«► 4T "^U. cF « • • - vv * ■#« °-v .* r- W £B£v %^ •- /W*. I 4? «Ck « • ^ {ftnifcergitp Litton* THE FEDERALIST: COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WRITTEN IN FAVOR OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AS AGREED UPON BY THE FCEDERAL CONVENTION, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787. REPRINTED FROM THE ORIGINAL TEXT. UNDER THE EDITORIAL SUPERVISION OF HENRY B. DAWSON. NEW YORK: CHAELES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 1888. JKl5~f dopy ^ Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1864, hy Henry B. Dawson, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York SEPT. 3, 1946 THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE: STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED B9 H. 0. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY. PKEFACE. The use of The Federalist as a text-book, in the collegiate institutions of the United States, is by no means a new and untried experiment ; and the recent introduction of the work into the classes of the venera- ble University at Cambridge, and the proposed intro- duction of it into those of other institutions in other States of the Union, will, it is hoped, be productive of the best results in the future of our country's political history. To promote so commendable a purpose this edition has been prepared; in which, beside the original text, a carefully prepared Analysis of the work, and of the claims to authorship of its several Numbers, have been introduced. The text employed is that which the distinguished Authors themselves originally gave to the world, with- out addition, abridgment, or the least alteration, except where typographical errors were subsequently corrected by the Authors themselves, or are apparent and unques- tionable ; and as the People for whom it was written, iv Preface* and to whom it was especially addressed, received and acted on it in the form in which its Authors presented it, the Editor has neither felt at liberty to alter that form in the least degree himself, nor to recognize any such alterations by others, except in the cases already referred to. Henry B. Dawson. Morrisania, N. T., September, 1864. SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. Essay. Page I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION, No. I. 1 II. "THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR [the People of the State of New York] POLITICAL PRO SPERIT Y," II. 6 1. introduction, 6 2. in its political relations with foreign nations, III. 12 A. by securing it against dangers from foreign arms and influence, 12 A. through a removal of the usual causes of just war, 13 a. violations of compacts and treaties, 13 A. by securing a more perfect administration of govern- ment, 13 a. by the employment of better men than those employed in State governments, 13 b. by an uniform interpretation of the provisions of those compacts and treaties, 14 c. by avoiding the local temptation to bad faith to which a single State may yield, 14 d. by avoiding local prejudices to which a single State may be subject, 14 b. direct and unlawful violence, 15 B. through the greater ability which it will afford to settle ami- cably those causes of just war, 16 a. in the absence of local pride and prejudices, 16 b. in the greater strength of the States when united, 16 C. through its removal beyond the influence of unjust causes, IV. 17 a. the superior power of neighboring nations, 17 b. ths jealousy of foreign powers from successful trade, 18 B. by securing it from similar influences in the several States, if disunited, V. 22 C. by preventing European alliances with rival States or con- federacies, 26 8. in its political relations with the Peoples of other States, VI. 27 A by securing it from inter-State hostilities, 27 a. the danger of hostilities arising between "independent, un- connected sovereignties," 27 a. through love of power 28 b. through jealousy of power, 28 c. through competitions of commerce, 28 d. through individual passions and influences, 28 vi Contents. Essay. Pag« A. Pericles and Aspasia referred to, No. VI. 28 B. the Peloponnesian war referred to, 28 C. Cardinal Wolsey referred to, 29 D. Madame de Maintenon referred to, 29 E. Duchess of Marlborough referred to, 29 F. Madame de Pompadour referred to, 29 G. Shays and the rebellion in Massachusetts referred to,. . 30 B. objections of anti-constitutionists answered, 30 a. " the genius of republics is pacific," 30 b. " the spirit of commerce tends to peace," 30 A. Introductory remarks, 30 B. Sparta referred to, 31 C. Athens referred to, 31 D. Pome referred to, 31 E. Cartilage referred to, , , 31 F. Venice referred to, 31 G. Holland referred to, . , 31 17. Great Britain referred to, 32 c. an appeal to the People, founded on these examples, ... 32 C. the inducements which the disunited States could have to make war on each other considered, VII. 34 a. the same which have produced wars elsewhere, 34 b. special causes within themselves, 34 A. unadjusted territorial disputes, 34 a. introductory remarks, 34 b. crown-lands, within the States, 34 c. western lands, 35 d. Wyoming lands, 36 e. New Hampshire grants, 36 B. commercial rivalry, 37 a. disregard of local revenue laws generally, 37 6. jealousy of New York in New Jersey and Connecticut, 38 C the existing debt of the confederacy, 38 a. in its apportionment among the States, . . 38 6. in its extinguishment, 38 D. local laws violative of private contracts, 40 E. incompatible alliances between individual States and foreign powers, 40 p. the consequences of inter-State hostilities, VIII. 41 a. primarily, great destruction of life and property, 42 b. ultimately, 43 A. the establishment of standing armies,. 43 B. the extension of the power of the executive, 44 C. the elevation of the military over the civil power, 44 C. objections answered, . 44 A. standing armies were not created in ancient Greece, ... 46 Contents. vii Essay. Page. B. the impotency of the army in Great Britain,. No. VIII. 46 d. the general subject discussed, and the value of the Union enforced, , ,-.-.47,. / 4. in affording a barrier to domestic faction and insurrection,. » .IX. 48 A. liability of republics to experience these troubles, />rrT"38 B. they afford arguments for the advocates of despotism, 49 C. the utility of a confederacy to guard against these troubles, 50 a. resorted to in other ages and countries, 50 B. approved by most authors on the subject of politics, 50 a. Montesquieu's sentiments concerning extended territories, under republican governments, misrepresented by the Anti-foederalists, 50 b. his views on a confederate republic, 51 C. distinction between a confederacy and a consolidation of the States discussed, 53 a. what a confederacy is said to be, 53 b. what a confederacy really is, 53 A. the proposed Constitution a confederate republican form of government, 54 B. the Lycian Confederacy a confederate republic, 54 D. the propensity of popular governments to faction, ^X. J ffi E. the United States liable to the same result, 55 F. what constitutes " a faction," 56 G. in what way its mischief may be cured, 56 A. by removing its causes, 56 a. in the destruction of the liberty of the People, 56 b. by causing every citizen to possess the same opinions, passions, and interests, 56 C. the first unwise, the second impracticable, 56 B. by controlling its effects, 56 a. the nature and purposes of " factions," 57 b. when the faction is a minority, " by regular vote," 59 c. when the faction is a majority, 59 A. by dividing the prevailing influences, 60 B. by preventing the concentration of those influences, 60 H. the advantage of a representative government over a democracy in curing the mischiefs of faction, 60 L the advantages of an extended republic over a small one, in like cases, 6^ 6. in their commercial relations with foreign nations, XI. A. the growing commerce of America has excited the jealousy of foreign powers, 65 B. the necessity of uniformity of action in America in order to secure the benefits arising from its own markets, 65 C. the establishment of a Foederal navy another resource for commanding the respect of foreign nations, , . 67 viii Contents. Essay. Page D. " a steady adherence to the Union " necessary to secure all the commercial advantages which America possesses, No. XI. 67 E. the effects of disunion on the commerce of America, 68 A. the rivalship of the different parts would frustrate all their natural advantages for promoting commerce, 68 B. it would become " a prey to the wanton intermeddling of all nations who are at war with each other/' 68 a. neutrality is respected only when it can be adequately de- fended, 68 C. it would produce "little arts of little politicians to control or vary the irresistible course of nature " in the growth of our commerce, 68 D. it would invite foreign nations to interfere with our rights, 68 a. by prescribing the conditions of our political existence, ... 68 b. by embarrassing our commerce, 68 c. by interfering with the commercial rights of the Union, which had been then acquired, 69 A. in the fisheries, 69 a. the importance of the fisheries to France and Britain, 69 b. our " decided mastery " therein, a subject of impor- tance to those powers, 69 ir. their importance to all the commercial States, 69 i. in affording a field for their enterprise, 69 ii. in affording a nursery for the mercantile marine,. . 69 d. their importance in promoting the establishment of a Foederal navy, 70 B. in the navigation of the western lakes, 69 C. in the navigation of the Mississippi River, 69 a. the jealousy of Spain on that subject, 69 6. in promoting the establishment of a Foederal navy, 70 A. such a navy would be mutually advantageous to all the States, 70 7. in their commercial relations with the Peoples of other States,... 70 A. it would promote the interchange of their respective produc- tions, 70 B. " the veins of commerce would be replenished " and invig- orated, 70 C. a greater variety would be afforded to the commerce of the country, 71 D. the aggregate balance of trade would be increased, in favor of America, 71 E. objection, concerning the necessary course of inter-State com- merce, in any event, answered, 71 F. the assumed superiority of Europe referred to, and Americans appealed to to disprove it, 71 8. in respect to revenue, XII. 73 A. commerce the most productive source of national wealth, .... 78 Contents. ix Essay. Page B. it increases the ability of the inhabitants to pay taxes, No. XII. 74 C. the system of u direct taxation " unsuccessful in the United States, 7 J D. " indirect taxation " the main dependence for the necessary revenues, 75 a. because " the genius of the People " is opposed to excise laws, 75 B. because the scarcity of money will render the collection of excise duties difficult, 75 E. the union of the States will best enable us to improve this resource, 75 A by being conducive to commerce from whence it is drawn,.. 76 b. by simplifying the regulations for its collection, 76 F. the separation of the States would destroy this source of revenue, 76 a. by promoting illicit trade, 76 B. by promoting jealousy between the States, and ultimate re- duction of impost duties, in order to secure trade, 76 C. from the absence of sufficiently rigorous border-guards be- tween the States, and the improbability of their establish- ment, 76 a. the ordinary powers of border-guards intolerable in a free country, 76 b. border-guards unnecessary with the States united, 77 6. the effect of a destruction of this resource, 78 a. necessity of revenue to the existence of a nation, 78 B. if it cannot be obtained from commerce it must be taken from the real estate of the inhabitants, 79 a. because excises will not be available, 79 b. because the objects proper for excise within the agricul- tural States will be insufficient to produce the requisite revenue, 79 c. because it is difficult to trace personal property, 79 in the greater economy in the administration of government, XIII. 80 A. " if the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support," 80 B. "if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many national civil lists to be provided for," 80 A. speculations on the number of confederacies to be formed from the d€bris of the Union, 80 B. each small confederacy will require a civil list as extended as has been proposed in the new system for the aggregate of all the States, 80 a. because of the extent of territory which each will occupy. 80 b. because of the necessary plurality of the revenue depart ments 82 x Contents. Essay. P*ge c. because of the necessary plurality of the military estab- lishments, No. XIII. 83 10. the objection which has been drawn from the extent of territory which the Union occupies, answered, XIV 83 A. the distinction between a republic and a democracy noticed,.. 84 B. the errors of political writers concerning the turbulence in the ancient republics, 84 C. practicability of extending the limits of a republic., , 85 D. the territory of the United States not too extended for their proper government, 85 E. the territory of the United States compared with those of some European nations, 86 F. the jurisdiction of the United States limited to objects of general interest, 86 G. the objects of the proposed Constitution are to secure the union of the thirteen primitive States, and to add to their number,. 87 H. the intercourse between the States will be daily facilitated by improvements for transit of passengers, etc., 87 I. almost every State being a frontier State, all will be exposed to foreign aggression, and all, alike, need protection, 87 J. an appeal to the People of New York to avoid disunion, 88 III. " THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFED- ERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION," XV. 90 1. introductory remarks, 90 2. the proposition neither controverted nor doubted, 91 3. disastrous result of its inefficacy, 91 4. an appeal to the People to " break the charm" of the confedera- tion, 93 6. the character of the opposition to the Constitution, and its incon- sistency, , 93 6. the character of the defects in the confederacy, 94 A. the legislation for States, in their corporate capacity, 94 A. the bad effect of this evil in raising men and money, 94 b. the opposition to the new system, because it deviates from this principle, considered generally, 94 c. the peculiarities of a simple league between independent nations, considered, 94 D. tlie eiiectof a simple league, as the bond of union between the States, considered generally, 95 B. such a bond of union inconsistent with the organization of " a superintending power, under the direction of a common council," 96 F. it is also inconsistent with the authority, over the persons of the citizens, Avhich is necessary in the establishment of a government, 96 a. the purposes of government considered generally, 96 Contents, xi b. the penalties which governments find it necessary to in- flict on offenders against their laws, No. XV. 9d A. the coercion of the magistracy, which is applicable only to men, 96 B. the coercion of arms, which is applicable only to States, 96 a. it would be productive of constant war 96 b. it would be subversive of every purpose of govern- ment, 96 C. the argument that breaches of the laws by the States need not be expected, considered, 96 A. such breaches would arise from the passions of the in- dividual members of the States, 97 B. from the impatience of control which arises from the sovereign powers of the States, 97 Q. the improbability of the execution of the Fcederal measures, in a simple league of the States, considered and averred, . . 98 a. supported by the natural constitution of the local author- ities, 98 b. supported by the experience of the United States, under the old confederation, = 99 C. supported by the experience of similar confederacies, else- where, XVI. 100 A. the Lycian and Achsean leagues not thus exposed, 100 H. the employment of force in executing the measures of such a league, " in its application to us," considered, 100 a. it would be productive of constant war between the States, 101 b. it would lead to counter-alliances between individual States, 101 c. it would lead to alliances between foreign nations and portions of the Union, 101 d. it would lead to " the violent death of the confederacy," 102 e. and to the establishment of a military despotism, 103 1. the impracticability of sustaining the Union by military co- ercion, 103 1. an efficient government can only be established on the re- sponsibility of individual citizens, 103 a. objections answered ; that the States, as such, may still interpose their authority, and obstruct the execution of the laws, 104 b. that individuals, also, more or less numerous, may still oppose the government, 105 c. that the reserved rights of the States would be invaded by the Fcederal government,. XVII. 107 A. the absence of any competent inducement, 107 B. the People of the several States, through the House of Representatives, could frustrate such an attempt, .... 108 sii Contents. Essay. Page C. the greater danger that the delegated authority of the Fcederal government will be invaded by the State governments, No. XVII. 108 a. from the superior influence which they will exercise over the People, 108 l. from the diffusive construction of the Foederal gov- ernment, 108 ii. from the nature of the objects of local control, ... 108 b. the general subject considered, 169 i. enforced by argument, 109 ii. illustrated from the history of the feudal system, . 110 iii. illustrated from the history of Scotland, Ill iv. illustrated from the history of the Amphictyonic league, XVIII. 112 V. illustrated from the history of the Achaean league, 115 vi. illustrated from the history of the Germanic league, ' XIX. 119 vii. illustrated from the history of Poland, 125 viii. illustrated from the history of Switzerland, 125 ix. illustrated from the history of the United Nether- lands, XX. 126 K. concluding remarks, 131^ B. " the total want of a sanction to its laws," XXI. 132 A. the Foederal government possesses no power to exact obe- dience, 132 B. the Foederal government possesses no power to punish dis- obedience, 132 C. the Foederal government has received no express delegation of authority to use force against the States ; 132 C. " the want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments," 133 A. the consequent absence of authority in the Foederal govern- ment to assist a State in enforcing its own laws, 134 B. the danger of an " officious interference in the domestic concerns of its members" by the Foederal government considered, 134 D " the principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common treasury, by quotas," 135 A. the standard of constitutional wealth, 135 b. the causes on which it is dependent, 136 c. the rule of the confederation, on taxation, is unequal and oppressive, 136 D. this cause alone is sufficient to work the destruction of the Union, 136 fi. the remedy proposed for this evil, 137 a. the advantages of taxes on articles of consumption, 137 b. the advantages attending indirect taxation, 138 Contents. lit Essay. Page E. " the want of a power to regulate commerce," No. XXII. 139 a. it operates as a bar to the formation of commercial treaties, 189 b. it has given occasion for dissatisfaction between the States, 139 F. the raising of troops by quotas, 140 a. it produces great expense in raising troops, 140 b. it is not conducive to a vigorous system of defence, 140 c. it is unequal in the burden it imposes on the several States, 141 G. the right of equal suffrage among the States, in the Congress, 141 A. arising from the inequality of weight among the States,. . 142 a. objection that sovereigns are equal, answered, 142 b. objection that " a majority of the States will be a major- ity of confederated America," answered, 142 c. objection that two thirds of the States, in approval, are necessary to the most important acts, 142 A. the mischief which is incident to the last-named rule, 143 B. the danger from foreign corruption which it imposes, 144 a. republics particularly exposed to this evil, 145 6. instances when this evil has prevailed, 146 i. the deputies of the United Provinces, 146 ii. the authorities in Sweden, 146 H. " the want of a judiciary power," 146 A. to expound and define the true meaning and operation of the laws, 146 b. to ascertain the true import of treaties with foreign na- tions, 146 C. to secure uniformity in the decision of the judges, 147 L " the organization of Congress utterly improper for the ex- ercise of those powers which are necessary to a Foederal Union, 148 J. the existing Foederal system never had a ratification by the People, 149 [V. "THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT " [the preser- vation of the Union], XXIII. 150 1 concerning " the objects to be provided for by the Foederal government," 150 A. " the common defence of the members," 150 a. "the authorities essential to the care of the common de- fence," 150 a. " to raise armies," 150 b. " to build and equip fleets," 150 C. " to prescribe rules for the government of both " the ar- mies and the fleets, 150 d. " to direct their operations," 150 e. " to provide for their support," 150 xiv Contents. Essay. Page B " these powers ought to exist without limitation," No. XXIII. 160 a. " because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies," 150, 151 b. because it is impossible to foresee "the extent and variety of means which may be necessary to satisfy " those exigencies, 150, 151 C. this principle fully recognized in the Articles of Confed- eration, 151 d. no " proper or adequate provision for its exercise " made in those articles, 151 e. the expectations concerning it of the framers of those articles, 152 f. " this expectation was ill-founded and illusory," 152 g. the effect of that failure, 152 h. the remedy therefor, the measures proposed in the new Constitution, 152 C. objection, the danger of standing armies, considered, XXIV. 156 a. the powers referred to are delegated to the legisla- tive department, not to the executive of the Union, 15G b. the Congress itself, in the exercise of the powers re- ferred to, is expressly limited by the terms of the proposed Constitution, 157 c. the State constitutions, with two exceptions, contain no interdiction of standing armies, in time of peace, 157 d. the Articles of Confederation "had not imposed a single restraint on the authority of the United States " on this subject, 158 e. the constant danger of the United States from foreign and Indian hostilities renders such authority in the Foederal government necessary, 159 f. the growing commerce of the United States demands a navy for its protection, 161 D. objection, " that the objects enumerated above ought to be provided for by the 'State governments," considered, XXV. 162 a. " it would be an inversion of the primary principle of our political association," by transferring the care of the common defence to the individual members of the Union, 162 A. the result of which would be "oppressive to some States," 162 B. it might become dangerous to all the States, through the inefficiency or inability of some of them, 163 C. it would create jealousy by increasing the military power of some of the States, 168 Contents. x^ Essay. Pagt D. it might afford temptation for invading the constitu- tional authority of the Union, No. XXV. 163 b. the provisions of the Articles of Confederation on State military and naval establishments, referred to, 164 K. the impropriety of restraining the discretion of Congress, on keeping up armies, further considered, . 164 a. the uncertainty of the period or extent of the danger to be guarded against, 164 b. it presumes a possibility of collusion between the Con- gress and the executive, in schemes of usurpation,. . . . 165 F. the impropriety of restraining Congress in raising armies in times of peace considered, 165 0. the objection that " the militia of the country is its natu- ral bulwark," considered, 166 a. it often wants " vigor and stability," 166 b. it is not the most economical, 166 c. standing armies sometimes necessary in times of external peace, 167 A. instance of Pennsylvania, notwithstanding her Bill of Rights, 167 B. instance of Massachusetts, notwithstanding the Arti- cles of Confederation, 167 H. the danger of " fettering the government with restric- tions " considered, 167 1. " the idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defence," further con- sidered, XXVI. 169 a. its origin, 169 b. it never found much favor in America, 169 J. " the idea which aims at the exclusion of military estab- lishments in times of peace," further considered, 170 a. its origin and progress, 170 b. vesting authority on the subject in the Congress, a suffi- cient safeguard, 171 A. because the subject must be reconsidered every two 3 7 ears, 173 'B. because "schemes to subvert the liberties of a people require time to mature them for execution," which cannot be secured, 174 C. objection, that the executive may seize supplies, an- swered, 175 D. an appeal for the Union based on this objection, 175 B. concerning the administration of the laws, XXVII. 176 A. the assertion that the laws which the Constitution au- thorizes cannot be executed without the aid of a military force, considered, 176 tvi Contents. Essay Pag« a. unless the Foederal government shall be worse admin- istered than the State governments, there will be no danger from popular ill-will, No. XXVII. 176 b. it is probable that the former will be better administered than the latter, 177 A. from the greater latitude of choice, in the selection of officers, 177 B. from the peculiar care and judgment with which the Foederal Senate will be composed, 177 C. from the superior intelligence of the Foederal Con- gress, 177 D. from the absence of faction therein, 177 c. there will be less liability to sedition, because there will be a greater power to suppress it, 178 d. the Foederal government " will be strengthened by its extension to matters of internal concern," 178 S. the proposed form of government " bids much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force," than that proposed by its opponents, 179 a. because " it enables the Foederal government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each State, in the execution of its laws," 179 b. because it displays to the People the common origin of both the Foederal and the State governments, 179 c. because it conveys to the People the consideration of its superior power to enforce obedience, and thereby checks disaffection, 179 A. "the laws of the confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, the supreme law of the land," 180 O. "there may happen cases in which the National govern- ment may be necessitated to resort to force,".. .XXVIII. 181 a. in which cases force must be employed, 181 A. examples referred to, in the individual States, 182 B. it would be equally necessary in the plan proposed by the opponents of the new system, 182 b. it will be entirely controlled by the representatives of the People, 183 A. if the Congress betrays the People there is no remedy but " the original right of self-defence, which is para- mount to all positive forms of government," 183 B. in that case it may be remedied better than if a State government should be similarly treacherous, 183 V, tho State governments the greatest security against Foederal usurpations of power by the Foederal au- thorities. . 186 Contents. xvii Essay. Page D. the great extent of our territory affords additional se- curity, No. XXVIII. 185 E. the limited resources of the country afford still more security, 185 C. concerning " a general power of taxation,". XXIX. 186 A. such authority is necessary in every constitution, .... 187 a. the want of such authority leads either to official plunder, or, 187 b. to " a fatal atrophy " in the government, and speedy dis- solution, 187 B in the present confederation, the want of it has produced disaster, 187 0. the only remedy is " that of permitting the National gov- ernment to raise its own revenues by the ordinary meth- ods of taxation," . . . . 188 O. objection, that the authority of Congress should be limited to " external taxation," answered, .... 188 B. reply, "that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the States," considered, 189 a. the "vices and deformities" of the system of requisi- tions, considered, 189 b. its effect in time of war, 190 A. primarily, no " proper dependence " on the plan, 191 B. secondly, the diversion of other funds, already appro- priated, to the defence of the State, 191 C. thirdly, the destruction of public credit, 191 D. fourthly, difficulty in procuring loans, 191 E. finally, disaster to the country, 191 F. surrejoinder, "that, from the scantiness of the resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds would exist, though the National government should possess this power," considered, 191 a. " the resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the Union," 191 b. " whatever deficiency there may be, can readily be sup- plied by loans, 191 A. confidence inspired, among lenders, by the delegation of this authority of taxation, 192 B. distrust arising from the absence of that authority, in the Confederation, removed, 192 ©. the necessity of " a general power of taxation *' further considered, XXX. 192 a. the importance of " first principles," on every general subject, 192 b. " first principles " in morals and politic* less frequently b fcviii Contents. Bssay. Pag* assented to than those of other branches of knowl- edge, No. XXX. 194 c. the reason for that diversity of opinion in morals and politics is the passions and prejudices of the rea- soner, 194 d. the same influences prevail among the opponents of the new system, 194 A. the reasoning of the anti-Foederalists reviewed, 194 B. their fairness, in argument, considered, 195 C. a review of Publius's arguments on the powers of the government, 197 D. a review of the anti-Foederal arguments on the proba- bility of usurpation by the Foederal government, 197 * E. a review of the arguments on the probable aggres- sions of the State governments on the Foederal au- thority, 197 a. the sympathy of the People with the State govern- ments, 197 & objection, that such a power in the Foederal government would interfere with the State governments in their levies of money, considered, XXXI. 198 a. the sense of the People, a barrier to the oppressive use of this power by the Foederal authorities, 198 b. the hazard of provoking the resentments of the State governments, another barrier thereto, 198 c. a conviction of the utility and necessity of local adminis- trations, for local purposes, a third barrier thereto, 198 d. the several States would still retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues, . . . 198 A. an attempt, by the Foederal authorities, to abridge that authority will be a violent assumption of unconstitu- tional power, 199 B. the sovereignty of the Foederal authorities limited in extent, 199 a. " where the Constitution in express terms grants an ex- clusive authority to the Union," 199 6. "where it grants an authority to the Union and prohibits the States from exercising the like au- thority," 199 c. " where it grants an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant," 199 C the only exclusive power of taxation which is delegated to the Foederal government is that of imposing taxes on imports, 200 D the authority to impose taxes on all other articles is Contents. xix Essay. Pagr concurrent and coequal in the Foederal and the State authorities, No. XXXI. 200 a. it has not been exclusively granted to the Union, 200 6. it has not been prohibited to the several States, 200 c. it is a necessary deduction from the particular re- straint which has been imposed on the States con- cerning duties on exports and imports, 200 i. the contrary would be an unnecessary restraint on the States, 201 ii. it would also be a dangerous restraint on them, 201 ill. " the restriction in question is a negative preg- nant," 201 d. there is no repugnancy between the authority to levy taxes by the Foederal authorities, and that un- der which the State governments do the same, . . . 202 e. concurrent authority to levy taxes the necessary re- sult of a division of the sovereign power, 202 I. objection to the delegation of incidental powers of taxation to the Foederal government considered, 203 a. no authority delegated which it Avould not have necessarily possessed, 203 b. the authority to levy taxes carries with it all the incidental authority which may be necessary and proper to carry it into execution, 204 c. the express delegation of incidental authority an act of caution, 205 d. the Foederal authorities must judge, in the first instance, what may be necessary and proper powers for them to exercise, 205 e. the constituents of that government must be the ultimate judge of the necessity and propriety of employing such powers, 205 A. how the constitutional impropriety of a Foederal meas- ure must be determined, 206 B. instances wherein such impropriety would be evident, 206 /. objection, that the laws of the Union concerning taxation are supreme, considered, 206 a. any other than supreme laws would be useless, 206 b. all laws must, necessarily, be supreme to those to whom they apply, 206 C. " acts which are not pursuant to the Constitution are merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treat- ed as such," 207 d. the new system " expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution," 207 •. any act of the United States which interferes with a *x Contents, Essay. Page State tax-law (unless upon imports and exports) an un- constitutional usurpation of power, No. XXXI. 207 K. " concurrent authority concerning taxation the only ad- missible substitute for an entire subordination of the States," XXXII. 208 a. absurdity of denying the practical impossibility of coor- dinate authority, 208 b. illustrations of its practicability, from Roman history,. . . 209 c. difficulties which will interfere with its execution less powerful than those which existed in Rome, 209 d. purposes of a Foederal revenue more extended than those which the State governments must provide for, ... 210 A. " there ought to be a capacity to provide for future contingencies," 210 JB. there must be a capacity to provide for the public de- fence, 210 C. for the payment of public debts, 212 e. concluding remarks, urging that a delegation of concur- rent authority was preferable to an entire subordi- nation of the States to the Foederal authorities, 214 L. objection, "that the jurisdiction of the National govern- ment, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects," considered, XXXIII. 215 a. it would oppress particular branches of industry, 215 b. taxes would be unequally distributed, 215 C. illustration from the proposed limitation of its jurisdic- tion to duties on imports, 215 A. objections against a high tariff, 216 a. it encourages smuggling, 216 b. it renders other classes tributary to the manufactur- ing classes, who will hold a monopoly of the mar- kets 216 c. it will force industry out of its more natural channels into those which are less beneficial, 216 d. it will oppress the merchant in the payment, of duties,. 216 B. the limitation proposed would be productive of in- equality of taxation among the several States, 216 C. the objection, " that the interest of the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against an extreme tariff," considered, 217 M. objection, that the House of Representatives cannot con- tain representatives of all classes of tax-paying citizens, considered, 218 a. such a special representation of each class impracticable, 219 b. merchants the natural representatives of the mechanic and manufacturing classes, 219 Contents. xxi Essay Page c. the learned professions form no distinct class in so- ciety, No. XXXIII. 21S d. the landholders will be well represented by those in whom they have most confidence, without regard to the extent of their property, 220 e. the good effects of a mixed representation, and the impracticability of special delegations from particular classes, 220 f. men possessing the most extensive information will best represent all classes, 221 g. men of strong minds, who belong to no particular class, will sometimes command the attention which is due to their merit, XXXIV. 222 h. men of different trades will seldom possess greater sym- pathy for each other than the merchant will for both, . . 222 H. objection, that a power of internal taxation in the Fced- eral Congress cannot be exercised with advantage for the want of sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, con- sidered, 224 a. the memhers from each State can obtain the necessary information, 224 b. systems of finance are usually framed by a few per- sons, 224 c. local disabilities may be easily ascertained and under- stood, 225 d. the assessment of property to be taxed will devolve on discreet persons who are acquainted with " local de- tails," 225 e. " the National legislature can make use of the system of each State within that State," 226 f. the proportion of taxes among the States is fixed, and is "to be determined by the numbers of each State," respectively, 226 g. if this power should prove " to be really inconvenient," it need not be used, and requisitions may be resorted to, 226 A. " why not omit that ambiguous power, in the first in- stance, and rely on requisitions 1 " answered, 227 a. because, if convenient, this mode will be prefer- able, : 22 b. because the existence of such authority will give greater efficacy to requisitions, 227 O. clashing of authority concerning taxation, State and Fed- eral, cannot occur, 227 p. minor objections to the delegation of authority to levy taxes considered, 227 xxii Contents. Essay. Page a. double sets of revenue officers, No. XXXIV. 228 b. "duplication of the popular burdens by double taxa- tions," 229 c. " the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll- taxes," ^ 229 2. in " the power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion,". XXXV. 231 A. uniformity in its organization and discipline is desirable,. . . . 231 B. that uniformity is attainable only by confiding the regulation of the militia to the Foederal authorities, 231 C. the weakness of those who oppose the delegation of this au- thority to the Foederal authorities, 232 D. objection, that no provision has been made for calling out the posse comitatus, to assist the Foederal magistrate, con-, sidered, 232 E. objection, that danger may be apprehended from the dele- gation of such an authority, considered, 233 A. the project for a militia establishment which " Pdblius " approved, 233 B. the necessity for a military establishment would, thereby, be diminished, 235 C. the pretence of danger from a disciplined militia ridiculed,. 235 d. the authority absolutely retained by the States, to appoint the officers of the militia, a sufficient safeguard, 235 F. objection, based on the authority to order the militia into distant States, considered, 236 V. " THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITU- TION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT," XXXVI. 238 1. introductory remarks, 238 A. difficulty of investigating public measures with moderation and candor, 239 B. the manner in which the proposed Constitution has been dis- cussed, considered, 239 a. the predetermined friend of the new system may be up- right, 2d0 B. the predetermined opponent "cannot be upright and must be culpable," 240 C. The FazderaUst not addressed either to predetermined enemies or friends of the measure, but to those who desire the happi- ness of their country, 240 D. in considering the plan allowances must be made for the dif- ficulties, inherent in the very nature of the undertaking, which the Convention experienced, , 240 A. the novelty of the undertaking, 240 B. the difficulty of " combining the requisite stability and en- Contents. xxiii Essay. Pag« ergy in government with a due regard to liberty and the republican form/' No. XXXVI. 241 O. the difficulty of " marking the proper line of partition be- tween the authority of the General, and that of the State governments," 242 D. " the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller States," 245 B. " other combinations [of the States], resulting from a dif- ference of local position and policy," 245 E. it need not excite wonder if the proposed Constitution shall want harmony between its several parts, 246 F. the experience of the past, on similar subjects, when com- pared with the result in this case, proves, 246 a. that the Convention was not afflicted with party animosi- ties, and, 247 B. that "all the deputations composing the Convention were finally accommodated," 247 6. " in every case reported by ancient history in which gov- ernment has been established with deliberation and con- sent," it has been framed by a single individual, XXXVII. 247 H. the difficulties which they experienced in the establishment of their governments, 248 I. the errors which the new system contains are rather the re- sult of the defect of antecedent experience, than of the want of accuracy and care in preparing it, 249 a. proved from general causes, 249 b. from the peculiar amendments to the Articles of Confedera- tion which have been proposed for ratification, 250 J. the present situation of America considered, 250 a. the severity of " her malady," 251 b. the diversity of the advice given for her relief, 251 c. improbability that those who object to the new system could improve it, 254 D. the proposed Constitution, notwithstanding its defects, an improvement on the old one, 254 B. the principal grounds of objection to the new one exist, or are permitted to be exercised, under the old one, 255 F. answer, that notwithstanding these practices, under the old constitution, they are rendered harmless by the entire dependence of the Congress on the constituent States, considered, 255 G. the Congress not open to censure for assuming doubtful authority, 257 % ' a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the Convention," XXXVHI. 258 xxiv Contents. Essay. Page A. no other than a strictly republican form of government recon- cilable with the genius of the People of America, No. XXXVIII. 258 A., what are the distinctive characters of the republican form, considered, „ 258 a. the example of Holland referred to, 258 b. the example of Venice referred to, 258 c. the example of Poland referred to, 258 d. the example of England referred to, 259 e. the general subject discussed, 259 B. the proposed Constitution conforms to the standard here fixed, 260 a. in the tenure of its offices, 260 B. in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, 261 C. objection, that it has not preserved the Foederal form, but provides for a National government, considered, . . . 261 a. what is the real character of the proposed government, . . 261 A. it will be founded on the assent and ratification of the People of the several States, as such, 262 B. the sources from which its ordinary powers will be drawn, 263 a. the House of Representatives, from the People of America, 263 b. the Senate, from the States, as such, 263 c. the Executive, 263 i. immediately from the States in their political char- acters, 263 ii. eventually by the House of Representatives, as representatives of the States, as distinct and co- equal bodies politic, 263 C. the operation of its ordinary powers, 263 D. the extent of its ordinary powers, 264 E. the authority by which amendments are to be made, . 265 F. the subject generally discussed, 266 b was the Convention authorized to frame and propose a mixed system, XXXIX. 266 A. the commissions of its members examined, ... 266 B. the recommendatory acts considered, 266 C. the authority of the Convention deduced therefrom,. 267 a. " to establish, in these States, a firm National govern- ment," 267 6. that government to be "adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of the Union" 267 e. these purposes were " to be effected by alterations and provisions in the Articles of Confederation," 268 d. these alterations were to be reported to the Congress and to the States, for approval and ratification, 268 Contents. xxv Essay Page D. the general subject discussed, No. XXXIX. 268 C how far considerations of duty might have supplied any defect of regular authority in the Convention, 272 A. as its powers were merely advisory and recommen- datory, the proposed system is harmless until it shall be approved, 272 B. the importance, to the United States, of the result of its deliberations, 273 C. the necessity which existed for a radical change in the form of government, 274 D. the question whether the Convention exceeded its powers does not affect the propriety of ratifying the proposed Constitution, 275 C. the Constitution proposed by the Convention considered,. XL. 276 A. "the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the [Foed- eral] government " considered 276 a. is the aggregate of that power greater than it should be,. 276 A. the arguments of opponents considered generally, 277 B. the objects of those powers considered, 277 a. concerning " security against foreign danger," . 278 i. the power of declaring war and granting letters of marque, 278 ii. that of providing armies and fleets, 278 i. it must be indefinite, 278 ii. it must extend to times of peace as well as to those of war, 278 Hi. the danger from military establishments consid- ered, 279 iii. that of regulating and calling forth the militia,. . . 284 iv. that of levying and borrowing money, 284 i. the authority to levy internal taxes considered, . . 285 ii. the indefinite character of the authority consid- ered, 285 A. it has been sufficiently restricted, 286 33. it was copied from the old system, 287 C. an appeal to the objectors, 287 b. concerning the " regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations," XLI. 288 L the power to send and receive ambassadors and consuls and to make treaties, 288 ii. to punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the laws of nations, 289 iii. to regulate foreign commerce, 29C i. reflections on the sanction of the slave-trade... . . 290 ii. objection to the Constitution, based on that clause, considered, 291 ix vi Contents. Essay. Pa^e c. the " maintenance of harmony and proper inter- course among the States," No. XLI. 291 i. to regulate commerce among the States and the Indian tribes, 292 ii. to coin money, and to regulate its value and that of foreign coin, 294 . iii. to provide for the punishment of counterfeiters of coin and public securities, 294 iv. to fix the standard of weights and measures, 294 v. to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, .... 294 vi. to establish an uniform law of bankruptcy, 296 vii. to establish a rule by which public acts, etc., shall be proved, and with what effect, 296 viii. to establish post-roads and post-offices, 296 d. " miscellaneous powers," XLIL 297 i. the power to pass laws for securing the exclusive right to their works to authors and inventors, . . 297 ii. the exclusive right of legislation over the seat of the Foederal government, 297 iii. the punishment of treason against the United States, 299 iv. to admit new States into the Union, 299 v. to dispose of and govern the territories and public property of the United States, 30C vi. to guarantee to every State a republican form of government, 300 vii. to protect the States against invasion, 302 viii. to protect the States against domestic violence, . 302 i. the powers and rights of majorities and minori- ties of the several States discussed, 302 •V. the probability of a general, overpowering in- surrection within all the States considered,... 304 IX. to assume the payment of outstanding debts of the United States, 305 t. its purpose, 305 ii. objection, that it does not assert the continued validity of debts due to the United States, an- swered, 305 X. to provide for amendments to the Constitution,.. . 306 XI. the establishment of the new system, when nine States shall have approved it 306 i. the violation, by this provision, of the Articles of Confederation considered, 307 at. the relations which will exist between the as- senting and the dissenting States of the Union considered, $& Contents. xxvii Essay. Page 0. " restrictions on the authority of the several States," No.XLIII. 308 i. forbidding the establishment of treaties and alli- ances between them, 309 ii. forbidding the issue of letters of marque and re- prisal, 308 iii. forbidding the coinage of money by them, 309 iv. forbidding the issue of bills of credit by them,. . . 309 v. forbidding the establishment of any other legal tender than gold and silver, 310 vi. forbidding the passage of bills of attainder, 310 vii. forbidding the passage of ex post facto laws, 310 viii. forbidding the passage of laws impairing con- tracts, 310 ix. forbidding the establishment of titles of nobility,. 311 X. forbidding the imposition of duties on exports or imports, 312 f. " the several powers and provisions by which effi- cacy is given to all the rest," 312 i. the power to make all necessary and proper laws for carrying the preceding powers into execution,.. 312 t. the necessity of such authority in the United States, 312 ii. other methods considered, 312 A. prohibiting the exercise of any power not expressly delegated to the Union, 313 B« a positive enumeration of the general powers so delegated, 313 C. a negative enumeration of them, by a specifi- cation of the reserved powers, 314 D. entire silence on the subject, 314 1*7. the remedy for an abuse of this authority, .... 315 Ii. the supremacy of the Constitution and constitu- tional laws of the United States, and of their treaties with other powers, 315 *. the effect of reserving the supremacy of the State constitutions therefrom, considered, 316 iii. the various officers, State and Eoederal, to be bound by oath to support it, 317 i. why State officers are to be thus obligated, 317 C. conclusion, that no part of the powers delegated to the Fcederal government is unnecessary or improper, 317 b. will the aggregated powers of the Union be dangerous to the reserved authority of the several States, . .XLIV. 318 A. if the objects of the Union can be attained only through the proposed Constitution, it is not a valid objection txviii Contents. Lssay. Page tliat it abridges the authority of the State govern- ments No XLIV. 318 B. the new Constitution will not prove fatal to the State governments, 319 a. because of the tendency, in confederacies, to despoil the General government of its delegated powers, . . 319 6. because the State governments will possess more in- fluence among the People, 321 c. because the State governments are constituent and essential parts of the Foederal government, 321 d. because the employees of the United States will be less numerous than those of the States, 321 e. because the powers reserved by the States are rel- atively greater and more numerous than those ■which are delegated to the Union, 323 f. because the proposed change consists less in the addi- tion of new powers to the Union, than in the invig- oration of its old ones, 324 g. because the State governments will possess more in- fluence among the People, resumed, XLV. 325 i. the State and the Foederal governments are in fact only different agents for the People, with differ- ent powers and for different purposes, 326 it. they both depend on the sentiments and sanction of common constituents for their respective powers, 325 iii. the first and most natural attachment of the Peo- ple will be to their respective State governments, 326 t. from the greater number of offices in the latter, 326 ii. from the character of the interests which they provide for, 326 Hi. from the greater familiarity of the People with them, 326 iv. from the history of the country during the war, 326 iv. if the popular favor should rest on the Foederal government, it will be only because that will be better administered than the others, 327 k, because the prepossessions of the members of the Foederal government will be in favor of their States, 327 i. because the respective States possess the means of defeating Foederal encroachments, 329 J. because other States would sympathize with the suf- fering State, and combine for its support, 330 k. the objection, that the military power will be in the Foederal government, answered, 330 L the impossibility of collecting a force for such a pur- pose, , 881 Contents, xxix Essay. Pagt ii, the superior power of the militia to resist and over- come it, No. XLV. 331 i concluding remarks on this particular branch of the subject, 332 C. concluding remarks, on the danger that the Foederal powers will be formidable to reserved powers of indi- vidual States, 333 " the particular structure of the Foederal government and the distribution of its powers among its constituent parts," XL VI. 333 I. " its supposed violation of the maxim, that the legis- lative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct," considered, 333 A. the truth of the maxim conceded, 334 B. the proposed Constitution does not violate it, 334 a. the meaning of the maxim discussed, 334 i. the views of Montesquieu examined, 334 i. the British Constitution, as his standard of gov- ernment, referred to, 334 ii. his own expressed reasons referred to, 335 ii. the provisions of the State constitutions, rela- » tive thereto, examined, 337 i. New Hampshire, 337 ii. Massachusetts, 338 Hi. New York, 339 iv. New Jersey, 339 v. Pennsylvania, 339 vi. Delaware, 340 vii. Maryland, 340 viii. Virginia, 346 ix. North Carolina, 341 x. South Carolina, 341 xi. Georgia, 341 xii. general remarks on the State constitutions 34i h. the necessity that " these departments shall be so far connected and blended as to give to each a con- stitutional control over the others," considered,.. . . XLVII. 343 i. " the powers belonging to one department ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the others," conceded, 343 ii. "neither of them ought to possess an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their powers," conceded, 343 ill. what practical security can be provided for each, against the invasion of the others, considered,. . . 348 tx\ Contents. Essay. Page I. the insufficiency of naked constitutional restric- tions, No. XLVII. 343 A. the tendency of the legislature to absorb the others, 348 a. from the nature of our political organiza- tion, 344 b. from " an intrepid confidence in its own strength," 344 C. from necessary extent of its powers, 345 d. from its control of the pecuniary resources of the country, and the indefiniteness of its authority in many cases, 345 e. from the examples presented in history, . . . 345 B. an instance of executive encroachment ac- counted for, 348 C. concluding remarks, 348 It. Mr. Jefferson's proposition, that, two thirds of the members of each of two of the departments concurring, an appeal to the People may be taken, considered, XL VIII. 349 A. the People the only source of authority, 349 B. the propriety of a well-defined mode of ap- pealing to the People considered, 350 C. it does reach the case of an improper com- bination of two departments of the govern- ment, 350 D. by frequent applications it might impair the respect with which the People would regard the government, 350 E. the public tranquillity might be disturbed by a too frequent recurrence to the decision of the society, 351 P. the decisions thus obtained would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government, 352 a. the legislature will still control the decision, 352 b. members of the legislature will probably be the members of the conventions to re- vise the form of government, 353 C. when such appeals to the People, against the legislature, will be useful, 553 Gr. concluding remarks on occasional appeals to the People, 354 Hi. periodical appeals to the People considered, XLIX. 354 A* the disadvantage of short intervals dismssed, 356 Contents. xxxi Essay. Paga U. the disadvantage of long intervals discussed, No. XLIX. 355 C. the example of Pennsylvania referred to,.. . . 355 M7. the interior structure of the government should be so arranged that its several constituent departments, by their mutual relations, may keep each other in their proper places, L. 358 A. the members of each should have little to do in the appointment of members of the others, 359 B. the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others for their emoluments, 359 C« the members of each should possess the con- stitutional means and personal motives to resist invasions by the members of other departments, 360 a. this policy not unfrequently resorted to,. . . 300 b. an equal power of self-defence cannot be granted to each department, 361 C-*a division of the power of the legislature necessary, in order to guard against its en- croachments, 361 d. an increase of the power of the executive, that of the veto, for its protection, neces- sary, 361 9. the advantages afforded by the Foederal system of America, in securing the rights of the Peo- ple, 362 A. the division of the delegated powers between two distinct governments, and its subse- quent subdivision, in each, among distinct and separate departments, 362 B. the multitude of different and distinct inter- ests among the People, 362 , " the House of Representatives," LI. 365 A. the qualifications of the electors thereof, 365 a. why not subject to regulation by the Congress, 365 6. why not subject to regulation by the State legisla- tures, 365 c. why not made uniform throughout the several States, 365 d. the advantages derived from the constitutional pro- vision, 365 B. the qualifications of the members, 366 C. the term of office of its members, 366 a. "whether biennial elections, in this case, will be safe," considered, 866 txxii Contents, i. frequent elections the only effectual security for an immediate dependence on, and sympathy with, the People, No. LI. 360 ii. the length of terms of service in other govern- ments, 367 t. British House of Commons, at different periods, 367 ii. Irish Parliament, , 368 Hi. the American colonies, 3^9 lii. conclusion, that biennial elections will not be dan- gerous, 370 XV. this conclusion strengthened by other circum- stances, 370 •". the Fcederal Congress \rll possess less power than the British or sdsh Parliaments, or the colonial Assemblies, 370 if. it will be restrained by its dependence on the People, while it will be watched, also, by the several State governments,.. 370 lit. the other departments of the Fcederal govern- ment will possess fewer means to seduce the House than are possessed by the governmenfr referred to, 370 V. objection, that " where annual elections end, tyr- anny begins," considered, LII. 371 i. no adequate reason for the opinion, 371 ii. the practice of different States in the choice of their legislators, 371 m. the practice of the British Parliament, by sim- ple statute, to change fundamental principles of government not applicable, in this case, as a reason, 872 & «re " biennial elections necessary or useful," t . 373 i. short terms of office prevent members from ac- quiring the practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of their duties, 373 t. greater scope of information necessary in the Fcederal than in the State governments, 374 ii*. the necessity of acquiring a knowledge of for- eign affairs, 376 ii. short terms will be inconvenient to members who reside at a distance from the capitol, 376 iii. short terms will be more dangerous from the greater number of inexperienced members, 377 iv. short terms will prevent the correction of spurious elections, 377 T. conclusion, that " biennial elections will be as use- Contents. xxxn Essay. Paga fill to the public, as they will be safe to the lib- erty of the People/' No. LII. 377 D. "the apportionment of its members to the several States," LIII. 378 a. numbers in each State the proper standard for reg- ulating the representation of each State, 378 i. objection against representation of slaves, consid- ered, 378 i. slaves not merely property, 379 ii. slaves are also persons, 379 m. the Constitution recognizes this mixed charac- ter in slaves, 379 it?, the apportionment is governed by the same rule as that for the levy of direct taxes, 380 v. they are not considered as property merely, in the laws of the States which possess them, . . . 380 A. reply, that they do not form a basis of local representation, considered, 380 vi. the right of representation of propeity as well as of persons, considered, 381 vii. the votes in the Congress which are allowed to the several States should be proportioned to the Comparative wealth of those States, . . . 382 b. there will be no inducement for falsifying the cen- sus, as the measure for representation is also the measure for taxation, 383 £. " the number of which the House is to consist " con- sidered, LIV. 384 a. the importance which is attached to this subject,... 384 b. the difficulty of determining the proper number, 385 e. the small States require smaller ratios of representa- tion than the large States, 386 d. with the limited powers which are delegated to the Congress the necessity for a numerous representa- tion is diminished, 386 e. objections considered and answered, 387 i. " so small a number of members cannot be safely trusted with so much power," 387 i. a rapid increase of population may be expect- ed, and a corresponding increase of represen- tation will ensue, 387 tV. "whether the smallness of the number, as a tem- porary regulation, be dangerous to the public lib- erty," considered, 387 mi. from whence can danger ultimately proceed, considered, 888 c txxiv Contents. Essay. Pago A. from foreign gold, No. LIV. 388 B. from other branches of the Foederal govern- ment, 389 ii. "it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents," considered, LV. 391 •'. " the representative ought to be acquainted with tbe interests and circumstances of his constitu- ents," considered, 39i ii. the objects of Foederal legislation considered, . . . 391 A. " a very few representatives will be very suf- ficient vehicles of information concerning commerce to the Foederal councils," 392 B. the same observations will apply to matters concerning taxation, 393 C- they " will apply also with greater force to the case of the militia," 393 !D. nothing in the above reasons will conflict with the necessity, before referred to, for general information in the representative,. . , 393 in. the experience of Great Britain referred to, . . . 394 fii. it will tend to the aggrandizement of the few at the expense of the many, LVI. 396 i. this objection strikes at the root of representa- tive government, 396 ii. the members of the House will be elected by all classes and conditions of citizens, 397 Hi. they will be taken from all classes and condi- tions of citizens, 397 iv. securities to insure their fidelity to their con- stituents, 39 n « A. their personal character, 397 B- the honorable position to which they will be called, 398 C. the opportunity which will be afforded to se- cure honor and distinction, 398 D. the frequent election compelling them to remember their dependence on the Peo- ple, 398 E. the measures adopted must operate on them- selves as well as on the great mass of the society, ,. 399 r. the provisions for electing members, and their qualifications for office, similar to those of the State constitutions for State officers, 40C rt. the relative numbers of the constituencies uo Contents. xxxv Essay. Page justification for approval of the State system and disapproval of the Foederal system, No. LVI. 400 A. the doctrine is not reasonable, 400 B- the doctrine is not admissible in its conse- quences, 401 C. the doctrine is not warranted by facts, 401 a. the British House of Commons 401 b. the State senators of New Hampshire, 401 O. the State senators of Massachusetts, 402 d- "the State senators of New York, 402 e. members of Assembly in the cities of New York and Albany, 402 f. State representatives in Pennsylvania, 402 g. the upper house of the Assembly of Con- necticut, 403 h. the Governor of Connecticut, 403 i. the Governor of Massachusetts, 403 j . the Governor of New York, 403 k. the President of New Hampshire, 403 r. " the number of its members will not be augment- ed from time to time as the progress of popula- tion may demand," LVIL 403 t. the provisions of the State constitutions compared with those of the proposed Constitution, 403 n. the practice of the State governments consid- ered, 404 •ii. the peculiar organization of the Congress will induce watchfulness on this subject, 404 A. the large States, in the House, can control the small ones, and compel their acquies- cence, 404 a. objection, that the Senate may object and prevent such an augmentation, answered, 405 1. there is no probability that the House, representing the majority of the People, could be successfully resisted, 405 2. the consciousness of the House being sup- ported by right, reason, and the Consti- tution, will check the Senate, 405 3. it is not certain that a majority of the Senate would oppose such an augmen- tation, 406 4. senators from the new States will, proba- bly, favor such an augmentation, 406 0. " a constitutional and infallible resource " txxvi Contents. Essay. Pag« will be a refusal by the House to vote the supplies, No. LVII. 406 6. the Senate will be more ready to yield, in such a contest, than the House, 407 iv. considerations against a numerous House of Representatives, 408 T. objection that a majority of the members of each House shall form quorums, and majorities of quorums enact laws, considered, 409 F. the authority vested in the Congress to regulate, in the last resort, the election of the members of the House of Representatives, considered, LVIII. 410 a. introductory remarks, 410 6. "every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation," 41 J i. the different depositaries of power to control the elections, considered, 411 ii. the exact character and extent of the delegated power considered, 411 e. " the existence of the Union would be entirely at the mercy of the State governments," if the regulation of elections for the Fcederal government is left en- tirely in their hands, 411 i. the right of self-preservation in the State govern- ments is unimpaired, 412 ii. objection, that the retention of authority in the State governments to control the election of senators is equally dangerous, considered, 413 t. it is necessary from the character of the States, as constituent bodies, 413 ii. it is less hazardous, from the peculiar organiza- tion of the Senate, 414 iii. objection, that the interest of each State to be represented in the House will be sufficient secu- rity against an abuse of power by its govern- ment, considered, 415 d. objection, the Congress may thereby " promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others," considered, t .LIX. 416 i. the improbability that such a purpose would be carried out through this channel, discussed, 416 ii. the certainty that, if attempted, it would be cor- rected by " an immediate revolt of the great body of the People, headed and directed by the State governments," averred and discussed, 417 iti. the dissimilarity of the organization of the Senate Contents, xxxvi Essay Page and the House a security against an improper exercise of this authority, No. LIX. 417 ir. there can he no conceivable motive for such an attempt on the part of Congress, 418 T. inquiry concerning the relative weight of influ- ence possessed by different classes ot the Peo- ple, 419 vi. the qualifications, both of the electors and the elected, being controlled exclusively by the State governments, no favor can be extended to any particular class by the Congress, 421 vii. the certainty of a general revolt against such an assumption of authority further discussed, and the necessity of a military power to insure suc- cess to the attempt considered, 422 s. objection, that this provision should have been ac- companied by a provision that all elections shall be held within the counties where the electors reside, considered, LX. 423 i. such a provision would be harmless, 423 ii. it would afford no security from the danger appre- hended, 423 iii. the provision compared with provisions concern- ing elections in the State constitutions, 424 t. those in the constitution of New York partic- ularly examined, 424 ii. defects in the State constitutions no apology for defects in the proposed Constitution, consid- ered, 425 f, the probability that such authority in the Congress, to fix uniform days of election, may be very im- portant to the public welfare, 426 i. the want of any provision in the proposed Consti- tution, fixing a particular day for the election, considered, 427 ri. concluding remarks, 427 C. the Senate, LXI. 428 A. " the qualifications of senators " considered 428 B. "the appointment of senators by the State legisla- tures " considered, 42 r C. " the equality of representation in the Senate " con- sidered, 429 a. the mixed character of the Foederal government re- quires a mixed representation, 429 6. the equal representation in the Senate a recognition of sovereignty in the States, 430 xxxviii Contents. Essay. Paj» c. it furnishes a security against improper acts of legis- lation, No. LXL 480 D. " the number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected," considered, , 431 a. "the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution," 431 i. the security which it furnishes against improper legislation will be wanting, 431 ii. there will be less security against the " infirmity " of faction, 432 iii. there will be less wisdom in the legislation of such a republic, 432 i. the importance of a knowledge of the proper mode of legislation, 433 ii. the little attention paid thereto in America, 433 iv. mutability in its councils from frequent changes in its members, 433 t. the mischievous effects of such mutability, 433 A. it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, 434 B. by multiplying laws " it poisons the blessings of liberty," 434 C. by affecting the market-price of property it gives the sagacious and the rich an undue advantage over the industrious and unin- formed poor, 435 J), it checks extended improvements and enter- prise, 4«jo E. it diminishes the attachment and reverence of the People, 435 T. " the want of a due sense of National character," LXII. 436 Ti. " the want of a due responsibility in the govern- ment to the People," 437 vii. the want of a defence to the People against their own temporary errors and delusions, 438 i. objection, that a widely spread People is not sub- ject to such errors and delusions, answered, . . . 439 6. " history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate," 439 i. the difference between the ancient republics and the United States, 440 t. Athens referred to, 441 ii. Carthage referred to, 441 iii. Sparta referred to, 441 iv. Rome referred to, 44 1 Contents. xxxix Essay. Pagf v. Crete referred to, No. LXII. 442 C. objection, that the Senate will " gradually acquire a dangerous preeminence in the government and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy," considered, 442 L the impossibility of such a result averred and dis cussed, 443 ii. the organization of the Senate of Maryland re- ferred to, 443 iii. the organization of the two Houses of the British Parliament, , 444 iv. the examples of the ancient republics referred to,. 444 i. Sparta and her Ephori, 444 it. Rome and her Tribunes, 444 iii. Carthage and her Senate, 445 t. the controlling influence bf the House of Repre- sentatives, 445 E. "the powers vested in the Senate," LXIII. 446 a. the treaty-making power, 446 i. the great importance of that power, 446 ii. the authority to exercise it vested in those who will be best qualified to exercise it, 446 iii. a popular assembly does not possess such qualifi- cations, 447 i. an intimate acquaintance with public affairs ne- cessary, 447 ii. secrecy and despatch are often required, 449 ir. objections to this part of the proposed Constitution considered, 450 »'. that the treaty-making power has not been dele- gated to men invested with legislative author- ity, 450 tt. that treaties so entered into are to be of supreme authority, 451 Hi. that treaties so entered into are not repealable at pleasure, like Acts of Assembly,. 451 iv. that they may be made instruments of oppres- sion, 451 v. that proper guards against corruption are wanting, 452 A. the responsibility of senators considered,.. . . 452 v. concluding remarks, 453 b. the app Dinting of public officers, LXIV. 453 c. its authority as a court for the trial of impeach- ments, 453 t the difficulty in forming such a court, in an elective government, 468 Contents. Essay. Pag« ii. the subjects of its jurisdiction render the trust a delicate one, No. LXIV. 453 ili. the Senate the most fit depositary of that trust, . . 454 iy. the propriety of delegating that authority to the Supreme Court considered, 455 i that court will not possess the fortitude, credit, and authority requisite to the execution of the duties of the trust, 455 it. the membership of the Supreme Court will be too limited, 456 in. as the punishment inflicted by the Court of Im- peachment will not terminate the proceedings, it will be improper to bring the offender twice before the same court, 456 T the propriety of a junction of the Supreme Court with the Senate in this trust, considered and de- nied, 457 ▼i. the propriety of delegating this authority to those who are wholly disconnected with other depart- ments of the government, considered and denied, 458 ▼ii. the proposed Constitution should not be rejected for that cause, even if this feature is not the most desirable, 459 ▼iii. objections to this portion of the new Constitu- tion considered, LXV. 4G0 i. it unites legislative and judicial authority in the same body, 460 A. the inconsistency of those who raise the ob- jection while they admire the constitution of New York, in which similar provisions exist 461 •V. it contributes to an undue accumulation of pow- er in the Senate, and tends toward the estab- lishment of an aristocracy, 461 in. as an appointing power, the Senate will be too lenient judges of the conduct of those whom they shall have appointed to office, 463 iv. as a treaty-making power, the Senate may be called to try themselves for corrupt or perfidi- ous action, 465 d. the Executive department, LXVI. 467 A. the misrepresentations of this subject considered,. . . 467 B. the mode of electing the President considered, ... LXVil. 472 a. the only part of the new Constitution which its oppo- nents do not condemn, 472 Contents. \\\ Essay Pag« b. "it is pretty well guarded," No. LXVII. 473 C "it was desirable that the sense of the People should operate in the choice," 473 d. it was desirable that the choice should be made by competent persons, 473 e. it was desirable to avoid tumult and disorder, 473 f. it was desirable to avoid cabal, intrigue, and corrup- tion, 474 g. it was desirable to maintain the independence cf the President on all but the People themselves, 475 h. " all these advantages will happily combine " in the proposed Constitution, 475 t. the choice will seldom fall on one who will not be qualified, 475 C the choice of a Vice-President by the People consid- ered and approved, 476 D. "the real characters of the proposed Executive" con- sidered generally, LXVIII. 471 a. the executive authority is delegated, generally, to one person, 477 i. compared with King of Great Britain 478 ii. compared with Governor of New York, .... 478 6. he is elected for four years, and is reeligible, 478 i. compared with King of Great Britain 478 ii. compared with Governor of New York, 478 c. he is liable to impeachment, trial, removal from of- fice, and subsequent punishment by the civil law, 478 i. compared with King of Great Britain, 478 ii. compared with Governor of New York, 478 iii. compared with the Governors of Maryland and Delaware, 478 d. he has the power of vetoing any measure passed by Congress, 479 i. his authority in this case compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 479 ii. his authority in this case compared with that of the Council of Revision in New York, 479 iii. his authority in this case compared with that of the Governor of New York, 479 iv. his authority in this case compared with that of the Governor of Massachusetts, 479 6. he is commander-in-chief of the militia, when in the Foederal service, 480 i. his authority in this case compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 480 Jtlii Contents. Essay. Page ii. his authority in this case compared with that of the Governor of New York, No. LXVIII. 480 f. he is commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, 480 i. his authority therein compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 480 ii. his authority therein compared with that of the Governor of New York, 480 iii. his authority therein compared with that of the Governors of New Hampshire and Massachu- setts, 481 g. his power to pardon offenders against the laws, 481 i. his authority therein compared with that of the Governor of New York, 481 h. his power, in one case, to adjourn the Congress, 482 i. his power therein compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 482 ii. his power therein compared with that of the Gov- ernor of New York, 482 «. his treaty-making power, .... 482 i. his power therein compared with tkat of the King of Great Britain, 482 j. his power to receive ambassadors and public ministers, 483 k. his power, in connection with the Senate, to appoint ambassadors and other ministers, 483 i. his power therein compared with that of the King of Great Britain, 484 ii. his power therein compared with that of the Gov- ernor of New York, 484 I. the general authority of the President reviewed, and compared with that of the Governor of New York, 485 m. the general authority of the President reviewed, and' compared with that of the King of Great Britain,.. 485 E. the provisions of the new Constitution, concerning the Executive, further considered, LXIX. 488 a. the idea that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government exam- ined and refuted, 486 b. " the ingredients which constitute energy in the Ex- ecutive " considered, 487 i. unity, 488 t. it has been approved by the soundest political writers, 488 ii. it is indisputably conducive to energy, 488 •Vt. in what manner it may be destroyed, 488 Contents. xliii Essay. Pagt A. by vesting the authority in two or more mag- istrates, No. LXIX. 488 B. by making the authority subject to the coop- eration and control of a council 488 a. plurality of magistrates considered, 489 b. the controlling authority of a council con- sidered, 491 C> the argument reviewed and concluded, 491 1. plurality removes responsibility and de- stroys the force of popular opinion,. . . . 492 2. it tends to concealment of wrong-doing,. 492 3. councils are unnecessary where the mag- istrate is personally responsible, 494 4. plurality in the Executive will be more dangerous to liberty, 495 5. plurality will be more expensive, 496 & duration in office of the Executive, LXX. 496 •'. it affects his personal firmness in the employ- ment of his constitutional powers, 496 A. more interest will be felt in that which is permanent, 497 B- subserviency to popular impulses not desira- ble in the Executive, 497 C. subserviency to the humors of the legislature equally improper, 498 D. independence of the several departments of government necessary, 499 E. shortness of the term of office will affect the independence of the Executive, 500 F. a term of four years compared with longer and shorter terms, 500 tt. it affects the stability of his system of adminis- tration, LXXI. 502 A- the term "administration of government" defined, 502 B. the heads of foreign, finance, military, and naval departments are only "assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate," and ought to be appointed by him and be subject to hrs superintendence, , 502 C. changes in the Executive will produce, pri- marily, changes in these departments, and, ultimately, changes in the system of admin- istration, 503 Hi. the reeligibility of the Executive considered, . . . 503 A. the opposition thereto considered,. .... ..... 508 xJiv Contents. Essay. Paga B. the effects of confining the eligibility to a single term, No. LXXI. 504 a. the inducements to good behavior would be diminished, 504 b. temptations would be offered to selfishness, peculation, and usurpation, 504 C. it would deprive the country of experi-. ence in the magistracy, 505 d.. it would deprive the country of the servi- ces of those who can be most useful in cases of emergency, 506 e. it would operate as a constitutional inter- diction of stability in the administration,. 506 C. an examination of the supposed advantages of such a limitation of eligibility, 507 a. greater independence in the magistracy,. . . 507 b. greater security to the People, 507 D. conclusions, on the impropriety of confining the choice of the People, when incumbents are qualified, to other and inexperienced can- didates, 508 Hi. an adequate provision for its support, LXX1I. 508 i. without such a provision the Executive would be at the mercy of the legislature, 509 it. the independence of the Executive cannot be impaired, '. 509 It. competent powers, 510 t. the power of returning bills to the legislature without approval, 510 A. the propensity of the legislature to usurp authority considered, 510 33. the propriety of delegating this authority to the Executive considered, 510 a. to defend the Executive from legislative aggressions, 510 b. to defend the People from improper legisla- tion, 611 C. objection, that " one man cannot possess more wisdom and virtue than a number of men," considered, 511 D. objection, that " the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones," considered, ; 512 £. the influence of the legislature will prevent the frequent and incautious use of this power, 512 Contents, x\\ Essay. Page P. the greater danger is that it will not be used at all times when it may be employed usefully,. No. LXXII. 513 Gr. the power not being absolute, two thirds of the legislature may successfully resist it, 514 a. a similar power delegated to the " Council of Revision " in New York, 515 b. the Governor of Massachusetts possesses a power similar to that which is here dele- gated to the Executive, 515 C. the latter preferable to the former, 515 «. the command of the military and naval forces of the Union, ." LXXIII. 516 m. to require opinions of heads of the executive departments, 516 •r. the power of pardoning offenders against the laws of the Union, 517 A. the propriety of delegating it to a single per- son considered, 517 £• the propriety of delegating authority to the President to pardon traitors considered, 517 V, in connection with the Senate, to make treaties, LXXIV. 519 A. one of the best digested features of the pro- posed Constitution, 519 3B. objection, that it unites the executive and legislative departments, considered, 520 a* it is a proper combination of the two depart- ments, 520 b. it is not entirely an executive, nor is it en- tirely a legislative subject, but combines the nature of both, 520 C- it cannot properly be delegated to an elec- tive Executive alone, , 521 d- it cannot properly be delegated to the Sen- ate alone, 522 e. the House of Representatives cannot prop- erly be admitted to share in that power,. . 523 C. objection, that two thirds of all the Senators should be required, instead of two thirds of those present, considered, 523 W*. in connection with the Senate, to appoint certain public officers, LXXV. 525 A- this feature of the proposed Constitution is entitled to particular commendation, 526 B- the People at large cannot exercise this power, 626 dvi Contents. Essay. Page C. the President will usually be a man of abil- ity, No. LXXV. 527 D. the delegation of this authority to one vian will beget a livelier sense of duty and greater regard to reputation than the delegation of it to many, 527 E. objection, that it should have been delegated solely to the President, considered, 528 a. all the advantages desired to be gained thereby will be secured by the proposed plan, 528 b« the fact that his choice may be overruled by the Senate considered, 529 C. the necessary concurrence of the Senate will afford a check on the favoritism of the President, 529 P. objection, that the President thereby may se- cure the complaisance of the Senate to his views, considered, 530 a. the integrity of the whole body of the Sen- ate will check such a result, 531 b. the proposed Constitution has guarded against it, 531 Gr. the consent of the Senate will be necessary to displace as well as to appoint officers of the government, LXXVI. 532 a. further stability will thereby be secured to the government, 532 H. objection, that the Senate will be unduly controlled by the President, considered, 533 I. objection, that the President will be unduly controlled by the Senate, considered, 533 J. this feature of the proposed Constitution com- pared with the plan of appointing State offi- cers in New York, 534 K. the impropriety of delegating this authority to a council of appointment, 535 Ii. the impropriety of admitting the House of Representatives to share in this authority, . . 536 pit*, to communicate information to Congress on the state of the Union, 536 viii. to recommend to Congress the adoption of such measures as he shall consider expedient,. . ... 637 Mr. to convene one or both branches of the Con- gress on extraordinary occasions, 537 s, to adjourn the Congress when there is a dia- Contents. xivii Essay. Page agreement concerning the time of adjourn- ment, No. LXXVI. 537 xi. to receive ambassadors and other public minis- ters, 537 xii. to execute the laws of the Union, 537 xiii. to commission all the officers of the United States, 537 F. concluding remarks, 537 , the Judiciary department, LXX VIII. 538 A. " the mode of appointing the judges," considered, 539 B. "the tenure by which the judges are to hold their places " considered, 539 a. it is similar to that by which the judges in the sev- eral States hold office, 539 b. objection thereto considered, 539 i. the Judiciary will be least in a capacity to annoy the other departments of the government, 539 ii. it is the weakest of the three departments of gov- ernment, 540 c. the necessity for a complete independence of the Ju- diciary, 041 i. the authority of the courts to pronounce legisla- tive acts void because contrary to the Constitu- tion, considered, 541 ii. the exercise of that authority does not indicate that the Judiciary is superior to the legislature, . . 541 iii. that the legislature is the constitutional judge of its own powers, considered and denied, 542 iy. the interpretation of the laws is the peculiar prov- ince of the courts, 542 i. the effect of that interpretation on the action of the courts, 542 ▼. that consideration a reason for the permanent ten- Tire of the Judiciary, 544 Ti. independence of the Judiciary also necessary in order that it may guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from sudden impulses of popular passion and prejudice, 544 Tii. as well as the private rights of individuals from the mischievous effects of unjust and partial laws, 545 viii. it is necessary, also, to insure an inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Consti- tution and of individuals, 546 ix. and from the nature of the qualifications which are required for the discharge of its duties, 540 d. the wisdom of the provision establishing good be- xlviii Contents. Essay. Pag* havior as the tenure of office in the Judiciary de- partment considered as conducive to its indepen- dence, No. LXXVIII. 547 0. a fixed provision for the support of the Judiciary also contributes to its independence, LXXIX. 548 i. "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will," 548 ii. the provisions of the proposed Constitution on this subject stated, 548 f* the responsibility of the Judiciary considered, 650 i. it will be liable to impeachments under the proposed Constitution, 550 ii. it is not liable to removal for inability, 650 i. the impossibility of fixing the limits of ability and disability, 550 m. the provisions of the constitution of New York considered, 550 g, the extent of the authority delegated to the Judi- ciary, LXXX. 551 i. to what cases the judicial authority of the Union ought to extend, considered, 551 t. to all cases arising from the duly enacted laws of the Union, 552 A. the necessity of a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions,.. 552 B. examples referred to, 652 ii. to all cases which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of Union, 553 Hi. to all cases in which the United States are a party, 653 iv. to all cases which involve the peace of the con- federacy, 653 A. in their foreign relations, 553 B- wherein two States, or a State and the citi- zens of another State, or the citizens of dif- ferent States, are parties, 654 v to all cases which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, . 555 0i\ to all cases wherein the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased, 555 ii. to what cases it will extend under the proposed Constitution, 556 i. the constitutional provision stated generally, 656 it. the powers thus delegated * conformable to the principles which ought to have governed thr structure of the Judiciary," 656 Contents. xlix Essay. Page Mi. the propriety of delegating " equity jurisdic- tion " discussed, No. LXXX. 557 iii. concluding remarks, 558 C. "the partition of the judiciary authority between dif- ferent courts, and their relations to each other,". . . . LXXXI. 559 o. the constitutional provision stated, 559 6. the propriety of establishing " one court of supreme and final jurisdiction " considered, 5G0 i. the propriety of delegating that authority to a dis- tinct department, considered, 560 i. that " the errors and usurpations of such a body will be unaccountable and remediless " con- sidered, 560 A- the proposed Constitution does not " directly empower the Judiciary to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution," 561 it. it secures more completely the separation of the Judiciary from the legislature, 561 iii. it recognizes more fully the principle of good behavior as the tenure of judicial oflice, 562 iv. it secures greater legal ability in the determina- tion of causes, 562 v. it removes the Judiciary from the arena of party strife, 562 vi. the example of several States considered, 562 li. no legislature can rectify the exceptionable de- cisions of the courts in any other sense than by prescribing a rule for future action, 563 iii. the " supposed danger of judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority " considered, 563 & "the propriety of the power of constituting inferior courts " considered, 564 i. " it obviates the necessity of having recourse to the Supreme Court in every case of Fcederal cognizance," 564 ii. why the same purpose may not be accomplished by the instrumentality of the State courts con- sidered, 565 iii. the advantage to be gained by dividing the United States into judicial districts, 566 d. "in what manner the judicial authority is to be dis- tributed between the Supreme and the inferior courts of the Union," 666 L the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court con- sidered, 666 d Contents. Essay. Page •'. the Foederal courts have no authority to enforce the payment of their debts by the individual States, No. LXXXI. 567 ii. the original jurisdiction of the inferior courts considered, 668 ill. the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court considered, 568 ' •*. the meaning of the term "appellate" dis- cussed, 568 «. a review of matters of fact by the Supreme Court not to be implied as a necessary conse- quence, 569 Hi. the motives which probably influenced the Convention in relation to this particular provi- sion, 670 iv. the Congress will have authority to restrain the Supreme Court from reexamining matters of fact, 570 v. concluding remarks, ... 571 , the jurisdiction of the State courts on Foederal ques- tions considered, LXXXIL 571 i. the individual States " will retain all preexisting au- thorities which may not be exclusively delegated to the Foederal head," 572 I. in what that " exclusive delegation " consists, . . . 572 if. "the State courts will retain the jurisdiction they now have, unless it appears to be taken away by exclusive delegation," . 572 i. "the concurrent jurisdiction of the State tribu- nals the most natural and defensible construc- tion " of the Constitution, 578 w. this is " only clearly applicable to those descrip- tions of causes of which the State courts had previous cognizance," 678 fii. the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation may be committed by the Congress to the Foederal courts solely, if it desires to do so, 673 I. this will not divest the State courts of any part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal, 578 if. nor, except where expressly excluded, of their right to take cognizance of the causes to which those particular regulations may give birth, 574 ir. the relation which will subsist between the State and the Foederal courts in instances of concur- rent jurisdiction, 674 Contents. \\ Essay. Fage i. an appeal will lie from the State courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, No . LXXXII. 574 iV. the appellate jurisdiction of the inferior Foeder- al courts, in such cases, considered, 575 D. objection, that no provision has been introduced into the proposed Constitution to establish the right of trial by jury in civil cases, considered, LXXXIII. 576 a. the disingenuous form of the objection considered, . . 577 i. the silence of the Constitution on this subject, 577 ii. rules of legal interpretation applicable to this case, considered, 577 ill. " a power to constitute courts is a power to pre- scribe the mode of trial " therein, 678 iv. concluding remarks, 578 b. the proper use and true meaning of the maxims on which the objection rests, 579 • the importance of the right of trial by jury considered, 581 i. its importance in criminal cases conceded, 581 ii. its relative unimportance in civil cases maintained, 581 t. a safeguard against undue taxation, denied, 582 ii. it affords security against official corruption, . . . 583 in. it is useful in settling questions of property, . . . 584 iii. the extent to which juries are employed in differ- ent States. 584 d. " no general rule could have been fixed upon by the Convention which would have corresponded with the circumstances of all the States," 686 «. " as much might have been hazarded by taking the system of any one State as a standard, as by omit- ting it altogether " and leaving it to the Congress,. 586 f. the difficulty of establishing a general constitutional rule, 586 i. the impropriety of its use in many cases, 587 t. those in which the foreign relations of the United States are concerned, 587 it. those which belong to the equity jurisdiction,. . 588 li. " the proposition of Massachusetts " on this sub- ject considered, 589 iii. the provision of the constitution of New York on this subject considered, 591 iv. the proposition that it should be established in all cases whatever, 592 v. concluding remarks, 592 other objections to the proposed Constitution considered and answered, LXXXIV. 694 Lu Contents. Essay. Page ft. it contains no Bill of Rights, No. LXXXIV. 595 A. the constitution of New York contains none, consid- ered, 59£ a. it contains provisions in the body of the instrument, which, in substance, amount to the same thing, . . 595 6. it adopts, in their full extent, the common and stat- ute laws of Great Britain, 595 B. the proposed Constitution contains, in the body of the instrument, similar equivalent provisions, 596 C. a Bill of Rights will be unnecessary, because the People will surrender nothing in the adoption of the proposed Constitution, and the government will be administered by their immediate representatives and servants, .... 598 D. a Bill of Rights would be dangerous, as implying the grant of all powers not expressly withheld, 599 E. the liberty of the press considered, 599 F. the proposed Constitution itself a Bill of Rights, 600 b. " the seat of government will be too remote from many of the States to admit of a proper knowledge, on the part of the constituent, of the conduct of the represent- ative," 601 C. there is no provision respecting debts due to the United States, 603 d. the additional expense which will be imposed by the new system, 603 A. the increase of offices under the new government con- sidered, 604 a. in many cases the State officers will be diminished to the same extent, 605 b. the judiciary will furnish the principal additions, 605 B. the diminished sessions of the Congress will counter- balance much of the increased expense, 605 C. the State legislatures, also, will hold shorter sessions, at diminished cost, 606 D. concluding remarks, 606 VI. "ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR [the People of the State of New York] OWN STATE CONSTITUTION," LXXXV. 607 VII. " THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOP- TION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY/' 608 \ III. CONCLUDING REMARKS, 609 1. the manner in which Publius had discussed the subject con- sidered, 609 A. an appeal to the reader to weigh the subject under discussion carefully, and to act conscientiously; 609 Contents. liii Essay. Pagt B. the entire confidence of Publius in the arguments which recommend the proposed system, >o. LXXXV. 610 2. the conceded imperfections of the system no cause for delay in adopting it, 610 A. the extent of these concessions has been greatly exagger- ated, 610 a. " that it is radically defective " denied, 610 B. " that without material alterations the rights and interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it " denied, 610 C. although not •perfect, it is upon the whole a good plan, 611 B. the precarious state of the country forbids delay for the only purpose of engaging in the chimerical pursuit of a -perfect plan of government, 611 A. the improbability of assembling a new convention with the same success as that which attended the last, 611 B. more easy to obtain amendments subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution than previous thereto, 612 c. no plan can be proposed which will be satisfactory to all the States, in every respect, 612 J>. supposed obstacles in the way of making subsequent amend- ments considered, 612 E. the ease with which a Fcederal convention may be called for the amendment of the Constitution, under the provi- sions of the proposed Constitution, 613 & concluding remarks, 614 A COMPARATIVE EXHIBIT OF THE CLAIMS TO THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE FOEDERALISI. 00 ® « 35« s i .s.sf 3S M a "d to ag 1 6 a o a a 3M ci a es 3 OS i as $ ■3 tiflfl . a a s3 n o oj fe a; as & © S Cb oW do No. No. I. I. Ham. Ham. n. II. J ^y Jay nr. ni. Jay Jay IV. IV. Jay Jay v. v. Jay Jay VI. VI. Ham. Ham. VII. VII. Ham. Ham. VIII. VIII. Ham. Ham. IX. IX. Ham. Ham. X. X. Mad. Mad. XI. XI. Ham. Ham. .2 _,•<» 00 3.9,; a § w 3 a». 00 ® 00 c O* 00 So a a It 3 °tf • a . n fe s* ^"5 a a r2 eS Si sis S8 3a sa Ham. Ham. Ham. Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Jay Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Ham. Ham. Ham. O DO •* a Jay Jay Jay Jay 1 Vide letter published in The Port Folio, Vol. IV. No. 20, ante, page xxviii. 2 Vide ante, pages xxvi. xxvii. 3 " I am assured that Numbers 2. 3. 4. 5. & 64 were written by John Jat " Numbers 10. 14. 37 to 49 both Inclusive & 53 by James Madison Jun — " Numbers 18. 19. 