenne) burnt down and about 
100 people shot," and that Liege would be treated 



204 The Creed of Deutschtum 

in the same way if the inhabitants attacked the 
German troops. 

On August 23, a proclamation by von Buelow 
announced to the citizens of Namur: 

1 — That citizens who did not betray the presence 
of Belgian and French soldiers would be "con- 
demned to hard labor for life," and that every such 
soldier found would "be immediately shot." 

2 — That any citizen who did not inform the au- 
thorities of the existence of any arms, powder or 
dynamite which he knew of would be shot. 

3 — That 10 hostages would be taken from "each 
street," and if there was any uprising in the street 
the corresponding "10 hostages will be shot." 

On August 27, a proclamation by von Nieher 
notified the citizens of Woevre that if the balance 
of the war levy of $600,000 was not paid on Sep- 
tember 1, "the town of Woevre will be set on fire 
and destroyed," and "without distinction of per- 
sons, the innocent will suffer with the guilty." 

Some 50 houses were set on fire and hostages 
taken in reprisal for alleged but denied sniping. 

On September 8, a proclamation by Major 
Dieckmann notified the citizens of Grivegnee, of 
Beyne-Heusay, Bois le Breux, and Fleron of a 
large number of acts and failure to act for which 
the penalty was death. 

Among these misdemeanors, some trivial, a fail- 
ure to obey the order "hands up," and failure to 
inform the military commandant of the location of 
"quantities greater than 100 litres of petroleum. 



American Versus German Viewpoint 205 

benzine, benzol, or any similar liquid," of which he 
had knowledge. (It followed that if an employee 
did not inform on his employer, or a friend upon 
a friend, he incurred death, and if he did, his em- 
ployer or friend incurred death.) 

Persons held as hostages, when their relieving 
substitutes did not present themselves within 24 
hours of the appointed time, incurred death, and 
also if the population of the communes did not re- 
main "quiet in any circumstances." 

On September 4, a proclamation by von Boehn 
notified the inliabitants of Termonde to "hoist the 
white flag immediately and to cease fighting. If 
you do not agree to this summons the town will 
be razed in a quarter of an hour by a very heavy 
bombardment." 

On October 5, a proclamation by von der Goltz 
announced : 

"In future, the localities nearest to the place 
where similar acts (destruction of a railway line 
and telegraph wires) take place will he pumshed 
mthout pity, it matters little whether they are ac- 
complices or not. For this purpose hostages have 
been taken near the railway lines thus menaced," 
etc. 

In view of these proclamations, the claim of the 
Belgians that when German troops have been re- 
sisted at the entrances of a village with shots fired 
by regular Belgian troops, the population has been 
held responsible, and punished by executions, fire 
and pillage, is not incredible. One instance, at 



206 The Creed of Deutschtum 

least, is vouched for by Powell, the instance he 
threw up at General von Boehn without contra- 
diction. 

That such proclamations were not mere bluff, 
but were literally carried out, the facts cited by 
them give evidence. The world knows it, too, from 
the ruins of cities and towns just as it knows by 
the debris that an earthquake destroyed Italian 
cities. 

The Evidence of German Soldiers' Diaries 

And the world knows it from the accounts writ- 
ten in the diaries of captured German soldiers, even 
if all other evidence be disbelieved. 

I have cited the evidence of Americans; let me 
cite the evidence of these German diaries in order 
that the German propagandists in this country may 
understand the reasons for the failure of their ap- 
peal to the American viewpoint. It will be seen 
that the German method of warfare is not confined 
to Belgium, but is carried into France. 

At the entrance of the village (near Dinant) were 
about 50 villagers shot for having treacherously fired 
upon our troops during the night. Many others were 
shot so that we counted over 200. Women and children, 
with lamps in their hands, had to witness the terrible 
sight. We ate our rice among the corpses. 

{From the diary of Private Philip of Kamenz, Saxony, First 
Battalion, 178th Infantry.) 

Langevillier, Aug. 22. 
Village destroyed by the Eleventh Pioneer Battalion; 
three women hanged on trees. 

{From a soldier's diary.) 



A^tierican Versus German Viewpomt 207 

Of the inhabitants, 300 were shot. Those who survived 
the volley were requisitioned as grave diggers. The 
women were a sight, but it cannot be helped. 

(Pnvate SchlmUer of the Third Battery Fourth Field Artillery, 
of the Guard.) 

Cirey, Aug. 24. 
In the night, incredible things have taken place; shops 
plundered, money stolen, violences. . . . Simply to make 
your hair stand on end. 

(From an officer's diary.) 

Dinant, Aug. 25. 
The Belgians, at Dinant on the INIeuse, fired on our 
regiment from inside the houses. We shot every one we 
could see, or we threw them out of the windows, women 
as well as men. The bodies lay three feet deep in the 
streets. 

(From a soldier's diary.) 

Aug. 26. 
The charming village of the Gue d'Hossus has, appar- 
ently, though innocent, been destroyed by fire. It seems 
that a cyclist fell down, which made his gun go off itself. 
He was immediately shot at. The male inhabitants were 
simply thrown into the flames. Let us hope that such 
horrors will not take place again. At Leppes, about 200 
men were shot. There, an example was necessary; it was 
unavoidable that some innocents should suffer; but a proof 
of all suspicious of guilt ought to be required, so that 
such an indiscriminate shooting of all men might be con- 
trolled. 

(Diary of an officer of the 17Sth Regiment of Infantry, 12th 
Saxony Army Corps.) 

Laval-Morancy, Aug. 28. 
Apparently a day of rest. Confiscation of all pro- 
visions, bread, jam, wine, cigars; killed geese, chickens, 
etc. Played piano, plundered fast ! 

(Diary of a soldier.) 

We have thus destroyed eight houses with their inhabi- 
tants. In one house only, two men with their wives and a 



208 ' The Creed of Deutschtum 

girl of eighteen were stabbed with bayonets. I might 
have pitied the girl, for she had such an innocent way of 
looking at us, but it was impossible to do anything 
against the infuriated mob; then, indeed, they are no 
longer men, but brutes. We are now on our way to 

Sedan. 

{Last page of an unknown soldier's notebook.) 

Rethel, September 8. 
Unfortunately, discipline is getting looser and looser. 
Spirits, wine and plunder are the order of the day. 

(From an officer's notebook.) 

Sept. 8, 1914. 
Tuesday, 8-9-14. — Reveille 5 a. m. Very violent fight 
in the woods. Artillery brought into action. Order to 
shoot down all Frenchmen, the wounded excepted, even 
if they offer to lay down their arms, because the French 
allowed us to come within a short distance, then took us 
by surprise with intense firing. 

{Last page from a killed soldier's notebook.) 



The American Way by Contrast 

It has been claimed by the apologists for Ger- 
many that this policy of terrorism was justifiable 
under the circimistances. 

That is a matter of viewpoint. 

The policy is justifiable if we deny all humani- 
tarian notions of warfare and admit the German 
contention that under circumstances, the circum- 
stances of this war, everything is permissible. 

That it is not the American viewpoint, was shown 
by our attitude towards Spanish rule in Cuba. 

We Americans went to war with Spain and drove 



I 



American Versus German Viewpoint 209 

the Spaniards from Cuba, and gave back the island, 
after conquering it, free to the inhabitants. 

Why? 

Because of the atrocities committed against the 
non-combatant inliabitants in pursuance of a mil- 
itary policy by Spain, without pity, without mercy, 
and without regard to human rights, under General 
Weyler. 

The American conscience would not stand for 
that. 

But have not the Germans outdone the Span- 
iards? The Spaniards did not aim at a policy of 
terrorism so much as to cut off the source of re- 
bellion ; they did not burn the cities and towns. Yet 
when the Spanish viewpoint of war was shown to 
the American people; when the press was able to 
bring home to the full consciousness of the Amer- 
ican people the cruelties inflicted by the "bloody 
Weyler," as he was called, on the inhabitants of 
Cuba, the American conscience was aroused and no 
"necessities of war" were accepted as an excuse. 
There arose an irrepressible conflict between the 
American viewpoint and the Spanish viewpoint. 

If we were willing to take up arms to enforce 
this American humanitarian viewpoint upon Spain, 
regardless of the Spanish necessities of war, do not 
Germany and her organized propagandists appeal 
in vain to the American people to morally tolerate 
the still more atrocious German methods of carry- 
ing on this war? 



210 The Creed of Deutschtum 

War as Taught by the German War Book 

That it is the German contention that under cir- 
cumstances nearly everything is permissible in war 
is shown both by their writings and acts. 

In a book issued by the general staff of the Ger- 
man army, entitled "Usages of War on Land," 
extracts from which I have in a review before me, 
there are a number of passages teaching this doc- 
trine to the soldiers. In one he is taught that: 

A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely 
against the combatants of the enemy state and the 
positions they occupy, but it will and must in like man- 
ner seek to destroy the total intellectual and material 
resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims, such as 
the protection of men and their goods, can only be taken 
into consideration in so far as the nature and object of 
the war permit. 

Was it from this viewpoint that the splendid ca- 
thedrals of Rheims and Malines and other great 
public monuments were bombarded and shattered? 

In another passage the soldier is taught to guard 

himself against the danger of "sentimentality and 

flabby emotion" of modern thought: 

The danger can only be met by a thorough study of 
war itself. By steeping himself m military history an 
officer will be able to guard himself against excessive hu- 
manitarian notions ; it will teach him that certain severi- 
ties are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true 
humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them. 

Was this the viewpoint from which, as described 
in the German soldiers' diaries, they threw women 
as well as men out of the windows of the houses 



American Versus German Viewpoint 211 

until the bodies lay piled three feet in the street, 
cast the "male inhabitants into the flames," stabbed 
the women in the homes with bayonets or hung them 
to the trees, shot down Frenchmen who offered to 
"lay down their arms" — acts that made even the 
hair of the German soldier "stand on end"? 

And was it with this passage from the text-book 
in mind that the Kaiser in 1900 instructed his troops 
embarking for China in the following words: 

When you come into touch with the enemy, give no 
quarter, make no prisoners. A thousand years ago the 
Huns, under their King, Attila, made themselves a name 
which still lives in tradition. Do you likewise strike home, 
so that for a thousand years to come no Chinaman may 
ever again dare to look askance at a German. 

On the other hand, certain acts, such as looting 
of private property, are forbidden, but little atten- 
tion seems to have been paid to such prohibitions 
in this war. 

It must be from the German viewpoint, as taught 
in this official text-book, that Admiral Schliepe, in 
the Lokal Anzeiger (as cited by the New York 
Times), complained bitterly that Germans in their 
conduct of war, and especially in this war, have 
been far too considerate! 

The purely human side of war receives too much 
attention ! 

England is choking Germany, and under the cir- 
sumstances everything is permissible ! England may 
throw up her hands and exclaim, "Oh, those Ger- 
man barbarians!" The British may accuse Ger- 



212 The Creed of Deutschtum 

mans of being invaders also, but these names must 
be borne. And other German authorities high up, 
even Admiral von Tirpitz, the naval secretary of 
state, have given voice to the same sentiments. 

And so, from this viewpoint, Germany, according 
to the press despatches, goes into a wild ecstasy of 
enthusiasm because her fleet bombards the English 
towns of Scarborough, Whitby and Hartlepool, 
two of these unfortified pleasure resorts like Atlan- 
tic City and Bar Harbor and Beverly, and knocks 
hotels and dwelling houses to pieces and kills non- 
combatants, men and women — servant girls and 
babies in arms, and then proudly sails safely home. 
Under the circumstances, as they say, everything is 
permissible. 

And from this viewpoint it must be that German 
aeroplanes dropped bombs upon English towns, rip- 
ping to pieces the houses of non-combatants and 
killing men, women and children ; and by the same 
policy bombs have been dropped in Paris and Ant- 
werp and Warsaw and numerous undefended places 
with intent to kill, or perfect indifference as to 
whether non-combatants were killed or not. 

It was according to this viewpoint that Germany 
sowed the North Sea with mines and blew up harm- 
less fishing and other vessels. 

The Policy of Destroying Merchantmen 

And now comes the announcement by the Ger- 
man Government that it w^ll blow up and sink, if it 



Ainerican Versus Gentian Viewpoint 213 

can, by submarines, British merchantmen with their 
crews and passengers, though the latter be Ameri- 
cans and other neutrals; and this notwithstanding 
the laws of war require that crews and passengers 
shall first be removed in safety before the ship is 
destroyed. 

And if by chance, owing to the use of a neutral 
flag by English merchantmen to escape (a practice 
common in all wars, by all nations) an American 
ship is mistaken for an English one and blown up 
with its crews and passengers — so much the worse 
for the American ship. 

The established rule that the ship shall be first 
searched to determine its nationality is to have no 
binding force on a German submarine. The avowed 
policy is to attack the non-combatant British mer- 
chant marine by submarines, and as submarines 
cannot take off crews and passengers, the human 
freight will have to go down with the ship. And 
this notwithstanding the fact that transatlantic 
liners carry for the most part American passengers. 

Are we to have another Titanic disaster? That 
would have happened if the Lusitania had been 
sunk by a submarine. 

Then as to the flag. German warships are to 
have a right to use a neutral flag to deceive and 
capture merchantmen as did the Emden and other 
cruisers, but the use of a neutral flag by merchant- 
men to escape capture or being blown up must be 
protested ! 

And as our ships cannot always be distinguished 



214 The Creed of Deutschtum 

by the flag or at sight without being boarded and 
searched, they run the risk. This is the meaning of 
the new German proclamation. 

I pass over the immediate responsibility of Ger- 
many's political and diplomatic activities for the 
war — ^lier secret agreement with Austria, kept from 
the powers during all the preliminary negotiations ; 
her secretly backing Austria while claiming to be 
working for peace; her refusal to join a conference 
of four powers to act as mediators; her refusal to 
give the same promise that France did to respect 
the neutrality of Belgium; her plans for the inva- 
sion of France through Belgium, long in advance, 
by the construction on the Belgian frontier of a 
system of strategic military railroads of little com- 
mercial use ; her refusal to accept any of the several 
modes of mediation acceded to by Russia; her sup- 
pression of the offer of Russia (now just come to 
light ) to leave the dispute to The Hague ; her dec- 
laration of war, although she knew Russia and 
Austria had actually agreed upon a basis of medi- 
ation by which peace might well have been pre- 
served. 

All this is too large a subject for discussion here, 
but may be read in the official publications of the 
despatches of the great powers. 

The Prostitution of Intellectual Honesty 

And now, in closing, one word regarding the so- 
called "Intellectuals": Are we not compelled to 



American Versus German Viewpoint 215 

believe it is owing to the unconscious influence of 
the German viewpoint that a large number of Ger- 
man university professors and others distinguished 
in literature, science and learning, men of great per- 
sonal probity and culture and hitherto commanding 
the respect of the intellectual world, have, in their 
aim to tell us "The Truth about Germany" in that 
and other publications, sacrificed their intellectual 
honesty to the cause of the fatherland. 

Are we not compelled to believe that it is from 
the German viewpoint that these intellectuals and, 
still more flagrantly, the organized political propa- 
gandists in this country, represented in the press by 
Dr. Dernburg, Dr. von INIach, Dr. Albert, Dr. 
Miinsterburg and Mr. Ritter, all of whom we are 
glad to respect for their culture in other fields, have 
misrepresented facts of common knowledge relat- 
ing to the causes of and responsibility for this war 
— have perverted the meaning of official dispatches 
and actions and motives of the governments of Eng- 
land and France and Belgium and Italy and Rus- 
sia, and have sought, by the shallowest sophistries, 
to throw dust in the eyes of the public and gain the 
sympathy of the American people ? 

