Class. Book. Esj-] ■ [5 k.1 £■ _5 I n " FRE MONT'S HUNDRED DAYS IN MIS SOURI." .r543 SPEECH OF HON. F. P. BLAIR, JR., OF MISSOURI, ON FREMONT'S DEFENSE; DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 7, 1862, WASHINGTON: PRINTED AT THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE OFFICE. 1862. speech of his aid-de-camp, the member from Indi- ana, [Mr. Shanks,] made in this House the other day. This speech and statement inaugurate a new campaign, and in a new and more congenial field, to be fouglit with new weapons, far different from the rude instruments of war with which General Fremont has been so unsuccessful. It is a cam- paign of proclamations, the only weapons which, up to this time, he seems to have used with effect. I commend his choice of weapons. His procla- mations will not help the enemy as much as he did by supplying them with arms at his isolated and unsupported positions at Lexington and else- where, nor will his proclamations injure the Gov- ernment in its struggle to put down rebellion one tithe as much as one single contract oFJiis making for condemned arms or for useless earthworks. The statement made by General Fremont is ex- traordinary both in its character and in the man- ner in which it was made public. I do not believe, after the statements upon this floor the other day by authority of the committee on the conduct of the war, that its publication was sanctioned by them. Mr. GOOCH. As that testimony has been made public, I feel bound to state, with the per- mission of the gentleman from Missouri, the ac- tion of the committee on the conduct of the war in reference to it. General Fremont came before the committee the same as all other witnesses that appeared before us. The committee deemed it essential that they should inquire into Uie conduct of the war in the western department, and for that purpose begun, as they have begun inaliotherdepartments, where it has been possible for them to do so, by bring- ing before them first the general in command of the department. When he appeared before the committee he pro- duced certain documents, from which he said the committee could select such parts as they deemed material. It was suggested by the chairman of thie committee — and in that the whole committee agreed — that General Fremont had better make a concise statement in writing, such as he wished to make in reference to the conduct of the war in his department. He did so; and when that statement was submitted these documents were submitted with it. They were not, liowever, received by the committee with the understanding tliat all of them were to be published in the report the com- mittee were to make to Congress, but only such parts as they should deem material to the investi- gation which they had been instructed to make. At a subsequent time General Fremont appeared before the committee, and certain questions were asked him, in relation to the western department, which he answered. When General Fremont left the committee room he was requested by the com- mittee, as all other witnesses have been, to give no information to any one of what he had stated to the committee. With that request I understood him to comply, the same as all other witnesses have done. I only wish to say further, that the testimony was published without the knowledge or consent of the committee; and I will add that I do not be- lieve that under any circumstances the committee would have fell it to be their duty to have reported to Congress all the letters and telegraphic dis- patches which were laid before them, because they would have considered that some of them would throw no light u^on the investigation which the committee was making, and ought, from their very character, to be suppressed. Mr. BLAIR, of Missouri. I ask the gentleman if all General Fremont's testimony is published.' Mr. GOOCH. The written statement and the letters and dispatches which he gave to the com- ■hiiltee are published, but not that part of his test- imony which was in response to interrogatories propounded to him by the committee. He did not give to the committee the original letters and dis- patches, but copies of them, and said that he would furnish the originals when we desired them. He had no copy of that part of his testimony which was in response to interrogatories, and therefore could not publish that. Mr. BLAIR, of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, the character of this statement is as extraordinary as the manner in which it has found its way before the public. It is an apology for disaster and de- feat; ingenious upon its face by the omission of important facts, and by the suggestion of others which never existed. It proves him to be a much better apologist for the defeats which he suffered, than he is a general to achieve victories. One of his aids-de-camp, a gentleman distinguished as a literary man, has also published an account of his campaign in Missouri, in one of our popular magazines, under the title of" Fremont's Hundred Days in Missouri," thereby challenging compari- son with the far-famed campaign of Bonaparte. Is there anything in this campaign, as portrayed by the general himself, and by his several aids- de-camp, that resembles, except in the number of days, the historic campaign of the first Napoleon? Can imagination conceive of Bonaparte returning to Paris, and announcing that he had lost two armies, liberated two negroes, and published a bombastic proclamation . It is known, Mr. Chairman, that I took an interest in the elevation of General Fremont to his present rank and recent command in the Army. I do not suppose that my recommenda- tion aided him in securing him that position, l)Ut it shows the good feeling I entertained for him, and the confidence I had in him at the time. I should have rejoiced in his success in the de- partment over which he was placed. I had been his friend for many years, and my whole fam- ily lind been most friendly to liim and to his fam- ily. The kindest relations had always existed be- tween us. I should have rejoiced in his success, not only on account of the great public cause in which we were both engaged, but also on account of my personal interest in him. I recommended him in the belief that he would serve the great public interest, and when I found he was incom- petent to serve that cause, I recommended his re- moval upon the same public considerations, and with no other feelings than those of humiliation and regret. There is nothing in the letter that I addressed to my brother, the Postmaster