{"1":{"fulltext":"I\niSMH","height":"4461","width":"2476","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0001.jp2"},"2":{"fulltext":"A","height":"3967","width":"1956","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0002.jp2"},"3":{"fulltext":"","height":"3967","width":"1956","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0003.jp2"},"4":{"fulltext":"","height":"3967","width":"1956","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0004.jp2"},"5":{"fulltext":"","height":"3967","width":"1956","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0005.jp2"},"6":{"fulltext":"","height":"3967","width":"1956","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0006.jp2"},"7":{"fulltext":"ELEMENTS\nor\naf$uteijircitinui Pifitoiw#tos\nDESIGNED A3 A TEXT-BOOK-\nS^erwvo^ *v^^t^\nN*w^\nPORTLAND,\nPUBLISHED BY WIL1 1AM HYDE.\nJOSEPH GRIFFIN— PRINTER— 3RUNSWKK.\n1827,","height":"3967","width":"1956","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0007.jp2"},"8":{"fulltext":"3\nDISTRICT OF MAINE, u.\nBE IT REMEMBERED. That on this 20th day of January, A.D. 1827,\nin the fifty first, year of the Independent e of the United States of Amer-\nica Mr Thomas C Upham.oi the District of Maine, has deposited in this\noffice the lirb- of a book, the right whereof he claims as proprietor, in lha\nword* following, viz.\nElements of Intel ectval Philosophy, designed as a Text-Book.\nPortlanu, published by l\\ illiam Hyde Jus ph (JnJ/.n, prirUefa Bruns-\nwick 18^7.*\nIn conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States, entitled, Aa\nact lor the encouragement of learning by securing the copies of maps,\ncharts, and books to the authors and proprietors of such copies duiing the\ntimes therein mentioned and al*o »o an act, entitled An act, «upple-\nmenraiy to an act, entitled, an act for the encouragement of learning-, by\nsecuring he copies of maps., charts -and books to the authors and proprietors\nof such copies dining the limes therein mentioned and extending the bene-\nfits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical, and\nofkar prints.\nJQH*N MUSSEY, Jun. Clerk of the District Court (f JMaww.\nstfS","height":"3967","width":"1956","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0008.jp2"},"9":{"fulltext":"This book professes to be a compilation, from a consid-\nerable number of authors, of those facts and opinions in In-\ntellectual Philosophy, which seemed to the writer most\nworthy to be received The authors, who have been chief-\nly consu ted, will be found mentioned in the course of the\nwork and, in some instances, a few remarks hava been\nmade on tht chars cter of their writings. Locke, Stewart,\nand Brown have afford id a greater si are of tie materials\nthan others Condillac, Eeattie, Malebranche, Hume, Reid,\nBerkeky, dc. lave Leen carefully consulted. In a few\ninstances, the statements of these writers have been admit-\nted with only slight variations, when it was thought they\nhad been pecu iarlv happy in them.\nThe work sets forth no other pretensions, than what is\npurported in the title page, viz. as a text-book. As such,\nit is hoped, it will be found acceptable tr instructers and\nstudents. A book of this kind, in this important depart-\nment of science, has been for a long time needed and the\npresent attt mpt towards supplying the deficiency is submit-\nted to the candid judgment of the publick.","height":"3967","width":"1956","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0009.jp2"},"10":{"fulltext":"Contents\nChap, i.— UWlv n f Intellectual\nPhilosophy.\nSect\nI\n2\n4\nh\n6\nPrejudice existing again ihh setence\nOf the Metaphysics of the schools\nSupposed practical inutility of this science\nIts suppo^d practical inutility answered\nTeaches us how to direct our inquiries\nRemark* of Mr. Locke on this point\nHelp,- us i„ the correction of mental errours 7\nIs the gratification of a reasonable curiosity 8\nA M;j in directing education\nInstructs in the nature of language\nHas a :onnexion with moral philosophy\nTeaches to revere the divine wisrom\nMental effort necessary in this study\nChap, ii.— Primary Truths\nIntro Tiictorv remarks on this subject 14\nBelief in our personal existence 15\nBel.ef of our personal identity 16\nThe external, material world ha* existence 17\nLonfi deuce i* to he repo-t d in the memory l«\nMan susceptible of i varety of emotions 19\nI his subject viewed in refei et.ee to God 2t\nChap, in.— Perception.\nClarifications of our intellectual powers\nCJttSMfication into understanding and will\nClass, fif.,., n active powers, 4:c.\nOf the objects of petcep ion\nOf the primary qualities of bodies\nOf the sense of smell\nOf the nen*e of taste\nOl the sense of bearing and of sounds\nManner of leni nii-g- .he place of sounds\nConnection of hearing with language\nOf the sense of touch\nOf the benefit* of the sen«e of sight\nMode or process in visual perception\nConnexion of the brain with perception\nImpressions on the semes and perceptions\nOf the estimation nf distances by fight\nFurther illustrations of this subject\nIdea of extension not originally from sight\nM«esurem«DU of magnitude by the eye\nKnowledge of the figure of bodies by sight 40\nThe senses reciprocally assist each other 41\nriters on our visual perception! 42\nChap, iv- No Innate Knowl-\nedge.\ninnate ideas before th* time of Mr. Locke 43\nEnumeration of innate principles 44\nArgument on subject of innaie knowledge 45\nVI r. Locke s opinions on thi* subject 46\nOpinions of Plato and Ari-totle. 47\nPrevailing opinions at the present time 48\nChap. v. Origin of Simple\nIdeas.\nSimple ideas received from the senses, fyc. 49\nOf verbal explanations of simple ideas 50\nDivision of our simple ideas 51\nOf simple ideas from one sense only 52\nmple itlea from more than one sense 53\nOf Mm pie ideas from tetlection 54\n-imple ideas irom a l the above sources 55\nOf exigence, unity, and succession 56\nOrigin of out idea of power 57\nKvidente for this account of the origin of\nour ideas 53\nSimple ideas the element of out knowledge 59\nChap. vi. Simple and Mixed\nModes.\nDivision of complex idea? into three kinds 60\nof (oniplex ideas called simple modes 61\n62\n63\n64\n65\n06\n67\nInstance of skill in the u*e of numbers\nSimple modes from duration\nSimple nodes from extension\nIdea of infii ity\nComplex ideas called mixed modes\nThree ways of forming mixed modes 68\nNot the same mixed modes in all languages 69\nChap. vn. Ideas of Substance.\nWhat under Hood by id«»* of aubsUnee 79","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0010.jp2"},"11":{"fulltext":"CONTENTS.\nSect.\nSpiritual existences included under this class\nKnowledge of spirit the same as of matter 72\nCohesion of bodies and motion by impulse 73\nExplanations on ideas of this class 74\nOn complexity in the state* of the mind 75\nConnection existing between material sub-\nstances 76\nOf chimerical ideas of sub tancea 77\nOf what is meant by real ideas 7«\nImportance of having real ideas 79\nOf our ideas of ang ls 80\nOrigin of the idea of God 81\nChap. viii. Ideas of Relation.\nWhat we understand by ideas of relation 82\nGreat number of our ideas of relation 83\nOf ihe use of corrective terms 84\nOf proportional relation* 85\nOf certain relative terms 8 b\nOf idea* of natural relations 87\nIdeas of conventional relations 8tt\nPlare is an idea of relation 89\nChronological dales involve ideas of relation\nCan»e and eHect idea* of relation 90\nModes, »Vc resolvable into simple ideas 91\nThe mind should be furnished with ideas 92\nChap, ix.— Of Apparitions.\nWhat we are to understand by apparitions 93\nConnexion between the mind and body 94\nThis subject illustrated from Shakespeare 91\nAppearance of Caesar s gho«u to Brutus 96\nConfessions of an English opium-eater 96\nOf temporary mental excitements 97\nStat* of i he mind in drowning 98\nOf the apparitions ofNicolai 99\nInstance similar to the preceding 100\nSecond right of the Scotch Highlanders 101\nGho ts and other spectral appearances 102\nOf the apparitions of the religious 103\nChap, x.— Origin of Signs of\nThought.\nMental operation are to he nmde known 104\nThoughts first expressed by gestures, 8fC. 105\nAn of Pantomime among the Romans 106\nThoughts expressed by symbolick actions 107\nObjections to the symbolick language of\nscripture 1°8\nPictorial delineations as signs of thought 109\nOf hieroglyphic il writing 110\nWritten characters of the Chinese 111\nThe Chinese chancier an improvement\non the hierog yphical 1 12\nAlphabeiick language a subject of dispute 113\nChap. xi. Use of Words.\nExcellence of alphabetical language\nWords are artificial and arbitrary signs\n114\n11$\nSect.\nWords at first few in number, 4re»- US\nFormation of general names 1 if\nAppellative, the result of a feeling of re-\nsemblance IIS\nOur earliest generalizations often incor-\nrect 119\nIllustration from the savages of Wateeoo 12ft\nReasoning without general terms 12!\nOf the formation of verbs 121\nFormation of conjunctions and other par*\ntides 123\nRemarks on the meaning of particles 124\nOrigin of particular or proper names 125\nOf words as used bv different persons 126\nWe have not words for all our ideas 127\nOf the definition of words 128\nOf i be imperfection of language 129\nWords not to he used wi-hout meaning 13Q\nWord* should stand for distinct ideas l3l\nThe same word not to he used at the same\ntime in different senses 132\nWords are to be employed agreeably to\ngood and reputable u-e 133\nWhat constitutes good and reputable use 134\nOf an universal language 135\nRemarks of ondillacon the changes, and\ncorruptions of language 136\nChap. xii. Charar.teristicks of\nLanguages.\nRemarks on peculiarities of style 137\nOf style in uncivilued nations 138\nOrigin of apologue*, SfC. 139\nMyle of civilized nations 140\nLanguages depend much on the habits,\n#c of the people 141\nLanguages and national character 14%\nNational intellect Sf progress of language 143\nLanguages as suited to d fferent minds 144\nTranslating fiom one language to another 145\nOf the Greek and Lann languages 148\nCharacteristic!** of the Italian language 147\nharactf-risticks of the Spanish language 148\nRequisites of an interpreter of languages 149\nChap, xiii.— Principles of Men-\ntal Association.\nOf the meaning of mental association 150\nThe first general principle of association 151\nResemblance in every particular not ne-\nnessary 15?\nOf resemblances in the effects produced 153\nResemblances in sounds alliteration 154\nContrast the second genera! principle 155\nPractical applications of this principle 156\nThis principle of association antithesis 157\nContiguity the third general principle 158\nCau-e and effect the fourth primary prin*\nciple 159\nSecondary principles ofmental as oeiaton 160\nOf genius in connexion with association 161","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0011.jp2"},"12":{"fulltext":"CONTENTS\nSect.\nDependence ©f transitions In style on as-\nsociation 162\nAssociations suggested by present object* 163\nHabits resolved into mental association 164\nHistorical remarks on association 165\nChap. xiv. Casual Connections\nof Thought.\nAssociation some imes misleads our judg-\nments 166\nConnexion of ideas of e ten°ion and time 167\nOf high and low notes in musick IH8\nConnection of ideas of extension t!jr colour 169\nWbether there be heat in fire. C 1*\n/Whether there be mean.ng in words 171\nBe.iefi vt examining such association? Ml\nPower of the will over mental associations 173\nChap. xv. Of Attention.\nNature of attention, fyc 174\nDepende ice of memory on attention 175\nRapidity in attending to different objects 176\nOf attention in connection with hat)its 177\nAttention in legerdemain 8? ventriloquism 178\nOf attending to more than one object at\nthe *ame time 179\nOf attending to different parts in musick 180\nAttention in the perception of objects 181\nRapidit) of attention in criticism 182\nAttention when one .f the sen-es is lost 18 i\nOf attention in men inactive life 1K4\nOf exercising attention in reading 185\nChap, xvi.— Of Conceptions.\nMeaning of conceptions. SfC. 186\nOf onceptions of objects of sight 187\nInfluence of habit on our conceptions 188\nSubserviency of conception* to description\nOf conceptions attended with belief 190\nConceptions .when joined with percept ions 191\nConceptions at tragical representations 192\nConceptions and apparitions 193\nChap. xvii. Of Abstract Ideas.\nDefinition 8nd kinds of abstract ideas 194\nFormation of particular abstract ideas 195\nGeneralizations of particular abstract ideas\nOf particular abstractions in poetry, 4* e 137\nOf general abstract ideas 198\nOf perceptions of relations 199\nOf th« clarification of objects 200\nAbstract ideas in connection with numhers201\nSpeculations of philosophers and others 202\nOf different opinions formerly prevailing 203\nOf the opinions of the Realists 204\nOf the opinions of the Nominalists 205\nOf the opinions of the Concept ualists 206\nOf histories of philosophical opinions 207\nChap, xviii. Of Dreaming.\nSect.\nA knowledge of our dreams interesting 205\nOf the prevalence of dreaming 209\nDreams often caused by our sensations 21(1\nDreams influenced by health, #o. 211\nConnection of dream* 4* waking thoughts 21 1\nDreams have the appearance of reality 213\nInfluence of volition suspended in dreams 214\nRemarks on apparent reality of dreams 215\nOf our estimate of time in dreaming 216\nSenses sink to *leep in succession 217\nRemaiks on Somnambulists 218\nOf the utility of dreams 2(9\nChap, xix Demonstrative\nReasoning.\nOf truth and different kinds of it 220\nWays in which truth is discovered 221\nOf truth or knowledge from intuition 222\nDefinition and kind- of proposition* 223\nDefinition*,^- in demonstrative reasoning 2*4\nSubjects of demons rative reasoning 225\nOpposite* of such reasoning absurd 226\nAdmits not of different degree* of belief 227\nOf the nature of demonstrative certainty 228\nU-e of diagrams in demonstrations 229\nInfluence on the mental character 230\nChap. xx. Moral Reasoning.\nSubjects Sc importance of moral reasoning 231\nOf i he na ure of moral certainty 232\nOf teasoning from analogy 233\nCaution in reasoning from analogy 234\nOf reasoning by induction 235\nCaution nece-sary in induc ive processes 236\nOf the evidence of testimony 237\nGrounds of belief in tes iiuony 233\nConfidence in testimony founded in an\noriginal tendency of out constitution 239\nOperation of association in reasoning 240\nGrounds of the selection of propositions 241\nLimitation of power over aiguments 242\nOl requisites in a skilful reasoner 2 J3\nOf moral reasoning as suited to our situ-\nation as accountable being* 214\nChap, xxi.— Dialecticks or Rules\nof Debate.\nOf the need of directions in argument**\ntive debate\nOf debating merely for the pleasure of it\nOf being governed by desire of truth\nConsider the importance of the subject\nCompetency to enter info the di»cus»ion\nCare in stating the question\nOf simplicity of language in arguments\nAll trifling propositions to be avoided\nt45\n248\n247\n24fl\n249\n250\n251","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0012.jp2"},"13":{"fulltext":"CONTESTS.\nSect.\nJudgments to be formed on evidence, not\non effects 2o3\nDifferent source* of evidence on question* 254\nSources ol false judgments or sophisms 255\nOf adherence to our opinions 256\nInfluence of. debating on the mind 2 7\nInfluence of the study of the Law 2:»8\nReasoners not able to express themselves 259\nPeople may reason wrong but judge right 2^0\nProcess in voting on Legislative subjects 261\nNotices of treatises on reasoning 262\nChap, xxii.— Of Memory.\nExplanation of the faculty of memory 263\nOf differences in the strength of memory 264\nPower of memory in operating with\nnumbers 265\nExploded opinions in regard to memory 266\nOf the effects of disease on the memory 267\nSuggestions on the ultimate restoration\nof though 263\nMemoi\\ of i he uneduna ed 269\nMemory of men of philwsopbick minds 270\nOf the memory of the aged 271\nMem rv of persons of a rich imagination 272\nCompatibility of memory and judgment 2*3\nIntentional mem -ry or recollection 274\nInstance illustrative of the proceeding 275\nM irks of a good memory 276\nOf the advantages of this faculty 277\nMean* of improving the memory 273\nOf committing to writing a a means of\nimproving the memory 279\nOf Miiemouicks or systems of artificial\nmemory 280\nChap, xxiii. Emotions\nBeauty.\nof\nExplanation of these emotions 231\nOf what is meant by beautiful objects 282\nExtensive application of the term beauty 283\nAll objects not equally fitted to excite\nemo. ions of beauty 281\nA susceptibility ol emotions of beauty an\nultimate principle of our constitution 28?\nRemark* on the beauty of forms 28 i\nOf the original beauty of colours 237\nOf amotions of beauty from sounds 28K\nOf motion as an element .of beauty 289\nOf the beauty of certain natural sigus 290\nOf the beauty or moral actions 291\nOf a distinct sense or faculty of beauty 292\nObjects rn-ty become beautiful by asso-\nciation merely 293\nFarther illustrations of associated feeling294\nInstances of national associations 295\nOf utility as an element of beauty 296\nOf proportion s a cauee or element of\nbeauty 297\nOriginal susceptibilities of this emotion 298\nGeneralizations of emotions of beauty 299\nMaaaer of foroiiag generalisations, £c. 300\nSect.\nSummary of view* in regard to beauty 30l\nEmotions of beauty compared with others 302\nOf picturesque beauty 303\nChap. xxiv. Emotions of Sub-\nlimity.\nConnection between beauty sublimity 304\nOf sublimity a parte rei 305\nOccasion* ot emotions of sublimity 306\nSublimity in actions or moral sublime 307\nNo objects sublime of themselves 308\nSublime objects have elements of beauty 309\nOf emoti. ih of grandeur 31(1\nOriginal or mtrinsick sublimity of objects 31 1\nOf association and emotions of sublimity 312\nChap. xxv. Of Imagination.\nDefinition of the power of imagination 313\nThe creations of imagination not entire-\nly voluntary 314\nOf imaginations not attended with desire 315\nOf imagination* attended with desire 316\nFunh r illustrations of the same subject 317\nRemarks from the writings of Dr Reid 318\nGround* of the preference of one concep\nlion to another 319\nMental process in the formation ol Mil-\nton s imaginary paradise 320\nLimitation* of imagination by the senses 321\nExplana -ion of (he case ol Blaoklock 322\nWorks of imagination give different degrees\nof pleasure 323\nUtility of the creations of poetry, 324\nOf misconceptions of the im-iginaliort 325\nExplanations of the e misrepresentations 328\nFeelings of sympathy aided by imagin-\nation 327\nRemark* on taste in the fine arts 328\n(Jha-racteristicks, Sfc. of a good taste 329\nChap. xxvi. Of Wit and Hu-\nmour.\nEmotions of the ludicrous 330\nOccasions of emotions of the ludicrous. 33t\nOf Hobbes account of the ludicrous 332\nWhat is to be understood by wit 333\nOf wit as it consist* in burlesque 334\nOf wit when employed in aggrandising\nobjects 335\nOf the character fy occasions of humour 336\nOf the advantages of wit and humour 3*7\nChap, xxvij. Of Instincts.\nj Of the meaning of the terra instinct 338\nj Of instinctive feelings in the human\nspecies 339\n{Of the desire of society, £{C. as instincts 340\nOf difference between instinct and reason 341","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0013.jp2"},"14":{"fulltext":"CONTESTS.\nSect.\nOf intellectual power in animals 342\nActions from instinct not moral actions 343\nChap, xxviii.— The Will, Con-\nscience c.\nOf volition and its objects 344\nNature and kinds ot motives 345\nOf moral liberty in man 346\nOf the liberty of the Supreme Being 347\nEvidence from observation of influence\nover our volitions 348\nEncouragement- to making moral efforts 349\nMotives are modifications of our feelings 350\nOf moral motives 351\nVirtue and vice in agents not in action* 352\nTrue import of the terms, virtue and vice,\nmerit and demerit 353\nOf moral obligation and conscience 354\nWant ot uniformity in moral judgments 355\nConscience perverted by passion 356\nComplexity in actions a source of con-\nfusion in our moral judgments 357\nInfluence of early associations on moral\njudgments 358\nOf enlightening the conscience 359\n0/ guilt when a person acts conscien-\ntiously 360\nChap. xxix. The Passions.\nVarious significations of the term, passion 361\nOf the passion of love\n362\nOf the passion of hatred\n363\nOf sympathy\n364\nOf nnger\n365\nOf gratitude\n366\nOf pride\n367\nOf fear\n368\nOf hope\n369\nOf jealousy\n370\nExternal signs of the passions\n371\nCh~p. xxx. Mental Alienation.\nMisfortune of a disordered state of mind 372\nDegree of mental power in idiocy 373\nOf occasions of idiocy 37 I\nIllustration* of the cause of idiocy 375\nPartial derangement by means ol the im-\nagination 376\nOf lightheadedness 377\nIllustration of this mental disorder 37tt\nMental derangement of hypochondriasis 379\nOf intermissions of hypochondria is, 3ft0\nOf the remedial of hypochondriasis 381\nThe insanity of the pas*ions 334\nStngUlar instance of this form of insanity 383\nSometimes* induced by early excessive i\nindulgence 384\nOf insanity with delirium 385 j\nOf perception in delirians insanity 386]\nOf association, in delirious insanity 387\nIflDMrntion oi r* action 388\nSft.\nEffects of delirium on power of belief 38$\nPowers of reasoning in the insane 399\nPartial in-anity in character »f Don Quixote.\nQuickness of thought in insane persons 392\nReadiness of reasoning in the insane 393\nEffect of insanity on the memory 394\nMomentary impulses inclining to insanity 395\nCauses of the insanity of delirium 396\nMoral accountability in mental alienation 397\nImputation of insanity to individuals 398\nOf the treatment of the insane 39$\nChap. xxxi. Origin of Prej-\nudices.\nOf the meaning of prejudices 408\nOf constitutional prejudices 401\nOt prejudices in favour of our youth 402\nOf prejudices of home and country 403\nProfessional prejudices 404\nPrejudices of sects and parlies 405\nPrejudices of authority 406\nPrejudices o( careless reading 407\nPrejudices of presumption 408\nPrejudices of enthusiasm 409\nPrejudices of superstition 410\nPrejudices of superstition contagious 411\nSuperstition in times ol distress. SfC. 412\nPrejudices of personal friendships 413\nPrejudices of custom or fashion 414\nCorrectives of fashionable prejudices 415\nPrejudices of menial indolence 416\nMethods of subduing prejudices 417\nChap, xxxii. Evidence of\nTestimony.\nPrejudices in connection with testimony 418\nOl the competency of the witness 419\nVeracity in connection wiih testimony 420\nInfluence ol friendship on testimony 421\nInfluence of personal interest on t«stimony422\nDoes the testimony come from a partisan 423\nMemory iu connection with testimony 424\nOn the testimony of the d\\ing 425\nOf possibility ofaconfutation testimony426\nOn the credibility of historical accounts 427\nChap, xxxiii. Education.\nMeaning earlie«t sources of education 428\nIntroduction of imaginary and false ideas 429\nGuarding against prejudices in general 430\nUniform developement of mental powers 431\nOf diversities in genius and temper 432\nOf moral and religious education 433\nOf education for particular arts. 8fC. 435\nFormation of intellectual hahiw 436\nOf a thorough examination of subjects 437\nOf a command of the attention 438\nOf physical education 438\nOf social intercour-e, #c, 439\nEducation suitable to a citizen. 8ft. 440\nOf mathematics and other sciences 443","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0014.jp2"},"15":{"fulltext":"CHAPTER FIRST.\nUTILITY OP XJSTEIiX. SCTUAIi PHILOSOPHY\n1. Of the prejudice existing against this science.\nA prejudice prevails against the science of Intellectual\nPhilosophy. It is generally entered upon in our acade-\nmies and colleges with reluctance, and relinquished with-\nout regret. This aversion is not limited to the idle, but\nincludes those, who know the value of time and the impor-\ntance of mental improvement.\nThe objections against the Philosophy of the Mind,\nwhich have in a great measure given rise to this prejudice,\nmay be principally summed up in two particulars.\n§.2. Of the metaphy sicks of the schools.\nOf these, one is the frivolous character of the meta-\nphysical writings of the schools.\nThe origin of those institutions, to which the name of\nschools is given, was this.* By order of a general Council\nof the Roman Catholick Church, held at Rome in the year\n1170, certain persons were appointed to give instructions\neither in the cathedrals and monasteries, or in some suita-\nble buildings erected near them. The places of instruc-\ntion were called by the Latin name scholae the teachers\nwere termed scholastici. These minor institutions, seme\nbf which had an existence previous to the enactment of\n2","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0015.jp2"},"16":{"fulltext":"10 UTILITY OF\nthe canons of the Council, which has been mentioned, at\nlength grew up into the more imposing shape of semina-\nries, answering to the publick literary institutions of mod-\nern times. But while there was an alteration in the insti-\ntutions themselves, and universities and colleges in the end-\narose from these small beginnings, the same appellations\ncontinued.\nBy the schools, then, are to be understood the European\nliterary and theological institutions, as they were constitu-\nted and regulated from about the middle of the twelfth\ncentury to the period of the Protestant reformation. By\nthe scholastics: philosophy, using the terms in a general\nsense, \\ve mean those topicks, which were most examined\nand insisted on during that period.\nThe learning- of the schools may in general be refer-\nred to three great divisions, viz.\nOntology or the science of Being in general\nNatural theology, which seems to have been the appli-\ncation of the principles of ontology to the particular exis-\ntences, called God and angels and pneumatology or doc-\ntrines having relation to the human mind.\nThe following are some of the inquiries, which were\nwarmly agitated during the period now under examination.\nWhether the Deity can exist in imaginary space no less\nthan in the space, which is real Whether the Deity\nloves a possible unexisting angel better, than an insect in\nactual existence\nWhether the essence of mind be distinct from its exis-\ntence f And whether its essence might, therefore, subsist,\nwhen it had no actual existence\nWhether angels can visually discern objects in the\ndark Or whether they can pass from one point of space\nto another without passing through the intermediate\npoints\nSuch inquiries, it will readily be admitted, were worse\nthan fruitless. But Intellectual Philosophy, as it exists at\nthe present day, evidently ought not to be estimated by\nwhat it was in the scholustick ages. If, therefore, the pre-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0016.jp2"},"17":{"fulltext":"INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. II\njudice, which has been mentioned as prevailing against\nthis science, be in any measure founded on the frivolous\ndiscussions of the schools, it is so far unjust since it is\nnow prosecuted on different principles and with different\nresults.\n3. Supposed practical inutility of this science.\nA second ground of the prejudice, existing against this\nscience, is the prevalence of a false opinion of its practical\ninutility. In studying Intellectual Philosophy, we are sup-\nposed in the erroneous opinion, which has been mentioned,\nto learn in a scientifick form only what we have previously\nlearnt from nature we acquire nothing new, and the time,\ntherefore, which is occupied in this pursuit, is mispent.\nAll persons, however ignorant, know what it is, to think,\nto imagine, to feel, to perceive, to exercise belief. All per-\nsons know the fact in Intellectual Philosophy, that memo-\nry depends on attention and when asked, why they have\nforgotten things, which occurred yesterday in their pres-\nence, think it a sufficient answer to say, that they did not at-\ntend to them. Every body is practically acquainted with\nthe principles of association, even the groom who, with\nall his ignorance of philosophical books, has the sagacity\nto feed his horses to the sound of the drum and bugle, as a\ntraining preparatory to their being employed in military\nservice.\nFrom some facts of this kind, which may safely be ad-\nmitted to exist, the opinion has arisen of the practical in-\nutility of studying Intellectual Philosophy as a science.\n4. Its supposed practical inutility answered.\nIf, however, these facts be admited to be a valid ob-\njection in application to this study, the same objection\nevidently exists to -the study of other sciences, for instance,\nNatural Philosophy. It is remarked of savages, that they\ngain an eminence before they throw their missile weapons,\nin order by the aid of such a position to increase the mo-\nmentum of what is thrown. They do this without anysci-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0017.jp2"},"18":{"fulltext":"12 UTILITY OF\nentiflck knowledge of the accelerating force of gravity.\nThe sailor, who has perhaps never seen a mathematical dia-\ngram, practically understands, as is evident from the mode\nin which he handles the ropes of the vessel, the composi-\ntion and resolution of forces. In a multitude of instances,\nwe act on principles, which are explained and demonstrated\nin some of the branches of Natural Philosophy, We act\non them, while we are altogether ignorant of the science.\nBut no one, it is presumed, will consider this a good ex-\ncuse for making no philosophical and systematick inqui-\nries into that department of knowledge.\nBut without contenting ourselves with this answer to\nthe objection, that the study, upon which we are entering,\nis of no practical profit, some further remarks will be made,\nmore directly and positively showing its beneficial results.\n5. Intellectual philosophy teaches us how to direct\nour inquiries.\nIt is one of the good results of a knowledge of Intel-\nlectual Philosophy, that we are taught by it to limit our\ninquiries to those subjects, to the investigation of which our\ncapacities are equal and are adapted. The Supreme Being\nis an all pervading mind, a principle of life, that has an ex-\nistence in all places and in all space, and whose intelli-\ngence is like his omnipresence, acquainted with all things.\nBut man, his creature, is made with an inferiour capacity\nhe knows only in part, and it is but reasonable to suppose,\nthat there are many things, which he will never He able to\nJcnow. But, although it be justly admitted, that man is\nsubordinate to the supreme Being and is infinitely inferiour\nto Fiim, his Maker has kindly given him aspirations after\nknowledge, with the power of satisfying in some measure\nand under certain limitations these natural breathings forth\nof the soul. If, therefore, man be a being, formed to\nknow, and there be, moreover, certain restrictions, placed\nupon the capacity of knowledge, it is highly important to\nascertain the limitations, whatever they may be, which are\nimposed. Nor is this always an easy thing to be determin.-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0018.jp2"},"19":{"fulltext":"INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 13\ned. There is oftentimes a difficulty in ascertaining pre-\ncisely the boundary, which runs between the possibility and\nthe impossibility of knowledge, but whenever it is ascer-\ntained, there is an indirect increase of mental ability by\nmeans of the withdrawment of the mind from unprofitable\npursuits, in which there is an expence of effort without any\nremuneration.\nWhen, for example, a piece of wood, or any other of\nthose material bodies, by which we are surrounded, is pre-\nsented to any one for his examination, there are some things\nin this material substance, which may be known, and others,\nwhich cannot. Its colour, its hardness or softness, its ex-\ntension are points, upon which he can inform himself, can\nreason, can arrive at knowledge. He opens his eye an im-\npression is made on the organ of vision, and he has the idea\nof colour. By means of the application of his hand to the\nwood, he learns the penetrability or impenetrability, the soft-\nness or hardness of the mass, which he holds. By moving his\nhand from one point to another in the mass, he is informed\nof the continuity or extension of its parts. But when he\npushes his inquisition beneath the surface of this body, when\nhe attempts to become acquainted not only with its quali-\nties, but with that supposed something, in which those\nqualities are often imagined to inhere, and, in a word,\nexpends his efforts, in obedience to this unprofitable deter-\nmination, in learning what matter is, independently of its\nproperties, he then stumbles on a boundary, which it is not\ngiven men to pass, and seeks for knowledge where they\nare not permitted to know.\nThe necessity of understanding what things come with-\nin the reach of our powers and what do not, was a thought,\nwhich laid the foundation of Mr. Locke s Essay on the Hu-\nman Understanding.\n6. Remarks of Mr. Locke on this point\nWere it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay\n(he remarks in the Epistle to the reader) I should tell thee,\nthat five or six friends meeting at my chamber and discours-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0019.jp2"},"20":{"fulltext":"14 Utility oy\nmg on a subject very remote from this, found themselves\nquickly at a stand by the difficulties that arose on every\nside. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves without com-\ning any nearer a resolution of those doubts, which perplex-\ned us, it came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong\ncourse, and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of\nthat nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities,\nand see what objects our understandings were or were not\nfitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who\nail readily assented, and thereupon it was agreed, that this\nshould be our first inquiry.\nSuch were the sentiments on this subject of a man, who\nhas probably contributed more largely than any other in-\ndividual to help us to the correct understanding of the\nmind and whose writings, such is their singular originali-\nty and acuteness, can hardly be too strongly recommended\nfor perusal.\n4- Helps as in the correction of mental errours.\nA second advantage resulting from the study of the\nPhilosophy of the Mind, is, that it teaches us in many cases\nto correct whatever deficiences or errours may exist in our\nmental constitution.\nIn our present state of imperfection, while we are found\nto experience various kinds of bodily evils, we are not ex-\nempt from those of the mind and we know not, that it\ncan any more excite surprise, that some people exhibit\nmental distortions, than it can, that we daily see not only\nthe healthy and the well-formed, but the maimed, the\nhalt, and the blind.\nIf then it be asked, how are these mental defects, which\nwe observe, -to be remedied, the answer is obvious, that we\nshould act in regard to the mind, as we do in promoting\nthe restoration of the body wo should commit the busi-\nness of ascertaining a remedy to those, who are in some\ngood degree acquainted with the subject and with the na-\nture of the disease. A physician, altogether ignorant of\nthe anatomy and physiology of the human system, would","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0020.jp2"},"21":{"fulltext":"INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY 15\nbe poorly qualified to relieve a fellow being in sickness, or\nwho had met with a fracture in his limbs. But if know-\nledge be necessary, in order to heal the weakness of the\nbody and restore it to its proper soundness and beauty, it\nis not less important in the restoration of analogous evils\nin the mental constitution.\nIn looking round to see, whose minds, are disordered\nand whose are in a sound and healthy condition, we notice,\nfor example, some persons to be troubled with a very\nweak memory. We have a very candid confession on this\npoint in the writings of Montaigne. He informs us, that\nhe did not trust to his memory. When he had any com-\nmands to execute he always punctually committed them to\nhis memorandum book. I am forced (says he) to call my\nservants by the names of their employments, or of the\ncountries, where they were born, for I can hardly remember\ntheir proper names and if I should live long, I question,\nwhether I should remember my own name. It appears,\nhowever, from his acqaintance with the principles of the\nancient philosophers, that he had not much reason to com-\nplain, except of his own inattention to this extremely val-\nuable mental operation. He remembered principles he\ncould keep in recollection the outlines of the sciences, but\ncould not so well remember insulated facts, especially if\nthey related to the occurrences of common life. This pe-\nculiarity in the operations of the memory is not unfrequent-\nly found among men of letters, especially if they possess a\nvivid imagination. But it must be considered a mental de-\nfect one, which it is not only important to understand,\nbut to try to remedy.\nSince then it must be admitted, that there are diseases\nand distortions of the mind no less than of the body, and\nthat we cannot expect a restoration from those evils with-\nout an intimate acquaintance with the state and tendencies\nof our intellectual powers, such an acquaintance become*\nexceedingly desirable.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0021.jp2"},"22":{"fulltext":"16 UTILITY 05*\n8* Is the gratification of a reasonable curiosity.\nThere is a third recommendation of this study, which\nwill apply to it in common with many others, viz. That it\nis the gratification of a very reasonable curiosity. The\nbotanist examines the seed of a plant, and its mode of ger-\nmination, the root and the qualities by which it is fitted to\nact as an organ of nutrition and support, the structure of the\nstem, the position of the branches, the form of the leaves,\nc. And it is considered in him a commendable pursuit,\nand suitable to the inquisitive turn of an intellectual being.\nAlthough the declaration of scripture be readily admitted,\nthat the flowers of the field are clothed in brighter raiment\nthan the robes of Solomon, it can never be doubted, that\nthey are a subject of inquiry far inferiour to the mind of\nman, for the same scriptures teach us, that it is for man,\nconsidered as an intellectual and immortal being, that all\nnature lives and blooms. If, therefore, he be worthily\nemployed, who marks the progress of the acorn as it shoots\nup and spreads itself forth into the strength and fullness of\nthe mountain oak how much more so is he, who observes\nthe first thoughts of an infant and marks their subsequent\nhistory, till he sees them in the proud and overshadowing\nmaturity of the demonstrations of Newton.\n9. Is a help to those ivho have the charge of early\neducation.\nThis study, in the fourth place, furnishes many very\nvaluable hints to those, who have the charge of early edu-\ncation. General experience evinces the truth of an inti-\nmation of Mr. Pope, that education gives a direction to the\nmental character in subsequent life much the same as the\ninclination of the tree follows the bent of the twig. Chil-\ndren and youth adopt almost implicitly the manners and\nopinions of those, under whom they happen in Providence\nto be placed or with whom they much associate, whether\nthey be parents, instructers, or others.\nLet it, therefore, be remembered, that passions both\ngood and evil may then rise up and gain strength, which it","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0022.jp2"},"23":{"fulltext":"INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. it\nwill afterwards be found difficult to subdue. Intellectual\noperations may at that period be guided and invigorated,\nwhich, if then neglected, can never be called forth to any\neffective purpose in after life. Habits and associations\nof various kinds may then be formed which will follow the\nsubject of them down to the grave, being, as long as life\nlasts, beyond the power of all attempts at a removal of\nthem.\nWhat We learn from every day s observation agrees with\nwhat we are taught in the saying cf Solomon Train up\na child in the way he should go, and when he is old, he\nwill not depart from it.\nIt is, then, reasonably expected of parents and instruc-\nted, that they attempt to eradicate in the minds of the\nyoung bad passions and foster and sustain those, which are\ngood that they pursue suitable methods for the invigora-\ntion of the mental powers, and that they strive to strength-\nen those habits and associations, which shall render them\ngood members of a family, useful citizens in the common-\nwealth and above all should those under their care be\ntrained up in the understanding and practice of that reli-\ngion, which brings peace and hope.\nNo one certainly can be considered properly qualified\nfor this great undertaking, who has not formed a systemat-\nick and philosophick acquaintance with the principles of\nthe mind.\n10. Instructs us not only as to our thoughts but\nlanguage.\nIt may not be out of place to remark here, that this sci-\nence concerns not only the various forms of thought, but the\nnature of language also, which is the medium of commu-\nnication, by which our thoughts are made known to others.\nHere then is another and fifth benefit, which may properly be\nset up against those objections, which have been made to this\ninteresting department of science, since it is in a great mea-\nsure by means of language, that dirTcrent and distant minds\nhold intercourse, the forms of society are preserved, and","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0023.jp2"},"24":{"fulltext":"18 tTTIIilTY OT\nthe great family of man are enabled to go forth in the path\nof social and civil melioration.\nAs words are in themselves mere arbitrary signs, and\nhave no natural or inherent fitness for the expression of the\nsignification, which is attached to them, more than various\nother signs, which might have been employed, they afford\na fruitful subject of remark to the intellectual philosopher,\nwho states the object for which they are used, explains\ntheir necessary imperfection, and teaches us in their skil-\nful and appropriate application.\n11. Has a connection with moral philosophy, ${C.\nIt is to be considered further, that this study has an in-\ntimate connection with others, which are of great impor-\ntance and this connection may be regarded as increas-\ning the urgency of attending to it. It will perhaps be a\nmore satisfactory illustration of this remark than any thing\nwe can say ourselves, if we make a quotation here from\nMr. Stewart s review of the philosophical works of Locke\nand Leibnitz.\nAlthough my design is to treat separately of meta-\nphysicks, ethicks, and politicks, it will be impossible to\nkeep these sciences wholly unmixed in the course of my\nreflections. They all run into each other by insensible\ngradations and they have all been happily united in the\ncomprehensive speculations of some of the most distin-\nguished writers of the eighteenth century. The connec-\ntion between mctaphysicks and ethicks is more pecu-\nliar) close the theory of morals having furnished, ever\nsince the time of Cud worth, several of the most abstruse\nquestions, which have been agitated concerning the gen-\neral principles, both intellectual and active, of the human\nframe.\nEspecially, is the knowledge of the principles of Intel-\nlectual Philosophy connected with the various departments\nof criticism. We see not how a person can give any ra-\ntional account of the effects of a work of imagination with-\nout such knowledge, or point out the excellencies and do-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0024.jp2"},"25":{"fulltext":"INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 1 9\nfects of a painting, or sit in judgment upon any other work\nof art. For, whatever we perceive to be beautiful or sub-\nlime in such works, could never possess the qualities of\nbeauty or sublimity independently of our mental frame,\nand we never apply those epithets to them, except it be\nwith reference to certain principles within us.\nBut we leave these and all other considerations, tend-\ning to show the utility of this science, with a single reflecr\ntion more, trusting, that it will be enough to justify us in\nour pursuits.\n12. Teaches us to revere the wisdom of our Creator,\nW« are taught by this science to revere the wisdom of\nour Creator.\nWe are frequently referred in theological writings to the\nworks of creation, as a proof of his greatness and wisdom;\nand the remark has been made, not without reason, that\nthe stars teach as well as shine. The discoveries of mod-\nern astronomy not only assure us, that there is a God, but\nimpart this additional assurance, that he is above all others,\nto whom the attributes of divinity may have been at any\ntime ascribed.\nBut it must be added, that of all things created, whetb-\ner in the heavens above or in the earth beneath, the hu-\nman mind is that principle, which evinces the most won-\nderful construction, which discloses the most astonishing\nmovements. There is much to excite our admiration in\nthe harmonious movements of the planetary orbs, in the\nrapidity of light, in the process of vegetation but still\ngreater cause for it in the principle of thought, in the in-\nexpressible quickness of its operations, in the harmony of\nits laws, and in the greatness of its researches. How strik-\ning are the powers of that intellect, which, although it\nhave a local habitation, is able to look out from the place\nof its immediate residence, to pursue its researches among\nthose remote worlds, which journey in the vault of heaven,\nand to converse both with the ages past and to come.\nIt ought not to be expected that we should be intimate-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0025.jp2"},"26":{"fulltext":"20 PRIMARY TRUTHS.\n]y acquainted with a principle possessing such striking pow-\ners, without some reverential feelings towards him, who is\nthe author of it.\n13. Of the mental effort necessary in this study.\nThis science demands great mental effort on the part\nof the student. This effort is of a peculiar kind. It con-\nsists essentially in a continued and unbroken fixedness of\nattention. Such an effort is painful to many, and perhaps\nthis is one cause of the unfavourable reception, which this\ndepartment of knowledge has often met with. But the ad-\nvantages attending it are so numerous, it is to be hoped,\nthey will overcome any disinclination to mental exertion.\nThe fruits of the earth are purchased by the sweat of the\nbrow, and it has never been ordered^ that the reverse of\nthis shall take place in the matters of knowledge, and that\nthe fruits of science shall be reaped by the hands of idle-\nness. No man has ever become learned without toil and\nlet it be remembered, if there be many obstacles in the ac-\nquisition of any particular science, that he, who overcomes\na multiplication of difficulties, deserves greater honour\nthan he, who contends only with a few.\nCHAPTER SECOND.\nPRIMARY TRUTHS,\n14. Introductory remarks on this subject.\nIt is often highly important, in the investigations of\na science, to state, at the commencement of such investi-\ngations, what things are to be considered as preliminary\nand taken for granted, and what are not. If this precau-\ntion had always been observed, which, where there is any\nroom for mistake or misapprehension, seems so rcasona-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0026.jp2"},"27":{"fulltext":"PRIMARY TRUTHS. 21\nble, how many useless disputes would have been avoided 5\nthe paths to knowledge would have been rendered more\ndirect and easy, instead of being prolonged and perplexed.\nIt is impossible to proceed with inquiries in the science of\nintellectual philosophy, as it will be found to be in al^\nmost every other, without a proper understanding of those\nfundamental principles, which are necessarily involved in\nwhat follows.\nThose preliminary principles, which are necessary to\nbe admitted, and without which we are unable to proceed\nwith any satisfaction and profit in our inquiries, will be\ncalled, for the sake of distinction and convenience, prima-\nry truths.\nThere would seem to be no impropriety in calling\nthem truths, since they are forced upon us, as it were, by\nour very constitution all mankind admit them in practice,\nhowever they may affect to deny them with their hps and\nthey are as plain and incontrovertible at their very first\nenunciation, as any discoveries in physicks or any demon-\nstrations in geometry. We call them primary, because\nthey are the ultimate propositions, into which all reasoning\nresolves itself, and are necessarily involved and implied\nin all the investigations, which we shall make on the pres-*\nent subject.\nThe first of this class of truths, which will come under\nconsideration, is this\n15. A belief in our personal existence.\nDes Cartes formed the singular resolution, not to be-\nlieve his own existence, until he could prove it.\nHe reasoned thus Cogito, ergo sum, I think, therefore,\nI exist. This argument, which he considered conclusive\nand incontrovertible, evidently involves what is termed a\npetitio principii or begging of the question.\nIt is easy to perceive, that the very thing to be proved\nis assumed. Cogito is equivalent to the proposition, am\na thinking being and ergo sum may be literally interpret-\ned, tkerefore, I m in being. His premises had already im-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0027.jp2"},"28":{"fulltext":"22 PRIMARY TRUTHS.\nplied, that he existed as a thinking being, and it is these\nvery premises, which he employs in proof of his existence.\nThe acuteness, which has generally been attributed to him,\nevidently failed him in this instance. The argument of\nDes Cartes was unsuccessful, and no one, who has attempt-\ned to prove the same point, has succeeded any better.\nIt is necessary to take different ground from that taken\nby this philosopher and his followers. We consider the\nbelief of our existence a primary truth. A few remarks\nmay tend to show the propriety of thus doing.\nThere was a time when man did not exist. He had no\nform, no knowledge. Light, and motion, and matter were\nthings, in which he had no concern. He was created from\nnothing with such powers and such laws to his powers, as\nhis Creator saw fit to give.\nWe are called upon to mark the history of this new\ncreated being.\nAt one year of age, or, if it be preferred, before one\nhalf or quarter of that period is passed, we will suppose,\nthat some object, external to himself, is, for the first time,\npresented to his senses; The consequence is, that there is\nan impression made on the senses, and a perception of the\nobject, presented to them. But it is impossible for him,\nas I think every one will allow, to perceive the object\nwithout a simultaneous conviction of the existence of the\npercipient. Nothing can be heard, or seen, or touched\nwithout an attendant belief, that there is a being, who\nhears, and handles, and beholds. This is a conclusion,\nwhich is necessarily involved in our mental constitution\nand which, as it has such an origin, neither requires any\n.argument nor fears any refutation.\nMalebranche in his search after truth speaks much, if\nthe expressions be admissible, in commendation of the\ni] .it of doubting. But then he bestows this commenda-\ntion with such limitations as will prevent those evils, which\nresult from too freely giving up to a sceptical spirit.\nTo doubt (says he) with judgment and reason, is not.\ngo small a thing as people imagine, for here it may be said,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0028.jp2"},"29":{"fulltext":"PRIx\\URY TRUTHS, £3\nthat there s a great difference between doubting and doubt-\ning. We doubt through passion and brutality, through\nblindness and malice, and, lastly, through fancy, and cnly\nbecause we would doubt. But we doubt also with prudence\nand caution, with wisdom and penetration of mind. Aca-\ndemicks and atheists doubt upon the first grounds, true\nphilosophers on the second. The first is a doubt of dark-\nness, which does not conduct us into the light, but al-\nways removes us from it. (B. I. ch. 20.)\nWe may remark in view of these observations of-Male-\nbranche, that such is the doubting of those over-scrupu-\nlous inquirers, who demand proof of their own existence.\nSuch scepticism as that is truly a doubt of darknes, which\ndoes not conduct us into the light, but always removes us\nfrom it.\nA second of those truths, which we term primary, w\nthis\n16. A belief of our personal identity.\nThe proof of our personal identity is sometimes refer*\nffed to what is termed consciousness. We are said to be\nconscious of our identity. When these expressions are\nused, it is meant by them, that we have a conviction of the\nunderstanding, or we know ourselves to have enjoyed a con-\ntinuance of being. If any thing more than this be intend-\ned, it will be found to be an use of terms without meaning.\nWe have employed the phrase, personal identity.\nThe words, person and personal, convey a complex idea.\nThey have indeed particular reference to that indestructi-\nble principle, which we denominate the mind; but they\nhave reference to it, considered in its connection with the\nbody.\nBy mental identity we have reference to the continu-\nance and oneness of the thinking principle merely.\nBy bodily identity we mean the sameness of the bodily\nshape and general organization. We cannot attach any\nother meaning to the latter phrase in consequence of the\nconstant changes in the material particles, which compose\n©ur systems.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0029.jp2"},"30":{"fulltext":"24 *MMAllY TRUTHS;\nIn those apprehensions, however, which we attach to\nthe phrase, personal identity, we have reference to both\nthe one and the other, the mind and the body and com-\nbine together the two ideas, which are conveyed in both\nthe phrases before mentioned, viz. mental identity and bodi-\nly ident ty.\nA belief in personal identity, or conviction that there\nhas been a continuance of our being, is to be regarded, and\nwith abundant reason, as a primary truth.\nThe mere fact, that it is implied in our reasonings from\nthe past to the future, and universally in our daily actions,\nis of itself a sufficient ground for considering it as such,\nfor reckoning it among the original and essential elements\nof the understanding.\nThe farmer, who now beholds his well cultivated fields,\nknows, that he is identically the same person, who twenty\nyears before, entered the forest with an axe on his shoulder,\nand felled the first tree. The soldier, who recounts by his\nfireside to his children and grand children the battles of\nhis youth, never once doubts, that he was himself the wit-\nness of those sanguinary scenes, which he delights to re-\nlate. It is alike useless to attempt to deny or to prove to\nthem what they know, what they believe, not on evidence,\nbut from nature what they take for granted in their hopes,\nin their retrospections, in their conversation, in all their\nengagements.\nAnother view of the subject may perhaps make the\nground, which has been taken, more clear and impressive.\nNo train of reasoning, (what may be termed an argu-\nment.,) can be brought to bear against this sentiment, that\na belief in our personal identity is to be regarded as a pri-\nmary truth, an original principle of our constitution.\nThe truth of this remark will appear on examination.\nThere evidently can be no argument, properly so called,\nunless there be a succession of distinct propositions. From\njjuch a succession of propositions, no conclusion can be\ndrawn by any one, unless he be willing to trust to the evi-\ndence of memory. But memory involves a notion of the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0030.jp2"},"31":{"fulltext":"PRIMARY TRUTHS. Zi)\ntime past, and whoever admits, that he has the power of\nmemory, in however small a degree, virtually admits, that\nhe has existed identically the same at some former period,\nas at present.\nThe considerations, w T hich we have in view and which\nare greatly worthy of attention in connection with the prin-\nciple under examination, may with a little variation of terms\nbe stated thus.\nRemembrance, without the admission of our personal\nidentity, is clearly an impossibility. But there can be no\nprocess of reasoning without memory. This is evident,\nbecause arguments are made up of propositions, which are\nsuccessive to each other not only in order, but in point of\ntime. It follows, then, that there can be no argument\nwhatever, or on any subject, without the admission of our\nidentity, as a point, from which to start. What then will it\navail to attempt to reason either for or against the views,\nwhich are here maintained, since in every argument which\nis employed, there is necessarily an admission of the very\nthing, Which is the subject of inquiry\nA third of those truths or fundamental propositions,\nwhich we term primary, may thus be stated 5\n17, The external, material world has an existence.\n*The Pyrrhonick sect, so named from Pyrrho, its found-\ner, a native of Elea, who flourished in the fourth century\nbefore Christ, called in question the truth of every system of\nopinions, adopted by other sects. Hence they have been\nalso called scepticks and the sceptical sect names, which,\nin consequence of holding every thing to be uncertain, they\nseem to have well merited. They denied among other\nthings the existence of matter. Their reasonings in res-\npect to the material world were such as the following.\nFirst; The organs of perception, said they, are differ-\nent in different animals, and it is probable, that the same\nobjects present different images or appearances to them.\nBut one person evidently can have no reason for saying,\nthat his perceptions are more agreeable to the real nature","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0031.jp2"},"32":{"fulltext":"26 PRIMARY TRUTHS.\nof things than those of another person or of other animals.\nSecondly Different objects present a different aspect\naccording to their position, their nearness, or distance, or\nthe mode, in which they are exhibited to the senses and\nno good reason can be given, why one of these aspects\nshould agree with the real object any better than the rest\nof them.\nFor instance we see a high steeple behind a very large\nwall or a hill and it appears to be very near and of dimin-\nished size, but we afterwards see it with a number of houses\nand spaces both open and enclosed between; and the\nsteeple, when seen under this difference of circumstances\nappears differently, seeming to be of a larger size and at a\ngreater distance.\nBut who can tell, which is the true, the correct repre-\nsentation of the object\nThe moon appears to be only a foot or two feet in\ndiameter, when beheld by the naked eye, but the telescope\ngives a very different account of its dimensions.\nIn this way, say those, who profess to be genuine scep-\nticks, we are constantly imposed upon, our senses always\ngiving us false representations. We, consequently, know\nnothing concerning the true nature of material objects.\nWhat is termed matter is entirely incomprehensible, and it\nis altogether an useless undertaking, to attempt to prove\nthe existence of any external substances.\nIt Was said of P) rrho, that he carried his principles so\nfar as to be in danger of being run over by carriages or of\ntumbling from precipices. But as his doctrine always found\nenough disposed to ridicule it, these statements were prob-\nably the fabrication of his enemies.\nSome have asserted, that the professions of the seep-\nticks are a mere pretence that they do not believe or rath-\ner disbelieve what they profess to but concerning this it is\nnot essential to inquire, since we have their own explicit\naccount of their opinions, whether it be an account cor-\nresponding with the truth or not.\nBut this is enough to have said concerning the scepticki\nas a sect.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0032.jp2"},"33":{"fulltext":"PRIMARY TRUTHS. 57\nWe should reckon ourselves to be but in a poor calling,\nif we were to stop, when so many important inquiries de-\nmand our attention, and argue at any length the point of\nthe existence of a ^material world with any, who may be\ndisposed to deny it\nLet them remember, we do not attempt to explain what\nthe real nature of matter is but only assert, that it ex-\nists no otherwise than when we acknowledge our igno-\nrance of the nature of the existence of God, while we be-\nlieve, there is such a being.\nIf the advocates of the doubting philosophy are unable\nby the sense of sight to judge correctly of the size of a\nsteeple, has not the Almighty furnished them with another\nsense, that of the touch, by which they can form a more\ncorrect estimation\nIf the eye of the body by itself alone be unable to give\nus a correct idea of the sun and moon, cannot the eye of\nthe mind come in to its assistance Can it not tell us not\nonly the size of those bodies but mark out the path of their\nmotion, and thus not only seeing those things, which actu-\nally exist, but those, which are to be hereafter, predict\ntheir position and appearance before that position and\nthose appearances happen\nThis also is to be considered.\nThese persons either deny or admit their own existence.\nIf they deny it, then we have none to contend with. If\nthey admit it, then it remains to be shown by them, how the\ndeclaration of Scripture, that all flesh is grass, does not\nhold true in respect to themselves, or that their bodies more\ntruly exist now, than they will, when they shall have ming-\nled with the dust, or have passed into other material shapes.\nFurthermore, whatever may be the idea of scepticks\non this point, the great mass of mankind believe in the ex-\nistence of the Deity a being of perfect truth as well as\nbenevolence. But to create man so that he should be\nirresistibly led to believe in the existence of a material\nworld, when it did not exist, to create him with high capa-\ncities of thought, of feeling, and of action and then to","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0033.jp2"},"34":{"fulltext":"2S PRIMARY TRUTHS.\nsurround him with a panorama of illusive and imaginary\nappearances, would seem to be beneath both truth and\ngoodness.\nAdmitting, therefore, the existence of the material\nworld without further remarks on the subject, we come to\na fourth primary truth, which will be found to enter very\nextensively into all our investigations concerning the mind.\n18. Confidence is to be reposed in the memory.\nWhen we say, that confidence is to be reposed in the\nmemory, it is not meant to be asserted, that we are liable\nto no mistakes from that source. It is merely meant, that\nwhen we are satisfied, that our memory fully and correctly\nretains any perceptions of whatever kind of a former pe-\nriod, we receive such remembrances with as much confi-\ndence and act upon them as readily, as if the original per-\nceptions were now present to the mind. Without this\nconfidence in the memory we could hardly sustain an ex-\nistence we certainly could not derive any thing in aid of\nthat existence from the experience of the past.\nOur past life has been a series of sensations or of differ-\nent states of the mind, following each other in rapid and\nalmost unbroken succession.\nBut if we are asked in what way we are able to con-\nnect the past states of the mind with the present, and to\nmake our former sensations a part of the sum of our knowl-\nedge now all the answer, which can be given to these in-\nquiries, is, that, in the original designation of those princi-\nples, which were selected for the composition of our intel-\nlectual being, we are so constituted as to place a perfect\nreliance on the reports of that mental operation, which we\nterm the memory and this statement is equally satisfac-\ntory and the only satisfactory account, whether we consid-\ner the memory a simple or a complex exercise of the mind.\nThere is one more of those principles, which are just-\nly considered primary and original, to be mentioned. It\nis this.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0034.jp2"},"35":{"fulltext":"PRIMARY TRUTHS.\n29\n19. Man is so constituted, as to be susceptible of a\nvariety of emotions.\nThis characteristic!* in our constitution will be the bet-\nter understood by being briefly illustrated.\nWe behold certain appearances in the external, mate-\nrial world for instance, a sloping hill, fields waving with\nverdure, with the accompaniments of brooks and forest.\nThis combination of natural scenery is presented before the\nmind and this presentation of it to the intellectual princi-\nple is immediately succeeded by an emotion of beauty.\nWe are subsequently removed from this pleasing com-\nbination of natural scenery to the brow of some rugged\nprecipice. Beneath us are giant oaks, which toss their\nhundred arms, and desert caves, from whose mysterious\nbosoms the hollow winds sigh responsive to the more aw-\nful voice of the torrent. When such a combination of the\nworks of nature is held up to the soul s inspection, it is im-\nmediately followed, as in the case already mentioned, by an\nemotion and we term it, by way of distinction from other\nstates of the mind, an emotion of sublimity.\nOther emotions are excited, when different combina-\ntions of natural objects are beheld, which will vary also\nwith differences in the situation and circumstances of the\nbeholder.\nBut this is a principle, which extends in its application\nnot only to those inanimate works, by which we are sur-\nrounded, but to human actions also.\nAny actions of our fellow beings, when beheld by us,\nare immediately connected in the mind with certain emo-\ntions, which exist in consequence of the previous exis-\ntence of those actions. Those actions, which discover jus-\ntice, beneficence, and propriety, are in general followed\nby pleasure and approbation. Other actions of an oppo-\nsite character are attended with pain and disapprobation.\nHence it may be laid down as a principle of our men-\ntal constitution, that certain emotions follow the exhibi-\ntion of objects or actions to the mind, much the same as\nvision follows the opening of the eyelids, or tha$ sounds","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0035.jp2"},"36":{"fulltext":"30 PRIMARY TRUTHS.\nwill be produced, when the vibrations of the air reach the\norgan of hearing.\nNo reason whatever can be given, why any combina-\ntion of objects or of actions, why any exhibition of purpose\nor of power, causes a new state of mind of that class term-\ned emotions any more, than actions and objects, purposes\nand powers utterly unknown to us, except it be this, that\na susceptibility of emotions is one of the constituent and\noriginal characteristicks of the intellectual principle.\nWilli se admitted principles in view, which seem to\nspring up before us from our very nature and to claim our\nundoubting assent, the philosophy of the mind at once as-\nsumes an interest, which it could not otherwise possess. It\nceases, at least in a great measure, to be charged with\nthat vagueness, and uncertainty, and spirit of triflings which\nhave hitherto been brought against it.\n20. Admission of preliminary truths agreeable to\nright feelings towards the Supreme Being.\nWhen we consider, how short-sighted we are, it was to\nbe expected, that we should find ourselves in the onset,\nunder the necessity of taking certain principles for granted,\nas the conditions and auxiliaries of our subsequent inqui-\nries.\nIf we are under the necessity of taking for granted\nthese preliminary or primary truths, which have been men-\ntioned, in all our investigations, which, we have seen to be\nthe case, we may well say, that we find them agreeable to\nfa t and we ought, therefore, to find the fact accordant\nwith our feelings, and not to complain of it.\nNot to be satisfied with such views and such admis-\nsions, when we puzzle ourselves in vain to get rid of them,\nmay justly be thought to indicate an unhappy perversity in\nthe moral disposition, and is a sort of complaint against\nGod himself. To undertake to explain every thing, inde-\npendently of the creating power, and without a careful re-\ngard to those ultimate principles, which that creating pow-\ner has ordained, betrays at least an ignorance of our limit-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0036.jp2"},"37":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION.\n31\ned ability, and, if it should not impeach one s piety, is an\nindication of weakness. If to know what our Creator has\ndone be the part of philosophy, to acknowledge and revere\nhim in his doings seems to be the part of religion and he,\nwho is not in some degree possessed of the latter, wants\nthat state of mind, which would be an essential aid to him\nin the investigations of the former. Since it is true, where-\never we go, wherever we push our inquiries, whether in re-\ngard to mind or matter, we find, in the result of those inqui-\nries, Him, who has given to us whatever capacity of knowl-\nedge we may possess, saying to men, as he does to the ex-\npanse of the ocean, there shall thy proud waves be stayd\nCHAPTER THIRD.\nPERCEPTION,\n$.21. On classifications of our intellectual powers.\nIt is a matter of convenience and helps to the mors\nready understanding and recollection of these subjects, to\nclass together and to assign a name to certain intellectual-\noperations or to combinations of them of the same kind.\nTo certain operations of the mind of one sort we give the\nname, perception while operations of another kind, dif-\nfering from perception and also from each other, are de-\nsignated by the terms, memory, imagination, c.\nBut it is not necessary to our purpose to attempt any\nclassification more general than this, what may be termed\na partitioning of the states or affections of the mind, as, for\ninstance, in the old division of the understanding and will.\nThe classification of certain operations of the same\nsort under the names, perception, memory, imagination,\nc. is only a subordinate division one which, if it be not\nclearly made, is at least suggested, by nature and is very","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0037.jp2"},"38":{"fulltext":"32 FEttCEPTION.\ndifferent from that of assigning a distinctive, general name\nto a number of operations, essentially differing from each\nother, with the intention of having them considered an en-\ntirely separate fraternity. Some remarks further may be\nmade to justify us in not attempting those more general\nclassifications, which have been formerly proposed.\n22. Of the classification into understanding and will.\nThe operations of the mind have formerly been divided\nand classed under the two general names of the under-\nstanding and will.\nUnder the will seems to have been included that abili-\nty, in whatever way it might exhibit itself, which was sup-\nposed to be necessary in bringing the mental constitution to\naction it was the mind s operative and controlling princi-\nple something which moved and governed it. Agreeably,\nthen, to this division, we find, on the one hand, the will,\nand, on the other, as its opposite, was the understanding.\nTo determine, however, what operations belonged to the\none and what belonged to the other, was by no means a\nmatter well settled, but of great contention and a zeal in\nthis particular was exhibited similar to that, when rival\npowers strive for the annexation of a disputed province to\ntheir respective empires. But of what benefit was this\ngeneral classification it is now difficult to say, and it has\nat last fallen into comparative discredit.\n23. Of the classification into active and intellectual\npowers.\nAnother general classification of the powers of the\nmind was this, into the intellectual and the active powers.\nUnder the intellectual, were comprehended perception,\nmemory, judgment, reasoning, abstraction, c. under the\nactive powers, volition, and a variety of emotions, such ag\npleasure, pain, aversion. This classification, excepting the\ndifference of names, was very similar to the one above men-\ntioned. But, very evidently, positive or active power must\nbe implied in some of the operations termed intellectual,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0038.jp2"},"39":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION. Ot\nas well as in those, to which the opposite designation is\ngiven. That state of the mind, which is termed abstrac-\ntion, or imagination, is as positively active as that, which\nchooses, or loves, or hates.\nWithout, therefore, attempting a general classification\nof the mental powers, it will be sufficient to remark upon\nthem separately, beginning with perception.\nAnd here it may be observed, that our principal object\nis to ascertain facts in regard to the mind the arrange-\nment of those facts and any speculations, which are not\nfounded directly upon them, are points of subordinate con-\nsideration.\n24. Of the objects of perception.\nAll things, with which we become acquainted by means\nof the senses, are objects of perception. External nature,\nin particular, in all its varieties is submitted to our inspec-\ntion; and whatever knowledge we are enabled to- possess\nof it we enjoy by means of that mental operation. In all\nour knowledge then from this source, two things are to be\ntaken for granted,\n(1) The existence of a material world,\n(2) Certain affections, caused in the organs of sense by-\nexternal things.\nNor do we anticipate, after what has already been\nsaid on the subject of a material world, taken in connection\nwith our consciousness of a susceptibility in our organs of\nsense of impressions from external objects, that any except\ntion will be taken to these reasonable assumptions.\nPerception, then, or external sensation is a state or affection\nof the mind, which is immediately successive to certain affec-*\ntion? of the organs of sense, these affections in the sensorial\npart being caused by external objects*\nThe qualities or properties of the material world, which\nis the great object of our perceptions, are considered by\nMr. Locke and others under the two heads of Primary and\nSecondary.\n5","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0039.jp2"},"40":{"fulltext":"34 PERCEPTION.\n25. Of the primary qualities of bodies.\nThe primary qualities of bodies are extension, figure,\ndivisibility, and solidity. The name of secondary qualities\nhas been given to sound, colour, taste, smell, heat, and cold.\nPrimary qualities are known by being essential to the\nexistence of all bodies. All bodies have extension, all\nbodies have figure, all are capable of division, all are solid.\nBy solidity in bodies is to be understood that quality,\nby which a body hinders the approach of others, between\nwhich it is interposed. In this sense water and all other\nfluids are solid. If particles of water could be prevented\nfrom separating, it would be impossible for any two bodies,\nbetween which they might be, to come in contact. Thia\nwas shown in an experiment, which was once made at\nFlorence. A quantity of water was enclosed in a gold\nball, which on the most violent pressure could not be made\nto fill the internal cavity, until the water inside was forced\nthrough the pores.\nDivisibility is reckoned among the primary qualities of\nmatter. The smallest particle is susceptible of division\nand to that small particle must belong not only divisibility\nbut the qualities of solidity, figure, and extension.\n26. Of the sense of smell.\nThe medium, through which we receive the sensations\nof smell, is the organ, which is termed the olfactory nerve,\nsituated principally in the nostrils, but partly in some con-\ntinuous cavities. When any odoriferous particles, sent from\nexternal objects, affect this organ, there is a certain state\nof mind produced, which varies with the nature of the\nodoriferous bodies. But we cannot infer from the sensa-\ntion itself merely, that there exists any necessary connec-\ntion between the smell and the external objects any more,\nthan that there exists a connection between thee motions of\njoy and sorrow and the same objects. It might indeed be\nsuggested to us by the change in our mental states, that\nthere must be seme cause or antecedent to the change, but","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0040.jp2"},"41":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION. 3f\nthis suggestion would be far from implying the necessity\nof a corporeal cause.\nHow then does it happen, that we are not merely sen-\nsible of the particular sensation, but refer it at once to\nsome external object, to the rose, or the honeysuckle In\nanswer it may be remarked, if we had always been destitute\nof the senses of sight and touch, this reference never could\nhave been made, but having been furnished with them by\nthe beneficent author of our being, we make this refer-\nence by experience. When we have seen the rose, when\nwe have been near to it and handled it, we have uniformly\nbeen conscious of that state of mind, which we term a sen-\nsation of smell. It is only when we have been in the field\nof honeysuckles or in its immediate neighbourhood, or\nwhen they have been gathered and presented to us, that\nwe have been reminded of their fragrance. And thus,\nhaving learnt by experience, that the presence of the odori-\nferous body, is always attended with the sensations of smell,\nwe form the habit of attributing the sensations to that body\nas their cause and this mental reference is made with\nalmost as much promptness, as if it were necessarily in-\nvolved in the sensation or perception itself.\n27. Of the sense of taste.\nA sapid body is applied to the organ of taste. The ap^\nplication of such body immediately causes a change or af-\nfection of the sensorial organ and this is at once followed\nby a mental perception. Thus we have the perceptions,\nto which we give the names, sweet, bitter, sour, acrid, dec.\nThe perceptions of the mind are referred by us to some-\nthing, external to itself, which we call bitter, sweet, c.\nas their caune. This reference is made very rapidly, so that\nwe at once say of one apple it is sweet, and of another, i%\nis sour but it will always be found to be subsequent, in\npoint of time, to the perception. As in the case of smells,\nwhich have been already remarked upon, the reference is\nthe result of our former experience. We say of one body,\nit is sweet, and of another, it is acrid, because we have ever","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0041.jp2"},"42":{"fulltext":"36 PERCEPTION.\nobserved, that the mental states, indicated by those terms,\nhave always existed in connection with the presence of\nthose bodies.\nWhenever, therefore, we say of any bodies, that they\nare sweet, bitter, acrid, or, apply any other epithets, ex-\npressive of sapid qualities, we mean to be understood to\nsay, that such bodies are fitted in the constitution of things\nto cause in the mind the perceptions of sweetness, bitterness\nand acridness, or other sensations, expressed by denomina-\ntions of taste. Or, in other words, that they are the estab-\nlished antecedents of such sensations, as there is, further\nthan this, no necessary connection between them.\n28. Of the sense of hearing and of sounds.\nSounds, which we perceive by means of the sense of\nhearing, are caused by undulations of elastick air, set in\nmotion by the sonorous body and striking on the tympa-\nnum of the ear.\nSounds differ, first, in the tone secondly, in the\nstrength of the tone. It is remarked by Dr, Reid, that\nfive hundred variations of tone may be perceived by the\near, also an equal number of variations in the strength of\nthe tone making, by a combination of the tones and of the\ndegrees of strength, twenty thousand simple sounds, dif-\nfering either in tone or strength.\nIn a perfect tone a great many undulations of elastick\nair are required, which must be of equal duration and ex-*\ntent, and follow each other with perfect regularity. Each\nundulation is made up of the advance and retreat of innu-\nmerable particles of elastick air, whose motions are all uni-\nform in direction, force, and time. Accordingly, there will\nbe varieties in the same tone, arising from the position and\nmanner of striking the sonorous body, from the constitu-\ntion of the elastick medium, and from the state of the organ\nof hearing.\nDifferent instruments, such as a flute, a violin, and a\nbass-viol may all sound the same tone, and yet be easily\ndistinguishable. A considerable number of human voices","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0042.jp2"},"43":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION. 37\nI\nmay sound the same note, and with equal strength, and\nyet there will be some difference. The same voice, while\nit maintains the proper distinctions of sound, may yet be\nvaried many ways by sickness or health, youth or age, and\nother alterations in our bodily condition, to which we are\nincident.\n29. Manner in which we learn the place of sounds.\nPrevious to all experience, we should not know, wheth-\ner a sound came from the right or left, from above or be-\nlow, from a smaller or greater distance.\nDr. Reid mentions, that once, as he was lying abed,\nhaving been put into a fright, he heard his own heart beat.\nHe took it to be some one knocking at the door, and arose,\nand opened the door oftener than once before he discovered,\nthat the sound was in his own breast. Some traveller has\nrelated, that when he first heard the roaring of a lion in a\ndesert wilderness, not seeing the animal, he did not know\non what side to apprehend danger, as the sound seemed to\nhim to proceed from the ground, and to enclose a circle,\nof which he and his companions stood in the centre.\nIt is by custom or experience, that we learn to distin-\nguish the place of things, and, in some measure also, their\nnature, by means of their sound. It is thus that we learn,\nthat one noise is in a contiguous room, that another is\nabove our heads, and another in the street. And what\nseems to be an evidence of this is, that when we are in a\nstrange place, after all our experience, we very frequently\nfjnd ourselves mistaken in these respects.\nIf a man born deaf were suddenly made to hear, he\nwould probably consider his first perceptions of sound as\noriginating wholly within himself. But in process of time\nwe learn not only to refer the origin of sounds to a posi-\ntion above or below, to the right or left but to connect\neach particular sound with a particular external cause, re-\nferring one to a bell as its appropriate external cause, ano-\nther to a flute, another to a trumpet.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0043.jp2"},"44":{"fulltext":"38\nPERCEPTION.\n$.«80. Connection of hearing with language.\nOne of the greatest benefits of the sense of hearing is,\nthat, in consequence of it, we are enabled to hold inter-\ncourse with each other by means of language, without\nwhich the advancement of the human mind must have in-\nevitably been very limited.\nIt is by language, that we express our feelings to the\nlittle company of our neighbours and our own family and\nwithout it this pleasant and cheering intercourse must be\nalmost entirely suspended. Not limited in its beneficial\nresults to families and neighbourhoods, it is the medium of\nthe transmission of thought from age to age, from genera-\ntion to generation. So that in one age is concentrated the\nresult of all the researches, the combination of the wisdom\nof all the preceding.\nThere is without all doubt, it has been observed,\na chain of the thoughts of human kind, from the origin of\nthe world down to the moment at which we exist, a chain\nnot less universal than that of the generation of every beings\nthat lives. Ages have exerted their influence on ages\nnations on nations truths on errours errours on truths.\nWhether language be an invention of man, or a power\nbestowed upon him by his Creator and coeval with the\nhuman race, the ear must in either case have been the pri-\nmary recipient the faculty of speech so necessary and\nso beneficial could not have existed without the sense of\nhearing.\n31. Of the sense of touch.\nThe principal organ of touch is the hand. This parr,\nof our frame is composed of various articulations, that by\nthe aid of the muscles are easily moveable, so that it can\nadapt itself readily to the various changes of form in the\nobjects, to which it is applied.\nThe senses, which have been already mentioned, are\nmore simple and uniform in their results, than that of the\ntouch. By the ear we have a perception of sounds or thai","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0044.jp2"},"45":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION. 39\nsensation, which we denominate hearing. By the palate\nwe have a knowledge of tastes, and by the sense of smelling\nwe become acquainted with the odours of bodies. The\nknowledge, which is directly acquired by all these senses,\nis limited to the qualities, which have been .mentioned.\nBy the sense of touch, on the contrary, we become ac-\nquainted not with one merely, but with a variety of qual-\nities, such as the following, heat and cold, hardness and\nsoftness, roughness and smoothness, figure, solidity, motion,\nand extension.\nSome might be inclined to say, that hardness and soft-\nness are expressive only of greater or less resistance, and\nare, therefore, the same thing, differing only in degree\nbut the consideration of these ideas separately does not\nproperly come in here. In the remarks, which are here-\nafter to be made on the origin of knowledge, it will come\nwithin the plan of these Elements to bestow on some of\nthem a more particular inquiry.\n32. Of the benefits of the sense of sight.\nOf those instruments of perception, with which a benev-\nolent Providence has furnished us, a high rank must be\ngiven to the sense of seeing. If we were restricted in the\nprocess of acquiring knowledge to the informations of the\ntouch merely, how many embarrassments would attend our\nprogress and how slow it would prove Having never\npossessed sight, it would be many years, before the most\nacute and active person could form an idea of a mountain\nor even of a large edifice. But by the additional help of\nthe sense of seeing, he not only observes the figure of large\nbuildings, but is* in a moment possessed of all the beauties\nof a wide and variegated landscape.\nIt does not fall within our plan to give a minute des-\ncription of the eye, which belongs rather to the anatomist,\nbut such a description, with a statement of the uses of the\ndifferent parts of the organ, must be to a candid and re-\nflecting mind a most powerful argument in proof of the ex-\nistence and goodness of the Supreme Being. How won-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0045.jp2"},"46":{"fulltext":"40 Perception.\nderfui among other things is the adaptation of the rays of\nlight to the eye If those minute particles, which come to\nus with such inconceivable rapidity from all things around\nus, were not coloured, we should be deprived of much of\nthat high Satisfaction, which we now take, in beholding\nsurrounding objects and if they were not of a texture so\nextremely small, they would cause much pain to the organ\nof vision.\nS3. Statement of the mode or process in visual per^\nception.\nIn the process of vision, the rays of light, coming from\nvarious objects and in various directions, strike in the first\nplace on the pellucid part of the ball of the eye.\nIf they were to continue passing on precisely in the\nsame direction, they would produce merely one mingled\nand indistinct expanse of colour.\nIn the progress through the chrystalline humour, they\nare refracted or bent from their former direction and distri-\nbuted to certain focal points, on the retina, which is a white,\nfibrous expansion of the optick nerve.\nThe rays of light, coming from objects in the field of\nvision, whether it be more or less extensive, as soon as they\nhave been distributed on their distinct portions of the re-\ntina, and have formed an image there, are immediately\nfollowed by the sensation or perception, which is termed\nsight.\nThe image, which is pictured on the retina, is the last\nstep, which we are able to designate in the material part of\nthe process in visual perception the mental state follows,\nbut it is not in our power to trace, even in the smallest de-\ngree, any physical connection between the optical image\nand the corresponding state of the mind.\nAll that we can say in this case is, that we suppose them\nto hold to each other the relation of antecedent and conse-\nquent by an ultimate law of our constitution.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0046.jp2"},"47":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION. 41\nNote. On certain terms used as synonymous*\nThe words, affection, idea, thought, sensation, opera-\ntion, and perception are in common use indiscriminately\napplied to the mind, although some of them not exclusive-\nly so and when thus applied, appear to be used as synony-\nmous, and as signifying merely a state or position of the\nthinking principle. It seems, therefore, to be useless to\nset up an arbitrary distinction between them, which the\ncommon speech, both in conversation and in writing, will\nbe continually annulling and which distinction, in the pre-\nsent almost indiscriminate application of the words, might\ntend rather to perplex than aid us in our inquiries. Be-\nsides nice inquiries into distinctions in the meaning of\nwords belong rather to treatises purely philological than\nthe present elementary work, which, taking language as\nit is, without pretending to define and settle its application,\nprofesses merely to collect for the use of the student, in a\nconcise and plain view, some prominent facts in respect to\nthe mind. Provided the facts are conveyed in an intelli-\ngible manner, so that the student can fully understand\nthem, our object will be answered.\n34. Of the connection which, the brain has with\nperception.\nIt was an odd opinion, which once widely prevailedj\nthat our ideas are inscribed in marks or traces in the\nmedullary substance of the brain. So soon as the soul\n(says Malebranche in his Search after Truth) receives some\nnew ideas, it imprints new traces in the brain, and so soon\nas the objects produce new traces, the soul receives new\nideas.\nThis leads us to observe, without taking up time in re-\nmarking on this now exploded opinion, that the brain is a\nprominent organ in the material part of the process of sen-\nsation or of external perception. The sensorial substance,\nas it exists in the nerves, excepting the coat, in which it is\nenveloped, is the same as in the brain, being of the same","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0047.jp2"},"48":{"fulltext":"42 PERCEPTION.\nsoft and partially fibrous texture and in perfect continuity\nwith it. When the brain is in an unsound state, or has\nbeen in any way injured, both the external impression and\nthe consequent perception are very imperfect. Also if the\nnerve, which is a supposed continuation of the brain, be\ninjured, or if its continuity be disturbed by the pressure of\na tight ligature, the effect is the same both the external\nimpression and the perception are either destroyed or are\nimperfect.\nThe brain, therefore, and the nerves in continuity with\nit constitute the sensorial o v gan, which in the subordinate\norgans of taste, of smell, of sight, of touch, and of hear-\ning, presents itself under different modifications to external\nobjects. On this organ, the sensorial, as thus explained, an\nimpression must be made, before there can be perception.\nAn impression, for instance, is made on that part of the\nsensorial organ called the auditory nerve, and a state of\nmind immediately succeeds, which is termed the percep-\ntion of sound.\nAn impression is made by the rays of light on that ex-\npansion of the optick nerve, which forms what is termed\nthe retina, and the intellectual principle is immediately\nbrought into that new position, which is termed visual per-\nception.\nThe hand is impressed on a body of an uneven and\nrough surface, and immediately consequent on this impres-\nsion, is that state of mind, which is termed a sensation or\nperception of roughness.\n35. Impressions on the senses and perceptions art\nantecedents and consequents.\nIn all these cases, as we have already remarked in re-\nspect to sight in particular, the impression made on the or-\ngan of sense is the antecedent, the mental perception is\nthe consequent, and we are utterly unable, further than the\nmere fact of precedence and sequence, to trace any con-\nnection between them. But while we can see in instances\nof this description no necessary, no physical connection","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0048.jp2"},"49":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION. 43\nbetween the perception of the mind and the impression on\nthe senses, we clearly discover the agency of the Supreme\nBeing, who has appointed and sustains this connection,\nwhich is in itself arbitrary and conventional.\nWe do indeed speak of cause and effect as if we could\nperceive how one follows another, but there is no other\ncause and effect in the physical w T orld, than that of antece-\ndent and consequent and the instances, which we thus\nname, are to be resolved into the independent and uncon-\ntrolled power of God; that Being, who, in the language of\ninspiration, brings forth Mazzaroth in his season, and\nguides Arcturus with his sons.\nThis discovery of the presence of the Almighty, to bind\ntogether and to give efficacy to things, which in themselves\nhave no necessary connection, ought to be attended with\na religious impression. It ought, on the one hand, to re-\nmind us of our own limited powers, and, on the other,\nof the unsearchable knowledge, and power, and benefi-\ncence of our Creator. It was his hand, which (to use an\nillustration of Akenside) attuned the mind to the impres-\nsions of external things, so that it returns to them a cor-\nresponding note, like the image of Memnon, which was\nsaid in the fables of antiquity, whenever the morning sun-\nbeams touched it, to pour forth its musick along the banks\nof the Nile.\n36. Of the estimation of distances by sight.\nBy the distance of objects, when we use the term in re-\nference to ourselves, we mean the space, which is interpos-\ned between those objects and our own position. Blind\nmen have a notion of distance and can measure it by touch\nor by walking forward, until they meet the distant object.\nThe perception of distance by the sight is an acquired\nand not an original perception.\nAll objects in the first instance appear to touch the\neye.\nOur experience has corrected so many of the representa-\ntions of the senses before the period, which we are yet","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0049.jp2"},"50":{"fulltext":"44 PERCEPTION.\nable to retrace by the memory, that we cannot prove this\nby a reference to our own childhood and infancy. It ap*\npears, however, from the statement of the cases of persons\nborn blind on the sudden restoration of their sight.\nWhen he first saw, (says Cheselden, the anatomist,\nwhen giving an account of a young man, whom he had re-\nstored to sight by couching for the cataract,) he was so\nfar from making any judgment about distances, that he\nthought all objects touched his eyes, as he expressed it, as\nwhat he felt, did his skin and thought no objects so\nagreeable as those, which were smooth and regular, al-\nthough he could form no judgment of their shape, or guess\nwhat it was in any object, that was pleasing to him.\nThis anatomist has further informed us, that he has\nbrought to sight several others, who had no remembrance of\never having seen and that they all gave the same account\nof their learning to see, as they called it, as the young man\nalready mentioned, although not in so many particulars\nand that they all had this in Common, that having never\nhad occasion to move their eyes, they knew not how to do\nit, and, at first, could not at all direct them to a particular\nobject but in time they acquired that faculty, though by\nslow degrees.\nBlind persons, when at first restored to sight, are una-\nble to estimate the distance of objects by that sense, but\nsoon observing, that certain changes in the visible appear-\nance of bodies always accompany a change of distance,\nthey fall upon a method of estimating distances by the via-\nble appearance. And it would no doubt be found, if it\ncould be particularly examined into, that all mankind come\nto possess the power of estimating the distances of objects\nby sight in the same way. When a body is removed from us\nand placed at a Considerable distance, it becomes smaller\nin its visible appearance, its colours are less lively, and its\noutlines less distinct and we may expect to find a number\nof intermediate objects, more or fewer, as the distance may\nhappen to be, showing themselves between the receding\nobject and the spectator. And hence it is, that a certain","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0050.jp2"},"51":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION. 45\nvisible appearance comes to be the sign of a certain dis-\ntance.\nHistorical and landscape painters are enabled to turn\nthese facts to great account in their delineations. By\nmeans of dimness of colour, indistinctness of outline, and\nthe partial interposition of other objects, they are enabled\napparently to throw back at a very considerable distance\nfrom the eye those objects, which they wish to appear re-\nmote. While other objects, that are intended to appear\nnear, are painted vivid in colour, large in size, distinct in\noutline, and separated from the eye of the spectator by few\nor no intermediate objects.\n37. Further illustrations of this subject,\nA vessel seen at sea by one, who is not accustomed to\nthe ocean, appears much nearer, than it actually is. In his\nprevious observations of objects at a distance he has com-\nmonly noticed a number of intermediate objects, interpos-\ned between the distant body and himself. The absence of\nthose intermediate objects causes the deception, under\nwhich he labours in the present instance or is, at least, a\nprominent cause of his erroneous supposition, that the ves-\nsel is nearer than it truly is.\nFor the same reason people misjudge of the width of a\nriver, estimating its width at a half or three quarters of a\nmile at the most, when it is perhaps not less than double\nthat distance.\nThe same in estimating by the eye the width and\nlength of plains and marshes.\nWe mistake in the same way also in estimating the\nheight of steeples and other similar elevated bodies. As\nthe upper parts of the steeple out-top the surrounding build-\nings and there are no contiguous objects with which to\ncompare it, any measurement taken by the eye must be in-\naccurate, but is generally less than the truth.\nA man on the top of a steeple seems smaller to those\nbelow, than the same man would seem to the same persons,\nand at the same distance on level ground. As we have","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0051.jp2"},"52":{"fulltext":"46 PERCEPTION.\nbeen in the habit of measuring distances on the ground by\nthe eye, we can give a pretty near guess, whether a person\nbe at an hundred feet distance, or more or less; and the\nmind immediately makes an allowance and corrects, so rap-\nidly that we do not remember it, the first visual representa-\ntion. But having never been in the habit of measuring\nperpendicular distances, the mind is at a loss, and fails to\nmake that correction, which it would very readily, and, as\nit were intuitively make in the case of any objects on level\nground. So that a man an hundred feet in the air appears\nto us smaller, than at the same removal from us on the\nearth.\nThe fixed stars when viewed by the eye, all appear to\nbe alike indefinitely and equally distant. Being scattered\nover the whole sky, they make every part of it seem like\nthemselves at an indefinite and equal distance, and, there-\nfore, give the whole sky the appearance of the inside of a\nsphere. Moreover, the horizon seems to the eye to be fur-\nther off than the zenith because between us and the for-\nmer-there lie many things, as fields, hills, waters, which we\nknow to occupy a great space whereas between ils and\nthe zenith there are no considerable things of known di-\nmensions. And, therefore, the heavens appear like the\nsegment of a sphere, and less than a hemisphere, in the\ncentre of which we seem to stand. And the wider ous\nprospect is, the greater will the sphere appear to be and\nthe less the segment.\nIn connection with what has been said we are led to\nmake this further remark, that a change in the purity of the\nair will perplex in some measure those ideas of distance,\nwhich we receive from sight. Bishop Berkely remarks\nwhile travelling in Italy and Sicily, he noticed, that cities\nand palaces, seen at a great distance, appeared nearer to\nhim by several miles than they actually were. The cause\nof this he very correctly supposed to be the purity of the\nItalian and Sicilian air, which gave to objects at a distance\na degree of brightness and distinctness, which in the less\nclear and pure atmosphere of his native country, could be","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0052.jp2"},"53":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION. 47\nobserved only in those towns and separate edifices, which\nwere near. At home he had learnt to estimate the distance\nof objects by their appearance but his conclusions failed\nhim, when they came to be applied to objects in countries,\nwhere the air was so much clearer.\n38. Idea of extension not originally from sight.\nWe have seen, that our idea of distance is not derived\noriginally from the sight, but from the touch. Our\nidea of extension has the same origin for, as distance is\nthe space interposed between one object and another, ex-\ntension is the distance between the parts of the same object\nwhere in the intermediate parts there is a continuity of the\nsame substance.\nIf a man, endued with sight, were to be fixed ail his\ndays in one place immoveably, and were deprived of the\nmeans of gaining any experience by the touch, that man\ncould never, from the information of his own senses, re-\nceive any accurate knowledge of extension. But having\nlearnt in time what appearance coloured and extended\nbodies make to the eye, he comes to learn from that ap-\npearance the extension of bodies, much the same as he es-\ntimates their distance from their appearance.\nAnd this statement leads us to the consideration of\nmagnitude or limited extension, which is also estimated by\nthe eye, although the pow r er of thus measuring it, like that\nof measuring distances and extension, is not an original\nperception, but is acquired by the aid of the touch.\n39. Measurements of magnitude by the eye.\nMagnitude is divided into two kinds, tangible and visi-\nble the tangible magnitude being always the same, but\nthe visible, varying with the distance of the object. A man\nof six feet stature is always that height, whether he be a\nmile distant, or half a mile, or near at hand the change of\nplace making no change in his real or tangible magnitude.\nBut the visible magnitude of this man may be six feet or\nnot oae foot, as we view him present with us, or at two","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0053.jp2"},"54":{"fulltext":"48 PERCEPTION.\nmiles distance; for his magnitude appears to our eye\ngreater or less, according as he is more or less removed.\nOf two objects equally distant or supposed to be\nequally distant, that, which has the greatest visible mag-\nnitude, is supposed to have the greatest tangible magni-\ntude.\nTo a man bewildered in a mist, objects seem larger\nthan the life, because their faint appearance conveys the\nidea of great distance, and an object at a considerable dis-\ntance, which has the same visible magnitude with one near,\nthe rnind immediately concludes to be larger.\nThe sun and moon seem larger in the horizon than in\nthe meridian, appearing then to be at the greatest distance,\neither because the horizon for a reason already given seems\nmore remote than the zenith, or because the atmosphere,\nbeing more full of vapour towards the horizon, makes the\nheavenly bodies appear fainter, and consequently more\ndistant.\n40. Of the knoivledge of the figure of bodies by the\nsight.\nA solid body presents to the eye nothing but a cer-\ntain disposition of colours and light. We may imagine\nourselves to see the prominencies or cavities in such bodies,\nwhen in truth we see only the light or the shade, occasion-\ned by them. This light and shade, however, we learn by\nexperience to consider as the sign of a certain, solid figure.\nA proof of the truth of this statement is, that a painter\nby carefully imitating the distribution of light and shade,\nwhich he sees in objects, will make his work very naturally\nand exactly represent, not only the general outline of a\nbody, but its prominencies, depressions, and other irregu-\nlarities. And yet his delineation, which by the distribu-\ntion of light and shade gives such various representations,\nis on a smooth and plain surface.\nIt was a problem submitted by Mr. Molyneux to Mr.\nLocke, whether a blind man, who has learnt the difference\nbetween a cube and a sphere by the touch, can, on being\nsuddenly restored to sight, distinguish between them, and","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0054.jp2"},"55":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION. 49\ntell, which is the sphere and which is the cube, by the aid\nof what may be called his new sense merely And the\nanswer of Mr. Locke is, that he cannot. The blind marj\nknows what impressions the cube and sphere make on the\norgan of touch and by that sense is able to distinguish be-\ntween them, but, as he is ignorant what impression they\nwill make on the organ of sight, he is not able by the lat-\nter sense alone to tell, which is the round body, and which\nis the cubick.\nIt was remarked, that solid bodies present to the eye\nnothing but a certain disposition of light and colours.\nIt seems to follow from this, that the first idea, which\nwill be conveyed to the mind on seeing a globe, will l?e\nthat of a circle, variously shadowed with different degrees\nof light. This imperfect idea is corrected in this way.\nCombining the suggestions of the sense of touch with those\nof sight, we learn by greater experience w T hat kind of ap-\npearance solid, convex bodies will make to us. That ap-\npearance becomes to the mind the sign of the presence of\na globe so that we have an idea of a round body by a\nvery rapid mental correction, whereas the idea first con-\nveyed to the mind is truly that of a plane, circular surface,\non which there is a variety in the dispositions of light and\nshade. It is an evidence of the correctness of this state-\nment, that in paintings plane surfaces, variously shaded,\nrepresent convex bodies, and with great truth and exact-\nness.\nIt appears then, that distance, extension, magnitude,\nand figure, are originally perceived, not by sight, but by\ntouch. We do not judge of them by sight, until we have\nlearnt by our experience, that certain visible appearances\nalways accompany and signify certain distances, exten-\nsions, magnitudes, and figures. This knowledge we ac-\nquire at a very early period in life, so much so, that we lose\nin a great measure the memory both of its commencement\nand progress.\nAnd yet many people can recollect the time, when they\nconsidered the sky to be a transoarent and solid concave.\n7","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0055.jp2"},"56":{"fulltext":"50 MEktfEPTIOB.\nresting on the tops of distant mountains. How different i^\nthis idea, which we receive from the sight, from what we\nfind in our subsequent experience to be the fact\n§.41. The senses reciprocally assist each other.\nThe errours and deficiences of one sense are made up\nand corrected by the friendly presence and suggestions of\nanother. And when any of the senses entirely fail, the\nothers are proportionably quickened and improved.\nA multitude of instances go to show to what extent\nthis correction and this aid take place.\nWe will suppose, as an illustration, that, at an early\nperiod of life, a person loses his sight. An effect on the\nsense of hearing and of touch is immediately perceived j\nthey are greatly improved.\nThe blind man cannot see his friend, but he knows,\nwhen he enters the room by the sound of his tread. He\ncannot see the large and heavy bodies, which happen in\nhis way when he walks about, but he suspects their too\ngreat nearness to him in consequence of the increased resis-\ntance of the atmosphere.* And a blind person, owing to\nthe increased accuracy of the remaining senses, would be\nbetter trusted to go through the various apartments of a\nhouse, in the darkness of midnight, than one, possessed of\nIt is a singular circumstance, that something similar to what is here\nstated of the ability of blindmen to discover the nearness or distance of objects*\nby changes in the resistance of the atmosphere, has been noticed by the natural-\nist, Spallanzani, in respect to bats. He discovered, that bats when perfectly\nblinded and afterwards set at liberty, had the extraordinary faculty of guiding,\nthemselves through the most complicated windings of subterraneous passages,\nwithout striking against the walls, and that they avoided with great skill cords,\nbranches of trees, and other obstacles, placed by deoign in their way.\nThis ability is probably owing loan extreme delicacy in the wing, which is-\n6f a very large size in proportion to that of the animal, and is covered with an\nexceedingly fine net- work of nerves. The bat, as it strikes the air with its wing,\nreceives sensations of heat, cold, and resistance, and, in consequence, is enabled\navoid objects, which would otherwise obstruct its flight, apparently in the same\nway that blind persons perceive a door or a wall by a change in the temperature\nBV in the resistance of the air.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0056.jp2"},"57":{"fulltext":"PERCEPTION. 51\nthe sense of seeing, but without any artificial light to as-\nsist him. It is stated on the authority of a Roman historian,\nthat there was a blind man, who made it his employment\nto conduct merchants and other travellers through the\nsands and deserts of Arabia. This statement seems not to\nbe improbable, when we recollect what is related in the\ntransactions of the Manchester Society in England of John\nMetcalf, otherwise called Blind Jack. He became blind\nat an early period but, notwithstanding, followed the pro-\nfession of a waggoner and occasionally of a guide in intri-\ncate roads, during the night, or -when the tracks were cov-\nered with snow. At length he became a projector and\nsurveyor of highways in difficult and mountainous districts\nan employment, for which one would naturally suppose a\nblind man to be but indifferently qualified. But he was\nfound to answer all the expectations of his employers, and\nmost of the roads over the peak in Derbyshire in England\nwere altered by his directions. Says the person, who\ngives this account of Blind Jack, I have several times\nmet this man with the assistance only of a long staff trav-\nersing the roads, ascending precipices, exploring vallies,\nand investigating their several extents, forms, and situa-\ntions, so as to answer his designs in the best manner. (Ed.\nEncy. Art. Blindness.)\nThis improvement of the remaining senses, when one\nof them is lost, is probably owing to the increased attention,\nwhich people then bestow upon the various and nicely dis-\ntinguished suggestions, which they furnish. Nothing es-\ncapes them, and those dim perceptions, which were form-\nerly almost unnoticed, now convey to them important infor-\nmation.\n42; Remarks on certain writers on out visual per-\nceptions.\nIt is proper to premise, before speaking of writers on\nthe subject of our visual perceptions, that whatever remarks\nwe may at any time make of a critical and historical nature","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0057.jp2"},"58":{"fulltext":"52 PERCEPTION.\nwill in general be brief; our object being chiefly to let\nthe student know, to whom he is indebted for new views\nin this science, and to offer what assistance we may be\nable to, in helping him to a selection of those books on\nthe mind, which are most worthy of his attention.\nIt does not appear, that there were just and well set-\ntied views on the subject of our visual perceptions before\nthe time of Dr. Barrow, who flourished about the middle\nof the seventeenth century, well known for his theological,\nand especially for his mathematical writings. We do not,\nhowever, mention his name, because he was in any great\ndegree a contributor to the philosophy of the mind, al-\nthough he has some merit in this respect but from the\ncircumstance that, in the conclusion of his Optical Lec-\ntures, he alludes to the subject of our visual perceptions in\nsuch a way as to let us know what perplexity rested upon\nit so late as at that period.\nThere are some facts in relation to the perception of\nthe distance of external objects, which he acknowledges\nare involved in the mysteries of nature, and will probably\nnot be discovered, until the manner of vision shall be\nmore perfectly known. He says, he, therefore, leaves the\nknot untied.\nAt a later period, Mr. Molyneux and Mr. Locke evi-\ndently had views on this subject closely approximating to\nwhat is now considered the true explanation of these phe-\nnomena, as may be inferred in particular from some re-\nmarks concerning them, which are made in the second\nBoojc of the Essay on the Understanding.\nBut it is only justice to u learned and ingenious man\nto remark hero, that the statement of our visual percep-\ntions, as above given in the sections on that subject,\ntvgs first fully proposed and established by Dr. Berkeley,\nbishop ofCloyne. Notwithstanding the great deduction,\nwhich he has incurred, in consequence of his peculiar\nviews in respect to the existence of a material world, his\nwritings, it must be confessed, exhibit much acuteness\nof thought, and what is no small merit, are written in a","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0058.jp2"},"59":{"fulltext":"NO INNATE KNOWLEDGE.\n53\nsimple and perspicuous style, well adapted to philosophi-\ncal subjects.\nDr. Beattie, in a note to the chapter, where he treats\nof imagination, gives a concise and plain view of the prin-\nciples developed and proved by Berkeley in his New The-\nery of Vision, with a variety of illustrations. In inquiries\nyet to be made, as in some of the statements in the preced-\ning sections on perceptions by means of sight, we fhali not\nunfrequently be indebted to his writings. They do not\ndiscover the originality and acuteness of Locke or even of\nBerkeley, but are exceedingly more valuable than a variety\nof other productions of a more scholastick nature, which\nmight be mentioned and may profitably be put into the\nhands of inquirers into the principles of mind and of morals,\nCHAPTER FOURTH\nNO INNATE KKOWLED^S.\n43. Innate ideas before the time of Mr. Locke.\nThe publication of Mr. Locke s Essay on the Human\nUnderstanding, has justly been considered as fixing an era\nin the science of Intellectual Philosophy. Before the pub-\nlication of this work, which was in the year 1690, the doc-\ntrine of innate or connatural ideas was widely prevalent.\nBy the phrase innate, or, to use an expression less ambig-\nuous, connatural ideas, is to be understood certain ideas\nand propositions, which were held to be wrought into their\nintellectual nature and to be born with all mankind. It\nwas maintained, that they were limited to no one class, nei-\nther to the rich nor the poor, neither to the learned nor the\nignorant, to no clime and to no country, but all participa-\nted in them alike. These propositions and ideas, being\ncoetaneous with the existence of the soul and being there","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0059.jp2"},"60":{"fulltext":"54 N6 INNATE KNOWLEDGE.\nestablished at the commencement of its existence by the-\nordinance of the Deity, were regarded as the first princi-\nples of knowledge, and as the rules, by which men were to\nbe guided in all their reasonings about natural and moral\nsubjects. From these innate and original propositions the\nfollowing may be selected as specimens of the whole.\n44. Enumeration of innate principles.\n(1) Of the natural kind,\nViz., The whole is greater than a part Whatsoever is,\nis It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be\nat the same time and in the same sense,\n(2) Of the moral kind,\nViz., Parents must be honoured Injury must not be\ndone; Contracts should be fulfilled, c.\n(3) Of the religious kind,\nViz., There is a God God is to be worshipped God\nwill approve virtue and punish vice.\nIf these propositions are innate or connatural w r ith\nthe mind, then the ideas, of which they are composed,\nmust be innate so that, whatever the number of proposi-\ntions, there will be a yet greater number of innate ideas.\nThe doctrine of the existence of such innate ideas and\npropositions was supported by Des Cartes and Malebranche,\nnames of such celebrity as to give at least a temporary\ncurrency to almost any opinion. The principal argument\nin support of this doctrine seems to have been this\n45. Argument on the subject of innate knowledge.\nAll mankind universally exhibit an acquaintance with,\nand give their assent to ideas and propositions of this de-\nscription hence they are innate.\nThis argument is considered inconclusive, because the\nstatement, which is made in it, is maintained to be untrue.\nIt is undoubtedly the fact, that a part of the human race\nremain ignorant through life of the greater number, if not\nall of the propositions in question.\nBut admitting that all men are acquainted with them","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0060.jp2"},"61":{"fulltext":"NO INNATE KNOWLEDGE. 55\nand assent to them, this by no means proves them innate,\nso long as we can account for this acquaintance and this\nassent in some other way. It is admitted by all, that the\nmind exists, and that it possesses the power or the ability\nto acquire knowledge. If, therefore, in the exercise of this\nability, which all admit it to have, we can come to the\nknowledge of what are called innate or connatural ideas\nand propositions, it is quite unphilosophical to assign to\nthem another origin, in support of which no positive proof\ncan be brought.\nFurther if the doctrine of innate knowledge be ad-\nmitted, ideas and propositions of this kind may be multi-\nplied to any extent every one will imagine himself at lib-\nerty to add to the number they will unnecessarily be\nbrought forward on a variety of occasions, and a most per-\nplexing hindrance be thrown in the the way of free inquiry\nand of the progress of knowledge.\n46. Mr. Lookers opinions on this subject.\nMr. Locke in the first book of his Essay on the Human\nUnderstanding has examined this subject at very consider-\nable length. It has indeed been said of his argument, that\nit is both too long and not always sufficiently to the point,\nbut it makes up in the variety and weight of its consider-\nations what it wants in exactness of arrangement 5 and it\nwill be found by no means easy to confute it.\nIt is one among the merits of this writer, that he has\nsuccessfully laboured to do away many of our ancient pre-\njudices, (what may be termed the rubbish of the science,)\nand shown us where to make a good and satisfactory begin-\nning. In accordance with what there is so much evidence to\nconsider the true doctrine, we are presented in his writings\nwith the mind, not as a mere recipient, already in a good\ndegree filled up with articles of knowledge, but as a prin-\nciple or power of action and all we have to do, is, to mark\nits operations, as they necessarily exist in consequence of its\nbeing furnished with the aid of the senses and surrounded\nwith material objects. It knows nothing at the first but it","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0061.jp2"},"62":{"fulltext":"«56 NO INIUTE KNOWLEDGE.\npossesses the ability to explore the forms of matter in its va-\nrious shapes, to mark the aspects and the operations of intel-\nlect and in this way it becomes possessed of a great varie-\nty of information. It is, therefore, a most wonderful princi-\nple, and, as it raises us far above the brute creation, it would\nfor its own nobleness be highly worthy of the student s at-\ntention, even if no practical benefit should result from the\npursuit.\n47. Opinions of Plato and Aristotle.\nIt may properly enough be remarked here, that the dis-\ncussion on the subject of innate ideas and propositions is\none of long standing. We refer in this remark to the\nstatement, which a French writer, De Gerando, in his His-\ntory of Philosophy, has given of the conflicting opinions of\nPlato and Aristotle, taking the translation of the passage,\nas we find it in an American periodical publication of mer-\nrited reputation. Ideas, (says Plato,) are not made up\nof deductions from experience. They have a different ori-\ngin. It would be impossible to explain the production\nof them, if they were not independent of experience, and,\nconsequently, innate, that is, placed in the mind by God\nhimself, to serve as the elements of knowledge. Before\nthey were communicated to us, they dwelt in the Divine\nmind, as so many forms or models, according to which the\nDeity arranged the universe.\nThe following is the reply of Aristotle.\nIf ideas are innate (he says) how happens it, that we\nare not always conscious of them And that it is so long\nbefore we obtain the knowledge, which they ought to im-\npart to us How can we have an idea of a thing, which\nwe never perceived I To call our ideas models, on which\nexisting objects were formed, is merely a poetical figure.\nWho is there, that acts with his eyes fixed on these sup-\nposed models We know, that objects may exist, may be\nmade without reference to them.\n11 Pluto was, therefore, (he says,) clearly in an errour.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0062.jp2"},"63":{"fulltext":"NO INNATE KNOWLEDGE, 57\nHis ideas are evidently a product of the understanding,\nformed by a generalization of the particular qualities of in-\ndividual objects.\nIt is this very question, namely, whether we have any\nideas, any thing, which can be called knowledge previous\nto sensation, which divided different writers so late as tha\ntime of Des Cartes, who appears to have adopted senti-\nments, similar to those of Plato. It was this question,\ntherefore, which Mr. Locke thought it necessary to exam-\nine at the commencement of his metaphysical writings, and\nwith what ability is generally known.\n48. Prevailing opinions at the present time.\nIt would seem then from the remarks, which have been\nmade, that in former times there has been a great diversity\nof opinion on the subject of the origin of our knowledge.\nThis diversity of opinion does not exist in so great a\ndegree at present. Few are found, who hold to the doc-\ntrine of innate or connatural ideas and propositions, as that\ndoctrine was formerly stated and maintained. The opin-\nions of Mr. Locke on this subject, adopted with some slight\nmodifications, are the opinions of nearly all mental philos-\nophers, not only in America and England, but in France,\nand on the continent of Europe generally.\nIn the statements, which are to be made respecting the\norigin and combinations of our ideas, we have, accordingly,\nfollowed in his footsteps with such deviations, as might be\nexpected from more recent, and, in some cases, more accu-\nrate and satisfactory inquiries.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0063.jp2"},"64":{"fulltext":"59\nCHAPTER FIFTH.\nORIGIN Or SIMPLE 2E2AS,\n49. Simple ideas received by means of the senses\nand from our mental operations.\nThere is one class of our thoughts, which we term sim-\nple ideas, and with sufficiently good reason, since we know\nnot, that they are in any degree compounded by being\nmade up of other thoughts, or that they can be resolved in-\nto any thing more elementary. This class then naturally\narrests our attention first.\nWhen we look at the history of our simple ideas, with\nthe intention of discovering, if possible, their true origin,\nwe find, that they may be traced to two sources.\n(1) Some of them originate in the senses, that is to say,\nare caused by means of external objects producing an af-\nfection of the senses.\n(2) Other simple ideas arise to us or exist from reflect-\ning on our mental operations.\nIn other words, the two predominant sources of our\nsimple ideas are the world without and the world within\nthe external creation, between which and our bodily sen-\nses, Providence has instituted a common and reciprocal\nadaptation, and the internal, mental creation, which no\nsooner commences its various and appropriate exercises,\nthan we are furnished with another series of simple ideas,\nwhich never could have been received from the senses\nalone.\nThese two sources of our simple thoughts, however\nthey may have been by some writers confounded with each\nother, are entirely distinct since the simple ideas, arising\nfrom the fact of the existence of certain mental operations,\ncould not have been suggested by any thing, which takes\nplace in the external world, independently of those opera-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0064.jp2"},"65":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF SIMPLE IDEAS. 50\ntions. And this circumstance of itself sufficiently justifies\nthe distinction, which has been set up between them.\nThere is, nevertheless, reason for saying, that those\nideas, which are received from the senses, have the prior-\nity in point of time a fact, which it may be necessary\nbriefly to illustrate.\nAs we know, that the human o*ind is not eternal, it is\nonly to state the same thing in other words, when we say,\nthat there must have been some particular period, when it\ncommenced its existence or was created. If its acts or\noperations were not connatural and innate, of which, as ap-\npeared in the preceding chapter, there is by no means suf-\nficient evidence, they must clearly have been subsequent\nin time to its creation. But while there is ground for say-\nkig, that our mental operations are subsequent to the cre-\nation of the thinking principle, the facts, which constantly-\npresent themselves to every one s attention, lead us to say\nfurther, that they are subsequent also to certain affections\nof the .senses.\nIn other words, were it not for impressions on the sen-\nses, which may be traced to objects external to the senses,\nour mental capabilities, whatever they may be, would\nalways have remained in a state of fruitless inaction.\nIJence the process, which is implied in the perception\nof external things, or what is commojnly termed by Mr.\nLocke sensation, may justly he considered the occasion or\nintroductory step to all our knowledge.\nBut, although the presentation of external objects be\nthe first occasion of the mind s becoming operative, it no\nsooner becomes such, than these operations furnish us with\nanother set of ideas, as already remarked, which, by way\nof distinguishing them from those received through the\ndirect mediation of the senses, may be termed ideas of re-\nflection.\nThese two classes, then, simple ideas from the senses,\nand simple ideas from reflection, are the earliest, with\nwhich the mind is furnished, and are the elements or sim-\nplest materials of all our subsequent, intellectual attain-\nments.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0065.jp2"},"66":{"fulltext":"60 ORIGIN OF SIMPLE IDEAS..\n50. Of verbal explanations of simple ideas.\nIn the remaining remarks on the subject now under\nconsideration, it is necessary to warn the reader, that we\nshall, for the most part, merely state something of the mode\nor rather of the circumstances, in which this class of our\nthoughts occur to the mind, without pretending to be more\nexplicit. Simple ideas admit of no definition, of no ex-\nplanation, further than such statement of the circumstan-\nces, in which they are brought to view.\nIf any one should charge us with want of clearness and\nprofess not to understand what is meant by the terms, ex-\ntension, solidity, heat, cold, red, blue, sweet, unity, or other\nnames of simple ideas, we know not that any thing can be\ndone to clear up that mental obscurity, under which he\nlabours, but merely to refer him to his own senses, to his\npersonal experience, as the only instructer, from whom he\nwill Le likely to receive any tolerable satisfaction.\nThe subject of definitions, both in its connection with\nsimple and with complex terms, will be further considered\nin the chapter on Language.\n51. Division of our simple ideas*\nMr. Locke, having reference to the mode, in which our\nsimple ideas are received into the mind, has divided them\ninto four classes\n(1) Those, which are received by one sense merely\n(2) Those, which are received from more than one\nsense\n(3) Those, which are received from reflection or the\nobservation of what takes place in our minds;\n(4) Those, which are received by reflection, and come\ninto the mind also at other times, in various ways, by the\nsenses or which in some instances are received by sensa-\ntion and reflection combined, and not separately, as in the\nsimple idea of power.\nAnd this seems to be the most natural division, whicfy\ncan be made, and, therefore, very well fitted to help us keep\nin memory the history of our early notions.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0066.jp2"},"67":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF SIMPLE IDEAS. 61\n52. Of simple ideas from one sense only.\nTo the class of simple ideas received from one sense\nonly, belong the varieties of colour, such as red, white,\nyellow, green, c, which are received by the sense of\nsight. To this class also belong all the varieties of sound,\nwhich are received by the sense of hearing also the di-\nversities of taste, received from the sense of taste.\nThe ideas of the sense of hearing do not belong to the\nsense of sight, nor those of sight to the sense of hearing\nand this is so obvious, that it is needless to attempt to prove,\nhow clearly the origin of the one is distinguished from that\nof the other set of ideas.\nIt may be remarked here, that not all our simple ideas\nhave names. Only the prominent distinctions are thus\nmarked, while there are many diversities in the sensations\npf touch, taste, vision, and,of the other senses, which are not.\n53. Of simple ideas from more than one sense.\nThere are other simple ideas, which we derive from\nmore than one sense, such as figure, extension, motion.\nWe perceive the extension of a body originally by means\nof the touch, but subsequently, when experience has given\ntou the sense of sight its full power, are informed of it by\nthe sight also.\nThe same of figure and motion.\nAs soon as we have learnt what significancy to attach\nto our visual perceptions, a subject, which was remarked\nupon in the third chapter, we have an idea of a statue by\nthe sight and at once perceive, that it possesses form or\nfigure but the blind man, who has not the power of see-\ning, learns its figure no less accurately by the sense of\ntouch merely.\nWhen a solid body is moving with any considerable\ndegree of rapidity from under our hands, such is the nature\nof the sensation produced, that we are immediately satis-\nfied, that this body is changing its position. And we are\nequally satisfied of this, whether our eyes be open or shut.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0067.jp2"},"68":{"fulltext":"62 ORIGIN CF SIMPLE IDEAS.\nIn another case, for instance, when we see a boat putting\noff from a ship, we perceive the change of position or mo-\ntion exclusively by the sight, the sense of touch being un-\naffected.\n54. Of simple ideas from reflection.\nBy the term, reflection, seems to be properly under-\nstood the observation of the operations of our own minds,\nas they are employed about the ideas, which they have\ngotten. Some of the simple ideas, which 1 we receive from\nthis source, are these, thinking, doubting, believing, judg-\ning, assenting.\nWhen a proposition is stated with little or no evidence\nattending it, the mind, in reference to that proposition, is\nput into a position, to which we give the name of doubling*\nBut if the evidence be considerably increased, the mental\nestimation, which we form, is altered in regard to it, and\nto this new state of the mind we give the name of belief or\nbelieving. The origin of other ideas of this class is similar,\nbeing the result of the observation of different states or\noperations of the thinking principle within us. They are\nrightly classed as simple ideas, since they are merely simple\nperceptions, and are no more compounded and can be\nno more resolved into any subordinate elements, than our\nperceptions of colour or taste.\n55. Simple ideas from both of the above mentioned\nsources.\nThere are certain simple ideas, which are received both\nby reflection and also by means of the senses and such\nare the ideas of existence, succession, unity, and power.\nThis will be the more clear from a few remarks, which re-\nmain to be made on each of them separately.\n5G. Of existence, unity, and succession.\nExistence is one of the ideas of this class. It is out of\nour power to define this idea, as it is all other simple ideas.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0068.jp2"},"69":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF SIMPLE IDEAS.\nS3\nbut it is clearly suggested to us by every external object,\nwhich we behold. Our minds also can never have ideas,\nor. what seems to be the same thing, be in successive states,\nwithout an attendant impression, that those ideas or mental\nstates actually and truly exist.\nThe idea, expressed by the word unity, is suggested\nby whatever, whether internal or external, can be consider-\ned as one, and can be regarded as distinct and separate\nfrom any other object, about which the mind is employed.\nHence, as ideas may be regarded in this way as well as\noutward objects, unity is properly considered one of those\nnotions, which may be referred both to the senses and to\nreflection, and is conveyed into the mind from those sour-\nces in a variety of ways.\nSuccession is another idea, belonging to this class.\nOur ideas, while we are awake, are constantly going in a\ntrain, one coming and another departing. In this way,\nhaving this regular appearance and disappearance of\nthought forced upon our attention, we receive the idea of\nsuccession and also by observing what takes place in ex-\nternal objects, such as the removal of bodies and the sup-\nply of their place by others, the changes of day and night 5\nc.\n57. Origin of our idea of poicer.\nThe idea of power, like those of existence, unity, and\nsuccession, is sometimes suggested to us from the senses,\nor what takes place in the external world, and sometimes\nfrom our mental operations or rather from the effects, which\nwe observe to follow certain mental acts.