If one wishes to recall to mind examples, one 
need only think of the audacious assertion of the 
propagandists that Germany offered to make a new 
treaty with England to guarantee the neutrality of 
Belgium and that England refused — a reckless as- 
sertion without a single scrap of authoritative evi- 
dence; the sophistical assertion that England and 



216 The Creed of Deutsclitum 

France had already violated the neutrality of Bel- 
gium before Germany did; that England and 
France intended to invade Belgium, thus forcing 
Germany to do so ; the disingenuous argument and 
misrepresentation that Belgium had forfeited its 
own neutrality before the war; that England 
claimed to declare war solely because of her treaty 
with Belgium without regard to her obligations to 
France; that England wished for war and did not 
try to prevent it ; the disingenuous claim that Ger- 
many strove to hold back Austria and maintain 
peace, and many other statements similar in kind. 

By their publications the propagandists have been 
successful to a certain psychological and political 
extent; to a psychological extent in that they have 
undoubtedly presented to those who were already 
national sympathizers with the fatherland, to those 
who have the will to believe, a point of view by which 
they can justify to themselves, in spite of the facts, 
their belief in the justice of Germany's cause; to 
a political extent in that they have produced a soli- 
darity among those who have the will to believe. 

But to neutral Americans, the publicists, the dip- 
lomats, the historians, the jurists, the men of Amer- 
ican universities, and the "man-in-the-street," who 
without previous affiliations and without previous 
national prejudices have studied for themselves the 
facts as revealed in the official publications of the 
belligerent nations, all this prostitution of intellec- 
tual honesty must be destined to be useless. 



THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE 
1914-15 



(It is difficult at this date, 1917, when we are actually 
at war with Germany and stirred to the depths of our 
being by the great issues at stake, to go back in thought 
to those pre-war days of 1914 and 1915, when we were 
still neutral and passive. It is almost impossible to put 
ourselves into the attitude of mind of those days previous 
to the sinking of the Lusitania, to fully realize and feel 
the atmosphere of doubt, hesitation and timidity as to 
what course we should pursue, how far we should go in 
the maintenance of American rights and American honor, 
and in what manner and degree we should express our 
sympathy with the allied nations. Although, as I be- 
lieve, the great majority of native born Americans, not 
of German descent, particularly those who had studied 
the issues of the war, were intensely sympathetic with the 
cause of the Allies, who they believed were fighting the 
battles of humanity and civilization, there was still con- 
siderable hesitation on the part of a good many to give 
public expression to this sentiment, and many more 
doubted whether our Government should take positive 
action in defense of American rights. Immediately after 
the sinking of the Lusitania opinion in favor of action 
was general, but even this became to a degree quiescent as 
the days of diplomatic note writing dragged on and noth- 
ing was done. But finally, when Germany decreed ruth- 
less submarine warfare to begin February 1, 1917, on 
friend and foe alike, all doubt and hesitation disappeared. 
The American conscience awoke and the nation found 
itself at last. The issues raised in this essay, therefore, 
are now dead. Nevertheless it is not well to neglect en- 
tirely the lessons of the past which may usefully serve the 
future, and it does no harm to record them from time to 
time lest we forget. And so I venture to include this 
and the following essay (The Disintegration of an Ideal) 
in this collection though the issues they touched fortu- 
nately, though tardily, proved to be ephemeral.) 



THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, 1914-15 * 

DOES silence give consent? 
Germany broke the moral and inter- 
national law of nations and invaded a 
neutral state — Belgium. The American 
answer was silence. 

Germany broke the moral and international law 
of nations and committed wholesale atrocities, as 
a policy of terrorism, upon a Belgian civil popula- 
tion. The American answer was silence. 

Germany broke the moral and international law 
of nations and ruthlessly, as a policy of terrorism, 
destroyed and carried off private property. The 
American answer was silence. 

Germany broke the moral and international law 
of nations and laid tribute of millions of dollars 
upon a defenceless population. The American an- 
swer was silence. 

Germany broke at least the moral law of human- 
ity and appropriated for its own armies the food of 
a whole nation, leaving the inhabitants to starve 
or to be fed by America. The American answer 
was silence. 

Germany broke the moral and international law 
of nations and bombarded with its warships, and 
dropped bombs from aeroplanes upon unfortified 

* Printed in part in The Boston Herald, April 3, 1915. 

219 



220 The Creed of Deutschtum 

cities and towns, killing non-combatants, men, 
women and children. The American answer was si- 
lence. 

Germany broke the moral and international law 
of nations and sowed the high seas with floating 
and other mines, destroying neutral ships. The 
American answer was silence. 

Germany now breaks the moral and international 
law of nations and destroys, by submarines, the mer- 
chantmen of the enemy without first rescuing the 
passengers and crew, but sinking them with the ships 
— if they cannot save themselves. The American 
answer thus far has been silence. Now Germany 
has torpedoed and sunk an American passenger 
steamship, the Falaha, drowning 112 of her pas- 
sengers and crew, and has similarly destroyed the 
steamer Aguila, with an estimated loss of nine lives. 
In the case of the Falaba the submarine made no 
attempt to help the drowning passengers, and it is 
believed that some persons were killed by the ex- 
plosion of the torpedo, so little time was given them 
to save themselves. In the case of the Agidla, 
it is reported that the submarine opened fire with 
her guns, killing a woman passenger, the chief en- 
gineer and two of her crew. There is reason to 
believe an American lost his life on the Falaba, 
Every day brings us news of a new barbarity. 

How long, we may ask with all due regard to con- 
servatism, is this kind of warfare to go on without 
awakening a response from the American con- 
science? I do not mean from our government at 



The American Conscience, 1914--15 221 

Washington. It has akeady committed itself to 
silence and will do nothing; it is too late to act, 
though very likely it will demand a money indem- 
nity for the loss of an American life, if that has oc- 
curred. I mean a public remonstrance from the 
sentiment of the communities in which we live, let 
them express it by any means and in any form they 
will. It is not too late for the American people to 
express their sentiments by public meetings, peti- 
tions, resolutions of public bodies and organizations, 
State Legislatures and other ways. 

Some of my friends of a conservative, cautious 
attitude of mind reply in answer to this, "What 
good will it do to protest?" To this, those who do 
not look at all national questions from only a ma- 
terial point of view reply, "A good deal of good 
that cannot be measured in materialistic terms or 
in terms of the present." Let me endeavor to jus- 
tify this answer. 

This is plainly not a matter involving the ques- 
tion of neutrality. But it is one that does involve 
the assertion of American ideals of humanity and 
of the national conscience. It is one, I believe, that, 
so far as we fail to stand up manfully for those 
ideals and follow the impulses of our conscience, 
involves the loss of our national self-respect and of 
national honor. It is one of moral duty and self- 
respect. 

There are a large number of Americans, the great 
majority as I believe, who hold that by not pro- 
testing against the "scrap of paper" doctrine and 



222 The Creed of Deutschtum 

the invasion of Belgium and all the barbarities that 
have been practised against that brave little nation, 
the United States lost the great opportunity that 
was hers of taking a position in this world as a great 
moral force — a position rightly due her. If the 
United States had done that, she would have been 
not only such a moral force in this war, but, in time 
to come, after peace has been restored, having shown 
the courage of her convictions, she would, by force 
of character, be recognized in the council of nations 
as a dominant factor in determining the general ac- 
ceptance of and submission to international laws 
that in the future will limit the barbarities of war, 
and perhaps even secure an international court with 
power to prevent them. 

To the opportunist who asks, "What good will it 
do?" we may ask in turn, "What harm will it do?" 
The answers usually given are two: 

First, we should gain the enmity of Germany. 

But suppose we should — what of it? Are we to 
refrain from asserting in the face of the world, if 
need be, what we believe to be morally right in fear 
that we should become ill-favored in the eyes of a 
nation whose policy of barbarity has shocked the 
world? Besides, all the signs of the times go to 
show that we are fast becoming the object of ha- 
tred of that nation, because, in addition to our 
known sympathy with her enemies, we refuse to be 
unneutral and stop selling munitions of war to any 
nation that commands the seas. So, looking at it 
in a purely practical, hard-headed way — if that is 



The Arfierican Conscience, 1914-15 223 

what is wanted — we shall gain Germany's ill-will 
anyway. 

Count Apponyi, in reply to the argument that all 
the parties to this war were awaiting the judgment 
of America, has already written voicing the senti- 
ment of Austria-Hungary: "Well, that was so, but, 
as far as we are concerned, it is no more." 

The second and most common answer is that we 
hope, if we keep silent — though we may venture 
to appoint a day to pray for peace in our churches 
— when the time comes for peace the United States 
will be able to play the part of a friendly mediator. 

Even if this hope be fulfilled, will the gain to the 
world make up for what has been lost? And even 
if Germany by that time shall have retained any 
friendly feeling for us and be willing to accept us 
as an arbitrator, what will the Allies say to us? Is 
it not reasonable that they will say, could they be 
blamed for saying: "Go to! What have you to 
say to what terms we shall impose, — you who stood 
by, in dumb silence, you who saw violated every 
moral law of nations, every law of humanity vio- 
lated, every human right for which Democracy 
stands — for which you claim to stand — and had not 
a word to say of protest. Go to ! What have you 
to say to terms of peace!" And would not the Al- 
lies be right? 

Whether a protest of the nation would have af- 
fected Germany's policy of terrorism in carrying 
on this war and changed her methods, no one can 
say. Yet it is reasonably a probability that if an 



224 The Creed of Deutschtum 

early protest by our government had been made, ex- 
pressing the moral uprising of a nation, Germany 
would have thought twice before bombarding unfor- 
tified towns, sinking merchantmen with their crews 
and passengers, and carrying out her harsh policies 
in conquered Belgium; and her future policies 
v/ould have been modified. Otherwise, why has she 
sought to obtain by an organized propaganda the 
moral support of the United States? No one has 
more emphatically insisted upon the advantage ac- 
cruing from the moral support of neutrals than Bis- 
marck. He made it one of the foundation stones of 
his diplomatic strategy and expressed it in his fa- 
mous declaration: "If we attack, the whole weight 
of the imponderables, which weigh much heavier 
than material weights, will be on the side of the ad- 
versaries whom we have attacked." 

As one of the ablest writers on the war. Profes- 
sor Munroe Smith,! has pointed out, it was just 
these imponderables — "love of independence, fidel- 
ity to treaty engagements and resentment against 
flagrant wrong" — that determined Belgium's hope- 
less resistance to Germany against overwhelming 
force. The failure of German military strategy was 
due to overlooking these imponderables. The 
moral protest of American sentiment is an impon- 
derable. 

But, waiving this point, there is another and co- 
gent reason why it would "do good" to have the na- 

t Military Strategy versus Diplomacy in Bismarck's Time and 
Afterwards; Political Science Quarterly, March, 1915. 



The American Conscience, 1014-15 225 

tional conscience express itself by protest. This rea- 
son is because of our duty to ourselves and to our 
own ideals of right and humanity. It is for ourselves, 
even if not for others, that we should sj)eak out. 

History shows that the moral conscience of a na- 
tion, as well as of the individual, can only be main- 
tained by standing up for its own ideals, for what 
it believes to be right. If, when our conscience is 
shocked, we do not do this, it soon becomes blunted 
and callous, and we cease to have convictions that 
will inflexibly determine the attitude of the nation 
when moral issues are presented. Already, appar- 
ently, our conscience has become dulled to the atroc- 
ities of this war. At first we were stunned, we 
could scarcely realize the horror of it all. Then we 
were silent. Then our conscience became blunted, 
callous, and now we take it all as a matter of course. 
A few days ago we read that the British merchant 
steamer Tanistan was, without warning, torpedoed 
by a submarine and went down with all her crew, 
saving one. We read also that the British steamer 
Blackwood was similarly torpedoed while the crew 
of the submarine, which came up from below, made 
no attempt to assist in the rescue, but coolly looked 
on. Then it was a Dutch vessel and now an English 
ship crowded with passengers. We read again 
that a neutral Swedish merchant vessel is sunk, w ith 
all the crew, and we pass on to the next item with 
hardly a conscious emotion. To-morrow it may be 
the Lusitania.t or even the American ship Phila- 

t The LiisUania was sunk about a month later, May 8. 



226 The Creed of Deutschtum 

delphia. Such news items of tlie day form simply 
a paragraph to be casually read with a blunted con- 
science — forgotten to-morrow ! 

If we think our national ideals and our national 
conscience are worth preserving, we must be will- 
ing to express publicly that conscience, and with 
no uncertain voice. And if we wish American sen- 
timent to be an "imponderable" that will influence 
not only our own Government but world-thought 
and the decisions of other nations, we must insist 
upon being heard. William Lloyd Garrison was 
actuated by the spirit of both these motives when 
he wrote the memorable w^ords engraved by Boston 
on the pedestal of his statue : 

"I am in earnest. I will not equivocate. 
I will not excuse. I will not retreat a 
single inch, and I will be heard." 

We will all admit that an individual is a man of 
character according as his conduct is inflexibly de- 
termined by fixed convictions. Well, the same is 
equally true collectively of a nation. And when a 
nation that meditates war, or is engaged in war, 
knows in advance that any intended action will in- 
exorably meet with the resistance of the moral con- 
victions of neutral nations, it will, as Bismarck coun- 
selled, hesitate before it loses the advantage of that 
neutral nation's moral support. 

It will, then, "do good" to have the national con- 
science speak out, because a nation that thus as- 
serts and maintains unshaken its convictions, will 



The American Conscience, 1914^-15 227 

itself be deterred by those convictions from com- 
mitting unjustifiable acts v/hen tempted by the ne- 
cessities of the moment, and also be a moral force 
in deterring other nations from making unjust wars 
and violating international laws of warfare. There- 
fore is it a duty to ourselves. 

II 

Let us not forget that in protesting against Ger- 
man methods of carrying on the war we protest 
against more than the actual barbarities themselves. 
These are only the expression of German political 
and militarj^ philosophy, of the German national 
conscience. In protesting we would raise our voice, 
therefore, against those German ideals and that 
German culture which teaches that "might goes be- 
fore right"; "that the State is power and war is its 
first most elementary function"; that war is in itself 
a good thing, "the basis of all healthy development" 
and "a moral necessity" demanded by "political 
idealism"; that strong states have a moral right to 
overcome weak states which might to go to the wall; 
that "efforts directed towards the abolition of war 
must be termed not only foolish but absolutely un- 
moral and unworthy the human race"; that "the 
idea of perpetual peace" is "a profoundly unethical 
conception"; that in war all things are permissible 
for the State to gain its ends; that "inexorability 
and seemingly hideous callousness are among the 
attributes necessary to him who would achieve great 



228 The Creed of DeutscJdum 

things in war" (Field Marshal von der Goltz) ; 
that "in concluding treaties the State does so always 
with the tacit reservation that there is no power be- 
yond and above it to which it is responsible, and it 
must be the sole judge as to whether it is expedi- 
ent to respect its obligations" ; that "he who com- 
mands, what need has he of agreements?"; that it 
is a crime in a statesman not to seize opportunities 
to make war upon a rival that seems likely to be- 
come stronger than itself, or is "weakened and ham- 
pered by affairs at home and abroad" ; "that the acts 
of a State cannot be judged by the standard of in- 
dividual morality." 

These are a few of the many maxims that might 
be taken at random from the writings of German 
publicists and military writers. They fairly express 
the national conscience of Germany, and are exem- 
plified by the methods adopted in inciting and car- 
rying on this war. They are not, therefore, merely 
academic philosophies, they are ideals which have 
passed into the thought of the present generation, 
and have been endorsed by the military party re- 
sponsible for the crime of this war. 

That German culture is responsible for militarism 
has been thus asserted by one German writer, G. 
Fuchs: "We Germans have a characteristic form 
of culture in nothing at all except as soldiers" 
"The German nation owes its present position as a 
European Power to the only form of culture which 
it has as yet created, its army. It will need to as- 
sert itself as an International Power by a similar 



The American Conscience, 1914-15 229 

manifestation, or disappear dishonorably." "The 
army is the only great organism of culture, compris- 
ing the entire nation, which we possess." "All cul- 
ture is bought at the price of blood." 