General, and through him to the President, that shows that I had one particle of feeling against him. The conviction which was forced upon me, came with i^iief and mortification, such as I have never be- fore experienced. My jiHly;ment, iiniiiflucnced by any motives except tiiose for the pul)lic e-ood, compelled me to the conclusion that General Fre- mont was unfitted for the conmiand of that depart- ment. I never had any private griefs against iiim of any kind. I never asked anything of him for myself, because there was nothing I desired that I could have obtained by his aid, which I could not just as well have oijtained without it. 1 never asked for anything for others, tha^ he did not cheerfully assent to, and, so far as it was in his power, grant. Fremont's apology for x-ot rein-forcing lyon. Now, sir, I jiave read with attention the state- ment he has made through the press, and I have read also the speech of the gentleman from In- diana, [Mr.Sii.wKs,] who followed him to Spring- field as an aid-de-camp, and I can find nothingm either to justify the enthusiasm which that gen- tleman seems to feel over a sad record of defeats and unvaried disasters. The one isa tame apology, the other a sort of frothy rhetoric and confused declamation. There are two great points which will forcverstand outin relief in the history of those hundred days, the saddest days that ever befdl the loyal men of that State, which no rhetoric and no studied obscurity of expression can slii^ld from view or make the nation forget. Those two great points of public interest upon which the sad eyes of the nation will always be fixed, are Springfield and Lexington; the fields where the heroic Lyon fell, and where iVlulligan yielded, not to the foe, but to famine and thirst. What had the gentle- man from Indiana [Mr. Shavks] to say about them > Absolutely nothing ! What has General Fremont said about them in his statement.' He treads lightly on that ground. The other histo- rian, who has chosen a popular magazine for his forum, finds little lime to bestow upon them. But I will do General Fremont the justice to quote his own language: '• From St. Louis to Ciiiro was an casv davV joiirncv by water, and traiis-portation abundant. To Hprin'-tulil was a weok's triarch, and before I could have reached it, (.'alio would have bvx-n taken, and with it, I believe. .St. Loui--. On mv arrival at Cairo, I found the force under General I remiss reduced to one thousand two hundred men, con- sisting mainly of a regiment which had agreed to awiiitmy "A few miles below, at New Madrid, General Pillow had landed a torce estimated at twentv thousand, which sub- sequent events showed was not exajferated. Our force greatly increased to the enemy bv rumors, drove him to a hasty retreat, and peimanently secured the nosiiioii. 'J'o tliese facts the .accompaiiyinp papers and the testimony of General Prentiss and other officers is offered to the coiii- mitice. " r returned to .rice, according to Fremont's statenWit, had one third more men to attack Lyon than Pillow iiad to as- sail Cairo, as it was then said he was threatenino- to do. Lyon was without fortifications and with" out heavy guns, Prentiss had both at Cairo, and that place was covered by two rivers in front, and could not have been assailed without crossing them, which it was utterly impossible for the enemy to do, in ftice of an army to oppose them. It is pretended and attempted to he shown by a dispatch from General Prentiss, that his army, consisting of six " three months"and two " lluee years" regiments, was about to be disbanded, and the statement of General Prentiss is left un- explained, and the argument boldly advanced that without reinforcements he could liave had but two regiments left to defend the post. The truth of the matter is, as shown by General Pren- tiss in a subsequent dispatch, that these six "three months" regiments were then in process of reorganization; and I say they did not disband, but reentered the service almost in a body for the war. Cook's regimenj, Oglesby'a regiment, McArthur's regiment, the regiment originally raised by Prentiss, were all "three months" men. They remained in the service; they re- mained at Cairo, and the other two regiments of " three months" men, whose oames 1 do not now remember, remained also, and all have since made their names illustrious at the siege of Fort Donelson. But if a portion of Prentiss's com- mand were " three moiiths" men, so also were a majority of the troops under Lyon's command, at Sjiringfield. • Springfield was a week's march from St. Louis, and was capable of bcin"- rein- forced only from that point. Yet General Fre- mont believed and acted upon the belief that Cairo, threatened by Pillow with twenty thou- sand men, was the point to be reinforced, although it was strongly intrenched, garrisoned by ei>^ht 6 regiments, defended by guns of the heaviest cali- ber, wiiii the Ohio and Mississippi rivers in front, and capable of being reinforced within twenty- four hours from any part of the entire Northwest; and that Lyon at Springfield, ihreatencd by thirty thousand men, having under his command a less force than that at Cairo, with no intreiichments, with no heavy guns, with no natural defenses in- terposed between him and the enemy, a week's march from St. Louis, from which point alone it could be effectually reinforced, was to be left to his fate, or to be left to wait until Cairo, naturally so much stronger, and with its artificial defenses so much better, so much more easily reinforced, and defended by more men, should first be at- tended to. This is the amplification of his own argument. Let him be judged on his own state- ment. So thoroughly was he possessed by this idea that he seems utterly to liave forgotten Lyon and Springfield until the 3d day of August, nine days after his arrival in Missouri. A messenger came from Lyon repeating the sad story of his distress and peril, which was forwarded to Cairo, and Gen- eral Fremont on that day telegrajtlied an order to Stevenson at Booneville and Colonel Montgomery at Leavenworth in Kansas, ordering them to rein- force Lyon with their regiments. These two reg- iments were probably tiie two of all others in his command the farthest from Springfield by the routes which they would be compelled to take, and in positions the most difficult to supply them im- mediately with transportation. This is literally all that Fremont ever did to reinforce Lyon. You may search his statement — every letter, every tel- egram, and every document — and you will