20. by Messrs Madison & Hamilton jointly. " All tbe rest by Mr Hamilton "((—Mr Hamilton told me that Mr Madison wrote 48 & 49 or from pa. 101 to 112 "of Vol.2n's copy of M'Lean's edition of The Feed- *ralist, now in the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 9 From the understanding in Mr. Jay's family, from Chancellor Kent's MS. notes, and from the biographical sketch of Mr. JaVs life in D ^laplaine's Repository of the Lives and Fortwits of Distinguished American Characters. Authorship of The Federalist. lv 1 1 "3 o 2 o a s a o Gen. Hamilton in his own copy and in the Benson manuscript. Gen. Hamilton to Chancellor Kent. •sit O no ca o a hEh h s s Is en 00 or «! a> o If * § u a 1 oo o c a O 42 ce- 1-5 3 s s 8S 3 8 00 • •; oo •§ No. No. xn. xn. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XIII. XIII. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XIV. XIV. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XV. XV. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XVI. XVI. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XVII. XVII. Ham. Ham. Ham. Mad. Mad. XVIII. XVIII. H. &M. H. & M. Mad. H. &M. Mad. Mad. XIX. XIX. H. & M. H. & M. Mad. H &M. Mad. Mad. XX. XX. H. &M. H. &M. Mad. H. & M. Ham. Ham. XXI. XXI. Ham. Ham. Ham. Mad. Mad. XXII. XXII. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. xxni. XXIII. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXIV. XXIV. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham XXV. XXV. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXVI. XXVI. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXVII. XXVII. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXVIII. XXVIII. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXIX. XXX. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXX. XXXI. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXXI. 1 XXXII. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. fxxxni. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXXII. XXXIV. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. xxxin. XXXV. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXXIV. XXXVI. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXXV. XXIX. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. XXXVI. XXXVII. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XXXVII. XXXYIII. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. txxvni. XXXIX. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XXXIX. XL. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XL. XLI. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XLI XLII. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XLIT. XLHI. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XLni. XLIV. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XLIV. XLV. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XLV. XLVI. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XLVI XL VII. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad Mad. XLVLI. XLVIII. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XLvm. XLIX. Ham. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. XLIX. L. Ham. Ham. Mad. Mad. Mad. L. LI. Ham. Ham. Mad- Mad. Mad. LI. LII. Ham. Ham. Mad. Mad. Mad. LTI. LIII. Ham. Mad. Mad. Mad. Mad. LIII. LIV. Jay Ham. Mad. Jay Mad. Mad. LIV. LV. Ham. Ham. Mad. Mad. Mad. LV. LVI. Ham. Ham. Mad. Mad. Mad. LVI. lvh. Ham. Ham. Mad. Mad. Mad. Lvn. LVIII. Ham. Ham. Mad. Mad. Mad. Lvm. LIX. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. LIX. LX. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. LX. LXI. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. LXI. Lxn. Ham. Ham. Mad Mad. Mad. LXII. LXIII. Ham. Ham. Mad. Mad. Mad. LXIII. LXIV. Ham. Jay Jay J^y Jay J*J LXIV LXV. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. LXV. LXVI. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. LXVI. LXVII. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Lxvn. LXVIII. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. LXVIII. LXIX. Ham. Ham. Ham Ham. Ham. LXIX. LXX. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. LXX. LXXI. Ham Ham. Ham. Ham Ham. • Ivi Authorship of The Fcederalish No. LXXI. LXXII. LXXIII. LXXIV. LXXV. LXXVI. LXXVIII. LXXIX. LXXX. LXXXI. LXXXII. LXXXIII. LXXXIV. LXXXV. No. LXXII. LXXIII. LXXIV. LXXV. LXXVI. LXXVII. LXXVIII. LXXIX. LXXX. LXXXI. LXXXII. LXXXIII. LXXXIV. LXXXV. ^a d a a a> fe a> Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham . . Ham. I Ham. o XD 3 a • a CO ^ CO • Id 13 ° a . gS CO o S o •25 >> h ■a &.-§ IS 3S OO SoS S CO Sa sa Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. | Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. Ham. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. I. To the People of the State of New Yoke: AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Fcederal Government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance ; comprehending in its consequences, noth- ing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this coun- try, by their conduct and example, to decide the impor- tant question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to de- pend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded as the aBra in which that decision is to be made ; and a wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune )f mankind. This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism to heighten the solicitude, which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a VOL. I. l 2 The Federalist. judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished, than seriously to be expected. The plan of- fered to our deliberations, affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects for- eign to its merits, and of views, passions and preju- dices little favorable to the discovery of truth. Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter, may read- ily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument and consequence of the offices they hold under the State- establishments — and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize them- selves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confeder- acies, than from its union under one Government. It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observa- tions of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views : Candor will oblige us to admit, that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions ; and it can- not be doubted, that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appear- ance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable ; the honest errors of minds led astray by pre- conceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes, which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occa- sions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as The Federalist. 3 on the right side of questions, of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those, who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right, in any con- troversy. And a further reason for caution, in this re- spect, might be drawn from the reflection, that we are not always sure, that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives, not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support, as upon those who oppose, the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit, which has, at ail times, characterized political parties. For, in politics as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution. And yet however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications, that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude, that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations, and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized, as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power, and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretence and artifice ; the stale bait for popularity at the expense of public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is 4 The Fcederalist the usual concomitant of violent love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten, that the vigor of Government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of Government. History will teach us, that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism, than the latter; and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics the greatest number have begun their career, by paying an obsequious court to the people ; commen- cing Demagogues, and ending Tyrants. In the course of the preceding observations I have had an eye, my Fellow-Citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my Countrymen, I own to you, that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion, it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced, that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves, which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation, when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not The Federalist. 5 oowever multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast : My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of bj all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth. I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the follow- ing interesting particulars. — The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity — The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that Union — The necessity of a Government at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the attainment of this object — The conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true prin- ciples of republican Government — Its analogy to your own state constitution — and lastly, Tlie additional se- curity, which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of Government, to liberty, and to property. In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention. It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer argu- ments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the Thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity, resort to separate con- federacies of distinct portions of the whole.* This doc- trine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has .votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, tc * The same idea, tracing the ar- lications against the new Const! ?uraents to their consequences, is tution. — Publius. &eld out in several of the late pub- 6 The Federalist. those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will, therefore, be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. II. To the People of the State of New York: WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important, that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident. Nothing is more certain than the indispensable neces- sity of Government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy of considera- tion, therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest of the people of America, that they should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one Fcederal Government, or that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each, the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national Government. The Federalist. 7 It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion, that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest Citi- zens have been constantly directed to that object. But Politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has its advocates ; and certain characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of the number. "Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these Gentlemen, it cer- tainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound Policy. It has often given me pleasure to observe, that Inde- pendent America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, wide- spreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accom- modation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together ; while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities. With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice, that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one united people ; a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, pro- 3 The Federalist. fessing the same religion, attached to the same prin ciples of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their general Liberty and Independence. This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and con- venient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties. Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people ; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made peace and war : as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies : as a nation we have formed alliances and made treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign States. A strong sense of the value and blessings of Union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a Fcederal Government to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence ; nay, at a time, when their habitations were in flames, when many of their Citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections, which must ever precede the formation of a wise and well-balanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at, that a Government insti- tuted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it Was intended to answer. This intelligent people perceived and regretted these The Federalist. 9 defects. Still continuing no less attached to Union, thar enamored of Liberty, they observed the danger, which immediately threatened the former and more remotely the latter ; and being persuaded that ample security foi both, could only be found in a national Government more wisely framed, they, as with one voice, convened the late Convention at Philadelphia, to take that im- portant subject under consideration. This Convention, composed of men who possessed the confidence of the people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue, and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild sea- son of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultations ; and finally, without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their Country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils. Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only recom- mended, not imposed, yet let it be remembered, that it is neither recommended to blind approbation, nor to blind reprobation ; but to that sedate and candid con- sideration, which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this, (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this Paper,) is more to be wished than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It is not yet forgotten, that well grounded apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of America to form the Memorable Congress of 1774. That Body recommended certain measures to their Con- stituents, and the event proved their wisdom ; yet it ia fresh in our memories how soon the Press began tc 10 The Federalist. teem with Pamphlets and weekly Papers against those very measures. Not only many of the Officers of Gov- ernment, who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good, were indefatigable in their en- deavors to persuade the people to reject the advice of that Patriotic Congress. Many indeed were deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people rea- soned and decided judiciously ; and happy they are in reflecting that they did so. They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced men. That being con- vened from different parts of the country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful information. That in the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country, they must have ac- quired very accurate knowledge on that head. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than their duty, to recommend only such measures as after the most mature deliberation they really thought prudent and advisable. These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress ; and they took their advice, notwithstand- ing the various arts and endeavors used to deter and dissuade them from it. But if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had then been fully tried or generally known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the Convention, for it is well known that some of the most distinguished members of that Con- gress, who have been since tried and justly approved for The Federalist. 11 patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political information, were also members of this Convention, and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience. It is worthy of remark, that not only the first, but every succeeding Congress, as well as the late Conven- tion, have invariably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its Union, To preserve and perpetuate it, was the great object of the people in forming that Convention, and it is also the great object of the plan which the Convention has ad- vised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this partic- ular period, made by some men, to depreciate the im- portance of the Union ? Or why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better than one ? I am persuaded in my own mind, that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that their uni- versal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall en- deavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the Convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy : that certainly would be the case, and I sin- cerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good Citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim in the words of the Poet, " Farewell ! a long Farewell to all my Greatness." PUBLIUS. 12 The Federalist. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. III. To the People of the State op New York: I T is not a new observation that the people of any -* country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well- informed,) seldom adopt, and steadily persevere for many years in, an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one Fcederal Government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes. The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opin- ion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive. Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first. The safety of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and con- sequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively. At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind arising from domes- tic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion, that a cordial Union under an The Federalist. 13 efficient national Government, affords them the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad. The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world, will always be found to be in pro- portion to the number and weight of the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or invite them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire, whether so many just causes of war are likely to be given by United America as by disunited America ; for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow, that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations. The just causes of war for the most part arise either from violations of treaties, or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us : She has also extensive commerce with Porrugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to. It is of high importance to the peace of America, that she observe the laws of nations towards all these Pow- ers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national Govern- ment than it could be either by thirteen separate States, or by three or four distinct confederacies. Because when once an efficient national Government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it ; for although town or country, or other con- tracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments ; yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend 14 The Federalist men to offices under the national Government, — espe- cially, as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence it will result, that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national Government, will be more wise, systematical, and judicious, than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect to us. Because, under the national Government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense, and executed in the same manner, — whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be con- sistent ; and that, as well from the variety of inde- pendent courts and judges appointed by different and independent Governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the Convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts ap- pointed by, and responsible only to, one national Gov- ernment, cannot be too much commended. Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice ; but those tempta- tions not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national Government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and jus- tice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning. Because even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temp- tations may, and commonly do, result from circum- stances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great The Federalist. 15 number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice med- itated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national Government, not being affected by those local circum- stances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent, or punish its commission by others. So far therefore as either designed or accidental vio- lations of treaties and the laws of nations afford just causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general Government, than under several lesser ones, and in that respect, the former most favors the safety of the people. As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me, that one good national Government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter. Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole ; of one or two States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present Foederal Government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offences, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants. The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States, and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, Dy direct violence, to excite war with those nations ; and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger, as a na- J 6 The Federalist. tional Government, whose wisdom and prudence wiL not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested. But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national Government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that re- spect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of States, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledg- ing, correcting, or repairing their errors and offences. The national Government, in such cases, will not be af- fected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them. Besides it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or Confederacy of little consideration or power. In the year 1685, the State of Genoa having offended Louis XIV., endeavored to appease him. He demand- ed that they should send their Doge, or chief magis- trate, accompanied by four of their Senators, to France^ to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded, or have re- ceived, the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, 01 any other powerful nation ? PUBLIUS. The Federalist V7 For the Independent Journal. THE FCEDERALIST. No. IV. To the People of the State of New York: MY last Paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by Union, against the danger it may be exposed to by just causes of war given to other nations ; and those rea- sons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommo- dated by a national Government, than either by the State Governments, or the proposed little Confedera- cies. But the safety of the People of America against dan- gers from foreign force, depends not only on their for- bearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite hostility or insult ; for it need not be observed, that there are pretended as well as just causes of war. It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it ; nay, that absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular fam- ilies, or partisans. These, and a variety of motives, which affect only the mind of the Sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice, or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in VOL. i. 2 18 Tlie Federalist. absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our atten fcion, there are others which affect nations as often as Kings ; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and circumstances. With France and with Britain, we are rivals in the fisheries, and can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to pre- vent it by bounties on their own, or duties on foreign fish. With them and with most other European nations, we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade ; and we shall deceive ourselves, if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish : for as our carrying trade cannot increase, without in some degree diminish- ing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain, than to promote it. In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them. The extension of our own commerce in our own ves- sels, cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this Continent, because the cheap- ness and excellence of our productions, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those territories afford, Hi an consists with the wishes or policy of their respec* tive Sovereigns. Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other ; nor will either of them permit the other waters, which are between them and us, to become the means of mutual inter* course and traffic. The Federalist. 19 From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with prudence, be more amplified and de tailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations ; and that we are not to expect they should regard our advancement in union, in power and conse- juence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure. The People of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present ; and that when- ever such inducements may find fit time and oppor- tunity for operation, pretences to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely therefore do they consider Union and a good national Government as necessary to put and keep them in such a situation, as, instead of in- viting war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defence, and necessarily depends on the Government, the arms and the resources of the country. As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without Government, ?ither one or more or many, let us inquire whether onp good Government is not, relative to the object in ques- tion, more competent than any other given number whatever. One Government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimi- late, and protect the several parts and members, and ex- tend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as eonnected with that of the whole. It can apply the 'esources and power of the whole to the defence of any 20 The Fcecterahst. particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State Governments, or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordi- nation to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consoli- date them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three 01 four distinct independent bodies. What would the militia of Britain be, if the Eng- lish militia obeyed the Government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the Government of Scotland, and if the Welch militia obeyed the Government of Wales ? Suppose an invasion : would those three Governments (if they agreed at all) be able with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single Government of Great Britain would ? We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national Government had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen — if one na- tional Government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet — Let Scot- land have its navigation and fleet — Let Wales have its navigation and fleet — Let Ireland have its navigation and fleet — Let those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be under four independent Govern- ments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance. Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen, or if you please into three or four independent Governments, what armies could they raise and pay, what fleets could they ever hope *o have ? If The Fasderahst. 21 one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defence ? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutral ity by specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished ? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would nevertheless be natural. The history of the States of Greece, and of other Countries, abounds with such instances ; and it is not improbable, that what has so often happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again. But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or Confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and money be afforded ? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which of them shall he receive his orders ? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them, and compel acquiescence ? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation ; whereas one Government, watching over the general and com- mon interests, and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people. But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national Government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign na- tions will know and view it exactly as it is ; and they will act towards us accordingly. If they see that our national Government is efficient and well administered — our trade prudently regulated — our militia properly organized and disciplined — our resources and finances discreetly managed — our credit reestablished — ou? 22 The Federalist. people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual Government, (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient,) or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes ! How liable would she become not only to their con- tempt, but to their outrage ; and how soon would dear- bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. V. To the People of the State of New York : QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the Union then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it. " An entire and perfect Union will be the solid found a- " tion of lasting peace : It will secure your religion, lib- " erty, and property, remove the animosities amongst " yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt " our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, " riches, and trade ; and by this Union the whole Island, '* being joined in affection and free from ail apprehen- The Federalist. 23 u sions of different interest, will be enabled to resist alt " its enemies." " We most earnestly recommend to you " calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty " affair, that the Union may be brought to a happy con- u elusion, being the only effectual way to secure our " present and future happiness ; and disappoint the de- " signs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, ois " this occasion, use their utmost endeavors to prevent or u delay this Union." It was remarked in the preceding Paper, that weak- ness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad ; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than Union, strength, and good Government within ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted. The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. "We may profit by their expe- rience, without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense, that the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest, with respect to the continental na- tions, was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and trouble- some, than they were useful and assisting to eaci. other. Should the People of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen ? Would not similar jealousies arise ; and be in like raan- ler cherished? Instead of their being "joined in af- 1 fection, and free from all apprehension of different 24 T/ie Fcederatist. " interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other bordering nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them. The most sanguine advocates for three or four con- federacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first : but admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equal- ity ? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part, and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the Government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration, would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight, would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies, for a long succession of years. Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might hap- pen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of political im- portance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear: Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might prom- ise to diminish her importance ; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance, or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be neces- sary to enable her to discern these unfriendly disposi- tions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence The Feeder alUi. 25 in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them : Distrust naturally creates distrustj and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and un- candid imputations, whether expressed or implied. The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable, that the most Northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a period. not very distant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident, than the Northern Hive would ex- cite the dame ideas and sensations in the more Southern parts of America which it formerly did in the Southern parts of Europe : Nor does it appear to be a rash con- jecture, that its young swarms might often be tempt- ed to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neigh- bors. They w T ho well consider the history of similar divis- ions and confederacies, will find abundant reason to ap- prehend, that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers ; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries ; in short, that they would place us ex- actly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz. formidable only to each other. From these considerations it appears that those Gen- 'lemen are greatly mistakes who suppose that alliances '{Tensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and union of wills, of arms, and of resources, which would oe necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defence against foreign enemies. When did the independent States, into which Britain End Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alii- 26 The Federalist. ances, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy ? The proposed confederacies will be distinct nations. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties ; and as their productions and commodities are different, and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create different in- terests, and of course different degrees of political attach- ment to, and connection with, different foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen, that the foreign nation with whom the Southern confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the Northern confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so con- trary to their immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith. Nay it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would fre- quently be found taking different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one an- other, than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others, by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innova- tions did they, under the same character, introduce into the Governments of those whom they pretended tc protect. Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of The Federalist. 27 America into any given number of independent sover- signties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. VI. To the People of the State of New York : rpHE three last numbers of this Paper have been -*- dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different, and, perhaps, still more alarming kind, those which will in all proba- bility flow from dissensions between the States them- selves, and from domestic factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances slightly an- ticipated ; but they deserve a more particular and more full investigation. A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations, who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial con- federacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests, as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that men* are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sov- ereignties, situated in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, 28 The Federalist. and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages. The causes of hostility among nations are innumera- ble. There are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power, or the desire of preeminence and dominion- — the jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and safety. There are others which have a more circumscribed, though an equally operative influence, within their spheres : Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between com- mercial nations. And there are others, not less numer- ous than either of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions ; in the attachments, enmi- ties, interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed ; and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tran- quillity to personal advantage, or personal gratification. The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the re- sentment of a prostitute,* at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the Samnians. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the Megarensians^ another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as an accom plice in a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias,J or to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the State in the pur- chase of popularity,§ or from a combination of all these * Aspasia, vide Plutarch's Life have stolen some public gold with ->f Pericles. — Publius. the connivance of Pericles for the t Ibid. — Publius. embellishment of the statue cf Mi X Ibid. — Publius. nerva. — Publius. § Ibid. Phidias was supposed to The Federalist. 23 causes, was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the Peloponnesicm war ; which, after various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth. The ambitious Cardinal, who was Prime Minister to ILenry VIIL, permitting his vanity to aspire to the Triple Crown,* entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and inter- est of this enterprising and powerful Monarch, he pre- cipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of Policy, and at the hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the Kingdom over which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in gen- eral. For if there ever was a Sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe. The influence which the bigotry of one female,f the petulance of another,^ and the cabals of a third, § had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known. To multiply examples of the agency of personal con- siderations in the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time. Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will themselves recol- lect a variety of instances ; and those who have a tol- erable knowledge of human nature, will not stand in need of such lights, to form their opinion either of the * Worn by the Popes. — Publius. J Duchess of Marlborough t Madame de Maintenon. — Pub- Publius. tu$. § Madame de Pompadour. — Pub lius. 30 The Federalist reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps however a reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be made to a case which has lately hap- pened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a des- perate debtor, it is much to be doubted whether Massa- chusetts would have been plunged into a civil war. But notwithstanding the concurring testimony ot experience, in this particular, there are still to be found visionary, or designing men, who stand ready to advo- cate, the paradox of perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific ; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be gov- erned by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord. Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevo- lent and philosophic spirit ? If this be their true inter- est, have they in fact pursued it ? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary pas- sions, and immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice ? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies ? Are not the former administered by men as well as the latter ? Are there not aversions, predi- lections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings ? Are not popular assem- blies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resent- ment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities ? Is it not well known that their determi- nations are often governed by a few individuals in The Federalist 31 whom they place confidence, and are of course liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individ- uals ? Has comnterce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war ? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory ? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives, since that has be- come the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion ? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, ad- ministered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other ? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries. Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage, were all Repub- lics ; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the com- mercial kind. Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring Monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better than a well- regulated camp ; and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest. Carthage, though a commercial Republic, was the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had earned her arms into the heart of Italy, and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the Commonwealth. Venice, in latter times, figured more than once in wars of ambition ; till becoming an object of terror to the other Italian States, Pope Julius II. found means to ac complish that formidable league,* which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty Republic. The Provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part * The League of Cambray, gon, and most of the Italian Prince* comprehending the Emperor, the and States. — Publius. King of France, the King of Ara- 32 The Federalist. in the wars of Europe. They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea ; and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the oppo- nents of Louis XIV. In the Government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one branch of the national legisla- ture. Commerce has been' for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people. There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclina- tions, and, sometimes, contrary to the real interests of the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority, between the rival Houses of Austria and Bourbon, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the English against the French, sec- onding the ambition, or rather the avarice of a favorite leader,* protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in op- position to the views of the Court. The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure grown out of commercial considera- tions, — the desire of supplanting, and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic, or in the general advantages of trade and navigation. From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose situations have borne the nearest re- semblance to our own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries, which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of sep- * The Duke of Marlborough. — Publius. The Federalist. 33 aration ? Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses, and evils incident to society in every shape ? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt is a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue ? Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and credit have sunk ; let the incon- veniences felt everywhere from a lax and ill administra- tion of Government ; let the revolt of a part of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebel- lions in Massachusetts, declare ! So far is the general sense of mankind from corre- sponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility be- tween the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An in- telligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect : " Neighboring nations (says he) are naturally " enemies of each other, unless their common weakness " forces them to league in a confederative republic, " and their constitution prevents the differences that 1 neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jeal- " ousy, which disposes all States to aggrandize them- " selves at the expense of their neighbors." * This pas- sage, at the same time, points out the evil and suggests the remedy. PUBLIUS. * Vide Principes des Negotiations par l'Abbe de Mably. — Publitu. TOL. I. 3 34 The Feeder alls t. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. YII. To the People of the State of New York: |"T is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming in* -*- umph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other ? It would be a full answer to this question to say - - precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, del- uged in blood all the nations in the world. But unfor- tunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our in> mediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a Fcederal Constitution, we have had sufficient experience, to enable us to form a judg- ment of what might be expected, if those restraints were removed. Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of the wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would exist, among us, in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them ; and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It is well known, that they have heretofore had serious and animated discussions concerning the right to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usu- ally went under the name of crown-lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial Governments thev were comprised, have claimed them as their property The Feeder alist. 35 the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union ; especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the submission of the Ind- ian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction of the King of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at ali events an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far ac- complished, as, under a continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of Fcederal compro- mise, would be apt, when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made, could not be revoked ; and that the justice of their participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a diffi- culty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportion- ment. Different principles would be set up by different States for this purpose ; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily De susceptible of a pacific adjustment. 36 The Federalist. In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, with- out any umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties. T3 reason from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbi» ter of their differences. The circumstances of the dis- pute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differ- ences. The Articles of Confederation obliged the par- ties to submit the matter to the decision of a Foederal Court. The submission was made, and the Court de- cided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determi- nation ; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it. till, by negotiation and management, something like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision ; and States, like individ- uals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage. Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions, which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and the district of Ver- mont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well from States not interested, as from those which were interested in the claim ; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition : one, a jealousy entertained of our future power ; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants The Federalist 37 of lands under the actual Government of that district Even the States which brought forward claims, in con fcradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismem ber this State, than to establish their own pretensions These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Con- necticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occa- sions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont ; and Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that place, entered deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our grow- ing greatness. In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes, which would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to become disunited. The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial polity peculiar to itself. This would oc- casion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been ac- customed from the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent, than they would naturally have, independent of this cir- cumstance. We should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were in reality the justifiable acts of in- dependent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest. The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade, by which particular States might endeavor to 38 The Fcederalist. secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The in« fractions of these regulations on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars. The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others tributary to them, by commercial regu- lations, would be impatiently submitted to by the tribu- tary States. The relative situation of New York, Con necticut, and New Jersey, would afford an example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be willing, nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not con- sent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors ; nor would it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undis- turbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive ? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the cooperating pressure of New Jersey on the other ? These are ques- tions that temerity alone will answer in the affirm- itive. The public debt of the Union would be a further cause •>f collision between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance, and the pro- gressive extinguishment, afterwards, would be alike pro- ductive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment, satisfac- The Federalist 39 tory to all ? There is scarcely any that can be proposed, which is entirely free from real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the States, as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citi- zens have little, if any, immediate interest in the ques- tion, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance to the pay- ment of the domestic debt, at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public, beyond the proportion of the State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effectual provision. The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule would in the mean time be postponed, by real differ- ences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the States interested would clamor; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands ; and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and internal contention. Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule sur- mounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose, that the rule agreed upon wouldj upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it, would naturally seek for a mitigation of the bur- den. The others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of iheir own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to with- oold their contributions, not to be embraced with avid- ity ; and the non-compliance of these States with their 40 The Federalist. engagements would be a ground of bitter dissension and altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payment, on the part of some of the States, would result from a diversity of other causes — the real deficiency of resources ; the mismanagement of their finances ; acci- dental disorders in the administration of the Government; and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced them, and inter- fere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is perhaps nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations, than their being bound to mutual contributions for any com- mon object which does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. For it is an observation as true, as it is trite, that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money. Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citi- zens are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to expect, that a more liberal, or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen, in too many in- stances, disgracing their several codes. We have ob- served the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecti- cut, in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the legislature of Rhode Island ; and we may reasonably infer, that in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of parchment, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice. The probability of incompatible alliances between th The Federalist. 41 different States, or confederacies, and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such opposite and jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera * must be the motto of every na- tion that either hates or fears us.f PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, November 20, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST. No. VIII. To the People of the State of New York : ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth, that the several States, in case of disunion, or such com- binations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one Govern- * Divide and command. — Pub- proposed to publish them four times Hus. a week, on Tuesday in the New t In order that the whole subject York Packet and on Thursday in of these Papers may be as soon as the Daily Advertiser. — Putting. possible laid before the Public, it is 42 The Federalist. ment, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation. War between the States, in the first periods of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long ob- tained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation, which used to mark the progress of war, prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mu- tually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admit- tance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country, almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received ; but now, a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued, and empires overturned , but of towns taken and retaken, of battles that decide nothing, of retreats more beneficial than victories, of much effort and little acquisition. In this country, the scene would be altogether re- versed. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of forti- fications, leaving the frontiers of one State open to an- other, would facilitate inroads. The populous States The Federalist 43 would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made, as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be des ultory and predatory. Plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of indi- viduals would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits. This picture is not too highly wrought ; though I con- fess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of na- tional conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent de- struction of life and property incident to war, the con- tinual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort, for repose and security, to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become will- ing to run the risk of being less free. The institutions chiefly alluded to are standing armies, and the correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution ; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under it.* Their existence, however, from the very terms of the proposi- tion, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably re- sult from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or confederacies would first have * This objection will be fully ex- is to be found in any Constitution fimined in its proper place ; and it that has been heretofore framed will be shown that the only nat- in America, most of which contain oral precaution which could have no guard at all on this subject.— been taken on this subject, has been Publius. taken ; and a much better one than 44 The Federalist. recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equal ity with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and resources, by a more regular and effective system of de- fence, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of Government; in doing which, their Constitutions would acquire a progressive direction tow- ards monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority. The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or confederacies that made use of them, a superiority over their neighbors. Small States, or States of less natural strength, under vigorous Gov- ernments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over large States, or States of greater natural strength, which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride, nor the safety, of the more important States, or confederacies, would permit them long to submit to this mortifying and ad- ventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost preeminence. Thus we should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the old world. This, at least, would be the natural course of things ; and our reason- ings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are accommodated to this standard. These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the hands of the people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclu- sions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress oi human affairs. It may perhaps be asked, by way of objection to this The Federalist. 43 why did not standing armies spring up out of the conten fcions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly multinlied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts o f industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, con- curring with the habits of nations, have produced an en- tire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the inseparable companion of frequent hostility. There is a wide difference, also, between military es- tablishments in a country seldom exposed by its situa- tion to internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior defence, the people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies ; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or pro- Densities of the other state. The smallness of the army fenders the natural strength of the community an over- match for it ; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery : they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which 46 The Federalist. they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of theii rights. The army under such circumstances may use fully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, 01 an occasional mob, or insurrection ; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the people. In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the Government to be always prepared to repel it ; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defence. The continual necessity for their ser- vices enhances the importance of the soldier, and pro- portionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights ; and by degrees, the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their supe- riors. The transition from this disposition to that of considering them as masters, is neither remote nor diffi- cult : but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military power. The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An insular situation, and a powerful ma- rine, guarding it in a great measure against the possi- bility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent, till the mili- tia could have time to rally and embody, is all thai tias been deemed requisite. No motive of national pol- cy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tol- erated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a long time past, The Federalist. 4V little room for the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the consequences of interna, war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute power of a single man. 'Tis possible, though not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes ; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within that kingdom. If we are wise enough to preserve the Union, we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insu- lated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength, to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military estab- lishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the inte- gral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe — our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jeal- ousy of each other. This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and veighty. It deserves the most serious and mature con- sideration of every prudent and honest man, of what- ever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance 48 The FasderalisL of this interesting idea ; if they will contemplate it, in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Con stitution, the rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some ot its adversaries, would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formi- dable. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. IX. To the People of the State of New York: 4 FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the -^*- peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty Republics of Greece and Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and disgust, at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions, by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration, between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrasts to the furious storms, that are to succeed. If, now and then, intervals of felicity open themselves to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection, that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a The Federalist. 49 transient and fleeting brilliancy, they, at the same time, admonish us to lament, that the vices of Government should pervert the direction, and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments, for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated. From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those Republics, the advocates of despotism have drawn argu- ments, not only against the forms of Republiean Gov- ernment, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free Government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid founda- tion of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their errors. But it is not to be denied, that the portraits they have sketched of Republican Government were too just cop- ies of the originals from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of Government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of vari- ous principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct depart- •nents ; the introduction of legislative balances and checks ; the institution of Courts composed of Judges holding their offices during good behavior ; the repre- sentation of the people in the Legislature, by Deputies of their own election ; these are either wholly new dis- 50 Tlie Federalist coveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and pow- erful means, by which the excellences of Republican Government may be retained, and its imperfections les- sened, or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances, that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civi! Government, I shall venture, however novel it may ap- pear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the New Constitution ; I mean the enlargement of the orbit within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State, or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will, how- ever, be of use to examine the principle, in its appli- cation to a single State, which shall be attended to in another place. The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress fac- tion; and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practised upon, in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subjects of politics. The opponents of the Plan proposed, have, with great assi- duity, cited and circulated the observations of Montes- quieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a Re- publican Government. But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man, expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle, to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence. When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for Republics, the standards he had in view were of dimen- Bions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania Tlie Federalist. 51 New- York, North Carolina, nor Georgia, can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned, and to which the terms of his description ap- p.y. If we therefore take his ideas on this point, as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative, either of taking refuge at once in the arms of Mon- archy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of lit- tle, jealous, clashing, tumultuous Commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miser- able objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers, who have come forward on the other side of the question, 'seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States, as a desirable thing. Such an in- fatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men, who possess not qualifications to extend their in- fluence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue ; but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America. Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here, that in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occa- sion, it would only dictate a reduction of the size of the more considerable members of the Union ; but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one Confederate Government. And this is the true ques- tion, in the discussion of which we are at present inter- ested. So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from stand- ing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a Confederate Republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular Govern- ment, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism. 52 The Federalist. " It is very probable," (says he,*) "that mankind would 4 have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under " the Government of a single person, had they not " contrived a kind of Constitution, that has all the inter- " nal advantages of a Republican, together with the ex- " ternal force of a Monarchical Government. I mean a " Confederate Republic. ■ " This form of Government is a Convention by which " several smaller States agree to become members of a " larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of " assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, ca- " pable of increasing by means of new associations, till " they arrive to such a degree of power, as to be able to " provide for the security of the united body. " A Republic of this kind, able to withstand an exter- " nal force, may support itself without any internal " corruptions. The form of this society prevents all " manner of inconveniences. " If a single member should attempt to usurp the su- " preme authority, he could not be supposed to have an " equal authority and credit in all the Confederate " States. Were he to have too great influence over one, " this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, " that which would still remain free might oppose him " with forces, independent of those which he had usurp- " ed, and overpower him before he could be settled in his " usurpation. " Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the u Confederate States, the others are able to quell it. " Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed u by those that remain sound. The State may be de- u stroyed on one side, and not on the other ; the Confed- 1 eracy may be dissolved, and the Confederates preserve * their Sovereignty. " As this Government is composed of small Repu.b * Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book IX. Chap. I. — Publius. The Feeder alls t 53 ' lies, it enjoys the internal happiness of each ; and with u respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by " means of the Association, of all the advantages oi " large Monarchies." I have thought it proper to quote at length these in- teresting passages, because they contain a luminoup abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impres- sions, which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of this Paper ; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection. A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a Confederacy and a consolidation of the States. The essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the indi- viduals of whom they are composed. It is contended, that the National Council ought to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a Confederate Government. These positions are, in the main, arbitra- ry ; they are supported neither by principle nor prece- dent. It has indeed happened, that Governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the distinction, taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature ; but there have been in most of them ex- tensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown, in the aourse of this investigation, that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of in- surable disorder and imbecility in the Government. The definition of a Confederate Republic seems sinv 54 The Federalist. ply to be, "an assemblage of Societies," or an Associa- tion of two or more States into one State. The extent, modifications, and objects of the Foederal authority, are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate or* ganization of the members be not abolished ; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes ; though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the Union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an Association of States, or a Confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an ab- olition of the State Governments, makes them constit- uent parts of the National Sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of Sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a Federal Government. In the Lycian Confederacy, which consisted of twen- ty-three cities, or Republics, the largest were entitled to three votes in the common council, those of the middle class to two, and the smallest to one. The common council had the appointment of all the Judges and Magistrates of the respective cities. This was certain- ly the most delicate species of interference in their in- ternal administration; for if there be anything that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Mon- tesquieu, speaking of this Association, says, " "Were I " to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic, " it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive, that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the con- templation of this enlightened civilian ; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements oi an erroneous theory. PUBLIUS. The Federalist 55 [From the New Yo~k Packet, Friday, November 23, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST. No. X. To the People op the State of New York : A MONG the numerous advantages promised by a -*-■*- well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular Governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and con- fusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular Govern- ments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adver- saries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American Constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired ; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are every- where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our Governments are too unstable ; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties ; and tnat measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and ^he rights of the minor party, but by the superior force 56 The Federalist. of an interested and overbearing majority. Howevei anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our Govern- ments ; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes ; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public adminis- trations. By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion* or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate in- terests of the community. There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of fac- tion : the one, by removing its causes ; the other, by con- trolling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction : the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence ; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, be- cause it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the The Federalist. 57 annihilation of air, which is essential to ajimal life, be- cause it imparts to fire its destructive agency. The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man con- tinues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, differ- ent opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opin* ions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other ; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the fac- ulties of men, from which the rights of property origi- nate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of Government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of prop- erty immediately results ; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective pro- prietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man ; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the dif- ferent circumstances of civil society. A zeal for differ- ent opinions concerning religion, concerning Government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of prac- tice ; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and power ; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interest- ing to the human passions, have, in turn, divided man- kind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and op- press each other, than to cooperate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occa- sion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful dip- 58 The Federalist. tinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriend ' j passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. Bui the most common and durable source of factions hag been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufactur- ing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civ- ilized nations, and divide them into different classes, ac- tuated by different sentiments and views. The regula- tion of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the Government. No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time ; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens ? and what are the different classes of Legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine ? Is a law proposed con- cerning private debts ? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges ; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction, must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures ? are questions which would be differently decided by the The Feeder alist. 59 landed and the manufacturing classes ; and probably by neither, with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various de- scriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality ; yet there is. perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and tempta- tion are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling, with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets. It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm : Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole. The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed ; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the so- ciety ; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular Government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, ind private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular Government, is then the great object to which 60 The FcederalisL our inquiries are directed : Let me add, that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of Govern- ment can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the es- teem and adoption of mankind. By what means is this object attainable ? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority, at the same time, must be prevented ; or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together ; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. From this view of the subject, it may be concluded, that a pure Democracy, by which I mean a Society con- sisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a major- ity of the whole ; a communication and concert results from the form of Government itself ; and there is noth- ing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbu lence and contention ; have ever been found incompati- ble with personal security, or the rights of property ; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of Government, have erro- neously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a per- fect equality in their political rights, they would, at the The Federalist. 61 same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions. A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a differ* ent prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure Democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union. The two great points of difference, between a Democ- racy and a Republic, are, first, the delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest : Secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine arid enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose, wisdom may best discern the true interest of their coun- try, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial consid- erations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the People, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the People themselves, con- vened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. The ques- tion resulting is, whether small or extensive Republics are most favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal ; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two ctovious considerations. In the first place, it is to be remarked that however small the Republic may be, the Representatives must be 62 The Federalist. raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few ; and that however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the num- ber of Representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the Constituents, and being pro- portionally greatest in the small Republic, it follows, that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small Republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice. In the next place, as each Representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small Republic, it will be more difficult for un- worthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried ; and the suffrages of the People, being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters. It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which incon- veniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests ; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to com- prehend and pursue great and National objects. The Foederal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect ; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the National, the local and particular to the State Legislatures. The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of Republican, than of Demc cratic Government ; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded The Federalist. 63 in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the so- ciety, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it ; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party ; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of op- pression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests ; you make it less prob- able that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens ; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that w 7 here there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the num- ber whose concurrence is necessary. Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a Republic has over a Democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small Republic, — is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the sub- stitution of Representatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice ? It will not be denied, that the Representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest ? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties, comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes 64 The Federalist. of an unjust and interested majority ? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advan- tage. The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States ; A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the Na- tional Councils against any danger from that source ; A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union, than a particular member of it ; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State. In the extent and proper structure of the Union, there- fore, we behold a Republican remedy for the diseases most incident to Republican Government. And accord- ing to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit, and supporting the character, of Foederalists. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XI. To the People of the State of New York: THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light is one of those points, about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has in fact commanded the most general assent of men, who The Federalist. 65 have any acquaintance, with the subject. This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries, as with each other. There are appearances to authorize a supposition, that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commer- cial character of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great inter- ference in that carrying trade which is the support of their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. Those of them, which have colonies in Amer- ica, look forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with painful solicitude. They foresee the dangers, that may threaten their American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have all the dis- positions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering divis- ions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of an active commerce in our own bottoms. This would answer the threefold purpose of preventing our inter- ference in their navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of clipping the wings, by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of Ministers. If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending, at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign coun- tries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate the importance of the markets of three millions of people — increasing in rapid progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to 66 The Federalist. agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain so — to any manufacturing nation ; and the immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of such a nation, between a direct communi- cation in its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of its products and returns, to and from America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we had a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all our ports ; what would be the proba- ble operation of this step upon her politics ? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom ? When these questions have been asked, upon other oc- casions, they have received a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been said, that prohibi- tions on our part would produce no change in the sys- tem of Britain ; because she could prosecute her trade with us, through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate customers and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for the supply of our mar- kets. But would not her navigation be materially in- jured, by the loss of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that trade ? Would not the principal part of its profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a com- pensation for their agency and risk ? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduction ? Would not so circuitous an intercom se fa- cilitate the competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other hands the management of this interesting branch of the British commerce ? A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will justify a belief, that the real dis- advantages to Britain, from such a state of things, con* The Federalist 6? spiring with the prepossessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those islands and elsewhere, from which our trade would derive (he most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British Government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade. A further resource for influencing the conduct of Eu- ropean nations towards us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a Foederal navy. There can be no doubt, that the continuance of the Union, under an efficient Government, would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy, which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight, if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the case, in relation to operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a cam- paign, on the event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a very commanding one. And if, to this con- sideration, we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military opera- tions in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived, that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price vould be set, not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union, 58 The Federalist. we may hope, erelong, to become the Arbiter of Europe in America ; and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world, as our interest may dictate. But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover, that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant, our com- merce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each other ; who, having nothing to fear from us, would, with little scruple or remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property, as often as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be respected, when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral. Under a vigorous National Government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This situa- tion would even take away the motive to such combina- tions, by inducing an impracticability of success. An active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flour- ishing marine, would then be the inevitable offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little arts of little politicians to control, or vary, the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature. But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions of our political existence ; and as they have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in prevent- ing our becoming theirs, they would, in all probability, sombine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner The Federalist. 69 as would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a passive commerce. We should thus be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us, to enrich our enemies and persecutors. That unequalled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American Merchants and Navigators, and which is in itself an in- exhaustible mine of National wealth, would be stifled and lost ; and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country, which, with wisdom, might make herself the admiration and envy of the world. There are rights of great moment to the trade oi America, which are rights of the Union — I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the Confederacy would give room for delicate questions, con- cerning the future existence of these rights ; which the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain, with regard to the Mississippi, needs no comment. France and Britain are concerned with us in the fish- eries ; and view them as of the utmost moment to their navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown us to be possessed, in this valuable branch of traffic ; and by which we are able to undersell those nations in their own markets. What more natural than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors ? This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit. All the navigating States may, in differ- ent degrees, advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile cap- ital would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of sea- men, it now is, or, when time shall have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the several 70 The F&deralist. States, will become an universal resource. To the estab« lishment of a navy, it must be indispensable. To this great National object, a Navy, Union wih contribute in various ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and sup- port. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State, or partial Confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a part. It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. The more Southern States furnish, in greater abundance, certain kinds of naval stores — tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood, for the construction of ships, is also of a more solid and lasting texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval strength, or of National economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external or maritime commerce, does not require a particular elucidation, no more than the conduciveness of that species of com- merce to the prosperity of a navy. They, by a kind of -eaction, mutually beneficial, promote each other. An unrestrained intercourse between the States them- selves will advance the trade of each, by an interchange of their respective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater The Federalist. 71 scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States. When the staple of one fails, from a bad har- vest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the value of prod- ucts for exportation, contributes to the activity of for- eign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms, with a large number of materials of a given value, than with a small number of materials of the same value ; arising from the competitions of trade, and from the fluctuations of markets. Particular articles may be in great demand, at certain periods, and unsalable at others ; but if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen, that they should all be at one time in the latter predicament ; and on this account, the opera- tions of the merchant would be less liable to any consid- erable obstruction, or stagnation. The speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these observations ; and will acknowledge, that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the thirteen States, without union, or with partial unions. It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united, or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them, which would answer the same ends : But this intercourse would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed, by a multiplicity of causes; which in the course of these Papers have been amply Retailed. An unity of commercial, as well as political, interests, can only result from an unity of Government. There are other points of view, in which this subject might be placed, of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a Newspaper discussion. — I shall briefly observe, that our situation jivites, and our interests prompt us, to aim at an ascend >\nt in the system of American affairs. The world may 72 The Federalist. politically, as well as geographically, be divided intc four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in dif ferent degrees, extended her dominion over them all, Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men, admired as profound philosophers, have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a phys- ical superiority ; and have gravely asserted, that all ani- mals, and with them the human species, degenerate in America — that even dogs cease to bark, after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.* Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the European : It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thir- teen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influ- ence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world ! PUBLIUS. * Becherches philosophiques sur les Amtiricains. — Publiu$. The Federalist. 73 [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, November 27, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XII. To the People of the State of New Yokk : HP HE effects of Union upon the commercial prosper- -*■ ity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry. The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged, by all enlightened statesmen, to be the most useful, as well as the most productive source of National wealth ; and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares. By multiply- ing the means of gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry, and to make them flow with greater activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the labo- rious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the in- dustrious manufacturer, all orders of men, look for- ward with eager expectation, and growing alacrity, to this pleasing reward of their toils. The often agitated question between agriculture and commerce, has, from indubitable experience, received a decision, which has silenced the rivalships that once subsisted between them, and has proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are intimately blended and interwoven. It has been found, in various countries, that in propor- tion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And how could it have happened otherwise ? Could that which procures a freer vent for the products of the 74 The Federalist. earth ; which furnishes new incitements to the cultiva tors of land ; which is the most powerful instrument in increasing the quantity of money in a State — ■ could that, in fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor and industry, in every shape, fail to augment the value of that article, which is the prolific parent of far the great- est part of the objects upon which they are exerted ? It is astonishing, that so simple a truth should ever have had an adversary ; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and refinement, is to lead men astray from the plainest paths of reason and conviction. The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the celerity with which it circu- lates. Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and populous territory, a large proportion of which is situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this terri- tory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering influ- ence of commerce, that monarch can boast but slender revenues. He has several times been compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations, for the preservation of his essential interests ; and is un- able, upon the strength of his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war. But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone, that Union will be seen to conduce to the purposes of reve- nue. There are other points of view, in which its influ- ence will appear more immediate and decisive. It is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the The Federalist. 