As one writer, a close and hitherto sj^mpathetic 
student for many years of German Government and 
life (W. H. Dawson) has said: "Germany stands 
forth, on its own confession, as the representative 
of national and social conceptions, ideals, and aims 
which are entirely alien to those pursued by other 
civilized nations. Its culture is a tribal culture 
based on force, yet it seeks to impose this culture 
on mankind for mankind's benefit." 

If the people of our country were fully cognizant 
of, or fully realized the meaning of German mili- 
tary and political culture, I believe there would be 
an uprising of national sentiment which would 
sweep our Government before it and compel a pro- 
test against Germany's methods in this war. Every 
student of German culture has arrived at the con- 
clusion that their methods in this war are not simply 
momentarily chosen expedients to meet military ex- 
igencies. To so regard them is a very superficial 
point of view. There can be no manner of doubt 
that they carry out long accepted principles and 
long-thought-out policies ingrained in the thought 
of the autocratic military caste. They are the ex- 
pression of a philosophy of national life, of a polit- 
ical philosophy formulated by its philosophers, his- 
torians, publicists, statesmen and military writers, 
and adopted by the autocratic class that rules Ger- 



230 The Creed of Deutschtum 

many. They are the expression of German ideals 
of government, of world power and of the methods 
of advancing them. Breaking the treaty with Bel- 
gium and the invasion of that country was not sim- 
ply an emergency measure ; it was the putting into 
practice of a deep ingrained political philosophy. 
The policy of terrorism which incited the atrocities 
in Belgium, burned down cities and towns, took and 
killed hostages, shot down innocent citizens to in- 
timidate the guilty, commandeered the food of seven 
millions of people and left them to starve — all this 
was not simply the sequel of a novel emergency 
measure; it was the practical expression of a po- 
litical and military culture which may be read over 
and over again in official literature; and so with the 
killing of non-combatants by bombs and the sinking 
of merchantmen with their crews and passengers. 
It was the expression of the national conscience. 
Nothing, I think, shows this interpretation more 
plainly than the "stormy applause" which greeted 
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's now historic 
speech in the Reichstag, when he proclaimed the in- 
tention of the govermnent to "hack its way through 
Belgium." One would have thought that the very 
awfulness of that violation, even as a "military ne- 
cessity," would have awakened silent awe in the 
assemblage. But, as the Vossische Zeitung re- 
ported: "The jubilation which greeted these words 
baffles description. One man spoke here in the name 
of the nation." 

From this point of view Germanism and Pan- 



The American Conscience, 1914-15 231 

Germanism are the greatest moral questions that 
have been presented to America and the world since 
the question of slavery was settled. 

Between these ideals of German autocracy and 
the ideals of American democracy there is an irrec- 
oncilable, and, what I firmhj believe will prove to 
he the case, an unavoidable conflict. It is more than 
a figure of speech to say that war — a moral war — 
is on between the American people and Germany. 
But that war is not with German democracy, with 
whom lies the future hope of the Empire. Between 
the 20,000,000 of plain people of Germany, its de- 
mocracy, and American democracy, there is a bond 
of sympathy based on common ideals, common as- 
pirations, common love of political liberty. The 
moral war is with Germany's autocracy, and it is 
against this ruling caste that American sentiment 
should, and sooner or later will, utter its protest. 
It will not, and should not be content with a pusil- 
lanimous morality. 

When our own American material "rights," our 
ships, our cargoes, our trade in cotton or wheat or 
copper, our money, are molested, we protest quickly 
enough, and it is fair to say, if an American life is 
threatened — though not in JVIexico. And when a 
bungling, stupid German naval officer, without au- 
thority from his government, sinks the American 
ship Frye, we protest and demand reparation, as we 
should. And now when England and France de- 
fending the cause of democracy, the world over, an- 
nounce a modified blockade of German ports as a 



232 The Creed of Deutschtum 

retaliatory means of stopping German barbarities 
and bringing this war to an end, a clamor goes up 
that we demand our technical rights and protest in 
the interest of commerce. Apparently our commer- 
cial interests are not willing to make this temporary 
sacrifice, but there is talk of retaliation excited by 
German propaganda. 

But when our ideals, the ideals of the American 
conscience are defied — we remain silent. And yet 
idealism for humanity has been the strongest moral 
element in our national life. If Sumner and Phil- 
lips and Garrison and Lowell and Andrew and Lin- 
coln were alive to-day would they remain silent? 
And so we may ask, "Is the American conscience 
dead?" Or is it that we are awaiting another Whit- 
tier to sing as in the olden time? — 

"Tell us not of banks and tariffs, — cease 

your paltry pedler cries, — 
Shall the good State sink her honor that 

your gambling stocks may rise? 
Would ye barter man for cotton? — That 

your gains may sum up higher. 
Must we kiss the feet of Moloch, pass our 

children through the fire? 
Is the dollar only real? — God and truth and 

right a dream? 
Weighed against your lying ledgers must our 

manhood kick the beam.?" 



THE DISINTEGRATION OF AN IDEAL 



THE DISINTEGRATION OF AN IDEAL * 

I 

THE IDEAL 

IN 1821 the Grecian "Senate" sent a formal 
appeal to the people of the United States for 
sympathetic support in the rebellion of Greece 
against Turkish oppression, just as the Belgian 
government sent an appeal in 1914 protesting 
against the violation of Belgian independence by- 
Germany and the atrocities committed by the Ger- 
man army. 

"The interest felt in the struggle rapidly in- 
creased in the United States. Local committees 
were formed, animated appeals were made, and 
funds collected with a view to the relief of the vic- 
tims of the war." Accordingly, on the assembling 
of Congress in December, 1823, President Monroe 
in his annual message addressed the following words 
to the Congress: 

A strong hope has been long entertained, founded on 
the heroic struggle of the Greeks, that they would suc- 
ceed in their contest and resume their equal station 
among the nations of the earth. . . . From the facts 
which have come to our knowledge, there is good cause 
to believe that their enemy has lost forever all dominion 

* Printed in the New York Times, November 21, 1915. 

235 



236 The Creed of Deutschtum 

over them; that Greece will become again an independent 
nation. That she may obtain that rank is the object of 
our most ardent wishes. (Italics not in original.) 

The President, plainly, did not pretend to moral 
or political neutrality. On the contrary, he did not 
hesitate to express the sympathy of the Adminis- 
tration and the nation in the struggle that Greece 
was maintaining to attain her independence and 
sovereignty. In complete accord with this message 
of the President, Webster introduced a resolution 
to provide for defraying the expense incident to the 
appointment of an agent or commissioner to be sent 
to Greece to investigate the conditions there. 

The specific intent of the resolution was not 
a matter of great importance. On its face it only 
purported to seek detailed information on the ex- 
isting conditions in Greece, just as an agent might 
have been sent at the beginning of this war to Bel- 
gium to collect information regarding the condi- 
tions from which the inhabitants were suffering as 
a result of the German invasion. The agent, or 
commissioner, was not to be a diplomatic represen- 
tative to the Grecian Government. Whether such 
an agent should be sent or not was only a matter 
of expediency, and probably Webster himself cared 
very little, it being a minor matter. Indeed, Web- 
ster said he "did not desire that the resolution 
should be at present acted upon, but simply that 
it lie upon the table for the consideration and de- 
liberate reflection of the House." The resolution 
ostensibly sought to carry out in a practical form 



The Disintegration of an Ideal 237 

the President's policy of moral support. But its 
author had another object in view which was more 
than an expression of sympathy of the American 
nation with a people struggling both against the op- 
pression of the Turks and the hostile attitude of 
the allied monarchies of Europe. It was not really 
necessary for Congress to define our attitude. This 
had already been done by the President. Monroe 
had laid down the policy of the Government in its 
relation to Greece, and this was to give the moral 
support of our nation to the cause for which the 
Greeks were fighting. In this he had the backing 
throughout the country of public opinion, which was 
universally in sympathy with Greece. Action by 
Congress was no more necessary than it was in re- 
ply to that part of the message now known as the 
Monroe Doctrine, which stated our attitude toward 
the threatened attempt of the Allied Nations of 
Europe to interfere with the republics of South 
America. That statement of our policy was never 
acted upon by Congress, but it has become a fixed 
national policy. So the President's statement of 
his policy toward Greece required no action by 
Congress. But Webster sought in the occasion, not 
only to express his complete accord with the Pres- 
ident, but to lay before Congress and the country 
his convictions as to what our larger policy ought 
to be when a small nation is oppressed by a greater 
power, particularly when that power pretends by 
the authority of autocracy and Divine Right to in- 
terfere with the destinies of a free people or a peo- 



238 The Creed of Deutschtum 

pie struggling to be free. Greece, as he expressly 
stated, was only an example of the prmciple. 

The political conditions in Europe with which 
Monroe and Webster dealt were very different 
from what they are to-day, and the war that was be- 
ing waged had a very different purpose from the 
present war. The Holy Alliance has ceased to ex- 
ist; the war was a revolution for independence. 
But it is remarkable how modern are Webster's 
thought and argument. Much of his speech might 
be delivered to-day, when half the world is dying 
because of the aggression of two autocratic mon- 
archies. The names of Belgium and Luxemburg 
and Serbia might be substituted for Greece, and the 
atrocities committed in Louvain, Aerschot, Ter- 
monde, Hartlepool, Scarborough, and on the high 
seas, or any one of a score of places in France and 
Serbia, might be substituted for Scio and Cyprus 
and Greece; the German policy of "frightfulness" 
and "terrorism," for the same Turkish policy in 
1821, then upheld and morally justified by the al- 
lied powers. 

Webster speaks of Greece and Turkey and the 
Holy Alliance, but when we read his words to-day 
the pictures that come into our minds are not of 
those states and that alliance of the far-away time 
of 1821, but of the small states whose peoples and 
whose sovereignties have been wronged in 1914, and 
of another alliance. 

Then again, though the Holy Alliance is dead, 
one cannot help thinking that its principles still sur- 



Tlie Disintegration of an Ideal 239 

vive when one recalls to mind the "Little Peoples" 
held in subjection against their will and national 
aspirations by the autocratic empires of middle and 
eastern Europe — of the Poles, the Bohemians 
(Czechs), the Slovaks, the Croatians, the Slovenes, 
the Ruthenians, the Litluianians, the Finns and Ar- 
menians. These people are now "dumb under an 
iron censorship." 

Tlie reason for the modernness of Webster's 
thought is that he dealt with international morality 
and with principles that do not change with time. 
His protest on behalf of Greece was a concrete ap- 
j^licatiDn of these fundamental ideals. His motive 
is eloquently expressed in his peroration : 

I close, then, Sir, with repeating that the object of this 
resolution is to avail ourselves of the interesting occasion 
of the Greek revolution to make our protest against the 
doctrines of the allied powers, both as they are laid 
down in principle and as they are applied in practice. 
I think it right, too. Sir, not to be unseasonable in the 
expression of our regard, and, as far as that goes, in a 
manifestation of our s^'mpathy with a long-oppressed and 
now struggling people. I am not of those who would, in 
the hour of utmost peril, withhold such encouragement 
as might be properly and lawfully given, and, when the 
crisis should be past, overwhelm the rescued sufferer with 
kindness and caresses. The Greeks address the civilized 
world with a pathos not easy to be resisted. They invoke 
our favor by more moving considerations than can well 
belong to the condition of any other people. They 
stretch out their arms to the Christian communities of the 
earth, beseeching them bv a generous recollection of their 
ancestors, by the consideration of their ruined cities and 
villages, by their wives and children sold into an accursed 
slavery, by their blood, which they seem willing to pour 



240 The Creed of Deutschtum 

out like water, by the common faith and in the name 
which unites all Christians, that they would extend to 
them at least some token of compassionate regard. 

The circumstances that led to Monroe's public 
statement of the attitude of his Administration to- 
ward Greece may be briefly told, but it is Webster's 
cogent argument and moral stand on behalf of in- 
ternational morality and democracy that have in- 
terest for us to-day, and let us see the change that 
has taken place in the national policy and how far 
we have traveled from the pillars that marked our 
ideals in the early days of the republic. 

Early in 1821 a revolution burst out in Greece 
against the tyranny of Turkish rule. By that rev- 
olution, we all know, Greece eventually won her 
independence after nearly eight years of an inde- 
scribably bloody war. But this was only after the 
aroused conscience of the people of Europe and the 
United States had forced the monarchies of Europe 
— England, France, and Russia — to break with 
Metternich and the principles of the Holy Alliance 
and to intervene. During the first six years Greece 
had fought alone, unaided. 

During the first year the progress of the revolu- 
tion was favorable to Greece. Then there followed 
a policy and campaign of "frightfulness" which it 
would be difficult for us in this twentieth century 
to take in or believe, were it not that we have seen 
with our own eyes in the last year a very perfect 
example of this policy, complete in almost all its 
details. The Turkish atrocities in Greece in 1822 



Tlie Disintegration of an Ideal 241 

can be well appreciated by a consideration of pres- 
ent-day German atrocities in Belgium, France, and 
England, and the sinking of the Lusitania and 
other ships on the high seas. 

Early in the second year of the war of Grecian 
independence there followed, to quote the words 
of Daniel Y\^ebster in his memorable speech in 
the House of Representatives, "that indescribable 
enormity, that appalling monument of barbarian 
cruelty, the destruction of Scio; a scene I shall not 
attempt to describe ; a scene from which human na- 
ture shrinks shuddering away; a scene having 
hardly a parallel in the history of fallen man." The 
Turkish fleet had landed an army of 15,000 men 
on the beautiful Island of Scio. "Here," Web- 
ster tells us, "was the seat of modern Greek lit- 
erature; here were libraries, printing presses, and 
other establishments which indicate some advance- 
ment in refinement and knowledge. . . . There 
was nothing to resist such an army. These troops 
immediately entered the city and began an indis- 
criminate massacre. The city was fired; and in 
four days the fire and sword of the Turk rendered 
the beautiful Scio a clotted mass of blood and ashes. 
The details are too shocking to be recited. Forty 
thousand women and children, unhappily saved 
from the general destruction, were afterward sold 
in the market of Smyrna, and sent off into distant 
and hopeless servitude." 

The population of Scio and the actual number 
massacred are only roughly known, but according 



242 The Creed of Deutschtum 

to a modern writer, it is believed that out of 90,000 
inhabitants, 23,000 were killed and 43,000 were sold 
as slaves. 

I have no intention of entering into an account 
of the Grecian war of independence, or of discuss- 
ing the indefensible methods of warfare emj)loyed 
on both sides. I mention these atrocities merely to 
call attention to events which largely determined 
the response of the United States Govermnent, not 
only to the appeal of Greece for sympathetic sup- 
port, but to the hostile attitude toward Greece of 
the continental monarchies. 

In view of the political situation in Europe, the 
stand taken by the President, and supported by 
Webster, was more than a declaration of sympathy 
by our Government for a small nation oppressed by 
an autocratic and powerful one. That declaration 
was, indeed, outspoken, unequivocal and humani- 
tarian. But the opinions expressed by the Presi- 
dent had a deeper meaning. They rebuked, and 
were intended to rebuke, the Sovereigns of the Al- 
lied Powers — commonly called the Holy Alliance — 
who had thrown all their moral support in favor 
of Turkey and against Greece. The Allied Powers, 
dominated by Prussia, Austria and Russia, had 
only recently, sitting in congress at Verona, "dis- 
couraged, discountenanced, and denounced" the 
Greeks for their resistance to Turkish oppression. 
Metternich, the famous Austrian statesman and 
master of European diplomacy, who dominated the 
Holy Alliance, and through it governed Europe, 



The Disintegration of an Ideal 243 

had said: "Three or four hundred thousand mdi- 
viduals hanged, butchered, impaled down there, 
hardly count." 

In this situation, in the face of the most powerful 
nations of Europe, the President of the United 
States did not hesitate to take a decidedly antago- 
nistic position and to offer the moral support of 
the nation to the cause of liberty and human rights. 
To appreciate fully the significance of our stand 
one must recall, what every schoolboy knows, that 
the Holy Alliance was based on the doctrine of the 
Divine Right of Kings, just as the German autoc- 
racy maintains that doctrine to-day. 