find no other order given. He makes tlie distress of Lyon the pretext for the purchase of condemned arms', but he made no effort of any kind except the orders given to Stevenson and to Montgomery, to relieve Lyon's distress, and he provided neither Stevenson nor Montgomery with transportation to enable them to carry out the order of relief. If lie had provided the transportation for these two regiments, they could not have reached Lyon in time, although both could certainly have done so had he made the order on his first arrival in Mis- souri. He had other regiments in his command which could have reached Lyon and reinforced him, even if ordered as late as the 3d of August. For instance, Wyman's regiment, thirteenth Illi- nois, tiien at RoUa, and (hirty-six hundred other men, as shown by the report of Colonel Chester Harding, jr., to have been at the arsenal and Jef- ferson barracks on the 5th day of August, of which Coler's Illinois regiment is stated by him to be the only one not ready for service. In this place I desire to allude to the assertions of General Fremont and of Colonel Chester Hard- ing, jr., to the effect that the force which Pillow is said to have had, and with which he was threaten- ing to assault and take Cairo, was denionstrated by subsequent events not to have been over-estimated. Well, sir, if subsequent events have demonstrated that fact, they have been very unfortunate in not pointing to a single one of them. Neither of them point to anything that has occurred that justifies any such statement; and, in my opinion, there was good reason forthis singular reserve on their parts Months afterwards, when the battle was fought at Belmont, it was not supposed by any one that there were twenty thousand men at Columbus, under command of General Polk, who had then taken the place formerly held by Pillow. It lias not been shown, by anything that will pass for evidence, that there were twenty thousand men at Columbus the other day when it was evacuated. The tact that Pillow retired when the reinforce- ments went forward under Fremont, would go to show that Pillow did not consider himself very strong at that time, and the fact that no demon- stration has since that time been made against Cairo, are among the " subsequent events" that do not strengthen their assertions. It is the opin- ion of many well-informed persons that the move- ment towards Cairo at that time, as well as the demonstration under Hardee against Iron Mount- ain, were mere feints to draw off reinforcements from Lyon, in order that he might be overwhelmed by the superior force brought against him under Price and McCulloch. The general and the ad- jutant general who had been deceived by such a ruse would be among the last to admit that they had been outwitted, although the fact that no serious attack nor even a demonstration in that quarter, lias since been made will go far to con- vince impartial jjersons that the enemy in that quarter weiie standing on the defensive, and their heavy fortifications at Columbus will be almost conclusive. I leave this branch of 'the case. I think I have made it appear that it was not Fre- mont's first duty to reinforce Cairo in preference to Springfield, but I am willing for the sake of the argument to admit that he was correct in his judg- ment upon this point. It is a matter of opinion, and will always be a matter of opinion, whether he should have taken that course or not. I am willing that upon the facts of the case — n'ot, how- ever, upon his statement of facts— the country shall judge his conduct upon this point. FREMONT HAD AMPLE FORCE TO REIXFORCE BOTH CAIRO AND SPRINGFIELD. There remains, however, another branch of this case, which is not a matter of opinion, but a ques- tion of fact, upon which I take issue with him. It is the statement that he had not sufficient force under hia command with which to reinforce both Cairo and General Lyon at Springfield. It is perfectly evident that he had enough to reinforce Cairo, for that was done, and the enemy fled be- fore his grand flotilla. I will undertake to prove that he had enough also, after he had reinforced Cairo, to have reinforced Lyon; and that he had ample notice of Lyon's peril, and ample time in which to forward reinforcements. I premise by saying that it is curious that he should have omitted, when he stated that he had not sufficient force lor both of these objects, to state also the force which he then had under his command. The statement which I shall make is not derived from the books in the Adjutant General's office, for I have had no access to them. General Fre- mont probably has those books, or at least all the data which embrace the returns of tlie number of troops in his own department. My knowledge is derived from my own early connection with the organization of troops in the department, from my association witii them since, and from scattered items of information which I have l)cun able to glean from tiie studied obscurity of General Fre- mont's own statements and the documents an- nexed to it. There was, on the day of arrival of General Fremont in Missouri, sixteen full Missouri regi- ments in the service of the United States. They were as follows: First regiment Missouri volunteers, Colonel F. P. Blair, at Sjiringfield. Second regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel Boernstein. Third regiment Missouri volunteers, Colonel Sigel, at Springfield. Fourth regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel Schuttner. Fifth regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel Saloman, at Springfield. Of these, the first regiment was the only three years' regiment. The sixth regiment Missouri volunteers. Col- onel Bland, at Ironton. Seventh regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel Stevenson, at Boone ville. Eighth regiment Missouri volunteers, Colonel Smith, in Warren county, Missouri. Ninth regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel Fredericks, at St. Louis. Tenth regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel Bayles, at or near St. Louis. I find Colonel Schasflfer's regiment, which I be- lieve to be the eleventh regiment Missouri volun- teers, is noticed in the Missouri Democrat with that of Bayle's and Frederick's, as being armed and equipped, and under marching orders on the Gth day of August. In addition to these, the five re- served corps regiments — Almstedt's, Kalmann's, McNeil 's. Brown 's, and Stifel 's — were then in the service, fully armed and equipped, and stationed at different points in