\nWe find, by way of illustrating our meaning, that we\nare able by a mere volition to move several parts of cur\nbodies, to go from place to place, and to do other tilings\nsimilar. We observe also, that physical bodies, external\nto ourselves, are able to cause certain effects, one on an-\nother, and hence there is suggested to us this idea.\nBut to be more explicit and to illustrate this statement\nby some instances, let it be observed, that the idea of pow-\ner connects itself closelv with cases of cause and effect","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0069.jp2"},"70":{"fulltext":"64 ORIGIN OF SI3IPLE IDEAS.\nand we become furnished with this idea by consulting such\ninstances, whether they involve both mind and matter, or\nonly material existences.\nA cause is that, which immediately and always, in simi-\nlar circumstances, is followed by a certain change the\nchange being the sequence or effect.\nFor example, fire and the melting of metals may be\nconsidered as standing to each other in the relation of\ncause and effect, or of antecedence and sequence j but\nalthough it be admitted to be true, that we know nothing\nmore than the mere fact, that one precedes and the other\nfollows, yet we at once and as it were of necessity have\nthe idea of power.\nAgain, we learn, that the loadstone has the quality of\ndrawing iron, but all we can properly understand from this\nstatement, is, that when the loadstone is made to approach\nthe iron, the iron moves still we leave it to any one to say,\nwhether we have not the idea of power. It is the same in\nother cases, where material bodies placed in certain cir-\ncumstances are constantly followed by changes in other\nbodies we associate with all such instances the idea of\npower.\nBut let us in particular reflect a moment on those in-\nstances, where the antecedent to the effect produced, is\nmind, is some intellectual operation or existence.\nWe exercise that desire or choice, to which we give the\nname of volition, and, immediately consequent on that vo-\nlition, there is a motion of the hand.\nIn the beginning the world was in darkness God said,\nLet there be light, and light was.\nThe Saviour said, Lazarus, come forth, and he arose\nfrom the dead.\nIn these cases we have the antecedent and consequent,\nthe volition and the effect.\nIt seems to us very clear, that, in all cases when such\nantecedents and sequences are placed before the mind, es-\npecially when the antecedent, as in the cases last mention-\ned, is intellectual and intelligent, we immediately have","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0070.jp2"},"71":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF SIMPLE IDEAS. 65\nthe idea of power, the same as when bodies of a certain\ncolour, are placed before us, and we have the idea of\nwhiteness or redness.\nBut we are perhaps called upon to give a definition or\nexplanation of power. The reply is, that power is a simple\nand uncompounded perception. In all cases of invariable\nand immediate antecedence and sequence, it at once and\nnecessarily arises in the soul. In such cases as when God\nsaid, Let there be light and light was it is an idea vivid\nand overwhelming.\nIntroduced, therefore, into the mind under such cir-\ncumstances, and being a simple idea, which can be resolv-\ned into no subordinate elements, we could give no defini-\ntion of it, if we desired to and to insist on a definition,\nwhere the idea is so obviously of such a character, seems to\nhave no more reason in it, than to demand a verbal defini-\ntion of the simple perceptions of taste, of hearing, and of\nsight.\n58. Of the evidence in favour of this account of the\norigin of our ideas.\nIt was remarked in a preceding section, that no posi-\ntive proof could be brought in confirmation of the once\nprevalent doctrine of innate ideas, and it is natural to in-\nquire what direct and positive evidence is there in favour\nof the account, which has now been given of the origin of\nour early thoughts\nIn answer to this inquiry let it be observed, in the first\nplace, that the statement, which has been made on this\nsubject, recommends itself to the common experience, to\nwhat every individual can testify, to a greater or less de-\ngree, in regard to himself.\nOur ideas at first are few in number they are suggest-\ned by the objects, by which we are immediately surround-\ned the greater number are from the senses or are forced\nupon us by our immediate wants, and a very small propor-\ntion only are abstract and remote. But we find, as we ad-\nvance in years, as we become more and more acquainted\n9","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0071.jp2"},"72":{"fulltext":"66 ORIGIN OF SIMPLE IDEAS.\nwith facts in the natural world, and have more acquaint-\nance with our fellow men, our ideas multiply, our views\nare more extensive, and that we no more jump at once into\nthe full stature of knowledge, than we advance without any\nintermediate growth from infancy into manhood.\nThis is the general experience, the testimony, which\neach one can give for himself.\nIf, in the second place, having ourselves arrived to some\ndegree of mental capacity and information, we observe the\nprogress^ the mind in infancy and childhood in those of\nour fellow beings, who have just entered on the early sta-\nges of their pilgrimage, we shall find, as far as we are able\nto judge from the facts coming within our observation, the\nsame process going on in them, which our consciousness of\nthe present and our memory of the past, even from our\nboyish days, enables us to testify with no little confidence\nin our own case.\nTo the infant its nursery is the world. Its first idea?\nof the human race are its particular conceptions of its nurse\nand its mother and the origin and history of all its no-\ntions may be traced to its animal wants, to the light, that\nbreaks in from its window, and the few objects in the im-\nmediate neighbourhood of the cradle and of the hearth.\nAnd, in the third place, it is not too much to say, that\nall the observations, which have been made on persons,\nwho from their birth or at any subsequent period, have been\ndeprived of any of the senses, and all the extraordinary\nfacts, which have come to knowledge, having a bearing on\nthis inquiry, go strongly in favour of the views which have\nbeen given.\nIt appears, for instance, from the observations, which\nhave been made in regard to persons, who have been deaf\nuntil a particular period, and then have been restored to\nthe faculty of hearing, that they have never previously had\nthose ideas, which naturally come in by that sense. If a\nperson has been born blind, the result is the same or if\nhaving the sense of sight, it has so happened, that he has\nnever seen any colours of a particular description. In the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0072.jp2"},"73":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF SIMPLE IDEAS. 67\none case he has no ideas of colours at all, and in the other,\nonly of those colours, which he has seen.\nOf those extraordinary instances, to which we alluded,\nas having thrown some light on the history of our intellec-\ntual acquisitions, is the account, which is given in the Me-\nmoirs of the French Academy of Sciences for the year 1703,\nof a deaf and dumb young man in the city of Chartres.\nAt the age of three and twenty, it so happened, to the great\nsurprise of the whole town, that he was suddenly restored\nto the sense of hearing, and in a short time he acquired the\nuse of language. Deprived for so long a period of a sense,\nwhich in importance ranks with the sight and the touch,\nunable to hold communication with his fellow beings by\nmeans of oral or written language, and not particularly\ncompelled, as he had every care taken of him by his\nfriends, to bring his faculties into exercise, the powers of\nhis mind remained without having opportunity to unfold\nthemselves. Being examined by some men of discernment,\nit was found, that he had no idea of a God, of a soul, of\nthe moral merit or demerit of human actions, and what\nmight seem to be yet more remarkable, he knew not what it\nwas to die the agonies of dissolution, the grief of friends,\nand the ceremonies of interment being to him inexplicable\nmysteries.\nHere we see how much knowledge a person was depri-\nved of, merely by his wanting the single sense of hearing\na proof that the senses were designed by our Creator to be\nthe original sources of knowledge, and that without them\nthe faculties of the soul would never become operative.\nThe instance of the young man of Chartres is more\nparticularly examined into, in Condillac s Essay on the Ori-\ngin of Knowledge, at Section fourth of Part first, and the\nwhole book may well be consulted by those, who wish for\nfurther information on this whole inquiry.\n59. Simple ideas the elements of all our knowledge.\nAdmitting the correctness of the views, which have\nbeen given, it follows, that from our simple ideas all others\nare derived.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0073.jp2"},"74":{"fulltext":"08 SIMPLE AND MIXED MODES.\nAs to the power, which we possess over the ideas in the\nmind, it may be observed, that we have no power to des-\ntroy or annul them by a mere volition nor does it appear,\nthat we are always able to detain an idea in the mind and\nmake it an object of contemplation to the entire exclusion\nof others, at least, for any length of time. We can exert\nthis power only in an imperfect degree.\nBut we have power,\n(1) Of comparing ideas together in various respects,\nsuch as extent, degrees, time, place.\nWe have the power,\n(2) of combining or compounding, an operation, by\nmeans of which we form what are termed complex ideas\nout of two or more simple ones variously put together.\nCHAPTER SIXTH.\nSIMPLE AND mSXSD ZKODE3.\n60, Division of complex ideas into three kinds.\nThose ideas, which are purely simple, are few in num-\nber, and may all be either traced, on the one hand, to some\naffection of the senses, or, on the other, to reflection,\nwhich is that observation or notice, which the mind takes\nof its own operations. But by the aid of the small num-\nber of simple ideas, a vast number of others are formed,\nwhich are termed complex. The power, which we pos-\nsess, of forming complex ideas from simple ones, may be\ncompared to our power of uniting together the letters of\nthe alphabet in the formation of words, which are of them-\nselves few in number, but lay the foundation of almost innu-\nmerable combinations.\nComplex ideas arc divided into three kinds, modes, sub-\nstances, and RELATIONS.\nModes are that class of complex ideas, which are sup-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0074.jp2"},"75":{"fulltext":"SIMPLE AND MIXED MODES.\n6§\nposed not to exist independently by themselves, but are\nrather the dependencies on, the attributes, or the affections\nof substances such as are expressed by the words, hon-\nour, gratitude, treachery, robbery, and also by the names\nof numbers and of mathematical figures, as dozen, twenty,\nsquare, parallelogram.\nOn this class or division of complex ideas we are to\nremark first and shall consider them under two heads,\nviz., simple modes and mixed modes.\n61. Of complex ideas called simple modes.\nSimple modes are complex ideas, made up of those sim-\nple ideas, which are all of the same kind in other words,\nthey are merely different modifications of the same original\nthought, carried on to a greater or less extent, but without\nany intermixture of foreign materials.\nOf this class of ideas are a dozen, a score, a thousand,\nwhich are simple modes formed by the repeated addition\nof units as far on as the collections, specified by those\nnames.\nTo this class belong ideas of time, as an hour, a day,\na month, a year and also ideas of extension in length, as\na furlong, a mile, a league.\ni. 62. Of simple modes from number.\nThe idea of unity is derived in some instances from\nthe senses. That is to say, it is always suggested to the\nmind, whenever we find ourselves able to consider any ex-\nternal object, as distinct and separate from other objects.\nThe consciousness also, which we cannot avoid, that the\nmind has different ideas or is in different states, and that,\nconsequently, there is a real line of distinction between\neach succeeding state and that, which went before, gives\nus the same notion of unity or oneness. So that it is an\nidea, which we become possessed of, both by means of the\nsenses, and from reflection but it is a simple idea, as we\ncannot resolve it into any thing more elementary.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0075.jp2"},"76":{"fulltext":"70 SIMPLE AND MIXED MODES.\nWhat are termed the simple modes of number, are-\nformed by the repeating or addition of the original idea,\nand it is worthy of remark, that there is the utmost distinct-\nness, a marked line of separation between each mode. The\nnumbers, one, two, and three, are as distinct and separate\nfrom each other, as one hundred and two hundred.\nNames are necessary to numbers. We repeat the idea\nof an unit, and this repetition or addition becomes a col-\nlective idea, to which we give the name of two. To the\ncollective or complex idea, which arises on the addition of\nanother unit, we give the name of three all enumeration\nfeeing only the addition of units with the giving of names\nto the collective ideas thus formed. As diversities in num-\nbers are only differences of more or less, and are not dis-\ntinguished from each other by size or colour, or in other\nways, but only by addition and subtraction, there seems\nto be the more need of names. If it should be admitted\nto be possible, that we may have simple modes of number\nwithout giving names, it is very evident, that without names\nwe could not employ them in enumeration so that they\nwould in that case be entirely useless.\nWe find, that many uncivilized tribes of savages are\nunable to carry enumeration to any great extent, not be-\ncause their minds are naturally incapable of this operation*\nbut in consequence of the scanty materials of their lan-\nguages. Mr. Locke mentions a Brazilian tribe, called the\nTououpinambos, who had no names for numbers above five\nany number beyond that they made out by showing their\nfingers and the fingers of those, who were present. When\nsavages wish to express a very large number, they remind\nus of the leaves on the trees, the stars in the sky, and the\n«ands on the sea-shore.\nAnd the same remark a little qualified will apply to\ncommunities somewhat raised above the savage state.\nThus Abraham was led abroad at night, and was command-\ned to try and number the stars a much more expressive\nintimation of the great increase of his posterity, than could\nhave been conveyed by the restricted power of the He-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0076.jp2"},"77":{"fulltext":"SIMPLE AND MIXED MODES. 71\nbrew numerals. See also the passage in the seventh of Judg-\nes, where the camels of the Midianites arc compared to\nthe sand by the sea-side for multitude.\nIn view of these remarks, two rules may be laid down\nin regard to correct enumeration,\n(1) That the mind distinguish carefully two ideas,\nwhich differ from each other only by the addition or sub-\ntraction of an unit\n(2) That it retain in memory the names or marks of the\nseveral intermediate combinations from an unit to the num-\nber, which completes the sum. Without an observance of\nthese directions no one can be assured, that he has made a\ncorrect enumeration.\n63. Extraordinary instance of skill in the use of\nnumbers.\nA peculiar instance of ability in the combination of numb-\ners may properly be mentioned here observing, however, in\nregard to the statement, that we have no other authority for\nits correctness than the weekly gazettes, but we see no\nreason to doubt its correctness.\nA young lad in the State of Georgia, at this time (1826)\nten years of age, can reduce any given number of miles to\ninches, years to seconds, c, performing the whole ope-\nrations in his head, and will give the result as quick as an\nexpert calculator can with a pen. Among the questions\nasked him, were the following, which he solved with ease\nand expedition How many inches are there in 1 ,373,489\nmiles How often will a wheel, 5 ft. 6 in. in diameter, turn\nover in ninety miles What is the cube root of 24,743,682\nHe has on more than one occasion, and even before he was\nnine years of age, raised the number twelve to its fifteenth\npower that is to say multiplied that number into itself\nfifteen times. He can multiply three figures by three fig-\nures. This faculty was discovered in the lad at about\neight years of age and has greatly improved since.\nSome might look upon this^ as a sort of supernatural\nintuition but certainly without good reason. It is indeed\nextraordinary, but is a mere act of the memory, and differs","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0077.jp2"},"78":{"fulltext":"72 SIMPLE AND MIXED MODES.\nfrom ordinary cases, only in going so far beyond the reach\nof ordinary power. The distinction between the numbers-\nis kept up if he have any new method of combining the\nnumbers, he is under the same necessity with others of\ngiving separate names to each combination there is no\nembarrassment, but the perception is exceedingly rapid,\nand the power of memory wonderful.\n64. Simple modes from duration.\nIt was remarked in speaking of our simple ideas, that\nour idea of succession was obtained in this way. Our\nideas, while we are awake, are constantly going in a train,\none coming and another departing. In this way, having\nthis regular appearance and disappearance of thought\nforced upon our attention, we receive the idea of succes-\nsion and also by observing what takes place in external\nobjects, such as the removal of bodies and the supply of\ntheir place by others, the changes of day and night, c.\nIt is by the aid of the simple idea of succession, that\nwe form the idea of duration, the ideas formed from which\nlast have a claim to be ranked with the simple modes.\nWe are conscious not only of our existence, but of the\ncontinuance of our existence, or of our personal identity;\nwe take it for granted, or rather it is forced upon us as an\noriginal characteristick of our minds, in every thing we do,\nin every step of reasoning. This indelible conviction, that\nwe are what we have been, being considered in connection\nwith our succession of ideas, gives rise to our idea of du-\nration. So that whenever we can speak of our existence\nas commensurate with or measured by a certain number of\nideas, we are furnished with this additional notion, to which\nthe name of duration is given.\nAs we cannot have the notion of duration without suc-\ncession, hence it happens, that we know nothing of dura-\ntion, when we are perfectly asleep, because we know not,\nthat there are then any of those intellectual changes, which\nwe term succession of ideas. If a person could sleep with\na perfect suspension of all his intellectual operations from","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0078.jp2"},"79":{"fulltext":"SIMPLE AND MIXED MODES. 73\nthis time until the resurrection, the whole of that period\nwould appear to him as nothing. Ten thousand years\npassed under such circumstances would be less than a\nwatch in the night.\nThat it is only by comparing that consciousness, which,\nwhen awake, ever attends us, of the permanency of our own\nexistence, with that ever successive change of states, to\nwhich the immaterial part of our being is subject, that we\nacquire our notions of duration, is in some measure proved\nby a variety of facts, which have been ascertained and pre-\nserved.\nThere is, for example, in the French work, VHisioire de\nVAcademie Royafa des Sciences pour Vannee, 1719, a statement\nto the following effect.\nThere was in Lausanne a nobleman, who, as he was\ngiving orders to a servant, suddenly lost his speech and all\nhis senses. Different remedies were tried, but, for a very\nconsiderable time, without effect. For six months he ap-\npeared to be in a deep sleep, unconscious of every thing.\nAt the end of that period, however, resort having been had\nto certain chirurgical Operations, he was suddenly restored\nto his speech and the exercise of his understanding. When\nhe recovered, the servant, to whom he had been giving or-\nders, when he was first seized with the distemper, happen-\ning to be in the room, he asked him, if he had done what\nhe had ordered him to, not being sensible, that any interval,\nexcept perhaps a very short one, had elapsed during his ill-\nness.\nWe get the idea of time, by considering any part of\nduration, as set or marked off by periodical measures, such\nas days or years. And it should be remarked, when we\nconsider our design of tracing all our ideas to sensation\nand reflection, that we obtain the idea of these lengths or\nmeasures by means of the senses, viz. by our observation of\nthe annual and diurnal revolutions of the sun.\nUnder the simple modes from duration, then, may be\nreckoned minutes, hours, days, months, years, indeed every\ndivision, of which duration is susceptible.\n10","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0079.jp2"},"80":{"fulltext":"^4 SIMPLE AND MIXED MODES.\n65; Simple modes from extension.\nTo extension, which is a simple idea, derived from the\nsenses of sight and touch, we give the name of length, when\nit is contemplated as existing only in one direction.\nAll our artificial measures of extension, such as an inch,\na foot, a yard, a furlong, a mile, a league, a degree, what-\never may be the process of the mind in forming those mea-\nsures, are among its simple modes.\nThat is to say, if we adopt an inch as the original mea-\nsurement or the unit, from which we are to begin, then a\nfoot consists of parts of extension, signified by the term\ninch, multiplied twelve times and a yard is the same mea-\nsure, increased or multiplied thirty six times.\n66. Idea of infinity.\nOf our idea of infinity it seems difficult to give any sat-\nisfactory explanation or to say with certainty where it\nshould be classed, but there are three things, with which\nwe are in the habit of connecting it, viz. number, duration,\nand extension.\nWe form the idea of infinity of number by adding num-\nbers as far as possible, with the additional notion, that this\nprocess may be carried on to any extent.\nWe form the idea of infinity of duration by repeating\nthe ideas of time, such as an hour or a day, the same as in\nnumber. N\nWe obtain the idea of infinity of extension, or rather of\nthat modification of extension, which is termed length, in\nthe same manner, by repeating the ideas of an inch, a foot,\na yard, or some other measure, always feeling, when we\nhave carried on this addition to the utmost extent of whiclji\nwe are capable, that it may be prosecuted still further, in-\ndefinitely.\nWe seem to ourselves to receive the clearest idea of\ninfinity from number, because the distinction between all\nits modes is very accurately marked, so that we have a well\ndefined perception of it. Indeed it does not appear, that,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0080.jp2"},"81":{"fulltext":"SIMPLE AND MIXED MODES. 75\nwithout the assistance of number, we could ever form the\nideas of infinity of duration and extension.\nWe obtain the idea of eternity by supposing our ideas\nof time, for instance, a month or year, repeated in both di-\nrections, in time past as well as in that which is to come,\nalways keeping the idea of the possibility of the further\nprosecution of this process of repeating.\n67. Of the complex ideas called mixed mpdes.\nMixed modes are complex ideas, the attributes or de-\npendencies of substances, compounded of simple ideas of\ndifferent kinds. Instances are the ideas of theft, murder,\ngratitude, e.\nTheft is a change of property without the consent of\nthe owner consequently, embraces among other ideas,\ndiffering from each other, those of ownership, transference,\nand consent.\nMurder is putting a person to death with evil inten-\ntion or malice aforethought consequently includes the\nideas of man, death, evil feelings.\nGratitude is an emotion of love or complacency to*\nwards a person for some act of kindness, which he has\ndone to us. In this mixed mode, therefore, we have refer-\nence, not only to the person, who has received the bene-\nfit, but to the person, who conferred it, as well as to the\nact itself and the intellectual emotion excited.\nd8. Three ways of forming mixed modes.\nThere are three ways in particular, in which we appear\nto receive into the mind mixed modes.\n(1) The first method is by experience or observation of\nthe things themselves.\nWe see a person wrestling, swimming, or fencing, and\nthence learn the ideas, conveyed by those words.\n(2) The second method is by invention or voluntarily\nputting together several simple ideas in our own minds.\nThe person, that first invented etching or printing, had\nan acquaintance both with the complex ideas, and some","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0081.jp2"},"82":{"fulltext":"76 SIMPLE AND MIXED MODES.\nsubordinate ideas conveyed in those terms, before they\ncould have existed in the minds of others.\n(3) Third method, By taking ideas, which already\nexist in the mind, and which, being generally known, may\nbe considered common property, and combining them to-\ngether for example in the word, falsehood.\nBy examining the mixed modes and tracing them to\ntheir original elements, we shall find them ultimately con-\nnected with the great sources of our knowledge, sensation\nand reflection.\n69. Not the same mixed modes in all languages.\nThe customs, habits, modes of thinking, political insti-\ntutions, c are not the same in all countries, but differ in\ngreater or less degree. Hence there is need of different\nexpressions that is, of expressions in one language not pre-\ncisely corresponding to expressions in another.\nThus the word, ostrakismos in the Greek, proscriptio\nin the Latin, and corban in the Hebrew, expressed ideas,\nto which most other nations found nothing precisely cor-\nresponding, and, consequently, had no corresponding term.\nThis suggests a remark on the changes, which take\nplace in languages. It is well known, that there are con-\nstant alterations in customs, and hardly less frequent\nfluctuations in feeling and opinion, and hence there\nnecessarily arise new combinations of thought or ideas\nand these must be expressed by new names.\nIf people should be found unable or unwilling to invent\nnew names for the expression of new complex ideas, they\nwould evidently be subjected to great inconvenience.\nThis may be seen, if we deprive ourselves of the benefit of\nany complex terms, for instance, reprieve and appeal, and\nattempt to converse on the subjects, where they naturally\noccur.\nWe do not consider a mixed mode, as actually existing\nin a language without a name.\nThe number of mixed modes, therefore, in any lan-\nguage, although it might be greatly increased, is looked","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0082.jp2"},"83":{"fulltext":"IDEAS OF substanceJ 77\nupon as limited by the number of names or words, by\nwhich they are expressed.\nCHAPTER SEVENTH.\nIDEAS OF SUBSTANCE.\n70. What we are to understand by ideas of substance.\nIn regard to those material bodies, by which we are\nsurrounded, we can properly and in truth be said to have\na knowledge only of those qualities in them, which are the\ncause of our simple ideas, or of tyhich our simple ideas are\nrepresentative. We truly knoW this, and nothing more\nit being altogether beyond our power to form an ac-\nquaintance with that, whatever it is, which is imagined\nto be the essence, substratum, or support of these qual-\nities.\nThe sentiment here conveyed is expressed in shorter\nterms by saying, that our knowledge of bodies is limited\nto the knowledge of their properties.\nAn idea of substance is that complex state of the mind,\nwhich considers a number of qualities, belonging to any\nparticular substance as one, or as naturally and permanent-\nly united. And this is the second general division or class\nof our complex ideas.\nInstances are the complex ideas, expressed by the\nwords, sun, loadstone, man, horse, iron, tree, indeed all\nthose intellectual states, which correspond to that great\nvariety of separate, material objects, which continually\ncome beneath our inspection.\nIn the idea of man we have, among others, the simple\nideas of figure, colour, motion, conscience.\n71. Spiritual existences included under this class.\nBut ideas of substance are not to be limited, as might","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0083.jp2"},"84":{"fulltext":"78 IDEAS OP SUBSTANCE.\nat first from these remarks be inferred, to material objects\nthis division includes many from another source. Under\nthis class is to be included our ideas of spiritual existences,\nof the mind, of the soul in its disembodied state, of angels,\nof God himself.\nIt is true, they are not substances in the ordinary mean-\ning of the term, that is, they are not material substances,\nlike the sensible objects, with which we are so much con-\nversant, and to which we almost exclusively apply that\nname.\nBut they are substances in this sense, they are real\nand not imaginary, they have an existence, they are not\nthe mere relations of one thing to another, not the mere\ndependencies on them, but the things themselves.\nBut some will doubt, whether we have that clear knowl-\nedge of mind and of spiritual things in general, which we\nhave of bodies material and on this ground think, that\nthey ought not to be included in the same division of our\ncomplex notions. This is a point, worthy a moment s\nnotice.\n72. Our knowledge of spirit the same as of matter.\nAlthough it may appear strange to some, when we say,\nthat we know no more of matter, about which we are daily\nconversant, and which we see and touch, than concerning\nmental or spiritual existences, which our bodily senses are\nunable to approach and examine, it i» a sentiment at last\nalmost universally received, and with the very, best reason.\nIt has already been remarked of matter, that we know\nnothing concerning it but by its properties, and we know\nnothing of immaterial existences likewise, except by their\nproperties and our knowledge?, therefore, is in both cases\non the same footing, being the same in kind at least, if not\nin degree. Our acquaintance witli the properties of ma-\nterial bodies may possibly go further than our acquaintance\nwith those of mind, but it is in both cases circumscribed\nby the eama limitation, unable to advance beyond those\nproperties.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0084.jp2"},"85":{"fulltext":"IDEAS OF SUBSTANCE. 79\nObserving certain mental operations, thinking, remem-\nbering, willing, assenting, doubting, and the like, we can-\nnot avoid the conviction of the existence of something, to\nwhich they belong, or of which they are qualities and we\ncall it spirit or a spiritual being.\nThe same of matter we learn its qualities,, primary\nand secondary, colour, extension, figure, motion, divisibili-\nty, c. and these, viewed by the mind in their state of\ncombination or as having a common ^d coetaneous ori-\ngin, give us the i^ea of what w r e call matter or substance.\nIf it be asked, how it happens, that we so uniformly re-\nfer these operations to what we term substance* or spirit,\nor rather how they are so promptly suggested on the ob-\nservation of the properties, (there being an universal b\nlief in the existence of the material and spiritual world,)\nthe only answer is that, already remarked upon in the\nsecond chapter viz. That wejhus constituted we are under\na sort of necessity, in consequence of the natural tenden-\ncies of our constitution, of connecting with the appearan-\nces, which we witness, the idea of a really existing some-\nthing, which we call, either matter or mind, material or\nspiritual, according to the character of those appearances.\nBut when this idea is once suggested, we are taught by\nthe inutility of our efforts to proceed any further, that we\nhave reached one boundary of our knowledge, which we\ncannot pass and that while we have an idea of matter and\nspirit, and cannot but believe in their existence, we know no\nmore of them, nor shall we probably ever know more, than\nthose appearances and operations, whatever they may be\nwhich they shall exhibit.\n73. Of cohesion of bodies and motion by impulse.\nIf there be any, who, after what has been said, think\nthey understand matter better than they do spirit, then\nwould we desire them to give an explanation of what that\nis in matter, which is termed cohesion. That the particle*\nof gold, of iron, of water, and other materia! bodies are\nheld together by what is termed cohesion, is a fact, which","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0085.jp2"},"86":{"fulltext":"80\nIDEAS OF SUBSTANCE.\nbeing within our daily observation, no one is inclined to\ndoubt, but it is the fact only which we know, and nothing-\nmore.\nOne body impinging on another puts it in motion, and\nwe term it motion by impulse. But how motion passes\nfrom one body to another, when the particles of those bodies\ncome in contact, if indeed there can be any actual con-\ntact, is by no means so easy to be determined. It will be\nfound as difficult to be understood and explained as any\nof those obstacles, which are supposed to stand in the way\nof a full knowledge of spiritual existences.\nSome further illustrations of this subject in particular\ninstances remain to be made.\n74. Explanations on certain ideas of this class.\nIf called upon to give an account of the loadstone,\nwhich is the name of one of the many ideas of substance,\nwe could give no other answer than by an enumeration of\nits qualities, something, which has colour, hardness, fri-\nability, power to draw iron.\nThe sun has been mentioned, as one among the com-\nplex ideas of substances, but little mo*re do we know of it\nthan this, that it is an aggregate of certain qualities or sim-\nple ideas, such as brightness, heat, roundness, regularity\nof motion.\nWe say of gold, that it is a combination of the qualities\nof yellowness, great weight, fusibility, ductility, c. exist-\ning together, and forming the material substance, to which\nwe give that name.\nv\\. 75. Remarks on complexity in the states of the mind.\nIt would seem from the statement thus far given in re-\ngard to our ideas of substance, that there is in this class of\n;ur thoughts a complexity in the state of the mind, corres-\nponding to the complexity in the object, and without this\ncomplexity, in all cases, of the intellectual principle, there\n«:ainiot be what is termed a complex idea. But it is not to be","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0086.jp2"},"87":{"fulltext":"IDEAS OF SUBSTANCE. 81\nthought, that we arrive at this ultimate complexity of men-\ntal state by a single act, by an undivided and inseparable\nmovement of the mind, although, such is the rapidity of\nthe process, it may in some cases seem to be so.\nOn the contrary, every simple idea, involved in, and\nforming a part of the compound, so far aS we have any dis-\ntinct conception of the compounded idea, passes under a\nrapid review, and the complex state of the mind or com-\nplex idea is the result of this rapid review.\nWe cannot, for instance, have a complex idea of man,\nof iron, or of a tree, without having first, at some time, sub-\njected each simple idea of which it is made up, to a partic-\nular examination.\nThis glance of the mind at the various simple ideas is\nperformed indeed with such extreme quickness, at least\ngenerally so, that the successive steps of it are not recollect-\ned but this, when we consider the rapidity of the mind s\nOperations in other instances, is no sufficient objection to\nthe statement, which has been made.\nThe process in the formation of complex ideas goes\non from step to step, from one simple idea to another, but\nwhen the examination is completed, the ultimate state of\nthe mind, which the completion Of the process implies, is\nnot to be considered as in any degree wanting in unity or\noneness.\nj. 76. Connection existing behveen material substances\nto be considered.\nIn forming our complex ideas of substances, it is highly\nimportant, that they should be conformed, as nearly as pos-\nsible, to the real nature of things and that we should not\ncombine in the idea any thing, which is not in the sub-\nstance. And in order to this, it should be remembered,\nthat bodies are operated upon one by another, and exhibit\nto us different qualities, in consequence of this operation.\nOne of the qualities of gold is yellowness, but break\noff entirely the intercourse between the particles of gold\nand the rays of light, and yellowness ceases. Life and\n-motion are ideas, which commonly enter into our complex.\n11","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0087.jp2"},"88":{"fulltext":"32 IDEAS OF SUBSTANCE.\nnotion of animals, but deprive them of air and life and\nmotion are gone.\nWe would not say, that, in these particular instances,\nin our complex ideas of gold and of animal, that these\nideas, yellowness, life, and motion are to be struck out\nbut use them merely as an illustration, that in making up\nour complex notion of any substances, we are to consider\nnot only the objects themselves, but also to take into view\nother objects, which have an influence on them.\n77. Of chimerical ideas of substances.\nThere are certain ideas, the consideration of which\nproperly falls in this chapter, termed chimerical the ideas,\nfor example expressed by the words, centaur, dragon, hypo-\ngrifT, harpy.\nThe centaur is represented, as an animal, partly man,\nand partly horse. The dragon is supposed to be an im-\nmense serpent furnished with wings and capable of making\nits way through the atmosphere by their aid. The hypo-\ngriff is an imaginary horse, capable of performing aerial\njourneys in the same way.\nIdeas of this kind are termed chimerical, because there\nis nothing corresponding to them in nature, there is no\nreality of the sort intimated by the term.\nIf a person were known to have an idea of a body,\nyellow or of some other colour, malleable, fixed, possess-\ning in a word all the qualities of iron or of gold with this\ndifference only, of its being lighter than water, it would\nbe what we term a chimerical idea that is it would\nhave nothing corresponding to it in the nature of things.\n78. Of what is meant by real ideas.\nReal ideas arc the opposite of chimerical, having a\ncorrespondence with natural things, or being such ideas as\nthings in their true nature arc fitted to produce.\nHence simple ideas are real, because there can be no\nsimple idea, except it be such as nature in some of its\nforms is fitted to produce within us also simple modes","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0088.jp2"},"89":{"fulltext":"IDEAS OF SUBSTANCE] 83\nare real, because they are only the multiplications or rep-\netitions of some simple idea.\nExcepting such chimerical ideas, as were mentioned in\nthe preceding section, viz. dragon, centaur, faery, harpy,\nhypogrifF, ghost, hobgoblin, iron lighter than water, c»\nall ideas of substance are real. But when we speak of\nideas of substance, with such exceptions as above, being\nreal, we do not mean, to say, that they do perfectly and in\nall respects represent their corresponding objects.\nIn our complex idea of gold, we combine the simple\nideas of yellowness, weight, malleability, and perhaps oth-\ners, but probably none combine, in their conception of it,\nall its properties so that, although we speak of it, as a\nveal, we do not speak of it, as a perfect or adequate idea.\nThe same of other instances.\nFurther, it may be incidentally remarked, that chimer-\nical ideas are in general formed in times of ignorance and\nsuperstition, and people suppose themselves to see what in\n.truth never was seen by them.\n79. Importance of having real ideas.\nIdeas are the elements or materials, about which the\nmind is employed in its yarious operations, and without\nwhich we can neither have opinion, nor faith, nor reason-\ning, nor knowledge. It is true, that those ideas, which are\ntermed chimerical, and of which there are no archetypes\nin nature, admit of being compared together, and if we\nadopt the definition given by Mr. Locke, that knowledge\nis the perception of the agreement or disagreement of\nideas, they may be considered as furnishing grounds of\nknowledge, but the superstructure will partake of the char-\nacter of the foundation in other words, it will be chimer-\nical.\nWe might ever so long puzzle ourselves in the investi-\ngation of such fantastical thoughts, and in the end be none\nthe wiser.\nThe greater number a person has of such ideas, he is\nso much the poorer, as we do not account a man rich,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0089.jp2"},"90":{"fulltext":"$4 IDEAS Or SUBSTANCE.\nwhose coffers are filled with hay, wood, and stubble, in*\nstead of the precious metals.\nEvery person, therefore, is not to be considered well\nfurnished, who has a great number of ideas, merely from\nthe circumstance of the greatness of their number but\ntheir character in various respects, their justness, their ob-\njects, and their conformity to those objects are to be taken\ninto consideration which is much the same as to say, that\na few real ideas are of more value, than many chimerical\nones.\n80. Of our ideas of angels.\nWe have our knowledge of mind in the same way as\nof matter, that is, by an observation of its qualities. And\nwe are led from the accounts given of celestial messengers,\nto conceive of that class of beings, to which the term,\nangels, is applied,, as if there were some resemblance or\nanalogy, existing between ouf minds and them in other\nwords, we regard them, as spiritual or immaterial.\nBut we $o not speak of them, as to their nature and\npowers, with the same degree of confidence, with which\nwe speak of the human mind and of matter, since they are\na class of beings, not coming under the examination of the\nsenses, neither are they to be examined by us in the way,\nin which we can form an acquaintance with our own inteU\nlectual part.\nFor our knowledge, therefore, of angels and of any\nother class of beings superior to ourselves but subordinate\nto the Deity, we must rest satisfied with what information\nis given us in the Holy Scriptures.\n§.81. Origin of tJu idea of God.\nArriong the complex ideas, included under this class,\nis to be mentioned in particular that of God and the ori-\ngin of it on the principles of Mr. Locke, which are in the\nmain adopted in this book, seems to be naturally account-\ned for in this way.\nWe suppose a person entirely separated from the rest","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0090.jp2"},"91":{"fulltext":"IDEAS OF SUBSTANCE. 85\nof the world, dwelling in some distant island, and furnish-\ned, as it were, only with the senses, and with the variety of\nobjects around him, fitted to operate upon them.\nHe will, in the first place, connect together certain\nthings, as antecedents and consequents, or what is the same\nthing, as causes and effects, such as the waving of woods\nand the blowing of the wind, the wearing away of the\nshore and the motion of the waves against it.\nHaving in this way formed an idea of antecedent and\nconsequent, it will be found, in the second place, that the\nthought will, ere a long period, arise slowly and dimly in his\nmind, that those appearances in nature, which he has been\nin the habit of regarding as antecedents or causes, should\nthemselves have a cause that while the tempest breaks\ndown in his own sight the forest, there should, and must be\nsome one to guide the storm, and while the shore crumbles\nbeneath the incursions of the ocean, there must be some-\nthing, though where or what it is, he cannot tell, which\nboth pushes on and restrains its raging.\nThe idea at first, it must be admitted, is an obscure\none, but it in time becomes less so for nothing can be\nmore true than the assertion of the Psalmist, that, in refer-\nence to the glory of God, Day unto day uttereth speech,\nand night unto night showeth knowledge.\nWe remarked in regard to the great first Cause, which\nthe natural workings of soul in our solitary islander will\nsooner or later inevitably discover, that he is unable to say,\nwhere or what it is and this inability becomes in the end,\na favourable circumstance. He cannot say of that first\nCause, that it is in the stars, or in the ocean, or in the wild\nwaste of the wilderness, but conscious of this inability to\ndiscover it in any particular place, he learns to identify it\nnot with one merely, but with every local habitation, and\nto associate it with all unmeasured space, and although he\ncan in one sense say, it is no where, he can, in another,\nsay, God is every where.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0091.jp2"},"92":{"fulltext":"86\nCHAPTER EIGHTH.\nX3DSAS OP HBIsATZO^.\n82. WTta/ we are to understand by ideas of relation.\nThe third, general division of our complex ideas is into\nideas of relation, which are formed by the comparison of\nour thoughts, one with another.\nThe mind, in the exercise of its various operations,\nhas the power of considering objects or rather the ideas\nstanding for objects, in such a manner that it does, as it\nwere, bring them together and set them side by side, and\nsee how they conform to each other, or how they differ\nin other words, discovers their relations. Take this illus-\ntration.\nWhen we consider Lorenzo, as distinct and separate\nfrom all others of his fellow beings, and make Lorenzo\nalone and exclusively the subject of our contemplations,\nwe have merely the complex idea of a man, bearing that\nname. But then Lorenzo may be a father, a son, a broth-\ner, a citizen, a legislator these terms express ideas of re-\nlation.\nWhen we speak of Lorenzo as a father, the mind first\nturns itself from the man himself to his children, and hav-\ning considered the relation they sustain, with sufficient rea-\nson ascribes to him the attribute of paternity.\nAny of our ideas, already existing in the mind, may lay\nthe foundation of other ideas of relation, since they may\nin general be compared together, or, at least, if they can-\nnot themselves be readily placed side by side, may be the\noccasion of bringing others into comparison.\n83. Of the great number of our ideas of relation.\nMr. Locke has the remark, that it would make a vol-\n«rne to go over all sorts of relations, and with good reason","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0092.jp2"},"93":{"fulltext":"IDEAS OF RELATION. 87\nsince they are as numerous, as that almost endless variety\nof respects, in which our ideas may be compared together,\nand of that multitude of circumstances, which are to be\ntaken into view in such comparisons. With the single\nidea of man how many others are connected in conse-\nquence of the various relations, which he sustains\nHe may, at one and the same time, be a father, broth-\ner, son, grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-in-law,\nhusband, friend, enemy, subject, general, judge, patron,\nclient, professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant,\nmaster, possessor, superiour inferiour, bigger, less, older,\nyounger, contemporary, like, unlike, together with sustain-\ning a variety of other relations too numerous to be men-\ntioned. We shall not pretend, therefore, to exhaust the\nsubject, but shall leave it to the reader more fully to pur-\nsue it, as opportunity and inclination may prompt, having\nfirst submitted to him a few prominent hints.\n84. Of the use of correlative terms.\nCorrelative terms are such terms, as are used to express\ncorresponding ideas of relation.\nThey suggest the relations with great readiness, and by\nmeans of them the mind can be more steadily, and longer,\nand with less pain, fixed upon the ideas, of which they are\nexpressive. The words, father and son, legislator and con-\nstituents, brother and sister, husband and wife, and others\n©f this class, as soon as they are named, at once carry our\nthoughts beyond the persons, who are the subjects of these\nrelations, to the relations themselves. Wherever, there-\nfore, there are correlative tejms, the relations may be ex-\npected to be clear to the mind.\nThe word, concubine, is a relative term, but there be-\ning no word correlative, expressing a corresponding rela-\ntion, we find it more difficult to form a conception of the\nthing signified, than of brother, which has the correlative,\nsister, and of wife, which has the correlative, husband.\nIt should be remembered, that the relation is something\ndifferent from the things related.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0093.jp2"},"94":{"fulltext":"88 IDEAS OF RELATION.\nA person may sustain the relation and be called a fa-\nther to-day, and to-morrow his children may be dead still\nhe is the same man, though this relation has ceased. The\nrelations, which we sustain are frequently changing,, while\nthe subjects of them are the same.\n85. Of proportional relations.\nAmong the various, subordinate divisions, of which our\nrelations are susceptible, there is one class, including a\nconsiderable number of ideas of this kind, called propor-\ntional RELATIONS.\nIn this minor division may be included all those ideas,\nwhich are capable of being considered as made up of parts\nor as susceptible of different degrees and of consequence,\nadmitting of being compared as to more or less. Hence\ntheir name, because we consider the proportion which they\nsustain to others, as to size or degrees.\nInstances are whiter, sweeter, holier, larger, smaller,\nnobler, indeed all adjectives, which admit of being put\ninto the comparative or superlative.\nWe cannot say of one apple, that it is sweeter than an-\nother, or of one man, that he is holier than another, with-\nout involving the supposition, that they have been compar-\ned together, the apples as to their degrees of sweetness,\nand the persons spoken of as to their degrees of holiness.\n86. Certain terms are relative which are supposed\nto be positive.\nThere are certain terms also, whether they are to be\nclassed with the proportional relations or not, is not essen-\ntial to inquire, but which are supposed to be positive terms\nand not to intimate any comparison or relative considera-\ntion of other ideas we allude to no small number of ad-\njectives in the positive degree take as instances, the\nepithets wise, ignorant, rich, poor, old, young. However\nthese may at first tight appear to be entirely positive, and\nhave been considered to be so, and as excluding any com-\nparative references, they may be found on examination t.»","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0094.jp2"},"95":{"fulltext":"IDEAS OF RELATION. 89\nbe of a somewhat different character from what has often\nbeen imagined.\nLet it, then, be considered what we mean, when we\nsay of a person, He is old we evidently compare him in\nregard to his age, whenever we use those expressions,\nwith others, with people in general,; and place the par-\nticular number of years, to which he^may have attained,\nby the side of that period, which we are in the habit of re-\ngarding as the ordinary limit of man s pilgrimage.\nThe same, when we say of any person, that he is young;\nhe is then considered as falling far short of an assumed pe-\nriod, an approximation to which gives to another person\nthe reputation of age.\nAgain, when we say of any individual, that he is wise\nor ignorant, we tacitly make a comparison of what he has\nlearnt with the acquisitions of mankind in general. If it\nexceed the ordinary sum of human knowledge, we call him\nwise if it fall short, he is characterized, as ignorant.\nAccordingly, a comparison of this sort being implied\nin the use of epithets, a North American savage, or a per-\nson of any other uncivilized race, might enjoy the reputa-\ntion of great wisdom among his own people, who could\nnot but be accounted ignorant in any philosophical socie-\nty of a civilized nation.\n87. Of ideas of natural relations.\nSecondly; Having mentioned proportional relations,\nas forming a minor or subordinate division of this third,\ngeneral class of our complex ideas, it is to be noticed here,\nthat there is another, a second occasion of comparing\nthings together, so as to ascertain ideas of relation viz.\nWhen we consider their orjgin or beginning, and see how\nother things stand in reference to that origin. And such\nideas as are ascertained in this way, and are found to re-\nsult, as it were, from creation and nature, are what are\ntermed ideas of natural relations.\nIt seems to be particularly characteristick of those re-\nlations, which we have now in view, that they are perma-\n12","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0095.jp2"},"96":{"fulltext":"90 IDEAS OF RELATION.\nnent meaning by the remark, that they are not altered and\nbrought to an end by ordinary circumstances but, as they\nbegin to exist at the moment of birth, will be found to ter-\nminate only with the life either of the subject of the rela-\ntion or of the correlated person.\nSuch are the ideas of father, brother, son, nephew, c.\nMr. Locke mentions the term, countrymen, that is,\nthose, who were born in the same country or tract of\nground, as belonging here.\n88. Of ideas of instituted or conventional relations.\nThirdly; There are relations, which do not result\nfrom the constitution of nature, but are the consequence\nof the various obligations and duties in civil society and\nthese, therefore, may be called ideas of constituted or\nCONVENTIONAL RELATIONS.\nThus a general is one, who has the power to command\nan army, this power being delegated to him by virtue of\ncertain provisions, entering originally into the terms of\nthe civil compact.\nAn army is a collection or body of armed men, who\nare under obligations, by the terms of such civil compact,\nto obey one man.\nA citizen or burgher is one, who has a right to the\nprivileges of civil society in a certain place, that is to say,\nis the subject of some government, to the principles of\nwhose organization he is supposed to have consented, and\nto have taken a part in it.\nThese relations may be distinguished from the natural\nrelations in the preceding section, by the circumstance,\nthat they are not permanent, but are dependent upon the\nwill or agreement of men, and may terminate before the\nsubjects of them have ceased to exist.\nThe general may cease to act in that capacity, since\nthe government, who gave him his authority, may take it\naway again. The army may be disbanded, and the bonds\nof civil society may be broken loose, and its members go","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0096.jp2"},"97":{"fulltext":"IDEAS OF RELATION. 91\nback again into the unrestricted freedom of the state of\nnature.\nIt is not thus in natural relations. The father is a fath-\ner, so long as the son lives, the son sustains the filial re-\nlation so long as the existence of the father, and, in ail\ncases of this description, the relations do not terminate,\nuntil one of the correlated persons is no more.\n89. Plate is an idea of relation.\nWe cannot conceive of any body having place or posi-\ntion, without comparing it with some other bodies. If,\ntherefore, having two bodies fixed, or which maintain the\nsame relative position, we can compare a third body with\nthem, the third body can then be said to have place or po-\nsition.\nThis may be illustrated by the chess-men, placed on the\nchess-board. We say, the men are in the same place, al-\nthough the board may have been removed from one room\nto another. We use this language, because we consider\nthe men only in relation to each other and the parts of\nthe board, and not in relation to the rooms or parts of the\nroom.\nHence we may clearly have an idea of the place or po-\nsition of all the different parts of the universe, considered\nseparately, because they may be compared with other\nparts.\nBut we are unable to form any idea of the place or\nposition o the universe considered, as a whole, because\nwe have then no other body, with which we can compare it.\n89. Chronological dates involve ideas of relation.\nThe independence of the North American colonies was\ndeclared, July 4th, 1776.\nThese expressions may be thus explained.\nWe assume the present year, 1826, as a given period\nand reckon back to the year, one, which coincides with the\nbirth of our Saviour then the year, 1776, expresses the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0097.jp2"},"98":{"fulltext":"92 IDEA3 OF RELATION.\ndistance between these two extremes, viz. one, and eighteen\nhundred, twenty six. This seems to be all we learn, when\nwe say, the Independence of the United States was declar-\ned at the period mentioned.\nWe mean the same thing, and convey the same idea,\nwhether we say that the Saviour was born in the year, one,\nof the Christian era, or, in the year, 4004, from the creation\nof the world. But, in the first case, the year, 4004, ex-\npresses the distance between these two extremes, viz. the\nbeginning of the world, and the present time while, in\nthe second instance, the event itself forms the beginning\nof the series.\nSo that all dates appear to be properly classed under\nideas of relation.\n90. Cause and effect ideas of relation.\nCause and effect, which are nothing more than regu-\nlar antecedents and consequents, as already repeatedly re-\nmarked, belong here. They certainly have a relation to\neach other, for we cannot conceive of a cause, if we ex-\nclude from the list of our ideas the correlative notion of\neffect, nor, on the other hand, do we call any thing an ef-\nfect without a reference to some antecedent.\nIt would seem from an examination of the process of\nthe mind, in regard to these ideas, that we derive our no-\ntion of effect from an observation of the changes, which\ntake place in bodies around us. When any change has\nhappened, we necessarily feel, as if something had been\ndone, and we term it an effect, having a mental reference\nto something antecedent, as before mentioned. So that\nwe have the idea of effect, in the first instance, by means\nof the senses and as we cannot have an idea of cause\nwithout its correlative, we may look upon this idea also as\ncapable of being traced to the same source and both of\nthem, when we notice their mutual dependence and con-\nnection, are to be considered as most naturally coming un^\nder the general class of relations.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0098.jp2"},"99":{"fulltext":"IDEAS OF RELATION\n93\n91. Modes, substances, and relations resolvable into\nsimple ideas.\nAll our complex ideas, whether modes, substances, or\nrelations, may be traced back and resolved int© simple\nideas, although it may not be very obvious, in some instan-\nces, how this is to be done, or when we have arrived at the\nend of the analysis.\nIt seems in general to be more easy to ascertain what\nare the simple ideas, which enter into the formation of the\ntwo first classes, than of the third. But nothing, it must\nbe confessed, is so much wanting as the patience necessary\nto go into a careful examination of our thoughts, in order\nto a successful result even in this last class.\nWhen ,we say, that honey is sweeter than bread, or\nthat iron is harder than wax, the words, sweeter and hard-\ner express relations or relative ideas, but being analyzed,\nso far as we are able to, they clearly terminate in the sim-\nple ideas of sweetness and hardness.\nWhen we say of any individual, whom we happen to\nsee, that he is our friend or our enemy, words, which not\nonly express relations, but are correlative to each other,\nwhat do we mean to say or imply in the use of such ex-\npressions, but this viz.\n(1) That he is a man, (2) That -he. exercises love or ha-\ntred, (3) That we are the subjects of it. And having\nmade this general analysis of the terms, we are then to\nconsider what the complex notion, expressed by the word,\nman, is made up of, to inquire also where the idea of love\nor of hatred is to be classed, and what is its origin, c.\nAnd thus we shall in the end arrive at those ideas, which\nare termed simple.\nAt present no further remarks remain to be made by us\non the subject of the origin of our ideas. As this Treatise\nis designed for beginners in the science, to be more par-\nticular might tend rather to discourage, than to lead them\non in the path of knowledge and yet, we trust, such a\nview of it has been taken, as will not only be deemed in\ngeneral correct, but sufficiently extensive to satisfy a mod-\nerate curiosity.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0099.jp2"},"100":{"fulltext":"94 IDEAS OF RELATION.\nWe finish this chapter with a few practical remarks on\nfurnishing our minds with ideas.\nIt was observed in the seventy ninth section, that a few\nreal ideas are of more consequence than many chimerical\nones, and let it to be admitted to be a just remark. But\nof such ideas, as are real, as are consistent, as are distinct,\nand ready at command, there cannot be too many, any\nmore than a man can have an excess of truth or an exuber-\nance of moral virtue.\n92. The mind should be furnished with a store of\nideas.\nAs early as possible should the mind be furnished with\na rich variety of thoughts. Although it be proper and\noftentimes necessary, that persons should direct their atten-\ntion more to some particular subject than others, yet he\nCannot be considered as possessed of a good education*\nwho is not in some degree acquainted with many sub-\njects,\nOur acquisitions are not to be limited to the affairs of\nour own country, but we are to become acquainted with\nthe history of other nations also and while there is much\nto be learnt, that is modern, the records of antiquity are\nnot to be neglected. We are to learn things both of a\npolitical and a religious kind, those, which have relation to\nthe mechanick arts, the laws of nature, the intercourse of\nlife, the principles of the mind, and on a variety of other\nsubjects.\nSome of the benefits of possessing a large fund of\nideas, which are the elements or materials of our knowl-\nedge, are these.\n(1) It enables us to take a wide, and, therefore, in gen-\neral a more accurate view of subjects.\nIn regard to every science there are some things true\nand some things false, and we are constantly liable to er-\nrour it may, therefore, well be expected, that he, who has\na large store of ideas in that science, which he can exam-\nine and compare together, stands so much the better","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0100.jp2"},"101":{"fulltext":"IDEAS OF RELATION. 95\nchance of having his sentiments well balanced and cor*\nrect.\nA person, designing to pursue the study of law or of\ntheology, may be of the opinion, that a knowledge of\nchymistry, of natural philosophy, or of the physiology of\nthe human sytem, may be of no advantage to him, as a\nlawyer, theologian, c., but there are many things, it may\nbe replied, even if we admit the propriety of this opinion,\nthe knowledge of which may not be so particularly ben-\neficial in one s chosen pursuit, but of which, neverthe-\nless, it would be highly discreditable to be ignorant.\nMoreover, a lawyer, who is quite familiar with the prin-\nciples of his particular department, may sometimes find\nhimself a little perplexed, even when debating in a court\nof justice, in consequence of his ignorance of the chymic-\nal art, and a judge has been known to be confused, in ma-\nking up a decision on a case of suspected murder, for want\nof a more intimate acquaintance with the philosophy of\nour animal organization.\n(2) There is a second advantage, resulting from this\nenlarged and general acquaintance with things, viz. It will\nhelp, on the one hand, to preserve us from an excess of cre-\ndulity or too readily believing every thing, which is propos-\ned to us for our assent, and, on the other, will be likely\nto guard us from a positive and, dogmatical turn of mind.\nThere are many things, which at first sight appeared\nstrange and incredible, but were afterwards found by us to\nbe true. The more extensive the range of our ideas, the\nmore shall we have found of instances of this sort. Hence\nwhen any thing is stated, however strange it may at first\nappear, we shall not be disposed to affirm or deny in re-\nspect to it with dogmatism, but to inquire farther.\nThe more we know also in general, the more we shall,\nconsequently, know, in particular, of intentional deceptions,\nand of the various unavoidable causes of mistake, and shall\nthus be strengthened against the indulgence of an extreme\ncredulity.\nThese are advantages, which are not to be lightly pri-\nsed, and are a sufficient reason, why we should early at-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0101.jp2"},"102":{"fulltext":"95 IDEAS OF RELATION.\ntempt to furnish ourselves with many ideas on a variety of\nsubjects, by our personal observation of what things take\nplace around us, by reading judicious books, and by con-\nversation.\nOne fruitful source of ideas is conversation. We may\nlearn something even in conversing with those persons,\nwho have not had the advantages of a liberal education,\nand whose time is perhaps chiefly taken up in the exercise\nof some mechanick art, or in manual labour in the cultiva-\ntion of the soil.\nIt is to be remarked further, that we are not to despise\nthe conversation of those, who are of slow utterance, and\nwhose conversation is thought to be rather uninteresting.\nIt is a remark of Dean Swift, which has some philosophy\nin it, that the common fluency of speech in many persons\nis owing to a scarcity of words and ideas. For whoever, as\nhe reasons on the subject, is master of language and has a\nmind full of ideas, will be apt, in speaking, to hesitate upon\nthe choice of both. Whereas common speakers have only\none set of ideas and one set of words to clothe them in, and\nthese are always ready. It is something like people com-\ning fast out of a church, when it is nearly empty, but slow\nwhen there is a large crowd.\nNote. In passing from the origin of our ideas to the\nsubject treated of in the next chapter, we have only to say,\nthat we follow an order in the discussion, which naturally\nsuggests itself. We do not mean to assert, that the ar-\nrangement will appear perfectly natural to every one at\nfirst sight, although it will be likely to, on a little examin-\nation.\nHaving spoken of the origin of our ideas, which are\nthe materials, about which the mind employs itself, it sure-\nly comes in course to examine those states of mind, where\nthere is supposed to be a real perception of external ob-\njects, but is not and whjch, therefore, are a species of\nfalse or illusive ideas, not resulting from the natural ope-\nrations of the intellect, and not furnishing grounds of\nknowledge.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0102.jp2"},"103":{"fulltext":"97\nCHAPTER NINTH,\nOT APPARITIONS.\n93. What we are to understand by apparitions,\nAngels have appeared on earth. The Almighty has\npermitted it, as one means of forwarding the Scripture rev-\nelation, so necessary to mankind also other preternatural\nappearances in connection with the same great object.\nIt is hardly necessary to mention, among other instan-\nces, the appearance of the angel to Manoah and his wife,\nthe sudden arrival of one of the same class of beings to re-\nlease Peter from prison, and the circumstances of the\nTransfiguration.\nAs the canon of Scripture has long been closed, and\nthe days of miracles are over, it does not rightly fall to us\nto consider the cases, to which we have alluded, and, fur-\nther, they do not properly come under the head of appari-\ntions, since they were not merely imagined appearances,\nbut real.\nApparitions are appearances, which seem to be real\nbut which exist only in the imagination.\nThere may be apparitions, then, of departed spirits, of\nangels, of celestial cities, of landscapes, of mountains and\nprecipices, of festivals, triumphs, funeral processions, tem-\nples. There may be apparitions of all things, which exist,\nand of some things which do not exist.\nWe may imagine, that we see sue things, as have\nbeen mentioned, and others, and firmly believe, that they\nare before us, or that we are in the midst of them, and all\nof it be merely a mental deception.\n94. Of the connection between the mind and body.\nAll apparitions, it may be said with safety, are owing\n13","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0103.jp2"},"104":{"fulltext":"98 OF APPARITIONS.\neither to a permanently disordered state of the mind, or to\nsome unnatural, temporary excitement but mental disea-\nses is a subject full of difficulty. Whether the immaterial\nprinciple have diseases of itself and peculiarly its own, in-\ndependently of its connection with the body, or whether\nall its disorders may be traced to that connection, is a\npoint, on which, in the present, limited state of our knowl-\nedge on this subject, it would be presumption to offer any\npositive opinion.\nBut whether all our intellectual derangements can be\ntraced to the connection, existing between the mind and\nbody, or not, it is very certain, that this is the case with\nvery many of them. A few well known facts will help to\nillustrate the influence of the body over the mind.\n(1) Old age may be considered as a disease, and the\neffects on the mind go, step and step, with those on the\nbody. The mental vigour in those, who are experiencing\nthe decrepitudes of age, is in most cases evidently impaired.\nThe intellectual is hardly less deaf and blind, and stands\nhardly less in need of crutches to support it, than the bod-\nily system.\n(2) Violent, corporeal diseases in manhood, before any\ndecays take place from age, often affect the powers of\nthouglit. Persons have been known after a violent fever\nor violent attacks of any other kind, to lose entirely the\npower of recollection a circumstance to be remarked up-\non in the chapter on memory.\n(3) Many things of a stimulating nature, when taken\ninto the system, do in some way violently affect the mind.\nThis is in particular true of the nitrous oxide gas when\nit is inhaled in a considerable quantity, the conceptions are\nmore vivid, associated trains of thought are of increased\nrapidity, and emotions are excited, corresponding to the\nacuteness of sensations and the vividness of idea*.\n(4) In general, whenever the physical condition of\nthe brain, which is a prominent organ in the process of\nperception, is affected, whether it be from a more than\ncommon fulness of the blood vessels, or from other causes,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0104.jp2"},"105":{"fulltext":"Of APPARITIONS. Q9\nthe mind itself will be found to be affected also and often-\ntimes in a high degree.\nFacts of this description will help us, in some measure,\nin the explanation of those states of the mind, which are\ncalled apparitions 5 but with whatever light may be deriv-\ned from this source, the whole subject still remains in\nsome obscurity and open to many further inquiries.\n95. This subject illustrated from Shakespeare.\nThe definition, which we give of apparitions, is, that\nthey are appearances, which seem to be real, but which ex-\nist only in the imagination. But how does it happen, that\nthey are merely imaginary, when they hate so much the\nappearance of reality 4 The answer is, that they are\nideas or conceptions, in no ways differing from ordinary\nconceptions but this, that they are more vivid and it is in\nconsequence of being so much more vivid than common,\nthat the conceptions are mistaken for the thing conceived\nof, a state of the mind, which is brought about on the prin-\nciples of association, for the real object, which was origin-\nally the cause of that state of mind. The conception of\nthe man, of the mountain, the temple, or the procession, is\nso intense, so extremely vivid, that we as firmly believe\nthem to be really in our view, as when at some former pe-\nriod we truly beheld them.\nIn many cases, this great intensity and vividness of\nconceptions may be traced to some affection of the bodily\nsystem, as has already been intimated when, for instance,\na person has inhaled a quantity of nitrous oxide gas, when\nthere is a general strong excitement of the nervous system,\nor when it so happens, that the blood vessels of the brain\nare overcharged. There are, however, some instances of\napparitions, which baffle the efforts of any solution of this\nsort.\nFew persons have exhibited a more intimate acquaint-\nance with the principles of the mental constitution, than\nShakespeare. He was not ignorant of the fact, that the\nhuman mind, under certain circumstances, is in such a po-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0105.jp2"},"106":{"fulltext":"100 OF APPARITIONS.\nsition, that imaginary appearances impress it as strongly,\nand seem to be as truly and really before it, as any objects\nwhatever, which are actually beheld by us.\nThus, when Macbeth is preparing to slay Duncan, he\nbeholds the apparition of a dagger.\nIs this a dagger, which I see before me,\nThe handle towards my hand Come, let me clutch thee,\nI have thee not, and yet I see thee still.\nIt was not true, that Macbeth saw any thing, although,\nif he had clutched the dagger in his hand, he would not\nhave believed more firmly in its existence and presence,\nthan he did.\nFrom this tragedy and also from others, we have evi-\ndence of what has been stated,\n(1) That Shakespeare believed and knew, that there\nare apparitions or mental conceptions so vivid, as to be\nmistaken for realities;\n(2) And also that he considered apparitions to be\nowing to a disordered state of the mind, whatever might\nbe the cause c,f that mental derangement, whether bodily\nor in the mind itself.\nIn the present instance, he seems to me obscurely to\nintimate an opinion, that the apparition was to be ascri-\nbed to an inordinate determination of the blood to the\nbrain\nA dagger of the mind, a false creation\nProceeding frorn the heat-oppressed brain,\n96. Jlppearance of Caesar s ghost to Brutus.\nBefore the last battle on the plains of Philippi, a spec-\ntre somewhat larger, but not less distinct than the life, ap-\npeared to Marcus Junius Brutus the same spectre is said\nto have appeared to him once before. This incident,\nwhich is related by the early biographers of the patriotick\nRoman, is more recently taken notice of by Shakespeare\nalso, in the play of Julius Caesar he takes the liberty\nof a poet, however, in placing it before the death of Cas-\nsius.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0106.jp2"},"107":{"fulltext":"OF APPARITIONS. 101\nBrutus is represented, as sitting in his tent late at night,\nand the only one awake. He is just taking up a book to\nread, when Caesar s unwelcome spirit enters.\nHow ill this taper burns Ha Who comes here\nI think it is the weakness of mine eyes,\nThat shapes this monstrous apparition.\nIt comes upon me Art thou any thing\nArt thou some god, some angel, or some devil\nThe English dramatist well knew, whether the historic-\nal account of the incident were true or false, there was\nnothing impossible and perhaps not improbable in the cir-\ncumstance, that Brutus should have been under the in-\nfluence of that mental delusion, which is termed appari-\ntion ^nd have thus been led firmly to believe in the pres-\nence of the spectre.\nIn explanation of the spectre, which appeared to, Bru-\ntus, there is to be considered,\n(1) His bodily fatigue. Oppressed as he was with the\nprincipal cares of the army, we may well suppose, that his\nbodily system was in a measure worn down, and in such an\nunsettled and feverish state, as to detract not inconsid-\nerably from the due and consistent exercise of the intel-\nlectual faculties.\n(2) It is only a natural supposition also, that he was in\ngreat mental excitement, independent of any intellec\nderangement arising from his great fatigue; fores6ein| the\nmisery, which would come upon himself, if he were defeat\ned, on his family, and the whole Roman people and\nmembering, in particular, that he had plunged the\ninto the bosom of his friend for freedom, and that the free-\ndom, which he had thus sought, was likely to be losi\nThus there was combined, with an over-wears ed\nfeverish condition of the bodily system and the natural\nfects on the mind arising from this source, a strong arid fe\nful mental agitation from other causes and then it is to\nbe remembered also\n(3) That, in the instance of which we are now speak-\ning, it was the night before the battle, it was in its depth o^\nstillness and darkness, and his lamp was burning dimly be-\nside him.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0107.jp2"},"108":{"fulltext":"102 OF APPARITIONS.\nThese circumstances, although we do not pretend to\nOffer them as a full solution, justify us in the opinion, not\nthat he had a dream, which some have supposed, but that\nhis waking conception of the dead Caesar was so vivid, as\nto lead him to mistake the image for the reality.\nIt will be deemed pardonable, if I pass from this in-\nstance of antiquity, briefly to comment on a remark, which\nis to be found in one of those interesting little narratives,\nwhich detail the sufferings of the early settlers in our coun-\ntry when taken captive in the Indian wars, I allude to the\nnarrative of the captivity of a Mrs. Howe and her seven chiU\ndren, who in 1775 were taken prisoners at Hinsdale in New\nHampshire by a party of the St. Francois Indians. Once\ncoming into the company of a lumber of savages, after\nhaving been absent from them some little time, she saw\nthem smile at each other, and asked what was the matter\nThey replied, two of her children were no more, one hav-\ning died a natural death, and the other being knocked on\nthe head. I did not utter many words, (says the mother,)\nbut my heart was sorely pained within me, and my mind\nexceedingly troubled with strange and awful ideas. I often\nimagined for instance, that I plainly saw the naked carcases\nof my enildren hanging upon the limbs of trees, as the In-\ndians are wont to hang the raw hides of those beasts, which\nthey take in hunting, ^c.\nIt needs but a little reflection to assure one, that these\nconceptions or ideas were of that intensely vivid kind,\nwhich are here denominated apparitions, the mind being\nthrown into an unnatural and feverish posture by the great\ndegree of mental and bodily suffering.\nNote. The remarks in relation to Caesar s spectre\nmay be applied also in explanation of the appearance of\nBanquo s ghost in the tragedy of Macbeth.\n96. Confessions of an English opium-eater*\nThere is a book entitled confessions of an English\nunuM-EATER not without merit in point of style, but\nchiefly valuable for affording some facts in respect to the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0108.jp2"},"109":{"fulltext":"OP APPARITIONS. 103\nI\nmind. This person seems to have been naturally of a feel-\ning and imaginative turn, and this intellectual vivacity was\ngreatly increased by an inordinate use of opium so that\nin the end his intellect was thrown into an unnatural and\ndisorderly posture. In the middle of eighteen hundred and\nseventeen, the faculty of forming apparitions, that is, as\nthe terms are to be understood in his case, the power of\npainting all sorts of phantoms on the darkness, became so\nfrequent and eifective, as to be positively distressing to him.\nAt night when he lay awake in bed, vast processions pass-\ned along in mournful pomp friezes of never-ending sto-\nries, that to his feelings were sad and solemn, he informs\nus, as if they were stories drawn from times before Oedi-\npus or Priam, before Tyre, before Memphis. Whenever\nthe night shades had fallen, what®ver he happened to think\nupon, whether it were landscapes, or palaces, or armies in\nbattle array, in a word, whatever was a subject of thought,\nand was capable of being visually represented, formed\nthemselves into phantoms of the eye and swept before him\nin order and in distinctness, no less marked and imposing,\nthan if the real objects themselves had been present.\nThis was a state of mind, without doubt, in many re-\nspects, similar to that which framed the spectre of Caesar,\nthe imaginary sword of Macbeth, and suspended before the\nbewildered sight of the American captive the bodies of\nher lifeless children.\n97. Of temporary mental excitewxnts.\nVery much resembling the states of mind, which have\nbeen mentioned, and differing in degree rather thai* in any\nother respect, are certain temporary mental excitements,\nto which literary men, especially those of a vived and pow-\nerful genius, have been too much subject.\nThe late lamented Professor Fisher of New-Haven has\nmade a statement on this point, drawn from his own ex-\nperience, as follows\nTo whatever subject I happened to direct my thoughts.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0109.jp2"},"110":{"fulltext":"104 OF APPARITIONS\nmy mind was crowded with ideas upon it. I seemed to\nmyself able to wield the most difficult subjects with perfect\nease, and to have an entire command over my own train\nof thought. I found myself wonderfully inventive scarce\na subject presented itself, in which I did not seem to my-\nself to perceive, as it were by intuition, important improve-\nments. I slept but a part of the night, my mind being in-\ntensely occupied with planning, inventing, c. All the\nwriting that I did was done in the utmost hurry. Ideas\ncrowded upon me five times as fast as I could put down\neven hints of them, and my sole object was to have some\nmemorial by which they might be recalled. I was em-\nployed the whole time in the most intense meditation at\nthe same time, thinking never seemed to me to be attend-\ned with so little effort. I did not experience the least\nconfusion or fatigue of mind. My thoughts flowed with a\nrapidity that was prodigious, and the faculties of associa-\ntion, memory, c. were wonderfully raised. 1 could read\ndifferent languages into English, and English into Hebrew,\nwith a fluency which I was never before or since master\nof. During the whole time, though I was in a low state\nof health, I never felt the least pain or fatigue of body.\nInstances of this sort are not unfrequent, but we\nhave selected from many others, that which has been given,\nas coming from a source entitled to more than ordinary\ncredit.\nOn these temporary mental excitements the following\nremarks are suggested\n(1) They are not the action of a healthy and well-bal-\nanced state of mind, but are rather indicative that it is dis-\neased, and happen in consequence of such disease. They\nare sometimes accounted moments of inspiration, but it\nwould be happier for the subject of them, if he were led\nto regard them, as seasons of intellectual malady.\n(2) They are generally followed by a depression, which\ncorresponds to the more than ordinary, previous excite-\nment. That energy of conception and strength of com-\nbination, which a little while before were perhaps recog-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0110.jp2"},"111":{"fulltext":"OF APPARITIONS* lGfc\nhised with emotions of pride, are followed by extreme\nprostration and inertness so that, if it could be proved,\nthat the previous state of the mind were not a diseased\none, no benefit could justly be considered, as having re-\nSuited from its occurrence.\nIt is of great practical consequence to many, especially\nto persons of studious habits, to pay attention to these re-\nmarks. If they find themselves the subjects of such men-\ntal excitements, as have been described, they will be led\nto regard them, if they consider these views well founded,\nas the indications of mental disease. They should, there-\nfore, seek some remedy. The influence of the body over\nthe mind, as already seen, is very great, and the unnatural\nexercises of the mind may, in this very instance, be traced\nto the connection, existing between them. If this should\nbe found to be true, the first thing to be attended to, would\nbe a restoration of the physical system.\nIt may be briefly remarked in this connection, that, in\ngeneral, a healthy and vigorous state of the body is neces-\nsary to a healthy and vigorous mental action.\n98. State of the mind in drowning.\nIt has been remarked, in a number of instances, by per-\nsons, who have been on the point of drowning, but have\nbeen rescued from that situation and have survived, that\nthe operations of their minds were peculiarly quickened.\nThere was such wonderful activity of the mental principle,\nthat the whole past life, with its thousand, minute incidents,\nhas simultaneously passed before them, and been viewed,\nas in a mirror. Scenes, and situations, long gone by, and\nassociates, not seen for years and perhaps buried, came\nrushing in upon the field of intellectual vision, in all the\nactivity and distinctness of real existence.\nIn a moment of time, when the soul was on the point\nof starting away from the body forever, millions of actions,\nmillions of thoughts, uncounted multitudes of feelings\nhave, in this way, appeared to pass in review.\nIn how many instances, compared with the whole nura-\n14","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0111.jp2"},"112":{"fulltext":"100 OF APPARITIONS.\nber of persons rescued from the waters, when on the point\nof yielding up their life, this peculiar state of mind may\nhave existed, it is not in our power to say that it has\nexisted in some cases of this sort there is no doubt.\nHere, then, is an instance of greatly increased mental\naction, in some respects analagous, undoubtedly, to other\ninstances, brought up in this chapter, but of which our in-\nformation is as yet too limited and conjectural, to furnish a\nsatisfactory solution.\nA remark may be made here in reference to the final\njudgment. The doctrine of the Scriptures on that most\ninteresting subject, is, that we shall be judged, and the ret-\nribution will be awarded according to the deeds done in\nthe body, whether good or evil. But it is difficult for us\nto harbour the belief, that God will pass judgment on his\ncreatures, and they not be enabled clearly to understand\nthe rectitude of his decisions. And still less easy is it for\nus to conceive, how there can thus be a conviction of his\nrectitude without a distinct recollection of the actions of\nthe past life.\nThe fact, which has now been mentioned, and others,\nwhich are related in different parts of this chapter, do\nnot permit us to doubt, that it is in the power of our\nCreator to quicker our mental capabilities, without the\nlaws, which ordinarily govern them, being, in the least,\naltered from their present state, so that the numberless\nmultitude, assembled at the judgment seat, shall, in a sin-\ngle instant, view the perfect panorama of their past life,\nin all the variety and in all the minuteness of its circum-\nstances.\nThis remark is worthy the consideration of those, who\nobject to a general judgment on the ground, that the ac-\ntions of the past life cannot possibly be recalled, in all\ntheir extent, to the person, who has committed them.\n99. Of the apparitions ofJVicolai.\nNicolai was an inhabitant of Berlin, a celebrated book-\nseller, of a naturally very vivid imagination. He was nei-\nther ignorant nor superstitious a fact, which some un-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0112.jp2"},"113":{"fulltext":"©F APPARITIONS. 107\ndoubtedly will esteem it important to know. The follow-\ning account of the apparitions, which appeared to him, is\ngiven in his own words.\nMy wife and another person came into my apartment\nin the morning, in order to console me, but I was too much\nagitated by a series of incidents, which had most powerful-\nly affected my moral feeling, to be capable of attending to\nthem. On a sudden, I perceived, at about the distance of\nten steps, a form like that of a deceased person. I point-\ned at it, asking my wife if she did not see it? It was but\nnatural that she should not see any thing my question,\ntherefore, alarmed her very much, and she immediately\nsent for a physician. The phantom continued about eight\nminutes. I grew at length more calm, and being extreme-\nly exhausted, fell into a restless sleep, which lasted about\nhalf an hour. The physician ascribed the apparition to a\nviolent mental emotion, and hoped there would be no re-\nturn but the violent agitation of my mind had in some\nway disordered my nerves, and produced further conse-\nquences which deserve a more minute description.\nAt four in the afternoon, the form which I had seen\nin the morning re-appeared. I was by myself when this\nhappened, and being rather uneasy at the incident, went\nto my wife s apartment, but there likewise I was persecut-\ned by the apparition, which, however, at intervals disap-\npeared, and always presented itself in a standing posture.\nAbout six o clock there appeared also several walking fig-\nures, which had no connection with the first. After the\nfirst day the form of the deceased person no more appear-\ned, but its place was supplied with many other phantasms,\nsometimes representing acquaintances, but mostly stran-\ngers those whom I knew were composed of living and de-\nceased persons, but the number of the latter was compara-\ntively small. I observed the persons with whom I daily\nconversed did not appear as phantasms, these representing\nchiefly persons who lived at some distance from me.\nThese phantasms seemed equally clear and distinct at\nall times, and under all circumstances, both when I was by\nmyself, and when I was in company, and as well in the day as","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0113.jp2"},"114":{"fulltext":"108 ©F APPARITIONS.\nat night, and in my own house as well as abroad they were,\nhowever, less frequent when I was in the house of a friend,\nand rarely appeared to me in the street. When I shut my\neyes, these phantasms would sometimes vanish entirely,\nthough there were instances when 1 beheld them with my\neyes closed, yet, when they disappeared on such occasions,\nthey generally returned when I opened my eyes. I con-\nversed sometimes with my physician and my wife of tho\nphantasms which at the moment surrounded me they ap-\npeared more frequently walking than at rest, nor were they\nconstantly present. They frequently did not come for\nsome time, but always re-appeared for a longer or shorter\nperiod, either singly or in company, the latter, however,\nbeing most frequently the case. I generally saw human\nforms of both sexes, but they usually seemed not to take\nthe smallest notice of each other, moving as in a market-\nplace, where all are eager to press through the crowd at\ntimes, however, they seemed to be transacting business\nwith each other. I also saw several times people on horse-\nback, dogs and birds. All these phantasms appeared to\nme in their natural size, and as distinct as if alive, exhibit-\ning different shades of carnation in the uncovered parts, as\nwell as different colours and fashions in their dresses,\nthough the colours seemed somewhat paler than in real\nnature. None of the figures appeared particularly terri-\nble, comical, or disgusting, most of them being of an indif-\nferent shape, and some presenting a pleasing aspect. The\nlonger these phantoms continued to visit me, the more fre-\nquently did they return, while, at the same time, they in-\ncreased in number about four weeks after they had first ap-\npeared. I also began to hear them talk these phantoms\nsometimes conversed among themselves, but more fre-\nquently addressed their discourse to me their speeches\nwere commonly short, and never of an unpleasant turn.\nAt different times there appeared to me both dear and sen-\nsible friends of both sexes, whose addresses tended to ap-\npease my grief, which had not yet wholly subsided their\nconsolatory speeches were in general addressed to me\nv hen I was alone. Sometimes, however, I was accosted","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0114.jp2"},"115":{"fulltext":"OF APPARITIONS. 109\nby these consoling friends while I was engaged in compa-\nny, and not unfrequently while real persons were speaking\nto me. These consolatory addresses consisted sometimes\nof abrupt phrases, and at other times they were regularly\nexecuted.\nAs Nicolai was a person of information and of a phi-\nlosophick spirit, he was able to detect and to assign the\ntrue cause of his mental malady.\nHe was, it is to be remembered, in the first place, a\nperson of a very vivid fancy, and, hence, his mind was the\nmore likely to be affected by any disease of the body. A\nnumber of years before the occurrences above related, he\nhad been subject to a violent vertigo, which had been\ncured by means of leeches it was his custom to lose blood\ntwice a year, but previously to the present attack, this\nevacuation had been neglected. Supposing, therefore,\nthat the mental disorder might arise from an irregularity\nin the circulation of the blood, he again resorted to the ap-\nplication of leeches.\nWhen the leeches were applied, no person was with\nhim besides the surgeon; but during the operation his\nchamber was crowded with human phantasms of all des-\ncriptions. In the course of a few hours, however, they\nmoved around the chamber more slowly their colour be-\ngan to fade, until growing more and more obscure, they at\nlast dissolved into air, and he ceased to be troubled with\nthem afterwards.\n100. Instance similar to the preceding.\nThere is an instance, very similar to that of Nicolai, in\nthe sixth volume of the Edinburgh Medical and Surgical\nJournal particulars, however, it is unnecessary minuteljr\nto repeat.\nA shopkeeper of Edinburgh was haunted with appari-\ntions, appearing not only at night, but in the day time so\nmuch so that, at one time, he was unable to tell which\nwere his real customers, and which were phantoms of the\nimagination.\nThe vfsionary beings, that appeared to him to enter","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0115.jp2"},"116":{"fulltext":"110 OF APPJLRITIOlfS.\nand leave his shop, were as distinctly marked, were appar-\nently as full of life and intelligence, as the persons, who\nwere really present.\nThe complaint in this instance was cured by medical\nprescriptions, in particular, as in the case of the Ber-\nlin bookseller, by letting of blood by means of leeches.\nFor other instances the reader is referred to a popular\nwork recently published, entitled,\nSketches of the Philosophy of Apparitions or, an\nAttempt to trace such Illusions to their Physical Causes by\nSamuel Hibbert, M. D.\nThe author treats of spectral illusions, resulting from\nIiighiy excited states of particular temperament, from a gen-\neral nervous irritability of the system, from hystericks,\nfrom neglect of accustomed, periodical blood-letting, from\nfebrile and inflammatory affections, hypochondriasis, c.\nIt is sufficiently clear from this work, that, in many ca-\nses of apparitions, the cause is undoubtedly to be sought,\nas in the instances, which have been last mentioned, in\nthe disordered condition of the bodily system the conse-\nquence of which is a disordered state of the mind.\n101. Of the second sight of the Scotch Highlanders,\nMuch has been said, although more formerly than in\nlatter days, of the second sight of the Highlanders in\nScotland a faculty, called, in the Erse language, Taisch\nand if it be considered a subject at all worthy of attention,\nit is proper to remark upon it, in connection with the ideas\nbrought up in this chapter.\nSecond sight is the power of visually beholding ob-\njects, which are not present, and which, therefore, are not\nnaturally and in the ordinary way, objects of vision.\nTake the following illustrations. A man on his jour-\nney, and far from home, is thrown from his horse a per-\nson, who is his neighbour, but has the power of second\nght, sees him bleeding on the ground, although at the\ndistance of a considerable number of miles, and, it may be.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0116.jp2"},"117":{"fulltext":"OF APPARITIONS. ill\nnot without a perception, more or less vivid, of the out-\nlines of the place, where the accident happened. Again;\na person, having this power, may be expected at some fit\ntime to see a funeral procession, with such attendant cir-\ncumstances, as are judged to point out some individual la\nthe neighbourhood, whose lot it will be soon to leave the\nworld.\nPerceptions of this sort are not limited to any particu-\nlar objects, but all things existing and all states of action\nand suffering may be thus seen, and such consequences arc\ndeduced and predicted, as the circumstances of the partic-\nular case seem to warrant.\nThere was a treatise on this subject, published in the\nyear 1762, in which many incidents were related of per-\nsons, whom the writer believed to have possessed this ex-\ntraordinary power, but the incautious credulity, which he\nmanifested, was such, as to prevent implicit confidence be-\ning placed in his details.\nAfter looking at the subject with the aid of such state-\nments as have reached these regions so remote from the\nsoil, where this power is supposed to have been peculiarly\nexercised, this seems to be a reasonable result, viz.\nThat the Highlanders of Scotland possessed, and un-\ndoubtedly do still possess, the second sight, which is more\nor less prevalent in all countries, and nothing more viz.\nthat of apparitions, or, in other words, of conceptions, ren~\ndered so vivid by circumstances, either mental, physic-\nal, or a combination of both, as to appear realities.\nThere may be reason, however, for supposing, that ap-\nparitions were more frequent among them, than is commoa\nelsewhere, but we are able to allude, and that briefly, only\nto one of the circumstances, which are considered as justi-\nfying the supposition.\nIt has been remarked with truth, that the high-lands of\nScotland are a picturesque, but a melancholy country.\nThe narrow vallies are but thinly inhabited they resound\nwith waterfalls and are overhung with precipices and fur-\nther upward are mountainous deserts, covered with the\nbrown heath and dark with mists.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0117.jp2"},"118":{"fulltext":"113 OF APPAMTlbNS;\nPeople, inhabiting such a land, will be likely to have\nstrong and lofty feelings, apparently partaking of the wild-\nness and darkness of their situation. If they are ignorant\nthey can hardly fail to be superstitious, as strength of feel-\ning, when not guided by information, has been found very\ngenerally to incline that way and if they are too* well\ninformed for superstition, they will discover an inclination\nto melancholy, superinduced, as One may say, by the gloomy,\nbut exalting sublimity of those works of nature, which\nconstantly surround them.\nTheir conceptions, therefore, will be extremely vivid\nand it will excite no wonder, if a larger number of persons,\nthan is common in less romantick countries, should be\nfound, whose conceptions are so strongly aroused, as to be-\ncome APPARITIONS i\n102. Of ghosts and other spectral appearances*\nGhosts are partly apparitions, taking that term, as it\nhas been illustrated, and in part mental illusions, arising\nfrom not viewing objects aright. In respect to ghosts,\nremark,\n(1) That they are seen most frequently in the dark,\nhardly any one pretending to have seen them in the day\ntime. And this is a circumstance altogether in favour of\nthe idea, that they are in all cases, although they cannot\nall be referred to one cause, deceptions practised on the\nimagination. In the dark, as we are exposed to a greater\ntariety of dangers than at other times, our feelings are in\nconsequence excited in a greater or less degree, and, a*\nthere is a great dimness in the outlines of objects, they\nreadily assume, when viewed by the mind under such cir-\ncumstances, new and various shapes.\nLet it be observed, as another circumstance attending\nthese spectral appearances,\n(2) That ghosts are seen most frequently among people\nof very little mental cultivation, among the ignorant. Un T\ninstructed minds are generally the most credulous. If\nthere were truly any beings in nature of this sort, and they","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0118.jp2"},"119":{"fulltext":"OF APPARITIONS. 113\nWere any thing more than imaginary appearances, persons\nwho were well-informed and philosophick, would stand a\nchance, equally good with others, of forming an acquaint-\nance with them.\nFrom these two circumstances it seems to follow clear-\nly, that many of these imaginary beings are the creations\nof a credulous and excited mind, viewing objects at an\nhour, when their outlines cannot be distinctly seen.\nIt is to be remarked further,\n(3) Ghosts, whenever they present themselves, are\nfound to agree very nearly with certain previous concep-\ntions, which persons have formed in respect to them. If,\nfor instance, the ghost be the spirit of one, with whom we\nhave been particularly acquainted, he appears with the\nsame lineaments, although a little paler, and the same dress\neven to the button on his coat the dress, in general, how-\never, is white, corresponding to the colour of the burial\nhabiliments so that they may be said to have a personal\nor individual, a generick, and, as some have maintained, a\nnational character.\nThey commonly appear, (says Grose, who has written\non this subject,) in the same dress, they wore while living\nthough they are sometimes clothed all in white but that\nis chiefly the churchyard ghosts, who have no particular\nbusiness, but seem to appear pro bono publico, or to scare\ndrunken rusticks from tumbling over their graves. Drag-\nging chains is not the fashion of English ghosts, chains\nand black vestments being chiefly the accoutrements of\nforeign spectres seen in arbitrary governments Dead or\nalive, English spirits are free.\nThis circumstance also remains to be considered\n(4) When spirits have come from the dead to the liv-\ning, it has generally been found, that these visitants were\namong the particular friends, although sometimes of the\nenemies of those, whom they came „o see. This is very\nnatural.\nIt is our friends and enemies, whom we think most of;\nmuch more than of those, to whom we are unknown, and\ntowards whom our feelings are indifferent.\n15","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0119.jp2"},"120":{"fulltext":"114 OF APPARITIONS.\nA person has lost a very near friend by death his soul\nis distressed, and amid the joys of life, which have now\nlost their charms, and amid its cares, to which he turns\nwith a broken heart, he incessantly recalls the image so\nendeared to him. What wonder then, that his imagina-\ntion, which, in the light and bustle of the day, was able to\nkeep before itself the picture of the departed,, should, in\nthe stillness and shades of midnight, when remembrances\nmultiply and feelings grow deeper and deeper, increase\nthat picture to the size and give to it the vivid form of real\nlife\nThese circumstances justify us in ascribing the ex-\nistence of that supposed class of beings, called ghosts, to\nthe two causes, mentioned at the head of this section, viz.\nconceptions rendered inordinately intense, and objects,\nactually seen, but under such circumstances, as to be mis-\nrepresented.\n103.- Of the apparitions of the religious.\nIndividuals, under great religious excitement, frequent-\nly make mention of having seen apparitions. One has be-\nheld angels, ascending to heaven, or descending on the\nladder of Jacob bright companies, singing the song of\nMoses and the Lamb and the river of the water of life,\nclear as chrystal.\nAnother has seen the Saviour in the most trying mo-\nments of the crucifixion and has no more doubt of having\ntruly and visually beheld Him, than the disciple, Thomas,\nwhen he thrust his hand into his side.\nThis subject, is one of a delicate nature, and on which\nwe are greatly liable to be misunderstood. Knowing this,\nwe shall decline either asserting or denying, that christians\nmay see, and have seen angels, heaven opened, the Saviour,\nand the like since any thing we have in view, in the\npresent section, does not require such assertion or denial.\nBut this proposition may probably be laid down with-\nout exciting opposition from any quarter That it is dan-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0120.jp2"},"121":{"fulltext":"OF APPARITIONS. 115\ngerous to rest one s hopes of a religious character on these\nvisions. And without rudely setting at defiance the feel-\nings and opinions, existing on this subject, we would in-\nquire, Whether they cannot very often, as in instances al-\nready remarked upon, be traced to some disorder of the\nphysical system 9 or, admitting, that the body is sound and\nunder no special excitement, whether they may not be\nmerely our own thoughts, strengthened by reflection, ren-\ndered intense by desire\nAlas we listen to our own fond hopes,\nEven till they seem no more our fancy s children,\nWe put them on a prophet s robe, endow them\nWith prophet s voices, and then Heaven speaks in them,\ny And that, which we would have be, surely shall be.\nThe salvation of the soul is too weighty a concern to\n•be risked on such an uncertain foundation especially as\nwe have the Word of life, which points out the marks of a\ngracious state, yet without making mention of dreams,\nvisions, or apparitions, as included among those marks.\nNote. In the London Quarterly of April, 1822, in an\narticle on Nervous Affections, are some remarks on Eman-\nuel Swedenborg. Whether they be philosophical and\njust, or not, the reader can judge they are, at least,\nwritten with more temper and candour, than some of the\ncriticisms on the life and writings of the individual, who is\nthe subject of them.\nWe have been looking over the life and writings of E-\nmanuel Swedenborg, and the conclusion to which we come\nis this that if allowance is made, first, for a credulous\nand fanciful intellect, (there is among sane men an infinite\nvariety in the susceptibility of belief,) and, secondly, for\nthe use of allegorical instead of common language if we\nhad him alive, could catechise and cross-examine him\nabout his statements, separate what was mere allegorical\njargon, and what was mere matter of opinion, and get his\nactual experiences in plain language, much, if not all the\nmystery would vanish, without resorting to insanity for an\nexplanation. In the present age, philosophers credit noth-\ning but what they perceive by sense, receive on satisfac-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0121.jp2"},"122":{"fulltext":"116 ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT.\ntory evidence, or infer by strict reason all notions, sugges-\nted by other impulses, they view with doubt or disbelief,\nWieland, in his Agathodamon, conjectures, that in the inr\nfancy of the human race, men did, as children do now,\nconfound their past dreams with real occurrences that\nwhen they had been dreaming of a dead friend, they would\nthink that they had been with him, and that thus has aris-\nen the belief in ghosts. Berkeley was of opinion that the\nreality of things consisted not in their outward existence,\nbut in being perceived. It is a common belief with reli-\ngious enthusiasts that strong inclination is divine impulse.\nNow if from natural facility of conviction, or from reli-\ngious hypothesis, Swendenborg believed that meditation\ncarried to a certain intensity was reality, how easy for him\nto sit in his arm-chair, shoot his soul into Heaven wand-\ner through its streets and squares behold its lofty build-\nings and splendid palaces, roofed with gold and floored\nwith precious stones, converse with its inhabitants dressed\nin white, or shining, or flame coloured garments, and walk\nunder trees with silver leaves, golden fruit, and rainbow\nflowers IV\nCHAPTER TENTH.\norigin or smw or thought.\n104. Our mental operations are to be made known.\nIt seems to be clearly the intention of Providence, that\nthere should be a communication of thoughts from one to\nanother. Without such an ability of making our thoughts\nknown, there would be but little force in the remark of one\nof the philosophick ancients, the truth of which is so gen-\nerally granted, that we are born not for ourselves alone,\nbut that our friends and country have a share in us.\nThere is, then, some way of reciprocal intercourse a-\nmong the souls of men hearts can meet each other in the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0122.jp2"},"123":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT. 117\nsalutations of friendship minds can grapple in the trial of\ntheir strength there are desires and aversions to be made\nknown, hopes and fears, doubts and determinations, per-\nceptions, imaginations, reasonings.\nAdmitting the truth of this representation, the mode of\ncommunicating these things, as well as the various thoughts\nand feelings themselves, becomes an interesting subject\nof inquiry. It is interesting, because the signs of thought,\nwhatever they may be, exercise a considerable influence\nover those mental operations, of which they are represen-\ntative, and also because it is of the utmost consequence to\nthe well-being and prosperity of mankind, that there should\nbe as much readiness and exactness as possible in those\nmental communications, which by means of signs are con-\nstantly taking place.\nIn this chapter, however, we are to inquire particular-\nly into signs of thought, where alphabetick characters and\noral speech may be supposed to be unknown, to observe\nupon that way of making communications, which was ear-\nliest used and upon others, as they successively follow re-\nserving to the following chapter a variety of speculative\nand practical remarks on the use of words, which is the\nsign or representative of thought, with which, at the pres-\nent day, we have most to do.\n105. Thoughts first expressed by gestures and the\ncountenance.\nSeparate an individual in very early life from the rest\nof the human family, and let him grow up without any in-\nstruction in the use of the organs of speech, and it will be\nfound, that he will be entirely ignorant in what way to em-\nploy them, except it be to utter a few inarticulate cries.\nThe story of the wild girl, found near the French vil-\nlage of Songi in 1731, also of a boy, found in the forests\nof Lithuania in 1695, who is particularly mentioned in Part\nFirst of Condillac s book on the Origin of Knowledge, and\nother instances similar, are a proof of what has been said.\nWhether God did, or did not, directly teach our first","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0123.jp2"},"124":{"fulltext":"118 ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT.\nparents alphabetical, oral language, (a question, which ha*\nbeen long disputed,) it is certain, that, in these instances,\nwe find persons, who could not avail themselves of that\nmode of communicating their ideas the same is true of\npersons, who are born deaf and dumb, and have not been in-\nstructed in any artificial method of making their thoughts\nknown. Such persons, not being able to express their\nideas by means of arbitrary signs, avail themselves, to the\nbest of their power, of the language of nature.\nAnd now the question is, when they are thus limited,\nwhat is the means, which they first employ The answer,\nin reference to such an inquiry, is, that they make use of\ngestures and expressions of the countenance.\nThe following illustrations may be given.\nThe flushed countenance and the uplifted hand denote\nan emotion of rage within a look, slightly illuminated\nwith a smile, with none or but a small motion of the body,\nis an indication of satisfaction and peace. In dejection\nand melancholy, the head sinks, the arms depend while\nadmiration and surprize elevate the arms, throw the body\nback, and fix it, seemingly immoveable, in one position.\nTwo savages of different tribes accidentally meet to-\ngether, totally unacquainted with each other s language\nthey are hungry, or athirst, or wounded in battle, or from\nsome other cause in suffering. By means of such ges-\ntures merely and such expressions of countenance, as have\nbeen mentioned, how many thoughts and feelings will\nthey be able reciprocally to communicate.\n106. Of the art of Pantomime among the Romans,\nIn pantomime thoughts are exhibited by gesture and\nthe countenance merely, without words. The Romans had\nthree collections of gestures, one for tragedy, another for\ncomedy, and a third for those satirical poems, which\nwere thought to be suited for publick exhibitions. There\nwere actors in pantomime, such as Pylades and Bathil-\n}us,who made it their whole business to address the people","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0124.jp2"},"125":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT. Jl§\nin this sort of dumb show, and they succeeded to a degree,\nwhich at the present day is quite astonishing.\nIt was before systems of gestures were fully agreed up-\non, as signs of thought, and pantomime had gotten to be an\nart, that the contest between Cicero and Roscius, which\nhas been so often mentioned, took place. Cicero pronoun-\nced a period, which he had composed Roscius followed\nand gave the meaning in action Cicero varied his expres-\nsions, and Roscius as readily varied his gestures. And\nwhether Cicero with words could convey the meaning with\nmore exactness and emphasis, than Roscius could without\nthem, has been made a question.\nIt may be more particularly noticed here, that gesture\nis the natural language of the deaf and dumb. It was re-\nmarked by a person, that, in travelling in one of the Uni-\nted States, he once stopped at a house, where were three\nsisters, all deaf and dumb two of them grown up, the\nother about six years of age. They had received no in-\nstruction, but they were, nevertheless, able to express very\nmany ideas, far more than one might at first suppose, by\nmeans of action or gesture. But it was not merely that\nlimited degree of action, which the violence of feeling\nseems instinctively and naturally to prompt they had, in\nsome way, agreed upon a numerous catalogue of signs of\nthis sort, and employed them with remarkable expertness.\nThey thus made out to converse with each other, and with\nthose of their acquaintances, who had succeeded in learn-\ning their vocabulary of action.\nAlthough the signs in this instance were in some mea-\nsure conventional, because reciprocally agreed upon, they\ndid not hit upon them of themselves, but they were sug-\ngested by what they observed in the daily employments of\ntheir fellow beings. For instance, a motion of the arm,\nslightly declining from the horizontal, was their sign for\na scythe and for mowing. A motion, similar to that of a\nperson cutting wood, was their sign for an axe and for cut-\nting. Their sign for a book was the laying of the palms\nof the hands together and then opening them, as one opens\na book, c.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0125.jp2"},"126":{"fulltext":"120 ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT.\nThe earliest mode of expressing thoughts, then, wag\nby gesture or action, and by expressions of the counte-\nnance.\n107. Thoughts expressed by symbolick actions.\nThe next mode of expressing thoughts, resorted to by\nthose, who have not arbitrary signs, is symbolick action.\nThis seems to be only the language of gesticulation, car-\nried to a greater extent and will, therefore, be most like-\nly to be frequently employed among nations of little men-\ntal culture, and in oriental countries more frequently than\nin others, owing to the greater vivacity of the people.\nWe, accordingly, find instances of this mode of -express-\ning thought among all savage tribes, and those, who are\nfamiliar with the Bible, know, how very frequently it was\nemployed among the Hebrews.\nAs far as uncivilized nations are concerned, it is well\nknown, that, when a citizen of this country or of the Can-\nadas makes a visit to an Indian tribe, with which his own\npeople is not in a state of hostility, he is expected, and, in\nconsequence of that expectation, deems it expedient, if not\nnecessary, to carry in his hand a large pipe, formed of clay\nor marble, and adorned with feathers, which is called the\ncalumet of peace. And this is a symbol, more expressive\nto the savage mind, than would be the utterance of the\nsame thing in words, that his visitant cherishes sentiments\nof amity and good will.\nFurther when any of the North American savages\nform a treaty with any other tribe or nation, they employ,\nas a symbol of certain feelings and determinations, the\nbelt of wampum, composed of shells of different colours,\nbut generally black and white, and wrought into the shape\nof beads. The beads are perforated and strung upon a\nthong, and several of these thongs, united together, consti-\ntute a belt. One party to the treaty holds one end of the\nbelt, the other party holds the other a symbolical action,\nby which the savages understand tlie sincere and recipro-\ncal confirmation of the stipulations of the treaty.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0126.jp2"},"127":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT. 121\nSuch symbolick actions were frequent also, as intima-\nted above, among the Hebrews. It will be enough, in il-\nlustration of this remark, merely to allude to the following\ninstances, which may be more fully understood by a refer-\nence to the Scriptures.\nElisha directs Joash to shoot arrows out of a window\neastward. Jeremiah, acting under divine direction, hides\nthe linen girdle in the hole of a rock near Euphrates he\nbreaks a potter s vessel in the sight of the people he\nputs on bonds and yokes, and casts a book into Euphrates.\nEzekiel weighs his beard, delineates the siege of Jerusalem\non a tile, c.\n10S. Objections to the symbolick language of scripture.\nIt has been sometimes thought, that the symbolick tic-\ntions, mentioned in the preceding section, were below the\ndignity of the propVetick office. They have, indeed, by\nopposers of the Bible, b on charged with nothing less\nthan meanness, absurdity, fanaticism. A short-sighted\nconclusion this.\nIt ought to be remembered, that it was the spirit of the\ntimes, the feeling of the people themselves, which dictated\nthose actions and if with good reason we speak of the\nspirit of the age in regard to every generation of men, it\nis absurd and fanatical in us to set up the feelings and\npractices of our own period, to guide us in the estimation\nof the actions of individuals in all the ages preceding.\nThe people undoubtedly well understood the meaning,\nwhen Ezekiel weighed the hair of his beard in balances\nand delineated the siege of Jerusalem on a tile and the\naction was no more considered foolish and improper, than\nvery many gesticulations are so considered by us, which\nwe every day witness, without any sense of incongruity or\nany emotions of surprise.\n100. Of pictorial delineations as signs of thought.\nWe next consider those pictured delineations, which\n16","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0127.jp2"},"128":{"fulltext":"122 ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT.\nvje meant to convey ideas by means of visible sketches of\nactions and events precisely, as they exist. These deline-\nations are made sometimes in painting, sometimes in em-\nbroidered work, and in other ways.\nThe expression of ideas in this method has been more\nor less practised in all nations during the early periods of\ntheir history, and has been of considerable aid to them in\nmaking out the record of their early annals. We are in-\nformed in the Pentateuch, that figures were embroidered\nin the curtains of the holy of holies; and learn from the\nancient poems of Homer, that Helen wrought in embroid-\nery the pictures of the battles, m which the ill-fated attrac-\ntions of her own person had caused the Greeks and Ro-\nmans to be engaged. We find some evidence of the ex-\nistence of this mode of expressing and transmitting ideas\namong the Persians, Phenicians, Egyptians, Scandinavians,\nas well as among the Greeks and Hebrews although, as\nmay well be supposed, when we ascend to a period so far\nback, as to have rendered this imperfect mode of express-\ning thoughts necessary, historical information becomes, in\ngeneral, scanty and doubtful.\nThe expression of ideas by painting in colours, or by\npictorial writing in other ways, was found to exist among\nthe savages of North America. Bows and arrows, hatch-\nets, animals of various kinds were imprinted on the bodies\nof their chiefs, the indications of their calling and of their\nheroick qualities.\nA recent and somewhat striking illustration of this\ntopick cannot well be omitted. In Schoolcraft s Journal\nof Travels through the north-western regions of the Uni-\nted States, we are told that the party, in passing across\nfrom the river St. Louis, to Sandy Lake, had, with their\nIndian attendants, gotten out of the way, and could not\ntell, where they were. In consequence of being in this\nsituation, the Indians, not knowing what might be the re-\nsult, determined to leave at a certain place, a memorial of\ntheir journey for the information of such of their tribe, as\nmight happen to come in that direction afterwards. In\nthe party there was a military officer, a person whom the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0128.jp2"},"129":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT. 123\nIndians understood to be an attorney, and a mineralogist\neight were armed when they halted, they formed three\nencampments. The savages went to work and traced out\nwith their knives upon a piece of birch bark a man with a\nsword for the officer, another human figure with a book in\nhis hand for the lawyer, and a third with a hammer for the\nmineralogist three ascending columns of smoke denoted\nthe three encampments, and eight muskets, the number of\narmed men, c.\nWe find pictorial delineations to have been practised,\nin particular, among the original inhabitants of Mexico.\nIt is related by historians, that when the Spaniards first\nlanded upon that coast, the natives despatched messengers\nto the king, Montezuma, with a representation, painted on\ncloth, of the landing and appearance of the Europeans,\nThe events and appearances, which they wished to des-\ncribe, were new to them, and these pictured representa-\ntions were the methods, which they adopted, in preference\nto any other, to express those ideas which they deemed\nit important the king should immediately possess.\nPictures, as well as gestures, are a very imperfect mode\nof communicating ideas, as they must, from their very na-\nture, be limited, in a great degree, to the description of\nexternal events. They fail in disclosing the connections\nof those events, in developing dispositions, intricate trains\nof thoughts, and, in some measure, the passions.\n110. Of hieroglyphical writing.\nHieroglyphicks, (from the Greek words, hieros, sa-\ncred, and GLUPHO, to carve,) are figures, sometimes paint-\ned, or embroidered, and at others, carved out used to\nexpress ideas. They differ from pictorial writing, chiefly,\nin being an abridgment of it, and also in this particular,\nthat they select, by the aid of analogies mare or less re-\nmote, figures for the purpose of expressing the less obvious\nmental emotions and abstract truths.\nHieroglyphicks were employed much more among the\nEgyptians than elsewhere, and the whole art probably arose","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0129.jp2"},"130":{"fulltext":"124 ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT.\nin this way. The method of communicating thoughts by\nmeans of paintings, as among the Mexicans, and which,\nundoubtedly, existed among the Egyptians, previous to the\ninvention of Hieroglyphicks, was found inconvenient. The\nwork was difficult in the execution, and bulky when it was\ncompleted and there was, accordingly, very soon an at-\ntempt at the abridgment of ^that method.\nThus, the head might be used to designate a man two\nor more hands with weapons opposed, a battle a scaling\nladder, set against a wall, a siege a leafless tree, the win-\nter. But when those, who depended upon this mode of\nexpressing their thoughts, came to certain classes of the\npassions, the moral qualities, and a variety of abstract\ntruths, they were under the necessity of finding out cer-\ntain sensible objects, which bore or were supposed to bear\nsome resemblance to such ideas, and, consequently, to go\nfurther in such instances, than a mere abridgment of pic-\ntorial delineations.\nThe eye was selected, in reference to such analogies,\nto signify wisdom ingratitude was expressed by a viper,\nbiting the hand, that gave it food courage, by a lion\nimprudence, by a fly cunning, by a serpent.\nOn the temple of Minerva at Sais, there were the fol-\nlowing hieroglyphical characters, an infant, an old man, a\nhawk, a fish, and a river horse, expressing this moral idea\nAll you, who come into the world, and go out of it,\nknow this, that impudence is hateful a plain and prac-\ntical truth, quite worthy to be read and understood by the\npeople.\nAs the number of ideas among the people increased,\nand became more and more abstract, greater ingenuity was\nrequired in the invention of hieroglyphical characters to\nexpress them. Thus a winged globe, with a serpent\nissuing from it, came to de r note the universe, or universal\nnature.\nThe opinion has been often expressed, that the knowl-\nedge, wrapt up in the hieroglyphical characters of the\nEgyptians, and which embraced history, laws, and civil\npolity, was limited wholly to the priests, and that the com-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0130.jp2"},"131":{"fulltext":"©RIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT.\n125\nnion people were made acquainted with it, only as they re-\nceived it from the priests. This might from some causes\nhave been the feet ultimately but probably hieroglyphicks\nwere at first designed not more for the priests than for the\npeople, not to conceal knowledge, but to preserve and to\ncommunicate it.\nWe come now briefly to consider the written charac-\nters of the Chinese.\n111. Of the written characters of the Chinese.\nIt is a peculiarity of the Chinese language, that it em-\nploys characters, i. e., artificial and arbitrary delinea-\ntions, to express ideas, instead of words. Thus, for the\nidea, expressed by the English word, prisoner, we have\nthis delineation, which is less complicated than many\nothers, viz. a figure, approaching in its form to a square\nwith another figure nearly in the shape of an equilateral\ntriangle, placed in the centre of it. The character, which,\nas it is articulated, is eul, and answers to the English\nword, ear, is somewhat in the shape of a parallelogram,\ncrossed at nearly equal distances from the erids by lines,\ndrawn at right angles to the sides.\nAs every separate idea must have a distinct, separate\ncharacter, standing for it, they are of course numerous.\nThe elaborate Chinese work, called by way of distinction,\nthe great dictionary, contains sixty thousand of them\nalthough an acquaintance with a far less number, it is sup-\nposed, with no more than two thousand, will enable one\nto read, that number being found sufficient for the under-\nstanding of treatises on common topicks and for the ordin-\nary transactions of business.\n112. The Chinese character an improvement on the\nhieroglyphical.\nAs hieroglyphicks are an improvement on the mode of\nexpressing ideas by painting, the characters employed by\n£he Chinese may with good reason be considered the next","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0131.jp2"},"132":{"fulltext":"126 ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT.\nstep in advance of hieroglyphicks. It is a proof of this,\nthat many of the characters, particularly those called el-\nementary, bore originally an analogy or resemblance to\nthe objects, for which they stand. They were of course\nanciently hieroglyphicks, although now arbitrary charac-\nters. The fact, on which this conclusion is founded,\nis ascertained by consulting ancient inscriptions on cups\nof serpentine stone, on vases of porcelain, on seals of\nagate, and the characters used in editions of very an-\ncient books. The characters, which at present stand\nfor the sun, moon, a field, and the mouth, are quite arbi-\ntrary, and we discover no analogy between them and the\nobject but it was otherwise at first.\nThe sun was originally represented by a circle with a\ndot in the centre the moon, by the segment of a circle\na field by a figure resembling a square, set off into small-\ner divisions by two lines intersecting each other at right\nangles in the centre a mouth by a figure, intended to re-\nsemble the projection of the lips.\nThe Chinese character, then, may be considered to be\nthe connecting link between hieroglyphicks and alphabet-\nical languages. And its comparative value, as a means of\nexpressing thought, seems to be indicated by the place,\nwhich it holds, viz. greater than that of the purely hiero-\nglyphical system, and less than that of the languages, form-\ned of alphabets.\nJVbte, The progress of the system of the Chiner.e from a hieroglyphica,;\nto a purely arbitrary character m;iy be illustrated by the following story.\nA tavern-keeper in Hungary, unable to write, kept account of the pums due\nto him by strokes chalked on his door to each series of strokes was annexed a\nfigure to denote the customer, to whom they applied. The soldier was repre-\nsented by the figure of a musket, the carpenter by a saw, the smith by a ham-\nmer. Tn a short time for convenience, the musket was reduced to a straight line,\nthe saw to a zig zag line, the hammer to a cross and thus began to be formed a\nset of characters, gradually receding from the original figure. The resemblance\nBlight, at last, be entirely lost sight of, snd the figures become mere arbitrary\nmarks.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0132.jp2"},"133":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF SIGNS OF THOUGHT. 127\n113. The invention of alphabetick language a subject\nof dispute.\nThere is a great distance between the arbitrary char-\nacters of the Chinese, which are employed as the signs of\nideas merely, and alphabetical language.-- Nor is it very easy\nto see, how the latter could flow out of the former, or what\nreciprocal connection of any kind they possess. Indeed it\nhas been strenuously contended by many persons, that no\nprogress of the human mind whatever, as it went forward\nfrom its barbarous to its more enlightened conditions,\ncould have arrived at this wonderful invention. They con-\nsider it the gift of God.\nThe arguments on both sides of the question, Whether\nalphabetick language be of human, or of divine origin, are\nnumerous and ingenious. But as the nature of our design\nrequires us to avoid, as much as possible, long discussions,\nthis must be our apology for declining an inquiry, which\nis certainly interesting, and not unimportant. Of those*\nwho maintain, that language is of divine origin are Warbur-\nton, Johnson, and Blair of the opposite opinion are Rich-\nard Simon and Condillac, with others on both sides.\nNote. We subjoin in this note the remark, which may possibly be of use 1\nto future inquirers on the subject treated of in this chapter, that there was a.o*\nciently among the Peruvians something like the arbitrary characters of the\nChinese. That people early contrived the following method of expressing and\npreserving their thoughts, viz. by means of cords of different colours and by\nknots on these of various sizes and differently arranged.\nSomething similar seems to have been practised among a North American\ntribe of savages, the Osages as appears from the journal of one of the mission-\naries among them under date of Aug. 8, 1825.\nProposed to White Hair to assemble his people to hear preaching. Ke declin-\ned, alledgi ng, that I gave him no tobacco. Sans Nerf said, it was bad to assemble\nthe people they did not understand well but if I would tell what I had to say,\nhe would tell it to the people. He then seated himself with his bundle of sticks,\nand I expressed to him twelve or fifteen ideas respecting God, his government, 8 -c\nFor every idea he laid down a stick, which is his manner cf writing. After J\nhad finished, he asked various questions, soliciting further explanations, until he\nwas sat.sfied. He then counted all his sticks and said, I understand it all/","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0133.jp2"},"134":{"fulltext":"128\nCHAJPTER ELEVENTH.\nUSE OF WORDS.\n114. Superiour excellence of alphabetical language.\nIft whatever way we may have come by alphabetical\nlanguage, whether God himself were directly its author,\nor whether he early raised up some happy inventor, whose\nremembrance is now passed away, it is truly, if we may\nbe allowed a scriptural allusion, a price, put into our hands,\nfor the getting of wisdom. The single circumstance, that\nit is fitted to be employed, as a sign both of things and of\nvocal sounds, renders it greatly superiour to the afore-men-\ntioned modes of expressing thought, gestures, symbolick\nactions, hieroplyphicks, paintings, Chinese characters, or\nother methods, which may have been at any time used.\nAs mental exertions are intimately connected with\nthose means, by which they become obvious or are made\nknown to others, one proof, and by no means a small one,\nof the superiour excellence of this over other methods may\nbe found in the intellectual degradation of Savages and\neven of the Chinese themselves, compared with the nations\nof Europe. To whatever other causes this difference may\nbe ascribed, the superiority of the latter in the signs of\nthought, which they employ, is undoubtedly one cause.\nIt may be said of alphabetical language in one sense,\nthat it not only expresses our ideas, but multiplies them at\nleast, the facility of expressing and communicating thought\nby means of it sets men upon renewed thinking, and the\nresult is wider views, more correct principles, sounder pol-\nicy moral, civil, and scientifick improvement.\n115. Words are artificial and arbitrary signs.\nWords, whether we consider them, as written or spoken,\nfor, as they arc thus respectively considered, they form the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0134.jp2"},"135":{"fulltext":"USE OF WORDS. 129\ntwo general divisions of written and spoken language,\nare arbitrary and conventional. They are used, as the\nsigns of ideas, not because there is any natural or inherent\nfitness in them for this purpose, but are thus employed by\nagreement or general consent. So that the emperour, Au-\ngustus, confessed with good reason, that, while the politic-\nal and military movements of the world were under his\ndirection, he had not power, of himself alone, to introduce\na single, new word into the Latin tongue. If this state-\nment were not correct, if words had any natural fitness for\nthat purpose, for which they are employed, and were not\nconventional, there would be but one language all na-\ntions would use the same words, instead of the English em-\nploying the word, white the Latin language, albus the\nFrench, blanc and the German, weiss for the same thing,\nwith a similar diversity in the expression of other ideas, and\nin other languages.