In this connection it is curiously interesting to 
note the similarity of the sentiments and language 
of Francis I., Emperor of Austria, one of the three 
chief supporters of the Holy Alliance in 1821, and 
of the present German Emperor. Both sovereigns 
maintained the doctrine of the Divine Right to rule 
and the determination to tolerate no opposition to 
the autocratic will. "I want faithful subjects," said 
Francis I. "Be such: that is your duty. He who 
would serve me must do what I command. He 
who cannot do this, or who comes full of new ideas, 
may go his way. If he does not, I shall send him." 
And in a similar spirit William II., the present 
Emperor, said: ''Those who are willing to help 
me I heartily welcome whoever they may be: those 
who oppose me in this task I will crush." Again: 
"There is but one law, and that is my law." And 
again: "One only is master within the Empire, 



244 The Creed of Deutschtum 

and I will tolerate no other." 

In accordance with this principle, the allied sov- 
ereigns at Laybach in 1821 announced that "use- 
ful and necessary changes in legislation and in the 
administration of States ought only to emanate 
from the free will and intelligent and well-weighed 
conviction of those whom God has rendered respon- 
sible for power. All that deviates from this line 
necessarily leads to disorder, commotion, and evils 
far more insupportable than those which they pre- 
tend to remedy." 

It was on this principle that the continental mon- 
archies denounced the Greeks, though the whole 
world recoiled from the cruelties they suffered at 
the hands of their oppressors, just as the world to- 
day recoils from the cruelties suffered by the Bel- 
gians and Serbians. Webster, therefore, in pro- 
testing against the treatment of Greece by Turkey 
and the Allied Powers, directed the main force of 
his argument against the principles of the Holy 
Alliance. And he brought all the power of his 
splendid eloquence to bear to show to the American 
people how "utterly hostile" those principles were 
"to our own free institutions." The question was 
very different from that raised by Monroe in that 
part of his message, now known as the Monroe 
Doctrine, dealing with the designs of the Holy Al- 
liance upon the South American Republics. There 
it was a question of direct interference with Re- 
publican forms of government and the forcible im- 
position of their system of government upon this 



The Disintegration of an Ideal 245 

hemisphere. This we should regard, he said, as 
"an unfriendly disposition toward the United 
States." 

It was, therefore, solely on the ground of prin- 
ciple and not because of any such "unfriendly dis- 
position," toward us or infringement of our legal 
rights on sea or land, or interference with our com- 
merce, that Webster urged that the moral support 
of the nation be given to the cause of Greece. 

"I wish to take occasion," he said, "of the strug- 
gle of an interesting and gallant people in the cause 
of liberty and Christianity, to draw the attention 
of the House to the circumstances which have ac- 
companied that struggle, and to the principles 
which appear to have governed the conduct of the 
great States of Europe in regard to it; and to the 
effects and consequences of these principles upon 
the independence of nations, and especially upon 
the institutions of free governments." 

And referring to the denunciation by the Con- 
gress of Verona above mentioned: 

We see here, Mr. Chairman, the direct and actual 
application of that system which I have attempted to 
describe. We see it in the very case of Greece. We 
learn, authentically and indisputably, that the allied 
powers, holding that all changes in legislation and admin- 
istration ought to proceed from Kings alone, were wholly 
inexorable to the sufferings of the Greeks and entirely 
hostile to their success. Now it is upon this practical 
result of the principle of the Continental Powers that I 
wish this House to intimate its opinion. The great ques- 
tion is a question of principle. Greece is only the signal 
instance of the application of that principle. If the 



246 The Creed of Deutschtum 

principle be right, if we esteem it conformable to the law 
of nations, if we have nothing to say against it, or if we 
deem ourselves unfit to express an opinion on the subject, 
then, of course, no resolution ought to pass. If, on the 
other hand, we see in the declaration of the allied powers 
jorinciples not only utterly hostile to our own free insti- 
tutions, but hostile also to the independence of all nations, 
and altogether opposed to the improvement of the con- 
dition of human nature ; if, in the instance before us, we 
see a most striking exposition and application of those 
principles, and if we deem our opinions to be entitled to 
any weight in the estimation of mankind, then I think 
it is our duty to adopt some such measure as the pro- 
posed resolution. 

One of the most objectionable principles held by 
the allied powers Webster considered to be the 
claim of "the right of forcible interference in the 
affairs of the States." 

Webster's speech is characterized by its lofty tone 
of humanitarianism and profound belief in the 
principles upon which our nation is founded. 
Throughout it there breathes the love of liberty and 
of human rights. Self -restrained and without pas- 
vsion he boldly takes his stand as the defender of 
these ideals, and he would have the nation assert, 
without equivocation, the national conscience. 
They, the allied nations, had "expressed their opin- 
ions," and he would have us express our "different 
principles and different sympathies." 

It is interesting, too, to note the entire subordi- 
nation of selfish, material interest, and technical 
legal rights belonging to Americans. His protest 
is bf^sed entirely on the broad rights of mankind 



The Disintegration of an Ideal 247 

and opposition to the oppression of one people by 
another. 

Webster anticipated the objection — the admoni- 
tion which we received in recent days from the 
President when we read day by day of the viola- 
tion of Belgium — that we should scrupulously re- 
main neutral in thought as well as speech, and mind 
our own business. 

As it is never difficult to recite commonplace remarks 
and trite aphorisms, so it may be easy, I am aware, on 
this occasion to remind me of the wisdom which dictates 
to men a care of their own affairs, and admonishes them, 
instead of searching for adventures abroad, to leave other 
men's concerns in their own hands. It may be easy to call 
this resolution Quixotic, the emanation of a crusading 
or propagandist spirit. All this, and more, may be 
readily said ; but all this, and more, will not be allowed 
to fix a character upon this proceeding until that is 
proved which it takes for granted. Let it first be shown 
that in this question there is nothing which can affect 
the interest, the character, or the duty of this country. 
Let it be proved that we are not called upon by either of 
these considerations to express an opinion on the subject 
to which the resolution relates. 

The propriety of a protest he placed upon con- 
siderations of our own duty, of our character and 
of our own interest. This conception of duty he 
returns to again and again; thus in one passage 
he said that the measure which he proposed he con- 
sidered "due to our own character and called for 
by our own duty." 

And again he argued: 

In my judgment, the subject is interesting to the 



-248 The Creed of Deutschtum 

people and the Government of this country, and we are 
called upon, by considerations of great weight and mo- 
ment, to express our opinions upon it. These consid- 
erations, I think, spring from a sense of our own duty, 
our character, and our own interest. I wish to treat the 
subject on such grounds exclusively as are truly Amer- 
ican. 

But in treating the subject on American grounds 
he rested his case on the higher plane of American 
ideals. 

"Let this be, then," he continued, "and as far as 
I am concerned I hope it will be, purely an Amer- 
ican discussion; but let it embrace, nevertheless, 
everything that fairly concerns America. Let it 
comprehend not merely her present advantage but 
her permanent interest, her elevated character as 
one of the free States of the world, and her duty 
toward those great principles which have hitherto 
maintained the relative independence of nations, 
and which have, more especially, made her what 
she is." 

It is interesting to note that Webster, a profound 
thinker and statesman, by "permanent interest" 
had in mind, as he later on argued, not material 
interests or legal rights, but the broad interest we 
had in resenting the breaking of international law 
and interference with the rights of small nations by 
great nations. 

It is true Webster in arguing from this ground 
struck solely at the pretensions of the Holy Al- 
liance, which as an alliance not long afterward 
came to a timely end. But it is no perversion of his 



TJie Disintegration of an Ideal 249 

argument to hold, as I shall later point out, that 
the principles from which he reasoned are equally 
applicable to the policies of "Might flakes Right," 
and "World Empire," and to the events which we 
have seen unfold themselves before our eyes to- 
daj^ to the consideration of a treaty as a scrap of 
paper, the violation of the sovereignty of small 
States by a powerful neighbor, the violation of all 
the civilized laws of war and humanity, the policy 
of "frightfulness" and "terrorism" as a method of 
warfare employed to-day as it was by the Turks 
against the Greeks, and the general breaking of in- 
ternational laws on the plea of "necessity." 

Furthermore, two fundamental principles that 
underlay the Holy Alliance are fundamental to the 
German Government to-day — that of the divine 
right of kings and uncompromising hostility to de- 
mocracy and to "government of the people, by the 
people, and for the people." To these two prin- 
ciples can be largely traced the existing "German 
militarism" which is responsible for this war and 
which the Allies are fighting to overthrow. 

A careful study of Webster's attitude of mind, 
revealing, as it does, his intense love of liberty, his 
profound belief in government by the people, and 
his respect for the rights of man, leave no doubt in 
the mind that he would be as ready to-day, if he 
were alive, to protest against the violation of these 
principles as he was against the violation of Grecian 
liberty and independence. 

The modernness of Webster's thought is brought 



250 The Creed of Deutschtum 

out vividly by a question which he anticipated — 
the same question which we have heard so often 
asked when a protest against the violation of Bel- 
gium and Germany's inhuman methods of warfare 
has been suggested. But the feeble answer given 
in these later days falls sadly short of the noble re- 
ply with which Webster rebuked his imaginary op- 
ponent. This passage deserves to be learned by 
every American and indelibly engraved in the con- 
science of the nation. 

It may, in the next place, be asked, perhaps, supposing, 
all this to be true, what can we do? Are we to go to war? 
Are we to interfere in the Greek cause, or any other 
European cause? Are we to endanger our pacific rela- 
tions? No, certainly not. What, then, the question 
recurs, remains for us? If we will not endanger our own 
peace, if we will neither furnish armies nor navies to the 
cause which we think the just one, what is there within our 
power? 

He then went on to characterize the part which 
the imponderable force of public opinion and moral 
sentiment plays in restraining and punishing the 
violations of human rights — that force which 
France and Belgium and England have appealed 
in vain to America to bring to the aid of humanity 
in this war: 

It is already able to oppose the most formidable ob- 
stiTjction to the progress of injustice and oppression; 
and as it grows more intelligent and more intense, it 
will be more and more formidable. It may be silenced by 
military power, but it cannot be conquered. It is elastic, 
irrepressible, and invulnerable to the weapons of ordinary 
warfare. It is that impassable, unextinguishable enemy 



The Disintegration of an Ideal 251 

of mere violence and arbitrary rule, which, like Milton's 
angels. 

Vital in every part . . . 

Cannot, but by annihilating, die. 

Until this be propitiated or satisfied, it is vain for 
power to talk either of triumphs or of repose — no matter 
what fields are desolated, what fortresses surrendered, 
what armies subdued, or what provinces overrun. 

Then, after narrating the unhappy events in 
Spain: 

It is nothing that arrests and confiscation and exe- 
cution sweep away the little remnant of national resist- 
ance. There is an enemy that still exists to check the 
glory of these triumphs. It follows the conqueror back 
to the very scene of his ovations ; it calls upon him to take 
notice that Europe, though silent, is yet indignant ; it 
shows him that the sceptre of his victory is a barren 
sceptre; that it shall confer neither joy nor honor, but 
shall molder to dry ashes in his grasp. In the midst of 
his exultation, it pierces his ear with the cry of injured 
justice; it denounces against him the indignation of an 
enlightened and civilized age; it turns to bitterness the 
cup of his rejoicing, and wounds him with the sting which 
belongs to the consciousness of having outraged the 
opinion of mankind. 

Later on he describes in vivid language and 
glowing admiration the splendid resistance of the 
Greeks to the powerful hordes of Turkey. But as 
we follow his words to-day it is pictures of Belgium 
and Serbia that rise before us and intrude them- 
selves into our consciousness. Then he returns to 
the question. What good will it do to protest? 

It may now be asked, perhaps, whether the expressioil 
of our own sympathy, and that of the country, may do 



252 The Creed of Deutschtum 

them good? I hope it may. It may give them courage 
and spirit, it may assure them of pubHc regard, teach 
them that they are not wholly forgotten by the civilized 
world, and inspire them with constancy in the pursuit 
of their great end. At any rate, Sir, it appears to me 
that the measure which I have proposed is due to our own 
character and called for by our own duty. When we shall 
have discharged that duty we may leave the rest to the 
disposition of Providence. 



II 

THE CONTRAST 

Nearly one hundred years have gone by since 
the days of Monroe and Webster — since they ut- 
tered their protests to the most powerfid nations 
of Europe. The policy of our nation has changed ! 

In 1821 we were a homogeneous nation imbued 
with common ideals and political beliefs, and with 
a uniform sentiment of American nationality. Ra- 
cially we were a unity. To-day we are a polyglot 
nation speaking many tongues. We have lost the 
homogeneity of a single race. The people of many 
nations, each with different political traditions, af- 
filiations, and sentiments, have been cast into the 
melting pot, and as yet a single national conscience 
has not been evolved. 

It is only to be expected, therefore, that follow- 
ing the great invasion by immigration of all the 
peoples of the world to this country, our common 
national conscience should have become disinte- 
grated. New forces have come into play to which 



The Disintegration of an Ideal 253 

our early national ideals have yielded themselves. 
Americans, apparently, have thought it wise to com- 
promise with these forces. These facts may explain 
the change that has taken place in our national at- 
titude and policy toward certain foreign questions. 
Whether or not they justify it must be left to the 
judgment of each individual. 

Though the policy of the nation has changed, yet 
history in many respects is repeating itself. Two 
powerful empires of central Europe have overrid- 
den the rights of two little States. In the one case, 
Serbia; by a preconcerted arrangement they de- 
manded the right to overrule the sovereignty of 
that State and dictate the administration of its in- 
ternal affairs. Indeed, there is every reason to be- 
lieve, on the basis of historical evidence come to 
light, that these powers conspired to extend their 
empires over this and other small Balkan States to 
the iEgean Sea. 

In the other case, Belgium, one of these empires, 
not only disregarded the accepted morality of in- 
ternational law, treated a treaty as a "scrap of 
paper," but by military force invaded that peace- 
ful neutral State which had given no offense what- 
ever — "hacked its way through." There was no 
question that a "wrong" was done, for it was ad- 
mitted officially by the Chancellor. The other na- 
tions of the world, therefore, did not have to wait 
for evidence to see on which side the wrong lay. 

In both cases atrocities were committed compar- 
able in every way to those which the Turks had 



254 The Creed of Deutschtum 

committed in 1821-1823, and which in a large meas- 
ure led to the moral stand taken by our Govern- 
ment in 1823. Indeed, the Turks are now commit- 
ting equal atrocities against the Armenians, appar- 
ently with the moral support of the Central Em- 
pires, just as the atrocities against the Greeks in 
their revolution were supported by the Holy Al- 
liance. In truth German publicists have resented 
any interference by outside nations, claiming the 
Turks are within their rights in taking any effective 
measures against the Armenians. 

The contrast between the policy of our Govern- 
ment in 1823 and that of 1914 is sharply drawn. 
In 1823, though a young and weak nation, the 
Administration did not hesitate to take a definite 
stand in opposition to the most powerful Govern- 
ments of Europe, and officially extend the sympa- 
thy of the nation and its moral support to an op- 
pressed people. This sympathetic interest was not 
confined to the Administration, but found collec- 
tive expression in public meetings throughout the 
nation, through organized associations and other 
ways. 

In 1914 the Government of the United States, 
grown to be not only the most powerful of the neu- 
tral nations in this war, but one of the most power- 
ful of all the nations of the world, maintained stud- 
ied reticence and almost ostentatiously adhered to 
neutrality of sentiment. Even in the Congress, 
where one would have thought differences of opin- 
ion would have found expression, no one felt called 



The Disintegration of an Ideal 255 

upon to take a different view. The President had 
admonished the people to be "neutral in thought 
and speech." But there was and could be no neu- 
trality seeing that each individual had his own moral 
conscience in his own keeping. It was different 
with the official conscience of the nation, which was 
in the keeping of the President, and he held it safely 
under lock and key; or, to express it slightly dif- 
ferently, he closed the lid of the box upon it and sat 
on the lid. Congress, perhaps, might have forced 
the President off his seat on the lid by taking ac- 
tion in the form of a sympathetic protest against 
the invasion of Belgium and the German campaign 
of f rightfulness, just as Monroe and Webster had 
protested in 1823. But Congress was pliant and 
timid, and official neutrality of thought and speech 
was maintained. 