Missouri. There were four Kansas regiments in his department — Dietzler's and Mitchell's, the first and second, then witli General Lyon; the third and fourth regiments, Montgomery's and Wecr's, one at Leavenworth, the other at Fort Scott, on the boundary between Missouri and Kansas, about sixty or seventy miles from Sj^ringfield. There were at that time four Iowa regiments in the State of Missouri, the first under Bates at Springfield, the second (Cur- tis) at Jefferson barracks, the third (Williams) on the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad; there was one other in the State, and three others, mak- ing seven regiments in all, in Iowa, and ready for service; two of which, the sixth and seventh regiments, reached Jefferson barracks on the 11th of August, and a battalion of the Iowa fifth was at the arsenal, St. Louis, on August 10; three com- panies of the Iowa fourth arrived ip St. Louis on the 11th of August. There were eighteen Illi- nois regiments in the service and under his com- mand. These regiments were numbered from sev- enth to twenty-fourth inclusive; sixof these were "three months" men, which I have already named as being at Cairo in the command of Gen- eral Prentiss, almost the whole body of which were reorganized and reentered the service, and are now leading the column of victory in Tennes- see. There were ten other.-?, " three years " men, numbered from thirteenth to twenty-fourth, in- clusive, fully armed and equipped, all in active service, mostly in Missouri, and all under Fre- mont's command. These ten regiments had been authorized by the Legislature of Illinois to be raised by the Governor in anticipation of a call by the President. There were one thousand reg- ular troops under Lyon at Springfield, as will ap- pear from the statement of the adjutant general. Captain Kulton, which is among the documents published in Fremont's papers. These consisted of cavalry, artillery, and infantry. Tiiere were also three companies of regulars at Leavenworth. There was a battalion of four hundred home guards at St. Joseph underColonel Pcabody, who was afterwards severely wounded in the siege of Lexington. There were three hundred underMa- i ir Hunt at Hannibal, and three hundred at Kan- sas City under Major , who was also subse- quently wounded at Lexington; there were also one hundred and fifty at Booneville, under a gal- lant officer, who afterwards defended that city with liis small force and dispersed eight hundred rebels. Tiie Nebraska regiment of four hundred and fifty-seven men reached St. Louis on the 13th or 14th of August. This statement shows that there were forty -four regiments in the western department armed and equipped when General Fremont arrived there and took the command. On the 4th of August Gov- ernor Morton of Indiana telegraphed to General Fremont, as appears from his dispatch annexed to Fremont's statement, offering him five regiments. Surely these regiments could have been made avail- able for the defense of Cairo, if any serious attack had been made on that position , and although they were not in the western department the Govern- ment would not have hesitated to have given him this force if Cairo had been attacked. The Gov- ernment did consent to his taking those regiments, for they arrived in St. Louis on or about the 17th of August, and were soon followed by three other regiments and several batteries of artillery from tl'.at State, all of which have since served with distinction in Missouri. I propose now to show something as to the par- ticular location of the troops actually in his de- partment at the time of Fremont's arrival in Mis- souri, and to prove that he not only had the men to reinforce Cairo and to succor Lyon, but that they were in position to be available to him for those purposes. I read from a letter addressed to me by Colonel John M. Palmer, fourteenth Illi- nois volunteers, now a brigadier general, who is well known to every member of this House from the State of Illinois: St. Louis, JVoicmAcr 23, 1861. Dear Sir: On Ihc 5tli of July, 1861, the fourteenth regi- ment Illinois volunteers (nine hundred strong) crossed tlic Mississippi river, and on the 13lli moved from Hannibal to Macon City, and remaining there and at Uenich and Stur- geon, on the North Missouri railroad, until the 'Jth of Au- gust, and on the lOth reached JctTiTson barracks. When this regiment left Hannibal, the third Iowa and the sixteenth Illinois were on the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad. On the IJtIi July, Colonel Turchln's Illinois regiment came into the State of Missouri. On the 8 I4t1), Colonel Grant's twenty-first Illinois was at Palmyra, atwiiich place Colonel Turehin was stationed. On the 31st July, I found at Mexico Colonel Marshall's first Illinois cavalry and one battalion of the fifteenth Illinois, Colonel Hacker's regiment having left the same place a few days before. During the month of July the following regiments were in North Missouri and within twenty-four hours of St. Louis: Fourteenth Illinois volunteers, (Palmer,) 900 men. Si.xteenth Illinois volunteers, (.Smith,) say 800 " Nineteenth Illinois volunteers, (Turehin,) say.. 800 " Fifteenth Illinois volunteers, (Turner,) say.... 800 " Twenty-first Illinois volunteers, (Grant,) say. .. 800 " First Illinois cavalry, (Marshall,) say 600 " Twenty-fourth Illinois volunteers, (Hecker,) say 900 " Third Iowa volunteers, (Williams,) say 700 " Total .6,300 men. All these regiments were then full, and the estimate of their actual strength is low. Very truly, Sic, J. M. PALMER. Colonel F. P. Blair. P. S. If it be inquired what all these regiments were doing, the answer is, eating their rations and holding the railroads. J. M. PALMER. I annex a statement, also, of the number and des- ignation of troops taken by General Fremont to reinforce Cairo, and it will be seen that of the whole number of sixty-three hundred men, con- tained in the list of General Palmer above, there was but one regiment of these taken to Cairo — Colonel Turehin 's — leaving fifty-five hundred men within twenty-four hours of St. Louis, available, when Fremont first arrived in St. Louis, to rein- force Lyon: List of troops taken by General Frimont to Cairo, August 1, 1661. " Nineteenth Illinois regiment. Colonel Turehin, armed with Minies. " Seventeenth Illinois regiment. " Rombauer's home guard, composed of one battalion of Almstedt's and one of Kalmann's of the first and second United States reserve corps — eleven hundred strong. " Second Iowa regiment, formerly Curtis's, and