\nIt ought to be observed, however, if we consider lan-\nguage, as it meets the ear instead of the eye, if we look at\nspoken, in distinction from written language, that there is\na slight exception to this general view of its nature. We\nallude to a class of terms, of which the words, crash,\ntwang, buzz, whistle, shrill, rattle, may be mentioned\nas specimens. There is evidently some resemblance be-\ntween these words, as they are enunciated by the voice,\nand the things, for which they stand; in other languages,\nsome words, similar to these, that is, having a like relation\nto the things, for which they stand, are to be found.\nSo that in regard to this very limited class, when we\nconsider them merely, as they come from the voice or are\nsounded, there may be said to be a natural fitness or adap-\ntation in the words to the things, which they express but\nwith this exception, which is one of very limited extent,\nwords are truly arbitrary and conventional signs.\n116. Words at first few in number and limited to\nparticular objects.\nIn the infancy of the human race, uiqii were without a\n17","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0135.jp2"},"136":{"fulltext":"J 30 LSE OF WORDS.\nknowledge of the arts they had no laws, but the dictates\nof conscience, no regularly instituted form of government;\nthey lived under the open sky, except when they retreated\nfrom the storm or the sunshine to the shade of trees or the\ncooler recesses of caverns. Their ideas, therefore, were\nfew the articulate sounds, which either the active ingenu-\nity of nature, or the special interference of Providence had\ntaught them not only to frame, but to employ as the insti-\ntuted signs of things, must have been few also even more\nso, than their ideas.\nThe few names, which they were able thus early to\nemploy, related solely to the objects, with which they were\nimmediately and particularly conversant they had a name\nfor the tree, under which they sat at noon for the cavern,\nto which they occasionally retired for the fruit, which re-\nlieved their hunger and for the running water, at which\nthey slaked their thirst. Afterwards they were led to form\ngeneral names, standing for a number of objects, and prob-\nably in the following manner.\n117. Of the formation of general names or appella-\ntives.\nMan, naturally possessed of too much activity of spirit,\nto rest satisfied with remaining in one place, or to quiet\nhis curiosity with a small number of objects, engages in\nsome new enterprise, explores new tracts of country, and\nthus enlarges his knowledge. In going from place to place,\nhe necessarily meets again with those particular objects,\nwith which he had formed such an intimate acquaintance\nin his first residence. He meets with other trees, with\nother animals, with o trier caves and fountains, which he at\nonce perceives to be of the same kind with those, that have\npreviously come under his observation.\nThe recurrence of these new objects instantly calls up\nthe others. This happens by a law of his nature, which\nhe cannot control and the recollection is the more in-\ntense, as, in the infancy of things, curiosity is more alive,\nand astonishment more readily and deeply felt. The ob-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0136.jp2"},"137":{"fulltext":"USE ©F WORDS. to I\njects, with which he had become first acquainted, could\nnot be recalled without a remembrance, at the same time,\nof the names, which he had given fchem. As he perceives\nthe objects, which he now beholds, to be the same in kind\nwith those, which he first knew, he at once, and it might\nalmost be said, by a natural impulse, concludes, that they\nhave an equal Tight to the names with those, to which those\nnames were first appropriated. He, therefore, exclaims,\na tree! a cave a fountain whenever and wherever he\nmeets them. And thus what was at first a particular term.,\nand was employed to express only an individual, has its\nmeaning extended, and comes in time to stand for a whole\n•class of objects.\nSuch, there can hardly be a question, was the origin of\ngeneral names and the statement is not only agreeable\nto the natural course of things, but is indirectly confirmed\nby many incidents. When the Spaniards first arrived at\na certain region, bordering on the gulph of Mexico, and\nfound, that the soil was rich, the dwellings good, the peo-\nple numerous they cried out, it is another Spain, and\nafter that it bore the name of New Spain. And Livy, in\nconnection with the early history of Rome, relates con-\ncerning two Trojan chiefs, Antenor and Aeneas, that the\nplaces in Italy, where they respectively landed, were call-\ned by them Troy, probably from the perception of some\nslight resemblance in the appearance of the shore or of the\ninteriour country to the places of their previous residence\nso readily does the mind connect together things, which\nare remote, and seek for analogies between what is novel\nand what is familiar. And it is on this principle, that we\nso often find ourselves in this country giving names to the\nobjects around us, in allusion to what exists in some other\ncontinent calling a large river, another Thames, and lofty\nmountains, tjie American Alps.\n118. The formation of appellatives the result of a\nfeeling of resemblance.\nWe discover, in the way which has been mentioned,\nmh origin of appellatives or common names,(in treatises of","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0137.jp2"},"138":{"fulltext":"132 USE OF WOBDS.\nlogick more commonly termed genera and species,) the\nformation of which has sometimes been considered a point\nof difficult solution. Taking the statement, in the last\nsection, to be the true one, it follows, that there is, pre-\nvious to the giving of the common name, a feeling or per-\nception of resemblance, prevailing among those objects,\nto which the common name is applied.\nIf there had not, between the perception of the objects\nand the giving of the common name, been an intermediate\nfeeling of resemblance, the primitive framers of language\nwould have been as likely to have assigned the appellative\nto the cave and the mountain, or to any other things alto-\ngether dissimilar, as to those resembling objects, to which\nit was assigned.\nWhen, therefore, those persons, who hold to the doc-\ntrine of the Nominalists, say, that all general ideas are but\nnames, they appear to mistake there is something more\nthan the mere name, viz., that feeling of resemblance,\nwhich has been mentioned,, and which, although it is diffi-\ncult to explain it, except it be by referring each one to his\nown intellectual experience, is clearly too important a cir-\ncumstance to be hastily overlooked and thrown out of the\nquestion.\n119. Our earliest generalizations often incorrect.\nWhen man first opens his eye on nature, (and in the in-\nfancy of our race, he finds himself a novice, wherever he\ngoes,) objects so numerous, so various in kind, so novel\nand interesting, crowd upon his attention that, attempting\nto direct himself to all at the same time, he loses sight of\ntheir specifical differences, and blends them together, more\nthan a calm and accurate examination would justify. And\nhence our earliest classifications, the primitive genera and\nspecies, are often incorrectly made.\nSubsequently, when knowledge has been in some\nmeasure amassed, and reasoning and observation have\nbeen brought to a greater maturity, these errours are at-\ntended to; individuals are rejected from species, where","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0138.jp2"},"139":{"fulltext":"USE OF WORD3, 133\nthey do not properly belong, and species from genera.\nLogical writers give a different account of the origin of\ngenera and species. We first separate (say they) the qual-\nities, combined in the objects, which come under our ob-\nservation, and where we are able to trace the same quality\nor a number of them in different objects, we rank those ob-\njects together as a species or genus, and give a common\nname. Thus, John is a man six feet high, and of a light\ncomplexion, but Peter is both short and swarthy, while\nthe stranger, who is walking with them, is as tall as John,\nand his countenance not less dark than Peter s. Although\nthere are some things, in which these three persons differ,\nwe readily perceive, that there are other things, in which\nthey agree, such as erect figure, speech, and reason and\nto this general perception, notion,or feeling of resemblance,\nwe give the name, man. An4 man thenceforth becomes\nthe name of a species.\nOn this account of the origin of genera and species,\ngiven in books of logick, we briefly remark, that all scien-\ntifick classifications must be formed in this manner, by an\nexamination and comparison of individuals. But then it is\nto be observed, that men generalize and form classes, be-\nfore they are able to do it in an exact and scientifick man-\nner. There is aji imperfect generalization, which is promp-\nted by nature, and which looks chiefly at resemblances,\nwithout minutely inquiring into the differences of objects.\nThis comes first. Those corrections, which are made by\nresorting to the logical or scientifick method, come after-\nwards.\nMay further be consulted on this part of this chapter,\nStewart s Elements, Vol. II. chap. II. sect. 4. with note K.,\nAdam Smith s Considerations on the first formation of lan-\nguages, Brown s Philosophy of the mind, Lect. XL VI.\nXLVII.\nf. 120. Illustration of our first classifications from the\nsavages of Wateeoo.\n•The English navigator, Cook, in going from New Zea-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0139.jp2"},"140":{"fulltext":"1 34 USB OF WORDS.\nland to the Friendly Islands, lighted on an island, called\nWateeoo.\nThe inhabitants (he says) were afraid to come near\nour cows and horses, nor did they form the least concep-\ntion of their nature. But the sheep and goats did not sur-\npass the limits of their ideas, for they gave us to under-\nstand, they knew them to be birds.\nCaptain Cook informs lis, that these people were ac-\nquainted with only three sorts of animals, viz. dogs, hogs\nl irds.\nHaving never before seen any such animals as a cow or\na horse, they beheld their great size and formidable aspect\nwith admiuation filled with fear, they could not be in-\nduced to approach, and knew not what to call or to think\nof them. They noticed the goats and the sheep, and\nclearly saw, that they were different from the dogs and\nhogs, with which they had been acquainted. But how did\nit happen, that they called them birds\nThere is no nation so rude and uncivilized, as not ta\nhove some few general terms, and how those general term*\narc formed, we have above explained. Having noticed a\nvariety of birds in their waters and forests, the people of\nWateeoo had undoubtedly found it necessary before this pe-\nriod to assign some general name or appellative to the fly-\ning animal, expressive of those resemblances, which evident-\nly pervaded the whole class. They called them, we will\nsuppose, birds. Knowing there was a great variety of them,\nand that they were of different sizes, they not unnaturally\napplied the same term to the sheep and goats of the En-\nglish. They knew not but there might be some new class\nof birds, which they had not hitherto noticed they saw\nno insuperable objection in the size of the sheep and\ngoats and their agility and power of climbing over rocks\nand steep ascents readily reminded them of the power pf\nflying, which they might imagine those animals had not\nyet thought proper fully to exhibit.\nBut they could clearly have no thoughts of this kind\nof cows and horses and as to hogs and dogs they had no\ngenerick term for them, having never known more than","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0140.jp2"},"141":{"fulltext":"USE OF WORDS. 135\none variety or class, and having never been led to suspect,.\nthat there were any others.\nIf any should be disposed to make strange of this clas-\nsification of these untutored savages, a little reflection may\nperhaps diminish their admiration. There are classifications\nto be found in the present improved state of the natural sci-\nences not more accurate than this that arrangement, for\nexample, which assigns to the same class and ranks under\none name the man, that walks upright and the whale that\nswims, the ant, that creeps, and the gnat, that flies.\n4. 121. Whether reasoning be possible without general\nterms.\nIt has been maintained by the Nominalists, who hold\nto the opinion of no general ideas, separate from their\nnames, that no process of reasoning, however concise, can\nbe carried on without the aid of general terms and of\ncourse, the statement, made in 118, that there must be a\nfeeling or notioa of resemblance, that is, a general idea, dis-\ntinct both from the individual objects and from the common\nname, cannot be true. An attention to what takes place\nin the minds of infants, shows the contrary that they can-\nreason, draw conclusions, from one thing to another, and\nthat, consequently, they have general ideas such, as have\nbeen explained, that is, certain general but real feelings\nof resemblance, altogether and essentially independent of\nthe names, which are subsequently made to stand for them.\nIt cannot, indeed be said, that the infant carries on its\narguments to any great extent, but it does to some extent\nand accurately. Were it not able to follow out some con-\ncise trains of argument, its existence could hardly be pre-\nserved. When the infant has once put his finger in the\nflame, he avoids a repetition of the experiment, reasoning\nin this way, that there is a resemblance between one flame\nand another, and that what has caused him pain, will be\nlikely under the same circumstances to cause the same\nsensation. When the infant sees before him some glitter-\nins toy, he reaches his hand towards it. and is evidently","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0141.jp2"},"142":{"fulltext":"136 USE OF WORD\ninduced to do so by a thought of this kind, that the acquis\nsition of the object will now follow the effort of the hand,\nas it has a similar effort previously -made.\nWords, then, whether general or particular, are not ab-\nsolutely necessary to reasoning, and of course there may\nbe ideas both general and particular, and those ideas may\nbe compared together without words. The illustrations,\nwhich have been given, are sufficient, although brought\nfrom what we perceive to take place in infants. It is\nhazardous to refer on this point to those, who are grown\nup and have for years employed language. The words\nand the thoughts are, in this instance, so strongly associa-\nted, that it is difficult to separate them.\nThe use of general terms, says Brown, is not to en-\nable man to reason, but to enable him to reason well. They\nfix the steps of our progress. They give us the power of\navailing ourselves with confidence of our own past reason-\nings and of the reasonings of others. They do not abso-\nlutely prevent us from wandering, but they prevent us from\nwandering very far, and are marks of direction, to which\nwe can return. Without them we should be like travel-\nlers, journeying on an immense plain without a track, and\nwithout any points on the sky to determine, whether we\nwere continuing to move east or west, north or south.\n122. Of the formation of verbs.\nIn the remarks, which have gone before, we have given\nan account of the origin of appellatives, or nouns substan-\ntive there are other ideas, expressed by another class of\nwords, viz. verbs. And these words are of great conse-\nquence both in the construction and the application of\nlanguage. As the ideas, expressed by verbs, concern ac-\ntions rather than objects, and the attributes and affections\nof things rather than the things themselves, and cannot,\ntherefore, be so easily defined to the understanding, and\nfixed upon by it, words of this kind were not, we may sup-\npose, so rapidly formed as others, although some of them\nmust have been of very early origin.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0142.jp2"},"143":{"fulltext":"tJSE OF WORDS. 137\nTheir origin may be illustrated in this way. Let it be\nadmitted, that the primitive inhabitants have given names\nto certain wild animals Condillac supposes, that such\nnames were given first, before those of trees, fountains, c.\nNo matter on what principle, those names were selected,\nfor after all the investigations in regard to it, it is still a\nsubject of doubt. It soon happens, as is very natural and\nreasonable to be imagined, that they see one of these an*\nimals, advancing towards them with great speed and appa-\nrent ferocity. Certainly they would have an idea of the\nmotion of the animal, as something different from the an-\nimal itself; and if they could give a name to the animal,\nwhy not to the fact of his coming towards them or run-\nning from them, as the fact might be\nIn the formation of the noun substantive or general\nterm, they exclaimed, The tyger The lion and this ex-\nclamation became in time the common name. But now\nthey discover a new attribute or action of the wild beast,\nwhich affects them strongly and deserves a distinct appel-\nlation, and, hence, they utter some new exclamation it\nmay be conjectured, the word, comes, or rushes and the\ncry now is, tyger rushes lion comes The articulate\nsounds, which under such circumstances are adopted,\nwhatever they may be, are eventually fixed upon, as the\nconventional and permanent representatives of certain ac*\ntions, attributes, and affections of things, and iii the matu-\nrity of society and of knowledge, when man finds all that\nhe has learnt subjected to a more exact and scientifick\nclassification, they are accordingly classed as verbs.\n123- Of the formation of conjunctions and other\nparticles.\nIt has been conjectured, that nouns and verbs were, in\ntime of origin, the earliest of all the parts of speech and,\nin truth, the hypothesis does not rest solely upon conjec-\nture. It was the object of men at first to express their\nideas, as they could and they reckoned it of but little\nconsequence, whether they did it. neatly or elegantly,\n18","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0143.jp2"},"144":{"fulltext":"138 USE OF WORDS.\nConjunctions, adverbs, prepositions, relative pronouns, were\nintroduced by degrees, as they were found to be needed\nbut nouns and verbs could never be dispensed with. And\nin addition to this consideration, that these parts of speech\ncould not at any time have been dispensed with, there is\nmuch reason to suppose from a variety of investigations,\nthat the particles, especially conjunctions, prepositions,\nand adverbs, were derived either from verbs or substan-\ntives, and of course they must have been subsequent in\norigin.\nIt will at this time be sufficient briefly to examine this\npoint in respect to conjunctions.\nThe conjunction, if, was originally a \\erb in the im-\nperative mode, viz. gif, the imperative of the Saxon word,\ngifan, which is the same with the modern, English infini-\ntive, to give. If we consider the original import of the\nwords in this sentence, viz. If ye love me, ye will keep my\ncommandments, it will stand thus Give or grant this,\nviz. ye love me, ye will keep my commandments.\nThe conjunctions, unless, lest, and else, are deriva-\ntives from the Saxon verb, lesan, to dismiss. The mean-\ning, conveyed in this sentence, viz. Unless ye believe, ye\nshall not understand, may be thus analyzed Dismiss, ye\nbelieve, (the circumstance of belief being out of the way,)\nye shall not understand.\nThe conjunction, though, was originally a verb in the\nimperative from the Saxon, thafian, meaning to grant or\nallow. The word was originally thaf or thof, and is thus\npronounced by many of the common people in England\nand the United States to this day. This sentence, Though\nhe slay me, I will trust in him, may be thus explained, in\nconformity with the etymological derivation Allow, grant\nthis, he will slay me, I will trust in him. Other particles,\nparticularly adverbs and prepositions, may, in many cases,\nbe traced to nouns.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0144.jp2"},"145":{"fulltext":"USE OF WORDS. 139\n124. Further remarks on the meaning of particles.\nIt is proper to guard ourselves here, by saying, that\nwhen a language is once fully formed and settled upon,\nwe would not advise a confident and indiscriminate refer-\nence to the etymology of particles, in order to determine\ntheir present significancy although in many cases, as in\nthose mentioned in the preceding section, such a reference\nthrows light upon them. Whatever particles may have been\nat first, whether nouns or verbs, or whatever direct and\npositive significancy they may have once had, they are at\nlast, when the language is fully formed, evidently without\nmeaning, except so far as they are connected with other\nwords.\nThe proper use of them seems to be, to express the\nstates of our mind, as we pass from one clause of a sen-\ntence to another, or from one proposition to another also\nthe restriction, distinction, and opposition of our thoughts.\nAdmitting, then, that, in some instances, we can derive\nconsiderable aid from etymology, the surest method of as-\ncertaining the meaning of this class of words, is by obser-\nving the operations of our own minds, as we connect to-\ngether our ideas in clauses, sentences, and consecutive\npropositions.\n125. Of the origin of particular or proper names.\nAlthough general names or appellatives, as appeared\nin 116, were first applied to particular objects, as soon\nas they became general and were employed to denote\nclasses of objects, they were no longer of use in the speci-\nfication of individuals. Their utility in that respect neces-\nsarily ceased. Hence arose the class of substances or\nnouns, called particular or proper names, designed espe-\ncially to indicate individual objects. In ascertaining to\nwhat objects terms of this kind shall be assigned, it can\nonly be said, that we give proper names to such things, as\nwe have frequent and urgent occasion to mention no oth-\ner rule can readily be laid down.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0145.jp2"},"146":{"fulltext":"140 U3E OF WORDS.\nWe, accordingly, give particular names to rivers, lakes,\ncataracts, mountains, because we have frequent occasion\nto speak of them individually, of the Mississippi, the La\nPlata, the Alps, and the Appenines. There is still greater\nreason, why we should give names of this sort to our fellow\nbeings, with whom we constantly associate, and on whom\nour happiness is in no small degree dependent. But the\nassignation of proper names is far from being limited to\nmen, or to rivers, or to mountains, or to cataracts; we\ncontinually meet with them.\nThe merchant gives names to his vessels, the farmer to\nhis oxen, the hunter to his dogs, and the jockey to his hor-\nses, on the same principles and for the same reason, that\none river is called Ganges and another Danube, and that\none man is called John, another William*\n126. Of the meaning of words as used by different\npersons.\nWords are to be considered, in the first place, as signs\nof the ideas of the speaker, of the person, who uses\nthem. Very little privilege indeed would it be for him to\nmake use of words, except as the signs of his own thoughts,\nA person, therefore, having a very imperfect notion of the\npowers of the electrick fluid, when he uses the word, elec-\ntricity, expresses, not the more ample idea of the well-in-\nformed philosopher, but that limited conception merely,\nwhich he himself happens to have.\nWe suppose a piece of gold to be presented to a child,\nand, undoubtedly, the prominent idea, which he has of it,\nis, that it is something of a bright, beautiful yellow. An\nother person, more advanced in age, adds the idea of weight\nto his complex notion of it another, who is better ac-\nquainted with its true nature, adds malleability, fusibility\nand any other qualities, which he may have been enabled\nto discover. The word, gold, in each of these cases stands\nfor that particular idea, which each person has, and no\nmore.\nBut in our intercourse with our fellow men we find our-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0146.jp2"},"147":{"fulltext":"USE OP WORDS. 141\nselves constantly and necessarily making a reference In\nthe language, which we use, to the ideas of others, as well\nas to the ideas in our own minds, I say, we do it neces-\nsarily, otherwise intercourse by means of language could\nnot be carried on.\nAnd it becomes then important to inquire, what is the\ngeneral rule, by which men in this particular are to be\ngoverned 9 When have they done what is incumbent upon\nthem in ascertaining the meaning of others 9\nOur duty in this respect is fulfilled, when we use words\nwith their customary signification, employing them, as far\nas we are able to learn, with that meaning, which is ordina-\nrily and generally attached to them.\nWhen a meaning has been once affixed to a word, it is\neffectual in calling up to the mind the thing signified by\nit the mention of the word or the sight of it, (such is the\npower of that characteristick of our mental constitution,\nwhich is termed association.) almost as readily suggests\nthe idea, as the object itself.\n127. We have not words for all our ideas.\nWords are employed as signs, standing for ideas but\nit must not be imagined, and certainly is not true, that all\nideas have words, corresponding to them. This assertion\nholds irrr-egard to both simple and complex ideas. Among\nour simple ideas are colours w r e call one colour, red an-\nother, white but it is certainly not too much to say, there\nare many diversities or grades in those colours, which we\nhave a notion of or perceive, but have never given them\nspecifick names. The same may be said of the diversities\nin our sensations of hearing, touch, and taste.\nThere are various complex ideas, which a person has,\nor may have, and yet without names, answering to then:.\nIn translating from one language into another, the truth\nhere stated is clearly perceived in reading the German\nlanguage, for example, which has a large number of very\nexpressive compounds, we often meet with words, which\nsuggest to the mind very clear ideas, but find no single","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0147.jp2"},"148":{"fulltext":"142 USE OF WORDS.\nwords in English precisely corresponding. And it is some-\ntimes with difficulty, that we can express them even by a\nnumber or combination of words. But, in general, we\nfind in every well-formed language words, sufficient for the\nexpression of those ideas, which are most distinctly form-\ned, and which, in the intercourse of life, we have most\nfrequent occasion to communicate.\n128. Of the definition of words.\nThe schoolmen defined terms per genus et bifferen-\ntiam, that is, by a term more general, than the word to be\ndefined, with an additional word or words, expressive of\nsome specifick or distinguishing quality. Thus, man was\ndefined by them animal rationale, an animal endued with\nreason animal being the term, wider in signification or\nmore generick than man, and rationale the epithet, in-\ndicative of the difference between man and other animals.\nA serious objection might be readily raised to this defini-\ntion. If the schoolmen meant by the epithet rationale\nwhat has been termed the discursive faculty or that opera-\ntion, by which we compare together propositions and de-\nduce conclusions from premises, it might be questioned,\nwhether horses and elephants are not men, since it is the\nopinion of very many, that they possess this ability in\nsome small degree.\nA better mode of definition is by enumerating and ex-\nplaining some essential elements, entering into the nature\nand composition of the thing to be defined and this an-\nalysis of the elementary parts may be more or less partic-\nular, as circumstances require.\nIt should be remarked here, that we now speak of the\nlitibn of words, standing for complex ideas since, as\nobserved in 50, where the reader is referred to\nion for a further view of the subject, simple ideas\nnit of definitions.\ncan make the simple ideas of red, white, blue,\nr, fec, more clear than they are at present by\n..lions; iiCitc\\cr, which can be given. Motion","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0148.jp2"},"149":{"fulltext":"USE OF WORDS. 143\nis a simple idea. It was defined by the schoolmen actus\nentis in potentia ojjatenus in potentia, the act of a being\nin power as far forth as in power. This, instead of making\nour idea of motion any more clear, is quite unintelligible.\nAt a later period it has also been defined a passage\nfrom one place to another. To this definition there is this\nobjection, that passage is synonymous with motion, and it\namounts to no more than to say, that motion is motion\nfrom one place to another.\nEvery person understands what is the meaning of the\nword, light, but the schoolmen, in order to make this gener-\nal understanding more easy and clear, defined it the act of\nperspicuous as far forth as perspicuous but if this definition\nshould be given to a blind man, who had never possessed\nthe faculty of sight, he would clearly be no wiser for it.\nAlthough it be difficult, or rather impossible to define\nsimple ideas, to make them any clearer than they already\nare, what are called complex ideas admit of a definition.\nComplex ideas consist of various simple ideas combined to-\ngether; the words,standing for them, cannot,indeed, of them-\nselves, suggest the simple ideas, and show us what they are,\nindependently of the aid of the senses but they may clear-\nly and readily indicate to us, how these ideas are to be ar-\nranged and combined together in order to form complex\nones. The word, rainbow, expresses a complex idea. Ac-\ncurately define it by an enumeration of the colours, enter-\ning into its composition, and by a statement of its appear-\nance to a person, who has the faculty of sight, and he will\nunderstand or have a conception of it, although he may nev-\ner have seen one and this happens, because he has the\nsimple ideas, and the words or description shows him, how\nthey are combined together. But it is impossible to impart\nsuch a conception to a person, who has always been blind,\nbecause he has never had the simple ideas of colours and\nwords merely can never convey to him that knowledge.\n129. Of (he imperfection of language.\nLanguage, notwithstanding its great and undeniable","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0149.jp2"},"150":{"fulltext":"144 L t se or woubs.\nadvantages, has its imperfections, and in this, is like every\nthing else, connected with our earthly existence. It may\nbe said in general, to be imperfect, or to Fail of its object,\nwhenever the same ideas are not excited in the mind of\nthe hearer or reader, as in that of the speaker or writer.\nNor can we reasonably expect, when we look at the cause\nor foundation of this imperfection, that it will ever be\notherwise since that cause will be found to exist ultimate-\nly in the condition of the mind and in our ideas, rather\nthan in the words, which stand for them. This requires a\nbrief illustration.\nIt often happens, that men view the same objects and\nactions in different lights whether it be owing to some\ndifference in early education, or to local prejudices, or to\nsome other cause, the fact itself is well known, and may\nwell be considered, as frequently unavoidable. Hence dif-\nferent persons very often attach the same name to certain\nobjects and actions, when their views of those actions and\nobjects are not the same. One has a greater number, than\nanother, of simple ideas, entering into his complex notions,\nand perhaps, in the formation of the compound, they re-\nspectively give to those simple ideas a different relation to\neach other. The consequence, therefore, is, that, in such\ncases, as have now been mentioned, the names or words,\nwhich are used, necessarily fail of exerting in the hearer\nthe same ideas, that exist in the mind of the speaker.\nMany of the disputes, which have existed in the world,\n(and the history of philosophical opinions shows, how numer-\nous they have been,) have been caused by a misunderstand-\ning of this sort different persons using the same terms,\nwhen their ideas arc not the same. In support of this re-\nmark, it will be enough merely to refer to the often re-\npeated discussions upon virtue, conscience, faith, free will,\nobligation, religion c.\nBut language, in so far as it is imperfect, fails of the great\nobject, for which it was invented and agreed upon, and it,\ntherefore, becomes important to diminish the amount of\nthis failure and to guard against it, as far as possible.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0150.jp2"},"151":{"fulltext":"USE OF WORDS, 145\nTo this end, the following rules on the use of words may\nbe laid down.\n130. Words are not to be used without meaning.\nRule First. In the employment of language, the first\nrule to be laid down, is this, that we should never use a\nword without some meaning. It may be thought extraor-\ndinary, that any should use words in this way, but a little\nexamination cannot fail to convince one of the fact. Let.\nany one inquire of those persons, who are in the habit of\nemploying such words, as instinct, sympathy, antipathy,\nand a variety of others, which might be mentioned, and it\nwill speedily appear, that, while some are greatly at a loss\nto assign any sort of meaning to them, others are utterly\nUnable to do it. They are applied, as one may say, by\nrote they have been learnt from hearing others use them,\nand are repeated, because they have been learnt, without\ntheir significancy having ever been inquired into.\nThere are not only words used in this way, but whole\nphrases, of which the Peripatetick philosophy readily af-\nfords many instances. What can be said of vegetative\nsouls, intentional species, substantial forms, abhor-\nrence of a vacuum, and the like, but that they are combi-\nnations of terms without meaning and while they have\nthe appearance of science, are no better, than an intended\nimposition on the understanding\nThis errour is much more frequent, than has generally\nbeen supposed many words go down from one to an-\nother by a sort of hereditary descent, and are passively re-\nceived and adopted, like a thousand opinions and prejudi-\nces, which exist again, merely because they have existed\nbefore. We are exceedingly apt to adopt words from our\nparents and instructers, and to repeat the peculiar phrase-\nologies of our favourite sect or party, and either out of our\ngreat reverence for them, or from the circumstance of our\nbeing too indolent to make careful inquiries, we rest satis-\nfied in a shameful ignorance of every thing but a mere\nsound. Hence, if it be considered desirable, that lan-\nguage should retain its value, which chiefly consists in re-\n19","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0151.jp2"},"152":{"fulltext":"X4.G t)SE OF WORDS.\ncording and communicating thought, the rule laid down\nshould be strictly observed, not to employ words without\nmeaning.\n131. Words should stand for distinct and determin-\nate ideas*\nSecond Rule It is not enough, that we use words\nwith meaning, or have ideas for them, but a second rule is,\nthat the meaning or the ideas be distinct and determinate.\nWe apply the epithet, distinct, to simple ideas, mean-\ning by the expression, that they should carefully be kept\nseparate from, and not confounded with other simple ideas.\nThe epithet, determinate, may more properly be applied\nto the class of our ideas, called complex. As complex\nideas are made up of simple ones, when we say, that they\nshould be determinate, the meaning is, that a precise col-\nlection of simple ideas should be fixed upon in the mind\nthat it should not remain a matter of uncertainty what sim-\nple ideas are included and what are not. We at once see\nthe value of this rule. If our simple ideas are confounded,\none with another, or if we know not accurately the ele-\nments of our complex states of mind, these circumstances\nnecessarily diminish very much from the value of the words,\nstanding for them. With this explanation, the rule cannot\nfail to be understood, viz. That our words should have a\ndistinct and determinate meaning or what is the same\nthing, that the ideas should be distinct and determinate,\nwhich the words express.\nThe application of this rule seems to be peculiarly im-\nportant in regard to terms, standing for mixed modes, es-\npecially such names of mixed modes, as are of a moral\nkind. And one reason of this is, that these terms have no\nsettled objects in nature, no archetypes, to which they can\nbe referred, which are external to, and independent of the\nmind itself. They have been rightly regarded, as a spe-\ncies of mental creations. The materials or simple ideas\nwhich compose them, are in a certain sense independent of\nthe mind, but the arrangement of them is not and they,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0152.jp2"},"153":{"fulltext":"USE OF WORDS. 147\ntherefore, have an existence by the mere choice and act\nof the mind, and are properly intellectual formations.\nThe word justice, comes within the class of ideas, call-\ned mixed modes, and, being a moral term, is of frequent\noccurrence but, although every person may be supposed\nto attach some meaning to it, that meaning is not always\ndeterminate, and, in consequence, the term often causes\nperplexity. We will imagine the proper definition of it to\nbe this, The assigning to any one a reward or punishment\nagreeably to law. It will readily occur, that the complex\nterm will be involved in obscurity and uncertainty without\na clear understanding of the subordinate idea, expressed\nby the word, law that the compound or the whole will\nnot be fully known, without a knowledge of the number\nand of the character of the parts and the same of\nother mixed modes.\nIn respect to the names of substances it should be ob-\nserved, that the ideas, which the names represent, should\nbe not only distinct and determinate, but such, as will ac-\ncurately correspond to the things themselves.\nIt will, undoubtedly, be considered troublesome, to be\nunder the necessity of complying with the directions here\nlaid down, and to take so much care in settling in our\nminds the precise import of our complex notions. But it\nis a labour, which cannot well be dispensed with. Until\nit be undergone, men will often be perplexed as to their\nown meaning, and disputes, which might by a different\ncourse be speedily terminated, will be prolonged and mul-\ntiplied without end.\n132. The same word not to be used at the same time\nin different smses.\nThird rule We are not to use the same word in the\nsame discourse with different meanings with this excep-\ntion, that, if we should find it in some degree necessary\nslightly to vary the signification, which may sometimes be\nthe case, notice should be given of it. But it is at once\nremarked, in connection with this rule, that words in all","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0153.jp2"},"154":{"fulltext":"148 U3E OF WORDS.\nlanguages have a variety of significations, and that it can-\nnot well be otherwise, unless we are willing to multiply\nthem to an inordinate and burdensome degree. This is\ntrue but it may justly be replied, that no well constitu-\nted language admits varieties of meaning, which the train\nof the discourse, the natural connection of thought fails to\nsuggest. When, therefore, a person uses an important\nword in an argument with another, or in any separate dis-\ncourse, whether the signification be the common one or\nnot, it is rightly expected, that he employ it in the same\nsense afterwards, in which he was understood to use it, when\nhe began. If he do not, there will be unavoidable misun-\nderstanding the most laboured discourses will fail of giv-\ning instruction, and controversies under such circumstan-\nces cannot be terminated. This making the same word\nstand for different ideas, is spoken of by Mr. Locke, as a\nspecies of cheating it being much the same, as if a per-\nson in settling his accounts, should employ the number,\nthree, sometimes for three at others, for four, five, or\nnine, which could not be attributed to any thing else, than\ngreat ignorance, or great want of honesty.\n133. Words are to be employed agreeably to good\nand reputable use.\nThe fourth rule is, that we are to employ names with\nsuch ideas, as good and reputable use has affixed to them.\nOne object of language is to communicate our ideas to\nothers and this object necessarily fails without an obser-\nvance of this rule, since common or general use, in the\nmeaning of writers on rhetorick, is no other, than good or\nreputable use.\nThis subject was briefly touched upon in 126, where\nit appeared, that, if we would fulfil .the purposes of lan-\nguage, we ought to use words with their customary signifi-\ncation, employing them with that meaning, which, as far\nas we are able to learn, is ordinarily and generally attach-\ned to them. But this remark does not exhaust this topick.\nIt still remains to be inquired, What we are to under*","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0154.jp2"},"155":{"fulltext":"USE OP WORDS. 149\nstand by common, or, what is to be considered the same\nthing, good and reputable usage 9 and this is a point,\nwhich cannot be decided without some care, and a recur-\nrence to some general principles. In answer to the ques-\ntion, What is the common usage of a language 3 What is\ngood and reputable use 7 or What is that use of a word,\nwhich will justify one in adopting and employing it the\nthree following rules may be given.\n134. What constitutes good and reputable use.\n(1) It is one circumstance in favour of the good and\nreputable usage of a word, which constitutes what is other-\nwise termed common use, that it is found in the writings of\na considerable number, if not the majority of good authors.\nIt is not, in ordinary cases, sufficient to authorize a word,\nthat it is found in one merely, or even in a few such writers,\nand those, who are supported by such limited authority,\ncannot expect to be generally understood.\n(2) A second direction is, that the words, which lay\nclaim to good and reputable use, should not be provincial,\nor limited to a particular district of country Further,\nthose words, which are recently introduced from a foreign\ntongue, either by merchants in the intercourse of business,\nor by travellers for other reasons or in other ways, but\nwhich are not naturalized, and are not known to be neces-\nsary, have not this character. Good and reputable words\nare such, as are in use among the great mass of the peo-\nple in all parts of the territories of a country, however exten-\nsive, where any language is professed to be spoken. This is\nwhat is termed national use, in distinction from that jargon,\nwhich often springs up in neighbourhoods, or which, in\nthe ways, to which we have already alluded, is at times\nintroduced from a foreign source.\n(3) There is implied, thirdly, in the common and re-\nputable use of a language, that use, which prevails at the\npresent time. If we would employ words with their cus-\ntomary signification, with that meaning, which is ordinari-\nly attached to them, we must adopt the use of the period,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0155.jp2"},"156":{"fulltext":"150 USE OF WORDS.\nin which we live. It is not, however, necessarily implied\nin this rule, that we must limit ourselves to the present\nyear or even the present age. Certain limits, it is true*\nmust be fixed upon, which include our own times, but they\nmay be of greater or less extent, although it is a matter of\nno small difficulty judiciously to ascertain and define them.\nNote. The subject of the nature and characteristic!^\nof the use, which gives law to language, is particularly ex-\namined by Dr. Campbell in his Philosophy of Rhetorick.\nTo this book, the reputation of which is too well establish-\ned to stand in need of any recommendation here, the rea-\nder is referred for further suggestions on the topick of tbM\nsection.\n135. Of an universal language.\nThe inquiry has sometimes been started, Whether there\nmight not be a language, which should be permanent, and\nbe employed by all nations in other words, Whether\nthere might not be an universal language °l The im-\npracticability of such an universal tongue appears both\nfrom the nature and the history of this mode of expressing\nthought.\n(1) The nature of language shows its impracticability.\nIt is an idea, which observation seems to have well es-\ntablished, that whatever is imperfect has a tendency to\nwork out its own ruin and language, however excellent\nan invention, can never be otherwise than imperfect, since\nthe human mind, whch forms it, is itself limited, and is\noften running into errour. It will illustrate this remark,\nwhen we are reminded, that the external, material world is\none of the great sources of our ideas, but our mental pow-\ners being imperfect, different persons form different ideas\nof the same objects. They then agree in giving the same\nnames to these ideas or combinations of ideas, and there\noften arises in this way a mutual misapprehension of that\nvery agreement, which is not only the origin, but the sup-\nport of language. The seeds of the mutability and des-\ntruction of language art;, therefore, sown in its very birth.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0156.jp2"},"157":{"fulltext":"USE OF WORDS. 151\nsince a very little reflection cannot fail to show, how many\nperplexities, how many discussions, how many changes may\narise from this single circumstance, that, in consequence\nof the imperfection of our faculties, men often agree to\nconsider words, as standing for what they imagine to be\nthe same ideas, but which are not. We cannot, then, rea-\nsonably expect an universal and permanent language, until\nour minds can fully penetrate into the true nature of things,\nuntil our ideas are perfect, and different individuals can cer-\ntainly and exactly inform themselves of the thoughts, ex-\nisting in the minds of others.\nFurther the political institutions of one country, the\npeculiarities in the aspects of its natural scenery, early as-\nsociations, occupations, and habits, lay the foundation for\na variety of thoughts and shades of thought, which, in\nother countries, will not exist, because the causes of their\nexistence are not to be found. If thoughts, feelings, imag-\ninations exist under these circumstances, words will be\nneeded to express them, for which there will be no occasion\nin another country and among another people so that\nwe find here also a permanent and extensive cause of the\ndiversities of language.\n(2) The impracticability of an universal language h\nseen also from the history of languages in times past.\nWe cannot conceive of an universal language without\nsupposing it to be permanent, for if there were any causes,\nwhich would operate to affect its permanency, the opera-\ntion of the same causes would be felt in checking and pre-\nventing its universality. But if we search the whole his-\ntory of man, in order to find a language, that has remained\npermanent, unaltered it will be an entirely fruitless pur-\nsuit. Not one such can be found.\nThere appears to have been originally in Asia Minor a\nlanguage, spoken to a great extent, which after a time dis-\nappeared, so that the very name is lost. So far from being\nable to maintain itself and increase the territories, where it\nwas spoken, it was at last broken up into a variety of sub-\nordinate idioms, certainly no less than seven, the Hebrew*","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0157.jp2"},"158":{"fulltext":"152 USE OF WORDS.\nthe Syriack, the Chaldaick, the Arabick, the Ethiopick, ft\nthe Phenician, and Samaritan.\nA common language seems also to have been the ori-\nginal foundation of the different dialects of Greece.\nNo reason can be given in explanation of the want of\npermanency in these ancient languages, which would not\nlead us to expect constant changes in any other tongue,\nand under any other circumstances. If all the nations of\nthe earth could, by the providence of the Supreme Being,\nbe made to-morrow acquainted with one universal speech,\na knowledge of the nature of language and of its history\nwould warrant us in predicting the speedy discontinuance\nof this universality and the division of the language of the\nworld into the dialects of islands, continents, and sectional\nterritories. So that the remark of De Stutt-Tracy, a\nFrench writer on the Mind, that an universal language is\nas much an impossibility as a perpetual motion, is not\nwithout reason.\n136. Remarks of Condillac on the changes, and cor-\nruptions of language.\nIt is a remark of Condillac, to whose treatise on the\nOrigin of Knowledge, we have already had occasion to re-\nfer, that it is nearly the same in language, as in physicks,\nwhere motion, the source of life, becomes the principle of\ndestruction. When a language abounds (says he) with\noriginal writers in every kind, the more a person is endowed\nwith abilities, the more difficult he thinks it will be to sur-\npass them. A mere equality would not satisfy his ambition\nlike them he wants the pre-eminence. He, therefore, tries\na new road. But as every style analogous to the charac-\nter of the language, and to his own, hath been already used\nby preceding writers, he has nothing left but to deviate\nfrom analogy. Thus in order to be an original, he is obli-\nged to contribute to the ruin of a language, which a century\nsooner he would have helped to improve.\nThough such writers may be criticised, their superiour\nabilities must still command success. The ease there\nis in copying their defects, soon persuades men of indirTer-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0158.jp2"},"159":{"fulltext":"CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGES. 158\nent capacities, that they shall acquire the same degree of\nreputation. Then begins the reign of subtile and strained\nconceits, of affected antitheses, of specious paradoxes, of\nfrivolous and far-fetched expressions, of new-fangled words,\nand in short of the jargon of persons, whose understandings\nhave been debauched by bad metaphysicks. The publick\napplauds foolish and ridiculous writings, the beings of a\nday, are surprisingly multiplied a vicious taste infects the\narts and sciences, which is followed by a visible decrease\nof men of abilities.\nCHAPTER TWELFTH.\nCHARACTSj ZSTXCKS OF X.AN€K7A E3.\n137. General remarks on peculiarities of style.\nThe style of a writer is his choice of words and manner\nof arranging them. Every writer of genius employs a style\nin some degree peculiar to himself. The nature of lan-\nguage leads us to expect this. Language is the express-\nion of thought, and all writers of real worth think and feel\nin some degree for themselves their style, therefore,\nwhich embodies and sets forth their mental states to others,\nwill have a form and impress of its own. The languages\nof nations also have a style or peculiarity of manner, cer-\ntain prevailing characteristicks, which readily distinguish\nthem from those of other nations.\nThe style of individual writers, the characteristicks in\nthe style of Savages in their brief records and speeches,\nand those also of the languages of civilized and literary\ncommunities are all subjects of philosophical inquiry, and\nnever can be fully understood and explained without re-\nferring to some principles of the human mind,\n20","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0159.jp2"},"160":{"fulltext":"154 CHARACTEJRISTICKS OF LANGUAGES.\n138. Ckaracteristicks of style in uncivilized nations.\nAs uncivilized tribes are ignorant of alphabetical lan-\nguage, they are unable to furnish us with many specimens\nof mental effort rarely any thing more than some brief\nhistorical sketches, war songs, and speeches. The words,\nwhich such tribes employ, are generally few in number,\ncompared with the vocabulary of civilized nations and of\nthis number only a small proportion are the signs of ab-\nstract ideas. Having but few abstract ideas, and, conse-\nquently, but few names for them, they are under a necessi-\nty of resorting constantly to figurative illustrations; so\nthat their language seems to partake of the materiality of\nthe external objects, with which they are chiefly conver-\nsant. But aided, as they are, by metaphorical expressions,\ntheir stock of words still remains small and the sentences,\nwhich they utter, must, therefore, of necessity be short.\nThese short and figurative sentences are inspirited with\nall the untamed passions of a savage mind.\nThe bones of our countrymen (say the Chiefs) lie un-\ncovered their bloody bed has not been washed clean\ntheir spirits cry against us they must be appeased sit\nno longer inactive upon your mats lift the hatchets con-\nsole the spirits of the dead.\n139. Origin of apologues and of the parabolick style.\nNations, while in an uncivilized state, or when at best\nthey are only in their progress towards intellectual refine-\nment, do not often attempt abstract reasonings or abstract\nspeculations of any kind and this is one marked char-\nacteristick of the style of such periods. The causes are\nchiefly two.\nOne of which is, that they have a small number of gen-\neral terms and it could not be expected to be otherwise.\nIt appeared at 121, that we are capable of carrying on\ntrains of reasoning to some little extent without the aid of\ngeneral terms or those words, which stand for abstract\nideas but it was no less evident, that they are of great","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0160.jp2"},"161":{"fulltext":"CHARACTERIST1CKS OF LANGUAGES, 155\nuse, and that without them all processes of reasoning must\nbe very much circumscribed.\nThis circumstance also deserves consideration, as ac-\ncounting in some measure for the absence of abstract spec-\nulations and reasonings from the mental efforts of nations\nin the early periods of their history, viz. They do not\npossess, to that number desirable, those parts of speech,\nsuch as conjunctions and relative pronouns, which are used\nto connect sentences and clauses of sentences, and to show\ntheir distinction from each other, or opposition. It ap-\npeared at 123, that these classes of words, which are\nevidently very important in long and connected trains of\nthought, and also adverbs and prepositions, are subsequent\nin their origin to nouns and verbs in other words, that, in\nthe formation of a language, these are the parts, which are\ncompleted last.\nUnder these circumstances, their reasonings, as might\nbe expected, are applied to the minds of people by a vari-\nety of obvious and familiar illustrations,— by means of apo-\nlogues and parables.\nWhen Menennius Agrippa (year 260 of the Roman re-\npublick) wishes to convince the people of the necessity of\nsubordination to the regularly constituted government, he\nlays down no abstract proposition and enters into no argu-\nment. The historian informs us, that he merely related,\nin an antiquated and uncouth way, the story of a rebellion\non the part of the other members of the body, the hands,\nthe mouth, and the teeth, against the stomach, and leaves\nthem to make an application of it. The people usider-\nstood what he meant.\nNot to say any thing of the apologues and parables,\nattributed to Msop and others, the Bible itself, written far\nthe most part at a very early period, helps to illustrate\nthese remarks. Who does not recollect the apologue of\nthe trees by Jotham in the book of Judges, that of the two\nmen in one city by Nathan, and a multitude of others\nin particular, the interesting parables of the Saviour","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0161.jp2"},"162":{"fulltext":"156 CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGES.\n140. Of the style of civilized and scientifick nations.\nA a nation advances in knowledge, its language be^\ncomes more strictly conventional, losing by degrees that\nmetaphorical aspect, which it presented in its earlier peri-\nods. A variety of new words are introduced, which pre-\nviously had no existence, because the things, for which\nthey stand, were not then known. New arts have their\ntechnical names and epithets, and new sciences furnish us\nwith their novel nomenclatures.\nThe distiller speaks of the cohobation of liquors the\nworker in mines of collieries the chymist of sulphates and\nmuriates the botanist and mineralogist employ a variety\nof terms, peculiar to their respective departments. An\nincreased refinement and abstraction discovers itself in\nterms, appropriated to moral, political, and literary subr\njects and the language in all respects is more removed\nfrom the senses, and becomes more intellectual. But\nwhile it is more exact and scientifick, it is less fervent and\npoetical a Savage, if he had the most refined language\nof Europe at his command, would be at a loss to express\nin it the fiery emotions of his bosom he would choose\nthe dialect of his tribe.\n141. Characteristicks of languages depend much on\nthe habits, c. of the people.\nIndividual writers, as already observed, have a style\nthat is, characteristicks of expression, of their own for\nevery one has a tendency to connect together thoughts or\nwords, which are the signs of thoughts, agreeably to his\npeculiar passions, and intellectual habits. But languages\nalso, considered in their whole extent, have a style; be-\ncause the nations, the whole inass of people, that make\nuse of those languages, have their characteristicks, as well\nas individuals. It follows, tjjen, from this, thjjt languages\nassume their general character or style, in a good mea-\nsure, from that of the people and this is what we are\nwilling to maintain. It will be found, that the language","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0162.jp2"},"163":{"fulltext":"CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGES. 157\nof every people has words, combinations of words, pecu-\nliarities of grammatical construction, c. springing entire-\nly out of the national habits and the* exigencies of their\npeculiar circumstances. Thus, we have the word, cor-\nban, in Hebrew, anggaros in Persian, ostrakismos in\nGreek, proscriptio and virtus in Latin words, which\nare either wholly peculiar to their respective languages, or\nemployed with some peculiarity of meaning, not elsewhere\nacknowledged. We find combinations of words and pe-\nculiarities of grammatical construction in the Hebrew and\nits cognate dialects, which we do not find in the languages\nof modern Europe and this will be more or less the case\nin whatever other languages or classes of languages we\nmay compare together.\nThe single fact, without going into particulars, that no\nperson can become fully acquainted with the true import\nand spirit of a language, without an acquaintance with the\ngeography of their country and its natural scenery, without\na knowledge of the dress, buildings, arts, religion, customs,\nand history of the people, seems enough in support of the\nremark, that languages take their character from the cir-\ncumstances of those, who speak them. If the fact, on\nwhich the conclusion is founded, be doubted, then we ask,\nwhy instructers consider it so essential, that their pupils\nshould have a knowledge of the antiquities of the Romans,\nof the antiquities of the Greeks, of the antiquities of the\nHebrews 9 and why this course is pursued, or is ac-\nknowledged to be requisite, in respect to every other dead\nlanguage\n142. Languages help us in forming a correct idea\nof the national character.\nIf the statements in the preceding section be true, it\nfollows, that a knowledge of languages very much helps\nus in acquiring a knowledge of the character of the peo-\nple, who speak them. The study of every language is the\nexamination of a new chapter in. the history and operations\nof the mind that is, of the mind, as it is modified by pe-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0163.jp2"},"164":{"fulltext":"158 CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGES.\nculiar circumstances, the climate, government, habits, c,\nof a people. Without an acquaintance, therefore, with\ntheir vernacular tongue, the critick will in vain take it\nupon him, to judge of the philosophy of their literature and\ncharacter. It is this, that breathes the national spirit; it\nfixes and retains it, after the nation itself is extinct.\nWhatever may have been at any time thought, it will\nbe found on examination, that those individuals, who are\nlooked up to, as the eminent writers of a nation, seldom\narise, until its language is nearly or quite completed. They\nemploy it, as the people have formed it and the people\nhave formed it, as their feelings .and habits prompted.\n143. Of the correspondence between national intellect\nand ike progress of a language.\nThe circumstance, that language is a great and admi-\nrable instrument of intellectual power, is of itself no small\nconfirmation of the hint thrown out in 142, that devel-\nopements of intellectual strength will correspond to the\nprogressive improvement of a language, and that its great\nmen, those, who are to speak in it long as it shall exist,\nwill not make their appearance, until it have arrived to\nsome degree of perfection.\nLet it be supposed, that in the midst of a savage tribe,\nwhose language is rude, a person is found of perfect men-\ntal organization, capable of remembering, separating, and\ncomparing ideas, with a quickness of invention, and other\nqualities of genius above the common lot. He has influ\nence over the minds of others he is consulted in difficult\nemergencies he is accounted wise but how far he falls\nshort of the mark, which is reached by others of originally\nnc greater genius, who appear in a civilized community\nwith the advantage of a perfect language\nIt is with languages (says Condillac) as with geome-\ntrical signs they give a new insight into things, and di-\nlate the mind in proportion as they are more perfect. Sir\nIsaac Newton s extraordinary success was owing to the\nchoice which had been alrjcady made of signs, together","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0164.jp2"},"165":{"fulltext":"0HARACTEHISTICKS OF LANGUAGES. 159\nnith the contrivance of methods of calculation. Had he\nappeared earlier, he might have been a great man for the\nage he would have lived in, but he would not have been\nthe admiration of ours. It is the same in every other\nbranch of learning. The success of geniuses, who have\nhad the happiness even of the best organization, depends\nentirely on the progress of the language in regard to the\nage in which they live for words answer to geometri-\ncal signs, and the manner of using them to methods of\ncalculation. In a language, therefore, defective in words,\nor whose construction is not sufficiently easy and convene\nient, we should meet with the same obstacles as occurred\niu geometry before the invention of algebra. The French\ntongue was for a long time so unfavourable to the progress\nof the mind, that if we could frame an idea of Corneille\nsuccessively in the different ages of our monarchy, we\nshould find him to have been possessed of less genius in\nproportion to his greater distance from the age in which\nhe lived, till at length we should reach a Corneille, who\ncould not give the least mark of abilities. (Origin of\nKnowledge, part II. I.) This writer thinks, it may be\ndemonstrated, that there can be no such thing, as a supe-\nriour genius, till the language of a nation has been consid-\nerably improved.\n144. Different languages suited to different minds.\nSome languages are more suited to certain minds than\nthey are to others more adapted also to the discussion of\ncertain subjects, than others. The French language is\nsimple, clear, precise, and, therefore, favourable to analyti-\ncal investigations. And it is here,it may be conjectured, that\nwe find one cause of the superiour excellence of the mathe-\nmaticians and philosophers, and of the comparative inferi-\nority of the poets of that nation. Not that we mean to\nspeak lightly of French poetry, for the genius of Corneille\nand other writers cannot but be felt even under the disad-\nvantages of their language but it cannot be presumed, that\nit would express, would give a reality of form and existence*","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0165.jp2"},"166":{"fulltext":"160 CHtARACTERISTICKS OF LANGUAGES.\nso admirably as the English, to the diversified, and illiniH\ntable genius of Shakespeare.\nIn no other languages, than the English and the Ger-\nman, could the Paradise Lost of Milton and the Messiah of\nKlopstock have been originally written; and into none\nothers can their true spirit be transfused. To take a case\nyet more obvious, the Athenian orator could never have\ncomposed his orations in the language of the Prophets,\nthat language being neither suited to his mind nor his cir-\ncumstances. The original tongue of the Old Testament\nis well adapted to lyricks and some forms of descriptive\npoetry, and to the simplest species of narration, but not to\nphilosophical analysis, and to such abstract reasonings, as\nare more or less found in orations of a political nature.\n145. Difficulties of translating from one language\nto another.\nIt was remarked, that the true spirit of the Paradise\nLost and of the Messiah of Klopstock cannot be transfused\ninto any other language, than those, in which they were\noriginally written. All translations from one language to\nanother are difficult, but this is emphatically true of poe-\ntry. But it is evident, that these difficulties could not ex-\nist to their present extent, if all languages had not a char-\nacter or style of their own.\nEvery tongue will be found to have combinations of\nideas, peculiar to itself, which are expressed by a single\nword, and which do not exist in this precise state of com-\nbination in other languages. See for instances 141.\nA variety of associations also will be connected with the\nwords and phrases of one dialect, which are not connected\nwith the corresponding words and phrases in others, and\nwhich slightly affect the meaning in a manner, not readily\nperceptible by a foreigner. These go, among other things*\nto constitute the style or characteristicks of languages, and\nare found in poetry more than in writings on other sub-\njects and hence the peculiar difficulty, which has always\nbeen experienced, of translating it.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0166.jp2"},"167":{"fulltext":"CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGES. 161\n|i 146. Ckaracteris ticks of the Greek and Latin lan-\nguages.\nThere are characteristicks of a language, which are ap-\npropriate to some particular period of its progress, to its\nstate of infancy, of manhood, or of decline. In its infancy\nit is metaphorical, wanting in copiousness, and adapted\nrather to express strong passions, than to abstract reason-\ning. In its manhood it seems to be more removed from\nthe senses and to become more strictly the creation of the\nintellect it has an increase in its range of expression, and\nis by degrees suited to abstract reasoning in its different\nkinds and to the various departments of literature. The\ncauses and some of the marks of the decline of a language\nare to be found at 136, in the preceding chapter.\nWe have seen also, that there is an influence exerted\nby the language on the men of superiour minds, the early\nwriters of a nation, and that particular languages are bet-\nter adapted to some minds and some species of writing\nthan others. The subject can be further illustrated by a\nbrief specification of some circumstances, in which a num-\nber of important languages are found to differ beginning\nwith the Greek and Latin, which sustain a relation of no\nordinary kind to certain living languages, which are exten-\nsively spoken.\nThe Greek and Latin differ from most modern langua-\nges in admitting of transposition, and for this purpose have\nfurnished certain classes of their words with particular vari-\nations, by means of which they are made to refer to Other\nwords, with which they are naturally connected by the\nmeaning or sense of the passage. Whether this power\ngives those languages any essential advantage over others,\nwhich are destitute of it, is a point, which has been vari-\nously decided. When these two languages are compared\nwith each other, it will be found, that the Greek possesses\nremarkable harmony, which is at once perceived even by\nthose, who do not understand the meaning of the wo/ds\nit has a great abundance of words, expressive of the dif-\nferent classes of ideas and of slight variations of meaning,\n21","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0167.jp2"},"168":{"fulltext":"102 eHARAGTERISTICKS OF LANGUAGES.\nwhich is what is meant by the copiousness of a language,\nand is supposed to possess more, than any other language,\nthe quality of flexibility or the power of giving to its words\na great variety of arrangements. The Latin is somewhat\nmarked for an air of stateliness and majesty, but, compar-\ned with the Greek, is less copious and flexible; the cir-\ncumstance of its want, in some degree, of flexibility, its pos-\nsession of a form of majesty, which it is unable to assume\nand lay aside at pleasure like the Greek, renders it not well\nsuited for easy conversation. We have in this language\nfine specimens of historical writing. It is not so well\nadapted to certain kinds of poetry, particularly the con-\ndensed and nervous sentiment, and the harmony of ex-\npression in lyricks Horace, a man of uncommon poetic-\nal genius, being the only successful instance in that kind\nof writing.\n147. Characteristicks of the Italian language*\nThe origin of the Italian language is a subject of no\nlittle difficulty, but among the various hypotheses, which\nhave been advanced, that of Muratori seems, on some ac-\ncounts, preferable to others. He considers the Latin lan-\nguage to have been successively adopted by the barbarian\ninvaders and conquerors of Italy, but to have received from\neach of them a portion of their own phrases, inflexions, arid\npronunciation and that the modern Italian was gradually\nformed in this way. In the fourteenth century, the lan-\nguage seems to have become fully constructed and fixed\nboth poetry and prose having then been carried to a pitch\nof excellence, not since surpassed.\nSweetness is so much the characteristick of this lan-\nguage, that it has been almost regarded by some, as if pur-\nposely formed for the service of musical genius. Although\nit is exceedingly harmonious, there is a want of diversity\nin its sounds, so much so that even its harmony proves\ntiresome. There has been in this language a historian,\nMachiavelli, who formed himself on the model of Tacitus,\nbut it cannot be pretended, that strength is one of its char-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0168.jp2"},"169":{"fulltext":"CHARACTSRISTICKS OF LANGUAGES. 163\nacteristicks, or that it is equally suited with the Latin to a\ngenius, like that of the Roman historian. Nothing can be\nmore finely fitted, than the sameness of melody, which pre-\nvails in this language, to that state of mind, that plaintive\nand melancholy feeling, which is the subject of elegiack\npoems.\n148. Char acteristicks of the Spanish language.\nThe Spanish language, which is the favoured dialect of\nso many young and hopeful republicks on the continent of\nAmerica, is essentially the same in origin with the Italian\nbut differing from it, notwithstanding, in many respects.\nIt has, like all other languages, a character of its own.\nSonorous and full, it seems to indicate, in its structure and\nmovements, that dignified and measured solemnity, which\nis so well known to be characteristick of the people, who\nspeak it. While it has not less than the majesty of the\nLatin, it much excels it in being adapted to the purposes\nof conversation and the common intercourse of life. As\nfar as conversation is concerned, it is by some thought, al-\nthough its pretensions come in competition with those of\nthe French, to be the most elegant and courteous language\nin Europe.\nThe order of chivalry first arose and was longest sus-\ntained among the Spaniards and as all the members of\nthat romantick institution were bound to be polite, as well\nas heroick, it naturally happened, that there were introdu-\nced in this way many expressions of respect and politeness,\nwhich have since been retained.\nIn connection with these remarks, and as helping to\nillustrate the general views, given in this chapter, we bring\nto the notice of the reader certain criticisms, which have\nbeen made on the English translations of that interesting\nand well-known work, the Adventures of the Knight of\nLa Mancha. It is sometimes said with great confidence,\nthat the characters so finely drawn by Cervantes are still\nbut very imperfectly known, excepting by those, who have\nread bis work in the language, in which he wrote. A great","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0169.jp2"},"170":{"fulltext":"164 CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGES.\npoint, in giving an idea of the two prominent characters,\nis, so to unite the follies of the hero with a certain gentle-\nmanly demeanour, suited to his rank, and the obsequious\ncredulity of the squire with such profound deference for\nhis master, that the one may never fail in courtesy, and the\nother may never be wanting in respect. As their inter-\ncourse is constant, and they are on terms of great fa-\nmiliarity, it is peculiarly difficult to prevent that familiarity\nof intercourse from becoming, on the part of the knight,\nsomething worse than dignified condescension, and, on the\nother hand, not less difficult to prevent the credulous and\nbusy simplicity of the squire from degenerating into im-\npertinence and disrespect. The line is here drawn with\nundeviating strictness in the Spanish, with the exception\nof a few instances of an extreme kind, where it seems not\nbeyond the bounds of probability, that even chivalry should\nforget that dignified and scrupulous conduct, which it had\never professed. In no other living language could these\ntwo characters have been drawn, in the respects now men-\ntioned, with such fidelity as in the Spanish as no other\npossesses in the same degree the requisite qualities.\nOf the French language we have already briefly\nspoken, enough for our present purpose. Of the Eng-\nlish, the language of so many millions of freemen, and the\nrepository of the thoughts of so many gifted minds, it is\nsufficient to let those, who use it, judge for themselves\njust mentioning, however, the necessity of caution, lest\ntheir relation to it should betray them into a greater sen-\nsibility to its beauties than its defects.\n149. Requisites of an interpreter of languages.\nFrom the views, which have now been taken of the\ncharacteristicks of language, we are led to educe a number\nof inferences, which may be stated in the form of rules or\nprinciples of interpretation wishing to observe, however,\nthat both the subject of the characteristicks of languages\nand that of interpretation are worthy of a more extensive ex-\namination, than can be expected from such abridged hints\nas thcfce. They open a wide field for literary exertion, which","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0170.jp2"},"171":{"fulltext":"CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGES. 165\nhas been zealously occupied by a few criticks, particularly\namong the Germans; and with such success, as to encour-\nage others to emulate their example. Those, who pursue\nit, cannot fail to meet with encouragement. The subject\nof the nature and interpretation of language is in itself,\nindependent of any remote consequences, one of exceeding\ninterest, and demands success. When interpretation is\nconducted on the principles here laid down, it is no longer\na business of conjugations and declensions merely, it is\nnot a mere dry comparison of words, but the study of the\nphilosophy of human nature.\nRule first The interpreter must have a good, gram-\nmatical knowledge of the vernacular tongue of the writer,\nwhom he interprets. This, no doubt, is evident it be-\ning a necessary, preliminary step.\nRule second The interpreter should have a philo-\nsophical knowledge of the language. Something more is\nnecessary than a knowledge of single words, of declensions,\nand conjugations, and of the rules of syntax. He must be\nacquainted with the prevailing spirit, or what are in this\nchapter termed the characteristicks of the language. He\nmust inform himself of the history of the people, learn their\npeculiar associations, their customs, the state of the arts,\nc. In no other way can he understand the true spirit,\nor have, what may be otherwise called, a philosophical\nknowledge of any language and without such knowledge\nhe can never do justice to his author. (See 141.)\nRule third He must know something of the author\nhimself, whatever is peculiar in his situation, or, in other\nwords, his personal history. If languages have character-\nisticks or a style of their own, it is certainly not less true\nof individual authors and this diversity is partly owing to\nthe peculiarities of their private fortunes. We cannot\ndissent from the saying of Petruchio in the play\nTie the mind, that makes the body rich.\nIt may be safely admitted, that the mind is not wholly de-\npendent on outward circumstances. If it be truly great,\nit will show something of the excellence of its nature in\nall situations, in want, in woe, in persecution, in ignorance","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0171.jp2"},"172":{"fulltext":"166 CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGES.\nItself as the sun breaks through clouds. But it is no\nless true, that circumstances are never without their influ-\nence they give to the mind a new direction and almost\nimpart to it, in some instances, a new character. Hence\nthe importance of this rule. We are to inquire amid what\nscenery of nature the writer dwelt What early supersti-\ntions were made familiar to his mind? In what political\nand religious principles he was educated What was his\npersonal calling and the degree of his rank in life What\nwas his treatment from men 1 and what his peculiar views\nof human character And it is not, until these things are\nmade known to us, that we are fully prepared to estimate\nwhat he has written.\nThe remarks here made admit of an illustration in al-\nmost all writers of any original genius. But to take an\ninstance, which is familiar, and on that account perhaps is\nbest chosen, it may be confidently said, that they may be\nillustrated from the writings of the New Testament. We\nobserve a difference in the style of Matthew and Luke, of\nPaul and John. The situations in which they were placed,\nand circumstances under which they acted, had undoubted-\nly an influence on their character, and through their char-\nacter on their writings, but this was not the whole origin\nof these peculiarities. Even the natural temperament of\nthe writer, by a powerful sympathy, communicates itself to\nthe written composition and while that of Paul is abrupt\nand vehement, like the soul of its author, that of John seems\nto express, in its very words and combinations, his af-\nfectionate disposition.\nThe apostle Paul, in particular, is a fortunate instance,\nto show the importance of attending to the peculiarities of\nindividual writers. Peculiarities whatever cause they\nmay have arisen from may be discovered in his writings,\nin the use even of single words. For instance, the word,\nkatargein, signifying to remove, destroy, kill, make free,\nis very seldom found in any Greek classick author, but is\nfound twenty six times in the apostle s writings only once\nin all the other books of the New Testament.\nSt. Paul has sometimes employed such words, as he foun4","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0172.jp2"},"173":{"fulltext":"CHARACTERISTICKS OF LANGUAGES. 167\nused in common conversation, and which, although not un-\nfrequent in common discourse, WGuld have hardly been con-\nsidered admissible in classical writers, certainly not in the\nsense, in which he employs them. The word, exousia, (1\nCor. xi. 10,) primarily means power, dignity, c but ap-\npears, by a fashion, which sometimes exists in language no\nless than in dress and in manners, to have been in the city\nof Corinth, the name of a woman s head-dress, which was\nworn, at the time of writing the Epistle to the Corinthians,\nin that city. There is no reason to think, that it is used\nin this sense by any other w T riter, either of the pure Greek,,\nor of tlie Hebrastick. When, therefore, we learn in re-\ngard to the apostle Paul, that he was brought up in the\ndoctrines of the Pharisees, that he afterwards embraced\nthe christian religion, that he was driven from place to\nplace, and resided in many cities, in Rome, in Ephesus,\nand particularly Corinth, that he was a person of great\nboldness, decision, and enterprise a knowledge of these\ncircumstances in his personal fortunes and character throws\nmuch light on his writings.\nRule fourth The views, which have been given, lead\nus to remark, as another and fourth rule, that the interpre-\nter should possess an intimate acquaintance with the par-\nticular subject, on which his author treats; and not only\nthis, should endeavour fully to possess himself of the spirit\nof the particular species of writing, of which the tract to\nbe interpreted is a specimen, whether it be poetry, the\nstyle of essays, of mathematical treatises, of history, or of\nphilosophy.\nNothing is more clear^than that the human mind, when\ncalled into exercise, will be differently affected according\nto the nature of that particular subject, to which its atten-\ntion is directed. It will be characterized by calm reflec-\ntions on the more intimate nature or the philosophy of cre-\nated things or will be thrown into a series of closely con-\ncatenated propositions or will be animated by a creative\npower and form thousands of new and glowing images or\nwill be excited by strong and declamatory impulses ac-\ncording to the characteristic* tendencies of the exercise,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0173.jp2"},"174":{"fulltext":"168 CHARACTERISTIC S OF LANGUAGES.\nabout which it is employed. The interpreter cannot dd\nhim justice without having his own mind brought into a sim-\nilar position with the original author s and in order to this,\nhe must be acquainted not only with the subject of the par-\nticular writing in question, but also with the characteristicks\nand spirit of that species of writing, to which it belongs.\nIt would be presumption, not to say injustice in a mathe-\nmatician, who had exclusively devoted himself to his chos-\nen science,to undertake to pass sentence on the productions\nof a poet those mental tendencies and that state of mind,\nwhich are adapted to the last mentioned department of lit-\nerature, not being fitted to, the former. It would be no\nless presumption and injustice for a mere painter to as-\nsume the criticism of musical compositions, or for a mere\nman of polite letters to attempt the interpretation of the\nwritings and an estimation of the character of mathema-\nticians.\nNote. It may seem to be a proper place here, to men-*\ntion a peculiar difficulty in the interpretation of the Bible,\narising from the nature of the subjects there treated of.\nRevelation is a communication of those things, which could\nnot have been fully learnt, and some of them could not\nhave been learnt in any degree, by our unassisted faculties.\nIt is a declaration of such facts, as eye hath not seen, and\near hath not heard.\nAs, therefore, we derive our ideas from sensation and\nfrom what takes place in our own minds, it ought not to\nsurprise us, that our weak and limited understandings are\nincapable of forming a perfect conception of God, of an-\ngels, of spiritual bodies, of the soul being brought to judg-\nment, of the resurrection from the dead, c. The words,\nwhich are employed on these subjects, are not without\nmeaning, but such is the nature of the things signified by\nthe words, that the meaning of them is often necessarily\nobscure to us and we here find a favourable opportunity\nboth for the exercise of that religious feeling, which is\ntermed faith, as to the things themselves, and also for the\nexercise of charity, when our own interpretations do not\nagree with those of any Of our erring fellow beings.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0174.jp2"},"175":{"fulltext":"169\nCHAPTER THIRTEENTH.\nPRINCIPLES OP MENTAL ASSOCIATION;\n150. Of the meaning of mental association and of\nits general principles or laws.\nOur thoughts and feelings follow each other in a regu-\nlar train. Of this statement no one needs any other proof,\nthan his individual experience we all know, not only,\nthat our minds are susceptible of new states, but what is\nmore, that this capability of new states is not fortuitous,\nbut has its laws. Therefore, we not only say, that our\nthoughts and feelings succeed each other, but that this an-\ntecedence and sequence is in a regular train a circum-\nstance in our intellectual economy, which, it may be just\nobserved, has the most direct and important bearing on our\npreservation and happiness. To this regular and estab-\nlished consecution of the states of the mind we give the\nname of mental association.\nThe term, association, is perhaps preferable to any oth-\ner. It may, with no little appearance of reason, be object-\ned to the word, suggestion, which has sometimes been em-\nployed, that it seems to imply a positive power or efficien-\ncy of the preceding state of the mind in producing the\nsubsequent. But of the existence of such an efficiency\nwe have no evidence. All that we know is the fact, that\nour thoughts and feelings, under certain circumstances, ap-\npear together and keep each other company And this is\nwhat is understood to be expressed, and is all, that is ex-\npressed, by the term, association.\nBy the principles or laws of association, we mean no\nother, than the general designation of those circumstances*\nunder which the regular consecution of mental states,\nwhich has been mentioned, occurs. The following may\nbe mentioned as among the primary principles of asso-\nciation, although it is not necessary to tako upon us to as-^\nsert, either that the enumeration is complete, or that some\n22","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0175.jp2"},"176":{"fulltext":"170 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\nbetter arrangement of these laws might not be proposed,\n—viz. resemblance, contrasTj contiguity in time and\nplace, and cause and effect.\n151. Resemblance the first general principle of\nassociation.\nNew trains of ideas and new emotions are occasioned\nr resemblance but when we say, that they are occasion-\ned in this way, all that is meant is, that there is a new state\nof mind, immediately subsequent to the perception of the\nresembling object. Of the efficient cause of this new state\nof mind under these circumstances, we can only say, the\nCreator of the soul has seen fit to appoint this connection\nin its operations, without our being able, or deeming it\nnecessary to give any further explanation. A traveller,\nwandering in a foreign land, finds himself in the course of\nhis sojournings in the midst of aspects of nature not un-\nlike those, where he has formerly resided, and the fact of\nthis resemblance becomes the antecedent to new states of\nmind; there is distinctly brought before him the scenery,\nwhich he has left, his own woods, his waters, and his home.\nThe result is the same in any other case, whenever there is\na resemblance between what we now experience, and\nwhat we have previously experienced. We have been\nacquainted, for instance, at some former period with a per-\nson, whose features appeared to us to possess some pecu-\nliarity, a breadth and openness of the forehead, an uncom-\nmon expression of the eye, or some other striking mark\nto-day we meet a stranger in the crowd, by which we are\nsurrounded, whose features are of a somewhat similar cast,\nand the resemblance at once vividly suggests the likeness\nof our old acquaintance.\n152. Resemblance in every particular not necessary.\nIt is not necessary, that the resemblance should be\ncomplete in every particular, in order to its being a princi-\nple or law of association. It so happens, for instance, that\nwc tee a painted portrait of a female countenance, which","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0176.jp2"},"177":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 171\nis adorned with a ruff of a peculiar breadth and display\nand we are, in consequence, immediately reminded of\nqueen Elizabeth. Not because there is any resemblance\nbetween the features before us and those of the English\nsovereign, but because in all the painted representations,\nwhich we have seen of her, she is uniformly set off with\nthis peculiarity of dress, with a ruff like that, which W3\nnow see. Here the resemblance between the suggesting\nthing and that, which is suggested, is not a complete -re-\nsemblance, does not exist in all the particulars, in which\nthey may be compared together, but is limited to a part of\nthe dress.\nThat a single resembling circumstance, (and perhaps\none of no great importance,) should so readily suggest th«\ncomplete conception of another object or scene, which is\nmade up of a great variety of parts, seems to admit of som3\nexplanation in this way. We take, for example, an indi-\nvidual; the idea, which we form of the individual is a\ncomplex one, made up of the forehead, eyes, lips, hair, gen-\neral figure, dress, c. These separate, subordinate ideas,\nwhen combined together, and viewed as a whole, hava a\nnear analogy to any of our ideas, which are compounded\nand are capable of being resolved into elements more sin\npie. When, therefore, we witness a ruff of a size and\ndecoration more than ordinary, we are at once reminded\nof that ornament in the habiliments of the British queen\nand this on the ground of resemblance. But this article\nin the decorations of her person is the foundation of only\none part of a very complex state of mind, which embraces\nthe features and the general appearance. As there has\nbeen a long continued co-existence of those separate parts,\nw ich make up this complex state, the recurrence to the\nmind of one part or of one idea is necessarily attended\nwith the recurrence of all the others. They sustain the re*\nlation of near friends they form a group, and do not easi-\nly and willingly admit of a separation. The principle,\nwhich maintains in the relation of co-existence such state*\nof the mind, as may be considered as grouped together, is\nthe same with that, whieh so steadily and permanently","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0177.jp2"},"178":{"fulltext":"172 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\ncombines the parts of mixed modes or other complex ideas,\nand is no less effectual in its operation. What this prin-\nciple is will more fully appear from remarks, shortly to be\nmade, on contiguity in time and place.\n153. Of resemblance in the effects produced*\nResemblance operates, as an associating principle, not\nonly when there is a likeness or similarity in the things\nthemselves, but also when there is a resemblance in the\neffects, which are produced upon the mind.\nThe ocean, when greatly agitated by the winds, and\nthreatening every moment to overwhelm us, produces in\nthe mind an emotion, similar to that, which is caused by\nthe presence of an angry man, who is able to do us harm.\nAnd in consequence of this similarity in the effects produ-\nced, they reciprocally bring each other to our recollec-\ntion.\nDark woods, hanging over the brow of a mountain,\ncause in us a feeling of awe and wonder, like that, which\nwe feel, when we behold, approaching us, some aged per-\nson, whose form is venerable for his years, and whose name\nis renowned for wisdom and justice. It is in reference to\nthis view of the principle, on which we are remarking, that\nthe following comparison is introduced in Akenside s\nPleasures of the Imagination.\nMark the sable woods,\nThat shade sublime yon mountain s nodding brow\nft With what religious awe the solemn scene\nCommands your steps As if the reverend form\nu Of Minos or of filuma should forsake\nThe Elysian seats, and down the embowering glade\nMove to your pausing eye.\nAs we are so constituted, that all nature produces in us\ncertain effects, causes certain emotions, similar to those,\nwhich are caused in us in our intercourse with our fellow-\nbeings, it so happens that, in virtue of this fact, the natur-\nal world becomes living, animated, operative. The ocean\nis in anger the sky smiles the cliff frowns-, the aged woods\nare venerable the earth and its productions are no longer\na dead mass, but have an existence, a soul, an agency.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0178.jp2"},"179":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 173\nWe see here the foundation of metaphorical language\nand it is here, that we are to look for the principles, by\nwhich we are to determine the propriety or impropriety of\nits use.\nIn every metaphor there is some analogy or resem-\nblance it is a comparison or simile in its most concise\nform. There is an examination instituted and circumstan-\nces of similitude are detected not, however, by a long and\nlaborious process, but in a single word. Hence it is the\nlanguage of strong emotion; and as such, is peculiarly the\nlanguage of uncivilized nations, and, in general, of the\nmost spirited parts of the poetry of those, that are civilized.\n154. Resemblances in sounds alliteration, c.\nOur states of mind are associated, one with another, not\nmerely by resemblances existing in the external and visible\nappearances of things, to which those states or ideas cor-\nrespond nor is the fact of their association limited to re-\nsemblances in the effects resulting from them they may\nalso be associated by similitudes of various degrees in the\nwords, which are appointed, as their signs. Sounds, which\nin a similar manner impress the organ of hearing, recipro-\ncally suggest each other and this is especially true of\nwords, whether they convey the same or similar meaning,\nor not._ Thus, it is not impossible, that powders may sug-\ngest patches, and billets-doux may be associated with Bi-\nbles, not because there is any resemblance in the things,\nbetween powders and patches, billets-doux and Bibles, but\nbecause the words begin with the same letters, and there\nis, consequently, a slight resemblance in the sounds. It\nis evidently in consequence of the operation of association\nin this manner, that we find these very things brought to-\ngether in a line of Pope s Rape of the Lock\nPuffs, powders, patches, Bibles, billets-doux.\nThis is an instance of what is termed alliteration, an\nartifice in poetical style, which is not unfrequently employ-\ned, and sometimes with good effect.\nAlliteration, if the meaning of the term be not al-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0179.jp2"},"180":{"fulltext":"174 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\nready quite familiar, is the repetition of the same letter at\nthe beginning of different words or any emphatick part of\nthe same word, at certain short intervals. The following,\nin addition to the one already given, are instances of this\npractice.\nUp the high h\\\\\\ he leaves a huge round stone. Pope.\n*Soon be soothed the soul to pleasures. Dryden.\nTo ftigh-born HoeYs harp, or soft Z.ZeweZZyn s Zay. Gray.\nThe poet often finds himself prodigally furnished with\nwords, which would be suitable for alliterations. And\nhis richness in such terms can be ascribed to nothing else,\nthan the faculty of association, operating in the manner\ndescribed with this additional circumstance in the case\nof the poet, that the operation is quickened and made more\neffectual, by his practice of seeking for words, which have\na similarity of termination. It is possible, that the fre-\nquency of the recurrence of such terms operates, as a\ntemptation to the poetical writer to employ them and to\nform stanzas, containing alliteration, more frequently than he\nought to. Whatever may be the difference of opinion as\nto the positive merit or want of merit in this species of or-\nnament, all readily admit, that its value cannot be account-\ned great. It is, therefore, to be employed with caution,\nand suits better on slight occasions and in subjects of no\nvery serious import, than in those of a solemn and impor-\ntant nature.\nIts good results may, for the most part, be summed up\nin these particulars (1) It sometimes affords us pleasure\nby reminding us of the power of the writer, who is able to\nexpress his meaning not only under the restraints of rhyme,\nbut of those additional shackles, which alliteration so ev-\nidently imposes. (2) Sometimes the meaning is more\nstrongly expressed, than it could possibly be without allit-\neration, as in this instance\nUp the /tigh h\\\\\\ he leaves a huge, round sfone.\nThe same might be shown in many other cases, especi-\nally in those, where the poet tries to imitate, which he\nsometimes does, by the structure and sound of his verses\nthe thing, which he describes. (3) As a rough stanza at","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0180.jp2"},"181":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 175\ntimes is thought to be no defect, but rather the contrary,\nbecause it improves the others by contrast so lines, with\nalliterations, which are imagined to fail on the other hand\nor by excess of harmony, may break in upon the oftentimes\nmonotonous sameness of poetick numbers, and improve the\ngeneral aspect of the piece for the same reason, as the\nstanzas, that are inordinately deficient in smoothness.\n155. Contrast the second general or primary principle.\nContrast is another principle, by which our succes-\nsive mental states are suggested or, in other terms, when\nthere are two objects, or events, or situations of a charac-\nter precisely opposite, the idea or conception of one is im-\nmediately followed by that of the other. When the dis-\ncourse is of the palace of the king, how often are we re-\nminded, in the same breath, of the cottage of the peasant\nAnd thus wealth and poverty, the cradle and the grave,\nhope and despair are found in publick speeches and in dec-\nlamations from the pulpit almost always going together\nand keeping each other company. The truth is, they are\nconnected together in our thoughts by a distinct and ope-\nrative principle they accompany each other, not because\nthere is any resemblance in the things thus associated, but\nin consequence of their very marked contrariety. Dark-\nness reminds of light, heat of cold, friendship of enmity\nthe sight of the conqueror is associated with the memory\nof the conquered, and when beholding men of deformed\nand dwarfish appearance,we are at once led to think of those\nof erect figure or of Patagonian size. Contrast, then, is no\nless a principle or law of association,than resemblance itself.\nIn those writers, who describe human action and suf-\nfering, and who make it a point to be true to nature, we\nhave illustrations of the operations of this principle. In\nthe memoir of the captivity of Mrs. Johnson, one of those\ndeeply interesting sketches, which acquaint us with the\nsufferings of the early settlers of this country, and which are\nworthy of being read in as much as they teach us the worth\nof that peace and prosperity, which are now enjoyed, and the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0181.jp2"},"182":{"fulltext":"176 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\namount of toil and suffering, which purchased them, we\nfind the following instance of the power of this law of our\nconstitution. After my feelings were a little quickened\nby warmth, my sad portion was brought me, consisting of\nthe duck s head and a gill of broth. As I lifted the unsa-\nvoury morsel with a trembling hand to my mouth, I cast\nmy thoughts back a few days to a time, when from a board\nplentifully spread in my own house, I ate my food with a\nmerry heart. The wooden spoon dropped from my feeble\nhand. The contrast was too affecting.\nThere is a little book entitled the leper of Aost, trans-\nlated from the French of Lemaistre, and although we can\npretend to no acquaintance with the character or writings\nof the author further than can be inferred from this speci-\nmen, we cannot doubt, that a tract of so much interest on\nsuch a subject must have come from a mind of no ordinary\nqualities. The book is mentioned here in consequence of\nNote. The subject of those states of mind, which are called apparitions\nas will be seen by those, who consult that chapter, is left imperfect. The facts,\nwhich have been hitherto collected, are so few in number, as hardly to justify U3\nin laying down general principles and offering solutions with much confidence.\nIn the above-mentioned book, the leper of Aost, there are statements of intellec-\ntual operations, which agree with what is said in the chapter on apparitions, and\nillustrate the remarks there made. The writer represents the leper s mind to\nbe partially affected by the sufferings of the body and to have become altered from\nwhat it was. But these strange states of mental alienation occur chiefly in\nthe night, when he is reposing on his pillow, but he tells us, they are not\ndreams, neither is he asleep. The statement admits of being compared in par-\nticular with 96 and 97. I yield (says the leper) to extraordinary impressions,\nwhich I feel only in these unhappy moments. Sometimes it is, as if an irresisti-\nble power were dragging me to a fathomless abyss. Sometimes I see nothing but\nbleak forms when I endeavour to examine them, they cross each other with the\nrapidity of lightning, increase in approaching, and soon are like mountains,\nwhich crush me under their weight. At other times, I see dark clouds rise\nfrom the earth around mc they come over me like an inundation, which in-\ncreases, advances, and threatens to ingulf me and when I try lo rise in order to\nfree myself fromthese dreadful images, it seems as if I were retained by invisible\nties, which enchain all my powers. You will perhaps believe this to be mere-\nly dreams but I am not sleeping. I see always the same objects, and those hor-\nrible sensations exceed all my other sensations. Leper of Aost, p. 17.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0182.jp2"},"183":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 177\nits philosophical truth in illustrating the effects of the prin-\nciple of association now under consideration. Like all\npersons, affected with the leprosy, the subject of the dis-\nease is represented as an object of dread no less than of\npity to others, and while he is an outcast from the society of\nmen, he is a loathsome spectacle even to himself. But what\nis the condition of his mind 1 What are the subjects of his\nthoughts? The tendencies of his intellectual nature prevent\nhis thinking of wretchedness alone. His extreme mis-\nery aggravates itself by suggesting scenes of ideal happi-\nness, and his mind revels in a paradise of delights, merely\nto give greater intensity to his actual woes by contrasting\nthem with imaginary bliss. I represent to myself contin-\nually (says the Leper) societies of sincere and virtuous\nfriends families, blessed with health, fortune, and harmo-\nn) r I imagine, I see them walk in groves, greener and\nfresher, than these, the shade of which makes my poor\nhappiness brightened by a sun more brilliant, than that,\nwhich sheds its beams on me And their destiny seems to\nme as much more worthy of envy, in proportion as my own\nis the more miserable.\n156. Practical and moral applications of this principle.\nThe remarks made in the preceding section on the\nleper of Aost, naturally lead us to offer some brief obser-\nvations on the practical and moral results of this law of\nassociation.\nFirst It operates as a powerful incitement to action,\nand may, therefore, in this respect be said to have a prac-\ntical application. A person finds himself poor, unknown,\nunhonoured. He is fully sensible of the position, which he\nholds, and it is a source of mortification and grief. But\nwhile he is deeply sensible of his poverty, obscurity, and\nwant of influence, the busy interference of this law of his\nmental constitution constantly brings up in his mind the\nideas of wealth, of honour, and of notoriety. As gilded\nedifices, although equally distant, appear nearer, than those\nof a less splendid exterior so when the mind paints before\n23","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0183.jp2"},"184":{"fulltext":"178 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL. ASSOCIATION.\nus bright images of future good, we think them almost\nwithin our grasp, because we so distinctly behold them.\nAs, therefore, the principle of contrast suggests to us some\nfuture happiness, when we are sensible, that our present\ncondition and enjoyment are below what they might and\nshould be, it may fairly be laid down among its good, prac-\ntical results, that it furnishes us with an- incitement to exer-\ntion. And the more so, as the views, which it presents to\nthe mind, are generally distinct, and their influence will, of\nconsequence, be proportionally augmented.\nSecond It may be considered as one of the moral re-\nsults of this principle, that it operates as a source of hap-\npiness to us, whenever those objects, which we have any\nlength of time been in pursuit of, are obtained. The prin-\nciple of contrast leads us back to what we were before\nwe look down from our present circumstances as from a\nheight, and the altitude, which we now occupy, seems to-\nbe increased, by the recollection of our former depres-\nsions.\nThird Let it be remarked further, that conscience\nowes a great part of the power, which it is able to exercise\nover the wicked, to this principle. It is from a knowledge\nof its tendencies, that solitary confinements have been so\nstrongly recommended in publick penitentiaries. Separate\nthe prisoner from his associates, leave his thoughts to fol-\nlow each other as nature prompts, and what will be the\nsubjects of them He will think of what he once was,\nand compare it with what he now is. He will place side\nby side a good name with a bad one, the charms of virtue\nwith the deformities of vice, honour and dishonour, wretch-\nedness and bliss, till the agitations of his own bosom, the\nlashes of his own conscience become far more terrible than T\nchains, or any species of corporeal inflictions.\nBut it will be said, does not this principle of the mind\noperate in the game way in respect to the good, when they\nhave been unfortunate It undoubtedly does. They think,\nand cannot do otherwise, of their former prosperity and\ntheir present ill success and depression appears the greater\nin consequence of such remembrances. But happily they","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0184.jp2"},"185":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 179\n■are supported by a consciousness of rectitude under what\n?might be otherwise insupportable. It is a remark of Gold-\nsmith, expressed in his happy manner, that one of the no-\nblest objects in the universe is a good man, struggling with\nadversity.\n157. This principle of association the foundation of\nantithesis.\nIn writers of acknowledged taste and discernment, we\nfind the rhetorical figure of antithesis employed, which is\nthe placing of two objects or ideas in opposition. The\nfact, that such writers occasionally employ this figure\nmight lead us to suppose, (which is the truth,) that it has\nits foundation in the human mind, viz. in the principle of\nassociation, to which we give the name of contrast. In\none of the tragedies of Southern we find certain expres-\nsions, which are here introduced not only in illustration of\n:the general principle, but as happily exemplifying some re-\nmarks in the preceding section.\nCould I forget\nWhat I have been, I might the better bear\nWhat I am destined to. I am not the first,\nThat have been wretched But to think how much\nI have been happier.\nHere the present is placed in opposition with the past,\nand happiness is contrasted with misery not by a cold\nand strained artifice, but by the natural impulses of the\nmind, which is led to associate together things, that are\nthe reverse of each other. I say not by a cold artifice\nbut naturally for what man ever was there, or can be,\nthat has been cast down from the heights of fortune, wheth-\ner it have happened with his guilt or his innocence, and\ndoes not most readily and unavoidably look back from\nhis present depressed condition to his former prosperities\nIn the poem of the Pleasures of Hope there is this\npassage.\nYet at thy call the hardy tar pursued,\nPale, but intrepid, sad, but unsubdued.\ns paleness is an appearance of the countenance, which","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0185.jp2"},"186":{"fulltext":"180 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\nis sometimes understood to indicate fear or cowardice,\nthere is occasion given to mention the opposite the mind\nnaturally thinks of it. A similar remark will apply to the\nlast clause of the stanza, and the whole passage is one of\ngreat ease and beauty, besides being spirited.\nThe often repeated eulogium of Mr. Burke on the phi-\nlanthropick Howard is a fine instance of this figure, and\nshows to what good purpose it may be applied on suita-\nble occasions by persons of genius. He has visited all\nEurope, not to survey the sumptuousness of palaces, or\nthe stateliness of temples not to make accurate measure-\nments of the remains of ancient grandeur, nor to form a\nscale of the curiosity of modern arts, nor to collect med-\nals or collate manuscripts but to dive into the depths of\ndungeons to plunge into the infection of hospitals to\nsurvey the. mansions of sorrow and pain to take the guage\nand dimensions of misery, depression, and contempt, to\nremember the forgotten, to attend to the neglected, to visit\nthe forsaken, and compare and collate the distresses of all\nmen in all countries. This figure of rhetorick, therefore,\nbeing fou nded in our mental constitution, is sometimes em-\nployed with success, but whenever there is such frequency\nin the use of it, as to betray artifice rather than natural\nemotion, it loses its effect, and becomes a vice rather than\nan excellence in style.\nAntithesis is frequently employed, and to very good\npurpose, in short, moral sayings, and in any writings what-\never, which purposely adopt the concise and emphatick\nmethod of aphorisms. It is a great object with writers of\nthis kind to have their sayings remembered. In throwing\nthem into the form of antitheses, they afford great help to\nthe memory, because when one part of the aphoristick sen-\ntence is known, the power of association, operating by the\nprinciple Or law of contrast, immediately calls up the con-\ntrasted or parallel part of it.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0186.jp2"},"187":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 181\n158. Contiguity the third general or primary principle.\nThose thoughts and feelings, which have been connect-\ned together by nearness of time and place, are readily\nsuggested by each other and, consequently, contiguity in\nthose respects is rightly reckoned, as another and third pri-\nmary principle of our mental associations. When we think\nof Palestine, for instance, we very readily and naturally\nthink of the Jewish nation, of the patriarchs, of the proph-\nets, of the Saviour, and of the apostles, because Palestine\nwas their place of residence, and the theatre of their ac-\ntions. So that this is evidently an instance, where the\nsuggestions are chiefly regulated by proximity of place.\nWhen a variety of acts and events have happened nearly\nat the same period, whether in the same place or not, one\nis not thought of without the others being closely associa-\nted with it, owing to proximity of time ¥/hen, therefore,\nthe particular event of the crucifixion of the Saviour is\nmentioned, we are necessarily led to think of various other\nevents, which occurred about the same period, such as the\ntreacherous conspiracy of Judas, the denial of Peter, the\nconduct of the Roman soldiery, the rending of the veil of\nthe temple, and the temporary obscuration of the sun.\nThe mention of Egypt suggests the Nile, the Pyramids,\nCaesar, Cleopatra, the battle of Aboukir. The naming of\nthe American revolution immediately fills the mind with\nrecollections of Washington, Greene, and many of their\nassociates,. whose fortune it was to enlist their exertions\nin behalf of freedom in the same country and at the same\nperiod.\nThe following passage from captain King s continuation\nof Cooke s last voyage furnishes a remarkable example of\nthe operations of this principle While we were at din-\nner in this miserable hut, on the banks of the river, Awats-\nka, and the guests of a people, with whose existence we\nhad before been scarce acquainted, and at the extremity\nof the habitable globe, a solitary, half-worn, pewter spoon,\nwhose shape was familiar to us attracted our attention\nand, on examination, we found it stamped on the back with","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0187.jp2"},"188":{"fulltext":"182 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\nthe word, London. I cannot pass over this circumstance\nin silence out of gratitude for the many pleasant thoughts,\nthe anxious hopes, and tender remembrances it excited in\nus. Those, who have experienced the effects, that long\nabsence, and extreme distance from their native country,\nproduce in the mind, will readily conceive the pleasure\nsuch a trifling incident can give. -^-The beauty of this il-\nlustration consists not so much in the city or place having\nbeen suggested in consequence of their seeing its name\nimpressed on the pewter spoon, although this may be sup-\nposed to have happened on the principle of contiguity, as\nin the circumstance, that such a multitude of other pleasing\nrecollections thronged around the memory of that place.\nWhen they thought of London, they thought of their\nhomes, they thought of the inmates of those homes,\nthey thought of a thousand incidents, which they had\nthere witnessed a striking illustration of the degree of\nimportance, which may be accumulated on the most tri-\nvial circumstance, when that circumstance can be made\nto connect itself effectually with any general principles of\nour mental constitution.\nThat, which we have set down, as the third general law\nof mental association, is more extensive in its influence\nthan any others. It has been remarked with truth, that\nproximity in time and place forms the whole calendar of\nthe great mass of mankind. They pay but little attention\nto the arbitrary eras of chronology but date events by\neach other, and speak of what happened at the time of\nsome dark day, or of some great eclypse, or of some war or\nrevolution, or when one neighbour built a house, or another\nlost a child. The practice of associating a considerable\nnumber of facts with some place, or with some event too\nprominent and wonderful to be easily forgotten, is the\ngreat and almost the only instrument, which the mass of\npeople employ in retaining the multitude of particulars of a\npersonal or local nature.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0188.jp2"},"189":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 183\nv 159. Cause and effect the fourth primary principle.\nThere are certain facts or events, which hold to each\nother the relation of invariable antecedence and sequence.\nThat fact or event, to which some other one sustains the\nrelation of constant antecedence, is in general called an ef-\nfect; And that fact or event, to which some other one\nholds the relation of invariable sequence, has in general\nthe name of a cause. Now there may be no resemblance\nin the things, which reciprocally bear this relation, there\nmay be no contrariety, and it is by no means necessary, that\nthere should be contiguity in time or place, as the meaning\nof the term, contiguity, is commonly understood. There\nmay be cause and effect without any one or all of these\ncircumstances. But it is a fact, which is known to every\none s experience, that when we think of the cause in any\nparticular instance, we naturally think of the effect, and, on\nthe contrary, the knowledge or recollection of the effect\nbrings to mind the cause And in view of this well-known\nand general experience, there is good reason for reckoning\ncause and effect among the general principles of our\nmental associations. What we here understand by prin-\nciples or laws will be recollected, viz. The general designa-\ntion of those circumstances, under which the regular con-\nsecution of mental states occurs.\nIt is on the principle of cause and effect, that when we\nsee a surgical instrument or any engine of torture, we have\nan idea of the pain, which they are fitted to occasion, and\nfor a moment are tempted to imagine, that we ourselves\nare partially the subjects of it. The sight of a wound, in-\nflicted however long before, suggests to us the instrument,\nby which it was made. When we witness any of our fel-\nlow beings in distress, we naturally think of the particular\ncause of it, if we know what it is and, if we are ignorant,\nwe make it a subject of inquiry. When we have good news\nto communicate, we please ourselves with the thought of\nthe joy, which it will occasion, and the bearer of afflictive\ntidings Cannot but anticipate the grief, which the annun-\nciation of them will produce.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0189.jp2"},"190":{"fulltext":"184 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL. ASSOCIATION.\n160. Secondary principles of mental association*\nThere are a variety of circumstances, which modify and\nslightly control the influence of the general laws or prin-\nciples of association, and these by way of distinction are\ncalled second AE.Y. They are as follows\n(1) Our mental states will, in the first place, be more\nor less readily associated, according as they existed together\nfor a greater or less length of time at first. Innumerable ob\njects pass before us, which but very slightly arrest our atten-\ntion although a connection is formed among them by the\ngeneral principles of association, the connection is weak\nand easily broken, and always of short duration. We can-\nnot, therefore, in general rely on the future remembrance\nof objects, unless we feel so much interest in them, as to\nlead us to dwell on them for some time. (2) The pro-\nbability of our mental states being associated by the gene-\nral principles, will depend in some measure, secondly, on\nthe character of the original feelings, and will be greater\nor less, according as those feelings were more or less lively.\nBright objects are more readily recalled, than faint or ob-\nscure also great joys and sorrows, while the many slight\npleasures and pains, which are constantly occurring, are\nalmost instantly forgotten.\n(3) The parts of any mental train are the more readily\nsuggested, thirdly, in proportion as they have been the\nmore frequently renewed. Having read a sentence a number\nof times, we find ourselves able to repeat it out of book,\nwhich we could not do with merely reading it once.\n(4) In the fourth place, our trains of thought and emotions\nwill be found to be more or less strongly connected, ac-\ncording as they are more or less recent. We remember\nmany incidents, even of a trifling nature, which occurred\nto-day or the present week, while those of yesterday or of\nlast week are forgotten. There is an exception to this law,\nwhich should be mentioned. The associated feelings of\nold men, which were formed in their youth and the early\npart of manhood, are more readily revived, than those of\nlater origin. This point will be further remarked on in","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0190.jp2"},"191":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION* 1 5\nthe chapter on memory. This exception, however, it may\nbe observed here, does not hold universally, even in the\ncase of extreme age. The general rule holds, when\nthe time is not extended far back, Events, which happen-\ned but a few hours before, are remembered, while there isi\nan utter forgetfuiness of those, which happened a few\nweeks or even days before.\n(5) Our feelings, in the fifth place, are associated more\nstrongly, as each has coexisted less with other feelings.\nWhen we have heard a song but from one person, it can\nscarcely be heard by us again without recalling that per-\nson to our memory. If we have heard the same words and\nair frequently sung by others, there is much less chance of\nthis particular suggestion.\n(6) The primary or general laws of association are modi-\nfied, in the sixth place, by. diversities in temper aad disposi-\ntion. In the minds of two persons, the one of a cheerful,\nthe other of a gloomy disposition, the trains of thought will\nbe very different. This difference is finely illustrated in\nthose beautiful poems of Milton, l allegro and il pense-\nroso. 1/ allegro or the cheerful man finds pleasure and\ncheerfulness in every object, which he beholds The\ngreat sun puts on his amber light, the mower whets his\nscythe, the milk-maid sings,\nAnd every shepherd tells his tale\nUnder the hawthorn in the dale.\nBut the man of a melancholy disposition, il penseroso,\nchooses the evening for his walk, as most suitable to the\ntemper of his mind he listens from some lonely hillock to\nthe distant curfew, and loves to hear the song of that\nsweet bird,\n—That shun st the noise of folly,\nMost musical, most melancholy.\nEtorther Our trains of suggested thoughts will be\nmodified by those temporary feelings, which may be re-\ngarded, as exceptions to the more general character of our\ndispositions. The cheerful man is not always cheerful, nor\nis the melancholy man at all times equally sober and con-\ntemplative. They are known to exchange characters for\n24","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0191.jp2"},"192":{"fulltext":"186 PRINCIPLES CF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\nwhole days together, sometimes in consequence of good or\nill health, or of happy or adverse fortune, and sometimes\nfor causes, which cannot be easily explained. So that our\nmental states will be found to follow each other, with a\nsuccession, varying not only with thev general character of\nour temper and dispositions, but with the transitory emo-\ntions of the day or hour.\n(7) The trains of our suggestions are modified, in the\nseventh place, by our particular pursuit or profession in\nlife. When men of different pursuits or professions read a\nbook, or hear a story, it will be seen, that they associate\nvery -different ideas with what they hear or read. If a trav-\neller happens iii their company, the man of letters imme-\ndiately inquires what new works are about to be published\nin his. country the merchant is anxious to hear of the\nprice of wheat or iron the soldiei insists on knowing, who\nis to take the place of the general or field-marshal lately\ndisplaced and the politician requests an explanation of\nthe late manifesto, or to be informed of the articles of the\nnew constitution.\n(8) The general or primary principles, by which our\nthoughts are connected together, are modified, eighthly,\nby an additional circumstance of so much influence, as to\nentitle it to be reckoned among the secondary laws of as-\nsociation viz. constitutional differences in mental character.\nWhether the origin of such differences, is to be referred\nto the mind itself, or to varieties in bodily temperament,\nis not necessary for our present purpose to be inquired\ninto. Admitting the existence of such original diversities,\nwe may suppose them, in the first place, to have the effect\neither of limiting and weakening, or of extending and aug-\nmenting the power of all the primary laws of association.\nIn other words, they have a general influence, either favour-\nable or unfavourable. The great varieties, in the power\nof remembering, which are so often observed, may be at-\ntributed chiefly to this secondary law, and to that form of\nits influence, which has just been supposed, and is a proof\n©f the correctness of the supposition. But original, con-\netitutional differences sometimes modify the influence of","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0192.jp2"},"193":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION-. 187\nthe four general and primary laws of association in another\nand less impartial way viz. by giving greater strength to\none set of associations, than to another. Thus, the men-\ntal associations, which are formed and sustained on the\nprinciple of resemblance or analogy, constitute one class\nthose, which are connected by the law of contiguity form\nanother and here it is, that we mark a distinction in the\nmental operations of men, which we think must be ascrib-\ned to original diversities in the intellectual organization.\nIn one mind, for instance, the associations, which are rank-\ned under one of these classes, are easily and readily, sug-\ngested the other class of associations is not but ob-\nserve another person, in whom there is, as we contend, a\nconstitutional difference, and we find, that it is just the re-\nverse, and the class of associations, which, in the first\ninstance, were easily suggested, are, in the latter case, sug-\ngested with great difficulty. One mind perceives ,the re-\nsemblances of objects, whether more or less obvious, and\ntheir relations of cause and effect; another mind of a dif-\nferent constitution observes only their contiguity in time\nand place. The fact is undeniable and the solution,\nwhich we propose, as on the whole the least exceptionable,\nis, that there are in men certain natural differences attri-\nbutable originally either to the mind exclusively, or to\nthe influence of the physical system over the mind, or\nto both.\nThe laws of association may here properly be given in\na condensed view, as follows. The general principles or\nlaws of association, which are sometimes called the prima-\nry laws, are these, resemblance, contrast, contiguity in\ntime and place, and cause and effect. The secondary\nlaws of association, which give such great variety to the\nresults of the .primary principles, are these (1) Differen-\nces in the length of time of the co-ex^tence of the associ-\nated feelings at first (2) Their greater or less degree of\nliveliness;— (3) The frequency of their renewal (4) The,\ncircumstance of their being more or less recent (5) The\ndegree or extent of their co-existence with other feelings\n(6) Diversities in temper and disposition; (7) The","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0193.jp2"},"194":{"fulltext":"IBB PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\ninfluence of particular professions and pursuits (8) Cer-\ntain constitutional differences in mental character.\n161. Genius nothing more than particular tendencies\nof association.\nMuch has been said of genius. To those, who have\nbeen supposed to possess it, praise and admiration have\nbeen amply given, as if they were peculiary endowed.\nOne man is said to have a genius for mathematicks, another\nfor poetry and war also, and politicks, and mechanical\nemployments have their geniuses. One hardly knows in\nwhat terms to convey an idea of it, and to do it concisely\nbut the common definition has been this, A talent or ap-\ntitude given us by nature, in order to excel in any one\nthing whatever. Whoever has those qualities, which,\nwhen applied to some particular art or science, enable\ntheir possessor to excel in it, is commonly called a man of\ngenius.\nStated in other, and, as we conceive, in more philo-\nsophical language, genius is a constitutional tendency to\nform mental associations on the principles of resemblance,\nof contrast, and of cause and. EFFECT.\nPersons, who show a constitutional inclination to form\nassociations on the principle of contiguity in time and\nplace, have minds of a lower grade, and are wanting\nin those penetrating and effective qualities, which are im-\nplied in genius. They may be good neighbours and use-\nful citizens, and are especially fitted to excel in the man-\nual practice of the mechanical arts, but it is beyond their\npower to give new beauties to literature, or new truths to\nscience and they seem to be inevitably destined to plod\nin the paths of humble imitation.\nMention a forest or any wooded field to a man want-\ning in genius, and He will be likely enough to think of an\naged and leafless oak. The thought of it will occur on\nme principle or law of contiguity, and, consequently, is\nnot, 4 beyond the ordinary range of his intellectual power.\nBut the man of genius, as in the description of Pompey in","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0194.jp2"},"195":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 189\nthe Pharsalia of Lucan, thinks with no less readiness of\nthat aged and leafless oak, whenever he sees an old and\nheroick citizen, who stands forth amid the corruptions of\nhis generation, the memorial of better times, and the prop\nof the commonwealth. But the thought occurs in the lat-\nter case on a different principle, that of resemblance or a-\nnalogy. The former can become a poetical imitator, but\nthe latter only can be the gifted bard.\nA man of no genius might consistently with the law,\nby which his associations are chiefly regulated, think of\nmeteors, when walking abroad on a cloudy and sultry\nnight; but would by no means be likely to, on merely see-\ning one of his aged neighbours with a long beard and\nhair floating in the wind. But how different are the as-\nsociations in the mind of the author of that sublime poem\nTHE BARD\nRobed in ths sable garb of woe,\nWith haggard eyes, the poet stood\nLoose his beard, and hoary hair\nft Streamed, like a meteor, to the troubled air.\nWhat, therefore, constitutes poetical genius, that intel-\nlectual peculiarity, which lays the foundation for a reputa-\ntion of that kind, is a constitutional tendency to connect\ntogether the states of mind in the way, which has been\nasserted. The subject will appear the clearer when look-\ned at in connection with the remarks in the preceding\nsection on the eighth secondary law of association.\nIt is to be further observed, that philosophical genius\nis essentially the same with poetical. Men may be cal-\nled philosophers, because they have by great industry\nlearnt the discoveries, which others have made, and the in-\nventions, of which they have been the authors. They may\nimitate their predecessors they may employ the same\nmeans, which have been employed before, and come to the\nsame results but learning and a high reputation do not\nnecessarily imply genius so that, if they are philosophers,\nthey are not philosophical geniuses.\nGenius implies a mind, that will pass from causes to ef-\nfects, and from effects to causes in cases, where it has not\nbeen taught by others that, with an almost intuitive read-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0195.jp2"},"196":{"fulltext":"190 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\niness, is able to draw a parallel between the qualities of\nobjects, without being limited to the circumstances of time\nand place, and that can deduce important conclusions be-\nfore unknown from analogies in those things, which have\ncome under its notice.\nBut if the qualities of genius be originally the same,\nboth in philosophy and poetry, it may be asked, how happens\nit, that men devote themselves to pursuits so different in\ntheir character and results The most obvious reply, is,\nthat we are influenced by a great variety of circumstances,\nand are not unfrequently influenced by them, when we are\nourselves not fully sensible of it such as the mental\ncharacter of those, with whom we associate, local scenery,\nnatural disposition, climate, government, early reading,\nc. These give a direction to those qualities, which con-\nstitute genius; and it happens in this way, that of those\npersons, whose mental capabilities were originally the same,\none gives himself to the science of laws, another to natur-\nal philosophy, another to poetry, another to some other of\nthe fine arts.\nThese views readily suggest an explanation of differ-\nences in degrees or strength of genius. There may be a ten-\ndency in different individuals to form associations on laws,\nwhich involve the resemblances and nature of objects, rather\nthan on the law of mere contiguity and this is the prominent\ncircumstance in securing to them the character in question.\nBut it does not follow, that it exists in the same degree\nand with the same strength in all. In some it is more, in\nothers less. To a few the power of perceiving the analo-\ngies, and dissimilitudes, and general relations of things is\nexceedingly great and it is to these alone that we can\nrightly give the credit of great geniuses, of being the lights\nof their age.\nNote. Genius in the philosophical sciences makes it-\nself known by inventions and discoveries. But there is a\ndifference between the two. Mr. Stuart, in remarking on\ninvention in the arts and sciences, draws a distinction be-\ntween inventions and discoveries which he supposes to be\ncorrect and well founded, and is peculiarly happy in his","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0196.jp2"},"197":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\nl^f\nillustrations. Rather than run the chance of a better op-\nportunity hereafter, we insert his remarks here.\nBefore we proceed, it may be proper (says Mr. Stuart)\nto take notice of the distinction between Invention and\nDiscovery. The object of the former, as has been frequent-\nly remarked, is to produce something which had no exis-\ntence before that of the latter, to bring to light something\nwhich did exist, but which was concealed from common\nobservation. Thus we say, Otto Guerricke invented the\nair-pump; Sanctorius invented the thermometer; Newton\nand Gregory invented the reflecting telescope Galileo dis-\ncovered the solar spots and Harvey discovered the circu-\nlation of the blood. It appears, therefore, that improve-\nments in the Arts are properly called inventions and that\nfacts brought to light by means of observation, are prop-\nerly called discoveries.\nAgreeable to this analogy is the use which we make of\nthese words, when we apply them to subjects purely intel-\nlectual. As truth is eternal and immutable, and has no\ndependence on our belief or disbelief of it, a person who\nbrings to light a truth formerly unknown, is said to make a\ndiscovery. A person, on the other hand, who contrives a\nnew method of discovering truth, is called an inventor.\nPythagoras, we say, discovered the forty-seventh proposi-\ntion of Euclid s first book Newton discovered the binomial\ntheorem but he invented the method of prime and ultimate\nratios and he invented the method of fluxions.\nIn general, every advancement in knowledge is consid-\nered as a discovery every contrivance by which we pro-\nduce an effect, or accomplish an end, is considered as an\ninvention. Discoveries in ^science, therefore, unless they\nare made by accident, imply the exercise of invention and,\naccordingly, the word invention is commonly used to ex-\npress originality of genius in the sciences, as well as in\nthe arts.