In the country at large, though the press and the 
great majority of citizens in a whole-hearted way 
warmlj^ espoused the side of the oppressed nations, 
the sentiment was not mobilized by public meet- 
ings and organized bodies and other ways into col- 
lective expression. It was, therefore, pragmatically 
valueless. It was the sentiment of Americans, and 
had not become American sentiment. It is only the 
mobilized or official sentiment that counts in in- 
ternational relations. There were none, indeed, to 
lead in the mobilization of public opinion into a 
concrete force. And though many and influential 
citizens expressed through letters to the press and 
public addresses the sentiment of the country, with 



256 The Creed of Deutschtum 

a few notable exceptions there was a general silent 
acquiescence in the official attitude adopted by the 
Administration — in the principle of official Gov- 
ernmental silence. But this acquiescence did not 
wholly mean agreement or final acceptance. There 
was a large quota of Americans who believed and 
still believe that our Government should have pro- 
tested in 1914 as in 1823. 

Nevertheless, though history is repeating itself, 
one thing stands out very clearly, and that is that 
the American nation and Government no longer 
feels called upon to give expression to any opinion 
or sentiment that we may entertain upon the great 
moral and political principles involved in interna-^ 
tional affairs. Nor does our Government any 
longer consider that the "interest" of America is 
involved in the possible eventual supremacy of prin- 
ciples of government absolutely hostile to our own. 
Here, indeed, is a great change since 1823. 

Objection may be raised to contrasting the Amer- 
ican policy of 1914-1915 with that of 1823 on the 
ground that conditions and the questions involved 
in the former period were very different from those 
of to-day. But this is to take a very narrow view. 
It is to mistake a particular policy of a nation for 
the principles by which the policy is actuated. The 
interference of the Allied Monarchies of 1821 with 
constitutional government wherever established was 
only a particular application of their principles and 
a matter of expediency. This Webster well pointed 
out in the case of the Greek revolution. It was 



The Disintegration of an Ideal 257 

when they attempted to mipose their principles and 
their pohtical doctrines on the rest of the world 
that we took issue with their application. And like- 
wise we may protest against the imposition of the 
principles of the present Dual Alliance upon the 
rest of the world if we feel called upon to do so. 

Regardless of political policy, the principles of 
the Holy Alliance were notoriously so opposed to 
those of our institutions that Monroe in his now 
famous message warned those nations not to at- 
tempt to establish their system of government on 
this continent. Their principles, aside from any 
particular mode by which they were put into prac- 
tice, were entirely opposed to the rights of man- 
kind, to the principles of democracy, to the rights 
of other nations, to humanitarianism, to govern- 
ment by the people. 

Likewise, looked at in this broad way, it is gen- 
erally conceded that the principles on which the 
German empire is governed and the doctrines which 
publicly have been avowed by that nation, by its 
publicists, its writers, its scholars, its press, its 
statesmen, its military men, and its Emperor, are 
as equally hostile to these other principles, and 
therefore to American institutions. 

So much has been written on this matter, and 
the large mass of data accumulated substantiat- 
ing this view is so readily accessible, that it would 
be reiteration or useless to go over it again here. 
It is sufficient to say that the principles and doc- 
trines of "Might Makes Right," ''World Empire 



258 The Creed of Deutschtum 

or Downfall," "The Morality of War," "the duty 
of a strong nation to wage war and to extend do- 
minion over weaker nations," "the duty to extend 
German Kultur over the whole world"; "the prin- 
ciple of a chosen people," of govermnent by an au- 
tocratic class, and that of the "Divine Right" to 
rule, the denial of representative government ex- 
cept in name ; the principle of militarism by v/hich a 
military caste is elevated to a position of privilege, 
and by which not only the democracy of the Ger- 
man nation but the world is to be crushed if it does 
not yield to German ambition; the principles of 
rule based on armed force, of lese-majeste, of the 
denial of freedom of the press and of speech, of the 
right to wage war by the principle of frightfulness 
without regard to international law, not to speak 
of much else — these principles and doctrines are 
wholly hostile to those principles upon which our 
Government is founded. This is only a statement 
of fact which the most neutral and indifferent per- 
son may state wdthout any committal of opinion as 
to the merits of the two systems of government. 
The difference between the two sets of principles, 
or national ideals, is the difference not simply be- 
tween democracy and autocracy, but autocracy of 
a kind so unique in principle, so barbaric in meth- 
ods, that it can scarcely be summarized in the few 
lines I have used. The Belgian and Serbian in- 
vasions, the general methods of warfare, and the 
planning for and the instigation of this war are 
only special applications of these principles, and it 



The Disintegration of an Ideal 259 

is to these applications that the question relates. 

If all this is admitted, then it follows that the sit- 
uation in 1823 was not fundamentally different 
from what it is in 1915. And, as with the Holy 
Alliance, when the Dual Alliance attempts to ap- 
ply its principles and its political doctrines to the 
rest of the world we have a right, at least, to take 
issue with their application. 

In this presentation of the American ideal of 
1823, and in contrasting with it the policy and at- 
titude of our Government in 1915, we can see to 
what an extent that ideal has become disintegrated. 
By the contrast we can see how far we have trav- 
eled since 1823. It is obvious that in 1914-1915 we 
have made a complete somersault in our policy. 

The ideal of 1823 may still persist in the older 
Eastern communities of the nation, but events have 
shown that even here it has ceased to be an all- abid- 
ing, inspiring creed. Nor does it permeate the na- 
tional consciousness as a whole. The indifference 
and apathy of public opinion in the country at 
large, particularly in the West, grown up without 
traditions, show that so far as this ideal still sur- 
vives it is no longer a living, vital force in our na- 
tional political thought and a trait of the national 
personality. Rather it has degenerated into an aca- 
demic opinion deprived of the vitality that springs 
from intensity of interest. It is difficult to formu- 
late the nature of the change, but, psychologically 
speaking, its emotional interest has been displaced 
and attached to material and local affairs. Consid- 



260 The Creed of Deutschtum 

erations of self-interest, self -development, self-ag- 
grandizement, self-concern, and self-safety have 
absorbed the interest. As defenders of humanitari- 
anism have we not become a "slob" nation? Sym- 
pathy with suffering? Yes, in plenty. But na- 
tional political resentment at the cause of the suf- 
fering — no. It is noteworthy that not a single 
leader has come forward to mobilize in practical 
form into an organized force such resentment as 
exists. Blase to humanitarian appeals, to political 
oppression, barbarities, and injustice, we are con- 
tent to follow along "the easier way" and justify 
to ourselves our course by the fact that the national 
conscience is no longer a unity. And so those con- 
siderations — "a sense of our own duty, our char- 
acter and our own interest" — ^which in the former 
period determined us to express boldly our opinion 
without fear of consequences and in defiance of the 
allied nations of that time, no longer have weight 
and no longer govern the thought of the nation. 

And yet when we think of this radical departure 
we cannot help recalling that in 1823, a small and 
weak nation that we were, the great monarchies of 
Europe cared little for our opinions — for either our 
moral support or our moral reprobation — but they 
had a high respect for what militarj^ action we 
might take. In 1914, when we had become a large 
and powerful nation, those same monarchies or 
their successors had a high respect for our opinions 
and little or none for our military effectiveness. 
The potentiality of our moral support, a force 



The Disintegration of an Ideal 261 

which issues only from character, self-respect, high 
ideals, and assertion of convictions steadfastly held 
— what Bismarck so highly valued as the "impon- 
derables" — was sought by every nation engaged in 
this conflict. 

In 1823 we spoke out without any hope that our 
moral support would do any material good, but 
nevertheless we spoke because it might give "cour- 
age and spirit" to the oppressed and because we 
owed it as a duty to ourselves and our character. 
That duty done, we could leave "the rest to the dis- 
position of Providence." It was one of the most 
noble acts in our history. 

To-day, when the early expression of our opinion 
in condemning the violation of a small and helpless 
nation, the violation of the rules of civilized war- 
fare and international law by every sort of atrocity, 
and the barbarous treatment of civil populations 
might have done some material good in mitigating 
the horrors of war, we refused, like Holland, Den- 
mark, and Sweden, and other small nations, from 
timidity to speak. We do not consider that we owe 
it to the oppressed to inspire them, if we could, with 
"courage and spirit," nor that we owe it to our- 
selves, to our character, to assert our convictions. 

And yet again, as we look back to the times of 
1823, there can be no one who does not thrill with 
pride when he reads the noble protest of our little 
nation of that time. Is there any one who is not 
glad that our predecessors took the stand that they 
did and spoke the words that expressed the con- 



262 The Creed of Deutschtum 

science of the nation and brought cheer to the 
hearts of the oppressed? Is there any one who is 
not glad that our country condemned the brutal 
application of principles utterly hostile to those 
upon which our Republic is founded and which vio- 
lated the rights of the Little Peoples? Is there any 
American who is not proud of the Administration 
of Monroe? Looking forward into the future we 
are forced to ask ourselves whether we shall be 
again regarded in the world of nations with that 
respect for our character which we had attained as 
the exponent of humanitarian ideals ; whether that 
moral greatness of our country which once was 
ours, and because of which our sympathy was 
sought, shall not have vanished. When we lose our 
character we lose our force as an "imponderable" 
to uplift the violated nations from the miseries of 
injustice, of oppression, and of war. As an impon- 
derable force in the world the nation once was 
mighty for good. 

It remains to be seen whether our timidity, our 
fear to follow the path which Monroe and Webster 
boldly took, has not weakened our character as a 
nation and will not earn the reprobation of those 
who come after us. Will the generations that are 
to come look back to 1914-15 with that pride with 
which we to-day look back to the Administration 
of 1823? 



THE WAK— A TEST OF THE GERMAN 
THEORY OF MILITARISM 



A PAPER PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE ON THE 
PROBLEMS AND LESSONS OF THE WAR" HELD AT CLARK 
UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER, 1915. 



THE WAR— A TEST OF THE GERMAN 
THEORY OF MILITARISM 

THE term "militarism" has different mean- 
ings for different people. With some its 
signification relates merely to the size of 
the army and navy maintained by a nation ; 
with others to the motives, attitude of mind and po- 
litical policies which are behind the military estab- 
lishments, and the purposes for which they are to 
be employed. So that in this view one nation might 
maintain a very small military force and yet its 
Government rest upon and be actuated by "mili- 
tarism"; while another, the United States, for ex- 
ample, or Great Britain, might maintain a very 
great military or naval establishment without ex- 
hibiting militarism. We must not confuse mili- 
tarism, understood in this sense, with the American 
idea of "preparedness" against war — a policy of 
national defense which is now in the public mind 
in this country. The two have nothing in common 
excepting that they make use of military organi- 
zation as a means to an end. It is the difference 
in the ends sought that distinguishes the two. 

However militarism in general be defined, our 
thesis requires only that we deal with the Geraian 
theory of militarism. There is a very general con- 
sensus of opinion throughout the world, outside, 

265 



266 The Creed of Deutschtum 

of course, of the Geraian Empire, as to the char- 
acter of German militarism and the purposes which 
it has been meant to subserve. I believe I am right 
in saying that it is commonly agreed that the fun- 
damental principle of German militarism is that 
the stability, power, and will of the nation rest on 
armed force ; and therefore that it is to such armed 
force that the Imperial Government looks both to 
maintain itself within the empire and to enforce its 
will, its "Kultur," its ideals, and its policies upon 
other nations without the empire. 

More concretely and concisely, German milita- 
rism in its external relations may be defined as the 
idea of extending the nation's trade and system of 
government by force. It would be easy to cite 
from numerous authorities to support this inter- 
pretation of German militarism. 

Militarism thus becomes something much more 
than a system of defense against encroachments 
from within and without— it is a mode of, and or- 
ganization for, attack in the enforcement of pro- 
gressive policies, of national growth, and of the 
will of the State, whatever direction these may 
take. It has been even the boast, not only of the 
German Emperor but of a host of German publi- 
cists, that by the potential power of its army Ger- 
many has maintained peace itself between the great 
powers of Europe during the past twenty-five 
years. 

With the questionable validity of this claim I am 
not here concerned, any more than with the proph- 



Test of German Theory of Militarism 267 

ecy of the Emperor in 1902, when he said: "The 
powerful German Army guarantees the peace of 
Europe." The irony of Aug. 1, 1914, makes such 
claims tragic. ]My only motive in citing them is to 
summarize the functions which militarism has un- 
dertaken to perform so that when we come to weigh 
its claims with its achievements we may judge it. 

With militarism as a principle of government 
within the German Empire I have nothing to do. 
Though it may be a system for the enforcement 
of the will of the State against the will of the peo- 
ple, if the German people are satisfied with gov- 
ernment resting on the principle of armed force, 
it is their own affair and concerns them alone. I 
will content myself with pointing out that that 
principle necessarily means autocracy based on 
armed force, and is utterly irreconcilable with and 
hostile to that other principle of government which 
rests upon the moral force of public opinion con- 
trolled and checked by constitutional guarantees 
to the individual of "natural" and "inherent" and 
"inalienable rights." And yet, if time permitted, 
the thesis would be an interesting one to defend 
that even within the German body politic milita- 
rism, like all other human forces acting upon human 
beings, is bound eventually to excite and bring 
into activity other forces antagonistic to itself and 
with which it sooner or later must come into con- 
flict. And this has happened. The extraordinary 
growth of the German democracy, to say nothing 
of the numerous political parties that have sprung 



268 The Creed of Deutschtum 

up in opposition to the Government, must be 
looked upon as the necessary reaction of human 
wills to an autocratic will attempting to impose it- 
self by force. However that may be, it is of the 
theory of militarism applied to international rela- 
tions that the present war can alone be regarded 
as a test, and it is this aspect of the theory that I 
propose to consider. 

We need not concern ourselves with the origin 
and historical evolution of German militarism. It 
is sufficient to accept it as it is found in its final 
form and as it has manifested itself during the 
last, say, twenty years — since 1896, the date of 
the Boer war. 

The best exposition of German militarism (com- 
monly called "Prussian") is to be found in concrete 
applications of its principles, and no more excellent 
example of applied militarism is to be found than 
in the attitude of Germany in the Serbian crisis in 
July, 1914. I trust I may be permitted to cite 
that incident in spite of the danger of introducing 
into this discussion controversial matters outside 
the main thesis. 

Serbia had been charged with being guilty of 
offenses against Austria. Germany accordingly 
gave Austria assurances, secretly, that the latter 
should have a "free hand" in dealing with Serbia 
as she saw fit, regardless of the interests of Russia 
or the sovereign rights of Serbia, and that Ger- 
many would back her up with her army, if neces- 
sary. To all expostulation on the part both of 



Test of German Theory of Militarism 269 

Serbia and the other powers Germany and Aus- 
tria turned a deaf ear. A settlement of Austria's 
demands — all of which were yielded but two and 
Serbia offered to refer these to The Hague — by 
mediation, by conference of the powers, by con- 
versations was refused. German militarism had 
the power, so it felt, to enforce its demands against 
Serbia, on the one hand, and against any outside in- 
terference by any power or combination of powers, 
on the other. ^lilitarism desired, of course, to "lo- 
calize" the conflict, for in that case its task would be 
easy ; but if the conflict could not be localized, mili- 
tarism had the power any way, so it believed, and 
was going to gain its ends by force and would ac- 
cept no other methods, no matter what the conse- 
quences. Its ulterior object, it is generally con- 
ceded, was to extend German hegemony and trade 
as an appanage of empire through the Balkans to 
the iEgean Sea, Constantinople, and the Persian 
Gulf by force. 