Captain Buell's battery of six pieces; eight steamboats; Fremont and staff in four carriages, the City of Alton steamboat being especially devoted to the general and his staff." This statement is imade from the columns of the St. Louis Democrat. In addition to the regiments mentioned in the schedule of Colonel Palmer within easy reach of Fremont, there was the thirteenth Illinois regi- ment, Colonel Wyman, at Rolla; Colonel Steven- son's regiment, at Booneville; Weer's regiment, at Fort Scott, in Kansas, sixty or seventy miles from Springfield, and Colonel Montgomery's regiment at Leavenworth, Kansas, all of which could have reached Springfield before the lOih of August, and in time to have reinforced Lyon. There were other regiments, including Bayle's, Frederick's, Shaef- fer's, Smith's and Coler's, then at or near St. Louis, which regiments I presume are included in the statement of Colonel Chester Harding, jr., as comprising the thirty-six hundred men in the St. Louis arsenal on tlte 5th of August. As the regi- ments not named by him in his statement are enu- merated in the Republican newspaper of St. Louis as being at the arsenal, and under marching or- ders, on the 6th of August. From this statement it is very clear that there were ten thousand men fully armed and equipped which might have been used to reinforce Lyon, if General Fremont had had the capacity to appreciate the difficulties sur- rounding Lyon, instead of making those difficul- ties an excuse for his purchase of Austrian guns, and breaking down under that effort for his relief, and making no other movement, and giving no . other order for that purpose, except the order to move two regiments, the only regiments at that time among those I have enumerated, whose posi- tions made it impossible they should reach Lyon by the 10th of August. He not only made no other effort, but, so far from it, transportation which was at Rolla, and which might have been used to forward troops to Springfield if Fremont had had any intention of sending them, was on the 4th of August discharged from service at Rolla and brought back to St. Louis. FREMONT HAD NOTICE OF LTON's DISTRESS, AND SUF- FICIENT TIME TO FORWARD REINFORCEMENTS. 1 assert that Fremont had notice of Lyon's perilous condition before he left the city of New York for St. Louis. I received a dispatch from General Lyon while I was in Washington during the extra session of Congress, on or about the 18ih of July, stating that Price was advancing upon him with a force of thirty thousand men, and that he would be overwhelmed unless rein- forced. My brother, Montgomery Blair, trans- mitted that message to General Fremont in New York, urging him at the same time to proceed to the West. When General Fremont arrived at St. Louis he was met by a messenger from Gen- eral Lyon, Major Barnard G. Farrar, attached to Lyon's staff, who came from Lyon with urgent entreaties for reinforcements. Captain John S. Cavender, of the first regiment Missouri volun- teers, also came from Lyon upon the same errand, and returned, and was afterwards wounded at the battle of Wilson's Creek. ColonelJohn S.Phelps, a member of this House from the Springfield dis- trict, made the same statements to Fremont, and placed in his hands a written statement from Gen- eral Lyon, which will be found among the docu- ments attached to Fremont's defense, in which Lyon said that Missouri would be devastated unless he was reinforced. Fremont, therefore, had ample knowledge of the position in which Lyon stood. He had that knowledge when he left' New York, and it was repeated to him in the most urgent terms when he arrived in St. Louis. He seems to have disregarded it alto- gether, and to have paid no attention to the wants of Lyon until the 3d of August. It does not appear that he even opened communication with Lyon until his return from Cairo. Lyon's letter of August 9, in response to one from Fremont, does not disclose any encouragement held out to him by Fremont's letter, to which his is in reply. Fremont's letter to Lyon is not published, for some reason best known to himself. He has favored the public with a great many of his letters upon matters wholly immaterial, and has chosen to keep back this letter, which might have dis- closed what his views were at that time, and what his intentions were with regard to reinforcing Lyon. I know of no subject connected with General Fremont's career which at this moment would have so much interest for the public. He says that Lyon had the assurance that he was 9 doing everything ho could for him. If he had that assurance, it is more than anybody else has been able to discover. If he had, it is more than he has attempted to prove by this record; for this record shows that he took no notice of Lyon until the .'W of August, nine days after his arrival in St. Louis, although I have shown that he had ample force under his command, in addition to tliat which he sent to Cairo. The only remaining question is, whether there was time, in the ]ieriod intervening between the 25th of July, the date of his arrival in St. Louis, and the 10th of August, when the btittle was fought, to draw in his forces and send them to reinforce Lyon. From St. Louis to Rolla, by railroad, the distance isoneliundred and eleven miles; from Rolla to Springfield, one hundred and fifteen miles, with a road firm and liard, though rough and broken. Sigel,in his first expedition to Springfield, made the same distance in much less time than fifteen days. The distance has been traversed before and since by large armies, in much less time, and we have General Fremont's own authority for saying that Springfield is only a week's march from St. Louis. WHY FREMONT MADE NO EFFORT TO SUCCOR LYON, AND WHY LYON DETERMINED TO FIGHT THE BAT- TLE OF SPRINGFIELD. I am willing to rest the case here. I think that I have proven that he had ample notice, ample time, and ample force with which to have relieved Lyon; but the difficulty was that he had no ap- preciation ofLyon's condition. He told Governor Gamble, of Missouri, who went to him to urge upon him the necessity of sending forward rein- forcements, that Lyon was stronger than anybody else upon his line. If further proof were needed it would be found in the fact, that immediately upon the receipt of the news of the battle of Spring- field he sent forward Palmer's and Turner's regi- ments, and two other regiments, all of which reached Rolla within three days after the news of the battle, and all of which might have been sent on the first day he arrived in St. Louis. The