75 point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws havt in vain been multiplied ; new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried ; the public expecta- tion has been uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained empty. The popular sys- tem of administration, inherent in the nature of popular Government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money, incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collec- tions, and has at length taught the different Legislatures the folly of attempting them. No person, acquainted with what happens in other countries, will be surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of Britain, where direct taxes, from superior wealth, must be much more tolerable, and, from the vigor of the Government, much more practica- ble, than in America, far the greatest part of the National revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter description. In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend, for the means of revenue, chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it, excises must be confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the unwel- come shape of impositions on their houses and lands ; and personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other way, than by the imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption. If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will best enable us to improve and ex- tend so valuable a resource must be best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serioua 76 The Federalist. doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis of a general Union. As far as this would be conducive to the interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations for the collection of the duties more simple and effica- cious, so far it must serve to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties more productive, and of putting it into the power of the Government to increase the rate without prejudice to trade. The relative situation of these States ; the number of rivers with which they are intersected, and of bays that wash their shores ; the facility of communication in every direction ; the affinity of language and manners ; the familiar habits of intercourse ; all these are circum- stances that would conspire to render an illicit trade between them a matter of little difficulty ; and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each other. The separate States, or Confederacies, would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade, by the lowness of their duties. . The temper of our Governments, for a long time to come, would not permit those rigorous precau- tions, by which the European nations guard the avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by water ; and which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of avarice. In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly employed to secure their fiscal regula- tions against the inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these pa- trols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense difficulty in preventing that species of traffic, where there is an inland communication, and places ir: a strong light the disadvantages, with which the collec- tion of duties in this country would be encumbered, if The Federalist. 77 by disunion the States should be placed in a situation, with respect to each other, resembling that of France with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexa- tious powers with which the patrols are necessarily armed, w 7 ould be intolerable in a free country. If, on the contrary, there be but one Government per* vading all the States, there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but one side to guard — the Atlantic coast. Vessels arriving directly from foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to hazard themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would have to dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well after as before their arrival at the places of their final destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent to the prevention of any material infrac- tions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed ves- sels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the Government having the same inter- est to provide against violations everywhere, the coop- eration of its measures in each State, would have a powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should preserve, by Union, an advantage which na- ture holds out to us, and which would be relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a great dis- tance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other places with which they would have extensive connections of foreign trade. The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single night, as between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neigh- boring nations, would be impracticable. This is a prodigious security against a direct contraband with foreign countries ; but a circuitous contraband to one State, through the medium of another, would be both 78 The Federalist. easy and safe. The difference between a direct itn portation from abroad, and an indirect importatior through the channel of a neighboring State, in small parcels, according to time and opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland communication, must be palpable to every man of discernment. It is, therefore, evident, that one National Government would be able, at much less expense, to extend the du- ties on imports, beyond comparison, further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any par- tial Confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted, that these duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three per cent. In France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Brit- ain they exceed this proportion.* There seems to be nothing to hinder their being increased in this country, to at least treble their present amount. The single arti- cle of ardent spirits, under Foederal regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quan- tity imported into the United States may be estimated at four millions of gallons ; which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce tw T o hundred thousand pounds. That article would well bear this rate of duty ; and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and to the health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of National extravagance as these spirits. What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail ourselves of the resource in question in its full extent ? A nation cannot long exist without revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign its independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a province. This is an extremity to which no Government * If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent. — Publiu*. The Fcederalist. 79 will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land. It has been already intimated that excises, in their true signification, are too little in unison with the feelings of the people, to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxation ; nor, indeed, in the States where almost the sole employment is agricul- ture, are the objects, proper for excise, sufficiently nu- merous to permit very ample collections in that way. Personal estate, (as has been before remarked,) from the difficulty of tracing it, cannot be subjected to large con- tributions, by any other means than by taxes on con- sumption. In popular cities, it may be enough the subject of conjecture, to occasion the oppression of indi- viduals, without much aggregate benefit to the State ; but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of the State, nevertheless, must be satis- fied in some mode or other, the defect of other resources must throw the principal weight of the public burdens on the possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wants of the Government can never obtain an ade- quate supply, unless all the sources of revenue are open to its demands, the finances of the community, under such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation consistent with its respectability or its security. Thus we shall not even have the consolations of a full treas- ury, to atone for the oppression of that valuatle class of the citizens, who are employed in the cultivation of the soil. But public and private distress will keep pace with each other in gloomy concert; and unite in de- ploring the infatuation of those counsels which led tc disunion. PUBLIUS 8o The Federalist. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XIII. To the People of the State op New York: AS connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another ; and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one Government, there will be but one National civil list to support : if they are divided into several Confederacies, there will be as many different National civil lists to be provided for ; and each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary for a Government of the whole. The entire separation of the States into thir- teen unconnected sovereignties is a project too ex- travagant, and too replete with danger, to have many advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire, seem generally turned towards three Confederacies ; one consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States. There is little probability that there would be a greater number. According to this distribution, each Confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a Confederacy can be properly regulated by a Government less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been proposed by the Convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy The Federalist. 81 of Government, and the same forms of administration, which are requisite in one of much greater extent. This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power, necessary to the government of any given number of individuals ; but when we consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed Confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt, that the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of dif- fusing its force to a very great extent ; and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire, by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions. The supposition, that each Confederacy into which the States would be likely to be divided would re- quire a Government not less comprehensive than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposi- tion, more probable than that which presents us with three Confederacies, as the alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prej- udices of the different States, we shall be led to con- clude, that in case of disunion, they will most naturally league themselves under two Governments. The four Eastern States, from all the causes that form the links of National sympathy and connection, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that Confederacy. There are obvious reasons, that would facilitate her ac- cession to it. New Jersey is too small a State to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more power- S2 The Federalist. ful combination ; nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern league An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from various circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system, which would give unlimited scope to all nations, to be the carriers, as well as the purchasers, of their commodities. Pennsyl- vania may not choose to confound her interests in a connection so adverse to her policy. As she must, at all events, be a frontier, she may deem it most consist- ent with her safety, to have her exposed side turned towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather than towards the stronger power of the Northern Confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be the deter- mination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one Confederacy to the south of that State. Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able to support a National Government, better than one half, or one third, or any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on the principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground. If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to guard the inland com- munication between the different Confederacies against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up Tlie Federalist. 83 out of the necessities of revenue ; and if we also take into view the military establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the States would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a sepa- ration would be not less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of every part. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, November SO, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XIV. To the People of the State of New York : "YT^TE have seen the necessity of the Union, as oui * * bulwark against foreign danger, as the conserva- tor of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only sub- stitute for those military establishments which have sub- verted the liberties of the old world, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular Governments, and of which alarm- ing symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection, that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces. A few observations on this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that the adversaries of the New Con- stitution are availing themselves of a prevailing preju- dice, with regard to the practicable sphere of republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary diffi- 84 The Federalist. culties, the want of those solid objections, which they endeavor in vain to find. The error which limits Republican Government to a narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in pre- ceding papers. I remark here only, that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy ; and applying to the former, reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the Government in person ; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their rep- resentatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region. To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects either of an abso- lute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils, of those forms, by placing in comparison with them, the vices and defects of the republican, and by citing as speci- mens of the latter, the turbulent democracies of an- cient Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic, observations applicable to a democracy only ; and among others, the observation that it can never be established but among a small number of people, living within a small compass of territory. Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular Governments of antiquity were of the democratic species ; and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no example is seen of a Government wholly popular, and founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If The Federalist. 85 Europe has the merit of discovering this great mechan- ical power in Government, by the simple agency of which, the will of the largest political body may be concentred, and its force directed to any object which the public good requires, America can claim the merit of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and ex- tensive republics. It is only to be lamented, that any of her citizens should wish to deprive her of the additional merit of displaying its full efficacy in the establishment of the comprehensive system now under her consid- eration. As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater number than can join in those functions ; so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the representatives of the people to meet as often as may be necessary for the administra- tion of public affairs. Can it be said, that the limits of the United States exceed this distance ? It will not be said by those who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union ; that during the term of thir- teen years, the representatives of the States have been almost continually assembled ; and that the members from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance, than those from the States in the neighborhood of Congress. That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting subject, let us resort to the actual dimen- sions of the Union. The limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are, on the east the Atlantic, on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the Mississip- pi, and on the north an irregular line running in some instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling is low as the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake 86 The Fcederalist. Erie lies below that latitude. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and forty -fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three common miles ; com* puting it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven hundred sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean for the distance, the amount will be eight hundred sixty- eight miles and three fourths. The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably ex- ceed seven hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our system commensu- rate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger than Germany, where a Diet, representing the whole empire, is continually assembled ; or than Po- land before the late dismemberment, where another National Diet was the depositary of the supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the representatives of the northern extremity of the island have as far to travel to the National Council, as will be required of those of the most remote parts of the Union. Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain, which will place it in a light still more satisfactory. In the first place it is to be remembered, that the gen- eral Government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdic- tion is limited to certain enumerated objects, which con- cern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate Governments, which can extend their care to all those other objects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the Convention to abolish the Governments of the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objection ; though it The Fmderalist. 8? would not be difficult to show, that if they were abol- ished, the General Government would be compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction. A second observation to be made is, that the imme- diate objects of the Foederal Constitution is to secure the nnion of the Thirteen Primitive States, which we know to be practicable ; and to add to them such other States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighbor- hoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our north-western frontier, must be left to those whom fur- ther discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task. Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the inter- course throughout the Union will be daily facilitated by new improvements. Roads will everywhere be short- ened, and kept in better order ; accommodations for travellers will be multiplied and meliorated ; an interior navigation on our eastern side will be opened through- out, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the Thir- teen States. The communication between the western and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy, by those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete. A fourth, and still more important consideration, is that as almost every State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus find, in a regard to its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices for the sake of the general protection ; so the States which lie at the great- est distance from the heart of the Union, and which of course may partake least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be at the same time immediately 68 The Federalist. contiguous to foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the States forming our western or north- eastern borders, to send their representatives to the seat of Government ; but they would find it more so to strug- gle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by the neighborhood of continual dan- ger. If they should derive less benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects, than the less distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained throughout. I submit to you, my Fellow- Citizens, these considera- tions, in full confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions will allow them their due weight and effect ; and that you will never suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or how- ever fashionable the error on which they may be founded to drive you into the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice, which tells you that the People of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family ; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness ; can no longer be fellow-citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you, that the form of Government recom- mended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world ; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors ; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. No, my Countrymen, shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it conveys ; the The Federalist. 89 kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citi- zens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defence of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, ene- mies. And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rending us in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties, and pro- mote our happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new ? Is it not the glory of the People of America, that whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience ? To this manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no Government estab- lished of which an exact model did not present itself, the People of the United States might, at this moment, have been numbered among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily for America, happily we trust for the whole human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of Governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy which it is incumbent on their successors to improve 90 The Federalist. and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewre^s of them. If they erred most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to be executed ; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of your Convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide. PUBL1US. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XV. To the People of the State of New York: IN the course of the preceding papers, I have endeav- ored, my Fellow- Citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America together to be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepre- sentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road, over which you will still have to pass, should in some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect, that you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which can engage the attention of a free people : that the field through which you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the jour- ney have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes The Federalist. 91 with which sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles to your progress, in as com- pendious a manner as it can be done, without sacrificing utility to despatch. In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down, for the discussion of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the " insufficiency of the present Confed- eration to the preservation of the Union." It may per- haps be asked, what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate a position, which is not either controverted or doubted ; to which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent ; and which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the friends of the New Constitution ? It must in truth be acknowl- edged, that however these may differ in other respects, they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are material imperfections in our National system, and that something is necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this opinion are no longer objects of specu- lation. They have forced themselves upon the sensi- bility of the people at large, and have at length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those de- fects in the scheme of our Fcederal Government, which have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelli- gent friends of the Union. We may indeed, with propriety, be said to have reached almost the last stage of National humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or jegrade the character of an independent nation, which we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of which we are held by every tie respect- able among men ? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners, 92 Tht Federalist. and 1o our own citizens, contracted in a time of immi- nent peril, for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provis- ion for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign pow- er, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered ? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggres- sion ? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor Gov- ernment* Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity ? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free partici- pation in the navigation of the Mississippi ? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger ? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to National wealth ? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments ? The imbecility of our Government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of National distress ? The price of improved and in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct ten- dency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry ? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more * I mean for the Union. — PuUius, The Federalist. 93 from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it ma} in general be demanded what indication is there of Na- tional disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural id vantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes ? This is the melancholy situation, to which we have been brought by those very maxims and councils, which would now deter us from adopting the proposed Consti- tution ; and which, not content with having conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss, that awaits us below. Here, my Countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity. It is true, as has been before observed, that facts, too stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of gen- eral assent to the abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our National system ; but the useful- ness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of Fcederal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous oppo- sition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the Government of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy : They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable ; at an augmentation of Foederal authority, without a dimi nution of State authority ; at sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political 94 The Federalist. monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a fuD display of the principal defects of the Confederation necessary, in order to show, that the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended, otherwise than by an altera- tion in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric. The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGIS- LATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACI- TIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVID- UALS of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money ; but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that, though in theory their reso- lutions concerning those objects are laws, constitution- ally binding on the members of the Union, yet in prac- tice they are mere recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their option. It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head, there should still be found men, who object to the New Constitution, for deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old ; and which is, in itself, evidently incompatible with the idea of government ; a principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent find sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influ- ence of the Magistracy. There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea The Federalist. 95 of a league or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty • regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity ; leaving nothing to future discretion ; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the par- ties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present century, there was an epidemi- cal rage in Europe for this species of compacts ; from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed ; but they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on trea- ties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith ; and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion. If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general discretionary superintend- ence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head ; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable. Abandoning all views towards a Confederate Govern- ment, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive : and would place us in a situation to be alternately friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the in- trigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us. 96 The Federalist. But if we are unwilling to be placed in th perilous situation ; if we still will ixdbere to the design of a National Government, or, wto^h is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of e> common Council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming i he characteristic difference between a league and a Government ; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, — the only proper objects of Government. Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction ; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pre- tend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, what- ever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways : by the agency of the Courts and Ministers of Justice, or by military force ; by the coercion of the magistracy, or by the coercion of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men : the last kind must, of necessity, be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident, that there is no process of a Court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last re- sort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty ; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war ; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve 1he name of Government, nor would an\ prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it. There was a time when we were told that breaches. The Federalist. 97 by the States, of the regulations of the Foederal author- ity were not to be expected ; that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the constitutional requisitions of the Union. This lan- guage, at the present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the orig- inal inducements to the establishment of civil power. Why has Government been instituted at all ? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals ? The con- trary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind ; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number, than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are com- posed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would blush in a private capacity. In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sov- ereign power, an impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number t>f lesser 'sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, 98 The Federalist. by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This ten- dency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposi- tion will teach us, how little reason there is to expect, that the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of a Confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from the constitution of human nature. If therefore the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed, without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the respective members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures themselves. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed or required to their immediate interests or aims ; the momentary conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All this will be done ; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of National circumstances and reasons of State, which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in every member of which the body is constituted ; and the execution of the plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular assem- blies ; who have seen how difficult it often is, wher TJie Federalist '. 9S there is no exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important points, will readily conceive how impossible it must be to in- duce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other, at different times, and under different impressions, long to cooperate in the same views and pursuits. In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sov- ereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been executed ; the delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the National Government, and brought them to an awful stand. Con- gress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a Foederal Government. Things did not come to this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been specified produced at first only unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. The greater defi- ciencies of some States furnished the pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common bur- den? These were suggestions which human selfish- ness could not withstand, and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or con- venience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the 100 The Federalist. frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon coi heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 4, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XVI. To the People of the State of New York : THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities, in their political capaci- ties, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other Governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact propor- tion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirma- tions of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and par- ticular examination. I shall content myself with barely observing here, that of all the Confederacies of antiquity, which history has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from the fetters of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding suffrages of political writers. This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphat- ically, be styled the parent of anarchy : It has been seen that delinquencies in the members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring ; and that when- ever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil war. It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of The Federalist. 101 Government, in its application to us, would e\en be capable of answering its end. If there should not be a large army, constantly at the disposal of the Nationa Government, it would either not be able to employ force at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of the Confederacy, concerning the infractions of a league ; in which the strongest combi- nation would be most likely to prevail, whether it con- sisted of those who supported, or of those who resisted, the general authority. It would rarely happen that the delinquency to be redressed would be confined to a single member ; and if there were more than one, who had neglected their duty, similarity of situation would induce them to unite for common defence. Indepen- dent of this motive of sympathy, if a large and influen- tial State should happen to be the aggressing member, it would commonly have weight enough with its neigh- bors, to win over some of them as associates to its cause. Specious arguments of danger to the common Liberty could easily be contrived ; plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty, be invented, to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the passions, and conciliate the good-will, even of those States which were not chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. This would be the more likely to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be expected sometimes to proceed from an ambi- tious premeditation in their rulers, with a view to get- ting rid of all external control upon their designs of personal aggrandizement ; the better to effect which, it is presumable they would tamper beforehand with lead- ing individuals in the adjacent States. If associates could not be found at home, recourse would be had to the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be disin- clined to encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy, arom the firm Union of w lich they had so much to fear 102 The Federalist. When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the States, against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes neces- sary to avenge the affront, or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union. This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy. Its more natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of experiencing, if the Foederal system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial form. It is not probable, considering the genius of this country, that the complying States would often be in- clined to support the authority of the Union, by engag- ing in a war against the non-complying States. They would always be more ready to pursue the milder course of putting themselves upon an equal footing with the delinquent members, by an imitation of their example. And the guilt of all would thus become the security of all. Our past experience has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full light. There would in fact be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when force could with propriety be employed. In the article of pecuni- ary contribution, which would be the most usual source of delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide, whether it had proceeded from disinclination or inabil- ity. The pretence of the latter would always be at hand. And the case must be very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with sufficient certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion. It is easy to see that this problem alone, as often as it should occur, would open a wide field for the exercise of fac- tious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the ma- jority that happened to prevail in the National council. It seems to require no pains to prove that the Statea Tlie Federalist. 103 ought not to prefer a National Constitution, which could only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large army, continually on foot to execute the ordinary requi- sitions or decrees of the Government. And yet this is the plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of extending its operations to indi- viduals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would instantly degenerate into a military despotism ; but it will be found in every light impracticable. The re- sources of the Union would not be equal to the main- tenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger States within the limits of their duty ; nor would the means ever be furnished of forming such an army in the first instance. Whoever considers the populous- ness and strength of several of these States singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what the} will become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme, which aims at regulating their movements by laws, to operate upon them in their collective capacities, and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic than the monster-taming spirit, which is at- tributed to the fabulous heroes and demi-gods of anti- quity. Even in those Confederacies which have been com- posed of members smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign States, sup- ported by military coercion, has never been found effect- ual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker members ; and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient have been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of the Confederacy has displayed its banners against the rther half. The result of these observations to an intelligent L04 The Federalist. mind must be clearly this, that if it be possible at an$ rate to construct a Foederal Government capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the ob- jects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the opponents of the pro- posed Constitution. It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations ; but must itself be empow- ered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the Na- tional authority must be manifested through the me- dium of the Courts of Justice. The Government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals ; and to attract to its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all the means, and have a right to re- sort to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is intrusted, that are possessed and exercised by the Governments of the particular States. To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State should be disaffected to the authority of the Union, it could at any time obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the same issue of force, with the necessity of which the opposite scheme is re- proached. The plausibility of this objection will vanish the mo- ment we advert to the essential difference between a mere non-compliance and a direct and active resist- ance. If the interposition of the State Legislatures be necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union, they have only not to act, or to act evasively, and the measure is defeated. This neglect of duty may be dis- guised under affected but unsubstantial provisions, so as not to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm The Federalist. 10c in the People for the safety of the Constitution. The State leaders may even make a merit of their surrepti- tious invasions of it on the ground of some temporary convenience, exemption, or advantage. But if the execution of the laws of the National Gov- ernment should not require the intervention of the State Legislatures ; if they were to pass into immediate oper- ation upon the citizens themselves, the particular Gov- ernments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional power. No omissions, nor evasions, would answer the end. They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner, as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the National rights. An experiment of this nature would always be hazardous in the face of a Constitu- tion in any degree competent to its own defence, and of a people enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority. The success of it would require not merely a factious majority in the Legislature, but the concurrence of the Courts of Justice, and of the body of the People. If the Judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the Legislature, they would pronounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of the land, unconstitutional, and void. If the People were not tainted with the spirit of their State representatives, they, as the natural guardians of the Constitution, would throw their weight into the National scale, and give it a decided preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this land would not often be made with levity or rashness ; because they could seldom be made without danger to the authors ; unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise of the Fcederal authority. If opposition to the National Government should arise from the disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious jidividuals, it could be overcome by the same meana 106 The Federalist. which are daily employed against the same evil, undei the State Governments. The Magistracy, being equally the Ministers of the law of the land, from whatever source it might emanate, would doubtless be as ready to guard the National as the local regulations from the inroads of private licentiousness. As to those partial commotions and insurrections, which sometimes disquiet society, from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction, or from sudden or occasional ill-humors, that do not in- fect the great body of the community, the General Gov- ernment could command more extensive resources, for the suppression of disturbances of that kind, than would be in the power of any single member. And as to those mortal feuds, which, in certain conjunc- tures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation, or through a very large proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent, given by the Gov- ernment, or from the contagion of some violent popular paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions, and dismemberments of empire. No form of Government can always either avoid or con- trol them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight or precaution ; and it would be idle to object to a Government, because it could not perform impossibilities. PUBLIUS. Tlie Federalist. 107 For the Independent Journal. THE FQBDERALIST. No. XVII. To the People of the State of New York: \ N objection, of a nature different from that which -*-*- has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said, that it would tend to render the Govern- ment of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to ab- sorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judg- ed proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of powei which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons in- trusted with the administration of the General Govern- ment could ever feel to divest the States of the authori- ties of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects Which have charms for minds governed by that passion ; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the National depository. The administration of private justice between the citi- zens of the same State, the supervision of agricultuir and of other concerns of a similar nature, all thos; things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a gen- eral jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable, that there should exist a disposition in the Foederal councils to usurp the powers with which they are connected ; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as trouble* 108 The Federalist. some as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the National Government. But let it be admitted, for argument' sake, that mere wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient io beget that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, chat the sense of the constituent body of the National representatives, or, in other words, of the People of the feveral States, would control the indulgence of so extrav- agant an appetite. It will always be far more easy for the State Governments to encroach upon the National au- thorities, than for the National Government to encroach upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposi- tion turns upon the greater degree of influence which the State Governments, if they administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the People ; a circumstance which at the same time teaches us, that there is an inherent and intrinsic weak- ness in all Foederal Constitutions ; and that too much pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the princi- ples of liberty. The superiority of influence in favor of the particular Governments would result partly from the diffusive con- struction of the National Government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the attention of the State administrations would be directed. It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the commu- nity at large, the People of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local Governments than towards the Government of the Union ; unless the The Federalist. 109 force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter. This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful auxiliaries in the objects of State regu- lation. The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruc- tion it might afford. There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the State Governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light, — I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular - obedi- ence and attachment. It is that, which, being the imme- diate and visible guardian of life and property ; having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye ; regulating all those personal interests, and familiar concerns, to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake ; contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the People, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the Government. This great cement of society, which wilJ diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular Governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the Union. The operations of the National Government, on the other hand, falling less immediately under the observa- tion of the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived 110 The Federalist. from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the People ; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire a habit- ual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment. The reasoning on this head has been abundantly ex- emplified by the experience of all Fcederal Constitutions with which we are acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to them. Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking, Confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority extended over the whole Nation ; and a number of subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land allotted to them, and numerous trains of inferior vassals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience to the persons of whom they held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sov- ereign within his particular demesnes. The conse- quences of this situation were a continual opposition to the authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars be- tween the great barons, or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the head of the Nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the public peace, or to protect the People against the oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy. When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigor- ous and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and influence, which answered for the time the purposes of a more regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons tri- umphed over that of the prince ; and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs Th* Federalist. Ill were erected into independent principalities or States. In those instances in which the monarch finally prevail- ed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their dependants. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and detested by both ; till mutual danger and mutual interest effected an union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity and devo- tion of their retainers and followers, the contests between them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal authority. This is not an assertion founded merely in specula- tion or conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant over- match for the power of the monarch, till the incorpora- tion with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules of subordina- tion, winch a more rational and more energetic system of civil polity had previously established in the latter kingdom. The separate Governments in a Confederacy may apt* be compared with the feudal baronies ; with this advan- tage in their favor, that from the reasons already ex- plained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-will of the People, and with so important a sup- port, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the National Government. It will be well, if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary au- thority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship 112 The Federalist. of power, applicable to both, and in tne concentra- tion of large portions of the strength of the community into particular deposits, in one case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at the disposal of politica. bodies. A concise review of the events that have attended Confederate Governments will further illustrate this im- portant doctrine ; an inattention to which has been the great source of our political mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XVIII. To the People of the State op New York : AMONG the Confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian Republics, associated under the Amphictyonie council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confed- eration of the American States. The members retained the character of independent and sovereign States, and had equal votes in the Fcederal council. This council had a general authority to pro- pose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of Greece ; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies be- tween the members ; to fine the aggressing party ; to employ the whole force of the Confederacy against the disobedient ; to admit new members. The Amphic- T/ie Federalist. 113 tyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy of the Fcederal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious de- spoilers of the Temple. In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply sufficient for all general purposes. In sev- eral material instances, they exceed the powers enumer- ated in the Articles of Confederation. The Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of the principal engines by which Government was then maintained ; they had a declared authority to use co- ercion against refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions. Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory. The powers, like those of the present Con- gress, were administered by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities ; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the Confed- eracy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from Demosthe- nes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years ; at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination. It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of the strongest cities awed and cor- rupted those of the weaker ; and that judgment went in favor of the most powerful party. Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars 114 The Federalist. with Persia and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The in- tervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissi hides, convulsions, and carnage. After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it ap- pears that the Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned out of the Confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The Athenians, rinding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer parti- sans by such a measure than themselves, and would become masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of his- tory proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common centre, had become, in fact, satel- lites of the orbs of primary magnitude. Had the Greeks, says the Abbe* Milot, been as wise as they were courageous, they would have been admon- ished by experience of the necessity of a closer Union, and would have availed themselves of the peace w T hich followed their success against the Persian arms, to estab- lish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired, became first rivals and then enemies ; and did each other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their mutual jeal- ousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the celebrated Peloponnesian war ; which itself ended in the ruin and slavery of the Athenians who had begun it. As a weak Government, when not at war, is ever agi- tated by internal dissensions ; so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities from abroad. The Phocians having The Federalist. 135 ploughed up some consecrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by- Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree. The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated God. The latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won over to his interests the popular lead- ers of several cities; by their influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic council ; and by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the Confed- eracy. Such were the consequences of the fallacious princi- ple on which this interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter Confederation, and persevered in her Union, she would never have worn the chains of Mace- don ; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome. The Achaean league, as it is called, was another so- ciety of Grecian republics, which supplies us with valu- able instruction. The Union here was far more intimate, and its organ- ization much wiser, than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear, that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved it. The cities composing this league retained their mu- nicipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The Senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of Deace and war ; of sending and receiving Ambassadors ; L16 The Federalist. of entering into treaties and alliances ; of appointing a Chief Magistrate or Praetor, as he was called, who com- manded their armies, and who, with the advice and con- sent of ten of the senators, not only administered the Government in the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when assembled. According to the primitive Constitution, there were two Praetors associated in the administration ; but on trial a single one was preferred. It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect proceeded from the authority of the Foederal Council is left in uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner com- pelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedsemon was brought into the league by Philopo3- men, it was attended with an abolition of the institu- tions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achseans. The Amphictyonic Confederacy, of which she had been a member, left her in the full exer- cise of her Government and her legislation. This cir- cumstance alone proves a very material difference in the genius of the two systems. It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monu- ments remain of this curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and regular operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light would be thrown by it on the science of Foederal Government, than by any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted. One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderati»n and justice in the admin- istration of its Government, and less of violence anc* sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of The Federalist 117 the cities exercising singly all the prerogatives of sov ereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations on Greece, says, that the popular Government, which was bo tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, because it was there tempered by the general authority and laws of the Con- federacy. We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that fac- tion dicf not, in a certain degree, agitate the particular cities ; much less, that a due subordination and harmony reigned in the general system. The contrary is suffi- ciently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic. Whilst the Amphictyonic Confederacy remained, that of the Achseans, which comprehended the less impor tant cities only, made little figure on the theatre oi Greece. When the former became a victim to Mace- don, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, how- ever, a different policy prevailed. The arts of division were practised among the Achseans : Each city was se duced into a separate interest ; the Union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons ; others under that of usurpers springing out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression ere- long awakened their love of liberty. A few cities re- united. Their example was followed by others, as op- portunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The eague soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus. Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered, by internal Ussensions, from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm, and seemed ready to unite in one Confed- eracy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achseans, threw a fatal damp an the enterprise. The drsad of the Macedonian power Induced the league to court the alliance of the Kings of 118 The Federalist Egypt and Syria ; who, as successors of Alexander were rivals of the King of Macedon. This policy was defeated by Cleomens, King of Sparta, who was led by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans ; and who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and Syrian Princes, to effect a breach of their engagements with the league. The Achseans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to Cleomens, or o'f suppli- cating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor. The latter expedient was adopted. The contest of the Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbor, of intermeddling in their affairs. A Macedonian army quickly appeared : Cleomens was vanquished. The Achseans soon experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and powerful ally is but an- other name for a master. All that their most abject compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon provoked, by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The Achseans, though weakened by internal dissensions, and by the revolt of Messene, one of its members, being joined by the ^Etolians and Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered : Macedon subdued. A new crisis ensued to the league Dissensions broke out among its members. These the Romans fostered. Callicrates, and other popular lead- ers, became mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder, the Romans had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed The Federalist. US universal liberty* throughout Greece. "With the same insidious views, they now seduced the members from the league, by representing to their pride the violation it committed on their sovereignty. By these arts, this union, the last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces ; and such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found lit- tle difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had commenced. The Achceans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with chains, under which it is groaning at this hour. I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important portion of history ; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and because, as a sup- plement to the outlines of the Achaean Constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of Fcederal bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XIX. To the People of the State of New York : THE examples of ancient Confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of experi- mental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic Body. * This was but another name dence of the members on the Feed- «ore specious for the indepen- eral head. — Publius. 120 The b mder ahsL In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was oc cupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the number, having con- quered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has taken its name from them. In the ninth century, Char- lemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction ; and Germany became a part of his vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which took place under his sons, this part was erected into a sepa- rate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the National Diets, which Charle- magne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke, and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and indepen- dence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insuffi- cient to restrain such powerful dependants ; or to pre- serve the unity and tranquillity of the empire. The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried on between the dif- ferent Princes and States. The imperial authority, un- able to maintain the public order, declined by degrees, till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last Emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first Emperor of the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century, the Em- perors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth, they had little more than the symbols and decorations of power. Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important features of a Confederacy, has grown the Fosderal system, which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a Diet representing the compo- nent members of the Confederacy ; in the Emperor, who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the de» The Federalist. 121 srees of the Diet ; and in the Imperial Chamber and Aulic Council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire or which happen among its members. The Diet possesses the general power of legislating for the empire ; of making war and peace ; contracting alliances ; assessing quotas of troops and money ; con- structing fortresses ; regulating coin ; admitting new members ; and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from his sovereign rights, and his possessions forfeited. The members of the Confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into compacts, prejudicial to the empire ; from imposing tolls and duties on their mutual intercourse, without the consent of the Emperor and Diet ; from altering the value of money ; from doing injustice to one another ; or from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban is de- nounced against such as shall violate any of these re- strictions. The members of the Diet, as such, are sub- ject in all cases to be judged by the Emperor and Diet, and in their private capacities by the Aulic Council and Imperial Chamber. The prerogatives of the Emperor are numerous. The most important of them are, his exclusive right to make propositions to the Diet ; to negative its resolutions ; to name ambassadors ; to confer dignities and titles ; to fill racant electorates ; to found universities ; to grant priv- . leges not injurious to the States of the empire ; to re- reive and apply the public revenues ; and generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the Elec- tors form a Council to him. In quality of Emperor, he possesses no territory within the empire ; nor receives ^ny revenue for his support. But his revenue and do- minions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe. 122 The Federalist From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and head of this Confederacy, the natu- ral supposition would be, that it must form an excep- tion to the general character which belongs to its kin- dred systems. Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns ; that the Diet is a representation of sovereigns ; and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns ; renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own mem- bers, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels. The history of Germany is a history of wars be- tween the Emperor and the Princes and States ; of wars among the Princes and States themselves ; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak ; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues ; of requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially complied with ; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, in- volving the innocent with the guilty ; of general imbe- cility, confusion, and misery. In the sixteenth century, the Emperor, with one part of the empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other Princes and States. In one of the conflicts, the Emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being made prisoner by the Elector of Saxony. The late King of Prussia was more than once pitted against his Im- perial Sovereign ; and commonly proved an overmatch for him. Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody pages which de- scribe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the Emperor, with one half of the empire, was an one side, and Sweden, with the other half, on the Tlie Federalist. 123 apposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic Constitution. If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the necessity of self-defence, its situatu n is still deplorable. Military preparations must be pre- ceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing preten- sions, of sovereign bodies, that before the Diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field ; and be- fore the Fcederal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter quarters. The small body of National troops, which has been judged necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with local prejudices, and sup- ported by irregular and disproportionate contributions to the treasury. The impossibility of maintaining order, and dispens- ing justice among these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the Empire into nine or ten circles or districts ; of giving them an interior organiza- tion ; and of charging them with the military execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious mem- bers. This experiment has only served to demonstrate, more fully, the radical vice of the Constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either fail to execute their com- missions, or they do it with all the devastation and car- nage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are default- ers ; and then they increase the mischief which they were instituted to remedy. We may form some judgment of this scheme of mil- itary coercion, from a sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the circle of Sua- oia, the A.bbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities 124 The Federalist. which had been reserved to him. In the exercise oi these, on some public occasions, outrages were commit- ted on him, by the people of the city. The consequence was, that the city was put under the ban of the empire ; and the Duke of Bavaria, though Director of another circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city, with a corps of ten thousand troops; and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered from his territory,* he took pos- session of it in his own name, disarmed and punished the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his domains. It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious. The weakness of most of the mem- bers, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers ; the weakness of most of the principal members, compared with the formidable pow- ers all around them ; the vast weight and influence which the Emperor derives from his separate and hered- itary dominions ; and the interest he feels, in preserving a system with which his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first Prince in Europe : these causes support a feeble and precarious Union ; whilst the repellent quality, incident to the nature of sovereign- ty, and which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be sur- mounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to take place, which would give to the Em- pire the force and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long considered themselves as in terested in the changes made by events in this Constitu- * Pfeffel, Nouvel Abrey. Chronol. for the expense of the expedition.— ie V Hist, etc., d'AHemagne, says the Pubiius. pretext was to indemnify himself The Federalist. 125 fcion; and have, on various occasions, betrayed tlieii policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness. If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a Government over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such institu- tions. Equally unfit for self-government and self' defence, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors ; who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one third of its people and territories. The connection among the Swiss Cantons scarcely amounts to a Confederacy ; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of such institutions. They have no common treasury ; no common troops even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of sovereignty. They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position ; by their individual weakness and insignificancy ; by the fear of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject ; by the few sources of contention among a People of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent possessions ; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and re- bellions, an aid expressly stipulated, and often required and afforded ; and by the necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accommodating disputes among the Cantons. The provision is, that the parties at vari- ance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral Cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose an um- pire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pro- nounces definitive sentence, which all the Cantons are bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of Savoy ; in which he obliges oimself to interpose as mediator in disputes between 126 Tlie Federalist. the Cantons, and to employ force, if necessary, against the contumacious party. So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle intended to be established. What- ever efficacy the Union may have had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprung up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. The con- troversies on the subject of religion, which in three in- stances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in fact, to have severed the league. The Protes- tant and Catholic Cantons have since had their separate Diets ; where all the most important concerns are ad- justed, and which have left the general Diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages. That separation had another consequence, which merits attention. It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers : of Berne, at the head of the Protestant association, with the United Provinces ; and of Luzerne at the head of the Catholic association, with France. PUBL1US. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 11, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XX. *o the People of the State of New York : /T1HE United Netherlands are a Confederacy of repub- J- lies, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the lessons derived from those svhich we have already reviewed. The Union is composed of seven coequal and sover- eign States, and each State or province is a composi The Federalist. 127 Hon of equal and independent cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces, but the cities must be unanimous. The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States- General, consisting usually of about fifty depu- ties appointed by the provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one years. From two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure. The States-General have authority to enter into trea- ties and alliances ; to make war and peace ; to raise armies and equip fleets ; to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all these cases, however, unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are requisite. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassa- dors ; to execute treaties and alliances already formed ; to provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports ; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the. pro- vincial rights ; to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories. The provinces are restrained, unless with the general consent, from entering into foreign treaties ; from establishing imposts injurious to others, or charg- ing their neighbors with higher duties than their own subjects. A Council of State, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify the Foed- eral administration. The executive magistrate of the Union is the Stadr- holder, who is now a hereditary Prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic are derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial es- tates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe ; and, more than all, per- haps, from his being Stadtholder in the several prov- inces, as well as for the Union ; in which provincial qual- ity, be has the appointment of town magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides 128 The Federalist. when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon. As Stadth older of + he Union, he has however consid- erable prerogatives. In his political capacity, he has authority to settle disputes between the provinces, when other methods fail ; to assist at the deliberations of the States- General, and at their particular conferences ; to give audiences to foreign Ambassadors, and to keep agents for his partic- ular affairs at foreign Courts. In his military capacity, he commands the Fcederal troops ; provides for garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs ; disposes of all appointments, from Col- onels to Ensigns, and of the Governments and posts of fortified towns. In his marine capacity, he is Admiral- General, and superintends and directs everything relative to naval forces, and other naval affairs ; presides in the admiral- ties in person or by proxy ; appoints Lieutenant- Admirals and other officers ; and establishes Councils of war, whose sentences are not executed till he approves them. His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three hundred thousand florins. The standing army which he commands consists of about forty thousand men. Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic Confeder- acy, as delineated on parchment. What are the char- acters which practice has stamped upon it ? Imbecility in the Government ; discord among the provinces ; for- eign influence and indignities ; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war. It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred of his countrymen to the House of Aus- tria kept them from being ruined by the vices of their Constitution. The Union of Utrecht, says another respectable writ* The Federalist. 129 er, reposes an authority in the States- General, seeming- ly sufficient to secure harmony ; but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very different from the theory. The same instrument, says another, obliges each prov- ince to levy certain contributions ; but this article never could, and probably never will, be executed ; because the inland provinces, who have little commerce, cannot pay an equal quota. In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the articles of the Constitution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others ; and then to obtain re- imbursement from the others, by deputations, which are frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The great wealth and influence of the province of Holland enable her to effect both these purposes. It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies have been ultimately to be collected at the point of the bayonet ; a thing practicable, though dreadful, in a Con- federacy where one of the members exceeds in force all the rest, and where several of them are too small to meditate resistance ; but utterly impracticable in one composed of members, several of which are equal to each other in strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and persevering defence. Foreign Ministers, says Sir William Temple, who vvas himself a foreign minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by tampering with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are numerous and notorious. In critical emergencies, the States- General are often compelled to overleap their constitutional bounds. In 'J588, they concluded a treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, by 130 The Federalist. which their independence was formally and finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zea- land. Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity was departed from. A weak Constitution must neces- sarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper pow- ers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective Constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities. Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the Stadt- holdership, it has been supposed, that without his influ- ence in the individual provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the Confederacy would long ago have dis- solved it. " Under such a Government," says the Abbe* Mably, " the Union could never have subsisted, if the " provinces had not a spring within themselves, capable " of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to " the same way of thinking. This spring is the Stadt- " holder." It is remarked by Sir William Temple, " that " in the intermissions of the Stadtholdership, Holland, " by her riches and her authority, which drew the others " into a sort of dependence, supplied the place." These are not the only circumstances which have con- trolled the tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose an absolute necessity of Union to a certain degree, at the same time that they nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices, which Keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy. The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal ten- dency of these vices, and have made no less than four regular experiments by extraordinary assemblies, con- The Federalist. 131 rened for the special purpose, to apply a remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible to unite the public councils in reforming the known, the acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing Constitu- tion. Let us pause, my Fellow- Citizens, for one moment, over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history ; and with the tear that drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish pas- sions, let our gratitude mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has distinguished the consultations for our political happiness. A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be administered by the Foederal authority. This also had its adversaries and failed. This unhappy people seem to be now suffering, from popular convulsions, from dissensions among the States, and from the actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their destiny. All nations have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by human- ity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a revolu- tion of their Government, as will establish their Union, and render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom, and happiness : The next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and console them for the catastrophe of their own. I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these Foederal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth ; and where its responses are une- quivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a Government over Governments, a legislation for commu- nities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice ii is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting vio 132 The Federalist. lence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of ihe sword in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XXI. To the People of the State of Few York : HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events, which have depicted the genius and fate of other con- federate Governments, I shall now proceed in the enu- meration of the most important of those defects, which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and satis- factory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease. The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Con- federation, is the total want of a sanction to its laws The United States, as now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolu- tions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or dives- titure of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode. There is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against delinquent members ; and if such a right should be ascribed to the Foederal head, as resulting from the nature of the social compact between the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the face of that part of the second Article, by which it is declared, " that u each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and The tfcederalist. 133 !i right, not expressly delegated to the United States in " Congress assembled." There is, doubtless, a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind does not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing that supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies of those who oppose the new Constitution ; and the want of which, in that plan, has been the subject of much plausible animadversion, and severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the force of this applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that the United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a Government, destitute even of the shadow of constitu- tional power to enforce the execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which have been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular, stands discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled phe- nomenon in the political world. The want of a mutual guaranty of the State Govern- ments is another capital imperfection in the Foederal plan. There is nothing of this kind declared in the Articles that compose it ; and to imply a tacit guaranty from consideration of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure from the clause which has been men- tioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion, fiom the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence, as the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws. Without a guaranty, the assistance to be derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers, which may sometimes threaten the existence of the State Con- stitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties 134 The Federalist. of the people ; while the National Government could legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law ; while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the Government. The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine, what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a C^sar or by a Cromwell ? Who can predict, what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts, would have upon the lib- erties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island ; of Connect- icut or New York ? The inordinate pride of State importance has sug- gested to some minds an objection to the principle of a guaranty in the Fcederal Government, as involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal advantages to be expected from Union ; and can only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no im- pediment to reforms of the State Constitutions by a majority of the People, in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be effected by violence. Towards the prevention of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society, and the stability of Government, depend abso- 'utely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this nead. Where the whole power of the Government is in the hands of the People, there is the less pretence for the use of violent remedies, in partial or occasional distem- pers of the State. The natural cure for an ill-adminis- tration, in a popular or representative Constitution, is a TJie Federalist. 135 shange of men. A guaranty by the National authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of rulers, as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community. The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common treasury by quotas is another fundamental error in the Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the National exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it now solely with a view to equality among the States. Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the circumstances which produce constitutional wealth, must be satisfied that there is no common standard or barometer, by which the degrees of it can be ascer- tained. Neither the value of lands, nor the numbers of the People, which have been successively proposed as the rule of State contributions, has any pretension to being a just representative. If we compare the wealth of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Ger- many, or even of France ; and if we at the same time compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of that contracted district with the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the three last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover, that there is no comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects, and that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel were to be run between several of the American States, it would furnish a like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Caro- lina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the respec- tive abilities of those States, in relation to revenue bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in lands or to their comparative population. The position 1.36 The Federalist. may be equally illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the same State. No man who ia acquainted with the State of New York will doubt that the active wealth of King's County bears a much greater proportion to that of Montgomery, than it would appear to be, if we should take either the total value of the lands, or the total numbers of the People, as a cri- terion ! The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes. Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of the Government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these cir- cumstances, and many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious, to admit of a particular specification, oc- casion differences hardly conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries. The conse- quence clearly is, that there can be no common measure of National wealth ; and, of course, no general or sta- tionary rule, by which the ability of a State to pay taxes can be determined. The attempt, therefore, to regulate the contributions of the members of a Confed- eracy by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and extreme oppression. This inequality would of itself be sufficient in Amer- ica to work the eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a compliance with its requisi- tions could be devised. The suffering States would not long consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of oth- ers would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight they were required to sustain. This, how- ever, is an evil inseparable from the principle of quotas and requisitions. The Federalist. 137 There is no method of steering clear of this incon- venience, but by authorizing the National Government to raise its own revenues in its own way. Imposts, ex- cises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of con- sumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its level with the means of paying them. The amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a de- gree be at his own option, and can be regulated by an attention to his resources. The rich may be extrava- gant, the poor can be frugal; and private oppression may always be avoided, by a judicious selection of ob- jects proper for such impositions. If inequalities should arise in some States from duties on particular objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by pro- portional inequalities in other States, from the duties on other objects. In the course of time and things, an equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be established everywhere. Or, if in- equalities should still exist, they would neither be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from quotas, upon any scale that can possibly be devised. It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of con- sumption, that they contain in their own nature a secu- rity against excess. They prescribe their own limit ; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed, — that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that, " in political arithmetic, two and two do not always make four." If duties are too high, they lessen the con- sumption ; the collection is eluded ; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens, by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them. 138 The Federalist. Impositions of this kind usually fall under the de- nomination of indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to lands and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land, or the num ber of the people, may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected with each other. And as a rule for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a pref- erence. In every country it is a Herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land : in a country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are in- creased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable ob- jection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion of the Government are to be found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at large. PUBLIUS. \From the New York Packet, Friday, December 14, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST, No. XXII. To the People of the State of New York : IN addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing Foederal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union The Federalist. 139 The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility ol such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries ; and for this reason, as well as from the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a Foederal superintendence. The want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties -with foreign powers ; and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. No Na- tion acquainted with the nature of our political associa- tion would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privi- leges of any importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on the part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members ; and while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage they desired in our markets, without granting us any return, but such as their momentary convenience might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Com- mons a bill for regulating the temporary intercourse be- tween the two countries, should preface its introduction by a declaration, that similar provisions in former bills had beer, found to answer every purpose to the com- merce of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan until it should appear whether the American Government was likely or not to acquire greater consistency.* Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibi- tions, restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this particular ; but the want of con- * This, as nearly as I can recol- on introducing the last bill. — Pub lect, was the sense of his speech lius. 140 The Federalist. 3ert, arising from the want of a general authority, and from clashing and dissimilar views in the States, has hith- erto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to do so, as long as the same obstacles to an uniformity of measures continue to exist. The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others ; and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a National control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord, than inju- rious impediments to the intercourse between the differ- ent parts of the Confederacy. " The commerce of the " German empire * is in continual trammels, from the " multiplicity of the duties which the several Princes " and States exact upon the merchandises passing " through their territories ; by means of which the fine " streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is " so happily watered are rendered almost useless." Though the genius of the people of this country might never permit this description to be strictly applicable to us, yet we may reasonably expect from the gradual con- flicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to be considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens. The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the Articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. This practice, in the course of the late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigor- ous, and to an economical system of defence. It gave oirth to a competition between the States, which created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the quo- * Encyclopaedia, article Empire. — Publius. The Federalist. 141 tas required of them, they outbid each other, till boun- ties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. The hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve, to procrastinate their enlistment; and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable periods. Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in the most critical emergencies of our affairs ; short enlistments at an unparalleled expense ; continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline, and subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppres- sive expedients for raising men, which were upon several occasions practised, and which nothing but the enthusi- asm of liberty would have induced the people to endure. This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The States near the seat of war, influ- enced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities ; while those at a distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss as the others were diligent, in their exer- tions. The immediate pressure of this inequality was not in this case, as in that of the contributions of mon- ey, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The States which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be charged with their deficiencies ; but no account could be formed of the deficiencies in the sup- plies of men. We shall not, however, see much reason to regret the want of this hope, when we consider how Little prospect there is, that the most delinquent States will ever be able to make compensation for their pecuni- ary failures. The system of quotas and requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view, a system of imbecility in the Union, and of in- tquality and injustice among the members. The right of equal suffrage among the States ia L42 The Federalist. another exceptionable part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Mas- sachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York ; and to Dela- ware an equal voice in the National deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its oper- ation contradicts that fundamental maxim of republican Government, which requires that the sense of the ma- jority should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sover- eigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and common sense. It may happen that this majority of States is a small mi- nority of the People of America ; * and two thirds of the People of America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtle- ties, to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and Welfare de- pend on Union, ought readily to renounce a pretension, which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its du- ration. It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or two thirds of the whole number, must consent to the most important resolutions ; and it may be thence * New Hampshire, Rhode Island, a majority of the whole number 01 New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, the States, but they do not contain Sauth Carolina, and Maryland are one third of the people. — Publius. Tfie Federalist. 143 inferred, that nine States would always comprehend a majority of the inhabitants of the Union. But this does not obviate the impropriety of an equal vote be- tween States of the most unequal dimensions and popu- lousness : nor is the inference accurate in point of fact ; for we can enumerate nine States, which contain less than a majority of the people;* and it is constitu- tionally possible that these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of considerable moment de- terminable by a bare majority: and there are others, concerning which doubts have been entertained, which, if interpreted in favor of the sufficiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its operation to interests of the first magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be ob- served that there is a probability of an increase in the number of States, and no provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of votes. But this is not all : what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon the majority, (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision,) is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser. Congress, from the non-attendance of a few States, have been frequently in the situation of a Polish Diet, where a single vote has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to its operations. This is one of those refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something ap- proaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposi- tion that it would contribute to security. But its real * Add New York and Connecti- will still be less than a majority.— :ut to the foregoing seven, and they Publius. 144 The Federalist. operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of Government, and to substitute the pleas- ure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness or strength of its Government, is of the greatest impor- tance, there is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must, in some way or other, go forward If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the National proceedings. Hence, tedious delays ; continual negotiation and in- trigue ; contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place : for upon some occa- sions things will not admit of accommodation ; and then the measures of Government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the im- practicability of obtaining the concurrence of the neces- sary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy. It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic faction, than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide ; though the contrary of this has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned, by obstructing the progress of Govern- ment at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any National act, we are apt to rest satisfied The Federalist. 145 that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely to be done ; but we forget how much good may be pre- vented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable pos- ture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods. Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of our situation demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making separate terms. In such a state of things, this ally of ours would evidently find it much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to tie up the hands of Govern- ment from making peace, where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple majority would suffice. In the first case he would have to corrupt a smaller number ; in the last, a greater num- ber. Upon the same principle, it would be much easier for a foreign power with which we were at war, to per- plex our councils and embarrass our exertions. And, in a commercial view, we may be subjected to similar inconveniences. A nation, with which we might have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility prevent our forming a connection with her competitor in trade ; though such a connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves. Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. One of the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is, that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary monarch, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his am- bition, has so great a personal interest in the Govern- ment, and in the external glory of the Nation, that it is \aot easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent VOL. I. 10 146 The Fcedera/ist. for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the State, The world has accordingly been witness to few exam pies of this species of royal prostitution, though there have been abundant specimens of every other kind. In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great preeminence and power, may find com- pensations for betraying their trust, which, to any but minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may ap- pear to exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to overbalance the obligations of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes us with so many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign corruption in republican Governments. How much this contributed to the ruin of the ancient common- wealths has been already delineated. It is well known that the deputies of the United Provinces have, in vari- ous instances, been purchased by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms. The Earl of Chesterfield, (if my memory serves me right,) in a letter to his court, intimates that his success in an important negotiation must depend on his obtaining a Major's commission for one of those deputies. And in Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France and England, in so barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited uni- versal disgust in the nation, and was a principal cause that the most limited monarch in Europe, in a single day, without tumult, violence, or opposition, became one of the most absolute and uncontrolled. A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Con- federation remains yet to be mentioned, — the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter, without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, The Federalist. 147 ike all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determina- tions. To produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one 6upreme tribunal. And this tribunal ought to be insti- tuted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable. If there is in each State a court of final jurisdiction, there may be as many different final determinations on (he same point, as there are courts. There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often see not only different courts, but the Judges of the same court differing from each other. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintend- ence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice. This is the more necessary where the frame of the Government is so compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals are invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion, there will be much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local regulations. As often as such an interference was to happen, there would be reason to apprehend that the provisions of the particular laws might be preferred lo those of the general laws;" for nothing is more natural to men in office than to look with peculiar deference towards that authority to which they owe their official existence. The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are liable to the infractions of thir- teen different Legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those 148 The Federalist. Legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mere} 7 of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a Government? Is it possible that the People of America will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a foundation ? In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to the exhibition of its most material defects ; passing over those imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power intended to be conferred upon it has been in a great measure rendered abortive. It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection, who can divest themselves of the prepossessions of pre- conceived opinions, that it is a system so radically vicious and unsound, as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change in its leading features and char- acters. The organization of Congress is itself utterly im- proper for the exercise of those powers which are ne- cessary to be deposited in the Union. A single Assem- bly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore dele- gated to the Fcederal head ; but it would be inconsistent with all the principles of good government, to intrust it with those additional powers, which, even the moderate and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitu- tion admit, ought to reside in the United States. If that plan should not be adopted ; and if the necessity of the Union should be able to withstand the ambi- tious aims of those men, who may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from its dissolu- tion ; the probability would be, that we should run into the project of conferring supplementary powers upon Congress, as they are now constituted ; and either the The Federalist. 149 machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will moulder into pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it ; or, by successive augmentations of its force and energy, as necessity might prompt, we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity, one of the most execrable forms of Govern- ment that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny, which the ad- versaries of the new 7 Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert. It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing Foederal system, that it never had a ratification by the People. Resting on no better foundation than the consent of the several Legislatures, it has been ex- posed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers ; and has, in some instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended, that the same authority might re- peal the law by wmich it was ratified. However gross a heresy it may be to maintain that a party to a com- pact has a right to revoke that compact, the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature, proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our National Government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fab- ric of American Empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the People. The streams of Na- tional power ought to flow immediately from that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority. PUBLIUS. 150 The Federalist. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 18, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIII. To the People of the State of New York: HP HE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally en- -*■ ergetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point, at the examination of which we are now arrived. This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches, — the objects to be provided for by the Foed- eral Government ; the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects ; the persons upon whom that power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will more properly claim our atten- tion under the succeeding head. The principal purposes to be answered by Union are these, — the common defence of the members ; the pres- ervation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks ; the regulation of com- merce with other nations, and between the States ; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and com- mercial, with foreign countries. The authorities essential to the care of the common defence are these, — to raise armies ; to build and equip fleets ; to prescribe rules for the government of both ; to direct their operations ; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation ; because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of National exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of uations are infinite ; and for this reason no constitu- tional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to The Federalist. 151 which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances ; and ought to be under the direc- tion of the same councils which are appointed to pre- side over the common defence. This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it ; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal ; the means ought to be proportioned to the end; the persons, from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained. Whether there ought to be a Foederal Government intrusted with the care of the common defence, is a question in the first instance, open for discussion ; but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will fol- low, that that Government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to the complete execution of its trust. And unless it can be shown, that the circum- stances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits ; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to provide for the defence and protection of the com- munity, in any matter essential to its efficacy ; that is, in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the National forces. Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of it ; though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise. Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requi- sitions of men and money ; to govern the army and yiavy ; to direct their operations. As their requisitions 152 The Federalist. are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who are in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them, the intention evidently was, that the United States should command whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the " com- mon defence and general welfare." It was presumed, that a sense of their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges for the punctual performance of the duty of the mem- bers to the Fcederal Head. The experiment has, however, demonstrated, that this expectation was ill-founded and illusory ; and the ob- servations, made under the last head, will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning, that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change in the first principles of the system ; that if we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities ; we must extend the laws of the Fcederal Government to the individual citizens of America ; we must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally imprac- ticable and unjust. The result from all this is that the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy troops ; to build and equip fleets ; and to raise the rev- enues which will be required for the formation and sup- port of an army and navy, in the customary and ordi- nary modes practised in other Governments. If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound instead of a simple, a confed- erate instead of a sole Government, the essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discrimi- nate the objects, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the different provinces or departments of power ; allowing to each the most ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge. Shall The Federalist 153 the Union be constituted the guardian of the common safety ? Are fleets and armies, and revenues, necessary to this purpose ? The Government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regula- tions which have relation to them. The same must be the case in respect to commerce, and to every other mat- ter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is the administration of justice between the citizens of the same State the proper department of the local Govern- ments ? These must possess all the authorities which are connected with this object, and with every other that may be allotted to their particular cognizance and direction. Not to confer in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvi- dently to trust the great interests of the Nation to hands which are disabled from managing them with vigor and success. Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the public defence, as that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided ; which, as the centre of information, will best understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten ; as the representative of the whole, will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of every part ; which, from the responsibility implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper exertions ; and which, by the extension of its authority throughout the States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans and measures, by which the common safety is to be secured ? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the Foederal Government the care of the general defence, and leaving in the State Govern- ments the effective powers, by which it is to be provided "or ? Is not a want of ccopeiation the infallible conse- quence of such a system ? And will not weakness, dis- 154 The Federalist. order, an undue distribution of the burdens and calam ities of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense, be its natural and inevitable concomitants ? Have we not had unequivocal experience of its effects in the course of the revolution, which we have just ac- complished ? Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after truth, will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny the Foederal Gov- ernment an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which are intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the most vigilant and careful attention of the People, to see that it be modelled in such a manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers. If any plan which has been, or may be, of- fered to our consideration, should not, upon a dispas- sionate inspection, be found to answer this description, it ought to be rejected. A Government, the Constitu- tion of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers which a free People ought to delegate to any Gov- ernment, would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the National interests. "Wherever these can with propriety be confided, the coincident powers may safely accompany them. This is the true result of all just rea- soning upon the subject. And the adversaries of the plan promulgated by the Convention ought to have confined themselves to showing, that the internal struct- ure of the proposed Government was such as to render it unworthy of the confidence of the People. They ought not to have wandered into inflammatory decla- mations and unmeaning cavils, about the extent of the powers. The powers are not too extensive for the ob- jects of Foederal administration, or, in other words, for the management of our National interests ; nor can any satisfactory argument be framed to show that they are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as The Federalist. 155 has been insinuated by some of the writers on the other side, that the difficulty arises from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of the country will not per- mit us to form a Government in which such ample pow- ers can safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought to contract our views, and resort to the expedient of separate Confederacies, which will move within more practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continu- ally stare us in the face of confiding to a Government the direction of the most essential National interests, without daring to trust it with the authorities which are indispensable to their proper and efficient management. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firm" ly embrace a rational alternative. I trust, however, that the impracticability of one gen- eral system cannot be shown. I am greatly mistaken, if anything of weight has yet been advanced of this tendency ; and I flatter myself, that the observations which have been made in the course of these papers have served to place the reverse of that position in as clear a light as any matter, still in the womb of time and experience, can be susceptible of. This, at all events, must be evident, that the very difficulty itself, drawn from the extent of the country, is the strongest argument in favor of an energetic Government ; for any other can certainly never preserve the Union of so large an empire. If we embrace the tenets of those who op- pose the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the standard of our political creed, we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines which predict the impracticability of a National system, pervading the entire limits of the present Confederacy. PUBLIUS. 156 The Federalist. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIV. To the People op the State op New York: finO the powers proposed to be conferred upon the -*- Foederal Government, in respect to the creation and direction of the National forces, I have met with but one specific objection ; which, if I understand it right, is this, — that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace ; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations. It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument ; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions ; in contradiction to the practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing Con- stitutions. The propriety of this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection under consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of re- straining the legislative authority of the Nation, in the article of military establishments; a principle un- heard of, except in one or two of our State Constitu- tions, and rejected in all the rest. A stranger to our politics, who was to read our news- papers at the present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported by the Convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions : either that it contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace ; or that it vested in the Executive the whole power of levying troops, The Federalist. i57 without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, jo the control of the Legislature. If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case ; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the Legislature, not in the Execu- tive ; that this Legislature was to be a popular body, con- sisting of the representatives of the People periodically elected ; and that instead of the provision he had sup- posed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in respect to this object, an important qualifica- tion even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation of money for the sup- port of an army for any longer period than two years : a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will ap- pear to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity. Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would naturally say to himself, it is impos- sible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding models of the Constitutions which they have established, inserted the most precise and rigid pre- cautions on this point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and clamor. If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in re- view the several State Constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that two only of them * * This statement of the matter is "to liberty, they ought not to tiken from the printed collections of " be kept up." This is, in truth, State Constitutions. Pennsylvania rather a caution than a prohibi- and North Carolina are the two tion. New Hampshire, Massachu- which contain the interdiction in setts, Delaware, and Maryland have, these words : " As standing armies in each of their Bills of Rights, a ' in time of peace are dangerous clause to this effect : " Standing ar 158 The Federalist. contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of peace ; that the other eleven had either observed a pro found silence on the subject, or had in express terms ad- mitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their ex- istence. Still, however, he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experiment upon the public cre- dulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to de- ceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the existing Confederation must contain the most ex- plicit provisions against military establishments in time of peace ; and a departure from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence these political champions. If he should now apply himself to a careful and crit- ical survey of the Articles of Confederation, his aston- ishment would not only be increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery, that these Articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous circum- spection, restricted the authority of the State Legisla- tures in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint " mies are dangerous to liberty, and the Constitutions of the other States, " ought not to be raised or kept up except the foregoing, and their Con- " without the consent op. the stitutions are equally silent. I am "Legislature;" which is a for- told, however, that one or two mal admission of the authority of States have Bills of Rights which do the Legislature. New York has no not appear in this collection; but Bill of Rights, and her Constitution that those also recognize the right Bays not a word about the matter, of the legislative authority in this No Bills of Rights appear annexed to respect. — Publius. TJie Federalist. 159 on that of the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposi- tion to a plan, which ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their coun- try ! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America as de- clared in its different forms of Government, and in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard un- known to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happen- ed to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so un- friendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a con- duct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to mislead the People by alarming their pas- sions, rather than to convince them by arguments ad- dressed to their understandings. But however little this objection may be counte- nanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination, it will appear, that restraints upon the discretion of the Legislature, in respect to mil- itary establishments in time of peace, would be improp- er to be imposed ; and, if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed. Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are grow- 160 The Federalist. ing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet the British settle- ments, are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation, and the vicinity of the West India islands, belonging to these two powers, create between them, in respect to their American pos- sessions, and in relation to us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be re- garded as our natural enemies, their natural allies ; be- cause they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the art of navigation, have, as to the facility of communication, rendered dis- tant nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Eu- rope. A future concert of views between these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increas- ing remoteness of consanguinity is every day diminish- ing the force of the family compact between France and Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of political connection. These circumstances, combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in con- sidering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of dan- ger. Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by per- manent corps in the pay of the Government. The first is impracticable ; and if practicable, would be perni- cious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their occupations and families, to per- form that most disagreeable duty in times of profounc The Federalist. 161 peace. And if they could be prevailed upon, or com- pelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rota- tion of service, and the loss of labor, and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of Government amounts to a standing army in time of peace ; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of the sub- ject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a con- stitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence of the Legislature. In proportion to our increase in strength, it is prob- able, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be ex- posed, in a naked and defenceless condition, to their insults or encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier garrisons, in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession of which will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remain- der. It may be added, that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part, would be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence and policy. If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To this purpose, there must be dock-yards and arsenals ; and for the defence of VOL. I. 11 162 The Federalist. these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can pro- tect its dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the ne- cessity of garrisons for that purpose ; but where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itsel£ PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, December 21, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXV. To the People of the State of New York: IT may perhaps be urged, that the objects enumer- ated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State Governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our political association ; as it would in practice transfer the care of the common de- fence from the Foederal head to the individual mem- bers : a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the Confederacy. The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood, do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury. It happens that some States, from local situation, are more directly exposed New York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate The Federalist. 163 provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her neighbors. This would neither be equitable as it re- spected New York, nor safe as it respected the other States. Various inconveniences would attend such a system. The States, to whose lot it might fall to sup- port the necessary establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of competent provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If the resources of such part becom- ing more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be proportion ably enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or three of its members : and those probably amongst the most powerful. They would each choose to have some counterpoise ; and pre- tences could easily be contrived. In this situation, mili- tary establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, wouid be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size ; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be engines for the abridgment or demolition of the National authority. Reasons have been already given to induce a supposi- tion that the State Governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the Union, the founda- tion of which will be the love of power ; and that in any contest between the Foederal head and one of its mem- bers, the People will be most apt to unite with their local Government. If, in addition to this immense advan- tage, the ambition of the members snould be stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation, and too great facility to them to make enterprises upon, and 6nally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the 164 The Federalist. Union. On the other hand, the liberty of the People would be less safe in this state of things than in that which left the National forces in the hands of the Na- tional Government. As far as an army may be consid- ered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be in those hands, of which the People are most likely to be jealous, than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. For it is a truth which the experience of all ages has attested, that the People are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion. The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States, have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or troops, un- less with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the existence of a Fcederal Government and military establishments, under State authority, are not less at variance with each other, than a due supply of the Fced- eral treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions. There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the impropriety of restraints on the discre- tion of the National Legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in time of peace ; though we have never been informed how far it is designed the prohibition should extend : whether to raising armies, as well as to keeping- them up, in a season of tranquillity, or not. If it be confined to the latter, it will have no precise signification, and it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised, what shall be denominated " keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the Constitution ? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation ? Shall it be a week, a month, a year ? Or shall we say, they may be con- The Federalist. 165 fcinued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised continues ? This would be to admit that they might be kept up in time of peace, against threat- ening or impending danger ; which would be at once to deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger ? This must undoubtedly be submitted to the National Gov- ernment ; and the matter would then be brought to this issue, that the National Government, to provide against apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them on foot, as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive, that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the force of the provision. The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination between the Executive and- the Legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabri- cate pretences of approaching danger ! Indian hostili- ties, instigated by Spain or Britain, would always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired appearances inight even be given to some foreign power, and ap- peased again by timely concessions. If we can reason- ably presume such a combination to have been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient pros- pect of success, the army when once raised, from what- ever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution of the project. If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the raising- of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has vet seen, — that of a nation incapacitated by its Consti- 166 The Federalist. tution to prepare for defence, before it was actually in- vaded. As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the Government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the State. We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering storm, must be ab- stained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a free Government. We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and defenceless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation. Here I expect we shall be told that the Militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the National defence. This doctrine, in sub- stance, had like to have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been saved. The facts, which from our own experience for- bid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American Militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monu- ments to their fame ; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, The Federalist. 167 is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence by perseverance, by time, and by practice. All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of that State declares, that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops : and in all probability, will keep them up as long as there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the same subject, though on different ground. That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the Articles of the Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of revolt. The particular Constitution of Massa- chusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure ; but the instance is still of use to instruct us, that cases are likely to occur under our Governments, as well as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in time of peace essential to the security of the society ; and that it is therefore improper, in this respect, to control the Legislative discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United States, how little the rights of a feeble Government are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment pro- visions are to a struggle with public necessity. It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the post of Admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The Peloponne- lian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea 168 The Federalist. from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in that capacity, to com- mand the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the real power of Admiral, under the nominal title of Vice- Admiral. This instance is selected from among a mul- titude that might be cited, to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated by domestic examples ; which is, that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims, calculated in their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cau- tious about fettering the Government with restrictions, that cannot be observed ; because they know, that ev- ery breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence, which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the Constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches, where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVI. To the People of the State op New York : IT was a thing hardly to be expected that in a pop- ular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between Power and Privilege, and combines the The Federalist. 169 energy of Government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience ' and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we may travel from one chimerical project to another ; we may try change after change ; but we shall never be likely to make any material change for the better. The idea of restraining the Legislative authority, in the means of providing for the National defence, is one of those refinements, which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have seen, however, that it has not had thus far an extensive prevalency ; that even in this country, where it made its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two States by which it has been in any degree patronized ; and that all the others have refused to give it the least countenance ; wisely judging that confidence must be placed somewhere ; that the neces- sity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating power ; and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence, than to embarrass the Government and endanger the public safety, by impolitic restrictions on the Legislative authority. The opponents of the pro- posed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general decision of America ; and instead of being taught by experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into which we may have heretofore run, they appear dis- posed to conduct us into others still more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of Government had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are calculated to induce us to depress or to relax 't, by expedients which, upon other occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the principles they 170 The Federalist. inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the People of this country for any species of Government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be appre- hended. The citizens of America have too much dis- cernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of Government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the community. It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of military establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may arise from a con- templation of the nature and tendency of such institu- tions, fortified by the events that have happened in other ages and countries, yet as a National sentiment, it must be traced to those habits of thinking, which we derive from the nation from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung. In England, for a long time after the Norman Con- quest, the authority of the monarch was almost un- \imited. Inroads were gradually made upon the pre- logative, in favor of liberty, first by the Barons, and afterwards by the People, till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely triumphant. As inci- dent to the undefined power of making war, an ac- knowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had, by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. And this number James [I. increased to 30,000 ; who were paid out of his civil list, At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bil! The Federalist. 171 of Rights then framed, that " the raising or keeping a " standing army within the kingdom in time of peace^ " unless with the consent of Parliament, was against « law." In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no security against the danger of stand- ing armies was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority of the Executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected that memorable revolution, were too temperate, and too well-informed, to think of any restraint on the Legisla- tive discretion. They were aware, that a certain num- ber of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensa- ble ; that no precise bounds could be set to the National exigencies ; that a power equal to every possible con- tingency must exist somewhere in the Government : and that when they referred the exercise of that power to the judgment of the Legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution, which was reconcilable with the safety of the community. From the same source, the People of America may be said to have derived a hereditary impression of dan- ger to liberty, from standing armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular rights ; and in some instances raised the warmth of our zeal beyond the degree, which consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The at- tempts of two of the States, to restrict the authority of the Legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the number of these instances. The principles which had taught us to be jealous of the power of a hereditary monarch, were by an injudicious excess ex- tended to the representatives of the People in their pop- ular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations. 172 The Federalist. that standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time of peace, without the consent of the Legislature. I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to any of the State Constitu- tions. The power of raising armies at all, under those Constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to re- side anywhere else, than in the Legislatures themselves ; and it was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare, that a matter should not be done without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it. Accord- ingly, in some of those Constitutions, and among oth- ers, in that of this State of New York, which has been justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of Government established in this country, there is a total silence upon the subject. It is remarkable, that even in the two States, which seem to have meditated an interdiction of military es- tablishments in time of peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies shall not be kept up, but that they ought not to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity of terms appears to have been the re- sult of a conflict between jealousy and conviction ; be- tween the desire of excluding such establishments at all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and unsafe. Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of public affairs was understood to require a departure from it, would be interpreted by the Legisla- ture into a mere admonition, and would be made to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State ? Let the fact already mentioned, with respect to Penn- sylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to operate the mo- ment there is an inclination to disregard it ? The Federalist. 1V3 Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy, between the provision alluded to, and that which is contained in the New Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military pur- poses to the period of two years. The former, by aim- ing at too much, is calculated to effect nothing : the lat- ter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the exigencies of the Nation, will have a salutary and powerful operation. The Legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot ; to come to a new resolution on the point ; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty to vest in the Executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incau- tious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be expected to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the National Legislature will- ing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition ; and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in the National Legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the State Legislatures, who will always be not only vigi- ant, but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens, against encroachments from the Fcederal L74 The Federalist. Government, will constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the National rulers, and will be ready enough, if anything improper appears, to sound the alarm to the People, and not only to be the voice, but, if necessary, the arm of their discontent. Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great communi- ty require time to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations ; which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination be- tween the Legislature and Executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all ? Is it probable that it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses ? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant he took his seat in the National Senate or House of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his con- stituents and to his country ? Can it be supposed, that there would not be found one man, discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise his constituents of their danger ? If such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The Peo- ple should resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person. If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to so great an extent, in time of profound peace. What col- orable reason could be assigned, in a country so situ- The Federalist. 175 ated, for such vast augmentations of the military force ? It is impossible that the People could be long deceived ; and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery. It has been said, that the provision which limits the appropriation of money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be unavailing ; because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large enough to awe the People into submission, would find resources in that very force, sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the Legislature. But the question again recurs : upon what pretence could he be put in possession of a force of that magni- tude in time of peace ? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the prin- ciples of the objection ; for this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary, as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebel- lion, or resist an invasion ; and if the defence of the community, under such circumstances, should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of Government : it might even result from a simple league offensive and defen- sive, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common defence. But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in an united than in a disunited state : nay, it may be safe- ly asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend \is in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if 176 The Federalist. we take into our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of dis- union, (as has been fully shown in another place,) the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable. PUBLIUS. {From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 25, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVII. To the People of the State of New York: ¥ T has been urged, in different shapes, that a Consti- A tution of the kind proposed by the Convention, can- not operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible des- ignation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition, that the People will be disinclined to the exercise of Fcederal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inac- curacy, or inexplicitness, of the distinction between in- ternal and external, let us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in the People. Unless we presume, at the same time, that the powers of the general Government will be worse administered than tfiose of the State Governments, there seems to be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or op- position in the People. I believe it may be laid down The Federalist. 177 as a general rule, that their confidence in, and obedience to a Government, will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must be ad- mitted, that there are exceptions to this rule ; but these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a Constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and max- ims. Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to induce a probability, that the general Government will be better administered than the partic- ular Governments ; the principal of which reasons are, th&c the extension of the spheres of election will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the People ; that through the medium of the State Legislatures — which are select bodies of men, and who are to appoint the members of the National Senate — there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge, and more extensive informa- tion, in the National councils ; and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors, or tempora- ry prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injus- tice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender schemes, which, though they gratify a mo- mentary inclination or desire, terminate in general dis- tress, dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify that probability, will occur, when we come to survey, with a more critic jye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the Fcederal Government is likely to be VOL. i. 12 178 The Federalist. administered in such a manner as to render it odious 01 contemptible to the People, there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition, that the laws of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular members. The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedi- tion : the dread of punishment, a proportion ably strong discouragement to it. Will not the Government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the former senti- ment and to inspire the latter, than that of a single State, which can only command the resources within it- self ? A turbulent faction in a State may easily sup- pose itself able to contend with the friends to the Government in that State ; but it can hardly be so in- fatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals, to the authority of the Confederacy, than to that of a single member. I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less just, because to some it may appear new \ which is, that the more the operations of the National authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of Government ; the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their politi- cal life ; the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings ; the further it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords, and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart ; the greater will be the probability, thai it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very much a Dreature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses, will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A The Federalist. 179 Government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the People. The inference is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal concern ; and will have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those channels and currents, in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of compulsion. One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a Gov- ernment like the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force, than that species of league contended for by most of its opponents ; the authority of which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective capacities. It has been shown, that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delin- quencies in the members are the natural offspring of the very frame of the Government ; and that as often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence. The plan reported by the Convention, by extending the authority of the Fcederal head to the individual cit- izens of the several States, will enable the Government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the exe- cution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all dis- tinction between the sources from which they might proceed ; and will give the Fcederal Government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority, which is enjoyed by the Government of each State, in addition to the influence on public opinion, tfhich will result from the important consideration of 180 The Federalist. its having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confeder- acy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, will become the supreme law of the land ; to the observance of which, all officers, Legislative, Ex- ecutive, and Judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the Legislatures, Courts, and Magistrates, of the respective members, will be in- corporated into the operations of the National Gov- ernment as far as its just and constitutional authority extends ; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforce- ment of its laws.* Any man, who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive, that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union ; if its powers are administered with a com- mon share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we please from the supposition ; for it is certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best Gov- ernment that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to pro- voke and precipitate the People into the wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume, that the National rulers would be in- sensible to the motives of public good, or to the obli- gations of duty, I would still ask them, how the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be pro- moted by such a conduct ? PUBLIUS. * The sophistry which has been Governments will, in its propel employed, to show that this will place, be fully detected. — Publius. tend to the destruction of the State The Federalist. 181 For the Independent Journal. THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXVIII. To the People of the State of New York: ^l^HAT there may happen cases in which the National -*- Government may be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations ; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all so- cieties, however constituted ; that seditions and insur- rections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic, as tumors and eruptions from the natu- ral body ; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican Government) has no place but in the reveries of those political doc- tors, whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experi- mental instruction. Should such emergencies at any time happen under the National Government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed must be propor- tioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue would be adequate to its suppression ; and the natural presumption is, that they would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause, eventually endangers all Government. Regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the Union, would engage the citizens, to whom the conta- gion had not communicated itself, to oppose the insur- gents : and if the general Government should be found in practice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of 182 The Federalist. the People, it were irrational to believe that they would be disinclined to its support. If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders within that State : that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State of New York had been inclined to reestablish her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont ; could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone ? Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of her design ? If it must then be admitted, that the necessity of recurring to a force different from the militia, in cases of this extraor- dinary nature, is applicable to the State Governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the National Government might be under a like necessity, in similar extremities, be made an objection to its existence ? Is it not surprising that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should urge, as an objec- tion to the proposed Constitution, what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend ; and what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an in- evitable consequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale ? Who would not prefer that possibility, to the unceasing agitations, and frequent revolutions, which are the c@ntinual scourges of petty republics ? Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of one general system, two or three, or even four Confederacies were to be formed, would not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies ? Would not each of The Federalist. 183 them be exposed to the same casualties ; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same expedients for upholding its authority, which are ob- jected to a Government for all the States ? Would the militia, in this supposition, be more ready or more able to support the Fcederal authority, than in the case of a general Union ? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally applicable to either of the two cases ; and that whether we have one Government for all the States, or different Governments for different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the commu- nity, and to maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them, which amount to insurrections and rebellions. Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those who require a more peremp- tory provision against military establishments in time of peace, to say, that the whole power of the proposed Government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the People. This is the essential, and after all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the People, which is attainable in civil society.* If the representatives of the People betray their con- stituents, there is then no resource left but in the exer- tion of that original right of self-defence, which is para- mount to all positive forms of Government ; and which, against the usurpations of the National rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual State. In a single State, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivis- "* Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.— Publius. 1.84 The Federalist. ions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct Government in each, can take no regular measures for defence. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource ; ex- cept in their courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of terri- tory, the more difficult will it be for the People to form a regular, or systematic plan of opposition ; and the more easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements ; and the military force in the possession of the usurpers, can be more rapidly directed against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation, there must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance. The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of re- sistance increase with the increased extent of the State; provided the citizens understand their rights, and are disposed to defend them. The natural strength of the People in a large community, in proportion to the artifi- cial strength of the Government, is greater than in a small ; and of course more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the Government to establish a tyranny. But in a Confederacy, the People, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the gen- eral Government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the State Governments ; and these will have the same disposition towards the general Government. The People, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. It their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the* other, as the instrument of redress. How wise will it be in them, by cherishing the Union, to preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized ! The Federalist. 185 It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State Governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the National authority. Proj- ects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretences so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men. as of the People at large. The Legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the danger at a distance ; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the People, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different States ; and unite their common forces, for the protection of their common liberty. The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already experienced its utility against the at- tacks of a foreign power. And it would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the National councils. If the Foederal army should be able to quell the resistance of one State, the distant States would have it in their power to make head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned, to subdue the opposition in others ; and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive. We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means of doing this increase, the population and natural strength of the community wiL proportionably increase. When will the time arrive, that the Foederal Government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a des- potism over the great body of the People of an immense 186 The Federalist. empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of their State Governments, to take measures for their own defence, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of independent nations ? The apprehension may be con- sidered as a disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, December 28, 1787.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIX. To the People of the State of New York : IT has been already observed, that the Foederal Gov- ernment ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the National forces ; in which prop- osition was intended to be included the expense of rais- ing troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of the National civil list ; for the payment of the National debts contracted, or that may be contracted ; and, in general, for all those matters which will call for dis- bursements out of the National treasury. The conclu- sion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of the Government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or another. Money is ; with propriety, considered as the vital prin- ciple of the body politic ; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential The Federalist. 187 functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every Constitution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue : either the People must be subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of sup- plying the public wants, or the Government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time, perish. In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is, that he permits the Bashaws or Governors of provinces to pillage the Peo- ple without mercy ; and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his. own exigencies, and those of the State. In America, from a like cause, the Government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of the People in both countries would be promoted by competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities of the public might require ? The present Confederation, feeble as it is, intended to repose in the United States an unlimited power of pro- viding for the pecuniary wants of the Union. But pro- ceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done m such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention. Congress, by the Articles which compose that compact, (as has been already stated,) are author- ized to ascertain and call for any sums of money neces- sary, in their judgment, to the service of the United States ; and their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment are in every constitutional sense 188 Tlie Federalist. obligatory upon the States. These have no right to question the propriety of the demand ; no discretion beyond that of devising the ways and means of fur- nishing the sums demanded. Bat though this be strictly and truly the case ; though the assumption of such a right would be an infringement of the Articles of Union ; though it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed ; yet in practice it has been constantly exer cised ; and would continue to be so, as long as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of this system have been, is within the knowledge of every man the least conversant in our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in dif- ferent parts of these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies. "What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the system which has produced it ? — In a change of the fallacious and delusive system of quotas and requisitions ? What substitute can there be imag- ined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permit- ting the National Government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation, authorized in every well-ordered Constitution of civil Government ? Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any subject ; but no human ingenuity can point out any other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences &nd embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies of the public treasury. The more intelligent adversaries of the new Consti- tution admit the force of this reasoning; but they qual- ify their admission, by a distinction between what they call internal and external taxation. The former they would reserve to the State Governments ; the lattei The Feeder alist. 189 which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to the Faederal Head. This distinc- tion, however, would violate that fundamental maxim of good sense and sound policy, which dictates that every power ought to be in proportion to its object ; and would still leave the General Government in a kind of tutelage to the State Governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency. Who can pre- tend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union ? Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the importance of pub- lic justice and public credit could approve, in addition to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter our- selves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation ; and upon the principle, more than once adverted to, the power of making provision for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may be regarded as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that in the usual progress of things, the necessities of a nation, in every stage of its existence, will be found at least qual to its resources. To say that deficiences may be provided for by requi- sitions upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowl- edge that this system cannot be depended upon ; and on the other hand, to depend upon it for everything beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices and deformities, as they have been exhibited by experience, or delineated in the course of /hese papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to trust- ing the National interests in any degree to its opera- 190 The Federalist. fcion. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of discord and contention between the Feed* eral Head and its members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode, than the total wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied, in the same mode ? It ought to be recollected, that if less will be required from the States, they will have propor- tionably less means to answer the demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude, that th«re was some known point in the economy of National affairs, at which it would be safe to stop, and to say : Thus far, the ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying the wants of Government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a Government, half supplied and always necessi- tous, can fulfil the purposes of its institution ; can pro- vide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of the Commonwealth ? How can it ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad ? How can its administration be anything else than a succes- sion of expedients temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity ? How can it indertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good ? Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation, in the very first war in which we should hap- pen to be engaged. We will presume, for argument sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt nd of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus cir The Federalist. 191 3umstanced, a war breaks out. "What would be the probable conduct of the Government in such an emer- gency ? Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh re- sources, and urged by considerations of National danger, would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated, from their proper objects, to the defence of the State ? It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided ; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was become essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a Government, that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in their extent as burden- some in their conditions. They would be made upon the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors, — with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums. It may perhaps be imagined, that, from the scantiness of the resources of the country, the necessity of divert- ing the established funds in the case supposed would exist, though the National Government should possess an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considera- tions will serve to quiet all apprehension on this head : pne is, that we are sure the resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the Union ; the other is, that whatever defi- 192 The Federalist. ciencies there may be, can without difficulty be supplied by loans. The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its own authority, would enable the National Government to borrow, as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements : but to depend upon a Government that must itself depend upon thirteen other Governments for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situa- tion is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice. Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous age ; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold the actual situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the evils which ambition or revenge might, with t«xi much facility, inflict upon it. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 1, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST, No. XXX. To the People of the State of New York : IN disquisitions of every kind, there are certain pri mary truths, or first principles, upon which all sub sequent reasonings must depend. These contain an The Federalist. 193 internal evidence, which, antecedent to all reflection 01 combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that " The whole is greater than its part ; that things equal to the same, are equal to one another ; that two straight lines cannot enclose a space ; and that all right angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there can- not be an effect without a cause ; that the means ought to be proportioned to the end ; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object ; that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter sciences, which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and un- sophisticated dictates of common sense, that they chal- lenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irresisti- ble. The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely ab- stracted from those pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions of the human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more pimple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes which, however they may appear susceptible of demonstration, are at variance with the natural con- ceptions which the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would be led to entertain upon the subject. The infi- vite divisibility of matter, or, in other words, the infinite divisibility of a finite thing, extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geome- voi,. i 13 194 The Federalist. fcricians, though not less incomprehensible to common sense than any of those mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of infidelity have been so industri- ously levelled. But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that this should be the case. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor against error and imposition. But this untractableness may be carried too far, and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverse- ness, or disingenuity. Though it cannot be pretended, that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics ; yet they have much better claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner, than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not give their own understandings fair play ; but yielding to some untow- ard bias, they entangle themselves in words, and con- found themselves in subtleties. How else could it happen, (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in their opposition,) that positions so clear as those which manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the Government of the Union, should have to encounter any adversaries among men of dis- cernment ? Though these positions have been else- where fully stated, they will perhaps not be improperly recapitulated in this place, as introductory to an exami- nation of what may have been offered by way of objec- tion to them. They are in substance as follows : — A Government ought to contain in itself every poweT requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects com- mitted to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other The Federalist. 195 control, but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the People. As the duties of superintending the National defence, and of securing the public peace against foreign or do- mestic violence, involve a provision for casualties and dangers, to which no possible limits can be assigned, the power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the re sources of the community. As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering the National exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring that article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for those exigencies. As theory and practice conspire to prove, that the power of procuring revenue is unavailing when exer- cised over the States in their collective capacities, the Fcederal Government must of necessity be invested with an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes. Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to conclude that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the National Government might safely be permitted to rest on the evidence of these propositions, unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact, that the antagonists of the proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and most zealous effort against this part of the plan. It may therefore be satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which they combat it. Those of them which have been most labored with that view, seem in substance to amount to this : " It is •* not true, because the exigencies of the Union may not % be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying 4 taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite 196 The Federalist. u to the purposes of the local administrations as to those I of the Union ; and the former are at least of equal im- II portance with the latter to the happiness of the People. " It is, therefore, as necessary that the State Govern- " ments should be able to command the means of sup- " plying their wants, as that the National Government " should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants " of the Union. But an indefinite power of taxation in " the latter might, and probably would in time, deprive " the former of the means of providing for their own " necessities ; and would subject them entirely to the " mercy of the National Legislature. As the laws of " the Union are to become the supreme law of the land ; " as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be " necessary for carrying into execution the authorities " with which it is proposed to vest it ; the National " Government might at any time abolish the taxes im- " posed for State objects, upon the pretence of an inter- " ference with its own. It might allege a necessity of " doing this, in order to give efficacy to the National " revenues : And thus all the resources of taxation " might by degrees become the subjects of Fcederal mo- " nopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the " State Governments." This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition of usurpation in the National Government : at other times, it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of its intended powers. It is only in the latter light that it can be admitted to have any pretensions to fairness. The moment we launch into conjectures about the usurpations of the Fcederal Government, we get into an unfathomable abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the 'each of all reasoning. Imagination may range at pleas- ure, till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and knows not on which side to turn TJie Federalist. 197 to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has so rashly adventured. Whatever may be the limits 01 modifications of the powers of the Union, it is easy to imagine an endless train of possible dangers ; and by indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute skepticism and irresolution. I repeat here, what I have observed in sub' stance in another place, that all observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the Government, not to the nature or extent of its powers. The State Gov- ernments, by their original Constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty. In what does our security consist against usurpations from that quarter ? Doubt- less in the manner of their formation, and in a due de- pendence of those who are to administer them upon the People. If the proposed construction of the Fcederal Government be found, upon an impartial examination of it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the same species of security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded. It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State Governments to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights of the State Governments. What side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict, must depend on the means which the contending par- ties could employ towards insuring success. As in re- publics strength is always on the side of the People, and as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State Governments will commonly possess most influ- ence over them, the natural conclusion is, that such con- tests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the Union ; and that there is greater probability of encroach- ments by the members upon the Foederal Head, than by the Foederal Head upon the members. But it is evi 198 The Fwderalist. dent that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely vague and fallible : and that it is by far the safest course to lay them altogether aside, and to confine our atten- tion wholly to the nature and extent of the powers, as they are delineated in the Constitution. Everything beyond this must be left to the prudence and firmness of the People ; who, as they will hold the scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the Gen- eral and the State Governments. Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult •»o obviate the objections which have been made to an indefinite power of taxation in the United States. PUBLIUS. [From the Daily Advertiser, Thursday, January 3, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXI. To the People of the State of New York : ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State Governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because I am persuaded that the sense of the People, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State Governments, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations, for local purposes, would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power ; yet I am willing here to allow, in its full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual States should possess an independent The Federalist. 199 and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And making thia concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of du- ties on imports and exports) they would, under the plan of the Convention, retain that authority in the most ab- solute and unqualified sense ; and that an attempt on the part of the National Government to abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any Article or clause of its Con- stitution. An entire consolidation of the States into one com- plete National sovereignty would imply an entire sub- ordination of the parts ; and whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State Gov- ernments would clearly retain all the rights of sover- eignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases : where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union ; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority ; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble it, but "which would, in fact, be es- sentially different : I mean where the exercise of a con- current jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences in the policy of any branch of administra- tion, but would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in' point of constitutional authority. These ihree cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the Foederal Gov- 200 The Federalist. ernment may be exemplified by the following instances. The last clause but one in the eighth Section of the first Article provides expressly, that Congress shall exercise " exclusive legislation " over the district to be appro- priated as the seat of Government. This answers to the first case. The first clause of the same Section empow- ers Congress " to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, " and excises ; " and the second clause of the tenth Sec- tion of the same Article declares, that " no State shall, " without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or " duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of " executing its inspection laws." Hence would result an exclusive power in the Union to lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular exception mentioned ; but this power is abridged by another clause, which declares, that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State ; in consequence of which qualification, it now only extends to the duties on imports. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in that clause which declares that Con- gress shall have power " to establish an uniform rule " of naturalization throughout the United States." This must necessarily be exclusive : because if each State had power to prescribe a distinct rule, there could not be an uniform rule. A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but which is in fact widely different, affects the question immediately under consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all articles other than exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States and in the individual States. There is plainly no ex- pression in the granting clause which makes that power exclusive in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence which prohibits the States from exercising it. So far is this from being the case, that a plain and con- The Federalist. 201 elusive argument to the contrary is tc be deduced from the restraint laid upon the States in relation to duties on imports and exports. This restriction implies an ad- mission, that if it were not inserted, the States would possess the power it excludes ; and it implies a further admission, that as to all other taxes the authority of the States remains undiminished. In any other view it would be both unnecessary and dangerous ; it would be unnecessary, because if the grant to the Union of the power of laying such duties implied the exclusion of the States, or even their subordination in this particular, there could be no need of such a restriction ; it would be dangerous, because the introduction of it leads di- rectly to the conclusion which has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of the objectors be just, could not have been intended ; I mean that the States, in all cases to which the restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power of taxation with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what lawyers call a negative pregnant ; that is, a negation of one thing, and an affirmance of another : a negation of the author- ity of the States to impose taxes on imports and ex- ports, and an affirmance of their authority to impose them on all other articles. It would be mere sophistry to argue that it was meant to exclude them absolutely from the imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at liberty to lay others subject to the control of the National Legislature. The restraining or pro- hibitory clause only says, that they shall not, without the consent of Congress, lay such duties ; and if we are to understand this in the sense last mentioned, the Consti- tution would then be made to introduce a formal provis- ion for the sake of a very absurd conclusion ; which is, that the States, with the consent of the National Legis- lature, might tax imports and exports ; and that they might tax every other article, unless controlled by the 202 The Federalist. same body. If this was the intention, why not leave it in the first instance, to what is alleged to be the natural operation of the original clause, conferring a general power of taxation upon the Union ? It is evident that this could not have been the intention, and that it will not bear a construction of the kind. As to a supposition of repugnancy between the powei of taxation in the States and in the Union, it cannot be supported in that sense which would be requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is indeed possible that a tax might be laid on a particular article by a State which might render it inexpedient that thus a further tax should be laid on the same article by the Union ; but it would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a further tax. The quantity of the imposition, the expe- diency or inexpediency of an increase on either side, would be mutually questions of prudence ; but there would be involved no direct contradiction of power. The particular policy of the National and of the State systems of finance might now and then not exactly co- incide, and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is not, however, a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional re- pugnancy, that can by implication alienate and extin- guish a preexisting right of sovereignty. The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of the sovereign power ; and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the Articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find, that, not- withstanding the affirmative grants of general author- ities, there has been the most pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities The Federalist. 20S should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States. The tenth Section of the first Article consists altogether of such provisions. This circumstance is a clear indica- tion of the sense of the Convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the body of the Act, which justifies the position 1 have advanced, and refutes every hypothesis to the contrary. The last clause of the eighth Section of the first Article of the plan under consideration authorizes the National Legislature " to make all laws which shall be "necessary and proper for carrying into execution the "powers by that Constitution vested in the Government " of the United States, or in any department or officer "thereof;" and the second clause of the sixth Article declares, " that the Constitution and the laws of the " United States made in pursuance thereof, and the " treaties made by their authority} shall be the supreme " law of the land ; anything in the constitution or laws "of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." These two clauses have been the source of much vir- ulent invective, and petulant declamation, against the proposed Constitution. They have been held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresenta- tion ; as the pernicious engines by which their local Governments were to be destroyed, and their liberties exterminated ; as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane ; and yet, strange as it may ap- pear, after all this clamor, to those who may not have happened to contemplate them in the same light, it may be affirmed with perfect confidence, that the constitu- tional operation of the intended Government would be precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely oblit- erated, as if they were repeated in every Article. They are only declaratory of a truth, which would have re- 204 The Federalist. suited by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a Foederal Government, and vesting it with certain specified powers. This is so clear a proposition, that moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been so copiously vented against this part of the Plan, without emotions that dis- turb its equanimity. What is a power but the ability or faculty of doing a thing ? What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the means necessary to its execu- tion ? What is a legislative power, but a power of making laws ? What are the means to execute a leg- islative power, but laws ? What is the power of lay- ing and collecting taxes, but a legislative power, or a power of making laws, to lay and collect taxes ? What are the proper means of executing such a power, but necessary and proper laws ? This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test by which to judge of the true nature of the clause complained of. It conducts us to this palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to pass all laws necessary and proper for the execution of that power : and what does the unfortunate and calumniated provision in question do, more than de- clare the same truth ; to wit, that the National Legisla- ture, to whom the power of laying and collecting taxes had been previously given, might, in the execution cf that power, pass all laws necessary and proper to carry it into effect ? I have applied these observations thus particularly to the power of taxation ; because it is the immediate subject under consideration, and because it is the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union. But the same process will 'ead to the same result, in relation to ail other powers f declared in the Constitution. And it is expressly to ex- ecute these powers, that the sweeping clause, as it has The Federalist. 205 been affectedly called, authorizes the National Legisla- ture to pass all necessary and proper laws. If there ia anything exceptionable, it must be sought for in the specific powers, upon which this general declaration is predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless. But suspicion may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer is, that it could only have been done for greater caution, and to guard against all cavilling refine- ments in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union. The Convention probably foresaw, what it has been a principal aim of these papers to inculcate, that the dan- ger which most threatens our political welfare is, that the State Governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union ; and might therefore think it necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to construction. Whatever may have been the inducement to it, the wis- dom of the precaution is evident from the cry which has been raised against it ; as that very cry betrays a disposition to question the great and essential truth which it is manifestly the object of that provision to declare. But it may be again asked, who is to judge of the necessity and propriety of the laws to be passed for ex- ecuting the powers of the Union ? I answer, first, that this question arises as well and as fully upon the simple grant of those powers, as upon the declaratory clause : and I answer in the second place, that the National Government, like every other, must judge, in the first nstance, of the proper exercise of its powers, and its constituents in the last. If the Foederal Government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the People, whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have 206 The Federalist. formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify. The propriety of a law, in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is founded. Sup- pose, by some forced constructions of its authority, (which indeed cannot easily be imagined,) the Foederal Legislature should attempt to vary the law of descent in any State ) would it not be evident, that in making such an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and infringed upon that of the State ? Suppose, again, that upon the pretence of an interference with its reve- nues, it should undertake to abrogate a land-tax im- posed by the authority of a State ; would it not be equally evident, that this was an invasion of that con- current jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax, which its Constitution plainly supposes to exist in the State Governments ? If there ever should be a doubt on this head, the credit of it will be entirely due to those reasoners, who in the imprudent zeal of their animosity to the Plan of the Convention, have labored to envelop it in a cloud, calculated to obscure the plainest and sim- plest truths. But it is said, that the laws of the Union are to be the supreme law of the land. But what inference can be drawn from this, or what would they amount to, if they were not to be supreme ? It is evident they would amount to nothing. A law, by the very meaning of (he term, includes supremacy. It is a rule, which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This results from every political^ association. If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its Constitution, must The Fcederalist. 