\n162. Dependence of transitions in style on association.\nIt requires skill rightly to manage the transitions in a\ndiscourse or poem, to conduct the hearer or reader from","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0197.jp2"},"198":{"fulltext":"192 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\none topick to another without violence to his feelings, anct\nwithout injury to the natural order, clearness, and interest\nof the subject. No transitions seem to be admissible, but\nsuch as are suggested by association, either by the prima-\nry laws alone, or as they are modified by the secondary\nlaws. But when that power holds out a number of ways,\nin which the passing from one topick to another can be ef-\nfected, the writer has an opportunity to discover his skill\nin the selection.\nIn Goldsmith s poem of the Traveller, the nature of the\nsubject requires frequent transitions, and they are happily\nmanaged. In one part of his poem, he describes the\ndescendants of the Romans in their state of effeminacy\nand debasement but how does it happen, that immedi-\nately after he undertakes a description of the character\nof the Swiss In speaking of the present inhabitants of\nItaly, he sees hardly any thing but indications of indolence\nand luxury, but little of vigour, of hardship, of ancient\ntruth. He is led, therefore, by the principle of contrast, to\nthink of conduct, characters, and situations directly the re-\nverse. To think, then, of the Swiss under such circum-\nstances seemed to be almost unavoidable\nMy soul turn from them— turn we to survey,\nWhere rougher climes a nobler race display,\nWhere the bleak Swiss their stormy mansions tread,\nAnd force a churlish soil for scanty bread.\n163. Of associations suggested by present objects of\nperception.\nAssociated thoughts and emotions, when made to pass\nthrough the mind by some sound, which the ear has caught,\nby some object, which has met the eye, or by any present\nobject of perception whatever, are vivid and strong. As-\nsociations, which do not admit any of our present percep-\ntions as a part of the associated train, cannot but impress\nus, as being in some measure airy and unsubstantial, how-\never distinct. We deeply feel, that they are a part of the\nexperiences of departed days, and which, in departing from\nus, have become almost, as if they had never been. But","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0198.jp2"},"199":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 193\nlot them partake of our present experience, of what we\nnow feel and know to exist, and they seem to gain new\nstrength the remembrances are not only distinct, but\nwhat was airy and unsubstantial fades away, and they have\nJife, and power, and form.\nHow often, in the wanderings 6f life, are we led by\nsome apparently accidental train of thought to the recol-\nlection of the residence of our early years and of the inci-\ndents, which then oecurred The associations are inter-\nesting, but we find it difficult to make them permanent,\nand they are comparatively faint. But let there be con-\nnected with that train of thought the present sound of\nsome musical instrument, which we then used to hear, and\nof our favourite tune, and it will be found, that the reality\nof the tune blends itself with the airy conceptions of the\nmind, and, while we kindle with an illusive rapture, the\nwhole seems to be real. Some illustrations may tend\nto make these statements more clear and to confirm them.\nIt is related in one of the published Lectures of Dr.\nRush, that an old native African was permitted by his mas-\nter, a number of years since, to go from home in order to\nsee a lion, that was conducted as a show through the state\nof New Jersey. He no sooner saw him, than he was so\ntransported with joy, as to express his emotions by jump-\ning, dancing, and loud acclamations, notwithstanding the\ntorpid habits of mind and body, superinduced by half a\ncentury of slavery. He had known that animal, when a\nboy in his native country, and the sight of him suddenly\nrevived the memory of his early enjoyments, his native\nland, his home, his associates, and his freedom.\nThere is in the same writer another interesting instance\nof the power of association, in which he himself had a\npart, and which will be given in his own words. During\nthe time I passed at a country-school, in Cecil County, in\nMaryland, I often went on a holiday, with my schoolmates,\nto see an eagle s nest, upon the summit of a dead tree in\nthe neighbourhood of the school, during the time of the\nincubation of that bird. The daughter of the farmer, in\n25","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0199.jp2"},"200":{"fulltext":"194 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\nwhose field this tree stood, and with whom I became ac-\nquainted, married, and settled in this city about forty years\nago. In our occasional interviews, we now and then\nspoke of the innocent haunts and rural pleasures of our\nyouth, and, among other things, of the eagle s nest in her\niather s field. A few years ago, I was called to visit this\nwoman when she was in the lowest stage of a typhus fever.\nUpon entering her room, I caught her eye, and, with a\ncheerful tone of voice, said only, The eagleh nest. She\nseized my hand, without being able to speak, and discov-\nered strong emotions of pleasure in her countenance,\nprobably from a sudden association of all her early domes-\ntick connexions and enjoyments with the words I had utter-\ned. From that time she began to recover. She is now\nliving, and seldom fails, when we meet, to salute me with\nthe echo of the c eagle s nest.\nFrom such illustrations it would seem to be sufficient-\nly clear, that, wheneve r associated thoughts and emotions\nare connected with any present perceptions, they are pe-\nculiarly strong and vivid. They steal into all the secret\nchambers of the soul, and seemingly by some magick pow-\ner impart a deeper intensity to its feelings, and give to the\nshadowy world of memory the stability of real existence.\nThere are two causes, why such associated feelings should\npossess more than ordinary strength and vividness. (1)\nThe particular train of thought and feeling, which is exci-\nted in the mind, continues longer than in other cases, in\nconsequence of the greater permanency and fixedness of\ntfce present objects of perception, which either suggested\nthe train, or make a part of it. So long as the lion was\npermitted to remain in the sight of the aged African, so\nlong without interruption was the series of delightful\nthoughts kept up within him. The bright images, which\nthrew him into such raptures, and awoke stupidity itself,\nwere not fleeting away with every breath, but remained\npermanent.\nThe sick lady of Philadelphia saw the physician, with\nwhom she had been acquainted in the early part of life.\nBy mention of the eagle s nest, he vividly recalled the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0200.jp2"},"201":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 195\nscenes of those young days. But it was the presence of\nthe person, whose observation had given rise to the train of\nassociation, which contributed chiefly to keep it so long in\nher thoughts. Had it occurred merely from some acciden-\ntal direction of her own mind, without any present object,\nwhich had made a part of it, no doubt her sufferings or\nother circumstances would soon have banished it.\n(2) The second cause of the increased vividness of as-\nsociations, suggested by a present object of perception or\ncombined with it, is this, viz. The reality of the thing per-\nceived is communicated in the illusions of the moment to\nthe thing suggested. The trees of the desert were the\nhiding place of the lion, when the African saw him in early\nlife and now, after the lapse of so many years, he ima-\ngines, that, in the quickened eye of his mind, he beholds\nthe forests of his native soil, because he has before him the\nproud and powerful animal, that crouched under their\nshade. And the presence of the monarch of the forest\ngives a reality not only to woods and deserts; but by a com-\nmunication of that, which is real to that, which is merely\nsuggested, the whole group of his early experiences, as\nwell as the sight of the animal, which made a part, are re-\nvived, and have virtually a real, renew«d existence.\nThese remarks may be properly applied to explain\nrecent, strong manifestation of feeling in a whole people*\nThe citizens of the United States have a multitude of pa-\ntriotick associations,connected with their revolutionary war.\nBut those associations, owing to length of time, were by\ndegrees growing dim on the minds of the aged, and made\na still more diminished impression on those of the young.\nIn the years 1824 5, La Fayette, the only surviving rev-\nolutionary officer of the grade of major-general, came on a\nvisit to this country to see once more the people, for whom\nhe had fought in his youth. All classes flocked to behold\nhim, and to grasp his hand. Nothing could exceed the\ndeep feeling, which existed from one part of the republick\nto the other. But it was not the individual merely,|how-\never strongly the people were attached to him, that awoke\nsuch a happy and lofty enthusiasm. All the events and all","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0201.jp2"},"202":{"fulltext":"196 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\nthe characters of the revolution exist to the present genera-\ntion in associated states of the mind, and, as La Fayette\nhad long formed a part in those ideal associations, when\nwe were so fortunate, as to see him with our own eyes and\ntouch him with our own hands, the revolution then seemed\nin a new sense to be real, and all its scenes were embodied\nbefore us. All his associates in suffering and danger, all\nthe renowned names that once fought by his side, were\nconcentred in himself, and he was in the midst of us the\nsole and illustrious representative of a long series of mo-\nmentous events and of a host of heroick men.\nIn all the cases, which have been mentioned, the\nassociated feelings Were intensely powerful a multitude\nof other instances, occurring indeed every day, illustrate\nthe same idea, that they are strong and vivid in an unusual\ndegree, when suggested by a present object of perception.\nThe two circumstances, which have been mentioned, seem\nto be the most obvious and satisfactory reasons, which can\nbe given in explanation of the fact.\nThese remarks suggest a rule of some practical conse-\nquence to writers of poems, romances, and other works of\nimagination. They should lay the scene of their works,\nwhere there are human beings, not in Arcadia, nor in\nFairy Land. They should describe men, women, and\nhuman nature in its various forms, and local scenery, as they\nare and then we can sympathize. We can at least say,\nthat we have seen such beings as they describe, and per-\nhaps that we have travelled in the very region of their res^\nidence and amid its natural scenery. Our personal ex-\nperiencies will give a permanency, and substanstiality,\nand consequently a greater interest to the images of the\nwriter, wMkh we might otherwise reject, as being unnatur-\nal, or at least affected, and better suited to other classes of\nbeings, than ourselves.\n1G4. Habits may be resolved into mental associations.\nThe word, habit, as commonly employed, expresses\nthat facility, which our mental operations or bodily actions\nacquire in consequence of practice. By long practice we","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0202.jp2"},"203":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 197\nbecome so familiar with a certain succession of ideas, that\nthe one not only infallibly suggests the others, but with\npeculiar quickness, and apparently without any effort of\nour own; and, in the same manner,our actions are so close-\nly connected by practice with the states of the mind,that the\nbodily movements will follow the thoughts without our be-\ning conscious of any effort of volition, previous to the ac-\ntive exertion. We apply the term habit to various classes\nof persons, to the dexterity of workmen in different manual\narts, to the rapidity of the accountant, to the fluency of the\nextemporaneous speaker. The fact, that the facility, im-\nplied in habit, is owing to practice, we learn from expe-\nrience.\nIn all mechanical arts and all cases, where there is a\ncorporeal as well as mental effort, the effect of practice\nwill be found to be partly on the mind, and partly on the\nbody. The muscles, whieb are at such times employed,\nbecome stronger and more obedient to the will. The fact\nis well known, but we know not, that any one has been\nable to offer a satisfactory explanation.\nThe effect of practice on the mind seems to consist\nwholly in quickening the power of association. Practice\nis the repetition of a thing. The more frequently our as-\nsociated trains of thought are repeated, the more readily\nthey occur. This was stated in the third secondary law\nof association, which is this; The parts of any mental\ntrain are the more readily suggested, in proportion as they\nhave been the more frequently renewed. All intellectual\nhabits, therefore, are nothing more than spontaneous men-\ntal suggestions, which have become such by frequent repe-\ntition. Further remarks, connected with this subject, will\nbe found in the. chapter on attention.\n§.165. Historical remarks on the doctrine of asso-\nciation.\nAlthough the tendency of one idea or state of the mind\nto suggest another must have ever been so obvious as to\nbe generally observed, it required something more than the\nordinary powers of discernment and classification, to","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0203.jp2"},"204":{"fulltext":"198 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\nhit upon those general principles, by which the associa-\ntions are regulated. Aristotle, in treating of memory,\nspeaks of these principles in part, and is the first, who is\nknown to have laid down any general rules. He says, that\nthe relations, by which we are led in seeking after or trac-\ning out those thoughts, which do not at once occur, are\nchiefly three resemblance, contrast, and contiguity.\nThere is an interesting passage in Cicero on the influ-\nence of association in the fifth book de finibus, His\nremarks illustrate particularly the results of the principle\nof contiguity. They also strikingly confirm the fact in\nthe doctrine of association, that suggested trains of thought\nwill be more vivid, when they are in some way connected\nwith present objects of perception.\nMr. Locke in his Essay on the Human Understanding\nadded a chapter in the fourth edition on the subject of as-\nsociation. This chapter, although it must be confessed\nto be a very imperfect one, compared with what has since\nbeen written on the subject, is mentioned with commenda-\ntion by Dugald Stewart, and he thinks, it has contributed as\nmuch as any thing else in Locke s writings to the subse-\nquent progress of intellectual philosophy. The first edi-\ntion of the Essay on the Human Understanding was pub-\nlished in 1690.\nErnesti, in his initia doctrinae solidioris, published in\n1734, enters into the subject somewhat particularly. He\nbegins with stating the fact of the existence of association,\nor that the states of the mind are in some way connected\ntogether. He then proceeds to give the general law, by\nwhich this connection or consecution of states happens,\nas follows A.ny thought or image in the mind has the\npower of suggesting the idea of some absent object. It\nmay suggest one, that is in some respects similar to itself,\n—or one, of which the present is a part, or one, which\nhas been present together with it on some former occa-\nsion.\nMr. Hume gave much attention to this subject. In an\nEssay on the association of ideas, he has the following","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0204.jp2"},"205":{"fulltext":"PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 199\npassage. Though it be too obvious to escape observa-\ntion, that different ideas are connected together, I do not\nfind, that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or\nclass all the principles of association a subject, however,\nthat seems worthy of curiosity. To me there appear to\nbe only three principles of connection among ideas, viz.\nre semblance, contiguity in time and place, and cause\nand effect.\nIt would seem from this statement, that he was igno-\nrant of the passage in Aristotle above referred to. He differs\nfrom the statement which we have preferred on the subject\nof the primary principles of association, in excluding con-\ntrast from the number of them. He considers contrast a\nmixture of resemblance and causation his arguments in\nsupport of his theory, which are examined in Brown s Lec-\ntures on the Mind, are rather specious than convincing.\nThe doctrine of association makes a considerable figure\nin the Observations on Man of Dr. Hartley. This work\nwas published in the beginning of 1749. Dr. Hartley does\nnot content himself with giving the mere facts of our men-\ntal operations, which are always valuable, however diffi-\ncult they may be in some cases to be explained but un-\ndertakes also to point out the precise connection of the\norigin of those facts with certain previous states of the\ncorporeal system. He supposes, that every impression on\nthe senses, caused by an external object, is propagated from\nthe external body to the brain by means of vibrations in the\nnervous system, or rather by means of the oscillating motion\nof vibratory particles or vibratiuncles in the nerves. He ex-\npressly compares the vibrations or the motions backwards\nand forwards to the oscillations of pendulums and the trem-\nblings of the particles of sounding bodies. When the vi-\nbration antecedent to one idea is in any degree whatever\ncoincident with the vibration of another idea, the recur-\nrence of either of them will have the effect to cause the\nrepetition of the other, and of course the repetition of the\nidea or mental state. In this way he has proposed to ac-\ncount, not only for the rise or origin of those ideas, which\ncome into the mind from things external to us, but for the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0205.jp2"},"206":{"fulltext":"200 PRINCIPLES OP MENTAL ASSOCIATION.\nexistence of the great law of association. But his specu-\nlations on these points, which do not so much concern\nthe facts themselves as their causation or physical history,\nhave been in general regarded, as bordering too much ori\nhypothesis to be particularly deserving of attention.\nAlmost all late writers on intellectual philosophy have\nmore or less on the subject of association and some,\nparticularly Dugald Stewart, have written on it with much\ntaste and eloquence. To this writer we are much indebt-\ned in this chapter, and also to the late Thomas Brown\nto the latter particularly for his valuable and original re-\nmarks on the secondary laws of association, for which\nhe is entitled to great credit. Not, however, that we have\nexactly followed him in his arrangement. The views,\nwhich have been given both in respect to the primary and\nsecondary laws of association, differ in some respects from\nhis, as will be seen on comparison. Unhappily for the\nscience, he was cut off from life before he was permitted\nto complete and give to the world in his own name his\nanalysis of the mind. Had he lived, hardly too much could\nhave been expected.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0206.jp2"},"207":{"fulltext":"201\nCHAPTER FOURTEENTH.\n€ASUA£, ©OSTHlSaTIOHS OP THOUGHT.\n166. dissociation sometimes misleads our judgments.\nThere are some cases, where the power of association\nso misleads us, that we cannot easily form a correct judg-\nment of the true nature of things. Every object of thought,\nin order to be fully understood, ought to be so much in\nour power, that we may examine it separately from all oth-\ner objects. Whenever, therefore, it happens from any cir-\ncumstances, that the power of association so combines one\nobject of thought with another, that the object cannot\nreadily be looked at and examined by itself, it so far has\nthe effect to perplex and hinder correct judgment. It\nwill be found, when we look into our minds, that there\nexist a few associations or combinations of thought of\nthis kind, which are obstinate and almost invincible and\nthere are very many of a less degree of strength, but which\nhave a considerable effect in disturbing the just exercise\nof the intellect, and require much care in their detection\nand eradication. The latter class will be examined at\nsome length in the chapter on prejudices some prom-\ninent instances of the former class will be considered\nhere, and, for the want of a better phraseology, we shall\narrange them together under the head of casual connec-\ntions OF THOUGHT.\nOf these a number of instances deserve a special at-\ntention. To explain the origin and to correct the errone-\nous tendencies of all such connections of thought, although\nthe number of such as we have now in view cannot be\nlarge, would occupy us too long. The examination of on-\nly two or three somewhat striking instances will throw\nlight on the philosophy of the mind in general, as well as\nbe of practical benefit.\n26","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0207.jp2"},"208":{"fulltext":"202 CASUAL CONNECTIONS OF THOUGHT.\n167. Connection of our ideas of extension and time^\nExtension is reckoned among the simple ideas, although\nit is derived from more than one sense it is, therefore,\ndifficult to define it so as to make it more clear, than it has\nalready become by each one s experience. It perhaps ap-\nproaches the nearest to a definition to say, that it is the\ndistance between the parts of the same object, where in\nthe intermediate parts there is a continuity of the same\nsubstance. We get the idea of time, which comes under\nthe class of simple modes, by considering any part of du 1\nration, as set or marked off by periodical measures, such\nas hours, days, or years. It is well known, whatever may\nbe the cause of it, that people are generally in the habit\nof considering time, as a sort of modification of space or\nextension. This observation may not appear perfectly\nobvious at first. But the expressions, which we apply to\nintervals of duration, are an evidence of its truth.\nWe say before such a time or after such a time, the\nsame as before or after any material object; we speak of\na long or a short time with no more hesitation than of a\nlong or short distance, of a long or short bridge, or rail-\nway, or any other object of extension. We utter our-\nselves precisely in the same way we should do, if we were\ncertain of having detected some real analogy between the\ntwo, between length and shortness in material substances\nand what are called length and shortness in time. But it\nis not too much to say, that there is no such analogy, no\nsuch similitude nor is it worth while to anticipate, that\nwe shall ever be able to detect such analogy or similitude,\nuntil we can apply the measures of feet, ells, roods, c. to\nhours, and days, and weeks. How then can it be account-\ned for, that we apply terms nearly in the same way, as\nif this were the case, and, as if such measurements could\nbe made\nThe strong association of these ideas has most proba-\nbly arisen in this manner, viz., from our constantly measur-\ning one of these quantities by the other. It is the common\nme th od to measure time by motion, and motion is measured","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0208.jp2"},"209":{"fulltext":"CASUAL CONNECTIONS OF THOUGHT. 203\nby extension. In an hour the hand of a clock moves\nover a certain space in two hours over double the space,\nand so on. No doubt it is convenient to apply the\nterms long and short, before and after, and\nothers similar to time. We could not well dispense with\nthem. But it ought to be remembered, if we would have\nright notions of things, that the application of those ex-\npressions has arisen from the mode in which we measure\ntime, and that time and space or that modification of space\nwhich we call extension are essentially distinct in their\nnature.\n168. Of high and low notes in musicfa\nWe speak of high and low in reference to notes in mu-\nsick, the same as of the high or low position of material\nbodies. There is supposed to be some analogy between\nthe relation, which the notes in the scale of musick bear\nto each other, and the relation of superiority and inferior-\nity in the position of bodies of matter. But it is impossi-\nble to prove the existence of such analogy however gen-\nerally it may have been supposed; and the supposition\nitself of its existence has no doubt arisen from a casual as-\nsociation of ideas, or, in the expressions placed at the head\nof this chapter, in a casual connection of thought. A\nproof of this association of ideas being purely accidental\nis, that an association, the very reverse of this, was once\nprevalent We allude to the observation of Dr. Gregory\nin the preface to his edition of Euclid s works, that the\nmore ancient Greek writers considered the grave sounds as\nhigh, and the acute ones as low. The present mode of\nspeaking on the subject is of more recent orign but at\nwhat time and in what way it was introduced cannot be\nasserted with confidence. In the preface just referred to,\nit is, however, observed, that the ancient Greek custom of\nlooking upon the grave sounds as high and the acute as\nlow, precisely the reverse of what is now common, contin-\nued down until the time of Boethius. It has been conjec-\ntured with some ingenuity, that this connection or associa-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0209.jp2"},"210":{"fulltext":"204 CASUAL CONNECTIONS OF THOUGHT.\ntion of thought among the Greeks and Romans, for it was\nequally prevalent among both, might have been owing to\nthe construction of their musical instruments. The string,\nwhich sounded the grave or what we call the low tone, it\nhas been conjectured, was placed highest, and that, which\ngave the shrill or acute, had the lowest place. If this con-\njecture could be ascertained to be well founded, it would\nstrikingly show, from what very slight causes strong and\npermanent associations often arise. It is hardly necessary\nto observe, that it is important to examine the origin and\nprogress of such associations, in order that we may correct\nthose erroneous and illusive notions, which will be found\nto be built upon them.\n169. Connection of ideas of extension and colour.\nThere is no necessary connection between colour, as\nthe term is commonly employed by philosophers, and ex-\ntension. The word colour properly denotes a sensation\nin the mind the word extension, the quality of an exter-\nnal, material object. There is, therefore, no more natural\nconnection and no more analogy between the two, than\nthere is between pain and solidity. And yet it so happens\nthat we never have the sensation or idea of colour without\nat the same time associating extension with it we find\nthem, however different they may be in their nature, in-\nseparable in our thoughts. This strong association is\nformed in consequence of our always perceiving extension\nat the very time, in which the sensation of colour is excit-\ned in the mind. The perception of the one, and the sen-\nsation of the other have been so long simultaneous, that we\nhave been gradually drawn into the belief, that, on the one\nhand, all colour has extension, and, on the other, all ex-\ntension has colour. But what we call colour being merely\na state of the mind, it is not possible, that it should with\npropriety be predicated of any external material substan-\nces. Nor is it less evident, if colour be merely a sensation\nor state of the mind, that matter can exist, and does exist\nwithout it.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0210.jp2"},"211":{"fulltext":"CASUAL CONNECTIONS OF THOUGHT. 205\nBut what has been said will not satisfy all the queries,\nwhich may be started on this point, unless we remark also\non the ambiguity in the word colour. The view, which\nhas been taken of the connection between colour and ex-\ntension, is founded on the supposition, that colour denotes\na sensation of the mind and that merely. It seems to be\nsupposed by some writers, that the word colour has two\nmeanings, and that it is thus generally understood (1) It\ndenotes that disposition or arrangement in the particles of\nmatter, which not only causes the rays of light to be reflec-\nted, but to be reflected in different ways (2) It denotes\nthat mental sensation, which follows, when the rays have\nreached the retina of the eye. When people use the term\nwith this diversity of signification they can say with truth,\nthat external bodies have colour, and also that colour is a\nsensation of the mind. It may be said also in the first sense\nof the term, which has been mentioned, that colour has ex-\ntension, because particles of matter have extension. But\nit is by no means evident, that people generally make this\ndistinction, although some may. They commonly mean\nby the term the appearance of colour or the sensation in\nthe mind and they no doubt do in general regard this ap-\npearance or sensation, as belonging to external objects, as\nbeing in some sense a part of those objects, and as having\nextension. How erroneous this supposition is, has al-\nready appeared\n170. Whether there be heat infire^c.\nThe questions, Whether there be heat in fire, coldness\nin snow, sweetness in sugar, and the like, seem well suit-\ned to the inquisitive and nicely discriminating spirit of the\nscholastick ages. Whether bodies have colour, a point of\ninquiry in the last section, is another question of essential^\nly the same character. Although well suited to exercise\nthe ingenuity of the Schools, they are far from being with-\nout importance in the inquiries of the better philosophy of\nlater times. If these questions concern merely the matter","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0211.jp2"},"212":{"fulltext":"206 CASUAL CONNECTIONS OF THOUGHT.\nof fact, if the inquiry be, What do people think on these\npoints It admits of different answers. But this is of\nless consequence to be known, than to know what is the\ntrue view of this subject The following, we think, is the\nview, which should be taken. If by heat, cold, and taste\nin bodies, we merely mean, that there is this or that dispo-\nsition or motion in the particles, then it must clearly be\ngranted, that fire is hot, that snow is cold, and sugar is\nsweet. But if by heat is understood what one feels on the\napplication of fire to the limbs, or if by sweetness is under-\nstood the sensation of taste when a sapid body is applied\nto the tongue, c, then fire has no heat, sugar no sweet-\nness, and snow is not cold. These states of the mind can\nnever be transformed into any thing material and external.\nThe heat or the cold which I feel, and the different kind?\nof tastes are sensations in the soul, and nothing else.\n17k Whether there be meaning in words?\nWe say in our common discourse, that there is meaning\nin words, that there is meaning in the printed page of an\nauthor and the language is perhaps sufficiently correct\nfor those occasions, on which it is ordinarily employed.\nWe do not deem it necessary to object to the common\nmode of speaking in this particular instance, nor to under-\ntake to propose any thing better. But there is here an as-\nsociation of ideas, similar, both in its nature and its effects,\nto that existing between extension and colour already rer\nmarked upon.\nWhen objects external to us are presented to the sense\nof sight, there is immediately the sensation of some colour.\nThis sensation we have been so long in the habit of refer-\nring to the external object, that we speak and act, as if\nthe colour were truly in that object and not in ourselves\nin the language of D Alembert, as if the sensation were\ntransported out of the mind, and spread over the material\nsubstance. And it is not until we take some time to re-\nflect, and until we institute a careful examination, that we\nbecome satisfied of our errour.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0212.jp2"},"213":{"fulltext":"CASUAL CONNECTIONS OF THOUGHT. 207\nIn the same way when we look upon the page of an au-\nthor we say it has meaning, or that it is full of thought\nwhereas in truth, in consequence of a long continued and\nobstinate association, of which we are hardly sensible our-\nselves, we transport the meaning or thought out of our-\nselves and spread it upon that page. The thought or\nmeaning is in ourselves, but is placed by us, through the\nmeans of a casual but very strong association, in the written\nmarks, which are before us. All the power, which the\nwords have, results from convention, or, what is the same\nthing, exists in consequence of certain intellectual habits,\nformed in reference to those words. It is these habits,\nformed in reference to them, it is this mental correspond-\nence, which gives these characters all their value and\nwithout the mind, which answers to and which interprets\nthem, they could be considered as nothing more than mere\nblack strokes drawn upon white paper, and essentially difc\nfering in nothing from the zigzag and unmeaning delinea-\ntions of a school boy on the sand. As all the beautiful\nvariety of colours do not and cannot have an existence\nwithout the mind, which has sensations of them or perceives\nthem, so words are useless, are unmeaning, are nothing\nwithout the interpretations of an intellect, that has been\ntrained up so as to correspond to them. Otherwise there\nwould be meaning in the unknown inscriptions on the\nbricks brought from Babylon, there would be meaning\nin the hieroglyphical figures on the monuments of Egypt,\nthey would not stare upon us with the unintelligent va-\ncancy of an idiot. They are now without meaning, with-\nout life and intelligence, for this reason and this only, that\nthe minds, which once corresponded to them, and which\ngave them life and intelligence, are no more. By associa-\ntion, therefore, we refer the meaning to the written char-\nacters or words, when in truth it is in the mind, and there\nalone.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0213.jp2"},"214":{"fulltext":"208 CASUAL CONNECTIONS OF THOUGHT.\n172. Benefit of examining such connections of thought\nIt is of great importance to us to be able to separate\nideas, which our situation and habits may have intimately\ncombined together. To a person, who has this power in a\nconsiderable degree, we readily give the credit of possess-\ning a clear and discriminating judgment. And this men-\ntal characteristick is of great consequence not only in pur-\nsuing the study of intellectual philosophy, but in the con^\nduct of life. Such an ability is of no less and probably of\ngreater value, than mere acuteness of reasoning or quick-\nnets of invention although the latter may be considered\nmore imposing and brilliant qualities. The associations\nof thought, which have been mentioned in this chapter*\nare so intimate or rather almost indissoluble, that they try\nand discipline the mind in this respect, they teach it to\ndiscriminate. They are worthy to be examined, therefore,\nand to be understood, not only for the immediate pleasure,\nwhich they afford in the discovery of our errours but also\nbecause they have the effect of training up one s powers to\nsome good purpose. Let a person be accustomed to mak-\ning such discriminations as are implied in fully understand-\ning the instances in this chapter, and he acquires a readi-\nness, which is not easily outwitted he trains himself to\nsuch a quickness of perception in finding out what truly\nbelongs to an object and what does not, as will not al-\nlow him to be imposed upon by that confusion of ideas,\nwhich in so many cases distorts the judgments of the mul-\ntitude.\n173. Power of the will over mental associations.\nIn view of what has been said in this and the preced-\ning chapters, the inquiry naturally arises, What is the de*\ngree of influence, which we are able to exercise by mere\nwill or volition over associated trains of thought I The\nanswer to be given to this inquiry is, that we have no direct\ninfluence or power over them there is a constant train\nof ideas, but their succession, their coming and departing\ndepends on causes beyond our immediate voluntary con-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0214.jp2"},"215":{"fulltext":"CASUAL CONNECTIONS OF THOUGHT. 209\ntrol. The truth of the general statement, that we cannot\nproduce or call up an idea by a mere direct act of the will,\nand that, consequently, trains of ideas are not directly un-\nder its control, cannot but appear quite evident on a lit-\ntle reflection. We never can will the existence of any\nthing without knowing what it is which we will or choose.\nThis requires no further proof than is contained in the\nproposition itself. Therefore, the expressions, to will to\nhave a certain thought or train of thought, clearly imply\nthe present existence of that thought or train and, conse-\nquently, there can be no such thing as calling up and di-\nrecting our thoughts by immediate volition.\nTo this view of want of direct voluntary power over\nour associafid ideas and to the argument in support of it,\nthose mental efforts, which we term recollection or inten-\ntional memory, have been brought up as an answer. In\ncases of intentional memory it will be said, an object or\nevent is remembered, or, in other words, an idea or train\nof ideas is called up, by mere volition or^choice. To this\nobjection we make this reply. It is evident, before we at-\ntempt or make a formal effort to remember the particular\ncircumstances of an event, that the event itself in general\nmust have been the object of our attention. There is some\nparticular thing in all cases of intentional remembrance,\nwhich we wish to call to mind, although we are totally un-\nable to state what it is but we know, that it is somehow\nconnected with some general event, which we already have\nin memory. Now by revolving in mind the great facts or\noutlines of that event, it so happens, that the particular\ncircumstance, which we were in search of, is called up.\nBut certainly no one can say, that this is done by a direct\nvolition so far from it, that nothing more is wanted to\nexplain it, than the common principles of association.\nThis statement is illustrated, whenever, in reciting an ex-\ntract which we had committed to memory, we are at a loss\nfor the beginning of a particular sentence. In such a case\nwe naturally repeat a number of times the concluding\nwords of the preceding sentence, and very soon we recall\nthe sentence, which was lost not, however, by direct vo-\nlition, but by association.\n27","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0215.jp2"},"216":{"fulltext":"110 CASUAL CONNECTIONS OF THOUGHT.\nBut we would not be understood to say, that the v)ill\npossesses no influence whatever over our trains of thought\nits influence is very considerable, although it is not, as we\nhave seen, immediate and direct. 1 We have, in the\nfirst place, the power of checking or delaying the succes-\nsion of ideas. We are not, indeed, enabled by our power\nin this respect either directly to call up or to banish any\none or any number of our thoughts. But the consequence\nis, a variety of trains of thought are suggested, which\nwould not have been suggested, had it not been for the\ncircumstance of the original train being delayed. Thus,\nin the course of our mental associations, the name of Sir\nIsaac Newton occurs; we check the current of our\nthoughts at that name, and we feel and are conscious, that\nwe have within us the power to do so. While we delay\nupon it, a variety of series of ideas occurs. At one mo-\nment, we think of eminent mathematicians and astronomers,\nfor he himself was one at another, we think of those co-\ntemporaries, who were his particular friends, whatever\ntheir rank in science, because they lived at the same time\na moment after, our minds dwell upon some striking inci-\ndents in his life or some marked features in his social or\nintellectual character and again, we may be led to think,\nalmost in the same instant, of some proposition or demon-\nstration, which had once exercised his patience and skill.\nIn consequence of delaying a few moments on the name\nor rather on the general idea of the man, these different\ntrains of thought are presented and we can evidently fix\nour minds upon one of these subjects, if we choose, and\ndismiss the others. This is one way, in which by choice\nor volition we are able to exercise a considerable indirect\npower over our associations.\n(2) We acquire, in the second place, great power over\nour associations by habit and, as no man forms such hab-\nit without willing or choosing to form it, we have here\nanother instance of the indirect power of volition. By\nthe term, habit, when it is applied to our mental oper-\nations, we mean that facility or readiness, which they ac-\nquire by being frequently repeated. (See 164.) The","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0216.jp2"},"217":{"fulltext":"OF ATTENTION. 211\nconsequence of repetition or frequent practice is, that cer-\ntain associations are soon very much strengthened, or that\na facility in them is acquired. It is a well known fact,\nthat almost any person may become a punster or rhymer\nby taking the pains to form a habit, that is, by increasing\nthe facility of certain associations by frequent repetition.\nBy punning we understand the power of readily summon-\ning up, on a particular occasion, a number of words differ-\nent from each other in meaning, but resembling each oth-\ner, more or less, in sound. That facility of association,\nwhich is acquired by frequent repetition and which is ex-\npressed by the word habit, is the great secret of fluency\nin extemporaneous speaking. The extemporaneous speak-\ner must, indeed, have ideas no modification of association\nwhatever can supply the place of them. But his ability to\narrange them in some suitable order and to express them\nin words without previous care and effort, is the result, in a\ngreat measure, of habits of association.\nCHAPTER FIFTEENTH.\nOP ATTENTION.\n174. Nature of attention and different degrees of it.\nWithout considering it necessary to speak of attention\nas a separate intellectual power or faculty, as some may\nbe inclined to do, it seems to be sufficient to say, that at-\ntention expresses the state of the mind, when it is steadily\ndirected, for some time, whether longer or shorter, to some\nobject of sense or intellect, exclusive of other objects.\nWhen we say, that any thought or idea receives attention,\nit seems to be the fact, as far as we are able to determine,\nthat the thought or idea, or whatever is the object of that\nattention, remains in the mind for a certain period, and\nthat all other thoughts are, for the time being, shut out.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0217.jp2"},"218":{"fulltext":"212 OF ATTENTION.\nIt follows from this view of it, that attention may be\nvery great or very small, in a very high or a very slight de-\ngree, according as the mind is occupied with any thought or\nsubject for a greater or less time. When the view of the\nmind is only momentary, a mere glance then the attention\nis said to be very slight but when it bend itself upon\na thought or series of thoughts for any considerable length\nof time and refuses during that period to attend to any\nthing else whatever, then the attention is said to be intense.\nOf instances of people, who are able to give but slight\nattention to a subject, who cannot bring their minds to it\nwith steadiness and power, we every where find multitudes\nand there are some instances, where this ability has been\npossessed in such a high degree as to be worthy of notice.\nThere have been mathematicians, who could investigate\nthe most complicated problems amid every variety and\ncharacter of disturbance. The chess-player Philidor could\ndirect three games of chess at the same time, of one of\nwhich only he required ocular inspection, the moves of\nthe other two being announced to him by an assistant.\nOf power in controlling the attention, Julius Caesar has\nsometimes been mentioned as an instance while writing\na dispatch, it is said, that he could at the same time dic-\ntate four others to his secretaries, and, if he did not write\nhimself, could dictate seven letters at once.\n175. Of the dependence of memory on attention.\nThere seems to be no fact in mental philosophy more\nclearly established than this, that memory depends on at-\ntention; that is, where attention is very slight, remem-\nbrance is weak, and where attention is intense, remem-\nbrance continues longer. The following statements go to\nprove and illustrate this remark. (1) Let a person be\nmuch engaged in conversation or occupied with any very\ninteresting speculation, and the clock will strike in the\nroom where he is, apparently without his having any know-\nledge of it. He hears the clock strike as much as at any\nother time, but, not attending to the perception of sound","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0218.jp2"},"219":{"fulltext":"OF ATTENTION. 213\nand having his thoughts directed another way, he imme-\ndiately forgets. —(2) In the the course of a single day per-\nsons, who are in the habit of winking, will close their eye-\nlids perhaps thousands of times, and as often as they close\nthem, will place themselves in utter darkness. Undoubt-\nedly they are conscious at the time both of closing their\neyelids and of being in the dark, but as their attention is\nchiefly taken up with other things, they have entirely for-\ngotten it. (3) Whenever we read a book, we do not ob-\nserve the words merely as a whole, but every letter of\nwhich they are made up, and even the minute parts of these\nletters. But it is merely a glance it does not for any\nlength of time ocupy our attention we immediately for-\nget, and with great difficulty persuade ourselves, that we\nhave truly perceived the letters of the word. The fact,\nthat every letter is in ordinary cases observed by us, may be\nproved by leaving out a letter of the word, or by substi-\ntuting others of a similar form. We readily in reading\ndetect such omissions or substitutions.\nMany facts of this kind evidently show, as we think,\nthat memory depends upon attention or rather upon a\ncontinuance of attention and varies with that continuance.\nEvery one s general reading confirms this. Whenever\nwe read a book, which does not particularly interest us,\nand which, in failing to interest us, leaves our thoughts to\ngo astray upon other subjects, how very little is engraven\nin the recollection The facts, which have been given,\nnot only go to evince the dependence of memory on at-\nMention, but show also, in a striking manner, the rapidity\nof our mental operations. The fact, that we notice every\nletter, and the shape of every letter, and combine them\ntogether in words, and still are not delayed in reading, but\nproceed from word to word without hesitation, gives a view\nof the mind, which cannot but astonish us. But as the sub-\nject of the rapidity of our mental operations, in attending\nto a variety of successive objects, which has thus beea\nsuggested, is one of much interest, we delay upon it here,\nand make a few further remarks.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0219.jp2"},"220":{"fulltext":"214 OF ATTENTION.\n176. Of rapidity in attending to different objects.\nThe following illustration, in addition to others in the\npreceding section, may be given, to show the rapidity of\nthe mind in giving its attention to different objects it\nis stated by Mr. Hobbes in his political treatise of the\nLeviathan. He says, he was once in company, where the\nconversation turned on the English civil war. A person\nabruptly asked, in the course of the conversation, What\nwas the value of a Roman denarius Such a question, so\nremote from the general direction of the conversation, had\nthe appearance not only of great abruptness, but of imperti-\nnence. Mr. Hobbes says, that, on a little reflection, he\nwas able to trace the train of thought, which suggested the\nquestion. The original subject of discourse naturally in-\ntroduced the history of king Charles the king naturally\nsuggested the treachery of those, who surrendered him up\nto his enemies the treachery of these persons readily in-\ntroduced to the mind the treachery of Judas Iscariot the\nconduct of Judas was associated with the thirty pieces of\nsilver, and as the Romans occupied Judea at the time of the\ncrucifixion of the Saviour, the pieces of silver were asso-\nciated with the Roman denarii. All these trains of thought\npassed through the mind of the person, who asked the\nquestion, in a twinkling and probably he himself, if he\nhad been asked upon it, could not have told the precise\nconnection of ideas, which led him aside from the original\ntopick of discourse. This instance illustrates both the\ngreat rapidity of thought and the dependence of memory\non attention.\nThe rapidity of thought is illustrated also, in a striking\nmanner, in the case of an equilibrist, balancing a rod on\nhis finger. To do this requires constantly not only the at-\ntention of his mind, but the observation of his eye. The\npart of the body, which supports the object, is never whol-\nly at rest for, if it were, the object would no more stand\nupon it, than it would retain its position, if placed upright\non a table. The equilibrist, therefore, watches every in-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0220.jp2"},"221":{"fulltext":"OF ATTENTION. 215\nclination of the object from the proper position, so as to\ncounteract that inclination by a contrary movement. But,\nwhat is worthy of remark, he can balance not only a single\nrod in this way, but two or three upon different parts of\nhis body, and, at the same time, balance himself on a small\ncord or wire. That the mind should be able to attend to\nthese different equilibriums, is very wonderful but that it\ndoes attend to them is evident, because not only the atten-\ntion of the mind is requisite, but a particular direction of\nthe eye. This direction cannot be given to the eye with-\nout a preceding act of the mind. We have a similar illus-\ntration of the rapidity of the mind in directing itself to dif-\nferent objects in the performers at the circus. The per-\nformer vaults upon a horse, when at full speed he rises on\nthe saddle he stands upon one foot, and, in this situation,\nwhile his horse is in the most rapid movement, performs a\nvariety of feats, every one of which requires from the mind\na multitude of distinct acts of attention.\n177. Of rapidity of attention in connection with habits.\nIn connection with what has been said, we are led to\nremark upon the views of Reid and Hartley on the subject\nof habits. Their views are, that habits operate without\nwill or intention on the part of the person, who has formed\nthem and that, as they are without any attendant thought\nor mental operation, they are to be considered as merely\nmechanical or automatick principles. They illustrate their\nideas, as well as imagine that they prove them, by the in-\nstance of a person, learning to play on the harpsichord.\nWhen a person first begins to learn, it is admitted by all,\nthat there is an express act of volition, preceding every\nmotion of the fingers. By degrees the motions appear to\ncling to each other at least they follow each other with\nsuch ease and rapidity, that the volitions, which were at\nfirst easily recognized and distinguished, become evanes-\ncent and imperceptible in other words, there is nothing\nleft but the motions there is no act of the mind. But\nthe concluding part of this statement, which is adopted by","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0221.jp2"},"222":{"fulltext":"216\nOF ATTENTION.\nthe advocates of the opinion, that habits are altogether me-\nchanical, does not carry with it very strong evidence. It\nmay be admitted, that the volitions are evanescent and ap-\nparently imperceptible. But all this may happen on what\nwe conceive the more rational supposition, that the voli-\ntions exist, but are so very rapid, and arrest in so very\nsmall a degree the attention, or rather arrest it for so short\na time, as not to be remembered.\nAn evidence of the correctness of this supposition is,\nthat the most rapid performer is able, when he pleases, to\nplay so slowly, that he can distinctly observe and recollect\nevery act of the will in the various movements of the fin-\ngers. And when he has checked his motions so as to be\nable to observe the separate acts of volition, he can after-\nwards so accelerate those motions and of course so dimin-\nish the power, or what is the same thing, the time of at-\ntention, that he cannot recall the accompanying volitions.\nIn favour of the latter statement, the performances of\nthe equilibrist and of the actors of the circus may be again\nreferred to. In their performances it is certain, that as\ngreat a rapidity of mental operation is requisite, as in per-\nforming on any musical instruments. The movements of\nthe equilibrist, of the rope-dancer, and of the performer on\nhorseback, do not succeed each other in a certain regular\norder, like the movements of a player on the harpsichord,\nin performing a piece of musick. It may be pronounced\nimpossible for them to perform experiments, which agree\nin every particular with preceding experiments. They\nare governed in their volitions and movements by a variety\nof circumstances, which arise on every particular occasion,\nand which could not have been foreseen and there is,\nconsequently, a rapidity of volition in these instances not\nless than would be required in playing the harpsichord on\nthe hypothesis, which we have thought preferable. There\nremains to be mentioned one more instance, illustrative of\nthe views, which have been given, that of an expert ac-\ncountant. We find, that such an accountant can sum up,\nalmost with a single glance of the eye, a long column of\nfigures. The operation is performed almost instantaneously,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0222.jp2"},"223":{"fulltext":"OF ATTENTION. 217\nand yet he ascertains the sum of the whole with unerring\ncertainty. There cannot be a question, that every figure\nin the whole column has come under his notice, and that\nits proper worth has been allowed to it, but he is unable to\nrecollect the particular figures. Here is an instance, where\nwe have decisive proof of the existence of a rapidity in the\nmental operation of attention as great as we have contend-\ned for, and where there is no distinct remembrance of that\noperation afterwards it is an instance well fitted to throw\nlight upon and explain the true nature of all other cases\nof mental habits, viz. That they are associations of thought,\nwhich have acquired facility and quickness by repetition\nor practice.\n178. Of attention in legerdemain and ventriloquism.\nIt has with no little reason been thought, that the dex-\nterity of jugglers in practising tricks of legerdemain or\nsleights of hand illustrates and confirms in some measure\nthe views, which have been given. These persons acquire\nthe power of performing certain feats with astonishing ra-\npidity by habit. The rapidity, with which they perform\ntheir feats, is undoubtedly the great secret of the imposi-\ntions, which they are able to practise on the understandings\nof those, who observe them. The time, which they take\nup in going through their tricks of legerdemain, is so very\nshort, that the spectator is unable to exert that degree of\nattention, which is necessary to lay the foundation of mem-\nory so that the performance is the same to him, in conse-\nquence of his inability to remember any thing, as if he\nhad never seen it.\nIt may not be out of place briefly to remark here in ex-\nplanation of ventriloquism, an art, by which persons can\nso modify their voice, as to make it appear to their audi-\nence to proceed from different distances and directions.\nThe great requisite on the part of the ventriloquist is to be\nable to mimick sounds and he will be likely to succeed\nnearly in proportion to his skill in this particular. The\nsecret then of his acoustick deceptions will be sufficiently\n28","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0223.jp2"},"224":{"fulltext":"318 OF ATTENTION.\nunderstood by referring to the statement in 29, viz.\nThat, previous to experience, we are unable to refer sounds\nto any particular external cause. The sound itself never\ngives us any direct and immediate indication of the place,\nor distance, or direction of the sonorous body. It is only\nby experience, it is only by the association of place with\nsound, that the latter becomes an indication of the former.\nNow, supposing the ventriloquist to possess a delicate ear,\nwhich is implied in his ability to mimick sounds, he soon\nlearns by careful observation the difference, which change\nof place causes in the same sound. Having in this way\nascertained the sounds, which, in consequence of the asso-\nciations men have formed, are appropriate to any particu-\nlar distance, direction, or object, it is evident, whenever\nhe exactly or very nearly imitates such sounds, that they\nmust appear to his audience to come from such distance,\nobject, or direction. One part of the art, however, con-\nsists in controlling the attention of the persons present,\nand in directing that attention to some particular place by\na remark, motion, or in some other method. If, for in-\nstance, the sound is to come from under a tumbler or hat,\nthe performer finds it important to have their attention di-\nrected to that particular object, which gives a fine oppor-\ntunity for the exercise of all those associations, which they\nhave formed with any sound coming from a very confined\nplace. All, then, that remains for him to do, is, to give\nhis voice a dull modulation and on a low key, which we\nknow from our experience to be the character of confined\nsounds. Then there seems to be a voice speaking under\na tumbler or hat and if any person should, either inten-\ntionally or unintentionally, lift these articles up, the ven-\ntriloquist immediately utters himself on a higher key, like\na person, who had been very much confined, on being re-\nadmitted into the free and open air. In all these cases,\nboth of legerdemain and of ventriloquism, a great deal\ndepends on the skill of the performer, in directing the at-\ntention of those, who witness the exhibition, to some par\nticular object, or in diverting their attention from it bu!\nin sleights of hand there is the still more difficult art o f","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0224.jp2"},"225":{"fulltext":"OF ATTENTION. 219\nperforming feats so rapidly as absolutely to prevent the de-\ngree of attention requisite for memory.\n179. Whether the mind can attend to more than one\nobject at the same time.\nIn connection with what has already been said, we\nare in some degree prepared to consider the question,\nWhether the mind can attend to more than one thing at\none and the same instant The question can perhaps be\nstated more clearly thus Whether we can attend at one\nand the same instant to objects, which we can attend to\nseparately f This question does not admit of a direct ap-\npeal to the fact, and, therefore, cannot be decided with\nperfect confidence but the opinion, that we cannot attend\nto more than one object at a time has been thought by\nmost of those, who have carefully examined the subject, to\nbe far the most reasonable and philosophical. It is true,\nthere are many cases, where the mind appears to exert dif-\nferent acts of attention at once. But when we consider\nthe astonishing rapidity of our thoughts, it is obvious, that\nthese cases may be explained without supposing the men-\ntal acts in question to be co-existent. The instances of\nmental rapidity, which have been brought forward already,\napply here, and are to be kept in recollection. It is a\npoint well and satisfactorily ascertained by such facts as\nwe have alluded to, that it is possible for the mind to exert\ndifferent acts of attention in an interval of time so short, as\nto produce the same sensible effect or appear to be the\nsame, as if they had been exerted at one and the same mo-\nment. This is proved in particular by what was said of\nequilibrists, performers at the circus, rope-dancers, and\nacts of legerdemain. As, therefore, we never can prove\nby any direct evidence, that the mind actually attends to\ndifferent objects at one and the same time, but merely that\nit appears to, we justly draw the conclusion, that it does\nnot thus attend to them, because that appearance can be\naccounted for by facts, which are well established. That\nis to say, it can be accounted for sufficiently well by what\nwe have seen and known of the rapidity of the mind s op-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0225.jp2"},"226":{"fulltext":"220 OF ATTENTION.\nerations and this, therefore, is the preferable doctrine.\nThe opinions, advanced in this section, may be further con-\nsidered in respect to musick.\n180. On attending at the same time to different parts\nin musick.\nIt seems to be a common idea, that, in a concert of mu-\nsick, a good ear can attend to the different parts at the\nsame time, and feel the full effect of the harmony. That\nthis may possibly be the case it seems not necessary to de-\nny. But after what has been said of the rapidity, with\nwhich the mind transfers its attention from one object to\nanother, it cannot be thought to be probable, and there is\ngood ground for offering another explanation and one\nmore philosophical. This explanation can be easily con-\njectured, viz. That the mind passes from one part of the\nmusick to the other with such quickness, as to give us no\nperception of an interval of time. If the views taken in\nthe preceding section be correct, as one can hardly doubt\nafter looking at the arguments brought forward, this ex-\nplanation in respect to musick necessarily follows.\n181. Of attention in the perception of external objects.\nIn discussing the subject of attention, Mr. Stewart, in\nconnection with his views on that subject, introduces\nsome remarks in respect to vision. He makes this supposi-\ntion, That the eye is fixed in a particular position, and the\npicture of an object is painted on the retina. He then\nstarts this inquiry, Does the mind perceive the complete\nfigure of the object at once, or is this perception the result\nof the various perceptions we have of the different points\nin the outline He holds the opinion, that the percep-\ntion is the result of our perceptions of the different points\nin the outline, which he adopts as naturally consequent on\nsuch views, as the following. The outline of every body\nis made up of points or smallest visible portions no\ntwo of these points can be in precisely the same direction\ntherefore, every point by itself constitutes just as distinct","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0226.jp2"},"227":{"fulltext":"OF ATTENTION. 221\nan object of attention to the mind, as if it were separated\nby some interval of empty space from all the other points.\nIt follows from these facts, that it is impossible for the mind\nto attend to more than one of these points at once, since\nthey can be distinct objects of attention, and it has appear-\ned that the mind cannot attend at one and the same time\nto objects, which it can attend to separately. The con-\nclusion, therefore, is, as the perception of the figure of the\nobject implies a knowledge of the relative situation of the\ndifferent points with respect to each other, that such per-\nception is the result of a number of different acts of atten-\ntion. How then do we appear to see the object at once\nThe answer is, that the acts of attention are performed\nwith such rapidity, that the effect with respect to us is the\nsame, as if the perception were instantaneous. There\nare some facts, which go to confirm these views of the\nmode of our perception of objects. We find, that we do\nnot have as distinct an idea, at the first glance, of a figure\nof a thousand sides, as we do of a triangle or square. But\nwe evidently should, if the perception of visible figure\nwere the immediate consequence of the picture on the\nretina, and not the combined result of the separate percep-\ntions of the points in the outline. Whenever the figure is\nvery simple, the process of the mind is so very rapid, that\nthe perception seems to be instantaneous. But when\nthe sides are multiplied beyond a certain number, the in-\nterval of time necessary for these different acts of attention\nbecomes perceptible. It follows from these views of the\nmode of perceiving visible figure, that there can be no per-\nceptions of the visible form of objects without the faculty\nof memory.\n182. Rapidity of attention one cause of difficulty in\ncriticism.\nExperience teaches us, that certain objects are fitted to\ngive pleasure, while others are either indifferent, or impart\ndisgust. We know the fact but it is impossible for us to\ngive any explanation of it, further than to say, that such is","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0227.jp2"},"228":{"fulltext":"222 OF ATTENTION.\nour constitution or that we are thus formed. (See 19,)\nBut then previously to the emotion of pleasure or displeas-\nure, of satisfaction or of disgust, the mind is very active,\nand has not only a multitude of perceptions, but forms va-\nrious comparisons. We will suppose, thai the emotion\nexcited is that of pleasure, and that the object which is the\ncause of it exhibits different qualities some of them are\npleasing, some are indifferent, and others are suited to\ncause disgust. All these different qualities are in a state\nof combination, and they mutually affect each other.\nHere the mind rapidly makes a discrimination it fixes\nupon the particular parts of the object, which is suppos-\ned to possess many different qualities, and separates the\nelements of beauty it assigns their due influence to those\nqualities, which are either indifferent or are displeasing\nit takes a comparative view of the whole and the result\nof these various perceptions and comparisons is that new\nstate of the mind, which we call a pleasing emotion. But\nwe no sooner have the pleasing emotion, than we feel a\nsort of disinclination to retrace the previous steps. And\nwhen it is otherwise and we have an inclination to, the\nmental process has been so rapid, that we often meet with\nserious difficulty in detecting the separate steps of it in the\norder of their succession. So that we have here one\ncause of difficulty in criticism, for it comes within the pro-\nvince of the philosophy of criticism, to detect and point\nout those operations of the mind, which precede emotions\neither of pleaure or disgust. And in doing this, criticks\nmeet with the obstacle, which has been mentioned. We\nsee here a cause also, why they are so often at variance\nwith each other as to the precise ground of emotions of\npleasure and the opposite and also why others, who do\nnot presume to take upon themselves the rank of criticks,\ndo not always assent to their expositions, and sometimes\ndiffer from them. One of the great requisites in a crit-\nick is the ability to reflect steadily and carefully on the\noperations of the mind, in order that he may check them\nin the rapidity of their progress and detain them sufficient-\nly long to be able to analyze them.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0228.jp2"},"229":{"fulltext":"pF ATTENTION. 223\n183. Of attention as connected with the improvement\nof the other senses when one is lost.\nAnother well-known and interesting fact illustrates the\nviews taken in this chapter. When one of our senses is\naccidentally lost, there is an improvement of the others\nwhen a person loses his sight, there is an increased sensi-\nbility of the touch. The cause of this has been already\nstated and remarked upon. (See 41.) We do not sup-\npose, that there is any change in the physical constitution\nof the body, which causes the improvement in the remain-\ning senses. Such a supposition is unnecessary, and, as the\nfact can be explained without it, is unphilosophical. An-\nother explanation, is, therefore, to be preferred. When\nall the senses remain and are in full exercise, there are a\nmultitude of slight suggestions from them, which are per-\nceived but are not attended to, because they are not of\nany urgent and immediate practical value and they are\nnot remembered, because they are not attended to. We\nmean, they receive but very slight attention. But when\none or more of the senses is gone, those slight suggestions\nat once assume an increased importance. They become\nnecessary to one s enjoyment and perhaps existence. The\nmind, therefore, is under a sort of necessity of delaying\nupon and marking a variety of evanescent intimations from\nthe senses, which it formerly neglected. It not only mere-\nly attends to them, but examines them, and puts them to\nhardly less practical use than many more obvious sensa-\ntions. So that there is not necessarily any physical im-\nprovement of the senses, when one is lost; but the mind\nmerely attends to and remembers their slight suggestions,\nmore than it previously did\n184. Of attention in connection ivith the intellectual\nhabits of men in active life.\nThe mental operations of men in active life are often\nvery rapid, the conclusions, at which they arrive on sub-\njects somewhat complicated, are generally correct, but","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0229.jp2"},"230":{"fulltext":"224\nOF ATTENTION,\nthey frequently find themselves unable to state clearly the\nprocess of reasoning, by which they arrived at the conclu-\nsion. Oliver Cromwell, the English Protector, is said to\nhave been a person, to whom this statement would well\napply. Rarely any man has had a clearer insight into\nevents, but when he attempted to explain himself, he was\nconfused and obscure. If we were to give his intellectual\ncharacter in a single sentence, it would be but just to say,\nthat Cromwell was a man of argument, but no speaker.\nHis mind readily insinuated itself into the intricacies of a\nsubject, and while he could assert with confidence, that he\nhad arrived at a satisfactory conclusion, he could not so\nreadily describe either the direction he had taken or the\ninvolutions of the journey. This character of the Protec-\ntor will apply to multitudes of men in active life, although\nundoubtedly for the most part in a less degree. Their\ndistinguishing traits are two, an ability to examine with\ngreat quickness all the parts of an intricate subject, and an\nequal want of ability in stating this process to others.\nConcerning the first of these characteristicks, it is suf-\nficient to say, that the great readiness, which they exhibit,\nis a habit, which they have been compelled to form by the\ncircumstances, in which they have been placed. In a\nthousand emergencies they have been obliged to act with\nquickness, and at the same time with caution in other words,\nto examine subjects, and to have it done with expedition. In\nthis way the habit spoken of has been formed, viz. of exceed-\ning readiness in all their mental acts. The other promi-\nnent mental trait in men in active life arises from this great\nquickness of intellectual operation,which they are capable of\nputting forth. The facts,which have but just been before us,\nillustrate this case. The minute circumstances, which are\nexamined, previous to a judgment on all subjects of diffi-\nculty, are passed in review with such rapidity, are made in\nso very small a degree or rather for so short a time the ob-\njects of separate attention, that they vanish and are forgot-\nten. Hence these persons, although the conclusion to\nwhich they have come be satisfactory, as they are unable\nto remember them, are, consequently, unable to state to","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0230.jp2"},"231":{"fulltext":"OF ATTENTION. 225\nothers all the subordinate steps in the argument. Every\nthing has once been fairly before their own minds, but\ntheir argument, as stated in words, owing to their inability\nto arrest and embody all the evanescent processes of\nthought, appears to others defective and confused. And\nin truth it is a known fact, that mere men of business have\nfor the most part a great repugnance to stating their views\nin publick. They regard it as a task of much difficulty,\nas undoubtedly it is to persons of such intellectual habits.\nWhen obliged to do it, their only resort is to prepare them-\nselves in private, to examine again and again their thoughts,\nto throw them into words and sentences, and to fix the\nverbal propositions with as much exactness as possible in\nthe memory otherwise they fail to do justice either to\nthemselves or their subject.\n185. Of exercising attention in 7 eading.\nIf attention, as we have seen, be the foundation of\nmemory, then we are furnished with a practical rule of\nconsiderable importance. The rule is, Not to give a hasty\nand careless reading of authors, but to read them with a\ndegree of deliberation and thought. It is the fault of\nsome persons, that they are too quickly weary, that they\nskip from one author to another, and from one sort of\nknowledge to another. It is true, there are many things\nto be known we w T ould not have a person limit himself\nentirely to one science, but it is highly important, that he\nshould guard against that rapid and careless transition\nfrom subject to subject, which has been mentioned. And\nwhy is it important The intimation at the head of this\nsection, that there cannot be memory without attention,\nor rather that the degree of memory will vary with the de-\ngree of attention, suggests the answer. By yielding to the\ndesire of becoming acquainted with a greater variety of\ndepartments of knowledge, than the understanding is able\nto master, and, as a necessary consequence, by bestowing\nupon each of them only a very slight attention, we remain\nessentially ignorant of the whole.\n29","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0231.jp2"},"232":{"fulltext":"226\nOF ATTENTION.\nThe person, who pursues such a course, finds himself\nunable to recall what he has been over he has a great\nmany half-formed notions floating in his mind, but these\nare so ill shaped and so little under his control as to be\nbut little better, than sheer ignorance. This is one evil\nresult of reading authors and of going over sciences in the\ncareless way, which has been specified, that the knowledge\nthus acquired, if it can be called knowledge, is of very\nlittle practical benefit, in consequence of being so poorly\ndigested and so little under control. But there is another\nand perhaps more serious evil this practice greatly dis-\nqualifies one for all intellectual pursuits the mind, having\nbeen so long left at liberty to wander from object to object\nwithout being called to account and subjected to the rules\nof salutary discipline, entirely loses at last the ability to\ndwell upon the subjects of its thoughts and to examine\nthem. And when this power is once Jost, there is but little\nground to expect any solid attainments.\nNote. Many writers on the mind and on education in\ngeneral from Quintilian down to Mr. Locke have noticed\nand remarked upon the connection existing between atten-\ntion and memory. More recently Condillac has briefly\nexamined the subject of attention, and has happily illus-\ntrated the astonishing rapidity, with which the mind is ca-\npable of giving its attention to successive objects. Hel-\nvetius, another French writer, has given, in his work on the\nmind entitled de l esprit, a chapter where he treats of the\nunequal capacity of attention in different individuals. The\nchapter to which we refer is entitled, de VinegaU capacite\n(T attention. He investigates in particular the ability of pa-\ntient inquiry or power of continued attention, which is so\nvery necessary in philosophical pursuits. Dugald Stewart?\npursuing the path which Condillac had partially opened,\nhas treated this subject with great ability he especially\nconsiders rapidity of attention or those exceedingly minute\nacts of attention, without which there can be no recollec-\ntion or memory whatever. -Locke s Essay, B. II. chap.\n10. Conctillac s Origin of Knowledge, P. 1. Sect. 2. chap.\n1. Stewards Elements, chap. 2.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0232.jp2"},"233":{"fulltext":"227\nCHAPTER SIXTEENTH,\nOF CONCEPTIONS.\n186. Meaning of conceptions and how they differ\nfrom certain oiher ideas.\nConceptions is the name given to those ideas, which\nwe have of any absent object of perception, or of any sen-\nsations which the mind has formerly felt. Whenever we\nhave conceptions, our ideas are replaced, as Shakespeare\nexpresses it, in the mind s eye, without our at all consid-\nering at what time or in what place they first originated.\nIn other words, our ideas or mental states are recalled, and\nnothing more. Using, therefore, the term conceptions\nto express a class of ideas, it may be sufficient, in order to\ngive some notion of their distinctive character, to mention,\nhow they differ from perceptions, and from ideas of mem-\nory. (1) They differ from perceptions, because the objects\nof them are absent. When we perceive any thing, an ed-\nifice, a lake, or a mountain the objects of our perceptions\nare before us. But we may form conceptions of them, and\nthey may exist in the mind s eye, however distant.\n(2) They differ also from ideas of memory, because they\nare contemplated exclusively of any considerations of time.\nBut in every act of the memory there is an idea of the past.\nHence, as those states of mind, to which we give the name\nof conceptions, possess these distinctive marks or charac-\nteristicks, they are entitled to a separate name.\nConceptions being merely mental states or acts of a\nparticular kind are regulated by the general laws of the\nintellect, and make their appearance and disappearance on\nthe principles of association. Those principles have al-\nready been explained. Whenever at any time we may use\nthe phrase power of conception or faculty of concep-\ntion, nothing more is to be understood by such expressions\nthan this, that there is in the mind a susceptibility of ideas","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0233.jp2"},"234":{"fulltext":"228 OP CONCEPTIONS.\npossessing the marks, which we have ascribed to this?\nclass.\n187. Of conceptions of objects of sight.\nOne of the striking facts in regard to our conceptions\nis, that we can far more easily conceive the objects of some\nsenses than of others. Suppose a person to have travelled\nabroad, and to have seen St. Peter s church and the Vati-\ncan, or to have visited the cataract of Niagara and the\nfalls of St. Anthony, or any other interesting object of\nsight it is well known, that the mind of this person after-\nwards even for many years very readily forms a conception\nof those objects. Such ideas are so easily and so distinct-\nly recalled, that it is hardly too much to say of them, that\nthey seem to exist as permanent pictures in the mind. It\nis quite different with a particular sound, which we have\nformerly heard, and with a particular taste, or any pleasant\nor painful sensations of the touch, which we have formerly\nexperienced. When the original perceptions have in\nthese last cases departed, we find that the ideas do not\nreadily exist again in the absence of their appropriate ob-\njects, and never with the distinctness, which they pos-\nsessed at first. Ideas of visible objects, therefore, are\nmore readily recalled, or we can more easily form concep-\ntions of such objects than we can of the objects of the oth-\ner senses. This peculiarity in the case of visible objects\nmay be thus partially explained.\nVisible objects or rather the outlines of them are com-\nplex that is, they are made up of a great number of points\nor very small portions. (See 181.) Hence the conception,\nwhich we form of such an object as a whole, is aided by\nthe principles of association. The reason is obvious. As\nevery original perception of a visible object is a compound,\nmade up of many parts, whenever we subsequently have a\nconception of it, the process is the same we have a con-\nception of a part of the object, and the principles of asso-\nciation help us in conceiving the other parts. Association\nconnects the parts together it presents them to the mind","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0234.jp2"},"235":{"fulltext":"OF CONCEPFIONS. 229\nin their proper arrangement, and helps to sustain them\nthere.\nWe are not equally aided by the laws of association in\nforming our conceptions of the objects of the other senses.\nWhen we think of some sound, or taste, or touch, the ob-\nject of our conception is a single detached sensation. In\nevery such sound, or taste, or sensation of touch, whether\nwe consider it at its first origin or when it is subsequently\nrecalled, there is not that association of the parts, which\nwe suppose to exist in every visual perception, and which\nmust, of course, exist in every conception of objects of\nsight, which subsequently takes place. Accordingly our\nconceptions of the latter objects arise more readily, and\nare more distinct than of the others.\n188. Of the influence of habit on our conceptions.\nIt is another circumstance worthy of Dotice in regard\nto conceptions, that the power of forming them depends\nin some measure on habit. In what sense we are to un-\nderstand the terms power and faculty, when used in this\nconnection, has already been explained. A few instan-\nces will help to illustrate this statement and the first to\nbe given will be of conceptions of sounds. Our concep-\ntions of sounds are in general very indistinct, as appeared\nin the last section. But a person may acquire the power\nof amusing himself with reading written musick. Having\nfrequently associated the sounds with the notes, he has at\nlast such a strong conception of the sounds, that he expe-\nriences^ merely reading the notes, a very sensible plea-\nsure. It is for the same reason,, viz. because our associa-\ntionsjare strengthened by habit, that readers may enjoy\nthe harmony of poetical numbers without at all articula-\nting the words-\nThat our power of forming conceptions is strengthened\nby habit is capable of being illustrated also from the sight.\nA person, who has been accustomed to drawing, retains a\nmuch more perfect notion of a building, landscape, or oth-\ner visible object, than one who is not. A portrait painter,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0235.jp2"},"236":{"fulltext":"230\nOF CONCEPTIONS.\nor any person, who has been in the habit of drawing such\nsketches, can trace the outlines of the human form with\nvery great ease it requires hardly more effort from them\nthan to write their name. This point may be illustrated\nby the difference which we sometimes notice in people in\ntheir conceptions of colours. Some are fully sensible of\nthe difference between two colours when they are present-\ned to them, but cannot with confidence give names to these\ncolours when they see them apart, and may even confound\nthe one with the other. Their original sensations or per-\nceptions are supposed to be equally distinct with those of\nother persons but their subsequent conception of the col-\nours is far from being so. This defect arises partly at least\nfrom want of practice or habit. The persons, who exhib-\nit this weakness of conception, have not been compelled\nby their situation nor by mere inclination to distinguish\nand to name colours so much as is common.\n189. Of the subserviency of our conceptions to deSr\ncription.\nIt is highly favourable to the talent for lively descrip-\ntion, when a person s conceptions are readily suggested\nand are distinct. Even such an one s common conversa-\ntion differs from that of those, whose conceptions arise\nmore slowly and are more faint. One man, whether in\nconversation or in written description, seems to place the\nobject, which he would give us an idea of, directly before\nus it is represented distinctly and to the life. Another,\nalthough not wanting in a command of language, is confu-\nsed and embarrassed amid a multitude of particulars, which\nin consequence of the feebleness of his conceptions he\nfinds himself but half acquainted with and he, therefore,\ngives us but a very imperfect notion of the thing, which\nhe would describe.\nIt has been by some supposed, that a person might\ngive a happier description of an object, of an edifice, of\na landscape, or other object, from the conception than from\nthe actual perception of it. The perfection of a descrip-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0236.jp2"},"237":{"fulltext":"OF CONCEPTIONS. 231\ntion does not always consist in a minute specification of\ncircumstances in general the description is better, when\nthere is a judicious selection of them. The best rule for\nmaking the selection is, to attend to the particulars, that\nmake the deepest impression on our own minds, or, what\nis the same thing, that most readily and distinctly take a\nplace in our conceptions. When the object is actually\nbefore us, it is extremely difficult to compare the impres-\nsions which different circumstances produce. When we\nafterwards conceive the object, we possess merely the out-\nline of it but it is an outline made up of the most striking\ncircumstances. Those circumstances, it is true, will not\nimpress all persons alike, but will somewhat vary with the\ndegree of their taste. But when with a correct taste any\none combines lively conceptions, and gives a description\nfrom those conceptions, he can hardly fail to succeed in it.\n190. Of conceptions attended with a momentary belief.\nOur conceptions are sometimes attended with belief;\nwhen they are very lively, we are apt to ascribe to their\nobjects a real existence or believe in them. It is not assert-\ned by us, that the belief is permanent but a number of\nof facts strongly lead to the conclusion, that it has a mo-\nmentary existence. (1) A painter in drawing the features\nand bodily form of an absent friend, may have so strong a\nconception, so vivid a mental picture, as to believe for a\nmoment that his friend is before him. After carefully re-\ncalling his thoughts at such times and reflecting upon them,\nalmost every painter is ready to say, that he has experienced\nsome illusions of this kind. It is true, the illusion is very\nshort, because the intensity of conception, which is the\nfoundation of it, can never be kept up long when the\nmind is in a sound state. Such intense conceptions are un-\nnatural. And, further, all the surrounding objects of percep-\ntion, which no one can altogether disregard for any length\nof time, every now and then check the illusion and termi-\nnate it. (2) Place a person on the battlements of a high\ntower his reason tells him he is in no danger he knows he","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0237.jp2"},"238":{"fulltext":"232 OF CONCEPTIONS.\nis in none. But after all he is unable to look down from\nthe battlements without fear his conceptions are so ex-\nceedingly vivid as to induce a momentary belief of danger\nin opposition to all his reasonings. (3) There are persons\nwho are entirely convinced of the folly of the popular be-\nlief of ghosts and other nightly apparitions, but who\ncannot be persuaded to sleep in a room alone, nor go alone\ninto a room in the dark. Whenever they happen out at\nnight, they are constantly looking on every side their\nquickened conceptions behold images which never had\nany existence but in their own minds, and they are con-\ntinually in terror. In such cases we see the influence of the\nprejudices of the nursery. They were taught in early\nchildhood to form conceptions of ghosts and other appari-\ntions, and the habit still continues. It is true, when they\nlisten to their reasonings and philosophy, they may well\nsay that they do not believe in such things. But the ef-\nfect of their philosophy is merely to check their belief;\nnot in one case in a thousand is the belief entirely over-\ncome. Every little while, in all solitary places, and espe-\ncially in the dark, it returns, and when banished returns\nagain otherwise we cannot give any explanation of the\nconduct of these persons.\n191. Conceptions which are joined with perceptions.\nThe belief in our mere conceptions is the more evident\nand striking, whenever they are at any time joined with\nour perceptions. A person walking in a field in a thick\nfoggy morning perceives something, rio matter what it is\nbut he believes it to be a man, and does not doubt it. In\nother words, he truly perceives some object, and, in addi-\ntion to that perception, has a mental conception of a man\nattended with belief. When he has advanced a few feet\nfurther, all at once he perceives, that what he conceived\nto be a man is merely a stump with a few large stones pi-\nled on its top. He perceived at first, as plainly or but\nlittle short of it, that it was a stump, as in a moment after-\nwards there was the whole time very nearly the same","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0238.jp2"},"239":{"fulltext":"OF CONCEPTIONS. 63\nrisible form and the same dimensions in his eye. But\nwhatever he had in his eye, he certainly had in his mind\nthe conception of a man, which overruled and annulled\nthe natural effects of the visual perception the concep-\ntion being associated with a present visible object acqui-\nred peculiar strength and permanency so much so that he\ntruly and firmly believed, that a human being was before\nhim. But the conception has departed; the present ob-\nject of perception has taken its place, and it is now impos-\nsible for him to conjure up the phantom, the reality of\nwhich he but just now had no doubt of. Maiay a per-\nson has waked up in the night and has firmly believed,\nthat he saw a form clothed in white standing in an erect\nposition at some paH of the room, but in a moment after\nthe imaginary visitant has vanished, and there is nothing\nleft but the reflection of the moonbeams on the wall. In\ncases of this kind, where the conceptions are upheld, as it\nwere, by present objects of perception, and receive a sort\nof permanency from them, nothing is better known, than\nthat we often exercise a strong and unhesitating belief*\nThese instances, therefore, can properly be considered as\nillustrating and confirming the views in the preceding sec-\ntion.\n192. Of our conceptions at tragical representations*\nThese observations suggest an explanation at least in\npart of the effects, which are produced on the mind by\nexhibitions of fictitious distress. In the representation of\ntragedies, it must be admitted, that there is a general con-\nviction of the whole being but a fiction. But, although\npersons enter the theatre with this general conviction, it\ndoes not always remain with them the whole time. At\ncertain passages in the poet peculiarly interesting, and at\ncertain exhibitions of powerful and well timed effort in\nthe actor, this general impression, that all is a fiction, fails.\nThe feelings of the spectator may be said to rush into the\nscenes he mingles in the events carried away and lost\nhe for a moment believes all to be real, and the tears gush\n30","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0239.jp2"},"240":{"fulltext":"354 ©F CONCEPTIONS.\nat the catastrophe which he witnesses. The explanation,\ntherefore, of the emotions felt at the exhibition of a trag-\nedy, such as indignation, pity, and abhorrence, is, that at\ncertain parts of the exhibition we have a momentary belief\nin the reality of the events which are represented. And\nafter the illustrations which have been given, such a belief\ncannot be considered impossible. The same explana-\ntion will apply to the emotions, which follow our reading\nof tragedies when alone, or any other natural and affecting\ndescriptions. In the world of conceptions, which the ge-\nnius of the writer conjures up, we are transported out of the\nworld of real existence, and for a while fully believe in the\nreality of what is only an incantation.\n193. Of conceptions in connection with apparitions.\nThe subject of apparitions was considered at chapter\nninth. Apparitions were defined at 93 in that chapter\nto be appearances, which seem to be real, but which exist\nonly in imagination that is, have only an imaginary exist-\nence. And at 95, in the same chapter, it was replied in\nanswer to the inquiry,— How merely imaginary appearan-\nces can have so much the aspect of reality that they are\nideas or conceptions, in no ways differing from ordinary\nconceptions but this, that they are more vivid. It was fur-\nther remarked, that the conceptions, in consequence of be-\ning so much more vivid than common, are mistaken for the\nthing conceived of, a state of the mind, which is brought\nabout on the principles of association, for the real object,\nwhich was originally the cause of that state of mind. The\nconception of the man, of the mountain, the temple, or the\nprocession, is so intense, so extremely vivid, that we a\nfirmly believe them to be really in our view, as when at\nsome former period we truly beheld them. This was thu\nstatement given at chapter ninth.\nThe statements made in the three last sections go a\ngreat ways in illustrating and confirming the views taker;\nin the chapter on Apparitions. If the doctrines in the\nthree preceding sections be admitted, it follows, that every","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0240.jp2"},"241":{"fulltext":"OF CONCEPTIONS. 23S\nperson may have conceptions so very vivid as for a short\ntime to arrest his belief. And no doubt every person does\nexperience something of this kind, more or less in the\ncourse of his life..\nApparitions, however, differ from conceptions where\nthere is only a momentary belief; otherwise they would\nnot have been treated of as a separate subject. Vivid con-\nceptions, attended with only a momentary belief, and which\nare continually checked and set right by surrounding ob-\njects, do not unfit us for the common duties of life. Ap-\nparitions do unfit one for such duties they are always ow-\ning, as appeared at 94, and other sections in the same\nchapter, to a disordered state of the mind either permanent\nor temporary. They differ, therefore, from ordinary con-\nceptions so vivid as to be attended with belief, in two re-\nspects. (1) They are greater m degree or the mental de-\nceptions continue for a greater length of time. (2) They\nalways imply a state of mind in some way disordered.\nThe causes of disordered states of mind is a subject of\ngreat difficulty, but as far as any light can be thrown up-\non it, it is examined at the chapter above referred to,\nand in a remaining one on persons, who are insane.\nBut it is of some consequence to remark, that cases of ap-\nparitions may be distinguished from cases of insanity.\nWhen a person professes to see objects, which his associ-\nates and by-standers know are not present, it is too apt to\nbe concluded, that he is deranged or insane in the usual\nsense of those terms. The mind is undoubtedly disorder-\ned but if any one insists on calling it insanity, it must be\nadmitted to be of a less permanent and less dangerous\n•kind, than commonly goes under that name. As an ev-\nidence, we refer to the case of Nicolai already given.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0241.jp2"},"242":{"fulltext":"236\nCHAPTER SEVENTEENTH.\nOF ABSTRACT IDEAS.\n194. Definition of abstract ideas and kinds of them.\nThere is a division of our thoughts, to which the name of\nabstractions or abstract ideas is given, because by certain\nacts of the mind they are abstracted or separated, and are\nmade subjects of consideration apart from other ideas, with\nwhich they are ordinarily found to be associated.— They\nmay be divided into two classes, viz. particular abstract\nideas, and general abstract ideas. Of the first class the\ndifferent kinds of colours may be mentioned as an in-\nstance. When any absent object of perception occurs to\nus, our thoughts will sometimes fix upon the colour and\nmake that the subject of consideration, without particular-\nly noticing other qualities of the object, such as weight,\nhardness, taste, form, c. We may distinguish in any\nbody its solidity from its extension, or we may direct our\nattention to its weight, or its length, or breadth, or thick-\nness, and make any one of these a distinct object in our\nthoughts, even when it is impossible to separate them in\nthe subject to which they belong. When any quality or\nattribute of an object, which does not exist by itself but\nalways in a state of combination, is detached by our minds\nfrom its customary associates and is considered separately,\nit becomes a particular abstract idea. By general ab-\nstract ideas we mean those states of mind, which stand for\nclasses or the various genera and species of objects, such\nas are expressed by the general names, man, bird, sheep,\nfish, animal, c. Thus we may consider those qualities\nin an object which will lead us to class it as an animal,\nwithout taking into view those which belong to it as a man\nor a bird or in looking at the various classes of animals\nwe may consider them as men or as birds, and neglect and\npass by those qualities, which in consequence of being","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0242.jp2"},"243":{"fulltext":"OP ABSTRACT IDEAS. 237\nfound in other animals cause them to be classed as differ-\nent species. These two classes seem to embrace all our\nabstract ideas whatever, but they are themselves so differ-\nent from each other and also the intellectual processes by-\nmeans of which they exist, that they require some sepa-\nrate consideration.\n195. Of the formation of particular abstract ideas.\nThe manner of expressing ourselves on the subject of\nour abstract notions, to which we have been accustomed,\nis apt to create and cherish in us a belief in the existence\nof a separate mental faculty, adapted solely to this* partic-\nular purpose. We know not that there is any the least\nground for such belief in the case of particular abstract\nideas to which we shall first attend nor has the opinion,\nto which we allude, been altogether well founded in re-\nspect to the other class although, as will be seen, the in-\ntellectual process in the two cases is not precisely the\nsame. —The following statement will be sufficient to show,\nhow those of the first class are formed. Our ideas in the\nfirst place are received from the senses, and from the ob-\nservation of what takes place within us or reflection and\nhowever much they may have been decomposed at first, a\nlarge class of them are soon found to exist with a consider-\nable degree of permanency in a state of combination or\nare complex. It has sufficiently appeared, that these ideas\nare recalled to the mind in the absence of their appropri-\nate objects by the principles of association, and also that\nthe separate parts of all our complex notions are held to-\ngether in their state of combination by the same princi-\nples. In every process of abstraction, which results in\nmerely considering any single quality or attribute of an\nobject separate from the rest, we have a desire to consider\nsome part of the complex idea more particularly than the\nothers. If any one object to the term desire, it is certain,\nthat our attention is from some cause, whatever it may be,\nmore particularly directed to such part and attention it-\nself seems to be nothing more than a particular direction","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0243.jp2"},"244":{"fulltext":"238 Or ABSTRACT IDEAS.\nof the mind, accompanied with desire. When the mind\nis in this high degree directed to any particular part of a\ncomplex idea, we find it to be the fact, that the principle\nof association, which keeps the other parts in their state\nof union with it, ceases in a corresponding degree to op-\nerate they rapidly fall off and disappear, and the partic-\nular quality or attribute, towards which the mind was es-\npecially directed, remains the sole subject of consider^\nation. That is to say, it is abstracted or becomes an ab-\nstract idea.\nThis in the formation of particular abstract ideas seems\nto be the process of the mind, and nothing more viz.\nSome feeling of desire or choice in respect to a part of the\ncomplex idea, accompanied with the exercise of associa-\ntion, (1) in suggesting to the mind the complex idea, and\n(2) in ceasing to retain the parts of it, towards which at-\ntention is not directed. Such is the activity of the mind,\nand in so many ways it views the images of things, that\nthis striking process of detaching, and examining, and re- I\nplacing, and changing the parts of our complex notions,\nis almost constantly going on. And after the mind has\nthus shifted its position, and has been now in this state and\nnow in that, as if playfully to show its wonderful readiness\nin diminishing itself to a part of its previous complexity, it\nseems as readily to swell back again, if we may be allowed\nin such figurative expressions, to its former dimensions,\nand exists the same as before the process of abstractioa\ncommenced.\n196. Of generalizations of particular abstract ideas.\nWhen we speak of the generalizing of this class of ab-\nstract ideas, it seems to be chiefly meant, that in our ex-\nperience of things we observe them to be common to many\nsubjects. We find whiteness to be a quality of snow, of\nchalk, of milk, and of other bodies; and whenever with\nthe simple abstract notion of whiteness we connect in\nour thoughts the additional circumstance of its not being\nlimited to one body bu,t the property of many, the term","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0244.jp2"},"245":{"fulltext":"OF ABSTRACT IDEAS. 239\nWay be said to be generalized. And this seems to be all,\nthat can be properly understood by generalization when ap-\nplied to the states of mind which we are now considering.\n197. Of particular abstractions in poetry, paintingfoc*\nThe process of abstraction, which is gone through in\nthe formation of particular abstract ideas, is greatly sub-\nservient to the exertions of a creative imagination, as they\nappear in painting, poetry, and the other fine arts. The\npoet and the painter are supplied with their materials from\nexperience without having received ideas from some\nsource, they never could have practised their art. But if\nthey do not restrict themselves to mere imitation, they\nmust combine and modify the ideas which they have, so as\nto be able to form new creations of their own. But every\nexertion of this kind which they make of their powers, pre-\nsupposes the exercise of abstraction in decomposing and\nseparating actual conceptions and in forming them anew.\nSee in connection with this section the chapter on imagin-\nation.\n198. Of general abstract ideas.\nWe are now to remark upon the second class. Gen-\neral abstract ideas are our notions of the classes, or genera\nand species of objects. As they include classes, it is\nhardly necessary to observe, that we cannot possess them\nwithout first considering two or more objects together.\nWe may form, on the contrary, those of the first class or\nparticular abstract ideas by considering individual objects\nmerely.\nWhenever, therefore, we see a number of trees of the\nsame kind, or a number of flowers, or of men, or of horses,\nor sheep, the mind immediately exists in that state, which,\nwhen we think fit to give it a name, we call a general\nabstract idea.\nThis general idea, however, does not embrace every\nparticular, which makes a part of the individuals before us\nit leaves out of consideration certain peculiarities which","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0245.jp2"},"246":{"fulltext":"240 OF ABSTRACT IDEA.S*\nbelong to each tree, each flower, man, c. when separate-\nly considered. And this is the reason of ideas of this\nkind being called abstract because, although they em-\nbrace the whole number of individuals in certain respects,\nthey detach and leave out altogether a variety of particu-\nlars in which they disagree. As soon, therefore, as we per-\nceive a number of objects before us of the same kind, we at\nonce virtually dismiss from our view these circumtances\nof disagreement, and the mind exists, as above remarked, in\nanew state, which is essentially a feeling of resemblance.\nSo that those mental states, which when put into words\nmay be called feelings or immediate mental discoveries of\nthe relation of resemblance in a number of objects, consti-\ntute what we understand by general abstract ideas, and\nthese, as far as the mind is concerned and leaving out the\nnames, are the true ideas of genera and species. But as a\nquestion may arise in the minds of some in regard to this\nfeeling of resemblance, it is proper, in order to meet any\nsuch inquiries briefly to remark further.\n199. Of relative suggestions or perceptions of relations.\nNothing is more evident than that the objects, which we\nperceive, are in some way compared, one with another\nand that we learn, when such comparisons take place, how\nthey conform to each other or how they differ. We com-\npare objects together in respect to their position, their re-\nsemblance, degrees, and in a great variety of respects, as\nwas particularly seen at chapter eighth in the remarks\nthere made on ideas of relation. This is conformable\nto the general experience of men. The result of thus con-\nsidering objects together is certain new states of the mind,\nwhich may be called ideas of relation or feelings of rela-\ntion, and which are essentially different from our simple\nperceptions or conceptions of the objects that sustain the\nrelation. But the inquiry arises, By virtue of what princi-\nple is this discovery of relations made The answer is,\nthat there is in the mind an original tendency or suscepti-\nbility, by means of which, whenever we perceive different","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0246.jp2"},"247":{"fulltext":"OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.\n241\nobjects together, we are instantly, without the intervention\nof any other mental process, sensible of their relation in\ncertain respects.\nWe may here give an illustration of the exercise of\nthis original susceptibility similar to those already given.\nWhen a number of objects are together, belonging to the\nsame species, as two or more sheep, or horses, or men, or\ntrees, or flowers, the mind immediately exists in that state,\nwhich constitutes the feeling of resemblance. Here be-\nside the mere perception of the objects we experience a\nfeeling of relation, since that resemblance in the objects\nbefore us of which we are conscious is one of the many\nkinds of relation, of the perception of which the mind has\nbeen asserted to be originally susceptible. It is by means\nof this original susceptibility of relations, as it exhibits it-\nself in particular in the perception of the relation of resem-\nblance, that all of that class which we term general abstract\nideas are formed. None we imagine can be formed without it.\nAll this we know is to be decided, not by the opinions\nand assertions of an individual, but by the general ex-\nperience. In any doctrines, which are laid down in regard\nto the mind, every person has a right to give his testimony\nand whenever that testimony is a correct representation of\nthe intellectual processes, it is valuable., whatever may be\nits tendency. But it is confidently thought, that nothing\nmore is wanted, than an appeal to what men generally\nfind themselves conscious of, to confirm the above views.\nFor a particular defence of the doctrine, that we have\nan original susceptibility of perceiving or feeling the relations\nof objects, the reader is referred to what is said on the sub-\nject in Brown s Philosophy of the Mind, who has entered\ninto the investigation of it at greater length, than can be\npermitted here.\n200. Of the classifications of objects.\nIn the classification of objects and in giving general\nnames, the process after what has been said cannot be\nthought to be either long or difficult.- -The first step is\n31","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0247.jp2"},"248":{"fulltext":"242 OF ikSSTKACT IlJEASv\nthe perception of two or more objects, which constitute*\none state of mind. The second is the feeling of resem-\nblance, which is the general idea. Guided by the feeling\nof resemblance, we are enabled to say, what objects come\nwithin the limits of a particular class, and what do not.\nThe name, which is given to the general idea, is what in\ntreatises of Logick is called the general name or genera and\nspecies. See in connection with this 117 119.\n201. Of general abstract ideas in connection with\nnumbers, e.\nThe ability which the mind possesses of forming gener-\nal abstract ideas is of much practical importance; but\nwhether it be the characteristical attribute of a rational\nnature or not, as some have supposed, it is not necessary\nnow to inquire. Its subserviency in the forming of classi-\nfications has already been seen. And it is further to be\nremarked, that without that mental susceptibility, by which\nwe form general notions, we should not be able to number t\neven in the smallest degree. Before we can consider ob-\njects as forming a multitude, or are able to number them,\nit seems necessary to be able to apply to them a common\nname. This we cannot do, until we have reduced them\nto a genus and the formation of a genus implies a men-\ntal susceptibility of feeling the relation of resemblance.\nConsequently, we should be unable without such mental sus-\nceptibility to number. How great then is the practical\nimportance of that intellectual property, by which general\nabstractions are formed Without the ability to number,\nwe should be at a loss in all investigations where this abil-\nity is required without the power to classify, all our spec-\nulations must be limited to particulars, and we should be\ncapable of no general reasoning.\n202. Of the speculations of philosophers and others.\nThere ip a characteristical difference between the spec-\nulations of philosophers and thoVe of the common tmss of","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0248.jp2"},"249":{"fulltext":"OF ABSTRACT IDEAS. 243\npeople, worthy of some notice. The difference between\nthe two is not so much, that philosophers are accustomed\nto carry on processes of reasoning to a greater extent, as\nthis that they are more in the habit of employing general\nabstract ideas and general terms, and that, consequently,\nthe conclusions which they form are more comprehensive.\nNor are their general reasonings, although the conclusions\nat which they arrive seem in their particular applications\nto indicate wonderful fertility of invention, so difficult in\nthe performance, as is apt to be supposed. They have so\noften and so long looked at general ideas and general\npropositions, have been so accustomed, as one may say, to\ncontemplate the general nature of things, divested of all\nsuperfluous and all specifick circumstances, that they have\nformed a habit; and the operation is performed without\ndifficulty. It requires in such persons no greater intellec-\ntual effort, than would be necessary in skilfully managing\nthe details of ordinary business.\nThe speculations of the great bulk of mankind differ\nfrom those of philosophers in being, both in the subjects\nof them and in their results^ particular. They discover an\ninability to enlarge their view to universal propositions,\nwhich embrace a great number of individuals. They may\npossess the power of mere argument, of comparing propo-\nsitions together which concern particulars, and deducing\ninferences from them to a great degree but when they\nattempt to contemplate general propositions, their minds\nare perplexed, and the conclusions which are drawn from\nthem appear obscure, however clearly the previous pro-\ncess of reasoning may have been expressed.\n203. Of different opinions formerly prevailing.\nThe subject of general abstract ideas, of which we\nhave given a summary view, excited very considerable in-\nterest during the scholastick ages and different opinions\nhave prevailed concerning them, not only at that period\nbut more or less down to the present time. The disputes\nso widely prevailed, and so much interest was taken, that","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0249.jp2"},"250":{"fulltext":"244 OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.\nit seems to be necessary to give a short sketch of them,\nIn this discussion there have been three parties, viz.\nthe Realists, the Nominalists, and the Conceptualists.\n204. Of the opinions of the Realists.\nThose, who go under this name, held, that general\nabstract ideas have a real and permanent existence, inde-\npendent of the mind. Of a man, of a rose, of a circle, and\nof every species of things, they maintained, that there is\none original form or archetype, which existed from eterni-\nty, before any individuals of the species were created.\nThis original model or archetype is the pattern, according\nto which the individuals of all species are in the most im-\nportant respects formed. The archetype, which is under-\nstood to embrace only the outlines or generick features of\nthings, becomes an object of perception to the human in-\nlect, whenever by due abstraction we discern it to be one\nin all the individuals of the species. Such was the doc-\ntrine of the Realists, which in its most essential respects\nwas very widely received from the time of Plato and Aris-\ntotle down to the commencement of the 12th century.\nBut since that period, excepting a few ineffectual attempts\nwhich have been made from time to time to revive it, it\nhas fallen into as general disrepute, on the ground of its\nbeing too hypothetical and not sufficiently sustained by facts.\n205. Of the opinions of the Nominalists.\nAbout the commencement of the 12th century, Rosce-\nJinus, the instructer of Abelard, whose name occupies so\nconspicuous a place in the history of scholastick learning,\nproposed a, new hypothesis. He maintained, not only that\nthere are no original forms or archetypes, such as had\nbeen asserted to exist by the Realists, but that there are no\nuniversal abstract ideas of any kind. On the contrary, it\nseems to have been his opinion, as well as the sentiment\nof those who have subsequently approved of this doctrine,\nthat nothing can be called general or universal but names,\n;ind that even to them universality can be ascribed only virr","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0250.jp2"},"251":{"fulltext":"OF ABSTRACT IDEAS. 245\ntually, and not in the strict and literal sense of the term.—\nThat is, the names are in the first instance given to indi-\nviduals, but when any individuals are specified, the na-\nture of the mind is such, that we naturally and immediate-\nly think of other individuals of the same kind. So that\nthe names are in fact particular, although owing to the\nprinciple which we now term association, the practical ef-\nfect is the same as if it were otherwise, and hence the ep-\nithets general and universal are applied to them.\nThis opinion in respect to general ideas and names, or\nsome doctrine essentially of this description has found\nmany advocates from Roscelinus and the enthusiastick\nAbelard down to Dugald Stewart.\n206. Of the opinions of the Conceptualists.\nThose, who hold to the actual existence of general ab-\nstract ideas, which are not permanent archetypes indepen-\ndent of the mind, but only states of the mind, have gener-\nally been called Conceptualists. We have already given\nwhat we suppose to be the true mental process in the for-\nmation of such ideas. Whether we can have such ideas\nis best decided by each one s personal experience and it\ncan hardly be doubted, notwithstanding the refined argu-\nments of Mr. Stewart and others, in what way such a ques-\ntion will be generally answered.\nAs far as the Realists are concerned the mere state-\nment of their doctrine is sufficient at the present day to\nensure its immediate rejection. The question lies then\nbetween the Nominalists, and those who have commonly\nbeen called Conceptualists and if there be insuperable\nobjections to the doctrine of the former, that of the latter\nenhances its claims on our adoption.\nSome of the objections to the sentiments of Roscelinus\nand those who have thought with him are forcibly summed\nup in the following passage from Brown s Philosophy of\nthe Mind.\nOf that rigid Nominalism, which involves truly no mix-\nture of Conceptualism or of the belief of those feelings of","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0251.jp2"},"252":{"fulltext":"lit} OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.\nrelation for which I have contended, but denies altogether\nthe existence of that peculiar class of feelings, or states of\nmind which have been denominated general notions, or\ngeneral ideas, asserting the existence only of individual\nobjects perceived, and of general terms that comprehend\nthese, without any peculiar mental state denoted by the\ngeneral term, distinct from those separate sensations or\nperceptions which the particular objects, comprehended\nunder the term, might individually excite, it seems to me\nthat the very statement of the opinion itself is almost a\nsufficient confutation, since the very invention of the gen-\neral term, and the extension of it to certain objects only\nnot to all objects, implies some reason for this limitation,—\nsome feeling of general agreement of the objects included\nin the class, to distinguish them from the objects not in-\ncluded in it, which is itself that very general notion pro-\nfessedly denied. As long as some general notion of cir-\ncumstances of resemblance is admitted, I see very clearly\nhow a general term may be most accurately limited but\nif this general notion be denied, I confess that I cannot\ndiscover any principle of limitation whatever. Why have\ncertain objects been classed together, and not certain other\nobjects, when all have been alike perceived by us and\nall, therefore, if there be nothing more than mere percep-\ntion in the process, are capable of receiving any denomin-\nation which we may please to bestow on them Is it ar-\nbitrarily, and without any reason whatever, that we do not\nclass a rose-bush with birds, or an elephant with fish and\nif there be any reason for these exclusions, why will not\nthe Nominalist tell us what that reason is in what feeling\nit is found and how it can be made accordant with his\nsystem Must it not be that the rose-bush and a sparro\\v t\nthough equally perceived by us, do not excite that gener-\nal notion of resemblance which the term bird is invented\nto express do not seem to us to have those relations of a\ncommon nature, in certain respects, which lead us to class\nthe sparrow and the ostrich, however different in other re-\nHpects, as birds or the petty natives of our brooks and\nrivulets with the mighty monsters of the deep, under one","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0252.jp2"},"253":{"fulltext":"OF ABSTRACT IDLAi. 347\ngeneral and equal denomination f If this be the reason,\nthere is more, in every case, than perception, and the giv-\ning of a general name for there is a peculiar state of\nmind a general relative feeling intervening between\nthe perception and the invention of the term, which\nis the only reason that can be assigned for that very inven-\ntion. Can the Nominalist then assert, that there is no\nfeeling of the resemblance of objects, in certain respects,\nwhich thus intervenes between the perception of them as\nseparate objects, which is one stage of the process, and the\ncomprehension of them under a single name, which is\nanother stage of the process,; or must he not rather con-\nfess, that it is merely in consequence of this interven-\ning feeling we give to the number of objects their gen-\neral name, to the exclusion of the multitudes of objects\nto which we do not apply it, as it is in consequence of\ncertain other feelings, excited by them individually, we\ngive to each separate object its proper name, to the exclu-\nsion of every other object To repeat the process, as al-\nready described to you, we perceive two or more objects,\nwe are struck with their resemblance in certain respects.\nWe invent a general name to denote this feeling of resem-\nblance, and we class under this general name, every par-\nticular object, the perception of which is followed by the\nsame feeling of resemblance, and no object but these alone.\nIf this be a faithful statement of the process, and for its\nfidelity I may safely appeal to your consciousness, the\ndoctrine of the Nominalists is not less false than that of\nthe Realists. It is false, because it excludes that general\nfeeling of resemblance, the relative suggestion, which\nis all that the general name itself truly designates, and\nwithout which, therefore, it never would have been invent-\ned while the doctrine of the Realists is false, by insert-\ning in the process those supposed separate entities, which\nform no part of it. The one errs, as I have already said,\nby excess, the other by deficiency.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0253.jp2"},"254":{"fulltext":"24 OF ABSTRACT iDfcAS.\n207. Of histories of philosophical opinions.\nWe pass from the view, which has been given of differ-\nent opinions on the subject of general abstract ideas, to re-\nmark on certain histories of philosophical opinions in gen-\neral. We consider the great principles of intellectual\nphilosophy at present for the most part well settled, and\nwhatever discrepancies apparently exist, as owing in a ma-\njority of cases rather to differences of statement than dif-\nferences of belief. But still it is sometimes important to\nlook back and see what has in former times been said and\nthought an exercise, which cannot fail to evince the\nstrength of prejudices, the evident fallibility of the under-\nstanding, and the necessity of cherishing a sincere love of\ntruth.\nIn the following works will be found all that will be\nnecessary to be known concerning the dispute on general\nor universal ideas, as also the history of other philosoph-\nical controversies and opinions almost without number*\nThe most part of them at present excite not the least in-\nterest, except as memorials of the struggles of the human\nmind in past ages.\n(1) Bayle s Historical and Critical Dictionary. This\ngreat work was first published in two folio volumes in 1697*\nIt consists of two parts one of which is a concise narra-\ntion of facts, and the other a sort of commentary on them.\nThe work contains very numerous illustrations of the his-\ntory of philosophy, and treats many difficult subjects with\nindependence and ability. And still we find some diffi-\nculty in mentioning it with much commendation, since, in\nthe opinion of a most competent judge, it has a tendency\nto unsettle the principles of superficial readers, and to damp\nthe moral ardour of youth by weakening their belief in the\nreality of virtue.\n(2) Brucker*s Critical History of Philosophy. This\nwork was first published at Leipsic in 1744 in Latin, exten-\nding through five quarto volumes. The author gives a\nbiographical sketch of ihe lives of different ancient and\nmodern philosophers, reviews their writings, and explains","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0254.jp2"},"255":{"fulltext":"OF ABSTRACT 1PEAS. 249\ntheir particular systems. This great work, the result of\nfifty year s labour of a hard and honest student, is particu-\nlarly valuable, as a book of reference for those, who have\ndevoted themselves to philosophical researches. There\nhas been published an abridged translation of it into Eng-\nlish by Enfield.\n(3) M. De Gerandoh History of Philosophical Systems.\nThis work, first published in 1802, is in French, and we\nknow not, that it has ever been translated, but on account\nof its acknowledged merits it cannot well be passed by\nand also because it is frequently referred to by English\nwriters on these subjects. M. De Gerando does not un-\ndertake to give a complete account of the progress of in-\ntellectual science his main object seems to be to recapit-\nulate the opinions of the most eminent ancient and modern\nphilosophers on a particular point, viz. the sources and cer-\ntainty of knowledge. His work is divided into five pe-\nriods. The first period comprises the time anterior to\nSocrates the second comes down to the age of Cicero\nin the third, which ends with the close of the seventh cen-\ntury, we have an account of the decline and fall of philos-\nophy the fourth reaches from the seventh century to the\ntime of Des Cartes and Bacon the fifth and last continues\nthe subject to the present century. An opinion of the val-\nue of this work, and a translation of some extracts from it,\nare given in the North American Review of April, 1824\nwhich can be consulted by those, who wish to know fur-\nther.\n(4) Stewarfs Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Polk\nteal Philosophy. This interesting work originally ap-\npeared in the form of a Preliminary Dissertation to the sup-\nplemental volumes of the Encyclopaedia Britannica and\nincludes merely the period since the revival of letters in\nEurope. As one reason for limiting his retrospect to a\nperiod extending no further back than the revival of let-\nters, the writer expresses an opinion, that the sciences, of\nwhich he treats, present but little matter for useful remark,\nprior to the time of Lord Bacon. Perhaps no one of the\nexcellent works of Mr. Stewart is more worthy the student s\n32","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0255.jp2"},"256":{"fulltext":"2§0\nOF BREAMING.\nattention than this whether we consider the richness and\npolish of his style, or that admirable discrimination, with\nwhich he detects, apparently by a sort of kindred intuition*\nthe characteristicks both of systems and of individual\nminds. There are also, both in the English and foreign\nlanguages, other works and treatises of greater or less ex-\ntent and value, which may profitably be referred to in ex-\namining the history of philosophical opinions*\nCHAPTER EIGHTEENTH.\nOF DREAMING.\n208. A knowledge of our dreams interesting.\nDreams are our mental states or operations while we\nare asleep. They are among the most curious phenom-\nena of the mind, and there is much difficulty at pres-\nent in giving a full and satisfactory explanation of them.\nThe intellectual states, which go under this name,\nhave ever excited much interest, and a man no less wise\nand practical than Dr. Franklin has written a charac-\nteristick pieee f entitled, The Art of procuring Pleasant\nDreams. But the further one goes back into antiquity, the\ninterest taken in them, especially among the ignorant, will\nbe found to be increased. We learn in the earliest re-\ncords of history, that they were regarded as supernatural,\nand as conveying prophetick intimations. This notion still\nlingers among the common people even to our own times,\nalthough in a diminished degree and even men of infor-\nmation and of some tincture of philosophy have not always\nbeen wholly undisturbed by them.\nSo great was the superstition respecting dreams among\nthe Romans, that the emperor Augustus, who might have\nb«cn expected to rise above it, took particular notice of\ntht time of year, when his dreams were most unfavoura-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0256.jp2"},"257":{"fulltext":"OF DREAMING. 251\nble. It is also said of him, that, on a certain day of every\nyear, he acted the part of a publick beggar, in conse-\nquence of a vision, and received alms of those, who were\nwilling to give him small sums of money. In the reign of\nAntoninus Pius, one Artemidorus spent his whole time in\ngoing about collecting dreams and finally published the\nfruits of his labours in a large work still extant entitled\noneirocritus. The superstitions among the Ancients in\nrespect to dreams w r ere very similar to what have been\nfound to exist among the Indian tribes of North America.\nBut, laying out of the account the superstitions, which\nhave given to our intellectual operations while we are\nasleep so much importance, there are other reasons for\ntaking an interest in them, of which the philosopher need\nnot be ashamed. And of these one is enough to justify\nus in this inquiry viz. That dreams form no inconsider-\nable part of our intellectual experiences, and all the know l-\n«dge of them which we acquire is an accession to our\n-knowledge of the principles of the mind in general.\n209. Of the prevalence of dreaming.\nIt is perhaps one reason of the attention, which the sub-\nject of our dreams has ever excited, among all classes of\npeople, that they are so prevalent it being very difficult,\nif not impossible, to find one, who has not had more or\nless of this experience. Mr. Locke, however, tells us of a\nperson, who never dreamed till the twenty sixth year of\nhis age, when he happened to have a fever, and then\ndreamed for the first time. Plutarch also mentions one\nCleon, a friend of his, who lived to an advanced age, and\nyet had never dreamed once in his life, and remarks, that\nhe had heard the same thing reported of Thrasymedes.\nUndoubtedly these persons dreamed very seldom, as\nw-e find that some dream much more than others but it is\npossible, that they may have dreamed at some times, and\nentirely forgotten it. So that it cannot with certainty be\ninferred from such instances as these, that thee are any,\nwho are entirely free from dreaming.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0257.jp2"},"258":{"fulltext":"252 OF BREAMING.\n210. Dreams are often caused by our sensations.\nThe first fact, which we notice in the explanation of\nthe mental states, which go under the name of dreaming,\nis, that they are intimately connected with our bodily sen-\nsations, and are often caused by them.\nDugald Stewart relates an incident, which may be con-\nsidered an evidence of this, that a person, with whom he\nwas acquainted, had occasion, in consequence of an in-\ndisposition, to apply a bottle of hot water to his feet, when\nhe went to bed, and the consequence was, that he dreamed\nhe was making a journey to the top of mount ^Etna, and\nthat he found the heat of the ground almost insupportable.\nThere was once a gentleman in the English army, who\nwas so susceptible of audible impressions, while he was\nasleep, that his companions could make him dream of\nwhat they pleased. Once, in particular, they made him\ngo through the whole process of a duel, from the prelimin-\nary arrangements to the firing of the pistol, which they\nput into his hand for that purpose, and which, when it ex-\nploded, waked him.\nSometimes the impressions on our senses do not merely\nsuggest our dreaming thoughts and give a character to\nthem, but appear to mingle with, and make a part of the\ntrain. If a person speak to us when in sleep, but his call\nis not effectual in waking us, the voice sometimes becomes\nan additional portion of our sleeping experiences.\nA cause of dreams closely allied to the above is the va-\nriety of sensations, which we experience from the stomach,\nviscera, c.\nPersons, for instance, who have been for a long time\ndeprived of food, or have received it only in small quanti-\nties hardly enough to preserve life, will be likely to have\ndreams, in some way or other directly relating to their\ncondition. Baron Trenck relates, that being almost dead\nwith hunger, when confined in his dungeon, his dreams\nevery night presented to him the well filled and luxurious\ntables of Berlin, from which, as they were presented be-\nfore him, he imagined he was about to relieve his hunger.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0258.jp2"},"259":{"fulltext":"OF DREAMING. 253\n211. Dreams influenced by disposition, health, kc.\nIt is a circumstance worthy of notice, that the charac-\nter of dreams depends in a considerable measure on the\ncharacter of the person himself, whether he be cheerful,\nor inclining to melancholy whether he be a great reason-\ner, or of a quick and creative imagination. And, accor-\ndingly, as the one or the other of these characteristicks\npredominates, the person dreaming will be apt to find him-\nself in sad or joyful situations, creating airy castles or\npuzzling himself over difficult propositions, or in such oth-\ner circumstances,- as may correspond to his previous men-\ntal tendencies.\nThe state of the health also has considerable influence,\nnot only in producing dreams, but in giving them a par-\nticular character. The observation has been made by\nmedical men, who have it in their power to give much in-\nformation, illustrative of our mental condition, that acute\ndiseases, particularly fevers, are often preceded and indi-\ncated by disagreeable and oppressive dreams aad also\nthat some temperaments are more subject to dreams than\nothers the sanguine more frequently than the phlegmatick.\n212. Connection of dreams with our waking thoughts.\nThe great multitude of our waking thoughts appear in\nthe form of trains of associations and these trains of asso-\nciated ideas, in greater or less continuity, and with greater\nor less variation, continue when we are asleep. The facts\nstated in the preceding section are an evidence of this, it\nappearing from them, that our dreams assume a character\nfrom our general disposition and mental habits.\nThere is also another circumstance going in evidence\nof this supposition. We find none of our associated recol-\nlections more strongly linked to each other and more fre-\nquently presenting themselves to the mind, than the remem-\nbrances of the scenes and occurrences of childhood and\nyouth. And it has been remarked (probably with truth) that","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0259.jp2"},"260":{"fulltext":"254 OF DREAMING.\nthose scenes and occurrences occur to the mind in our\ndreams more frequently than almost any others.\nIt has been observed, that there are probably few math-\nematicians, who have not dreamed of an interesting prob-\nlem. Condorcet told some one, that, while he was enga-\nged in abstruse and profound calculations, he was frequent-\nly obliged to leave them in an unfinished state, in order to\nretire to rest and that the remaining steps and the con-\nclusion of his calculations have more than once presented\nthemselves in his dreams. Franklin also has made the\nremark, that the bearings and results of political events,\nwhich had caused him much trouble while awake, were not\nunfrequently unfolded to him in dreaming. The orator\npresses home his arguments with renewed energy, when\nhis senses are locked up in slumber and the poet finds\nhimself transported into those Elysian regions, which were\ncreated by his waking imaginations.\nIt seems clearly to follow from some circumstances of\nthis kind, that our dreams are fashioned from the materials\nof the thoughts which we have while awake in other\nwords, they will, in a great degree, be merely the repeti-\ntion of our customary and prevailing associations.\n213. Dreams have the appearance of reality.