pretext now put up by himself for not sending them, and which is also to be found in the certifi- cate given him by Colonel Chester Harding, jr., was that they were required in northeast Missouri to prevent an uprising of the rebels. The fact is, that these troops were withdrawn from northeast Missouri before the battle of Springfield, Palmer's regiment arriving in St. Louis on the lOth of Au- gust, and there was no organized body of secession- ists there when Fremontarrived in the State, and Palmer, in his letter above quoted, states: " If it be inquired what all these regiments were doing, the answer is, eating their rations and holding the railroads." Everybody knows that these troops could have been better spared from northeast Mis- souri, or indeed from any other ytart of the State before the battle of Springfield, than they could afterwards, because that event inspired the rebels with hope and confidence, and set them to organ- izing all over the State. The sum total of his at- tempts to succor Lyon may be thus stated. He made no effort at all until it was too late. He ordered two regiments forward, but made no ar- rangements for transportation; and that these two regiments, so ordered, had the leas^ chance of get- ting to Springfield in time. It was under these circumstances that Lyon was forced , by the condition in which he found himself, to engage the enemy tw, p. 9-1. (Special .'Mi'ssfiifrer.) Pilot Knob, October- 15, Ififel. Captain (.:. :vIcKkkveu, .//. ^. G.: Ji'tr Tlioiiip'-oii is lepoitrd twenty-two miles east, near Farmiiiytoii. I rf(|iilrc two more icijinifnts if yon can send them. I will attaclt liitii and t'ollow liliii up. His force is estiiiiat(ul at three Ilionsaiid, (3,0(10.) The telegraph is broken or cut, and I Tear the railroad will ho obstructed. CAKLIN, Colonel Commanilius;. The second dispatch shows tliat Fi-emont was out of reach of the telegraph, and was, fortunately for t.he country, where lie could not interfere with the disposition of the troops called on to aci 12 igainst Thompson. He was twenty-five miles south of Syracuse, and could only be communi- •,ated with by express. The date of the dispatch s the night of the 15th of October. I present it: (2) [Vol.4, p, 94. Syracuse, October 15, 1861. Captain C. McKeever, ^. ^. G. : Rumor reports tlio fiestruction of Ion? bridge, on Iron louninin road, and tlie capture by the enemy of its guard. Jeneral Fremont is to-niglit twenty-five miles soutli of ere. Dispatclies sent to me can reacii him by express from liis place. McKINSTRV, Brigadier General. The dispatches which I shall now read prove lat the movements which led to the defeat of ^hompson,at Frederickton, were concerted be- '.veen General Curtis and Captain C. McKeever, 'ho agreed cordially upon the measures necessary ) be taken. The dates of these dispatclies prove lat Fremont had no hand in them: ' (3) [Vol. 5, p. 100. i Benton B.\rracks, October 16, 1861. i M. McKeever, ^. ^. G?.; iWho commands south of St. Louis county.' Important Iports are coining to me. Tliompson was at Hig River lidge. SA.MUEL U. CURTIS, Jl Brigadier General Commanding. \ (4) [Vol. 5, p. 101. St. Louis, October 15, 1861. Igadier General Grant, Cairo, Illinois : leffThompson, with between two and three thousand Ml, is at Farinington, twenty miles east of Irontoii. Send large a force as you can from Cape Girardeau, in the di- •tioii of Ironton, or Pilot Knob, to cutofl'his retreat into kansas. ly order of Major General Fremont. McKEEVER, Jl. Jl. G. (5) [Vol. 5, p. 102. Camp Benton, October 16, 1861. McKeever, ^i. ^. G. : 'he remainder of the (8th) eighth Wisconsin went to lot early this morning. Boyd's is about ready to move ; elayed for want of wagons, but will soon move down. S. R. CURTIS, Brigadier General. \t ( G ) [Vol. 5, p. 102. Camp Benton, October 16, 1861. McKeever, ^. ^. G.: ave detailed Captain Spoore'.^ company. Dodge's light cry, and the captain, to go forthwith. S. R. CURTIS, Brig. Gen. Com. ■'idc No. 5.] (7) [Vol. 5, p. 111. St. Louis, Oc/ofcci-16, 1861. ;adicr General Curtis, Benton Barracks: plonel Carlin is in command south of St. Louis county. headquarters are at Pilot Knob. Send six days' pro- '>iis Willi Colonel Boyd's regiment. Have the remain- •^ompanios of the eighth Wisconsin left this morning? tnpsoii is at Farinington. .\iiswer how soon troops can I depot. C. McKEEVER, ^. .4. G. 'irfe No. 6^ (8) [Vol.5, p. 111. ' St. Louis, October 16, 1861. adier General Curtis, Benton Barracks : ive one of the companies of light artillery under your iiand equipped immediatrly. You will make requisi- upon Major .'^lleii and Captain Callender for everything Is nc!CKssary. Please notify me which company you id equipping. I order of Genera! Fremont. I C. McKEEVER, ^. ^. G. he next dispatch is from General Fremont, ■Cinstry's express having reached him and ighi back iiis orders. Forlunately they came too late to make another Springfield or Lexington at Frederickton: Headquarters, October 21, 1861. To Brigadier General Curtis : Orderall the troops that you have sent on the Iron Mount- ain road back to Benton jjarracks. The whole affair has been grossly exaggerated. Colonel Carlin should have kept the road open without any additional force. By order of Major General Frrmont. C. McKEEVER, ^. ^. j?. G. The querulous tone of this dispatch proves that it emanated from the commanding general, who never thought anybody to bo in danger but him- self. It could not have been McKeever's, because he iiad concerted the movements with Curtis which led to the sending of the reinforcements counter- manded by Fremont. 