207 necessarily be supreme over those societies, and the in- dividuals of whom they are composed. It would other- wise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a Government; which is only an- other word for political power and supremacy. But it will not follow from this doctrine, that acts of the larger society, which are not pursuant to its constitu- tional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the su- preme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive, that the clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have just before considered, only declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a Foederal Government. It will not, I presume, have escaped observation, that it expressly confines this su- premacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution; which I mention merely as an instance of caution in the Convention ; since that limitation would have been to be understood, though it had not been expressed. Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United States would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be opposed or controlled ; yet a law for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and exports,) would not be the supreme law of the land, but an usurpation of power not granted by the Constitu- tion. As far as an improper accumulation of taxes, on the same object, might tend to render the collection dif- ficult or precarious, this would be a mutual inconven- ience, not arising from a superiority or defect of power on either side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by one or the other, in a manner equally dis- advantageous to both. It is to be hoped and presumed, however, that mutual interest would dictate a concert 208 The Federalist. in this respect which would avoid any material incon- venience. The inference from the whole is — that the individual States would, under the proposed Constitu- tion, retain an independent and uncontrollable author- ity to raise revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation, except duties on imports and exports. It will be shown in the next paper that this concurrent jurisdiction in the Article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an en- tire subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of the State authority to that of the Union. PUBL1US. [From the New York Packet, Friday, January 4, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXII. To the People of the State of New York: I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number, that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have coequal authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no color for the assertion, that they would not possess means as abundant as could be desired, for the supply of their own wants,' independent of all ex- ternal control. That the field is sufficiently wide, will more fully appear, when we come to advert to the in- considerable share of the public expenses, for which it will fall to the lot of the State Governments to pro- vide. To argue upon abstract principles, that this coordi The Federalist. 209 nate authority cannot exist, is to set up supposition and theory against fact and reality. However proper such reasonings might be, to show that a thing ought not to exist, they are wholly to be rejected, when they are made use of to prove that it does not exist, contrary to the evidence of the fact itself. It is well known, t hat- in the Roman Republic, the legislative authority, in the last resort, resided for ages in two different political bod- ies — not as branches of the same Legislature, but as distinct and independent Legislatures, in each of which an opposite interest prevailed ; in one, the Patrician ; in the other, the Plebeian. Many arguments might have been adduced, to prove the unfitness of two such seem- ingly contradictory authorities, each having power to annul or repeal the acts of the other. But a man would have been regarded as frantic, who should have attempt- ed at Rome to disprove their existence. It will be read- ily understood, that I allude to the comitia centuriata and the comitia tributa. The former, in which the people voted by centuries, was so arranged as to give a superiority to the Patrician interest : in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the Plebeian interest had an entire predominancy. And yet these two Legislatures coexisted for ages, and the Roman Republic attained to the utmost height of human greatness. In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such contradiction as appears in the example cited ; there is no power on either side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice, there is little reason to appre- hend any inconvenience ; because, in a short course of time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce them- selves within a very narrow compass ; and in the interim, the United States will, in all probability, find it con- venient to abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular States would be inclined to resort. To form a more precise judgment of the true merits VOL I. 14 210 The Federalist. of this question, it will be well to advent to the propor tion between the objects that will require a Foederal pro- vision in respect to revenue, and those which will re- quire a State provision. We shall discover that the former are altogether unlimited : and that the latter are circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In pursu- ing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil Gov- ernment are not to be framed upon a calculation of ex- isting exigencies ; but upon a combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in the National Government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to be a capacity to provide for future contin- gencies, as they may happen ; and as these are illimita- ble in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is true, perhaps, that a computation might be made, with sufficient accuracy to answer the purpose, of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the subsisting engagements of the Union, and to maintain those establishments which, for some time to come, would suffice in time of peace. But would it be wise, or would it not rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at this point, and to leave the Government, intrusted with the care of the National defence, in a state of absolute incapacity to provide for the protection of the commu- nity against future invasions of the public peace, by foreign war or domestic convulsions ? If, on the con- trary, we ought to exceed this point, where can we stop, short of an indefinite power of providing for emergen- 3ies as they may arise ? Though it is easy to assert, in general terms, the possibility of forming a rational judg- ment of a due provision against probable dangers ; yet The Federalist. 211 we may safely challenge those who make the assertion, to bring forward their data, and may affirm, that they would be found as vague and uncertain as any that could be produced to establish the probable duration of the world. Observations, confined to the mere prospects of internal attacks, can deserve no weight ; though even these will admit of no satisfactory calculation : but if we mean to be a commercial people, it must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that com- merce. The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve contingencies that must baffle all the efforts of political arithmetic. Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in politics, of tying up the hands of Govern- ment from offensive war, founded upon reasons of State ; yet certainly we ought not to disable it from guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of other nations. A cloud has been for some time hanging over the European world. If it should break forth into a storm, who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would not be spent upon us ? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce, that we are entirely out of its reach. Or if the combustible materials, that now seem to be collecting, should be dissipated without com- ing to maturity; or if a flame should be kindled without extending to us, what security can we have that our tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some other cause, or from some other quarter ? Let us recol- lect that peace or war will not always be left to our. op- tion ; that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition of others. Who could have Imagined at the conclusion of the last war, that France and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were, would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other? To judge from the history of man- 212 The Federalist. kind, we shall be compelled to conclude, that the iiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace ; and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tran- quillity, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character. What are the chief sources of expense in every Gov- ernment ? What has occasioned that enormous accu- mulation of debts with which several of the European nations are oppressed? The answer plainly is, wars and rebellions ; the support of those institutions, which are necessary to guard the body politic, against these two most mortal diseases of society. The expenses arising from those institutions which are relative to the mere domestic police of a State ; to the support of its Legis- lative, Executive, and Judicial departments, with their different appendages ; and to the encouragement of agri- culture and manufactures, (which will comprehend al- most all the objects of State expenditure,) are insig- nificant, in comparison with those which relate to the National defence. In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the osten- tatious apparatus of Monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth part of the annual income of the na- tion is appropriated to the class of expenses last men- tioned : the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the payment of the interest of debts, contracted for carrying on the wars in which that country has been engaged, and in the maintenance of fleets and armies. If, on the one hand, it should be observed, that the expenses in- curred in the prosecution of the ambitious enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a Monarchy, are not a proper standard by which to judge of those which might be necessary in a Republic ; it ought, on the other hand vo be remarked, that there should be as great a dispro* The Federalist. 213 portion between the profusion and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its domestic administration, and the frugality and economy which in that particular be- come the modest simplicity of republican Government. If we balance a proper deduction from one side, against that which it is supposed ought to be made from the other, the proportion may still be considered as holding good. But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves contracted in a single war, and let us only cal- culate on a common share of the events which disturb the peace of nations, and we shall instantly perceive, without the aid of any elaborate illustration, that there must always be an immense disproportion between the objects of Foederal and State expenditures. It is true, that several of the States, separately, are encumbered with considerable debts, which are an excrescence of the late war. But this cannot happen again, if the pro- posed system be adopted ; and when these debts are discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence, which the State Governments will continue to experience, will be for the mere support of their respective civil lists ; to which, if we add all contingencies, the total amount in every State ought to fall considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds. In framing a Government for posterity as well as our- selves, we ought, in those provisions which are designed to be permanent, to calculate, not on temporary, but on permanent causes of expense. If this principle be a just one, our attention would be directed to a provision in favor of the State Governments for an annual sum of about two hundred thousand pounds; while the exi- gencies of the Union could be susceptible of no limits, even in imagination. In this view of the subject, b^ arhat logic can it be maintained that the local Govern- ments ought to command, in perpetuity, an exclusive 214 The Federalist source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two hundred thousand pounds ? To extend its power fur- ther, in exclusion of the authority of the Union, would be to take the resources of the community out of those hands which stood in need of them for the public wel- fare, in order to put them into other hands which could have no just or proper occasion for them. Suppose, then, the Convention had been inclined to proceed upon the principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, between the Union and its members, in pro- portion to their comparative necessities ; what particular fund could have been selected for the use of the States, that would not either have been too much or too lit- tle ; too little for their present, too much for their future wants ? As to the line of separation between external and internal taxes, this would leave to the States, at a rough computation, the command of two thirds of the resources of the community, to defray from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses ; and to the Union, one third of the resources of the community, to defray from nine tenths to nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If we desert this boundary, and content ourselves with leaving to the States an exclusive power of taxing houses and lands, there would still be a great disproportion between the means and the end; the possession of one third of the resources of the community to supply, at most, one tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been se- lected and appropriated, equal to and not greater than the object, it would have been inadequate to the dis- charge of the existing debts of the particular States, and would have left them dependent on the Union for a provision for this purpose. The preceding train of observations will justify the position which has been elsewhere laid down, that " a M concurrent jurisdiction in the article of taxation was " the only admissible substitute for an entire subordina* The Federalist. 215 u tion, hi respect to this branch of power, of State au- " thority to that of the Union." Any separation of the objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon, would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great in- terests of the Union to the power of the individual States. The Convention thought the concurrent juris- diction preferable to that subordination ; and it is evi- dent that it has at least the merit of reconciling an indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Foed- eral Government with an adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their own necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this important subject of taxation will claim a further consideration. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIII. To the People of the State of New York: BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objec- tions to an indefinite power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark ; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the National Government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to particular ob- jects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils would spring from this source : the oppression of particular branches of industry, and an unequal distri- oution of the taxes, as well among the several States, as among the citizens of the same State. Suppose, as has been contended for, the Fcederal power 216 The Federalist. of taxation were to be confined to duties on imports , it is evident that the Government, for want of being able to command other resources, would frequently be tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess. There are persons who imagine that they can never be carried to too great a length ; since the higher they are, the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage an ex- travagant consumption, to produce a favorable balance of trade, and to promote domestic manufactures. But all extremes are pernicious in various ways. Exorbi- tant duties on imported articles would beget a general spirit of smuggling; which is always prejudicial to the fair trader, and eventually to the revenue itself: they tend to render other classes of the community tributary, in an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes, to whom they give a premature monopoly of the markets : they sometimes force industry out of its more natural channels into others in which it flows with less advan- tage : and in the last place, they oppress the merchant, who is often obliged to pay them himself without any retribution from the consumer. When the demand is equal to the quantity of goods at market, the consumer generally pays the duty ;- but when the markets happen to be overstocked, a great proportion falls upon the mer- chant, and sometimes not only exhausts his profits, but breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think, that a division of the duty, between the seller and the buyer, more often happens than is commonly imagined. It is not always possible to raise the price of a commodity, in exact proportion to every additional imposition laid upon it. The merchant, especially in a country of small commercial capital, is often under a necessity of keep- ing prices down in order to a more expeditious sale. The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener true than the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more equitable that the duties on imports should The Federalist. 211 go into a common stock, than that they should redound to the exclusive benefit of the importing States. But it is not so generally true, as to render it equitable, that those duties should form the only National fund. When they are paid by the merchant, they operate as an additional tax upon the importing State, whose cit- izens pay their proportion of them in the character of consumers. In this view, they are productive of in- equality among the States ; which inequality would be increased with the increased extent of the duties. The confinement of the National revenues to this species of imposts would be attended with inequality, from a dif- ferent cause, between the manufacturing and the non- manufacturing States. The States which can go far- thest towards the supply of their own wants, by their own manufactures, will not, according to their numbers or wealth, consume so great a proportion of imported arti- cles as those States which are not in the same favorable situation. They would not, therefore, in this mode alone contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their abili- ties. To make them do this, it is necessary that re- course be had to excises ; the proper objects of which are particular kinds of manufactures. New York is more deeply interested in these considerations, than such of her citizens as contend for limiting the power of the Union to external taxation, may be aware of. New York is an importing State, and is not likely speed- ily to be, to any great extent, a manufacturing State. She would of course suffer in a double light, from re- straining the jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts. So far as these observations tend to inculcate a dan-' ger of the import duties being extended to an injurious extreme, it may be observed, conformably to a remark made in another part of these papers, that the interest of the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against 218 The Federalist. such an extreme. I readily admit that this would be the case, as long as other resources were open ; but if the .avenues to them were closed, hope, stimulated by necessity, would beget experiments, fortified by rigorous precautions and additional penalties ; which, for a time, would have the intended effect, till there had been lei- sure to contrive expedients to elude these new precau- tions. The first success would be apt to inspire false opinions ; which it might require a long course of sub- sequent experience to correct. Necessity, especially in politics, often occasions false hopes, false reasonings, and a system of measures, correspondently erroneous. But even if this supposed excess should not be a conse- quence of the limitation of the Foederal power of taxa- tion, the inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though not in the same degree, from the other causes that have been noticed. Let us now return to the examination of objections. One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition, seems most to be relied on, is, that the House of Representatives is not sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different classes of citizens, in order to combine the interests and feelings of every part of the community, and to produce a due sympathy between the representative body and its constituents. This argument presents itself under a very specious and seducing form ; and is well calculated to lay hold of the prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. But when we come to dissect it with attention, it will appear to be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The object it seems to aim at, is in the first place impracti- cable, and in the sense in which it is contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for another place, the discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the representative body in respect to numbers ; and shall content myself with examining here the particular use The Federalist. 219 which has been made of a contrary supposition, in ref erence to the immediate subject of our inquiries. The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by persons of each class, is altogether vision- ary. Unless it were expressly provided in the Constitu- tion, that each different occupation should send one or more members, the thing would never take place in prac- tice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be in- clined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to mer- chants, in preference to persons of their own professions or trades. Those discerning citizens are well aware, that the mechanic and manufacturing arts furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many of them, indeed, are immediately connected with the operations of commerce. They know that the mer- chant is their natural patron and friend ; and they are aware, that however great the confidence they may justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by themselves. They are sensible that their habits in life have not been such as to give them those acquired en- dowments, without which, in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural abilities are for the most part use- less ; and that the influence and weight, and superior acquirements of the merchanl s render them more equal to a contest with any spirit which might happen to in- fuse itself into the public councils, unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. These considera- tions, and many others that might be mentioned, prove, and experience confirms it, that artisans and manufact- urers will commonly be disposed to bestow their votes upon merchants and those whom they recommend. We must therefore consider merchants as the natural repre- sentatives of all these classes of the community. With regard to the learned professions, little need be observed ; they truly form no distinct interest in society 220 The Federalist. and* according to their situation and talents, will be in- discriminately the objects of the confidence and choice of each other, and of other parts of the community. Nothing remains but the landed interest : and this, in a political view, and particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be perfectly united, from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be laid on land which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every land- holder will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible ; and common interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. But if we even could suppose a distinction of interest between the opulent landholder and the mid- dling farmer, what reason is there to conclude, that the first would stand a better chance of being deputed to the National Legislature than the last ? If we take fact as our guide, and look into our own Senate and As- sembly, we shall find that moderate proprietors of land prevail in both ; nor is this less the case in the Senate, which consists of a smaller number, than in the Assem- bly, which is composed of a greater number. Where the qualifications of the electors are the same, whether they have to choose a small or a large number, their votes will fall upon those in whom they have most confidence ; whether these happen to be men of large fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no property at all. It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have some of their own number in the represent- ative body, in order that their feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to. But we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the People free. Where this is the case, the representative body, with too few excep* tions to have any influence on the spirit of the Govern The Federalist. 221 ment, will be composed of landholders, merchants, ana men of the learned professions. But where is the dan- ger that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these three descriptions of men ? Will not the land- holder know and feel whatever will promote or injure the interest of landed property ? And will he not, from his own interest in that species of property, be suffi- ciently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or en- cumber it ? Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the in- terests of the. mechanic and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly allied ? Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutral- ity to the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the so- ciety ? If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions which may happen to prevail in particu- lar parts of the society, and to which a wise administra- tion will never be inattentive, is the man whose situation leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely to be a competent judge of then nature, extent, and foun- dation, than one whose observation does not travel be- yond the circle of his neighbors and acquaintances ? Is it not natural that a man, who is a candidate for the fa- vor of the People and who is dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuance of his public honors, should take care to inform himself of their dis- positions and inclinations, and should be willing to al- low them their proper degree of influence upon his con- iuct ? This dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent, are the true, and they are the strong 222 The Federalist. chords of sympathy, between the representative and the constituent. There is no part of the administration of Government that requires extensive information, and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political economy, so much as the business of taxation. The man who un- derstands those principles best, will be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients, or to sacrifice any par ticular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue It might be demonstrated that the most productive sys- tem of finance will always be the least burdensome. There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious ex- ercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the person in whose hands it is should be acquainted with the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking of the People at large, and with the resources of the country. And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the People. In any other sense, the proposition has either no mean- ing, or an absurd one. And in that sense, let every con- siderate citizen judge for himself, where the requisite qualification is most likely to be found. PUBLIUS. {From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 8, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIV. To the People of the State of New York : WE have seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the natural operation of the differ- ent interests and views of the various classes of the The Federalist. 223 community, whether the representation of the People be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly represent all those different interests and views. If it should be objected, that we have seen other descriptions of men in the local Legislatures, I answer, that it is admitted there are ex- ceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient number to influence the general complexion or character of the Government. There are strong minds in every walk of life, that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situa- tion, and will command the tribute due to then* merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly be- long, but from the society in general. The door ought to be equally open to all ; and I trust, for the credit of human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigor- ous plants flourishing in the soil of Foederal, as well as of State legislation ; but occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning, founded upon the general course of things, less conclusive. The subject might be placed in several other lights, that would all lead to the same result ; and in particular it might be asked, What greater affinity or relation of in- terest can be conceived between the carpenter and black- smith, and the linen manufacturer or stocking-weaver than between the merchant and either of them ? It i notorious, that there are often as great rivalships be tween different branches of the mechanic or manufact- uring arts, as there are between any of the departments of labor and industry ; so that, unless the representative body were to be far more numerous than would be con- sistent with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its de- Liberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the spirit of the objection we have been considering, should ever be realized in practice. But I forbear to dwell any onger on a matter which has hitherto worn too loose a 224 The Federalist. garb to admit even of an accurate inspection of its reai shape or tendency. There is another objection of a somewhat more pre- cise nature, that claims our attention. It has been as- serted that a power of internal taxation in the National Legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as from an interference between the reve- nue laws of the Union and of the particular States. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge, seems to be entirely destitute of foundation. If any question is depending in a State Legislature, respecting one of the Counties, which demands a knowledge of local de- tails, how is it acquired ? No doubt from the informa- tion of the members of the County. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the National Legislature, from the representatives of each State ? And is it not to be presumed, that the men who will generally be sent there, will be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence to be able to communicate that information ? Is the knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxa- tion, a minute topographical acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams, highways, and by-paths in each State ; or is it a general acquaintance with its situation and resources — with the state of its agricult- ure, commerce, manufactures — with the nature of its products and consumptions — with the different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry ? Nations in general, even under Governments of the more popular kind, usually commit the administration of their finances to single men, or to Boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the first instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or Legislature. Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed The Federalist 225 everywhere best qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for revenue ; which is a clear indi- cation, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge of local circumstances, requisite to the purposes of taxation. The taxes intended to be comprised under the gen- eral denomination of internal taxes, may be subdivided into those of the direct and those of the indirect kind. Though the objection be made to both, yet the reason- ing upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be under- stood duties and excises on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive, what can be the nature of the difficulties apprehended. The knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can easily be procured from any well-informed man, espe- cially of the mercantile class. The circumstances tha may distinguish its situation in one State from its situa- tion in another, must be few, simple, and easy to be comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to, would be to avoid those articles which had been pre- viously appropriated to the use of a particular State ; and there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the reve- nue system of each. This could always be known from the respective codes of laws, as well as from the infor- mation of the members of the several States. The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and lands, appears to have, at first sight, more foundation ; but even in this view, it will not bear a close examination. Land-taxes are commonly laid in one of two modes, either by actual valuations, perma- nent or periodical, or by occasional assessments, at the discretion, or according to the best judgment, of certain officers whose duty it is to make them. In either case, the execution of the business, which alone requires the VOL. I. 15 226 The Federalist. knowledge of local details, must be devolved upon discreet persons in the character of Commissioners or Assessors, elected by the People, or appointed by the Government, for the purpose. All that the law can do, must be to name the persons or to prescribe the manner of their election or appointment; to fix their numbers and qualifications ; and to draw the general outlines of their powers and duties. And what is there in all this that cannot as well be performed by the National Legis- lature as by a State Legislature ? The attention of either can only reach to general principles : local details, as already observed, must be referred to those who are to execute the plan. But there is a simple point of view, in which this matter may be placed, that must be altogether satisfac- tory. The National Legislature can make use of the system of each State within that State. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in each State, can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the Foederal Government. Let it be recollected, that the proportion of these taxes is not to be left to the discretion of the National Legis- lature : but is to be determined by the numbers of each State, as described in the second Section of the first Article. An actual census, or enumeration of the People must furnish the rule ; a circumstance which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been provided against with guarded circumspection. In addition to the precaution just mentioned, there is a provision that " all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform " throughout the United States." It has been very properly observed, by different speak- ers and writers on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power of internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment to be really The Federalist. 227 inconvenient, the Fcederal Government may then for- bear the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in its stead. By way of answer to this, it has been tri- umphantly asked, why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource ? Two solid answers may be given ; the first is, that the exercise of that power, if convenient, will be preferable, because it will be more effectual ; and it is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise than by the experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised. The con- trary, indeed, appears most probable. The second an- swer is, that the existence of such a power in the Con- stitution will have a strong influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States know that the Union can supply itself without their agency, it will be a pow- erful motive for exertion on their part. As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of its members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or repugnancy of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, interfere with each other ; and it is far from impossible to avoid an interference even in the policy of their different sys- tems. An effectual expedient for this purpose will be, mutually to abstain from those objects which either side may have first had recourse to. As neither can control the other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And where there is an immediate common interest, we may safely count upon its operation. When the particular debts of the States are done away, and their expenses come to be limited within their natural compass, the possibility al- most of interference will vanish. A small land-tax will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource. Many spectres have been raised out of this power *f internal taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the 228 The Federalist. People — double sets of revenue officers — a duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain. As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no room for double sets of officers : one, where the right of imposing the tax is exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties on imports ; the other, where the object has not fallen under any State regulation or provision, which may be applicable to a variety of objects. In other cases, the probability : s, that the United States will either wholly abstain from .he objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the State officers and State regulations for col- lecting the additional imposition. This will best answer the views of revenue, because it will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the State Governments and to the People. At all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an in- convenience; and nothing more can be required than to show, that evils predicted do not necessarily result from the plan. As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it is a sufficient answer to say, that it ought not to be presumed ; but the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should in- fest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to the accomplishment of its aim would be, to employ the State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments. This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into the channels of the National Government instead of making Fcederal influence flow in an opposite and ad- verse current. But all suppositions of this kind are in- vidious, and ought to be banished from the considera The Federalist 22S tion of the great question before the People. They can answer no other end than to cast a mist over the truth. As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. The wants of the Union are to be supplied in < one way or another ; if to be done by the authority of the Fcederal Government, it will not be to be done by that of the State Government. The quantity of taxes to be paid by the community must be the same in either case ; with this advantage, if the provision is to be made by the Union — that the capital resource of commercial imposts, which is the most convenient branch of reve- nue, can be prudently improved to a much greater ex- tent under Fcederal than under State regulation, and of course will render it less necessary to recur to more in- convenient methods ; and with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real difficulty in the ex- ercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose a disposition to greater care in the choice and arrange- ment of the means ; and must naturally tend to make it a fixed point of policy in the National administration to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest which the Government has in the preservation of its own power, coincides with a proper distribution of the public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from oppression ! As to poll-taxes, I, without scruple, confess my dis- approbation of them ; and though they have prevailed from an early period in those States,* which have uni- "ormly been the most tenacious of their rights, I should ament to see them introduced into practice under th National Government. But does it follow because there * The New England States. — Publius. 230 The Federalist. is a power to lay them, that they will actually be laid ? Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this kind ; and yet in several of them they are unknown in practice. Are the State Governments to be stig- matized as tyrannies, because they possess this power ? If they are not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a charge against the National Government, or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption ? As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still feel a thorough conviction, that the power of having re- course to it ought to exist in the Foederal Government. There are certain emergencies of nations, in which ex- pedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal. And the Government, from the possibility of such emergen- cies, ought ever to have the option of making use of them. The real scarcity of objects in this country, which may be considered as productive sources of rev- enue, is a reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging the discretion of the National councils in this respect. There may exist certain critical and tempestuous con- junctures of the State, in which a poll-tax may become an inestimable resource. And as I know nothing to exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I ac- knowledge my aversion to every project that is calcu- lated to disarm the Government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the general defence and security. PUBLIUS. The Federalist. 231 [From the Daily Advertiser, Thursday, January 10, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXV. To the People of the State of New York : THE power of regulating the militia, and of com- manding its services in times of insurrection and invasion, are natural incidents to the duties of superin- tending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy. It requires no skill in the science of war to discern, that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial ef- fects, whenever they were called into service for the public defence. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field, with mutual intel- ligence and concert — an advantage of peculiar mo- ment in the operations of an army : and it would fi.1 them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions, which would be essential to theii usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be ac- complished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the National authority. It is, there- fore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the Convention proposes to empower the Union " to provide " for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, u and for governing such part of them as may be em- " ployed in the service of the United States, reserving " to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, " and the authority of training the militia according to u the discipline prescribed by Congress." Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan of the Convention, there is none 232 The Federalist that was so little to have been expected, or is so unten able in itself, as the one from which this particular pro- vision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body, which is constituted the guardian of the National security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the Foederal Government can command the aid of the mili- tia in those emergencies, which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dis- pense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its exist- ence, than a thousand prohibitions upon paper. In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute trie laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the posse comitatus, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty ; whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have ap- peared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the Foederal Government will be despotic and unlim- ited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority suf- ficient even to call out the posse comitatus. The lat- ter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that The Federalist. 233 a right to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be in trusted with the execution of those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and nroper for the imposition and collection of taxes, would .nvolve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evi- dent, that the supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the posse comitatus is entirely destitute of color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the Fcederal Government over the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of author? ity, merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary ? What shall we think of the motives, which could induce men of sense to reason in this man- ner ? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and judgment ? By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the Fcederal Govern- ment. It is observed, that select corps may be formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pur- sued by the National Government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as dan- gerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the Foederal Legislature from this State on the subject of a militia establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the following discourse : — 234 The Federalist. " The project of disciplining all the militia of the * United States is as futile as it would be injurious, * if it were capable of being carried into execution. A ' tolerable expertness in military movements, is a busi- 1 ness that requires time and practice. It is not a day, "■* or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of " it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and " of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms " for the purpose of going through military exercises " and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to ac- " quire the degree of perfection which would entitle " them to the character of a well-regulated militia, " would be a real grievance to the People, and a seri- " ous public inconvenience and loss. It would form an " annual deduction from the productive labor of the " country, to an amount, which, calculating upon the " present numbers of the People, would not fall far short " of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all "the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge "the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an " extent, would be unwise : and the experiment, if made, " could not succeed, because it would not long be en- li dured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with w< respect to the People at large, than to have them prop- " erly armed and equipped ; and in order to see that this " be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them " once or twice in the course of a year. " But though the scheme of disciplining the whole " Nation must be abandoned as mischievous or imprac- " ticable ; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance, " that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, " be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. " The attention of the Government ought particularly to *• be directed to the formation of a select corps of mod- " erate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them * for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the The Federalist. 235 plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of * well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever u the defence of the State shall require it. This will H not only lessen the call for military establishments, u but if circumstances should at any time oblige the a Government to form an army of any magnitude, " that army can never be formidable to the liberties of " the People, while there is a large body of citizens, lit- " tie, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use * of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights, " and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to " me the only substitute that can be devised for a stand- " ing army, and the best possible security against it, if " it should exist." Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should I reason on the same subject ; de- ducing arguments of safety from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. But how the National Legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee. There is something so far fetched, and so extravagant, in the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss, whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery ; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians ; as a disingenuous artifice, to instil prejudices at any price ; or as the se- rious offspring of political fanaticism. "Where, in the name of common sense, are our fears to end, if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fel- low-citizens ? What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen ; and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests ? What rea- sonable cause of apprehension can be* inferred from a }ower in the Union to prescribe regulations for the rnilitia, and to command its services when necessary. 236 The Federalist. while the particular States are to have the sole and ex- clusive appointment of the officers ? If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia, upon any conceivable establishment under the Foederal Govern- ment, the circumstance of the officers being in the ap- pointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt, that this circumstance will al- ways secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia. In reading many of the publications against the Con- stitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance, which, instead of nat- ural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes — " Gorgons, Hydras, and Chimeras dire ; " discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming everything it touches into a monster. A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable suggestions which have taken place re- specting the power of calling for the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in nilitia-men instead of Louis d'ors and ducats. At one moment, there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the People ; at another moment, the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes, five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy »f Massachusetts ; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance, to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the per- sons who rave at this rate, imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the People of America for infallible truths ? The Federalist. 23V If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism, what need of the militia ? If there should be no army, whither would the militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and hope- less expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had medi- tated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed People ? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and en- lightened Nation ? Do they begin by exciting the detes- tation of the very instruments of their intended usurpa- tions ? Do they usually commence their career by wan- ton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred and execration ? Are suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning Peo- ple ? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of chagrined incendiaries, or distempered enthusiasts ? If we were even to suppose the National rulers actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would employ such preposterous means to accom- plish their designs. In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper, that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another, to resist a com- mon enemy, or to guard the republic against the vio- lence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the Ease, in respect to the first object, in the course of the late war ; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal *nd of our political association. If the power of afford- ing it be placed under the direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to Jie dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had 238 The Federalist. superadded the incitements of self-preservation, to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy. I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be considered as having an immediate rela- tion to the energy of the Government ; and have endeav- ored to answer the principal objections which have been made to them. I have passed over in silence those minor authorities which are either too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the oppo- nents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of controversy. The mass of Judiciary power, however, might have claimed an investigation under this head, had it not been for the consideration that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously considered in connection. This has determined me to refer it to the branch of our inquiries, upon which we shall next enter. PUBLIUS. [From the Daily Advertiser, Friday, January 11, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVI. To the People of the State of New York • IN reviewing the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing that they cannot be supplied by a Gov- ernment of less energy than that before the public, several of the most important principles of the latter fell of course under consideration. But as the ultimate object of these papers is, to determine clearly and fully the merits of this Constitution, and the expediency of adopt- ing it, our plan cannot be completed without taking a The Federalist. 239 more critical and thorough survey of the work of the Convention ; without examining it on all its sides ; comparing it in all its parts ; and calculating its proba- ble effects. That this remaining task may be executed under impressions conducive to a just and fair result, some reflections must in this place be indulged, which candoi previously suggests. It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good ; and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished than promoted, by those occasions which require an unusual exercise of it. To those who have been led by experience to attend to this consideration, it could not appear surprising, that the act of the Convention, which recommends so many important changes and innova- tions, which may be viewed in so many lights and rela- tions, and which touches the springs of so many pas- sions and interests, should find or excite dispositions unfriendly, both on one side and on the other, to a fair discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. In some, it has been too evident from their own publica- tions, that they have scanned the proposed Constitution, not only with a predisposition to censure, but with a predetermination to condemn ; as the language held by others betrays an opposite predetermination or bias, which must render their opinions also of little moment in the question. In placing, however, these different characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their opinions, I wish not to insinuate that there may not be a material difference in the purity of their intentions. It is but just to remark in favor of the latter description, that as our situation is universally admitted to be pecu- liarly critical, and to require indispensably, that some- 240 The Federalist. thing should be done for our relief, the predetermined patron of what has been actually done may have taken his bias from the weight of these considerations, as well as from considerations of a sinister nature. The prede- termined adversary, on the other hand, can have been governed by no venial motive whatever. The intentions of the first may be upright, as they may on the contrary be culpable. The views of the last cannot be upright, and must be culpable. But the truth is, that these papers are not addressed to persons falling under either of these characters. They solicit the attention of those only, who add to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their country, a temper favorable to a just estimate of the means of promoting it. Persons of this character will proceed to an examina- tion of the Plan submitted by the Convention, not only without a disposition to find or to magnify faults ; but will see the propriety of reflecting, that a faultless plan was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on the fallibility to which the Convention, as a body of men, were liable ; but will keep in mind, that they them- selves also are but men, and ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others. With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these inducements to candor, many allowances ought to be made, for the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred to the Convention. The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. It has been shown in the course of these papers, that the existing Confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious ; that we must consequently change this first foundation, and with it the superstructure rest- ing upon it. It has been shown, that the other Confed- eracies which could be consulted as precedents have been *itiated by the same erroneous principles, and can there- The Federalist. 241 fore furnish no other light than that of beacons, which give warning of the course to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The most that the Convention could do in such a situation, was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our own ; and to pro- vide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as future experience may unfold them. Among the difficulties encountered by the Conven- tion, a very important one must have lain, in combining the requisite stability and energy in Government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty, and to the repub- lican form. Without substantially accomplishing this part of their undertaking, they would have very imper- fectly fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the expectation of the public; yet that it could not be easily accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray his ignorance of the subject. Energy in Gov- ernment is essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execu- tion of the laws, which enter into the very definition of good Government. Stability in Government is essential to National character, and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the People, which are among the chief blessings of civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself, than it is odious to the Peo- ple ; and it may be pronounced with assurance, that the People of this country, enlightened as they are, with regard to the nature, and interested, as the great body til' them are, in the effects of good Government, will never be satisfied, till some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and uncertainties, which characterize the State administrations. On comparing, however, these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them VOL. I. 16 242 The Federalist. together in their due proportions. The genius of repub- lican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the People, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the People, by a short duration of their appointments ; and that even during this short period, the trust should be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands. Sta- bility, on the contrary, requires, that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a length of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of elections ; and a frequent change of measures, from a frequent change of men: whilst energy in Government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand. How far the Convention may have succeeded in this part of their work, will better appear on a more accurate view of it. From the cursory view here taken, it must clearly appear to have been an arduous part. Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper line of partition between the authority of the General, and that of the State Governments. Every man will be sensible of this difficulty, in proportion as he has been accustomed to contemplate and discrimi- nate objects, extensive and complicated in their nature. The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical phi- losophers. Sense, perception, judgment, desire, volition, memory, imagination, are found to be separated, by such delicate shades and minute gradations, that their boun- daries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a pregnant source of ingenious disquisition and controversy. The boundaries between the great king- doms of nature, and, still more, between the various prov- inces, and lesser portions, into which they are subdivided afford another illustration of the same important truth The Federalist. 243 The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have never yet succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which separates the district of vegetable life from the neigh- boring region of unorganized matter, or which marks the termination of the former, and the commencement of the animal empire. A still greater obscurity lies in the distinctive characters, by which the objects in each of these great departments of nature have been arranged and assorted. When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the delineations are perfectly accurate, and appear to be otherwise only from the imperfection of the eye which surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the obscurity arises as well from the object itself, as from the organ by which it is contemplated; we must per- ceive the necessity of moderating still farther our expec- tations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity. Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the science of Government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great prov- inces, the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary ; or even the privileges and powers of the different Legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of prac- tice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in politi- cal science. The experience of ages, with the continued and com- bined labors of the most enlightened legislators and jurists, have been equally unsuccessful in delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of laws, and different tribunals of justice. The precise extent of the common law, and the statute law, the maritime law, the ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations, and other local laws and customs, remains still to be clearly and finally established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has been more industriously pursued than in 244 The Federalist. any other part of the world. The jurisdiction of her several Courts, general and local, of law, of equity, of admiralty, &c, is not less a source of frequent and intri- cate discussions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate limits by which they are respectively circumscribed. All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most "mature deliber- ation, are considered as more or less obscure and equiv- ocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of men are con- veyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity therefore requires, not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they should be expressed by words dis- tinctly and exclusively appropriated to them. But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many, equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen, that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. "When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated. Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions : indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of these must produce a certain The Federalist. 24S legree of obscurity. The Convention, in delineating the joundary between the Fcederal and State jurisdictions, must have experienced the full effect of them all. To the difficulties already mentioned, may be added the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller States. We cannot err, in supposing that the former would contend for a participation in the Government, fully proportioned to their superior wealth and impor- tance ; and that the latter would not be less tenacious of the equality at present enjoyed by them. We may well suppose, that neither side would entirely yield to the other, and consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by compromise. It is extremely proba- ble, also, that after the ratio of representation had been adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a fresh struggle between the same parties, to give such a turn to the organization of the Government, and to the distribution of its powers, as would increase the impor- tance of the branches, in forming which they had respec- tively obtained the greatest share of influence. There are features in the Constitution which warrant each of these suppositions ; and as far as either of them is well founded, it shows that the Convention must have been compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety, to the force of extraneous considerations. Nor could it have been the large and small States only, which would marshal themselves in opposition to each other on various points. Other combinations, re- sulting from a difference of local position and policy, must have created additional difficulties. As every State may be divided into different districts, and its citi- zens into different classes, which give birth to contending interests and local jealousies ; so the different parts of che United States are distinguished from each other, by a variety of circumstances, which produce a like effect on a larger scale. And although this variety of inter- 24G The Federalist. ests, for reasons sufficiently explained in a former paper, may have a salutary influence on the administration of the Government when formed ; yet every one must be sensible of the contrary influence, which must have been experienced in the task of forming it. Would it be wonderful, if, under the pressure of all these difficulties, the Convention should have been forced into some deviations from that artificial structure and regular symmetry, which an abstract view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Consti- tution planned in his closet, or in his imagination ? The real wonder is, that so many difficulties should have been surmounted ; and surmounted, with an unanimity almost as unprecedented, as it must have been unex- pected. It is impossible for any man of candor to reflect on this circumstance, without partaking of the astonish- ment. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection, not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand, which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the Revolution. We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of the repeated trials which have been unsuccessfully made in the United Netherlands, for reforming the baneful and notorious vices of their Constitution. The history of almost all the great councils and consultations held among mankind for reconciling their discordant opin- ions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting their respective interests, is a history of factions, conten- tions, and disappointments ; and may be classed among the most dark and degraded pictures, which display the infirmities and depravities of the human character. If, in a few scattered instances, a brighter aspect is pre- sented, they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of he general truth ; and by their lustre to darken the gloom of the adverse prospect, to which they are con» trasted. In revolving the causes from which these ex The Federalist 247 septions result, and applying them to the particular instance before us, we are necessarily led to two impor' tant conclusions. The first is, that the Convention must have enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the pestilential influence of party animosities — the diseases most incident to deliberative bodies, and most apt to contaminate their proceedings. The second conclusion is, that all the deputations composing the Convention were either satisfactorily accommodated by the final act, or were induced to accede to it by a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opin- ions and partial interests to the public good, and by a despair of seeing this necessity diminished by delays, or by new experiments. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 15, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVII. To the People of the State of New York : I T is not a little remarkable, that in every case reported ■*■ by ancient history, in which Government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but has been performed by some individual citi- zen, of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity. Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the Government of Crete ; as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. Theseus first, and after him Draco and Solon, instituted the Government of Athens. Lycurgus was the lawgiver of Sparta. The foundation of the original Government of Rome was laid by Romulus; 248 The Federalist. and the work completed by two of his elective succes- sors, Numa, and Tullius Hostilius. On the abolition of royalty, the Consular administration was substituted by Brutus, who stepped forward with a project for such a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared by Tul- lius Hostilius, and to which his address obtained the assent and ratification of the Senate and People. This remark is applicable to Confederate Governments also. Amphictyon, we are told, was the author of that which bore his name. The Achaean league received its first birth from Acjleus, and its second from Aratus. What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their respective establishments, or how far they might be clothed with the legitimate authority of the People, cannot, in every instance, be ascertained. In some, however, the proceeding was strictly regular. Dra- co appears to have been intrusted by the People of Athens with indefinite powers to reform its Government and laws. And Solon, according to Plutarch, was in a manner compelled, by the universal suffrage of his fellow-citizens, to take upon him the sole and absolute power of new-modelling the Constitution. The proceed- ings under Lycurgus were less regular; but as far as the advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all turned their eyes towards the single efforts of that cele- brated patriot and sage, instead of seeking to bring about a revolution, by the intervention of a deliberative body of citizens. Whence could it have proceeded, that a People, jeal- ous as the Greeks were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen ? Whence could it have proceeded, that the Athenians, a People who would not suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten Gen- erals, and who required no other proof of danger to their liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen The Federalist. 249 should consider one illustrious citizen jls a more eligible depositary of the fortunes of themselves and their pos- terity, than a select body of citizens, from whose com- mon deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety, might have been expected ? These questions cannot be fully answered, without supposing that the fears of dis- cord and disunion among a number of Counsellors, exceeded the apprehension of treachery or incapacity in a single individual. History informs us, likewise, of the difficulties with which these celebrated reformers had to contend ; as well as of the expedients which they were obliged to employ, in order to carry their reforms into effect. Solon, who seems to have indulged a more temporizing policy, confessed that he had not given to his countrymen the Government best suited to their hap- piness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And Ly- curgus, more true to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a portion of violence with the authority of superstition ; and of securing his final success, by a vol- untary renunciation, first of his country, and then of his life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of Govern- ment : they serve not less on the other, to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident to such experi- ments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily multiplying them. Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which may be contained in the plan of the Convention are such as have resulted rather from the defect of antece- dent experience on this complicated and difficult subject, than from a want of accuracy or care in the inves- tigation of it ; and, consequently, such as will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many considerations of a general nature, but by the 250 The Federalist. particular case of the Articles of Confederation. It ia observable that among the numerous objections and amendments suggested by the several States, when these Articles were submitted for their ratification, not one is found, which alludes to the great and radical error, which on actual trial has discovered itself. And if we except the observations which New Jersey was led to make, rather by her local situation, than by her peculiar foresight, it may be questioned whether a single sugges- tion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of the system. There is abundant reason, nevertheless, to suppose that immaterial as these objections were, they would have been adhered to with a very dangeious inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their opinions and supposed interests been stifled by the more powerful sentiment of self-preservation. One State, we may remember, persisted for several years in refusing her concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole period at our gates, or rather in the very bowels of our country. Nor was her pliancy in the end effected by a less motive, than the fear of being chargeable with pro- tracting the public calamities, and endangering the event of the contest. Every candid reader will make the proper reflections on these important facts. A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger, after coolly revolving his situ- ation, and the characters of different physicians, selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence. The physicians attend : the case of the patient is care- fully examined : a consultation is held : they are unani- mously agreed that the symptoms are critical; but that the case, with proper and timely relief, is so far from oeing desperate, that it may be made to issue in an im- provement of his constitution. They are equally unan- The Federalist. 251 imous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy effect is to be produced. The prescription is no soon- er made known, however, than a number of persons in- terpose, and, without denying the reality or danger of the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription will be poison to his constitution, and forbid him, under pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not the patient reasonably demand, before he ventured to follow this advice, that the authors of it should at least agree among themselves on some other remedy to be substituted ? And if he found them differing as much from one another as from his first counsellor, would he not act prudently in trying the experiment unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than be hearkening to those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree in proposing one ? Such a patient, and in such a situation, is America at this moment. She has been sensible of her malady. She has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from men of her own deliberate choice. And she is warned by others against following this advice, under pain of the most fatal consequences. Do the monitors deny the reality of her danger ? No. Do they deny the necessity of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be sub- stituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one tells us, that the proposed Constitution ought to be re- jected, because it is not a confederation of the States, but a Government over individuals. Another admits, that it ought to be a Government over individuals, to a certain extent, but by no means to the extent pro- posed. A third does not object to the Government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want of a Bill of Rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute 252 The Federalist. necessity of a Bill of Rights, bat contends, that it ought to be declaratory not of the personal rights of individ uals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity. A fifth is of opinion, that a Bill of Rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced, and that the plan would be unexceptionable, but for the fatal power of regulating the times and places of elec- tion. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly against the unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate. An objector in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of Representatives. From this quarter, we are alarmed with the amazing expense, from the number of persons who are to administer the new Government. From another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter, on another occasion, the cry is, that the Congress will be but a shadow of a representation, and that the Gov- ernment would be far less objectionable, if the number and the expense were doubled. A patriot in a State that does not import or export, discerns insuperable objections against the power of direct taxation. The patriotic adversary in a State of great exports and im- ports is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician discovers in the Constitution a direct and irresistible ten- dency to monarchy : that is equally sure it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say which of these shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it must be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with no less confidence affirms that the Constitu- tion is so far from having a bias towards either of these dangers, that the weight on that side will not be suffi- cient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite propensities. With another class of adversaries to the Constitution, the language is, that the Legislative, Ex- ecutive, and Judiciary departments are intermixed iu The Federalist 253 such a manner, as to contradict all the ideas of regular Government, and all the requisite precautions in favor of liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general expressions, there are not a few who lend their sanction to it. Let each one come forward with his particular explanation, and scarce any two are exactly agreed on the subject. In the eyes of one, the junction of the Senate with the President, in the responsible func- tion of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this Exec- utive power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of the organization. To another, the exclusion of the House of Representatives, whose numbers alone could be a due security against corruption and partiality in the exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With another, the admission of the President into any share of a power, which must ever be a dangerous engine in the hands of the Executive magistrate, is an unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy. No part of the arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, which is alternately a member both of the Legislative and Executive departments, when this power so evidently belonged to the Judiciary department. " We concur u fully," reply others, " in the objection to this part of the " plan, but we can never agree that a reference of im- " peach ments to the Judiciary authority would be an " amendment of the error. Our principal dislike to the ' organization arises from the extensive powers already ' lodged in that department." Even among the zealous patrons of a Council of State the most irreconcilable variance is discovered, concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted. The demand of one gentle- man is, that the Council should consist of a small num- ber to be appointed by the most numerous branch of the Legislature. Another would prefer a larger number, xid considers it as a fundamental condition, that the 254 The Federalist. appointment should be made by the President him- self. As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of the Fcederal Constitution, let us suppose, that as they are the most zealous, so they are also the most sagacious, of those who think the late Convention were unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and better plan might and ought to be substituted. Let us further suppose, that their country should concur, both in this favorable opinion of their merits, and in their unfavorable opinion of the Convention ; and should accordingly proceed to form them into a second Con- vention, with full powers, and for the express purpose of revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were the experiment to be seriously made, though it required some effort to view it seriously even in fiction, I leave it to be decided by the sample of opinions just exhibited, whether, with all their enmity to their predecessors, they would, in any one point, depart so widely from their example, as in the discord and ferment that would mark their own deliberations ; and whether the Constitution, now before the public, would not stand as fair a chance for immortality, as Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to depend on his own return from exile and death, if it were to be immediately adopted, and were to continue in force, not until a better, but until another should be agreed upon by this new assembly of Lawgivers. It is a matter, both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitu- tion should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect : it is sufficient that the lattei is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tot- The Federalist. 255 tering habitation for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or the ceiling a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned them. But waiving illustrations of this sort, is it not manifest that most of the capital objec- tions urged against the new system lie with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation ? Is an indef- inite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of the Fcederal Government? The present Congress can make requisitions to any amount they please ; and the States are constitutionally bound to furnish them ; they can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops dangerous ? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also ; and they have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and unsafe to intermix the different powers of Government in the same body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole depositary of all the Fcederal powers. Is it particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the com- mand of the army, into the same hands? The Confed- eration places them both in the hands of Congress. Is a Bill of Rights essential to liberty ? The Confedera- tion has no Bill of Rights. Is it an objection against the new Constitution, that it empowers the Senate, with the concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties which are to be the laws of the land ? The existing Congress, without any such control, can make treaties which they themselves have declared, and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the land. Is the importation of Slaves permitted by the new Constitu- tion for twenty years ? By the old it is permitted for- ever. I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture 256 The Federalist. of powers may be in theory, it is rendered harmless by the dependence of Congress on the States for the means of carrying them into practice : That however large the mass of powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless mass. Then, say I, in the first place, that the Confederation is chargeable with the still greater folly, of declaring cer- tain powers in the Fcederal Government to be abso- lutely necessary, and at the same time rendering them absolutely nugatory ; and, in the next place, that if the Union is to continue, and no better government be sub- stituted, effective powers must either be granted to, or assumed by, the existing Congress; in either of which events, the contrast just stated will hold good. But this is not all. Out of this lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent power, which tends to realize all the dan- gers that can be apprehended from a defective construc- tion of the supreme Government of the Union. It is now no longer a point of speculation and hope, that the Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the United States; and although it is not of such a nature as to extricate them from their present distresses, or, for some time to come, to yield any regular supplies for the public expenses, yet must it hereafter be able, under proper management, both to effect a gradual discharge of the domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain period, liberal tributes to the Fcederal treasury. A very large propor- tion of this fund has been already surrendered by indi- vidual States ; and it may with reason be expected, that the remaining States will not persist in withholding similar proofs of their equity and generosity. We may calculate, therefore, that a rich and fertile country, of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States, will soon become a National stock. Congress have as sumed the administration of this stock. They have begun to render it productive. Congress have under- taken to do more : — they have proceeded to form new The Federalist. 257 States ; to erect temporary Governments ; to appoint officers for them ; and to prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the Confed- eracy. All this has been done : and done without the least color of Constitutional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no alarm has been sounded. A great and independent fund of revenue is passing into the hands of a single body of men, who can raise troops to an indefinite number, and appropriate money to their support for an indefinite period of time. And yet there are men, who have not only been silent spec- tators of this prospect, but who are advocates for the system which exhibits it ; and, at the same time, urge against the new system the objections which we have heard. Would they not act with more consistency, in urging the establishment of the latter, as no less neces- sary to guard the Union against the future powers and resources of a body constructed like the existing Con- gress, than to save it from the dangers threatened by the present impotency of that Assembly ? I mean not, by anything here said, to throw censure on the measures which have been pursued by Congress. I am sensible they could not have done otherwise. The public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon them the task of overleaping their Constitutional limits. But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger resulting from a Government, which does not possess regular powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolu- tion or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is continually exposed. PUBLIUS. tol. i. 17 258 The Federalist. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVI To the People of the State of New York: npHE last paper having concluded the observations, -*- which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of Government reported by the Convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking. The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the Government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the People of America ; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution ; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the Convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must aban- don it as no longer defensible. What then are the distinctive characters of the repub- lican form ? "Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the applica- tion of the term by political writers, to the Constitutions of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the People, has passed almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the People is exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a -small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified The Federalist 259 with the same appellation. The Government of Eng- land, which has one republican branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissim- ilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions. If we resort, for a criterion, to the different principles on which different forms of Government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a Government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the People, and is administered by persons holding their offices dur- ing pleasure, for a limited period, or during good be- havior. It is essential to such a Government, that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it ; other- wise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their op- pressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their Govern- ment the honorable title of republic. It is sufficient for such a Government, that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the People; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified ; otherwise every Government in the United States, as well as every other popular Gov- ernment that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican char- acter. According to the Constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of the officers of Government are appointed indirectly only by the People. According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so ap- oointed. And according to one, this mode of appoint- ment is extended to one of the coordinate branches of the Legislature. According to all the Constitutions, also, 260 The Federalist. the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the Legisla- tive and Executive departments, to a period of year?. According to the provisions of most of the Constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject, the members of the Judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior. On comparing the Constitution planned by the Con- vention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State Legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the People. The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the People. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the People, according to the example in most of the States. Even the Judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the People them- selves. The duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the Republican standard, and to the model of the State Constitutions. The House of Rep- resentatives is periodically elective, as in all the States ; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six years ; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland ; and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The Presi- lent is to continue in office for the period of four years ; as in New York and Delaware the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two vears. In the other States the election is annual. In everal of the States, however, no constitutional pro- vision is made for the impeachment of the Chief Magis- The Federalist. 261 tiKve. And in Delaware and Virginia, he is not im- peachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continu- ance in office. The tenure by which the Judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case, and the example of the State Constitutions. Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the Foederal and the State Governments ; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter. " But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, " for the Convention to adhere " to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, " to have preserved the Federal form, which regards the " Union as a Confederacy of sovereign States ; instead " of which, they have framed a National Government, u which regards the Union as a consolidation of the " States." And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken ? The handle which has been made of this objection requires, that it should be examined with some precision. Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinc- tion on which the objection is founded, it will be neces- sary to a just estimate of its force, First, to ascertain the real character of the Government in question ; Sec- ondly, to inquire how far the Convention were author- ized to propose such a Government ; and Thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority. First. In order to ascertain the real character of the Government, it may be considered in relation to the 262 The Federalist. foundation on which it is to be established ; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn ; to the operation of those powers ; to the ex- tent of them ; and to the authority by which future changes in the Government are to be introduced. On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the as- sent and ratification of the People of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose ; but on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the People, not as individuals composing one entire Na- tion, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, — the author- ity of the People themselves. The act, therefore, estab- lishing the Constitution, will not be a National, but a Fcederal act. That it will be a Fcederal, and not a National act, as these terms are understood by the objectors, the act of the People, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate Nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a majority of the People of the Union, nor from that of a majority of the States. It must result from the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the Legisla- tive authority, but by that of the People themselves. Were the People regarded in this transaction as form ing one Nation, the will of the majority of the whole People of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority ; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual 'ores, or by considering the will of the majority of the The Federalist. 