0- ,>^",. \^^ ■;■ ^0^ _.■''"'. -^ -^. %6<' \>^ -^ .'^^' 9^ .^■^ f^ ^ '^ '^r v.^^ 9^* ,^' cS ^. ^.>.\^ cS r,^^ V>' '•^. %^5&&*.^ r^"^"^ *^ / %-0< .0- V <. -^^ ,SL> -^. -^-.. . / ^- ^: ..-,... .^ i^^ ^• oH .x'^^' y o h '-.^' ^^ "=^^^0^ -^^ C . .^^'' ^<^ '•^ ^^" -^ ^..s^ ,^^^. 0- ^-'-.<^ - V ' t> 4- s '' A^ A"^ % % ^^^ °^- .A^^ .xN ^^ . ■> o , < ''f. ^.v.^' v^^ x^' '%,^^ .^^ ^^" ^^• '^, '\ -1^ ^^^.^'^ ^-p ^^^ ^- '^r. .O0<- vV '% ,sX^ ^/.O^ ■^^ o\- A^ '-^^ r:^^ ^^ ^^..<^' ><. .<^^ ■:f' >A'" <. ^^- o< c9' %-0^ ^^ A^' '-fi -<^. .v\- 0.^' ^'^^ -^' ,% V-' <. ^^ rO- ^z.0< A^^ ^^• \^ rO- > ^ . < '\^' A .<^' ,v5 O,, ^<^ X^-'o^ 0- ^'^'^ ^^^ '■''^'4 <^' j^' <^' ^-<. '^- ^^ -9 ^ ^^. -^^0^ cH .^ ^. /^ %'^^^^ ■"^^0^ <.^ a >■ c:^^ '^ ..N .^^ ^- .%:--\^ .x^'^ ^..<^^^ ^^ "-f ^•■^ FRENCH POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE OF 1778 EDWARD S. CORWIN, Ph.D. Proi>essor of Politics, Princeton University; Author of "National Supremacy," "The Doctrine of Judicial Review," Etc. "La Diplomatie . . . ne pent, elle ne doit avoir qu'tin but, la force et la grandeur du pays qu'etle reprtitente." — Capejigue. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1916 f Copyright, 1916, by PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PhESS Published June, 1916 JUL -8 i9l6 / f { TO MY SISTERS "BELOVED ALLIES" THIS BOOK IS AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED J -^ iMi > i^ o PREFACE The materials for the following study were assembled more than ten years ago as a part of work done for the doctorate, at the Universities of Michigan and Pennsylvania. About two years ago I had prepared for publication the por- tion of the present volume comprising, essen- tially, chapters I, V, and VIII-XV, when Mr. P. C. Phillips' The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution appeared, covering much of the ground of several of these chapters. I then decided to enlarge the scope of the volume to that of a general history of the one entangling alliance to which the United States has been party. I have been particularly interested in these pages in emphasizing the idea that France's in- tervention in the American Revolution was moti- vated primarily by her desire to recover her lost preeminence on the Continent of Europe. Writ- ers have sometimes made verbal recognition of this fact, but in the case of American writers at least, they have generally failed to appreciate its really controlling importance for the subject, and in the end have usually contrived — thanks, f vi PREFACE no doubt, to Professor Seeley's famous dictum — to present French intervention as an episode in the British-French struggle for colonial do- -r- minion in the Western Hemisphere rather than ! for what it really was, an episode in the Euro- pean policy of the Ancien JRcgime. A second phase of the general subject to which I have given prominence is the embarrassment which resulted to France from the conflict of interest between her new ally, America, and her heredi- tary ally, Spain, a conflict which greatly en- hanced the difficulty of getting Spain into the war in the first place; which subsequently forced France to make a very restrictive interpretation of certain of her engagements with the United States; and which finally eventuated in the breach of their instructions by the American commissioners at the negotiations of 1782. Last- \y, I have felt that it would be a service to American students to make the materials in Doniol's monumental work more available. These materials, supplemented by the other sources that I have used, will be found, I think, to furnish adequate basis for judgment with ref- erence to most, if not all, of the more important questions likely to suggest themselves to an American student of the Alliance of 1778. In gathering my materials I have incurred ob- ligations to several libraries, which I gladly take this opportunity to acknowledge: to the Penn- PREFACE vii sylvania Historical Society, the American Philo- sophical Society, and the Kidgeway Branch Li- hraries of Philadelphia, for the use of nmneroiis eighteenth century puhlications, both French and Knglish; to the University of Pennsylvania Library, for the use of its extensive collection of materials on the Mercantile System ; to the Har- vard University Library, for the use of the Jared Sparks Manuscripts ; to the American Antiquar- ian Society Library at Worcester, for the use of newspapers of the Revolutionary period; to the Library of Congress for numerous services. I should also note a more special obligation to the staffs of the University of Michigan and the Uni- versity of Pennsylvania Libraries and of the Princeton L^niversity Library, for many courtesies. My other indebtednesses are not extensive, but they are deep. I wish especially to record my grateful recognition of the aid which I received from my teachers. Professors A. C. McLaughlin and W. E. Lingelbach, in the early stages of my labors. E. S. C. May 25, 1916. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I — The Question of Motive 1 II— The Classical System and British Sea-Power 23 III — Vergennes Discovers the American Revolt 54 IV — The Portuguese and Corsair Questions ... 80 V — Florida Blanca Defines Spain's Position. . 105 VI — Vergennes, Alarmist and Propagandist. . . 121 VII — The Treaty of Alliance and Outbreak of War 149 VIII — Spanish Mediation and the Convention of Aranjuez 1T3 IX— The Two Alliances Compared 195 X — The Mississippi and Western Land Ques- tion 217 XI — Sieur Gerard and the Continental Congress 243 XII— The Mission of La Luzerne 263 XIII— The Crisis of the Revolution 284 XIV— Jay's Mission to Spain 318 XV— Jay and the Negotiations of 1782 329 XVI— Profit and Loss 361 Bibliographical Note 379 Appendices 385 Ind X 415 CHAPTER I THE QUESTION OF MOTIVE The great majority of students today would, I suppose, concede that but for our alhance with France, the War of Independence would have ended without independence, and that but for the aid which France lent us secretly in the months ^preceding Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, we should hardly have become allies of His most Christian Majesty, at least on anything like terms of equality. To emphasize the efficacy and indispensability of French aid in the Revolution is, however, only to throw into higher light its aspects of paradox : the oldest and most despotic monarchy of Europe making common cause with rebels against a sister monarchy; a govern- ment on the verge of bankruptcy deliberately provoking a war that, to all appearances cer- tainly, it might have easily avoided. Ignorance of the dangers it invited might conceivably afford a partial explanation of the course taken by the French government in the years between 1776 and 1783, but in fact the explanation is available in onh slight measure. The risk to a monarch in 2 FRENCH POLICY AND promoting rebellion, albeit in another's domin- ions, was clearly present to Louis' mind, while the unfitness of the royal exchequer for the bur- dens of war was pressed upon him by Turgot with all possible insistence. Bancroft explains France's championship of American independence thus: "Many causes combined to produce the alliance of France and the American republic, but the forces which brought all influences harmoniously together, over-ruling the timorous levity of Maurepas and the dull reluctance of Louis XVI was the move- ment of intellectual freedom."^ The important element of truth in this theory is unquestionable. The direction and momentum of French popular sentiment established, to some extent certainly, the possibilities and limitations of French official action, and this sentiment was in turn to no inconsiderable extent the product of the liberalism of the age. Nevertheless, the idea that France ought to intervene, if chance offered, between England and her North Ameri- can colonies in behalf of the latter, came in the first instance, not from the salon but the Foreign Office. And it is not less clear that the precise policy pursued by the French government toward the United States from 1776 on was shaped, not by philosophers but by professional diplomatists. ^History of the United States (Author's last revision), V. 256. See also ib., 264 ff. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 3 Confining then our attention from the outset to the question of what were the official motives of French intervention, we have naturally to con- sider in the first instance the Count de Vergen- nes' argimient in behalf of his program, which eventually became that of the French govern- ment, that however the American situation even- tuated, it carried with it the substantial risk for France of having to come finally to the defense of her Caribbean possessions against an English at- tack; since if England subjugated America she woidd be tempted to turn the large forces she would have on hand to some profitable employ- ment, whereas if she did not, she would make allies of those whom she had lost as subjects in an endeavor to compensate herself at the ex- pense of France." It was a theory calculated to appeal strongly to the French mind of that day and generation. The Seven Years War had been begun by the Britisli govenmient in the midst of negotiations without a word of warning. It had been con- ducted by Chatham in a spirit of ferocious anti- pathy toward France and her ruling House. ^ It had been concluded by a peace which had been ^ Henri Doniol, Uistoire d.i la Participation de la France h I'EtabUnsement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique (Paris, 1886-99), I. 273-5; II. 460, 462-3. Cited hereafter as "Doniol." ^ Expressions of Vergennes' distrust of Chatham will be found in Doniol I. 61-2, 67-72. At the same time he admits in effect the unlikelihood of George Ill's calling him to power, ib., 62. 4 FRENCH POLICY AND roundly denounced by an influential section of the English public for restoring to France Eng- lish conquests in the Caribbean. Moreover, the violence of English party contests was notorious ; and to men to whom it had not yet become evident in what a powerful leash George III held Parlia- ment it was natural to suppose that, rather than incur the penalty of a too long delayed triumph in America, the North ministry would be ready, if worse came to worst, to resort to the most desperate expedients. And not only did the argument in question strike hands with the popular French estimate of British policy; it also countered admirably the strongest argument against French intervention in America, namely, that it meant war with Eng- land. Yet these very considerations should perhaps put us on our guard against too spon- taneously crediting Vergennes with complete sincerity in this matter; or if we decide to ac- cord him that, we should at least remember his owTi warning, that "it is human nature to believe readily that which one desires most ardently."^ The evidence presented by Vergennes to sup- port a plea of self-defense in behalf of France's action in America we shall pass upon later. Here we need only weigh some more general con- siderations militating against that plea: To *Ib., II. 790. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 5 begin with, the risks involved in attempting to aid the Colonies secretly were obvious from the first; yet it is on the increment of danger resulting from his own policy at this point that Vergennes based in part his argument for an open alliance with the Colonies.' Again, by his own argument, the danger that confronted France arose alike from the prospect of English victory and of English defeat in America; yet it will be found that he was quite ready to retreat from his program of alliance with America whenever English victory seemed seriously to impend. ° In other words, it would seem that, while the danger menacing France from the prospect of an immediate Eng- lish triumph in America was one to be awaited in calm — the calm of despair, forsooth — the dan- ger which threatened from the opposite contin- gency was one that must be met half-way. Yet it was the latter contingency precisely which the policy of secret aid was designed to make sure!" But, again, while a British attack upon her Carib- bean possessions would, of course, have forced France to come to their defense, it may be ser- iously doubted whether French official opinion held these possessions after 1763 in sufficient es- teem to have warranted a policy that materially increased the likelihood of a serious war of which ' lb., 724. 'lb., I. 567-75 and 613-31; also II. 536-9, 534-6, 539, and 551-5. • lb., I. 247-8. 6 FRENCH POLICY AND their security would be the main objective.^ In- deed Vergennes himself declared more than once that the French West Indies could offer but slight temptation to English cupidity, that Eng- land already had enough of that sort of thing ;'^ and it is significant that during the negotiations of 1782 he stood ready to surrender some of the most valuable items of these possessions if he could thereby procure Gibraltar for Spain. ^^ Finally, there is good reason for believing that France could, at any time before 1778, have ob- tained from England a specific guaranty of her American holdings — a guaranty which Spain would have been glad to sanction, and which Eng- land would have been slow to violate, so long at any rate as peace continued on the Continent." * See the remarks of M. Abeille, quoted infra. In the same connection one should also recall the pacifist attitude of the French government early in 1777 toward the question of defending Santo Domingo, the obvious explanation of it being the fear of arousing suspicion on the part of Great Britain that vi'ould pre- judice the policy of secret aid: Doniol, II. 234-41, 253, 264-5, 272-5. "lb., II. 643-4; III. 50-1. See also Life of Arthur Lee, I. 361, "76., V. 220. It should also be noted that throughout the war France definitely subordinated obvious opportunities to enlarge her holdings in the West Indies to other objectives. "Au vrai," says Lavisse, "les interets coloniaux paraissaient a Vergennes, corame a presque tous les hommes d'Etat fran^ais, de mediocre importance," Histoire, IX.* 117. "Both at the end of 1776 and in the spring of 1777, the British Government suggested a common disarmament on the part of England, France, and Spain, Doniol, II. 145-54, 232. An earnest advocate of such a plan, which was to be accompanied THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 7 The principal reason for Vergennes' constant employment of the Hne of argument under discus- sion undoubtedly lies in its propagandist use. Before, of course, any diplomatic program could be entered upon it had to receive the assent of the king. Had the idea of an aggressive program been unbiased by other considerations it would probably have had Louis' assent from the start, for ignorant as he was of domestic affairs, he was well versed in dynastic politics and jealous for the honor of his House. But unfortimately for such a program, Louis had ascended the throne promising reforms that forbade ambitious schemes abroad; and besides, an endeavor to by a joint guaranty by tlic parties to it — France, Spain, England, and Portugal — of their possessions in America and the two Indies, was Beaumarchais' friend Lord Rochford, a member of the ministry, Wharton, III. 727-8. Vergennes however had from the first been averse to seeking any sort of understanding with Eng- land, Doniol, I. 51-2; P. C. Phillips, The West in the Dlplonuicy of the American Revolution (Univ. of 111., 1913), 38 fn. 25 and 54 fn. 74; B. F. Stevens, Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783 (London, 1889-98, 25, vols., cited hereafter as SMSS.), Nos. 1533, 1544, and 1549. In Aug., 1777, we find Vergennes arguing against France's accepting n British guaranty of French and Spanish possessions, Doniol, H. 528-9. At the very end of the year, that is after Saratoga, if we are to credit a statement attributed by the Spanish ambas- sador Aranda to Vergennes, tlie English government was offer- ing France the Island of Cape Breton and Nova Scotia, together with extensive rights in the Newfoundland fisheries, if France in return would close her ports to the rebels. Aranda to Florida Blanca, Jan. 31, 1778, Sparks MSS. (Harvard Univ. Library), CI I. See also SMSS., No. 1838. 8 FRENCH POLICY AND strike at England through America involved the naturally unwelcome idea of assisting rebels."^ ^' Nor could Vergennes' calculations stop short with his own sovereign. For the logic of the Family Compact clearly exacted that the Spanish court too should be consulted about measures that might involve it in war. How, then, could the Foreign Office better meet the twofold necessity before it than by giving its program as much as possible of the appearance of a program of de- fense? With Louis the device succeeded, and probably no other would have. At Madrid, on the contraiy, though the argument was plumed especially for the favorite anxieties of that court, it failed utterly; with the result however that the argument of defense had to be pressed upon Louis with fresh insistence, in order to in- duce him to take a line different from that of his imcle and ally. In short, while the argument that England designed to attack her Caribbean possessions assisted materially in bringing France into the Revolution, especially by tending to minimize "* One of the few literary remains of any importance from the hand of I>ouis XVI is a note scribbled on the margin of a Projet of the "Expose des Motifs de la Conduite de la France," etc., of 1779, to protest against Vergennes' assertion that France had only recognized a people already free. "Cette observation," runs the royal gloss, "pourrait autoriser . . . I'Angleterre a aider ouvertc- ment les mecontents si souvent agites en Bretagne, nos protestants, et tous les Francjais discordants d'avec I'autorite royale." Capc- figue, Louis XVI (Paris, 1856), 107-9. See also Appendix IV. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 9 with the king the weightiest consideration against such a project, it does not follow that the defense of these possessions furnished the princi- pal purpose of French intervention. The central core of Vergennes' program from the first was aid to the Americans in the achievement of their independence; and the prospect of American in- dependence necessarily brought into view objec- tives which far overshadowed the security of the French West Indies, either momentary or per- manent. French intervention in the Revolution was, in other words, determined by motives of "aggression" rather than of "defense"; which is to say that its real purpose was the upsetting of the status quo in certain particulars rather than its i>reservation in certain others. But in what particulars? Was France's objective territory, or commerce, or was it something less tangible pi,an either of these ? ir ' The possibility that it was territory is raised by the contention of Professor Turner that France hoped in the Revolution to replace Eng- land in Canada and Spain in Louisiana. In sup- port of this thesis Professor Turner adduces first, the testimony of Godoy, "the Prince of Peace," that after the war was over, Vergennes, counting upon the close union between France and Spain, sought to induce the latter, "already so rich in possessions beyond the sea, to give to 10 FRENCH POLICY AND France her ancient colony"; secondly, the fact that during the war Vergennes appeared anxious "to protect the interests of Spain in the country between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi"; and thirdly, a document published in Paris in 1802 under the caption Memoir e historique et politique siw la Louisiane par M. de Vergennes.^^ Upon closer scrutiny each item of this evidence must for one reason or other be disallowed. The reliability of the testimony of Godoy, who did not come into power until six years after Ver- gennes' death, is in itself questionable, but even if it be accepted at face value it says nothing of Vergennes' intentions before and dunng the Revolution. Vergennes' attitude during j that period toward Spain's claims to the territory be- tween the Alleghenies and the Mississippi is sufficiently accounted for by his feeling that it was necessary to harmonize the conflictingv^ terests of the United States and Spain, eac. 1 whom was in alliance with France against E. land. The document published in 1802, thou^ \ it may possibly date from the Revolution, was no the work of Vergennes nor yet of any one who spoke for him. Not only does the program that it proposes directly traverse, in its reference to Canada, the pledge of His Most Christian Ma- jesty in article VI of the Treaty of Alliance, re- nouncing "forever the possession ... of any '^American Historical Review, X. 249 flf. THE AIMERICAN ALLIANCE 11 part of the continent" that had lately helonged to Great Britain, but it materially conflicts with the policy which Professor Turner himself ac- knowledges that Vergennes pursued, of support- ing Spain's claims in the region between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi. This policy was clearly designed to allay Spain's alarm at the prospects of American independence. The program urged in the Memoire of 1802 proposed, on the contrary, the deliberate aggravation of this alarm as the easiest means of inducing Spain to relinquish Louisiana to the stronger hands of France.^" "See the Memoire, pp. 25-30. Other considerations that forbid the attribution of this document to Vergennes or official asso- ciates of his are the following: It is to be noted that while the anonymous editor of the Memoire assumes to vouch for "the style, the thoughts" of the document as being those of the French secre- tary, he says nothing of a signature, nor does any appear in the published form. The Memoire is also devoid of certain distinctive marks of a French official document addressed to royalty. The most obvious consisting in the failure of the writer (or compiler) ever to refer to France and Spain by the titles of their Bourbon rulers. If we are to rely upon the silence of the Invent aire Som- maire, no memoir on Louisiana exists in the French archives of the date to which the Memoire published in 1803 is assigned by its editor, tiiough several are to be found there of an earlier date from which this one might have been fabricated, and to one of these the editor makes specific reference in a footnote. Further- more, the fact that the Memoire of 1802 was, if at this point we are to follow the editor, found among Vergennes' own papers of itself casts doubt on its ever having been presented to the king. In connection with his statement that "both French and Ameri- can bibliographers have accepted" the "genuineness" of the 12 FRENCH POLICY AND But if France's objective was not territory, perhaps it was commerce ? Unquestionably there was a widespread behef in France early in the Revolution, which was appealed to not only by Memoire, Professor Turner cites only the Voyage a la Louisiane of Baudry des Lozieres. Yet Baudry, while praising the Memoir* for "plusieurs des ses vues qui sont tres sages," directly challenges the assertion that it was the work of Vergennes. "If," says he, *'M. de Vergennes has any part in these memoirs, it is only a very small part." But perhaps the most remarkable feature of the document under consideration is (assuming it to date from before 1783) the ignorance it discloses on the part of its author that by the Treaty of 1763 Florida belonged to Great Britain (see pp. 26 and 30). The Duke of Newcastle is reported to have once ad- dressed a despatch to "the Governor of the Island of Massachu- setts." But Vergennes was neither a British peer nor a spoilsman in office, but a man noted among his contemporaries for the range and accuracy of his information in the field of diplo- macy. It may be safely assumed, therefore, that he was fully aware that France's closest ally had lost an extensive province by the Peace of Paris and had been compensated by France herself with a still more extensive one. Besides, as is shown below, the Mfmoire of 1802, considered as an entity, must by any assumption date from a period later than early January, 1778. Before this however, Holker, in instructions dated Nov. 25, 1777, was informed by the French Foreign Office that his government wished to see England left in possession of Florida, Nova Scotia and Canada, Doniol, II. 616. Upon careful examination of it I am convinced that the Memoire of 1802 comprises two earlier documents loosely joined together by the author of the short address "Au Roi," chapter I, and certain paragraphs of chapter X of the published document. The first of these two earlier documents comprises most of chapters II-X of the Memoire of 1802 and was written before the outbreak of the Seven Years War to refute Great Britain's claim to the region then in dispute between France and Great Britain. It closed with a j)lan of compromise in the form of a proposed treaty between the two nations, which plan is THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE IS the American envoys but by Vergennes himself on occasion, that if France assisted the United States to tlieir independence, American trade touched up at points by the compiler of the 180»' dociunent. The second of the earlier documents was written after the events described in pages 162 to 169 of the published volume — i.e. about 1769 — to protest against tl)e then recent cession of I-ouisiana to Spain. The entire separateness of the two documents is attested by the words with which the second one o])ens ("Ce niemoire a pour but," etc., p. 115), by the vastly different styles of the two documents, and by their diverse spelling of certain proper names. (In the latter connection compare pp. 57 and 150-1; also pp. 61 and 172.) When, then, was this compilation made? Dismissing the editor's assertion that the document was the work of Ver- gennes, but taking the document itself at face value, it was brought togetlM>r after the outbreak of the War of Independence (Chapters I and X), but before the Treaty of Alliance recogniz- ing American independence was known (the United States are always referred to as "colonies" and "provinces" and on p. 180, the compiler speaks of "strengthening the peace "between France and Great Britain"); also during a warlike situation on the Conti- nent (pp. -27 and 10:5, by the com|)iler). But this last condition can be satisfied, for the period between 1775 and 1781, only by supposing the references just cited to have been to the events lead- ing up to the so-called War of the Bavarian Succession. If, then, the Memoire of 1802 is to be assigned as a whole to the period of the American Revolution, it must be placed between late Jan- uary and the middle of March, 1778. We know that, in the months preceding France's intervention, numerous memoirs were transmitted to the Foreign Office, and the Memoire of 1803 may therefore represent one from a sheaf of similar later j)roductions. Doniol I. 242 footnote. Mr. Paul C. Phillips, on the other hand, conjectures plausibly that the document published in 1802 owes its existence to an effort to bolster up Napoleon's then recent acqui-sition of Louisiana, The West in the Diplomacy of the American Reroliition p. 30 fn. 2. 