Militarism refused to take into consideration the 
rights of a sovereign nation, the "natural" and "in- 
herent rights" of mankind, the political interests 
of other European powers, racial sympathies and 
prejudices, the traits, instincts, passions, and as- 
pirations of other peoples, and, above all, mutual 
international moral obligations by which one na- 
tion should respect the rights and interests of every 
other. Its sole function was to gain the ends of 
its own nation by force, and, relying upon a sup- 
posed fear of its own armed power, it refused until 



270 The Creed of Deutschtum 

it was too late every other mode of settlement. That 
was the method of militarism. Necessarily mili- 
tarism, to be efficient, requires a liighly developed 
condition of preparedness for war. And this the 
German State has provided, first, in a scheme of 
offensive and defensive alliances; and, second, in a 
more efficiently organized military machine than 
the world has ever before seen and, for that mat- 
ter, than the world ever dreamed of or thought 
possible. So that if militarism when tested shall 
be found not to have been a success, its failure 
, cannot be laid to inefficiency of preparedness. 

At this point the difference between the Amer- 
ican idea of preparedness and the German idea 
becomes apparent. The American idea is prepar- 
edness for defense against attack. 

The German idea includes this, but adds to it 
preparedness for defense of imperial intentions to 
extend German trade, German thought, and a sys- 
tem of government throughout the world by force 
— world empire or downfall, it has been called. 

The underlying theory of militarism of course 
has been that, if all the resources of a nation are 
organized into a military system and that system 
is developed to its very highest efficiency in every 
one of its multiplicity of parts, it will be so power- 
ful as to be irresistible against any combination of 
powers likely within human foresight to be brought 
against it; and that therefore no Power or likely 
combination of Powers will dare to attack it, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, it can enforce its 



Test of German Theory of Militarism 271 

will on the world. 

As opposed to this we have the rival theory that 
under modern conditions of civilization, whatever 
may have been the case in the ancient Roman world, 
no one or two or three States can dominate the 
whole world by force; that any State that disre- 
gards the natural and inlierent rights of sovereign 
States and fails to show "a decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind" is bound to awaken into ac- 
tivity the latent moral and physical forces of the 
world; that aggressive actions threatening to ob- 
tain unjust advantage by force stimulate resist- 
ance, and that sooner or later, under the influence 
of public opinion, combinations of forces come into 
being which are too powerful to be overcome by 
any single power or possible alliance of powers. 

A perfect analogy may be found in the great 
political conflict which of recent years agitated this 
country — the conflict between organized industries 
and organized capital on the one hand and public 
opinion on the other. Great aggregations of cap- 
ital and industrial corporations, grown arrogant 
with power, undertook to extend their systems in 
disregard of the laws that protected the natural 
and inherent rights of individuals and lesser or- 
ganizations, and to take what they wanted by the 
power which they wielded through their mighty 
militant organizations. In the pursuance of this 
policy there failed to be shown "a decent respect 
to the opinions of mankind." It was the principle 
of militarism adopted by industrialism and applied 



272 The Creed of Deutschtum 

by industrial force. Such overriding of the rights 
of others necessarily created an uprising of public 
opinion which gathered to itself the political powers 
of the nation and the States. These were more 
mighty than any that industrialism could mobilize. 
The result was such as might have been expected, 
and industrial militarism was overthrown. 

As tested by the results of the conflict, indus- 
trial militarism proved itself a failure. Let us see 
how far German State militarism has proved suc- 
cessful as tested by this war. We are not con- 
cerned, of course, with the moral aspects of the 
question — ^with such questions as right and justice 
— but only with the pragmatic question of success 
or failure. If militarism can point to success, it 
can at least find one defense on the ground of 
necessity and expediency. 

Has German Militarism been successful? 

When one thinks of the great military successes 
achieved by the German armies thus far in this war, 
of the large regions of conquered territory in Bel- 
gium, France, Russia, and Serbia, one is prompted 
offhand to answer in the affirmative. But deeper 
consideration, I think, shows this view to be a su- 
perficial one. None of the armies of the great bel- 
ligerents on either side has been destroyed. They 
all remain intact, and until the armies have been 
eliminated as effective forces, or their Governments 
rendered incapable by exhaustion of using them for 
further effective offense or resistance, it is idle 
to talk of victory for one side or the other. Against 



Test of German Theory of Militarism 273 

the occupation of territory by the armies of the 
Central Empires may be set ojft': 

1. The complete failure of their plan of cam- 
paign, designed years in advance, and to carry 
out which the German militaiy organization had 
been perfected. So far from France being crushed 
and "bled white" by German preparedness, the 
German armies, after an early retreat, are held in 
their trenches, unable to move on the west, and on 
the east apparently are incapable of further ad- 
vance. 

2. The complete impotence of the German Navy, 
the bottling up of her merchant marine, the de- 
struction of her commerce, and consequent impair- 
ment of her industries. 

3. The loss of all Germany's colonies. 

4. The encircling of Germany by an iron naval 
and military ring from which she cannot break out. 

5. The indefinite isolation of Germany from 
commerce with over-sea nations and the continuous 
paralyzing of her industries by England's navy 
until England is satisfied with the terms of peace; 
thus probably enabling England to dictate terms. 

6. The possible restriction, after the war, of Ger- 
many's commerce by preferential tariffs, mercan- 
tile port restrictions and other measures on the 
part of England and her colonies, France and Rus- 
sia, against Germany and Austria. 

These are offsets to the ten-itories conquered by 
Germany and Austria. In view of them the final 
possession of the territories now held will be de- 



274 The Creed of Deutschtum 

termined by considerations governing the urgency 
or necessities for peace and not by the fact of tem- 
porary occupancy by force. But, however that 
may be, after giving the very maximum of weight 
to the initial territorial gains justly to be credited 
to militarism, including those in Serbia, let us look 
at the other side of the ledger and see what ma- 
terial and moral forces its very successes have called 
into being to threaten its supremacy. 

By its own very example, the object lesson it 
has given, it has not only taught other nations the 
possibilities of military efficiency but, as a neces- 
sary reaction, has directly excited them to imitate 
the machine which German Militarism invented and 
to rival its standards. The results have been: 

1. That France, at first half prepared, has in 
self-preservation developed and organized a mil- 
itary machine which, in proportion to its size, is 
the equal of Germany's. For this time was the sole 
requisite and this was gained when the German 
war machine was checked and held immobile after 
the first six weeks of war. 

2. That the English nation, hitherto pursuing a 
policy opposed to the maintenance of large military 
land forces, has been stimulated to create for the 
purposes of this war a great military, industrial, 
and fighting machine which soon will be equal in 
efficiency to, and approximate in numbers of men, 
that of Germany. But, more important of all from 
the point of view of the validity of the theory of 
militarism, there have been evoked, as a reaction 



Test of German Theory of Militarism 275 

to the threatening oppression of militarism, a so- 
lidified British public opinion and a national con- 
sciousness that not only accept military prepared- 
ness on land as a requisite for national security 
against force, but are inspired by a national will 
to destroy the militarism of German autocracy. 

3. We are too far removed from Russia to judge 
the conditions there existing, but it is probably safe 
to assume that Russia, with her armies still intact, 
and taught by reverses, is reacting as England and 
France have done. 

4. Even the United States has not remained 
quiescent. The thought of the nation has reacted 
to the object lesson of this war, and public opin- 
ion, as a counterforce, is fast being mobilized into 
a national will to oppose the threatening aggres- 
sions of militarism by a preparedness to meet the 
attacks of organized force with organized force. 

5. But beyond these reactions, resulting in the 
mobilization of moral and physical forces against 
militarism, there have been other moral reactions 
of great portent. Without undertaking to pass 
judgment in a discussion of this kind on the rights 
and wrongs of the cause for which the belligerents 
of each side are contending, the lamentable fact 
still remains that the hatred and animosities that 
have been created in one people for another will 
prove to be both moral and industrial losses com- 
parable to the loss of provinces. 

There is another world condition which can be 
justly attributed to German Militarism and which 



276 The Creed of Deutschtum 

should be taken into consideration in the test of 
its success or failure as a policy of government. I 
refer to the world-wide hostility to and dislike of 
Germany and her sj^stem of government which 
now, it must be acknowledged, permeates almost 
all nations. Here, again, I wish to emphasize that 
I am not concerned with the rightness or wi'ong- 
ness, the justice or injustice, of this attitude of 
mind. I am dealing only with the psychological 
fact as determined by observation and of common 
acceptance. 

Although this world attitude of mind has been 
brought to a culmination by the war and by con- 
temporary studies of the German State forced into 
the focus of interest by the problems raised by the 
war, its origin can be traced to a succession of 
events, or better termed, peAaps, "crises," begin- 
ning at least twenty years ago. It has therefore 
been of gradual growth. Let me briefly sketch its 
histoiy. We need not go further back than 1896, 
although it would be a serious omission to overlook 
the formation of the Dual Alliance in 1879, made 
into a Triple Alliance in 1883 by the union of Italy. 
For this alliance created a fear of Germany, and 
as a necessaiy reaction called forth the dual Fran- 
co-Russian alliance in 1891, to become the Triple 
Entente in 1904 and 1907 by "understandings" 
between England, France, and Russia. Potential 
force awakens distrust and creates preparations to 
use counterforce. 

In 1896 the celebrated so-called Kruger tele- 



Test of German Theory of Militarisin 277 

gram of the Kaiser stirred the resentment of the 
English nation, even to the mobilization of her 
fleet, and set the people thinking. Suspicions of 
Germany's intentions became rife, and were kept 
alive during the next ten years by Germany's am- 
bitions to wrest the supremacy of the seas from 
England; so that in 1908 the Emperor felt con- 
strained to give out his famous London Telegraph 
interv'iew in the hope to appease them. But the 
fear of German Militarism had taken deep root 
in the national consciousness of England and 
haimted her statesmen. Thus the germs of hos- 
tility to Gennany were planted in the English 
mind. 

In 1897 the act of German militarism that seized 
Kiao-Chau by force, in disregard of the sovereignty 
of China, shocked the public opinion of the world. 

In 1898, in Manila Bay, the German Admiral 
Diederichs brought Gennany to the brink of war 
with the United States, and the Gennan Govern- 
ment attempted to form a European coalition 
against the United States for the purpose of inter- 
vening in our war with Spain. Though Dewey, 
supported by British ships under Captain Chiches- 
ter, thwarted the scheme of the German Admiral, 
and the British Cabinet blocked the designs of the 
German Government, the seeds of a public opinion 
hostile to Germany were sown in the United States 
by these episodes, to germinate later in widespread 
suspicions of a German design to test the Monroe 
Doctrine. 



278 The Creed of Deutschtum 

In 1905 a diplomatic controversy with Germany 
over Morocco" left France humiliated after the cap- 
ture of Algeciras, with the resignation of Delcasse 
forced under the threat of war by Germany; Ger- 
many gained a point by militarism, but strength- 
ened the entente of France with England against 
a common foe. Thus in France new seeds of hos- 
tility were sown by militarism. 

In 1908 it was Russia's turn, when Germany, 
in disregard of both the Treaty of Berlin and the 
Treaty of London in 1871, compelled Russia by 
the threat of the sword to back down and assent 
to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
Austria. And Russia announced, "Never again!" 

Then in 1911 came the crisis of Agadir, when 
Germany sent the Panther to that port and threat- 
ened to interfere for the second time by force with 
France in Morocco, and nearly brought on a Eu- 
ropean war. Though the German militarism 
backed down before the power of the combined 
fleets of France and England, it left increased feel- 
ings of hostility to Germany behind. 

And so, whatever be the rights and the wrongs 
of the successive controversies in these crises, there 
has gradually been incubating for years in the 
world-consciousness an attitude of mind hostile to 
German militarism, and this has burst into full 
ripeness under the heat of resentment for wrongs 
committed against humanity and civilization dur- 
ing the present war. I have passed over, of course, 
a large number of co-operating happenings, such 



Test of German Theory of Militarism 279 

as the German Emperor's appeal to Mohanmiedan- 
ism ill 1898 and 1905, the mihtant naval program 
of 1897, the Venezuelan episode in which Roose- 
velt thwarted Gennany's aggi'ession against the 
Monroe Doctrine in 1902, the Casablanca affair in 
1908, etc. I have selected only the more critical 
energizing causes of world hostility. 

In view of these critical events, so far from Ger- 
many having kept the peace of Europe by the 
power of its anny during the past twenty-five 
years, as has so often been proclaimed, she has, 
besides robbing China of a province in 1897, nearly 
precipitated war by the aggressive actions of her 
militarism on five different occasions: once in 1896 
with England, twice with the United States (in 
1898 and 1902), twice with France, in 1905 and 
in 1911, and once with Russia in 1908. And finally, 
by common consent, German Militarism incited the 
world cataclysm of 1914. 

It is not given to any one to prophesy the final 
outcome of this war, but we can at least say this, 
that, whatever it may be, it is not conceivable that 
the successes of German militarism can be a recom- 
pense for its moral and material losses, and that it 
will not be left in a relatively far weaker condition 
for offense than before the war. Whatever may 
be the final result as determined by the terms of 
peace, German militarism at the end of the war 
will not only not have succeeded in gaining its long- 
planned for ends of achieving its ambitions by force, 
but will have called into being a combination of op- 



280 The Creed of Deutschtum 

posing forces far more powerful than its own. 

The Central Powers will find themselves sur- 
rounded by hostile powers not one of which will be 
more exhausted than Germany herself. 

There will have been created in each of the greater 
allied nations — France, England, Russia* and 
Italy — a military organization, modeled after the 
German pattern, fully equipped and prepared and 
coiximanding all the mobilized industrial resources 
of the nation. 

German Militarism will have awakened m every 
nation, including the United States, a complete 
understanding of the forces with which it will have 
to deal in the future — ^an understanding that was 
previously lacking — ^and will have created a pre- 
paredness by the great powers against attack which 
will guarantee that none can be taken unawares; 
will make another invasion impossible, and military 
threats impotent. 

In other words, it will have created a world con- 
dition, probably with groups of offensive and de- 
fensive alliances, in view of which no nation, and 
no alliance of nations, can hope to aggressively 
enforce its policies against a great power by mil- 
itary force. 

In other words, German Militarism, by its poten- 
tial 'power and aggressive tactics, has called into 
being, as it was bound in time to do, forces more 

* The sudden collapse of Russia from internal revolution could not, 
of course, be foreseen at this time (December, 1915) nor can we now 
(January, 1917) see what the final fate of Russia is to be. 



Test of German Theory of Militarism 281 

powerful than itself. 

By the test of this war, then, as I view the case, 
GeiTnan Militarism has failed as a theory of em- 
pire. In this failure have we not the most power- 
ful motive for an international court to enforce 
peace ? 



A WORLD CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
FUTURE PEACE 



AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE CONCORDIA ASSOCIATION 
OF JAPAN, AT TOKYO^ JUNE 13, 1916. 



A WORLD CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
FUTURE PEACE 



THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS 

THE newer Western psychology is giving 
us a deeper insight into the human mind 
than was possible by the older psychology. 
It is laying bare the hidden yearnings and 
aspirations and strivings of human beings w'hether 
as individuals, or collectively as families, civic com- 
munities or nations. And therefore it enables us 
to discover the real, the true motives which, under- 
lying the superficial motives and apparent motives, 
determine human conduct, whether that conduct be 
an individual striving to accomplish his ambition, 
or a nation striving for World Empire. 

This newer Western psychology is teaching us 
that the older psychology, the academic psychology 
of the universities is, as our great and lamented 
William James aptly expressed it, but the clanging 
of brass cymbals — ^much noise but without real 
meaning. The academic psychology is superficial 
in that it does not touch the profounder motives 
and mechanisms of human nature. 