263 States as evidence of the will of a majority of the Peo pie of the United States. Neither of these rules has been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitu- tion, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a Federal, and not a National Con- stitution. The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of Government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the People of America ; and the People will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the Legislature of a particular State. So far the Government is National, not Feeder aL The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies ; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the Government is Federal, not National. The Ex- ecutive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the Legislature which consists of the National rep- resentatives ; but in this particular act, they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the Government, it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many Federal as Na- tional features. The difference between a Fcederal and National Gov- ernment, as it relates to the operation of the Government, 264 TJie Federalist. is supposed to consist in this, that in the former, the pow- ers operate on the political bodies composing the Con- federacy, in their political capacities ; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the Nation, in theii individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the National, not the Fed- eral character ; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States maybe par- ties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the Na- tional countenance of the Government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few Fcederal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan ; and the operation of the Government on the People, in their in- dividual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this re- lation, a National Government. But if the Government be National with regard to the operation of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of its powers. The idea of a National Government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful Government. Among a People consolidated into one Nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the National Legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general, and partly in the municipal Legis- latures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme ; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and in- dependent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to them, within The Federalist. 265 its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed Government cannot be deemed a National one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true, that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the General Govern- ment. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution ; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartial- ity. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword, and a dissolution of the com- pact ; and that it ought to be established under the Gen- eral, rather than under the local Governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely estab- lished under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated. If we try the Constitution by its last relation, to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly National, nor wholly Faederal. Were it wholly National, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the People of the Union ; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every National so- ciety, to alter or abolish its established Government. Were it wholly Foederal, on the other hand, the concur- rence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the Plan of the Convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from the National, and advances towards the Foederal charac- ter : in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole 266 The Federalist. number of States sufficient, it loses again the Federal and partakes of the National character. The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a National nor a Fcederal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is Fcederal, not National : in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the Government are drawn, it is partly Fced- eral, and partly National : in the operation of these powers, it is National, not Fcederal : in the extent of them, again, it is Fcederal, not National : and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly Fcederal nor wholly National. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, January 18, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIX. To the People op the State of New York : THE second point to be examined is, whether the Convention were authorized to frame, and propose this mixed Constitution. The powers of the Convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in Februa ry, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular Acts. The Act from Annapolis recommends the " appoint- M ment of Commissioners to take into consideration the * situation of the United States ; to devise such furthet The Fcederatist. 267 ''provisions, as shall appear to them necessary to rendei " the Constitution of the Foederal Government adequate " to the exigencies of the Union ; and to report such an * Act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress " assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards " confirmed by the Legislature of every State, will effect- " ually provide for the same." The recommendatory Act of Congress is in the words following : " Whereas, there is provision in the Articles " of Confederation and Perpetual Union, for making " alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the " United States, and of the Legislatures of the several " States : And whereas experience hath evinced, that u there are defects in the present Confederation ; as a " mean to remedy which, several of the States, and par- " ticularly the State of New York, by express instructions u to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a Con- " vention for the purposes expressed in the following "resolution; and such Convention appearing to be the " most probable mean of establishing in these States a "firm National Government : — " Resolved, — That in the opinion of Congress it is " expedient, that on the 2d Monday of May next a " Convention of delegates, who shall have been ap- " pointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, " for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles "of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the "several Legislatures such alterations and provisions " therein, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and con- " firmed by the States, render the Foederal Constitution " adequate to the exigencies of Government and the pres- " ervation of the Union" From these two Acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the Convention was to establish, in these States, a Hrm National Government ; 2d, that this Government vas to be such as would be adequate to the exigencies 268 The Federalist of Government, and the preservation of the Union , 3d that these purposes were to be effected by alterations and provisions in the Articles of Confederation, as it is expressed in the Act of Congress ; or by such further provisions as should appear necessary, as it stands in the recommendatory Act from Annapolis ; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to Con- gress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the former and confirmed by the latter. From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the Convention acted. They were to frame a National Government, adequate to the exigencies of Government, and of the Union; and to reduce the Articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes. There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end. The other is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less im- portant should give way to the more important part : the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means. Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the au- thority of the Convention were irreconcilably at vari- ance with each other ; that a National and adequate Government could not possibly, in the judgment of the Convention, be effected by alterations and provisions in the Articles of Confederation ; which part of the defi- lition ought to have been embraced, and which reject- ed ? Which was the more important, which the less important part? Which the end; which the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated pow- ers; let the most inveterate objectors against those The Federalist. 269 exercised by the Convention, answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the People of America, that the Articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate Government be provided, and the Union pre- served ; or that an adequate Government should be omitted, and the Articles of Confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the preservation of these Articles was the end, for securing which a reform of the Government was to be introduced as the means ; or whether the establishment of a Government, adequate to the National happiness, was the end at which these Articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed. But is it necessary to suppose, that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable to each other ; that no alter- ations or provisions in the Articles of the Confederation, could possibly mould them into a National and ade- quate Government ; into such a Government as has been proposed by the Convention ? No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the title ; a change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power. Alterations in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized. New pro- visions therein are also expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the Title ; to insert new Articles; to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted, that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old Articles remain ? Those who maintain the affirmative, ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations ; between that degree of change which lies within the compass of alterations and further provisions, and that which amounts to a transmutation of the Government. Will it be said, that the alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the Confed- eration ? The States would never have appointed a 270 The Federalist. Convention with so much solemnity, nor described it's objects with so much latitude, if some substantial reform had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the fundamental principles of the Confederation were not within the purview of the Convention, and ought not to have been varied ? I ask, What are these princi- ples ? Do they require, that in the establishment of the Constitution the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns ? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. Do they require, that the members of the Government should derive their appoint- ment from the Legislatures, not from the People of the States? One branch of the new Government is to be appointed by these Legislatures ; and under the Confed- eration, the delegates to Congress may all be appoint- ed immediately by the People, and in two States * are actually so appointed. Do they require, that the pow- ers of the Government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new Govern- ment will act on the States in their collective charac- ters. In some instances, also, those of the existing Gov- ernment act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture ; of piracy ; of the post-office ; of coins, weights, and measures ; of trade with the Indians ; of claims under grants of land, by different States ; and, above all, in the case of trials by Courts-martial in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted without the in- tervention of a jury, or even of a civil Magistrate; in all these cases, the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do these fundamental principles require, par- ticularly, that no tax should be levied, without the inter- mediate agency of the States ? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the * Connecticut and Rhode Island. — Publius. The Fcederalist. 271 post-office. The power of coinage has been so con- strued by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But pretermitting these in- stances, was it not an acknowledged object of the Con- vention, and the universal expectation of the People, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the General Government, in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue ? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure, as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Con- federation ? Had not every State but one ; had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress, as to recognize the principle of the innova- tion? Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of the General Government should be limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence ? We have seen, that in the new Government, as in the old, the general powers are limited ; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction. The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitu- tion proposed by the Convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the Articles of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined, as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it ; and to require a degree of enlargement, which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old. In one particular, it is admitted that the Convention have departed from the tenor of their commission. In- stead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation of he Legislatures of all the Slates, they have reported a plan, which is to be confirmed by the People, and may 272 The Federalist. be carried into effect by nine States only. It is worthy of remark, that this objection, though the most plausi- ble, has been the least urged in the publications which have swarmed against the Convention. The forbear- ance can only have proceeded from an irresistible con- viction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth ; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a majority of one sixtieth of the People of America, to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the People ; an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have criti- cised the powers of the Convention, I dismiss it without further observation. The third point to be inquired into is, how far consid- erations of duty arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular authority. In the preceding inquiries, the powers of the Conven- tion have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had been real and final powers, for the establishment of a Constitution for the United States. We have seen, in what manner they have borne the trial even on that supposition. It is time now to recollect, that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory ; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood by the Convention ; and that the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Con- stitution, which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed This reflection places the subject in a point of view altogether different, and will enable us to judge with propriety of the course taken by the Convention. The Federalist. 273 Let us view the ground on which the Convention stood. It may be collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis, which had led their country almost with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced ; that they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced, that such a reform as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment. It could not be unknown to them, that the hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of their delibera- tions. They had every' reason to believe, that the con- trary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and pros- perity of the United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with which the proposition, made by a single State, (Vir- ginia,) towards a partial amendment of the Confedera- tion, had been attended to and promoted. They had seen the liberty assumed by a very few deputies, from a very few States, convened at Annapolis, of recommend- ing a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, as- sumptions by Congress, not only of recommendatory but of operative powers, warranted in the public esti- mation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected, that in all great changes of established Governments, forms ought to give way to substance ; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nugatory the tran- scendent and precious right of the People to " abolish or VOL. I. 18 274 The Federalist. 1 alter their Governments as to them shall seem most u likely to affect their safety and happiness," * since it is impossible for the People spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object ; and it is there- fore essential, that such changes be instituted by some informal and unauthorized propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen, or number of citizens. They must have recollected, that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege, of proposing to the People plans for their safety and happiness, that the States were first united against the danger with which they were threat- ened by their ancient Government; that Committees and Congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts, and defending their rights ; and that Conventions were elected in the several States, for establishing the Constitutions under which they are now governed ; nor could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scru- ples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were any- where seen, except in those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance contended for. They must have borne in mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be sub- mitted to the People themselves, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever : its approbation blot out all antecedent errors and irregular- ities. It might even have occurred to them, that where a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them, and still more their recommendation of any measure whatever, not war- ranted by their commission, would not less excite ani- madversion, than a recommendation at once of a meas- ure fully commensurate to the National exigencies. Had the Convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all these considerations, instead of exer- cising a manly confidence in their country, by whose * Declarator of Independence. — Publius. The Federalist. 275 confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished and of pointing out a system capable in their judgment of securing its happiness, taken the cold and sullen res- olution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me ask the man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in liis bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly ? Or if there be a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control, let me then ask, what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who usurped the power of sending deputies to the Convention, a body utterly un- known to their Constitutions ; for Congress, who recom- mended the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the Confederation ; and for the State of New York, in particular, who first urged and then complied with this unauthorized interposition ? But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pre- text, it shall be granted for a moment, that the Conven- tion were neither authorized by their commission, nor jus- tified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason alone, to be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends ? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be, not so much from whom the advice comes, as whether the advice be good. The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that the charge against the Convention of exceeding *;heir powers, except in one instance little urged by the 276 The Federalist objectors, has no foundation to support it ; that if they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential servants of their coun- try, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assumed; and that finally, if they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nev ertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accom- plish the views and happiness of the People of America. How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the subject under investigation. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XL. To the People of the State of New York : THE Constitution proposed by the Convention may be considered under two general points of view. The first relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the Government, including the re- straints imposed on the States. The second, to the particular structure of the Government, and the distri- bution of this power among its several branches. Under the first view of the subject, two important questions arise : 1. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the General Government be unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the sev- eral States? Is the aggregate power of the General Government The Federalist. 277 greater than ought to have been vested in it ? This is the first question. It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of the Government, that the authors of them have very little considered how far these powers were necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political advan- tages; and on the possible abuses which must be inci- dent to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the subject cannot impose on the good sense of the People of America. It may display the subtlety of the writer ; it may open a boundless field for rhetoric and declama- tion; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them ; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the greater, not the perfect good ; and that in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused. They will see, there- fore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the public good ; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the public detriment. That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, t will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the Government of the Union ; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regula« 278 The Federalist. tion of the intercourse with foreign nations ; 3. Main tenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States ; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general util- ity; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts ; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers. The powers falling within the first class are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque ; of pro- viding armies and fleets ; of regulating and calling forth the militia ; of levying and borrowing money. Security against foreign danger is one of the prim- itive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the Foederal councils. Is the power of declaring war necessary ? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the af- firmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form. Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary ? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of self-defence. But was it necessary to give an indefinite power of raising troops, as well as providing fleets ; and of maintaining both in peace, as well as in war? The answer to these questions has been too far an- ticipated in another place, to admit an extensive discus- sion of them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive, as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place. With what color of oropriety could the force necessary for defence be lim- ited by those who cannot limit the force of offence ? [f a Foederal Constitution could chain the ambition, or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of it» The Federalist. 27S own Government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety. How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like man- ner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation ? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. They will in fact be ever determined by these rules, and by no oth ers. It is in vain to oppose Constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain ; because it plants in the Constitution itself neces- sary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations, who may be within the reach of its enterprises, to take corresponding precautions. The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in time of peace. They were introduced by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into the example. Had the example not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal monarch. Were every nation, except France, now to disband its peace establishments, the same event might follow. The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations, and rendered ber the mistress of the world. Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs ; and that the liberties of Europe as far as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a danger- ous, at the same time that it may be a necessary provi- sion, On the smallest scale, it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale, its consequences may be fatal. On 280 The Federalist. any scale, it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these con- siderations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one, which may be inauspicious to its liberties. The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a mili- tary establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition, than America, disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situation and her maritime resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United States from the powerful nations of the world, gives them the same happy security. A dangerous es- tablishment can never be necessary or plausible, so long as they continue a united People. But let it never, for a moment, be forgotten, that they are indebted for this advantage to their Union alone. The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII. did in the Old World. The example will be followed here, from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. Instead of deriving from our situation the precious advantage which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of The Federalist. 281 America will be but a copy of that of the Continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The fortunes of disunited America will be even more disas- trous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to her own limits. No superior pow- ers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jeal- ousy, and revenge. In America, the miseries springing from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part only of her lot. A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe. This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves his coun- try, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it. Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently added. I will not repeat here the observations, which I flatter myself have placed this subject in a just and satisfactory light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument against this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said, that the continuance of an army in that kingdom re- quires an annual vote of the Legislature : whereas the American Constitution has lengthened this critical period to two years. This is the form in which the comparison 282 The Federalist. is usually stated to the public : but is it a just form '' Is it a fair comparison ? Does the British Constitution restrain the Parliamentary discretion to one year ? Does the American impose on the Congress appropriations for two years ? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the Legislature, and that the American ties down the Legislature to two years, as the longest admissible term. Had the argument from the British example been truly stated, it would have stood thus : The term for which supplies may be appropriated to the army estab- lishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution, has nevertheless, in practice, been limited by Parliamen- tary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Brit- ain, where the House of Commons is elected for seven years ; where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so small a proportion of the people ; where the electors are so corrupted by the Representatives, and the Representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the Representative body can possess a power to make ap- propriations to the army for an indefinite term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that the Representatives of the United States, elected freely by the whole body of the Peo- ple, every second year, cannot be safely intrusted with a discretion over such appropriations, expressly limited to the short period of two years ? A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management of the opposition to the Fced- eral Government is an unvaried exemplification. But among all the blunders which have been committed, none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on that iide the prudent jealousy entertained by the People, of The Federalist. 283 standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the public attention to that important subject ; and has led to investigations which must terminate in a thorough and universal conviction, not only that the Constitution has provided the most effectual guards against danger from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the National defence, and the preser- vation of the Union, can save America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States or Con- federacies, and from such a progressive augmentation of these establishments in each, as will render them as burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liber- ties of the People, as any establishment that can become necessary, under a united and efficient Government, must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter. The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy, has protected that part of the Consti- tution against a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It must indeed be numbered among the greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her security against danger from abroad. In this respect, our situation bears another likeness to the insular advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling for- eign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious Government against our liberties. The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply-interested in this provision for naval pro- tection, and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds ; if their property has remained safe against the predatory spirit of licentious adventur- ers ; if their maritime towns have not yet been com- pelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a con- flagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and 284 The Federalist. sudden invaders, these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing Govern- ment for the protection of those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious. If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their Eastern frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject than New York. Her sea-coast is extensive. A very important district of the State is an island. The State itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition of America, the States more immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a General Government which now exists ; and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the danger, the object to be pro- tected would be almost consumed by the means of pro- tecting them. The power of regulating and calling forth the militia has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained. The power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the National defence, is properly thrown into the same class with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be ne. cessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the The Federalist. 28* Constitution. I will address one additional reflection, only, to those who contend that the power ought to have been restrained to external taxation — by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from other coun- tries. It cannot be doubted, that this will always be a valuable source of revenue ; that for a considerable time it must be a principal source ; that at this moment, it is an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do not call to mind in our calcu- lations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the variations, both in the ex- tent and the kind of imports ; and that these variations do not correspond with the progress of population, which must be the general measure of the public wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor, the importation of manufactures must increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which will be wrought into articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of boun- ties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A sys- tem of Government, meant for duration, ought to con- template these revolutions, and be able to accommodate Hself to them. Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power " to lay " and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay '* the debts, and provide for the common defence and ' general welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power, which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defence 286 The Federalist. or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objec- tions, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objec- tion might have had some color for it ; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possi- ble cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of de- scents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singu- larly expressed by the terms " to raise money for the u general welfare." But what color can the objection have, when a speci- fication of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon ? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning ; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever ? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power ? Nothing is more natural or common, than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enu- meration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Consti The Federalist. 287 tution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter. The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by the Convention is a copy from the Articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as described in Article third, are, " their common defence, security of their lib- " erties, and mutual and general welfare." The terms of Article eighth are still more identical : " All charges " of war, and all other expenses, that shall be incurred " for the common defence or general welfare, and al- " lowed by the United States in Congress, shall be " defrayed out of a common treasury," &c. A similar language again occurs in Article ninth. Construe either of these Articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defence and general welfare ? I appeal to the objectors them- selves, whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress, as they now make use of against the Convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation ! PUBLIUS. 288 The Federalist. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 22, 1788-3 THE FEDERALIST. No. XLI. io the People op the State op New York : ^I^HE second class of powers, lodged in the General •*- Government, consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit : to make Trea- ties ; to send and receive Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls ; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations ; to regulate foreign com- merce, including a power to prohibit, after the year 1808, the importation of slaves, and to lay an interme- diate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement to such importations. This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the Foederal administration. If we are to be one Nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other Nations. The powers to make Treaties, and to send and receive Ambassadors, speak their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the Articles of Confederation ; with this difference only, that the former is disembarrassed by the plan of the Convention of an exception, under which Treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of the States ; and that a power of appointing and re- ceiving " other public Ministers and Consuls," is ex- oressly and very properly added to the former provision concerning Ambassadors. The term Ambassador, if taken strictly, as seems to be required by the second of the Articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest grade only of public Ministers ; and excludes the grades The Federalist. 289 which the United States will be most likelv +\ prefei where foreign embassies may be necessary. AnJ under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend Consuls. Yet it has been found expedient, and has been the practice of Congress, to employ the inferior grades of public Ministers ; and to send and receive Consuls. It is true, that where Treaties of commerce stipulate for the mutual appointment of Consuls, whose functions are connected with commerce, the admission of foreign Consuls may fall within the power of making commer- cial Treaties ; and that where no such Treaties exist, the mission of American Consuls into foreign countries may perhaps be covered under the authority, given by the ninth Article of the Confederation, to appoint all such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States. But the admission of Consuls into the United States, where no previous Treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the lesser instances, in which the Convention have improved on the model before them. But the most minute provi- sions become important when they tend to obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power. A list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the defects of the Confederation, into violations of their chartered authorities, would not a little surprise those who have f>aid no attention to the subject ; and would be no in- considerable argument in favor of the new Constitution, which seems to have provided no less studiously for the lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the old. The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations, belongs with equal propriety to the General VOL- T. 19 290 The Federalist. Government, and is a still greater improvement on the Articles of Confederation. These Articles contain no provision for the case of offences against the law of na- tions ; and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with for- eign nations. The provision of the Fcederal Articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offences. The definition of piracies might, perhaps, with- out inconveniency, be left to the law of nations ; though a legislative definition of them is found in most muni- cipal codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signifi- cation, even in the common law of England ; and of various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But neither the common, nor the statute law of that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the pro- ceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legis- lative adoption. The meaning of the term, as defined in the codes of the several States, would be as imprac- ticable as the former would be a dishonorable and ille- gitimate guide. It is not precisely the same in any two of the States ; and varies in each with every revision of its criminal laws. For the sake of certainty and uni- formity, therefore, the power of defining felonies in this case was in every respect necessary and proper. The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within several views which have been taken of this subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its being properly submitted to the Fced- eral administration. It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been post- poned until the year 1808, or rather, that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the Gen- TJie Federalist. 291 eral Government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy ; that within that period, it will receive a considerable discouragement from the Fcederal Government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few States which continue the un- natural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equai prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren ! Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another, as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I men- tion these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none ; but as speci- mens of the manner and spirit, in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed Government. The powers included in the third class are those which provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the States. Under this head might be included the particular re- straints imposed on the authority of the States, and cer- tain powers of the Judicial department ; but the former are reserved for a distinct class, and the latter will be particularly examined, when we arrive at the structure and organization of the Government. I shall confine myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers comprehended under this third description, to wit : to -egulate commerce among the several States and the 292 The Federalist. Indian tribes ; to coin money, regulate the value there- of, and of foreign coin ; to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current coin and securities of the United States ; to fix the standard of weights and meas- ures ; to establish an uniform rule cl naturalization, and uniform laws of bankruptcy ; to prescribe the manner in which the public Acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States ; and to establish post-offices and post-roads. The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be added, that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating foreign com- merce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade be- tween State and State, it must be foreseen, that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the lat- ter, and the consumers of the former. We may be as- sured, by past experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances ; and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably ter- minate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity. To those who do not view the question through the medium of passion, or of interest, the desire of the com- mercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect rev- enue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear The Federalist. 293 not less impolitic than it is unfair ; since it would stim nlate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain. The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of Confederated States, has been illus- trated by other examplesas well as our own. In Switzer- land, where the Union is so very slight, each Canton is obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction into other Cantons, without an augmenta tion of the tolls. In Germany, it is a law of the Empire, that the Princes and States shall not lay tolls or customs on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of the Emperor and Diet ; though it appears from a quota- tion in an antecedent paper, that the practice in this, as in many other instances in that Confederacy, has not followed the law, and has 'produced there the mischiefs which have been foreseen here. Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its mem- bers, one is, that they shall not establish imposts disad- vantageous to their neighbors, without the general per- mission. The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the Ar- ticles of Confederation, which render the provision ob- scure and contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State vithin its own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is not yet settled , .md has been a question of frequent perplexity and con- tention in the Fcederal Councils. And how the trade 294 The Federalist. with Indians, though not members of a State, yet resid- ing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehen- sible. This is not the only case, in which the Articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impossibilities ; to reconcile a partial sover- eignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the States ; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain. All that need be remarked on the power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, is, that by providing for this last case, the Constitution has supplied a material omission in the Articles of Con- federation. The authority of the existing Congress is restrained to the regulation of coin struck by their own authority, or that of the respective States. It must be seen at once, that the proposed uniformity in the value of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign coin to the different regulations of the different States. The punishment of counterfeiting the public securi- ties, as well as the current coin, is submitted of course to that authority which is to secure the value of both. The regulation of weights and measures is transferred from the Articles of Confederation, and is founded on like considerations with the preceding power of regulat- ing coin. The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as a fault in our system, and as lay- ing a foundation for intricate and delicate questions. In the fourth Article of the Confederation, it is declared, " that the free inhabitants of each of these States, pau- % pers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted % shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of '*free citizens in the several States ; and the People of The Federalist. 295 u each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges u of trade and commerce," &c. There is a confusion of language here, which is remarkable. Why the term? free inhabitants are used in one part of the Article, free citizens in another, and People in another ; or what was meant by superadding to " all privileges and immunities "of free citizens,'.' "all the privileges of trade and " commerce," cannot easily be determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that those who come under the denomination of free inhabitants of a State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled, in every other State, to all the privileges of free citizens of the latter ; that is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their own State : so that it may be in the power of a particular State, or rather every State is laid under a necessity, not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other States upon any whom it may ad- mit to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. But were an exposition of the term " inhabitants " to be admitted which would confine the stipulated privi- leges to citizens alone, the difficulty is diminished only, not removed. The very improper power would still be retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every other State. In one State, residence for a short term confers all the rights of citizenship: in another, qualifica- tions of greater importance are required. An alien, therefore, legally incapacitated for certain rights in the latter, may, by previous residence only in the former, elude his incapacity ; and thus the law of one State be preposterously rendered paramount to the law of an- other, within the jurisdiction of the other. We owe it to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments on this subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of several States, certain descriptions of aliens, who had endered themselves obnoxious, were laid under inter- 296 The Federalist. diets inconsistent, not only with the rights of citizenship, but with the privilege of residence. What would have been the consequence, if such persons, by residence or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of another State, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the State prescribing them? Whatever the legal conse- quences might have been, other consequences would probably have resulted of too serious a nature, not to be provided against. The new Constitution has accord- ingly, with great propriety, made provision against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the Con- federation, on this head, by authorizing the General Gov- ernment to establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States. The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of com- merce, and will prevent so many frauds where the par- ties or their property may lie, or be removed into dif- ferent States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question. The power of prescribing, by general laws, the man- ner in which the public Acts, records, and judicial pro- ceedings of each State, shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States, is an evident and valu- able improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the Articles of Confederation. The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate ; and can be of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear. The power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated in any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction. The power of establishing post-roads must, in every The Fcedtranst. 297 view, be a harmless power; and may perhaps, by judi- cious management, become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which tends to facilitate the in- tercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy of the public care. PUBLIUS. [For the Independent Journal.'] THE FEDERALIST. No. XLII. To the People of the State op New York: THE fourth class comprises the following miscella- neous powers : 1. A power " to promote the progress of science and " useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors " and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective. " writings and discoveries." The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coin- cides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress. 2. " To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases what- " soever, over such district (not exceeding ten milea i square) as may, by cession of particular States and * the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the 298 The Federalist. " Government of the United States ; and to exercise like " authority over all places purchased by the consent of " the Legislatures of the States in which the same shall " be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock- " yards, and other needful buildings." The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of Government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every Legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its gen- eral supremacy. Without it, not only the public author- ity might be insulted and its proceedings be interrupted with impunity; but a dependence of the members of the General Government on the State comprehending the seat of the Government, for protection in the exer- cise of their duty, might bring on the National Councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the Government and dissatisfactory to the other mem- bers of the Confederacy. This consideration has the more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationary residence of the Gov- ernment, would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the Government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The ex- tent of this Fcederal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it ; as the State will no doubt pro- vide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it ; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing par- ties to the cession ; as they will have had their voice in the election of the Government, which is to exercise authority over them ; as a municipal Legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed thern ; and as the authority of the The Federalist. 296 Legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to concur in the cession, will be derived from the whole People of the State, in their adoption of the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated. The necessity of a like authority over forts, maga zines, &c, established by the General Government, is not less evident. The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, re- quire, that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated, by requiring the concurrence of the States con- cerned, in every such establishment. 3. " To declare the punishment of treason, but no " attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, " or forfeiture, except during the life of the person at- " tainted." As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free Governments, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the Convention have, with great judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a Constitu- tional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond the person of its author. 4. " To admit new States into the Union : but no " new State shall be formed or erected within the juris- ' diction of any other State ; nor any State be formed 4 by the junction of two or more States, or parts of 300 The Federalist " States, without the consent of the Legislatures of tho " States concerned, as well as of the Congress." In the Articles of Confederation, no provision is found on this important subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her joining in the measures of the United States ; and the other colonies, by which were evidently meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of nine States. The eventual establishment of new Stales seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this omission, and the assumption of power into which Congress have been led by it. With great propriety therefore has the new system supplied the defect. The general precaution, that no new States shall be formed, without the concurrence of the Foederal authority, and that of the States concerned, is consonant to the princi- ples which ought to govern such transactions. The par- ticular precaution against the erection of new States, by the partition of a State without its consent, quiets the jealousy of the larger States ; as that of the smaller is quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of States without their consent. 5. " To dispose of and make all needful rules and " regulations respecting the territory or other property " belonging to the United States, with a proviso, that " nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as " to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any " particular State." This is a power of very great importance, and required by considerations, similar to those which show the pro- priety of the former. The proviso annexed is proper in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and questions concerning the Western ter- ritory sufficiently known to the public. 6. " To guarantee to every State in the Union a re- " publican form of Government ; to protect each of them The Federalist. 301 u against invasion ; and on application of the Legislature, ■' or of the Executive, (when the Legislature cannot be " convened,) against domestic violence." In a Confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintend- ing Government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a Union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other ; and the greater right to insist, that the forms of Government under which the compact was entered into, should be substan- tially maintained. But a right implies a remedy ; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution ? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a Fcederal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the Confederate republic of " Germany," says Montesquieu," consists of free Cities, " and petty States, subject to different Princes, experi- " ence shows us that it is more imperfect than that of " Holland and Switzerland." " Greece was undone," he adds, " as soon as the King of Macedon obtained a " seat among the Amphictyons." In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the mo- narchical form of the new Confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State Governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the General Government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enter- 302 The Federalist prising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers ? To the second question it may be answered, that if the General Government should inter- pose by virtue of this Constitutional authority, it will be of course bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no farther than to a guaranty of a republican form of Government, which supposes a pre existing Government of the form which is to be guar- anteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the Fcederal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the Fcederal guar- anty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican Constitutions ; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance. A protection against invasion is due from every soci- ety to the parts composing it. The latitude of the ex- pression here used, seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vin- dictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and modern Confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the Union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this Article. Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss Cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one Government, provision is made for this ob- ject ; and the history of that League informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded ; and as well by the most democratic, as the other Cantons. A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature. At first view, it might seem not to square with the The Federalist. 303 republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the force, to subvert a Government ; and consequently, that the Foederal interposition can never be required, but when it would be improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State, as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State ; and if the authority of the State ought in the latter case to protect the local magistracy, ought not the Foederal authority, in the former, to support the State authority ? Besides, there are certain parts of the State Constitutions, which are so interwoven with the Foederal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one, without com- municating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a Foederal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of Government. It will be much better, that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will gen- erally prevent the necessity of exerting it. Is it true, that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican Governments ? May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary re- sources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword ? May not a more com- pact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength ? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine, that in a trial of actual force, victory may be 304 The Fmderahst. calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an elec- tion ! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of citizens may become a majority of persons, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the Constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage ? J take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular Government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a supe- riority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves. In cases where it may be doubtful on which side jus- tice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of Confederate States, not heated by the local flame ? To the impartiality of Judges, they would unite the affection of friends. Happy would it be, if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free Governments ; if a project equally effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind ! Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a Constitu- tional right ; the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the compass of human prob- ability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the Fcederal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity, for which no possible Constitution can pro- vide a cure. Among the advantages of a Confederate republic, Enumerated by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that The Federalist. 305 " should a popular insurrection happen in one of the " States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses " creep into one part, they are reformed by those that " remain sound." 7. " To consider all debts contracted, and engage- " ments entered into, before the adoption of this Con- " stitution, as being no less valid against the United " States, under this Constitution, than under the Con- " federation." This can only be considered as a declaratory proposi- tion ; and may have been inserted, among other reasons, for the satisfaction of the foreign creditors of the United States, who cannot be strangers to the pretended doc- trine, that a change in the political form of civil society, has the magical effect of dissolving its moral obliga- tions. Among the lesser criticisms which have been exer- cised on the Constitution, it has been remarked, that the validity of engagements ought to have been asserted in favor of the United States, as well as against them ; and in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics, the omission has been transformed and magnified into a plot against the National rights. The authors of this discovery may be told, what few others need to be in- formed of, that as engagements are in their nature recip- rocal, an assertion of their validity on one side, necessa- rily involves a validity on the other side ; and that as the Article is merely declaratory, the establishment of the principle in one case is sufficient for every case. They may be further told, that every Constitution must limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether imaginary ; and that no real danger can exist that the Government would dare, with, or even without, this Constitutional declaration before it, to remit the debts justly due to the public, on the pretext here con- demned. vol. i. 20 306 The Federalist. 8. " To provide for amendments to be ratified by u three fourths of the States, under two exceptions « only." That useful alterations will be suggested by experi- ence, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, there- fore, that a mode for introducing them should be pro- vided. The mode preferred by the Convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would ren- der the Constitution too mutable ; and that extreme- difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It moreover equally enables the General and the State Governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other. The exception in favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a pal- ladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, im- plied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the Legislature ; and was probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality. The other exception must have been admitted on the same considerations which produced the privilege de- fended by it. 9. " The ratification of the Conventions of nine States, " shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Consti- " tution between the States, ratifying the same." This Article speaks for itself. The express authority of the People alone could give due validity to the Con- stitution. To have required the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essen- tial interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member. It would have marked a want of foresight in the Convention, which our own experience would have rendered inexcusable. Two questions of a very delicate nature present them- selves on this occasion: — 1. On what principle the Con The Fccdemlist. 3(T# federation, which stands in the solemn form of a com- pact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it ? 2. What rela- tion is to subsist between the nine or more States rati- fying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become parties to it ? The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the case ; to the great principle of self-preservation ; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. Perhaps, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere Legislative ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to require, that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of Legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the Articles are mutually conditions of each other ; that a breach of any one Article is a breach of the whole treaty ; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void, Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these deb icate truths for a justification for dispensing with th<* consent of particular States to a dissolution of the Fced- eral pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the multiplied and important infractions with which they may be confronted ? The time has been, when it was incumbent on us all to veiJ 308 The Federalist. the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same mo tives dictate. The second question is not less delicate ; and the flat- tering prospect of its being merely hypothetical, forbids an over-curious discussion of it. It is one of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general, it may be observed, that although no political relation can subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected ; whilst con- siderations of a common interest, and above all, the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the ob- stacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain moderation on one side, and prudence on the other. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, January 25, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIII. To the People of the State of New York: A FIFTH class of provisions in favor of the Feed eral authority consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the several States. 1. " No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or u confederation ; grant letters of marque and reprisal ; K coin money ; emit bills of credit ; make anything but " gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts ; '* pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law The Federalist. 309 ■ impairing the obligation of contracts ; or grant any « title of nobility." The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and con- federations, makes a part of the existing Articles of Union ; and, for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into the new Constitution. The prohibition of letters of marque is another part of the old system, but is somewhat extended in the new. According to the former, letters of marque could be granted by the States after a declaration of war; according to the lat- ter, these licenses must be obtained, as well during war, as previous to its declaration, from the Govern ment of the United States. This alteration is fully jus- tified by the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers ; and of immediate responsi- bility to the Nation in all those, for whose conduct the Nation itself is to be responsible. The right of coining money, which is here taken from the States, was left in their hands by the Confederation, as a concurrent right with that of Congress, under an exception in favor of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate the alloy and value. In this instance, also, the new provision is an improvement on the old. Whilst the alloy and value depended on the general authority, a right of coinage in the particular States could have no other effect than to multiply expensive mints, and diversify the forms and weights of the circulating pieces. The latter inconveniency defeats one purpose for which the power was originally submitted to the Fcederal head : and as far as the former might prevent an incon- venient remittance of gold and silver to the central mint for recoinage, the end can be as well attained by local mints established under the general authority. The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give pleasure to every citizen, in proportion to his ove of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of 310 The Federalist. public prosperity. The loss which America has sus« tained since the Peace, from the pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man and man, on the necessary confidence in the public councils, on the industry and morals of the People, and on the character of republican Government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsat- isfied ; or rather an accumulation of guilt, which can be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the power which has been the instrument of it. In addition to these persuasive con- siderations, it may be observed, that the same reasons which show the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin, prove with equal force, that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium, in the place of coin. Had every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse among them would be impeded; retrospective altera- tions in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be injured, and animosities be kindled among the States themselves. The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member. No one of these mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit paper money, than to coin gold or silver. The power to make any- thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, is withdrawn from the States, on the same principle with that of issuing a paper currency. Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws im- pairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every prin- ciple of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the The Federalist. 313 State Constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Out own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that addi- tional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the Convention added this Constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights ; and I am much deceived, if they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober People of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and with indig- nation, that sudden changes, and legislative interfer- ences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one Legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference be- ing naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and indus- try, and give a regular course to the business of society. The prohibition with respect to titles of nobility is copied from the Articles of Confederation, and needs no comment. 2. " No State shall, without the consent of the Con- M gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, ' except what may be absolutely necessary for executing " its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties " and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, " shall be for the use of the treasury of the United u States ; and all such laws shall be subject to the re- •' vision and control of the Congress. No State shall, r< without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on 312 The Federalist. ' l tonnage, keep troops or ships of war "enter into any agreement or compact with another u State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless " actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will " not admit of delay." The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the Foederal councils. It is needless, therefore, to remark further on this head, than that the manner in which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at once to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in providing for the conveniency of their imports and ex- ports, and to the United States a reasonable check against the abuse of this discretion. The remaining particulars of this clause fall within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark. The sixth and last class consists of the several powers and provisions, by which efficacy is given to all the rest. 1. " Of these the first is, the power to make all laws " which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into " execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers " vested by this Constitution in the Government of the * United States." Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance than this ; yet on a fair investigation of it, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. Without the substance of this power, the whole Consti- tution would be a dead letter. Those who object to the Article, therefore, as a part of the Constitution, can only mean that the form of the provision is improper. But have they considered, whether a better form could have been substituted? There are four other possible methods, wfcich the Con- vention might have taken on this subject. They might The Federalist. 313 have copied the second Article of the existing Confeder ation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any power not expressly delegated ; they might have at- tempted a positive enumeration of the powers compre- hended under the general terms "necessary and proper;" they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them, by specifying the powers excepted from the gen- eral definition ; they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper pow- ers to construction and inference. Had the Convention taken the first method of adopt- ing the second Article of Confederation, it is evident that the new Congress would be continually exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of con- struing the term "expressly" with so much rigor, as to disarm the Government of all real authority whatever, or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force of the restriction. It would be easy to show, if it were necessary, that no important power, delegated by the Articles of Confederation, has been or can be ex- ecuted by Congress, without recurring more or less to the doctrine of construction or implication. As the pow- ers delegated under the new system are more extensive, :he Government which is to administer it would find it- self still more distressed with the alternative of betray- ing the public interest by doing nothing, or of violating the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not ex- pressly granted. Had the Convention attempted a positive enumera- tion of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates ; accommodated too, not only to the existing state of things, but to all the pos- sible changes which futurity may produce ; for. in every 314 The Federalist. new application of a general power, the particular pow- ers, which are the means of attaining the object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object ; and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same. Had they attempted to enumerate the particular pow- ers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less chimerical ; and would have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of au- thority. If, to avoid this consequence, they had at- tempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and described the residue by the general terms, not necessary or proper, it must have happened that the enumeration would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only ; that these would be such as would be least likely to be assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would of course select such as would be least necessary or proper; and that the unnecessary and improper powers included in the residuum, would be less forcibly excepted, than if no partial enumeration had been made. Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the Government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in rea- son, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included. Had this last method, therefore, been pursued by the Convention, every objection now urged against their plan would remain in all its plausibility ; and the leal inconveniency would be incurred of not removing a pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for drawing into question the essential powers of the Union. The Federalist. 315 If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Consti- tution, and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning, I answer, the same as if they should miscon- strue or enlarge any other power vested in them ; as if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated ; the same in short, as if the State Legislatures should violate their respec- tive constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the Executive and Judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts ; and in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the People, who can, by the election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitu- tional acts of the Fcederal, than of the State Legisla- tures, for this plain reason, that as every such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the People, and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of Fcederal representa- tives. There being no such intermediate body between the State Legislatures and the People, interested in watching the conduct of the former, violations of the State Constitutions are more likely to remain unno- ticed and unredressed. 2. " This Constitution and the laws of the United " States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and " all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the " authority of the United States, shall be the supreme " law of the land, and the Judges in every State shall * be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or " laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitu- tion has betrayed them into an attack on this part of it 316 The Federalist. also, without which it would have been evidently and radically defective. To be fully sensible of this, we need only suppose for a moment, that the supremacy of the State Constitutions had been left complete, by a sav- ing clause in their favor. In the first place, as these Constitutions invest the State Legislatures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases not excepted by the existing Articles of Confederation, all the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution, so far as they exceed those enumerated in the Confed- eration, would have been annulled, and the new Con- gress would have been reduced to the same impotent condition with their predecessors. In the next place, as the Constitutions of some of the States do not even expressly and fully recognize the existing powers of the Confederacy, an express saving of the supremacy of the former would, in such States, have brought into question every power contained in the proposed Constitution. In the third place, as the Constitutions of the States differ much from each other, it might happen that a treaty or National law, of great and equal importance to the States, would interfere with some and not with other Constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the States, at the same time that it would have no effect in others. In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of Government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all Government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts ; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direc- tion of the members. 3. " The Senators and Representatives, and the mem- 4 bers of the several State Legislatures, and all Exec- * utive and Judicial officers, both of the United Statea The Federalist. 317 "and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affir- u mation, to support this Constitution." It has been asked why it was thought necessary, that the State magistracy should be bound to support the Foederal Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of the United States, in favor of the State Constitutions ? Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself with one, which is obvious and conclu- sive. The members of the Foederal Government will have no agency in carrying the State Constitutions into effect. The members and officers of the State Govern- ments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the Foederal Constitution. The elec- tion of the President and Senate will depend, in all cases, on the Legislatures of the several States. And the election of the House of Representatives will equally depend on the same authority in the first instance ; and will, probably, forever be conducted by the officers, and according to the laws of the States. 4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the Foederal powers might be added those which belong to the Executive and Judiciary departments : but as these are reserved for particular examination in another place, I pass them over in this. We have now reviewed, in detail, all the Articles composing the sum or quantity of power, delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Foederal Government; and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accom- plishing the necessary objects of the Union. The question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall oe granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not a Government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be established ; or, in other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved PUBLIUS. 318 The Federalist. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIV. To the People of the State of New York: TTAVING shown that no one of the powers trans- ^~"" ferred to the Federal Government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States. The adversaries to the plan of the Convention, instead of considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the Foederal Government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the Governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essen- tial to the security of the People of America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions and wars among the different States ; if it be essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain ; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the People of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objec- tion to a Government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a Government may derogate from the importance of the Governments of the individual States ? Was then the American Revo- lution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, ,vas the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard- earned substance of millions lavished, not that the Peo- The Federalist 319 pie of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety ; but that the Governments of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a cer- tain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain digni- ties and attributes of Sovereignty ? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the People were made for kings, not kings for the People. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape, that the solid happiness of the People is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the People, is the supreme object to be pursued ; and that no form of Government whatever has any other value, than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the Convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the pub- lic happiness, it would be, abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the People, the voice of every good citizen must be, let the former be sacri- ficed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question before us. Several important considerations have been touched in the course of these papers, which discountenance the supposition, that the operation of the Fcederal Govern- ment will by degrees prove fatal to the State Govern- ments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded, that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale. We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and jnodern Confederacies, the strongest tendency continually defraying itself in the members, to despoil the Genera! 320 The Federalist. Government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. Although, in most of these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under con- sideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded. In the Achaean league it is probable that the Fcederal head had a degree and species of power, which gave it a considerable like- ness to the Government framed by the Convention. The Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted, must have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us, that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consol- idated Government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the Foederal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the external causes by which the component parts were pressed together were much more numerous and powerful than in our case ; and consequently less powerful liga- ments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the head, and to each other. In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propen- sity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns and the People, and the sympathy in some instances between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the rival- ship for encroachments. Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and par- ticularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the People, the great kingdoms in Europe would at The Fosderalisl. 321 this time consist of as many independent princes, as there were formerly feudatory barons. The State Governments will have the advantage of the Foederal Government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other ; to the weight of personal influence which each side will possess ; to the powers respectively vested in them ; to the predilection and probable support of the People ; to the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other. The State Governments may be regarded as constit- uent and essential parts of the Foederal Government ; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State Legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State Legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the People, will be chos- en very much under the influence of that class of men, whose influence over the People obtains for themselves an election into the State Legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the Foederal Government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State Governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious, than too overbearing towards them. On the other side, the component parts of the State Govern- ments will in no instance be indebted for their appoint- ment to the direct agency of the Foederal Government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members. The number of individuals employed under the Con- Btitution of the United States will be much smaller VOL. i. 21 322 The Federalist. than the number employed under the particular States There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers, for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be employed in the administration of the Foed- eral system. Compare the members of the three great departments of the thirteen States, excluding from the Judiciary department the justices of peace, with the members of the corresponding departments of the single Government of the Union ; compare the militia officers of three millions of people, with the military and marine officers of any establishment, which is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage of the States to be decisive. If the Fcederal Govern- ment is to have collectors of revenue, the State Govern- ments will have theirs also. And as those of the former will be principally on the sea-coast, and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side. It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States : but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for sup- plemental purposes of revenue ; that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own ; and that the eventual collec- tion, under the immediate authority of the Union The Federalist. 328 will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances, partic- ularly in the organization of the Judicial power, the offi- cers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union. Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the Foederal Government, the influence of the whole number would not be a comparison with that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite pcale. Within every district, to which a Foederal col- lector would be allotted, there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even more, officers, of different descrip- tions, and many of them persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie on the side of the State. The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Foederal Government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be ex- ercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce ; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the People, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. The operations of the Foederal Government will be most extensive and important in times of war and dan- ger ; those of the State Governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State Governments will here enjoy another advantage over the Foederal Government. The more adequate, indeed, the Foederal powers may be rendered to the National defence, the ess frequent will be those scenes of danger which might 324 The Federalist. favor their ascendency over the Governments of the par- ticular States. If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of new powers to the Union, than in the invigoration of its original powers. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power ; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress by the Articles of Confederation. The pro- posed change does not enlarge these powers ; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. The change relating to taxation may be regarded as the most important: and yet the present Congress have as complete authority to require of the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defence and general welfare, as the future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens ; and the latter will be no more bound than the States themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. Had the States complied punctually with the Articles of Confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with success towards single persons, our past experience is very far from countenancing an opinion, that the State Governments would have lost their constitutional powers, and have gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To main- tain that such an event would have ensued, would be to say at once, that the existence of the State Govern- ments is incompatible with any system whatever, that ccomplishes the essential purposes of the Union. PUBLIUS. The Federalist. 325 [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 29, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XLV. To the People of the State of New York : RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire, whether the Fosderal Government or the State Governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the People. Not- withstanding the different modes in which they are ap- pointed, we must consider both of them as substantially- dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. I assume this position here as it re- spects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The Feeder al and State Governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the People, constituted with different powers, and designated for different pur- poses. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the People altogether, in their reason- ings on this subject ; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior, in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told, that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the People alone, and that it will not depend merely on the compara- tive ambition or address of the different Governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to en- large its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires, that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constitu- ents. 326 The Federalist. Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt, that the first and most natural attachment of the People will be to the Governments of their respective States. Into the administration of these, a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these, a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the People will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the People will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these will a greater proportion of the People have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments ; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline. Experience speaks the same language in this case. The Fcederal administration, though hitherto very de- fective, in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as great as it can well have, in any future circumstances whatever. It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their object the protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of everything that could be desira- ble to the People at large. It was, nevertheless, invari- ably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the People were turned anew to their own particular Governments ; that the Foederal Council was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to pro- posed enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken by the men, who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens. The Federalist. 327 If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the Peo pie should in future become more partial to the Fcederal than to the State Governments, the change can only re- sult from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a bet- ter administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the People ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confi- dence where they may discover it to be most due ; but even in that case, the State Governments could have little to apprehend, beause it is only within a certain sphere, that the Foederal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered. The remaining points, on which I propose to compare the Fcederal and State Governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other. It has been already proved, that the members of the Fcederal will be more dependent on the members of the State Governments, than the latter will be on the for- mer. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the People, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State Governments, than of the Foederal Government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State Governments must clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The preposses- sions, which the members themselves will carry into the Foederal Government, will generally be favorable to the States ; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State Governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the General Government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the mem- bers of Congress, than a National spirit will prevail in the Legislatures of the particular States. Every one inows, that a great proportion of the errors committed 328 The Federalist. by the State Legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and per- manent interest of the State, to the particular and sep- arate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their partic- ular State, how can it be imagined, that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its Government, the objects of their affections and consultations ? For the same reason that the members of the State Legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to National objects, the members of the Foederal Legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter, what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the National prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the Governments and People of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the charac- ter, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations to the aggrandizement of the Foed- eral Government, the great interests of the Nation have suffered on an hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the new Foederal Government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the existing Govern- ment may have pursued ; much less, that its views will be as confined as those of the State Legislatures ; but The Federalist. 329 only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their Governments. The motives on the part of the State Governments, to aug- ment their prerogatives by defalcations from the Fcederal Government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predis- positions in the members. Were it admitted, however, that the Foederal Govern- ment may feel an equal disposition with the State Gov- ernments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the National Government, be generally popular in that State, and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is exe- cuted immediately and of course by means on the spot, and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the Foederal Government, or the interposition of Foed- eral officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the Foederal Government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the People; their repugnance, and perhaps refusal, to cooperate with the officers of the Union ; the frowns of the Executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by Legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised ; would form, in a large State, very serious mpediments; and where the sentiments of several ad- joining States happened to be in unison, would present 330 The Federalist. obstructions which the Foederal Government would hardly be willing to encounter. But ambitious encroachments of the Foederal Govern- ment, on the authority of the State Governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every Government would espouse the common cause A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combination, in short, would result from an apprehension of the Foederal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign yoke ; and un- less the projected innovations should be voluntarily re- nounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case, as was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the Foederal Government to such an extremity ? In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other. The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise ; but it was not in speculation abso- *uteiy chimerical. But what would be the contest, in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the People would be opposed to the People themselves; or rather one set of represent- atives would be contending against thirteen sets of rep- resentatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the down- fall of the State Governments is the visionary suppo- sition that the Foederal Government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. That the People and the States should, for a sufficient The Federalist. 