\nWhen objects are presented to us in dreams, we look\nupon them as real and events, and combinations and se-\nries of events appear the same. We feel the same interest\nand resort to the same expedients, as in the perplexities or\nenjoyments of real life. When persons are introduced, as\nforming a part in the transactions of our dreams, we see\nthem clearly in their living attitudes and stature we con-\nverse with them, and hear them speak, and behold them\nmove, as if actually present.\nThe prominent reasons of this greater vividness of our\ndreaming conceptions, and our firm belief in their reality\nseem to be these. The subjects, upon which our thoughts\nare then employed, occupy the mind exclusively. We\n-can form a clearer conception of an object with our eye»","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0260.jp2"},"261":{"fulltext":"OF DREAMING. 255\nshut, than we can with them open, as any one will be con-\nvinced on making the experiment and the liveliness of\nthe conception will increase in proportion as we can sus-\npend the exercise of all the other senses.\nBut in sound sleep, not only the sight, but the other\nsenses also may be said to be closed and the attention is\nnot continually diverted by the multitude of objects, which\narrest the hearing and touch, when we are awake.\nIt is, therefore, a most natural supposition, that our\nconceptions must at such times be extremely vivid and dis-\ntinct. At 190, we particularly remarked upon concep-\ntions or those ideas which we have of absent objects of\nperception, which possess this character. And it there\nappeared, that they might be attended with a momentary\nbelief even when we are awake. But as conceptions ex-\nist in the mind when we are asleep in a much higher de-\ngree distinct and vivid, what was in the former case a mo-\nmentary, becomes in the latter a permanent belief. Hence\nevery thing has the appearance of reality and the mere\nthoughts of the mind are virtually transformed into persons,\nand varieties of situation, and events, which are regarded\nby us in precisely the same light, as the persons, and situ-\nations, and events of our every day s experience. -And\nhere we have an explanation of what many individuals\nhave experienced. They endeavour to recall the image\nof some departed friend, but their efforts are in a great\nmeasure unavailing, and they find they have but a very in-\ndistinct conception. On the contrary in sleep, when the\nmind is undisturbed by surrounding objects, the concep-\ntion gathers strength it becomes more and more distinct-\nly defined and bright and there is a clear vision of the\nform, which they had deeply thought upon, and long wish-\ned to see.\n214. Influence of volition suspended in dreaming.\nThere is frequently much of wildness, inconsistency,\nand contradiction in our dreams. The mind passes very\nrapidly from one object to another strange and singular","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0261.jp2"},"262":{"fulltext":"256\nOF DREAMING?.\nincidents occur, and yet in general there is no emotion of\nsurprise. If our dreams be truly the repetition of our\nwaking associations, it may well be inquired, how this\nwildness and inconsistency happen\nThe fact, which explains this, is, that, when we are\nasleep, our associated trains of thought are no longer un-\nder the control of the mental power or susceptibility,\nwhich we term the will. We do not mean to say, that\nthe susceptibility, by which we exercise volitions, or\nthe will itself is suspended, and has no existence at\nsuch times. On the contrary, there is sufficient evi-\ndence of the continuance of its exercises in some degree\nsince volitions must have made a part of the original\ntrains of thought, which are repeated in dreaming and\nfurthermore, we are often as conscious of exercising or\nputting forth volitions when dreaming as of any other\nmental acts, for instance, imagining, remembering, assent-\ning, or reasoning. When we dream, that we are attacked\nby an enemy sword in hand, but happen as we suppose in\nour dreaming experiences, to be furnished in self-defence\nwith an instrument of the same kind, we dream, that we\nwill to plunge it into the body of our antagonist, and we\nas truly in this case put forth the mental exercise which\nwe term a volition, as, in any other, we exercise remem-\nbrance, or imagine, or reason in our sleep.\nBut admitting that the power or susceptibility of will-\ning is entirely retained in sleep, it is quite evident, that\nthe volitions, which are put forth by it, have ceased to ex-\nercise their customary influence, both in respect to other\nmental acts, and, particularly, in regard to the members\nof the body. Of the general truth of the last remark no\none presumes to doubt. It is indeed true, that our vital\nand involuntary motions go on essentially the same as\nwhen we are awake, but it is unnecessary to observe, that\nthese do not come into consideration here. The reg-\nulation of the voluntary movements of the members of the\nbody is placed beyond our reach, with some slight excep-\ntions hereafter to be mentioned. In regard to the other\npoint, it will be remembered, that we have already consid-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0262.jp2"},"263":{"fulltext":"OF DREAMING. 257\nered it at 173, which concerned the power of the will\nover our associated trains of thought. The conclusion, to\nwhich we there arrived, was, that, although we have no\ndirect, we have an indirect power over the successions of\nthought, which is very considerable for instance, we fix\nour attention upon some particular part of any general sub-\nject, which has been suggested, and thus give a new di-\nrection to the whole train of mental operations. Although\nthis power, which we thus exercise, is indirect, we justly\nconsider it a voluntary power, and attribute it to the facul-\nty of the will. But the moment we are soundly asleep,\nthis influence ceases, and hence arise the wildness, inco-\nherency, and contradictions in dreaming which have been\nmentioned.\nA person while he is awake has his thoughts, (admitting\nto the full extent the power, which is commonly ascribed\nto association,) under such government, and is able, by the\nindirect influence of volitions, so to direct them, as to bring\nthem in the end to some conclusion, which he foresees and\nwhich he wishes to arrive at. But in dreaming, as all di-\nrecting and governing influence is at an end, our associa-\ntions seem to be driven forward, much like a ship at sea\nwithout a rudder, wherever it may happen.\n215. Further remarks on apparent reality of dreams.\nThe striking circumstance, that our dreams have the\nappearance of reality, has already been noticed and an\nexplanation given. If that explanation, allowing to it its\nfull weight, should appear to any hardly sufficient to ex-\nplain so extraordinary a fact, the last section suggests an-\nother reason, which may be supposed to combine its in-\nfluence with that of the explanation already proposed, viz.\nOur conceptions have to us the appearance of reality ivhen\ndreaming, because they cannot be controlled, either directly or\nindirectly, by our volitions. We cannot, admit this as the\nsole reason of the belief, but suppose, it combines its in-\nfluence with that of the circumstances already mentioned,\nand that this influence mav be very considerable.\n33","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0263.jp2"},"264":{"fulltext":"258 OF BREAMING.\nBut still the question remains to be looked into. How\ndoes it happen, that our dreaming thoughts appear to be\nreal, because they are not in any way controllable by voli-\ntions In answer to this inquiry, it is to be observed,\nthat we are so formed as almost invariably to associate reality\nwith whatever objects of perception continue to produce in\nus the same effects. A hard or soft body/or any substance\nof a particular colour, or taste, or smell, are always, when\npresented to our senses, followed by certain states of mind\nessentially the same and we yield the most ready and\nfirm belief in the existence of such objects. In a word,\nwe are disposed from our very constitution to believe in\nthe existence of objects of perception, the perceptions of\nwhich do not depend on the will, but which we find to\nbe followed by certain states of the mind, whether we\nchoose it or not. But it is to be recollected, that our\ndreaming thoughts are mere conceptions our senses be-\ning closed and shut up, and external objects not being pre-\nsented to them. This is true. But if we conclude in favour\nof the real existence of objects of perception, because they\nproduce in us ideas independently of our volitions, it is*\nbut natural to suppose, that we shall believe in our con-\nceptions also, whenever they are in like manner beyond\nour voluntary control. They are both merely states of the\nmind and if belief always attends our perceptions, wher-\never we find them to be independent of our choice, there\nis no reason, why conceptions, which are ideas of absent\nobjects of perception, should not be attended with a like\nbelief under the same circumstances. And essentially\nthe same circumstances exist in dreaming that is, a\ntrain of conceptions arises in the mind, and we are con-\nscious at such times of being unable to exercise any direc-\ntion or control whatever over them.\n216. Of our estimate of time in dreaming.\nOur estimate of time in dreaming differs from that\nwhen awake. Events, which would take whole days or a\nlonger time in the performance, are dreamt in a few mo-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0264.jp2"},"265":{"fulltext":"OP DREAMING. 259\nments. So wonderful is this compression of a multitude\nof transactions into the very shortest period, that, when we\nare accidentally awakened by the jarring of a door, which\nis opened into the room where we are sleeping, we some-\ntimes dream of depredations by thieves, or of destruction\nby fire, in the very instant of our awaking. Our dreams\nwill not unfrequently go through all the particulars of a\npassage of the Alps, or of a military expedition to Moscow,\nor of a circumnavigation of the globe, or of other long and\nperilous undertakings, in a less number of hours, than it\ntook weeks, or months, or even years in the actual per-\nformance of them. We go from land to land, and from\ncity to city, and into desert places we experience transi-\ntions from joy to sorrow, and from poverty to wealth we\nare occupied in the scenes aiad transactions of many long\nmonths; and then our slumbers are scattered, and, behold,\nthey are the doings of a single watch of the night!\nThis striking circumstance in the history of our dreams\nis generally explained by supposing, that our thoughts, as\nthey successively occupy the mind, are more rapid, than\nwhile we are awake. But their rapidity is at all times very\ngreat so much so, that, in a few moments, crowds of ideas\npass through the mind, which it would take a long time to\nutter, and a far longer time would it take to perform all\nthe transactions, which they concern. This explanation,\ntherefore, is not satisfactory, for our thoughts are oftentimes\nequally rapid in our waking moments.\nThe true reason, we apprehend, is to be found in those\npreceding sections, which took under examination the\napparent reality of dreams. Our conceptions in dreaming\nare considered by us real every thought is an action\nevery idea is an event and successive states of mind are\nsuccessive actions and successive events. He, who in his\nsleep has the conception of all the particulars of a mil-\nitary expedition to Moscow, or of a circumnavigation of\nthe globe, seems to himself to have actually experienced\nall the various and multiplied fortunes of the one and the\nother. Hence what appears to be the real time in dreams,\nbut is only the apparent time, will be, not that, which is","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0265.jp2"},"266":{"fulltext":"260\nOF BREAMING.\nsufficient ibr the mere thought, but that, which is necessary\nfor the successive actions.\nSomething perfectly analogous to this may be re-\nmarked (says Mr. Stewart) in the perceptions we obtain\nby the sense of sight. When I look into a shew-box,\nwhere the deception is imperfect, I see only a set of paltry\ndaubings of a few inches in diameter but if the repre-\nsentation be executed with so much skill, as to convey to\nme the idea of a distant prospect, every object before me\nswells in its dimensions, in proportion to the extent of\nspace, which I conceive it to occupy, and what seemed\nbefore to be shut within the limits of a small wooden frame,\nis magnified, in my apprehension, to an immense landscape\nof woods, rivers, and mountains. 5\n217. Of the senses sinking to sleep in succession.\nIt has been remarked, that in sleep the mind ceases to\nretain its customary power over the muscular movements\nof the system; and all the senses also are at such times\nlocked up, and no longer perform their usual offices. The\neffect upon the senses is such, that it seems to be proper\nto speak of them as individually going to sleep and awak-\ning from sleep. It remains, therefore, to be observed,\nthat there is some considerable reason to suppose, that the\nsenses fall asleep in succession. For a detailed explana-\ntion and proof of this singular fact, reference must be had\nto Cullen, and particularly to Cabanis, a French writer on\nsubjects of this nature but the conclusions, at which they\narrive on this particular point, may be here stated.\nThe sight, in consequence of the protection of the eye-\nlids, ceases to receive impressions first, while all the other\nsenses preserve their sensibility entire and may, therefore,\nbe said to be first in falling asleep. The sense of taste,\naccording to the above writers, is the next, which loses its\nsusceptibility of impressions, and then the sense of smell-\ning. The hearing is the next in order, and last of all\ncomes the sense of touch.\nFurthermore, the senses are thought to sleep with dif-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0266.jp2"},"267":{"fulltext":"OF DREAMING.\n261\nferent degrees of profoundness. The senses of taste and\nsmelling awake the last the sight with more difficulty\nthan the hearing, and the touch the easiest of all. Some-\ntimes a very considerable noise does not awake a person,\nbut if the soles of his feet are tickled in the slightest de-\ngree, he starts up immediately.\nSimilar remarks are made, by the writers above refer-\nred to, on the muscles. Those, which move the arms and\nlegs, cease to act, when sle»ep is approaching, sooner than\nthose, which sustain the head and the latter before those,\nwhich support the back. We may notice here an excep-\ntion to the general statement at the commencement of this\nsection, that the mind in sleep ceases to retain its power\nover the muscles. Some persons can sleep standing, or\nwalking, or riding on horseback with such we cannot well\navoid the supposition, that the voluntary power over the\nmuscles is in some way retained and exercised in sleep.\nThese statements are particularly important in connection\nwith the facts of somnambulism only admit, that the sus-\nceptibility of the senses, and the power of the muscles may\nremain even in part while we are asleep, and we can ac-\ncount for them. We know, that this is not the case in a\nvast majority of instances, but that it does sometimes hap-\npen, is a point, which seems at last to be sufficiently well\nestablished.\n218. Remarks on Somnambulists.\nSomnambulists are persons, who are capable of walking\nand other voluntary actions while asleep. Some of the\nfacts in respect to them are these. The senses are in\ngeneral closed, and not susceptible of being affected by\noutward objects, much the same as in ordinary sleep with\nsome slight exceptions, however, hereafter to be mentioned.\nHence, the somnambulist walks, and performs other volun-\ntary actions without the use of vision and yet in some\ncases he has his eyes open, but is still unable to see. Do-\ning the works of day at unseasonable hours, he piles up his\nwood at midnight, or yokes his oxen, or goes to mill, and","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0267.jp2"},"268":{"fulltext":"262 OY DREAMING.\nall the while is as profoundly asleep as any of his neigh-\nbours until he falls over some obstacle at his feet, or\nrides against a tree, or is in some other way brought to his\nrecollection. He is not certain of walking in safe places,\nbut may sometimes be found on the roof of houses or on\nthe edge of precipices, but evidently with an utter insensi-\nbility to terrour. He is a sort of automatick machine,\nthat is carried about from place to place, but without feel-\ning, vision, hearing, or other exercises of the senses and\nstill more without calculation, or any thing, which may\nbe truly called reason always excepting such calculation\nand reasoning as may be found in dreams.\nNOTE. The following is an instance of somnambulism, which recently took\nplace, of an extraordinary character. A farmer in one of the counties of Mas-\nsachusetts had employed himself, for some weeks in winter, thrashing his\ngrain. One night as he was about closing his labours, he ascended a ladder to\nthe top of the great beams in the barn, where the rye, which he was thrashing,\nwas deposited, to ascertain what number of bundles remained unthrashed, which\nhe determined to finish the next day. The ensuing night, about two o clock, as\nwas supposed, he was heard by his mother to get up and go out, who had nu\nfurther recollection of him during the night. He repaired to his barn, being in\nsound sleep, and altogether unconscious of what he was doing, set open his\nbarn doors, ascended the ladder as he had done the day before, went on to the\nhay-mow, thence on to the great beams of the barn where the said rye was\ndeposited, and threw, down a flooring, and again descended and commenced\nthrashing it. When he had completed it, he raked off the straw, and bound it\ninto bundle*, and shoved the rye to one side of the floor, and then carried the\nstraw up the ladder and deposited it on some rails, that lay across the great\nbeams. He then threw down another flooring of rye, which he thrashed and\nfinished as before. Thus he continued his labours until he had thrashed five\nfloorings, and on returning from throwing down the sixth and last, in passing\nover part of the hay-mow, he fell off, where the hay had been cut down about six\nfeet, on to the lower part of it, which awoke him. He at first imagined himself\nin his neighbour s barn, but after groping about in the dark for a long time, as-\ncertained that he was in his own, and at length found the ladder, on which\nhe descended to the floor, closed his barn doors, which he found open and return-\ned to his house. On coming to the light, he found himself in such a profuse perspi-\nration, that his clothes were literally wet through,— he went to bed, and the next\nmorning on going to his barn, found that he had ihrashed, during the night, five\nbushels of rye, had raked the straw off in good order, and deposited it on the\ngreat beams, and shoved the grain to one side of the floor, all in a workmanlike\nmanner, without the least consciousness of what he was doing, until he fell\nfrom the bay.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0268.jp2"},"269":{"fulltext":"OF DREAMING. 263\nOf such persons many instances are on record, and of\nsome a particular account is given the accompanying in-\nstance in the note will help to illustrate the above asser-\ntions, which, as a general statement, are sufficiently near\nthe truth. The explanation which seems on the whole\nthe most satisfactory, is this viz. (1) The somnambulist\nis in all cases dreaming, and we may suppose in general,\nthat the dream is one, which greatly interests him. (2)\nThose volitions, which are a part of his dreams, retain their\npower over the muscles, which is not the fact with oth-\ner people. Consequently, whatever the somnambulist\ndreams is not only real in the mind, as in all other dream-\ners, but his ability to exercise his muscles enables him to\ngive it a reality in action. Whether he dream of writing\na letter, or of visiting a neighbour s house, or even of thrash-\ning out his wheat, his muscles are faithful to his vivid\nmental conceptions, which we may suppose in all cases\nclosely connected with his customary labours and experi-\nences, and carry him pretty safely through the operation,\nhowever sightless may be his eye, or dull his other senses.\nFurther We are not to forget here a remark on the\nsleep of the senses, already alluded to, and which is an\nexception to the general statement in regard to them.\nBoth in somnambulism and in ordinary cases of dream-\ning the senses are not always entirely locked up many\nobservations clearly show, that it is possible for the\nmind to be accessible through them, and that a new direc-\ntion may be given in this way to a person s dreams without\nawaking him. Hence somnambulists may sometimes\nhave very slight visual perceptions they may in some\nslight measure be guided by sensations of touch all the\nsenses may be affected in a small degree by their appro-\npriate objects, or this may be the case with some and not\nwith others, without effectually disturbing their sleep.\nThese facts will be found to help in explaining any circum-\nstances, which may be thought not to come within the\nreach of the general explanation above given.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0269.jp2"},"270":{"fulltext":"264 OF DREAMING.\n219. Of the utility of dreams.\nIt is a common opinion, that nature does nothing iri\nvain. Without doubting the general truth of this senti-\nment, some have, nevertheless, found it difficult to discov-\ner any practical utility in dreams. But, on the con-\ntrary, others have not been so sceptical. Dr. Beattie\nassures us, that dreaming is not without its uses, though\nwe should never be able to discover them and one would\nthink from some remarks of Franklin, that he was pretty\nmuch of the same opinion. The former writer imagines\namong other benefits, that they sometimes convey moral\ninstruction, and refers in support of his opinion to a fine\nmoral tale in the Toiler, given in the form of a dream. He\nfurther thinks, that they may sometimes convey intimations\nof good or evil results in the conduct of life, which are\nnot to be altogether disregarded. Condorcet and others\nhave from their own experience mentioned their aid in the\nsolution of difficult problems and the poetical writers\nhave so frequently beheld\nMost beauteous beings in their hours of sleep,\nthat one is almost persuaded to believe, that we should\nhave had less bright poetick creations, if they had not\nbeen real dreamers.\nBut however this may be, whether they be useful or\nnot, they are in general harmless, and sometimes amusing\nand perhaps we ought not to be too confident of their inu-\ntility, until we know more about them. As to any evil ef-\nfects resulting from dreaming, only be temperate in food,\nabundant in exercise, and follow Franklin s advice in the\narticle of a good conscience, and almost any one would be\nwilling to insure against them.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0270.jp2"},"271":{"fulltext":"265\nCHAPTER NINETEENTH.\naftBXKOtfSTRATX VS REASONING.\n220. Of truth and different kinds of it.\nThere is no small difficulty in giving a definition of\ntruth, which will be satisfactory to all. The following i*\nperhaps as unexceptionable as any Truth is the con-\nformity of our thoughts or mental states to things, as they\nactually exist. Agreeably to this definition, we may say\nof any propositions whatever, whether expressed in words\nor merely mental, that they are true, whenever they repre-\nsent things, as they are. And, consequently, all are neces-\nsarily either true or false, being either conformed or not\nconformed to the nature and state of things. Truth\ndoes not depend upon belief. The proposition, that red-\nness is a quality inherent in a soldier s coat, is, no doubt,\nfirmly believed by many, but is not true in the sense, in\nwhich it is generally understood to be so. We have al-\nready seen, that this and other colours are sensations in\nthe mind. The belief, which people have in regard to it,\ndoes not affect the truth of the proposition itself.\nTruth has by some writers been divided into two kinds,\nviz. necessary and contingent. Necessary truths are such as\nalways exist the same, and can neither be caused, nor an-\nnulled by the will of any being whatever. The proposi-\ntion, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two\nright ones, expresses a truth of this kind. Contingent\ntruths have relation to those things, which are not neces-\nsarily permanent. The proposition, that the world exists,\nexpresses a truth of this description.\n221. Of the tvays in which truth is discovered.\nTruth seems to be but another name for knowledge\nand among the means, which a beneficent Providence has\n34","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0271.jp2"},"272":{"fulltext":"266 DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.\nput into our hands for the acquisition of it, the three fol-\nlowing are the most considerable, viz. the senses, intu-\nition, and reasoning.\nAll our knowledge commences with the senses, as the\nideas from this source are prior to any others without\nthem we do not readily perceive, how our minds could ever\nhave been called into action. If the senses be one of the\nappointed means of conveying to us truth or knowledge,\nthen we must suppose, that they give us ideas of things, as\nthey actually exist. Nothing can be more evident, than\nthat they give us such ideas of things, as our Maker inten-\nded they should and if in any case we can trace the foun-\ndation of «ur knowledge to the intention or will of Him,\nwho gave us the capacity of knowledge, we ought to be\nsatisfied. By means of the senses we first become ac-\nquainted with external objects, with their form, and some\nof their various qualities, and properties so that we orig-\ninally owe to them those notions, which we have of all the\nmultiplied and wonderful works of creation.\nIt may perhaps be objected, that we derive erroneous\nnotions of things from the senses in the case of colours,\nand in some other instances and that, therefore, the sen-\nses cannot be safely regarded, as a foundation or source\nof knowledge. In reply we observe, that our misapprehen-\nsions of colours are not so much owing to the senses, as\nto the principles of association and it is altogether clear,\nthat our Maker has given us the power, whenever our men-\ntal susceptibilities are fully and happily developed, of cor-\nrecting all such misapprehensions of whatever origin.\nSee the chapters on primary truths, and on casual con-\nnections of thought.\n222. Of truth or knowledge from intuition.\nWe have knowledge also or new discoveries of truth\nfrom intuition. This is the name given to the state or\noperation of the mind, when there is an immediate percep-\ntion of the agreement or disagreement of two or more\nideas, without the intervention of any third idea. For in-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0272.jp2"},"273":{"fulltext":"DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 267\nstance,- three and three are six, things equal to the same\nare equal to one another,- the whole is greater than a part.\nIn these propositions and others like them, it is at once\nperceived by the mind, that there is an agreement of ideas,\nor that what is expressed in the predicate is compatible\nwith what is expressed in the subject of the proposition.\nOn such propositions no deductions of reasoning can con-\nfer any additional evidence.\nIntuition is nothing more than one of the exercises of that\nsusceptibility, which, we have already seen, the mind posses-\nses of feeling the relation among different objects. We\nrefer here to 199, in the chapter on abstract ideas.\nHence we notice the mind to be in that state, to which we\ngive the name of intuition, in the perception of the identi-\nty and diversity of objects, also of their resemblance or co-\nexistence, and in the perception of the relations of quanti-\nty and number, and of cause and effect.\nWe increase our knowledge or have new discoveries of\ntruth, in the third place, by reasoning. Reasontng is that\nmental process, by which unknown truths are inferred from\nthose, which are already known or admitted. It is divided\ninto two kinds, viz. demonstrative reasoning, and moral\nreasoning. In this chapter we confine ourselves to de-\nmonstrative reasoning.\n§.823. Definition of propositions and kinds of ihem.\nBut before we can enter with advantage on the subject\nof reasoning, it is necessary to go into a brief explanation\nof propositions, which are the subordinate parts in every\nprocess of that kind. A proposition has been defined\nto be a verbal representation of some perception, act, or\naffection of the mind. Mr. Locke also speaks of mental\npropositions, or those states of mind, where two or more\nideas are compared together, previous to their being em-\nbodied and set forth in language.\nThe parts of a proposition are, (1) The subject, or\nthat, concerning which something is either a-serted, or de-\nnied, commanded, or inquired (2) The predicate, or","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0273.jp2"},"274":{"fulltext":"368 DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.\nthat, which is asserted, denied, commanded, or inquired\nconcerning the subject (3) The copula, by which the\ntwo other parts are connected. In these two propositions,\nCaesar was brave,\nMen are fallible,\nMen and Ccesar are the subjects fallible and brave are\nthe predicates are and was are the copulas.\nPropositions have been divided, (1) Into simple or\nthose, whose subject and predicate are composed of single\nwords, as in this\nBenevolence is commendable\n(2) Into complex, or those, where the subject and pre-\ndicate consist of a number of words, as in this,\nFaithfulness in religion is followed by peace of mind\n(3) Into modal, where the copula is qualified by some\nword or words, representing the manner or possibility of\nthe agreement or discrepancy between the subject and\npredicate, as in these,\nMen of learning can exert influence\nWars may sometimes be just.\nPropositions, more or less involved, are necessary parts\nin every process of reasoning. They may be compared to\nthe separate and disjointed blocks of marble, which are\ndestined to enter into the formation of some edifice. The\ncompleted process of reasoning is the edifice the proposi-\ntions are the materials.\n224. Use of definitions and axioms in demonstrative\nreasoning.\nDemonstrative reasonings are chiefly found in mathe-\nmaticks and the first principles of them are definitions.\nWe can never have a demonstration of the properties of a\ncircle, parabola, ellipse, or other mathematical figure,\nwithout first having given a definition of them. The\nfirst principles of any science are those propositions,\nwhether fac\\s or merely assumed, from which the remoter\ntruths of that science are derived. Thus in Natural Phi-\nlosophy the general facts in relation to the gravity and\n.elasticity of the air may, agreeably to this explanation, be","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0274.jp2"},"275":{"fulltext":"DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 269\nconsidered as first principles. From these principles in\nPhvsicks are deduced, as consequences, the suspension of\nthe mercury in the barometer, and its fall, when carried\nup to an eminence. And agreeably to the same explan-\nation, definitions, which may be considered in the light of\nfacts assumed, are the foundation of demonstrative reason-\nings, or are those propositions, from which by means of\nthe subsequent steps the conclusion is derived.\nWe must not forget here the use of axioms in the dem-\nonstrations of mathematicks these are certain self-evi-\ndent propositions, or propositions, the truth of which is dis-\ncovered by intuition, such as the following Things\nequal to the same are equal to one another. From\nequals take away equals, and equals remain. We gen-\nerally find a number of them prefixed to treatises of geom-\netry and it has been a mistaken supposition, which has\nlong prevailed, that they are at the foundation of geomet-\nrical, and of all demonstrative reasoning. But axioms, ta-\nken by themselves, lead to no conclusions. With their\nassistance alone, it cannot be denied, that the truth, invol-\nved in propositions susceptible of demonstration, would\nhave been beyond our reach.\nBut axioms are by no means without their use, although\ntheir nature may have been misunderstood. They are\nproperly and originally intuitive perceptions of the truth,\nand whether they be expressed in words, as we generally\nfind them, or not, is of but little consequence, except as a\nmatter of convenience to beginners, and in giving instruc-\ntion. But those intuitive perceptions, which are always\nimplied in them, are essential helps and if by their aid a-\nlone we should be unable to complete a demonstration,\nwe should be equally unable without them. We be-\ngin with definitions we compare together successively a\nnumber of propositions and these intuitive perceptions of\ntheir agreement or disagreement, to which, when express-\ned in words, we give the name of axioms, attend us at\nevery step.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0275.jp2"},"276":{"fulltext":"270 DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.\n225. Of the subjects of demonstrative reasoning.\nDemonstrative reasoning differs from any other species\nof reasoning in the subjects, about which it is employed.\nThose subjects are abstract ideas and the necessary rela-\ntions among them. And there may be reckoned, as com-\ning within this class of subjects, the properties of numbers\nand of geometrical figures also extension, duration,\nweight, velocity, forces, c, so far as they are suscep-\ntible of being accurately expressed by numbers. But\nthe subjects of moral reasoning, upon which we are to re-\nmark hereafter more particularly, are matters of fact, in-\ncluding their connection with other facts, whether con-\nstant or variable, and all attendant circumstances.\nThat the exterior angle of a triangle is equal to both\nthe interior and opposite angles, is a truth, which comes\nwithin the province of demonstration. That water freezes\nat a temperature of thirty two degrees, that Xerxes invaded\nGreece, c. are inquiries, belonging to moral reasoning,\n226. The opposites of demonstrative reasonings\nabsurd.\nIn demonstrations we consider only one side of a ques-\ntion it is not ne cessary to do any thing more than this.\nThe first principles in the reasoning are given they are\nnot only supposed to be certain, but are taken for granted,\nas such these are followed by a number of propositions in\nsuccession, all of which are compared together if the\nconclusion be a demonstrative one, then there has been a\nclear perception of certainty at every step in the train.\nWhatever may be urged against an argument thus conduct-\ned is of no consequence the opposite of it will always im-\nply some fallacy. Thus, the proposition, that the three\nangles of a triangle are not equal to two right angles, and\nother propositions, which are the opposite of what has been,\ndemonstrated, will always be found to be false, and also\nto involve an absurdity that is, are inconsistent with, and\ncontradictory to themselves. Nothing more can be wanted","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0276.jp2"},"277":{"fulltext":"DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 271\nto confirm this, than a careful examination of such propo-\nsitions.\n6. 227. Demonstrative reasonings do not admit of dif-\nferent degrees of belief\nW hen our thoughts are employed upon subjects, which\ncome within the province of moral reasoning, we yield dif-\nferent degrees of assent we form opinions more or less\nprobable. It is different in demonstrations the assent,\nwhich we yield, is at all times of the highest kind, and is\nnever susceptible of being regarded, as more or less. In\nshort, all demonstrations are certain. But a question arises,\nWhat is certainty And what in particular do we under-\nstand by that certainty, which is ascribed to the conclu-\nsions, to which we are conducted in any process of demon-\n228. Of the nature of demonstrative certainty.\nIn proceeding to answer the above inquiry, it is to be\nobserved, that, in demonstrative reasonings, we always be-\ngin with certain first principles or truths, either known, or\ntaken for granted and these hold the first place, or are\nthe foundation of that series of propositions, over which\nthe mind successively passes, until it rests in the conclu-\nsion. In mathematicks the first principles, of which we\nhere speak, are the definitions. We begin, therefore, with\nwhat is acknowledged by all to be true or certain. At eve-\nry step there is an intuitive perception of the agreement or\ndisagreement of the propositions, which are compared to-\ngether. Consequently, however far we may advance in the\ncomparison of them, there is no possibility of falling short\nof that degree of assent, with which, it is acknowledged,\nthat the series commenced. So that demonstrative certain-\nty may be judged to amount to this Whenever we ar-\nrive at the the last step or the conclusion of a series of\npropositions, the mind intuitively perceives the relation\nexisting, whether it be the agreement or disagreement, co-\ni ncidence or want of coincidence, between that last step","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0277.jp2"},"278":{"fulltext":"272 DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.\nor the conclusion, and the conditions involved in the pro-\npositions at the commencement of the series and there-\nfore, demonstrative certainty is in effect the same as the\ncertainty of intuition.\n229. Of the use of diagrams in demonstrations.\nMr. Locke has advanced the opinion, that moral sub-\njects are no less susceptible of demonstration, than math-\nematical. However this may be, we are certainly more\nfrequently required to practice this species of reasoning in\nthe mathematicks, than any where else and in conduct-\ning the process, nothing is more common, than to make use\nof various kinds of figures or diagrams. The proper use\nof diagrams, of a square, circle, triangle, or other figure,\nwhich we delineate before us, is to assist the mind in keep-\ning its ideas distinct, and to help in comparing them together\nwith readiness and correctness. They are a sort of auxili-\naries, brought in to the help of our intellectual infirmities,\nbut are not absolutely necessary since demonstrative rea-\nsoning, wherever it may be found, resembles any other\nkind of reasoning in this most important respect, viz. in be-\ning a comparison of our ideas. In proof that artificial\ndiagrams are only auxiliaries, and not essentially necessa-\nry in demonstrations, it may be remarked, that they are\nnecessarily all of them imperfect, owing to the imperfec-\ntion of our senses. Our reasonings, therefore, and our\nconclusions will not apply to the figures before us, but\nmerely to an imagined perfect figure. And a verbal state-\nment of the properties of this imagined perfect figure is\nwhat we understand by a definition, the use of which in\nthis kind of reasoning in particular has already been men-\ntioned.\n230. Influence of demonstrative reasoning on the\nmental character.\nA considerable skill in demonstrative reasoning is on a\nnumber of accounts desirable, although it cannot be de-\nnied, that very frequent practice and great readiness in it","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0278.jp2"},"279":{"fulltext":"DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING, 273\nis not always favourable so that it seems proper briefly to\nmention the effects, both propitious and unpropitious, on\nthe mental character. (1) A frequency of practice in\ndemonstrative reasoning greatly aids in giving one a ready\ncommand of his attention. In this species of reasoning,\nthe propositions follow each other in such regular order\nand so closely, and so great is the importance of perceiv-\ning the agreement or disagreement of each succeeding\none with that, which goes before that a careless, unfixed,\nand dissipated state of the mind seems to be utterly incon-\nsistent with carrying on such a process with any sort of suc-\ncess to the conclusion. As, therefore, the strictest atten-\ntion is here so highly necessary, the more a person subjects\nhimself to this discipline, the more ready and efficient will\nbe the particular application of the mind, to which we\ngive that name. And we often find distinguished individ-\nuals in political life and in the practice of the law, who are\ndesirous of holding their mental powers in the most prompt\nand systematick obedience, imposing on themselves exer-\ncises in geometry and algebra for this purpose.\n(2) This mode of reasoning accustoms one to care\nand discrimination in the examination of subjects. In all\ndiscussions, where .the object is to find out the truth, it is\nnecessary to take asunder all the parts, having relation to\nthe general subject, and bestow upon them a share of our\nconsideration. And in general we find no people more\ndisposed to do this than mathematicians they are not\nfond of reasoning, as Mr. Locke expresses it, in the lump,\nbut are for going into particulars, for allowing every thing\nits due weight and nothing more, and for resolutely throw-\ning out of the estimate all propositions, which are not di-\nrectly and truly to the point. It must further be said, as a\ngeneral remark closely connected with what has just been\nobserved, that those departments of science, which require\ndemonstrative reasoning, are promotive of a characteristick\nof great value, a love of the truth.\n(3) Demonstrative reasoning gives to the mind a great-\ner grasp or comprehension. This result it is true, will not\nbe experienced in the case of those, who have merely ex-\n35","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0279.jp2"},"280":{"fulltext":"374 fcEHONSTBATIVE REASONING.\nercised themselves in the study of a few select demonstra-\ntions it implies a familiarity of the mind with long and\ncomplicated trains of deductions. A thorough mathema-\ntician, who has made it a business to exercise himself in\nthis method of reasoning, can hardly have been otherwise\nthan sensible of that intellectual comprehension, or length\nand breadth of survey, which we have in view since one\ndemonstration is often connected with another, much in\nthe same way as the subordinate parts of separate demon-\nstrations are connected with each other and he, there-\nfore, finds it necessary, if he v/ould go on with satisfaction\nand pleasure, to gather up and retain, in the grasp of his\nmind, all the general and subordinate propositions of a\nlong treatise.\nBut, on the other hand, there are some results of a very\ngreat attention to sciences, which require the exclusive appli-\ncation of demonstrative reasoning, of a less favourable kind.\n(1) It has been thought, that it has a tendency to ren-\nder the mind mechanical That is, while it increases its\nability of acting in a given way, it diminishes the power of\ninvention, and prevents its striking out into a new path,\ndifferent from that, which it has been in the habit of going\nover. (2) It nourishes a spirit of .scepticism or per-\nhaps we may say, diminishes the power of belief. The ex-\nclusive mathematician has been accustomed to yield his\nassent to demonstration only and it is but natural, that he\nshould find some difficulty in being satisfied with any lower\ndegree of evidence. This disposition to doubt will be, in\nsome measure, experienced, even in the transition from\npure to mixed mathematicks, at least there will be an ab-\nsence of that full and delightful satisfaction, which had\nhitherto been enjoyed. Still more will it be felt, when he\nis called upon to judge of events, and duties, and actions\nof common life, which do not admit of the application of\ndemonstration. In a word, it has been supposed to un-\nfit the mind in a considerable degree for accurate discrim-\ninations as to moral evidence on all subjects whatever, where\nthat species of evidence is alone admissible and also for\nfair and correct judgments in matters of taste.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0280.jp2"},"281":{"fulltext":"MORAL REASONING. 275\nSuch, on the whole, being the results of an exclusive\nattention to sciences, which admit of demonstrations alone,\na restricted pursuit of them is all, that can be safely re-\ncommended. Those, who aim at a perfect education, will\nnot canton out to themselves a little Goshen in the intel-\nlectual world, which is to receive all their labours, and\nleave the rest of the vast field of the mind to neglect.\nMathematicians should make themselves acquainted with\nthe principles of moral evidence, otherwise they fail in the\nconduct of life and it is not too much to say, that even\nliterature, which is an elegant as well as lofty pursuit, is\nby no means incompatible with a suitable degree of devo-\ntedness to their chosen sciences.\nThe ablest mathematicians have in some instances\nbeen accomplished literary scholars. Among many others,\nBlaise Pascal can hardly fail to be remembered. He was\ncapable of offering the most valuable contributions to\nthe abstract sciences and in his Provincial Letters and\nother writings of a less abstract character, has bequeathed\nto France and to the world the most honourable monu-\nments of sensibility, of taste, and eloquence.\nCHAPTER TWENTIETH.\nIVEORAL REASONING.\n231. Of the subjects and importance of moral\nreasoning.\nMoral reasoning, Which is the second great division\nor kind of reasoning, concerns opinions, actions, events\nc; embracing in general those subjects, which lo not\ncome within the province of demonstrative reasoning. The\nsubjects, to which it relates, are often briefly expressed by\nsaying, that they are matters of fact nor would this defini-\ntion, concise as it is, be likely to give an erroneous idea of\nthem. Skill in this kind of reasoning is of great use in","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0281.jp2"},"282":{"fulltext":"276 MORAL REASONING.\nthe formation of opinions concerning the duties, and the\ngeneral conduct of life. Some may be apt to think, that\nthose, who have been most practised in demonstrative rea-\nsoning, can find no difficulty in adapting their intellectual\nhabits to matters of mere probability. This opinion is not\naltogether well founded, as we have seen in the preceding\nchapter. Although that species of reasoning has a favour-\nable result in giving persons a command over the atten-\ntion, and in some other respects, whenever exclusively\nemployed it has the effect in some degree to disqualify\nthem for a correct judgment on those various subjects,\nwhich properly belong to moral reasoning. This last,\ntherefore, which has its distinctive name from the primary\nsignification of the Latin mores, viz. manners, customs, c,\nrequires a separate consideration.\n232. Of the nature of moral certainty.\nMoral reasoning causes in us different degrees of as-\nsent, and in this respect differs from demonstrative. In\ndemonstration there is an intuitive perception of the rela-\ntion of the propositions compared together; and a know-\nledge or absolute certainty of their agreement or disagree-\nment.— -In moral reasoning this agreement or disagree-\nment is only presumed, but this presumption may be more\nor less, admitting a great variety of degrees. While,\ntherefore, one mode of reasoning is attended with know-\nledge the other can properly be said to produce only\njudgment or opinion. But the probability of such\njudgment or opinion may arise so high, as to exclude all\nreasonable doubt. And hence we often speak, as if we\npossessed certainty in respect to subjects, which admit\nmerely of the application of moral reasoning. Although\nthere is undoubtedly some difference between the belief\nattendant on demonstration, and that produced by the\nhighest probability, the effect on our feelings is very nearly\nthe same. A man, who should doubt the existence of the\ncities of London and Pekin, although he has no other evi-\ndence of it than that of testimony, would be considered\nhardly less singular and unreasonable, than one, who might","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0282.jp2"},"283":{"fulltext":"MORAL REASONING. 277\ntake it into his head to doubt of the truth of the proposi-\ntions of Euclid. It is this very high degree of probability,\nwhich we term moral certainty.\n233. Of reasoning from analogy.\nMoral reasoning admits of some subordinate divisions\nand of these, the first to be mentioned, is reasoning from\nanalogy. The word, analogy, is used with some vagueness,\nbut in general denotes a resemblance, either greater or\nless. Having observed a consistency and uniformity in\nthe operations of the physical world, we are naturally led\nto presume, that things of the same nature will be affected\nin the same way, and will produce the same effects and\nalso that the same or similar effects are to be attributed to\nlike causes. Analogical reasoning, therefore, is that\nmental process, by which unknown truths or conclusions\nare inferred from the resemblances of things.\nThe argument, by which Sir Isaac Newton establishes\nthe truth of universal gravitation, is of this sort. He proves,\nthat the planets in their revolutions are deflected towards\nthe sun in a manner precisely similar to the deflection of\nthe earth towards the same luminary and also that there\nis a similar deflection of the moon towards the earth, and\nof a body projected obliquely at the earth s surface towards\nthe earth s centre. Hence he infers by analogy, that all\nthese deflections originate from the same cause, or are\ngoverned by one and the same law, viz. the power of\ngravitation.\nThis method of reasoning is applicable to the inquiry,\nWhether the planets are inhabited? and furnishes the\nsole ground for the indulgence of such a supposition. We\nobserve a resemblance in certain respects between Mars,\nJupiter, Saturn, and other planets, and the earth. They\nall revolve around the sun, as the earth does, and all de-\nrive light from that source. Several of them are ascertain-\ned to revolve on their axis, and, consequently, must have a\nsuccession of day and night. Some of them have moons,\nand all are subject to the law of gravitation. From these","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0283.jp2"},"284":{"fulltext":"*7a MORAL REASONING.\nvarious similitudes we draw the conclusion by analogy,\nthat those planets must be inhabited, like the earth.\nThere are a variety of subjects, both speculative and\npractical, in respect to which we may reason in this way\nand sometimes with considerable satisfaction. And among\nothers, this method of reasoning finds a place in the argu-\nments of persons in the practice of the law. An attorney,\nfor instance, advocates a case, which does not fall within\nthe provisions of existing statutes, and for which he finds\nin his authorities no exact precedent. He is, therefore,\nunder the necessity of ascertaining, as far as possible, the\nanalogy or resemblance between this case, and others,\nwhich are given, and have been decided upon. And he\nhas here a favourable opportunity for the exhibition of his\nresearch and discrimination. A considerable part of\nthe argumentation among pleaders at the bar Is employed\nin urging various analogies of this sort. It is the business\nof the court in such instances to adjust, and compare them\ntogether, and allow them their due weight. In doing this,\ntheir discernment and integrity are called into exercise\nfor sometimes a small circumstance, and perhaps one,\nwhich the pleader has laboured to involve in obscurity 5\nwill disclose an essential distinction between the case in\nhand, and that on the file of precedents, to which it has\nbeen likened.\n234. Caution to be used in reasoning from analogy.\nThe last remark leads us to observe, that much care is\nnecessary in arguments drawn from this source, especially\nin scientifick investigations and they are in all cases to\nbe received with some degree of distrust. The ancient\nanatomists are an instance of precipitate reasoning from\nanalogy. Being hindered by certain superstitions from\ndissecting the bodies of men, they endeavoured to obtain\nthe information they wanted, by the dissection of those\nanimals, whose internal structure was supposed to come\nnearest to that of the human body. In this way they\nwere led into a variety of mistakes, which have been de-\ntected by later anatomists. Tt does not follow, because","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0284.jp2"},"285":{"fulltext":"MORAL REASONING. 279\nthings resemble each other in a number of particulars, that\nthis resemblance will be found in all others and we are,\ntherefore, always to consider ourselves in danger of push-\ning the supposition of similitude too far.\nThe proper use of analogical reasoning seems to be,\nin all scientifick inquiries, to illustrate and confirm truths,\nwhich are susceptible of proof from other sources of evi-\ndence. A happy instance of this use of it is the work of\nBishop Butler, entitled, The Analogy of Religion, natural\nand revealed, to the constitution and course of nature It\nis not the object of the writer to prove the truth of reli-\ngion, either natural or revealed, but to answer some ob-\njections, which may be brought against its principles. And\nthis he does by proving, that the same objections exist to\nthe providence of God in the natural world. There is an\nanalogy or resemblance in the two and if the objections,\nwhich are brought, will reject him from the authorship of\nwhat we term religion, they will dethrone him also from\nall direction in the ordinary economy of nature.\n235. Of reasoning by induction,\nVi e come now to another method of moral reasoning,\nviz. by induction. Inductive reasoning is the inferring of\ngeneral truths from particular facts, that have fallen under\nour observation. Our experience teaches us, that nature\nis governed by uniform laws and we have a firm expec-\ntation, (whether it be an original principle of our constitu-\ntion or whatever may be the origin of it that events will\nhappen in future, as we have seen them to happen in times\npast. With this state of mind we are prepared to de-\nduce inferences by induction.\nWhen a property has been found in a number of sub-\njects of the same kind, and nothing of a contradictory na-\nture appears, we have the strongest expectation of finding\nthe same property in all the individuals of the same class\nin other words, we come to the conclusion, that the pro\nperty is a general one. Accordingly, we apply a magnet\nto several pieces of iron we find in every instance a strong","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0285.jp2"},"286":{"fulltext":"280 Moral reasoning,\nattraction taking place and we conclude, although we\nhave made the experiment with only a small number of\nthe masses of iron actually in existence, that it is a proper-\nty of iron to be thus affected by that substance, or that all\niron is susceptible of magnetical attraction. This is a\nconclusion drawn by induction. Although the belief\nattending it is not precisely of the same nature with the\nbelief accompanying demonstration, it is moral probaba-\nbility of the highest kind, or what is sometimes termed\nmoral certainty and is at least found to be sufficient for\nall practical purposes. We obtain all the general truths,\nrelating to the properties and laws of material objects, in\nthis way.\nAnd we thus not only acquire a knowledge of the gen-\neral nature of material objects, but apply the same induc-\ntive process also in the investigation of laws, which gov-\nern the operations of the mind. It is by experience or\nobserving what takes place in a number of individuals, that\nwe are able to infer the general law of association, viz.\nWhen two or more ideas have existed in the mind in im-\nmediate succession, they are afterwards found to be mu-\ntually suggested by each other. It is the same in ascertain-\ning other general laws.\nThe method of induction, which is recommended by\nLord Bacon, as one of the most important aids in the search\nafter truth, is employed not only in ascertaining the gener-\nal facts both of physical and intellectual nature, but is\nemployed also in the formation of such practical rules and\nmaxims, as are of use in the common concerns of life.\n236. Of the caution necessary in inductive processes.\nReasoning in this method requires the exercise of cau-\ntion, no less than by analogy. It is especially liable\nto prove fallacious, whenever our investigations have\nbeen marked with impatience, and our judgments are form-\ned on a very small number of facts. When the num-\nber of examined instances is large, and the results are uni-\nform, the conclusion amounts to moral certainty. But","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0286.jp2"},"287":{"fulltext":"MORAL REASONING. 281\nwhen the number of such instances is small, and the re-\nsults are not altogether uniform, the judgments formed\nwill possess a greater or less degree of probability, varying\nwith circumstances.\n237. Of the evidence of testimony.\nBefore entering directly on the subject of the evidence\nof testimony, we shall dwell a moment on the remark in\na previous section, that, among the most considerable\nsources of knowledge, are the senses, intuition, and rea-\nsoning. A large portion of our knowledge, which we\nconsidered to be the same with what is otherwise termed\ntruth, is derived from the senses and this is what is\nmeant in general, when it is said, that we have a knowledge\nof this or the other thing, by our personal observation.\nA second source of knowledge is intuition. Whatever per-\nceptions we have, which are intuitive, have an equally\nstrong claim to be reckoned as knowledge or truth with\nthose, which can be traced to the senses. Further all\nreasoning, as far as it is demonstrative, is a source of know-\nledge we have no more doubt of the truth of the conclu-\nsions, drawn from such reasoning, than we have of the\nseparate intuitive perceptions, which preceded it. And\nalso the deductions of moral reasoning may, with good\ngrounds, be considered as coming within the limits of\nwhat men commonly dignify with the title of knowledge,\nwhen attended with a probability of the highest kind that\nis, whatever is morally certain. To other conclusions, de-\nduced by moral reasoning, we ordinarily give the name\nOf JUDGMENTS Or OPINIONS.\nBut something remains to be said on the nature of the\nevidence, involved in these sources of knowledge. Of\nevidence itself it is perhaps sufficient to say, by way of de-\nfining it, that it is a circumstance, which is naturally\nfitted to affect our belief. And then with this idea of it in\nview, we say, that the evidence of the senses, which were\nmentioned as the first source of all truth, is something in\nseparable from that part of our constitution, is ultimate,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0287.jp2"},"288":{"fulltext":"282 MORAL REASOJflNGi,\ncan be resolved into nothing more simple or certain, and\nstands in no need of explanation. Our Creator himself,\nin as much as he has made us thus, seems to have offered\nhis responsibility, that they will not fail to guide us into\ncertainty, so far at least as is necessary for us. The ev-\nidence of intuition is certainly not less strong, resulting\nfrom the constitution of the mind, as much as the other\ndoes from that of the body, and demonstrative certainty\nis in effect the same as that of intuition that is, the ev-\nidence, on which the conclusions in demonstrations are\nfounded, is not less decisive.\nBut when we come to moral reasoning, we meet with\na species of evidence of a different kind and yet of so\nfrequent recurrence and of so great importance, as to merit\nsome particular consideration. We refer to the evidence\nof testimony.\nTestimony is the report of men concerning those things,\nwhich have fallen under the observation of their senses.\nTestimony is admitted as evidence that is, it is a circum-\nstance, which is naturally calculated and fitted to influence\nour belief. As to the fact, that we readily receive the tes-\ntimony of our fellow beings as evidence, it is undeniable.\nWithout such confidence in what they assert, every one s\nknowledge of events and facts would be limited to those\nonly, of which he himself had been a personal witness. In\nthis case, no American, who has not been a traveller, can\nbelieve, that there is such a city as London and no Eng-\nlishman can believe, that there is such a city as Rome\nand no person whatever has any ground for believing, that\nsuch men as Hannibal and Caesar have ever existed. But\nthen it is to be remembered, that there is no natural con-\nnection between words and things, between the testimony,\nwhich is given, and the thing concerning which it is given.\nThis being the case, it has often been asked, Upon what\nprinciple do we give credit to human testimony And the\nquestion certainly has a direct connection with the philos-\nophy of the human mind, and deserves consideration.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0288.jp2"},"289":{"fulltext":"MORAL REASONING.\n283\n238. Grounds of belief in testimony.\nMr. Hume maintains, that our confidence in testimony\nis derived from no other principle, than our observation of\nthe veracity of men, and of the usual conformity of facts\nto the reports of witnesses. In other words, he makes ex-\nperience the foundation of our confidence or belief in testi-\nmony.\nBut there is a serious objection to this explanation,\nwhich is thought by many quite to overthrow his view of\nthe subject. The objection is this, Children, who have\nhad but very little experience, give their assent to testi-\nmony, and the strength of their assent or belief will be the\ngreater, the less removed they are from infancy. The\ncredulity of children has almost passed into a proverb\nyouth surrenders its belief almost as readily but manhood,\nwhich has seen more of the operation of the human pas-\nsions, becomes cautious and often the caution of man-\nhood degenerates in old age into a suspicion and distrust\nof the worst kind. What then becomes of the doctrine of\nMr. Hume, that confidence in testimony is the result of ex-\nperience One would think, if this be the course which\nthings take, that the opposite of his statement is nearer\nthe truth.\n239. Confidence in testimony founded in an original\ntendency of our constitution.\nWe must, therefore, adopt some other explanation\nand we cannot but think, there is good reason for suppos-\ning, that confidence in testimony has its foundation in an\noriginal tendency of our minds. Certainly the wise Author\nof our nature intended, men should live together in society.\nConsequently, he would give to them those mental tenden-\ncies, which are suitable and necessary in such a situation\nsuch, for instance, as a disposition to speak the truth. And\naccordingly we find, that men are disposed to speak the\ntruth, to convey, in their intercourse with others, their real\nsentiments. The telling of falsehoods is undoubtedly a","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0289.jp2"},"290":{"fulltext":"284 MORAL REASONING.\nviolence to our natures, and the greatest liars tell the\ntruth an hundred times, where they utter a falsehood once.\nBut it is no harder to believe, that we naturally credit\ntestimony, or have a natural tendency of that sort, than\nthat we naturally speak the truth. And we imagine, there\nis as much evidence of the former, as of the latter. Indeed\nthe latter tendency, or a disposition to speak truth, seems\nto require just such a counterpart in our constitution as\nthe former, and without the one, the other would lose\nno small share of its fitness and worth. For surely a\nnatural tendency to speak the truth would be very near\nsuperfluous, if there were not in our nature something cor-\nresponding, which would lead us to yield, to what we hear,\na ready and confiding assent. In answer, therefore, to\nthe inquiry, What is the foundation of our belief in testi-\nmony, we reply in short, that we are naturally led, or are\nled by the principles of our mental constitution, both to\nspeak the truth, and to yield a ready assent to what we\nhear spoken, or to testimony.\nFurthermore, this original tendency to believe in testi-\nmony is weakened in most cases, as we. have great reason\nto think, the further we advance in life. At first we yield\nour assent without any hesitation to doubt is unnatural,\nand when we are compelled to do it, it is no small trial to\nour feelings. But no one lives long and mingles much\nwith men, without being deceived many times. We learn\nby degrees the wide influence of interested motives and\nso far from falling in with Mr. Hume s hypothesis, we have\ngreater reason for saying, that experience leads us to dis-\ntrust, where nature would prompt us to believe.\n240. Of the operation of the principles of association\nin reasoning.\nBefore leaving the subject of reasoning, it is proper to\nremark on the influence of the principles of association on\nany process of this nature. Proposition follows proposi-\ntion with so much regularity, that we are apt to imagine,\nthe whole is perfectly arbitrary. This supposition is quite","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0290.jp2"},"291":{"fulltext":"MORAL REASONING. 285\nfar from the truth. It is true, when a number of ideas are\npresented nearly at the same time, the mind puts forth a vo-\nlition, or exercises choice, in selecting one idea in prefer-\nence to another. But the ideas, from which the choice is\nmade, and without the presence of which, it could not be\nmade, are not caused by volition, and, therefore, mere\narbitrary creations but are suggested by the laws of asso-\nciation.\nAs an illustration we will suppose an argument on the\njustice and expediency of capital punishments in ordinary\ncases. The disputant first denies in general terms the\nright, which social combinations have assumed of capitally\npunishing offences of a slight nature. But before consid-\nering the cases he has particularly in view, he remarks on\nthe right of capital punishment for murder and admits,\nthat the principle of self defence gives such a right. He\nthen takes up the case of stealing, and contends, that we\nhave no right to punish the thief with death, because no\nsuch right is given by the laws of nature for, before the\nformation of the civil compact, the institution of property\nwas not known. He then considers the nature of civil soci-\nety, and contends, that, in the formation of the social com-\npact, no such extraordinary power, as that of putting to\ndeath for stealing or other crimes of similar aggravation,\ncould have been implied in that compact, because it never\nwas possessed by those, who formed it c.\nHere is an argument made up of a number of proposi-\ntions, and carried on, as may be supposed, to very consid-\nerable length. And in this argument, as in all others, ev-\nery proposition is, in the first instance, suggested by the\nlaws of association it is not at all a matter of arbitrary\nvolition. The disputant first states the inquiry in general\nterms he then considers the particular case of murder\nthe crime of theft is next considered and this is examin-\ned, first, in reference to natural law, and, afterwards, in\nreference to civil law. And this consecution of proposi-\ntions, takes place precisely the same, as when the sight of\na stranger in the crowd suggests the image of an old friend,\nand the friend suggests the village of his residence, and","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0291.jp2"},"292":{"fulltext":"386\nMORAL REASONING.\nthe village suggests an ancient ruin in its neighbourhood,\nand the ruin suggests heroes and battles of other days.\nIt is true, that other propositions may have been suggested\nat the same time, and the disputant may have had his\nchoice between them, but this was all the direct power,\nwhich he possessed.\n241. Grounds of the selection of propositions.\nA number of propositions are presented to the mind by\nthe principles of association the person, who carries on\nthe process of reasoning, makes his selection among them.\nBut it is reasonable to inquire, how it happens, that there\nis such a suitableness in propositions, as they follow each\nother And this seems to be no other than to inquire into\nthe circumstances, under which the choice of them is made,\nor the grounds of the selection.\nLet it be considered, then, that in all arguments there\nis some general subject, on which the evidence is made to\nbear there is some point in particular to be examined.\nIn reference to these general outlines, we have a prevail-\ning and permanent desire. This desire is not only a great\nhelp in giving quickness and strength to the laws of asso-\nciation but exercises also a very considerable indirect in-\nfluence in giving an appropriate character to the thoughts,\nwhich are suggested by those laws. Hence the great body\nof the propositions, which are at such times brought up,\nwill be found to have a greater or less reference to the gen-\nral subject. These are all very rapidly compared by the\nmind with those outlines, in regard to which its feelings of\ndesire are exercised, or with what we usually term the point\nto be proved. Here the mind, in the exercise of that sus-\nceptibility of feelings of relation, which we have already\nseen it to possess, immediately discovers the suitableness or\nwant of suitableness, the agreement or want of agreement\nof the propositions presented to it, to the general subject.\nThis perception of suitableness, which is one of those rel-\native feelings, of which the mind is from its very nature","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0292.jp2"},"293":{"fulltext":"MORAL REASONING. 287\nheld to be susceptible, exists as an ultimate fact in our men-\ntal constitution. All, that can profitably be said in rela-\ntion to it, is the mere statement of the fact, and of the cir-\ncumstances, under which it is found to exist. Those prop-\nositions, which are judged by the mind in the exercise of\nthat capacity, which its Creator has given it, to be agree-\nable to the general subject or point to be proved, are per-\nmitted by it to enter in, as continuous parts of the argument.\nAnd in this way a series of propositions rises up, all hav-\ning reference to one ultimate purpose, regular, appropriate,\nand in their issue laying the foundation of the different\ndegrees of assent. This explanation will apply not only\nto the supposed argument in the preceding section, but to\nall instances of moral reasoning, and also to demonstrative.\n242. Of the limitation of power over arguments.\nFrom what has been said it very naturally follows, that\nour power in argumentation is limited, and that we can no\nmore by mere volition secure the existence of new and\nconclusive points in any given process of reasoning, than\nwe can by mere volition give creation in the first instance\nto our thoughts. Persons of the most gifted intellect are\nheld in check, and are restrained by the ultimate princi-\nples of their mental constitution these are boundaries,\nwhich they cannot pass and those, who are capable of the\ngreatest efforts in framing arguments, will be no less sen-\nsible of this truth, when they carefully examine the course\nof their thoughts, than others.\nHence we are led very readily to see in some measure\nwhat things enter into the mental possessions and disci-\npline of a successful reasoner.\nJ. 243. XOf requisites in a skilful reasoner.\n(1) The skilful reasoner must be well informed.\nNo man can reason well on a subject, unless he has in-\nformed himself in regard to it. That many speak on sub-\njects, which are proposed to them, without having made","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0293.jp2"},"294":{"fulltext":"288 MORAL REASONING.\nany preparation, cannot be denied but there is a vast dif-\nference between noisy, incoherent declamation, and a well\nwrought argument, made up of suitable propositions, fol-\nlowing each other with a direct and satisfactory reference\nto the conclusion. The mind passes from one point to an-\nother, connected with the argument, and in so doing is\ngoverned by the principles of association, as we have seen\nbut what opportunity can there possibly be for the opera-\ntion of these principles, when the mind is called to fasten\nitself upon a subject and to decide upon that subject with-\nout any knowledge of those circumstances, which may be\ndirectly involved in it, or of its relations, and tendencies\nLet the greatest orator attempt to speak with such slight\ninformation on the question to be debated, and he would\nappear to hardly greater credit, than a school -boy in his\nfirst essays.\n(2) Much depends also on practice. In the prose-\ncution of an argument there is necessarily a mental per-\nception of the congruity of its several parts, or of the\nagreement of the succeeding proposition with that, which\nwent before. The degree of readiness in bringing togeth-\ner propositions and in putting forth such perceptions, will\ngreatly depend on the degree of practice.\nThe effect of frequent practice, resulting in what is\ntermed a habit, is often witnessed in those, who follow aiay\nmechanick calling where we find, that what was once\ndone with difficulty comes in time to be performed with\ngreat ease and readiness. The muscles of such persons\nseem to move with a kind of instinctive facility and accu-\nracy in the performance of those works, to which they have\nbeen for a long time addicted.\nThere is a similar effect of frequent practice in the in-\ncrease of quickness and facility in our mental operations\nand certainly as much so in those, which are implied in\nreasoning, as in any others. If a person have never been\nin the practice of going through geometrical demonstra-\ntions, he finds his mind very slowly and with difficulty ad-\nvancing from one step to another while, on the other","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0294.jp2"},"295":{"fulltext":"MOHJLL REASONING\n28*\nhand, a person, who has so often practised this species of\nargumentation, as to have formed a habit, advances for-\nward from one part of the train of reasoning to another\nwith great rapidity and delight. And the result is the\nsame in any process of moral reasoning.\n244. Of moral reasoning as suited to our situation\nas accountable beings.\nSome remarks were made in the last section of the last\nchapter and in the first of this, tending to show the compar-\native value of demonstrative and moral reasoning. There\nis another point of some consequence, which has a connec-\ntion with that subject, remaining to be mentioned here.\nIt is this 5— Moral reasoning, in as much as it does not\ncompel our assent, but leaves the mind, in most cases, in\nsome degree of doubt, is peculiarly suited to our condition\nas moral agents.\nIf all the common subjects of life admitted of demon-\nstration, and all the conclusions, which we formed, were\ncertain and irresistible, it would come near driving both\nvice and virtue out of the world. It would subject the vol-\nuntary powers to a constraint little short of mechanical\nand have a direct tendency to confound characters and\ndispositions neither demanding a contest with passion,\nnor the exercise of candour, nor desires to learn the will\nof God, and excluding, in a great measure, religious faith\nand other principles, which are now suited to our situation,\nand training us up for the day of final account. While,\ntherefore, the judgments, resulting from moral reasoning,\nwill be allowed to be in general sufficient to guide us,\nwherever there is an honest and candid heart they evid-\nently present no insuperable barriers to the influence of\npride, and passion, and self-interest, and prejudice. They\nhold out ample inducements to those, who love the truth,\nand are sincere but those, who are not of this character,\nwill no doubt pursue a different course, pervert evidence,\nand bring their conclusions to meet and fall in with their\nprivate views.- And thus by their own works thev are\n37","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0295.jp2"},"296":{"fulltext":"290 RULES OF DEBATE*\njudged. So that moral reasoning is especially suited to be-\nings, who are accountable for their passions, accountable\nfor their perversions of the truth, and for all their conduct\nand this is a circumstance, in no small degree, to its honour.\nCHAPTER TWENTY FIRST.\nDZAXiEOTSOSS- OR XLUXiZSS ©F DEBATES.\n245. Of the need of directions iti argumentative debate*\nHowever frivolous may have been the art of disputa-\ntion, otherwise called in the language of the Schools\ndialecticks, during the Scholastick ages, and for many years\nsince in some learned seminaries, there is no doubt a dia-\nlecticks more rational, more practical, and worthy of our\nconsideration in this place. The circumstances of the\ntimes, which ought to have an influence in determining;\nwhat is necessary in a course of education, forbid our lay-\ning aside this subject the art of debating as altogether\nout of place and useless. We allude in particular to the\nspirit of inquiry, which has gone abroad, to the deep ex-\naminations, which have made their way into the founda-\ntions of political science, and to the establishment of free\ngovernments. But as our efforts in all intellectual exerci-\nses are at first unstable and imperfect, and we are aided in\nthem, and are kept from running into errour by means of\nrules so shall we find the advantage of a few directions\nin those argumentative controversies, to which we give the\nname of debates. The subject very clearly belongs to\nthat part of intellectual philosophy, which relates to men-\ntal discipline.\nIt will help in some measure to show the degree of im-\nportance which properly attaches itself to this subject, if\nwe mention some of the occasions, on which the practice\nof debating occurs. (I) There are debates in the com-\nmon intercourse of life, in the management of ordinary af-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0296.jp2"},"297":{"fulltext":"RULES OF DEBATE. 29 J\nfairs, and in fireside conversations Although rot attend-\ned with much formality, occasional controversies at such\ntimes are unavoidable, and are often a source both of im-\nprovement and of pleasure. (2) Disputations orForen-\nsick exercises are often appointed in academies, college?,\nand other schools of learning. The object is, not only to\nset students upon thinking, and to help them in the discov-\nery of truth but still more to quicken the argumentative\npowers, and to afford them a suitable discipline. Some-\ntimes a certain number are appointed on the affirmative and\nothers on the negative but in general it is b:st, where\nthere is found to be a considerable share of enterprise in\ndiscussion, to let each one affirm or deny the question, as\nhe chooses, (3) The controversies at the bar are prop-\nerly debates they are often managed with much skill and\nconsiderable warmth. But the advocate in courts of judi-\ncature labours under the disadvantage of being obliged\nalways to adhere to the interests of his client, whatever\nmay be his own private opinions on the subject in discus-\nsion. (4) Legislative assemblies, which in latter times\nhave so rapidly multiplied, afford good opportunities for\nthe efforts of the honest dialectician. He has great mo-\ntives, operating upon him, and calling him to put forth the\nnoblest powers of argument. His obligations to* his con-\nstituents, the honourable feelings of his own breast, the\nhappiness of thousands, to say nothing of that accountabil-\nity, which awaits all at last, all imperiously summon him to\nexamine, to advance what he believes, and to maintain\nit. (5) Subjects, proposed in literary and philosophical\nsocieties, written controversies of whatever kind, discus-\nsions in ecclesiastical councils, and on other occasions, are\nall so many opportunities of debate. So that it is a ve-\nry important accomplishment, especially in this age of the\nworld, to be able to reason well on subjects proposed, and\nwith proper views and feelings. And hence the proprie-\nty of laying down at least the few directions, which are\nto follow.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0297.jp2"},"298":{"fulltext":"292 RULES OF DEBATE.\n246. Of debating merely for the pleasure of it*\nIt is not advisable to enter into debates merely for the\npleasure of it, because, whenever this practice is once a-\ndopted, the person will often unavoidably set himself up\nas a disputant, both to his own discredit, and the annoy-\nance of his associates. How many persons, by inordin-\nately indulging in this propensity, become talkative, obstin-\nate, and assuming, to a degree intolerable They oppose\nalmost every thing they hear, and their heads are continu-\nally busied with finding out arguments for this purpose.\nAnd this tends to disturb the harmony and happiness of\nlife and it is discountenanced also by those sentiments of\nmutual respect, which men owe to each other.\n247. Of being governed by a desire of the truth.\nIn all questions, which admit of discussion, and on\nwhich we find ourselves at variance with the opinions of\nothers, we are to make truth our object. A desire of the\ntruth is the first qualification in such inquiries. Neither\nacquirements, nor strength of natural talents can much avail\nus without a mind honest, and open to conviction. The\nopposite of the desire of the truth is a wish to decide the\nsubject of dispute in one way rather than another. The\nfoundation of such a preference of one result to another\nare in general prejudice, interest, and passion and these\nare the great enemies of truth. Whenever we are under\ntheir influence, we form a different estimation of facts and\nof other sources of evidence from what we should do un-\nder other circumstances and at such times they can hard-\nly fail to lead us to false results.\nWe have an illustration of the effects of a disputatious\nspirit, unconnected with any desire of the truth, among the\nSchoolmen. No persons seem to have been more skilled\nin the technical forms of argument. To dispute with\nreadiness and skill was considered among them a part of\neducation so valuable, that all possible pains were taken in\nsecuring this mental accomplishment. But the acquisition","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0298.jp2"},"299":{"fulltext":"RULES OF DEBATE. 293\n©f truth did not form any prominent part of their plan.\nThe subjects, about which they debated, were frivolous\nand the spirit, which animated them, utterly captious and\ndisingenuous. The testimony of John of Salisbury, a\nlearned man of the Scholastick ages, confirms this. He vis-\nited Paris in the year 1137, and attended upon the lectures\nof the famous Abelard and other masters, and made great\nadvancements in learning. A number of years afterwards\nhe returned to the place of his early studies, in order to\nconfer with his former associates, who yet remained there,\non the topicks, on which they had been used to converse.\nI found them (says he) the same men, and in the same\nplace nor had they advanced a single step towards resolv-\ning our ancient questions, nor added a single proposition,\nhowever small, to their stock of knowledge. Whence, I\ninferred, what indeed it was easy to collect, that dialectick\nstudies, however useful they may be when connected with\nother branches of learning, are in themselves barren and\nuseless.\n248^ Consider the importance of the subject\nIt was the fault of the Schoolmen, not only that they\ntoo much cherished a disputatious spirit, but that they\ndisputed upon subjects, which were in general of the\nmost trivial kind. Mr. Locke mentions, that they actually\nthought themselves to have succeeded in proving, that\nblack is white, and that white is black. And this may be\nreceived as a specimen of their exquisite inquiries, viz.\nWhether different colours, that is, different simple ideas, (a\nclass of ideas forming a part of our knowledge the most\nclear and distinct,) be not the same colours, or the game\nideas The example, which they set, in the selection of\nsuch subjects of debate, is to be avoided. Always debate\non subjects of some importance. But the specification of\nwhat constitutes importance, is not easily done. It may\nbe said, however, that there are some subjects, which pos-\nsess a general importance, viz. Such as concern the laws","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0299.jp2"},"300":{"fulltext":"294 RULES OF DEBATE.\nof nature and the principles of the human constitution the\nrights of man, the duties of a citizen, the sources of pros-\nperity in civil communities, c in general all philosophi-\ncal, moral, and political inquiries. There are a variety of\nother subjects, which are not of general importance, but\nare far from being of inconsiderable consequence to indi-\nviduals, since they concern their particular profession or\ncalling. Many subjects are of great moment to the phy-\nsician or the merchant, which are of less importance to the\nfarmer or mechanick. The importance of subjects, there-\nfore, is to be measured in some degree by their bearing\nupon those stations and duties, to which Providence has as-\nsigned us. And however wanting they may be in gener^\nal interest, no man is to be blamed for frequently discus?-\nsing them, when he is convinced, that such discussions\nwill conduce to greater skill in his appropriate calling,\nand, consequently, to increased success and usefulness,\n249. Of competency to enter into the discussion.\nIt is proper, before undertaking to discuss a question, to\npause, and make some inquiries into our ability for it. In-\ncompetency, or want of ability may be either owing to a\ndeficiency, in some way, of mental power, or it may be ow-\ning to our not having taken proper pains to inform our*-\nselves. Some may have too little talents and others, too\nlimited an acquaintance with facts. There is also another\nspecies of incompetency perhaps more frequent than either\nof these, viz. a too great personal interest in the decision.\nNothing more disturbs the just exercise of reasoning, and\ncauses perversion in our judgments, than this. And what\nrenders the evil of it the greater, persons are often under\ninfluence from this source, without being themselves fully\nawaie of it.1 Whenever any one has ground to believe, that\nhe is under any degree of bias of this kind, he should be\nmore careful in the examination of evidence, and exercise\nthe greater caution in general.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0300.jp2"},"301":{"fulltext":"RULES OF EEBJLTS. 295\n250. Care to be taken in stating and understanding\nthe question.\nOur desire of the truth and our adequacy for the dis-\ncussion of the question will not excuse us from a degree of\ncircumspection in the statement of the point in debate.\nIn the first place, the question is to be fairly stated.\nNo artifice here is to be allowed. The matter in contro-\nversy may be stated in such a way as to include in the very\nenunciation of it something taken for granted, which must\nnecessarily lead to a decision in favour of one of the op-\nponents. But this amounts to begging the question, a spe-\ncies of fallacy or sophism, upon which we shall again have\noccasion to remark. Sometimes the subject of discus-\nsion is stated so carelessly, that the true point at issue is\nwholly left out. It may be proper, therefore, in many cas-\nes to adopt the practice of special pleaders, and first t3 as-\ncertain all the points, in which the opponents agree, and\nthose in which they differ. And then they can hardly fail\nof directing their arguments to what is truly th subject of\ncontention.\nIn the second place, we should aim to have clear ideas\nof every thing stated in the question, which has an inti-\nmate connection with the point at issue. If the inquiry\nconcern some fact, we are to endeavour clearly to under-\nstand its nature, and then we can better judge of the weight\nof the evidence, which is made to apply to it. If the state-\nment affirm or deny any thing, in regard to the qualities or\nproperties of material bodies, it is incumbent upon us to\npossess as clear ideas as possible, both of the object in gen-\neral, and of those properties or qualities in particular.\nSimilar remarks will apply to other subjects of inquiry of\nwhatever kind.; As an illustration of these directions,\nwe will suppose, that the point in dispute is, Whether civ-\nil government originates from the people °l Here it is\nnecessary to understand what is meant by the word, gov-\nernment that is, whether it is meant to include in the term\nall the different kinds of government, such as monarchical\naristocratical, republican, c and to give it the most gen-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0301.jp2"},"302":{"fulltext":"fH06 jlUL£« OF DESATg.\neral meaning. The meaning of the word, originate, is alstf\nto be looked into. We are to know, whether the term, as\nhere used, implies or admits the validity of a tacit agree-\nment. In the inquiry, it will necessarily be admitted, that\nmany governments exist without any written or express\nagreement and still it may be urgently contended, that\nthey have originated by virtue of a tacit agreement.\nAgain, the question is, Whether some political measure\nis constitutional, or unconstitutional? Here we are to ob-\ntain precise ideas of the measure in debate, and also inform\nourselves of the terms or articles of the Constitution. The\ntaking of such precautions would often have prevented\ngreat waste of words, as well as undue indulgence of irri-\ntable feelings and would have often led more directly\nto the discovery of truth.\n251. Of simplicity of language in arguments.\nA brief remark here upon the dress or style, which is\nproper in arguments/ Let the word be suited to the idea,\nand be common without being vulgar and the con-\nstruction of the sentences, as much as possible, without ar-\ntifice. There is a sincerity, when the mind is earnestly\nbent upon the discovery of truth, which delights in plain-\nness of speech. This direction is especially necessary,\nwhen the force of an argument is meant not for ourselves\nonly, but for others also and when perhaps many of those,\nto whom it is meant to apply, have not had the advantage\nof much education. Men of exalted minds have seen the\npropriety of the course here pointed out, and have followed\nit. Martin Luther remarked, in defence of his plain and\ndirect way, that he had an eye on the multitude and an-\nother of his sayings, that logical power is the ability to\nteach, was an admirable commentary on the folly of the old\nScholastick methods.\nj 252. Ml trifling propositions to be avoided.\nFull of the subject, and bent, not so much upon putting\ndown your opponent, as the discovery of truth, avoid all","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0302.jp2"},"303":{"fulltext":"RULES OJT DEB AT J. SIT\ntrifling propositions. And such propositions are all those,\nwhich communicate no new information. Of trifling pro-\npositions the first class may be termed,\nIdentical propositions,— The proposition, whatever\nis, is, may be given as an instance. When examined, it\nwill be found to teach us nothing and although it was, in\nthe times of the Scholastick philosophy, employed as an\naxiom, and thought to be of much consequence in helping\nalong as a medium in argument, the proof, which it brings\nin any case whatever, amounts to no more than this, that\nthe same word may with certainty be predicated of itself.\nWhen we say that man is man, or that blue is blue, we re-\nceive as much information and as valuable, as when we\nsay, that whatever is, is that is, we know no more after-\nwards than we did before the enunciation of the proposi-\ntion. The same of all, which belong to this class.\nThere is a second class of trifling propositions, viz.\nThose, in which a part only of the complex idea is predica*\nted of the whole.\nHence to this class of propositions belong all those,\nwhere the genus is predicated of the species when, for\ninstance, it is said, that lead is a metal.\nWhen a person frames a proposition, it is supposed, that\nboth he and his opponent know the meaning of the terms\nof the proposition and, accordingly, if they know the mean-\ning of the term, lead, and what ideas are contained in it,\nit communicates no new information, either to the speak-\ner or to others, when it is asserted, that lead is a metal.\nSuch propositions, as these, Man is rational, Gold is\nyellow or fusible, are of this kind.\nWhen, on the contrary, we are told, that man has a\nnotion of God, or that man is cast into asleep by opium,\nwe then learn something, since the ideas here expressed\nare not contained in the word, man.\nA proposition, then, may be said to be instructive or to\nconvey information, when something is affirmed, which is\na necessary consequence of any complex idea, but is not\ncontained in it, and not otherwise. Take the following\nillustration The external angle of all triangles is great-\n•38","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0303.jp2"},"304":{"fulltext":"298 RULES OF DEBATE.\ner than either of the internal opposite an T es. Here there\nis some information communicated, since the relation of\nthe outward angle to either of the internal opposite angles,\ndoes not make a part of the complex idea conveyed by the\nword, triangle.\nThe second class of trifling propositions, when care-\nfully examined into, will be found to be essentially the same\nwith the first, although they have a little more the ap-\npearance of conveying knowledge.\nIn argument, when a word is employed with looseness\nand inconsistency, it is rightly considered to be a proper\nsubject of criticism, and may be fairly objected to and\nthe same liberty, and for the same reasons, may properly\nbe taken with those propositions, which are called trifling\nwhich have the appearance of carrying us onward in the\ninvestigation of a subject, but which, when truly estimat-\ned, leave us no wiser, than before we heard them.\n253. Judgments to be formed on evidence, not on effects*\nPersons, engaged in debate, should aim at the truth in\na fair and direct way and in doing this, they will find it\nimportant to regard another rule, viz. To be guided by\nevidence, rather than by consequences. We often imag-\nine it highly desirable, that the question should be found\nto terminate in one way, rather than in another. We ought\never to form an opinion according to the preponderance of\nevidence, whatever effects may be connected with the for-\nmation of such opinions. This rule is of consider-\nable consequence, when questions are agitated among per-\nsons, belonging to different political or religious parties.\nIf either of the disputants admits the sentiments of his op-\nponent, he commits and injures those interests, which he\nhas warmly espoused and this he is very unwilling to do.\nEspecially is this unwillingness manifest, when a person\nis called upon to decide on facts, which involve the char-\nacter of a friend. Whenever we are thus influenced, it\nis manifest, that truth is not the main object, and that we\nare ready to sacrifice it to personal interest and pre-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0304.jp2"},"305":{"fulltext":"RULES OF DEBATE. $99\nconceived views.- But, while our judgments should be\nformed wholly on the evidence, and not on the anticipated\nresults, a consideration of consequences may have an im-\nportant influence of this kind, viz. in making us more scru-\npulous and laborious in the examination of the subject be-\nfore us.\n254. Different sources of evidence on different questions.\nOne subject admits of the application of one species of\nevidence another subject admits of evidence of a differ-\nent kind. And the point under discussion should be look-\ned at in this point of view, in order to discover what spe-\ncies of evidence it admits. In demonstrations we have\nthe evidence of intuition, and the conclusions are certain.\nIn the examination of the properties of material bodies, we\nhave the evidence of the senses. In judging of those facts\nin the conduct of men, which have not come under our\nown observation, we must depend on testimony. Some\nsubjects admit only of the evidence of tradition, and in re-\nspect to others we have no other aid than analogy. And\nin others again the evidence is wholly made up of circum-\nstances.\nThe evidence, which exists in demonstrations, produ-\nces certainty that of the senses is the same, as far as it\ngoes. The evidence of testimony causes probability in a\ngreater or less degree, as the testimony is from one or\nmore, given by a person, who understands the subject, to\nwhich it relates, or not, c. Tradition, analogy, com-\nbinations of mere circumstances have their weight, some-\ntimes strongly influencing our judgments, and at others,\nonly in a small degree.\nDifferent kinds of evidence may be brought to bear up-\non the same subject, and if so, all are to have their due\nweight. Other subjects admit of only one but should not\nfail of being examined on that account. In some cases,\nadmitting of the evidence of circumstances merely, we\nmay arrive at a high degree of probability.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0305.jp2"},"306":{"fulltext":"300 RULES OF DEBATE,\n255. Sources of false judgments or sophisms*\nThere is a species of false reasoning, which we call a\nsophism. A sophism is an argument, which contains some\nsecret fallacy, under the general appearance of correctness.\n(1) Ignoratio elenchi, or misapprehension of the\nquestion, is one instance of the sophism. It exists, when the\narguments advanced do not truly apply to the point in\ndebate. Let it be supposed, that some person has found-\ned a literary institution. The question is, Whether he be\na man of learning, a scholar It is argued, that he is, in\nconsequence of having founded a seminary for scientifick\npurposes. Here we may deny the connection between the\npremises and the conclusion, although the argument is\nsomewhat specious because we know it to be the fact,\nthat many men of but small information have been the pa-\ntrons of science. That is, an argument is applied, which, it\nis supposed, would not have been brought forward, if there\nhad been a proper understanding of the import and spirit\nof the tueition, and of what was justly applicable to it.\n(2) Petitio pi incipii, or begging of the question, is\nanother instance of soph sm. This sophism is found,\nwhenever the disputant offers, in proof of a proposition, the\nproposition itself in other words. The following has been\ngiven as an instance of this fallacy in reasoning A per-\nson attempts to prove, that God is eternal, by asserting,\nthat his existence is without beginning and without end.\nHere the proof, which is offered, and the proposition itself,\nwhich is to be proved, is essentially the same. When we\nare told, that opium causes sleep, because it has a sopo-\nrifick quality, or that grass grows by means of its vegeta-\ntive power, the same thing is repeated in other terms.\nThis fallacy is very frequently practised and a little care\nin detecting it would spoil many a fine saying, and deface\nmany an elaborate argument. What is called arguing\nin a circle is a species of sophism very nearly related to the\nabove. It consists in making two propositions recipro-\ncally prove each other.\n(3) Non causa pro causa, or the assignation of a false","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0306.jp2"},"307":{"fulltext":"RULES OF DEBATE. 10 I\ncause. People are unwilling to be thought ignorant; rath-\ner than be thought so, they will impose on the credulity of\ntheir fellow men, and sometimes on themselves, by assign^\ning false causes of events. Nothing is more common,\nthan this sophism among illiterate people pride is not\ndiminished by deficiency of learning, and such people,\ntherefore, must gratify it by assigning such causes of events\nas they find nearest at hand. Hence, when the appearance\nof a comet is followed by a famine or a war, they are dis-\nposed to consider it as the cause of those calamities. If\na person have committed some flagrant crime, and shortly\nafter suffer some heavy distress, it is no uncommon thing\nto hear the former assigned, as the direct and the sole\ncause of the latter.\n(4) Another species of sophistry is called fallacu\naccidentis. Vie fall into this kind of false reasoning,\nwhenever we give an opinion concerning the general nature\nof a thing from some accidental circumstance. Thus, the\nChristian religion has been made the pretext for persecu-\ntions, and has in consequence been the source of much suf-\nfering but it is a sophism to conclude, that it is on the\nwhole, not a great good to the human race, because it has\nbeen attended with this perversion. Again, if a medicine\nhave operated in a particular case unfavourably, or, in an-\nother case, have operated very favourably, the universal\nrejection or reception of it, in consequence of the favoura-\nble or unfavourable result in a particular instance, would\nbe a hasty and fallacious induction of essentially the same\nsort. That is, the general nature of the thing is estimated\nfrom a circumstance, which may be wholly accidental.\n256.0/ adherence to our opinions.\nWhenever the rules laid down have been followed, and\njudgments or opinions have been formed on a careful and\ncandid examination of the evidence presented, those opin-\nions are to be asserted and maintained with a due degree\nof confidence. Not that a person is to set himself up for\ninfallible, and to suppose, that new accessions of evidence","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0307.jp2"},"308":{"fulltext":"302 RULES OF DEBATE.\nare impossible, or that it is an impossibility for him to have\nnew views of the evidence already examined. But a suit-\nable degree of stability is necessary in order to be respect-\ned and useful and, in the case supposed, such stability\ncan be exhibited without incurring the charge, which is\nsometimes thrown out, of doggedness and intolerance.\nIt is further to be observed, that we are not always to\nrelinquish judgments, which have been formed in the way\npointed out, when objections are afterwards raised, which\nwe cannot immediately answer. The person thus attack-\ned, can, with good reason, argue in this way I have\nonce examined the subject carefully and candidly the ev-\nidence, both in its particulars and in its multitude of bear-\nings, has had its weight many minute and evanescent\ncircumstances were taken into view by the mind, which\nhave now vanished from my recollection T, therefore, do\nnot feel at liberty to alter an opinion thus formed, in con-\nsequence of an objection now brought up, which I am un-\nable to answer but choose to adhere to my present judg-\nment, until the whole subject, including this objection,\ncan be re-examined.\nThis reasoning would in most cases be correct, and\nwould be entirely consistent with that love of truth and\nopenness to conviction, which ought ever to be maintained.\n!257. Influence of the practice of debating on the mind.\nThe art of debating, when pursued on proper princi-\nples, is undoubtedly one of the noblest of arts. The able\ndialectician, who is known to refuse the application of his\nability to any other, than what he deems good purposes,\nhas greater influence, than he, who commands armies.\nSuch men necessarily become leaders in the rising family\nof republickSj that is spreading over the face of the\nearth. But this art is not without its disadvantageous\nresults, ngainst which it is necessary, that the student should\nbe in some measure guarded. The results of dialecticks\nin the case of the Schoolmen have been already alluded to;\nand they have not always been of the most favourable n»-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0308.jp2"},"309":{"fulltext":"RULES of debate: 303\nture, when the art has been practised with better views\nand under better regulations. Whenever a person has\nbeen occupied a great portion of his life in debates in\ncourts of justice, or in legislative assemblies, or has from\nsome causes been much involved, in polemical controver-\nsies, which have called forth all his powers, it has frequent-\nly proved to be the case, that a character somewhat pecu-\nliar has been given to his mental operations. —To such\npersons we may give the name of professed debaters\nmeaning by the phrase those, who either from choice or\nthe pressure of circumstances, have been so much occupi-\ned in debating, as to prevent a suitable degree of attention\nto other parts of intellectual culture. The unfavourable\nresults, to which we allude, are these.\n(J.) The professed debater is not likely to take a broad\nview of a subject. Such has been his mental discipline,\nthat he too readily attaches himself to one side of an in-\nquiry, and proposes to defend it, without having sufficient\nreasons for so doing. There are many things, which can\nneither be positively affirmed nor denied cases, where the\ntrue statement is neither in the affirmative nor the nega-\ntive, as the question stands proposed but probably some-\nwhere between them. A person is said to take a broad\nview of a subject, who examines it in all its parts, weighs\nevidence with care, and settles upon that opinion of it,\nwhether affirmative, negative, or somewhere intermediate,\nwhich such careful examination of the evidence seems to\nhim to warrant.\n(2) The professed debater is inordinately tenacious of his\nopinions. The subject of an adherence to our opinions\nhas been already in some measure explained. Such adhe-\nrence was not considered blameworthy, except when car-\nried so far, as to be inconsistent with a preference of the\ntruth and a proper openness to conviction. But those per-\nsons, whom we have now in view, seize with a strong and\nmasculine hold on such points, as are favourable to the\nside of any question, which they may have espoused. They\nhave fallen into the habit of asserting their arguments with\nno small degree of confidence and are ready to believe","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0309.jp2"},"310":{"fulltext":"304 RfrLliS OF DEBATfi.\ntheir own assertions, made in the ardour of feeling, which/\nunder other circumstances, they would probably have\ndoubted. Having, therefore, been accustomed to de-\nfend their opinions, for so long a time, with much power\nof argument, and especially under the influence of excited\nfeeling, in consequence of which they have often imposed\nupon themselves, their minds have gradually acquired a\ntenacity, which cannot but appear ungenerous^ and repul-\nsive to men of candour.\nFurthermore, it has sometimes been remarked that\nprofessed debaters, who have been distinguished for their\nsuccess in controversy, have at last become sceptical, wav-\nering, full of uncertainty. They have so often disproved\nand put to flight the opinions, advanced by others, that\nthey have become suspicious, that truth is to be found no\nwhere. This chaFacteristick, which is not unaccountable,\nalthough quite different from the result just stated, may be\nillustrated by the influence, which his success in polemi-\ncal controversies is said to have had on the mind of Chil-\nlingworth. The contemporaries of Chillingworth have\nborne the most honourable testimony to his native candour.\nHe was at first undoubtedly desirous of learning the truth\nand without any undue inclination to scepticism, ready to\ngive to evidence of whatever kind its due weight. The\nconsequences, to which the training up of his vast powers\nto the sole art of disputation finally led, are stated by Lord\nClarendon. Mr. Chillingworth had spent all his younger\ntime in disputations and had arrived at so great a mastery,\nthat he was inferiour to no man in those skirmishes but\nhe had, with his notable perfection in this exercise, con-\ntracted sucli an irresolution and habit of doubting, that by\ndegrees he grew confident of nothing. Neither the\nbooks of his adversaries nor any of their persons, though\nhe was acquainted with the best of both, had ever made\ngreat impression on him. All his doubts grew out of him-\nself, when he assisted his scruples with all the strength of\nhis own reason and was then too hard for himself. But\nfinding as little quiet and repose in those victories, he\nquickly recovered by a new appeal to his own judgment","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0310.jp2"},"311":{"fulltext":"RULES OF DEBATE. 3©i\nso that, in truth, he was in all his sallies and retreats his\nown convert.\n258. Influence of the study of the Law.\nThese remarks may prove an useful hint to those youth,\nwho are entering upon the study of the Law. Mr. Burke\nhas said of this study, that it quickens and invigorates the\nmind more than all the other kinds of learning put togeth-\ner, but he is also of opinion, that it is not apt, except in\npersons very happily born, to open and to liberalize it,\nexactly in the same proportion. The observations, which\nhave already been made on the tendency of the practice of\ndisputation when carried to an extreme, go to confirm these\nremarks of Mr. Burke. There is this further remaining to\nbe said, concerning the practice of the law, that the mem-\nbers of this profession are constantly under the necessity of\nreferring to the provisions of the national constitution,\nto legislative enactments, and to court decisions. Hence\ntheir powers, however great, are fettered. They are com-\npelled by the circumstances, under which they act, to show\nhow the cause now under trial agrees or disagrees with\nprinciples already established, and with cases already de-\ncided upon. They are to measure the rectitude or want\nof rectitude in things by the standards already in existence,\nwithout having that liberty, which would be highly agreea-\nble to minds of a philosophick turn to institute inquiries\ninto right and wrong in the abstract.\nAnd what is another circumstance quite unfavourable\nto the exercise of a free and philosophick spirit, they are\napt to make references to legal decisions, legislative acts,\n,c. under the influence of that bias, to which they are\nexposed in consequence of their zeal in behalf of the re-\nspective litigants, whose cause they may have espoused.\nIf it be asked then, how happens it, that there are so\nmany men in the practice of the law, who not only possess\nthe power of making refined and acute distinctions, to-\ngether with wit and invention, but also in addition to these\nrequisites of the Forum, are candid and liberal, and are\ncapable, as any men whatever, of forming a discreet judg-\n39","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0311.jp2"},"312":{"fulltext":"306\nRULES OF DEBATE.\nment on any complicated concern the natural reply is,\nthat such men, aware of the tendency of their professional\ncontests, have guarded against it and, in the true spirit of\nan enlightened wisdom, have made a successful effort to\nkeep the mind free, liberal, and well balanced against the\ncontracting influence of their calling.\n259. Reasoners not always able to express themselves*\nFrom these views in respect to the members of the legal\nprofession and disputants in general, we naturally pass to\nthe consideration of a class of persons, who are unable to\nhold an argument in words, but are regarded as men of\ngood judgment, and, as will appear, are reasoners.\nHow does it happen, that persons possessing the most\njust and efficient understandings are incapable of stating\nthe grounds of their decisions to others wise, prompt and\nconsistent in their actions, but in their publick discourses\nobscure and perplexed\nThe English Protector, Oliver Cromwell was a person\nof this description. (See 184.) All accounts, says\nMr. Hume, agree in ascribing to Cromwell a tiresome, dark,\nunintelligible elocution, even when he had no intention to\ndisguise his meaning yet no man s actions were ever in\nsuch a variety of difficult cases, more decisive and judicious.\nMany of the most respectable and valuable men in our\nlegislative assemblies are persons, who are rarely heard in\ndebate. W hile they are known to possess reach of thought\nand correctness of judgment, they exhibit in publick dis-\ncussion little more than confusion and apparent inability.\nMr. Jefferson, author of the Declaration of American inde-\npendence, is declared by one of his illustrious associates,\nwho knew him well, to have been a silent member of the\nContinental Congress. And yet he had at that period the\nreputation of literature and science, and of being a happy\nwriter and lent great aid by his promptness and decision\non committees. Instances of this sort are not unfrequent.\nIn cases of this description, there is, (1) Great rapid-\nity of thought. The mind has been trained to rapid","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0312.jp2"},"313":{"fulltext":"RULES OF DEBATE. 807\nviews of subjects in all their bearings. The inability to\nspeak in publick does not arise from incompetency in the\nexamination of those minute circumstances, which enter\ninto our judgments of difficult cases. On the contrary,\nthese persons are found to give opinions, which may be re-\nceived with confidence, with more promptness, than very\nmany others.\n(2) There is, however, in such men, an inability to stop\nand analyze the current of thought.- They form their\nopinions with readiness and correctness, but when required\nto state the grounds of them, they are much at a stand\nthey fail in imparting to others the various circumstances,\nwhich led to their own convictions. Many of those finer and\nmore intricate suggestions, which had an influence on\ntheir conclusions, can no longer be retraced by the memo-\nry. So that their argument, when stated in words, is but\na series of propositions, poorly weighed and connected,\nmere membra disjecta, compared with the more admi-\nrable texture of sheir mental logick.\nThese remarks, we have already seen, are peculiarly\napplicable jo men in active life, who are almost constantly\nbeset with the calls of business. They are necessarily\nfrom their situation rather men of actions, than of words\ncalled upon in many cases to decide suddenly, and not in\ngeneral having leisure to form the habit of expressing\nthemselves with effect and clearness to others. But their\njudgments are entitled to respect, resembling, as has been\nremarked by Dugald Stewart, the professional tact, with\nwhich the medical practitioner estimates the symptoms of\na disease, or the intelligent eye-glance of the military en-\ngineer. An English officer, a friend of Lord Mansfield,\nwas appointed to the government of Jamaica. He ex-\npressed some doubts of his competency to preside in the\ncourt of chancery. Mansfield assured him, that he would\nnot find the difficulty so great, as he imagined. Trust,\nsaid he, to your own good sense in forming your opinions,\nbut beware of attempting to state the grounds of your\njudgments. The judgments will probably be right the\nargument will infallibly be wrong.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0313.jp2"},"314":{"fulltext":"308 RULES OF DEBATE,\n260. People may reason wrong but judge right,\nIt appears, then, that people may sometimes be wrong\nin their argument, but correct in their conclusion. We\nwould not have these expressions misunderstood. -All, that\nis intended, is, that an opinion may be given, which shall\nbe correct, being founded on that silent, intellectual pro-\ncess, which has been mentioned, while an attempt at a\nverbal statement of the argument would prove an evident\nfailure. In other words, the argument stated in language\nand the argument, as it exists in the mind, are not coined\ndent; there being chasms and inconsistencies in the for-\nmer, which did not exist in the latter.\nThis enables us to throw some light on a mental pecu-\nliarity in old people. Those, who are advanced in years\nand in the declination of their mental powers, very seldom\nenter into an argument. Still we regard them with rever-\nence, and receive their sententious sayings, as a species of\noracles. The opinion seems to have gained almost as wide\na reception in these days, as in the time of Job; With\nthe ancient is wisdom, and in length of days is understanding.\nOld men by a sort of necessity have formed that kind of\nintuitive tact, which we see in men much involved in the\nbusiness of active life. Owing to weakness of memory\nand a difficulty in fixing their attention, they find themselves\nunable to give a verbal statement of a considerable num-\nber of consecutive propositions, either satisfactory to them-\nselves, or to others. Their reasonings, therefore, are mere-\nly mental processes, leading them in general to conclu-\nsions, sufficiently just the conclusions only, and not the\npropositions leading to them being communicated to others.\nWe see here an explanation, why old people are so fond\nof an aphoristical method, or rather why they express\nthemselves so seldom in any other way, than by short say-\nings.\n261. Process of the mind in voting on Legislative\nand other subjects,\nA proposition in some national legislature, perhaps\nwhether the independence of some new formed republick","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0314.jp2"},"315":{"fulltext":"RULES OF DEBATE.\n309\nshall be acknowledged, is to be discussed. The votes are\ntaken and a majority of them are in favour of the acknowl-\nedgment of independence in the case proposed. Under\nthis general question, the acknowledgment of independ-\nence, it is easy to see, that there must be many subordinate\npropositions, having a connection more or less remote with\nthe general question.\nThe question we suppose to have been decided in the\naffirmative. Condorcet has expressed an opinion of this\nkind, that, if the vote were taken on every subordinate\nproposition, the decision might be directly the reverse, in\nthe negative, instead of the affirmative. But this intimation\nof Condorcet, there is reason to believe, in view of the re-\nmarks, which have been made, is incorrect.\nIn voting on the general question, every member thus\nvoting virtually gives his opinion also on every subordinate\ninquiry. There are perhaps five, eight, or ten minor sub-\njects, which it is important for him to examine he has ex-\namined them, andTiras in his own mind made up an opin-\nion on them. And the last opinion, the opinion on the\ngeneral question, may properly be considered the compar-\nison, combination, and the result of all the subordinate or\nminor decisions.\nThis is sometimes a very rapid mental process, so much\nso in some cases, as not to be remembered by the voter\nhimself. But, if he be an honest man and desirous to give\na judgment, which his own conscience would approve,\nsomething of this kind must have taken place.\n262. Notices of treatises on reasoning.\nThere are a few works in English, some of which will\nhere be mentioned, which may give some further instruc-\ntion on the subject of this, and of the two preceding chap-\nters.\nLocke s Conduct of the Understanding. The object of this\nwork is practical it is of less extent, as well of less value,\nthan his Essay. But it has a number of original and im-\nportant remarks on demonstrative and other forms of rea-\nsoning, on fallacies or sophisms, on the influence of prac-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0315.jp2"},"316":{"fulltext":"oH) RULES OF DEBATE.\ntice, on difference of natural talents, c. The book ex^\nhibits the characteristic!?: excellencies and defects of the\nwriter great originality, but want of method, and too\nmuch of irrelevant discussion and of repetition for the\neconomical habits of this busy age.\nWatts 1 Improvement of the Mind. Dr. Johnson remark-\ned in regard to this book, that he had perused it with great\npleasure, and further observed, that instructers might be\ncharged with deficiency in their duty, if they did not re-\ncommend it. No doubt the warm commendations of Dr.\nJohnson are in the main correct but it seems necessary\nto observe, that the writer has advanced some views on the\nphilosophy of the mind, which at the present day are re-\ngarded as quite inadmissible. For instance, we find the\nnotion, which was once prevalent, that ideas are pictures\nor images, that in memory these pictures are inscribed up-\non the brain, much the same as the impression of the seal\nis left upon the wax, and that the greater or less degree of\nreadiness in memory will depend on the greater or less\ndegree of rigidity in the cerebral fibres.\nGambler s Introduction to the Study of Moral Evidence.\nThis valuable treatise contains many useful directions re-\nlating to moral reasoning, and examines particularly the\nsubject of evidence it cannot fail to be interesting and\ninstructive to the student.\nThe Study and Practice of the Law considered in their va-\nrious relations to Society. This work, written in a series of\nletters, is ascribed to Sir James Mackintosh. The letters\nare addressed to the young and rising mind, without pro-\nfessing to add greatly to the stores of science. They re-\nmark on the duties in general, one owes to society, and is\nbound to perform suggest motives to great effort show\nthe distinction between the philosophy and the forms of\nlaw with a variety of observations on method in business,\non court pleadings, eloquence, imagination, c. The work\ncontains the suggestions of a phiiosophick mind, and is\nenlivened by eloquent passages.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0316.jp2"},"317":{"fulltext":"311\nCHAPTER TWENTY SECOND.\nOF MEMORY.\n263. Explanation of the faculty of memory.\nMemory is that power or susceptibility of the mind, from\nwhich arise those conceptions, which are modified by the\nrelation of past time. It is not a simple, but complex state\nof the intellectual principle, implying, (1) a conception of\nthe object, (2) the relation of priority in its existence.\nThat is, we not only have a conception of the object, but this\nconception is attended with the conviction, that it under-\nwent the examination of our senses, or was perceived by us\nat some former period.\nWhen we imagine, that we stand in the midst of a for-\nest, or on the top of a mountain, but are snug all the\nwhile in our own chimney corner, these pleasing ideas of\nwoods, and of skies painted over us, and of plains under our\nfeet, are mere conceptions. But when with these insulated\nconceptions, we connect the relation of time and they\ngleam upon our souls, as the woods, plains, and mountains\nof our youthful days; then those intellectual states, which\nwere before mere conceptions, become remembrances.\nAnd the susceptibility, which the mind possesses of these\nlatter complex states, is what usually goes under the name\nof the power or faculty of memory.\n264. Of differences in the strength of memory.\nThe susceptibility of remembrances is the common pri-\nvilege of all, and, generally speaking, it is possessed in\nnearly equal degrees. To each one there is given a suffi-\ncient readiness in this respect his ability to remember is\nsuch, as to answer all the ordinary purposes of life. But,\nalthough there is in general a nearly equal distribution of\nthis power, we find a few instances of great weakness and\nother instances of great strength of memory.\nIt is related of the Roman orator, Horterisius, by Seneca,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0317.jp2"},"318":{"fulltext":"2(12 tot MEMORY.\nthat, after sitting a whole day at a publick sale, he gave\nan account from memory, in the evening, of all things sold,\nwith the prices and the names of the purchasers, and that\nthis account, when compared with what had been taken in\nwriting by a notary, was found to be exact in every par-\nticular.\nThe following is an instance of strength of memory\nsomewhat remarkable. An Englishman, at a certain time,\ncame to Frederic the Great of Prussia for the express pur-\npose of giving him an exhibition of his power of recollec-\ntion. Frederic sent for Voltaire, who read to his majesty\na pretty long poem, which he had just finished. The En-\nglishman was present, and was in such a position, that he\ncould hear every word of the poem but was concealed\nfrom Voltaire s notice. After the reading of the poem\nwas finished, Frederic observed to the author, that the\nproduction could not be an original one as there was a\nforeign gentleman present, who could recite every word of\nit. Voltaire listened with amazement to the stranger, as\nhe repeated, word for word, the poem, which he had been at\nso much pains in composing and giving way to a momen-\ntary freak of passion, he tore the manuscript in pieces. A\nstatement, being made to him of the circumstances, mitigat-\ned his anger, and he was very willing to do penance for the\nsuddenness of his passion by copying down the work from\na second repetition of it by the stranger, who was able to\ngo through with it, as before.\nA great number of instances of this description are\nfound in the records of various individuals, but they must\nbe considered as exceptions to the general features of the\nhuman mind, the existence of which cannot be explained\non any known principles. As no one can tell, why one\noak on the mountains is tall and large, while its neighbour,\non the same soil and of the same description of trees, re-\nmains stinted and dwarfish so we find ourselves unable\nto give any philosophick explanation of such instances as\nhave been mentioned.\nBut there are also weak memories, so much so, as to be","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0318.jp2"},"319":{"fulltext":"OF MEMORY. 313\nproperly considered exceptions to the generally equal dis-\ntribution of this mental susceptibility. Individuals can be\nfound, from whose memory truths have passed away almost\nthe moment after they have been acquired and who, in\nthe management of the common concerns of life, discover\na forgetfulness extremely unfortunate and perplexing. In-\nstances of this kind are indeed not so frequently found\nrecorded as of an opposite description because it is more\npleasing and satisfactory to the literary annalist to record\nthe excellencies, than the defects of the mind.\n265. Power of memory in operating with numbers*\nThere have been some remarkable instances of mental\npower in operating with numbers One 63.) has been\nbefore stated. These instances differ from those, where a\ngood degree merely of natural talents has been improved by\nassiduous efforts. The combination of good natural abili-\nties and of long continued practice has wrought out for\nmany individuals usefulness, admiration, and fame. These\nworthy cases may be considered common others, like that of\nBuxton, a native of Derbyshire, Eng. are extraordinary. This\nsingular man had no education, not being able to write his\nname however, it is said, that he learnt the multiplication\ntable in his youth. He invented an unwieldy sort of no-\ntation, reckoning, after he had gotten beyond millions, by\ntribes, and by cramps a method, which probably no one\nelse has ever thought it worth while to employ. Among\nhis common operations in figures was that of multiplying\nfive or six figures by as many, or dividing as large sums,\nwithout pen, chalk, or slate, in as short time as the most\nexpert arithmeticians could do it with them. It is mention-\ned of him, as a well attested fact, that on a certain occa-\nsion he multiplied thirty nine figures by thirty nine figures*\nThis took him some time but when we remember, that\nthe operation was performed without slate, or paper, or\nany other aids of the kind, it is well worthy of admiration.\nThis person was capable of great abstraction of thought.\nIgnorant as he was, numbers had a peculiar charm for him*\n40","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0319.jp2"},"320":{"fulltext":"314 OF MEMORY.\nand he could pursue his calculations in the midst of noiie\nand company, as well as in solitude.\nOn the case of Jedediah Buxton, as well as on that\nabove referred to, and on others similar, two remarks are to-\nbe made and if these are not enough to explain them, it\nis to be hoped, that, in due season, further light may be\nthrown on these intellectual phenomena.\n(1) It appears, that in all such instances, the suscepti-\nbility of remembering numbers is very great. As to their\npower of remembrance in othar things, there seems to be\nbut little evidence, that they were anxious to make the tri-\nal. (2) There is a wonderful power of attention. They\nare capable of withdrawing their thoughts from other\nthings, and of fixing them, in a very high degree, on the\ncalculations, with which they are occupied. This ability\nof drecting the mind to one subject, exclusively of a regard\nto others, implies, of course, a strong feeling of interest or\ndesire and figures have for all these persons a charm, which\nis not possessed by any other signs of thought. These are\nthe prominent facts and many will think, nothing more\nneed be said.\nBut it is replied, that they perform their operations with\nvery uncommon rapidity. True so the expert accountant,\nwho makes no pretensions to any other readiness, than can\nbe acquired by practice, sums up in a minute a column of\nfigures, which would occupy another person an half an\nhour. The rapidity of their operations is to be chiefly at*\ntributed to habit.\nNote. We have known nothing more remarkable, than\nthe following instance. In the summer of 1812, a youth\nappeared in London about eight years of age, a native of\nthe United States. His education had been very limited,\nand like Jedediah Buxton, he was unacquainted both with\nwriting and cyphering. As the report of his being some-\nwhat of a prodigy was rapidly circulated, many persons,\nvery soon after his arrival in London, made it a point to\ncall and converse with him. It was found, that he could\ndetermine with the greatest ease and despatch the exact\nnumber of minutes or seconds in any given period of time.\nHe was able to tell the exact produet, arising from the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0320.jp2"},"321":{"fulltext":"MEMORY. 315\n266. Of exploded opinions in regard to memory.\nIt is fortunate, that, at the present day, there is such a\ngeneral disposition to apply the inductive method of reas-\noning, in attempting to ascertain the general facts or the\nlaws of our mental operations. In general, no one stops to\ninquire, how the mind operates, although that may be a\nproper inquiry when pursued on the inductive method, but\nwhat are its operations and free from the impatience of\nthose,who are continually offering hypotheses, we are requir-\ned to observe and to classify. It has not always been thus.\nMen have too often speculated, rather than examined and\nhave taken up with the mere suggestions of their fancies.\nWe have formerly been furnished with hypotheses in\nregard to the memory, as well as other acts of the mind not\nto say any thing of the hypotheses in respect to the gener-\nal nature of the mind itself. The following ar~ u deas\nof Malebranche, as they are found in his Search after Truth.\nHe supposes, that the soul has its residence in the\nbrain, and in a particular part of it. In every perception,\nwhich we have, and in all acts of the mind whatever, there\nare certain changes in the fibres of the part of the brain,\nwhere the soul resides. This being admitted, he assures\nus, that the nature of memory is explained. It is to be\nmultiplication of any number, which consisted of two,\nthree, or four figures, by any other number, made up of the\nlike number of figures. VVhen any number, consisting of\nsix or seven places of figures, was proposed to him, he was\nfound able to state, almost as soon as it was mentioned, all\nthe factors, of which it is composed. He could extract\nthe square and cube roots of numbers, as in the other eases,\nwithout the assistance of ink or pencil. He was asked the\nsquare root of 1 06,929, and before the number could be writ-\nten down, he immediately answered 327. Being required\nto give the cube root of 268,336,125, he replied with equal\npromptness 645.\nThis lad is said to have been a native of Vermont it does\nnot seem, that any thing further can with much safety be of-\nfered in explanation here, than has already been said in re-\nference to the other instances above given.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0321.jp2"},"322":{"fulltext":"316 OF MEMORY.\nremembered, that the fibres of the brain are bent at every\nnew perception. Now what do we find to be the fact,\nwhen the branches of a tree have been bent in a particular\ndirection, and especially, when they have continued so for\nsome time Evidently, that they acquire an aptitude to be\nbent anew after the same manner. In the same way, the\nfibres of the brain, having received certain impressions by\nthe course of the animal spirits, acquire a facility, or per-\nhaps we may say, a habit of receiving certain arrange-\nments. It is in this facility, that memory is said by Male-\nbranche to consist, since we always think of the same\nthings, when the brain receives the same impressions, and\nits fibres are similarly affected as at former times.\nThis hypothesis is somewhat different from that, men-\ntioned at page 310, as having been received by Dr. Watts.\nBut nothing, which is worthy to be called proof, has been\noffered in favour of either and they are mentioned, not\nbecause it is necessary to confute them, but because it may\nbe found profitable to know, what erroneous opinions have\nsometimes found their way into the belief of well-meaning\nand learned men. (See Malebranche s Search after Truth,\nBook II. chapter 5.)\n267. Of the effects of disease on the memory.\nBut however disposed we may be to reject such fanci-\nful hypotheses as those above alluded to, it seems to be\nwell established, that there is a connection of some kind\nbetween the mind and body. We rightly and fairly infer,\nthat there is such a connection, because there are a multi-\ntude of facts, which can be explained on no other supposi-\ntion but in what way, or to what extent it exists, it would\nbe worse than futile to assert, with the limited knowledge,\nwhich we at present possess. (See 94) The gener-\nal truth, however, that there is a connection of some sort\nbetween the mind and body, and, consequently, a recipro-\ncal influence, is confirmed, besides other sources of evi-\ndence, by some facts in respect to the memory. I have\nread, (says Dr. Beattie,) of a person, who, falling from the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0322.jp2"},"323":{"fulltext":"OF MEMORY. 317\ntop of a house, forgot all his acquaintances, and even the\nfaces of his own family and of a learned author, who, on\nreceiving a blow on the head by a folio dropping from its\nshelf, lost all his learning, and was obliged to study the al-\nphabet the second time. He further remarks, that he was\nhimself acquainted with a clergyman, who was attacked\nwith a fit of apoplexy. After his recovery, he was found\nto have forgotten all the transactions of the four years im-\nmediately preceding, but remembered as well as ever what\nhad happened before that period. The newspapers, which\nwere printed during the period mentioned, were read\nwith interest, and afforded him a great deal of amusement,\nbeing perfectly new. Thucydides, in his account of\nthe plague of Athens, makes mention of some persons, who\nsurvived that disease but their bodily sufferings had af-\nfected their mental constitution, so that they had no recol-\nlection of their own former history, had forgotten their\nfriends, and every thing else.