1 read another dispatch an- nouncing the victory: Headquarters, October 23, 1861. To Brigadier General Curtis, Benton Barracks : Colonel Carlin left Pilot Knob Sunday. Attacked the enemy yesterday and routed liitn. The eighth Wisconsin and Colonel Boyd's Missouri volunteers will remain for the present at Pilot Knob. You will order Colonel St. James with his command to return immediately to Benton bar- racks. Orders will be issued at once sending his regiment forward to Tipton. By order: C. McKEEVER, ^5. ^. ^. G. A singular fact in connection with this transac- tion which deserves mention is, that the dispatch to Curtis, countermanding the reinforcements is not to be found in the whole batch produced by the gentleman from Indiana; each of which has the mark of the folio of Fremont's order-book attached to it, showing who furnished them, for the purpose of appropriating to General Fremont the honors of that victory. The dispatch to Cur- tis is discreetly left out. May we not presume that the man who suppressed that dispatch might overlook others calculated to throw light on the other events of the " hundred days." The dis- patch to Curtis was given to me by that gentle- man with his own hand; I use it now, that honor may be given where honor is due. THE ARMY CREATED BY FREMONT. We have heard much in this House and out of it of the great army which General Fremont cre- ated, and of the enthusiasm which he inspired. I had thought that the people of the West had vol- unteered for the defense of the cause. When the President made his first call for " three mouths" volunteers, the quota was filled to overflowing in the West. The second call was filled up before General Fremont's reluctant footsteps were lured back from France by the offer of a major general- ship. Everjr call made on the people of the West has been filled, and the acceptance of more men was refused by the Government. But the idoia- tors of General Fremont will have it that iiis pop- ularity alone created our western nriny, and that the Governors and people of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and the entire Northwest have no merit at all in this matter; but when we have been forced by the clamors of his partisans almost to admit that he alone raised this vast army, and when we beheld with our eyes their gallant ar« ray, as wc did on the grand flotilla which bore him and them to Cairo, when the pleading for suc- cor fell sadly on our cars before the battle of Wil- son's Creck,.and as we did, also, at that splendid 13 pagciiut whicli commcinoiated the inauguration of Bciitoii barracks, at the very iiour when iIk; boom- ing cannon sliook tlie resounding liills at Lexing- ton, and when we ask why were these brave men not permitted to succor tlieir brothers and carry our banners to victory upon the stricken fields of Wilson's Creek and Lexington, instead of min- istering to tlie pride and vainglory of our chief, then we are told that liiesc long and splendid lines of troops, who marched before ourown eyes to the sound of martial music and with flaunting flags, were not men, they were jihantoms; the gay flo- tilla "a painted ship upon a painted ocean;" and the clang of arms, which made the breast of more than one burly brigadier swell with pride, and paled the cheek of beauty at Benton barracks, was a mere imagination of men, and a thing unreal. Now, sir, he did have the troops, but he did not know how to use them. He did not create these troops. Most of them were enlisted before his feet touched the shores of America on his re- turn from Europe. Missouri overflowed her quota. I have seen men in Missouri after he arrived there, high men, too, coming to him with offers of regi- ments, and they were elbowed out of the way by his lackeys and orderlies. They were made to give way to the California cormorants. The army that he raised was that army of contractors who settled down upon us like obscene birds of prey upon a carcass. They elbowed everybody else out of the way, and unfortunately for him and the country, engrossed his time and attention. I sup- pose that there are no men in America whose char- acters are so bad as the men who were his famil- iars and associates. Of course, I do not refer to the gentlemen who were near hitn, of whom there were many on his stafl'; very many of them were most honorable men, whose only motives were to serve the country and to serve him, and among that number I take pleasure in distinguishing the gentleman from Indiana. My allusion is directed to those who sought him for the sake of contracts. Those of his aids-de-camp who did get contracts were the worst of all. 1 IS ST. LOUIS A REBELLIOUS CITY.' -» I desire, in this place, although somewhatoutof place in the line of my remarks, to refer, for a mo- ment, to an allusion in the speech of the gentle- man from Indiana, to the efl'ect that St. Louis was seething with treason when Frcmontarrived there. The general himself stigmatizes St. Louis as a re- bellious city, over which he was compelled to es- tablish martial law, and reoort to the most stringent measures to prevent the secessionists from taking the town. These statements are made in utter ig- norance of affairs in St. Louis. Thecity and county of St. Louis voted for Abraham Lincoln for Presi- dent by a large majority, and almost all the votes of the minority were given for Douglas. The vote for Breckinridge did not number one thousand, in a total vote of more thaii twenty thousand. I ven- ture the assertion that, at the time General Fre- mont came to the city, there were not a thousand secessionists there. They had the whole winter, with the State and national Governments in their favor, to raise and arm men for the secession cause, and yet they raised only two meager regiments- the other troops captured with these two regi- ments atCamp Jackson, iiy General Lyon, on the 10th of May, came from the interior of the State. The secessionists arc found among the would-be respectable peoiile, and a few other thoughtless persons, led by these upstarts; but when the call to arms was made in support of the Union cause, ten thousand men volunteered in St. Louis in two weeks, and ton thousand more would have ofl'ered if they could have been accepted. No congress- ional district in the Union has given so maliy sol- diers to the Union cause as the city and county of St. Louis. St.Louisarebelliouscity! Therenever was a greater slander uttered by any man. Some of the rich men were, as he said, secessionists, but the working men, the mechanics and the great body of the people, nine tenths of them, were for the Union, and ready to bear arms in its defense. The declaration of martial law by General Fremont was the ofi'spring of timidity, seeking to prevent imaginary dangers by inspiring the terrors with which he himself was haunted. The robust cour- age of Lyon failed to sec any efficacy in martial law, even whtn the traitors were openly congre- gating in Camp Jackson. He relied on his own courage and the valor of his soldiers. The people of that city took up arms, when they were not permitted to bear commissions, but the men who bore arms for their country without commissions from anybody, sustained the power of the Gov- ernment in the State of Missouri. If they had waited for commissions, anarmed miudrity would have trampled down the authority of the Govern- ment there, as was done in many, if not all, of the southern States. It can be said of St. Louis, what cannot be said of any city in a slave State, that