331 period of time, elect an uninterrupted succession of mei? ready to betray both ; that the traitors should, through out this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the military estab- lishment; that the Governments and the People of the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed ; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the Fcederal Government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State Governments, with the People on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hun- dredth part of the whole number of souls ; or one twen- ty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, offi- cered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by Governments possessing their affections and confi- dence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a pro- portion of regular troops. Those who are best ac- quainted with the late successful resistance of this coun- try against the British arms, will be most inclined to ieny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the 332 The Federalist. People of almost every other nation, the existence of Bubordinate Governments, to which the People are at- tached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier, against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple Govern- ment of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Eu- rope, which are carried as far as the public resources wil bear, the Governments are afraid to trust the People with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone, they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the People to possess the additional advan- tages of local Governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the National will, and direct the National force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these Governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assur- ance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free 1 and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer in- sult them with the supposition, that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, oy a blind and tame submission to the long train of in- sidious measures which must precede and produce it. The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise form, which appears altogether con- clusive. Either the mode in whi»ch the Fcederal Gov- ernment is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the People, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents The Federalist 333 On the other supposition, it will not possess the confi dence of the People, and its schemes of usurpation wiL be easily defeated by the State Governments, who wiL be supported by the People. On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they seem to amount to the most con- vincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the Fcederal Government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are in- dispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union ; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State Governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, February 1, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XLVI. To the People of the State of New York: HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed Government and the general mass of power al- lotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular struct- ure of this Government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts. One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the Leg- islative, Executive, and Judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the Fced- eral Government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty 334 The Federalist. The several departments of power are distributed ana blended in such a manner, as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts. No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded. The accumulation of all powers, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-ap- pointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the Fcederal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable w T ith this accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires, that the three great departments cf power should be separate and distinct. The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to as- certain his meaning on this point. The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the immortal Bard as the perfect model from which the principles The Federalist. 33c and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged : so this great polit- ical critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of political liberty ; and to have delivered in the form of elementary truths the several character- istic principles of that particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn. On the slightest view of the British Constitution we must perceive that the Legislative, Executive, and Ju- diciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other. The Executive magis- trate forms an integral part of the Legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of Legislative acts. All the mem- bers of the Judiciary department are appointed by him ; can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament ; and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional Councils. One branch of the Legislative department forms also a great constitutional Council to the Executive chief; as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with the Legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a Legislative vote. From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred, that in saying '' There can u be no liberty, where the Legislative and Executive % powers are united in the same person, or body of " magistrates," or, " if the power of judging be not sep- * arated from the Legislative and Executive powers," 336 The Federalist. he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another de- partment, the fundamental principles of a free Consti- tution are subverted. This would have been the case in the Constitution examined by him, if the King, who is the sole Executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete Legislative power, or the supreme administra- tion of Justice ; or if the entire Legislative body had pos- sessed the supreme Judiciary, or the supreme Executive authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that Constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole Ex- ecutive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law ; nor admin- ister justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no Executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the Executive stock ; nor any Legislative function, though they may be advised with by the Legislative Councils. The entire Legislature can perform no Judiciary act; though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices ; and though one of its branches is possessed of the Judicial power in the last resort. The entire Legislature again can exercise no Executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme Executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the Executive department. The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. •' When the Legislative and Executive powers are united The Federalist. 337 u in the same person or body, " says he, " there can be ''no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the ''same monarch or Senate should enact tyrannical laws "to execute them in a tyrannical manner." Again, " Were the power of judging joined with the Legisla- tive, the life and liberty of the subject would be " exposed to arbitrary control, for the Judge would then be the Legislator. Were it joined to the Executive "power, the Judge might behave with all the violence " of an oppressor" Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages ; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author. If we look into the Constitutions of the several States, we find, that, notwithstanding the emphatical, and in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire, whose Constitution was the last formed, seems to have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments ; and has qualified the doctrine by declaring, "that the " Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers ought H to be kept as separate from, and independent of each "other, as the nature of a free Government will admit; " or as is consistent with that chain of connection, that * binds the whole fabric of the Constitution in one indis- ' soluble bond of unity and amity" Her Constitution accordingly mixes these departments in several respects. The Senate, which is a branch of the Legislative depart- ment, is also a Judicial tribunal for the trial of impeach- ments. The President, who is the head of the Executive deoartment, is the presiding member also of the Senate ; tnd, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting vol. i. 22 338 The Federalist. vote in case uf a tie. The Executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the Legislative depart- ment; and his Council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same department. Several of the officers of State are also appointed by the Legislature. And the members of the Judiciary department are appointed by the Executive department. The Constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental Article of liberty. It declares, "that "the Legislative department shall never exercise the " Executive and Judicial powers, or either of them : " the Executive shall never exercise the Legislative and " Judicial powers, or either of them : the Judicial shall " never exercise the Legislative and Executive powers " or either of them. " This declaration corresponds pre- cisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the Convention. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exer- cising the powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The Executive magis- trate has a qualified negative on the Legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the Legislature, .s a court of impeachment for members both of the Executive and Judiciary departments. The members of the Judiciary department, again, are appointable by the Executive department, and removable by the same authority on the address of the two Legislative branches. Lastly, a number of the officers of Government are annually appointed by the Legislative department. As the appointment to offices, particularly Executive offices, is in its nature an Executive function, the compilers of the Constitution have, in this last point at least, violated the rule established by themselves. The Federalist. 339 I pass over the Constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, because they were formed prior to the Revolution, and even before the principle under exam- ination had become an object of political attention. The Constitution of New York contains no declara- tion on this subject ; but appears very clearly to have been framed with an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless to the Executive magistrate, a partial control over the Legislative department ; and, what is more, gives a like control to the Judiciary department; and even blends the Executive and Judiciary departments in the exercise of this control. In its Council of Appointment, mem- bers of the Legislative are associated with the Executive authority, in the appointment of officers, both Executive and Judiciary. And its Court for the trial of Impeach- ments and Correction of Errors, is to consist of one branch of the Legislature and the principal members of the Judiciary department. The Constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of Government more than any of the pre- ceding. The Governor, who is the Executive magistrate, is appointed by the Legislature ; is Chancellor and Ordinary, or Surrogate of the State ; is a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and President, with a casting vote, of one of the Legislative branches. The same Legislative branch acts again as Executive Council of the Governor, and with him constitutes the Court of Appeals. The members of the Judiciary department are appointed by the Legislative department and removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment of the other. According to the Constitution of Pennsylvania, the President, who is the head of the Executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which the Legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an 340 The Federalist. Executive Council, he appoints the membeis of the Judiciary department, and forms a court of impeach- ment for trial of all officers, Judiciary as well as Exec- utive. The judges of the Supreme Court, and justices of the peace seem also to be removable by the Legis- lature ; and the Executive power of pardoning in certain cases to be referred to the same department. The mem- bers of the Executive Council are made ex officio justices of peace throughout the State. In Delaware, the chief Executive magistrate is annually elected by the Legislative department. The Speakers of the two Legislative branches are Vice-pres- idents in the Executive department. The Executive chief, with six others, appointed, three by each of the Legislative branches, constitute the Supreme Court of Appeals; he is joined with the Legislative department in the appointment of the other judges. Throughout the States, it appears that the members of the Legisla- ture may at the same time be justices of the peace ; in this State, the members of one branch of it are ex officio justices of the peace ; as are also the members of the Executive Council. The principal officers of the Exec- utive department are appointed by the Legislative ; and one branch of the latter forms a Court of Impeach* ments. All officers may be removed on address of the Legislature. Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqual- ified terms ; declaring that the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forevei separate and distinct from each other. Her Constitu- tion, notwithstanding, makes the Executive magistrate appointable by the Legislative department; and the members of the Judiciary by the Executive depart- ment. The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this Buoject. Her Constitution declares, " that the Legisla- The Federalist. 341 'tive, Executive, and Judiciary departments shall be * separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the pow- ers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any per "son exercise the powers of more than one of them "at the same time; except that the justices of county "courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly." Yet we find not only this express exception, with re- spect to the members of the inferior courts, but that the chief magistrate, with his Executive Council, are ap- pointable by the Legislature; that two members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the Legislature ; and that all the principal offices, both Ex- ecutive and Judiciary, are filled by the same department. The Executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case vested in the Legislative department. The Constitution of North Carolina, wmich declares, " that the Legislative, Executive, and supreme Judicial "powers of Government ought to be forever separate " and distinct from each other," refers, at the same time, to the Legislative department, the appointment not only of the Executive chief, but all the principal officers with- in both that and the Judiciary department. In South Carolina, the Constitution makes the Ex- ecutive magistracy eligible by the Legislative depart- ment. It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of the members of the Judiciary department, including even justices of the peace and sheriffs : and the appointment of officers in the Executive department, down to cap- tains in the army and navy of the State. In the Constitution of Georgia, where it is declared. 1 that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary depart- u ments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither ' exercise the powers properly belonging to the other," we find that the Executive department is to be filled by appointments of the Legislature ; and the Executive pre- rogative of pardon to be finally exercised by the same 342 The Fcederalist. authority. Even justices of the peace are to be ap- pointed by the Legislature. In citing these cases in which the Legislative, Exec- utive, and Judiciary departments have not been kept to- tally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the sev- eral State Governments. I am fully aware, that among the many excellent principles which they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but too obvious, that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation of the different powers ; and that in no instance has a compe- tent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper. What I have wished to evince is, that the charge brought against the pro- posed Constitution, of violating a sacred maxim of free Government, is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America. This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing paper. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, February 1, 1788.] THE FCEDERALIST. No. XLVII. To the People of the State op New York : IT was shown in the last paper, that the political ap- ophthegm there examined does not require that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments should The Federalist. 343 De wholly unconnected with each other. I shall under- take in the next place to show, that unless these depart- ments be so far connected and blended, as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free Government, can never in practice be duly main- tained. It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that neither of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an over- ruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power as they may in their nature be Legislative, Executive, or Judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others. What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved. Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the Government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power ? This is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American Constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated ; and that some more adequate defence is indispensably necessary for the more feeble, against the more power- ful, members of the Government. The Legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. 344 The Feeder alist. The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed, that no task can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen. A respect for truth, how- ever, obliges us to remark, that they seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the Legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from Legisla- tive usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threat- ened by Executive usurpations. In a Government where numerous and extensive pre- rogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary mon- arch, the Executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jeal- ousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in per- son the Legislative functions, and are continually ex- posed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their Executive magistrates, tyranny may well be appre- hended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But in a representative republic, where the Executive magistracy is carefully limited, both in the extent and the duration of its power ; and where the Legislative power is exercised by an assem- bly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the People, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength ; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes ; it is against the enter- prising ambition of this department, that *the People ought to indulge all their jealousy, and exhaust all thei/ orecautions. The Federalist. 34c The Legislative department derives a superiority ia our Governments from other circumstances. Its con- stitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the coordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in Legislative bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure will, or will not extend beyond the Legislative sphere. On the other side, the Executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature, and the Judiciary be- ing described by landmarks, still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of these departments would im- mediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this all : as the Legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the People, and has in some Constitu- tions full discretion, and in all, a prevailing influence over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former. I have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary to verify this experience by particular proofs, they might De multiplied without end. I might find a witness in every citizen who has shared in, or been attentive to, the course of public administrations. I might collect vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of every State in the Union. But as a more concise, and at the same time equally satisfactory evidence, I will refer to the example of two States, attested by two un- exceptionable authorities. The first example is that of Virginia, a State which, as we have seen, has expressly declared in its Constitution, that the three great departments ought not to be inter- 346 The Federalist. mixed. The authority in support of it is Mr. Jefferson, who, besides his other advantages for remarking the op- eration of the Government, was himself the chief magis- trate of it. In order to convey fully the ideas with which his experience had impressed him on this subject, it will be necessary to quote a passage of some length from his very interesting " Notes on the State of Virginia," p. 195. " All the powers of Government, Legislative, Executive, "and Judiciary, result to the Legislative body. The " concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the " definition, of despotic Government. It will be no al- " leviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plu- rality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred " and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive " as one. Let those who doubt it, turn their eyes on " the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, that "they are chosen by ourselves. An elective despotism "was not the Government we fought for; but one which " should not only be founded on free principles, but in " which the powers of Government should be so divided " and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as " that no one could transcend their legal limits, without " being effectually checked and restrained by the others. " For this reason, that Convention which passed the or- " dinance of Government, laid its foundation on this " basis, that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary " departments should be separate and distinct, so that " no person should exercise the powers of more than one " of them at the same time. But no barrier was provided " between these several powers. The Judiciary and Exec- " utive members were left dependent on the Legislative w for their subsistence in office, and some of them for " their continuance in it. If, therefore, the Legislature " assumes Executive and Judiciary powers, no opposi- " tion is likely to be made ; nor, if made, can be efFect- * nal ; because in that case they may put their proceed- The Federalist. 347 " ing into the form of an Act of Assembly, which wiL "render ihem obligatory on the other branches. They " have accordingly, in many instances, decided rights "which should have been left to Judiciary controversy , " and the direction of the Executive, during 1 the whole "time of their session, is becoming habitual and familiar" The other State which I shall take for an example is Pennsylvania ; and the other authority, the Council of Censors which assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of this body, as marked out by the Constitution, was " to inquire, whether the Constitution " had been preserved inviolate in every part; and whether " the Legislative and Executive branches of Government " had performed their duty as guardians of the People, " or assumed to themselves, or exercised other or greater " powers than they are entitled to by the Constitution." In the execution of this trust, the Council were neces- sarily led to a comparison of both the Legislative and Executive proceedings, with the constitutional powers of these departments ; and from the facts enumerated, and to the truth of most of which both sides in the Council subscribed, it appears, that the Constitution had been flagrantly violated by the Legislature in a va- riety of important instances. A great number of laws had been passed, violating, without any apparent necessity, the rule requiring that all bills of a public nature shall be previously printed for the consideration of the People ; although this is one of the precautions chiefly relied on by the Constitu- tion against improper acts of the Legislature. The constitutional trial by jury had been violated ; and powers assumed, which had not been delegated by the Constitution. Executive powers had been usurped. The salaries of the Judges, which the Constitution expressly requires to be fixed, had been occasionally 348 The Federalist. varied ; and cases belonging to the Judiciary depart- ment frequently drawn within Legislative cognizance and determination. Those who wish to see the several particulars falling under each of these heads, may consult the Journals of the Council, which are in print. Some of them, it will be found, may be imputable to peculiar circum- stances connected with the war ; but the greater part of them may be considered as the spontaneous shoots of an ill-constituted Government. It appears, also, that the Executive department had not been innocent of frequent breaches of the Constitu- tion. There are- three observations, however, which ought to be made on this head : First, A great propor- tion of the instances were either immediately produced by the necessities of the war, or recommended by Con- gress, or the Commander-in-chief; Secondly, In most of the other instances, they conformed either to the declared or the known sentiments of the Legislative de- partment ; Thirdly, The Executive department of Penn- sylvania is distinguished from that of the other States, by the number of members composing it. In this re- spect, it has as much affinity to a Legislative assembly, as to an Executive Council. And being at once exempt from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the acts of the body, and deriving confidence from mutual example and joint influence, unauthorized measures would of course be more freely hazarded, than where the Executive department is administered by a single hand, or by a few hands. The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations is, that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those en- croachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration «f all the powers of Government in the same hands. PUBLIUS. The Federalist. 349 [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 5, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XLVIII. To the People of the State of New York : THE author of the " Notes on the State of Virginia," quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valu- able work the draught of a Constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a Convention expect- ed to be called in 1783, by the Legislature, for the estab- lishment of a Constitution for that Commonwealth. The plan, like everything from the same pen, marks a turn of thinking, original, comprehensive, and accurate ; and is the more worthy of attention as it equally dis- plays a fervent attachment to republican Government, and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against which it ought to be guarded. One of the precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker depart- ments of power, against the invasions of the stronger is perhaps altogether his own, and as it immediately relates to the subject of our present inquiry, ought not to be overlooked. His proposition is, "that whenever any two of the ' three branches of Government shall concur in opin- 1 ion, each by the voices of two thirds of their whole number, that a Convention is necessary for altering ' the Constitution, or correcting- breaches of it, a Con 1 vention shall be called for the purpose." As the People are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter under which the severa* branches of Government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant to the 350 The Federalist. republican theory, to recur to the same original author- ity, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of the Government; but also whenever any one of the departments may com- mit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others. The several departments being perfectly coordi- nate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or su- perior right of. settling the boundaries between their re- spective powers ; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the People them- selves, who, as the grantors of the commission, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its observ- ance? There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed to prove, that a constitutional road to the decision of the People ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occa- sions. But there appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to the People, as a pro- vision in all cases for keeping the several departments of power within their constitutional limits. In the first place, the provision does not reach the case of a combination of two of the departments against a third. If the Legislative authority, which possesses so many means of operating on the motives of the other departments, should be able to gain to its interest either of the others, or even one third of its members, the remaining department could derive no advantage from its remedial provision. I do not dwell, however, on this objection, because it may be thought to lie rather against the modification of the principle, than against the principle itself. In the next place, it may be considered as an objec- tion inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to The Federalist. 351 the People would carry an implication of some defect in the Government, frequent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the Government of that veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest Governments would not possess the requisite stability. If it be true that all Governments rest on opinion, it is no less true, that the strength of opinion in each individual, and its prac- tical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone ; and acquires firmness and confidence, in proportion to the number with which it is associated. When the examples which fortify opinion are ancient, as well as numerous, they are known to have a double effect. In a Nation of phi- losophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a Nation of philosophers is as little to be expected, as the phil- osophical race of kings wished for by Plato. And in every other Nation, the most rational Government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side. The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of consti- tutional questions to the decision of the whole society. Notwithstanding the success which has attended the revisions of our established forms of Government, and which does so much honor to the virtue and intelli- gence of the People of America, it must be confessed, that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect, that all the existing Constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly 352 The Federalist to order and concord ; of an enthusiastic confidence of the People in their patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great National questions ; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by a universal resentment and indigna- tion against the ancient Government; and whilst no spirit of party, connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. The future situations in which we must expect to be usually placed, do not present any equivalent security against the danger which is appre- hended. But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which would probably result from such appeals would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitu- tional equilibrium of the Government. We have seen that the tendency of republican Governments is to an aggrandizement of the Legislative, at the expense of the other departments. The appeals to the People, therefore, would usually be made by the Executive and Judiciary departments. But whether made by one side or the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The members of the Executive and Judiciary depart- ments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part only of the People. The latter, by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the People to share much in their prepossessions. The former are generally the objects of jealousy ; and their administration is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular. The members of the Legislative department, on the other hand, are numerous. They are distributed and dwell among the People at large. Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of ac- quaintance, embrace a great proportion of the most The Federalist. 353 influential part of the society The nature of their public trust implies a personal influence among the People, and that they are more immediately the confi- dential guardians of the rights and liberties of the People. With these advantages, it can hardly be sup- posed that the adverse party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue. But the Legislative party would not only be able to plead their cause most successfully with the People. They would probably be constituted themselves the judges. The same influence which had gained them an election into the Legislature, would gain them a seat in the Convention. If this should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty certainly with those leading characters, on whom every thing depends in such bodies. The Convention, in short, would be composed chiefly of men who had been, who actually were, or who expected to be, members of the department whose conduct was arraigned. They would consequently be parties to the very question to be de- cided by them. It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals would be made under pircu instances less adverse to the Executive and Judiciary departments. The usurpations of the Legislature might be so flagrant and so sudden, as to admit of no specious coloring. A strong party among themselves might take side with the other branches. The Executive power might be in the hands of a peculiar favorite of the People. In such a posture of things, the public decision might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the Legislative party. But still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the question. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of preexisting parties, or of parties springing out of the question itself. It would be connected with persons of distinguished character, and extensive influ- vol. i. 23 354 The Federalist. ence in the community. It would be pronounced by the very men who had been agents in, or opponents of the measures, to which the decision would relate. The passions, therefore, not the reason, of the public, would sit in judgment. But it is the reason of the public alone, that ought to control and regulate the Govern- ment. The passions ought to be controlled and regu- lated by the Government. We found in the last paper, that mere declarations in the written Constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several departments within their legal limits. It appears in this, that occasional appeals to the People would be neither a proper, nor an effectual provision for that purpose. How far the provisions of a different nature contained in the plan above quoted might be adequate, I do not examine. Some of them are un- questionably founded on sound political principles, and all of them are framed with singular ingenuity and precision. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 5, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIX. To the People of the State of New York: IT may be contended, perhaps, that instead of occa- sional appeals to the People, which are liable to the objections urged against them, periodical appeals are the proper and adequate means of preventing and correcting infractions of the Constitution. It will be attended to, that in the examination of liese expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for The Federalist. 255 enforcing the Constitution, by keeping the several de- partments of power within their due bounds, without particularly considering them as provisions for altering the Constitution itself. In the first view, appeals to the People at fixed periods appear to be nearly as ineligi- ble, as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. If the periods be separated by short intervals, the meas- ures to be reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date, and will be connected with all the circum stances which tend to vitiate and 'pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be applicable to all recent measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the others may favor a dispassionate review of them, this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant prospect of public censure would be a very feeble re- straint on power from those excesses, to which it might be urged by the force of present motives. Is it to be imagined, that a Legislative assembly, consisting of a hundred or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some favorite object, and breaking through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or twenty years ? In the next place, the abuses would often have completed their mischievous effects before the remedial provision would be applied. And in the last place, where this might not be the case, they would be of long standing, would have taken deep root, and would not easily be extirpated. The scheme of revising the Constitution, in order to correct recent breaches of it, as well as for other pur- poses, has been actually tried in one of the States. One of the objects of the Council of Censors which met in Pennsylvania, in 1783 and 1784, was, as we have seen, 356 The Federalist. to inquire, "whether the Constitution had been violated "and whether the Legislative and Executive departments " had encroached on each other." This important and novel experiment in politics merits, in several points of view, very particular attention. In some of them it may perhaps, as a single experiment, made under circum- stances somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not abso- lutely conclusive. But as applied to the case under consideration, it involves some facts, which I venture to remark, as a complete and satisfactory illustration of the reasoning which I have employed. First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen who composed the Council, that some, at least, of its most active and leading members had also been active and leading characters in the parties which preexisted in the State. Secondly. It appears, that the same active and lead- ing members of the Council had been active and in- fluential members of the Legislative and Executive branches, within the period to be reviewed; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures to be thus brought to the test of the Constitution. Two of the members had been Vice-presidents of the State, and several others members of the Executive Council, with- in the seven preceding years. One of them had been Speaker, and a number of others distinguished mem- bers of the Legislative assembly, within the same period. Thirdly. Every page of their proceedings witnesses the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of their deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the Council, it was split into two fixed and violent parties. The fact is acknowledged and lamented by themselves. Had this not been the case, the face of their proceedings Exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. In all questions, however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected Tfie Federalist. 357 with each other, the same names stand invariably con- trasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiased ob- server may infer, without danger of mistake, and at the same time, without meaning to reflect on either party, or any individuals of either party, that, unfortunately, pas- sion, not reason, must have presided over their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and freely, on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them. When they are governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called, will be the same. Fourthly. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions of this body do not, in several instances, mis- construe the limits prescribed for the Legislative and Executive departments, instead of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places. Fifthly. I have never understood that the decisions of the Council on constitutional questions, whether rightly or erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the practice founded on Legislative constructions. It even appears, if I mistake not, that in one instance the contemporary Legislature denied the constructions of the Council, and actually prevailed in the contest. This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same time, by its researches, the existence of the disease, and by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy. This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging that the State in which the experiment was made was at that crisis, and had been for a long time before, vio- ently heated and distracted by the rage of party. Is it to be presumed, that at any future septennial epoch the same State will be free from parties ? Is it to be pre- sumed that any other State, at the same or any other given period, will be exempt from them ? Such an ivent ought to be neither presumed nor desired ; be- cause an extinction of parties necessarily implies eithei 358 The Fwdera/ist. a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty. Were the precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by the People, to revise the preced- ing administration of the Government, all persons who should have been concerned in the Government within the given period, the difficulties would not be obviated. The important task would probably devolve on men, who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be little better qualified. Although they might not have been personally concerned in the administration, and therefore not immediately agents in the measures to be examined^ they would probably have been involved in the parties connected with these measures, and have been elected under their auspices. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. L. To the People of the State of New York: TO what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution ? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriv- ing the interior structure of the Government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full devel- opment of this important idea, I will hazard a few gen- The Federalist. 359 3ral observations, which may perhaps place it in a dearer light, and enable us to forrn a more correct judg- ment of the principles and structure of the Government planned by the Convention. In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of Gov- ernment, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own ; and consequently should be so constituted, that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the su- preme Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary magistra- cies should be drawn from the same fountain of author- ity, the People, through channels having no communica- tion whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice, than it may in contemplation ap- pear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some devi- ations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted In the constitution of the Judiciary department in par- ticular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle : first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications ; secondly, because the per- manent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of de- pendence on the authority conferring them. It is equally evident, that the members of each de- partment should be as' little dependent as possible on chose of the others, for the emoluments annexed to then offices. Were the Executive magistrate, or the Judges, 360 The Federalist. not independent of the Legislature in this particular their independence ^in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of Government. But what is Government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature ? If men were angels, no Government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor inter- nal controls on Government would be necessary. In framing a Government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the Government to control the governed ; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the People is, no doubt, the primary control on the Government ; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precau- tions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival in- terests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power; where the constant aim is, to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other ; that the private interest of every individ- ual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These Tlie Federalist. 361 inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defence. In republican Government, the Legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the Legis- lature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election, and different principles of action, as little connected with each other, as the nature of their common functions, and their common dependence on the society, will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the Legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the Executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An ab- solute negative on the Legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defence with which the Executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe, nor alone sufficient. On or- dinary occasions, it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness ; and on extraordinary occasions, it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State Constitu- tions, and to the Foederal Constitution, it will be found, that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with ihem, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. 362 The Federalist. There are moreover two considerations particularly applicable to the Foederal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First, In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the People is submitted to the administration of a single Government ; and the usurpations are guarded against, by a division of the Government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the People is first divided between two distinct Governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the People. The different Gov- ernments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests ne- cessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a ma- jority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil : the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself; the other by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all Governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power indepen- dent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the Foederal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in The Federalist. 363 it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free Government, the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the mul- tiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases, will depend on the number of interests and sects ; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of People comprehended under the same Government. This view of the subject must partic- ularly recommend a proper Fcederal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican Govern- ment; since it shows, that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circum- scribed Confederacies, or States, oppressive combina- tions of a majority will be facilitated ; the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished; and consequently, the stability and independence of some member of the Gov- ernment, the only other security, must be proportionally increased. Justice is the end of Government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society, under the forms of which 'he stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not se- cured against the violence of the stronger; and as in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a Government which may protect the weak, as well us themselves : so, in the former state, will the more oowerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by 364 The Federalist. a like motive, to wish for a Government which will pro- tect all parties, the weaker as well as the more power- ful. It can be little doubted, that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy, and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of Government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities, that some power altogether independent of the People would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any othei principles than those of justice and the general good ; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the Government a will not dependent on the latter: or, in other words, a will independent of the society it- self. It is no less certain than it is important, notwith- standing the contrary opinions which have been enter- tained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the Federal principle. PUBLIUS. The Federalist. 365 [From the New York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1 788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. LI. To the People of the State of New York : FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular exam- ination of the several parts of the Government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the Govern- ment relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of repub- lican Government. It was incumbent on the Conven- tion, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the Legislative discretion of the States, would have been improper for the same reason ; and for the addi- tional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State Governments, that branch of the Foederal Government which ought to be dependent on the People alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule, would prob- ably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States, as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The provision made by the Convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State ; because it is conformable 366 The Federalist. to the standard already established, or which may be established by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States ; because, being fixed by the State Con- stitutions, it is not alterable by the State Governments, and it cannot be feared that the People of the States will alter this part of their Constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the Foederal Constitution. The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State Constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the Convention. A representative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years ; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States ; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the Foederal Government is open to merit of every descrip- tion, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any par- ticular profession of religious faith. The term for which the Representatives are to be elected, falls under a second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of this Article, two questions must be considered : First, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe ; Secondly, whether they be necessary or useful. First. As it is essential to liberty, that the Govern- ment in general should have a common interest with the People ; so it is particularly essential, that the branch of it under consideration should have an imme- diate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with the People. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy The Federalist. 367 can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the pur- pose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circum stances with which it may be connected. Let us con- sult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed, whenever it can be found. The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person, being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more modern times only, that we are to expect instructive ex- amples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine our- selves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be applied, is the House of Commons in Great Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield in- struction. The very existence of it has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest rec- ords of subsequent date prove, that Parliaments were to sit only every year; not that they were to be elected every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch, that under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles II., that the intermissions should not be protracted beyond a period of three years. On the ac- cession of William III., when a revolution took place in the Government, the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the funda- mental rights of the People, that Parliaments ought to be held frequently. By another statute, which passed a Cew years later in the same reign, the term, "frequently," 368 The Federalist. which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles II., is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted, that a new Parliament shall be called within three years after the determination of the former. The last change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early in the present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian suc- cession. From these facts it appears, that the greatest frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom, for binding the Representatives to their constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the Parliamentary Constitution, we can- not doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of the People over their Repre- sentatives as to satisfy us, that biennial elections, under the Fcederal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of Representa- tives on their constituents. Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated en- tirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the accession of a new Prince, or some other contingent event. The Parliament which commenced with George II. was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The only dependence of the Representatives on the People consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies, by the election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election. The ability also of the Irish Parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their delibera- tion. Of late, these shackles, if I mistake not, have The Federalist. 369 been broken ; and octennial Parliaments have besides been established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform, must be left to further experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that if the People of that country have been able under all these disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, which might depend on a due connection between their Representatives and themselves. Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The exam- ple of these States, when British colonies, claims par- ticular attention, at the same time that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. The prin- ciple of representation, in one branch of the Legislature at least, was established in all of them. But the periods of election were different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any reason to infer from the spirit and conduct of the Representatives of the People, prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections would have been dangerous to the public liberties ? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself, at the commence- ment of the struggle, and which vanquished the ob- stacles to Independence, is the best of proofs, that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere en- joyed, to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement. This remark holds good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections were least frequent, as to those whose elections were most frequent. Virginia was the colony which stood first, in resisting the Parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain ; it was the first also in espousing, by public Act, the resolution of Independence. In Virginia, never- theless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former Government were septennial. This particu- TCI- I. 24 370 The Federalist. lar example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was probably accidental ; and still less of any advantage in septennial elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are inadmissible ; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the People can be in no danger from biennial elections. The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened, by recollecting three circum- stances. The first is, that the Foederal Legislature will possess a part only of that supreme Legislative author- ity which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial Assemblies, and the Irish Legislature. It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration ; and conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on another occa- sion, been shown, that the Foederal Legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on the People as other Legislative bodies are, but that it will be more- over watched and controlled by the several collateral Legislatures, which other Legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made be- tween the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the Foederal Government, for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the People, and the means of influence over the popular branch, possessed by the other branches of the Government above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the Foederal Representatives can be less tempted on one Bide, and will be doubly watched on the other. PUBLIFS The Federalist. 371 [From the New York Packet, Ttiesday, February 12, 1788.] THE FOEDERALIST. No. LII. To the People of the State of New York : I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current ob- servation, " that where annual elections end, tyran- " ny begins." If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subjeet himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. Happily for man- kind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual ; and if circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side ? Turn- ing our attention to the periods established among our- selves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the State Legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elec- tions of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the othei 372 The Federalist. States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. Ik South Carolina they are biennial ; as is proposed in the Foederal Government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the longest and shortest periods ; and yet it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina ; or that either the one or the other of these States are distin- guished in these respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both. In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the People, and unalterable by the Government, and a law established by the Government and alterable by the Government, seems to have been little understood, and less observed in any other country. Wherever the su- preme power of legislation has resided, has been sup- posed to reside also a full power to change the form of the Government. Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained, that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent, and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of Legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed by Legislative Acts, some of the most fundamental Articles of the Govern- ment. They have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last occa- sion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same Act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the People. An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the vota- The Federalist. 373 ries of free Government, of which frequency of elections is the corner-stone ; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount to the Government, either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other secur- ity, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innova- tions, for fixing the National sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions ? The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject, was that of a year ; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited Government, that the ad- vance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a Government, limited as the Fcederal Government will be, by the authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the People of America will not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitu- tion, than those of any other Nation would be, where elections were annual, or even more frequent, but sub- ject to alterations by the ordinary power of the Govern- ment ? The second question stated is, whether biennial elec- tions be necessary or useful ? The propriety of answer- ing this question in the affirmative, will appear from several very obvious considerations. No man can be a competent Legislator, who does not &dd, to an upright intention and a sound judgment, a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which 374 The Federalist. he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be ac- quired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in private, as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which re- quires the use of it. The period of service, ought, there- fore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge, requisite to the due per- formance of the service. The period of Legislative ser- vice established in most of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be put into this simple form : does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for Foederal Legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State Legislation ? The very statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it. In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws, which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant ; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diver- sified, and occupy much of the attention and conver- sation of every class of people. The great theatre of the United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region, and are ex- tremely diversified by the local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any other place, than in the central councils, to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the Representa- tives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws of all the States ought to be possessed by the members from each of the The Federalist. 375 States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of the different States? How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated, without some knowl- edge of their relative situations in these and other re- spects ? How can taxes be judiciously imposed, and effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the different States ? How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other? These are the principal objects of Fcederal Legislation, and suggest, most forcibly, the extensive information which the Representatives ought to acquire. The other interior objects will require a proportional degree of in- formation with regard to them. It is true, that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much diminished. The most laborious task will De the proper inauguration of the Government, and the primeval formation of a Foederal code. Improvements on the first draughts will every year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the Government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those of different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements, the business of Foederal Legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the Legis- 'ative business of a single State, as to justify the longer yeriod of service assigned to those who are to trans- act it. 376 The Fcederatist. A branch of knowledge, which belongs to the acquire- ments of a Foederal Representative, and which has not been mentioned, is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether igno- rant of the law of nations ; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal Legislation, is submitted to the Foederal Government. And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of Legislation, and will sometimes demand particular Legislative sanc- tion and cooperation. Some portion of this knowl- edge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet ; but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information ; and all of it will be acquired to best effect, by a practical attention to the subject, during the period of actual service in the Legislature. There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the Representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered neces- sary by that circumstance, might be much more serious objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a single year, than if extended to two years. No argu- ment can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true ; but their reelection is considered by the Legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The election of the Representatives by the People would not be governed by the same principle. A few of the members, as happens in all such assem The Federalist. 377 blies, will possess superior talents ; will, by frequent reflections, become members of long standing ; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members, the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is no less applicable to the re- lation which will subsist between the House of Repre- sentatives and the Senate. It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent elections, even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one^Legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlaw- ful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the Foederal Leg- islature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States. Each House is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members ; and whatever improvements may be suggested by ex- perience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would una- voidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat. All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public, as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the People. PUBLIUS 378 The Fcederalisi. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 12, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. LIII. To the People of the State of New York : f PHE next view which I shall take of the House of -*■ Representatives, relates to the apportionment of its members to the several States, which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. It is not contended, that the number of People in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the People of each State. The establishment of the same rule for ,the apportionment of taxes will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself, in this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the former ease, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the People, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference to the propor- tion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise meas- ure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But not- withstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least exceptionable among the prac- ticable rules ; and had too recently obtained the gen- eral sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the Convention. All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said : but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citi- zens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation ? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore, to be comprehended in estimates of taxation TJie Federalist. 379 which are founded )n property, and to be excluded iron- representation, which is regulated by a census of per- sons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side. " We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our Southern brethren observe, " that representation relates " more immediately to persons, and taxation more ira- u mediately to property, and we join in the application of " this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must " deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as " property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The " true state of the case is, that they partake of both " these qualities : being considered by our laws, in some " respects, as persons, and in other respects as property. " In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for " a master; in being vendible by one master to another "master; and in being subject at all times to be re- " strained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the "capricious will of another, — the slave may appear to " be degraded from the human rank, and classed with " those irrational animals which fall under the legal " denomination of property. In being protected, on the " other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the vio- " lence of all others, even the master of his labor and " his liberty ; and in being punishable himself for all "violence committed against others, — the slave is no " less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the " society, not as a part of the irrational creation ; as a •' moral person, not as a mere article of property. The u Fcederal Constitution, therefore, decides with great 4 propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them 1 in the mixed character of persons and of property. This ' is in fact their true character. It is the character 1 bestowed on them by the laws under which they live ; and it will not be denied, that these are the proper 380 The Federalist. " criterion ; because it is only under the pretext that the M laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of u property, that a place is disputed them in the compu- " tation of numbers ; and it is admitted, that if the laws " were to restore the rights which have been taken away, " the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share " of Representation with the other inhabitants. " This question may be placed in another light. It " is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale " of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper " scale of Representation. Would the Convention have " been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected " the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares " of Representation were to be calculated, and inserted " them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was "to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected, " that the Southern States would concur in a system, " which considered their slaves in some degree as men, " when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to con- " sider them in the same light, when advantages were " to be conferred ? Might not some surprise also be " expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States " with the barbarous policy of considering as property " a part of their human brethren, should themselves " contend, that the Government to which all the States u are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate " race more completely in the unnatural light of property, u than the very laws of which they complain ? " It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not includ- een apprehended, nor experienced. The utmost degree 408 The Federalist. of firmness that can be displayed by the Foederal Sen- ate or President, will not be more than equal to a resist- ance, in which they will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles. In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I have passed over the circumstance of economy, which, in the present state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening the temporary number of Representatives ; and a disregard of which would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution, as has been furnished by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the Foederal ser- vice a large number of such characters as the People will probably elect. One observation, however, I must be permitted to add on this subject, as claiming, in my judgment, a very serious attention. It is, that in all Legislative Assemblies, the greater the number compos- ing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more numerous any Assembly may be, of whatever char- acters composed, the greater is known to.be the ascend- ency of passion over reason. In the next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely on characters of this description, that the eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the People assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway, as if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative Assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities inci- dent to collective meetings of the People. Ignorance The Federalist. 409 will be the dupe of cunning ; and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The People can never en more than in supposing, that by multiplying their Rep- resentatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the Government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them, that on the contrary, after securing- a sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views, by every ad- dition to their Representatives. The countenance of the Government may become more democratic; but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged ; but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed. As connected with the objection against the num- ber of Representatives, may properly be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the number made competent for Legislative business. It has been said, that more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum ; and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a pre- caution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests, and an- other obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the incon- veniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where jus- tice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the funda- mental principle of free Government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule: che power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an .nterested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable 410 The Federalist. indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions ; a practice which has shown itself even in States where a majority only is required ; a practice subversive of all the principles of order and regular Government ; a practice which leads more directly to public convulsions, and the ruin of pop- ular Governments, than any other which has yet been displayed among us. PUBLIUS. {From the New York Packet, Friday, February 22, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. LVIII. To the People of the State of New York: THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place, that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the National Legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own members. It is in these words : " The times, places, and manner " of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, " shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature "thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, " make or alter such regulations, except as to the places u of choosing Senators."* This provision has not only been declaimed against by those who condemn the Con- stitution in the gross ; but it has been censured by those who have objected with less latitude, and greater moder- ation ; and, in one instance, it has been thought excep- tionable by a gentleman who has declared himself the advocate of every other part of the system. I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be * 1st Clause, 4th Section of the 1st Article. — Publius. The Federalist. 411 any Article in the whole plan more completely defensible than this. Its propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition, that every Government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation. Every just reasoner will, at first sight, approve an adherence to this rule, in the work of the Convention; and will disapprove every deviation from it, which may not appear to have been dictated by the necessity of incorporating into the work some particular ingredient, with which a rigid con- formity to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case, though he may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will not cease to regard and to regret a departure from so fundamental a principle, as a portion of imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future weak- ness, and perhaps anarchy. It will not be alleged, that an election law could have been framed and inserted in the Constitution, which would have been always applicable to every probable change in the situation of the country; and it will, there- fore, not be denied, that a discretionary power over elec- tions ought to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded, that there were only three ways in which this power could have been reasonably modified and disposed ; that it must either have been lodged wholly in the National Legislature, or wholly in the State Legislatures, or primarily in the latter, and ulti- mately in the former. The last mode has, with reason, been preferred by the Convention. They have submitted the regulation of elections for the Foederal Government, in the first instance, to the local administrations; which, in ordinary cases, and when no improper views prevail, maybe both more convenient and more satisfactory; but they have reserved to the National authority a right to interpose, whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its safety. Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive 412 The Federalist. power of regulating elections for the National Govern ment, in the hands of the State Legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs. It is to little purpose to say, that a neglect or omission of this kind would not be likely to take place. The constitutional possibility of the thing, with out an equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objec tion. Nor has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned for incurring that risk. The extravagant surmises of a distempered jealousy, can never be dignified with that character. If we are in a humor to presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the State Governments, as on the part of the General Gov- ernment. And as it is more consonant to the rules of a just theory, to intrust the Union with the care of its own existence, than to transfer that care to any other hands, if abuses of power are to be hazarded on the one side or on the other, it is more rational to hazard them where the power would naturally be placed, than where it would unnaturally be placed. Suppose an Article had been introduced into the Constitution, empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the particular States, would any man have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable transposition of power, and as a premeditated engine for the destruction of the State Governments ? The violation of principle, in this case, would have required no comment ; and, to an unbiased observer, it will not be less apparent in the project of subjecting the exist- ence of the National Government, in a similar respect, to the pleasure of the State Governments. An impar- tial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a convic- tion, that each, as far as possible, ought to depend on 'tself for its own preservation. TJie Federalist 413 As an objection to this position, it may be remarked that the constitution of the National Senate would in- volve, in its full extent, the danger which it is suggested might flow from an exclusive power in the State Legis- latures to regulate the Foederal elections. It may be alleged, that by declining the appointment of Senators, they might at any time give a fatal blow to the Union ; and from this it may be inferred, that as its existence would be thus rendered dependent upon them in so es- sential a point, there can be no objection to intrusting them w 7 ith it, in the particular case under consideration. The interest of each State, it may be added, to maintain its representation in the National Councils, would be a complete security against an abuse of the trust. This argument, though specious, will not, upon exam- ination, be found solid. It is certainly true, that the State Legislatures, by forbearing the appointment of Senators, may destroy the National Government. But it will not follow, that because they have the power to do this in one instance, they ought to have it in every other. There are cases in which the pernicious tendency of such a power may be far more decisive, without any motive equally cogent with that which must have reg- ulated the conduct of the Convention in respect to the formation of the Senate, to recommend their admission into the system. So far as that construction may ex- pose the Union to the possibility of injury from the State Legislatures, it is an evil; but it is an evil which could not have been avoided without excluding the States, in their political capacities, wholly from a place in the organization of the National Government. II this had been done, it would doubtless have been inter- preted into an entire dereliction of the Foederal princi pie; and would certainly have deprived the State Gov ernments of that absolute safeguard, which they will enjoy under this provision. But however wise it may 414 The Federalist. have been, to have submitted in this instance to an in- convenience, for the attainment of a necessary advantage or a greater good, no inference can be drawn from thence to favor an accumulation of the evil, where no necessity urges, nor any greater good invites. It may be easily discerned, also that the National Government would run a much greater risk, from a pow- er is the State Legislatures over the elections of its House of Representatives, than from their power of ap- pointing the members of its Senate. The Senators are to be chosen for the period of six years; there is to be a rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two years ; and no State is to be entitled to more than two Senators ; a quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members. The joint result of these circumstances would be, that a temporary combination of a few States, to intermit the appointment of Senators, could neither annul the existence, nor impair the activity of the body ; and it is not from a general and permanent combination of the States, that we can have anything to fear. The first might proceed from sinister designs in the leading members of a few of the State Legislatures : the last would sup- pose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the People ; which will, either never exist at all, or will, in all probability, proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the General Government to the advance- ment of their happiness : in which event, no good citi- zen could desire its continuance. But with regard to the Fcederal House of Represent- atives, there is intended to be a general election of mem- bers once in two years. If the State Legislatures were to 3e invested with an exclusive power of regulating these elections, every period of making them would be a del- icate crisis in the National situation ; which might issue in a dissolution of the Union, if the leaders of a few of The Federalist. 41c the most important States should have entered into a previous conspiracy to prevent an election. I shall not deny, that there is a degree of weight in the observation, that the interest of each State, to be represented in the Fcederal Councils, will be a security against the abuse of a power over its elections in the hands of the State Legislatures. But the security w T ill not be considered as complete, by those who attend to the force of an obvious distinction between the interest of the People in the public felicity, and the interest of their local rulers in the power and consequence of their offices. The People of America may be warmly at- tached to the Government of the Union, at times when the particular rulers of particular States, stimulated by the natural rivalship of power, and by the hopes of per- sonal aggrandizement, and supported by a stong faction in each of those States, may be in a very opposite tem- per. This diversity of sentiment between a majority of the People, and the individuals who have the greatest credit in their councils, is exemplified in some of the States at the. present moment, on the present question. The scheme of separate Confederacies, which will al- ways multiply the chances of ambition, will be a "never failing bait to all such influential characters in the State administrations, as are capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the public weal. With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections for the National Govern- ment, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the most considerable States, where the temptation will al- ways be the strongest, might accomplish the destruction of the Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the People, (and which perhaps they may themselves have excited,) to discontinue the choice of members for the Fcederal House of Repre- sentatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm 41b" The Federalist. Union of this country, under an efficient Government, will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe ; and that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers, and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by some of them. Its preservation there- fore ought in no case, that can be avoided, to be com- mitted to the guardianship of any but those, whose situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust. PUBL1US. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 26, 1788.] THE FCELERALIST. No. LIX. To the People of the State of New York "YJCT" E have seen, that an uncontrollable power over * * the elections for the Foederal Government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State Legisla- tures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side : that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right would e/e\ oe used for the exclusion of any State from its s^are in the repre- sentation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens lit large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical sup- positions, this seems to be the most chimerical. On the The Federalist. 417 one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition, which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever find its way into the National Councils; and on the other, it may be concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form altogether difTerent and far more decisive. The improbability of the attempt may be satisfacto- rily inferred from this single reflection, that it could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the People, headed and directed by the State Governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbu- lent and factious seasons, be violated, in respect to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbear- ing majority ; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a country so situated and enlightened, should be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the People, by the deliberate policy of the Government, without occasion- ing a popular revolution, is altogether inconceivable and incredible. In addition to this general reflection, there are consid- erations of a more precise nature, which forbid all appre- hension on the subject. The dissimilarity in the ingre- dients which will compose the National Government, and still more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches, must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views, in any partial scheme of elections. There is sufficient diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of the People of the different parts of the Union, to occa- sion a material diversity of disposition in their Repre- sentatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society. And though an intimate intercourse under the same Government will promote a gradual assimilation, vol. i. 27 418 The Federalist. in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as weU physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less de- gree, permanently nourish different propensities and in- clinations in this respect. But the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the mat- ter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the sev- eral component parts of the Government. The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the People, the Senate by the State Legislatures, the President by Electors chosen for that purpose by the People, there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilec- tion for any particular class of electors. As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of " time and manner," which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the National Government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members. The collective sense of the State Legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous cir- cumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us, that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have, to concur in a preference in which it- self would not be included ? Or to what purpose would it be established, in reference to one branch of the Leg- islature, if it could not be extended to the other ? The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate, unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary cooper- ation of the State Legislatures. If we make the latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the pow- er in question is placed, whether in their hands, or in those of the Union. But what is to be the object of this capricious partial- ity in the National Councils ? Is it to be exercised i/i a The Federalist. 419 discrimination between the different departments of in* dustry, or between the different kinds of property, 01 between the different degrees of property ? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing inter- est? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the eleva- tion of " the wealthy and the well-born," to the exclu- sion and debasement of all the rest of the society ? If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property, I presume it will readily be admitted, that the competition for it will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is infi- nitely less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the National Councils, than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local Councils. The inference will be, that a conduct tend- ing to give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former, than from the latter. The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them agriculture is predominant. In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire; and in most of them has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed into the National rep- resentation ; and for the very reason, that this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and in much more various proportions, than are to be found in any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse either of them with a decided partiality, than the repre- sentation of any single State. In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of jand, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate 'n the Government. As long as this interest prevails in 420 The Federalist. most of the State Legislatures, so long it must main- tain a correspondent superiority in the National Senate which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those Assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the Foederal Legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am governed by the consideration, that the credulous votaries of State power cannot, upon their own principles, suspect, that the State Legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external in- fluence. But in reality the same situation must have the same effect, in the primitive composition at least of the Foederal House of Representatives, an improper bias towards the mercantile class, is as little to be ex pected from this quarter as from the other. In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the National Government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the Foed- eral administration to the landed class? As there is little likelihood, that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it, a labored answer to this question will be dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first, that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the Coun cils of the Union, than in those of any of its members. Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And, thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources jf public prosperity, upon a large scale, must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce to be inclined The Federalist 421 to inflict upon it so deep a wound, as would result from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest, from a share in the management of them. The importance of commerce, in the view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body which would be continually importuned in its favor, by the urgent calls of public necessity. I the rather consult brevity, in discussing the prob- ability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property, be- cause, as far as I understand the meaning of the objec- tors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They appear to have in view, as the objects of the pref- erence with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of "the wealthy and 'the well-born." These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious preeminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens. At one time, however, their elevation is to be a neces- sary consequence of the smallness of the representative body ; at another time, it is to be effected by depriving the People at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body. But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference ? Are " the wealthy " and the well-born," as they are called, confined to par- ticular spots in the several States ? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them, a common place of residence ? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot, or that of their predecessors ? If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be,*) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places ot * Particularly in the Southern States and in this State. — PvbUus. 422 The Federalist. elections to particular districts, would be as subversive of its own aim, as it would be exceptionable on every other account ? The truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect, or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the National Govern- ment. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose, or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the Legislature. Let it however be admitted, for argument sake, that the expedient suggested might be successful; and let it at the same time be equally taken for granted, that all the scruples which a sense of duty, or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of the National rulers ; still I imagine, it will hardly be pretended, that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution, without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the People. The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object, has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers ; but that the futility of the objec- tion under consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment, that such a force might exist ; and the National Government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community, and with the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election aws for securing a preference to a favorite class of The Federalist men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation than to trust to precarious expedients which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear, that citizens, not less tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock from the remotest extremes of their respective States to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the People? PUBLIUS. IFrom the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 26, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. LX. To the People of the State of New York : THE more candid opposers of the provision respect- ing elections, contained in the plan of the Con- vention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision ; with this qual- ification, however, that it ought to have been accom- panied with a declaration, that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. A declaration of this nature would cer- tainly have been harmless ; so far as it would have had :he effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no additional security against the danger appre- 424 The Federalist hended ; and the want of it will never be considered, by an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still less as an insuperable objection to the plan. The differ- ent views taken of the subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all dispassionate and discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the National rulers, the power under examination, at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice. If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only, would exercise it in a careful inspection of the several State Constitutions, they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm, from the latitude which most of them allow in respect to elections, than from the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the National Government in the same respect. A review of their situation, in this particular, would tend greatly to remove any ill impressions which may remain in re- gard to this matter. But as that review would lead into long and tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example of the State in which I write. The Constitution of New York makes no other provi- sion for locality of elections, than that the members of the Assembly shall be elected in the counties; those of the Senate, in the great districts into which the State is or may be divided : these at present are four in number, and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may /eadily be perceived, that it would not be more difficult to the Legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York, by confining elections to particular places, than for the Legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union, by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of elec- tion for the county and district of which it is a part, Would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become The Federalist. 425 the only electors of the members both of the Senate and Assembly for that county and district? Can we imagine, that the electors who reside in the remote sub- divisions of the county of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, &c, or in any part of the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give their votes for members of the Assembly or Senate sooner than they would repair to the city of New York to participate in the choice of the members of the Fed- eral House of Representatives ? The alarming indiffer- ence discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privi- lege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question. And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of elec- tion is at an inconvenient distance from the elector, the effect upon his conduct will be the same, whether that distance be twenty miles, or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear, that objections to the particular modification of the Foederal power of regulating elec- tions, will, in substance, apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the Constitution of this State ; and for this reason it will be impossible to acquit the one, and to condemn the other. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion, in re- spect to the Constitutions of most of the other States. If it should be said, that defects in the State Consti- tutions furnish no apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed, I answer, that as the for- mer have never been thought chargeable with inatten- tion to the security of liberty, where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to them also, the presumption is, that they are rather the cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition, than the well-founded inferences of a candid research after truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as 426 The Federalist. innocent omissions in the State Constitutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the Convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can only be asked to assign some substantial reason why the Representatives of the People, in a single State, should be more impregnable to the lust of power, or other sinister motives, than the Representatives of the People of the United States ? If they cannot do this, they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier to subvert the liberties of three millions of People, with the advantage of local Governments to head their opposi- tion, than of two hundred thousand People who are destitute of that advantage. And in relation to the point immediately under consideration, they ought to convince as that it is less probable that a predominant faction in a single State, should, in order to maintain its superior- ity, incline to a preference of a particular class of elec tors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of the Representatives of thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circumstances, preju- dices, and interests. Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindi- cation of the provision in question, on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing it in the manner proposed. But there remains to be men- tioned a positive advantage, which will result from this disposition, and which could not as well have been ob- tained from any other: I allude to the circumstance of uniformity, in the time of elections for the Foederal House of Representatives. It is more than possible, that this uniformity may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public welfare; both as a security against the perpetuation of the same spirit in tfie body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If The Federalist. 427 each State may choose its own time of election, it is possible there may be, at least, as many different periods as there are months in the year. The times of election in the several States, as they are now established for local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March and November. The consequence of this diversity would be, that there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new mem- bers, as they come forward in succession. The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same ; assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions. There is a contagion in example, which few men have sufficient force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think, that treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration subject to gradual and successive alterations. Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation in the Senate, and for conveniently assembling the Legis- lature at a stated period in each year. It may be asked, Why then could not a time have been fixed in the Constitution ? As the most zealous adversaries of the plan of the Convention in this State, are, in general, not less zealous admirers of the Con- stitution of the State, the question may be retorted, and it may be asked, Why was not a time for the like pur- pose fixed in the Constitution of this State ? No better answer can be given than that it was a matter which might safely be intrusted to Legislative discretion ; and that if a time had been appointed, it might, upon experiment, have been found less convenient than some other time. The same answer may be given to the question put on the other side. And it may be added 428 The Federalist. that the supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative, it would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish, a*s a fundamental point, what would deprive several States of the con- venience of having the elections for their own Govern- ments, and for the National Government, at the same epochs. PUBLIUS. For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. LXI, To the People of the State of New York* HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered such of the ob- jections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the Senate. The heads into which this member of the Gov- ernment may be considered, are, I. The qualifica- tions of Senators ; II. The appointment of them by the State Legislatures; III. The equality of represen- tation in the Senate ; IV. The number of Senators, and the term for which they are to be elected ; V. The powers vested in the Senate. I. The qualifications proposed for Senators, as dis- tinguished from those of Representatives, consist in a more advanced age, and a longer period of citizenship. A Senator must be thirty years of age at least ; as a Representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years ; as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinc- tions is explained by the nature of the Senatorial trust The Federalist. 429 which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires, at the same time, that the Senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages ; and which, partici- pating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the Na- tional Councils. II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appoint- ment of Senators by the State Legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the Government, that which has been proposed by the Convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recom- mended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State Governments such an agency in the formation of the Foederal Govern- ment, as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems. III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of com- promise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a People thoroughly incorporated into one Nation, every district ought to have a. proportional share in the Government; and that among independent and sovereign States, bound to- gether by a simple league, the parties, however unequal Id size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils ; it does not appear to be without some reason. 430 The Federalist. that in a compound republic, partaking both of the Na- tional and Fcederal character, the Government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of propor- tional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the Constitu- tion which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but " of a spirit of amity, and that mutual * deference and concession which the peculiarity of our " political situation rendered indispensable." A common Government, with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation, of America. A Government, founded on prin- ciples more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the former, lies between the proposed Government, and a Government still more ob- jectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of pru- dence must be, to embrace the lesser evil ; and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mis- chiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice. In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recog- nition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States ; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every pos- sible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic. Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional imped- iment it must prove against improper acts of legisla- tion. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the People, and, The Federalist. 433 then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowl- edged that this complicated check on legislation may, in some instances, be injurious as well as beneficial ; and that the peculiar defence which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more rational, if any inter- ests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our Governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice, than it appears to many in contemplation. TV. The number of Senators, and the duration of their appointment, come next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a Senate ; and in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution. First. It is a misfortune incident to republican Gov- ernment, though in a less degree than to other Govern- ments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a Senate, as a second branch of the Legislative Assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the Government. It doubles the security to the People, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or per- fidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded ;>n such clear principles, and now so well understood in 432 The Federalist. the United States, that it would be more than super- fluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in propor- tion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican Government. Secondly. The necessity of a Senate is not less in- dicated by the propensity of all single and numerous as- semblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into in- temperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from pro- ceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked, is, that a body which is to correct this infirm- ity, ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to pos- sess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration. Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a Senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an as- sembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the in- tervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our Governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the The Federalist 433 nearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many im- peachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each preceding session ; so many admonitions to the People, of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted Senate ? A good Government implies two things : first, fidelity to the object of Government, which is the happiness of the People ; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some Govern- ments are deficient in both these qualities ; most Govern- ments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American Governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The Foederal Constitution avoids this error ; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first. Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils aris- ing from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest man- ner, the necessity of some stable institution in the Gov- ernment. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the Representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions ; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsist- ent with every rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and be- comes more just, as well as more important, in National transactions. To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable Govern- ment, would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumer* able others. vol. i. 28 434 The Federalist. In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected with National character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unstead- iness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his ; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another, what one individual is to another; with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, .are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of its wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situa- tion. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends ; that she is the derision of her enemies ; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs. The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the People, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulged, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action ; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed? The Feeder alist. 435 Another effect of public instability is the unreason- able advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterpris- ing, and the moneyed few, over the industrious and uninformed mass of the People. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any manner af- fecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change and can trace its consequences ; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things, in which it may be said, with some truth, that laws are made for the feiv, not for the many. In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable Government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a continu- ance of existing arrangements. What prudent mer- chant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch ot commerce, when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant Government ? In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go for- ward, which requires the auspices of a steady system of National policy. But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminu- tion of attachment and reverence, which steals into the hearts of the People, towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No Government, any more than an individual, will long be respected, without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, with- out possessing a certain portion of order and stability. PUBLIUS 436 The Federalist For the Independent Journal. THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIL To the People of the State of New Yokk : A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a -£^- Senate, is the want of a due sense of National character. Without a select and stable member of the Government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the National Councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less neces- sary in order to merit, than it is to obtain its respect and confidence. An attention to the judgment of other nations is im- portant to every Government, for two reasons : the one is, that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the National Councils may be warped by some strong passion, or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations ; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her meas- ures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the un- biased part of mankind. Yet however requisite a sense of National character "nay be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently The Federalist. 437 possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It car only be found in a number so small that a sensible de- gree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual ; or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorpo- rated with the reputation and prosperity of the com- munity. The half-yearly Representatives of Rhode Island would probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments drawn from the light in wbich such meas- ures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the sister States ; whilst it can scarcely be doubted, that if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to National character alone would have prevented the calamities under which that mis- guided People is now laboring. I add, as a sixth defect, the want, in some important cases, of a due responsibility in the Government to the People, arising from that frequency of elections, which in other cases produces this responsibility. This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important. Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be lim- ited to objects within the power of the responsible party; and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. The objects of Govern- ment may be divided into two general classes : the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible operation ; the other depending on a suc- cession of well-chosen and well-connected measures, ;vhich have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter description to the collec- tive and permanent welfare of every country, needs no 438 The Federalist. explanation. And yet it is evident, that an assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the People to estimate the share of influence which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult, to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a numerous body, for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its con- stituents. The proper remedy for this defect must be an addi- tional body in the Legislative department, which having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as re- quire a continued attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attain- ment of those objects. Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well-constructed Senate, only as they relate to the Representatives of the People. To a People as little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted by flattery, as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes ne- cessary, as a defence to the People against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and delib- erate sense of the community ought, in all Governments, and actually will, in all free Governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers : so there are particu- lar moments in public affairs, when the People, stim- ulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit ad- vantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of The Federalist 439 interested men, may call for measures which they them selves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the People against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind ? What bitter an- guish would not the People of Athens have often es- caped, if their Government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions ? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day, and statues on the next. It may be suggested, that a People spread over an extensive region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions, or to the danger of combining in pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the con- trary, endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary pre cautions. It may even be remarked, that the same ex tended situation, which will exempt the People of America from some of the dangers incident to lessei republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may succeed in distributing among them. It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to ecollect that history informs us of no long-lived re- public, which had not a Senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only States to whom that 440 The Federalist character can be applied. In each of the two first, there was a Senate for life. The constitution of the Senate in the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it probable, that it was not different in this par- ticular from the two others. It is at least certain, that it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations ; and that a smaller Council, drawn out of the Senate, was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other an- cient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular Governments, as well ancient as modern ; and which render extreme circum- spection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this consider- ation, it may still be maintained, that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a Senatorial in- stitution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by the People, and to the People themselves. There are others peculiar to the former, which require the control of such an institution. The People can never wilfully betray their own interests ; but they may possibly be betrayed by the Representatives of the Peo- ple ; and the danger will be evidently greater, where the whole Legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public Act. The difference most relied on, between the American and other republics, consists in the principle of represen- tation ; which is the pivot on which the former move, The Federalist. 441 and which is supposed to have been unknown to the lat- ter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown, that I am disposed neither to deny its existence, nor to undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint, therefore, in ob- serving, that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient Governments on the subject of representa- tion, is by no means precisely true in the latitude com monly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts, in support of what I advance. In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the Executive functions were performed, not by the People themselves, but by officers elected by the People, and representing the People in their Executive capacity. Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons, annually elected by the People at large. The degree of power delegated to them, seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find an Assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hun- dred members, annually elected by the People ; and par- tially representing them in their Legislative capacity, since they were not only associated with the People in the function of making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating Legislative propositions to the Peo- ple. The Senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the duration of its appointment, appears to to have been elective by the suffrages of the People. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the popular Governments of antiquity. Lastly, in Sparta, we meet w T ith the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in number, but annually e-ected by the whole body of the People, and considered as the Representatives of the People, almost in their plenipotentiary capacity. The 442 The Federalist. Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by iht People, and have been considered by some authors as an insti- tution analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only, that in the election of that represent- ative body the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the People. From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients, nor wholly overlooked in their political Constitutions. The true distinction between these and the American Governments, lies in the total exclusion of Hie People, in their collective capacity, from any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of the Representatives of the People from the administration of the former. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superior- ity in favor of the United States. But to insure to this ad- vantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed, that any form of representative Government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece. In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experi- ence, the jealous adversary of the Constitution will prob- ably content himself with repeating, that a Senate ap- pointed not immediately by the People, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous preemi- nence in the Government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy. To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient, that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former as well as of the *atter ; and that the former, rather than the latter, is ap- parently most to be apprehended by the United States But a more particular reply may jpe given. The Federalist. 443 Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State Legislatures ; must then cor- rupt the House of Representatives ; and must finally corrupt the People at large. It is evident that the Sen- ate must be first corrupted, before it can attempt an es- tablishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State Legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the periodical change of members would otherwise regener- ate the whole body. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of Repre- sentatives, the opposition of that coequal branch of the Government would inevitably defeat the attempt ; and without corrupting the People themselves, a succes- sion of new Representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself, that the proposed Senate can, by any possible means within the compass of human address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these obstructions? If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by experience. The Constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the Fcederal Senate will be, indirectly by the People, and for a term less by one year only than the Fcederal Senate. It is distin- guished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment, and at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the Fcederal Senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which would expose the former to colorable objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the Foederal Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate 444 The Fcederahst. of Maryland; but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the Foederal Constitu- tion, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland Constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be ri- valled by that of any State in the Union. But if anything could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be the British example. The Senate there, instead of being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or for- tunes, is an hereditary Assembly of opulent nobles. The House of Representatives, instead of being elected for two years, and by the whole body of the People, is elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion, by a very small proportion of the People. Here, un- questionably, ought to be seen in full display the aristo- cratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States. Unfortu- nately, however, for the Anti-Fcederal argument, the British history informs us that this hereditary Assembly has not even been able to defend itself against the con- tinual encroachments of the House of Representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch. As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta, the Ephori, the annual Representatives of the People, were found an overmatch for the Senate for life , continually gained on its authority; and finally drew all power into their own hands. The Tribunes of Rome, who were the Representatives of the People, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the Senate The Federalist. 445 for life, and in the end gained the most complete tri- umph over it. The fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free Government, which has the People on its side. To these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose Senate, according to the testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the com- mencement of the second Punic War, lost almost the whole of its original portion. Besides the conclusive evidence resulting" from this assemblage of facts, that the Fcederal Senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independant and aristocratic body, we are warranted in believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the House of Representatives, with the People on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the immediate Representatives of the People, nothing will be able to maintain even the Constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a display of enlight- ened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the Legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the People themselves PUBL1U& 146 The Federalist. [From the New York Packet, Friday, March 7, 1788] THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIII. To the People of the State of New York : IT is a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution m the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable Articles in it. The second Section gives power to the President, u by " and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make " treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pres- " ENT CONCUR." The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce ; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest security, that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the pub- lic good. The Convention appears to have been atten- tive to both these points ; they have directed the Presi- dent to be chosen by select bodies of Electors, to be Jeputed by the People for that express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of Senators to the State Legislatures. This mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the People in their collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, tak- ing advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often The Federalist. 447 places men in office by the votes of a small proportion of the Electors. As the select Assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the State Legislatures who appoint the Sen- ators, will in general be composed of the most enlight- ened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume, that their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distin- guished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the People perceive just grounds for confidence. The Con- stitution manifests very particular attention to this ob- ject. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines the Electors to men of whom the People have had time to form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appear- ances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be well founded, that wise Kings will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an Assembly of select Electors possess, in a greater degree than Kings, the means of extensive and accurate infor- mation relative to men and characters, so will their ap- pointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results from these considerations is this, that the President and Sen- ators so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand our National interests, whether considered in relation to the several States or to foreign Nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making trea- ties may be safely lodged. Although the absolute necessity of system, in the con- duct of any business, is universally known and acknowl- edged, yet the high importance of it in National affairs, 448 The Federalist. has not yet become sufficiently impressed on the public mind. They who wish to commit the power under con- sideration to a popular assembly, composed of members constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem not to recollect, that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the attainment of those great objects, which require to be steadily contemplated in all their relations and circumstances, and which can only be approached and achieved by measures, which not only talents, but also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the Convention to provide, not only that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with our National concerns, and to form and introduce a system for the management of them. The duration prescribed is such as will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their political information, and of ren- dering their accumulating experience more and more beneficial to their country. Nor has the Convention dis- covered less prudence, in providing for the frequent elec- tions of Senators in such a way as to obviate the incon- venience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely to new men ; for by leaving a considerable res- idue of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of official information, will be preserved. There are few who will not admit, that the affairs of trade and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily pursued ; and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with and be made to promote it. It is of much consequence that this correspondence and conformity be carefully main- tained ; and they who assent to the truth of this position Will see and confess, that it is well provided for by mak- Tlie Federalist. 449 ing concurrence of the Senate necessary, both to treaties and to laws. It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate despatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the per- sons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons, whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives ; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the Presi- dent, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular Assembly. The Convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the Presi- dent must, in forming them, act by the advice and con- sent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest. They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have perceived that there are tides in them ; tides very irregular in their duration, strength, and direc- tion, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these tides in National affairs, is the business of those who preside over them ; and they who have had much expe- rience on this head inform us, that there frequently are occasions when days, nay, even when hours are precious. The loss of a battle, the death of a Prince, the removal of a minister, or other circumstances intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may- turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to our wishes. As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pass, and they who pre- side in either, should be left in capacity to improve them. So often and so essentially have we heretofore TOL. I. 29 450 The Federalist. Buffered from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention had been paid to those objects. Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most despatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are no otherwise important in a National view, than as they tend to facilitate the at- tainment of the objects of the negociation. For these, the President will find no difficulty to provide ; and should any circumstance occur, which requires the ad- vice and consent of the Senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus we see, that the Constitution pro- vides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, informa- tion, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch, on the other. But to this plan, as to most others that have ever appeared, objections are contrived and urged. Some are displeased with it, not on account of any errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when made, are to have the force of laws, they should be made only by men invested with Legislative authority. These gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of our courts, and the commissions constitutionally given by our Governor, are as valid and as binding on all per- sons whom they concern, as the laws passed by our Legislature. All Constitutional acts of power, whether in the Executive or in the Judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the Legislature ; and therefore, whatever name be given to the power of making treaties, or however obli- gatory they may be when made, certain it is, that the People may, with much propriety, commit the power to a distinct body from the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judicial. It surely does not follow, that because they have given the power of making laws to the Legis- The Federalist. 451 ature, that therefore they should likewise give them )ower to do every other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound and affected. Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are averse to their being the supreme laws of the land. They insist, and profess to believe, that treaties, like Acts of Assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country ; but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect, that a treaty is only another name for a bargain; and that it would be impossible to find a Nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be bind- ing on them absolutely, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them ; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them : but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the con- tracting parties, but by both ; and consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of Legislative Acts now, as they will be at any future oeriod, or under any form of Government. However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic, the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that mal- ady casts on surrounding objects. From this cause, probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of some, that the President and Senate may make treaties with- out an equal eye to the interests of all the States. Oth- ars suspect, that two thirds will oppress the remaining 452 The Federalist. third, and ask, whether those gentlemen are made suffi- ciently responsible for their conduct; whether, if they act corruptly, they can be punished ; and if they make disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those treaties ? As all the States are equally represented in the Sen- ate, and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially while they continue to be careful in appointing proper persons, and to insist on their punctual attendance. In proportion as the United States assume a National form, and a National character, so will the good of the whole be more and more an object of attention ; and the Gov- ernment must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget, that the good of the whole can only be promoted by ad- vancing the good of each of the parts or members which compose the whole. It will not be in the power of the President and Senate to make any treaties, by which they, and their families and estates, will not be equally bound and affected with the rest of the community; and having no private interests distinct from that of the Nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect the latter. As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, or possess a heart very susceptible of such im- pressions, who can think it probable, that the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross, and too invid- ious, to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of Nations. With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to oonceive how it could be increased. Every considera- Tlie Federalist. 453 fcion that can influence the human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and family affections and attachments, afford security for their fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the ut- most care that they shall be men of talents and integ- rity, we have reason to be persuaded, that the treaties they make will be as advantageous, as, all circumstances considered, could be made ; and so far as the fear of pun- ishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the Article on the subject of impeachments. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, March 7, 1 788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIV. To the People of the State of New Yokk : THE remaining powers which the plan of the Con- vention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the Executive in the appointment to offices, and in their Judicial char- acter as a Court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments, the Executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that depart- nent. We will therefore conclude this head, with a view w)f the Judicial character of the Senate. A well-constituted Court for the trial of impeach- ments is an object not more to be desired, than difficult jo be obtained in a Government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which pro- ceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other 454 The Federalist. words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to inju- ries done immediately to the society itself. The prose- cution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly, or inimical, to the ac- cused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the preexisting factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases, there will always be the great- est danger, that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt. The delicacy and magnitude of a trust, which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly, in a Government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is consid- ered that the most conspicuous characters in it wall, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders, or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny. The Convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depositary of this important trust. Those who can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will be least hasty in condemning that opinion ; and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may be supposed to have produced it. What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the insti- tution itself? Is it not designed as a method of Na- tional inquest into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the in The Federalist. 45* quisitors for the Nation as the Representatives of the Nation themselves ? It is not disputed that the power of originating the inquiry, or in other words, of prefer- ring the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the Legislative body : will not the rea- sons which indicate the propriety of this arrangement, strongly plead for an admission of the other branch of that body to a share of the inquiry ? The model, from which the idea of this institution has been borrowed, pointed out that course to the Convention. In Great Britain, it is the province of the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment ; and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. Several of the State Constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter, as the former, seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments, as a bridle in the hands of the Legislative body upon the Executive servants of the Government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded ? Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently indepen- dent ? "What other body would be likely to feel confi- dence enough in its own situation, to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an individual accused, and the Representatives of the Peo- ple, his accusers ? Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this description ? It is much to be doubted, whether the members of that tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task ; and it is still more to be doubted, whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority, which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconcil- ing the People to a decision that should happen to clash with an accusation brought by their immediate Repre- sentatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to 4 1)6 The F&deralist the accused ; in the last, dangerous to the public tran- quillity. The hazard in both these respects, could only be avoided, if at all, by rendering that tribunal more nu- merous than would consist with a reasonable attention to economy. The necessity of a numerous Court for the trial of impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offence by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the Judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of Courts in favor of personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the Judges, who are to pronounce the sen- tence of the law, and the party who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a Court of Impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons. These considerations seem alone sufficient to author- ize a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have been an improper substitute for the Senate, as a Court of Impeachments. There remains a further considera- tion, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It is this: — The punishment which may be the conse- quence of conviction upon impeachment, is not to ter- minate the chastisement of the offender. After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his coun- try, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper that the persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a citizen, in one trial, should, in an- other trial, for the same offence, be also the disposers of his life and his fortune ? Would there not be the great* est reason to apprehend, that error, in the first sentence, would be the parent of error in the second sentence; The Feeder alls t. 45? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights which might be brought to vary the complexion of another decision ? Those who know anything of human nature, will not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative ; and will be at no loss to perceive, that by making the same persons Judges in both cases, those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution would, in a great measure, be deprived of the double security in- tended them by a double trial. The loss of life and estate would often be virtually included in a sentence which, in its terms, imported nothing more than dismis- sion from a present, and disqualification for a future office. It may be said, that the intervention of a Jury, in the second instance, would obviate the danger. But Juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of Judges. They are sometimes induced to find special verdicts, which refer the main question to the decision of the Court. Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a Jury acting under the auspices of Judges who had predetermined his guilt? Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to have united the Supreme Court with the Senate, in the formation of the Court of Impeachments ? This union vould certainly have been attended with several advan- tages ; but would they not have been overbalanced by the signal disadvantage, already stated, arising from the agency of the same Judges in the double prosecution to which the offender would be liable ? To a certain ex- tent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from making the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the President of the Court of Impeachments, as is proposed to be done in the plan of the Convention ; while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into the latter will be substantially avoided. This was oerhaps the prudent mean I forbear to remark upon 458 The Federalist. the additional pretext for clamor against the Judiciary which so considerable an augmentation of its authority would have afforded. "Would it have been desirable to have composed the Court for the trial of impeachments, of persons wholly distinct from the other departments of the Government ? There are weighty arguments, as well against, as in fa- vor of such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a trivial objection, that it could tend to increase the com- plexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring to the Government, the utility of which would at best be questionable. But an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy of attention, is this : a Court formed upon such a plan, would either be attended with a heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a va- riety of casualties and inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent officers, stationary at the seat of Government, and of course entitled to fixed and regular stipends, or of certain officers of the State Governments, to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actu- ally depending. It will not be easy to imagine any third mode materially different, which could rationally be pro- posed. As the Court, for reasons already given, ought to be numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by every man, who can compare the extent of the public wants with the means of supplying them ; the second will be espoused with caution by those who will seri- ously consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed over the whole Union ; the injury to the innocent, from the procrastinated determination of the charges which might be brought against them ; the advantage to the guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford to intrigue and corruption ; and in some cases the detri- ment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might have exposed them to the persecution of an intemperate The Federalist. 459 or designing majority in the House of Representatives Though this latter supposition may seem harsh, and might not be likely often to be verified, yet it ought not to be forgotten that the demon of faction will, at cer- tain seasons, extend his sceptre over all numerous bod- ies of men. But though one or the other of the substitutes which have been examined, or some other that might be de- vised, should be thought preferable to the plan, in this respect, reported by the Convention, it will not follow that the Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected. If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of Government, until every part of it had been adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a des- ert. Where is the standard of perfection to be found ? Who will undertake to unite the discordant opinions of a whole community, in the same judgment of it; and to prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his in- fallible criterion for the fallible criterion of his more con~ ceiled neighbor ? To answer the purpose of the adver- saries of the Constitution, they ought to prove, not merely that particular provisions in it are not the best which might have been imagined, but that the plan upon the whole is bad and pernicious. PUBUUS. 460 m The Federalist. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 11, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. LXV. To the People of the State of New York: A RE VIEW of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed Court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the re- mains of any unfavorable impressions which may still exist in regard to this matter. The first of these objections is, that the provision in question confounds Legislative and Judiciary authori- ties in the same body, in violation of that important and well-established maxim which requires a separation be- tween the different departments of power. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascer- tained in another place, and has been shown to be en- tirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those de- partments for special purposes, preserving them, in the main, distinct and unconnected. This partial inter- mixture is even, in some cases, not only proper, but ne- cessary to the mutual defence of the several members of the Government against each other. An absolute or qualified negative in the Executive upon the acts of the Legislative foody, is admitted by the ablest adepts in political science, to be an indispensable barrier against the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may, perhaps, with no less reason be contended, that the powers relating to impeachments are, as before in- timated, an essential check in the hands of that body upon the encroachments of the Executive. The division of them between the two branches of the Legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the The Federalist. 461 right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and Judges ; and guards against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches. As the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate will be requi- site to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire. It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men who profess to admire, without excep- tion, the Constitution of this State ; while that Consti- tution makes the Senate, together with the Chancellor and Judges of the Supreme Court, not only a Court of Impeachments, but the highest Judicatory in the State, in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in point of numbers, of the Chancellor and Judges to the Senators, is so inconsiderable, that the Judiciary au- thority of New York, in the last resort, may, with truth, be said to reside in its Senate. If the plan of the Con- vention be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure from the celebrated maxim which has been so often mentioned, and seems to be so little understood, how much more culpable must be the Constitution of New York?* A second objection to the Senate, as a Court of Im- peachments, is, that it contributes to an undue accumu- lation of power in that body, tending to give to the Government a countenance too aristocratic. The Sen- ate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with .he Executive in the formation of treaties and in the appointment to offices : if, say the objectors, to these Drerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of * In that of Xew Jersey, also, sylvania, and South Carolina, one the final judiciary authority is in a branch of the Legislature is the oranch of the Legislature. In New Court for the trial of impeach' Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn- ments. — Publius. 462 The Federalist. impeachment, it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial influence. To an objection so little precise in itself, it is not easy to find a very precise answer. Where is the measure or criterion to which we can ap- peal, for determining what will give the Senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of influ- ence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more sim- ple, to dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to examine each power by itself, and to decide, on general principles, where it may be deposited with most advan- tage and least inconvenience ? If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelli- gible, if not to a more certain result. The disposition of the power of making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the Convention, will, then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully justified by the considerations stated in a former number, and by others which will occur un- der the next head of our inquiries. The expediency of the junction of the Senate with the Executive, in the power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the same head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last paper must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving, that it was not easy, if practicable, to find a more fit receptacle for the power of determining impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If this be truly the case, the hypothetical dread of the too great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from our reasonings. But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the Senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of historical examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the most popular branch of every Government, partaking of the republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the People, will be as The Federalist. 463 generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member of the Government. But independent of this most active and operative principle, to secure the equilibrium of the National House of Representatives, the plan of the Convention has provided in its favor several important counterpoises to the additional authorities to be conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive privilege of originating money bills will belong to the House of Representatives. The same House will possess the sole right of instituting im- peachments : is not this a complete counterbalance to that of determining them ? The same House will be the umpire in all elections of the President, which do not unite the suffrages of a majority of the whole number of Electors ; a case which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of in- fluence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the more important will appear this ultimate, though contin- gent power, of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious citizens of the Union, for the first office in it. It would not perhaps be rash to predict, that as a mean of influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate. A third objection to the Senate as a Court of Im- peachments, is drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments to office. It is imagined that they would be too indulgent Judges of the conduct of men, in whose official creation they had participated. The principle of this objection would condemn a practice, which is to be seen in all the State Governments, if not in all the Governments with which we are acquainted : I mean that of rendering those who hold offices during pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of those who ap- point them. With equal plausibility might it be alleged in this case, that the favoritism of the latter would al- i64 The Federalist. ways be an asylum for the misbehavior of the former. Bat that practice, in contradiction to this principle, pro- ceeds upon the presumption, that the responsibility of those who appoint, for the fitness and competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice, and the in- terest they will have in the respectable and prosperous administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient dispo- sition to dismiss from a share in it all such, who, by their conduct, shall have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed in them. Though facts may not al ways correspond with this presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy the supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the Ex- ecutive, should feel a bias, towards the objects of that choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so extraordinary, as to have induced the Represent- atives of the Nation to become its accusers. If any further arguments were necessary to evince the improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of the agency of the Senate in the business of appointments. It will be the office of the President to nominate, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint. There will, of course, be no exertion of choice on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another ; but they cannot themselves choose — they can only ratify or re- ject the choice of the President. They might even en- tertain a preference to some other person, at the very mo- ment they were assenting to the one proposed ; because there might be no positive ground of opposition to him ; and they could not be sure, if they withheld their as- sent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their own favorite, or upon any other person in their es- timation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus it could hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate The Federalist. 465 would feel any other complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it destroy. A fourth objection to the Senate, in the capacity of a Court of Impeachments, is derived from their union with the Executive in the power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would constitute the Senators their own Judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. After having combined with the Execu- tive in betraying the interests of the Nation in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of their being made to suffer the punishment they would deserve when they were themselves to decide upon the accusa- tion brought against them for the treachery of which they had been guilty? This objection has been circulated with more earnest- ness, and with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared against this part of the plan ; and yet I am deceived, if it does not rest upon an erroneous foundation. The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers and charac- ters of those who are to make them. The joint agency of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of two thirds of the members of a body selected by the collective wis- dom of the Legislatures of the several States, is designed o be the pledge for the fidelity of the National Coun- cils in this particular. The Convention might with pro- priety have meditated the punishment of the Executive, for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the conduct of the negotiations com- mitted to him; they might also have had in view the punishment of a few leading individuals in the Senate, who should have prostituted their influence in that body Bis the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption : but 466 The Feeder alist. they could not, with more or with equal propriety, have contemplated the impeachment and punishment of two thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty, than of a majority of that or of the other branch of the National Legislature, consenting to a pernicious or un- constitutional law : a principle which, I believe, has never been admitted into any Government. How, in fact, could a majority of the House of Representatives impeach themselves ? Not better, it is evident, than two thirds of the Senate might try themselves. And yet what reason is there, that a majority of the House of Representatives, sacrificing the interests of the soci- ety by an unjust and tyrannical act of legislation, should escape with impunity, more than two thirds of the Sen- ate, sacrificing the same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power ? The truth is, that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom, and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the body, that the members of it should be exempt from punishment for acts done in a collective capacity ; and the security to the society must depend on the care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their inter- est to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good. So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Exec- utive in perverting the instructions, or contravening the views of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence, or to vindicate their own authority. We may thus far count upon their pride, if not upon their virtue. And so far even as might concern the cor- ruption of leading members, by whose arts and influence the majority may have been inveigled into measures odious to the community, if the proofs of that corruption should be satisfactory, the usual propensity of humar The Federalist. 467 nature will warrant us in concluding that there would be commonly no defect of inclination in the body to divert the public resentment from themselves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their mismanagement and dis- grace. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 11, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVI. To the People of the State of New York : THE Constitution of the Executive department of the proposed Government, claims next our attention. There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the ar- rangement of it than this ; and there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed against with less candor or criticised with less judgment. Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation. Calculating upon the aversion of the People to monarchy, they have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the intended President of the United States ; not merely as the embryo, but as the full-grown progeny of that detested parent. To es- tablish the pretended affinity, they have not scrupled to draw resources even from the regions of fiction. The authorities of a magistrate, in few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a Governor of New York, have been magnified into more than royal prerog- atives. He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor to those of a King of Great Brit- 468 The Federalist ain. He has been shown to us with the diadem spar- kling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions and mistresses, giving audience to the Envoys of foreign potentates, in all the supercilious pomp of majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and volup- tuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the ex- aggerated scene. We have been taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering janizaries ; and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio. Attempts so extravagant as these to disfigure, or it might rather be said, to metamorphose the object, render it necessary to take an accurate view of its real nature and form : in order as well to ascertain its true aspect and genuine appearance, as to unmask the disingenuity, and expose the fallacy of the counterfeit resemblances which have been so insidiously, as well as industriously, propagated. In the execution of this task, there is no man who would not find it an arduous effort either to behold with moderation, or to treat with seriousness the devices, not less weak than wicked, which have been contrived to pervert the public opinion in relation to the subject. They so far exceed the usual, though unjustifiable li- censes of party artifice, that even in a disposition the most candid and tolerant, they must force the sentiments which favor an indulgent construction of the conduct of political adversaries to give place to a voluntary and un- reserved indignation. It is impossible not to bestow the imputation of deliberate imposture and deception upon the gross pretence of a similitude between a King of Great Britain and a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the President of the United States. It is still more impossible to withhold that imputation from the rash and barefaced expedients which have been employed to give success to the attempted imposition. The Federalist. 469 In one instance, which T cite as a sample of the general spirit, the temerity has proceeded so far as tc ascribe to the President of the United States a powei which by the instrument reported is expressly allotted to the Executives of the individual States. I mean the power of filling casual vacancies in the Senate. This bold experiment upon the discernment of his countrymen, has been hazarded by a writer who (what- ever may be his real merit) has had no inconsiderable share in the applauses of his party ; * and who, upon this false and unfounded suggestion, has built a series of observations equally false and unfounded. Let him now be confronted with the evidence of the fact; and let him, if he be able, justify or extenuate the shameful outrage he has offered to the dictates of truth, and to the rules of fair dealing. The second Clause of the second Section of the sec- ond Article empowers the President of the United States " to nominate, and by and with the advice and | consent of the Senate, to appoint Ambassadors, other i public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme I Court, and all other officers of the United States, I whose appointments are not in the Constitution other- " wise provided for. and which shall be established by " law." Immediately after this Clause follows another in these words : " The President shall have power to fill 1 up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of ' the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire 1 at the end of their next session." It is from this last provision that the pretended power of the President to fill vacancies in the Senate has been deduced. A slight attention to the connection of the Clauses, and to the obvious meaning of the terms, will satisfy us that the deduction is not even colorable. The first of these two Clauses, it is clear only provides * See Cato, No. V. — Publius. 470 The Federalist. a mode for appointing such officers, " whose appoint- " ments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitu- " tion, and which shall be established by law ; " of course it cannot extend to the appointment of Senators, whose appointments are otherwise provided for in the Constitu- tion,* and who are established by the Constitution, and will not require a future establishment by law. This position will hardly be contested. The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, can- not be understood to comprehend the power of filling vacancies in the Senate, for the following reasons: — First. The relation in which that Clause stands to the other, which declares the general mode of appointing officers of the United States, denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to the other ; for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to which the general method was inadequate, The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and Senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate ; but as it would have been improper to oblige this body to be con- tinually in session for the appointment of officers, and as vacancies might happen in their recess, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President, singly, to make temporary ap- pointments " during the recess of the Senate, by grant- ing commissions which should expire at the end of " their next session." Secondly. If this Clause is to be considered as supplementary to the one which precedes, the vacancies of which it speaks must be construed to relate to the " officers " described in the preceding one ; and this, we have seen, excludes from its description the members of the Senate. Thirdly. The time within which the power is to operate, " during the recess of the * Article 1, Section 3, Clause 1. — Publius. The Federalist. 471 u Senate," and the duration of the appointments, "to the I end of the next session " of that body, conspire to elu- cidate the sense of the provision, which, if it had been intended to comprehend Senators, would naturally have referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the recess of the State Legislatures, who are to make the permanent appointments, and not to the recess of the National Senate, who are to have no concern in those appointments ; and would have extended the duration in office of the temporary Senators to the next session of the Legislature of the State, in whose representation the vacancies had happened, instead of making it to ex- pire at the end of the ensuing session of the National Senate. The circumstances of the body authorized to make the permanent appointments would, of course, have governed the modification of a power which re- lated to the temporary appointments ; and as the National Senate is the body, whose situation is alone contemplated in the Clause upon which the suggestion under examination has been founded, the vacancies to which it alludes can only be deemed to respect those officers in whose appointment that body has a concur- rent agency with the President. But lastly, the first and second Clauses of the third Section of the first Article, not only obviate all possibility of doubt, but destroy the pretext of misconception. The former provides, that " the Senate of the United States shall be composed of " two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legisla- " hire thereof for six years ; " and the latter directs, that, i: if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation If or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of k ' any State, the Executive thereof may make tempo- rary appointments until the next meeting of the Legis- K lature, which shall then fill such vacancies." Here is an express power given, in clear and unambiguous terms, to the State Executives, to fill the casual vacan- 472 The Federalist. cies in the Senate, by temporary appointments ; which not only invalidates the supposition, that the Clause before considered could have been intended to confer that power upon the President of the United States, but proves that this supposition, destitute as it is even of the merit of plausibility, must have originated in an intention to deceive the People, too palpable to be obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated by hypocrisy. I have taken the pains to select this instance of mis- representation, and to place it in a clear and strong light, as an unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which are practised, to prevent a fair and impartial judgment of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the consideration of the People. Nor have I scrupled, in so flagrant a case, to allow myself in a severity of ani- madversion, little congenial with the general spirit of these papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any candid and honest adversary of the proposed Government, whether language can furnish epithets of too much asperity, for so shameless and so prostitute an attempt to impose on the citizens of America. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, March 14, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVII. To the People of the State of New York : THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States, is almost the only part of the sys- tem, of any consequence, which has escaped without se« vere censure, or which has received the slightest mark of The Federalist. 473 approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit, that the election of the President is pretty well guarded.* I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for. It was desirable, that the sense of the People should operate in the choice of the person to whom so impor- tant a trust was to be confided. This end will be an- swered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the People for the special purpose, and at the particular conjunct- ure. It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circum- stances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious com- bination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of per- sons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations. It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little op- portunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magis- trate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the Government, as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice of several, to form an intermediate body of Elec- tors, will be much less apt to convulse the community, with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of one who was himself to be the final object of * Vide FcederaJ Farmer. — Publius. 474 The Federalist. the public wishes. And as the Electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the People, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place. Nothing was more to be desired than that every prac- ticable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican Government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an im- proper ascendant in our Councils. How could they bet- ter gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the Chief Magistracy of the Union ? But the Con- vention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to de- pend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes ; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the People of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibil- ity to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office No Senator, Representative, or other person holding a olace of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the Electors. Thus without corrupt- ing the body of the People, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their de- tached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satis- factory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion -»f it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace bo considerable a number of men, requires time as weL 1 The Federalist. 475 as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to em- bark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which, though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty. Another, and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the People themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his com- plaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the dura- tion of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his reelection to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the soci- ety for the single purpose of making the important choice. All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the Convention ; which is, that the People of each State shall choose a number of persons as Electors, equal to the number of Senators and Repre- sentatives of such State in the National Government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the National Government ■ and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes, will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to cen- tre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to-be conclusive, it is provided, that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates, who shall have the five high- est number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office. The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any \aaan who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the 476 The Federalist. requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State ; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to es- tablish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it, as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a con- stant probability of seeing the station filled by characters preeminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Con- stitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the Executive in every Government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says, " For forms of Government let fools contest — " That which is best administered is best — " yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good Government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration. The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same man- ner with the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the ] atter. The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice- President, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that descrip- tion. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the Convention in this respect. One is, that to se- cure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the Senator of The Federalist. 477 any State from his seat as Senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in re- gard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme Executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election pre- scribed for the one, apply with great, if not with equal force, to the manner of appointing the other. It is re- markable, that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie against the Consti- tution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the People at large, who presides in the Sen- ate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Govern- or, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities, and dis- charge the duties of the President. PUBLIUS. [From the New York Packet, Friday, March 14, 1788.] THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVIII. To the People of the State of New York : T PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the ■- proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the oian of the Convention. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard to it. The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the Executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison car 478 The Feeder a list. be grounded ; for if, in this particular, there be a resem« blance to the King of Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the Khan of Tar- tary, to the man of the seven mountains, or to the Gov- ernor of New York. That magistrate is to be elected for four years : and is to be reeligible as often as the People of the United States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances, there is a total dissimilitude be- tween him and a King of Great Britain, who is an hered- itary monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever ; but there is a close anal- ogy between him and a Governor of New York, who is elected for three years, and is reeligible without limi- tation or intermission. If we consider, how much less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States, we must con- clude that a duration of four years for the Chief Magis- trate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a duration of three years for a correspondent office in a single State. The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office ; and would afterwards be liable to prosecu- tion and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the King of Great Britain is sacred and invio- lable ; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable ; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a National revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a Governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the Governors of Maryland and Delaware The Federalist. 479 The President of the United States is to have power to return a Bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the Legislature, for reconsideration ; and the Bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsidera- tion, it be approved by two thirds of both Houses. The King of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute neg- ative upon the Acts of the two Houses of Parliament. The disuse of that power for a considerable time past, does not affect the reality of its existence ; and is to be ascribed wholly to the Crown's having found the means of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gain- ing a majority in one or the other of the two Houses, to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could sel- dom be exerted without hazarding some degree of Na- tional agitation. The qualified negative of the Presi- dent differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign ; and tallies exactly with the revision- ary authority of the Council of Revision of this State, of which the Governor is a constituent part. In this respect, the power of the President would exceed that of the Governor of New York, because the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the Chancel- lor and Judges ; but it would be precisely the same with that of the Governor of Massachusetts, whose Constitu- tion, as to this Article, seems to have been the original from which the Convention have copied. The President is to be the " Commander-in-Chief of "the army and navy of the United States, and of the " militia of the several States, when called into the act- * ual service of the United States. He is to have power " to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against * the United States, except in cases of impeachment; to " recommend to the consideration of Congress such u measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; "to convene, on extraordinary occasions, both Houses H of the Legislature, or either of them, and, in case of 480 The Federalist. U disagreement between them with respect to the time of " adjournment, to adjourn them to such time as he shall "think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully "executed ; and to commission all officers of the United " States." In most of these particulars, the power of the President will resemble equally that of the King of Great Britain, and of the Governor of New York. The most material points of difference are these: — First The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the Nation, as by Legisla- tive provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. The King of Great Britain, and the Gov- ernor of New York, have at all times the entire com- mand of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. In this Article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the Monarch, or the Governor. Secondly. The President is to be Com- mander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect, his authority would be nom- inally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direc- tion of the military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confederacy: while that of the Brit- ish King extends to the declaring of war and to the rais- ing' and regulating of fleets and armies ; all which by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the Legislature.* The Governor of New York, on * A writer in a Pennsylvania pa- II., Chap. 6, it was declared to be in per, under the signature of Tamony, the King alone, for that the sole has asserted that the King of Great supreme government and command Britain owes his prerogative as Com- of the militia within his Majesty's mander-in-Chief to an annual mu- realms and dominions, and of all tiny bill. The truth is, on the con- forces by sea and land, and of all trary, that his prerogative, in this forts and places of strength, ever respect, is immemorial, and was only was and is the undoubted right of disputed, "contrary to all reason his Majesty and his royal predeces- " and precedent," as Blackstone, sors, Kings and Queens of England vol. 1, page 262, expresses it, by the and that botih or either House of Long Parliament of Charles L; but Parliament cannot nor ought to pre by the statute the 13th of Charles tend to the same. — Publius. The Federalist. 481 the other hand, is by the Constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and navy. But the Constitutions of several of the States expressly de- clare their Governors to be Commanders-in-Chief, as well of the army as navy ; and it may well be a ques- tion, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachu- setts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective Governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States. Thirdly, The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, except those of impeachment The Governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in those of impeachment, except for treason and murder. Is not the power of the Governor, in this Article, on a calculation of political consequences, greater than that of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the Government, which have not been matured into actual treason, may be screened from punishment of every kind, by the interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. If a Governor of New York, therefore, should be at the head of any such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened into actual hostility, he could insure his accomplices and adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union, on the other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could vihelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps, be a greater temptation to undertake, and persevere in an en- terprise against the public liberty, than the mere pros- pect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry ? Would this last expectation have any influence at all, when the probability was com- puted, that the person who was to afford that exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of the VOL. i. 31 482 TJie Federalist. measure ; and might be incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired impunity? The better to judge of this matter, it will be necessary to recollect, that, by the proposed Constitution, the offence of treason is limited " to levying war upon the United States, and " adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and com- " fort ; " and that by the laws of New York it is confined within similar bounds. Fourthly. The President can only adjourn the National Legislature, in the single case of disagreement about the time of adjournment. The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Par- liament. The Governor of New York may also pro- rogue the Legislature of this State for a limited time ; a power which, in certain situations, may be employed to very important purposes. The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. The King of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the Nation, in all foreign transactions. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other description. It has been insinuated, that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, and that his conventions with foreign powers are subject to the revision, and stand in need of the ratification of Par- liament. But I believe this doctrine was never heard o^ until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every jurist* of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the Crown in its utmost plenitude ; and that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most complete legal va- lidity and perfection, independent of any other sanction. The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the * Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 257. — Publius The Federalist. 483 stipulations in a new treaty ; and this may have possi- bly given birth to the imagination, that its cooperation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty But this Parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system of revenue and commer- cial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of the treaty ; and of adapting new provisions and pre- cautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine from running into disorder. In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sov- ereign. The one can perform alone what the other can only do with the concurrence of a branch of the Legis- lature. It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the power of the Foederal Executive would exceed that of any State Executive. But this arises naturally from the exclusive possession by the Union of that part of the sovereign power which relates to treaties. If the Con- federacy were to be dissolved, it would become a ques- tion, whether the Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that delicate and important pre- rogative. The President is also to be authorized to receive Am- bassadors, and other public Ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the Government; and it was far more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be a necessity of convening the Legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign Minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor. The President is to nominate, and, with the advice and wnsent of the Senate, to appoint Ambassadors and other 4S4 The Federalist. public Ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The King of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices. He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure ; and has the disposal of an immense number of Church preferments. There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the President, in this particular, to that of the British King; nor is it equal to that of the Governor of New York, if we are to interpret the meaning of the Constitution of the State by the practice which has obtained under it. The power of appointment is with us lodged in a Coun- cil, composed of the Governor and four members of the Senate, chosen by the Assembly. The Governor claims, and has frequently exercised the right of nomination, and is entitled to a casting vote in the appointment. If he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds it in the article of the casting vote. In the National Government, if the Senate should be divided, no ap- pointment could be made : in the Government of New York, if the Council should be divided, the Governor can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination.* If we compare the publicity which ,xnust necessarily attend the mode of appointment by the President and an entire branch of the National Legislature, with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the Governor of New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most four, and frequently with only two persons ; and if we * Candor, however, demands an tionally questioned. And independ- acknowledgment, that I do not ent of this claim, when we take into think the claim of the Governor to view the other considerations, and a right of nomination well founded, pursue them through all their con- Yet it is always justifiable to reason sequences, we shall be inclined to from the practice of a Government, draw much the same conclusion. — till its propriety has been constitu- Publius. The Federalist. 485 at the same time consider, how much more easy it must be to influence the small number of which a Council of Appointment consists, than the considerable number of which the National Senate w T ould consist, we cannot hesitate to pronounce, that the power of the Chief Ma- gistrate of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be greatly superior to that of the Chief Ma- gistrate ©f the Union. Hence it appears, that except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the Article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the Governor of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretence for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the King of Great Britain. But to render the contrast, in this respect, still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group. The President of the United States would be an offi cer elected by the People for four years : the King of Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary Prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace : the person of the other is sacred and inviola- ble. The one would have a qualified negative upon the Acts of the Legislative body : the other has an absolute negative. The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the Nation : the other, in addition to this right, possesses that of declaring war, and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the Legislature in the formation of treaties : the other is the sole possessor of the power of making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices : the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can confer no 486 The Federalist. privileges whatever: the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners ; can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rales concerning the commerce or currency of the Nation : the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can estab- lish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and meas- ures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of for- eign coin. The one has no particle of spiritual juris- diction : the other is the supre