\nFrom many instances of this kind, and from others,\nwhich go to prove, that the state of the mind, on the other\nhand, often has a very perceptible effect on the bodily\nfunctions, it may justly be inferred, that there is a connec-\ntion existing between the mind and body, and that a recip-\nrocal influence is exercised. But what that precise con-\nnection is whether it be limited, on the part of the body,\nto the brain on what it depends in what ways it is mod-\nified are inquiries, which cannot be satisfactorily answer-\ned at present, whatever hypotheses may be proposed.\nWhy a fever, or an attack of apoplexy, or a removal of a\npart of the brain, or an inordinate pressure of it, which\nare effects on the body, should affect the mind, a spiritual\nsubstance, which is supposed to be essentially different\nfrom matter, no one is able to say. The fact, however,\nthat such a reciprocal connection exists, suggests a reason\nfor a due degree of attention to the physical system. The\nimportance of a healthy and vigorous constitution of the\nbody, as being very nearly connected with a correspond-\ning health and vigour of the intellectual principle, should\n#ver be remembered by those in the pursuit of knowledge.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0323.jp2"},"324":{"fulltext":"318 OF MEMORY.\n368. Suggestions on the ultimate restoration of thought\nIt is said to have been an opinion of Lord Bacon, that\nno Thoughts are lost, that they continue virtually to exist,\nand that the soul possesses within itself laws, which, when-\never fully brought into action, will be found capable of\nproducing the prompt and perfect restoration of the collec-\nted experiences of its whole past existence. This opinion\nseems to be adopted in an article on the laws of associa-\ntion in Biographia Literaria of S. T. Coleridge. By\nlooking at 98, it will be seen, that various facts may be\nbrought forward, going to show, that this opinion, which\ninvolves the most important moral consequences, may have\nsome foundation. The subject is suggested here, in conse-\nquence of the remarks in the last section, on the reciprocal\ninfluence of mind and body; it appearing beyond doubt,\nthat in certain conditions of the body, especially when the\nbrain is much affected, some of the laws of the mind un-\ndergo a vast increase both in strength and rapidity of oper-\nation. But as intellectual philosophy can never become\nthe true metaphysicks, the true first philosophy,\nwithout a continual recurrence to facts and careful induc-\ntions from them, we take this opportunity to insert the sub-\nstance of a statement to be found in the Biographia of the\nlast mentioned writer. It is a statement of some facts,\nwhich became known to him, in a tour to Germany in 1798.\nIn a Catholick town of Germany, a young woman of\nfour or five and twenty, who could neither read nor write,\nwas seized with a nervous fever, during which she was in-\ncessantly talking Greek, Latin, and Hebrew, with much\npomp and distinctness of enunciation. The case attracted\nmuch attention, and many sentences, which she utter-\ned, being taken down by some learned persons pre-\nsent, were found to be coherent and intelligible, each\nfor itself, but with little or no connection with each\nother. Of the Hebrew only a small portion could be tra-\nced to the Bible the remainder was that form of Hebrew,\nwhich is usually called Rabbinick. Ignorant, and simple,\narid harmless, as this young woman was known to be, no","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0324.jp2"},"325":{"fulltext":"OF MEMORY. 319\none suspected any deception and no explanation could\nfor a long time be given, although inquiries were made for\nthat purpose, in different families, where she had resided,\nas a servant. Through the zeal, however, and philo-\nsophical spirit of a young physician, all the necessary in-\nformation was in the end obtained. The woman was of poor\nparents, and at nine years of age had been kindly taken to\nbe brought up by an old Protestant minister, who lived at\nsome distance. He was a very learned man being not\nonly a great Hebraist, but acquainted also with Rabbinical\nwritings, the Greek and Latin Fathers, c. The passages,\nwhich had been taken down in the delirious ravings of the\nyoung woman, were found by the physician precisely to\nagree with passages in some books in those languages,\nwhich had formerly belonged to him. But these facts\nwere not a full explanation of the case. It appeared on\nfurther inquiry, that the patriarchal protestant had been in\nthe habit for many years of walking up and down a passage\nof his house, into which the kitchen door opened, and to\nread to himself, with a loud voice, out of his favourite\nbooks. This attracted the notice of the poor and igno-\nrant domestick, whom he had taken into his family the\npassages made an impression on her memory and many\nyears afterwards, when her body was racked with pain, and\nher brain burning with a fever, they were vividly restored\nto her recollection, and were uttered in the way, which\nhas been mentioned.\nFrom this instance, and from several others of the same\nkind, which Mr. Coleridge asserts can be brought up, he\nis inclined to educe the following positions or inferen-\nces. (1) Our thoughts may, for an indefinite time, ex-\nist, in the same order, in which they existed originally, and\nin a latent or imperceptible state. (2) As a feverish\nstate of the brain, (and of course any other peculiarity in\nthe bodily condition,) cannot create thought itself, nor\nmake any approximation to it, but can only operate, as an\nexcitement or quickener to the intellectual principle it\nis, therefore, probable, that all thoughts are, in themselves,\nimperishable.- (3) In order greatly to increase the pow _","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0325.jp2"},"326":{"fulltext":"320 ©F MEMORY.\ner of the intellect, he supposes it would require only a dif-\nferent organization of its material accompaniment.\n(4) And, therefore, the presentation of the dread book of\nfinal judgment may be no other, than the investment of\nthe soul with a celestial instead of a terrestrial body and\nthat this may be sufficient to restore the perfect record of\nthe multitude of its past experiences. He supposes, it\nmay be consistent with the nature of a living spirit, that\nheaven and earth should sooner pass away, than that a\nsingle act, or thought, should be loosened and effectually\nstruck off from the great chain of its operations.\nIn giving these conclusions, the exact language of the\nwriter has not been followed, but the statement made will\nbe found to give what seems to have been his meaning.\nThese conclusions afford materials for reflection the just-\nness of them is to e determined by a consideration of the\nfacts, on which they are founded. Similar facts, or rather\nfacts, leading to similar conclusions, were mentioned at\n98 and taken together, they undoubtedly show, that the\nmind, in consequence of alterations even in the material\nsystem merely, with which it is here connected, may be\nrendered susceptible of an augmentation of power and\nquickness in its operations, which at first sight seems in-\nconceivable. It is, therefore, not impossible, that thoughts\nmay hereafter be recalled, which we now imagine to be\nnot only forgotten, but utterly lost it is not impossible,\nthat, at some future time, our past life may be reanimated,\nrealizing in us not only a resurrection of the body, but a\nresurrection also of the multiplied acts of the soul.\n269. Memory of the uneducated.\nThere is a peculiarity in the memories of uneducated\npeople, of mcchanicks, formers, day-labourers, and of all\nothers, who, from the pressure of their particular callings,\nmay have had but little means of mental culture. This\npeculiarity is seen in their great readiness in the recollec-\ntion of places, times, arrangements in dress and in build-\nings, local incidents, c. In their narrations they will be\nfourid to specify the time of events; not only the year, but","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0326.jp2"},"327":{"fulltext":"of MEMoar. 321\nthe month, and day, and in their description of persons\nand places are not less particular. This trait in the men-\ntal character of* this class of people seems to have arrested\nthe notice of Shakespeare.\nMrs. Quickly, in reminding Sir John FalstafF of his\npromise of marriage, discovers her readiness of recollec-\ntion in the specification of the great variety of circumstan-\nces, under which the promise was made. —Thou didst\nswear to me on a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in my Dolphin cham-\nber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, on Wednesday in\nWhitsun week, when the prince broke thy head, for likening\nhim to a singing man of Windsor, c. The coachman\nin Cornelius Scriblerus gives an account of what he had\nseen in Bear-garden Two men fought a prize one was\na fair man, a serjeant in the guards the other black, a butcher\nthe serjeant had red trousers, the butcher blue they fought up-\non a stage about four o clock, and the serjeant wounded the\nbutcher in the leg.\nThe explanation of this peculiarity of memory in com-\nmon people is this. It will be kept in mind, that our\nremembrances are merely conceptions, modified by rela-\ntions of past time. Removing then the modification of\npast time, and the remaining element of our remembran-\nces will be conceptions. Our conceptions cannot be call-\ned up by a mere voluntary effort, because to will the exis-\ntence of a conception necessarily implies the actual exist-\nence of the conception already in the mind. Our concep-\ntions, therefore, arise in the mind on the principles of asso-\nciation or simple suggestion. We come, then, directly\nto the fact, which explains that peculiarity or characteris-\ntick of memory, of which we are speaking.\nThe knowledge, which is possessed by persons of very\nsmall education, will be found to be connected together\nby the most obvious and easy principles of association for\ninstance, contiguity in place and time. These people have\nbeen very much, we may say chiefly, in the practice of as-\nsociating those things, which happened at the same time,\nor were proximate in position. It may be thought, that\nmere time and place are very unimportant relations, but\n41","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0327.jp2"},"328":{"fulltext":"322 OF MEMORY.\nhowever that may be, they most strongly seize the notice\nof persons of small education and by means of them, their\noverflowing multitude of remembrances is kept in place.\nHaving by almost constant exercise greatly strengthened\nthe tendency to those associations, which exist in conse-\nquence of mere contiguity, they can very readily tell you,\nnot only the precise place,where any thing has happened, but\nalmost every thing, which has happened in the immediate\nneighbourhood not only the time, when the event occur-\nred, but many other things, which occurred about the same\nperiod. (See in connection with these remarks, 158.)\n270. Memory of men of philosophick minds.\nFrom speaking of the power of remembrance in the\nuneducated, we naturally turn to persons of a reflecting,\nand philosophick mental character, It has often been re-\nmarked of such, that they discover want of readiness of\nrecollection. The servant in the family of the philoso-\npher will be likely to know much more about the fields,\nand fences, and cattle of the neighbours will be more\nminutely acquainted with their individual dress, and man-\nners, and habits, than the philosopher himself. More than\nthis, he has an aptness, an ability at remembering things of\nthis nature, which his philosophick master evidently does\nnot possess. Again, we suppose a battle to have been\nfought persons of limited intellectual culture will tell you\nthe precise day of the month, the exact number of troops,\nthe names of the regiments, the amount of killed and wound-\ned, and many trifling incidents of individuals, whether sol-\nemn or ludicrous, which are fitted subsequently to enliven\nthe narrations of the fireside. But the philosopher, who has\nread the same accounts, does not remember these particu-\nlars, and finds it a very difficult thing to do it. But we\nperceive, that his mind has been profitably employed in\nreflections on the causes of the battle, on various striking\ndevelopements of human character in its heat and bustle,\nand on its effects upon the happiness, or misery of families,\nand nations.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0328.jp2"},"329":{"fulltext":"OF MEMORY. 323\nMany have imagined, that the memory of the uneduca-\nted, because it deals so much in minute particulars, is in-\ntrinsically stronger, than of others. It is, no doubt, to the\nmultitude a more imposing species of memory, and admi-\nrably answers the purpose of those, in whom it appears.\nBut mere contiguity in time and place, which is almost the\nsole principle that binds together events in the recollec-\ntion of such persons, is of but small consequence in the\nestimation of the philosopher. He looks more deeply into\nthe nature of things their mere outward and incidental\ncircumstances do not particularly arrest his attention and\nconsequently his knowledge is connected together by less\nobvious and ready, but more important principles, such as\nanalogy, cause and effect.\n271. Of the memory of the aged.\nA defect of memory is often noticed in persons, who\nare advanced in years. Very few retain those powers of\nrecollection, which they possessed in earlier days. Age,\nsays Ossian, is now on my tongue, and my soul has failed\nmemory fails on my mind.\nThe failure of this mental susceptibility in the aged\nseems to be owing to two causes, viz. the impaired state\nof the organs of perception, and a defect of attention.\n(1) Their organs of external perception are impaired.\nWe find it difficult, in consequence of the failure of\ntheir sense of hearing, to converse with people, advanc-\ned in years, and it requires a great effort, both in our part\nand theirs, to make them understand what we say. The\n.most conclusive arguments, and flashes of wit, and rich\nstrains of musick have in a great measure ceased to excite\nin them any interest. There is a like failure of the sense\nof seeing also. They no longer take pleasure in the de-\nlightful aspects of creation and the waving forest, and the\ngay beams of the sun, although they have not ceased to\nhave charms for others, have none for them. All the\nother senses fail of their wonted operation in the same way;\nand the natural and necessary consequence is, that the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0329.jp2"},"330":{"fulltext":"*24 OF MEMORT.\nideas, which are let in by the senses, make but a very fee-\nble impression, and are almost immediately erased from the\nmind.\n(2) The second cause of the weakness of memory, of which\nold people complain, is a defect in attention. That mental\nexercise, to which we give the name of attention, always\nimplies desire, an emotion of interest and without an emo-\ntion of this description, it cannot exist. But the world,\n(including in the term what is beautiful in nature, and\nwhat is important in the duties and callings of life,) has at\nlast ceased to excite the emotions, which it formerly awak-\nened. The aged are like the prisoner, released, in the\nperiod of the French revolution, from the Bastille they\nfind themselves, as it were, in a new creation, which pas-\nses before them with great indistinctness, and with which\nthey feel but little sympathy. And why should it be\nthought unnatural, that they should neglect in some meas-\nure that scene of things, which has already learnt to forget\nand to neglect them 9 As their organs of external per-\nception have failed them, and there has also been a defect\nof attention, the memory, as a natural consequence, has\nbecome powerless and broken.\nIt should, however, be remarked here, that, notwith-\nstanding what has been said, aged people often recal, with\ngreat readiness and precision, the feelings and the incidents\nof their youth. As when a man, who has been greatly\nprospered, but who at last meets with sudden and disastrous\nreverses of fortune, finds, in this new state of things, his\nobsequious attendants fleeing away and turning against\nhim, while only a few early friends remain unmoved in\nevil and good report so early feelings and early associa-\ntions appear to cling with a faithful fondness to the shat-\ntered intellects of the aged. The old soldier, who had\na share in the American Revolution, will sit down by his\nfireside and describe with great particularity the scenes,\nwhere he toiled and bled, and yet be qtiite unable to give\nan account of the incidents of the preceding week.\nThe explanation of this trait in the mental aspects of\nthe aged seems to be this. As a general statement, our","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0330.jp2"},"331":{"fulltext":"OF MEMORY. 32\nearly feelings and our early associations are the strongest.\nThat they should be so is not strange, since we have then\nentered on a state of things, which, in its essential features,\nis new, and which, in all its diversities of duty, and plea-\nsure, and danger, attracts, and excites us by continual nov-\nelty. W ho can forget the plains, where he wandered in\nearly life Who can erase from his recollection the asso-\nciates of those days of wonder, activity, and hope Who\ncan obliterate from his heart his toils, and his sufferings,\nand his joys, all which assumed a peculiar emphasis and\nimportance, being connected with future prospects, the\nadversities and the successes of after life —These things\nremain, while others vanish. Such feelings, so deeply\nfixed in the mind, and bound together and made perma-\nnent by the strength of a mutual association, are frequent-\nly recalled they recur to the soul in the activity and bus-\ntle of life, and in those more favoured moments, when it is\ngiven up to silent and solemn meditations. .The effect of\nthis frequent recurrence can easily be imagined. The\nearly impressions, which are the subjects of such recur-\nrence, become in time, if one may be allowed the expres-\nsion, a part of the mind itself; they seem to be woven into\nits existence. Hence old men, who have no eye and no hear-\ning for the events, that are passing around them, repeat,\nwith the greatest animation, the stories of scenes, and ac-\ntions, and friendships of fifty years ago.\n£72. Memory of persons of a rich imagination.\nIt is a remark of Dr. Watts, that a fine genius is often\nfound to have but a feeble memory. By a fine genius he\nprobably understood what we commonly mean by a person\nof a rich imagination that is, one, who is furnished with\na rich store of images, has readiness in the perception of\ntheir congruity or incongruity with each other, and of\ncourse has great power in the formation of various new\ncombinations.\nSuch a person finds a luxuriance of wealth in himself.\nHe is continually and happily entertained with the new\npictures, which his imagination creates. Hence he does","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0331.jp2"},"332":{"fulltext":"326\nOr MEMORY.\nnot so much entertain himself with outward events many\nfacts, which are particularly noticed and retained by oth-\ners, pass by him unregarded and, therefore, quickly es-\ncape from his remembrance. Montaigne 7.) seems\nto have been a person of this description acquainted with\nthe general principles of the sciences, possessing an exu-\nberance of intellectual riches, but utterly incapable of re-\nmembering dates, times, places, and the numerous matters-\nof-fact of every day 5 s occurrence.\nWeakness of memory in persons of a rich imagination\nis discovered also in their reading of books. The reason\nof it seems to be a too great confidence in their own abili-\nty. Conscious of their own resources, they are tempted to\nperuse books in a hasty and careless manner, and without\ndue attention. The result of this careless manner, both in\nrespect to events and the sentiments of authors, is that they\nare but imperfectly known at first, and are very speedily\nforgotten. This will not appear strange, in connection\nwith the remarks at 1 75, on the connection existing be-\ntween memory, and attention. The weakness of memory,\ntherefore, in persons of rich imagination is not constitution-\nal and permanent, but a matter of mere accident and, for\nthis reason, the more discreditable. When such persons have\nhabitually taken an interest in the common affairs of life,\nthey are found to remember their details, however unpoet-\nical and in their reading of authors nothing seems to be\nwanting, but interest and attention, in order to secure them\nfrom the reproach, under which they are thought to labour.\n273. On the compatibility of strong memory and\ngood judgment.\nBy judgments we in general understand nothing more\nthan the opinions, which we form in view of evidence in\nother words, they are the results or conclusions of moral\nreasoning. By a person of good judgment, we generally\nmean one, who examines subjects with caution, and whose\nresults, founded on such examination, for the most part,\nprove correct. That persons may possess, in a very high\ndegree, the susceptibility of memory, and still be incapable","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0332.jp2"},"333":{"fulltext":"OF MEMORY. Ml\nof correct moral reasoning, or of exhibiting any other indi-\ncations of a well judging mind, is a fact well known-\nThere have even been idiots, who certainly could present\nno claims to the character of judging well, that have, nev-\nertheless, been remarkable for memory. Such are, indeed,\ninstances of an extreme kind however, there are not\nwanting many other cases, where strong memories have\nbeen found united with feeble judgment. On this fact, it\nmay be remarked, as follows.\nThe connection between a strong memory and a weak\njudgment, it may be said without any hesitation, is not\nnecessary, but merely accidental that is, is not the constitu-\ntion of nature, but in general the result of circumstances.\nAs it is an accidental state of things, and not any thing\nessential and permanent in our mental structure, we must\nlook for its appropriate cause in erroneous mental disci-\npline. It may well be supposed, that, those, who pos-\nsess strong memories, are not insensible of their excellence\nin this respect and the approbation, which they have re-\nceived in consequence of it, encourages them to treasure\nup a dry collection of all facts, which will, in any way, bear\nrepetition. Dates, genealogies, local incidents, tradition-\nal anecdotes, are all seized, and retained with peculiar\navidity. But too much intent upon the mere dates and\nnames of things, such persons fail to inquire into their true\nnature they neglect other and more important forms of\nmental discipline and thus justly sustain the reputation\nof possessing a showy, rather than discriminating and sound\nknowledge. In instances of this description, the relations,\nby which the suggested trains of thought are associated, are\nthe more slight and obvious ones, such as of time, place, c.\nBut there are some exceptions to this unwise course\nindividuals may be found, who, with an astonishing ability\ntorecal the most unimportant incidents of daily occurrence,\nas well as the dry details of historical facts, combine the\nfar more enviable ability of discriminating the true differ-\nences of things, of combining means for the attainment of\nends, and of rightly estimating evidence in its various ap-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0333.jp2"},"334":{"fulltext":"32*$ of MEMORY.\nplications which are among the characteristic^ of titetf\nof sound judgment.\n274. Intentional memory or recollection.\nThe definition of memory, which has been given, is,\nthat it is the power or susceptibility of the mind, from\nwhich arise those conceptions, which are modified by the\nrelation of past time. This definition necessarily resolves\nmemory in good part into association, or what Mr. Brown\nhas preferred to term suggestion. It is, therefore, to be\nhere observed, that our trains of associated thought are not\nvoluntary that is, are not directly under the control of\nthe will. They come and depart, without it being possi-\nble for us to exercise any thing more, than an indirect gov-\nernment over theni. (See 173.) It follows from these\nfacts, that our remembrances also are not voluntary or,\nin other words, it is impossible for us to remember in con-\nsequence of merely choosing to remember. To will or to\nchoose to remember any thing implies, that the thing in\nquestion is already in the mind and hence there is not\nonly an impossibility resulting from the nature of the mind,\nbut also an absurdity, in the idea of calling up thought by\nvolition. Our chief power, therefore, in quickening and\nstrengthening the memory, will be found to consist in our\nskill in applying and modifying the various principles or\nlaws of association. And this brings us to a considera-\ntion of what is called intentional memory or recollection;\na subject, which was partly illustrated in the section above\nreferred to.\nWhenever we put forth an exercise of intentional mem-\nory, or make a formal attempt to remember some circum-\nstance, it is evident, that the event in general, of which\nthe circumstance when recalled will be found to be a part,\nmust have previously been an object of attention. That\nis, we remember the great outlines of some story, but can\nnot, in the first instance, give a complete account of it,\nwhich we wish to do. We make an effort to recal the cir-\ncumstances not remembered in two ways. We may, in\nth first place, form different suppositions, and sec, which","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0334.jp2"},"335":{"fulltext":"OF HEMOItT.\n32$\nagrees best with the general outlines the general features\nor outlines of the subject being detained before us, with a\nconsiderable degree of permanency, by means of some\nfeeling of desire or interest. This method of restoring\nthoughts is properly an inference of reasoning.\nvVe may, in the second place, delay upon those thoughts,\nwhich we already hold possession of; and revolve them in\nour minds until, aided by some principle of association,\nwe are able to lay hold of the particular ideas, for which\nwe were searching. Thus, when we endeavour to recite\nwhat we had previously committed to memory, but are at\na loss for a particular passage we repeat, a number of\ntimes, the concluding words of the preceding sentence.\nIn this way, the sentence, which was forgotten, is very fre-\nquently recalled.\n275. Instance illustrative of the preceding.\nWe had occasion, in -a former section, to mention\nthe case of an individual, who, in consequence of an attack\nof apoplexy, forgot all the transactions of the four years\nimmediately preceding. It is further to be observed here,\nthat the same individual recovered by degrees all he had\nlost so as nfter a while to have nearly or quite as full a\nremembrance of that period, as others. In this instance\nthe power of the principles of association appears to have\nbeen at first completely prostrated by the disease, without\nany prospect of their being again brought into action, ex-\ncept by some assistance afforded them. This assistance,\nno doubt, was reading and conversation. Bv reading old\nnewspapers and by conversation, he, from time to time,\nfell upon ideas, which he had not onlj been possessed of\nbefore, but which had been associated with other ideas,\nforming originally distinct and condensed trains of thought.\nAnd thus whole series were restored. Other series again\nwere recovered by applying the methods of intentional\nrecollection that is, by forming suppositions and com-\nparing them with the ideas already recovered, or by con-\ntinually revolving in mind such trains as were restored*\nand thus rousing up others. Such, we can hardly doubt,\n42","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0335.jp2"},"336":{"fulltext":"330 01 MEMORY,\nto have been, in the main, the process, by which the per-\nson, of whom we are speaking, recovered the knowledge,\nhe had lost.\nThese views, in addition to what has now been said\nmay be illustrated also by what we sometimes observe in\nold men. Question them as to the events of early life\nand at times, they will be unable to give any answer what-\never. But whenever you mention some prominent inci-\ndent of their young days, or perhaps some friend, on whom\nmany associations have gathered, it will often be found,\nthat their memory revives, and that they are able to state\nmany things, in respect to which they were previously silent.\n276. Marks of a good memory.\nThe great purpose, to which the faculty of memory i\nsubservient, is, to enable us to retain the knowledge, which\nwe have from our experiences, for future use. The marks\nof a good memory, therefore, are these three, viz. Facility\nin receiving ideas, tenacity in retaining them, and readi-\nness in bringing them forward, on necessary occasions.\nFirst of facility in receiving ideas. We frequent-\nly find this characteristick of a good memory in persons of\nsmall education and it is not incompatible with a very\nlimited genius. For whatever else may be said, it can\njustly be observed, that the abundance of a man s remem-\nbrances does not necessarily prove him, either a learned\nman, or of a philosophick turn. Still the trait is a valua-\nble one, considered in itself. The intellectual habits of\npersons of small education, and the methods, which they\nfollow, in retaining their knowledge, have been before par-\ntially explained. It is not, therefore, wonderful, that they\nshould exhibit great facility in the reception of ideas of\nremembrance, inasmuch as they deal almost wholly with\nthe outside or surface of things, not only seizing upon their\nobvious and obtrusive appearances, but connecting them\ntogether by the most obvious laws of association.\nSecond of power of retaining ideas. Memories,\nwhich have great facility in the reception, are sometimes\nvery tenacious of what they h^ve gotten but most com-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0336.jp2"},"337":{"fulltext":"OF MEMORY. 331\nmonly the latter quality characterizes the memory of a\ndifferent class of people we mean persons of reflection,\nwho deal more with principles than facts, except when facts\nare brought forward to confirm and illustrate principles.\nThird of readiness in producing what is remember-\ned. In general those persons, who possess great facili-\nty in the reception of ideas, are no less ready in calling\nthem into service, when occasion offers. It is not com-\nmon to find them at a loss. But, as their thoughts are\nconnected together by slight and casual relations, they of-\nten succeed each other in a disorderly and irregular man-\nner. For the most part, they are found to have ideas\nenough, and words enough but it is not so evident, that\nwhat they have to say is always suitable to the occasions,\non which it is produced. These persons, however, often\ngive an interest and a variety to common conversation,\nwhich it is very difficult for minds of a higher order to\ndo. The latter class of person^ have reduced the par-\nticulars of their knowledge to principles it is, therefore,\nfirmly fixed, and cannot be readily wrested from them\nbut principles cannot be so easily brought forward on or-\ndinary occasions, nor are they found to be so attractive and\nacceptable with the multitude, as facts. The incidents of\na murder, when the story is well told, arrest the attention\nof the great mass of people much more strongly, than a\nphilosophical dissertation on the nature and aggravation of\nthe crime.\n277. Of the advantages of this faculty.\nBut whether we have a memory, possessing more or less\nof those marks, which belong to it, as it exists in its high-\nest state of perfection it is a faculty always securing to\nus inestimable benefits. As there could not be any\ncomparison of our ideas without it, it is, in the first place,\nthe foundation of the greatest part of our knowledge and\nwithout its assistance the human mind would necessarily\nbe sunk into the lowest form of idiocy. And, secondly,\nthe susceptibility of remembrances is not only necessary\nt© us as intpJJectvcfl, but also as moral beings. Without","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0337.jp2"},"338":{"fulltext":"33£ OF MEMORY.\nmemory we should certainly be incapable of gratitude for\nkindnesses received. We should be incapable of esteem,\nwhich is founded on a view of a variety of acts and quali-\nties; aqd be destitute also of many other moral judgments\nand emotions.\n278. Means of improving the memory.\nBut if this faculty be so exceedingly important, it be-\ncomes us to consider in what way it may be improved. On\nthis point the following dirjttions are particularly worthy\nto be fol c wed.\n(1) We are, in the first place, to make a selection among\nthe particulars of our knowledge. It is unwise to try to\nremember every thing. A mem ry thus loaced may be\ncompared to what Milton calls the Fathers, a drag-net,\nwhich comes floating down to us on the stream of time,\nand bearing articles of m st disproportionate value, shells\nand shell-fish, jewels and pebbles, sticks and straws, sea-\nweeds and mud. It is i np rtant, therefore, to distinguish\nthings aright; and in the mulntu !e of particulars of grea-\nter and less value, to retain those only, which are of some\nreal worth.\n(2) Wi are to refer our hioiule ige, as much as possible,\nto general principles. To refer our knowledge to gener-\nal principles is much the same as to classify it; at least\nthis is the best mode of classification. If a lawyer or mer-\nchant were to throw all their papers together promiscuous-\nly, they could not cal u ate on much readiness in finding\nwhat they might at any time want. If a man of letters were\nto record in a commonplace book all the ideas and facts,\nwhich occurred to him, without any method, he would ex-\nperience the greatest difficulty in applying them to use.\nIt is the same with a m mory, where there is no classifica-\ntion. Whoever fixes upon some general principle, wheth-\ner political, literary, or philosophical, and collects facts in\nillustration of it, will find no diificulty in remembering\nthem, however numerous when without such general prin-\nciple the recollection of them would have been extremely\nburdensome.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0338.jp2"},"339":{"fulltext":"of memory. 38$\n(3) Never he satisfied with a partial or half acquaintance\nwith things. There is no less a tendency to intellectual,\nthan to bodily inactivity students, in order to avoid intel-\nlectual toil, are too much inclined to pass on in a hurried\nand careless manner. This is injurious to the memory.\nNothing (says Dugald Stewart) has such a tendency to\nweaken, not only the powers of invention, but the intellec-\ntual powers in general, as a habit of extensive and various\nreading without reflection. Always make it a rule fully to\nunderstand what is gone over. Those, who are determin-\ned to grapple with the subject in hand, whatever may be\nits nature, and to become master of soon feel a great\ninterest; truths, which were at first obscure, become clear\nand familiar. The consequence of this increased clear-\nness and interest is an increase of attention and the nat-\nural result of this is, that the truths are very strongly fixed\nin the memory. A perpetual vacillation between the hon-\nours and toils of science is a species of halting between\ntwo opinions, that is not less injurious in learning, than in\nrelig on.\n(4) The memory may he strengthened by exercise. It is\nfound, that all the mental susceptibilities are strengthened\nby exercise, much the same as our bodily powers and the\nfaculty of memory certainly not less than others. This\nfact, which seems to be an ultimate law of our constitution,\nreminds one of a certain Milo, an inhabitant of Crotona.\nThis man is said to have carried an ox on his shoulders\nbut 1 e couM do it, only by beginning with carrying a calf.\nHe practised this every day as the animal grew in size^\nthe firmness of his joints and his muscular strength in-\ncreased also and thus he gradually became able to sup-\nport such an enormous burden. And, in the same way,\nour minds when left to sloth and inactivity, lose all their\nvigour but when they are kept in exercise, and, after\nperform ng what was before them, are tasked with new re-\nquisitions, it is not easy to assign limits to their ability.\n(5) Consider the nature of the study, and make use of those\nhelps, which are thus afforded. This rule may be illustrat-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0339.jp2"},"340":{"fulltext":"3 4 OF MEMORY.\ned by the mention of some departments of science. Thus?,\nin acquiring a knowledge of geography, the study is to be\npursued, as much as possible, with the aid of good globes,\ncharts, and maps. It requires a great effort of memory, and\ngenerally an unsuccessful one, to recollect the relative ex-\ntent and situation of places, the numerous physical and\npolitical divisions of the earth, from the book. The ad-\nvantages of studying geography with maps, globes, c.\nare two, (1) The form, relative situation, and extent of\ncountries become, in this case, ideas, or ratHer conceptions\nof sight; such conceptions 187.) are very vivid, and\nare more easily recalled to remembrance, than others.\n(2) Our remembrances are assisted by the law of contiguity\nin place 158), which is known to be one of the most ef-\nficient aids. When we hive once, from having a map or\nglobe before us, formed an acquaintance with the general\nvisible appearance of an island, a gulf, an ocean, or a con-\ntinent, nothing is more easy than to remember the subor-\ndinate divisions or parts. Whenever we have examined,\nand fixed in our minds the general appearance or outlines\nof a particular country, we do not easily forget the sit-\nuation of those countries, which are contiguous.\nWe find another illustration of this rule in the reading\nof history. There is such a multitude of facts in histor-\nical writings, that to endeavour to remember them all is\nfruitless; and if it could be done, would be of very small\nadvantage. Hence, in reading the history of any country^\nfix upon two or three of the most interesting epochs make\nthem the subject of particular attention learn the spirit\nof the age, and the private life and fortunes of prominent\nindividuals in a word, study these periods not only as an-\nnalists, but as philosophers. Vv hen they are thus studied,\nthe mind can hardly fail to retain them they will be a sort\nof landmarks and all the other events in the history of\nthe country, before and afterwards, will naturally ar-.\nrange themselves in reference to them. The memory will;\nstrongly seize the prominent periods, in consequence of the\ngreat interest felt in them and the less important parts of*","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0340.jp2"},"341":{"fulltext":"OF MEMOiir. 3«3»\nthe history of the country will be likely to be retained, so\nfar as is necessary, by aid of the principle of contiguity;\nand without giving them great attention.-^ -Further, his-\ntorical charts or genealogical trees of history are of some as-\nsistance for a similar reason, that maps, globes, c. are in\ngeography.\nThis rule for strengthening the memory will apply also\nto the more abstract sciences. In every science, says\nStewart, the ideas, about which it is peculiarly conversant,\nare connected together by some particular associating\nprinciple in one science, for instance, by associations\nfounded on the relation of cause and effect in another, by\nthe associations founded on the necessary relations of\nmathematical truths. (Stewart s Philosophy of the Hu-\nman Mind, Chap. VI. Sect. III.)\nj 279. Of committing to writing as a means of impro-\nving the memory.\nIt is often recommended to us to commit to writing the\nknowledge, which we acquire. This practice is unfavoura-\nble in this respect it supersedes, in a degree, the neces-\nsity of a direct exercise of the memory. It may be remark-\ned, in particular, that persons, who follow this method, are\nfound to fail in the recollection of detached observations,\nof insulated facts. This practice, therefore, promises but\nlittle benefit to persons, who are much occupied with the\nactive business of life, and have but little time for reading\nand reflection to whom, consequently, a very ready, as\nwell as tenacious memory is of great importance.\nBut for others, for persons in some professional busi-\nness, and for professed scholars, it has some considerable\nadvantages such as the following. The records, which\nwe make of our experiences and thoughts, are a sort of land-\nmarks of the progress of our own minds, with which certain-\nly it is highly desirable to be acquainted. But they not on-\nly show us what progress our minds have made they are\namong the means, by which that advancement itself has\nbeen secured.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0341.jp2"},"342":{"fulltext":"336 OF MEMORY.\nIn particular, this practice enables one to make im*\nprovements on those, who have gone before, or rather aids\nhim in so doing. A person, when he has completed his\neducation, finds, there is a certain amount of knowledge,\nand that he has learnt what there is to be learnt but,\nsurely, he is not to rest satisfied with this. He must do\nsomething himself; he is bound in some way to contribute\nto the stock of information, which has been collected.\nNow, when a student is in the practice of noting down\nnew facts, and his own original thoughts upon them, he\nnot only secures them, but he thus gives to himself the op-\nportunity of making them the further subject of his reflec-\ntions. And having done this, these new results become to\nhim a sort of elementary truths they are not only one\nstep in advance of what is any where to be found in\nbooks, but, like all new discoveries, they in their turn be-\ncome helps in making yet further advancements. Some-\ntimes great improvements in science have resulted from a\nsingle remark, or from a slight hint, which was, at the time,\nthought to be of the smallest consequence.\nIt cannot be doubted, therefore, that, to a certain ex-\ntent, the noting down of facts, which we observe, the re-\ncording of our own mental deductions, and of important\nideas in reading, is a practice of very considerable utility\nto those, who have opportunities of mental culture.\n280. Of M nemo nicks or systems of artificial memory.\nBy a system of mnemonicks or of artificial memory is\nmeant a method of connecting in the mind things diffi-\ncult to be remembered, with things easily remembered, so\nas to enable it to retain and recollect the former by means\nof the latter. There have been no less than sixty differ-\nent authors, who have proposed their plans for this purpose,\nmany of them agreeing in the most important respects, but\nall of them differing in some.\nAmong the most used of these is Gray s memorta technica.\nIt contains a great deal of historical, chronological and\ngeographical knowledge, embraced in a set of rules, which","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0342.jp2"},"343":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 337\nthe student is required to make as familiar to himself, as\nschool-boys do the rules of grammar. Some alterations are\nmade on the final syllables of words, so as to make them\nsignificant of dates or other important particulars. There\nhave been various opinions in respect to this system but\nthe prevailing feeling seems to be against it.\nAmong the most popular writers on the subject of\nMnemonicks, who have recently appeared, is M. Gregor\nvon Feinagle but a statement of the principles of his sys-\ntem would occupy too large a space in this book. Nor,\nafter bestowing some reflection on the subject, can we\nconsider the omission a very serious disadvantage. It\nis, no doubt, possible to aid the memory by arbitrary\narrangements and by associating our ideas with a set of\nplaces and images; and such assistances may,at some times,\nbe of considerable advantage to publick speakers, and in\ngeneral to all persons, who may have occasion to remem-\nber a large number of insulated facts. But, notwithstand-\ning, it may be said of the systems now in use, as a gener-\nal remark, that they are too complicated for plans, which\nprofess to render the acquisition of knowledge more easy.\nThey can never be adopted into general use, unless they\nare rendered more simple nor do we apprehend, that a\nperson, who follows the rules for strengthening and applying\nthe memory above laid down, will stand greatly in need of\nany other helps in recollecting most things, that will be\nfound to be useful and important.\nCHAPTER TWENTY THIRD.\nEMOTIONS OP BUAUTY.\n281. Explanation of emotions of beauty.\nThere is a class of our mental feelings, to which we com-\nmonly give the name of emotions. We speak of a melan-\ncholy emotion, of a cheerful emotion, of emotions of pity,\nof wonder, and the like. Among other emotions are those\n43","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0343.jp2"},"344":{"fulltext":"333 EMOTION OF BEAUff.-\nof beauty and sublimity. In the present chapter, our\nattention will be particularly directed to those of beauty.\nOf emotions of beauty it is hardly less difficult to give\na definition, than to define the sensations of colour, or of\ntaste. We find in then, however, these marks or charac-\nteristicks. (1) The emotion of be nty is always a pleas-\ning one. We never give the name to one, which is pain-\nful, or to any fee ing of disgust. Wh mc ver, therefore, we\nspeak of an emotion of beat/, we imp! in th 3 u o f the\nterms, some degree of satisfaction r pleasure! All per-\nsons, the illiterate as well as the soi ntifick, use the phrase\nwith this import. (2) We never speak of emotions of\nbeauty, to whatever degree may be our experience of in-\nward satisfaction, without referring such emotions to some-\nthing external. The same emotion, which is called satis-\nfaction or delight of mind, when it is wholly and exclusive-\nly internal, we find to be termed an emotion of beauty, if\nwe are able to refer it to something without, and to spread\nits charms around any external object. l^See 19.)\n282. Of what is meant by beautiful objects.\nThere are a great variety of mater. al objects, which ex-\ncite the emotion of beauty that is, when tr»e objects ar^\npresented, this emotion, in a greater or less degree, (for the\nemoti n itself is susceptible f many v ireties,) immediate-\nly exists.— As to the existence of n aterial objects, it is un-\nnecessary to dispute. We take it for granted although if\nwe were called up^n for a definition of them, we could only\nsay, that they are mere assemblages of particles,and that the\ndifferent arrangements of those particles constitutes the\ndifference between one cbjact and another. The ashes,\nthat are mouldering in the tomb, do not differ from the living\nform of man u the m terials, but only in disposition, and\nin symmetry. In themselves considered, therefore, all\nbodies of matter are without beauty the fairest creations\nof architecture, and the dust, on which they are erected,\nare alike 5 all are originally destitute of that interest, which\nv/e denominate beaory.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0344.jp2"},"345":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS O? BEAUTr, 33$\nThe beauty of objects being something not in the na-\nture of the things themselves, although we constantly speak\nof them, as possessing that quality, it is necessary to enter\ninto some explanation. Whenever certain objects are\npresented to us, there is a feeling of pleasure, in a higher\nor less degree. This feeling, which is termed an emotion\nof beauty, does not exist, it will readily be admitted, in the\nobject, which cannot be supposed to be susceptible of it,\nbut in the mind. And here we have the solution of the\npoint, on which we are remarking. We have from ear-\nliest childhood been in the habit of referring this mental\nemotion, of which no inanimate object can possibly be\nsusceptible, tr» external objects, as its antecedent. We\nhave made this reference, for so long a time, and so fre-\nquently, that at last, in consequence of a very tenacious\nassociation, the object itself seems to us to be invested\nwith delight, and to beam out with a sort of intellectual\nradiance that is, to have qualities, which can truly and\nproperly exist only in the mind. Such objects are termed\nby US BEAUTIFUL OBJKCTS.\nThe result of this strong and early disposition, to refer\nthe emotions within us to those external objects, which\nare the antecedents to thorn, is, that all material creation\nis clothed over again. There is a beauty in the sun there\nis a beauty in woods and waters and blossorr, and flower,\nand fruit are all invested with the same transferred or asso-\nciated splendour. But annul the emotions of the mind,\nwhich throws back its own inward light on the objects\naround it and the sun will become dark, and the moon\nwill withheld its s jiung, and the flower will be no more\ndelightful, than tie Loi, from whose mouldering bosom it\nsprings up.\n283. Extensive application of the term beauty.\nEmotions of 1 eauty are felt, and perhaps in a higher\ndeg ^e lhan any where eke, in the contemplation of objects\nof sight, cf woods, waters, a:ure skies, cultivated fields,\nand particularly of the human form. But they are not lim-\nited to vhes emotions, which not only bear the sam?","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0345.jp2"},"346":{"fulltext":"?AQ EMOTIONS OF BEALTY.\nname, but are analogous in kind, exist also on the contem-\nplation of many other things.\nThe sense or feeling of beauty exists, when we are\nfollowing out a happy train of reasoning and, hence, the\nmathematician, who certainly has a delightful sensation,\nanalogous to what we experience in contemplating many\nworks of nature, speaks of a beautiful theorem. The\nconnoisseur in musick applies the term, beautiful, to a fa-\nvourite air the lover of poetry speaks of a beautiful song j\nand the painter discovers beauty in the design and in the\ncolouring of his pictures. We apply the term, beauty, fy\nexperiments in the different departments of physicks; es-\npecially when the experiment is simple, and results in de-\nciding a point, which has occasioned doubt and dispute.\nAlso, in the contemplation of moral actions, we find the\nsame feelings. The approbation, which we yield, when\nthe poor are relieved, and the weak are defended, and any\nother deeds of virtue are done, is not merely the cold aj-\nsent of the head, but is always attended with a delightful\nmovement of the affections. Set that all nature, taking\nthe word in a wide sense, is the province of beauty the\nintellectual, and the moral, as well as the material world.\nBut a remark is to be made here of some consequence,\nin connection with some of the numerous speculations,\nthat have been at different times offered on the subject\nof beauty. It has been thought by some, that the applica-\ntion of the term to any other objects than those of external\nnature, is wholly metaphorical. In reply it may be said,\nthat we do truly feel a delightful emotion on the contem-\nplation of intellectual works, and when we observe virtu-\nous actions, no less than when our attention is fixed upon\nthe pleasing appearances of the natural world. And there\nis such an analogy, such a resemblance in the feelings in\nall these cases, that, if the term, beauty, be proper to ex-\npress one, it is no less appropriate to all. Instead, there-\nfore, of considering this term as metaphorical, whenever\napplied to any thing other than the external appearances\nef nature, it is better to speak of it, as a common name, ex-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0346.jp2"},"347":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. $41\npressive of a variety of emotions, arising on different occa-\nsions, but always pleasing, and varying rather in the occa-\nsions of their origin and in degree, than in their real na-\nture. In particular, they agree in their nature as to\nthis we refer all the emotions, which come under the\ndenomination of beauty, to the objects, whatever they may\nbe, which are found immediately and constantly to pre-\ncede them. The charm of the mind, which exists solely\nin ourselves, seems to flow out and to spread itself over\nthe severest labours of intellect, over the creations of the\narchitect, over the fictions of the imagination, over virtu-\nous moral actions, and whatever else we call beautiful, no\nless than upon those forms of material nature, which fill us\nwith delight.\nMind, mind alone Bear witness, earth and heaven\n11 The living fountain, in itself contains\nOf beauteous and sublime\n284. All objects not equally fitted to excite emotions\nof beauty.\nIn view of what has been said, beauty may be defined\na pleasing emotion, excited by various objects, but which,\nin consequence of an early and tenacious association, is\nalways felt by us, as if diffused over, and existent in the ob-\njects, which excite it. An object, therefore, is called beau-\ntiful, when it is the c use or invariable antecedent of the\nemotion of beauty. But no one can be ignorant, that not\nall objects cause the emotion, and of those, which do,\nsome have this power in a greater, and some in a less de-\ngree. This brings us to a very important inquiry. It is\nno unreasonable curiosity, which wishes to know, why the\neffect is so limited, and why all objects are not embraced\nin it 9 Why different objects cause the same emotion in\ndifferent degrees And why the same objects produce a\ndiversity of emotions in different individuals, and even in\nthe same individual at different times f","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0347.jp2"},"348":{"fulltext":"M£ EMOTION S OF B£AUTT.\n285. A susceptibility of emotions of beauty an ult%*\nmale principle of our constitution.\nIn answering these questions, something must be taken\nfor granted, there must be some starting point otherwise\nall, that can be said, will be involved in inextricable con*\nfusion. That is, we must take for granted, that the mind has\nan original susceptibility of such emotions. Nor can we\nsuppose, there can be any objection to a concession, which\nis warr anted by the most general experience. We all\nknow, that we are created with this susceptibility, because\nwe are all conscious of having had those emotions, which\nare attributed to it. We may, therefore, repeat here a remark\nmade at 19. No reason whatever can be given, why\nany combination of objects or of actions, why any exhibi-\ntion of purpose or of power, causes a new state of mind, ojf\nthat class termed emotions, an more than actions and ob-\njects, purposes and powers utterly unknown to us, except it\nbe this, that a susceptibility oi emotions is one of the con-\nstituent and original charact.risixks of the inkLeUual\nprinciple.\nThese remarks hive considerable importance, in con-\nnection with the views of those, who resolve all em tions of\nbeauty into association. Those, who resolve the whole\neffect of beautiful objects into association, commit that\nsort of sophism, which logicians call reasonins in a circle.\nWhen we speak of association in reference to objects and\nemotions of oeauty. the province, which we assign to it, is,\nto impart to one thing the agreeable or disagreeable ef-\nfects of another. This power it posses eg; but then\nassociation of itself can never account for the origin of a\nclass of pleasures, different from all the others, of whjch\nwe have any experience. If there were nothing originally\nand intrinsically beautiful, that is, if it were not so ordered\nby nature, th it the mind should be filled with delightful feel-\nings, whenever certain objects were presented to it, the as-\nsociating principle, having no materials, on which it could\noperate, could not exist. Accordingly Mr. Alison himself,\nwho attributes so much to association, is so sensible of this,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0348.jp2"},"349":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF JBEAUTT. 34$\nthat he does not deny, that the mind, in consequence of its\nadaptation to objects around it, and of the objects to the\nmind, is by is very constitution susceptible of pleasing,\nand de ig tfu a d sublime emotions, independently of the\ninfluence of custom and habit.\nAdmitting, therefore, that emotions of beauty are mod-\nified by circumstances, find that, consequently, very much\nmay justly be attributed to asscciation, it will, nevertheless,\nhold true, that certain objects can never be presented to\nthe mind, and the mind be unmoved; in other words,\nemotions of beauty will necessarily exist, whenever certain\nobjects are before the mind, until its laws are altered.\nWe proceed, then, to inquire, What o .j cts, whether bo-\ndies of matter, sounds, colours, or whatever causes the emo-\ntion in question, are intrinsically beautiful That is to say,\nwe inquire what objects produce, or ere antecedent to emo-\ntions oi beau ty of thumsJves, inJe-:endtntly of cusUm or\nassociation.\n236. Remarks on the beauty of forms*\nIn making that sel ctian of tho^e objects, which we sup*\npose to be fitted, in the original constitution of things, to\ncause within us pleasing emotions, independently of the aid\nof association, we ca met profess to speak with certainty.\nT he appeal is t tie g^.eral ex; erience of men and all\nwe can do, is, t give, s fur as it seems to have been as-\ncertained, the results of that experience* Beginn ng,\ntheiefore, with material objects, we are justified by gener-\nal experience in saying, that certain dispositions or forms\nof matter aid beaui.fui -for instance, the circle.\nWe rarely look upon a win I ng or serpentine form,\nwithout experiencing a feeling of pleasure and on seeing\na circle, this pleasure is heightened. Hence Hogarth in his\nAnalysis of Beavty, expressly lays it down, that those lines,\nwhich have most variety in themselves, contribute most\ntowards the production of beauty, and that the most beau-\ntiful line, by which a surface can be bounded, is the waving\nor serpentine, or that which constantly, but imperceptibly\ndeviates from the straight line. This, which we frequently","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0349.jp2"},"350":{"fulltext":"344 EMOTIONS Otf BEAUT?.\nfind in shells, flowers, and other pleasing natural produc-\ntions, he calls the line of beauty. Now, we admit, that the\ncircle, and all winding forms may have more or less of beau-\nty in consequence of associated qualities no doubt, the\ngreater part of their beauty may be attributed to this cause;\nstill there is very great reason to believe, that a pleasing\nemotion, although it may be in general a slight one, is ex-\ncited by these forms, independently of any association\nwhatever.\nFor the same reasons, we are to suppose, that a square\nfigure has intrinsically some beauty, although less than the\ncircle. What the cause of the diffeience is, it is somewhat\ndifficult to say, unless it be, that a circle being more sim-\nple, makes a more direct and entire impression whereas\nthe attention is divided among the sides and angles of a\nsquare.\n2S7. Of the original beauty of colours.\nWe experience what may be termed an original emo-\ntion, which is pleasing, in beholding colours. This is ob-\nserved in all children and sometimes when the objects\nare brilliant, and the colours are various, the emotion of\npleasure is intense. It is found to be the same universally\namong savages and also, but in a less degree, among the\nuneducated classes in civilized communities. In persons\nof refinement, the original tendency to receive pleasing\nemotions from the contemplation of brilliant colours seems\nto have, in a measure, lost its power, in consequence of the\ndevelopement of tendencies, to receive pleasure from oth-\ner causes. (See, in connection with this section, Trans-\nactions of Royal Society of Edin. P. I. Vol. VII. p. 7.)\n288. Of emotions of beauty from sounds.\nThere are feelings arising on other occasions, to which\nwe apply the phrase, emotions of beauty, which favour\nthe supposition, that the mind is so constituted, as to be\nnaturally and originally susceptible of receiving from some\nobjects that pleasure, which is a constituent part of what-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0350.jp2"},"351":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 345\n•ever is termed beautifbl. We refer to the emotions, pro-\nduced on hearing sounds. It is true, that, in different\nnations, we find different casts or styles of musick but,\nnotwithstanding this, certain successions of sounds, viz.\nthose, which have certain mathematical proportions in\ntheir times of vibration, are alone pleasing. As, therefore,\nnot all series of sounds are beautiful, but only those\nof a particular character, and these are every where found\nto excite emotions of beauty without exception the pre-\nsumption is, that beauty, in other cases, is not wholly con-\ntingent, but is partly original, although the greater por-\ntion may arise from the principles of association.\n289. Of motion as an element of beauty.\nMotion has sometimes been reckoned as an element\nof beauty but not every kind of motion. The motion of a\nwinding river gives us pleasure, and also of a ship at sea.\nWe look on, and are pleased without being able to control\nour feelings, or to tell, why they exist. With what pleasing\nsatisfaction, we gaze upon a column of smoke, ascending\nfrom a cottage in a wood And what a feeling of pleasure\narises on beholding a horse, that is freed from the subjec-\ntion of the bit, moving at full speed over a plain It\nmay be said, we are aware, that the pleasure arising from\nbeholding the ascending smoke of the cottage, is caused\nby the favourite suggestions, which are connected with it, of\nrural seclusion, peace, and abundance. But the pleasure\nwould be essentially the same, if it were known to as-\ncend from the uncomfortable wigwam of the savage, or the\nfires of a wandering horde of gypsies.\nBut there are some kinds of motion, for instance, when-\never it is accelerated beyond a certain degree of swiftness,\nwhich cannot be said to be beautiful, but which, on the\ncontrary, cause painful feelings.\n290. Of the beauty of certain natural signs.\nThere are certain signs, expressive of feelings and of\ncharacter, with which nature has furnished us. There is\n44","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0351.jp2"},"352":{"fulltext":"2 40 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY.\nsome reason to believe, that these signs may excite emo-\ntions, and may possess their appropriate meaning, indepen-\ndently of experience. They cannot, indeed, all of them be\nsaid to be beautiful for instance, the frown, which is indi-\ncative of reproof and of the angry passions. But the smiling\ncountenance gives pleasure, not only to persons grown up,\nbut to the infant in the cradle and, therefore, seems not\nonly to have been furnished, but to have been appointed by\nnature as the sign of placid or of joyful emotions, and not\nless fitted to excite corresponding emotions in others. The\nemotion of pleasure, which the infant exhibits, on seeing a\nsmiling countenance, cannot, with any degree of probabili-\nty, be ascribed to experience. A supposition of that kind,\nto say the least, can never admit of such positive evidence,\nas to entitle it to much weight. And when in connec-\ntion with its improbability, we consider, that associated feel-\nings themselves, to which so much is justly attributed, can-\nnot exist, without something, with which to begin, and on\nwhich to fasten, it can hardly be regarded, as unphilosophi-\ncal, to ascribe the feelings, of which w T e are now speaking\nto something original and permanent in our constitution.\n291. Of the beauty of moral actions.\nThe views, which have been taken, will be found to\nhold good of those pleasurable emotions, which arise,\nwhenever we contemplate moral actions of a praiseworthy\nkind. If those theories, which deny an original suscepti-\nbility of moral emotions, and make all our moral judg-\nments the result of experience and some sort of calculation,\nwere true then we might expect to find the perception of\nmoral beauty perfect in mature age, but hardly having an\nexistence in youth and childhood. But this is not the fact.\nThe child, that successively exults and weeps at the nar-\nrations of the ballad, has something within him, which\nmost decisively pronounces upon the character of those\nactions, which he is thus made acquainted with. He\nsympathizes with those, who are in suffering he admires\nflic virtuous; he abhors the unprincipled and the villain.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0352.jp2"},"353":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF BEAC IT. ?A 7\nHis moral susceptibility, to say the least, is equally quick\nwith that of persons grown up in all cases, except in those\ninstances, where he is not so well able, as persons of ma-\nture minds, to see the full consequences of actions.\n292. Of a distinct sense or faculty of beauty.\nFrom the views, which have been taken, it might be\nConjectured, that we adopt the opinion of those, who have\nheld, that there is a distinct sense or faculty of beauty.\nThere have been some writers, among whom Mr. Alison has\nincluded Hogarth and Winkelman, who have supposed,\nthat all emotions of beauty and sublimity are to be refer-\nred to a distinct sense and, consequently, that all quali-\nties, which are in general antecedent to those emotians,\nare the established and appropriate objects of that suppo-\nsed sense. By means of this sense or faculty of beauty,\nwhich seems to have been regarded as entirely analogous\nto the external senses of sight and feeling, the mind expe-\nriences the emotion of beauty constantly, or almost con-\nstantly, whenever a particular object is present. That is,\n•having this supposed sense, we can no more be without\nthe appropriate emotion, whenever the beautiful object is\npresented, than we can be without sight or feeling,\nwhen our eyes are open, to behold objects, or when our\nhands are impressed upon them. And, moreover, the\nbeauty, which is thus discovered, has, according to this\nsystem, a precise and definite character, concerning which\nthere cannot ordinarily be any possible mistake.\nThere are some parts, undoubtedly, of this doctrine of\nemotions of beauty, to which it is, by no means, necessary\nto object. Its advocates hold, with good reason, that cer-\ntain objects give us pleasure of themselves and also that\nthe emotions arise in the mind at once, whenever the ob-\njects are presented to it, and, therefore, much the same, as\nwhen vision follows the opening of the eyelids. But here,\nit cannot be denied, that the analogy between the suscep-\ntibility of emotions of beauty, and the external senses,\nceases.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0353.jp2"},"354":{"fulltext":"24 i EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY.\nThe opinion, that we have a distinct sense or faculty\nof beauty, would give to its appropriate emotions a char-\nacter more exact and particular, than is justified by what is\nknown to be the face there would in this case be no more\ndifference of opinion concerning the beauty and deformity\nof objects, than concerning thtir sensible qualities, their\ntaste, sound, or colour. If this doctrine, taken in its full\nextent, were true, the peasant, who can tell, whether the\ntaste of the apple be sweet or sour, and whether the col-\nour of the clouds of heaven be bright or dark, can sit in\njudgment on the beauty of the works of nature and art, no\nless than persons of the most critical taste. While,\ntherefore, we cont nd, that there is in the mind an original\nsusceptibility of emotions of beauty, it is to be regarded\nas something quite different in its nature from the external\nsenses and these emotions, therefore, unlike our sensa-\ntions, will differ, in kind and degree, with a variety of cir-\ncumstances.\n293. Obj( cts may become beautiful by association\nmerely.\nWhile some of thp f rms, of which matter is suscepti-\nble, are pleasing of themselves and originally, while we are\nunable to behold bright colours, and to listen to certain\nsounds, and to gaze upon particular expressions of the\ncountenance, and to behold praiseworthy actions, without\nemotions, in a greater or less degree, delightful it must be\nadmitted, that, in the course of our experience, we find a va-\nriety of objects, that seem, as they are presented to us to be\nunattended with any emotion objects, that are perfectly\nindifferent. And yet these objects, however wanting in\nbeauty to the great mass of men, are found to be invested,\nin the minds of some, with a charm, allowedly not their own.\nThese objects, which previously excited no feelings of\nbeauty, may become beautiful to us in consequence of the\nassociations, which we attach to them. That is to say,\nwhen the objects are beheld, certain former pleasing feel-\nings, peculiar to ourselves, are recalled.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0354.jp2"},"355":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY, 349\nThe lustre of a spring morning, the radiance of a sum-\nmer evening may of themselves excite in us, a pleasing\nemotion but, as our busy imagination, taking advantage\nof the images of delight, which are before us, is ever at\nwork and constantly forming new images, there is, in com-\nbination with the original emotion of beauty, a superadded\ndelight. And if in these instances, only a part of the beau-\nty is to be ascribed to association, there are some oth-\ners, where the whole is to be considered, as derived from\nthat source.\nNumerous instances can be given of the power of as-\nsociation, not only in heightening the actual charms of ob-\njects, but in spreading a sort of delegated lustre around\nthose, that were entirely uninteresting before. Why\ndoes yon decaying house appear beautiful to me, which\nis indifferent to another And why are the desolate fields\naround it clothed with delight, while others see in them\nnothing, that is pleasant It is, because that house\nformerly detained me, as one of its inmates, at its fire-\nside, and those fields were the scenes of many youthful\nsports. When I now behold them, after so long a time,\nthe joyous emotions, which the remembrances of my ear-\nly days call up within me, are, by the power of association,\nthrown around those objects, which are the cause of the\nremembrances,\n294. Further illustrations of associated feelings.\nHe, who travels through a well-cultivated country\ntown, cannot but be pleased with the various objects,\nwhich he beholds the neat and comfortable dwellings\nthe meadows, that are peopled with flocks, and with herds\nof cattle the fields of grain, intermingled with reaches of\nthick and dark forest. The whole scene is a beautiful\none the emotion we suppose to be partly original a per-\nson, on being restored to sight by couching for the cataract,\nand having had no opportunity to form associations with it,\nwould witness it, for the first time, with delight. But a\ngreater part of the pleasure is owing to the associated feel-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0355.jp2"},"356":{"fulltext":"B50 AMOTIONS OF BEAUTY.\nings, which arise, on beholding such a scene these dwell-\nings are the abode of man these fields are the place of\nhis labours, and amply reward him for his toil here are\ncontentment, the interchange of heartfelt joys, and an-\ncient truth.\nThose, who have travelled over places, that have been\nsignalized by memorable events, will not suspect us of at-\ntributing two great a share of our emotions to association.\nIt is true, that in a country so new as America, we are una-\nble to point so frequently, as an European might do, to\nplaces, that have witnessed the gallantry and patriotism of\nancient times. But there are some such consecrated\nspots. With whatever emotions the traveller may pass\nup the banks of the Hudson, he cannot but find his feel-\nings much more deeply arrested at Stillwater and at\nSaratoga, the scenes of the memorable battles of Sept.\n19, and Oct. 7, 1777, and of the surrender of Burgoyne, than\nat any other place. It was there, that brave men died it\nwas there, that an infant people threw defiance at a power-\nful enemy, and gave sanguinary proof of their determination\nto be free. A thousand recollections have gathered upon\nsuch places, and the heart overflows witji feeling at behold-\ning them.\nThe powerful feeling, which here exists, whether we call\nit an emotion of beauty, or sublimity, or give it a name,\nexpressive of some intermediate grade, is essentially the\nsame, with that, which is caused in the bosom of the trav-\neller, when he looks for the first time upon the hills of the\ncity of Rome. There are other cities of greater extent,\nand washed by nobler rivers, than the one, which is before\nhim but upon no others has he ever gazed with such in-\ntensity of feeling. He beholds what was once the mistress\nof the world he looks upon the ancient dwelling place of\nBrutus, of Cicero, and of the Cassars. The imagination is at\nonce peopled with whatever was noble in the character,\nand great in the achievements of that extraordinary nation;\nand there is a strength, a fulness of emotion, which, with-\nout these stirring remembrances, would be very sensibly\ndiminished.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0356.jp2"},"357":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS ©F BEAEfTT. 351\n295. Instances of national associations*\nThe influence of association in rousing up, and in giving\nstrength to particular classes of emotions, may be striking-\nly seen in some national instances. Every country has\nits favourite tunes. These excite a much stronger feel-\ning in the native inhabitants, than in strangers. The ef-\nfect on the Swiss soldiers of the Ranz des Teaches, their na-\ntional air, whenever they have happened to hear it in\nforeign lands, has often been mentioned. So great was\nthis effect, that it was found necessary in France to forbid its\nbeing played in the Swiss corps in the employ of the French\ngovernment. The powerful effect of this song cannot be\nsupposed to be owing to any peculiar merits in the compo-\nsition but to the pleasing recollections, which it ever viv-\nidly brings up in the minds of the Swiss, of mountain life, of\nfreedom, and domestick pleasures.\nThe English have a popular tune, called Belleisle\nMarch. Its popularity is said to have been owing to the\ncircumstance, that it was played when the English army\nmarched into Belleisle, and to its consequent association\nwith remembrances of war and of conquest. And it will\nbe found true of all national airs, that they have a charm\nfor the natives of the country, in consequence of the recol-\nlections connected with them, which they do not possess\nfor the inhabitants of other countries.\nWe have abundant illustrations of the same fact in re-\nspect to colours. The purple colour has acquired an ex-\npression or character of dignity, in consequence of having\nbeen the common colour of the dress of kings among the\nChinese, however, yellow is the most dignified colour, and\nevidently for no other reason, than because yellow is that,\nwhich is allotted to the royal family. In many countries,\nblack is expressive of gravity, and is used particularly in\nseasons of distress and mourning and white is a cheerful\ncolour. But among the Chinese ¥/hite is gloomy, because\nit is the dress of mourners and in Spain and among the\nVenetians black has a cheerful expression, in consequence of\nbeing worn by the great. So that the remark of Sir Joshua","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0357.jp2"},"358":{"fulltext":"352 EMOTIONS 01* BEAUTY.\nReynolds has some foundation, that custom makes, in a\ncertain sense, white black, and black white. It is\ncustom alone, (says he,) determines our preference of the\ncolour of the Europeans to the Ethiopians, and they, for\nthe same reason, prefer their own colour to ours. I sup-\npose no body will doubt, if one of their painters were to\npaint the goddess of beauty, but that he would represent\nher black, with thick lips, flat nose, and wooly hair and\nit seems to me, he would act very unnaturally, if he did\nnot. (The Idler, No. 82.)\n296. Of utility as an element of beauty.\nSome theorists, among others Mr. Hume, have imagined*\nthat they were able to discover the origin or foundation of\nall emotions of beauty in the perception of utility; under-\nstanding by the term a fitness or adaptation of the beautiful\nobjects to some important purpose. We certainly contem-\nplate this quality with a degree of complacency and ap-\nprobation. Many objects, when their use or adaptation to\nsome purpose became known to us, have at once been\nclothed with an interest, which they did not before pos-\nsess. A share, therefore, of our emotions of beauty may be\ntraced to this source. But when the perception of utility\nor fitness is proposed, as the ground and origin of all of\nthem, the doctrine evidently cannot be sustained. If this\nprinciple hold universally, it is considered a fair inference\nfrom it by Mr. Burke, that the wedge-like snout of the\nswine, with its tough cartilage at the end, and the general\nmake of its head, so well adapted to digging aud rooting,\nare extremely beautiful and that hedge-hogs and porcu-\npines, which are so admirably secured against all assaults\nby their prickly hides, can justly be considered creatures\nof no small elegance.\nOn the theory, therefore, which proposes the perception\nof utility, as the true ground of all emotions of beauty, it\nis enough for us to say, that it goes too far; it does, in-\ndeed, in connection with the laws of association, suggest a\nhappy explanation of many pleasing emotions, but, by no","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0358.jp2"},"359":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF BEAU1T. 853\nmeans, of all. The inferences of Burke in opposition to it\nare not without foundation. (See Burke on the Sublime\nand Beautiful, P. III. Sect. 6.)\n297. Of proportion as a cause or element of beauty.\nThere are some, who imagine, they find the source of\nbeauty in a certain symmetry and determinate proportion\nof parts. This idea has been particularly advocated by\nartists, who seem to have supposed, that the elements of\nbeauty might not only be discovered, but even measured\nin the great models of statuary and painting. Mr. Burke\nhas examined this opinion also directing his inquiries to\nvegetables, the inferior animals, and man. He has shown,\nthat, in all these cases, there are no certain measures, on\nwhich the beautiful can justly be said to depend. For\ninstance, in the vegetable creation we find nothing more\nbeautiful than flowers, but there is a very great variety in\ntheir shape, and in the dispositior of the parts, which per-\ntain to them. In the rose the stalk is slender, but the\nflower is large. The flower or blossom of the apple, on\nthe other hand, is very small, but the tree large. Now if\none of these be in proportion, the other wants it and yet,\nby general consent, both the rose and the apple-blossom\npossess beauty, and the bush of the one and the tree of\nthe other allowedly present a very engaging appear-\nance. If again we inquire in respect to man, or the in-\nferior animal creation, we are brought to the same result,\nviz. that beauty does not depend upon a fixed relative size\nof the parts, that is, upon proportion. Those, who deem\nit important to amuse themselves with every thing, that\nhas been advanced on the subject, and find time for such\nminuteness of inquiry, may meet with various other the-\nories of more or less value, and probably none of them,\nhowever unphilosophical, without some worth.\n298. Differences of original susceptibility of this\nemotion.\nSupposing it to be true, that we possess an original\nsusceptibility of emotions of beauty, independently of\n45","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0359.jp2"},"360":{"fulltext":"354 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY.\ncustom, and of considerations of utility and proportion, it\nseems, however, to be the fact, that this susceptibility is\nfound existing in different degrees in different persons.\nLet the same beautiful objects be presented to two per-\nsons, and one will be found to be not only affected, but\nravished, as it were, with feelings of beauty; while the\nother will have the same kind of emotions, but in a very\ndiminished degree. A great degree of susceptibility of\nemotions of beauty is usually termed sENsiBrLiTY. The\ndifferences of men in this respect may justly be thought,\nwhere we cannot account for it by any thing in their edu-\ncation or mental culture, to be constitutional. Nor is it\nmore strange, that men should be differently affected by\nthe same beautiful objects in consequence of some differ-\nence of constitution, than that they should constitutionally\nhave different passions, that one should be cholerick, an-\nother of a peaceable turn, that one should be mild and\nyielding, another inflexible.\n299. Generalizations of emotions of beauty.\nIt is a well founded opinion, and worthy of some con-\nsideration, that there may be a species of generalization\nof our emotions, as well as of our other intellectual states\nthere may be classes of feelings, as well as classes of per-\nceptions, or of objects. The ordinary process of gener-\nalizing, which precedes the giving of common names, has\nalready been explained. A general or common name is\none, which is employed as expressive of a general notion\nor feeling of resemblance, existing in a number of partic-\nulars thus, horse, quadruped, animal, peace, pleasure,\nhappiness, are names of this kind. In all languages, there\nare many general terms but they are much less in\nnumber, than the states of mind, which are general. For\ninstance, we apply the word, happiness, to many states of\nmind, in which there would be found, if we were to make\nthem the subjects of particular examination, no small dif-\nference in the degree of the delightful emotion. And,\nconsequently, one general name is given to feelings, which\nmight be arranged as different classes or species.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0360.jp2"},"361":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 355\nWe have notions of various degrees of beauty, as well\nas of happiness but, although these notions, (that is to\nsay, different degrees of beauty, which are fully ascertain-\ned and settled upon,) are truly mental generalizations, we\nfail, in both cases, in having appropriate names for all of\nthem. The word, beauty, is made to stand, therefore, in\nconsequence of the imperfection of language for a number\nof different degrees of delightful emotion that is, for va-\nrious feelings, which might be separated into species; and,\ntherefore, be entitled to general names. As we have no\nnames, allotted to many of these classes or generalizations\nof emotions, we cannot, as we are able to in other cases, call\nup the emotions, by merely seeing or hearing the name.\nBut, although we do not have them embodied in words,\nwe find, that they are capable of being suggested by par-\nticular objects, as if they were so embodied and that thus,\nthe objects, by which they are so suggested, are made to\nanswer, in some measure, the place of language.\n300. Manner of forming such generalizations, c.\nWe form our general notions of the beautiful in the\nsame way as we form other general ideas, to which we al-\nluded in the preceding section, viz. by the observation and\ncomparison of many particulars. The emotions, therefore,\nwill arise in the mind on all occasions, when the particu-\nlars, observed at the present moment, correspond with the\nparticulars, which have been before observed.\nIt is one excellence of these generalized emotions, that\nbeing formed on the experience of many, and corrected\nby such general experience, they possess an uniformity and\npermanency, which could not be expected in those, which\nare formed from the experiences of an individual merely.\nAnd, hence, the person, who has furnished his mind\nwith them, is capable of anticipating and predicting much\nmore than any others, what objects will arouse emotions\nof beauty in the great mass of people and his anticipa-\ntions and foresight will be the more correct, in proportion\nas his inductions have been more wide and careful.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0361.jp2"},"362":{"fulltext":"35G EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY,\nBut then it is not to be inferred, that these general no-\ntions are all, that is present to the mind, when beautiful\nobjects are before it. In general, the imagination is at\nsuch times much quickened trains of distinct images can\nhardly fail to be called up these images are accompanied\nwith lively emotions and, in this way, the emotion of\nbeauty, which we feel as particularly appropriate to any\nobject, may be either very much strengthened, or very\nmuch diminished by the incorporation with it of feelings\nfrom various other sources. The feelings of beauty,\nwhich we have from this last source, are comparatively\nslow in arising, and are constantly varying whereas the\nsuggestion of any generalized emotions of beauty is com-\nmonly instantaneous and they are also of a more perma-\nnent character.\n301. Emotions of beauty compared with others.\nWe stop here to notice one of the objections, which\nmay occur to these views of this subject. Supposing, as\nwe do, that the mind has originally certain tendencies to\nemotions of beauty, we admit the power of various circum-\nstances in modifying, and, in some cases, of overcoming\nsuch original tendencies. Nor in point of fact, can it be\ndenied, that the character of our feelings of beauty fre-\nquently changes that is, what is regarded by us, as beau^\ntiful at one time, is not at another what is beautiful in\nthe eyes of one age or of one nation, loses its lustre in the\nview of another. The objection is, that such changes of\nfeeling in regard to the beautiful are inconsistent with an\noriginal susceptibility of such emotions. The answer to\nbe given is, that we experience analogous variations in all\nour emotions of whatever kind, as well as those of beauty.\nTake, for instance, that feeling by which we are led\nto regard any thing as true or false. It will surely be ad-\nmitted, that there is in the mind an original tendency to\nassent to certain propositions, rather than others of an op-\nposite kind. It cannot be supposed, that the characteris-\ntick of mind, which leads us to regard one thing as true, and","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0362.jp2"},"363":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 357\nanother as false, is something, which is wholly superindu-\nced, the result merely of accidental circumstances.-\nAnd yet it is well known, that our views of subjects contin-\nually alter those objects, which appeared just, and wor-\nthy, and desirable in youth, have a different appearance\nin manhood, and again have a different aspect in old age.\nAnd the fluctuations of opinion, which are found in indi-\nviduals, may also be clearly traced in the moral, political,\nand religious history of different ages and nations. We\nfind the same tendency to perpetual fluctuations in all our\nemotions, in the feelings of cheerfulness and melancholy,\nof desire and aversion, of love and hatred, c.\n302. Summary of views in regard to the beautiful.\nAs the subject of emotions of beauty is one of no small\ndifficulty, it may be of advantage to give here a brief sum-\nmary of some of the prominent views in respect to it.\n(1) Of emotions of beauty it is difficult to give a definition,\nbut we notice in them two marks or characteristicks\nThey imply, 1st, a degree of pleasure, and 2dly, are always\nreferred by us to the external object. (2) No objects are\nbeautiful of themselves, and independently of the soul,\nwhich contemplates them but appear to have a degree of\nsplendour or beauty in consequence of our having associa-\nted with them, constantly, and from a very early period,\nthe feelings, which exist in our own minds.\n(3) The feeling, which we term an emotion of beauty,\nis not limited to natural scenery, but may be caused by\nworks of art, by creations of the imagination, by the sever-\nest efforts of reasoning, and by moral actions. On all\nthese the mind may reflect back the lustre of its own emo-\ntions, and make them beam out with a sort of splendour,\nwhich is not originally in the objects and this is done in the\nsame manner, as when we diffuse our sensations of colour,\nwhich are merely affections of the mind, over the objects,\nwhich we call red, white, yellow, c. (4) There is in\nthe mind an original susceptibility of emotions in general,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0363.jp2"},"364":{"fulltext":"358 EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY.\nand, consequently, of those of beauty and not only this*\nsome objects are found, in the constitution of things, to be\nfollowed by these feelings of beauty, while others are not\nand such objects are spoken of as being originally or in-\ntrinsically beautiful. That is, when the object is present-\ned to the mind it is of itself followed by emotions of beauty,\nwithout being aided by the influence of accessory and\ncontingent circumstances.\n(5) Without pretending to certainty in fixing upon those\nobjects, to which, what is termed original or intrinsick\nbeauty may be ascribed, there appears to be no small rea-\nson, in attributing it to certain forms, to sounds of a par-\nticular character, to bright colours, to certain expressions\n©f the countenance, and to praiseworthy actions. The\nwhole amount, however, of the feeling of beauty, arising\nfrom this source, is comparatively small. (6) Many ob-\njects, which cannot be considered beautiful of themselves,\nbecome such, by being associated with a variety of form-\ner pleasing and enlivening recollections; and such, as pos-\nsess intrinsick beauty, may augment the pleasing emo-\ntion from the same cause. Also much of the difference of\nopinion, which exists as to what objects are beautiful, and\nwhat are not, is to be ascribed to association.- These\nare some of the prominent views in this discussion others\nare, in a measure, subordinate, but are not without interest\nand importance.\n303. Of picturesque beauty.\nWe apply the term picturesque to whatever objects\ncause in us emotions of beauty, in which the beauty\ndoes not consist in a single circumstance by itself, but\nin a considerable number, in a happy state of combina-\ntion. The meaning of the term is analogous to the sig-\nnification of some others of a like termination, which\nare derived to us from the Italian through the medium\nof the French. Mr. Stewart remarks of the word, arabes-\nque, that it expresses something in the style of the Arabi-\nans moresqne, something, in the style of the Moors; and","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0364.jp2"},"365":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. 359\ngrotesque, something which bears a resemblance to cer-\ntain whimsical delineation s in a grotto or subterranean a-\npartment at Rome. In like manner, picturesque, originally\nimplies what is done in the style and spirit of a* painter,\nwho ordinarily places before us an object made up of a\nnumber of circumstances, in such a state of combination,\nas to give pleasure.\nThe epithet may be applied to paintings, to natural\nscenery, poetical descriptions, c. The following des-\ncription from Thompson, which assembles together some\nof the circumstances, attending the cold, frosty nights of\nwinter, is highly picturesque.\nLoud rings the frozen earth and hard reflects\nA double noise while at his evening watch,\nThe village dog deters the nightly thief;\nThe heifer lows the distant waterfall\nSwells in the breeze and with the hasty tread\nOf traveller, the hollow-sounding, plain\n^Shakes from afar.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0365.jp2"},"366":{"fulltext":"360\nCHAPTER TWENTY FOURTH.\nEMOTSOHS OF SUBXiXXftSTY\n304. Connection between beauty and sublimity.\nThose emotions, which we designate as sublime, are a\nclass of feelings, which have much in common with emo-\ntions of beauty they do not differ so much in nature or\nkind, as in degree. When we examine the feelings, which\ngo under these two designations, we readily perceive, that\nthey have a progression that there are numerous degrees in\npoint of intensity but the emotion, although more vivid in\none case than the other, and mingled with some foreign\nelements, is for the most part, essentially the same. So\nthat it is, by no means, impossible to trace a connection\neven between the fainter feelings of beauty, and the most\noverwhelming emotions of the sublime.\nThis progression of our feelings from one, that is gen-\ntle and pleasant to one, that is powerful and even painful,\nhas been happily illustrated in the case of a person, who is\nsupposed to behold a river at its first rise in the mountains,\nand to follow it, as it winds and enlarges in the subjacent\nplains, and to behold it at last losing itself in the expanse\nof the ocean. For a time the feelings, which are excited\nwithin him, as he gazes on the prospect, are what are term-\ned emotions of beauty. As the small stream, which had\nhitherto played in the uplands and amid foliage, that al-\nmost hid it from his view, increases its waters, separates its\nbanks to a great distance from each other, and becomes\nthe majestick river his feelings are of a more powerful\nkind. We often, by way of distinction, speak of the feel-\nings existing under such circumstances, as emotions of\ngrandeur. At last it expands and disappears in the im-\nmensity of the ocean the vast illimitable world of bil-\nlows flashes in his sight; the emotion then, widening and\nstrengthening with the magnitude and energy of the ob-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0366.jp2"},"367":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 361\njects, which accompany it, becomes sublime. Emotions\nof sublimity, therefore, chiefly differ, at least in most instan-\nces, from those of beauty in being more vivid and powerful.\n305. Of sublimity a parte rei.\nThere is neither beauty nor sublimity a parte rei, using\na phrase, which has come down to us from the Schools. In\nsaying, there is no sublimity of this sort, we mean, there is\nno sublimity, which has a permanent and unchangeable\nexistence in all sublime objects, independently of the emo-\ntions, which we feel in the contemplation of them. Of\nthose, who hold to the doctrine of a sublime of this des-\ncription, the opinions are various although they all main-\ntain, that sublimity is a quality existing alike in all objects,\ncapable of producing the emotion, they are not agreed as\nto what, that particular quality is. According to one, it is\nthe terrible another makes it consist in the exertion of\nmighty power according to a third, it is great altitude or\nvast extent. -We cannot agree, that there is any abstract\nsublimity of this kind. When we rightly consider the\nwords, sublimity, and the sublime, we shall regard them\nas merely common names, expressive of a certain charac-\nter or trait in our emotions, and nothing more. And of\ncourse they are applied to all those emotions, however they\nmay differ in some other respects, in which that distinctive\ncharacteristick is found. The characteristick, to which\nive refer, is by no means easy of definition although it is\ngenerally understood to imply great vividness and strength.\n306. Occasions of emotions of sublimity.\nIt will aid in the better understanding of this subject\nbriefly to mention some of the occasions, on which the\nfeeling of sublimity arises. -Among other occasions*\nthis emotion is found to exist, whenever it happens,\nthat we have our attention called to objects of vast ex-\ntent. Accordingly, mountains of great altitude, the ce-\nlestial vault, when seen from high summits, vast plains, be-\nheld from a commanding position, the ocean, c. affect us\nwith sublime emotions,\n46","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0367.jp2"},"368":{"fulltext":"362 EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY.\nThere is the same result in the contemplation of all\nobjects, which indicate great exertions of power even\nwhen we have but very confused notions of that energy,\nwhich we know to be somehow put forth. Nothing can\nbe more sublime, than a volcano, throwing out from its\nbosom, clouds, and burning stones, and immense rivers of\nlava. The ocean, greatly agitated with a storm, and toss-\ning the largest navies, as if in sport, possesses an increase\nof sublimity, on account of the more striking indications\n©f power, which it at such a time gives. The shock of\nlarge armies also is sublime. But in these instances, as\nin most others, the sublime emotion cannot be ascribed\nsolely to one cause something is to be attributed to vast\nextent something to the original effect of the brilliancy\nor darkness of colours and something to feelings of dread\nand danger.\nWe often experience emotions of sublimity in witness-\ning objects, that move with very great swiftness. This is\none source of the feelings, which we have, at beholding\nbodies of water rushing violently down a cataract. For\nthe same reason, the hurricane, that hastens onward with\nirresistible velocity, and lays waste whatever it meets, is\nsublime. And here also we find a cause of part of that\nsublime emotion, which we feel on seeing at a distance\nthe electrick fluid, darting from the cloud to the earth.\n307. Sublimity in actions or moral sublime.\nThis emotion is found also to accompany certain ac-\ntions of men and here we find instances of what is termed\nmoral sublime. We in general regard those human\nactions as sublime, which are not only praiseworthy but\nwhich are put forth under such circumstances, as very\nstrongly to excite our feelings. So that we here also see\nthe progression from the beautiful to the sublime, the same\nas in the beautiful and sublime of the natural world. The\nbenevolent man is a pleasing or beautiful object, but when\nin the pains and agonies of death, he requests with his dy-\ning breath, that the poor may be fed from his substance,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0368.jp2"},"369":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 363\nthe exercise of benevolenee under such circumstances\nstrongly excites our feelings, and becomes an instance of\nthe moral sublime.\nWhenever we look abroad upon men, and witness the\ntrait of unconquerable fortitude, whenever we behold great\nself-possession in sudden and fearful emergencies, or see a\nreadiness to share voluntarily in another s sufferings, or\nbecome acquainted with other moral exercises of a like\nkind, we cannot but experience a strong emotion. It is\nnot easy to communicate an exact notion of this feeling,\nexcept perhaps in the circumstance of its great strength.\nIt is evident, however, that it is closely analogous to that\nagitation and expansion of the soul, which exists, when we\ncontemplate what is vast, and terrible, and mighty in na-\nture.\n308. JVo objects sublime of themselves.\nBut objects are not sublime, any more than they are\nbeautiful in themselves in both cases, it is the mind of\nman and that alone, which gives them the sublimity, they\nseem to possess of their own nature. The hurricane, the\ncataract, the lightning, when resolved into their elements,\nare only a number of contiguous atoms. And yet it seems\nto be unalterably fixed in the constitution of things, that\nwe cannot behold them without strong feeling. The\nemotions, which we feel, are diffused by us over the objects,\nthat are their cause, or more properly are antecedent to\nthem and this diffusion will be found to be all, that con-\nstitutes their sublimity -There is a similar diffusion of\nour own emotions over objects of our contemplation, that\nare instances of the moral sublime.\n309. Sublime, objects have some elements of beauty.\nWe have seen, that a regular progression may, in most\ninstances, be traced from the beautiful to the sublime. It\nseems, therefore, to follow, that instances of the sublime\nwill, on removal of some circumstances, possess more or\nless of the beautiful. And this, on examination, will be","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0369.jp2"},"370":{"fulltext":"364 EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY.\nfound to be generally the case. Take, as an exarnp^\nthe shock of powerful armies, which is confessedly a sub-\nlime scene. We have only to remove the circumstance\nof slaughter and at once the regular order of the froops,\ntheir splendid dress, and rapid movements, together with\nthe floating of banners and the sound of musick, are ex-\nceedingly picturesque and beautiful nothing more so.\nAnd all this is none the less beautiful, when thousands are\nfalling and dying in actual contest; although the painful\nemotion, consequent on witnessing a scene of slaughter,\nso much overpowers the sense of the beautiful, that it ap-\npears v ven not to have an existence. If the engagement\nbetween the armies should be wi I out the accompaniments\nof military dress, and without order, and without strains\nof musick, but a mere struggle between man and man, with\nsuch arms as came readiest, ini their pcwer, the scene,\nhowever destructive, would be any thing, rather than sub-\nlime. Diminish the foice of the whirlwind to that of\nthe gentle bree e, and as it layfully sweeps by us, we feel\nthat emotion of pleasure, which is an element of the beau-\ntiful. And so when the mighty cataract is dwindled down\nto the cascade, we shall discover, that the tumultuous emo-\ntions of ,iK sublime are convji -tad into the gentler feelings\nof beaut The sime effect will be found to follow the\nmoral sublime.\nBut it will be asked, was there any thing of moral beau-\nty in Marius, ti.e blood-thirsty Roman chief? And yet\nwhen we ^ee him sheltered amid the ruins of Carthage,\nfallen from his.grea ness, butretainii g the unconquerable\nwill, there is something in it of sublimity. In reply it\nmay be said, hat when we experience in this instance the\nmoral sublime, we fix our attention upon a particular trait of\ncharacter and do not wander over the whole life of the\nman. The trait lure is fortitude; and, consequently, we\nmay discover in this, and in all similar instances, grada-\ntions o r emotion. Whenever we see an individual cheer-\nful, and happy, and composed in ordinary difficulties and\npressures, such an individual is undoubtedly an object of\nmoral beauty. But let these misfortunes be increased,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0370.jp2"},"371":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 365\nlet him be driven from home and country, let the world, as\nit were, be combined against him, and the man, who, in\nsuch circumstances, betrays no diminution of fortitude, but\nholds up an unshaken stability of soul amid the blackness\nof the desolations around him, is a sublime object. We\nshall feel the emotion, whatever may be his character, be-\ncause our attention is fixed not upon the whole man, but\nupon a particular trait and that trait will be found, when\nexhibited in a less striking degree, to be a beautiful one.\nHowever true it may be, as a general statement, that\nsublimity implies some elements of the beautiful, it is not\nnecessary to assert, that this is always the case. Perhaps\nin some instances it is not. A tract of barren heath or of\nsand, which certainly cannot possess much, if any beauty,\nmay, when spread abroad before us to great extent have a\nconsiderable degree of the sublime. The statement given\nis meant as a general one, admitting certainly of but few\nexceptions.\n310. Of emotions of grandeur.\nFor all the various emotions, of which we are now\nspeaking, as they rite from the lowest to the highest, we\nhave the two general terms, beauty, and sublimity. There\nis, however, another form of expression, which is, with\nsome good reason, putting forth its claims to be received\ninto use viz. emotions of grandeur. We may happily ap-\nply this phraseology to various objects, which we hardly\nknow, whether to class with the beautiful or sublime hav-\ning too much of fullness and expansiveness for the former,\nand too little of power for the latter. The meandering\nriver is beautiful as it becomes deeper and wider, it as-\nsumes an appearance not of beauty, but of grandeur but\nthe ocean only is more than either, is sublime.\n311. Of original or intrinsick sublimity of objects*\nIf there be a connection between the beautiful and\nsublime, if beauty, grandeur, and sublimity are only names\nfor various emotions, not so much differing in kind, as in\ndegree; essentially the same views, which were advanced","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0371.jp2"},"372":{"fulltext":"3G6 EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY.\nin respect to beauty, will hold here. It will follow, that\nif the contemplation of some objects is attended with emo-\ntions of beauty, independently of associated feelings; or,\nin other words, if they have an intrinsick beauty, that there\nare objects also intrinsically sublime. Hence we may con-\nclude, that whatever has great height, or great depth, or\nvast extent, or other attributes of the sublime, will be able\nto excite in us emotions of sublimity of themselves, inde-\npendently of aid from any connected, feelings. We have\nmuch ground for regarding this as a correct supposition\nand still a great part of the sublime emotion is to be attri-\nbuted to association.\n312. Influence of association on emotions of sublimity.\nThe remark, that a great part of the sublime is to be at-\ntributed to association, admits of an illustration in the case\nof sounds. When a sound suggests ideas of danger, as the\nreport of artillery, and the howling of a storm; when it\ncalls up recollections of mighty power, as the fall of a cat-\naract, and the rumbling of an earthquake, the emotion of\nsublimity, which we feel, is greatly increased by such sug-\ngestions. Few simple sounds are thought to have more of\nsublimity, than the report of a cannon but how different,\nhow much greater the strength of feeling, than on other\noccasions, whenever we hear it coming to us from the fields\nof actual conflict Many sounds, which are in themselves\ninconsiderable, and are not much different from many oth-\ners, to which we do not attach the character of sublimity,\nbecome highly sublime by association. There is frequent-\nly a low feeble sound, preceding the coming of a storm,\nwhich has this character.\nAlong the woods, along the moorish fens,\nSighs the sad genius of the coming storm,\nResounding long in fancy s listening ear.\nThompsons Winter.\nIt is sometimes the case, that people, whose sensibilities\nare much alive to thunder, mistake for it some common\nsounds, such as the noise of a carriage, or the rumbling of\na cart. While they are under this mistake, they feel these\nsounds as sublime because they associate with them all","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0372.jp2"},"373":{"fulltext":"EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 367\nthose ideas of danger and of mighty power, which they cus-\ntomarily associate with thunder. The hoot of the owl at\nmidnight is sublime chiefly by association also the scream\nof the eagle, heard amid rocks and deserts. The latter is\nparticularly expressive of fierce and lonely independence\nand both are connected in our remembrances with some\nstriking poetical passages. The same results will be\nfound to hold in other cases. A view of the Egyptian\npyramids animates us with sublime emotions it is impossi-\nble to behold such vast efforts of human power, and be un-\nmoved but the strength of these feelings is increased\nby means of the solemn recollection, that they have stood\nunshaken, while successive generations have flourished and\nperished at their feet, and by their being connected with\nmany ideas of ancient magnificence, of unknown kings,\nand with numerous incidents in the history of a people,\nonce famous for opulence and the arts, but now no longer\nan independent nation. Mount Sinai in Arabia Petrsea\nis a rocky pile of considerable altitude, and like other sum-\nmits must have always excited some emotion in those, who\nbeheld it but when it is seen by a christian traveller, the\nsublime emotion is greatly increased by the recollection of\nthe important place, which this summit holds in the histo-\nry of the Jews, and of its consequent connection with the\nbelief and the hopes of all those, who embrace the religion\nof the Saviour.\nNote. The subject of emotions of beauty and sublim-\nity has justly been regarded as one of no small difficulty.\nA great variety of opinions have been advanced and ma-\nny of them confused and contradictory. It would be un-\nwise, therefore, to recommend the reading of every thing,\nwhich has been written on the subject which would tend\nrather to perplex, than enlighten the mind. The views\nwhich have been given, are essentially those, wHch are il-\nlustrated and supported in Brown s Lectures on the Mind\nthey are here given in a condensed form. There are also\nmany interesting and philosophical illustrations in Alison s\nNature and Principles of Taste, and in Burke s Inquiry in^\nto the Sublime and Beautiful.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0373.jp2"},"374":{"fulltext":"368\nCHAPTER TWENTY FIFTH,\nOF IM AG22S- TSOH.\n313. Definition of the power of imagination.\nImagination is a complex exercise of the mind, by\nmeans of which various conceptions are combined togeth-\ner, so as to form new wholes. The conceptions have\nproperly enough been regarded as the materials, from\nwhich the new creations are made but it is not until af-\nter the existence of those mental states, which are implied\nin imagination, that they are fixed upon, detained, and\nbrought out from their state of singleness into happy and\nbeautiful combinations.\nOur conceptions have been compared to shapeless\nstones, as they exist in the quarry, which require little\nmore than mechanick labour to convert them into common\ndwellings, but that rise into palaces and temples only at\nthe command of architectural genius. That rude, and\nlittle more than mechanick effort, which converts the\nshapeless stones of the quarry into common dwellings, may\njustly be considered, when divested of its metaphorical as-\npect, a correct representation of this mental property, as\nit exists among the great mass of mankind while the ar-\nchitectural genius, which creates palaces and temples, is\nthe well-furnished and sublime imagination of poets, paint-\ners, orators, c.\nImagination is a complex mental operation implying\nthe exercise of the power of association or simple sugges-\ntion in furnishing those conceptions, which are combined\ntogether; also the exercise of that susceptibility, by which\nwe perceive the relations of things, that is, of relative\nsuggestion. Nor is this all, that is necessary, as will here-\nafter more fully appear.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0374.jp2"},"375":{"fulltext":"W 1KAQINATI01C. 5C9\n314. The creations of imagination not entirely\nvoluntary.\nThe opinion, that even persons of the most ready imag-\nination can form new imaginary creations, whenever they\nchoose, by a mere volition, however widely it may have pre-\nvailed, cannot be maintained. To will, or to exercise a vo-\nlition, always implies a mental determination, a choice.\nIn accordance with the common opinion, we will sup-\npose, that a person wills, or chooses, to imagine an ocean\nof melted brass, or an immense body of liquid matter, which\nhas that appearance. The statement itself evidently in-\nvolves a contradiction. It is certainly impossible for a\nperson to will to imagine any thing, since that precise thing,\nwhich he wills to imagine, must already be in his mind at\nthe time of such volition. He wills, for instance, to imag-\nine a sea of melted brass but of what meaning or what\nutility is this volition, when he has already imagined the ve-\nry thing, which this language seems to anticipate as future\nWhatever a person wills, or rather professes, to will to\nimagine, he has already imagined and, consequently, there\ncan be no such thing as entirely voluntary imaginations.\n315. Of imaginations not attended with desire.\nThe creations, which we form by means of the power of\nimagination are of two kinds, those attended with desire,\nand those which are not. It is the latter kind, which we\nspeak of in this section. There is hardly any mind so\nwanting in intellectual wealth as not to find clusters of as-\nsociated conceptions, groups of images, often arising in\nitself. They seem to come upon us, as it were, unbidden\nand to combine themselves in a variety of proportions, pre-\nsenting new, and perhaps grotesque figures. But, al-\nthough this varied presentation of floating imagery have\nthe appearance of occupying the mind in an accidental\nmanner, it all arises, and is regulated by the laws of sim-\nple suggestion. No image whatever occurs, which has not\nsome connection with the state of the mind, which prece-\n47","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0375.jp2"},"376":{"fulltext":"370 OF IMAGINATION.\nded it. In using these expressions, however, we would not\nbe understood to imply, by the connection asserted, any\nthing more than this, that one intellectual state, in certain\ngiven circumstances, follows another, agreeably to an orig-\ninal law or principle of our constitution established by its\nmaker. But although we truly have here instances of the\nexercise of imagination, it is not of that higher and effec-\ntive kind, which gives birth to the creations of poetry, and\npainting, and the other fine arts.\n316. Of imaginations attended with desire.\nWhile there are some combinations, the result of imag-\nination, which are formed without any accompanying emo-\ntion of desire, there are some, where desire, or intention\nof some sort, clearly exists. It is of cases of this last men-\ntioned kind that we are accustomed to think, when with\nthose intellectual susceptibilities and states, to which, con*\nsidered conjointly, we give the name of imagination, we\nassociate the idea of effective power or the ability to cre-\nate. It is this frame of mind, which exists in every at-\ntempt at composition in prose and verse, where the sub-\nject admits of lively images and appeals to the passions.\nIt may assist us in understanding this species of imag-\nination, if we endeavour to examine the intellectual opera-\ntions of one, who has sat down to write, whether the inten-\nded production be of a poetick or other kind.\nA person cannot ordinarily be supposed to sit down to\nwrite on any Occasion whatever, without having some gen-\neral idea of the subject to be written upon already in the\nmind. He, accordingly, commences the task before him\nwith the expectation and the desire of developing the sub-\nject more or less fully, of giving to it not only a greater\ncontinuity and a better arrangement, but an increased inter-\nest in every respect. And it may be the case, that many\ncircumstances, indirectly relative to the effort of composi-\ntion, such as the anticipated approbation or disapprobation\nof the publick, have an affect greatly to fix and increase\nthe emotion of interest or desire. All vivid emotions of","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0376.jp2"},"377":{"fulltext":"©F IMAGINATION. 371\nChis kind, such as love, fear, and hatred, (with which desire,\nin reference to some of its qualities, may be classed,) pos-\nsess a degree of permanency, which cannot be considered,\nas belonging to any mere conception. And, as, in the in-\nstance, which we are now considering, the emotion of de-\nsire or interest is intimately connected with the general\nconception of the subject before the mind, the effect of\nthis connection is a communication of the permanency,\noriginally belonging solely to the desire, to the general\nidea or outlines of the subject, which the writer is to dis-\ncuss. The conception, therefore, of those outlines loses\nin this way the fleeting and ever-varying nature of other\nconceptions, and becomes fixed. The lineaments of the\nanticipated treatise remain in their length, breadth, and\nproportions, permanently held up to the writer s view.\nSpontaneous conceptions continue, in the mean while,\nto arise in the mind, on the common principles of sugges-\ntion hut as the general outline of the subject remains\nfixed, they all have a greater or less relation to it. And\npartaking in some measure of the permanency of the out-\nline, to which they have relation, the writer has an oppor-\ntunity to approve some and to reject others, according as\nthey impress him as being suitable or unsuitable to the na-\nture of the subject. Those, which affect him with emo-\ntions of pleasure, on account of their perceived fitness for\nthe subject, are retained and committed to writing, while\nothers, which do not thus affect and interest him, soon fade\naway altogether.\nWhoever carefully notices the operations of his own\nmind, when he makes an effort at composition, will proba-\nbly be well satisfied, that this account of the intellectual\nprocess is very near the truth.\nIt will be recollected, therefore, that the exercise of\nimagination in the composition of any theme, which ad-\nmits of it, is not the exertion of merely a single intellec-\ntual ability. It is the development of various susceptibil-\nities, of desire, of the principle of simple suggestion or as-\nsociation, and of judgment or relative suggestion, in con-\nsequence of which a feeling of relative fitness or unfitnesi","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0377.jp2"},"378":{"fulltext":"372 OP IMAGINATION.\narises, on the contemplation of the conceptions, which\nhave spontaneously presented themselves.\n317. Further illustrations of the same subject\nWe first think of some subject. With the original\nthought or design of the subject, there is a co-existent de-\nsire to investigate it, to adorn it, to present it to the exam-\nination of others. The effect of this desire is to keep the\ngeneral subject in mind and, as the natural consequence of\nthe power of association, various conceptions arise, in some\nway or other related to the general subject. Of some of\nthese conceptions we approve in consequence of their per-\nceived fitness to the end in view, while we reject others on\naccount of the absence of this requisite quality of agreea-\nbleness or fitness.\nFor the sake of convenience and brevity we give the\nname of imagination to this complex state or series of\nstates of the mind. It is important to possess a single\nterm, expressive. of the complex intellectual process, other-\nwise, as we so frequently have occasion to refer to it in\ncommon conversation, we should be subjected, if not prop-\nerly to a circumlocution, at least to an unnecessary mul-\ntiplication of words. But while we find it so much for our\nconvenience to make use of this term, we should be careful\nand not impose upon ourselves, by ever remembering, that\nit is the name, nevertheless, not of an original and indepen-\ndent faculty, which of itself accomplishes all, that has been\nmentioned, but of a complex state or of a series of states\nof the mind. A single further remark may be added in\nillustration of the process of the mind in literary composi-\ntion. It has been seen, to how great a degree efforts of\nthis kind depend on the laws of suggestion. When, there-\nfore, a person has sat down to write, it may be expected,\nthat he has furnished himself with pen and paper, and that\nhe has books around him. The presence of these and oth-\ner things, subordinate to the writer s general undertaking,\nconstantly reminds him, by the operation of the same laws,\nof the lubjcct before him, and recals his attention, if ho\ndiscover any disposition to wander from it.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0378.jp2"},"379":{"fulltext":"OF IMAGINATION. %1%\n318. Remarks from the writings of Dr. Reid.\nDr. Reid (Essay IV. ch. 4.) gives the following graph-\nical statement of the selection, which is made by the wri-\nter from the variety of his constantly arising and departing\nconceptions.\nWe seem to treat the thoughts, that present themselves\nto the fancy in crowds, as a great man treats those [court-\niers] that attend his levee. They are all ambitious of his\nattention. He goes round the circle, bestowing a bow up-\non one, a smile upon another asks a short question of a\nthird, while a fourth is honoured with a particular confer-\nence and the greater part have no particular mark of at-\ntention, but go as they came. It is true, he can give no\nmark of his attention to those, who were not there but\nhe has a sufficient number for making a choice and dis-\ntinction.\n319. Grounds of the preference of one conception to\nanother.\nA question after all arises, on what principle is the\nmind enabled to ascertain that congruity, or incongruity,\nfitness or unfitness, agreeably to which it makes the selec-\ntion from its various conceptions. The fact is admitted,\nthat the intellectual principle is successively in a series of\ndifferent states, or, in other words, that there are succes-\nsive conceptions or images, but the inquiry still remains,\nwhy is one image in the group thought or known to be\nmore worthy than any other image, or why are any two\nimages combined together in preference to any two others?\nThe answer is, it is owing to no secondary law, but to\nan instantaneous and original feeling of approbation or\ndisapprobation. Those conceptions, which according to\nthis original power of approving or disapproving, are found\nto be suitable to the general outlines of the subject, are\ndetained. Those images, which are perceived to possess\na peculiar congruity and fitness for each other, are united\ntogether, forming new and more beautiful compounds.\nWhile others, although no directly voluntary power is ex-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0379.jp2"},"380":{"fulltext":"374 OF IMAGINATION.\nercised over either class, are neglected, and soon become\nextinct. But no account of this vivid feeling of approval\nor disapproval, of this very rapid perception of the mutual\ncbngruity of the images for each other or for the general\nconception of the subject, can be given, other than this,\nthat with such a power, the original author of our intel-\nlectual susceptibilities has been pleased to form us.\n320. Mental process in the formation of Milton s\nimaginary paradise.\nWhat has been said can perhaps be made plainer, by\nconsidering in what way Milton must have proceeded, in.\nforming his happy description of the garden of Eden.\nHe had formed, in the first place, some general outlines of\nthe subject and as it was one, which greatly interested\nhis feelings, the interest, which was felt, tended to keep\nthe outlines steadily before him. Then, the principles of\nassociation, which are ever at work, brought up a great\nvariety of conceptions, having a relation of some kind to\nthose general features; spch as conceptions of rocks, and\nwoods, and rivers, and green leaves, and golden fruit.\nThe next step was the exercise of that power, which we\nhave of perceiving relations, which has sometimes been\ndesignated as the susceptibility or power of relative sug-\ngestion. By means of this he was at once able to deter-\nmine, whether the conceptions, which were suggested,\nwere suitable to the general design of the description and\nto each other, and whether they would have, when com-\nbined together to form one picture, a pleasing effect. Ac-\ncordingly, those, which were judged most suitable, were\ncombined together as parts of the imaginary creation, and\nwere detained and fixed by means of that feeling of inter?\nest, which was at first exercised towards the more promi-\nnent outlines merely while others speedily disappeared\nfrom the mind.— And thus arose an imaginary landscape,\nmore interesting, more perfect, than we can ever expect tQ\nfind realized in nature.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0380.jp2"},"381":{"fulltext":"OF IMAGINATION. 375\n321. Limitations of imagination by the condition\nof the senses.\nThe power of imagination depends in some measure on\nthe number and condition of the senses. If Milton had\nbeen blind from infancy, it cannot be supposed, that he\nwould have been able to have formed that beautiful com-\nbination, the description of Paradise. Had he possessed\nthe sense of seeing only in an imperfect degree, furnished,\nfor instance, with only those glimmerings of sight, which\npersons sometimes possess before being couched for the\ncataract, he would not have been able to have done it, at\nleast to the degree of perfection, in which the description\nappears at present.\nA person undertakes to describe a battle, who has al-\nways been deaf; and in order that he may enjoy every\nfacility for the execution of his plan, he places himself on\nsome eminence, where he can overlook those military man-\noeuvres and conflicts, the description of which he antici-\npates giving. He gives us an account of the number en-\ngaged, of the position occupied, of the military dress, of\nthe valour of different corps but it was to him, as he be-\nheld it, and it is to us, as we read it in his description, only\na noiseless scene. A deathlike silence prevails. The word\nof command flies from rank to rank and we hear it not*\nThe hoofs of war-horses beat the earth, and we perceive\nthe motion, without a perception of the noise of their\ntread. We witness the flashes of cannon on the hills of\nthe battle, but while we feel the trembling of the earth, no\nsound reaches us. What an inadequate conception must\na person, who does not possess the sense of hearing, have\nof many of those circumstances, which inspire others with\nemotions of pleasure and sublimity\nSimilar remarks will apply to those cases, where there\nis a failure of any other sense. We read of a philoso-\npher,who attempted to give a blind man a notion of scarlet\ncolour. The philosopher assured him, that it yielded a lively\nand pleasant sensation that it was an emblem of courage\nand being considered ornamental to them, was worn by","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0381.jp2"},"382":{"fulltext":"376\nOF IMAGINATION.\nkings and princes. Having specified these and some oth-\ner things, connected with this colour, he then asked the\nblind man, whether he had any idea of scarlet The\nblind man replied, that he thought he had some notion of\nit, and that he supposed, it must be more like the sound\nof a trumpet, than anything else in the world.\nBut it will be asked, how does it then happen, that men\nborn blind, frequently talk of visible things with great\nreadiness and propriety 9 When they with propriety ap-\nply epithets to objects of colour, such conversation must be\nthe effect of memory. They repeat what they have heard\nothers say. For, if they are perfectly blind, they certainly\ncan have no idea of what is meant by colours being as ig-\nnorant of them as any man whatever is of the phenomena\nof the world of spirits.\nIn their efforts, (which, in consequence of their unhap-\npy condition, they undoubtedly often make,J to form a\nconception of light, their ideas must always be conform-\ned, in a great measure, to the knowledge they already pos-\nsess by means of the other senses. And it must conse-\nquently be very erroneous, as there is certainly noth-\ning in the nature of light, analogous to the nature of\nsound, or of taste, or of smell.\n322. Explanation of the case of the poet Blacklock.\nIn connection with the remarks, which have already\nbeen made on the limitation of imagination by the state\nand condition of the senses, it seems proper to say some-\nthing in explanation of the case of the poet Blacklock.\nThomas Blacklock, a poet and a minister of the estab-\nlished church of Scotland, lost his sight in consequence\nof a disease at five months of age. It does not come\nwithin our plan to repeat in this place his interesting and\ninstructive history, any further than to say that, notwith-\nstanding the great misfortune, under which he laboured, he\nmade such advances in learning as to merit the reputation\nof a philosopher as well as of a poet. I am acquainted,\n(says Dr. Beattie, referring to Blacklock,) with a person,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0382.jp2"},"383":{"fulltext":"OP IMAGINATION. ST7\nwho, having at the age of five months lost his sight by the\nsmall-pox, retains not the idea of any thing visible and is\nyet a good poet, philosopher, and divine, a most ingenious\nas well as a most worthy man. He dreams too as frequent-\nly as other people, and dreams are universally ascribed to\nthe fancy; and his writings prove, that he possesses, what\nevery critick will allow to be, and what Addison himself\nwould have called, a sublime imagination.\nIn the remarks before made, we find a solution, in some\nmeasure, of his poetical ability. He was undoubtedly a\nperson of a natural capacity superiour to that of most men\nand possessed in particular of no small share of poetical\nsensibility. Giving loose to the ardour of his imagination,\nhe was led to treasure up in his memory, from conversation\nand from hearing works read, the words, white, black,\npurple, and others, descriptive of the colour of objects.\nHis general accuracy, in the application of them, may be\naccounted for in this way. He had acquired in the same\nway, that he had acquired the words themselves, those as-\nsociations, which people in general are in the habit of at-\ntaching to such colours, as have been mentioned. With\nthe word, white, for instance, although it could not sug-\ngest to him the idea of that colour, he associated the iJeas\nof cheerfulness and innocence with the word, purple the\nideas of splendour and majesty; with the word black, the\nqualities of gloom and melancholy, ft is not, therefore,\nwholly unaccountable, that he should have been able to\nspeak of the purple dawn, or of dark woodland scene-\nry, although he at the same time was without any correct\nnotions of the primary signification of these terms.\n323. Works of imagination give different degrees of\npleasure.\nDifferent persons receive different degrees of pleasura\nfrom works of imagination. The fact is well known.\nSomething may be said in explanation of it, in reference to\npoetry which is one of the creations of the power, we are\nconsidering. And the same explanation will apply in [art\nto other efforts of the imagination. Although poetry hi\n48","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0383.jp2"},"384":{"fulltext":"378 OF IMAGINATION,\ngenerally looked upon to be a useful and pleasing art, vre\nfind, that all have not the same relish for its beauties.\nThe pleasure, which is felt by a reader of poetry, will in-\ngeneral depend upon two circumstances, (1) the confor-\nmity of his experience to the things described, (2) the live-\nliness of his own imagination.\nThe pleasure received will depend, in the first place,\non the conformity of the reader s experience, to the things\ndescribed. Accordingly, if the scene of a poem be laid\nwithin the limits of a commercial city, if it deal chiefly in\nthe description of the habits of the people residing there,\nand of their various turns of fortune, it will excite but.\ncomparatively little interest in those, who have been\nbrought up wholly amid retired and rural scenes. And\nwhen, on the other hand, the scene of it is laid in the\ncountry, when it deals in the toils, and sorrows, and joys of\ncountry life, it excites comparatively little interest in those,\nwho have never had any actual experience of that kind.\nBurn s Cotter s Saturday Night is an admirable poem but\nit is exceedingly more pleasing to those, who can clearly\nperceive, from what they have themselves seen, and heard,\nand felt, its accurate conformity to nature, than to those,\nwho cannot.\nThe pleasure, which is felt by a reader of poetry, will\ndepend also in part on the liveliness of his own imagina-\ntion. In poems the different parts are only imperfectly\nfilled up some describe more minutely than others but\nthe most minute describersonly trace the outlines. These\nremain, therefore, to be filled up by the reader. But the a-\nbility to do this is found in very different degrees in different\npersons some very rapidly an admirably finish the picture,\nand others do not. The latter, consequently, remain, in a\nconsiderable degree, unaffected, and perhaps condemn the\nppem as deficient in interest while the former read it\nwith great feeling and pleasure. This statement ac-\ncounts for the fact, that the same poem gives to different\npersons different degrees of satisfaction and also, in as\nmuch as it requires in all cases some power of imagination\nin the reader, explains the circumstance, that so many","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0384.jp2"},"385":{"fulltext":"OF IMAGINATION.\nS79\nappear to be utterly destitute of any relish for the beau-\nties of the poetick art.\n324. Utility of the creations of poetry, painting, kc.\nSome have questioned the utility both of the poetick\nand of the other fine arts. It is evident, that the bene-\nfits and evils of poetry, whatever they may be, cannot be\naccurately pointed jut, without the separate consideration\nof each department, into which the art is divided. The\nelegy, lyricks, the epick, pastorals, descriptive and didac-\ntick poetry, and the tragedy, all have their different laws\nthey aim, in some measure, at different objects, and cannot\nbe judged of on precisely the same principles. But as the\nconsideration of each department separately cannot be at-\ntempted, a few general remarks must answer. Poetry\npreserves the recollection of early days. When wo are\nnigh having every finer feeling entirely blunted by the\ncares and interests of life, it revives before us a youth of\ninnocence, confidence, and affection. In doing this, it tells\nus, we must not give up all to the world, and that if we\nwould be happy and beloved, we must yield something to\nthe cultivation of the moral sensibilities. This is one ben-\nefit; Poetry dwells with enthusiasm on the works of na-\nture. It makes us acquainted with the blue mountains,\nthe gray old trunks of trees, the voice of floods and\nwhile it holds up the beauties of nature, it secures a yet\nhigher object, in more fully revealing to us the character of\nthe author of nature. And here is another good result.