14 FRENCH POLICY AND would turn forthwith to French ports/^ Yet squarely confronted with the theory that this belief had been material in determining his pro- gram, Vergennes unqualifiedly rejected the no- tion. "They perhaps think at Madrid," he wrote after the alliance had been determined upon, "that the interest of acquiring a new trade had principally decided us." But he repelled the suggestion thus: "This motive, assessed at its true worth, can be only a very feeble accessory. American trade, viewed in its entirety and sub- ject to the monopoly of the mother-country, was undoubtedly a great object of interest to the latter and an important source of the growth of her industry and power. But American trade, thrown open as it is to be henceforth to the avid- ity of all nations, will be for France a very petty consideration."^^ These words of Vergennes have, however, no merely negative value ; they bring us in fact to the veiy threshold of the object of our quest. Offi- cial thinking about trade was moulded in the " Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolu- tion (Washington, 1889), II. 79; Deane Papers (N. Y. Hist'l Soc. Cols., 1886), I. 181, 184 ff., 207; Doniol, I. 244. Deane later changed his views on this as well as certain other subjects. In his letter of June 10, 1781, to Robert Morris, he says: "America left at liberty will, I am persuaded, take at least three-fourths of the European articles she wants from Great Britain," Deane Papers, IV. 406. "Doniol III. 140. Madrid received its impression from Aranda, Aranda to Florida Blanca, Jan. 31, 1778, Sparks MSS., CII. THE AMERICAX ALLIANCE 15 eighteentli century in vast part by the categories of what is called "the Mercantile System," and it is the significance of the words just quoted that they show Vergennes to have been of this school. The salient features of Mercantilism mark it at once a system of statecraft rather than of economics, at least in any modern sense of these terms. Thus wealth was identified with that form of it in which, in a period when the machinery of public credit was rudimentary and the usual cement of international alliances was provided by cash subsidies, it was most available for political purposes. Again, the welfare of the subject was assessed for its contribution to the power of the state. Finally, the power of the state was evaluated in the terms furnished by the doctrine of the Balance of Power. But granting these premises and it followed, first, that the prin- cipal advantage to be sought from trade was a balance payable in coin or bullion, and secondly, that the most desirable branch of trade was that which was most susceptible of manipulation to produce such a balance, in other words, colonial trade. For subject as it was, within the laws of nature, to the unlimited control of the mother- country, the colony could be compelled to obtain all its manufactures from the mother-country and to return therefor raw materials and a cash balance. At least, by furnishing the mother- countrv raw materials which she would otherwise 16 FRENCH POLICY AND have to purchase from her pohtical rivals, the colony would contribute directly to the mainten- ance of a favorable balance of trade and, pro tanto, to that of a favorable balance of power, against those rivals. ^'^ " A good general account of the rise of Mercantilism and of its principles is to be found in C. F. Bastable's Commerce of Nations (1899), ch. IV. For an admirable statement of the connection which mercantilist theory and policy established between colonies and commerce, see Prof. C. M. Andrews, American Historical Review, XX. 43 ff. "During the greater part of our colonial period commerce and colonies were correlative terms, unthinkable each without the other," ib. 43. See also the same writer's article, ib., XX. 589 flf., entitled "Anglo-French Commercial Rivalry, 1700- 1750." "France and England were fairly matched rivals, in that their policies were the same, to acquire colonies in the inter- est of trade, shipping, and manufactures, to exclude the foreigner fron) the colonial market, and to make the welfare and wealth of the mother state the first and chief object of the efforts of all, colonies and mother-country alike," ib., 546. It will be noted that Professor Andrews makes welfare the objective of the mercantile policy, but power would perhaps be the better word even for English mercantilism. Note the following passage quoted by Professor Andrews from Otis I-ittle's The State of the Trade of the Northern Colonies Considered (1748), pp. 8-9: "As every state in Europe seems desirous of increasing its trade, and the acquisition of wealth enlarges the means of power, it is necessary, in order to preserve an equality with them, that this kingdom extend its commerce in proportion; but to acquire a superiority due en- couragement ought to be given to such of its branches as will most effectually enrich its inhabitants. As trade enables the subject to support the administration of government, the lessen- ing or destroying that of a rival has the same effect as if this kingdom had enlarged the sources of its own wealth. But as an ascendancy is to be gained by checking the growth of theirs, as well as by the increase of our own, whenever one of these happens to be the consequence of the other to this nation, its figure and THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 17 Applying these considerations to the case of French intervention in the American Revolution, we note at once that by tlie Treaty of Amity and Commerce all privileges of trade were to be "nm- tiial" and none given France but what the United reputation will rise to a greater height than ever." lb., 543 foot- note. In other words, the mercantilist looked beyond the welfare of the subject to the power and reputation of the State, and these he measured by the standard set by the doctrine of the Balance of Power. The same point is also brought out by a passage from Postlethwayt's Britain's (Commercial Interest Explained and Im- proved (1757): "I next enter ui)on the general princijiles whereon the balance of trade is founded — the consideration of which is earnestly recommended to the public regard, in order to throw the balance of trade so effectually into tiie hands of Great Britain as to put the constant balance of power in Europe into her hands," ih., II. 551. See also Gentleman's Maf/azine, XII. 589 (Nov., 174i2): "\ow, that Money is the Sinews of War, is become a proverbial Expression; and, with Kesiicct to (avisse ct Ranibaud, op. cit., VII. 212-14. ^//6., 503-11. 46 FRENCH POLICY AND "The Tragedy of the North" it was that incited BrogHe, the principal agent of the Secret du Roi, to the composition, in collaboration with the ver- satile Favier, of his elaborate Conjectures Rai- sonnees, referred to above. "One would wish in vain," this document begins, "to conceal the rapid degradation of the credit of France in the courts of Europe, not only in consideration but even n dignity. From the primacy among great powe rs she has been forced to descend to a passive role or that of an inferior."^^ Putting then the ques- tion as to the cause of this unhappy transfor- mation, Broglie first assailed "the change of sys- tem produced by the Treaty of Versailles."^^ The preponderance in Europe was the rightful pat- rimony of the French crown: this was a do^rma consecrated by a thousand years.^^ But the Treaty of Versailles had accustomed Europe "to regard France as . . . subject to orders fr^om Austria." To the same cause was it due that France had abandoned her ancient allies Sweden, Poland, Turkey, and the German princes; Pind worse still, that she had made to fill the role of dupe in the recent developments in Poland hnd Turkej^ the result of which was her own re(^uc- tion to the fourth grade of powers.**^ The Family **Segur, I. 212. \ " lb., 212-13. \ "^Ib., 229. *'Ib., 213, 258-64, 303-4; II. 33-4, 64, 88-92. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 47 Compact of 1762, too, had had the worst possible effect upon European opinion, since by it Spain was admitted to virtual equality with France. "France for the first time admitted the equality of another power."^^ Thus far spoke the critic and rival of Choiseul. The longest section of the Conjectures however deals with England and the tone here is signifi- cantly harmonious with that of Choiseul's Me- moire. The attitude of England toward France was that of ancient Rome toward Carthage. England of course did not expect to wipe out the French monarchy ; her inferiority on land forbade the idea. But she had adopted the principle of keeping the French marine reduced, "of watching our ports, of surveying our dockyards and arsen- als, of spoiling our projects, our preparations, our least movements." Her policy in this respect was to be explained in part by that spirit of rapine native to the English people, but also in part by the knowledge of the English ministers that the edifice of English power was still supported by factitious resources and forced means and that its natural tendency, in face of the approaching danger of a schism between the mother-country and her colonies, would be to crumble and dis- solve. In short, it was fear that determined Eng- land's policy toward France, though a fear that knew how to choose its weapons. In view of this "lb., I. 229-30. 48 FRENCH POLICY AND fact, France should know her real strength, should know that her industr3% resources, patriot- ism, and intelligence were sufficient to overturn "the colossus of English power," could she once restore her marine. She should know too that the feeble line of conduct taken with England in the immediate past had but nom-ished English pride and disdain and that what was needed was a firm line of conduct. France's military system and her diplomatic policy must alike sustain the dignity and preeminence of the crown of France on sea as well as on land.^- The influence of the Conjectures Raisonnees upon those who were interested in France's diplo- matic position is beyond all question, and the same is true of Abbe Raynal's contemporaneous Hisfoire des Indes.^'^ "The marine," declared this writer, "is a new kind of power which has given, in some sort, the universe to Europe. This part of the globe, which is so limited, as ac- quired, by means of its fleet, an unlimited empire over the rest, so extended." Yet the benefit of this control had passed, in effect, to one nation alone, England, and with it had passed the bal- ance of power. Such had not always been the case. In the days of Louis XIV France had '"lb., II. 165-97. "Sorel, op. cit., I. 304-10. "La doctrine de Favicr se ram^ne k une proposition essentielle: I'an^antissement de I'Angleterre," ib., 306. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 49 given the law to Europe, and the hasis of lier greatness liad been in her marine. Unfortu- nately, the excesses of that monarch, while cementing the alliance of the maritime states against France, had also turned the martial ener- /, gies of the latter from the fleet to tlie army; and ' so French power luid been doubly undermined." The connection between England's greatness as a colonial power and her influence among the states of the world and the memory of France's greatness under Louis XIV are constantly re- iterated thoughts in Kaynal's pages, and the course to which they incited French sentiment, both official and unofficial, is plain. "Favier," writes Sorel, "made disciples and liaynal proselytes. "^^ ^ France's intervention in the American Revolu- tion is often described as an act of Revenge. The description is less erroneous than incomplete, for while it calls to mind the fact that France had humiliations to be redressed, it fails to indicate the even more important fact that she had also a role to be retrieved. Furthermore, it leaves en- tirely out of account the logic by which, in an Age of Reason, the purpose of either revenge or restoration was brought into relation with a con- crete situation. This logic comprised the foUow- "^ UhUnre des Indes (Paris edition of 1781), V. 203; VII. 208 ff.; IX. 88 ff., 219 ff.; and especially, X. 136 ff. " Sorel, op. cit., I. 309. 50 FRENCH POLICY AND ing ideas: That France was entitled by her wealth, power, and history, to the preponderating influence in Continental affairs ; that she had lost this position of influence largely on account of Great Britain's intermeddling; that Great Bri- tain had been enabled to mingle in Continental concerns by virtue of her great naval strength, her commercial prosperity, and her preparedness to maintain Continental subsidiaries; that these in turn were due in great part to her American colonial empire and especially to the policies con- trolling her trade therewith; that America, be- come independent, would be an almost total loss from the point of view of British interests; that this loss would mean a corresponding diminution of British power; that since the two were rivals, whatever abased the power of Great Britain would elevate the power of France. By calling into existence the New World, France would V "redress the balance of the Old." But while these ideas define the principal ad- vantage which France hoped to obtain from the course she took, there were also supporting ideas that should not be lost to view. For one thing, it was by no means impossible that whether she intervened or not in behalf of the American rebels, France would find herself, sooner or later, at war with Great Britain in defense of the French West Indies. Again, it had for centuries been France's role to back the smaller fry against THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 51 her greater rivals. Again, it was generally felt that, formidable as it was at the moment, British power was in reality more or less spurious. Fur- thermore, recent diplomatic developments had most miraculously paved the way for French in- tervention in North America. The withdrawal of France from Canada had left Amei'ica no reason to fear her; the Family Compact convenanted the assistance of the Spanish marine; the Austrian alliance constituted a reasonable guaranty of peace on the Continent. Finally, it was felt to be not only allowable but right for France to seize so favorable an opportunity to tear down a power that had been used so outrageously as Eng- land had used her power on the sea. In the end, the project did not lack some of the aspects of a crusade. The primary requisite, however, to an under- standing of Louis XVI's espousal of the cause of American independence is that due weight be given the fact that Europe was still organized on the dynastic principle, and to the further fact, especially noteworthy in the case of the elder branch of the House of Bourbon, that position and influence were the essential objectives of di- plomacy, even in the age of "Benevolent Mon- archy."^ ^ To-day with the voice of the common " Indeed among a people so fond of glory as the French the very security of the crown demanded that the dishonor it had suffered abroad in the detested latter years of Louis XV should be wiped -^ 52 FRENCH POLICY AND man dominant in the direction of society, histori- cal investigators are apt to give too shghting attention to all but bread-and-butter interests as interpretative of the conduct of states. But this is plain anachronism. The doctrine of the equal- away as speedily as possible. "Or la France, passionnee comnie elle etait pour la gloire, et qui aurait excuse bien les fautes du gouvernement interieur, ne pardonna pas au Roi . . . son humilia- tion." Lavisse, Histoire de France, VIII.- 411. It is interesting to note that as early as November, 1775, Burke had predicted French intervention. "He observed, that from being the first, she was, with regard to effective military power, only the fifth state in Europe. That she was fallen below her former rank solely from the advantages we had obtained over her; and that if she could humble us, she would certainly recover her situation." Pari. Hist., XVIII. 9f)7. Eighteen months before this Col. Barre in the debate in Commons on the "Bill for Regulating the Government of Massachusett's Bay," had declared that "during these troubles with our colonies, France would not lie quiet," ib., XVII. 1307. A hint of foreign interference is conveyed in Franklin's "Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a Small One," Works (Ed. Sparks), IV. 396. In a sermon delivered June 6, 1774, in the Second Church of Boston, the Rev. John Lathrop declared, "France and Spain will take satisfaction for their losses in the late War," Pennsylvania Packet, No. 147. In his "Farmer Refuted," which was published in Feb., 1775, Hamilton put the question whether "the ancient rivals and enemies of Great Britain would be idle," in the event of an open breach between Great Britain and her colonies; and answered, that ere this could come about, "the French, from being a jealous, politic, and enterprising i>eo})le, must be grown negligent, stupid, and inat- tentive to their own interest. They coidd never have a fairer opportunity or a greater temptation to aggrandize themselves and triumph over Great Britain than would here be presented." Works (Constitutional Ed.), I. 1(54-5. A year later John Adams raised the same question on the floor of Congress (Mar. 1, 1776). "Is it," he inquired, "the interest of France to stand neuter, to THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 53 ity of man was indeed a tenet of the schools in 1776, but it had made httle headway among- the professional diplomatists, who still assessed the general welfare in terms furnished by the compe- tition for station of rival reigning* houses.''^ join with Britain, or to join with the colonies? Is it not her interest to dismember the Britisii empire? Will her dominions l)e safe if Britain and America remain connected? Can she preserve her possessions in the West Indies? ... In case a reconciliation should take place between Britain and America, and a war should break out between Britain and France would not all her islands be taken from her in six months?" Life and Works, II. 487-8. There was, of course, a strong possibility, even probability, of such a reconciliation at this date. For this and other reasons the danger to France cited by Adams was much more real than after Saratoga. See infra. Adams, at this date, wished only a "commercial" connection with France, and declared flatly against a "political' or "military" connection. "Receive no troops from her," he advised, ib. For some further items on American expec- tation of French aid because of the rivalry between France and England, see the Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser of Boston, issues of July 11, 18, and 25, and Oct. 17, 1776. '^ See further the document given in Appendix II. CHAPTER III YERGENNES DISCOVERS THE AMERICAN REVOLT Louis XVI ascended the throne in May, 1774, and was at once confronted with the task of choos- ing a ministry. The queen, anxious to see the policy of friendship with Austria continued, urged that Choiseul be again called to power. The dull and priggish Louis, however, abhorred both the aggressive talents and tawdry morals of the former minister, and his scruples carried the day. When the new cabinet was formed in the course of June and July the post of chief-minister was assigned to the old and decrepit Count de Maurepas, while that of secretary of state for Foreign Affairs was bestowed upon the Count (3e Vergennes.^ Charles Gravier, later the Count de Vergennes, was born at Dijon, in 1717, of one of those fami- lies of the lesser noblesse whose function it was, under the Old Regime, to replenish the ranks of French officialdom. He began his diplomatic career in 1740 by accompanying his uncle Cha- vigny to the latter's post as ambassador at Libson. ' Lavisse, Histoire de France, IX.' 5, 6. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 55 Six years later he won the praise of Argenson by the clarity of his views on questions then at issue between Portugal and Spain. In 1750 he became minister plenipotentiary at Treves, and a little later His Most Christian Majesty's representa- tive at the Congress of Hanover, where he is said to have shown great dexterity in foiling the de- signs of George II's representative, the Duke of Newcastle. This and other successes brought him four years later the great post of ambassador to Constantinople, where for fourteen years he rep- resented both the official diplomacy and the Secret (lu Roi. Then followed a short term of retire- ment on account of an altercation with Choiseul. But in 1771, at the instance of Aiguillon, he be- came the king's ambassador at Stockholm; and here the year following he successfully engi- neered a coup d'etat, which by transferring the governing power in Sweden from the antiquated and corrupt estates to the king, saved that coun- try from the fate which had just overtaken Poland and was even then overshadowing Turkey." ^ La Grande Enniclopedif, title "Vergennes"; 'Mayazine of Amer- ican History, XIII. 31 if.; Flassan, op. cit., VI. 12-13, 234-58; Arthur Hassall, The Balance of Power (N. Y., 1898), passim; Le Bonneville de Marsangy, Le Checalier de Vergennes, son Am- bassade a, Constantinople (2 Vols.; Paris, 1894); H. Doniol, "Le Ministere des Affaires etrangeres de France sous le Comte de Vergennes," Revue d'Histoire diplomatique, VII. 528-60 (1893). This reference is chiefly valuable for the extracts it contains from *\le "Souvenirs" of Vergennes' friend Hennin, written at the time 56 FRENCH POLICY AND Compared with the brilliant Choiseul, the new secretary is a somewhat prosaic figure, an impres- sion which Carlyle has recorded in the dictum that "M. de Vergennes was a clerk, a mere clerk with his feet under the table." The fact is that, to a taste for methodical employment, and to the minute knowledge of the diplomatic systems of Europe that stirred the admiration of Segur, Vergennes added an ambition for patriotic achievement that was none the less real because it was controlled by the prudence of a man who had risen to station by his own efforts. Nor is the traditional Vergennes less remote from fact, the Vergennes who is pictured to us as "a difficult and dangerous man with whom to have dealings," a washed-out version of the legendary Machia- veUi. It is certain that Vergenne's was no senti- mentalist, for which, however, he is hardly to be blamed, since the happy thought of blending sen- timentalism and diplomacy had not yet occurred to men. On the other hand, the Machiavellian principle that self-interest is the only feasible basis of a public policy was applied by him with certain very essential qualifications and limita- tions. England, it is true, he treated from the outset to a policy of duplicity and falsehood, but that nation, he held, had put herself beyond the of the minister's death. See also a eulogy of Vergennes' Conti- nental policy by Sorel in the Revue historique, XV. 273 ff., and a criticism of the same by Tratchevsky, ib., XVI, 327 ff. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 57 pale. On the Continent itself he sought unre- mittingly to bulwark the status quo behind the maxims of tlie Systeme de Conservation. "Force," he wrote, "can never vest a title, nor convenience bestow a right"; and the partition of Poland he denoimced as "political brigandage." Moreover, he regarded the honor of the king as setting very definite limits beyond which politi- cal advantage was not to be sought. Capable himself of playing the Jesuit with most admired skill when occasion required, yet once the word of His JMajesty was distinctly pledged, he deemed it inviolable. In a word, expert that he was in the use of the conventional weapons of eighteenth century French diplomacy, Vergennes had no thought of casting these aside or of greatly changing them. And the same is true of his attitude toward the accepted axioms of his profession. He believed in the doctrine of the Balance of Power, and till he was disillusioned by the results of the Ameri- can Revolution, in the tenets of Mercantilism. He adopted without reservation the fundamental postulate of the Classical System, that France by virtue of geographical position, wealth, intel- ligence, and military resources, was entitled to the preponderance in Europe. "France," he wrote in 1778, "placed in the center of Europe has the right to influence all great affairs. Her king, comparable to a supreme judge, is entitled 58 FRENCH POLICY AND to regard his throne as a tribunal set up by Provi- dence to make respected the rights and properties of sovereigns."^ Alas! in 1774, the age-long prerogative of France was in eclipse, her pres- tige dimmed. "Among all nations," he after- ward declared of this period, the opinion prevailed that France no longer had either will or resources. The envy which till then had governed the policy of other courts toward France became con- tempt. The cabinet of Versailles had neither influence nor credit in any quarter. Instead of being, as formerly, the center of all great affairs, it became their idle spec- tator. Everywhere men treated its approval and its disapproval as alike negligible.^ It was a situation that touched him hardly less acutely than if it had been his own personal misfortune. How, then, was France to recover her influ- ence and what use would she make of it, once it was recovered? Like Argenson, Vergennes linked the reputation of the House of Bour- bon with the cause of Continental peace. 'Memoire of Apr. 18, 1778, Flassan VI. 140 flfg. See also Recueil des Instructions, I. (Autriche), 488. See SMSS., No. 861, where Vergennes compares the wealth of France and Great Britain favorably to France. At the same time he envied the British gov- ernment the facility with which it commanded the resources of the realm. "Nous avons assurement," he wrote, "des resources plus reelles que I'Angleterre, mais il s'en faut bien que le jeu en soit aussi facile. Cela tient a une opinion qui ne pent pas s'etablir dans une monarchic absolue comme dans une monarchic mixte." Doniol, II. 18. *Ib., I. 3-4. See also Sorel, op. cit., I. 309. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 59 Like Broglie, he censured the overestimation of the Austrian connection that had eventuated in neglect of France's guardianship of the Peace of Westphaha, "one of the most beautiful jewels" of the Gallic crown. On the other hand, follow- ing Choiseul, he admitted that the Austrian al- liance, kept within due bounds, might yet prove useful to France in that its tendency was to pre- vent England and Austria from striking hands once more. It thus guaranteed, he argued, the peace of the Continent, where France could de- sire only peace, and, by the same sign, it left France at liberty "to direct her efforts to counter- balancing the power of England, whose naval superiority most necessarily enlisted her fore- sight." Finally, from the same point of view, /fie acclaimed the Family Compact as the very "cornerstone of France's whole system./ This connection, it was true, required France always to stand ready to come to the defense of Spain's vast possessions beyond the sea, but it was, for all that, more valuable to France than to Spain. England was loath to break with Spain on ac- coimt of her profitable commerce there, from which she drew riches and employment, while with France no such motive held her back. "If there is anything capable of giving England pause, it is the thought of France and Spain united: it is the certainty that the first cannon- 60 FRENCH POLICY AND shot directed at the one or the other will be an- swered by both."^ None the less, it would seem that at the moment of taking office Vergennes' policy looked toward an effort at amity with England; and it is cer- tain that he first assessed the American revolt as guaranteeing England's continued peaceableness rather than as furnishing a fulcrum for an ac- tively anti-English policy.*' For this there were three reasons: In the first place, the American business itself was still much "in the vague." Again, Vergennes was aware that Louis had taken the throne pledged to a program of econ- omy and internal reform and to this program, he naturally assumed, diplomatic programs would have to be subordinated.^ Finally, in July, 1774, by the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji Russia had established herself on the shores of the Black Sea in territory wrested from Turkey. Alarmed at the prospect of a repetition of what had just oc- curred in Poland, as well as for France's monop- oly of the Levantine trade, Vergennes felt that his first attention must be given to the South- * "Instructions to the Baron de Breteuil," Deo. 28, 1774, Re- cueil des Instructions, I. 478 fFg. ; "Expose succinct" of Dec. 8, 1774, Doniol I. 14 ff. *Jb., I. 13, 40. 'See Recueil des Instructions, I. 488: "La grandeur de la puis- sance du Roi, la position de ses Etats et ses soins que sa Majesty est resolve de donner a leur administration interieure, le mettront en effet ... en ^tat de choisir entre tous les syst^mes politiques celui qui conviendra le mieux a ses vues et a ses interets." THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 61 eastern situation. Indeed, he seems at one moment to have considered the possibihty of per- suading England herself to join in an effort to curb Russia's assaults upon the established equilibrium.^ But this attitude was, after all, weakly rooted in a thin soil. Moreover, Turkey's cession of the Chersonese was soon seen to be fait accoiwpli. Vergennes' real disposition toward England found expression in connection with the dispute which began brewing in July, 1774, between Spain and Portugal over some aggressions of the lat- ter in South America. The possibility of war between Portugal and Spain raised the possibil- ity of war between Spain and England and that, in turn, the possibility of war between England and France. Commenting on the report that England desired an amicable settlement of the affair, Vergennes remarked: "We share the wish, rather from necessity than inclination.'"'* And equally illuminative is an episode which oc- curred early in 1775 in connection with the de- struction which the king had just then ordered of the correspondence of the Secret dii Roi. Among the papers about to be consigned to the flames was a plan that had been drawn up by Broglie in 1766 for the invasion of England. Vergennes * See Hassall, The Balance of Power, 320; Recueil des Instnic- tion.s, IX. (Russe), 318-20; and Doniol, T. 15. •Vergennes to Ossun, Oct. 31, 1774, Doniol, I. 33. 62 FRENCH POLICY AND and his associate, the Count du Muy, at once pe- titioned Louis to be allowed to save this docu- ment, a request which was promptly granted/** But all other sources of instruction as to the new secretary's attitude toward England yield place to a document I have already cited more than once, his Expose Succinct, which was pre- pared early in December, 1774. This was, in brief, a plea for military preparation based on a survey of the whole diplomatic situation with which France was then confronted. "People," its author wrote, "respect a nation which they see prepared to make a vigorous resistance and which, without abusing the superiority of its forces, de- sires only that which is just and useful for the whole world, to wit, peace and general tranquil- lity." Unfortunately, however, while this was the objective of diplomacy, diplomacy itself was unable "to fix conclusively the choice of route thereto." It was a truth albeit a trite one, that the longer a peace has endured the less likely is it to continue. The fact that the present peace has lasted twelve years furnishes a strong prejudgment against its further stability. It is then not to transgi"ess the limits of allowable prevision to insist upon the necessity of being ready for any event ; and besides, one is never better assured of peace than when one is in position N^ not to fear war. Opinion, 'tis said, is queen of the world. ^1 ^"Scgur, I. 104-6; Doniol, I. 33-i. "S^gur, I. 169-70; Doniol, I. 20. , THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 63 Nor did Vergerines leave those whom he ad- dressed in doubt as to the practical bearing in the main of these generahzations : If [he wrote] having surveyed the Continent we turn our eyes coastward, do we find there greater pledges of security? We see lying alongside us a nation greedy, restless, more jealous of the prosperity of its neighbors than awake to its own happiness, powerfully armed and ready to strike on the instant. Let us not deceive our- selves; whatever parade the English ministers may make of their pacific intentions, we cannot count upon this disposition longer than their domestic difficulties con- tinue. These however may come to an end, or indeed they may increase to such a point as to cause the government to direct the general uneasiness against ob- jects abroad. It is not without precedent that the cry of a war against France has become the ralhang point of all parties in England. . . . Having nothing to gain with France by the prosecution of a legitimate commerce, England looks with envy upon the vast ex- tent of our plantations in America and our industry in Europe. ^- Rarely has a minister of state drawn a more sinister picture of the purposes and policies of an ostensibly friendly government; and to the pic- ture so delineated, rumor soon added the touch of imminent menace. Within a few days of the preparation of the Expose, Vergennes received ^-Ib., 18-9. Note the point of view revealed by the assertion that England has nothing to gain from "a legitimate commerce with France." 64 FRENCH POLICY AND from Garnier the repoi-t then circulating about London that Chatham had a plan by which peace could be reestablished in America without offense to the dignity of England. This plan, he at once inferred, could only be at the expense of France. True, he wrote Garnier, England was burdened with debts and was the object of universal enmity. True too, George III has little love for Chatham. But the very extremity of the situation in Amer- ica might compel his Britannic Majesty to con- quer his prejudices and call this "enemy of peace" to power once more. His doing so would signal a situation for which desperate remedies had been determined upon and France would have need to beware. ^^ Six weeks later Garnier wrote still more alarmingly. Speaking on his own responsi- bility, he asserted very confidently that if the measures of the existing ministry "do not meet with complete success, the end of the administra- tion will follow immediately and the king will be forced to yield to circumstances and place my lord Chatham at the head of affairs. He will come in clothed with absolute power."^^ There now ensued a considerable pause ; and it was the end of July, 1775, when the Count de Guines wrote that Lord Rochford, a member of the British ministry, had confided to him the be- lief of men in both parties, that the only way '= Vergennes to Gamier, Dec. 26, 1774, ib., 60-2. " Jb., 69. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 65 to end the war in America was to declare war upon France, the argument being that, if con- fronted with the necessity of choosing between England and France, the Americans in fear of seeing the latter once more in Canada would cer- tainly cast in their lot with the former, even at the expense of liberty.^^ A little later advices reached Vergennes by way of Madrid that, even though Chathan did not come again to power — which was improbable — the existing ministers seemed to wish to imitate his way of thinking, from which it resulted that war was not unlikely to break out at the least expected moment. ^"^ Fi- nally in the middle of September Vergennes sent Beaumarchais, the famous author of Figaro, to pump from Rochford, who was an old acquaint- ance of his, further information as to British intentions. /iBeaumarchais, in a letter which was handed the king September 21st, summarized his conclusions thus: "In short, America is lost to the British in spite of their efforts. The war is waged more ferociously in London than in Bos- ton. The crisis will end with war against France if the opposition comes in, whether it is Chatham or Rockingham who replaces Lord North. '^^ "7fc. 116-17. "76., 117-19. See also the letter of Aug. 7 from Louis to Charles III, indicating the former's persuasion of the possibility of war with England, ib., 131-2. "John Durand (Ed.), Documents on the American Revolution (N. Y., 1889), 53-4 66 FRENCH POLICY A>[D Already, however, the secretary's interest in the American situation had ceased to be exclu- sively one of alarmed concern. Thus, late in Au- gust the ambassador had forwarded from London the text of the royal proclamation pronouncing the Americans "rebels," and Vergennes had con- cluded thence that, so long as the existing min- istry remained in office, there was little danger of an alliance between America reconciled and the mother-country, which would turn its combined forces against France and Spain/*^ Further- more, the little likelihood there had been at any time that the arch-enemy of France would come again to power was for the time being at an end. This great man, "the world forgetting, by the world forgot," was now in a mysterious seclusion from which he did not emerge till the beginning of 1777. For many months the name of Chat- ham, its magic in abeyance, drops out of the despatches altogether. ^^* A clue to the new point of view of the Foreign Office is afforded by its response to Guines' de- spatch of September 8th, reporting a statement by Rochford that the American Lee, now in London, had sworn "on his honor" that the col- onists had assurance of aid from France and Spain, and his own positive denial that this ^Doniol, I. 172-4. "» The Correspondence of King George the Third with Lord North, from 1768 to 1783. (Ed. W. B. Donne, London, 1867, 2 vols.), II. 10. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 67 statement had basis in fact. Replying ten days later Vergennes had commended the ambassa- dor's method of parrying his English interlocutor but at the same time had cautioned him against putting anything in writing. "The king," said he, "wishes neither to augment the difficulties of the British government nor to encourage the resistance of the Americans, but neither does it suit his interest to serve as a means of putting , the latter down."^» ^ Late in October Vergennes received the Brit- ish ambassador Stormont and engaged him in an extended conversation on the American situation with the aim, at once, of reassuring the English government as to French intentions and of dis- covering how seriously that government regarded its trans-Atlantic affairs. That which was now happening in America, the French secretary de- clared, he had himself foreseen when as ambassa- dor at Constantinople he had learned of the cession of Canada to England. He then pro- ceeded to suggest that what the Americans were plainly aiming at was independence and to con- jecture the consequences should they attain their object: In that case they would immediately set about form- ing a great marine, and as they have every possible ad- vantage for ship-huilding, [it] would not be long before they had such fleets as would be an overmatch for the "Doniol, 1. 150-1. 68 FRENCH POLICY AND whole naval power of Europe, could it be united against them. ... In the end they would not leave a foot of that hemisphere in the possession of any European power. To these speculations the Englishman assented eagerly.-*^ It is evident that against the back- ground furnished by the siege of Boston, the news of which was already producing an immense stir in Paris, Choiseul's observation that "the balance of power lay in America" revealed a new significance. In the closing days of 1775 the French Foreign Office proceeded, under Vergennes' direction, to formulate the problem with which the American revolt confronted France. It had before it memoirs and letters from a variety of quarters, some even from the French West Indies, but what is much more to the point, it had before it the plans and projects of Choiseul, wherein was clearly set forth the connection that existed between the American insurrection and the res- toration of French power and prestige, and wherein the large general problem was reduced to the more precise question whether the Americans would really proclaim their independence, or if they once proclaimed it, be of a mind to make a persistent effort for it.^^ ^ SMSS., No. 1306. ^ Doniol, I. 240-2. V^ergennes had, upon taking office, reorgan- ized the archives of the Foreign Office, and had had his secretaries THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 69 The answer that the Foreign Office returned to this question and the consequences that it deduced from its answer are set forth in the Reflexions, which was penned hy Vergennes' secretary, Ger- ard de R^3^neval, probably early in November, 1775."- "There is reason to believe," this most im- portant document begins, "that the colonies are not in quest simply of a redress of grievances, but that they are resolved to throw off the yoke of the mother-country altogether." Yet, it con- tinues, "if the colonies are left to themselves, it is probable that Great Britain will succeed in subjugating them." What then is the course that France should pin*sue at this juncture? "If England subjugates the colonies she will at least retain the commercial benefits that she has always drawn thence and which will accordingly continue to sustain both her manufactures and her marine. She will, moreover, prevent the colonies from be- coming what they would be if independent, a con- siderable weight in the balance of power in favor of some other state." France's interest was there- fore plain. "England is the natural enemy of France, and a greedy, ambitious, unjust, and prepare elaborate summaries of French foreign policy in all di- rections from the time of the Peace of Westphalia, Revue d'llistolre diplomatique, VII. 540. ^Ib., 243-9; SMSS., No. 1310. The conjecture as to date is based on M. Doniol's %'ery probable theory that Beaumarchais' ac- tivities in behalf of the idea of secret aid came after the secretary had formulated his program in the "Reflexions": see Doniol I. 251. / .J 70 FRENCH POLICY AND treacherous enemy, the constant and cherished object of whose system is, if not the destruction of France, at least her abasement, humihation, and ruin." But now at this moment, England's "colonies are in open war against her, their pur- pose is to cast off her yoke, they ask us to furnish them aid and supplies." Suppose then we meet their desires and our assistance proves effective, what advantages will result to us? 1. The power of England will shrink and ours will ex- pand correspondingly ; 2. Her commerce will suffer an irreparable loss while ours will increase; 3. It is very probable that in the course of events we may be able to recover some of the possessions that the English ridded us of in America, as for instance, the Newfound- land fisheries, those of the gulf of St. Lawrence, the Isle Royal, etc. I do not speak of Canada.-^ But if these were the premises upon which France should base her course, what precisely should that course be ? Of men capable and will- ing to bear arms the colonies had a great suffi- ciency, but they lacked: "first, provisions of war; secondly, currency; thirdly, a good navy." To obtain the first it would only be necessary for them to send their vessels to French ports laden with produce which they should there exchange for arms and munitions. This commerce could easily proceed without the government having any visible hand in it: "it would only be necessary "76., 243-4. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 71 to have at each of the ports to which the American vessels resorted an intelhgent merchant whose loyalty and discretion could be relied upon." The demand for money was somewhat more difficult, but given legitimate dimensions, it could be met in the same way as the demand for nnniitions. Most difficult of all would it be to furnish the insurgents vessels of war without declaring openly for them and so "precipitating war with Great Britain." Still it would perhaps be feasi- ble to send some merchant vessels adapted to the uses of war to Santo Domingo, where they could pass to the Americans b}^ a simulated purchase. But the essential thing was that France should lose no time in reinforcing the courage of the Americans, and by doing it secretly she would avoid compromising herself either with the insur- gents or the court of London, while at tlie same time "she would be putting herself in shape to strike decisive blows" when the time was ripe.^* Thus, it was admitted, that secret aid looked forward to possible war. But then, it was argued, a policy of inaction would be no guaranty of peace either, whether England triumphed or the insurgents. For in the one case as in the other the court of London would believe itself warranted in attacking France's colonies. Pru- dence therefore dictated that the means of waging war with success should be prepared beforehand, »*J6., 246-8. 72 FRENCH POLICY AND and one of the most essential of such means was "to make sure" of the Americans. ^^ With the appearance of the Reflexions be- gan in good earnest the contest for the support of the king, earher alhided to, between those who wished to see a briUiant diplomatic program adopted and those who, headed by Turgot, urged domestic reform and economy.^^ At the outset the royal conscience was in the possession of the reformers. Happily for the program of the Foreign Office, in the lively and inventive Beau- marchais, a veritable Cagliostro in the blend he presents of interested calculation and generous enthusiasm, Vergennes had a zealous missionary of his cause and one who, moreover, stood high in the favor of the royal family. On December 7th Beaumarchais handed Vergennes a letter ad- dressed "to the king alone, very important" and headed with the motto summum jus summa in- juria. In this extraordinary document the author of Figaro proceeded to attack with vigor the conscientious scruples which he thought stood in the way of the king's adopting the plan of secret aid: "The national policy which preserves =»/6., 249. -'See Lavisse, op. cit., 46-51. -• On Beaumarchais' part in the American Revolution see Whar- ton, I. §§ 5(1-75; John Durand, op. cit., 38-159; Louis de Lomenie, Beaumarrhais and hh Times (Trans, by H. S. Edwards. N. Y., 1857), Chs. XVII-XX; Blanche E. Hazard, Bemtmarchais and the American Rei^ohition (Boston, 1910). THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 73 states," he argued, "differs in every respect almost entirely from the civil morality which gov- erns individuals." "Salus populi suprcma lex."- But even if this were not the case good faith would not he due England, "that natural enemy, that jealous rival of your success, that people always systematically unjust to you." Indeed not even a treaty would have justly restrained you on this occasion. For when have the usurpations and outrages of this people ever had any limit but that of its strength? Has it not always waged war against you without declaring it? Did it not begin the last one, in a time of peace, by the sudden capture of five hundred of your vessels? Did it not humble you by forcing you to destroy your finest seaport? Has it not recently subjected your merchant vessels to inspection on the northern seas? — a hunnliation which would have made Louis XIV rather eat his hands than not atone for it? Finally, Beaumarchais again invoked general principles. Tranquillity is most safely based on the division of one's enemies, the way to conquer iniquity is to arm it against itself. And if, he concluded, there is anyone who does not agree with me, "beginning with M. de Vergennes," "I close my mouth, I cast into the fire Scaliger, Gro- tius, Puffendorf, Gravina, Montesquieu, every writer on public rights, and admit that the study of a lifetime has been only a waste of effort."