If we would understand the human mind we must 

285 



286 The Creed of Deutschtum 

dive beneath the surface of consciousness, beneath 
the momentary ebulhtions of thought. These, we 
ai*e learning, are but the superficial, phenomenal 
and momentarily fragmentary manifestations of a 
larger and profounder consciousness. The teach- 
ings of modern investigations, and of our Western 
philosophical thought which those investigations 
have stimulated, is to regard our conscious thought 
as only a superficial consciousness and but a frag- 
ment of a larger mind which we term the subcon- 
scious or unconscious mind. As an English student, 
the late Frederick Myers, in his studies of "Human 
Personality" has expressed it, our thoughts and 
impulses at any given moment are but uprushes 
from this larger reservoir of consciousness. And, 
therefore, if we would discover the motives and 
springs to human action, the components and real- 
ities of human personalitj'- we must seek them by 
exploring not the superficial consciousness but be- 
low its threshold in the great, underlying conscious- 
ness and primitive inborn instincts of each individ- 
ual. In this underlying subconsciousness, in this 
larger mind we find the solution of the riddle of 
personality and, more pragmatically important, 
the solution of the problems of what we may call 
the collective consciousness of communities. 

By collective consciousness I mean, speaking 
generally, that unity of thought, tliose common 
ideals and that common will which take possession 
of the soul of a people — whether of small commu- 
nities or of nations. Just as there is a personal 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 287 

consciousness peculiar to the individual alone, so 
there is a larger family consciousness, a community 
consciousness, a civic consciousness and a national 
consciousness shared in common by the members 
of the group. 

The larger subconscious mind can be reached by 
various devices: for instance, by putting ourselves 
in a state of deep revery or profound contempla- 
tion — that is, abstracted from all awareness of the 
immediate environment. Then there wells up a 
wealth of images and emotions and thoughts; and 
memories reaching, perhaps, far back into the past, 
and knowledge of the previously unknown. And 
of all this subconscious knowledge in our ordinary 
state of mind we were profoundly ignorant. But 
now we may see translucently, with almost a su- 
pernatural clearness and brightness of vision, what 
before was obscure or hidden. Thus to my way of 
thinking modern Western psychology and philos- 
ophy are reaching a point of approachment with 
Eastern philosophy, for it would seem to me, that 
it was this same subconscious mind that Buddha 
probably reached by profound contemplation. It 
is only a question of interpretation. Indeed, some 
Western thinkers, like Frederick Myers, would 
bring this great subconscious mind into close rela- 
tion with a transcendental cosmic consciousness of 
which perhaps the individual consciousness is but 
one focus of intensity — a sort of vortex in a uni- 
versal consciousness, or the energy of the Universe. 

But we need not enter into that larger meta- 



288 The Creed of Deutschtum 

physical question which is far beyond my purpose. 
I want rather to treat of human personahty and 
its ethical and pragmatic bearing upon individual 
and collective conduct. What then is the great 
subconscious mind that plays so large a part in 
personality? 

It is impossible for me in such a brief address 
as this to treat this great subject with any fullness 
and you will not expect me, or indeed wish me, 
to do so. I should tire you if I did. It is indeed 
the great problem of the future. As M. Bergson, 
the French philosopher, has recently said: "To ex- 
plore the most sacred depths of the unconscious, to 
labor in what I have just called the subsoil of con- 
sciousness, that will be the principal task of psy- 
chology in the century that is opening. I do not 
doubt that wonderful discoveries await it there, as 
important, perhaps, as have been in the preceding 
centuries the discoveries of the physical and natural 
sciences. That at least is the promise which I make 
for it, that is the wish that in closing I have for 
it." 

I shall little more than touch upon it, sufficiently 
only to elucidate the main subject of my addi-ess. 

Personality as Evolved by the Creative Force of 
the Experiences of Life 

In this great underlying subsoil of consciousness 
are to be found the memories of a vast mass of ex- 
periences of life, extending, we may almost say, 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 289 

from the cradle to the grave. Most of them are 
l)eyoiid voluntary recall as memory. By the tenn 
"experiences of life" you must understand all oiu* 
conscious experiences of both our outer and inner 
life, our conscious experiences with the external 
world of men and things about us and oin* inner 
thoughts — our soul's thoughts. The subconscious 
thus includes the deposited experiences not only 
of our ephemeral everyday life, but of our whole 
acquired education, acquired from childhood to the 
grave — our pedagogical, our social, our religious, 
our ethical, our civic, our political and our patriotic 
education. It includes eveiything that has come 
to i,is by teaching from our ancestors and predeces- 
sors. 

Within it, therefore, are to be found the formu- 
lated memories of codes of right conduct, codes of 
ethical precepts and of ideals. These when acquired 
in early life may have been repressed and lost sight 
of by the individual who, in later years, developed 
in an environment govenied by antagonistic codes 
or allowed himself to be governed by instinctive 
impulses and interests of a conflicting character. 
But nevertheless they may still be subconsciously 
conserved ready to be called again into being by 
favoring influences. 

A great mass of such experiences we conceive 
of as deposited as memories and dispositions to 
behavior, dispositions that may strive to find ex- 
pression below the threshold of consciousness in 
the subconscious realm. 



290 The Creed of Deutschtum 

And then among the experiences of the inner 
life must be reckoned the strivmgs and conflicts of 
the soul — all that pertain to the innermost sanc- 
tuary of personality and character, the intimate 
communings with self, the doubts and fears and 
scruples pertaining to the moral, religious and other 
problems of life, and the struggles and trials and 
difficulties which beset its paths; the internal con- 
flicts of the soul with the world, the flesh and the 
devil — conflicts which each individual may have 
undergone in efforts to adapt himself to the con- 
flicting cii'cumstances of his real life. 

Memories of all these inner experiences, and of 
these and other unsolved problems of life are de- 
posited in the subconscious mind. Sometimes it hap- 
pens that, as in sudden religious conversion, they 
undergo subconscious incubation or reasoning and 
burst out into flower as a sudden realization of a 
religious truth. 

By the creative force of all these life's experi- 
ences cooperating with the inborn primitive instincts 
— inborn in every individual — the subconscious 
mind is formed. 

And out of the subconscious mind, as the acquired 
experiences of life, and these instincts are evolved 
and organized those tendencies, traits, ideals, and 
habits of mind and action which we term personal- 
ity and character. I would, indeed, emphasize the 
primitive instincts because, besides all these ac- 
quired dispositions to behavior, there are, of course, 
inherited dispositions, by which we understand the 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 291 

primitive instinctive impulses coming from all the 
inborn instincts of human nature. I mean the in- 
stincts of fear, and love, and anger, and aversion, 
and the sexual life, and their kind which motivate 
human nature. 

The Subconscious as the Dynamic Source of 
Conduct 

But a small fraction only of all these subconscious 
memories emerge as conscious processes of thought. 
The greater portion remain beneath the threshold 
and tend, unconsciously, to shape and determine 
our conscious processes — our judgments, ideals, be- 
liefs, conventions, points of view, habits and the 
tendencies of our mental lives. Whence these come, 
how they were born, we often have long ceased 
to remember. For they have not only their roots 
but the springs which motivate them deep down 
in the subconscious past. Indeed there is reason 
to believe that in profound thought it is the sub- 
conscious that does the real work. Drawing upon 
the deposited experiences of the past for the con- 
scious needs of the moment, it thnists up into con- 
sciousness for consideration a selected series of ger- 
mane ideas. From these our consciousness at such 
moments does little more tlian choose those judged 
adequate to meet the conditions of the problem. 

As I said at the beginning, though we cannot by 
conscious effort attain to all our subconscious knowl- 
edge, yet, by special devices, like profound media- 



292 The Creed of Deutschtum 

tion, abstraction, r every, etc., we can bring a large 
amount to the full light of consciousness. 

Thus it comes about that our reactions to the 
environment, our moral and social conduct, our sen- 
timents and feelings, our points of view and atti- 
tudes of mind — all that we term character and per- 
sonality — are predetermined by mental experiences 
of the past by which they are developed, organized 
and conserved in the subconscious mind. We react 
with hatred or with love, with loyalty or disloyalty, 
with sympathy or with aversion, to the traits, or 
character, or principles, or ideals, or behavior of 
some other being, or group of beings, or nation, 
because in the past there have been incorporated 
in our personalities and conserved in our subcon- 
scious minds sentiments, points of view, ethical prin- 
ciples, habits of mind, desires, tendencies, primitive 
instincts, etc., in harmony with or antagonistic to 
them. We are thus the offspring of our past and 
the past is the present. It may be that in certain 
cases such reactions are, as the newer psychology 
teaches, the outcome, the conscious expression of 
unrecognized conflicts with subconscious strivings 
or self-reproaches, if you like. But that is a detail 
of mechanisms with which we need not concern our- 
selves here as it does not affect the fundamental 
principle. 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 293 

II 

THE COLLECTI^^ CONSCIOUSNESS 

Thus far I have been concerned with the devel- 
opment of the consciousness pecuHar to the indi- 
vidual — his personality. 

But an individual is a unit in a community, and 
in the development of his personality he acquires 
systems of ideals and habits of mind and actions 
which are not peculiar to himself but are common 
to the community — i. e., to a group of individuals 
united by common ties, and associations, and tra- 
ditions and interests. These systems may be called 
a collective consciousness, because they are possessed 
in common by a collection of individuals. Hence 
it is that we have what is commonly spoken of as 
the social consciousness. It needs but a little 
thought to appreciate that this embodies established 
habits of thought and ideals and sentiments which 
underlie the customs, manners and etiquettes, the 
habits and modes of living peculiar to social groups, 
the social, philanthropic and other obligations of 
one individual to another and to the body of the 
community; the accepted principles of social mor- 
ality. In recognition of such a collective conscious- 
ness and the social conduct regulated and deter- 
mined by it, there has come into being a specialized 
field of study known as social psychology. 

As there are many different kinds of social 



294 The Creed of Deutschtmn 

groups, and as difFerent groups become united into 
larger groups with common ties, so there are many 
different collective consciousnesses, or community 
consciousnesses. 

Types of Collective Consciousness 

There is the family consciousness in which are 
embodied, among much else, ideals of affection and 
loyalty of each member to each of the others and 
to the whole as a unit. 

There used to be the clan consciousness of feudal 
times. There is the caste consciousness, such as 
was that of the samurai of Japan, of the Brahmins 
of India, the ancient noblesse of France, the knights 
of the days of King Arthur in England; and there 
is that of the military caste of Germany to-day, 
and the democracy of America; and so on. 

More important for us to-day from a political 
point of view and of modern civilization is the civic 
community consciousness common to groups of in- 
dividuals united for purposes of commercial, indus- 
trial and social interests and orderly government. 
Thus the citizens of Tokyo and eveiy city have 
a civic consciousness. And still more important 
there is in every nation a state or national conscious- 
ness. 

The Development of a Collective Consciousness 

Now the first point that I would like to make 
is that the same principle underlying the devel- 



A World Consciousiiess and Future Peace 295 

opnient of the consciousness peculiar to the indi- 
vidual and characteristic of his own personality 
brings about the organization of a collective con- 
sciousness. But here it is the creative force of 
common experiences. Through a common ethical 
and social education, and, in the case of political 
groups, political education, common habits of 
thought, common sentiments and ideals, common 
aversions, common desires, and common habits of 
action are established and firmly conserved in the 
consciousness of the members of the group. Sim- 
ilarly a common point of view and a common atti- 
tude of mind towards the circumstances of the so- 
cial organization and of everyday life become de- 
veloped. And, most important, as I shall presently 
point out, things and ideas of common experience 
become possessed of a common meaning for every 
individual. 

Further, out of a collective consciousness by the 
force of common ideals and common desires, there 
necessarily develops a unity of thought, and com- 
mon will which impel towards uniformity of be- 
havior. But all is not explicitly conscious. The 
processes of the mind and conduct, in losing their 
plasticity and becoming fixed, necessarily become 
largely matters of habit and of second nature; 
which means that they have become organized be- 
low the threshold of consciousness and have their 
roots and sources of energy in subconsciously con- 
served experiences of the past. Each one of us 
would find it difficult or impossible to explain why 



296 The Creed of Deutschtum 

he has the same viewpoint as the rest of the com- 
munity, why the same ideals, the same desires, the 
same will ; why he regulates his conduct in the same 
way towards everyday life. He would give you 
undoubtedly an explanation, reasons that seem 
plausible to himself, but the real reason is that his 
social and ethical education have left dispositions to 
thought, dispositions to action^ — sort of phono- 
graphic records^ — in his subconsciousness, out of 
which have crystallized, as a sort of resume, habit 
reactions. These govern him in spite of himself, 
even though he struggles hard against their im- 
pulses. And this is also in large part the case be- 
cause through education the primitive instinctive 
impulses of human nature have been enlisted and 
harnessed to serve the habits of the social ideals, 
or brought under control and repressed in accord- 
ance with the aims of the community conscious- 
ness. 

Furthermore we see the collective mind manifest- 
ing the same reactions to subconscious processes as 
does the individual mind. Thus we frequently see 
the consciousness of a community or nation react- 
ing to the conduct of another community or nation 
with aversion or hatred, just as Germany does 
to-day towards England. The ostensible and given 
reason is because of some alleged immorality of 
conduct, like hypocrisy, that shocks the common 
ideal. But the real reason is because of a common 
baffled subconscious desire, or jealousy, or fear, dic- 
tated perhaps by self-interest and unacknowledged, 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 297 

to which aversion or hatred is only the common 
conscious reaction. 



A Common Meaning to Ideals Essential to a Col- 
lective Consciousness 

The unity of the collective mind depends in no 
small degree upon ideas acquiring a common mean- 
ing for all the members of the community. This 
principle has far-reaching consequences. I do not 
refer to the dictionary meaning, or the etymolog- 
ical meaning, but rather to the meaning which ideas 
comiote through their associations and implications. 
The meaning of the national flag of every nation 
is easily defined in a dictionary as a piece of cloth 
of a certain color and design, but it has, over and 
above this, an additional patriotic meaning for all 
the people of that nation which it has for the people 
of no other. And the meaning, when it is awakened, 
sends a thrill of emotional impulses throbbing 
through the veins which no dictionary meaning 
could do. And likewise patriotism, duty, morality, 
virtue, ti*uth, honesty, valor, humanity, culture, and 
such ideas too often connote a different meaning to 
people of different communities and different na- 
tions, as we unfortunately see exemplified in the 
present war. And similarly ideas of relationship 
like wife, father, emperor, subject, citizen; concep- 
tions such as God, religion, temple, connote differ- 
ent meanings to different people, individually or 
collectively; and so on. And thus it is that ac- 



298 The Creed of Deutschtum 

cording as ideas have a common meaning in this 
sense, they play a large part in determining the 
unity of the social consciousness, on the one hand, 
and variations in the customs, manners and habits 
of different communities. 

Let us not forget that it is one's own personal 
experiences of life that give that special connoted 
meaning to ideas which is peculiar to each one of 
us, and therefore that shape your and my points 
of view and attitudes of mind towards the life about 
us. And according as these experiences are unique 
for each of us or are shared by the other members 
of the community, will the meaning of a given idea 
and the point of view and attitude of mind be purely 
personal or common to a group of individuals as 
part of a collective consciousness. Consider, for 
example, the difference in meaning of the word 
"son" for you and for me, according as the context 
shows it to mean your son or my son. Your son 
means something more and different to you than 
to me. Why? Because a large number of personal 
and intimate experiences have woven or systema- 
tized about the idea many sentiments and memories 
which give it a peculiarly personal meaning for you: 
and correspondingly in my case. And so our points 
of view and attitudes of mind towards your son and 
my son are different. But there is also a social 
meaning which we share in common. This is be- 
cause, besides those experiences, intimate and per- 
sonal, peculiar to ourselves, there are many experi- 
ences associated with this idea of filial relationship 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 299 

which are common to most members of the com- 
munity. These are derived from a common social 
education and enviromnent. They may be ideas 
held in common of paternal and filial duty and 
obligations and affections and inheritance, etc. In 
this way there emerges a collective meaning which 
belongs to the collective consciousness. The ex- 
periences which provide this connoted meaning is 
called in psychological language the "setting" or 
"apperceptive mass." But there could be no "set- 
ting" or "apperceptive mass" and no persistent con- 
noted meaning to ideas — no persistent point of view 
— unless life's experiences were conserved when out 
of mind as subconscious dispositions. 