\nPoetry may be said to be the book of the passions. It\npaints man without reserve both his good and bad qual-\nities. It describes his truth, his gratitude, and his magna-\nnimity and, on the other hand, -discloses with equal free-\ndom the unworthy passions of pride, self-seeking, envy, re-\nvenge. The benefit here is, not merely that the passions,\nwhich are the elements of human nature, are made known,\nbut that it is done with such precision, with such truth,\nand strength. Further poetry realizes by anticipation\nthose restless and expansive desires, which we find natur-\nally in the soul. He, who scrutinizes the operations of","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0385.jp2"},"386":{"fulltext":"680 OF IMAGINATION\nh s mind, will observe it full of activity it is ever strug-\ngl ng against the bounds, which limit it; as if fully con-\nscious of its immortal destiny, it not cnly looks forward to\nsomething new, but to something greater, and higher, and\nnobler. And hence it enters with joy into those bright\ncreations, those new worlds, which it is the prerogative of\npoetry to form and they seem to it a congenial residence.\nMost of these considerations in favour of the poetick\nart will pply also to painting. Thess are truly sister arts\nthey require, in the performance, a kindred genius their\nobject, is essentially the same. Po try indeed addresses\nitself to the ear, and painting to the sight; but both are\ncddr esed to the imagination. And the success in either\ncase will depend greatly on the degree, to which the ima-\ngination is awakened up. Other fine arts, musick, sculp-\nture, architecture, as well as poetry and painting, are arts\nof the imagination. They are addrt ssed to it, and are foun-\nded on it. They may all be equally misapplied and perver-\nted. But when directed, as they ought to be, it is no less\nevident, that they are indications of the progress of the hu-\nman mind, and may contribute to men s convenience and\nenjoyment.\n325. Of misconceptions by means of the imagination.\nBut while it is safe to admit, that the imagination may\nbe made subservient to valuable purposes, it is no less true,\nthat it may sometimes mislead us. The following are in-\nstances among others, where this is the result. Our\nadmiration of the great may be reckoned a prejuJice of\nthe imagination. We are apt to suppose them possessed\nof personal attractions, and of the highest happiness and\nnot enly this, to invest them with every worthy moral attri-\nbute. Tl e misfortunes, (says a late writer,) of Mary,\nQueen of Scots, and of her descendant, Prince Charles\nEdward, commanded the sympathy, the love, and the en-\nthusiasm of millions. In the cause of these princes, how\nmany have joyfully sacrificed life, though neither of them\nwas worthy or capable of reigning How many labour\nstill to blot out every stain from their memory And ye!","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0386.jp2"},"387":{"fulltext":"Or IMAGINATION. 381\nevery individual, in the circle of his own private friends\nand acquaintances, can undoubtedly find many persons\nmore distinguished for virtue, for good principles, for in-\ntegrity of character, than the prince for whom he is will-\ning to lav down his life but a friend, a private man is in-\nvested with none of those attributes, always dazzling but\noften fal^e, which are calculated to strike the imagination.\nOur imaginations mislead us also in respect to war,\nwhenever we contemp ate it at a distance, and do not feel\nits effects at our own firesides and homes. We delight to\ndwell upon the idea of mighty power, which it suggests\nwe recal to memory the homage and plaudits, which have\nbeen given to the brave we combine together conceptions\nof all, that is stirring in musick, and brilliant in equipage.\nIn a word, it is a kindling imagination, seizing upon some\nimposing circumstances, that leads multitudes into deplo-\nlable mistakes as to the character of that great scourge of\nthe human race.- Again the power of imagination of-\nten gives a wrong colouring to future life. It is here as in\nsome prospects in natural scenery,\nTis distance lends enchantment to the view.\nWhatever may be our present evils, we imagine there\nis good to come. We rush forward in the pursuit of it,\nlike children, who set out with spirited emulation, expect-\ning to grasp in their hands the splendours of the rainbow,\nthat appears to them to rest upon the neighbouring hills.\n326. Explanation of the above misrepresentations of\nthe imagination.\nBut how happens it, that this faculty so often misleads\nus What explanation can be given\nThe answer is, that the mind turns away with a natural\naversion from whatever causes it pain or uneasiness; delight-\ning to dwell on the elements of beauty and sublimity, and\nin general on all scenes, which excite in it pleasant emo-\ntions. As there is, therefore, more or less in all actual\nsituations, which causes dissatisfaction, we shall always find,\nin every condition, in which we are placed, something,\nwhich detracts from what we imagine to be the sum of hap-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0387.jp2"},"388":{"fulltext":"3$g OF IMAGINATION-\npinesss. The evils, which are around us and neat us, we\nmust know Our situation forbids an attempt at the con-\ncealment of them. Every day forces the lesson of human\nadversity on our attention. But when we look abroad from\nthe reality, which exists at home, from the cares and the\nsorrows, which are ever near at hand, to other scenes and\nprospects, we do not think of trial and disappointment, be-\ncause we are not obliged to. We fix our attention upon\nthose circumstances, which appear most favourable and in-\nteresting and consequently,knovv nothing of the uneasiness\nand misery, which actually exist in the imaginary Paradise of\nour creation. For instance, we are apt to associate, as has\nbeen remarked, with persons in very high stations in life,\nthe ideas of unalloyed happiness, of moral excellence, of\nmanliness and beauty of form; but while men in the most\nexalted stations have no less a share than others of bodily\ndeformities and suffering, they have still greater anxie-\nties their hours of sorrow are often more numerous than\nthose of any other class of persons. It was well inquired\nby King Henry in Shakespeare,\nWhat infinite heart s ease must kings neglect,\nThat private men enjoy i\nAnd what have king-, that privates have not too,\nSave ceremony, save general ceremony f\nAnd under the direction of the same mental tendency,\nby which we are led to mark the elevations without noti-\ncing the depressions of the great men of the earth, we are\nled also to see the sublimities and hide from our sight the\ndegradations and miseries of war, to behold the sunshine\nof the future, but no clouds.\n327. Fcelihgs of sympathy aided by imagination*\nBut where the imagination is not at liberty to fix itself\nexclusively upon pleasing circumstances, the results as to\nthe degree of creative power are the same, although they\nare of a different kind. In the one case, it forms creations\nof beauty, magnificence, sublimity in the other, it is equal-\nly efficacious in combining images of gloom and suffering.\nH«nce a quick 6l powerful imagination is no small ajd in tb«","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0388.jp2"},"389":{"fulltext":"0T IMAGINATION. 38$\nexercise of the sympathetic!; feelings. Accordingly, when\ntwo men, the one a person of imagination, the other not,\nmeet a poor man, who has been suddenly reduced to pover-\nty, they will be found to have different degrees of sympathy\nfor him. The former no doubt will pity the unfortunate\nman but the latter will pity more. He will think of his\nformer situation he will follow him to his dwelling he\nwill see in his prophetick eye the tears of his family;\nin a word, he will, as a general statement, have more\nfeeling for all individuals in suffering, and, consequently, be\nlikely to do more for them.\nThus, in Sterne s Sentimental Journey, he is led by\nsome circumstance to think of a captive in one of the\nFrench State Prisons. Pie gives the reins to his imagina-\ntion and looks through the twilight of the grated door to\ntake the picture. 1 beheld, (says he,) his body half-wasted\nwith long expectation and confinement, and felt what kind\nof sickness of the heart it is, which arises from hope defer-\nred. Upon looking nearer, T saw him pale and feverish.\nIn thirty years, the western breeze had not fanned his\nblood. He had seen no sun, no moon, in all that time\nnor had the voice of friend or kinsman breathed through\nhis lattice. -His children But here my heart began\nto bleed, and I was forced to go on with another part of\nthe portrait.\n328. Remarks on taste in the fine arts.\nClosely connected with the subject of imagination and\nof emotions of beauty and sublimity, is that of taste in the\nfine arts. Taste is a habit of correctly judging of beau-\nty and deformity in works of art, founded on the expe-\nrience of emotions. We find all men to be formed with\nsome degree of sensibility to the appearances of external\nnature some things strike them as pleasing others as\ndispleasing. We may notice the developernent of this\nsusceptibility of emotions in children, who show an attach-\nment for some objects, a dislike for others at one time\nare pleased, at another pained. The most stupid peasant\nlingers to behold the clouds, that brighten in the setting\nsun and at his rude fireside listens with pleasure to old","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0389.jp2"},"390":{"fulltext":"384 OF lMAGINATiOrr.\ntales and ballads. As no man is without feeling, we all\nbegin after a time to ascribe certain characteristicks to\nobjects, answering to those emotions, which have been ex-\ncited in us. We set down some as pleasing, others as dis-\npleasing some as beautiful, others as deformed and oth-\ners as possessing the marks of grandeur and sublimity.\nThat is, we form a judgment of objects, founded on the\nemotions, which we experience.\nWe do not ordinarily speak of the works of nature, as\nobjects of taste they excite in us emotions of various\nkinds but in general we employ the term, taste, in refer-\nence to the fine arts. A man may be said to have a\ntaste in the arts, who, from a careful study of the emotions,\nthat have been excited in himself or others on various\noccasions, can tell, with a considerable degree of accuracy f\nwhat works will be found generally pleasing, or the oppo-\nsite. This implies, that he will readily seize upon the\ngreat characteristicks of the work, whatever it is, of which\nhe judges and being able to point out its prominent ex-\ncellencies and defects, he can be expected to give the gen-\neral character of the painter, poet, sculptor, c. on whose\nproduction he may happen to be remarking.\nThus, a man of taste in painting gives us the following\nidea of the character of Rubens. His figures, as we learn\nfrom him, were not always drawn with so much ease and\nwith such studied correctness, as those of some other paint-\ners. His superiority lies not in an attitude or any peculiar\nexpression, but in. the general effect, in the genius, which\npervades and illuminates the whole. The works of some\nother painters are the effect of great labour and pains\nand, with very few defects, are after all spiritless and insip-\nid but those of Rubens seem to have come from his hand\nwith ease and freedom, and are full of spirit. The bril-\nliancy of his colours, and their lively opposition to each\nother, the flowing freedom of his outline and the animation\nof his pencil keep alive the attention of the spectator, and\nmake him feel a degree of that enthusiasm, with which the\npainter himself was carried away. This was Sir J. Rey-\nnold s opinion of Rubens.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0390.jp2"},"391":{"fulltext":"OF iaXAGIN ATl»Jf 38£\n329. Characteristicksi c. of a good taste.\nIn connection with the illustrations above given, we\nmay lay down two characteristicks of a good taste. Th«\nfirst is correctness. The province of correctness of\ntaste is the detection of blemishes. The taste, that has\nthis quality, does not mistake deformities for beauty, and\nis not likely to be imposed upon by counterfeits, however\nwell executed. A second characteristick is delicacy.\nA person of delicacy of taste notices those more refined\nbeauties, which are perceived only by cultivated minds.\nIt marks the latent, as well as the more obvious excel-\nlencies.\nIt is worthy of notice, that the judgments, which a per-\nson of taste passes upon works of art, are rapid he often\nforms an opinion of them instantaneously. When it is re-\nmembered, that taste is not a distinct faculty, but a power,\nwhich is acquired, this circumstance deserves some notice.\nIt is explained, however, in the definition, which has been\ngiven, viz. Taste is the habit of judging correctly, c.\nThe influence of habit, in giving quickness to our mental\noperations, was considered in some remarks in the chapter\non Attention. The skilful accountant can tell, by a mere\nglance of the eye, the sum of a long column of figures.\nThe practised military engineer estimates with almost intu-\nitive readiness the fitness or unfitness of a spot of ground for\nencampments and fortifications. It is the same in the de-\ncisions of taste. The person, who has this quality in a\ngood degree, is impressed with the excellencies and defects\nof a production in the arts at once. That is, he takes into\nview the various circumstances, which go to constitute its\nbeauty or deformity with such quickness, that it appears\nfeo be a single perception.\n49","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0391.jp2"},"392":{"fulltext":"336\nCHAPTER TWENTY SIXTH?\nOF WIT. AND HUMOUR.\n330. Emotions of the ludicrous.\nWe shall not be in a way to give a correct idea of wit\nand humour, without briefly examining another class of our\nfeelings, viz, emotions of the ludicrous. It is difficult to give\na precise definition of this feeling, although, when we ana-\nlyze it, we find it to be complex, embracing an emotion of*\nsu: prize, also of quick and playful delight. But the pleas-\ning part of the emotion receives a peculiar modification,\nand one, which cannot be fully conveyed in words, in con-\nsequence of our perception of some incongruity in the\nperson or thing, which is the cause of it.\n331. Occasions of emotions of the ludicrous.\nBut what are the true occasions of emotions of the Iu*\ndicrous In answer, we say, that this feeling is never ex-\nperienced, except when we notice something, either in\nthoughts, or in outward objects and actions, which is un-\nexpected and uncommon. That is to say, whenever this\nemotion is felt, there is always an unexpected discovery by\nus of some new relations. But then it must be observed,\nthat the feeling in question does not necessarily exist in con-\nsequence of the discovery of such relations merely. Some-\nthing more is necessary, as may be very readily seen.\nThus, we are sometimes, in the physical sciences, present-\ned with unexpected and novel combinations of the proper-\nties and qualities of bodies. But whenever we discover in\nthose sciences relations in objects, which were not only\nunknown, but unsuspected, we find no emotion of ludi-\ncrousness, although we are very pleasantly surprized.— -A-\ngain, similes, metaphors, and other like figures of speech\nimply in general some new and unexpected relations of","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0392.jp2"},"393":{"fulltext":"OF WIT AND HUMOUR. 387\nideas. It is this trait in them, which gives them their\nchief force. But when employed in serious compositions,\nthey are of a character far from being ludicrous. Hence\nwe infer, that emotions of ludicrousness do not exist on\nthe discovery of new and unexpected relations, unless there\nis at the same time a perception, or supposed perception of\nsome incongruity or unsuitablcness. Such perception of\nunsuitableness may be expected to give to the whole emo-\ntion a new and specifick character, which every one is ac-\nquainted with from his own experience, but which, as be-\nfore intimated, it is difficult to express in words.\n332. Of Hobbes account of the ludicrous.\nThere has not been an entire uniformity on the subject of\nemotions of the ludicrous. It would seem, that Fobbes\n(Human nature, chap, ix.) considered feelings of this kind,\nas depending on a modification of mere pride in a compari-\nson of ourselves with others to our own advantage. He\nsays of laughter, which, when considered in reference to\nthe mind and independently of the mere muscular action)\nis nothing more than a feeling of the ludicrous, that it is a\nsudden glory, arising from a sudden conception of some em-\ninency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of\nothers, or with our own formerly. To this notion of\nthe origin of this class of our feelings, there are some objec-\ntions viz. (1) In many instances we have the feeling in\nquestion, when there is evidently no discovery of any in-\nfirmity, either in the witty person, or in the subject of his\nwit, over which we can ourselves triumph with any good\nreason. (2) Further, if the doctrine, which resolves the\nemotion of ludicrousness into a proud comparison of our-\nselves with others, were correct, it would follow, that the\nmost proud and self conceited men would be most inclined\nto mirth and sociability, which we do not find to be the\nfact. (3) According to Hobbes notion of the origin of\nthese feelings, we have only to go into the company of the\nmost ignorant and stupid, if we wish to be exceedingly\n.merry. In such company we could not fail to be sensible","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0393.jp2"},"394":{"fulltext":"38$ OF WIT AND HUMOUR.\nof some eminency in ourselves, in comparison with the infir-\nmities of others. We should here be in a situation, cor-\nresponding to his definition of laughter, but there can be\nno doubt, that multitudes would be but very little inclined\nto indulge that feeling in the midst of such associates.\nBut while we cannot receive this writer s account of the\nfeeling in question, we may undoubtedly be well agreed in\nrespect to it, as far as this There is an emotion of sur-\nprize, combined with a quick and playful delight of a pecu-\nliar kind, and this emotion arises on the discovery of unex-\npected relations of ideas, and the perception or apparent\nperception of some incongruity.\n333. What is to be understood by wit\nWe apprehend, that an emotion of the ludicrous is al-\nways, in a greater or less degree, experienced in all instan-\nces of wit, as the term is generally understood at the pres-\nent time. We are, therefore, led to this definition of it\nWit consists in suddenly presenting to the mind an assem-\nblage of related ideas of such a sort as to occasion feelings\nof the ludicrous. This is done in a variety of ways\nand among others in the two following.\n334. Of wit as it consists in burlesque or in debasing\nobjects*\nThe first method, which wit employs in exciting the\nfeeling of the ludicrous, is, by debasing those things, which\nare pompous that is, those things which have an appear-\nance of greater weight and gravity, than they are truly en-\ntitled to. Descriptions of this sort are termed burlesque.\nAn attempt to lessen what is truly and confessedly serious\nand important, has in general an unpleasant effect, very\ndifferent from that, which is caused by true wit. In the\npractice of burlesque, as on all other occasions of wit, there\nis a sudden and uncommon assemblage of related ideas.\nTake as an instance the following comparison from Hu-\ndibras\nAnd dow had Phoebus in the lap\nOf That ll tafcan out hit nap","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0394.jp2"},"395":{"fulltext":"OF WIT AND HUMOUR, 589\nAnd, like a lobster boiled, the mom\nFrom black to red began to turn.\nOf a similar kind are those instances, in which objects\nof real dignity and importance are coupled with things\nmean and contemptible, although there is no direct and\nformal comparison made. As in this instance from the\nabove-mentioned book\nFor when the restless Greeks sat down\nSo many years before Troy-town,\nAnd were renowned, as Homer writes,\nFor well-soaled boots, no less than rights.\nIn these instances we have related ideas. In the first,\nthere is undoubtedly an analogy between a lobster and the\nmorning, in the particular of its turning from dark to red.\nBut however real it may be, it strikes every one, as a singu-\nlar and unexpected resemblance. In the other passage, it\nis not clear, that Butler has done any thing more than Ho-\nmer in associating the renown of the Greeks with their\nboots, as well as their valour. But to us it is hardly less\nuncommon, and singular, not to sayjncongruous, than the\nformer.\n335. Of wit when employed in aggrandizing objects.\nThe second method, which wit employs in exciting\nemotions of the ludicrous, is by aggrandizing objects, which\nare in themselves inconsiderable. This species of wit may\nbe suitably termed mock-majestick or mock-heroick. While\nthe former kind delights in low expressions, this is the re-\nverse, and chooses learned words, and sonorous combina-\ntions. In the following spirited passage of Pope, the wri-\nter compares dunces to gods, and Grub-street to heaven.\nAs Berecynthia, while her offspring vie\nIn homage to ihe mother of the sky,\n41 Surveys around her in the blest abode\nAn hundred sons, and every son a god\nNot with less glory mighty Dullness crowned,\nShall take through Grubstreet her triumphant round\nV And her Parnassus glancing o er at once,\nBehold an hundred sons, and each a dunce.\nIn this division of wit, are to be included those instan-\nces where grave and weighty reflections are made upon","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0395.jp2"},"396":{"fulltext":"390 OF WIT AND HUMOUR.\nmere trifles. In this case, as in others, the ideas are in\nsome respects related, or have something in common but\nthe grouping of them is so curious and unexpected, that we\ncannot observe it without considerable emotion.\nMy galligaskins, that have long withstood\nThe winter s fury and encroaching frosts,\nBy time subdued, (what will not time subdue\nAn horrid chasm disclose.\nThere are various other ways, in which ideas are com-\nbined together, so as to excite in us that emotion, which\nfollows whatever we term witty. It is worthy of remark,\nthat some sayings, which would otherwise have appeared\nto us witty, lose their intended effect, whenever we are led\nto suspect, that they were premeditated. Hence an obser-\nvation or allusion, which would be well received in conver-\nsation, would often be insipid in print; and it is for the\nsame reason, that we receive more pleasure from a witty\nrepartee, than a witty attack. From this circumstance\nwe infer, that part of the complex feeling, which follows a\nwitty saying, is an emotion of vivid pleasure or admiration,\nat witnessing the power of the witty person in bringing to-\ngether peculiar combinations of thought.\n336. Of the character and occasions of humour.\nWe in general apply the terms, humour, and, humorous,\nto descriptions of a particular character, whether written,\nor given in conversation. We find among men what\nseems to us a disproportion in their passions for instance,\nwhen they are noisy and violent, but not durable. We\nfind inconsistencies, contradictions, and disproportions in\ntheir actions. The)* have their foibles, (hardly any one is\nwithout them,) such as self-conceit, caprice, foolish partial-\nities, jealousies, c. Such incongruities in feeling and\naction cause an emotion of surprise, like an unexpected\ncombination of ideas in wit. Observing them, as we do,\nin connection with the acknowledged high traits and res-\nponsibilities of human nature, we can no more refrain from\nan emotion of the ludicrous, than we can, on seeing a gen-\ntleman of fine clothes and high dignity making a false step,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0396.jp2"},"397":{"fulltext":"OF WIT AND HUMOUR. 391\nand tumbling into a gutter. A person, who can seize upon\nthese specialities in temper and conduct, and set them forth\nin a lively and exact manner, is called a man of humour his\ndescriptions are humorous descriptions. Addison has giv-\nen many examples of the humorous in the incidents char-\nacters of the Tatler and Spectator. But excellence in this\nspecies of writing is not very frequently found, and is an\nattainment of considerable difficulty. In general it im-\nplies something peculiar in the character of the writer.\nThere are some persons, who seem to have a natural incli-\nnation for noticing those traits in the feelings and actions\nof men, which cause ludicrous emotions. Whatever may\nbe the cause of it, there can hardly be a question as to the\nfact, that some possess this characteristick more than oth-\ners this was particularly true of Swift and Fontaine,,.\nWriters, who have a natural turn of this sort, will be more\nlikely to excel in the humorous, than others.\n337. Of the advantages of wit and humour.\nWit and humour are not without some obvious benefits\nof no small value. (1) They serve to enlighten many\nhours, which without them would pass heavily along. Nor\nare they sources of pleasure merely. The mind, that con^\nstantly rejects them, becomes by degrees reserved and*\ncheerless, and is greatly unfitted for social converse. Few\nminds can sustain the constant pressure of serious con-\ncerns. When occasionally employed with objects, which\nseem trifling, they afterwards enter witk more vigour into\nweighty matters, so that at times the good-natured relaxa-\ntions of humour and wit are not only pleasant, but neces-\nsary.\n(2) There is. also another benefit to be considered.^\nThey sometimes operate, as a seasonable check on many\nimproprieties. It is these, indeed, which are the genuine\noccasions, that call them forth. And when considerably\nmarked and important, the wit, which they call forth, is it\nmost suitable rebuke. When it appears in that more bit-\nter and imposing form, which we term ridicule and sarcasm,\nit keeps back some from offending, who can neither be e£-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0397.jp2"},"398":{"fulltext":"392 OF INSTINCTS.\nfectually checked by publick opinion, nor any internal\nmoral restraints. Some, who are insensible to almost every\nthing else, cannot muster eourage enough to withstand the\nworld s dread laugh.\nCHAPTER TWENTY SEVENTH.\nOF INSTINCTS-\n338. Of the meaning of the term instinct.\nIt may be given as a definition of instinct, that it is a\nnatural and invariable tendency to do certain things, with-\nout previous forethought and deliberation. Instincts are\nfound both in men, and in the inferiour animals particu-\nlarly in the latter, as they are furnished with the power of\nreasoning only in a very small, if in any degree. The in-\nstincts of animals, by means of which they are taught to\nemploy their powers of offence and defence, and to which\nwe can trace such ingenious results as the ball of the silk-\nworm, the house of the beaver, c. are among the most\npleasing parts of the study of natural history, Particularly\nso, because they strikingly illustrate the care of that Being,\nwho assures us, that not a sparrow falls to the ground with-\nout his notice. By giving them instruments adapted to their\nsituation, He has virtually given them food, and raiment,\nand barns, and houses.\n339. Of instinctive feelings in the human species*\nMan, possessed of the power of comparing, abstracting,\ngeneralizing, and reasoning, does not stand in need of in-\nstincts to the degree, in which they are necessary to the\nbrute creation. But, although tendencies of this kind\nare generally acknowledged to have an existence in the\nhuman species, it is not certainly agreed upon, how far","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0398.jp2"},"399":{"fulltext":"or instincts. 395\nthey exist, nor in what particular instances. This, howev-\ner, seems to be thought clear, that they are both fewer in\nnumber, and also more restricted in the degree of their\npower, than in the brute species.\nIn making inquiries on the subject as to what are in-\nstinctive feelings in the human species, and what are not,\ntwo things should be kept in view. Instincts are to be\nconsidered as distinct from the automatick or mechanical\nactions of the bodily system, such as the contraction and\ndilatation of the chest and lungs in breathing by the\nmotion of certain muscles. Automatick actions have a\ncause, but the cause is not in the mind, and is no part of\nthe mental structure. They rise solely from the bodily\nmechanism. Further, instincts are to be distinguished\nfrom our natural appetites, and other mere animal feelings.\nThus, hunger and thirst in a child are not instincts, but the\ndisposition, which it exhibits in the earliest period of its ex-\nistence, to gratify those wants in a particular way, is justly\nthought instinctive. Accordingly, we may lay it down as\na general statement, that while the appetites and some oth-\ner animal sensations imply a feeling of want instinct, in\ndistinction from them, is the principle, which leads to their\ngratification.\nSome have thought, that there are instinctive feelings\nof a higher kind, than those, which lead men to relieve\ntheir animal wants such as the feelings of fear and resent-\nment, the desires of wealth, and society, knowledge, and\npower, also our benevolent and sympathetick feelings.\nSome of these supposed instinctive tendencies deserve a\nbrief consideration.\n340. Of the desire of society, power c. as instinc*\ntivefeelings.\nThe dosire of society has been reckoned among the ul-\ntimate and instinctive principles of our nature. r J hfs,\nwe imagine, cannot be done without violence to th«\nusual acceptation of language. An instinctive principle\nalways has a particular object in view, and is borne jo*-\n50","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0399.jp2"},"400":{"fulltext":"394 OF INSTINCTS.\nward to that particular object without being counteracted^\nThe desire of society arises out of the circumstances of\nour situation men find themselves dependent on each\nother; and their enjoyment and security being promoted\nby entering into society, they are of course led to desire it.\nBut let the mother flee into the wilderness, and nourish\nher child apart from all other human beings, and he will\ngrow up wild, untractable, and like the son of Hagar, his\nhand will be against every man s hand. This would not\nbe, if the desire of society were an instinct, in the common\nacceptation of that term.\nThe desire of knowledge has also been set up, as an\ninstinctive feeling. Men are led to seek knowledge,\nbecause they are unable to do without it. But having ac-\nquired so much of it as answers for their present turn, most\nmen are quite satified with that. They do not find in\nthemselves a strong and unappeasable tendency to make 4\nfurther acquisitions, which would be the case, if the desire\nof knowledge were instinctive. Similar objections may\nbe made to the admission of the desire of power, as an in-\nstinctive principle. The passion is strong it makes its\nappearance at a very early period and if there be ground\nfor considering it a natural passion, it is not, from that cir-\ncumstance merely, to be considered an instinct. It ought\nto be considered also, that this feeling, however early it\nmay exist hid and nestling in the heart, is brought forward\nand cherished by the circumstances of our condition. Mara^\nfeels himself in want of various conveniences and enjoy-\nments he imagines, if he had power, he could procure\nthem but without it, he is unable to. He seeks power,\ntherefore, in various ways, as a means of securing what he\nimagines, although perhaps very erroneously, the highest:\ndegree of happiness.\nThis feeling is often called forth and is greatly strength-\nened in this way, although it is by no means impossible,\nthat it may be loved for its own sake, independently of its\naid in promoting one s personal enjoyments. The feel-\nings, therefore, of fear, resentment, avarice, ambition, be-\nnevolence, justice, fec. may be natural they may have","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0400.jp2"},"401":{"fulltext":"OF INSTINCTS. 395\ntheir origin in the human heart, however they may be\nmodified by circumstances and, undoubtedly, all this is\ntrue of them. But after all they do not seem to be of that\ndefinite and invariable character; they have not that pre-\ncise and certain adaptation to particular ends, which would\nentitle them to be termed instincts.\nInstinct is much more clearly defined, and apparently\nmore efficient in the inferiour animal creation, than in man\nit is here chiefly, that it is to be regarded, as an interest-\ning and important subject of inquiry. In examining the\nintellectual economy of the human species, we find other\nprinciples of action, and such, as from their nature and\nimportant results, more strongly arrest our attention.\n4. 341. Marks of difference between instinct and reason.\nThere are some characteristical differences between in-\nstinct and reason, worthy to be noticed. (1) Of these\none is, that instinct requires no previous instruction.\nWhile reason expands and gathers strength by slow de-\ngrees, advancing in childhood, and still advancing in ma-\nture age, instinct may be said to be always full-grown, al-\nways perfect. Accordingly it has been observed, that a\nbird, which has always been confined in a cage, will build,\nwhen suitable materials are furnished it, a nest precisely\nsimilar to those of its own kind in the woods. It requires\nno instruction, how to lay the sticks like the carpenter, nor\nwhere to mix in the clay like the mason, but shows very\nstriking proofs of ingenuity without a long process of pre-\nvious training.\n(2) Another ground of difference is, that instinct is\n-more accurate in its results, than reason.- We have ref-\nerence here to the adaptation of means to an end and,\nconsequently, the observation will apply only to those ca-\nses, where both instinct and reason are employed in per-\nforming the same or similar things. A man may build his\nhouse too high or too low, he may lay the foundation well\nor ill, but in general there is no mistake in the construction\nof a bird s nest, or the cells of a bee. Reason, in the adap-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0401.jp2"},"402":{"fulltext":"3 G OF INSTINCTS.\ntation of means to an end, is liable to a thousand errours;\nbut in instinct there is a sort of infallibility. The con-\nstruction of a honey-comb indicates the greatest accuracy\nthe cells are all regular hexagons; a form, which permits\nthem all to be equal and similar, without any useless inter-\nstices; and for skill and precision throughout, it almost\ndefies imitation. But this is the work of instinct.\nAgain, instinct is limited, reason is always progress-\nive. However successful instinct may be in conducting\nits possessor to a particular end, its power is evidently lim-\nited to that particular purpose. It is an impulse, implant-\ned by the Creator, which carries forward the agent prompt-\nly and unerringly to one end, and one only. It can oper-\nate, it can be felt no further. But reason, although more\nliable to err, has a wider range it is applicable to a far\ngreater variety of purposes and hardly having an exist-\nence at iirst, it ultimately embraces the universe.\n342. Of intellectual power in animals*\nInstinct is found frequently in brutes, seldom in men\nit operates very extensively among the former, in a very\nlimited degree in the latter. So that when we consider\nthe origin of this principle, as being directly from the Su-\npreme Being, we can almost subscribe to the maxim, Deus\ne*t brutorum anima. In connection with the subject of\ninstinct in the inferiour animals, it is natural to take this\nopportunity to say something of the indications, which they\ngive of intellectual power. While they are highly furnish-\ned with instincts, they are not without some things, analo-\ngous to traits of intellect in the human race. Helvetius\nthought, that the superiority of intellect in man is to be\nascribed solely to difference in corporeal organization, and\nto the influence of some adventitious circumstances in his\noutward condition. No doubt, there are advantages, in\nthe conformation of the human system, for the exercise of\nintellectual power but the question is not so much what\nbrutes might be with another, as what they actually are,\nwith their present form. The inferiour animals have\nmemory and it would seem from some facts, that some","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0402.jp2"},"403":{"fulltext":"OF INSTINCTS. 3t 7\nhave possessed this power in a remarkable degree. This\nis seen in the readiness, with which they retrace objects in\nan inverted order, as when a dog or horse returns by a\nroad, over which he has passed only once, and at a consid-\nerable time distant. Animals possess the power of asso-\nciation. This is implied in their possessing memory, inas-\nmuch as association is a principal element in that complex\nmental state. Their associations, however, are chiefly\nthose of contiguity in time and place but they are tena-\ncious, and not easily altered. It is chiefly by availing them-\nselves of this circumstance, that men are able to acquire\nand retain their dominion over them. Animals are\nthought by many to have the power of reasoning in a small\ndegree. Dogs and bears are learnt to dance and tumble\nby rewards for their obedience, and by chastisements for\nthe contrary. They are supposed in such cases to reason\nin this way. If I obey, I shall be caressed and fed If I\ndo not, I shall be beaten it is, therefore, better to obey\na regular syllogism. But all this, some will say, can be\notherwise accounted for; viz. Obedience is associated with\nan idea of pleasure, and refusal to obey with the idea of\npain. When this association is strong, the animal may be\nled to do what is imposed upon him without any logical\ndeduction. Mr. Locke thought, that brutes can reason,\nbut in so doing are limited to particular ideas, not having\nthe power of forming general or abstract ideas. Ani-\nmals have many of the passions, which are common among\nmen, as shame, pride, revenge, gratitude. Some of them\nare capable of an attachment to men. A man will sooner\ncast off and injure his friend, than a dog betray a kind\nmaster. But there is no evidence, that they are influen-\nced by moral impressions, or that they can discern between\ngood and evil in conduct.\n343. mictions from instinct not moral actions.\nIf men were guided in all their actions by instinct, they\nwould be no longer moral, but necessary agents. They\nwould be urged forward with such directness and force,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0403.jp2"},"404":{"fulltext":"£98 OF INSTINCTS.\nthat, while they infallibly obeyed, they could claim no mer-\nit for obedience. This is true, if we do not admit fear, am-\nbition, avarice, benevolence, c. to be instinctive feelingsj\nand there are very few, who will not deny them the char-\nacter of instincts in the sense, in which we usually apply\nthat term to animals.\nIn order that man may be accountable, it seems to be\nnecessary, that good and evil, that right and wrong should\nbe set before him, with a liberty of choosing between them.\nVv hen this is the case, there are motives influencing him to\npursue one course, and opposite considerations operating\nupon him to pursue another and his moral rectitude, his\nmerit or demerit will be known by the choice, which he\nmakes under such circumstances. But in pure instincts\nthere is no balancing of motives in this way and, conse*\nquently, no accountability, and no praise and blame.\nCHAPTER TWExNTY EIGHTH,\nTHE WSLIi, eOHSCXEKTCE, C-\n344. Of volition and its objects.\nVolition is the determination of the mind to do or not\nto do something or it may be expressed more briefly by\nsaying, that it is the determination or act of choice. It\ncan be objected to this definition, that to describe volition,\nas a determination of the mind, or as an act of the mind, is\nmerely to increase the list of terms, and to call the thing in\nquestion by another name. There is some ground for this\nobjection but it will not have so much weight, when it is\nnoticed, that the qualifying terms point out the nature of\nthe act or determination viz. an act of the mind, in- refer-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0404.jp2"},"405":{"fulltext":"THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, C. 39£\nence to which two things are compared together, and which\ngives the preference to one over the other, Further, it\nis to be kept in memory, that the simple acts of the mind\ndo not readily admit of definitions, however convenient\nand desirable they may in some cases be. Something, it\nis true, can be said. But in order to have a clear notion\nof such simple acts, we ought to make them subjects of at*\ntentive reflection, as we find them to exist in ourselves.\nAnd, therefore, the above definition, although it be a de-\nfective one, will not be without its use, if we connect with\nit a careful observation of what takes place within us. Cer-\ntainly without such observation, no definition whatever\ncan give a full idea of what is intended to be commu-\nnicated.\nThe capability, which the mind has, of putting forth\nsuch a determination, of exercising choice, is commonly\nintended by the phrase, power or faculty of the will,\nand also by the will simply All acts of the will, that\nis, all volitions must have objects. A person cannot well\nexercise the act of willing, without having his mind direc-\nted towards something, which is the object of his volition.\nTo will without willing something, would be much the\nsame, as to remenber without remembering something.\n345. Nature and kinds of motives.\nAs volition is found to exist only in certain circum-\nstances, it may, therefore, be considered an effect, and, con-\nsequently, must have a cause, which gives rise to it using\nthe term, cause, in the sense heretofore explained, viz. as\nimplying merely a regular and constant antecedence. The\ncauses of volition are motives so that a motive may be\ndefined to be any thing, which moves or excites the mind\nin putting forth volition. Without motives, that is, without\nsome ground or reason of our choice, volition would never\nbe exercised, and, consequently, there would never be vol-\nuntary action, since a voluntary action implies, and is prece-\nded by volition.\nMotives, in reference to their tendency to cause voll^","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0405.jp2"},"406":{"fulltext":"400 THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, C.\ntion are spoken of, as either weak or strong. That motive,\nwhich has a less degree of previous tendency to move the\nwill, or, what is the same thing, appears the less inviting,\nas it is presented to the view of the mind, is called the\nweaker motive. On the contrary, that motive, which ap-\npears to the mind the most inviting, and, therefore, has the\ngreater tendency to move the will, is the stronger motive.\nThe strength of a motive is found to vary in two ways,\nor from two causes. (1) It will be found to vary, first, not\nonly with the particular object, which is before the mind,\nbut also with the attendant circumstances. Many things,\nwhich once appeared eminently desirable, and strongly in-\nfluenced our volitions, appear less desirable, and have less\npower over us, in consequence of being accidentally asso-\nciated with other things, [n other instances, the effect is\ndirectly the reverse. (2) Things, that exist in the view\nof the mind, have their tendency to move the will increa-\nsed or diminished according to the nature and circumstan-\nces of the mind, which views them. Thus, the same thing\nwill appear differently to different individuals, and also to\nthe same individual at different times.\nMotives, in reference to their origin, may be divided\ninto two classes, internal, and external. By the in-\nternal, we mean those, which are connected with our phys-\nical organization, such as hunger, thirst, and bodily pains\nand enjoyments and also our passions or affections, wheth-\ner good or evil. Accordingly in all languages, people\nspeak of being impelled, of being exciter) to action in these\nways. By the external, we mean such as can be tra-\nced to external causes, and exist in something without us.\nAll external objects, which please or disgust us, operate\nupon us as motives. It is true, that they influence the will\nthrough the medium of the passions but as the influence ex-\nercised may be traced to them, as the ultimate subjects of it,\nthey may properly be termed the motive. As all external\nobjects, which are not utterly indifferent, affect the will\nmore or less, it is useless to attempt an enumeration of the\nmotives from this source. In what way it happens, that\ncertain appetites pissions, or that certain external objects","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0406.jp2"},"407":{"fulltext":"THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, C. 481\nwhich appear to us pleasing and desirable, affect the will,\nand cause volition, cannot be explained. Nor can we\ngive an explanation of any other instance of cause and ef-\nfect but of the truth of the fact, that the will is influenced\nby means of them, there is no room to doubt.\n346. Of moral liberty in man.\nThe volition will always be determined by the strongest\nmotive in other words, the will always is, as the greatest\napparent good, or as what appears most agreeable. To\nsay otherwise would imply the direct contradiction, that\nthe mind chooses, what it does not choose, and likes what it\ndislikes. Our voluntary actions correspond to our voli-\ntions that is, the action will be as the volition is and yet\nmen under the circumstances stated, having their volitions\nin perfect correspondence with the motive, and the action\nagreeing with the volition, are justly said to act freely, or\nwith liberty. But moral liberty, we apprehend, is not right-\nly considered a quality or property of man, analogous to\nhis other mental and physical qualities, but a privilege.\nIf this be a correct notion, liberty, in its full extent, is\nthe privilege of acting according to our wishes, without\nbeing subject to any restraint. This definition coincides\nvery nearly with the concise explanation of it by the un-\nlearned, who commonly say, that liberty consists in choosing\nand doing, as one pleases It will, indeed, be said, that\nthere is an indissoluble relation between the volition and\nthe motive. This is true. But the circumstance, that\nnothing can have the character of a motive independently\nof our feelings, and that the efficient or strongest motive is\nnever at variance with them, takes away from this fixed and\ninflexible relation the attribute of constraint.\nLiberty, then, may be predicated of man in two re-\nspects, viz. liberty of will, and liberty of external, action.\nAs to the will, it may be said, that it always has liber-\nty, is always free, using the terms in accordance with the\nabove definition. When a person, looking upon a number\nof objects, makes choice of one in preference to another,\n51","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0407.jp2"},"408":{"fulltext":"402 THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, C.\nhe does it agreeably to his wish or inclination, and has the\nhighest possible liberty we can conceive of no greater.\nAs, therefore, there is an inseparable connection between\nthe volition, and the preference or the strongest desire of\nthe heart, it is safe to assert, that there is no constraint on\nthe volition, and that the will is always free. In support\nof the fact, that the volition, whatever its relation to the\nmotive, is in the same direction with the preponderance of\ninclination, an appeal may be made to the common expe-\nrience of men and it can hardly be doubted, that on ex-\namination every one will find it confirmed by what takes\nplace in himself. If they do not find this to be the case?\nthey will find, that the will is not always conformed to the\nstrongest motive, which will lead to plain contradictions,\nif the terms are used in the sense here attached to them.\nThere is also liberty of external actions. But while\nwe say, that there is liberty in this respect, it cannot be de-\nnied, that it is subject to contingencies, which do not ex-\nist in relation to the freedom of volitions. In other words,\nthe freedom of external actions is sometimes from various\ncauses interrupted. For instance, a person has a desire to\ngo to a certain place he exercises volition or wills to go\nto that place; and the means, by which his determination\nis to be eSected, is the motion of his feet. If there be\nnothing to prevent this motion, then his actions are free, as\nwell as his will but if he be bound or shackled, then\nthere is a constraint, a deprivation of freedom, in respect\nto the action. And it is the same in all analogous cases.\nThere may be a freedom in the volition, while there is a con-\nstraint and hinderance in the performance so that neces-\nsity can be predicated of external actions, but no neces-\nsity analogous to that, which is predicated of actions, can be\npredicated of the mental resolve. But in all outward actions,\nwhere such necessity truly exists, men are not accountable.\nNote. Tlie view of libeny above given seems to coincide essentially with\nthat ol M. Destutt-Tracy. He has the following remarks Je tiis que V idee\nd e liberie nail de faculte de vouloir car, avec Locke, j entends par liberie la\npuissance d executer sa volonte, d 1 agir cuoformement a son desir et je sou-\ntiens, qu ii est impossible d ettacher utie idee nette a ce mot, qaund on Veutl\nlui d onner un autn serj? ({Siemens d 1 Ideologic, part 4 et 5, p. 99 2d. ed.)","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0408.jp2"},"409":{"fulltext":"403\nThe responsibility rests with that extraneous force, whatever\nits origin, which makes the action contrary to the intention.\nThe action does not properly belong to the subject of it\nbut to that power, which forced the subject to act contrary\nto his own wishes.\n347. Of the liberty of the Supreme Being.\nThe checks, which are assigned to men s actions, the\nlimits, which are there placed, cannot fail to remind them of\ntheir weakness and insufficiency. But their desires are\nboundless, their views of good and evil are wide and con-\ntinually progressing and their volitions invariably fall in\nwith their views and desires. We are so constituted,\nthat we will or exercise choice, in reference to the last re-\nsuit of an examination that is, the volition coincides with\nthe present view or inclination. It is the great excellency\nof our nature, and the consummation of our freedom, that\nthe mind does not remain unmoved under such circumstan-\nces and that it is not without a preference, when it has\nclearly before itself a view of the highest good or evil. So\nthat our condition in this respect seems to be essentially\nthe same with that of the Supreme Being himself. It is\nevident, that there is no being more free and perfect than\nGod and yet he is inevitably governed in all his doings\nby what, in the great range of events, is wisest and best.\nHis fixed and invariable principles of action are wisdom\nand goodness and whatever he does, is in accordance\nwith them. So that it may be said, that the Deity himself\nhas his laws and surely the weak mind of man cannot\npresume to be more free and unrestrained, than that of\nthe God, who made it.— Any other liberty than this can-\nnot well be supposed to exist. If (says Mr. Locke) to\nbreak loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that\nrestraint of examination and judgment, that keeps us from\ndoing and choosing the worse, be liberty, madmen and\nfools are the only free men. Yet I think nobody would\nchoose to be mad, for the sake of such liberty, but he that\nis mad already.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0409.jp2"},"410":{"fulltext":"404 THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, C.\n348. Evidence from observation of influence over our\nvolitions.\nThere is proof from observation, that our volitions are\ninfluenced by motives, or that our actions will be agreeably\nto what we consider the highest good. That is, in our in-\ntercourse with men, we cannot help observing, that they\nact precisely, as they would do, if this were the case; and,\ntherefore, we conclude it to be so. So evident is it from\nwhat we observe around us, that the will, as well as the\nimagination, and memory, and other mental powers, has its\nlaws, as to have elicited the remark, that a certain regular\norder may be traced in the conduct of men, analogous to\nthe regular course, which we observe in the physical world.\nIt can be pronounced, that men will act in a particular way\nin given circumstances with hardly less confidence, than\nthat trees will grow in a given situation. So that there is\na general course of nature applicable to the mind of man,\nas well as to external material things and not less appli-\ncable to the moral, than the intellectual part of his spirit-\nual constitution. But if we take away the influence of\nmotives, if we say that men are not governed by what ap-\npears to them the highest good then this regularity is\nmarred, the moral order and beauty of nature are broken\nup, and it will be impossible to form any opinion of the\nprobable course of men, although we may be well acquaint-\ned with the minutest circumstances of their situation.\n349. Encouragements to the making of moral efforts*\nThe fact, that men ajre influenced and directed by the\nmotives set before them, is an encouragement in the making\nof moral efforts, and in the use of such means, as are adap-\nted to reclaim the vicious, or to strengthen habits of vir-\ntue. When men go astray, what can we do more in our\nattempts at reclaiming them, than apply promises, threat-\nening, and exhortations We address these to them as\nmotives, expecting that they will be received, and have their\ninfluence as such. These are the means, which we em-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0410.jp2"},"411":{"fulltext":"THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, C, 405\nploy, and we find that they meet with success. But liber-\nate the will from all particular tendencies and law show\nthat we are utterly unable to predict the nature of its acts\nunder all circumstances whatever, and then there is no en_\ncouragement to apply means for the attainment of moral\nends there is no encouragement to moral efforts of any\nkind. When this is the case, we can never tell what is\nsuitable to be addressed ip men, in order to induce them\nto change their course of conduct.\n350. M motives are modifications of our ownfeelings.\nThe greater the consideration, which is bestowed upon\nthe nature of motives, the clearer the insight, it is suppo-\nsed, there will be into the correctness of these opinions*\nIt is an essential attribute of every motive, that it be some-\nthing, which, as it is viewed by the mind, is agreeable to it.\nThere may be different degrees in the pleasing quality,\nwhich it possesses, but it can never be wholly wanting in\nelements of an agreeable nature. The origin of the agree-\nableness of that class of motives, which was termed inter-\nnal motives, is evidently in the mind itself. Hunger and\nthirst and other appetites, revenge and charitable impulses\nand other passions and desires do not operate upon us, and\ndirect the will, and, consequently, the action, in conse-\nquence of any thing extraneous to ourselves, and out of\nour constitution. As to motives of this kind, therefore, if\nthere be any constraint, it must be in our own breasts, in\nourselves, in the natural impulses of our own intellectual\neconomy. But it is evident, that such constraint as this\ncannot be at variance with any rational idea of the highest\nliberty.\nIf then we look again at external motives, we shall be\nled to the same result. All objects and actions are utterly\ndestitute of character, as far as men are concerned, when\nthey are regarded, as existing independently of their own\nminds. Abstracted from those internal emotions, of which\nthey are the cause, they are all equally good and bad, equal-\nly beautiful and ugly, equally sublime and ludicrous, equal-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0411.jp2"},"412":{"fulltext":"A06 THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, C.\nly indifferent. It is our own feelings, therefore, reflected\nback upon all external objects of whatever kind, which in-\nfuse into them their qualities of excellence. This charac-\nter of excellence, this pleasing attribute in its turn oper-\nates upon the mind. All motives, therefore, are, either\ndirectly or indirectly, our own feelings. They differ from\neach other not in their nature, but in being variously modi-\nfied. And, hencej to assert, that the soul is governed by\nmotives, is much the same as to say, that it is governed by\nitself. It is like the citizens of a free republick it is not\nwithout law, but it obeys no enactments, but such as are\nagreeable to its own choice.\n351. Of moral motives.\nWhatever is beautiful and interesting in nature may, in\ncertain circumstances, operate upon us as a motive. In-\ncitements or motives may be found also in whatever is beau-\ntiful or interesting in moral conduct. Accordingly, enco-\nmiums have been often lavished on the excellence of\nvirtue, and men have been earnestly invited to love and\nto obey it. Hence, we are led to remark upon virtue,\nupon merit and demerit, upon moral obligation, c. in\nother words, we are to consider moral motives.- And\nthis, in short, is to inquire, why man, regarded, as an ac-\ncountable being, is bound to do any one thing in prefer-\nence to another.\n352. Virtue and vice in agents, not in actions.\nAnd in order to clear the way to this inquiry, it is to be\nnoticed, in the first place, that actions, in themselves con-\nsidered, have no character. It is true, that we speak of\nactions, as good or bad, as virtuous or vicious, as worthy of\npraise or of censure. It is from our very constitution im-\npossible to behold actions of moment coming from our\nfellow beings, without having certain vivid feelings, which\nlead us to speak of them, as right or wrong, worthy or un-\nworthy. But if we analyze our feelings, if we accu-\nrately consider what it is, to which we apply these epi-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0412.jp2"},"413":{"fulltext":"THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, C. 407\nthets, we shall come to the conclusion, that by actions,,\nas the subjects of moral merit or demerit, is meant\nthe agent acting. The action is nothing, except so far\nas it is significant of certain mental qualities and, there-\nfore, virtue considered as distinct from the virtuous person,\nand vice, as distinct from the vicious person, have no exis-\ntence. There is no virtue or vice, merit or demerit, a par-\nte rei or independently of the agent, any more than there\nis a beauty or sublimity of that character.\n353. True import of the terms, virtue and vice, merit\nand demerit.\nAnd yet it remains to be stated, in what way such terms\nmay be employed consistently with truth, and without\ncausing misconception.- Observe then, that certain ac-\ntions, that is, certain agents in acting, excite in us emo-\ntions of approval, and others, on the contrary, cause emo-\ntions of disapprobation. Certain actions, therefore, are\nmade, from our very constitution, to sustain a particular\nrelation to certain emotions or intellectual states. The\nrelation, which exists between actions and emotions of dis-\napproval, is expressed by the terms, demerit, and vice the\nrelation, which exists between other actions and emotions\nof approval, is expressed by the terms, merit, and virtue.\nVirtue and vice, merit and demerit, therefore, inasmuch\nas they are the mere relations existing between the thing\napproved and the approving mind, are evidently nothing\nself-existing, like the universal essences of the Schools,\nor the eternal ideas of Plato. At most they can only be\nconsidered a felt relation and, therefore, can never exist\nabstracted from and independently of the agent. But\nwhile we are willing to allow them an existence only as\nrelations, we are ready to concede, that in this sense there\nis permanent and immutable distinction between them.\nThat is, whatever actions are generally approved by men\ncan never be otherwise than approved by them, while their*\nmental constitution remains the same, as at present. On\nthe other hand, whatever actions are generally disappro-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0413.jp2"},"414":{"fulltext":"408 THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, C,\nved, can never be otherwise, while the same constitution\nremains. Vice can never become virtue virtue can never\nbecome vice. And this interesting truth will appear the\nmore impressive, when we consider, that the permanency\nand immutability of the distinction between virtue and vice\nhave their origin in the Supreme Being himself. It is He,\nthat has ordained, that certain actions shall cause certain\nemotions, that some things shall be approved and others\nnot it is He, that has instituted the relation, which exists\nbetween the deed, which is performed, and the feeling,\nwhich responds to it. As He was governed by the highest\nwisdom in so doing, we may well conclude, that there is a\npermanency in moral distinctions no less lasting, than the\ndivine nature.\n354. Of moral obligation and conscience.\nBut something remains to be said as to the particular\ninquiry, Why men are bound to do one thing in preference\nto another, Why they are under moial obligation 9\nIt has sometimes been given, as a definition, that moral\nobligation is that, by which we are bound to perform that,\nwhich is right, and avoid that, which is wrong. Tfyere\nhave been various opinions concerning the ground of moral\nobligation, or what it arises from. One ascribes it to the\nmoral fitness of things another finds it in the decisions of\nreason another in expediency, and in the promotion of\nthe publick good another in Revelation. But after hear-\ning these and other solutions of the ground of moral obli-\ngation, the question still returns, Why does a regard for\nthe publick good, or a belief in Revelation, or the conclu-\nsions of reason render it right for me to do a particular ac-\ntion, and wrong not to When such a question is put to\nus, we find ourselves driven back upon the feelings of ©ur\nown hearts. Our Creator, in forming us with a suscepti-\nbility of emotions of approval or disapproval, has furnished\nus with a guide in the discharge of our duties to Him, to\nour fellow beings, to ourselves. Without this susceptibil-\nity, which under another name is called conscience, men\nwould feel no regret and compunction even in disobeying","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0414.jp2"},"415":{"fulltext":"THE WILL, CQ^ SCIENCE, G. 4180\nthe express commands of God himself. Without this sus-\nceptibility, it would be all the same, whether they regard-\ned or disregarded the most affecting calls of charity and of\nthe publick good. Without this, benevolent intercourse\nwould cease religious homage would be at an end the\nbonds of society would be loosed and dissolved. The true\nsource, then, of moral obligation is in the natural impulses\nof the human breast; in a man s own conscience. It is\nin this, that we find the origin of the multitude of moral\nmotives, thit are continually stirring up men to worthy\nand exalted enterprizes. This is the law, which governs\nthem and as it is inseparable from that nature, of which\nthe Supreme Being is the author, it is the law of God.\n355. Want of uniformity in our moral judgments*\nBut here some difficulties are to be considered. It has\noften been objected to the doctrine, which attributes our\nmoral judgments and moral obligation to an original sus-\nceptibility, that there is too great a want of uniformity in\nthe results of such alleged susceptibility. Dr. Paley seems\nto have thought, that there is great weight in this objec-\ntion. His views are given in connection with the follow-\ning narration, which he has translated from Valerius Max-\nimus. The father of Caius Toranius had been proscri-\nbed by the Triumvirate* Caius Toranius coming over to\nthe interests of that party, discovered to the officers the\nplace, where he concealed himself, and give them withal\na description, by which they might distinguish his person,\nwhen they found him. The old man more anxious for the\nfortunes and snfety of his son, than about the little, that\nmight remain of his own life, began immediately to inquire\nof the officers, who seized him, Whether his son was well,\nWhether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of his gen-\nerals That son, replied one of the officers, so dear to\nthy affections, betrayed thee to us by his information thou\nart apprehended and diest. The officer with this struck a\nponiard to his heart, and the unhappy parent fell, not so\nmuch affected by his fate, as by the means to which [hs\nnwed it,-- The advocates of an original susceptibility of\n52","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0415.jp2"},"416":{"fulltext":"410 THE- WILL, CONSCIENCE, kc.\nmoral emotions maintain, that if this story were related to\nthe most ignorant and degraded Savage, to one, who had\nbeen cut off from infancy from intercourse with his fellow-\nmen, he would at once exhibit disapprobation of the con-\nduct of Toranius, and pity and respect for his father. Dr.\nPalsy, inasmuch as he discountenanced the notion of a na-\ntural conscience, and of original judgments of virtue and\nvice, has given, at some length, the arguments of those, who\ndeny this result. Following the suggestions of our own\nfeelings, we cannot help thinking with those, who hold,\nthat the Savage would have sentiments favourable to the\nfather, and against the son provided that the Savage were\nmade acquainted with the relation between them, and\nwith the nature and degree of the acts of kindness, which\nare ab\\ays implied in the history of those, who sustain the\nparental relation. Unless he were made to understand\nthis, his decision, whatever it might be, would be irrelevant\nto the present inquiry.\nDr. Paley and those, who think with him, remind us,\nthat theft, which is punished by most laws, was not unfre-\nquently rewarded by the laws of Sparta. We are remind-\ned also of the cruelty exercised by Savages upon their\nprisoners taken in war, and of the appalling fact, that in\nsome countries aged and infirm parents have been cast out\nby their children, and exposed to a sure and lingering\ndeath. Now, in reference to these facts, we readily admit,\nthat, in consequence of some accidental circumstances,\nmoral distinctions have sometimes been neglected or over-\nruled in civilized communities. Nor can it be denied, that\nsome Savage tribes, debased by want and ignorance, have\ngiven instances of injustice and cruelty of the most shock-\ning nature. But we cannot readily see, how these few ex-\nceptions disprove the general rule although they are un-\ndoubtedly exceptions to it. The general statement, that\nmen are originally susceptible of moral emotions, is con-\nfirmed by the experience, and testimony, and conduct of\nmillions and millions of mankind. The great mass of the\nhuman race, amid all the differences of climate and gov-\nernment, and local institutions and, observances, pronounce,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0416.jp2"},"417":{"fulltext":"*SB WJLLj CONSCIENCE, 4 It\nwith the most evident uniformity, on the excellence of\nsome actions, and on the iniquity of others. Reasoning,\ntherefore, in this case, as we do in others, we cannot admit\nthe discordant voice of some depraved individual, or the\naccidental moral obliquities, which have at times pervaded\nsome civilized communities, or the testimony of the savage\nand ignorant inhabitants of a remote island, as disproving\nwhat is evidently the unanimous declaration of all the\nworld besides. They prove, that the original susceptibil-\nity of moral emotions may be weakened and perverted, but\nthat is all. They show, that conscience may be misguid-\ned by accidental circumstances, or that its influence may\nbe blunted and annulled, but they are vainly brought to\nshow, that conscience has no existence.\n356. Conscience sometimes perverted by passion.\nAdmitting the fact, that the moral susceptibility may\nsometimes be blunted and perverted, something more\nseems to be necessary, viz., That we should briefly state,\nunder what circumstances, or from what causes, this takes\nplace. And, in the first place, the due exercise of this\nsusceptibility, or what is otherwise termed conscience, may\nbe perverted, when a person is under the influence of vio-\nlent passions. -The moral emotion, which under other\ncircumstances would have arisen, has failed to arise in the\npresent instance, because the soul is intensely and wholly\n-taken up with another species of feeling. But after the pres-\nent passion has subsided, the power of moral judgments\nreturns the person, who has been the subject of such vio-\nlence of feeling, looks with horror on the deeds, which\nhe has committed. So that the original susceptibility,\nwhich has been contended for, cannot justly be said to\ncease to exist in this instance; although its due exercise\nis prevented by the accidental circumstance of inordinate\npassion. Further those, who imagine, that there are\nno permanent moral distinctions, because they are not re-\ngarded in moments of extreme passion, would do well to\nconsider, that at such times persons are unable rightly U\napprehend any truths whatever. A murderer, when draw-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0417.jp2"},"418":{"fulltext":"4:1% THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, C\ning the blade from the bosom of his victim, probably could\nnot tell the quotient of sixteen divided by four, or any\nother simple results in numbers but certainly his inability\nto perceive them under such circumstances does not. annul\nnumerical p wers and distinctions. Why then should the\ngame inability take away moral distinctions\n357, Complexity in actions a source of confusion in\nour moral judgments,\nA second reason, why men, although they are under\nthe guidance of an original susceptibility, do not always\nform the same judgments of actions, is to be found in their\ncomplexity. We have already seen, that actions are\nnothing of themselves, independently of the agent. In\nforming moral judgments, therefore, we are to look at\nthe agent; an J we are to regard him, not only as willing\nand brin ;in j to pass certain effects, but we are to consider\nhim also as the subject of certain desires and intentions;\nand we are unable rightly to estimate these, without taking\ninto view various attendant circumstances, [n some cases\nthe intention is obvious; and in these the judgment is rea-\ndily formed. But in other cases, the results are complex;\nthey are a mixture of good and evil and hence arises a\ndifficulty in ascertaining the true intention and design of\nthe agent. When different individuals are called upon to\njudge of an instance of this kind, they will be not unlikely\nto give their attention to different circumstances, or they\nmay have different views of the same circumstances, con-\nsidered as indications of feeing and intention. This being\nthe case, tie judgments, which they will pass, will in effect\nbe pronounced upon different things, inasmuch as they\nwill have such difference of views. Hence in a multitude\nof actions, there will be sufficient reason for a diversity of\nmoral sentiments, where by superficial observers a perfect\nuniformity may have been expected. These remarks\nthrow some light upon the supposed approbation of theft\namong the Spartans. This people were trained up by\ntheir political institutions to regard property as of little\nyalu© their lands were equally divided they ate at public","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0418.jp2"},"419":{"fulltext":"THE WI£X, €O.NSCXB2ff€£, ,C. 415\ntables and the great end of all their civil regulations was\nto lender the citizens athletick, active, patient, and brave.\nEvery thing else was considered subordinate. The per-\nmission, which was given to the Spartan lads to steal, was\na part of the publick regulations. It was a sort of tax,\nwhich the citizens voluntarily imposed upon themselves, in\norder to encourage vigilance, endurance, and address in\nthe younger part of the community and hence, when they\nwere detected immediately after the theft, they were se-\nverely punished for deficiency of skill. Accordingly the\ntheft, which was permitted and approved by the Spartans\nwas a very different thing from what goes under that name\nwith us. The mere act may have been the same, but there\nwas no Correspondence in the results and attendant cir-\ncumstances, and in the degree of evil intention. Simi-\nlar inquiries in other instances will go far in explaining\nmany apparent deviations from the permanent distinctions\nbetween vice and virtue, and reduce the number of cases\nof supposed want of uniformity in moral sentiments.\n358. Influence, of early associations on moral\njudgments.\nOur moral judgments, in the third place, are some-\ntimes perplexed and perverted by means of early associa-\ntions. The principle of association does not operate\nupon the moral capacity directly it operates indirectly,\nwith considerable influence. When a particular action is\nto be judged of, it calls up, in the mind of different indi-\nviduals, different and distinct series of accessory circum-\nstances. This difference in the tendencies of the suggest-\ning principle can hardly fail to have considerable effect in\nmodifying the sentiment of approbation or disapprobation,\nresulting from the consideration of any particular action.\n^-Savage life gives us an illustration of this. Owing\nto the peculiar situation of those in that state and the con-\nsequent early associations, a factitious and exaggerated\nimportance is attached to mere courage and gentleness,\nequanimity, and benevolence, are, as virtues, proportionally\ndepressed. When vices are committed by near friends","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0419.jp2"},"420":{"fulltext":"414 THJB WILL, CONSCIENCE, C.\nby a brother, or a parent, they dp not excite in us such ab-\nhorrence, as in other cases. Our prepossessions in favour\nof the persons, who have committed the crime, suggest a\nthousand circumstances, which seem to us to alleviate its\naggravation. We frame for them a multitude of plausi-\nble excuses, which we should not have thought of doing,\nhad it not been for the endearments and intercourse of our\nprevious connection.\nWhile we contend, therefore, for an original suscepti-\nbility of moral emotions, it must be admitted, that its de-\ncisions are sometimes perverted by the violence of momen-\ntary passion the uniformity of its decisions is interrupted\nalso by complexity in the action and a complication of\ngood and evil in the results and some partial and erron-\neous judgments may be attributed to the influence of as-\nsociation. To these causes are to be ascribed those instan-\nces of striking deviation from moral rectitude, which the\nopposers of an original susceptibility of moral emotions, are\nfond of bringing up. Those instances, we apprehend, do\nsiot disprove the existence of the susceptibility, but merely\nshow, that it is sometimes liable to perversions.\n359. Of enlightening ike conscience.\nIt clearly follows from the views, which have been ta-\nken, that the moral susceptibility will operate with the\ngreater readiness and efficiency, in proportion as (he\nknowledge of ourselves and of our relations to other beings\nis increased. And the knowledge to be acquired with this\nend may be stated in some particulars. (1) As the\nBeing who gave us life, has given us conscience, and, con-\nsequently could not intend, that conscience should act in\nopposition to himself, it seems to be an indispensable duty,\nthat men should be acquainted with his character. His\ncharacter and will are made known in those works, of\nwhich He is the author, and in the Scriptures. If we\nhave right views of the Supreme Being, and of the re-\nlation, which we sustain to Him, our conscience will\ninfallibly approve what he has enjoined, and disapprove\nwhat h« has forbidden. (2) Inasmuch as it results","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0420.jp2"},"421":{"fulltext":"from the relation, which we sustain to the Supreme Be-\ning, that the decisions of conscience are not, and can-\nnot be at variance with his laws, but will agree with\nthem, whenever they are made known, it follows, that\nall should be acquainted with the moral and religious pre-\ncepts, which he has communicated to us. To every mind,\nthat has proper views of the self-existence of God and of\nour dependence upon Him, it will be enough to justify any\naction, that He has said it. The mere disclosure of his\nwill cannot but render, in all cases, an action approved in\nthe sight of conscience, whatever may be our ignorance\nof the consequences connected with it.\n(3) As all duties, which truly result from the relations,\nwhich we sustain to our fellow beings, are expressions of the\nwill of God, \\\\e are to consider what he requires us to per*\nform in respect to our immediate circle, to the poor and the\nsick, to our neighbourhood, and to society in general. Our\nfeelings in respect to th» performance of such duties can-\nnot be so clear and vivid, if we exclude the Supreme Being\nfrom our consideration of them, as they would otherwise be.\n(4) Since the decisions of conscience are often great-\nly perverted by the undue influence of passion, men should\nboth gu ird against the recurrence of passionate feelings\nin general and when at any time they have reason to sus-\npect themselves of being under the influence of such pas-\nsion, the decision on the merits or demerits of any particu-\nlar action ought to be put oft to a more favourable period.\nNor are we less to guard against prejudices, the prejudi-\nces in favour of friends, and against those, whom we may\nimagine to have injured us, the prejudices of sects, politi-\ncal parties, c. for they often give the mind a wrong\nview of the action, upon which it is to judge. Also when\nactions are complex, either in themselves or their results,\nthe greater care is requisite in properly estimating them.\n360. Of guilt when a person acts conscientiously.\nThe question has sometimes been started, Whether a per-\nson is in any case to be considered as guilty and to b«","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0421.jp2"},"422":{"fulltext":"416 THE WILL, CONSCIENCE. C\npunished for actions, done conscientiously for instance\nwhen certain ignorant Savages are supposed to act con-\nscientiously in putting their infirm and aged parents to\ndeath. Undoubtedly, in many cases, where people act\nconscientiously, there is great guilt. And the reason of it\nis evident. We have seen, that conscience, is in some\nmeasure under our control it may be enlightened it may\nbe strengthened or it may be greatly weakened, and in\nsome cases be made to approve of actions of the most un-\nworthy and sinful kind. Men, therefore, are to have a\nright conscience; this great and exalting principle is to\nreceive, and ought to receive the very first attention and\nthey are accountable, whenever it is neglected. Other-\nwise we furnish a very easy and convenient excuse to the\niniquitous perpetrators of all the cruelties of the Inquisi-\ntion, of all the persecutions of the Protestants, of all the\nacts of unkindness and tyranny, which have ever been ex-\nercised upon individuals and communities. And the\nposition, that men are accountable and guilty for having\na wrong conscience in proportion to their means of knowl-\nedge, holds good in respect to the most ignorant and degra-\nded Savage tribes, as well as in respect to civilized nations.\nIt is true, no individual ought to assume the province of judg-\ning, what that degree of guilt is for no one is competent\nto it. All, that is meant to be asserted, is, that when per-\nsons feel an emotion of approval in doing wrong, (that is,\nin doing what is condemned by the general moral senti-\nments of mankind, and by the written law of God and yet\nhave within their reach neglected sources of knowledge,\nwhich on being laid open to the mind, would have caused\ndifferent feelings, they are criminal for such neglect of the\ninformation before thern, and, consequently, cannot under\nsuch circumstances be rendered otherwise than criminal\nby any internal approbation.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0422.jp2"},"423":{"fulltext":"417\nCHAPTER TWENTY NINTH.\nTHE PASSIONS.\n361. Various significations of the term, passion*\nThe term, passion, originally means suffering this\nmeaning is strictly conformable with its etymology from\nthe Latin patior. It is employed in this sense, when\nin some Writers we are told of the Saviour s passion.\n-Again, it implies in some instances a strong pre-\ndiction, a sort of enthusiastick fondness for particular\nsrts, or pursuits. We say, that a person has a passion\nfor musick, or for painting or that he is passionately\nfond of gardening or of some diversions.* ^-Agairt,\nthe word in question has another meaning implying what\nwe otherwise express by the word, anger. It is said of a\nman, that he is in a passion that is, he is angry.\nAs the term, passion, is used here and in what follows, it\ndenotes a state of mind, of which some simple emotion\nis always a part, but which differs from any single simple\nemotion, in being combined with some form of the gen-\neral feeling of desire. In consequence of this com-\nplexity, the passions have a character of permanency,\nwhich is not found to belong to any separate emotions. It\nis not easy to assign a distinction between the passions and\naffections the terms are here used as synonymous.\n362. Of the passion of love.\ntn pursuing the examination of this subject, we are\nfirst to consider that class of our complex and permanent\nfeelings, to which we give the name of love. There are\nmany modifications or degrees of this passion, the mere\npreference of regard and esteem, the warmer glow of friend-\nship, and the increased feeling of devoted attachment*.\n*There are not only differences in degree, the passion it-\n*3","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0423.jp2"},"424":{"fulltext":"418 THE PASSION*.\nself seems to be modified, and to be invested with a*different\naspect, according to the circumstances, in which it is found\nto operate. The love, which we feel for our friends, is\ndifferent from that, which we feel for a parent or brother\nand both are different from that, which we feel for our\ncountry. But it is impossible to convey in words the pre-\ncise distinctions, which may justly be thought to exist both\nin kind and degree. Such an attempt would only in-\nvolve the subject in greater confusion.\nNor could we expect to succeed much better in giving\na definition of the passion in general. Every one must be\nsupposed to be acquainted with it from his own experience,\nto know what it is to love parents, and friends, and coun-\ntry and we must, therefore, refer to that experience for a\nbetter idea of it, than can be conveyed by language. The\ndifficulty here is precisely the same as that in explaining by\nwords the simple ideas from the senses. The sweetness\nof honey or of sugar, the smell of the violet and of the rose,\nare better known by these mere names, than by any des-\ncription or definition. When we merely name the sensa-\ntions, we virtually refer back the individual to his own ex-\nperience and when this is done, the necessity of a formal\nand necessarily an imperfect definition is superseded.\nWithout undertaking, therefore, to give any thing in\nthe shape of a, precise and accurate definition of the\npassion, we may say something further, which shall give us\nsome light into its nature, considered, as a part of the phys-\niology of the human mind. The feeling is a complex\none and we may disco ver in it at least two elements viz.\nan emotion of vivid delight in the contemplation of the ob-\nject, and a desire of good to that object. Hence there\nwill always be found in the object some quality, either\nsome excellence in the form, or in the intellect, or in the\nmoral traits, or in all combined, which is capable of exciting\na pleasurable emotion. There is a pleasing emotion, ante-\ncedent to the desire of good to the object, which causes it\nbut this happy feeling continues to exist, and to mingle with\nt fie subsequent kind desire. And there may be supposed\nf i be a constant action and reaction, the desire of good in-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0424.jp2"},"425":{"fulltext":"THE PASSION!, 411\ncreasing the strength of the pleasurable emotion, and the\nmere feeling of delight enhancing the benevolent desire.\nWhen the kind desire, which is one of the elements of\nlove, is not excited merely in consequence of our having ex-\nperienced the antecedent pleasurable emotion, but in conse-\nquence of regarding that pleasurable emotion as indica-\ntive of qualities, to which the unalterable voice of nature\npronounces, that our affections may be justly given, it is\nthen a pure and exalting feeling. As to how far this pu-\nrity of feeling exists, there may undoubtedly be a differ-\nence of opinion but just so far as it does, there is a glow\nof the heart, analogous to the devotional feelings of a high-\ner and happier state of being.\n363. Of the passion of hatred.\nThe passion of hatred is the opposite to that of love.\nAnd as the latter was found to be complex, the former also\nmay be separated into opposite, though analogous ele-\nments viz. an emotion of pain, and a desire of injury to the\nobject or cause of the painful feeling. For a correct\nnotion of this passion, as well as of its opposite, we must\nresort to our own experience. Some have maintained, that\nthe malevolent affections, in the present condition of\nthe world, are necessary and commendable that without\nthem frauds and oppressions would come boldly forth into\nthe great community of mankind. It cannot be denied,\nthat a spirit of watchfulness and of retribution is necessary\nbut it is not so evident, that there is need of malevolence.\nThe Supreme Being is a sovereign, who does not grant im-\npunity to sin but he is represented as correcting with the\nfeelings of a parent, and as anxious for the good of those,\nwho have subjected themselves to his chastisements.\nS64. Of sympathy.\nSympathy, by the common use of language, implies an\ninterest in the welfare of others, and may be considered in\ntwo respects, being either an interest in their joy, or an\ninterest in their sorrow. The sympathetick man falls in","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0425.jp2"},"426":{"fulltext":"420 THE PASSIOJCS.\nwith the requisition of Scripture, rejoicing with those, who\nrejoice, and weeping with those, who weep. His heart\nkindles up with happiness at beholding the happy, and he\nsheds the tear for the miserable. But that sympathy,\nwhich rejoices with the rejoicing, is only one of the forms\nof love. In an analysis of our passions, it is entitled to no\nseparate place. Like love it is a feeling of delight, com-\nbined with benevolent desires towards the object of it. It\nis only the sympathy for sorrow, which can have a distinct\nconsideration in the list of our passions.\nSome have thought, that sympathy for sorrow is only a\nmodification of love but we may discover a difference\nbetween them. We can sympathize in the griefs of those,\nin whom we are abje to discern no pleasing qualities, and\neven with those, who are positive objects of hatred. We\nleave it to the feelings of any one to determine, Whether, if\nhe saw even his enemy perishing with hunger in a dungeon,\nor his limbs broken on the rack, hp would not harbour a\nrelenting emotion, and be glad at his rescue If so, sym-\npathy for grief is different from love, for we may sympa-\nthize with those, whom we do not, and cannot love and,\nconsequently, it is to be considered a distinct passion.\nAs the passion of love is a feeling of delight, combined\nwith the desire of good to the object of it, and hatred\nis the opposite of it, being a painful emotion, attended\nwith a desire of injury so the sympathy of grief seems to\nagree in some respects with both, and to disagree in other\nrespects. It includes a painful emotion, as in hatred, and\na desire of good or of relief to the object of it, as in love.\nThe painful emotion, which is a port of the complex feel-\ning of sympathy, does not differ from the simplest form\nof sadness and is probably the same feeling, although\nin a less degree, with the sorrow of the person, in whose\nbehalf our sympathetick interest is enlisted.\nThe laws of association appear to have somewhat to do\nin calling our sympathies into existence. When we be-\nhold the contortions of countenance in one, who is in suf-\nfering, they become signs to us of what we ourselves have\nsuffered. And as such, they effectually revive the idea","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0426.jp2"},"427":{"fulltext":"TUB PASSIONS. 421\nof our own past distresses no less than the word, which\nis a mere arbitrary sign, calls up the thought. But the laws\nof association furnish us with but one element of sympathet-\nick feeling. When we have this feeling, there is not only\nan emotion of grief, but the soul, regardless of itself, min-\ngles in the fortunes of another, in a way which all can un-\nderstand, but which is very imperfectly conveyed by call-\ning it a desire for the relief of the sufferer.\n365. Of anger.\nThe passion of anger does not appear to differ essen-\ntially in its nature from that of hatred. When the painful\nemotion, and the desire of evil to the object of it, which\nare implied in hatred, arise suddenly and violently on the\nreception, or supposed reception of some injury, or from\nsome other cause, if any can be imagined, the state of the\nmind is then called anger. That is to say, we suppose,\nanger is essentially the same with hatred, and differs\nfrom the ordinary forms of that passion chiefly in the cir-\ncumstance of great suddenness and violence. When\nthe angry emotion is protracted, awaiting in all its power\nfor some more favourable opportunity to show itself, it be-\ncomes revenge. We speak of such feelings as revenge-\nful.\nThe precept of St. Paul, Be ye angry, and sin not,\n(Eph. iv. 26.) reminds us, that this passion is liable to ex-\nceed due limits, and also that we ought to cherish such\nconsiderations, as are likely to check and properly control\nits influence. When we are angry, we should consider,\nin the first place, that we may have mistaken the motives\nof the person, whom we imagine to have injured us. Per-\nhaps the oversight or crime, which we alledge against him,\nwas mere inadvertence. And it is possible, that his inten-\ntions were favourable towards us, instead of being, as we\nsuppose, of a contrary character. (2) We should con-\nsider, secondly, that the indulgence of this passion on\nslight occasions renders us contemptible in the sight of all\naround us y it excites no pity, nothing but feelings of scorn\nand, therefore, instead of being a punishment to the cause","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0427.jp2"},"428":{"fulltext":"4 22 THE FASSI0N3.\nor supposed cause of the affront, only increases our own\nmisery. (3) Let it be remembered also, that when the\nmind is much agitated by this passion, it is incapable of\ncorrect judgment actions, considered as the indications of\nfeeling and character, do not appear in their true light\nand the moral susceptibility is overborne and rendered use-\nless. The saying of Socrates to his servant, I would beat\nyou, if I were not angry, although uttered by a Heathen,\nis not unworthy of the Christian philosophy. (4) There is\nanother consideration, which ought to prevent the indul-\ngence of this passion, and to allay its effects It is, that all\nhave offended against the Supreme Being, and stand in\nneed of pardon from Him. Every one, who knows his\nown heart, must see, and feel himself to be a transgressor.\nHow pitiful is it, then, for man to talk largely of satisfac-\ntion and revenge, when he is every moment dependent on\nthe clemency and forgiveness of a Being, whom he has\ndisobeyed and dishonoured\nThere is a species of anger, termed peevishness or fret-\nfulness, which often interrupts the peace and happiness\nof life. It differs from ordinary anger in being excited by\nvery trifling circumstances, and in a strange facility of in-\nflicting its effects on every body, and every thing within\nits reach. The peevish man has met with some trifling\ndisappointment, (it matters but little what it is,) and the\nserenity of whole days is disturbed no smiles are to be\nseen every thing, whether animate or inanimate, rational\nor irrational, is out of place, and falls under the rebuke\nof this fretful being. Genuine anger is like a thunder-\nshower, that comes dark and heavily, but leaves a clear\nsky afterwards. But peevishness is like an obscure, driz-\nzling fog it is less violent, and lasts longer. In general,\nit is more unreasonable and unjust, than violent anger, and\nwould certainly be more disagreeable, were it not often,\nin consequence of being so disproportioned to its cause,\nirresistiblv ludicrous.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0428.jp2"},"429":{"fulltext":"THE PASSIONS. 42-7\n36G. Of gratitude.\nAs anger is but one of the forms of hatred, gratitude\nseems to be one of the forms of the general passion of\nlove. Like the last named passion, it includes an emotion\nof pleasure or delight, combined with a desire of good or a\nbenevolent feeling towards the object of it. But we nev-\ner give the name of gratitude to this combination of pleas-\ning and benevolent emotion, except it arise in reference to\nsome benefit or benefits conferred. A great part of that\nstrong feeling, which is exercised by children toward par-\nents, is that species of love, which is termed gratitude*\nThey think of them, not only as possessing many qualities,\nwhich are estimable and lovely in themselves but as fond\nand unm earied benefactors. They cannot behold, without\nhaving their feelings strongly moved, their earnest disposi-\ntion to relieve their sufferings, to supply their wants, to en-\nhance their enjoyments.\nDifferent individuals exhibit considerable diversity in\nthe exercise of grateful emotions. Some receive the fa-\nvours heaped upon them without exhibiting any visible re-\nturns of benevolent regard others are incapable of a passive\nreception of benefits, and are strongly affected, whenever\nthey are conferred. This difference is probably owing in\npart to original diversities of constitution and is partly to\nbe ascribed to wrong views of the characters and duties of\nmea, or to other adventitious circumstances.\n367. Of pride.\nPride is a consciousness or belief of some superiority\nin ourselves over others, attended with a desire, that oth-\ners should be sensible of it. There are many modifica-\ntions of this, no less than of the other passions. When it\nis very officious, and makes an ostentatious display of those\ncircumstances, in which it imagines its superiority to con-\nsist, it is termed vanity. When it discovers itself, not so\nmuch in the display of the circumstances of its superiority\nas in a contempt, and in sneering disparagements of the","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0429.jp2"},"430":{"fulltext":"424 THE PASSIONS.*\ninferiour qualities of others, it is termed haughtiness or ar-\nrogance. If the above notion of pride be correct, this\npassion cannot exist without implying a comparison of our-\nselves with others. The proud, in making this comparison\neither are, or believe themselves to be superiour in some re-\nspect to others this superiority, they are desirous, should be\nmade known, when there is evidently no reason for it, except\nwhat may be found in the peculiar state of their own feelings.\nThis limitation should go with the definition, which has been\ngiven for there may not only be superiority and a con*\nsciousness of it without pride, but under certain eircum-\ntances, (perhaps when ignorance is to be enlightened, or\nturbulence is to be subdued, or lawless vice is to be awed,)\nthere may be even a desire of making it known, and yet\nwithout the passion in question.\nThe passion of pride is not limited to the possession of\nany one object or quality, or to any single circumstance\nor combination of circumstances. One is proud of his an-\ncestry; another of his riches, and a third of the beauty of\nhis dress or person. It is the same feeling in the statesman,\nand the jockey in the leader of armies, and the hunter of\nhares and foxes in the possessor of the princely palace,\nand of the well-wrought cane or snuff-box. Some have\nthought, that many good results, connected with human\nenterprize and efforts, may be justly ascribed to the influ-\nence of this passion. On the other hand, it has been main-\ntained, that there are other principles of action of a more\ngenerous and ennobling kind, which might accomplish,\nand ought to accomplish all, which has been attributed\nto this. Certainly, a little reflection, a little insight into\nour origin, infirmities, and wants, would tend to diminish the\ndegree of it, if nothing more. If we could trace our de-\nscents, (says Seneca,) we should find all slaves to come\nfrom princes, and princes from slaves. To be proud of\nknowledge, is to be blind in the light to be proud of vir-\ntue, is to poison ourselves with the antidote to be proud\nof authority, is to make our rise our downfall.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0430.jp2"},"431":{"fulltext":"THE F ASSIGNS. 425\n368. Of fear.\nFear is an emotion of pain, caused by an object, which\nwe anticipate will be injurious to us, attended with a de-\nsire of avoiding such object or its injurious effects.\nHere, as in other cases, there is a simple emotion, that of\npain and, in respect to this particular emotion, it does\nnot differ from certain other of the passions. But it dif-\nfers in some other things, viz. in always having the object\nor cause of the painful emotion in the future, and also in\nthe particular form of the attendant desire. Having made\ndesire a part of the passion of fear, and also of other com-\nplex states of the mind, which involve emotions, of the pas-\nsions of love, hatred, sympathy, anger, gratitude, and pride,\nit may have occurred, ere this, to ask, What is meant by\nthat term? In answer, it must be acknowledged, that it\nis difficult to give a satisfactory explanation of it. We\ncan, indeed, say, that desire is preceded by the idea of\nsomething, which is the object of it and also that it is\npreceded by an emotion of pain or of delight. But\non the examination of one s own feelings, it will be readily\nperceived, that both of these are different from the state of\nmind in question. With the mere feelings [of desire,]\nsays Brown, I may suppose you to be fully acquainted\nand any attempt to define them, as feelings, must involve\nthe use of some word exactly synonymous, or will convey\nno meaning whatever.\nBut to return to the passion under consideration. The\nstrength or intensity of fear will be in proportion to the\napprehended evil. There is a difference of original sus-\nceptibility of this passion in different persons and the\namount of apprehended evil will, consequently, vary with\nthe quickness of such susceptibility. But whatever causes\nmay increase or diminish the opinion of the degree of evil,\nwhich threatens, there will be a correspondence between\nthe opinion, which is formed of it, and the fearful pas-\nsion. When this passion is extreme, it prevents the due\nexercise of the moral susceptibility, and interrupts correct\njudgment of any kind whatever. It is a feeling of great\n54","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0431.jp2"},"432":{"fulltext":"420 THE PASSIOHS.\npower, and one, which will not bear to be trifled with. It\nmay serve as a profitable hint, to remark, that there have\nbeen instances of persons thrown into a fright suddenly,\nand perhaps in mere sport, which has immediately resulted\nin a most distressing and permanent mental disorganiza-\ntion. In cases, where the anticipated evil, is very great,\nand there is no hope of avoiding it in any way, the mind\nexists in that state, which is called despair.\n369. Of hope.\nSuch is the extensive influence of that state of the\nmind, to which we give the name of hope, that it de-\nserves a separate consideration, although it cannot be\nreckoned, as a distinct passion. It is truly nothing more\nthan a modification or form of desire. We desire a thing\nif there be but little probability of obtaining it, it is what\nis termed a wish when there is an increase of probability,\nthe wish becomes hope and when the probability is still\nfurther increased, the hope becomes expectation, and ex-\npectation itself may be distinguished as weak or strong.\nConsequently, hope may be predicated of every thing of\nwhatever kind, where there is desire, whether it be a de-\nfire of good or of evil, for ourselves, or for others. When\nthe desire is attended with so little probability as to be a\nmere wish, it is languid when there is hope, it assumes\na more vivid and enlivening aspect. We, accordingly, speak\nof gay hope, of cheering, or bright hope, and re-\ngard it as spreading a sort of rapturous light over the dis-\ntant objects/ which it contemplates.\nWith thee, sweet Hope resides the heavenly light,\nThat pours remotest rapture on the sight\nThine is the charm of life s bewildered way,\nThat calls each slumbering passion into play.\nThe influence of that vividness and pleasure of desire,\nwhich we term hope, is very great. It is felt, more or less*\nin all the duties and situations of life. The school-boy is\nencouraged in his tasks by some hope of reward and\nwhen grown up to manhood, he cheers himself after* a\nthousand disappointments, with some good in prospect.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0432.jp2"},"433":{"fulltext":"78E risfieaa. 427\nThe poor peasant, who laboriously cultivates his few sterile\nacres, sees them in his anticipation, rich, and blooming, and\nprodigal of wealth. It proffers its aid in the chambers of\nthe sick and suffering and the victim of oppressive tyran-\nny, the captive in the dungeon, is encouraged to summon\nup the fortitude, necessary to prolong his existence, by\nthe hope, however poorly founded, of future deliverance.\n370. Gf jealousy.\nJealousy is a painful emotion, caused by some object\nof love, and attended with a desire of evil towards that ob-\nject. The circumstance, which characterizes this passion\nand constitutes its peculiar trait, is, that all its bitterness\nand hostility are inflicted on some one, whom the jealous\nperson loves. The feelitg of suspicious rivalship, which\noften exists between candidates for fame and power, is\nsometimes called jealousy on account of its analogy to this\npassion. There are various degrees of jealousy from the\nforms of mere distrust and of watchful suspicion to its high-\nest paroxysms. In general the strength of the passion will be\nfound to be in proportion to the value, which is attach-\ned to the object of it and is perhaps more frequently\nfound in persons, who have a large share of pride, than in\nothers. Such, in consequence of the habitual belief of their\nown superiority, are likely to notice many trifling inadver-\ntencies, and to treasure them up as proof of intended neg-\nleet, which would not have been observed by others, and\ncertainly were exempt from any evil intention.\nThe person under the influence of this passion is inca-\npable of forming a correct judgment of the conduct of the\nindividual, who is the object of it he observes every thing,\nand gives it the worst interpretation and circumstances,\nwhich, in another state of the mind, would have been to-\nkens of innocence, are converted into proof of guilt. Al-\nthough poetry, it is no fiction\nTrifles, light a« air,\nArc to the jealous confirmations strong,\nAs proofs of holy writ.\nHence it it justly said to be the monster, that makes\nthe meat it feeds on. This paision is at times exceeding-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0433.jp2"},"434":{"fulltext":"428 THE PA5SJOX3.\nly violent. At one moment the mind is animated with all\nthe feelings of kindness the next, it is transported with the\nstrongest workings of hatred, and then it is suddenly over-\nwhelmed with contrition. Continually vacillating between\nthe extremes of love and hatred, it knows no rest; it would\ngladly bring destruction on the object, whom it dreads to\nlose more than any other, and whom at times it loves more\nthan any other.\n371. External signs of the passions.\nSuch of our abstract ideas, as are purely intellectual,\nare expressed merely by words, and other artificial, and\nconventional signs. The simple emotions of pleasure and\npain, and the passions, of which they form a part, have,\neach of them, a language of their own, independently of\nany artificial mode of expressing them they are attended\nwith certain external appearances, peculiar to themselves.\nThese external appearances, which consist of certain move-\nments of the countenance and body, accompanied some-\ntimes with inarticulate sounds, constitute a natural lan-\nguage, and very readily signify to all, who behold them,\nthe existence of the correspondent emotions and passions.\nThe emotions, of j y and grief, which differ from\nthose of pleasure and pain only in degree, the passions\nof love and hatred, of sympathy, gratitude, jealousy, c,\nare all displayed externally in this way; so that a per-\nsons immediate feelings, sometimes the prominent traits\nof his character may be understood from them. Some\nhave regarded the interpretation, which we are able to give\nof these signs, for instance, of a smile or of a frown, as an\ninstinctive Or natural power, with which we are endowed\nespecially for this purpose. And considering the early\npericd, at which wc promptly receive them as interpreters\nof the heart, and the difficulty of resolving the whole of\nthis early power of interpretation into experience, this\nopinion, which has been advocated by respectable authori-\nty, is not without weight. In whatever way it is to be ac-\ncounted for, the fact, that there are certain signs, appropri-\nate to the emotions and passions s is taught us by our daily","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0434.jp2"},"435":{"fulltext":"THE PASSIONS.\n429\nintercourse and experience. And we are greatly indebted\nto the benevolent oversight of a kind Providence in fur-\nnishing us, whether directly or indirectly, with this partic-\nular language. Some of its benefits are these.\nAmong other things it is an introductory step to the\nformation of oral and alphabetical language. Artificial\nlanguage, whether we regard it as spoken or written, which\nare its two great divisions, is arbitrary, and a matter of\nmere agreement. But if it were not of divine original, as\nsome have contended, it is evident, that there must have\nbeen some antecedent signs, by means of which such a-\ngreement was first formed. And w T e can think of no oth-\ner instrument, which could have been employed to this end,\nbut those signs of gesture and the countenance, which we\nfind frum the earliest period of life to be expressive of emo-\ntions, and the passions. After the formation of artificial\nlanguage, they lend some aid in fixing the meaning of\nwords, which are employed to express the feelings, inas-\nmuch as they help us in ascertaining the nature and degree\nof the feelings themselves, and in distinguishing one from\nanother. The happiness ofdomestick society and of our\ngeneral intercourse with our fellow beings is greatly promo-\nted by these signs. There is a tendency in society to be-\ncome constrained and artificial, which is checked by them.\nLooks and gestures give a sort of visible existence to what\ntakes place within they open a direct access to the heart,\nand make friends and confidants of those, who would oth-\nerwise be strangers. They evidently have a powerful ef-\nfect in calling into action, and in improving the social af-\nfections. These signs give us information of the putting\nforth of the malignant and dissocial passions. The lurking\nhostility, which is often denied in language, is discovered\nby means of them, and puts us upon our guard. And they\ndo this not only by disclosing the hostile passions of our\nenemy, but by thus indirectly giving occasion to the exis-\ntence of the corresponding passion of fear, and consequent-\nly by leading us to take precautions for our security.\nThe utility of the external signs of the passions is particu-\nlarly to be noticed in cases of affliction. They become to","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0435.jp2"},"436":{"fulltext":"430 MENTAL ALIENATION.\nus most striking intimations of the distress of our fellow be-\nings. We feel, when we behold them, the passion of\nsympathy, and fly to their relief.\nCHAPTER THIRTIETH.\nIMEBNTAXi ALIENATION-\n372. Of the misfortune of a disordered state of mind.\nThe mind of man, when in its full and unbiassed exer-\ncise, imparts a dignity to human nature, and is the founda-\ntion of its superiority over the irrational part of creation.\nThis being the case, it follows, that when the due exercise\nof the intellectual powers is permanently disturbed, or\nwhen there is naturally some deficiency in them, the digni-\nty of his nature is gone his ascendency is lost, and, with\nthe exception of his erect form, there is no mark to dis-\ntinguish him from the brute. Nothing, therefore, can be\na greater misfortune nothing can be more calamitous,\nthan those mental disorders, of which we are to give some\naccount. —The evils, to which the mind is subject, are\nmany, differing in kind and degree, being hardly less nu-\nmerous than the diseases of the body. But however nu-\nmerous, and various, we shall treat of them all under the\ngeneral head of mental alienation, which is but another\nname for mental disorders beginning with idiocy, and\nprosecuting the inquiry into the characferisticks of the va-\nrious forms of insanity.\n373. Degree of mental power in idiocy.\nPersons, in the condition of idiocy, will be found to\nhave but few ideas of any kind. This small number they\nare able to compare together, so far as to distinguish objectf,\nin which there are any striking differences. Such, how-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0436.jp2"},"437":{"fulltext":"MENTAL ALIENATION. 431\never, is their weakness, and at times total incapacity of the\nsusceptibility of feeling relations, that the class of abstract\nideas, resulting from the perception of the relations of ob-\njects, when they are compared together, are not only few-\ner than those of any other class, but are ill-defined and\nindistinct. These few ideas they are able to combine to-\ngether, and form some simple propositions. They have\nthe power of deducing inferences from the comparison of\na number of consecutive propositions, that is, by reasoning,\nonly in a very small degree. Their great feebleness of\nreasoning power is to be attributed partly to the fewness of\nthe ideas and propositions, which they possess partly, to\nthe dulness of their susceptibility of perceiving relations,\nthe exercise of which is always implied in the comparison\nof propositions and partly, to a great weakness of memo-\nry. We never find an idiot, who can steadily attend to a\nlong argument, and estimate the point and weight of its\nconclusion whether it be the steps of a mathematical de-\nmonstration, or an argument of a moral nature.\nOwing to this inability to compare propositions and\ndeduce conclusions, the idiot is often unable to take care of\nhimself; he knows no better than to run under the wheels of\na carriage, or toset fire to the house, where he would prob-\nably be consumed. Hence it is not considered right in\nthose, who are responsible- for his conduct and preservation\nto leave him in situations, where he can do injury to him-\nself or others. Whatever injury he may do, he is not con-\nsidered accountable. The imbecility c/ mere intellectual\npow r er extends to the susceptibility of moral distinctions.\nHe knows no right or wrong moral blame or approbation.\nThis is a description of common cases of idiocy but\nthere are gradations in this, as well as in all other mental\nweaknesses and disorders. There are some, who need not\nto be closely watched by their relatives and friends, and are\ncapable of some species of manual labour but who can-\nnot be safely entrusted with property, and are unequal to\nthe management of affairs.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0437.jp2"},"438":{"fulltext":"432 HEJKTAL ALIENATION.\n374. Of occasions of idiocy,\nIdiotism is sometimes natural that is, the causes of U\nexist from the commencement of life. In many of these\ncases, there is a greater or less bodily mal -formation; the\nskull is of a size less than common, and there is a dispro-\nportion between the face and the head, the former being\nlarger in proportion than the latter. The bones of the\nhead are asserted by Dr. Rush to be preternaturally thick\nand the consequence of this is a diminution of the internal\ncapacity of the cranium. What appears most striking,\n(says Pinel, in giving an account of an idiot in the asylum,\nBicetre,) is the extremely disproportionate extent of the\nface, compared with the diminutive size of the cranium. No\ntraits of animation are visible in his physiognomy. Every\nline indicates the most absolute stupidity. Between the\nheight of the head, and that of the whole stature, there is a\n▼ery great disproportion. The cranium is greatly depress-\ned, both at the crown and at the temples. His looks are\nheavy, and his mouth wide open. The whole extent of\nhis knowledge is confined to three or four confused ideas,\nand that of his speech to as many inarticulate sounds.\nFrom this instance, which is one of the lowest forms of id-\niocy, and from others, where there was a similar conforma-\ntion of the head, Pinel seems to be inclined to the opinion,\nthat a mal-conformation of the head in particular is the\ncause of idiotism, when it exists from infancy.\nThat absence or weakness of intellectual power, which is\ntermed idiocy, is often found to exist from other causes.\nMen of great mental ability have sometimes sunk into the\nstate of idiotism, in consequence of too great application\nof the mind, combined with a disrelish for social inter-\ncourse, which would have checked, and probably have pre-\nvented such entire prostration of the intellect. The latter\ncause is thought to have co-operated in bringing on the fa-\ntuity of Dean Swift. In consequence of mean views of\neconomy, he was in the habit of absconding from visitors,\nand, in denying himself their company, he lost the oppor-\ntunity both of acquiring now ideas, and of renovating his-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0438.jp2"},"439":{"fulltext":"Mental alienation. 433\nformer stores of knowledge. His once vigorous mind col-\nlapsed into such weakness and ignorance, that he was at\nlast confined in a hospital, which he had himself founded\nfor idiots. Franklin, on the contrary, continued to employ\nhimself, not onlv in reading and writing, but in conversa-\ntion; he felt a lively interest in the welfare of his friends,\nand in the progress of all publick enterprizes and institu-\ntions, and at the period of his death, in the 85th year of\nhis age, discovered no weakness and decay of mind.\nIdiocy may be induced by mere old age. The senses at\nthat period of life become dull the ideas received from\nthem are less lively, than formerly the memory fails, and\nwith it the power of reasoning and there is combined, with\nthese unfavourable circumstances, a want of interest in per-\nsons and events. Further; this state of the mind may\nbe caused by various diseases, such as violent fevers,\nwhich at times suddenly disturb the mental powers, produce\na temporary delirium, and then leave the intellectual facul-\nties in a permanently torpid and inefficient condition. It\nmay originate also in the abuse of ardent spirits, from great\ngrief, from violent blows on the head, from sudden and\ngreat terrour, c. The idiocy, which is natural, and exists\nfrom infancy, has sometimes been distinguished from that,\nwhich is brought on by the above-mentioned and other\ncauses in after life but the mental condition being in\nboth cases essentially the same, they may properly be con-\nsidered together in one view. This species of mental\nalienation is generally incurable.\n375. Illustrations of (he cause of idiocy.\nGreat and sudden terrour was mentioned, as one of the\ncauses of idiocy. Very great and sudden excitements of\nany of the passions may produce the same effect. We\nknow of no illustrations of this statement more striking,\nthan the following from the interesting work of Pinel on\nInsanity. The feelings of individuals, endowed with\nacute sensibility, may experience so violent a shock, that\nall the functions of the mind are in danger of being sus-\npended in their exercises or totally abolished. Sudden\n55","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0439.jp2"},"440":{"fulltext":"434 MENTAL ALIENATION.\njoy and excessive fear are equally capable of producing\nthis inexplicable phenomenon. An engineer proposed to\nthe committee of public safety, in the second year of the\nrepublick, a project for a new invented cannon, of which\nthe effects would be tremendous. A day was fixed for the\nexperiment at Meudon and Robespierre wrote to the in-\nventor so flattering a letter, that, upon perusing it, he was\ntransfixed motionless to the spot. He was shortly after-\nwards sent to Bicetre in a state of complete idiotism.\nAbout the same time, two young conscripts, who had\nrecently joined the army, were called into action. In the\nheat of the engagement, one of them was killed by a mus-.\nket ball, at the side of his brother. The survivor, petrified\nwith horror, was struck motionless at the sight. Some\ndays afterwards he was sent in a state of complete idio-\ntism to his father s house. His arrival produced a similar\nimpression upon a third son of the same family. The\nnews of the death of one of the brothers, and the derange-\nment of the other, threw this third viciini into a state of\nsuch consternation and stupor as might have defied the\npowers of ancient or modern poetry to give an adequate rep-\nresentation of it. My sympathetick feelings have been fre-\nquency arrested by the sad wreck of humanity, presented\nin the appearance of these degraded beings: but it was\na scene truly heart-rending to see the wretched father\ncome to weep over these miserable remains of his once\nenviable family.\n676. Partial derangement by means of the imagin-\nation.\nMen of sensibility and genius, by giving way to the sug-\ngestions of a melancholy imagination, sometimes become\nmentally disordered. Not that we are authorized to include\nthese cases as among the more striking forms of insanity\nthey in general attract but little notice, although sources\nof exquisite misery to the subjects of them. But such are\nthe extravagant dreams, in which they indulge such are\nthe wrcng vievvs of the character and actions of men, which\nWr huKy and melan^ho-y imaginations are apt to form?","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0440.jp2"},"441":{"fulltext":"IfENTAi. ALIENATION. 43»\nthat they cannot be reckoned persons of truly sound minds.\nThese instances, which are not rare, it is difficult fully to\ndescribe but their most distinguishing traits will be rec-\nognized in the following sketch from Madame de Stael s\nReflections on the Character and Writings of Rousseau.\nHis faculties were slow in their operation, but his\nheart was ardent it was in consequence of his own med-\nitations, that he became impassioned he discovered no\nsudden emotions, but all his feelings grew upon reflection.\nIt has, perhaps, happened to him to fall in love gradually\nwith a woman, by dwelling on the idea of her during her\nabsence. Sometimes he would part, with you, with all his\nformer affection but if an expression had escaped you,\nwhich might bear an unfavourable construction, he would\nrecollect it, examine it, exaggerate it, perhaps dwell upon\nit for a month, and conclude by a total breach with you.\nHence it was, that there was scarce a possibility of unde-\nceiving him for the light, which broke in upon him at\nonce, was not sufficient to efface the wrong impressions\nwhich had taken place so gradually in his mind. It uas\nextremely difficult, too, to continue long en an intimate\nfooting with him. A word, a gesture, furnished him with\nmatter of profound meditation he connected the most\ntrifling circumstances like so many mathematical proposi-\ntions, and conceived his conclusions to be supported\nby the evidence of demonstration.- I believe, she\nfurther remarks, that imagination was the strongest of\nhis faculties, and that it had almost absorbed all the\nrest. He dreamed rather than existed, and the events\nof his life might be said, more properly, to have passed in\nhis mind, than without him a mode of being, one should\nhave thought, that ought to have secured him from dis-\ntrust, as it prevented him from observation but the truth\nwas, it did not hinder him from attempting to observe it\nonly rendered his observations erroneous. That his soul\nwas tender, no one can doubt, after having read his works J\nbut his imagination sometimes interposed between his rea-\nson and his affections, and destroyed their influence: he\nappeared sometimes void of sensibility but it was because","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0441.jp2"},"442":{"fulltext":"436\nMENTAL ALIENATION.\nhe did not perceive objects such as they were. Had he\nseen them with our eyes, his heart would have been more\naffected than ours.\nThe mental alienation, resulting from a melancholy\nimagination, is the more deplorable, because it is generally\nfound to be connected with exquisite sensibility, and often\nwith great mental power. Nothing but a warm heart and\ngreat ability in combination could originate and frame to-\ngether the elements of such ideal exaggerations. Per-\nsons, exposed to this mental disorder, should take the\nalarm; and happy will it be for them, if they can be exci-\nted to some decided effort by the future misery, which they\nare preparing for themselves. They should strenuously\nendeavour to demolish the world, which their imaginations\nhave created, and come out from their solitude into more\nactive and busy life.\nGo, soft enthusiast quit the cypress grove,\nNor to the rivulet s loneiy moanings nine\nYour sad complaint. Go, seek the cheerful haunts\nOf men, and mingle with the bustling crowd\nLay schemes for wealth, or power, or fame, the w 3h\nOf nobler minds, and push them night and day.\nOr join the Caravan in quest of scenes,\nNew to your eyes, and shifting every hour,\nBeyond the Alps, beyond the Appeiiines,\n377. Of lightheadedness.\nThere is another of the slighter forms of an alienated\nmind, which may be termed lightheadedness otherwise\ncalled by Pinel, demence, and by Dr. Rush, dissociation.\nPersons, subject to this mental disease, are sometimes de-\nsignated as flighty, hair-brained and when the indica-\ntions of it are pretty decided, as a little cracked.\nTheir disorder seems chiefly to consist in a deficiency of\nthe ordinary power over associated ideas. Their thoughts\nfly from one subject to another with great rapidity and,\nconsequently, one mark of this state of mind is great volu-\nbility of speech, and almost constant motion of the body.\nThis rapid succession of ideas and attendant volubility of\ntongue are generally accompanied with forgetfulness in a","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0442.jp2"},"443":{"fulltext":"MENTAL ALIENATION.\n437\ngreater or less degree. And as the subject of this form of\nderangement is equally incapable of checking and reflect-\ning upon his present ideas, and of recalling the past, he\nconstantly forms incorrect judgments of things. Another\nmark, which has been given, is a diminished sensibility to\nexternal impressions.\n378. Illustration of this mental disorder.\nDr. Rush in his valuable work on the Diseases of the\nMind has repeated the account, which an English clergy-\nman, who visited Lavater, the physiognomist, has given of\nthat singular character. It accurately illustrates this mental\ndisorder. I was detained, (says he,) the whole morn-\ning by the strange, wild, eccentrick Lavater, in various con-\nversations. When once he is set a going, there is no such\nthing as stopping him, till he runs himself out of breath.\nHe starts from subject to subject, flies from book to book,\nfrom picture to picture measures your nose, your eye,\nyour mouth, with a pair of compasses pours forth a tor-\nrent of physiognomy upon you drags you, for a proof\nof his dogma, to a dozen of closets, and unfolds ten thou-\nsand drawings but will not let you open your lips to pro-\npose a difficulty crams a solution down your throat, be-\nfore you have uttered half a syllable of your objection.\nHe is as meagre as the picture of famine his nose and\nchin almost meet. I read him in my turn, and found lit-\ntle difficulty in discovering, amidst great genius, unaffect-\ned piety, unbounded benevolence and moderate learning,\nmuch caprice and unsteadiness a mind at once aspiring\nby nature, and grovelling through necessity an endless\nturn to speculation and project in a word, a clever, fligh-\nty, good natured, necessitous man.\n379. Mental derangement of hypochondriasis.\nThe mental derangement from hypochondriasis is par-\ntial; in some cases, it is slight in others, it assumes a for-\nmidable aspect. The subject of this disease suffers much\nmental distress, on account of some erroneous views, eith-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0443.jp2"},"444":{"fulltext":"-l3S MENTAL ALIEXATIOJS,\ner in respect to himself or others. One imagines, that\nhe has no soul another, that his body is gradually, but\nrapidly perishing and a third, that he is converted into\nsome other animal, or that he has been transformed into a\nplant. We are told in the Memoirs of Count Maurepas,\nthat this last idea once took possession of the mind of one\nof the princes of Bourbon. So deeply was he infected\nwith this notion, that he often went into his garden, and\ninsisted on being watered in common with the plants\naround him. Some have imagined themselves to be trans-\nformed into glass, and others have fallen into the still\nstranger folly of imagining themselves dead.\nAs the characteristick of this disorder of the mind, as\nfar as the emotions and passions are concerned, is that\nof repining and grief, the subjects of it are found to be\npeevish, as might be expected, and often irascible. Any\ndelay in the gratification of their wishes, the slightest noise,\ntrivial d^appointments of whatever kind produce in them\nanger and they are thus rendered somewhat uncomforta-\nble companions even to their relations and friends.\n380. Of intermissions cf hypochondriasis.\nThere are not only degrees in this mental malady,\n(sometimes merely a great depression, at others a combina-\ntion of grief, and of perversion in the susceptibility of be-\nlieving,) it is also characterized by occasional intermissions.\nAn accidental remark, some sudden combination of ideas, a\npleasant day, and various other causes are found to dissipate\nthe gloom of the mind. In general the intervals of inter-\nmission are attended with a high flow of spirits, often cor-\nresponding to the previous extreme depression. Few\npersons, who have not experienced it, have an adequate\nidea of the sufferings, which are endured by the unhappy\nsubjects of this disease at its worst stage. The greatest\nbodily pains are light, when compared to them. There\nis nothing, which is a source of joy. Labours, and lacera-\ntions, and tortures would be welcomed, if they could tear\naway the soul from the consciousness of its own griefs.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0444.jp2"},"445":{"fulltext":"HZNTAL ALIENATION. 439\n381. Of the remedies of hypochondriasis.\nThe remedies of the mental disease under considera-\ntion divide themselves into two kinds. One species are\nthose, which are intended to act directly upon the bodj^\nand which, therefore, are found fully detailed in med-\ncal treatises. A statement of them cannot be expected\nhere. -—The other class of remedies are of an intellectual\nand moral nature. One of these is the successful diversion\nof the sufferer s thoughts from the particular subject, upon\nwhich he is most disposed to dwell. When the mind can\nbe elevated and torn away from that topick, whatever it may\nbe, a speedy restoration has sometimes been known to fol-\nlow. Another is an attempt to correct or alleviate moral\nimpressions by the application of moral motives. If hypo-\nchondriasis arise from some supposed injury, it may be re-\nmoved or at least alleviated, by suggestions tending to les-\nsen the estimate of the amount of injury received. When\nthe injury is very great and apparent, suggestions on the\nnature and duty of forgiveness are not without good effect.\nAs all his old associations of ideas have been, more or\nless, visited and tinctured by the sufferer s peculiar malady,\nefforts should be made to break them up and remove them\nfrom the mind, by changes in the objects, with which he is\nmost conversant, by being introduced into new society, or\nby travelling. By these means his thoughts are likely to\nbe diverted, not only from the particular subject, which has\nchiefly interested him but a new impulse is given to the\nwhole mind, which promises to interrupt and banish that\nfatal inertness, which had previously encumbered and pros-\ntrated it.\n382. The insanity of the passions.\nWe come now to some species of mental alienation,\nmore formidable, than those hitherto mentioned. They\nare not chiefly limited in their effects to the subjects of\nthem but are sources of loss, danger, and injury to others.\nSo much so, that it is always necessary to watch the per-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0445.jp2"},"446":{"fulltext":"440 MEXTAL ALIENATION.\nsons afflicted, and often, not only to place them in lunatick\nasylums, but to confine them with chains.- Among the va-\nrious species of this more decided and fearful derangement\nof the mind, we may first notice the insanity of the passions,\notherwise called insanity or madness without delirium.\nThe assertion may be unexpected, that there is sometimes\ninsanity, when the powers of perception are in full and\njust exercise, and when the mind has all its usual ability\nin comparing ideas, and in deducing conclusions. But\nnumerous instances have proved it true. This form of\ninsanity is either continued or is intermittent, and only\nbreaks out at intervals. It causes no alteration in what are\nusually designated as the intellectual powers, in distinction\nfrom the affections. It perverts the passions solely, and the\nvictim of it is borne forward to his purpose with a blind,\nbut irresistible violence.\nPinel mentions a mechanick in the Asylum, Bicetre,\nwho was subject to this form of insanity. It was intermit-\ntent. He knew, when the paroxysms of passions were com-\ning on, and even gave warnings to those, who were expos-\ned to its effects, to make their escape. His powers of cor-\nrectly judging remained unshaken in the commission of\nthe most violent and outrageous acts. He saw clearly\ntheir impropriety, but was unable to restrain himself; and\nafter the cessation of the paroxysms, was often filled with\nthe deepest grief.\n3S3. Singular instance of this form of insanity-\nAt the time of the French Revolution, a band of sol-\ndiers violently entered the above-mentioned Asylum, under\npretence of liberating certain victims, whom they asserted\nto have been unjustly confined there by the tyrannical au-\nthority of the French monarchs. They marched in arms\nfrom one cell to another, passing such, as were evi-\ndently insane. At last they came to a maniack, bound in\nchains, who arrested their attention. Is it not shame-\nful (said he,) that I should be bound in chains, and con-\nfounded with madmen It is an instance of the most","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0446.jp2"},"447":{"fulltext":"SffiWTAL AL125AT10K. Mi\nflagrant injustice. He conjured the soldiers to termin-\nate such oppression, and to become his liberators. The\nsoldiers called for the governor of the Asylum, and present-\ning their sabres to his breast, demanded an explanation of\nhis conduct in confining this man. The governor endeav-\noured to reason with them he assured them, there are\ninstances of madnesss, where there is no delirium, no fail-\nure of the reasoning powers; but to no purpose. The\nsoldiers released the maniack, shouting, Vive la Republique.\nThe sight of so many armed men, and their shouting sud-\ndenly brought on the ungovernable paroxysm. The mad-\nman flew upon his liberators wrested his sabre from the\nnearest soldier, and commenced an indiscriminate attack.\nThe soldiers, more convinced by their wounds and their\napprehensions of danger, than by milder forms of argu-\nment, were glad to return him to the protection of the\nAsylum.\n384. Sometimes induced by early excessive indulgence.\nThis form of insanity appears in some instances to have\na natural origin, like some of the cases of idiotism. That\nuncontrollable violence of the passions, which is its charac-\nteristick, is developed in the early periods of childhood, and\nindicates the existence of some inherent evil in the mental\norganization. In other instances, it does not make its ap-\npearance in early life, but is superinduced by long contin-\nued and excessive indulgence. A child is found to have\na violent temper his parents, in the excess of a weak at-\ntachment, indulge his impetuosity his passsions gain\nstrength the will becomes subservient to them and at\nlast he is justly looked upon, as equally dangerous with\nany other maniack, and is consigned for safe keeping to a\nhospital. It may be laid down as a truth, confirmed by\nwhat we know of our intellectual tendencies, also by many\nfacts on record, that all persons, whose passions are per-\nmitted to run on without restraint, are rapidly approaching\nthe state of most deplorable mental alienation. It is not\nthe indulgence of one passion merely, to which the remark\napplies, but all. ——The form of insanitv, to which the re-\n56","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0447.jp2"},"448":{"fulltext":"442 MENTAL ALIENATION.\nmarks in this, and the two preceding sections, ha^e relation,\nis otherwise known, as insanity of the will. But they are\nthe same thing with correct views of the mind, we can-\nnot separate them. We always find the will, the men-\ntal choice or determination, coinciding with the pre-\nponderating motives. Inasmuch, therefore, as we have\nalready seen, that nothing has, or can have the char-\nacter of a motive, independently of the affections, it fol-\nlows, that there is no act of the will, independently of\na particular state of the affections, that is, of the passions.\nConsequently, the insanity of the affections or passions in-\nvolves, and implies insanity of the will.\n385. Of insanity with delirium.