^* Meantime, in August, 1775, the Count de *Durand, op. cit., 59-73. J A 74 FRENCH POLICY AND Guines, acting under instructions from Ver- gennes, had despatched a certain Bonvouloir to America to travel in a private capacity, to gather impressions, and to insinuate to such influential Americans as he met the admiration felt in France for their noble efforts after liberty, the entire disinterestedness of the French govern- ment so far as Canada was concerned, and the welcome which American merchantmen would receive in French harbors. Early in March, 1776, Bonvouloir's first report, which was highly san- guine of American prospects, reached Paris.^^ Thus confirmed in his idea of the military compe- tence of the Colonies, Vergennes proceeded at once to shajje up his plan of secretly aiding them, for discussion by his associates in office. At the same time he still had before him the certainty of Turgot's opposition, with the result that there is a marked difference in tone between the Me- moire de Considerations^^ and the earlier Reflex- ions. Thus at the outset of the Considerations, in an effort to supersede the language of advocacy with that of scientific detachment, Ver- gennes cQncedes ostensibly that whether France and Spain should desire the subjection or the independence of the English colonies was "per- haps problematical," that either event perhaps "Wharton, I. §§38-40. For the report itself, see Doniol, I. 267- 92, especially 287-8; and for a translation, Durand, 2-16. »» Doniol, I. 273-9; SMSS., No. 1316. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 75 threatened "dangers that it was not within human foresight to provide against. "^^ Also the notion that "Providence had marked out this moment for the humihation of England by striking her with the madness which is the sure precurser of destruction" is ostentatiously disavowed in the name of both the Bourbon kings. ^" On the other hand, two propositions are offered as axiomatic: first, that the prolongation of the American war would be "highly advantageous to both France and Spain, inasmuch as it would be calculated to exhaust both the victors and the vanquished" ;^^ and secondly, that whatever the final result of the struggle between England and her Colonies, France could hardly hope for peace, since if England conciliated or subjected the Colonies she would be tempted by the large forces on hand to make an easy conquest of the West Indies, whereas if she lost them, she would be driven thus to indemnify herself .^^ And from these sup- posed facts it is held to follow that it was for the interest of both France and Spain, while "dexter- ously reassuring" England as to their intentions, to "extend the insurgents secret aid both in money and military stores without seeking any return for so doing beyond the political objective " Doniol, I. 273 "lb., 275. •*Ib., 276. •* lb., 274-5. 76 FRENCH POLICY AND of the moment". This should be the program for at least the ensuing twelve months. Meantime "the idea of independence, which seems to ger- minate rather slowty among the Americans," would perhaps have come to maturity. At any rate the two crowns would have had opportunity to perfect their forces.^*^ Adroitly, however, as this argument was framed to anticipate the objections of the control- ler-general, it did not conceal the essential risk of the program it supported. It is significant, therefore, that the burden of Turgot's criticism of the Considerations is a protest against any program likely to precipitate an avoidable war, the expense of wliich must necessarily aggravate the already serious state of the royal finances. For the rest, striking to the very heart of the for- eign secretary's argument, its mercantilist pre- J suppositions, the controller-general predicted that the day of "colonies exclusively riveted to the mother-country" was over, and coimselled that that nation would show itself wisest and most deserving of happiness which should first convert its colonists from subjects to allies. Spain, said he, "ought to expect to see herself abandoned by her colonies; it was necessary to make ready for the commercial revolution which the new regime would bring about: by the same sign, there was little need of uneasiness lest England pounce •76., 277-8. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 77 upon France's colonies, since there was no ad- vantage involved in longer possessing them." "What difference did it make, then, wliether England suhjugated her colonies or not? Sub- jugated, they would occupy her attention by their desire to become free; freed, their wliole commer- cial system would be altered and Kngland would have no further interest than to appropriate to herself the benefits of the new system.""'' As to the likelihood that England was planning to attack France, Tin-got was frankly sceptical, but, he argued, if that were found to be the case, then France ought to prepare for the danger nearer at home, and especially by strengthening her fleet. Meantime it would be proper to put the Americans in the way of procuring the nmnitions and even the money they needed by means of trade, but there shoidd be no departui'e by the government itself from neutrality and no act of direct aid.^^ Turgot, however, was fighting what from the first was foreordained a losing battle. In the words of Soidavie, the cause of "Reform, Re- trenchment, and Rights to be realized" could not hold its own with a selfish and ambitious court against a program of "Revenge, Glory, and Hu- "76., 281. " 76., 282-3. Turgot also makes the point, later to be empha- sized by the Spanish government, that "an attack on England would be a signal for tiie reeoneiliation of England and America and would })reive comme le seiil nioyen de retablir notre marine d'nne part et de Tautre d'aflfaiblir celle de I'Angleterre, et comme le seul moyen d'assurer pour longtems la paix du Continent qui n'a Jamais etc troublee que par leurs intrigues ou leur argent." "The ablest man I knew," wrote Horace Walpole, "was the old Comte de Maurepas. . . . Knowing his enmity to this country, I told him . . . that it was fortunate for England that he had been so long divested of power." Trevelyan, The American Revolution, Pt. III. 413 fn. " Durand, op. cif., 74-85; I.omenie, op. cit., 267-71. "See the references in note 27, svpra, especially Wharton, I. §§ 60 ff.; also C. J. Stiile, "Beaumarchais and the Lost Million," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XI. 1-36. CHAPTER IV THE PORTUGUESE AND CORSAIR QUESTIONS For many months secret aid was a mystery closely guarded from even its beneficiaries. The decision to render it, none the less, involved cer- tain diplomatic consequences at once. Beaumar- chais had not yet begmi operations when Eng- land lodged a complaint against Americans being allowed to procure powder in the French West Indies and to fly the French flag from their mast- heads.* Perceiving the bearing of the question, Vergennes promptly took up an aggressive posi- tion. He recalled England's traffic in arms with Corsica when France was subjugating that island. He asserted entire willingness to abide by the English doctrine that contraband must have a hostile destination, wherefore vessels plying be- tween France and the French islands would not be subject to seizure on the charge of carrying it. He ridiculed the idea that England could pretend a grievance in the fact that the Ameri- cans were getting aid from France through the channels of trade: the French markets were open ^ Gamier to Vergennes, May 6, 1776, Doniol, I. 463. r-^ V THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 81 to all and those who paid best would have the preference. Thus, to use a more modern termin- ology, Vergennes gave notice of his government's / intention to treat the Americans as possessed of "belligerent rights", including the right of an inviolable asylum in neutral ports for their peace- ful traders." But the question of the trading rights of neu- trals was from the outset but one ingredient of the d'plomatic situation between England and France, and not the most important ingredient at that. Far more ominous was the stage which the dispute between Spain and Portugal, arising ' Vergennes to Garnier, June 15 and 21, ib., 466-9. See also Vergennes to Noailles, March 21, 1777, ib., II. 3:^4: "Nous en [the question of prizes] usons avec les insurgens conime nous ferions avec toute nation ainie qui seront en guerre avec I'Angle- terre." Other interesting documents in tiie same connection are Dumas' letter to the Conunittee of Secret Correspondence, May 14, 1776, Wharton II. 90-2; the "Expose des Motifs de la Conduite du Roi Tres-Chretien relativement a TAngleterre," Doniol, III. 923-36; and Observations on the Justificatory Memorial of the Court of London (see Appendix IV), 102-12. That the modern distinction between "Belligerency" and "Independence" in the case of communities seeking admission to the Family of Nations found no i>Iace in the Public Law of the jieriod is shown by the following passage from the pen of Horace Walpole: "An Amer- ican privateer had carried three prizes into Bilboa. The governor had detained them. . . . He was ordered by Grimaldi's letter to restore them, the king of Spain professing an exact neutrality, which was in eflFect owning our colonies for an indei)endent state," Last Journals, II. 87. It it an interesting speculation, to what extent the French alliance with the United States was made neces- sary by the absence of a distinction which would have enabled France to aid the Americans without violating England's rights. 82 FRENCH POLICY AND from the latter's aggressions in South America, had now reached. Because of the aUiances of these powers with France and England respec- tively, the outbreak of war between them meant almost inevitably war between England and France as well.^ The Spanish ambassador at Paris, the Count d'Aranda, who was a bitter enemy of England, had from the first pro- claimed this as a welcome development in view of England's growing embarrassment in North America.^ Vergennes, on the other hand, dis- liking the obvious ambition of Spain to annex Portugal, both because he regarded such a pro- ject as contrary to the precepts of the Systeme de Conservation and also because he feared for the smooth working of the Family Compact should Spain become the equal of France, had sought to compose the differences of the Iberian states. His efforts at pacification had, however, been followed by fresh aggressions on Portugal's part, instigated, Spain hinted, by the English;^ •"Si la guerre entre TEspagne et le Portugal devient indis- pensable, ce que la situation presente des affaires entre les deux puissances ne donne que trop sujet d'apprehender, il est inevitable que la guerre avec I'Angleterre en sera la suite et que la France ne pourra pas se dispenser d'y prendre la part la plus directe." Such are the opening words of the memoir read by Vergennes to the council of ministers held at Marly, July 7, 1776, Doniol, I. 527. * Vd. ib., 353 ff. For an Interesting characterization of this unique individual, see Segur, Memoirs, I. 390. Cf. Doniol, V. 30. •On the whole matter, see Doniol, I. 75-6, 298-312, 330-7, 525, 532-3. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 83 and by the beginning of July, Vergennes had come quite around to Aranda's viewpoint. A warhke situation now developed rapidly.* To a council of ministers held at Marly on July 7th Vergennes presented the Spanish-Portu- guese matter as offering France the opportunity "to break the power of the single enemy she had cause to fear," provided only French diplomacy was equal to the occasion. First and foremost, the war must be kept from spreading to the Con- tinent, which could be readily guaranteed by Austria's standing by to prevent Russia from falling upon Sweden. Again, in Holland the ashes of the old Republican party must be fanned to flame once more and Dutch neutrality be se- cured by appeal to Dutch avarice. Finally, it was essential "to let the Americans know of the present state of affairs and the results which it presaged, and, without assuming engagements with them, yet to make them understand the full advantage which existing circumstances prom- ised had they but the hardihood and patience to await their imfolding."^ • Vergennes' English correspondence at this period contains many sharp criticisms of the treatment French subjects were alleged to be receiving in Newfoundland and Hindoostan. Most of these supposed grievances were long-standing ones. Their revival at this moment is indication of the French government's belligerent intention. See generally the references in note 2, above. '76., 527-8. Compare Garnier's "I.ettre particuliere" of May 15, SMSS., No. 868. 84 FRENCH POLICY AND V^ Four daj s later Deane, the Continental Con- gress' first agent to P^rance, who had just arrived at Paris, was admitted by Vergennes to a secret interview. The secretary would not express him- self on the subject of American independence, especially as "the United Provinces" had not yet expressed themselves ; but he gave assurance that no obstacles would be placed in the way of Amer-. icans trading in French ports, whether in muni- tions or other products. He proposed that Deane should keep the Foreign Office en rayport with all important happenings in America, and strongly advised him to steer clear of Englishmen.^ Then on August 13th Garnier wrote from London that the Americans had at last declared their in- dependence.'^ In a "committee" consisting of the king and cabinet, held on August 31st, Ver- gennes, casting equivocation aside, proclaimed that, as between the advantages and disadvan- tages of a war "against England in the present juncture, . . . the former outweigh the latter so unmistakably that no comparison can be made": The Americans had now declared their indepen- * Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, Wharton, op. cit., II. 112-6. The British government protested against Deane's having been allowed to land in France, a protest at which Vergennes professed to take great umbrage: "Le Roy est le maitre chez lui, . . . il n'a compte a rendre a qui que soit des etrangers qu'il juge a-propos d'admettre dans ses Etats," Doniol, I. 583. »/6., 561. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 85 dence. These same Americans it was, tlieir sailors and soldiers, who had made "those vast conquests of which France has in times past so keenly felt the humiliation." They were now available allies; and, thanks to commerce, the connection now formed with them could not fail to be lasting/*^ Against these arguments no voice was raised, and a week later the memoir embody- ing them was despatched to Madrid for approval by that court. Why, then, did not the war come ? The answer is supplied by the fact that the very day that the response of the Spanish government arrived ac- cepting its ally's program, though with a char- acteristic stipulation for further delay,^^ the news came from Garnier of the American defeat at Long Island.^" Vergennes at once decided that the policy of secret aid still remained the better part of valor, but he was able to conceal his re- treat under the pretext of disapproving of Spain's plan, which still included the conquest of Portugal.^'' "The king," he wrote, "will always regard the aggrandizement of the Spanish mon- archy with satisfaction but His Majesty is unable to conceal from the king, his uncle, that the con- quest of Portugal would be alarming to all states i»/6,, 567-77, especially 570-1; SMSS., No. 897. "Grimaldi to Aranda, Oct. 8, 1776, Doniol, I. 603-lf{. The main points of the document are summarized on pages 612-13. " Jb., 615-6. '""Reflexions," ib., 681-8. 86 FRENCH POLICY AND interested in maintaining the balance of power." "If," he continued, "it is a universal maxim, as contended by the Marquis de Grimaldi, that one makes war onl}'^ for the purpose of gain, yet this maxim ought to be adopted by the two crowns in the existing situation only with the idea in mind that everything is to be gained by breaking down the power of England." Could that be done, then would France and Spain have achieved an advantage more precious than could be represented by the conquest of a rich province. For once England is unable to keep going the flame of discord among the great sovereigns of Europe, then will the two monarchs no longer be ham- pered in exercising their better inclinations, which look only to securing to their own subjects and to all Europe the sweet fruits of a sure and durable peace. ^^ A few weeks later we find Vergennes penning the British ambassador the following billet : Versailles, December 21st, 1776. Monsieur: I am indeed touched at the attention shown me by Your Ex- cellency in admitting me to share your joy at the satis- factory news of the success of British arms in Connecti- cut and New York. I beg Your Excellency to accept my many thanks at this testimonial of your friendship, and my sincere felicitations upon an event so calculated to contribute to the reestablishment of peace in that part of the globe. I shall impart the communication made me to the king and now take it upon myself to assure you that His Majesty will always receive with "76., 68.5-7. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 87 pleasure news of whatever may contribute to the satis- faction and glory of the king your master.^'^ Vergennes' policy during the late months of 1776 and the early months of 1777 may he char- acterized in the poignant phrase of today as one Y of "watchful waiting." The secretary had aban- doned none of his fundamental premises: "The purpose of every offensive war is either to ag- grandize one's self or to enfeeble the rival power, whose superiority one fears. . . . As everything is relative in the political order, they [the two crowns] will necessarily increase by reason of the enfeeblement of their rival. . . . By renoimcing every idea of supremacy the English would be free to recognize the independence against which they are armed": and more to like effect.'^ On "//;., II. 107, fn. 2. A month earlier than this, Vergennes had told Storniont that it was contrary to the king's intention that his subjects should go to America, SMSS., No. 90.5. On Dec. 10, the secretary ordered Lenoir to arrest all persons giving out that they were intending to go to America, ib., No. 1385. Vergennes' de- spatches to Noailles at this period display considerable uneasiness as to British intentions, ib. Nos. 907, 913, and 917. The fact is that Vergennes, relying on American and Spanish assistance, had been planning an attack upon England for which the French marine was not at all fit. See Doniol, II. 156-70. Hence, the extent of his reaction after the American defeat at Long Island. !• Vergennes to Ossun, Mar. 11, 1777, ib., 238-41. See also the document given in Appendix II. Though the work of a "private citizen" it was prepared, Doniol thinks, for the Council. Vd. ib., 118. Its speculations as to the effect of the success of the Revolution on France's position in Europe take a wide range. 88 FRENCH POLICY AND the other hand, it is quite apparent that his con- fidence in the mihtary capacity of the Americans — indeed, in the vitahty of their cause — had suf- fered a great shock from the disaster of Long Island. Of these facts he must again he per- suaded hefore he would consent to risk the dig- nity of the French crown, and meantime, between American importunity and British suspicion, he must take his way charily. The clue to the period is furnished by the com- parison of two memoirs from the secretary's pen that are dated respectively April 12th and April 26th, 1777. The latter, a criticism upon certain propositions of the Spanish government, which still continued in a warlike frame of mind, con- tained the following homily in favor of peace: "One knows well enough where war begins, but no one can know where or how it will end. If one could be sure that England would concentrate against us and not extend her efforts to the Continent, the present occasion would be very seductive and it would require a sublime exercise of virtue to repulse it. But tlie existence of England is a matter of concern from the point of view of the equilibrium of Europe; it is accordingly necessary to anticipate that she will not be left alone. . . . The uprising in America has remained up to the present a purely domestic matter so far as England is concerned ; she sees in the insurgents only a people in revolt whom she has a right to recall to their obedience by whatever means lie within her reach and without other powers having any title to mix up in the affair. To offer to THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 89 intervene would be in some sort to recognize and support the independence which the American provinces have J ^ declared, since it is only between equal powers that intervention ordinarily takes place. ^^ The earlier memoir struck a quite different note. Composed in anticipation of a visit of the em- peror to Paris, it urged the necessity of the Austrian connection to France, because, by assur- ing the peace on the Continent, it paved the way for "taking measiu-es against England, the natural and most inveterate enemy of France, her glory and prosperity."^^ " "Lettre . . . communlquee au Roi," etc., ih., 271 ff., 272-4 See also passage to like effect in V^ergennes to Ossun, Mar. 22, 1777, ih., 248. Also, same to same, Apr. 12, wliere the following words occur: "Si nous pouvions retablir I'opinion du bon etat de nos finances, toutes nos possessions servient bien plus en suret6 sous cet abri que sous la protection d'escadres nombreuses qui peuvent etre primees ou surpassecs," xb., 261, — a sentiment alto- gether worthy of Ttirgot ! '* /b., 428; Flassan, Histoire generale et raisonnee, etc., VII. 135, See also Vergennes' note of February 12 to Aranda in response to propositions emanating from the British government looking to a general disarmament by France, Spain, and Great Britain: "Si nous accordons a desarmer nous epargnons sans doute une grande depense mais I'oconomie sera plus grande pour I'Anglc- terre," etc. Doniol, II. 155, 208-9. It was also during this period that the controversy occurred between the French and Spanish gov- ernments over the question of sending further reinforcements to Hayti and Santo Domingo, in view of the continued possibility of war over the Portuguese question. Vergennes argued against the idea on the ground that the climate was fatal to Europeans and on the ground that such a step would tend to alarm Great Britain and make her less ready to accept France's friendly as- 90 FRENCH POLICY AND Inevitabl}^ it was a period of episodes. It was at this time that LaFayette, eluding the decep- tive vigilance of the royal officers, made his way to America, though he would have preferred to lead a filibustering expedition against the Eng- lish settlements in the East.^^ It was at this time that the minister of War, St. Germain, induced Steuben to come to America to assist in training the Continental Army. It was also at this time that the Count de Broglie launched his scheme, which had the approval of Deane, for making himself a sort of temporary stadtholder of the United States and commissioned Kalb, Choiseul's former emissary to America, to enlist the interest of Congress. Writing Kalb from his country-seat at Ruffec, December 11th, Broglie set forth the outlines of his plan as follows: A military and political leader is wanted, a man fitted to carry the weight of authority in the colonies, to unite its parties, to assign to each his place. The main point of the mission with which you have been entrusted will therefore consist in explaining the advantages, or rather, the absolute necessity of the choice of such a man. The rank accorded the candidate would have to be of the first eminence, such for instance, as that of the Prince of Nassau ; but his functions would have to be suranoes. As the troops were sent later on (in July: see Doniol, II. 453), we man conclude that the second was the important con- sideration. See references in Chapter I., supra, note 8. '•Doniol, II. ch. 2; SMSS., No. 756. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 91 confined to the army, . . . with perhaps the single exception of the political negotiations with foreign powers ; . . . the assurance of the man's return to France at the end of three years will remove every ap- prehension ill regard to the powers to be conferred and will remove even the semblance of an ambitious design to become governor of the new republic. Of course large pecuniary consideration would have to be claimed for the preparation of the journey and for the journey itself and a liberal salary for the return home. You can give the assurance that such a measure will bring order and economy into the public expense, that it will reimburse the cost a hundred-fold in a single campaign. You will be equally mindful to dwell upon the effect necessarily produced by such an appointment on its mere announcement in Europe.