This is one of the principles according to which 
the points of view and attitudes of mind and ideals 
of different communities — the collective conscious- 
ness of coimnunities — may differ or be identical re- 
garding even the fundamentals of the social organ- 
ization and conduct. According to differences in 
the settings appear differences in the ideals of the 
collective consciousness of different communities, 
whether of a circmnscribed locality or a nation. 
Such differences underlie the variations in the codes, 
customs, manners and etiquette of the different 
classes of society and of nations. 

I hardly need say that the formation of a col- 
lective consciousness regarding many matters begins 
in child-life in the home; regarding others, such as 
political ideals, later in life in the social world. In 
child-life moral and social ideals begin to be formed. 



300 The Creed of Deutschtum 

The formative influences here are the family, the 
school and social environnient. The active forces 
are on the one hand repressive, and on the other 
creative. Either force may consciously or uncon- 
sciously be directed by the environment. Both, 
of course, are in principle educational. I suppose 
that in no country does repression play so dom- 
inant and large a part as in Japan. By repression 
the instinctive inborn impulses and tendencies in 
conflict with the ideals of the collective conscious- 
ness are inhibited and kept in check, and thus pre- 
vented from forming habits. On the other hand by 
the creative force of education ideas are instilled 
and systematized into a collective ideal that shall 
be a habit of thought. But from childhood and 
even infancy the individual begins to undergo re- 
pression and to accumulate the creative experiences 
that are to form the meaning of his ideas and estab- 
lish his points of view. Many of these are the basis 
upon which manners, customs and etiquette rest. 
Indeed he is permitted, or directly required, to have 
these experiences because they are either the nec- 
essary resultant of the already existing habits of 
society or are demanded by society. 

Is it any wonder then that nations have a dif- 
ficulty in understanding, and therefore have a lack 
of sympathy with the customs and manners and 
ideals of one another? Ideas through differences 
in the apperceptive mass come to have a different 
meaning for different nations. Even those of fath- 
er, mother, son, daughter, virtue, morality, set in a 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 301 

mass of different associated ideas of duties, obliga- 
tions, etc., have acquired social meanings that show 
marked variations for each nation corresponding 
with the social customs and codes of each, such as 
those of marriage and inlieritance. That which is 
repressed by the social consciousness of one peo- 
ple may be entirely neglected or encouraged by 
that of another. In this particularly the Oriental 
and Occidental nations stand sharply contrasted. 
Note, as a simple example, nudity which is strongly 
repressed in everyday life by Occidentals, but is 
disregarded by Orientals so that it becomes a com- 
monplace fact of daily life for the child as well as 
adult. The result is that while with the former 
nudity has a meaning that excites lively reactions 
from its apperceptive mass — the social root ideas 
which have been both its source and the repressing 
force — with the latter it arouses no more emotional 
reaction than would pots, kettles and pans. Like- 
wise exposure of the face with Moslems has a mean- 
ing and causes reactions that belong to exposure 
of other parts of the body with people having other 
social codes. It is impossible, therefore, for one 
nation to completely understand the meaning of 
many social ideas of another nation, and therefore 
the corresponding points of view, without acquir- 
ing the same apperceptive mass — that is to say, 
without undergoing the same social education from 
childhood to adult life. 

Through this same principle we find the difficulty 
of some nations — nations that are composed of poly- 



302 The Creed of Deutschtum 

glot people, racially and in stock heterogeneous, — 
acquiring a national consciousness rich in common 
ideals. Such common ideals) as exist are, for the 
most part, instinctive and of the kind found in 
primitive tribes. They may be limited to defense 
of the national domain against encroachments of 
territory or defense against military aggressions 
upon national sovereignty and national interests. 
Such, for example, must be the case of the Austrian 
Empire with its polyglot people — Magyar, Ger- 
mans, Bohemians, Roumanians, Slovenes, Slovaks, 
Serbs, Croats, and others. The same difficulty be- 
sets, even if in less degree, the United States, with 
its one hundred millions of people drawn from every 
race on the globe and now in the "melting pot." 
Out of that melting-pot will come some day a peo- 
ple with a national consciousness, common ideals, 
which will be the spiritual inspiring force of the 
nation. The same difficulty may arise even within 
homogeneous nations, wherein the disintegrating 
influences of modern economic, individual and po- 
litical development have created heterogeneous 
class divisions based upon demoralizing social phi- 
losophy and selfish conflicting interest to the disre- 
gard of the interest of the national whole. Under 
such conditions the national consciousness becomes 
shorn of many of its most spiritual, amalgamating 
and inspiring ideals that give unity and force to a 
nation. Among these are ideals of personal self- 
sacrifice at the behest of national duty, the obliga- 
tion of the individual to subordinate private rights 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 303 

and selfish interests to the good of the State and 
the spiritual obligation of universal service in what- 
ever field and wherever required by the State for 
its safety. In such a situation of disintegrated 
ideals England awoke at the outbreak of this war, 
and wondered with the whole world at her internal 
weakness. Nations, like individuals, must some- 
times be tried in adversity to find themselves, to re- 
cover their ideals. And so England in the bap- 
tism of calamity has found herself, and in the find- 
ing has acquired ideals that have crystallized the 
soul of the nation into a spiritual force. 

The Social Consciousness as the Regulator of 
Society 

The second point I want to make is that the col- 
lective consciousness of the social organization — ^the 
social consciousness — plays a greater part in gov- 
erning and regulating society than laws, or the 
military or police forces of even the most auto- 
cratic government. And this it does through the 
development of those habits of mind and action 
that underlie social customs and of an instinctive 
sense of social obligation which is the foundation 
of society. Lord Haldane, the former British Min- 
ister of War, dwelt upon this fact in a remarkable 
address just a year before the present war, and 
pointed out, as I shall also later argue, that it is 
not chimerical to hope that through the interna- 
tional extension of this type of collective conscious- 



304 The Creed of Deutschtmn 

ness, it may become a common consciousness of 
nations — a world consciousness. If so, the duties 
and obligations of one nation to another may be 
regulated by it, and future wars prevented. 

He laid stress upon the fact that the Germans 
have a word which he thought may be used to desig- 
nate this particular field of the social consciousness. 
It is Sitthchkeit. The German philosopher Fichte 
has defined Sitthchkeit as "those principles of con- 
duct which regulate people in their relations to 
each other and therefore have become matters of 
habit and second nature at the stage of culture 
reached, and of which, therefore, we are not ex- 
plicitly conscious." But Sitthchkeit implies moral 
principles and it would seem preferable not to at- 
tempt to define too narrowly those principles, and 
therefore the kind of customs of society which per- 
form this function. The fact requiring emphasis 
is that social customs become so much matters of 
habit that we are not explicitly conscious of the 
sense of social obligation and other principles which 
compel obedience to tliem. 

This field of the social consciousness embraces a 
code of social ethics and of manners and customs 
to which the conduct of each member of the com- 
munity must be conformed under penalty of the 
social tabu. And it embraces what we call the social 
conscience in which are crystallized the ideals, the 
soul of the community. It manifests itself through 
that great and powerful arbiter of private and 
community conduct. Public Opinion — the opinion 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 305 

of the collective consciousness. The code of the so- 
cial consciousness embodies or connotes duties and 
obligations which each citizen owes to society and 
the common welfare and each other. It embodies 
customs and manners which respect the rights and 
liberties and happiness which every citizen is en- 
titled to enjoy without molestation by his fellows. 
It is thus a system of thought and customs based 
upon common points of view and attitudes of mind 
towards community life, grown into habit, and 
under which social customs have become established. 
As the social conscience it is the censor which pun- 
ishes with the moral reprobation of public opinion 
infringement by the individual of those customs and 
of the social codes which the social conscience has 
established. 

Out of this ethical and social system there de- 
velops a unity of thought and a common ideal and 
"common desire which can be made to penetrate 
the soul of the people and to take complete pos- 
session of it."* And necessarily there follows in 
consequence of psychological laws a "general will 
with which the will of the good citizen is in ac- 
cord." This will of the conmiunity (inspired by 
the common ideal and desires) is common to all 
the individuals composing it. Herein lies the power 
of public opinion to which all governments bow and 
which all governments seek for their own support. 
Public opinion contains the potential common will 
which if not heeded will enforce the ideals of the 

* Haldane. 



306 The Creed of Deutschtum 

social conscience. 

To realize the truth of all this we have only to 
examine our own daily social habits and customs 
and behavior in relation to society. We then see, 
although we are not explicitly aware of it, that these 
are dictated by the social consciousness and not by 
our own personal desires. For if we imagine any 
radical departure from them we at once feel within 
us the deterring force of social criticism. 

It is interesting to note that such a collective 
conseiousness, in principle, is analogous to Bushido, 
which Professor Nitobe has so charmingly ex- 
plained to English readers was "a code of moral 
principles which the knights were required to ob- 
serve in the regulation of the ways of their daily 
life as well as in their vocation." Only Bushido was 
the collective consciousness of a caste, while "Sitt- 
lichkeit" is that of a whole community or state or 
nation. 

jSTow it is a commonly accepted fact, as Lord 
Haldane pointed out, that the citizen is governed 
in his social conduct only to a relatively small ex- 
tent by statutory laws and physical force, on the 
one hand, and by the dictates of his own individual 
conscience and his instinctive desires and impulses 
on the other. To a much larger extent he is gov- 
erned by the more extensive system of the collective 
consciousness whether of the civic, state or national 
community. Even laws, in a democracy at least, 
must be the expression of the comrnunity conscious- 
ness, that is to say, of public opinion and the com- 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 307 

moil will, or else they cannot be enforced, and it 
is really this collective consciousness that is the pow- 
er behind the law. And still more is it true that 
the individual in his everyday life is regulated and 
governed not by law, but by habits of mind and 
customs and codes. From the moment we rise in the 
morning to the time we go to bed at night our social 
behavior is governed not by legal law but by cus- 
toms and habits. Nearly everything we do, even 
the time of getting up and the time of going to bed, 
as well as the kind of bed we sleep in — whether 
we lie on the floor as in Japan or on a bedstead 
as in the western world ; what shall we do and what 
we shall not do, and the way we shall do it; our 
manners and behavior towards one another; the 
way we shall live, our ceremonies and our etiquette ; 
in short our daily conduct is regulated by customs 
established by the principles of the social codes. 
These become second nature, almost automatic and 
instinctive. The}'^ are, therefore, governed by sys- 
tems of mental dispositions organized in the mind 
by the social education. 

Indeed, from the very beginning of social life 
in the nursery, education consists in the repression 
of the barbaric instincts with which every child is 
bom, bringing the savage impulses of his nature 
under control and adapting the child and the man 
to the customs and ideals of the civilization to which 
he belongs: in other words, to developing in him 
the community consciousness with its habits of mind 
and behavior. 



308 The Creed of Deutschtum 

Every child is born a savage; he only acquires 
culture and the common ideals and the cominon will 
of the social conscience. 

The collective consciousness, then, is the founda- 
tion of the social organization; without it the or- 
ganization would fall to pieces. If this be so, is it 
not because of the lack of an international collective 
consciousness, one of ethical codes and possessed in 
common by all the great peoples of the world^ — a 
world consciousness^ — that the world to-day has 
fallen to pieces in this holocaust of war? 

A World Consciousness 

What hope does psychology hold out to civiliza- 
tion? The common ideals of a collective conscious- 
ness respect and protect the rights of individuals 
and regulate their relations to one another within 
the nation. May it not be that, with time, fostered 
by systematic worldwide teaching, there may be de- 
veloped an international consciousness, or world 
consciousness so far as concerns international rela- 
tions? And may it not be that the principles of 
such a consciousness will regulate the nations in 
their relations to one another to the same extent 
that the social and national consciousness within a 
single nation regulate the relations of the people 
to one another, and, in the United States to-day, 
the relations of the sovereign states of the Amer- 
ican Union to one another? In such a world con- 
sciousness there would grow up common habits of 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 309 

mind that would become second nature- — common 
points of view, common ideals of right and wrong 
in the dealings of one nation with another. 

Likewise conceptions of humanity, of liberty and 
of the obligations of one people to another would 
have a common meaning, which is not the case to- 
day. In a consciousness of this kind, among the 
international habits of thought would be that of re- 
specting the rights and interests of other nations 
whether large countries like China or small ones 
like Serbia, and the habit of repressing desires 
which have for an object the selfish aggrandizement 
of a nation at the expense of weaker ones. Such a 
world consciousness would mean desire, grown into 
habit and customs, to respect the rights of foreign 
peoples under international law, which, in turn, 
would be truly the expression of world ideals and 
desires, not of selfish interests as to-day, and the 
habit of looking to arbitration and conciliation to 
compose the conflicting interests of nations. The 
imponderable force of such a consciousness would 
offer the strongest support to international law — 
the power behind the law — and out of such ideals 
and such desires, when established, there would nec- 
essarily develop a general will to peace and a will 
to fulfil the obligations imposed by the ideals. 

Theoretically the attainment of a world con- 
sciousness of this kind is psychologically possible, 
and if ever attained it would necessarily have the 
same binding force in regulating international con- 
duct as has the social consciousness within a nation 



310 The Creed of Deutschtum 

to-day. To reach such an end the old world-habit 
of mind — the habit of thinking in war terms, of 
turning at first thought to war as a necessary means 
of settling international disputes, must be broken. 
A world conscience will be the censor which, like 
the social censor, will threaten with the tabu a 
breach of treaties of international customs, codes 
and habits of conduct. The ideals of the German 
autocracy and of the German military caste as 
taught, by their philosophers and publicists like 
Treitschke and Nietzsche and military writers like 
Bernhardi and their Kaiser, such ideals as "Might 
makes Right," "World Empire or Downfall," "It 
is the duty of great nations to make war on weak 
nations," "Little nations have no rights which pow- 
erful nations are bound to respect," and "Nothing 
shall happen in this Avorld without Germany being 
consulted," in short "Kultur" and the worship of 
force, all such militaiy ideals must give place to 
the ideals of that collective consciousness of the 
German people that govern them in their relations 
to each other within the Empire and to a newly 
created collective consciousness of the world. The 
war attitude of mind of the German autocracy and 
military caste, which, like a mental disease, has per- 
meated and taken possession of the soul of the Ger- 
man people in its attitude towards other nations, 
must give place to a world consciousness. 

If such a world consciousness should be devel- 
oped, one nation will understand another because 
the ideals of the common consciousness will have 



A World Consciousness and Future Peace 311 

the same meaning. We shall think in the same lan- 
guage though we do not speak it. It is not through 
militarism, nor by piling up armaments, nor by a 
"league to enforce peaee" that a world, peace can 
be perpetually maintained. Such methods can be 
only temporary. Nor in the future when all na- 
tions shall be equally armed to the teeth and all 
the peoples of all the nations mobilized into armies, 
as wdll be the case after this war, can even just 
aspirations be attained and international disputes 
and conflicts of interest be settled by arms, be- 
cause there must result a dead-lock of force. Some 
other mode must be found. May not these legiti- 
mate aims be reached without war when the great 
nations arrive at an international consciousness, 
with common ideals, a common understanding, and 
a common will.f 

A world consciousness in international relations 
— that is the vision I see, the dream that psychol- 
ogy permits us to have. May that dream come 
time ! 

t The thesis of such a world consciousness which Lord Haldane ably 
presented from a legal standpoint and which I have endeavored to 
develop along ps_ychological lines necessarily, of course, assumes the 
cooperation of an international police of some kind, just as the social 
consciousness is supplemented by a civic and national police. There 
are "Apache" or bandit nations as there are bandits within the social 
organization of every nation, and in the case of revolutions the rights 
of foreign nationals must be protected from mob violence.