\nThe insanity of the passions was characterized as insan-\nity without delirium. We apply thefterm, delirium, as mark-\ning the species of mental alienation, when there is some de-\nrangement of what are distinctively termed the intellectual\npowers. In cases of delirium, the powers of perception,\nmemory, imagination, reasoning, belief, c. are all per-\nverted. Not, however, in all instances in the same de-\ngree and in some cases, the perversion and derangement\nextend only to a part of these susceptibilities, and perhaps\nonly to one. It is generally characteristick of delirious\ninsanity, that it is attended with nervous excitement. The\ninsane person is animated with strong emotions and pas-\nsions, sometimes tending to great despondency, at others to\ngaiety or fury.\n386. Of perception in cases of delirious insanity.\nIn delirious insanity there is often a derangement of\nthe powers of perception. The senses of taste, touch,\nsmell, hearing, and sight may be all affected but particu-\nlarly the sense of sight. In visual perception, all objects\nat first seem to touch the eye. Our estimate of distance\nby the sight isnot an original, but an acquired perception.\nWhat we term perception of distance, therefore, always\npresupposes certain preceding acts of the mind. But in\ndelirious insanity the power of judging is, in a great meas-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0448.jp2"},"449":{"fulltext":"MENTAL ALIENATION, 443\nure, and often, totally, subverted and lost. Hence the de-\nlirious man often mistakes in the perception of distance,\nand it is no uncommon thing to find him attempting to throw\nhimself from the windows of an upper story, or down the\nbrink of a precipice. Such attempts can be accounted for\non no other supposition, than a mistake of sight, except in\nsome instances of very violent paroxysms, or of a perma-\nnent inclination to self-destruction. The same causes,\nwhich perplex their perceptions of distance, confuse their\nnotions of extension, of the form of bodies, and of the out-\nlines of any object of sight whatever. Hence delirious\npersons are found to experience great difficulty in reading\na book, and often confound objects and persons. When a\nmaniack mistakes a man for a horse, and tells the bystan-\nders to keep on the look out, because the animal is un-\ntractable and given to kicking, the remark is not always\nto be regarded, as a mere madman s attempt at wit. It is\nwell ascertained from the confessions of maniacks, who\nhave recovered, and have remembered what passed in their\ndelirium, that there may be a derangement of the visual\nperceptions so great, as to occasion such an absurd mis-\ntake. They sometimes see objects and persons, which\nare not present. This fact may perhaps be explained in the\nsame way, as those mental states, which we have termed ap-\nparitions. Hence madmen are, as they suppose, surrounded\nat times with demons, angels, bodies of armed men, c.\nThey declaim, put themselves in attitudes of defence, vio-\nlently beat the air, cry out for help, gain victories all\noccasioned by their disordered visual perceptions.\n387. Of association in delirious insanity.\nIn the form of insanity, which is termed delirious, the\nlaw of association or suggestion is found to be greatly af-\nfected. Rapidity of association was given, as a character-\nistick of that form of partial insanity, which was termed\nlightheadedness or demence. But in delirium it often\nexists in a far more striking degree. In lightheadedness,\nthe indirect power, which is retained and exercised by the\nwill over trains of thought, is only diminished in delirium","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0449.jp2"},"450":{"fulltext":"444 MENTAL ALIENATION.\nit is often wholly annulled. Every new object, every new\ncountenance, every noise heard in the room, where the de-\nlirious person is, or noises, that are heard from without,\nindeed every thing, with which thoughts and feelings have\nbeen formerly associated, revives those ancient trains of\nmental acts. They are poured in upon him, like a flood\nand it is easier to conceive, than describe what a tumultu-\nous chaos the mind in such a condition must be. When\nwe consider, that these uncalled for trains of thoughts are\nthrown in upon the maniack,when his system is in great ner-\ntous excitement, and that he is unable to resist or to regu-\nlate the instantaneous transference of the mind from sub-\nject to subject, it is no wonder, that he should exhibit much\nexternal agitation, wildness of countenance, violence of\ngestures, outcries, e.\nIt is further to be remarked here, that the utter inabil-\nity of the madman to control the train of associated\nthoughts is one cause of the perversion of the power of\nperception. It appeared in the chapter on Dreaming,\n215.) that when our conceptions of things *ire not sus-\nceptible of any guidance and control from the will, they\nhave a tendency to take the place of, and appear to us\nnuch the same, as the original perceptions. This is one\ncause, why they mistake their mere thoughts for beings,\nthe n.ere workings of the mind for external and local ex-\nistences.\n388. Illustration of the above section.\nThe following account of the rapid mental transitions of\nan insane person in the New Bethlem Hospital, London, will\ngo to confirm, and illustrate what has been said. Like all\ncharacteristick traits of insanity, it is a melancholy picture.\nDifficult as it is to conceive, that such an endless series of\ntopicks should be crowded into the mind in a space so\n■hort, it is only what is realized in all cases of delirious in-\nsanity, where a derangement of the laws of association is\nthe prominent trait. Wholly unlimited by the identi-\nties of time, place, or person, he instantly accommodate®","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0450.jp2"},"451":{"fulltext":"KENTAL ALIENATION 44\neach to his fancy, and in a moment he is any where, and\nevery where, and any body, by turns. At one time he imag-\nined himself to be the Lord Chancellor, or, as he emphatic-\nally styled himself, Young Baggs and no mortal tongue\never maintained the loquacity of the law, or talked with\nmore incessant volubility, than his imaginary lordship. He\nwould decide ten thousand causes in a day he would ac-\ncuse, try, condemn, and execute whole nations in a breath.\nHis language was as wild and far-fetched as his fancy was\nvarious; topicks of all kinds\\ seemed to come tumbling into\nhis mind, without order or connexion. Of every name he\nheard mentioned he instantly became the personal repre-\nsentative, and says, I am he f thus he is by turns Bona-\nparte, the King, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Londonder-\nry, the Persian Ambassador, Mr. Pope, Homer, Smollett,\nHume, Gibbon, John Bunyan, Mrs. Clarke, the Queen,\nBergami. He is successively a Hottentot, a Lascar, a\nSpaniard, a Turk, a Jew, a Scotsman. He has been in all sit-\nuations and occupations of life, according to his own ac-\ncount a potboy at Hampstead, a shoeblack, a chimney-\nsweeper, an East-India Director, a kennel-raker, a gold-\nfinder, an oyster- woman, a Jew cast-clothesman, a police\njustice, a judge, a keeper of Newgate, and, as he styles it,\nc His Majesty s law iron-monger for the home department:\nnay, he has even been Jack Ketch, and has hung hundreds\nhe has been a soldier, and has killed thousands a Portu-\nguese, and poignarded scores a Jew pedlar, and cheated\nall the world a member of Parliament for London, and\nbetrayed his constituents a Lord Mayor, a bishop, an ad-\nmiral, a dancing-master, a Rabbi, Grimaldi in the panto-\nmime, and ten thousand other occupations, that no tongue\nor memory but his own could enumerate. The specimen\njust given may serve as a sample of what is passing in his\nfancy.\n389. Of the effect of delirium on the power of belief.\nIn men of sane minds we find great diversities in the\nsusceptibility of belief. Whatever may be the cause of it,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0451.jp2"},"452":{"fulltext":"446 MENTAL ALIENATION.\nit is very obvious, that the same circumstances extort a\nreadier and stronger assent from some, than others. There\nare three classes of persons, in whom this faculty or sus-\nceptibility appears to be disordered. (1) The first class\nare those, who seem incapable of believing any thing,\nwhich they are required to receive on the testimony of oth-\ners. They must seer it with their own eyes they must\nbear it, or handle it for themselves they must examine it\nby square, rule, and compass. They remind one of the\nSavage, who complained, when something was proposed\nlor his belief, that it would not believe for him. The\ncauses of this singular inability are worthy of more inqui-\nry, than has hitherto been expended upon them. When\nIt is very great, it is a mark of the approach or actual ex-\nistence of idiocy. (2) There is another class of persons,\nwho plainly show a derangement of this power, by their\nreadiness to believe every thing. No matter how incon-\ngruous or improbable a story is, it is received at once.\nThey take no note of dates, characters, and circumstances;\nand as they find nothing too improbable to believe, they\nfind nothing too strange, marvellous, and foolish to report,\nThis state of mind is frequently an accompaniment of\nlightheadedness. (3) The susceptibility of belief must\nof course be very much affected in delirious persons. They\ndo not, and cannot rely upon the reports of the senses as\nevidence, as is done by men of sound minds. Being inca-\npable of checking their thoughts, so as carefully to exam-\nine them, they do not have it in their power to estimate\ndegrees of probability. And in this class, as well as in\nthe first mentioned, that original tendency in our constitu-\ntion, which leads us to repose with so much confidence on\nthe testimony of our fellow beings as to matters of fact,\nwhich have come under their observation, seems to be ob-\nliterated. This, in general, is the condition of the power\nof belief in madmen. There is, however, in some cases\na peculiarity in this respect, which requires to be mention-\ned. In the instances, to which we allude, the predomina-\nting cause of the insanity consists in the mere tenacity of\nbelief. That is, certain propositions, which are erroneous","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0452.jp2"},"453":{"fulltext":"MENTAL ALIENATION. 447\nand absurd, are received by the disordered persons as cer-\ntain; and nothing can convince them of the contrary.\nOne believes himself to be a king another, that he is the\nprophet, Mahomet and various other absurdities are re-\nceived by them, as undoubtedly true. On all other sub-\njects they appear to be rational but their insanity is evid-\nent, as soon as their cherished errours are mentioned-\nSomething of this kind has already been mentioned, as ex-\nisting in extreme cases of hypochondriasis. When delir-\nium extends no further than a derangement of the suscep-\ntibility of belief, it cannot easily be distinguished from\nthem except that, in instances of hypochondriasis, there\nis a more fixed and decided melancholy feeling, and in\ngeneral less nervous agitation.\n390. Powers of reasoning in the insane.\nWhen the derangement is total, extending to all sub-\njects, the powers of reasoning are gone although some-\ntimes a few propositions seem to be accurately connected\ntogether, perhaps by accident rather than otherwise. When\nit is partial, the ability of ratiocination remains. The in-\nsane man often appears rational, talks very well, and is\nknown to be otherwise than of a sound mind, not by his\nconclusions, or his mode of connecting propositions, but\nby his premises.\n391. Instance of partial insanity in the character\nof Don Quixote.\nCervantes has taken advantage of that condition of\nmind, which we term partial insanity, in laying the founda-\ntion of his entertaining work. The hero of his story is\nrepresented as having his naturally good understanding\nperverted by the perusal of certain foolish, romantick sto-\nries, falsely purporting to be a true record of knights and\nof deeds of chivalry. These books, containing representa-\ntions of dwarfs, giants, necromancers, and other preternatu-\nral extravagance, were zealously perused, until the poor\nman s head was effectually turned. But, although he was","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0453.jp2"},"454":{"fulltext":"448 MENTAL ALIENATION.\nin a state of real mental derangement, it was limited to the\nextravagancies, which have been mentioned on other sub-\njects he was rational and could his mind have been freed\nfrom its knight errant delusion, he would have been, with-\nout a greater celebrity than is possessed by a thousand\nothers, a reputable citizen of his native village.\nIn all his conversations (Bk. iv. ch. 23) and replies,\nhe gave evident proofs of a most excellent understanding,,\nand never lost the stirrups, except on the subject of chiv-\nalry. On this subject he was craz d.\nBracing his shield, therefore, and brandishing his lance,\nhe declares to his credulous attendant (B. iii. ch. 6.), that\nstrange perils and vast adventures are reserved for him;\nthat he is ordained to re-establish the knights of the Round\nTable, and that his fame will exceed that of the Tablantes\nand the Olivantes.\nWhen the barber and curate visited him on a certain\noccasion, the conversation happened to turn on what are\ntermed reasons of state, and on modes of administration\nand Don Quixote spoke so well on every topick, as to con-\nvince them, that he was quite sound and had recovered the\nright exercise of his judgment. But something being un-\nadvisedly said about the Turkish war, the Knight at once\nremarked with much solemnity and seriousness, that his\nmajesty had nothing to do, but to issue a proclamation,\ncommanding all the knights-errant in Spain to assemble at\nhis court by such a day and although not more than half a\ndozen should come, among these one would be found, who would\nalone be sufficient to overthrow the whole Turkish power.\nWhen the subject of conversation turned upon war,\nwhich had so near a connection with shields, and lances,\nand all the associations of chivalry, it came within the range\nof his malady.\nIn reading the book, to which these remarks have ref-\nerence, if we keep in mind the true mental state of its he-\nro, we shall see an admirable consistency in its narrations,\nand a truth to nature, which otherwise might not be ob-\nserved.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0454.jp2"},"455":{"fulltext":"MENTAL ALIENATION. 449\n392. Of quickness of thought and cunning in insane\npersons.\nThose, who have been personally acquainted with the\nintellectual condition of the insane, have sometimes obser-\nved in them great quickness of thought in some little emer-\ngencies, and an unusual degree of Cunning. When, for\ninstance, an attempt has been made to seize and confine\nthem, they steadily and promptly mark the motions of their\npursuers they rapidly decypher their intentions from\ntheir countenance and cause them no small degree of\nperplexity. This quickness and cunning may sometimes\nbe noticed in those, who have no lucid intervals but chief-\nly in those, who are only partially insane.\nPersons, whose derangement originates in the reception\nand firm belief of certain erroneous propositions, often rea-\nson correctly from them. If the madman believes himself\nto be a king, he reasons right in requiring suitable hom-\nage, and in expressing dissatisfaction, when it is withheld.\nFurther they frequently discover more rapidity of thought,\nmore fluency of expression, and even more exactness of\ndeduction, than others of a perfectly sound mind, or than\nthemselves could have exhibited before their derangement.\nThis singular fact is to be briefly explained.\n393. Causes of readiness of reasoning in the partial-*\nly insane.\nThe unusual powers of reasoning, which have been\nnoticed in partially insane persons, may be referred to two\ncauses. There is, in the first place, an uncommon\nexcitation of the attention, and of all the intellectual pow-\ners. They are not troubled with torpidness. Whatever\nis done, or asserted, is strictly observed by them.\nThere is, in the second place, a removal of those\nchecks, which attend the sober and the rational in their\nreasonings.\nSome of the checks, which retard the process of rea-\nsoning in the case of men, whose powers are in a goad\nstate, are these (1) A distrust of phraseology,— -a fear\n56","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0455.jp2"},"456":{"fulltext":"450 KgMTAt! AfclEHATlCtf.\nof mistakes from the ambiguity and vagueness of lan-\nguage. The object of a rational man is supposed to be\nto arrive at truth, and not merely to gain a victory. He,\ntherefore, feels anxious, not only to employ terms, which\nappear to himself proper, but which shall be rightly under-\nstood by his opponent. But the irrational man, as might\nbe expected, does not find himself embarrassed with con-\nsiderations of this nature. (2) A second obstruction to\nfacility and promptness in argumentation, in the case of\nthe soberminded and rational, is this They fear, that they\nmay not be in possession of all those premises, on which\nthe solution will be found in the event to depend. Many-\ndisputes are carried on without previously forming an ac-\nquaintance with those facts, which are necessarily and\nprominently involved. While disputants of sound minds\nhave any suspicion on this point, and know not but it will\nbe labour lost, they of course feel their interest in the dis-\npute very much diminished. (3) The third circumstance,\nto which reference was had, is this; The influence of\ncertain feelings of propriety and of good sense, which or-\ndinarily govern men in the full exercise of their powers.\nThe disputant feels himself under obligations to profess a\ndeference for his opponent it is due to the customary\nforms of society. He is sometimes restrained and embar-\nrassed by what he considers due to those, who are present\nto hear the argument. He is particularly careful to say\nnothing foolish, absurd, or uncharitable. All these\nthings weigh nothing with the insane person. He is not\ntroubled about exactness of expression, or the observance of\nceremonies, but strangely rushes, as it were, upon the main\npoints of the controversy, regardless of all minor considera-\ntions.\n394. Effect of insanity on the memory*\nWhile the other acts of the mind, perception, and asso-\nciation, and reasoning are disordered, the memory does\nnot remain unaffected. The past life of the delirious per-\nson, (we here speak of eases where the mental disorder is","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0456.jp2"},"457":{"fulltext":"MBRTAL ALIEN AXIOM. 4 t\nnot partial,) is an utter chaos. Such is the rapidity,\nwith which thoughts crowd in upon him, that he is unable\nfor this reason, if there were no other, to arrange, and clas-\nsify, and refer them to their proper periods. He may re-\nmember for a few moments, perhaps for a (ew hours. He\nmay revengefully treasure up some act of punishment for\na much longer time but this does not affect the truth of\nthe general statement. The heterogeneous confusion of\nhis own intellect, might be assumed, as a fit symbol of\nhis notions of the great multitude of facts, which have\ntaken place in the past.- See here then the picture\nof the mind, thai noble fabrick, in the more formidable\nstages of delirium the power of perception disordered\nin all its forms— the laws of association disturbed and torn\nfrom the guidance of the will the susceptibility of belief\nperverted the memory gone, and with it the world of the\npast the power of reasoning, and with it the world of the\nfuture. This cumbersome mass of intellectual ruins is\nconvulsed and rendered still more hideous, bj the demor-\nalization and unrestrained impulses of the passions.\n395. Of momentary impulses inclining to insanity*\nThere is sometimes a peculiar, but transitory state of\nmind, bordering on partial insanity, which deserves a men»\ntion here although it is experienced in persons, who are\nsane. It is a strange propensity in a person to do in cer*\ntain situations those things, Which, rf done, would clearly\nprove him deranged. The instances of these very sudden\nand singular impulses ^re probably not numerous. At\nan illustration, a person of a perfectly sane mind acknowl-\nedged, that whenever he passed a particular bridge, ho\nfelt a slight inclination to throw himself over, accompanied\nwith some dread, that his inclination might hurry him\nway.\n396. Causes of the insanity of delirium.\nSome of the causes of idiocy were mentioned in a for-\nmer section something is to be said of the causes of the\nmental alienation or insanity of delirium although there 13","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0457.jp2"},"458":{"fulltext":"452 MENTAL ALIENATION.\nmuch ground for considering them essentially the same,\ninasmuch as delirium often terminates in idiocy. The\ncauses of delirious insanity are of two kinds, moral, and\nphysical. All diseases, which violently affect the physical\nsystem, such as epilepsy, fevers, apoplexy, also injuries of\nthe brain, c. indirectly affect the mind, and may cause per-\nmanent delirium. It is worthy of remark also in regard\nto this form of mental alienation, that it is in some degree\nhereditary; hence it is often said of particular families,\nthat they are predisposed to insanity. The father, son, and\ngrandson have not only been known to become succes-\nsively insane, but the derangement has sometimes taken\nplace in each case, in the same year of their life.\nThere are various moral causes of mental alienation.\nIt has been caused, among other circumstances of a mor-\nal nature, by disappointed ambition. Disappointment in\nmercantile and other speculations, and in any ardent ex-\npectations whatever, often has the same effect. Erroneous\nreligious opinions, great excitements of feeling on reli-\ngious subjects have contributed towards supplying lunatick\nhospitals. An unrestrained indulgence of any of the pas-\nsions is found to be attended with the same results.\nWe find a fruitful source of mental derangement in the\nvicissitudes of political events. A recent writer in a\nFrench medical journal says, that he could give a\nhistory of the political revolutions in France from the\ntaking of the Bastille, down to the return of Bonaparte from\nElba, by detailing the causes of certain cases of insanity.\nIt appears from reports from insane hospitals, that moral\ncauses of insanity are more numerous, than physical. But\njn many cases the influence of both is combined together.\n397. Of moral accountability in mental alienation.\nIt is in some respects a difficult question, Whether men,\nwho are in a state of mental alienation, are morally ac-\ncountable Whether they are subjects of merit or demer-\nit And if so, in what cases, and how far? In deter-\nmining this question, there ought to be a distinction made","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0458.jp2"},"459":{"fulltext":"MENTAL ALlENATIOJf, 45J\nbetween cases of insanity from mere melancholy imagina-\ntion, or from confirmed hypochondriasis, and those of total\ndelirium. In the last, there is evidently no accountability.\nIn the former instances, a judgment should be formed\nfrom the circumstances of the particular case under con-\nsideration and also in all cases, where there is a mere de-\nrangement of the associating principle, so far as to consti-\ntute a person light-headed or flighty. The same must be\nsaid of the insanity of the passions.\nThis, however, may be laid down, as a general rule in\nrespect to some of the aspects of insanity and perhaps it\nis the only one, which can be viz. Insane persons, whether\ntheir insanity arise from original deficiency and weakness\nin the ordinary mental powers, or from delirium, are not to\nbe considered accountable, are not subjects of praise or\nblame, whenever it appears, that such deficiency or de-\nlirium extends to, and annuls the power of judging.\nAnd this is the case with all persons, who are the subjects\nof total insanity. When the insanity is partial, it would\nseem to follow, therefore, that the first inquiry should\nbe, whether the action committed comes within the range\nof the malady. For a person, who is insane on one sub-\nject merely, will probably be found to labour under a per-\nversion of judgment in respect to that particular subject,\nno less than if the delirium were total. Consequently, a\ndistinction may be justly set up, although it w r ill require\nmuch caution in doing it, between those actions, which can\nbe clearly found within the limits of the person s insanity,\nand those, which evidently fall without it.\n398. Of the imputation of insanity to individuals.\nWhile the existence of insanity, so far as materially to\naffect the powers of judging, takes away accountability in\nwhole or in part, it affects proportionally the relations, which\nthe subjects of it sustain to society. In all^well organized\ncommunities it will be found [to follow from the terms of\nthe civil compact, that those, who exercise sovereignty, are\nbound to afford protection to the citizen^in general, to in-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0459.jp2"},"460":{"fulltext":"4f 4 RENTAL ALIENATION.\ndividuals in particular, in certain cases. Hence they will be\nfound to have taken precautionary measures, the nature of\nwhich all are acquainted with, to protect the community\nagainst the injuries, which insane persons might commit,\nand also to alleviate that unhappiness, which they necessa-\nrily bring, in a greater or less degree, on themselves and\nfamilies.\nAccordingly it is implied in the imputation of insanity\nto individuals, by an act of the civil authorities, that the\ninsane person is deprived of that ability of self-government,\nwhich is the common allotment of men that the strong\nbonds of friendship, of family, and of country, which once\nkept him in his appropriate station in society, are loosen-\ned; and that he must find, in the substitution of the will\nand guardianship of the State, that oversight and protec-\ntion, which he has lost by the alienation of his own. While\nall must admit the propriety of this course, where the cir-\ncumstances of the case justly demand it, it must be con-\nceded, that nothing can be more solemn and affecting,\nthan such a publick imputation of derangement, which,\nwhether just or unjust, practically annihilates the civil and\nsocial character of man, and seals his degradation in these\nrespects. It is a right, therefore, which ought not to be ex-\nercised but upon good ground, and the exercise of which\nought to be understood to require, and to imply a correct\nacquaintance with this difficult, but practical and impor-\ntant subject. And the more so, because there have been\ndepraved individuals, who have endeavoured to fasten the\ncharge of insanity upon others from some interested mo-\ntives,— in order to gratify malignant passions, or to control\ntkeir persons, or property. A suitable protection against\nthe designs of such is to be had, not merely in the integri-\nty of those, who are to judge in these cases, but in their\nacquaintance with the laws and tendencies of the mind.\nBefore leaving this topick, one suggestion further re-\nmains. In forming an opinion as to the mental aliena-\ntion of an individual, not only those particular facts are to\nhe considered, which are supposed to indicate insanity,","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0460.jp2"},"461":{"fulltext":"XENTAL ALIENATION. 455\nbut they are to be estimated, in connection with constitu-\ntional traits of character. That rapidity of association, that\ngay and heedless transition from subject to subject, which\nis natural in one, and occasions no surprize, would be re-\ngarded in another, as a positive indication of the distur-\nbance of the mental powers.\n399. Of the treatment of the insane.\nIn closing this view of mental maladies, it is proper to\nmake some suggestions on the treatment due to those of\nour fellow beings, who are thus afflicted. It is no uncom-\nmon thing to see them treated with unkindness. Al-\nthough they may not, in general, so readily perceive and so\nintensely feel, as others, the injuries they receive, any\ncruelty of treatment towards them is very unjustifiable in\nthe authors of it.\nIt is wrong on the general principle, that we are bound,\nnot to cause and increase suffering unnecessarily in any\ncase whatever, even in the animal creation. The poet,\nCowper, uttered the sentiment of all kind and honourable\nmen, when he declared, he would not reckon in his list\nof friends the man, who should needlessly set foot upon a\nworm.\nIt is wrong also, on the principle, that we should do to\nothers, as we ourselves wish to be done by. The person\nof an alienated mind may not be able to reason on the sub-\nject of what is due to him, but those, who possess rational\npowers, can. They cannot fail to see the application of\nthe Scriptural principle, which has been mentioned, in the\npresent instance. All persons whatever are subject to\nthese mental evils and it is presumed, that no one would\nbe easy in the anticipation of being left without care and\nassistance from others, when he should be unable to take\ncare of himself. If, therefore, we take the ground, that\npersons in the state of idiocy, or of delirium, or of any\nof the forms of mental alienation, are not entitled to care\nand kindness, we are possibly treasuring up for ourselves\na retribution of a similar fearful character.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0461.jp2"},"462":{"fulltext":"4 5 6 M E N T AL AlAE ft T I O N\nAgain ill treatment of cases of this kind is a tacit re-\nflection on the Supreme Being, which we cannot, with-\nout great self-ignorance, imagine ourselves authorized\nto make. He has in his wisdom permitted them to exist, as\nmemorials of human weakness, and as useful commentaries\non pride of intellect and perhaps also to give us an op-\nportunity of exercising the noble virtues of charity and hu-\nmanity. We are, therefore, bound to receive the instruc-\ntions they impart, and to exercise the virtues, which they\ngive us an opportunity of exercising; otherwise, we cast\ncontempt on Him, whose almighty hand orders the distinc-\ntions, and distributes the allotments both of bodily and of\nintellectual life.\nNote.— The subject of insanity in its various forms is so in-\ntimately connected with human happiness, that it could not\nfail very early to arrest attention. Medical writers in par-\nticular had abundant occasion to notice the causes and\ncircumstances of its developement. A numerous cata-\nlogue of them have made it the subject of their remarks.\nAnd while it was their prominent object to prevent or to\nalleviate one of the sorest maladies, which it is the lot of\nhuman nature to suffer, they have indirectly thrown light on\nthe whole field of the philosophy of the mind.\nWhere so many have written, it would be some labour\nto make out a full list, and a weightier and more responsi-\nble task, to discriminate their respective merits. Without,\ntherefore, presuming to undertake it, we merely embrace\nthis opportunity to mention among others, as writings that\nmay be read with advantage, M. Pinel s Treatise on In-\nsanity, Hush on the Diseases of the mind, and the articles\non the subject of mental alienation in the Dictionaire\npes Sciences Medicales. There is in these writings an\naptness of illustration, a philanthropick eloquence, a spirit\nof philosophy, which can hardly fail to interest and ir*-\nitruct.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0462.jp2"},"463":{"fulltext":"45\nCHAPTER THIRTY FIRST.\nORIGIN OP PREJUDICES.\n400. Of the meaning of prejudices.\nIn forming our judgments or opinions of things, we are\nled to take into consideration a variety of facts and circum-\nstances, which are applicable to the particular subjects under\nconsideration, and are fitted to influence the mind in the\nformation of such opinions. The circumstances and facts,\nwhich are thus fitted to influence our belief, in conse-\nquence of giving new views in respect to the subjects be-\nfore us, are commonly termed evidence. Prejudices,\nto which we are now to attend, are judgments or opinions,\nwhich are formed without a suitable regard to the evi-\ndence, properly pertaining to them. Whenever, for ex-\nample, sources of evidence, which are within our reach,\nare overlooked or when the facts and incidental circum-\nstances constituting the evidence are allowed to have too\ngreat, or too little influence. A mind, which discovers a\ntendency thus to overlook or misapply grounds of evidence,\nis called a prejudiced mind. A greater or less degree\nof importance will be attached to this subject, according\nas we attach a greater or less degree of value to the pos-\nsession of correct and enlightened opinions. None can\nconsider it unimportant; many will justly regard it, as of\nthe very highest importance. It is the object of this chap-\nter to point out some of the principal sources of prejudices.\n401. Of constitutional prejudices.\nThe formation of opinions without a suitable regard to\nthe evidence may sometimes be attributed to something in\nthe constitution, to some original weakness or obliquity in\n57","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0463.jp2"},"464":{"fulltext":"455 ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES.\nthe mental character as in the following instances.\nSome person s minds appear to be limited in their range j\nthey are incapable of taking in, and retaining, and com-\nparing a number of propositions at once. Inasmuch,\ntherefore, as they are incapable of doing this, and must p\nconsequently, let many facts and incidents go without\nproper examination, they are led to adopt and cherish opin-\nions on other grounds, than a suitable regard to the evi-\ndence. Such opinions, although those, who maintain\nthem, may be thought to be less culpable than many oth-\ners, are rightly considered prejudices.— Another class\nare those, who are naturally too credulous; who are ready\nto receive every thing for truth, which has even the slight-\nest degree of evidence in its favour. It seems to be alto-\ngether impossible to induce them to pause, to examine, to\ncompare, to reflect. They readily believe whatever they\nread, or hear asserted, until they find it contradicted and\nthen they adopt some other opinion as readily and on as\nslight ground, as they adopted the first, which they retain\nno longer than they are met with, and driven about by the\nnext wind of doctrine. Other persons are of a temper\nnearly the reverse; they are naturally obstinate, and con-\ntentious, and are unwilling to receive any thing, that is\nproposed for their belief, however reasonable it may be.\nConsequently their opinions, so far as they are the oppo-\nsite of those, which have a higher degree of evidence\nin their favour, are prejudices. And this is the case with\nvery many of them. Erroneous opinions of this kind,\nwhich can be traced back to some peculiarity originally\ninherent in the mind, may be termed constitutional preju-\ndices When such constitutional defects are excessive,\nand disqualify the subjects of them for the ordinary con-\ncerns of life, they are considered as coming within some\nof the multiplied forms of insanity. (See 389.)\n402« Of prejudices in favour of our youth.\nMany of those opinions, which we form of the scenes,\nandeventf, and characters of our youthful days, are preju-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0464.jp2"},"465":{"fulltext":"GRXGZN OF PREJUDICES, 45S\ndices. As we look back and frame an estimation of that\nearly period, the associates of our childhood and youth\nseem to us to have been without a crime; the interests of\nparents were never at variance with those of their children j\nmasters sought the good of their dependants the poor\nwere fed magistrates were virtuous the religious teach-\ners were eminently holy men, Alas, for these evil days of\nour manhood and old age, in which there is such rottenness\nin all civil institutions, that have been changed, such cor-\nruption in ev?ry new set of magistrates, and such deprav-\nity in the great mass of the people The causes of this appa-\nrent disparity between the world, as it exists now, and for-\nmerly, are briefly these. In the morning of life every\nthing is new our attention is arrested by a multitude of\nnovel objects, and the mind is filled with delight. Happy\nourselves, we imagine, that, with few exceptions, all others\nare not less so and while our own hearts are conscious\nof innocence, we are exempt from any suspicion of crime\nin others. In a word, we suppose all the world to be hap-\npy, all the world to be innocent and just, because we are\nconscious of the existence of rectitude and truth and inno-\ncence in ourselves, and are too unexperienced to be aware\nof the frequency of their absence from the great mass of\nmankind. As we grow up, cares multiply bodily infirm-\nities increase we more often see collisions of interest,\nhollow professions, deceptive expedients, and intriguing\narts of all kinds and what is worse, we discover in our\nown breasts more of distrust, jealousy, passion, and other\nevils, than had been developed in our earlier days. The\ntrue solution then is this We attribute to one thing what\nbelongs to another. We ascribe to the great mass of man-\nkind changes, which have only taken place in ourselves.——*\nThe world appears to us differently from what it did when\nwe were young, not because it has itself essentially altered,\nwhich can never be supposed to have happened in the pe-\nriod of a single life of man but because we, as individual!,\nhave become more acquainted with its true character, and\nare made more sensibiy to feel the pressure of its many ills.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0465.jp2"},"466":{"fulltext":"460 ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES,\nIt has been by means of this prejudice in favour of our\nyouth, that a permanency has often been communicated to\npolitical institutions, to which they were not entitled by\ntheir intrinsick merits. It has often excited surprise in\nthe historian, that forms of government, which were unjust\nin their operation, expensive, and every way defective, have\nbeen sustained without a murmur, and even loved and ven-\nerated by those, who have chiefly experienced their evil re-\nsults. It is the same government, (and if it be a monar-\nchy, the same administrators of it, or their lineal descen-\ndants,) which existed, when they were young. They then\nloved it, because they neither understood, nor felt its de-\nfects, and because at that period every thing was new, and\ninteresting, and lovely. The attachments then formed\ncontinue, at least till manhood and then it is too late\nwith the greater part of mankind to throw off old affec-\ntions, and to form the mind to the love of a new and better\norder of things. And thus, in consequence of the mental\nblindness, superinduced by prejudices of this sort, errours\nare perpetuated, gross abuses are too patiently borne,\nand each generation entails an inheritance of wretched-\nness on the succeeding.\n403. Of prejudices of home and country.\nThere are prejudices in favour of one s native country\nand of the village, where he may happen to have been\nbrought up, and to live. And this prejudice in favour of\none s own residence and nation is too often attended with\na contempt and dislike of those, who have their origin\nelsewhere. It is notorious, that two of the most powerful\nand well informed nations on earth, the French and Eng-\nlish, have for a long series of years affected to despise, and\nhave most certainly hated each other. The French and\nSpaniards, who also are near neighbours to each other,\nhave hardly been on better terms. The Italians, flattered\nby the eminent succeis of some of their countrymen in the\narts, term the Germans blockheads while the Germans\nget their satisfaction by bestowing the same appellation on\nthe Swiss. Even the poor and ignorant Greenlander has","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0466.jp2"},"467":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES. 461\nhis grounds of triumph and amid his rocks and, snows\nfondly imagines, that there is no home, no freedom like his.\nDifferent explanations may be given of the origin of\nthis strong attachment to our nation and the place of our\nresidence, and of the contempt, which is often entertained\nfor others. Whatever explanation may be adopted, the\nexistence of such feelings is well known, and their influ-\nence in perplexing our judgments of men and things exten-\nsively felt. This is seen in the criticisms, which are made\nby the authors of one nation on the productions in litera-\nture and the arts of anothar. With the Englishman, Mon-\ntesquieu is superficial and dull; with the Frenchman,\nNewton dwindles down to a mere almanack-maker in one\ncountry a writer is extolled on account of the place of his\nbirth, and in another is decried and put down for the same\nreason. It is important to all to be aware of the tenden-\ncy to form erroneous opinions in consequence of these pre-\ndelictions and antipathies. A mind well balanced, and anx-\nious to know the truth and to do equal and exact justice to\nall, will carefully guard against it.\n404. Professional prejudices.\nSome erroneous opinions may be attributed io men s\nprofessions or callings in life. A little self-examination\nwill convince us, that our feelings are apt to be unduly en-\nlisted in favour of those, who are practising the same arts,\npursuing the same studies, engaged in the same calling of\nwhatever kind. When at any time it falls to us to discrim-\ninate between such, and persons of another art or calling\nto determine which has the greatest merit, or is the deepest\nin crime, there is no small difficulty in becoming entirely\ndivested of this feeling. It continually rises up, even\nwhen we seem to be unconscious of it it gives a new as-\npect to the facts, which come under examination; it secretly\nbut almost infallibly perplexes the decisions of men, who\nhave the reputation of candour, and who would be offend-\ned at the imputation of intended injustice.\nThe causes of prejudices, arising from particular pro-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0467.jp2"},"468":{"fulltext":"^$2 oaieiN of prejudices.\nfessions in life, are undoubtedly much the same, as those\nwhich are at the bottom of the partial sentiments, which\npeople entertain of their own home and country. There is\nsomething in our constitution, which leads us to feel a\ndeep interest in those, with whom we are much associated,\nwhose toils are the same, who have the same hope to stim-\nulate, and the same opposition to encounter. Besides,\nour own selfish feelings are at work. Our honour, and\nconsequently, our respectability are in some degree involv-\ned in that of the profession. As that rises or falls, individ-\nuals experience something of the elevation or depression.\nUnder this class of prejudices may be reckoned those,\nresulting from that contraction and halting of the mind,\nwhich is often superinduced by an exclusive attention to one\nclass of subjects, or to one train of thought. When a man,\nwho has been taught in one science onlv, and whose men-\ntal operations have consequently been always running in\none track, ventures out of it, and attempts to judge on other\nsubjects, nothing is more common than for such an one to\njudge wrong. It is no easy matter for him to seize on the\ntrue distinctions of things beyond his particular sphere of\nknowledge and he mistakes not only in respect to the\nnature of the things themselves, of which he is to judge,\nbut also as to the nature and rules of the evidence applicable\nto them. An eminent mathematician is said to have at-\ntempted to ascertain by calculation the ratio, in which the\nevidence of facts must decrease in the course of time, and to\nhave fixed the period, when the evidence of the facts, on\nwhich Christianity is founded, shall become extinct, and\nwhen, in consequence, all religious faith must be banished\nfrom the earth.\n405. Prejudices of sects and parties.\nIn religious sects, and in political or other parties,\nprejudices are still stronger, than those of particular arts\nand professions. In sects and parties there is a conflict, of\nopinions, and not of trades; a rivalship of principles, and\nnot of mere labour and merchandize. It is, therefore, an\nactive, an aspiring competition. Too restless to lie dor-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0468.jp2"},"469":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES, 46$\nmant, it is introduced in high-ways, and workshops, and\nprivate and publick assemblies too ambitious to be easily\novercome, it continually renews and perpetuates the con-\nflict. The prejudices, therefore, of sects and parties have\nall the elements of professional prejudices, embittered\nby constant exercise. They convulse nations they dis-\nturb the peace of neighbourhoods they break asunder\nthe strong ties of family and kindred.\nThe history of every republick, not excepting our own,\naffords abundant instances of the putting forth of these\nvirulent and ungenerous tendencies. We do not mean to\nsay, that a man cannot belong to a party without being\nprejudiced however difficult it may be, to be placed in that\nsituation without being tinctured with those feelings. But\nwherever they actually exist, they deaden every honourable\nsentiment they perplex every noble principle. Nothing\ncan be clearer evidence of this, than that we continually be-\nhold men of exalted patriotism, and of every way unsullied\ncharacter, traduced by unfounded imputations and charges\nand which are known to be so by those political opponents,\nwho make them. And it is a still more striking illustration\nof the strength of party prejudices, that we find the same\npolitical measures, advocated or opposed by the same men,\nas they happen to be in, or out of office or as the meas-\nures in question happen to be advocated or opposed by the\nmembers of the other party. As if the men, and not meas-\nures as if places, without regard to principles, were to be\nthe sole subject of inquiry. The prejudices of sects have\nbeen no less violent than those of political parties, as\nmay be learnt from the hostility which is yet exercised\namong them, and from the history of former persecutions\nand martyrdoms. Even philosophy has not been exempt\ndifferent scientifick systems have had their parties for and\nagainst; and the serious and dignified pretensions of phi-\nlosophick inquiry have not always preserved them from\nvirulent contentions, which were not merely discreditable\nto science, but to human nature. We are told in the his-\ntories of philosophical opinions, that the controversies be-\ntween the Realists and Nominalists ran so high, as to end","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0469.jp2"},"470":{"fulltext":"464 ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES.\nnot only in verbal disputes, but in blows. An eye-witness\nassures us, that the combatants might be seen, not only\nengaging with fists, but with clubs and swords, and that\nmany were wounded, and some killed. Not a very suita-\nble way, one would imagine, of deciding an abstract, meta-\nphysical question.\n406. Prejudices of authority.\nMen often adopt erroneous opinions merely because\nthey are proposed by writers of great name. The writings\nof Aristotle were upheld as chief authorities for a number\nof centuries in Europe, and no more was necessary in sup-\nport of any controverted opinions, than to cite something\nfavourable from them. The followers of Des Cartes receiv-\ned hardly less implicitly the philosophical creed of that new\nmaster of science not so much because they had investiga-\nted,and were convinced in view of the evidence before them,\nas because Des Cartes had said it. There have been teach-\ners in religion, also in politicks other subordinate depart-\nments of science, who have had their followers for no bet-\nter reason. Such prejudices have been a great hinderance\nto free discussion and the progress of knowledge.\nThe influence of authority in giving a direction to peo-\nple s opinions is not limited to persons, who can truly make\npretensions to some superiour wisdom it is also frequently\nexercised by mere riches, titles, outward splendour. This\nis often seen in republican states, where the people have\nthe right of choosing their rulers, and of expressing their\nopinions on a variety of publick questions. It is well, if\nnot more than half of the people in any of the smaller cor-\nporations do not, in giving their suffrages, fall in with the\nsentiments, however absurd, of a few individuals, whose\nriches enable them to make a somewhat greater figure than\ntheir poorer neighbours. But this is a very unreasonable\nprejudice. The poorer classes of the community, inas-\nmuch as they have but a small amount of property to boast\nof, ought at least to show in all cases, where they are at all\ncapable of judging, that they have understandings, and\npoft eftS and value freedom.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0470.jp2"},"471":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES. 46fr\n407. Prejudices of careless and indiscriminate\nreading.\nIt has been remarked by men of careful observation,\nthat those, who apply themselves most eagerly to reading,\nand do not combine with this practice a very considerable\ndegree of caution and discrimination, are often led into a\ngreat number of errours. As they never pretend to ex-\namine and to weigh subjects carefully, their minds can be\njustly thought to be no better than a mere bundle of preju-\ndices, although they may be of a l^ss tenacious kind, than\nthose arising from other sources. If their author happens\nto be in an errour, which is very probable, as they take lit-\ntle or no pains in the selection of books, they have n way\nof avoiding it. Their only remedy is continual reading,\nwhich increases the evil like travellers, gotten into a\nwrong road, who are less likely to arrive at the place of\ntheir destination, the further they advance.\nAlthough many ideas are to be derived from books, and\nit would be no less unwise than unprofitable to throw them\naside, they are not to he consulted to the neglect of our own\ninvention and of that effjrt, without which there cannot be\na well furnished, and well disciplined mind. It is easier\nto read than to meditate and he, who reads merely or chiefly\nbecause he has an aversion to thinking, may be a book-\nworm, and even be thought to be learned, and yet be far\nfrom reaping the full benefit, which he might receive from\nhis intellectual powers.\n408. Prejudices of presumption*\nIt must be admitted, that there is a difference in men s\nUnderstanding?, that some, where the education has been\nthe same, appear to have naturally greater intellectual\nparts, than others. Those, who are thus originally favour-\ned above their competitors, are too apt to presume on such\nsuperiority, and to trust to their genius, wh^re care, pa-\ntience, and labour would be much better auxiliaries. Such\nmen, who imagine, that their minds will not only be furn-\nished with spontaneous materials, but regulated by a spon-\n58","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0471.jp2"},"472":{"fulltext":"466 ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES.\ntaneous and infallible discipline, may impose upon the ig-\nnorant, but they make but a poor figure in the presence of\nlearned and discerning persons. They will perhaps be\nfound to have ideas enough, but there will be less prospect\nof their being suitably defined, compared together, and\nadjusted. We could not expect this with any better rea-\nson, than we can anticipate, that stones and timber, the\nipontaneous products of nature, will of themselves, without\nlabour and art, be arranged together into well constructed\nand covenient piles of buildings.\n409. Prejudices of enthusiasm.\nEnthusiam always implies some object, which the mind\njudges good and desirable, but the pursuit of which is at-\ntended with a strong excitement of the feelings. In gen-\nuine enthusiasm the ardent feeling, which is exercised to-\nwards the object of pursuit, is supposed to be excited by\nthat object exclusively, and to be free from any mixture of\nselfishness. So that this trait is in general an exalted and\nnoble one, although sometimes attended with effects, which\nit is necessary to guard against. There may be enthusi-\nasm in literature, politicks, religion, the arts, war, c.\nPersons under the influence of enthusiasm are subject\nto prejudices that is, they form opinions without a cau-\ntious and suitable examination of all those facts and cir-\ncumstances, which properly pertain to them. They are\nurged forward by too violent an impulse to permit them to\nstop and to analyze many objections, which come in their\nway, are overlooked or disregarded while every thing,\nthat is favourable to the objects before them, is made to\nassume an exaggerated importance. The glow of feeling,\nthe impetuosity of the passsions is made to take the place\nof cool and well-founded decisions. The scenes of the\nFrench Revolution illustrate the prejudices of enthusiasm.\nThe object, which the principal actors had in view, the es-\ntablishment of freedom in Prance, was a good one. But\nhurried away by an excessive zeal, they magnified the dan-\ngers, which threatened them while celebrating the rights","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0472.jp2"},"473":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN Or PREJUDICES. 40*7\nof man, they violated the plainest principles of justice 5 bj\narbitrary, capricious, and cruel acts they made even des-\npotism itself desirable and in the end, after great sacri-\nfices and efforts, effectually defeated their own object.\nIt should be added, however, that the evils of enthusi-\nasm are in general felt, only when it is excessive. A mod-\nerate share at least seems to be necessary, in overcom-\ning the difficulties of all great undertakings.\n410. Prejudices of superstition.\nSuperstition, as the term is commonly employed, im-\nplies an excessive susceptibility of belief, arising from, or\nsuperinduced by fear. We do not often speak of a person\nas superstitious, unless we observe in him these two char-\nteristicks, excessive timidity on some subjects, combined\nwith too great readiness of faith in respect to the same.\nThe term, therefore, may be applied to the idolatrous wor-\nship of the heathen to many of the mythological and oth-\ner traditions of nations to the belief in witchcraft and\nmagick to a regard for omens, whether of a political, re-\nligious, or domestick significancy to an inordinate attach-\nment to mere forms and ceremonies of whatever kind to\nany object or subject whatever, where fears may be enlist-\ned, and where belief follows chiefly in consequence of such\nfears.\nThe prejudices or erroneous opinions from this source\nhave been exceedingly numerous. It is superstition, which,\nmuch to the disturbance of men s happiness and to the\nhinderance of the progress of the truth, has peopled the\nworld with fairies and satyrs, with hypogriffs and dragons,\nwith witches and centaurs, with the host of mythological\ndeities, with marvellous sights in the sky, and with un-\nknown sounds and voices on earth. There is no end to\nthe catalogue of what may be seen, and heard, and believ-\ned by men under its influence.- In the consulship of Pos-\nthumius Albus and Furius Fusus, the sky, (says the histo-\nrian, Livy,) appeared as on fire in many places, and other\nportents either occurred to people s sight,or were formed by","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0473.jp2"},"474":{"fulltext":"408 ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES.\nterrour intheir imaginations. (Bk. in. 5.) Before\nsun-setling, (says Josephus,) chariots and troops of soldiers\nin their armour were seen running about among the clouds,\nand surrounding of cities. Moreover, at that feast, which\nwe call Pentecost, as the priests were going by night into\nthe inner Court of the Temple, as the custom was, to per^\nform their sacred ministrations, they said, that, in the first\nplace, they felt a quaking, and heard a noise, and after\nthat they heard a sound as of a great multitude, saying, Lst\nus remove hence. (Jewish War, Bk. vi.)\n411. The prejudices of superstition contagious.\nOf all the sources of prejudices, which exist in the\nmind, superstition seems io be the most contagious. When\nonce fairly started, it rapidly goes from house to house,\nfrom village to village and sometimes infects whole pro-\nvinces. This was remarkably the case in the witchraft de^\nlusions, which prevailed in New England about the year\n1680; and all history affords instances, where this rapidity\nof infection has been experienced. When the superstition\nis thus extensive, there is a constant reciprocal action and\nreaction of the minds contaminated with it; and the evil\nis in this way greatly increased. In the year 1812, the\nfreedom of the whole state of Venezuela in South America\ncame near being lost by the contagious influence of the\nprejudices arising from this cause. In the early pait of\nthat year a most violent earthquake was experienced, which\nwas attended with very considerable injury to many iarge\ntowns, and with the destruction of nearly twenty thousand\npersons. As this calamity happened on the day and hour\nof a great religious festival, it was interpreted by those,\nwho were not favourably disposed towards the existing or-\nder of things, into a divine judgment, a manifestation of\nthe displeasure of the Almighty at the wickedness of the\npeople in attempting to secure their liberty. This idea\nwas readily seized by the mass of the inhabitants, who were\nat that time ignorant and credulous. They joined in great\nnumbers the Spanish army, that was acting against the re-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0474.jp2"},"475":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES. 469\npublick; the patriots became discouraged and after be-\ning defeated in a number of battles, Venezuela was again\nbrought under its ancient masters. This disastrous result\nwas owing to the prejudices of superstition.\n412. Of superstition in times of distress and danger.\nThe fact above-mentioned leads us to observe, that in\nall times of distress and danger the creations of a supersti-\ntious mind are greatly multiplied. Fear is one of the ap-\npropriate elements of such a mind and when difficulties\nand dangers thicken around it, nothing can surpass the de-\ngree of its excitement. Under the influence of the excite-\nment of such dark periods, it notices many things, which at\nother limes would not have attracted attention. A violent\nthunderstorm, which in times of tranquillity and peace,\nwould have been unnoticed, has an ominous significancy\nin periods of revolutions and wars. The flight of birds, the\nblowing of the winds, the rise and fall of the tides, the\nmotion of the clouds, the darting of meteors, any of the\ncommonest natural appearances arrest, and fill with as\ntonishment the minds of the superstitious at such seasons*\n413. Prejudices of personal friendships and dislikes.\nIf man were to choose a state of apathy and indiffer-\nence, he would be unable to obtain it, at least permanent-\nly; it would be refused to him by the very elements, the\noriginal laws of his nature. He is destined not only to\nact, but to feel and his feelings in respect to others will\nvary, according as he has been more or less in their com-\npany, as he has received from them greater or less favours\nor injuries. Hence he has his sympathies and his dislikes,\nhis favourable and unfavourable sentiments, his friends and\nhis opposers. And here we have another source of preju-\ndices. It is so well understood as to have become a com-\nmon saying, that it is a difficult matter to judge, with per-\nfect impartiality, either of friends or foes. A question ari-\nses, we will suppose, concerning the merit or demerit, the\nright or wrong in the conduct of a friend of one, in whose","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0475.jp2"},"476":{"fulltext":"470 ORIGIN OP PREJUDICES.\nfavour our sympathies are strongly enlisted. In the delib-\neration upon the facts before us, which we attempt to hold,\nthe mind is continually interrupted by the remembrance\nof those kind acts and excellent qualities, which have laid\nthe foundation of our favourable partialities. They come\nbefore the eye of the judgment we attempt to remove\nthem, and they return again they interrupt and cloud the\nclearness of its perceptions. And, hence, our judgments\nprove to be wrong.\nWe experience the same difficulty in forming a just es-\ntimate of the character and conduct of those, for whom\nwe entertain a personal dislike. There is a continual\nsuggestion of acts and of qualities, which are the founda-\ntions of that dislike. The effect of this is partly to di-\nvert the mind from the question properly before it, and\npartly to diffuse over it a misrepresentation, which has its\norigin solely in our own feelings of antipathy. Our\ndislike interposes itself, as in the other case, between the.\nthing to be judged of, and the susceptibility of judging,\nand renders the mind unable to perceive so clearly the\ntrue merits of the question, as it otherwise would.\nAnd here it may be further remarked, in connection\nwith these views, that sympathy for sorrow, that the feel*\ning of compassion for persons in distress has a tendency to\nperplex the judgment. It is true, that the perplexity and\nerrour of judgment in such cases is an amiable prejudice,\nbut it is not less a prejudice. How often people under-\ntake the defence and justification of those, who are unfor-\ntunate and distressed, merely from feelings of sympathy\nAfterwards when their cooler reason is permitted to de-\ncide, they learn to their mortification, that the subjects of\nthose chivalrous feelings and partial judgments were alto-\ngether unworthy of such unreflecting kindness.\n414. Prejudices of custom or fashion.\nThe practices of different nations, and the prevailing\nnotions in respect to them, differ from each other nor are\nthose of the same nation the same at different periods.—","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0476.jp2"},"477":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES. 471\nThe modes of salutation in France are different from those\nof Russia; and those of both nations are different from\nthe forms, which are commonly received in Oriental coun-\ntries. There is no less diversity among nations in the fash-\nions of dress, than in the methods of civility, and of polite\nintercourse. The dress of a Turk or of a Chinese would\nmake but an ill figure on an Englishman and the English-\nman himself would reject with contempt the obsolete and\nneglected fashions of his own ancestors. The authori-\nty of fashion extends also to political and religious ceremo-\nnies, to the regulation and management of domestick af-\nfairs, and to methods of education. No two nations are\nalike in all these respects and hardly one age, or one year\nagrees with another.\nWe find in the authority of fashion or custom a fruitful\nsource of limited and erroneous judgments. Each nation\npasses its censure on the customs, that prevail abroad, but\nare not adopted at home each age ridicules the practices\nof a preceding age, that have since become obsolete. We\nhave great reason for considering these limited and pre-\nmature judgments prejudices. We see no grounds, why one\nnation, especially where there is nearly an equal degree of\nmental improvement, should set itself up as an infallible\njudge of propriety and impropriety in the customs and\nceremonies of another nation. But the fallacy consists\nnot merely in ignorantly censuring others. The great\nbody of people are found to be not more unanimous in\ncensuring the opinions and fashions of other ages and\nnations, than they are, in blindly and implicitly adopting\nthose of their own, however trivial or absurd they may be.\nThey do, as they see others do; this method they have\nfollowed from their youth up, without exercising their own\njudgment and in this way custom has become to them a\n4 second nature.\nSome respect is due undoubtedly to the sentiments of\nthe great mass of people around us, although those senti-\nments are acknowledged to be prejudiced. A sudden and\nindiscriminate breaking off from all their practices is not\nto be recommended. But then a greater respect is due to","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0477.jp2"},"478":{"fulltext":"472 ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES.\ntruth, justice, and conscience something may be sacrifi-\nced to the weaknesses of human nature, but more must be\ngiven up to its nobler elements.\n415. Correctives of fashionable prejudices.\nThree things, (says Watts,) are to be considered, \\h\norder to deliver our understandings from this danger and\nslavery.\n1. That the greatest part of the civil customs of any\nparticular nation or age spring from humour rather than\nreason. Sometimes the humour of the prince prevails,\nand sometimes the humour of the people. It is either the\ngreat or the many, who dictate the fashion, and these have\nnot always the highest reason on their side.\n2. Consider also, that the customs of different nations\nin different ages, the customs of different nations in the\nsame age, and the customs of different towns and villages\nin the same nation, are very various and contrary to_each\nother. The fashionable learning, language, sentiments,\nand rules of politeness, differ greatly in different countries\nand ages of mankind but truth and reason are of a more\nuniform and steady nature, and do not change with the\nfashion. Upon tins account, to cure the piepossessions\nwhich arise from custom, it is of excellent use to travel\nand see the customs of various countries, and to read the\ntravels of other men, and the history of past ages, that ev-\nery thing may not seem strange and uncouth, which is not\npractised within the limits of our own parish, or in the nar-\nrow space of our own life-time.\n3. Consider yet again, how often we ourselves have\nchanged our opinions concerning the decency, propriety,\nor congruity of several modes or practices in the world,\nespecially if we have lived to the age of thirty or forty.\nCustom or fashion, even in all its changes, has been ready\nto have some degree of ascendancy over our understand*\nings, and what at one time seemed decent, appears obso*\nlete and disagreeable afterward, when the fashion chan-\nges. Let us learn, therefore, to abstract as much as pos*","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0478.jp2"},"479":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES. 475\nsible from custom and fashion, when we would pass a\njudgment concerning the real value and intrinsick nature\nof things.\n416. Prejudices of mental indolence.\nThe catalogue of prejudices may be yet further in-\ncreased it would be no easy matter to give a perfect enu-\nmeration of them. Men often take up with erroneous\nsentiments, and expose themselves and others to all the ill\neffects of such wrong opinions, rather than submit to the\nmere labour of a thorough examination of them. These\nare prejudices of mkntal indolence.\nThe mind, in the early part of life, exhibits much ac-\ntivity every thing, that is novel, arrests its attention and\nat that period all objects possess something of that charac-\nter. After the fervour of youth has passed, this attivity\ngenerally ceases the soul, no longer stimulated by the\nexcitement of novelty, seeks repose. To doubt leads to\ninquiry inquiry is laborious, and, therefore, painful and\nthe resolution is, consequently, taken to harbour no doubts,\nto ask no questions.\nThis resolution, so fatal to the progress of the truth\nand to all right views, is sometimes taken for another rea-\nson. Inquiry, and the suggestion of doubts on all long es-\ntablished opinions are extremely distressing to those, who\nhave not been in the habit of careful and exact investiga-\ntion and who have, therefore, no weli settled and satis-\nfactory views as to the powers of the mind, and the nature\nand degrees of evidence. To tear them from their ancient\nopinions is like the separation of old friends. It is in\nitself exceedingly trying; but there is a distress more poig-\nnant than that of the present moment, in the vaccillation*\nthe tossing to and fro of the mind, which for a long time\nsucceeds. Men have been frequently induced by the\nexperience of this unpleasmt state of mind, which results\nfrom their previous neglect to examine and to form opin-\nions with care, to give up inquiry altogether. They be-\ncome unwilling to have their mental slumbers disturbed\n59","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0479.jp2"},"480":{"fulltext":"474 ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES.\npreferring a quiet adherence to their long adopted belief,\nhowever erroneous it may be, to the endurance of the\nperplexing uneasiness of that state of skepticism, which\nintervenes between the rejection of old opinions and the\nformation of new.\n417. Of the methods of subduing prejudices.\nIt is no easy task fully to remove prejudices, especially\nwhere they have been of long standing. But in some ca-\nses we cannot decline attempting it, without evidently\nneglecting a duty, owed to a fellow-being. In the dis-\ncharge of this difficult, but important duty, the following\ndirections will not be without use.\n(1) In attempting to subdue the prejudices of others, a\nscrupulous regard is to be had to their feelings. It is\nimplied in the very attempt to subdue a prejudice, that the\nviews in respect to that particular subject, which we our-\nselves entertain, have the greater degree of correctness but\neven this implied superiority is not unnecessarily to be ob-\ntruded on the prejudiced man s attention, but rather to be\nkept out of sight. The poorest man has his treasures of\nself-love, the most ignorant arid prejudiced man has his\npride of intellect; and if that self-love or that pride of in-\ntellect be offended, in vain will be all attempts at a reduc-\ntion of their erroneous notions. So that a regard to the\nfeelings and even the weaknesses of those, whose opinions\nwe controvert, is due not more to the general claims of\nhumanity, than to the success of the particular object,\nwhich we have in hand.\n(2) Having by all suitable means conciliated the pre-\njudiced man s feelings, the wrong sentiments, which he\ncherishes, may be attacked by direct argument. They\nmay be shown to be ill founded by reasoning, conclusively\ndeduced from propositions so plain and just, as to be ad-\nmitted by both parties. This perhaps will answer the pur-\npose, where the prejudices have not been of very long\ncontinuance, and have not acquired a great degree of\nstrength.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0480.jp2"},"481":{"fulltext":"ORIGIN OF PREJUDICES. 475\n(3) Where they are found to be very tenacious, another\ncourse is thought to be preferable. Let no direct attack\nbe made upon the prejudice, which is to be opposed, but let\nit pass with as little immediate notice, as possible. Efforts\nshuuld be made, in the mean while, to instruct the individ-\nual in those acknowledged truths, which have a distant, but\ndirect connection with his false opinions. In this way his\nmind will be furnished with a mixture of truth and errour,\ninstead of errour alone hereanVr the discordant elements\nwill be carrying on a conflict of themselves and his pre-\njudices will certainly be weakened by this inward contest,\nand probably overthrown.\nNote. Many writers have examined the subject of\nprejudices. A number of valuable remarks on this topick\nare found in Malebranche s Search after Truth. Lord\nBacon, to whom the sciences ar? so much indebted, deem-\ned the subject of prejudices deserving a place in the\nNovum Organum, where he has examined them under the\ndesignation of idola. Dr. Watts in his book of Logick has\ndevoted to it a valuable chapter, and also made some re-\nmarks on it in his Improvement of the Mind. It has re-\ncently received new illustrations and embellishments frons\nan article in the New Edinburgh Encyclopaedia by M. Si^\nmonde de Sismondi.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0481.jp2"},"482":{"fulltext":"476\nCHAPTER THIRTY SECOND.\nEVIDENCE CF TESTIMOKY.\n418. Of prejudices in connection with testimony.\nFrom the view, which has been given of prejudiced\njudgments, one of the obvious inferences is, that great per-\nversions and mistakes may be expected to exist in testimo-\nny. We have already had occasion to say something of\nthe nature of testimony, and of the grounds of belief in it.\n237.) If the subject had not been of importance, it\nwould not have ;een resumed here; although some of the\nTiews just given admit of a ready and weighty application\nto it.\nAs to the importance of this form of moral evidence,\nthere can be no mistake. It not only influences our con-\nduct in all our ordinary concerns but is constantly ap-\npealed to, in courts of justice, and in the most serious and\nweightv transactions. Individuals are frequently required\nto give testimony, which involves, in its results, the repu-\ntation, property, and life of their fellows. But we have\nseen, in the preceding chapter, in how many ways their\njudgments are liable to be warped and that this per-\nversion may often exist without necessarily implying\nany evil intention. It is the object of this chapter to\nsuggest a faw rules of caution in respect to testimony,\ndrawn chiefly from those susceptibilities in our mental con-\nstitution, which are the foundation of prejudices.\n419. Of the compet3ncy of the witness.\nBefore speaking of these circumstances, which perplex\nand give a wrong bias to the judgment, a prior inquiry\nseems to be as to the competency of the witness to form an\nopinion on that subject, to which his testimony relates.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0482.jp2"},"483":{"fulltext":"EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY. 477\nWitnesses sometimes labour under a natural incapacity of\njudging, which necessarily annuls t! eir testimony. A. per-\nson, v\\ho is deprived of the sense of hearing, is not capa-\nble of test fyin# to the oral assertions of others: and a\nblind man cannot give testimony on subjects, the knowl-\nedge ol which necessarily implies the existence of the\nsense of seeing. r i he c( mpetenry of the witness, there-\nfore, to judge in respect to that subject, on which his tes-\ntimony is given, is very justly to be examined into.\nAnd in the question of competency, we may not only in-\nquire into the capacity, or want of it in the witness; we\nmay further inquire into his opportunities of exercising that\ncapacity, which he is acknowledged to possess. If he tes-\ntifies, ibat he saw an object or action, when circumstan-\nces positively show, that he had no opportunity ol thus\nseeing, his testimony is as much invalidated, as if he\nlaboured under a natural incapacity of sight. If, for in-\nstanee, it be necessarily implied in what he says, that\nhe w::s in a particular place, but on inquiry circumstances\nsatisfactorily show, that he v\\as not there, then evidently he\nhad no opportunity of knowing what he testifies, and his de-\nclarations are to be set aside.\n420. Of habits of veracity in connection with tes-\ntimony.\nPeople can hardly expect to hear the truth from those,\nwho are in the practice of uttering falsehoods; and it is,\ntherefore, proper to inquire, What are the witness charac-\nter and habits in this respect? Of professed liars, we have\nhere nothing to say. Of persons, who are in the practice\nof telling the truth, and whose habits are acknowledged to\nbe those of veracity, a distinction may be made between\ntwo classes.\n(1) Some men are, in principle and in practice, scru-\npulous. They have so long and so steadily exhibited this\ntrait, that it seems to be inherent, something in the consti-\ntution. Persons of this character are found to be some-\nwhat averse to stating what has not come within their own\npersonal observation and knowledge. When repeating","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0483.jp2"},"484":{"fulltext":"478 EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY.\nthe assertions of others, they do not incline to conceal their\nauthority, but are desirous that it should be known and\nwould not, on any consideration, convey a wrong impress\nsion. This is their general character, although there is a\ndifference among individuals of this class, and some are\nfound to be less particular in their ordinary asseverations\nand in testimony, thun others.\n(2) There is a second class of persons, who would esteem\nthemselves injured in having their veracity suspected, but\nwho have formed habits, which render it necessary, that\ntheir testimony should be carefully examined. We allude\nparticularly to the habit, which some have formed of tell-\ning extraordinary stories, or anecdotes of whatever kind,\nwhich are intended, and are calculated to interest. They\nconsider themselves in a measure pledged to meet the in-\nterest, which they know to be excited on the part of those\npresent, and are, therefore, under an extraordinary tempta-\ntion to enliven and embellish their narration. If any cir-\ncumstances have escaped their memory, which were essen-\ntial to the unity of the story, their own invention is\ntaxed to furnish them, since it is too late to search for, and\nof too much consequence to omit them. They become in\ntime not a little insensible to the false colouring, which\nthey give to their statements, and convey erroneous im-\npressions, without being conscious of an intention to de-\nceive.\nSuch persons, when called upon to testify on oath, will\nbe likely to give a false colouring to the most serious state-\nments, similar to that, which heightens their discourses to\ntheir fire-side hearers. We would not say, that they in-\ntentionally do this. But those, who are acquainted with\nthe power of habit, will readily imagine the possibility of\ntheir thus doing, without its being implied, that they are\ndesignedly untrue.\n421. Of the influence of friendship, lc. on testimony*\nFriendship is generally founded on our favourable opin-\nion of the good qualities of those, towards whom we hava","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0484.jp2"},"485":{"fulltext":"EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY. 410\nfriendly feelings. In the ordinary course of things, no one\ncan be expected to cherish the feelings of friendship to-\nwards a person, whom he knows to be a knave, or a hypo-\ncrite, or in any other respects essentially bad. Whenever\na witness, therefore, is called upon to give testimony unfa-\nvourable to the case of a friend, he will find, on a little ex-\namination of himself, that his testimony is modified by his\nown previous feelings and opinions. This modification of\nour testimony, or rather of the belief and experience, on\nwhich our testimony is founded, is often effected with great\nrapidity, and in almost all cases by a process, to which we\nyield very slight attention\nAlthough our own eyes have been the witnesses, we can\nhardly suspect one, to whom we had ascribed so many\ngood qualities, of committing a crime. We suppose, that\nwe ourselves may be mistaken, and are led, both in conse-\nquence of our own supposed liability to mistake, and in\nconsequence of our previous convictions of the criminated\nperson s goodness, to give his conduct the most favourable\nconstruction. The publick testimony, therefore, although\ngiven under the most solemn circumstances, will corres-\npond to this very favourable mental construction, which\nhas been previously formed, and of which we ourselves\nare in a measure insensible.\nSuch testimony may be critically examined, and without\nany necessary impeachment of the witness integrity. If\nfriendship have secretly taken away any thing from the truth,\nit is the part of the judges, who are the investig- tors of\ntruth, to see, that it is demanded back again. The\nsame views will hold, where dislike exists. It has an\nequal degree of influence in perplexing and prejudicing\ntestimony, with personal friendships.\n422. Influence of personal interest on testimony.\nThe love of gain is a passion, which is greatly nourish-\ned by many circumstances in our situation. As riches\nnot only deliver their possessors from many inconvenien-\nces, incident to a want of them but secure influence and","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0485.jp2"},"486":{"fulltext":"480 EVIDENCE OP TESTIMONY.\nrespect, we find one reason in these effects of it, why this\npassion has taken so deep root in the minds of men. An\nattachment to pleasure, and other modifications of self-\nlove, are hardly less strong, than the passion for wealth.\nIt is;he tendency and result of these interested feel.ngs to\npresent whatever concerns ourselves in the happiest light,\nand to heap up arguments in our own favour and on the\nother hand, to prevent our bestowing due attention or or-\ndinary justice upon the concernments of others.\nIn all cases, therefore, where the private interest of the\nperson, who gives testimony, is concerned, there are two\nclaims; that of interest on the one side, and that of truth\non the other.\nThe claims of one s own interest, which are so near his\nfeelings, are carefully examined, and every circumstance,\nwhich could have an influence to make him act in accor-\ndance with that interest, has its full weight. Wh.le, on\nthe other hand, we fe« 1 an indescribable reluctance to ex-\namine claims, which we anticipate will be against our-\nselves; and ignorance becomes to us, under these circum-\nstances, a source of satisfaction.\nPersons, who are placed in this situation, ought careful-\nly to guard against the powerful and sometimes impercep-\ntible influenc which is exerted over them an influence,\nwhich is often pernicious to their understandings, and still\nmore so to virtue. Those, who hear and receive the testi-\nmony of persons interested, cannot do justice to the p rson\nor subject, which th s testimony concerns, without making\nsuitable allowance (or the misrepresentations, which are\nfound to arise from this source.\n423. Does the testimony come from a parl san?\nThere are parties in religion, parties in politicks, par-\nties in neighbourhoods and families an I in lee I we find\nthem in almost every situation in life. The feelings of par-\ntisanship, which are renewed at every meeting of our opp\nsers, and at the knowledge of every circumstance, calcula-\nted to remind us of the existence of a controversy, are ex-\nceedingly strong. Hence the prejudices of parties, which","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0486.jp2"},"487":{"fulltext":"EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY.\n481\nare opinions, modified by these feelings, are tenacious, and\nconversions for one party to another are few.\nIt is a remark somewhere made by Hume, that suspi-\ncions of a person s being your enemy is one step towards\nmaking him such. Generally speaking, partisans have\nstrong suspicions of those of the opposite denomination, and\nhence it is natural to expect, that there will be much of\nan inimical spirit. And every one knows, how difficult is\na fair and candid statement of the concerns of those, whom\nwe suspect to be hostile, or approaching to enmity. Under\nthe influence of this bias, those who give testimony may be\nexpected to seize upon circumstances, unfavourable to their\nadversaries, and to throw other circumstances of a different\ncharacter into the back ground and yet profess themselves\nunconscious of a premeditated design to do injustice.\n424. Of the memory in connexion with testimony.\nThe great majority ©f persons have sometimes occasion\nto complain of treachery of the memory. Facts, which\nhappened some considerable time previous to the testimony\ngiven, may not be perfectly recollected.\nWe may expect, however, that the knowledge of the\ncircumstances of a past event will possess increased ac-\ncuracy, when it appears, that the person has used such\nmeans as assist the memory, such as writing them down,\nand frequently repeating them. We may be directed\nalso in our inquiries on this point by the nature of the sub-\nject, to which the testimony relates. If the testimony\nConcern words or a discourse spoken, which are peculiar-\nly evanesent, it is far from impossible, that the witness may\nnot perfectly recollect.\nThere are many circumstances necessarily occurring at\nthe time of hearing the witness assertions, which will help\nin forming an opinion of his powers of recollection, but\nwhich cannot well be specified here,\n60","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0487.jp2"},"488":{"fulltext":"4S2 EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY.\n425. On the testimony of the dying.\nIt may not be considered irrelevant to the general sub-\nject to offer some remarks on the testimony of those, who\nare thought to be near the period of their departure from\nthe world. Such are generally supposed to utter them-\nselves with a peculiar regard to the truth. It is supposed,\nthat the nearness of the future world, while the present is\npassing away from them, operates upon them with the\npower of the most efficient motives, and that, under such\ncircumstances, they will not be guilty of falsehood.\nGreat weight is undoubtedly to be given to the asseve-\nrations of a dying man, who is in the perfect exercise of his\nreasoning powers but then our readiness to give credit to\nthem must be regulated by circumstances. If we make\nthe supposition of the case of a person, condemned to death\nby the civil laws, the remarks, applicable to such a case,\nwill suggest considerations, applicable to ordinary cases\nof death.\nLet it be supposed, therefore, that a person is condemn-\ned to death, that he is about to be executed for some\ncrime, but that he asserts his innocence to the last.\n(1) The first circumstance to be considered here is,\nwhether eternal things have any real influence upon his\nmind, and whether he looks upon death, as about to intro-\nduce him into the presence of God. If this be not the case,\nif God and the day of judgment have no terrors, his asser-\ntions are no more to be believed, than the assertions he\nmade before condemnation. It is generally supposed, that\nthe dying utter truth, in consequence of the operation up-\non them of motives drawn from eternity. But this suppo-\nsition, under the circumstances now specified, cannot be\nadmitted.\n(2) It is to be considered again, whether the criminal\nhave not some lingering hope of pardon. He knows it to\nbe possible for this pardon to come, although it should be\nonly an hour before the time of execution. To make con-\nfession, therefore, may be the means of destroying that life,\nto vrhich he fondly clings; and hence, if he be guilty, he","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0488.jp2"},"489":{"fulltext":"EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY. 483\nhere finds a strong motive to persevere in his assertions.\n(3) There is a third circumstance also to be remember-\ned. It is sometimes the case, that men, who have been\nleft to commit the greatest crimes, have within them, not-\nwithstanding the commission of such crimes, the remains\nof truth, honour, and feeling. It does not necessarily fol-\nlow, because a man has committed those criminal acts, for\nwhich justice demands, that he should suffer the severest\npunishment, that he never has moments of contrition, and\naspirations after better things. A person may betray his\nfriend and murder him, and yet, while in the possession of\nthis dreadful obliquity of feeling, may retain the most sin-\ncere and devoted attachment to his wife and children.\nWithout having the least expectation of living, he, never-\ntheless, violently and constantly avers his innocence one\nhonourable passion yet secures a residence in his dark\nsoul and he fears a confession may bring a disgrace on\nhis family and descendants, which a denial may possibly\navert.\n(4) And then there is the additional circumstance of\nhis own reputation The love of fame has been spoken\nof, as being the infirmity of noble minds ignoble\nminds also are beset with the same infirmity. It will be\nfound to have made its way into the hearts of thieves, rob-\nbers, assassins. As the time has formerly been, when it\nwas no small honour to perish as a martyr, it is possible,\nthat this time has not wholly past. The man, who has\nbeen bad enough to commit piracy, may, therefore,\nhave vanity enough to prompt him to attempt, just as\nhe is leaving the world, an imposition on the sympathi-\nzing feelings of the multitude. And it is a real gratifica-\ntion to his self-love, to think, that, at such a time, he can\ncheat those into a good opinion of himself, or cajole tears\nfrom them, whom he would not have hesitated in former\ndays, nor at that very time, if it were possible, to rob or\nto murder.\nWe ought not, therefore, to be too confident, that the\ntestimony of the dying is to be always depended on. And\nyet, notwithstanding these exceptions and cautions, it","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0489.jp2"},"490":{"fulltext":"484 EVIDENCE OP TESTIMONY.\nwould be pushing our ill opinion of human nature to an\nunwarrantable length, to suspect, in all or even in a majori-\nty of cases, the testimony given at the period of death.\n426. Influence of the possibility of a confutation on\ntestimony.\nThe distinction between virtue and vice has its founda-\ntion in the original constitution of things, but men exer-\ncise the right, depending partly on their own susceptibility\nof judging, and partly on the information of the Scriptures,\nof saying what things belong to the class of virtue, and\nwhat belong to that of vice. Those actions, which are\njustly accounted vicious, are universally esteemed worthy\nof blame while actions, which are truly assigned to the\nclass of virtue, are as generally considered praiseworthy.\nThe man, therefore, who commits what the community\nunite in deeming a crime, forfeits his reputation he turns\nupon himself the eye of scorn and derision; and becomes,\nmore or less, according to the degree of his offence, a his-\nsing and a byeword. 5\nWhenever a person utters false testimony, which is\nreckoned a crime of a very high description, he does it,\nknowing well the consequences, if a want of veracity should\nbe detected. He will be likely, therefore, to inform him-\nself well of the nature of the subject, on which he testifies,\nand of the circumstances, under which the testimony is to\nbe given and if there be a prospect of the false testimony\nadmitting an easy confutation, he will be doubly cautious,\nhow he utters such testimony. This rule then may be\nlaid down Whenever such circumstances exist, that false\ntestimony may very probably be confronted and confuted,\nthere is a corresponding diminution of the probability,\nthat any such false testimony will be given.\n427. On the credibility of historical accounts.\nOf the many errours, which doubtless exist in the great-\ner part of historical narrations, some are Jwing to the care-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0490.jp2"},"491":{"fulltext":"EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY. 485\nlessness, and some to the prejudices of the writer. The\ngreat majority of them may perhaps be traced to these two\ncauses, to want of care, and to feelings, influenced by\nprejudice. These are points, therefore, of great impor-\ntance to be ascertained.\n(1) We may be aided in forming an opinion, whether\nthe writer was, or was not sufficiently disposed to be exact,\nby considering the circumstances, in which he wrote.\nIf the narration at the time of its publication was calcula-\nted to excite peculiar interest, and if untrue, to cause con-\ntradiction, it may reasonably be supposed, that the care\nand scrupulosity of the writer will be proportioned to his\nexposure to examination and to rebuke for any erroneous\nrepresentations. His own interest, (if we were deprived\nof any other assurance of authenticity in his statements,)\nis in such cases a pledge, that he will not make statements\nwithout the ability to support them.\nHence we may see, how much credit is due to the wri-\nters of the New Testament. They stated facts, in respect\nto which a very great interest was felt their narrations\nwere undoubtedly very carefully examined, and as the\nfacts were capable of the readiest contradiction or con-\nfirmation, the prevailing disposition to confute them would\nhave availed itself of the first opportunity to do it, if there\nhad been any untruth. What writer, for instance, would\nhave hazarded his reputation on the assertion, that five\nthousand were miraculously supplied by means of a few\nloaves of bread, had he not been satisfied of the correct-\nness of the statement Such a statement could have been\nat once exposed, and the consequent folly of the write r 5 if\nit had not been true. We justly think, that we have\ngood reason to admit the general truth of the narrations of\nLivy, of Xenophon, and of other Greek and Roman histo-\nrians but there are weighter and more imperative reasons,\nwhy we should yield our assent to the sacred writers.\n(2) Admitting the historian to have been sufficiently\nlaborious and careful, we are next to take into considera-\ntion the prejudices, to which he may have been exposed.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0491.jp2"},"492":{"fulltext":"486 EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY.\nThe character, which, Livy, the Roman historian, gives of\nHannibal, is, that he was a man of great cruelty, perfidious\nand untrue, without any fear of the gods, without any re-\ngard to his oath, and without feelings of religion (inhu-\nmana crudelitas, perfidia plusquam punica, nihil veri, nihil\nsancti, nullus Deum metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla re-\nligio.) But there is reason to believe, that this writer\nspeaks in this instance rather with the feelings of a preju-\ndiced Roman, than with that impartiality and coolness,\nwhich may justly be expected from historians. If Hanni-\nbal had been born a Roman, possessing and exhibiting,\nnevertheless, the same traits of character, should we not\nprobably have received a different account? Or if the\nCarthaginians had furnished native historians of their own\nbattles, would there not have been, (and perhaps very just-\nly,) more credit given to their own nation and fewer evi-\ndences of perfidy and deception —It is a remark of\nMontesquieu, that it was victory only, which decided,\nwhether we ought to say, the Punick, or the Roman faith.\nAmong the men, who have obtained great warlike glory\non this side of the Atlantick, hardly any name is more fre-\nquently mentioned and with greater emotion than Wolfe,\nthe conqueror of Quebec. No one can read his midnight\nexpedition up the heights of Abraham, and the bloody\nconflict of the ensuing day, without the profound ac-\nknowledgment of the heart to the intrepidity and valour of\nthe English general. How often and how enthusiastically\nhas his glory been celebrated\nBut a comparative silence and dishonour rest upon the\nname of the Marquis de Montcalm, who fell on the same\nfield of battle, the worthy rival of Wolfe. And yet he\nwas no less brave, no less generous, no less devoted to his\ncountry and his king. The remark of Montesquieu will\napply here It was victory, which made the difference.\nHad the French general conquered, Montcalm would have\nbeen the hero, Wolfe would have been blamed for his\nrashness.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0492.jp2"},"493":{"fulltext":"EDUCATION*\n4S7\nNote. In the remarks, which have been made, it is\nnot presumed, that the subject of the evidence of testimo-\nny is by any means exhausted. It is a subject, however,\nwhich, in many respects, has a close connection with the\nlaws and tendencies of the mind. And it has been our\nobject here, merely to give a few illustrations of it, ex-\ntracted from the great fountains of human nature. Any\nfurther than this, it could not with propriety be investiga-\nted in a work, relating particularly to the mind. For a\nfull investigation of testimony, and of other forms of moral\nevidence, the reader is referred to the work of Gambier,\nalready mentioned. (See 262.)\nCHAPTER THIRTY THIRD,\nEDUCATION.\n428. Of the meaning and earliest sources of education.\nBy education we understand all the various methods,\nby which the mind is furnished with knowledge and its in-\ntellectual and moral susceptibilities gradually developed\nand improved. Education, therefore, includes those means,\nby which knowledge is communicated in infancy and child-\nhood the influence of the examples, which are set by par-\nents and others the moral and religious principles, which\nare instilled either by books, or by conversation instruc-\ntion in the arts, sciences, and literature. As the process\nof intellectual culture commences with the very beginnings\nof existence, Nature has very kindly and providently taken\ntaken care of it at an earlier period, than can be commenc-\ned by man.\nThe infant no sooner comes into the world, than its\nmind expands itself for the reception of knowledge as nat-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0493.jp2"},"494":{"fulltext":"4SS EDUCATION.\nurally as its delighted eye opens to the beams of the sun.\nIt begins to receive ideas by means of the senses having\nno other effectual medium of instruction, than what is im-\nmediately furnished by the Author of its existence. The\nearnestness, which it discovers, as it turns its eye towards\nthe light or any bright object, its expression of surprise on\nhearing sudden and loud sounds, show, that the work of in-\ntellectual developement is begun. Not one of the senses\nis without a share in this work multitudes of new objects\noperating upon all of them, become sources of knowledge\nhardly at any time, except in the hours of sleep, leaving\nthe mind without occupation. The actions and words of\nits attendants soon begin to be noticed and imitated even\nits sufferings become auxiliary in the great process of fur-\nnishing the soul with new notions, and of unfolding its un-\ntried capacities. So that probably in the very first years\nof its life, there has been a gradual increase of knowledge,\nas great, when we consider that the mind was at first with-\nout ideas, as at any subsequent period,\n429. Of the introduction of imaginary and false ideas*\nWhile the young mind, by the mere aid of that instru-\nmentality, which the Author of nature has furnished, is\ncontinually storing up important thoughts, it also receives\nfalse ideas from various sources. These erroneous intima-\ntions are not necessarily to be attributed to the imperfec-\ntion of the senses, or to any thing originally in the consti-\ntution for the child is now supposed to be arrived at that\nperiod, when the suggestions of nature may be aided, or\ncounteracted, or misrepresented by parents and domesticks*\nIn saying, that false notions may be introduced, we al-\nlude to the opinions, which children are led to entertain,\nof the existence of ghosts, spectres, or other imaginary be-\nings. There is no want of true and important notions,\nwinch can be made an excuse for the introduction of such\nabsurd ideas and it ought to be made a great object to\nkeep the mind as free from them as possible.\nThe. greater. heed is to.be given to this direction- b§","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0494.jp2"},"495":{"fulltext":"EDUCATION 489\ntause permanently evil consequences are found to result\nfrom the neglect of it. The introduction of ideas of ghosts,\nc. in early life ever afterwards renders one incapable of\nenduring darkness or solitude with any tolerable degree of\ncomfort. Attention should be given, in the early periods\nof infancy and childhood, to the developement of the pas-\nsions. Those, which are vicious, should be checked and\nsubdued, which can be done much more easily at that time,\nthan afterwards. Virtuous and noble affections should be\ncherished such as gratitude to parents, benevolence to\nthe poor, regard and love for the truth.\n430. Of guarding against prejudices in generaU\nA superstitious belief in the agency of spiritual be-\nings in the dark, which is early received, is only one of the\nmany false notions, with which the mind is then liable to\nhe impressed, by means of a wrong intellectual culture.\nThe whole host of errours, which were mentioned in the\nchapter on Prejudices, may have their origin at the same\ntime; even errours of a moral, political, and religious na-\nture. It is difficult to assign a period, when the mind is\ntoo young and powerless to receive some faint notions on\nthese subjects. Individuals can sometimes state, as far\nback as their memory can reach, circumstances, (perhaps\nand accidental remark, perhaps an unimportant religious\nceremony,) which have had a permanent influence.\nPrejudices so numerous and tenacious are introduced\ninto the mind in childhood, that it requires much pains and\ntime in after life to unlearn the false notion^ to which we\nhave been accustomed to render an implicit belief. The\nstruggle against the influence which they have acquired\nover us, will be found to be a severe one and oftentimes\nit is quite unsuccessful. IV] any persons, who have been\nfully aware of the extent and evil nature of the tendencies,\nwhich were given to their minds in early life, have desired\nto counteract and annul their influence, and have made ef-\nforts to that purpose, but without effect. The seeds, that\nwere sown in the nursery, and had borne their fruits in\n61","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0495.jp2"},"496":{"fulltext":"490 EDUCATION.\nyouth, had taken too deep root to be eradicated in the full-\nness of years. We conclude, therefore, that it is a part of\nall right education, and the duty of all, who are engaged\nin instructing young minds, scrupulously lo guard against\nthe admission of any th»ng other than the truth.\n43 L Of an uniform devclopemcnt of the mental powers.\nIt is a great object, to render the mind comprehensive,\nand liberal. This object is necessarily defeated, when\nthere is an exclusive attention to one, or even more of our\nintellectual susceptibilities, to the neglect of others. Con-\nsequently, such a degree of culture seems very properly to\nbe bestowed upon all of them, as will secure to them a good\nshare of strength and activity. Some persons possess\nimagination in a high degree, and the k eye in a fine phrerc-\nzy rolling but the vigour of the reasoning faculty is en-\ntirely demolished. They can picture in their imaginations,\nno less vividly than the writer himself, the scenes of love\nand war in their favourite romances but cannot grasp*\nconsecutive propositions, and feel the force of an argument.\nOthers are mere reasoners without taste having the pow-\ner to conquer demonstrations, but without a soul to feel\nthe touches of sentiment, or an ear for the harmonies of\npoetry.\nWe cannot help regarding such an education, which\nimproves some of the intellectual powers, while others are\ngreatly neglected, as erroneous and defective. It tends to\ndefeat the great purpose of life, which is not to establish a\nsuperiority in a few individuals over the rest of mankind,\nbut to render all qualified to fulfil, in the best manner pos-\nsible, the duties of men, of citizens, of members of families,\nand above all of Christians.\n432. Of diversities in genius and temper.\nStriking differences are sometimes discernible in the\ntemper and genius of youth. It is not always easy to say\nwhat they may be owing to, whether to something origins!\nin the mental organization, or to some accidental circurri-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0496.jp2"},"497":{"fulltext":"EDUCATION. *^1\nstances, nor is it of great importance. In the process of\neducation these differences should be regarded, and a pre-\nference should be given to those parts of study, for which\nthe mind appears to have a natural inclination. No*\nonly individuals have mental characteristicks, which distin-\nguish them from other individuals there are also heredita-\nry traits in families, which go down from generation to gen-\neration. The members of one family successively dis-\ncover a fondness for abstract speculation, for all studies,\nwhich require the closest application of the reasoning pow-\ners; whiie the successive members of another are distin-\nguished for vivacity, wit, imagination But while some\nreference ought to be had, in the course of an education,\nto these circumstances, and a preference should be given,\nin the selection of pursuits, to such personal and hereditary\ninclinations, there should be the greater caution in seeing\nthat other pursuits, to which there is supposed to be a\nnatural aversion, be not wholly neglected. The man of\nimagination is not to leave his reasoning powers to neg-\nlect nor should the lover of mathematicks forego those\nmethods of intellectual culture, by which the taste may\nbe quickened and improved. An exclusive attention to\na particular pursuit, even when it seems to be warranted\nby the high claims of genius, would be inconsistent with\nthat developement and exercise of all the intellectual pow-\ners, which we conceive to be implied in a perfect educa-\ntion.\n433. Of moral and religious education.\nIt ought nDt to be forgotten in the early periods of ed-\nucation, that man is a moral being, and that he is, even in\nthe commencement of life, susceptible of instruction in the\ndistinctions of right and wrong. The doctrine, which\nRousseau and others have studiously advanced, that child-\nhood and youth are incapable of receiving moral and reli-\ngious ideas, has provoked an indignant and triumphant\nopposition. It is both unsound in point of fact, and most\npernicious in its tendency. All experience goes against it.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0497.jp2"},"498":{"fulltext":"4i)2 EDUCATION\nIn France, where it has found its most numerous advo-\ncates, its evil results have been very deeply felt. A re-\ncent French writer, who cannot be suspected of giving\nunfavourable representations of his countrymen without a\ncause, thinks, that the widely spread dornestick corruption\nand miseries, which he acknowledges to exist, can be cor-\nrected only by a greater attention to early moral education.\nThis remark implies, that the origin of those evils is to be\nfound in the neglect of such education.\nAs a first great principle in morals and religion, let the\nminds of youth be taught, that there is a God. It is true,\nthey will not understand his nature But does any one un-\nderstand it? Can the most mature and enlightened mind\nexplain the mysteries of the Supreme Being But even\nchildren may have notions of God, which approach more\nnearly to truth than we are aware, although we are unable\nto say precisely how far. Let the existence, therefore, of\nthe Supreme Being be carefully inculcated from the first\nmoment, when access can be had to the mind. Let it be\nassociated with the rising and setting of the sun with\nwoods and waters; with that starry sky, which elevated\nthe devotions of the Psalmist; with all the appearances of\nnature. When the young have become impressed with\nthis idea, the natural consequence will be, that they will\nfeel themsi lvt s under control and government, when ab-\nsent from parents, guardians, and instructers. They be-\nlieve, they remember, that there is a Being every where\npresent and this belief will be f »und to operate as a pow-\nerful restraint on evil propensities and actions.\nHaving begun with the idea of a God, they should next\nbe instructed in suitable portions of the Bible, that great\nsyste.ri of duty, submission, and hope. It is no serious\nobjection, if they do not fully understand the import of ev-\nery passage, which is read, or committed to memory.\nSomething will be understood, which will be valuable in\nthe end and the more so, because it will be associated\nwith all the delightful recollections of early days. It is\nthis part of education, which most effectually promotes in-\ndividual happiness, making life comfortable amid all its","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0498.jp2"},"499":{"fulltext":"EDUCATION. 493\nroughnesses and trials which maintains peace in families,\nand affords security to the commonwealth. In general,\nno length of time, no change of circumstances wholly des-\ntroys its propitious influence. And without it, without a\nbelief in the existence of God, and a high sense of accoun-\ntability, all sciences will be in vain all other attainments\nwill utterly fail of making men happy, and widely useful.\nMultitudes of illustrations might be introduced to con-\nfirm the views of this section. How natural is the follow-\ning incident And how agreeable, therefore, to sound\nphilosophy! When I was a little child, (said a reli-\ngious man,) my mother used to bid me kneel beside her,\nand place her hand upon my head, while she prayed. Ere\nI was old enough to know her worth, she died, and I was\nleft much to my own guidance. Like others, I was inclin-\ned to evil passions, but often felt myself checked, and as\nit were drawn back by the soft hand upon my head.\nWhen I was a young man, I travelled in foreign lands, and\nwas exposed to many temptations, but when I would have\nyielded, that same hand was upon my head, and I was saved.\nI seemed to feel its pressure, as in days of my happy in-\nfancy, and sometimes there came with it a voice in my\nheart, a voice that must be obeyed— Oh, do not this wick-\nedness, my son, nor sin against thy God.\n434. Of education for particular arts or professions,\nWhen men first flowed together into societies, they\njustly anticipated, that the wants of one would be supplied\nby the labours of another. As all could not devote them-\nselves to one calling, different pursuits were chosen by\ndifferent individuals. In making their choice, they were\ninfluenced by a variety of circumstances by the wants of\nthe community, by the wishes of their associates, or by\ntheir own predilections and hence we find the whole\ncommunity divided into arts, or professions.\nIn prescribing a course of study, regard should be had\nto the calling, which the person has in view and it should\nJ e suited, as mveh as possible, to promote the objects of","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0499.jp2"},"500":{"fulltext":"494 EDUCATION.\nthat calling. Jt would be absurd, therefore, for a youths\nintended for some mechanick art, to spend any length of\ntime in the acquisition of languages, which might be very\nproper and important in a merchant, lawyer, or theolo-\ngian. But then we would not have such an one exclu-\nsively limited to those sciences, which have an immediate\nrelation to his business in life. Let such sciences have a\ngreat share of his attention, but not all. Mechanicks\nshould remember, that they are men, as well as artisans\nand while they must give up much to their work-shops,\nthey owe not a little to their friends, to their families, and\nto society. If they are disposed to, they can save many\nfragments of time from their appropriate callings,\nwhich may be profitably employed in disciplining all the\nmental powers, and in the improvement of the social and\nreligious affections.\n435. Formation of intellectual habits.\nThe term, habit, may be applied either to bodily or\nmental operations, and expresses that readiness or facility,\nwhich is found to be the result of frequent practice.\nBy practice, the limbs of the body may be strengthened,\nand may be brought to perform a variety of admirable mo-\ntions. Rope-dancers, and the performers of the circus ex-\nhibit feats, which would seem incredible, were we not led\nto expect almost any thing from the formation of habits.\nThe results of intellectual habits are not less striking than\nthose of the body the mind can be raised up to its high-\nest excellence only by repeated actions. Many traits,\nsuch as a turn for punning, for diverting stories, for imag-\ninary creations, for close reasoning, which are thought\nto be natural, are caused wholly by a repetition of the same\nacts.\nThis great law of the mind, that it is susceptible of\nhabits, or that it acquires a facility of doing merely by the\nrepetition of doing, is of no small practical value in the\nconduct of education. If the student would becomes*\n£ood writer, he must form a habit; that ib, he must acquire","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0500.jp2"},"501":{"fulltext":"EDUCATION. 495\na command of words, and a ready perception of what is\nbeautiful or deformed in the combinations of thought and\nof language, by frequent practice. If he would become a\nready speaker or reasoner, he must use himself to the task\nof connecting together his thoughts in arguments, and of\nexpressing them in unpremeditated diction. If he would\npossess the power of framing at will ideal creations, it can\nonly be done by a frequent exercise of the imagination\nYou may give to the pupil all the rules in the world\nyou may succeed in making him fully understand the pro-\npriety of them and they will utterly avail nothing, unless\nhe shall set set his own mind at work, and not only go\nthrough with a series of mental operations, but continue to\nrepeat them, until a facility is acquired. Here is the\nsecret of excellence in frequent, and consequently labo-\nrious repetition. It is in this way, that good poets, good\norators, mathematicians, painters, c. are formed. In mul-\ntitudes of instances a want of excellence is to be ascribed,\nnot so much to any defect of nature, as to a repugnance to\nthe formation of intellectual habits. And this is much the\nsame as to say, that in all such cases the true occasion of\nmental inferiority is indolence.\n$7 436. Of a thorough examination of subjects.\nThere is great difference between a superficial, and a\nthorough education between a mere smattering, and a\nsound knowledge of things. Owing partly to laziness,\nand partly to the vanity of appearing to know every thing,\nmultitudes dissipate their time in skipping from one sort of\nknowledge to another, and informing a slight acquaintance\nwith all, without a full understanding of any. It is thought\nby many, that this is particularly the vice of the present\ntimes; and that there has been a diminution of laborious\nand thorough scholarship, in proportion as books have\nmultiplied, and there has been a wider dissemination of\nknowledge among all classes. One part of education is\nthe storing of the mind with new ideas another, and\nnot a less important one, is the giving to all the mental\npowers a suitable discipline exercising those, that are","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0501.jp2"},"502":{"fulltext":"400 EDUCATION.\nstrong strengthening those powers, which are weak\nmaintaining among all ot them a suitable balance. A\nthorough examination of subjects is an education, or train-\ning up of the mind, in both these respects. It furnishes it\nwith that species of knowledge, which is most valuable,\nbecause it is not mixed up with errours and, moreover,\ngives a strength and consistency to the whole structure of\nthe intellect. These facts are highly worthy of being re-\ngarded in the conduct of the understanding.\nThe direction, which we would deduce from them, is,\nthat the student be made to go to the foundation, the ulti-\nmate principles of every subject. Almost every topick,\nwhich is worthy of being examined, has its difficulties.\nThe mind, when unaccustomed to patient labour, discovers\na disposition to fly off, and not to meet them. This feel-\ning must not be yielded to but however reluctant, the\nmind should be again and again brought up to the attack,\nuntil the difficulties be overcome. It is not to be supposed\nfrom this, that the student s efforts are to be limited to one\ndepartment of science exclusively it is merely meant, that\nhe ought not to be permitted to go from one lepartment of\nknowledge to another or from one subject to another, with*\nout thoroughly understanding, without going to the bottom\nof them.\nThis practice once adopted will become in the end\neasy and delightful. The love of truth will be strengthen-\ned, and become a mighty principle; the mind will approach\ndifficulties with greater firmness and readiness and toil\nitself vvill no longer be a source of uneasiness.\n437. Of a command of the attention.\nThose, who are required to follow the directions above\ngiven as to a thorough examination of subjects, will some-\ntimes complain, that they find a great obstacle in their ina-\nbility to fix their attention. They are not wanting in abil-\nity to comprehend, but find it difficult to retain the mind\nin one position so long, as to enable them to connect to-\ngether all the parts of a subject, and duly estimate their\nvarious bearings. When this intellectual defect exists, it","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0502.jp2"},"503":{"fulltext":"EDUCATION. 49T\nbecomes a new reason for that thorough examination of\nsubjects, which has been above recommended. It has\nprobably been caused by a neglect of such strictness of\nexamination, and by a too rapid and careless transition\nfrom one subject to another. Attention expresses the\nstate of the mind, when it is steadily directed for some\ntime, whether longer or shorter, to some object of sense\nor intellect, exclusive of other objects. All other objects\nare shut out and when this exclusion of every thing else\ncontinues for some time, the attention is said to be in-\ntense. It is well known, that such an exclusive direc-\ntion of the mind cannot exist for any long period, without\nbeing accompanied with a feeling of desire or interest. In\nthe greatest intellectual exertions, not the mere powers of\njudging, oi abstracting, and of reasoning, are concerned,\nthere will also be a species of excitement of the feelings.\nAnd it will be found, that no feeling will effectually con-\nfine the minds of men in scientifick pursuits, but a love of\nthe truth.\nMr. Locke thought, that the person, who should find\nout a remedy for the wandering of thoughts, would do\ngreat service to the studious and contemplative part of\nmankind. We know of no other remedy, than the one\njust mentioned, a love of the truth, a desire to know the\nnature and relation of things, merely for the sake of knowl-\nedge. It is true, that a conviction of duty will do much\nambition and interest may possibly do more but when\nthe mind is led to deep investigations by these views mere-\nly, it is a tiresome process, and after all is ineffectual.\nNothing but a love of the truth for its own sake will per-\nmanently keep off the intrusions of foreign thoughts, and\nsecure a certainty of success. The excellency, therefore,\nof knowledge, considered merely as suited to the intellect-\nual nature of man, and as indicative of the character of\nthat Being, who is the true source of all knowledge and\nthe fashioner of all intellect, cannot be too frequently im-\npressed.\nThe person, who is capable of strictly fixing his atten-\ntion, will have a great advantage over others. Of two\n02","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0503.jp2"},"504":{"fulltext":"493 EDUCATION.\npersons, who seem naturally to have equal parts, the one,\nwho possesses this quality, will greatly excel. So that it\nis hardly too much to say, that it may become a sort of\nsubstitute for genius itself.\n43C. Physical education or the regard to be had to\nthe body*\nAlthough education, as the term is commonly employ-\ned, has particular reference to the growth and expansion\nof the intellectual powers, the objects, at which it aims,\ncannot be fully secured without attention to the body, tt\nis important, that the physical system should be sustained\nin force and activity. And where this precaution is neg-\nlected, where the bodily constitution is permitted to con-\ntract diseases, or rapidly to wear itself out from mere indo-\nlence, the objects of education are not only not secured, but\ndefeated. Life U short, ned the mind becomes inert;\nand oftentimes is irrecoverably prostrated.\nLaying, therefore, out of view all other considerations,\nit seems of great consequence, that attention should be\ngiven to the growth and discipline of the physical powers,\nas a mere auxiliary to the bringing out, and disciplining\nof the mind.\n439. Of social intercourse as a means of improvement.\nIt can hardly be expected of a professed scholar, who\nmust spend very many hours in solitary retirement, that\nhe will appear to as much advantage, as one, who lives\ncontinually in polite society. But the evil effects on his\naddress and manners might be overlooked, were it not, that\nan awkwardness and singularity may be impressed upon\nthe mind from the same cause. The feelings, the opin-\nions, and the taste of persons, who have mingled but little\nin society, differ in many respects from those of the mass\nof mankind around them. To meet, therefore, with\nothers at suitable times, to enter into conversation and to\ncompare opinions with them in argument, may be recom-\nmended, as a part of intellectual culture. In this way,","height":"3986","width":"2156","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0504.jp2"},"505":{"fulltext":"EDUCATION. 499\nnew light may be thrown on many subjects the faculties\nacquire a degree of readiness and vivacity, which will turn\nto good account, when they are pressed by sudden emer-\ngencies; odd and singular notions will be extirpated.\nBut if this direction be important to professed scholars,\nwho are justly expected to remain much with their books,\nit is still more applicable to those, who go through a course\nof education, merely to prepare themselves for the world,\nand that they may the better discharge the duties of a man\nand a citizen among their felloes.\n440. Of the education suitable to a citizen.\nThere are some parts of education, which can be less\nsafely omitted, than others; and particularly that, which\nregards man as having certain social and civil rights, or as\na citizen. In all legitimate governments, monarchial as\nwell as republican, the will of the people is law they are\nthe source of all rightful authority, and the seat of judg-\nment, to which it must render up its account. Hence\nthere is a political importance attached to every individual\nnot merely to the learned civilian, but to every farmer, me-\nchanick, day labourer. They may at times be concerned\ndirectly, and at the election of their rulers are always con-\ncerned indirectly, in the management of the affairs of the\nwhole nation in the enactment of commercial regula-\ntions, in the adjustment of boundaries, in the formation\nof treaties.\nEvery man should be taught from his childhood up,\nwhatever may be his calling, or his standing in life, that\nhe is a participator in these things, and that he has not on-\nly the unalienable rights, but the unalienable duties of a\ncitizen These ideas give to man a new character they\nelevate him from his degradation throwing the mind open\nto grand views, giving breachh and comprehension to the\nfeelings, and honourable sentiments. We do not under-\ntake to state in what way, or by the aid of what treatises,\nthis part of education is to be conducted but only that\nan undue neglect of it is an unwarrantable contempt of","height":"3986","width":"2156","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0505.jp2"},"506":{"fulltext":"500 EDUCATION.\nthe calls of the age, and a violation of the demands of hu-\nu.an nature.\n441. Of arithmctick, geography, mathcmaticks, c.\nIn the remarks, that have hitherto been made, we have\ntaken precautions against the admission of early preju-\ndices. Rules have been given with reference to the insti-\ntution of a salutary mental discipline, with such remarks\non the consideration of man, as a moral being and a mem-\nber of society, as seemed to have a bearing on this impor-\ntant subject. We now suppose, that the merit- 1 powers\nof our pupil have become in some degree expanded, and\nin good exercise and there are spread before him many\ndepartments, which present claims on his attention of\ngreater or less urgency. Something will be said on the\nstudy of languages in the next section a few remarks on\nsome other departments of study will be made here.\nArithmetics This branch of study presents claims\nto attention. The difficulties, which are to be met with\nin this pursuit, are generally not greater, than can be over-\ncome by the minds of young persons. It affords a good\nexercise to the reasoning powers, and helps to form habits\nof precision, arrangement, and classification. In cases\nwhere no foreign language is studied, we think of no de-\npartment of knowledge, which affords a better discipline\nto the young mind. Very much, however, depends upon\nthe manner, in which it is taught.\nGeography This science may also be studied at an\nearly period. It interests curiosity; gives employment to\nthe memory, and is a fruitful source of new ideas. Pecu-\nliarities in the climates of different countries, traits in the\ncharacter of the people, and striking curiosities naturally\nfall within the limits of this science. It is probably not\nso much the fault of the science as of those, who teach it,\nthat with too many pupils the knowledge, which they get,\nis a mere record of names. At a somewhat later period,\nsome departments of natural history may be attended to.\nTreatises on plants and animals are found to possess a great","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0506.jp2"},"507":{"fulltext":"EDUCATION. 601\ninterest for the young mind and the information, which\ncan be obtained on such subjects, is not less valuable\nthan interesting.\nAJathemiticks In a course of liberal education,\nmathematical studies deservedly hold a distinguished rank.\nMany have thought, that if we would enjoy the use of our\nmental powers in all their perfection, we inustdevo e much\ntime to sciences, admitting of demonstration. Such sci-\nences enable the mind to conceive with clearness, by form-\ning a habit of distinguishing one idea from another they\nquicken the susceptibility of judgment, and operate as a\nwholesome check on flights of imagination. Allowing\nto mathematicks the credit, to which it is entitled, it is but\njust to remark, that in one respect its influence is less fa-\nvourable. Persons, whose minds are exclusively trained\nup to demonstrative reas3ning, are liable to be perplexed\nand at a loss on subjects, which are not susceptible of\ndemonstration Their minds have been so long guided by\nthe evidence of intuition, that when left to the helps of\nmoral evidence merely, to circumstances and testimony,\nthey are perplexed and uncertain to a degree, which ap-\npears surprising to others, who have subjected themselves\nto a different sort of discipline. (See 230.) It is a\ncircumstance much in favour of mathematical studies, that\nthey are subservient to the pursuit of most of the other\nsciences particularly of the different branches of natur.il\nphi osophy.\nHistory. At a later period than the studies, which\nhave been mentioned, comes that of history. A slight\nacquaintance may have been previously formed with the\nannals of one s own country, and perhaps something more.\nBut a valuable knowledge of history implies much more\nthan this. No one can have such an acquaintance with\nhistory as is desirable, without first informing himself of\nthe characteristick properties of human nature. He must\nhave studied the mind of man the intellectual laws, to\nwhich he is subject the motives, which influence his con-\nduct the passions, which agitate him. A knowledge of\nthe doctrine of human rights, and of the principle! of na-","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0507.jp2"},"508":{"fulltext":"502 EDUCATION.\ntional policy and intercourse are also necessary. History,\nwhen studied under these advantages, possesses the high-\nest interest and importance.\n442. Of the study of languages.\nThe study oflanguages, more particularly of the Greek\nand Latin, has long been made a part of education. The\nreasons, which are commonly given for occupying a con-\nsiderable portion of time in this way, are chiefly these.\n(1) Much information is locked up in these languages.\nThe original Greek and Roman literature is of itself high-\nly valuable their poets, historians, and orators, are worthy\nof being compared with those of any age or nation. In\naddition to this, vast numbers of literary and other treati*\nses have been written in the Latin language in later peri-\nods, particularly on the readings and interpretation of an-\ncient authors, and on obscure and difficult points of histo-\nry. A person ignorant of that language is shut out from\nthe greater part of these important documents.\n(2) The intercourse of the world has been so much\nincreased in consequence of the spread of knowledge and\nthe facilities of commerce, that an acquaintance with some\nof the modern languages, particularly the Spanish, Italian,\nand French, is considered highly desirable. An entire\nignorance of all modern languages is thought to imply a\nvery defective education. But the languages, which have\nbeen mentioned, together with the Portuguese, have their\norigin in great part from the Latin and can be more\neasily and perfectly learnt by previously giving some at»\ntention to the parent dialect, than by attempting them\nwithout it.\n(3) No one, who speaks the English language, can deny\nthe importance of a thorough knowledge of it. It embod-\nies, and retains the vast wisdom of many good and learned\nmen and is the medium, by whhh the thoughts and feel-\nings of our own generation and of our own hearts are to be\ncommunicated. But in the knowledge of this language,\nthe student will find himself assisted by an acquaintance\nwith the Latin inasmuch as about one half of the words","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0508.jp2"},"509":{"fulltext":"EDUCATION.\nmi\nin the English language are derived from that source.\nThe Greek, which is a source of many English words, has\na similar argument in its favour and the additional cir-\ncumstance of being the original language of the New Tes-\ntament.\n(4) The study of languages answers a good purpose, as\na sort of basis of education. During the period from eight\nto eleven years of age, the intellect may be supposed to be\ndeveloping itself under the mere guidance of nature. It is\na great point in education to aid this developement, to\nkeep the mental powers in exercise, and to promote their\ngrowth. This object is known to be secured by the study\nof the languages in a high degree; certainly much more\nthan by the study of elhicks, history, mineralogy, chemistry,\nc; or even by the more appropriate study of arithmetick.\nIt is thought, that the object cannot be secured, in so high\na degree, by any other course of study whatever, which\ncan be pointed out.\n(5) It has also been strongly contended, that an acquaint-\nance with any language is a valuable acquisition, because\nit opens up new views of mental character. The language\nof every nati n is m dified by the exigencies of the peo-\nple, who speak it and by individual and national traits.\nIt embodies their emotions, custo ns, prejudices, domestick\nand political history. No nan, therefore, can m ike him-\nself fully acquainted with a new language, without having\nmore correct and broader views of the developement of\nthe mind, of the progress of men, as they rise from barba-\nrism to refinement, and of human nature in general. And\nthese advantages can be secured by the study of the Greek\nand Latin languages, no less than by others.\nIn view of this subject, all, that remains to be said here,\nis briefly this; -There can be no objection to changes in\nexisting systems of education, whenever good reasons can\nbe showfa for making them, whether they concern the study\nof languages, or any other part of education. On t^he con-\ntrary, systems of instruction ought to be examined into,\nand all improvements, of which they are susceptible, should\nbe made. The above statements, however, in favour of","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0509.jp2"},"510":{"fulltext":"604 EDUCATION.\nthe study of the classick languages, show, that the advo-\ncates for retaining them, as a part of the methods of liber-\nal education, do not give this preference to them without\nsome good grounds.\n443. Of education in connection with the progress\nof science.\nThe progress of education ought to keep pace with\nthe progress of the sciences and when the sciences are\nadvanced, and are spreading abroad their light, the mass\nof intellect, the minds of the great body of the people,\nought not to be kept back in the twilight of former ages.\nIt has been remarked and not without reason, that a young\nman, on completing his studies at a modern seminary, may\nhave made himself acquainted with those principles of\nmathematicks, in the acqusition of which the profound\nNewton spent his life. A similar remark may be made in\nrespect to all the departments of knowledge. The vast\nmultitude of facts in physicks have been reduced to order,\nand all the sciences, founded on observation and experi-\nence, have been compressed, as it were, into a smaller\nspace. What was the extent, the ultimate boundary of\nknowledge in one age, and was reached only by the most\npowerful minds, becomes in the succeeding age elementa-\nry, and makes a part of the rudiments of education.\nIn conducting, therefore, the process of education, it is\nof less consequence to inquire what was believed, and\nwhat was known in the sciences in former ages, than to\ninquire what is believed and known at the present moment.\nThere are thousands of treatises, which were once valua-\nble and entitled their authors to great credit; but have\nnow lost their interest, and have no claims to be put into\nthe hands of the student. It is true, they are the docu-\nments, out of which a history of the progress of the human\nmind is to be formed, but they arc out of place in those\nsystems of practical education, the object of which is to\nenlighten the minds of the great body of the people.\n674 j\nND.","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0510.jp2"},"511":{"fulltext":"","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0511.jp2"},"512":{"fulltext":"","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0512.jp2"},"513":{"fulltext":"","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0513.jp2"},"514":{"fulltext":"■ir\ns\noV\nf*-y*^?*\nA* 9\nOo\nI 1\nC o\nV\no 1\nj£\nv\nN\nDeacidifjed using the Bookkeeper process. I\nNeutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide\nireatment Date: August 2004\nPreservationTechnofoqies I\nA WORLD LEADER N PAPE* PRESERVAT.ON I\n1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive\nCranberry Township, PA 16066\n(724)779-2111","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0514.jp2"},"515":{"fulltext":"•V\ns s v\ns\nv\n-e*","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0515.jp2"},"516":{"fulltext":"LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\n012 825 669 6\nm\nWBA\ni\nHE\nVIM\nI\n■9\n^m\nwm\nV\nuna\nH\n8\nM\nIBM\nEM","height":"3967","width":"2112","jp2-path":"elementsofintell00upha_0516.jp2"}}