^** I know of no documentary evidence connecting Vergennes with this extraordinary scheme. Yet it seems to me hardly supposable that a great noble like Broglie, who obviously had none of the youthful enthusiasm of LaFayette and who was already more or less at outs with the court on account of his connection with the Secret du Roi, would have risked the king's further displeasure " Friedricli Kapj), Life of Knlh, pp. 94-5. See also Kalb's memoir of Dec. 17, addressed to Deane, which is to be found in the French Archives des Affaires etrangeres. Here tlie additional argument is offered that the step proposed by Broglie would so enlist the interest of the nobility that they would force the king to make an alliance with the Americans. Broglie's own expecta- tions from the scheme are also set forth in greater detail. SMSS., No. 604; Deane Papers, I. 426-31. 92 FRENCH POLICY AND by lending himself to a project of incalculable possibilities without some sort of assurance as to the attitude of his government. Moreover, the plan lent itself rather nicely to the requirements of the American situation as these appeared to the French government at the moment: The American cause was on the verge of collapse for want of competent military leadership; it also lacked prestige in Europe; the king did not dare openly take up the cudgels for so feeble a client; French officers were departing daily for America on their own account; if Broglie failed, it would be as easy to disavow him as to disavow LaFay- ette, Coudray, or any other; if lie succeeded, France would reap the fruits of his success; His Most Christian Majesty has proffered Poland a Conti, why not America a Broglie?'"^ But now a policy of marking time is one that from the nature of things ceases in time to be feasible, for either the event awaited is upon one or it has descended below the horizon of sensi- ble probability. Even bj^ January 1st, 1777, there"^ was in train a series of events that by mid-summer of that year had forced Vergennes finally to choose his position. The rendition of secret aid to the Americans through the channels of commerce still continued, but subject to be inter- '■^ See generally C. J. Stille, "The Conite de Broglie, Proposed Stadtholder of America," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XI. 369-405; Doniol, II. Ch. 2; Wharton, I. 391-6. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 93 rupted at any time by measures of the govern- ment meant to allay British suspicions. The result was discontent on both hands. The, per- haps designedly, bungling methods of the agents of secret aid were constantly furnishing Lord Stormont texts for remonstrance,^^ and mean- time American gratitude took on a tinge of resentment.^^ But of far more importance was the fact that Frankhn was now in France. Almost from the outset had Franklin's assured front restored the American cause to the footing it had had in popu- lar estimation before the news of Long Island. The prestige of his immense reputation — "more universal than that of Leibnitz or Newton, Fred- erick or Voltaire"^^ — had suggested, for the first ="SMSS., Nos. 1306, 1309, 1418, 1427, 1496, 1519, 1531, 1593, etc. In his despatch to Weymouth of Jan. 7, 1778, Stormont declares that "the very existence of the American army depends npon the arrival of these succors," ib.. No. 1822. " See, for instance, Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Jan. 5, 1777: "We are also instructed to solicit the court of France for an immediate supply of twenty or thirty thousand muskets. . . . This aj)plication has now become the more neces- sary, as the private j)urchase made by Mr. Deane of those articles is rendered ineffectual by an order forbidding their exportation": Wharton, II. 245. Also, to like effect, ib., 257. The inadequacy of secret aid to establish any hold on the Americans is recognized by Vergennes in his despatch to Ossun of Apr. 7, Doniol, II. 341. And see ib., generally, pp. 305-12. ^Life and Works of John Adams (Boston, 1856), I. 660. The passage is worthy more extended quotation: "His reputation was more universal than that of Leibnitz or Newton, Frederick or Voltaire, and his character more beloved and esteemed than any 94 FRENCH POLICY AND time perhaps, that if America was to be made an ally at all, it must be on terms of exact equality. The charm of his unique personality, the interest- ing phases of which he exploited with faultless facility and with just the touch of charlatanism that the sentimentalism of the age demanded, had served from the moment of his landing at Auray to focus to a blaze of enthusiasm the diverse lines of opinion making among all classes of French- men for the king's espousal of the American cause.^^ or all of them. Newton- had astonished perhaps forty or fifty men in Europe. . . . But this fame was confined to men of letters. The common people knew little and cared nothing about such a recluse philosopher. Leibnitz's name was more confined still. . . . Frederick was hated by more than half of Europe. . . . Voltaire, whose name was more universal . . . was considered as a vain and profligate wit, and not much esteemed or beloved by anybody, though admired by all who knew his works. But Franklin's fame was universal. His name was familiar to government and people, to kings, courtiers, nobility, clergy and philosophers, as well as plebeians, to such a degree that there was scarcely a peasant or a citizen, a valet de rhambre, coachman or footman, a lady's cham- bermaid or a scullion in a kitchen, who was not familiar with it, and who did not consider him a friend to human kind." Matthew Arnold somewhere comments on the curious fact that America contributed her only world-wide reputation, that of Franklin, while she was still a province. ^' See generally Edward Everett Hale and Edward Everett Hale, Jr., Franklin in France (Boston, 1886-8, 2 vols.). "Tout Paris visitait Franklin dans sa maison de Passj'. Admire par les savants et les philosophes qui le comparaient a Socrate et a New- ton, 11 charmait le populaire par sa bonhomie et par la simplicite de ses habits bruns et de ses gros souliers." Lavisse, op. cit., IX.* 104. See also an undated pamphlet by Hilliard d'Auberteuil on Franklin (Penn. Hist'l Soc. Lib.). THE AxMERICAX ALLIANCE 95 Franklin arrived in Paris December 21st, and two days later he and his associates, Deane and Lee, requested an audience with the French sec- retary, which was accorded them the 28th."*' The suggestion of a formal audience having been evaded by Vergennes, on January 5th, 1777, the commissioners made explicit their expectations of France in a note: "Eight ships of the line completely manned," with which to clear the American coast of British cruisers, and twenty or thirty thousand stand of muskets and bayonets, together w^ith a "large quantity of ammunition and brass field pieces, to be sent under convoy." In return for these favors. Congress offered France and Spain a treaty of amity and com- merce and also "to guarantee in the firmest man- ner to those nations all their possessions in the West Indies, as well as those they shall acquire from the enemy in a war that may be consequen- tial of such assistance as" it requested. ^^ It is hardly surprising that Vergennes foimd these demands rather staggering. However, he ar- gued his refusal of them with the utmost suavity and good nature ;^^ and, what is more, followed it up with an advance of 250,000 livres, tlie first instalment, as he announced, of a loan of two mil- ** Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Committee of Secret Corres- pondence, Jan. 17, 1777, Wharton, II. 348; SMSS., No. 606. -• Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Wharton, II. 345-6. -' N'ote approved by the king, Jan. 9, Doniol, II. 120-2. 96 FRENCH POLICY AND lions from the king, who exacted only that the thing be kept secret.^^ But if Vergennes thought thus to stop the mouths of the Americans, he soon learned his error. Congress' instructions did not at this date permit its envoys to offer France and Spain an alliance, — only treaties of amity and commerce.'^** On February 2nd, however, with the news before them of the preparation of Burgoyne's expedi- tion in England, the commissioners resolved to break through this limitation and to offer the two crowns a pledge that, if thej^ became involved in war with Great Britain in consequence of making a treaty of amity and commerce with the States, the latter would not conclude a separate peace. -' lb., 266 ; Wharton, II. 347, 250 fn., 404-5. It must be understood, of course, that until the declaration of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, in Mar., 1778, all of the intercourse of the commis- sioners and the Foreign Office was guarded from publicity with the greatest care. Certain precautions were, in fact, taken against the Americans themselves, even after they were admitted to the general secret, for it was not impossible, of course, that France might eventually find it convenient to clear her skirts of rebel- lious associations. "No written proof of the least importance," says Deane, "was ever left in our hands. Even M, Gerard's letters appointing occasional interviews with us were always without any signature; though five hmidred thousand livres were quarterly [in 1777] paid to our banker from the Royal Treasury, not the smallest evidence of the source from whence that subsidy came was permitted to remain in our power." Deane Papers, IV. 373, ^Journals of the Continental Congress (Ed. W. C. Ford, suc- ceeded by G. Hunt, Washington, 1904 flf., -25 vols., covering the years 1774-82, still in progress), V. 768, 813, fF., the Instructions of Sept. 24, 1776. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 97 This decision, moreover, was speedily confirmed b}^ new instructions from Congress authorizing "any tenders necessary" to secure the immediate assistance of tlie Bourbon powers. The result was renewed activity on the part of the conmiis- sion, and of a much more ambitious sort." On JNIarch 18th Deane sent Vergennes a plan of triple alliance between France, Spain, and the United States looking to an immediate war against England and Portugal. Hostilities were to continue till Spain had conquered Portugal, till the United States had established their inde- pendence, and till France and the United States had expelled England from the North American continent and the West Indies; and peace was to be concluded only by the joint consent of the allies. A few days later Franklin laid a similar scheme before Aranda.'^^ The Spaniard was en- thusiastic, Vergennes cold. "Considering," the latter inquired of the formei-, "the condition of lassitude and division in which this people is at present, what security could we have that our diversion would not produce their defection, espe- cially if, as no doubt would be the case, they were offered their independence?"'^^ Meantime Lee, having at the instigation of Aranda set out for "Wharton, II. :357, ;?60 and footnote; Harrison «/, al. to the Commissioners, Dec, 30, 1776, ib., -240. ■•^Doniol, II. 319-22; Deane Papers, II. 25-7; SMSS., No. 659. "^Vergennes to Aranda, Apr. 10, Doniol, II. 325. 98 FRENCH POLICY AND Madrid with the idea of approaching the Spanish court directly, had been met at Burgos by Gri- maldi and turned back, though with pledges of further monetary aid, some of which were ulti- mately redeemed.^^ Of this phase of the episode the British ambassador was, however, of course ignorant. Seeing only that a rebel envoy had been denied the hospitality of Spanish soil, he promptly made the fact a theme for obvious comparisons unfavorable to France.^' But in less direct ways too did the American commissioners daily contribute to rendering the ' French government's equivocal position more and . more precarious. The mere fact that they were in Paris created an ever thickening cloud of spec- ulation as to American prospects and English and French designs. It also brought thither the spies and secret agents both of the British gov- ernment and of the Whig opposition, whose busi- ness it was to watch the Americans, the French ministers, and each other.^" The quite normal precipitate of such an atmosphere was all sorts of startling rumors, many of which were concerned with an alleged pending agreement between rep- resentatives of the British government and the American commissioners, granting the Colonies their independence and providing for the inevi- "/6., 195-6, 265-6; Wharton, II. 380-3. Cf. ib., 148. '^ Vergennes to Ossum, Apr. 12, Doniol, II. 268. "See Wharton, I. Chs. 21 and 22. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 99 table joint attack upon the French West In- dies."'^ Vergennes received these rumors with a measure of scepticism. "We appreciate," he wrote, "how httle probable it is that the English would confide so dangerous a secret into the keeping of their enemies as that of their hostile views toward France and Spain, and we are aware how great is the interest of the insurgents to create suspi- cion."^^ At the same time he recognized that France had not yet done enough for the Colonies "to secure their gratitude,"^^ and he feared the import of the armaments which England was pre- paring. Indeed, at no time during the Revolu- tion do the hazards of France's equivocal position appear more substantial than at just this period. Yet at no time did Vergennes show himself more . bent upon keeping the peace, and that notwith- \/ standing the still belligerent temper of France's ally. And meantime a fresh element of complexity was introduced into the situation through Frank- lin's activity in encouraging American privateers to resort to French harbors. Vergennes had from the first foreseen that difficulties would arise when American "corsairs" began seeking the hospital- ity of French waters and he had determined to ^'Doniol, II. 319, :i35-8 and in., and 368-70. ^Ib., 257. "'76., 341. 100 FRENCH POLICY AND restrict them to the universally recognized right of asylum, that is the right to take refuge from adverse elements. But this meagre concession, which signified only that the French government did not accept the British view that they were pirates, was little satisfactory to the American vikings. What these individuals demanded was the right to equip, arm, and supply themselves in French ports, to bring their prizes there and sell them, to arm and equip once more and sally forth, — in short, the right to make the French coast a base of operations against English shipping. In vain did Vergennes point out how entirely incom- patible such demands were, not only with His Most Christian Majesty's treaty obligations, but with the Law of Nations itself; for these were a thick-skinned gentry, who well understood that hard words break no bones and with whom measures to be effective had to be drastic. The resultant dilemma personified itself in the bland Franklin and the insistent Stormont. Franklin professed to accept Vergennes' legal principles but was endlessly resourceful in concocting delays to blunt their practical application. Stormont was unremittingly vigilant of results."^ '" In general, see Hale, Franklin in France, I. ch. 7. Also, the correspondence between the English and French government; Doniol, II. 334-5, 478-9 and 504-19; and between Vergennes and the commissioners, ib., 520-?2 (translated in Wharton, IT. 364-6). See also index to SMSS. under "Conyngham," "Wickes," "Dolphin," "Lexington," "Reprisal." THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 101 By the middle of July, the "corsair" issue had become so acute that it was clearly necessary for the French government to cease drifting and take its bearings once more. Meantime, and this was the one material result of the policy of delay, the French marine had reached a plane from which substantial parity with the British marine was within easy reach. In a memoir communicated to t!ie king on July 23rd, Vergennes, contending that the moment had arrived when France must resolve "either to abandon America or to aid her courageously and effectively," pronounced with eloquence and fervor for a close alliance with her. The document is worthy of a brief rcsiimc^^' The primary question, Vergennes declared, was wliether France and Spain could afford to see the colonies return either directly or indirectly to Britisli control; and that question turned on the further one, whether it was sound policy to contribute to the strength of an enemy when op- portunity offered to enfeeble that enemy. Eng- land was the natural rival of the House of Bourbon. Mistress again of North America and its immense resources of all sorts, she would be a menace to the possessions of the two crowns in that part of the world. It followed that the re- union of North Amei'ica and (ireat Britain, in whatever manner brought about, could not be indifferent either to the security, the prosperity, *» Doniol, II. 460-69. 102 FRENCH POLICY AND or the glory of the two crowns and that no pains must be spared to prevent it/^ Secret aid had been well enough in its day, but it was no longer sufficient to prevent the reconciliation of the col- onies and the mother-country, especially since the charge was now made by the English that the policy of France and Spain was to destroy Eng- land by means of America and America by means of England. It was necessaiy, in short, that the assistance rendered the Americans be sufficient to assure their total separation from Great Britain and their gratitude to the House of Bourbon. Open assistance undoubtedly meant war. But war was probably imminent anyway, since if Great Britain failed in the current campaign to reduce the rebels, she would make an accommo- dation with them and then with their assistance would fall upon France and Spain.^^ No doubt the magnanimity and religion of the two mon- archs made repugnant to them the thought of profiting by the circumstances in which England found herself to give her influence a mortal blow. But in diplomacy self-interest was the major force, and in politics the same maxim held as in war, that it was better to anticipate than to be anticipated. Besides, let their majesties con- sider whether their flags were respected, their commerce free, whether, in fact, their vessels were "76., 461. *'Ib., 462-3. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 103 not subject from the moment they left home waters, to humihating visitations, odious seizures, unjust confiscations/^ What the situation called for was a close offensive and defensive alliance with the Americans, all parties to which should be bound not to abandon the war without the con- sent of the others. The American commissioners should be informed of the intentions of the two crowns at once; but at any rate decisive steps could not be delayed later than January or Feb- ruary, when the British Parliament would meet to determine the fate of the present ministry. Fortunately, the European situation was in every way favorable to a joint enterprise by the two crowns against England. Spain's difficulty with Portugal was on the way to settlement, and a war on the sea would not spread to the Continent. From such a war, it was possible that the two crowns would not derive every advantage they could hope for, but to succeed in breaking the chain between England and America would for- ever be an immense advantage.^^ The memoir was approved by the king the same day, and tlu-ee days later was despatched to Ossun, Louis' ambassador at Madrid, to be sub- mitted by him to the Spanish crown.^^ Why then, the question at once arises, was not the « Ih. 464-5. ** lb., 467-9. *'■ Jb., 469. 104 FRENCH POLICY AND course it recommended promptly entered upon, at least by France ? The answer is to })e f omid in the altered attitude of Spain. Spain's desire for war during the latter half of 1776 and the early months of 1777 had rested ahnost alto- gether upon the prospect of having Portugal for her quarry. By July 23rd, however, as Vergen- nes himself noted, the contre-temps between the two Iberian courts was practically at an end. With a new monarch on the Portuguese throne, the warlike Pombal had fallen from power; and meantime the Spaniards under Ceballos had trounced the Portuguese forces along La Plata soimdly.^^ But another factor, too, in bringing about the pending settlement had been Ver- gennes' constant opposition to the idea of Spain's overrunning her neighbor; and, as was now to transpire, he had therein overshot his mark. For with Portugal out of the calculation, Spain had no wish to fight England, and least of all in be- half of American independence. On the other hand, even Louis' assent to the program of July 23rd was only a conditional one, the condition being Spanish cooperation. Until, therefore, either Sj)ain could he brought to the support of this program or Louis could be persuaded that it was perilous for France longer to wait upon her ally, decisive action was impossible. *• lb., 432. CHAPTER V FLORIDA BLANCA DEFINES SPAIN's POSITION Notwithstanding a close coincidence of race, religion, and economic interests, and the fact that they were ruled by the same House, the two branches of which were boimd together in pre- sumably indissoluble alliance, the French and Spanish peoples of the eighteenth century were strongly disposed to mutual antipathy, not to say antagonism ; while between the Spanish and Eng- lish, particularly of the governing classes, there seems always to have been a considerable measure of reciprocal understanding and sympathy/ So long as Grimaldi, a Genoese by birth, had remained at the head of affairs at Madrid, Ver- gennes liad not encountered the anti-Gallican prejudices of the court circle of the Escurial. But in February, 1777, Grimaldi had fallen from power and had been succeeded })y a Spaniard of ^ See Francois Rousseau, "Participation de I'Espagne a la Guerre d'Amerique," Revue den Questions historiques, LXXII. 444 flF. Note also Jay's observation: "They [the Spanish] appear to me to like the English, hate the French, and to have prejudices against us," Jay to the President of Congress, May 36, 1780, Wharton, III. 733. 106 FRENCH POLICY AND Spaniards, Don Jose Monino, the Count de Florida Blanca.^ To be sure, the new minister promptl}^ volunteered the assurance that he would base his policy on the maintenance of the Family Compact, and "the most perfect har- mony" between the two crowns;^ but he also soon made it clear that in interpreting the alliance be- tween France and Spain, he would treat the interests of his own country as of quite as much importance as those of France and, furthermore, that he regarded these interests as strictly mater- ial/ Accordingly, whereas Grimaldi had ac- cepted Vergennes' contention that Spain as well as France had "much to gain from breaking down British power by effecting the complete and radical separation of the colonies,"' Florida Blanca considered "the abasement of England" as without substantial interest to a nation whose Continental role was no longer worth restoring.^ Nor yet did Vergennes' notion of "a durable peace" to follow upon England's undoing appeal more strongly to him. These were "moral ob- jects," and he frankly characterized them as "quixotic." However, Vergennes also urged it as an argument for his program that the total separ- ^ Doniol, II. 24-7, 197-8. ^Ossun to Vergennes, Feb. 24, 1777, ib., 227-8. * See the correspondence cited in note 59, supra. » Grimaldi to Aranda, Feb. 4, lb., 192-3. *Ib., 703. Cf. ib., 567. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 107 ation of the American provinces from Great Britain would make for the security of French and Spanish colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere, and he contended further that, inas- much as Spain's colonial empire in this part of the world was vastly more valuable than the few islands that still remained to France, Spain's in- terest in bringing about the separation in question was proportionately greater than France's v' Again the Spanish minister's views diver-ged widely from those of his respondent. For awhile he was ready to admit that British sea-powe.^r was more or less of a menace to Spain's hold ings in the New World and also that this power ,was sus- tained to an important extent by England's mastery of North America, he was not ready to conclude that therefore the independence, of Eng- land's North American provinces would, so far as Spain was concerned, remove the danger. On the contrary, he held that it would, if due prec autions were not taken, actually increase it. We ai e thus brought to a subject that must be of very con trolling interest in the pages following. One of the earliest advocates of a French- Spanish-American alliance was the Count d'Aranda, the Spanish ambassador at Paris.' Unhappily for the Colonies, Aranda was less a representative of his government than a Themis- '/ft., 461, 64.3-4.; III. 50-1, 140. •See his memoir on the subject, loc. ciL, II. 310-8. 108 FRENCH POLICY AND tocles in exile, — a former chief-minister whom the existing regime at Madrid fomid it convenient to devise any plausible expedient to keep remote from the seat of power. So long as Grimaldi was Charles Ill's chief-minister, Madrid had been quite willing that Paris should make its own ar- rangements with the rebellious provinces, but even he had not favored Spain's doing more than t'vO contribute secretly certain funds to the Ameri- can^ cause, of which he dexterously made France the a Imoner. And after Long Island his attitude becan.ie still more aloof. Writing Aranda as he was ab out to leave office, he admonished his too enthusiastic subordinate thus: The king our master, who possesses in the Indies domains so vast and important, should be very backward in making a formal treaty with provinces which as yet can only be regarded as rebels, an inconvenience that would not exist should the colonies succeed in really throwing off the yoke and constituting themselves an indepe-ident power. The riglits of all sovereigns to their rp_<&pective territories ought to be regarded as sacred, and the example of a rebellion is too dangerous to allpw of His Majesty's wishing to assist it openly.^ How a little later he met the American Lee and turned him back at the Spanish frontier has al- ready been told. And if Grimaldi saw cause for alarm on Spain's part in the rebellious example of the Americans, *Ib., 192. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 109 the Marquis de Castejon, a member of the Span- ish royal comicil, saw it no less in their actual power and their supposed ambitions. "Spain," said Castejon, writing also in February, 1777, "is about to be left alone, face to face witli one other power in the whole of North America, — a power which has assumed a national name, which is very formidable on account of the size of its population and the ratio of increase thereof, and which is accustomed to war even before it has begun it. I think that we should be the last country in all Europe to recognize anif sovereign and indepen- dent state in North America." Such a state would develop more rapidly than a colony, would have its resources immediately at hand, would be uninfluenced by the Balance of Power, and so, careless of the good will of Europe, woidd be able to push its own designs with the utmost aggres; siveness. Furthermore, even assuming t|ie English colonies in America to have become inde- pendent, "the English and American powers would still be of one nation, one character and one religion, and would so form their treaties and compacts as to obtain the objects they both de- sire." In such a contingency "the kingdom of Mexico would be compromised, in fact lost."^*' But indeed the Foreign Oflice had been forced to meet and allay opinions of this sort even from French sources from the very outset of the Revo- « Sparks MSS., CII. The date of the document is Feb. 3, 1777. 110 FRENCH POLICY AND lution. Thus in the Reflexions of November, 1775, Gerard had recited: "But, they say, the independence of the Enghsh colonies will prepare a revolution in the new world; they will hardly be at peace and assured of their liberty than they will be seized with the spirit of conquest, whence may result the invasion of our colonies and of the rich possessions of the Spanish in South Amer- ica." In answer to these objections Gerard had urged two considerations: first, that the existing war would fatigue the colonists for a long time to come; and secondly, that if they became inde- pendent, the colonists would have a republican form of government and would be united with each other only in a loose confederacy. The dom- inant spirit of the new community, he had there- fore concluded, would be one of trade, industry, and peace; and he had added: "Even supposing that the colonists should encroach upon the Span- ish possessions, that is far from proving that this revolution would be prejudicial to France."^^ In July, 1777, however, Vergennes had before him the direct task of reassuring Spanish opinion ; and it is entirety evident that he had underesti- mated its difficultv. There are those, he wrote in the memoir of July 23rd, who hold that the time will come when America will be "a formidable " Doniol, I. 245. See also a passage in the "Considerations," ib., 974. For further arguments against Spain's favoring American independence, forthcoming from English sources, see Wharton, III. 727-31. / THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 111 power even to her benefactors." The danger surely was greatly exaggerated. Doubtless America would in time become a considerable na- tion, but certainly never "a terror to be armed against." For one thing, their constitution stood in the way of such a consummation. For they were held together only by a confederacy of thir- teen members, each of which reserved its powers of internal administration. Furthermore, the in- terests of the several provinces were as diverse as their climate: and particularly striking were the differences between North and South. The South, with its sparse population and with the cultivation of its soil abandoned to negroes, was bound to have commerce for its informing principle. The North, it was true, furnished with abundant pop- ulation living in frugality, might well breed a spirit of emigration and conquest; but its atten- tion in turn would be occupied with Canada, which to that end should remain in the hands of the English. Also many years, not to say ages, must pass, ere the New Englanders have occupied effectively all the lands which still remain for them to cultivate and before therefore they will have a superabundant population which they will want to be rid of; and ere that time shall have come our vices will have been introduced among them by more intimate intercourse, with the result of having retarded their increase and progress.^ - '"'fb., ir. 466. 112 FRENCH POLICY AND - The argument was ingenious but to Florida Blanca, who participated to the fullest extent in the apprehensions that had been voiced by Cas- te j on, it was quite unconvincing. The Spanish minister's program, while the dispute with Portu- gal was still unsettled, had been that the struggle in America should be kept going till the parties to it were exhausted; meantime France and Spain should increase their forces in the West Indies; then Avhen the moment arrived, they should inter- vene between England and her rebellious prov- inces, with the object of filching from the occasion such profits as might be available, perhaps the Floridas for Spain and Canada for France.^^ And in August, 1777, the Spanish minister was of opinion that the time was not yet at hand for any course of action likely to precipitate war with England, and he was especially averse to the sug- gestion of an alliance with the Americans: For one thing, the Spanish treasure fleet from Mexico would not arrive until spring, and it would never do to tempt British cupidity with that. For an- other thing, for the two crowns to declare them- selves in behalf of the Colonies would be to furnish England with the best possible argu- ment for coming to an accommodation with them at once. Finally Spain had not yet had an oppor- tunity to build up a sufficient casus belli against the English, to give, that is, her multiplied causes '3 lb., 264, 273-4. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 113 of complaint that fail* appearance of consistency that decency demanded. Meantime, however, it would be pertinent, with a view to preventing the reconciliation of England and the Colonies, to per- suade the latter, through Franklin and Deane, and also through envoys to the Congressional chiefs, that any accommodation with the mother- coimtry would be useless which was not guaran- teed by France and Spain. "We can assure the deputies at the outset that we would not sanction anything contrary to the liberty and advantage of the Colonies, and that they would be protected in these respects, without saying more for the present." Surely the Americans could not with- stand such an inducement.^* Obviously balked in his own design by the specious intransigency of the Spaniard, Ver- gennes, in his despatch to Ossun, of August 22nd indicated the willingness of Paris, for the nonce at least, to follow in the wake of Madrid : "We ad- mit. Monsieur, without abbreviation, the hypothe- sis of the Spanish minister, that before thinking of a rupture we should make sure of the return of our own fishermen and of the fleet from Mexico." Meanwhile, it would be appropriate for the two powers to send secret envoys to America, charged with "brief, indirect hints" as to the advantage " "Traduction dii Memoire de la conr d'Espagne dii S aoust 177(j [sic] servant de reponse a eelui de la cour de Franee, envoye le 26 Juillet incine annee," ib., 490-1$. 114 FRENCH POLICY AND that the colonies would gain if, when procuring England's recognition of their independence, they should also obtain "the recognition and guaranty thereof of the European states most interested in sustaining it." True, it did appear somewhat im- probable that the American deputies in Paris could be brought round to this view. "Ready enough to enter into the closest kind of union if the two crowns would consent to war, the}' are apparently determined to decline any other sort of diplomatic connection," and "I have had more tJian one occasion to observe that their art looks not only to interesting us in their cause, but also to compromising us with England." "Still, I will throw out some words to them of a guaranty, and if they refuse to nibble at that bait, I have an- other idea . . . namely, to make them compre- hend that it would not be enough to obtain from England a recognition of their independence without taking steps at the same time to establish its permanence," and that the measure best cal- culated to that end would be treaties of amity and commerce with the powers most interested in seeing them free and prosperous. ^^ But before any action could be taken along this line, opportunity presented itself for Vergennes to press afresh for open war with England. The very day the French secretary penned his des- patch to Ossun, an imaccredited agent of the " Vero;ennes to Ossun, Aug. 22, ib., 500-3. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 115 V British government named Forth announced to Maurepas the intention of his government to ob- lige France, under pain of war, to return to their British owners all prizes brought into French ports by American vessels. ^^ The day following Vergennes presented the king a memoir vigor- ously protesting against compliance with such a demand. To do so, he argued, would be tanta- mount to stigmatizing the American privateers, and their countrymen as well, as pirates and sea- robbers ; and the result of that would be to arouse resentment in America tliat would lead at once to reconciliation with Kngland and "a desire for vengeance that ages perhaps would not diminish." It would be in entire accord with his dignity for the king to make some concessions, and policy demanded it on account of the absence of the Spanish treasure fleet. The orders against the admission of American privateers and their prizes to French harbors except in "absolutely urgent cases" could be renewed, and such pri- vateers as were already in port could be sent away, without however the time of their depar- ture being fixed. But more than this could not be conceded. "A great state can undergo losses without suffering in its reputation, but if it sub- scribes to humiliations, it is undone." As to "an assm-ance of the possessions of the two crowns in America," — for apparently Forth had sug- '•76., 525-6. 116 FRENCH POLICY AND gested some such idea, — that would be both un- profitable and useless. "It would tie our hands so that we should be unable to put ourselves in a state of defense" and arm our enemy with a club with which he could always extort some new compliance/^ The memoir received the approval both of king and council the same daj^ and three days later a second despatch was sent Ossun to acquaint him with the new turn of affairs. It was accompanied by a letter in Vergennes' own hand to Florida Blanca, which, recounting that "a new order of things" had most surprisinglj' intervened since the previous conmiunication, indicated the opin- ion that it was touch and go as between war and peace, but promised that every precaution which wisdom could suggest would be taken "to avoid if possible that the first blow should be too sen- sible."^^ Four days later, the secretary wrote Noailles, at London, that "the British ministry, despairing of subjugating the Americans . . . will seek to direct the passions of the nation against an object more capable of inflaming them, which object can only be France and Spain "''^ But again the complexion of affairs suddenly altered. Not only did Stormont fail to back up Forth's representations, but what is more to the "lb., 537-9; SMSS., No. TOK. "*/6., .134-5. *» lb., 536-7. See also ib., 526-9, 533-5. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 117 point, the news now came to Paris of Bur^i^oyne's capture of Ticonderoga.^*^ As after Long- Island Vergennes' anxiety as to the ultimate in- tentions of the British ministry imderwent nota- ble surcease. Florida Blanca was quick to detect the French secretary's vacillation and the opportunity offered for a homily against Amer- ican wiles. The shaft struck home, for with the advance of Burgoyne through northern New York, further disconcerting intelligence had come from London. His despatch of September 26th sliows the secretary of state in full retreat, though with an arrow or two still in his quiver: The Spanish minister had rightly judged that Forth's mission was not to be taken seriously, but what then was to be expected of a government that lent itself to such pranks in the midst of a civil war! France would give the preference to peace, of that Spain could be assured, and the more so as the moment had passed when by strik- ing at England she could have guaranteed suc- cess to the revolution in America. No doubt the attention of France and Spain ought to be di- rected to winning the confidence of the Ameri- cans without entireh' forfeiting that of the English but the task would not be an easy one, especially since the English government at least was well aware of what it was for the interest of the two crowns to do, while tlie Americans on =»/^., 537, 572 fn., 628. 118 FRENCH POLICY AND the other hand were inconsiderately disposed to look at everything from the point of view of their own advantage.^^ And what precisely was the attitude of the Americans at this juncture? Earlier in the year it had been their tactics to keep before Vergennes the possibility that, unless France promptly es- poused their cause, the Colonies, "dispirited by bad success, "^^ might be forced to accept terms from England that would be to the serious dis- advantage of France."^ But these methods, if they had not actually injured the American case by making the secretary sceptical of the substance and durability of the Revolution,"^ had at least netted nothing, and after Ticonderoga the com- missioners discarded them. Evidence of this fact is to be seen in their letter of September 25th to Vergennes and Aranda, to beg a subsidy of the two crowns or their friendly offices in a negotia- tion for peace, with a view to saving to America her "liberties with the freedom of commerce :" ''lb., 551-4. ^See Carmichael to Vergennes, SMSS., No. 647. The date is illegible save for the year, 1777, but it was clearly written before the news of Saratoga. "See Wharton, II. 280-3; Deane Papers, I. 434-42, II. 52-6, 66-9; and the memorial prepared earlj' in 1777 by Franklin, Deane, and the Abb^ Niccoli, SMSS., Nos. 149 and 150. This document was communicated to Lord Suffolk by the British spy Wentworth and was later quoted by Pownall on the floor of Parliament. See SMSS., No. 182, and Parlleimenlary History, XIX. 930 fiF. ^* See p. 67 supra. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 119 They [the comniissioners, the letter proceeds] can assure Your Excellencies that they have no account of any treaty on foot in America for an accommodation, nor do they believe there is any. Nor have any propo- sitions been made by them to the court of London, nor any the smallest overture received from thence which they have not already connnunicated ; . . . and the commissioners are firmly of the opinion that nothing will induce the Congress to accommodate on the terms of an exclusive commerce with Britain but the despair of obtaining effectual aid and support from Europe.'-'* On October 3r(i Vergennes proposed tliat France and Spain should each pledge the Colon- ies three millions Uvres on condition that they should enter into no negotiation with Great Bri- tain without the joint approval of the two crowns. Raisons de jinance, he admitted, were apparently opposed on this occasion to raisons de politique, but, he contended, in appearance only, since if England were enfeebled by the loss of America both France and Spain would enjoy peace for many years. ^^ But Florida Blanca was not to be persuaded ; and on November 7th, Vergennes an- ="SMSS., No. 1G98. See also Lee's "JournaF' in R. H. Lee's Life of Arthur Lee, L 354. On November 27, Deane proposed that the coniinissioners demand "a categorical answer" from France. "Dr. Franklin," Lee writes, "was of a different opinion: he would not consent to state that we must give up the contest without their interposition, because the effect of such a declaration upon them was uncertain. It might be taken as a menace, it might make them abandon us in dpsj)air, or anger. Besides, he did not think it true." Lee agreed with Franklin. "See Doniol, II. oM, 570, 575-8. 120 FRENCH POLICY AND nounced that Louis had determined to give the United States three milHons outright, to be paid quarterly."' Some days later, the Foreign Office instructed one Holker to proceed to America to sound Congress on the question of a French- Spanish guaranty along the lines originally sug- gested b}^ Madrid. The instructions were never carried out. On November 30th, the news of Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga reached Nantes, and M. Holker became the first emissary to America of a new and decisive policy. ^^ "lb., 579-80. But word of this decision was apparently not Communicated to the commissioners till after November 30, as no mention is made of it in their report to Congress of that date, Wharton, II. 433-6. And cf. ib., 445. -»//>., 615-6 and notes; SMSS., No. 1748. Holker late became the first French consul at Philadelphia. CHAPTER VI ^'ERGEXNES, AEARMIST AND PROrAGANDIST Vergennes' first reaction to the news of Sara- toga was that it meant American independence and tliat tlie problem presented to France by it was whether she could beat Great Britain out in according recognition of the fact. "The power," he wrote Montmorin, "that will first recognize the independence of the Americans will be the one that will reap the fruits of this war."^ Later he revised this estimate: Absolute independence would probably cost the pride of the British mon- arch too much, but even so, what guaranty was ' Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 11, Doniol, II. 632; SMSS., < No. 1769. The words are taken from Beauraarchais' extremely alarmist letter of the same date to Vergennes: The ministry, he writes, are denounced in I^ondon, the opposition triumphs, secret councils multii)ly, Ireland prepares to rise. What is the meaning? ^ "It is that of the two nations, England and France, the first who recognizes American independence will alone gather from it all the fruits, whilst the independence will be certainly fatal to the one that allows its rival to take the lead": SMSS., No. 1768. The / letter will also be found in Doniol, II. 684. Vergennes' recogni- tion of the decisive character of Saratoga was delayed somewhat on account of the exultant tone assumed by the British government and its amba^ssador over the news of Howe's capture of Philadel- phia and Washington's defeat at Brandywine: op. ciL, 620-4, and footnotes. 122 FRENCH POLICY AND there that the Americans, wearied by the war and discouraged by the indifference of Eu- rope, would not consent to waive the name if they were given the substance? At any rate, some sort of reconcihation of the mother-country and her rebelHous provinces impended and with it the menace of a joint attack by the Enghsh and Americans on France and Spain. The suc- cor given the insurgents by the two crowns would furnish from the British point of view a suffi- cient pretext and the rehabilitation of the French and Spanish navies a sufficient grievance. In such a war, New York would furnish the English a port of embarkment for the French posses- sions; the American corsairs would enrich them- selves by falling upon French and Spanish com- merce ; the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi would be a powerful lure to the Americans, and in their hands would render the possession of Mexico precarious, because, protected by the British navy, the colonists would have nothing to fear from the vengeance of France or Spain on the American continent. There could not be the least doubt in the world that such a program would be carried through were it not for His Britannic Majesty's squeamishness in the matter of independence. Thanks to that, the House of Bourbon had its opportunity.^ 2 Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 27, Doniol, II., (J65-6; "]Memoire lu an Roi," Jan. 7, 1778, ib., 734-5; Vergennes to Montmorin, par rEpine, Jan. 8, ih., 719-20; SMSS., Nos. 1805, 1824, 1826. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 123 A question touched upon at the beginning of this vohinie becomes at this point of renewed interest, that of Vergennes' intention in urging the above argument for his crown's intervention in the American revolt. Immediately, of course, , his intention is to present the war which this act of intervention will probably bring in its wake as essentially a war of self-defense on France's part, rather than one of aggression, or, to use his o>vn terms, as "a M^ar of necessity" rather than "of choice"; and were he thus making, for a policy already determined upon, the usual con- cession to "the decent opinion of mankind," his words would call for little comment. But in fact he is doing something quite different. He is argu- ing for the adoption of a proposed policy, and on that account it becomes important to inquire with some particularity whether this argument was a sound one, whether it was probable, was sustained by credible evidence, was consistently adherred to. In the pages immediately following I shall canvass these questions. Certainly the theory that England, defeated in America, would attack France and Spain had not / gained in intrinsic probability in the thi-ee years ^ that had elapsed since it was first broached. Then the weakness of the French and Spanish fleets had presented British naval aggressiveness an obvious temptation; now, by the statement of Vergennes himself, this weakness had been re- paired and Bourbon naval power had become 124 . FRENCH POLICY AND matter for alarm on England's part.^ Then the name of Chatham and his monumental hatred of the House of Bourbon had given viability to the most disturbing speculations; now it Avas recog- nized by the French Foreign Office itself, as at least highly probable, that the North ministry would continue as the instrument of His Britan- nic Majesty's American policies/ Then it was plausible to argue that the colonies could yet be drawn off from their pursuit of independence by the ancient lure of an attack on France, and the anticipated assault upon the French Antilles had accordingly been pictured as tlie first step to reconciliation between England and America. Now it had to be conceded by all that indepen- dence was the paramount objective of the Ameri- cans, with the result that this hypothetical assault had to be presented as the outcome of reconcilia- tion.^ But in this connection, Vergennes is fur- ' See also Vergennes' comments quoted infra on Lord Sand- wich's review in Parliament of the British naval situation; note, further, the following words in the Expose des Motifs of the French government (1779): "It is notorious that the armaments of France were in a condition to act offensively long before those of England were prepared," Annual Register, XXII. 394. * There was no possibility of Chatham's lieing called to power at this period. Even after France had declared the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States, we fmd George III asserting that "nothing shall bring me to treat personally with Lord Chatham"; and again, that "no consideration in life shall make me stoop to Opposition." Donne, Correspondence of George in, II. 149, 153. ■•See especially Doniol, II. 664 and 727. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 125 ther citable for the admission, as we have just observed, that England would not even yet offer the Americans complete independence, that she would insist upon retaining at least a nominal sovereig-nty ovei' them. The question thus emerges whether it was reasonable to suppose that the Americans would consent, in return for less than independence, to join in an assault on the possessions of P^'rance and Spain. It was not im- probable that the Colonies, weary of war, would finally content themselves with less than inde- pendence, if France did not come to their aid, but it was most unlikely that they would do so with any great alacrity or precipitancy; and just in proportion as the necessity of peace was a motive with them was it unlikely that they would embark upon war in another quarter for a comparatively minor object, and particularly when, in the pur- suit of such object, they would alienate the only powers that had befriended them and whose en- mity would leave them henceforth to face alone a still wrathful mother-country.^ Nor when I pass in review the evidence offered by Vergennes in support of his alarmist theorj% • Vergennes himself admitted that any arrangement between England and America would "not be the aflFair of a day," ib., 738-9, fn. In his despatch to Montmorin of Dec. 13, the secretary gives it as his own opinion that the commissioners prefer a coalition with the two crowns to a reconciliation with England: ih., 639. See also the Congressional resolutions of Nov. 22, 1777, and the commissioners' letter of Dec. 8 to Vergennes, Wharton, II. 455-6 and 444-5; also, pp. 117-9, supra. 126 FRENCH POLICY AND am I^ better convinced of its substance. First I shall consider some items of a comparatively trustworthy sort that bear on the question of what terms England would be likely to offer America and America be likely to accept. Then I shall turn to some items that demand more careful scrutiny. Vergennes knew from his confidential agents of the visit to Franklin of an Englishman named Hutton, reputed to be a friend of the English king;^ and he observed that Franklin remained reticent about the matter.^ This circumstance, however, was plausibly explained to him by Chaumont, one of the above-mentioned agents, as due to Franklin's reluctance to prejudice an old acquaintance with the English court,'' and we find the secretary himself testifying at this very time to his confidence in Franklin's loyalty and good faith. ^"^ Again, he had before him two letters which had been shown him by the American com- missioners and which he considered so important that he forwarded copies of them to Madrid. In the first of these, the writer, a citizen of Boston, seems to have advanced the idea that unless France and Spain evinced a disposition to come to the assistance of the colonies, at least in a financial way, Burgoyne's victory could be turned ' Doniol, II. 771-2. »/6., 718. "See Note 113, supra. ** Vergennes to Noailles, Dec. 37, Doniol, II. 657, footnote. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 12T to best account by getting as favorable terms as possible from England/^ In the other one, which had been sent from London to a secret agent of the commissioners named Banci'oft, the anonymous writer foreshadowed the intention of the Xorth ministry to bestow something like au- tonomy on the colonies for their internal affairs, while retaining control of their external relations, political and conm^iercial/" Lastly, he knew from Deane that an Englishman named Went- worth had visited this commissioner and, suggest- ing a truce for America, had proposed that the envoys send one of their number either to Eng- land or up into the Netherlands, to meet there an Englishman of high rank and negotiate a recon- ciliation on the basis of a qualified dependency; but he knew also that Deane had met these prop- ositions with a demand for unconditional inde- pendence, and that the Englishman had in turn pronounced the latter demand unallowable.*" But obviously this evidence is quite insufficient to justify Vergennes' assertion in the memoir of " Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 11, ib., 634. The content of the letter is further revealed by Florida Blanca's comments upon it in his despatch to Aranda of Dec. 33rd, ih., 709. " SMSS., N'os. 1787 and 1805; V^ergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 27, Doniol, II. 6()4-5. For some interesting speculations as to Bancroft's real character, see Wharton, I. 621-41. "Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 19, ib., 661-2; SMSS., No. 1786. See also Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Doniol, loc. cit., 685-6. Wentworth was a spy and stock-jobber in whom George III pro- fessed small confidence, Donne, Correspondence, II. 109. 128 FRENCH POLICY AND January 7th, which immediately preceded tlie king's sanction of an alliance with the United States, that the English government "already . . . displays to them [the American envoys] the certain advantages of a coalition against France iind Spain,"^^ and still less, if possible, does it prove that the English government was likely to achieve anything by such tactics. It is true that, in making this assertion, the secretary pleads that "the particulars are too long to detail," though he says the king knows them.^ ' But the fact is that both on this occasion and on earlier ones Vergennes does cite nimierous "particulars,"^® which it is fair to conclude are the most cogent ones for his purpose; and while, of course, we do not know what matters Vergennes reported orally to the king,^^ we do have both the elaborate memoir upon which the royal council based its decision in favor of an American alliance and also the extended correspondence with Madrid at this '*Doniol, II. 7-23. The statement is repeated in the "Preeis of Facts relative to the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce," which was read to the Council Mar. 18, SMSS., No. 1904. "76., 724. ^* The fact of the matter is that he straightway contradicts the words just quoted, in his confidential letter of the day following to Montmorin, where he writes: "J'espere que ce prince [the king of Spain] nous jugera favorablement lors qu'il aura peze les raisons exposees dans le m^moire et la depcche que vous recevrez par ce courier." Doniol, 11. 736. For the memoire and despatch re- ferred to, see ib., 717-38. " "lyC Roi ... a entendu mon raport particulier, a garde les pieces, a examine le pour et le centre": Vergennes to Montmorin, "Privd," Jan. 9: ib., 736; SMSS., No. 1828. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 129 period ; and we may, I submit, reasonably believe that tlie evidence intended for the eyes of the Spanish king and for the critical scrutiny of the Spanish minister was at least as convincing in character as that wliich, supplemented by the per- sonal presence and eloquence of the French secre- tary, persuaded the well-intentioned but stupid Louis of "the moral certainty of peril."' '^ We turn, then, to consider this additional evi- dence, if "evidence" it may be called; and first we note the kind of sources from which it issued. So far as is discoverable, Vergennes' infomiants, with the single exception of the French ambassa- dor at London, were either professional alarmists whose practical interests were already enlisted with the American cause — men like Beaumar- chais, Chaumont, and Grand — or the mere anony- mous voices of rumor, — as witness his repeated "(yn dit." From such sources as these it is that the statement finds its way into the secretarj^'s de- spatches, that the Howes have been instructed to open negotiations with Congress,'*^ that a '*"Ce n'est point rinfluence de ses ministres qui Pont decide; I'evideiice des faits, la certitude morale du danger et sa conviction I'ont seuls entraine," loc. cit. To the same effect is the letter of Louis to Charles, Jan. 8, ib., 713-4. '•Vergennes to Montmorin, "P.S., Dec. 15, ib., 649: "Ce qu'on (N. B.] a recueilli de plus positif est, que des instructions out ete envoyces aiix frcres Howe j)our eiitainer une iicgociation en Amerique." But compare with this the cautious tone of his despatch to Noailles five days later: "Des ordres de rt^conciliation doivent avoir etc envoyes tres recerament a M. Howe," ib., 704. For 130 FRENCH POLICY AND special courier has been sent to America,"*^ that Lord George Germaine's secretary is in Paris to treat with the commissioners,^^ that FrankHn's attitude of silence with reference to Hutton is matter for suspicion,^^ that the first steps have been taken in London toward the formation of a coalition ministry of which Chatham and Shel- burne are to be members,^^ that at Passy "they are negotiating briskly"^^ and finally, that "one formal proposition is to unite cordially and fall upon us."^' Ordinarily, it is true, the secre- tary discloses through what channels he ob- tained his information; but that fact does not hinder his arguing on the basis of it without allow- ance for its source, nor yet from sinning against the light shed by more reliable sources. a later rumor that General Howe had arrived at terms of recon- ciliation with Washington, see Wharton, II. 483. This rumor was of too late date to find a place in the despatches. =»Doniol, II. 647. ^' Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 13, "au soir" ib., 64,5, footnote 2: "D'une autre part le Lord Germaine . . . envoye, dit on [N. B.], ici son secretaire pour tralter avec les Americains." "Same to same, Jan. 8, ib., 718, following Grand's alarmist account of the matter, ib., 771. *^Same reference as note 21, siipra. ^ Same reference as note 33. The source of this item, which Vergennes himself says did not influence his decision, was Frank- lin and Deane's landlord at Passy, who was in Vergennes' pay. Sparks MSS., LXXVIII. p. 139. " Doniol, II. 649. The "inconnu" was Wentworth, whose prof- fers were reported by Deane to Vergennes a day or two later as impossible, since they did not include unconditional independence, ati/pra, p. 197. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 131 The person best entitled, both by length of offi- cial experience and by first-hand knowledge, to claim something like authority for his conclusions was the Marquis de Noailles, Louis' ambassador at the court of St. James, and indeed Vergennes himself pays striking tribute to the reliability cf Noailles' reports."^ Yet it is plainly not the policy of the secretary to put forward the ambas- sador's communications except so far as they can be wrought into the fabric of his own alarmist theory. Thus Noailles points out that there can be no binding negotiations between the British executive and the Americans till Parliament shall have repealed certain statutes. Vergennes, with- out citing Noailles, repeates the observation in his despatches to Montmorin but accompanies it with the conjecture that it will be the policy of the British ministrj^ to solicit overtures from the Americans as a basis for propositions to be laid before Parliament. Again, Noailles always im- plies that the North ministry will survive. This conclusion, too, Vergennes seems generally to accept; but he pits against it the contention that North and his associates now participate in the Opposition's way of thinking.^' Again, Noailles assures his government that North will not and '* Same reference as note 21. ^ Unfortunately, what "the Opjwsition's way of thinking"' was is by no means clear. See note below. As used by Vergennes this phrase signified what was for the most part a figment of his imagination — or calculation. 132 FRENCH POLICY AND cannot offer the Americans their independence. That is quite probable, rejoins the secretary, but the real danger lies in the possibility that the Americans will take less. At this point, however, the divergence between the secretarj^ and the am- bassador becomes flat contradiction, for Noailles, like Florida Blanca and Montmorin, is confident throughout that the Americans will never take less.^** Vergennes is determined, in short, that every- thing shall be grist to his mill. Unfortunately, there are times when his heroic endeavors to make it such hedge perilously upon dereliction. Thus on the authority of the Courier de V Eur ope, he erroneously attributes to Lord Sandwich the re- mark that "the time will come perhaps when com- plete reparation will be had of France and Spain for their insults," though the version of Sand- wich's speech which the scrupulous Noailles had forwarded him contained no such menacing pas- sage.^® Again, on no apparent authority at all, ^ See Noailles to Vergennes, Dec. \-2, 23, 26, SMSS., Nos. 1772, 1793, 1803. Cf. Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 19 and 27, Jan. 8, 16, and 23, SMSS., Nos. 1786, 1805, 1827, 1838, 1847. ^Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 3, Doniol, II, 589. Cf. SMSS., Nos. 1743 and 1772; also Parliamentarif HL^tory, XIX. HO. Even in quoting the above remark attributed by the Covrier to Lord Sandwich, Vergennes is forced to add the Englishman's admission that "it would be folly to propose war against the House of Bourbon." But he underscores the more alarming sentiment. The Courier de I'Enrope was evidently somewhat disposed to sensa- tionalism. See Lagt Journals of Horace Walpole, II. 181. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 133 he attributes to Lord North the idea of a frater- nal union with America and a new family com- pact to confront that of the House of Bourbon, though Noailles' report of the same debate quite correctly credited this idea to Lord Richmond, a Whig advocate of American independence.^*'v Indeed, as late as January 13th, that is nearly a week after the royal coimcil had sanctioned an alliance with the LTnited States, a memoir from the Foreign Office repeats the assertion that Eng- land is disposed to sacrifice her supremacy in America for "a sort of family compact, that is to say, a league against the House of Bourbon." This seems to be a distinct reference to the sen- timent which, Vergennes must have known, had been wrongly attributed to Lord North. It is, moreover, the only reference in the document, direct or indirect, to any evidence whatsoever supporting the charge that a coalition between England and America, hostile to France, im- ** Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 13, Doniol, II. 640 and (545 fn. 9. Cf. Noailles to V>rgennes, Dec. \2 and 23, SMSS., Nos. 1773 and 1793; also Parllamentari/ Hintory, XIX. 591 and 609. The fact of the matter is that the Parliamentary debates during the period between Burgoyne's surrender and the declaration by France of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce were singularly free of hostile flings at that power. The government wanted France's support, the Rockingham Whigs advocated unqualified independence for the colonies, Chatham, opposed to in(ic|)endence, had not yet further indicated his course. The fact that tlie only two citations which Vergennes made at this time of the debates were the two spurious •nes considered above is significant of their general tone toward France. 134 FRENCH POLICY AND pended l^'^' But even where the secretary's deflec- tions from the most scrupulous methods of propagandism are more venial, they are fre- quently not less instructive; and it is interesting to observe conjectures which have the form of positive statement in a despatch to Madrid as- sume, in a despatch of the same date to London, the more modest form of interrogation.^^ And not less illuminating is the constant habit of the secretary in his despatches of dropping the note of alarm for that of confidence. Examples might be multiplied, but one will suffice, that furnished by his comments upon Lord Sand- wich's review in Parliament of the British naval situation : But why should we look only on the dark side of things? According to Lord Sandwich himself, England has thirty-five ships of the line ready and with some effort could increase the number to forty-two. That then is all she can rely upon to guard the Channel, to observe our fleet at Brest, the Spanish fleets at Cadiz and Ferrol, to protect her establishments and her com- merce in the Mediterranean and secure the defense of her islands in America. Even she docs not count greatly upon the naval forces which she has in North America. These consist of such ancient vessels, with such impover- ished and dilapidated equipment, that they could lend ^' The memoir is given in Appendix III. It represents an effort to bring together every possible argument for the Ameri- can alliance. '' Cf. SMSS., Nos. 1805 and 1807, bearing date of Dec. 27, 1777. See also note 19 above. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 135 little assistance to inferior forces. All of which, as you see, Monsieur, is not calculated to discourage the two crowns if they know how to take their time and strike at the proper moment. ^^ How badly these words comport with Ver- geiines' supposed anxieties for the French An- tilles is obvious. But what is equally to the point, the inconsistency thus exemplified is much more than a characteristic of the secretary's ar- gument; it also projects itself into his policy in the most vital way, if we are to regard that as designed primarily for the defense of the Antilles. The only feasible method of either attacking or defending the Antilles was with a fleet; but the United States, though they had ports of embark- ment, had no fleet capable of such an enterprise, while Spain, pledged to come to France's assist- ance at the first hostile blow, had both a fleet and ports of embarkment that opened directly on the Caribbean. Yet Vergennes deliberately put in jeopardy the alliance with Spain in order to get an alliance with the United States; and in so doing, moreover, made war with England a certainty !^^ ^Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 27, Donlol, II. 666; SMSS.; No. 1805. See also to same general effect Vergennes to Mont- morin, Jan. 30, Doniol, II. 789-90; SMSS., No. 1853. Note, too, the secretary's complacent survey of the defenses of the West Indies, in his "Project de Reponses," to Florida Blanca's ques- tions, which was read to the king Jan. 28, Doniol, II. 782. ** Of course, if it was assumed that America reconciled with England, would be the one to instigate the attack on the French 136 FRENCH POLICY AND Nor does inconsistency stop short always of contradiction. For the fact of the matter is that Vergennes himself is quotable for the conten- tion that the defense of the French Antilles was not a leading, or even a considerable object with his government. Thus, early in the volume I drew attention to a despatch penned shortly after the news of Saratoga in which he wrote: "The in- terest of Spain is at least tenfold our interest ; our islands are little designed to tempt the cupidity of the English ; they already have enough of that sort of thing ; what they want is treasure, and that is to be got only from the continent. "^^ And the alliance having been consummated, he ex- pressed himself even more to the point: West Indies and that England would not otherwise make such an attack, then the above argument would fail. But Vergennes suggests America's interest in such an attack in only one passage and that put in the form of an interrogation. Thus, in his des- patch of December 37th to Montmorin, he writes: "Les Am6ri- cains nous proposent de conquerir les isles angloises et de leurs y accorder un commerce libre. Si vice versa, les Anglois font la mcme proposition, ne sera t'elle pas ecoutee, sera t'elle rejettee?" Doniol, II. 665. It is true that he represents the Spanish colonies as also presenting certain temptations to the Americans, e.g., the navigation of the Mississippi, but he also constantly assures Spain that the Americans will be very peaceable neighbors, quite dif- ferent from the avaricious English. As we have seen repeatedly, it is upon the proverbial cupidity of England and the desire she will have to retrieve her losses that Vergennes bases his whole alarmist argument. As to the Spanish alliance being put in jeopardy, the memoir given in Appendix III proves that the Foreign Office was quite ready to face the possibility, in January, 1778, that vSpain would remain neutral throughout the war. Vd. ib. '* lb., 643. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 137 It is not, I assure you [he wrote Montmorin, April 3, 1778], without something of pain and effort that the king and those of his ministers who enjoy his closest confidence have brought themselves to adopt a dif- ferent course with reference to American affairs than that of the Catholic king and his ministry ; but indeed, the interest of Spain herself has had greater weight in our decision than our own interest. The latter is com- paratively feeble, if we measure it by our possessions, for these are hardh'^ of a nature to whet the desires of the English, since they have none of the precious metals for which the English are so famished. It is rather toward the Spanish mainland that their eyes are turned, and I demand if England, mistress of the industry and re- sources of North America, and capable of fructifying these with her own wealth, would not be a neighbor more inconvenient, more formidable than the United States could probably ever become, given over as they are to the inertia which is the very essence of democratic in- stitutions?^^ Now, of course, it is quite true that these pas- sages both occur in despatches intended for Madrid and designed to persuade that govern- ment that its interest lay with France and Amer- ica, wherefore it may be argued that they are not to be taken too seriously as a revelation of the way of thinking of the French Foreign Office. Let the argument be granted to the fullest extent: what, then, is the implication as to utterances designed primarily for another forum and show- ing imminent peril to French possessions? Be- ''-Ib., III. 50-1. 138 FRENCH POLICY AND sides, it does not appear very precisely how, supposing there had been a reasonable degree of hkehhood of France having to come to the de- fense of her possessions, Vergennes' plea in ex- tenuation of her course, addressed as it was to France's ally, was strengthened by disparaging that fact. Palpably, the very contrary is the case. However, it may be urged from another angle, that the material feature of the passages under consideration is the assertion of France's concern for the safety of Spanish America, and that since this feature constantly reappears both in papers intended for Madrid and those intended for his own court, it is to be taken as expressing a ser- ious objective of his policy. Let this too be granted: the question then confronts us, Wliy was this so? It will hardly be contended, I sup- pose, that the French government was moved to any great extent by altruistic considerations, and especially since the course it took was extremely disagreeable to the only possible beneficiary of its altruism. And by the same token, the terms of the Family Compact can scarcelj^ be cited to fur- nish the required explanation. One explanation, then, and only one, remains: The very keen in- terest that France felt at all times in preventing a British conquest of Spain's holdings in America sprang from considerations connected with the doctrine of the Balance of Power, the idea being that, since England and France were rivals, any accession of new resources to the former would THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 139 put the latter at a correlative disadvantage in the field of rivalry. Yet the moment these considera- tions are made premises of the discussion, France's vast interest in promoting the separa- tion of Great Britain and North America looms before us. And which of the two contingencies, this separation or a British conquest of Spanish America, must have appeared the more imminent after Saratoga, and therefore as furnishing the more calculable basis of policy, is hardly a matter for serious doubt, v^ ''The interest of separating the English colo- nies from the mother-country and of preventing their reunion at any time in any manner what- soever is so primary a one that if the two crowns should purchase it at the price of a war a little disadvantageous, yet if they brought this separ- ation about, it would seem that they ought not to regret the war whatever its outcome/' Thus wrote Vergennes in December, 1777, while American recognition was still under debate.^® Ajid why should France desire this separation? The answer is supplied from another despatch written after the cause of recognition had tri- umphed, in these words: ''That which ought to determine and indeed has determined, her [France^ to join with America is the great en- feeblement of England effected by the subtrac- ^Ib., II. 644. To the same effect is the memoir given in Appen- dix III. 140 FRENCH POLICY AND tion of a third of her empire/'^' And why should France desire the enfeeblement of England? This question is answered in a third despatch, written with reference to the appearance of the Bavarian Succession question, at the moment the American alliance was in the act of consumma- tion. ''Eiigland is our first enemy, and the others never had any force or energy except from her"^^ But with these and like passages before us,^^ " Vergennes to Montmorin, June 20, 1778, ib., III. 140. ^Vergennes to Noailles, Jan. 17, ib., II. 745-6 and fn.; SMSS,, No. 1839. ^ See Ch. I, note 21. "Ou est, pourra t'on me dire, la surete que cette guerre nous sera heureuse? Je repons d'abord: est elle de choix ou de necessite. Si elle est de la derniere espece, comme tout en fait la demonstration, il faut done s'y soummettre avec resignation et courage. Mais supposons qu'elle soit mal- heureuse, ce qui est bien problematique. Si Vindependance de I'Amerique en est la conseqvence, si cette independance est absolue; si elle ne produit pas un pacte de fraterniti qui reindentifieroU les deux peuples et n'en feroient plus q'un, les' deux Couronnes n'auront elles pas infiniment gagn6 d'avoir procure une separation aussi considerable et diminue d'autant la puissance de leur ennemi invetere?" Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 27, Donlol, II. 666. Florida Blanca thus epitomizes the arguments of the French despatches: "La cour de Versailles a pens^ de son cote qu'il convenoit a sa gloire, a la bonne politique et aux interets les plus essentiels de la monarchic fran^oise de gagner de vitesse Tactivit^ du cabinet britannique, et de ne point laisser echaper une occasion aussi favorable (et qui ne se presentera plus jamais) de convertir en avantages immenses pour la maison de Bourbon les memes moyens dont les Anglois avoient imaging pouvoir se servir pour sa ruine,' 'i6., 749. "L'objet principal des ministres du roi ^tait d'assurer Tindependance des Etats-Unis et d'enlever ces treize riches provinces k I'Angleterre," Segur, Memoires ou Souvenirs et Anecdotes (Paris, 1844, 3 vols.), I. 166. Segur was a friend and confidant of Vergennes. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 141 it becomes evident that the substance of Ver- gennes' concern in the period following the news of Saratoga was not, primarily, the security of tlie French West Indies; that, indeed, the anxie- ties which he at times professed on this score, at other times minimized, are not to be regarded too seriously. His real concern, a concern that finds repeated utterance in his despatches and again through Gerard, in the latter's negotiations with Franklin, Deane, and Lee, was of a reconciliation between England and America which, however devoid of belligerent intent toward the House of Bourbon, would yet pave the way for the final restoration of British dominion over the military^ industrial, and commercial resources of America, and especially of the last/*^ In other words, his concern was the obverse of his desire, and, with the evidence that Saratoga afforded of the real dimensions of the Revolution, of his hope, that is to say, the hope of seeing England and America permanently separated. The way, however, to make that sure, he argued, was for France to espouse the cause of American independence; for then the Americans would persist till inde- « See Doniol, II. 633-4, 638, 640, 655-6 fn., m5-Q, 738 fn., and 837; SMSS., Nos. 1831 and 1847. "We must now either support the colonies or abandon them. We must form the alliance before Eng- land offers independence or we will lose the benefit to be derived from America, and England will still control their commerce." Vergennes to Montmorin, Phillips, op. cit., 73 (citing the Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Espagne, 588, No. 17). 142 FRENCH POLICY AND pendence was in fact won and, when won, would use their hberty of action in ways beneficial to France. But before, of course, he could put this program into effect he had either to persuade his own king and the king of Spain to join in ac- cepting it, or to persuade Louis to take a line of his own. He soon found that the latter alterna- tive was the immediately feasible one, though not so easily feasible ; whereas, in so important a mat- ter as this one of intervention, involving the cer- tainty of war, no half-way conversion of the king to the ministerial program would at all suffice. The somewhat abstract argmiient showing the large but rather intangible advantages to flow from England's loss of North America and its resources, had, therefore, to be supplemented by an argument of a more imperative sort, showing a danger immediate and concrete. The notion that French possessions in the West Indies were menaced by a pending Eng- lish-American coalition played an important part in bringing France into the War of Indepen- dence. It was this suggestion, supported by the somber name of Chatham, which first drew Ver- gennes' infra-Continental gaze to what was tak- ing place on the other side of the Atlantic. It was with the same notion that Vergennes him- self was able to counter Turgot's argument against secret aid, that it invited war. Lastly, it was with this notion that Vergennes overcame THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 143 Louis' reluctance to part company with his royal uncle for the sake of some rascally American rebels. Yet, when all is said, the theory in ques- tion throws little, if any, light on the nature of the principal advantage which the secretary ex- pected that France would derive from interven- tion. And clearly, his statement at the moment of the royal council's decision in favor of an American alliance, that it was "not the influence of his ministers that decided the king" but "the evidence of facts, the moral certainty of peril," should be taken with a saving allowance of salt. No doubt Louis was convinced by the "facts" as they were represented to him ; but if the monarch was unable to discern the flimsy texture of hear- say and guess-work beneath the ministerial var- nish, the secretary was not so unaware of the quality of his own elaboration, as his constant admissions attest. Nor does "the evidence of facts" from American sources assist his effort thus to bridge the gap between remote possibility and calculable probability. Not a single state- ment of either Franklin, Deane, or Lee is on record showing either that they ever heard the word "coalition" from any British agent, or that, after Saratoga, they ever hinted such an idea to^ the French government, or that they supposed the French government to be alarmed on that score. The argument from silence is not always the most convincing, but its concurrence with 144 FRENCH POLICY AND more positive considerations, as in this instance, is at least reassuring.^ ^ ■" The theory of an hnpending hostile English-American coalition having played its part in bringing the king into line for an American alliance was next utilized to exonerate France's con- duct to legitimist Europe. The original form of the French government's apology for recognizing the independence of the United States is to be found in the "Precis of Facts relative to the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce," which was read to the Council, March 18, 1778, (SMSS., No. 1904). Several months later a more extended apology was put forth in the form of the Expose des Motifs, etc. (translated in the Annual Register, XXII, 390 ff.). In the latter document the following statement occurs: "The French treaty defeated and rendered useless the plan formed at London for the sudden and precarious coalition that was about to be formed with America and it baffled those secret projects adopted by His Britannic Majesty for that purpose." This document was answered for the British government by Gibbon the historian in a paper of vast ability, entitled Memoire justicatif, etc., and written in French. (For translation, see Annual Register, XXII. 397 flf.) Gibbon taxes the French gov- ernment with having rendered the Colonies secret aid — "the court of Versailles," he says, "concealed the most treacherous con- duct under the smoothest professions"; with having revived old quarrels reaching back, some of them, to before the Peace of Utrecht; and with claiming the privileges of a belligerent while professing the character of a neutral. Coming then to the coali- tion charge, he writes: "When an adversary is incapable of justifying his violence in the public opinion, or even his own eyes, by the injuries he pretends to have received, he has recourse to chimerical dangers. . . . Since, then, that the court of Versailles cannot excuse its procedure but in favor of a supposition desti- tute of truth and likelihood, the king hath a right to call upon that court, in the face of Europe, to produce a proof of an asser- tion as odious as bold; and to develop those public operations or secret intrigues that can authorize the suspicions of France that Great Britain, after a long and painful dispute, offered peace to her subjects with no other design than to undertake a fresh war \, \. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 145 against a respectable power with which she had preserved all the appearances of friendship." The author of Figaro was now set to answer the historian of the Decline and Fall. His answer, entitled Observations sur les Mdmoire justicatif, etc., in its original form practically ignored Gibbon's challenge. The bulk of it con- sists of an excited review of cases of seizures of French vessels by the British on the charge of carrying contraband, and the coali- tion idea appears in a single paragraph near the end of the docu- ment. See Oeuvres Completes (Paris, 18'J5), pp. 530-43. The work was unsatisfactory to the Foreign Office, however, and was recast, presumably by Rayneval, Vergennes' secretary. (See Appendix IV and bibliographical data there given.) In the form in which it received official sanction the Observations rehashes Bcaumarchais' review of British seizures, stoutly denies Gibbon's charge of secret aid, asserts that the Americans were independent in fact when France recognized them, and devotes considerable space to the coalition charge, but without very convincing results. Thus Gibbon's demand for proof is met by the assertion that naturally the British government was not so imprudent "as to leave direct marks of its darksome manouvre" and by the reputa- tion of the king of France for probity. "It was natural," the docu- ment continues, "for the British ministry, unable to subdue her Colonies, to seek to be reconciled with them." "In this situation," the quei^y is put, "ought it not to be supposed that, the moment the British ministry perceived the necessity," etc. Finally, it is added: "Moreover, although the king had not had certain proof of the hostile views of the court of London, it would have been sufficient to have had probable grounds to suspect that they existed.'' etc. In other words, if the fact did not exist, it at least behooved the French government to imagine that it did. Later passages in the document defend France against the charge of having entered the war for the purpose of crushing England: her purpose was only to diminish British power, and in this en- deavor she represented the interests of Europe. See Appendix IV; also the following note. For the more general considerations supporting the conclusions of the above chapter, see chapter I, supra. \ 146 FRENCH POLICY AND NOTE Just as the page proof of this book is coming in I receive my April number of the American Historical Review, in which Professor C. H. Van Tyne reasserts the notion that the French government's decision to enter into alliance with the United States after Saratoga was determined by the fear that otherwise it would be confronted with a hostile English-American coalition which would pounce on its West Indian holdings. The printer has kindly put space at my disposal for some comments on this article, and I avail myself of the opportunity the more gladly as in doing so I can perhaps make my own position somewhat clearer: 1. To begin with. Professor Van Tyne is in error in stating that this explanation of France's action has heretofore escaped American writers. Pitkin (History, I. 398-400), Otis' Botta (II. 423-39), Perkins (France in the American Revolution, pp. 231-2), and Laura C. Sheldon {France and the American Revolution), passim, all note this argument for the alliance. And see further American State Papers, "Foreign Affairs," I. 569-71. Indeed, so far from the idea in question being at all "elusive," as Professor Van Tyne suggests, it is quite impossible for one perusing the documents to escape it, the only question being, what weight, when all the evidence is compared, ought to be assigned it in explanation of the alKance. So also, Doniol places the "coalition" argument alongside the "enfeeblement" ar- gument as explanatory of the alliance, without however making any effort to assess the relative value of the two as representa- tive of French motives or to distinguish between the point of view of the Foreign Office and that of the king. See ib., II. 624-5. As to the French writers whom Professor Van Tyne cites as voicing his own view, it may be conjectured that they got the idea from widely circulated Observations described above. But it is to be noted that later writers, like Lavisse and Sorel both of whom have investigated the origins of Bourbon diplomatic policy and both of whom had Doniol available, give the "coalition" argument no weight whatsoever. 2. Professor Van Tyne would draw a hard and fast line between the policy of secret aid and the policy of al- liance. But as he himself shows, the "coalition" argument was urged no less in behalf of secret aid than in that of the alliance. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 147 Indeed, it is altogether obvious that the reasoning by which the Foreign Office supported its policy from start to finish ivas all of a piece, and that the American victory at Saratoga — and, conse- quently, the situation which it produced — was the consummation, exactly, which secret aid had from the first been intended to{ bring about. 3. Professor Van Tyne brings forward what he calls a "key-document" to the motives of the French government in entering into alliance with the United States in 1778. I fail to see, however, that this document has any significance whatsoever, save that it may have been the source from which Professor Van Tyne himself first derived his idea of French motives. Thus, on the point imder discussion, it merely repeats several earlier documents (see previous note) and brings forward not one iota of additional evidence, except that it apparently endeavors to repre- sent North's conciliatory propositions, which post-dated the alli- ance, as having been known to the French government at the time of its decision. Again, it was written more than five years after the events wliich it narrates. Finally, it was written with the pur- pose of silencing the very bitter criticism which, after Grasse's defeat in the West Indies, was visited on the ministry's American policy. Vergennes' tactics, it seems clear, are to remind the king of his own responsibility for this policy and so to fasten on his critics the charge of Use-majeste. See Doniol, V. 186-7 and fn.; Revue d'Histoire diplomatique VII. 528 ff. ; Jobez, La France sous Louis XVI (Paris, 1881), II. 492-506. 4. Nor is Professor Van Tyne's citation of one or two other documents in support of his thesis beyond criticism. Thus the Carmichael memorial cited by him on p. 538 of the Review was written before Saratoga and is in no wise applicable to show the attitude of the American commissioner at the later date. See p. 118, supra. Again, the Broglie memoir, cited at p. 537 of the Review, makes distinctly against the thesis it is brought forward to support. For while Broglie argues that England must in an endeavor to preserve her rank, try to recoup her losses at the expense of France and Spain, he rejects the idea that the Colonies will accept a coalition with her or anything less than independence. And it may be fairly said that while it is insisted that England will, from the very desperation of her case, fall upon the Antilles, the whole trend of the argument is that she has already lost her opportunity. 148 FRENCH POLICY AND tog:tIier with her naval superiority. Finally, Broglie opposes an alliance with the Americans, contending that a commercial con- nection will answer all purposes. See Doniol, II. 674 flF. All of the other material which Professor Van Tyne cites that is rele- vant to his contention will also be found in Doniol, and is suffi- ciently discussed in the above chapter. 5. At the close of his article Professor Van Tyne writes thus: It seems "clear that Vergennes did not invent this motive for the alliance — the idea that France was confronted by the dilemma of war with England any- way . . . merely ... to get the consent of the king and the other ministers to the plan he wished to pursue. But whether it is his conviction or his device, the idea of this terrible dilemma remains the reason for the decision of the French cabinet." These words avoid the real issue on several accounts: The "terrible dilemma" with which Vergenes confronted the king was not of a war with England simply — for that France, backed as she would have been by Spain, was quite ready (see following chapter) — but of a hostile English-American coalition. Again, the attitude of the cabinet was assured from the first (see pp. 78-9, 85 supra), and it is the conversion of the king alone whicli Vergennes finds it worth while to explain — in terms meant for the ears of the Spanish court — in his despatch of January 8. See Doniol, II. 736, Finally, since the American alliance was the work of Vergennes, it is the underlying reason for his preference that we really need to know. Does this reason connect itself primarily with the history of French-English rivalry for colonial dominion in the Western Hemisphere, or with the history of French-English rivalry for influence on the Continent of Europe? That is the interesting question. See further, the data in chapter XVI, infra. CHAPTER VII THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND OUTBREAK OF WAR The steps by which the fascinated monarch approached the decision that was ultimately to cost him his crown and his life are visible in the stages by which the Foreign Office and the Ameri- can conmiissioners came to terms. On Decem- ber 6th the king authorized advances to the Americans looking to a good understanding be- tween the new republic, on the one hand, and France and Spain, on the other, — but nothing more definite/ In the audience that he ac- corded the commissioners, six days later, in consequence of this authorization, Vergennes emphasized the fact that the common policy of France and Spain made it impossible for the king to agree to a negotiation without the concurrence of his uncle. The Americans in turn indicated their preference for a simple treaty of amity and commerce and renewed an argument they had earlier made, that such an engagement would not involve the two crowiis in war. But to this con- • lb., f)2o-(>. For further details of this interview and of the ensuing negotiations, see Lee's "Journal" in R. H. Lee's Life of Arthur Lee, I. 357-89. 150 FRENCH POLICY AND tention Vergennes demurred strongly, urging that if they were to treat at all "it must be in good faith" and on such foundations of justice that the resulting ties "would have all the solidity of human institutions."^ Mid-December came the rumor that Lord Germaine's secretary was in Paris, and Ver- gennes at once authorized Gerard to go to Passy and "make glitter before his [Deane's] eyes, as consented to in advance, everything necessary to keep the legation in the lap of France."^ On December 17th, accordingly, Gerard brought to Passy the news that the king had decided to acknowledge the indepen- f\ C dence of the United States, to enter into a treaty of amity and commerce with them, and to sustain their independence by all the means at his dis- posal without exacting any compensation for the risks he took, "since, besides his real good-will to us and our cause, it was manifestly the interest of France that the power of England should be diminished by our separation from it." Of an active alliance, however, Gerard said not a word. On the contrary, according to the united testi- mony of the three Americans he stated explicitly that the king would "not so much as insist that, if ^^ he engaged in a war with England on our account, we should not make a separate peace," the only = Doniol, II. 637-9. ^Jb., 647. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 151 condition being "that we, in no peace to be made with Enoland, should give up our independence and return to the obedience of that govern- /' ment."^ In other words, while recognition of ./ American independence had been decided upon, the question of an alliance was still in abeyance. There now ensued a fortnight's delay while word from Madrid was being awaited. It came the last day of the year and was unfavorable." A further delay of a week was set against the gout of the aged chief-minister. Meantime, the Americans w^ere pressing for a more indicative sign of the course that France was to take, and the date of the British Parliament's reassem- bling, January 20th, was drawing nigh. At last, on January 7th, a royal council, convened at Versailles, declared unanimously for a treaty of ^ amity and commerce with the United States, and a treaty of alliance which should embodj^ the fol- lowing features: first, it should become operative only upon the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain; secondly, it should have for its end to secure the "absolute and unlimited inde- pendence of the United States"; thirdly, it should stipulate a reciprocal guarantee of the possessions of the two powers in North America and the West Indies ; fourthly, it should allow the accession of either party to it to a treaty of peace * Wharton, II. 4,5-'-3. ^ Doniol, II. 706, footnote, and 7C.J-70. 152 FRENCH POLICY AND with the common enemy only upon the consent of the other; lastly, it should provide, in a separate and secret article, for the right of Spain to join the alliance.^ The next evening Gerard made a second visit to Passy. Pledging the Americans to secrecy, lie began by repeating much of what he had said on the earlier occasion, inveighed strongly against a curtailed independence, especially as to matters of commerce — saying that "clear- sighted people had perceived this to be a com- mercial war from the outset" — and urged that the deputies at once forego every appearance of negotiating with their enenw. Franklin, inter- rupting, inferred that war would be begun at once by the king upon England, but Gerard answered that such was not the king's plan, that that was out of the question. He then asked what the deputies would consider a sufficient induce- ment to make them reject all propositions from England which did not include full independence in matters of trade as well as of government ; also what terms would evoke a like response from the American Congress and people. To the first question the envoys returned answer on the spot : the immediate conclusion of a treaty of commerce and alliance would close their ears to all pro- posals not providing for the unqualified indepen- dence of the United States both political and « lb., 7:29-30. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 153 commercial. Gerard now announced that he was authorized to say that the king would conclude such an arrangement at once, in the form of two treaties, one a commercial treaty, which shoul,d go into effect upon ratification and should be strictly reciprocal, and the other an eventual treaty of alliance. He then referred to the pos- sible conquest of the American continent by the United States, Deane having told him that Franklin was eager for this and indeed foimd in it the principal reason for an alliance with France. But Gerard indicated that he was im- certain how far His Most Christian Majesty would engage to cooperate in such an enterprise. He also let them know that he now spoke for France alone and hot for Spain, with whom, he implied, they would have to come to terms sep- arately, — an announcement which disappointed Franklin greatly." Three days later the commissioners, through Deane, returned Gerard an answer to his second question. It was a demand for "an immediate engagement" on the part of France "to guarantee the present possessions of the Congress in Amer- ica, with such others as they may acquire on the 'Gerard's Narrative, Jan. 9, 1778, SMSS., No. 1831. Note that on this occasion, as on that of his earlier visit to the commissioners, Gerard's chief concern was to mal