the arsenal of the United States and the United States treasury were saved to the Government by its loyal citizens, while the Stale and national governments were conspiring for their capture. Fremont's contrjvct for the fortifications. I return to the point I was discussing before this digression on the subject of the loyalty of St. Louis demanded that I should say a few words in defense of the patriotism of its citizens. Gen- eral Fremont approaches the subject of contracts with rather more of confusion in his manner than characterizes the rest of his statement. In respect to the Beard contract, he makes use of some remark- able language-. Among other things, with regard to this contract, when speaking of its treatment in the report of the Van Wyck committee, he says: " Coiiceriiing the contract for tliis work tin; committee of I invcsli>;;ition say lli.il it w;is iiiade iimler the ' special order 1 and direction of General Fremont,' and Concerning the pay- ments thatthey were made upon his ' personal order.' The foUowins; extract will show that not only was I recognized to have this power, but that I was, so laic as the 3d of Sep- ternher, counseled to exercise it by the Quartermaster Gen- eral, General .Meigs." » Here is the counsel of duartcrmaster General Meigs, which he quotes: Letters of the Hon. M. Blair, P. M. G. '• Washington. Scptemhcr 3, ISGl. "Meigs begged inc this afternoon to get you to order fif- teen-inch guns from riltsburg for your gunboats. He says that the boats can empty any battery the enemy can make with such guns, lie advises that you coniraet i«)r them di- rectly yourself, telling the contractor you will direct your urdnaiiuo offlcor to pay (br tliem," 14 duartermaster General Meigs counsels him to buy fifteen-inch guns. For what? For his gun- boats. And this he construes as authority to erect fortifications around St. Louis, forgetful of the order of tiie Secretary of War to stop the erection of these same fortifications, and make no further payment on account of them, which order he set at defiance, and continued the construction of the forts, and ordered the payment of $60,000 on them to be made by Major Allen, as is clearly shown by the testimony of that officer in the very report upon which he was commenting. What is still more singular is, that when the committee were charging that this was a case of gross fraud upon the Government, and not laying so much stress upon his want of authority, that he should setup his power to make the contract instead of vindi- cating its fairness. The contract, by its terms, re- quires that the forts shall be built in five days. It is proven , and admitted by General Fremont, that he set Beard to work upon them as soon as he (Beard) arrived in St. Louis from California. The first payment on account of the forts was made to Beard on tlie 29th of August; tlie contract was dated on the 25th of September. It is shown by the testimony that Beard had been working for twenty-five days on the forts before the contract was signed, which contract required him to com- plete them in five days. It is proven that the forts were not completed on the 14th of October, when the Secretary of War ordered Fremont to stop the work on them. -The work continued. How long Beard was in completing them, I do not know. I liave been informed that they were not completed on the 1st of November. Thus it is estaljlished that Beard was working for six weeks, and probably for two months, on a job which he had stipulated to finish in five days. rThe factof his havingbeen employed in construct- ing these forts for six weeks, is brought home to the knowledge of General Fremont; the stipula- tion toco mjilete them in five daysv/as the colorable pretext merely for the enormous prices paid him for the job. Beard built five of the forts; five others were built under the superintendence of Major Kappner, he employing and paying the laborers. The five built by Kappner cost $60,000, and were one fifth larger than the five built by Beard, who received in money $171,000, and received orders upon the quartermaster, signed by General Fre- mont, for $75,000 more; making in all $246,000. Tiie committee in their report say: " It will be seen, therefore, tlio total amount ordered to be paid to IJeurd, on account oftlicse works, by General Fre- mont, was ,^346,000, or which .'5171,000 was actually paid. Tlirougli the firnintss of Major Allen, who appears to he a vigilant anil incorruptible guardian of the pul)lic interest, this last amount of $60,000 was saved from going into the capacious and already gorged pocket of Beard, who, in the language of Major Allen, was the ' le.ider among the eon- traetors,J anil perhaps ' tlie most extravagant and grasping of them all.' " The committee say further: " There is, however, another way of testing the character of this contract. The five forts built by Major Kappner, by days' work, which would ordinarily be the most expens- ive way, cost the sum of j^SOjOOO, while they were one fifth larger cm an average than the five built by Beard. Ma- jor Kappner testifies positively that the five forts built by Beard woifld certairdy not cost more than $60,000, which the five forts cost that he built. Allowing to Beard the lib- eraj estimate that the cost of building the five forts which he constructed was $60,000, he has already obtained from the Treasury of the United States the profit of $111,000; and had the additional amount of $7.5,000 been paid him, which General Fremont had ordered to be paid, the Gov- ernment would have been defrauded in that one transaction out of the enormous sum of .§176,000. " From the fact that the contract with Beard was entered into 30 long alter the work had been commenced by him it has the appearaacc that it was really intended to cover all the work on all the forts— that done by Major Kappner by days' work as well as by himself— for the purpose of en- abling him to obtain pay for the whole at the extravagant and outrageous prices provided for in liis contract. It is but justice to General McKinstry to state that he is not re- sponsible for this contract. It was made at headquarters, and the enormous and unconscionable prices were there fixed upon between General FrCMnont and the contractor, and the payments made by him on the contract were made by the express direction of General Fremont. He acted for the conmianding general, and by his direction. Beard brought to him a paper from headquarters, ' formally drawn up,' which contained the prices. (See Clement's testi- mony, p. 885.) Me objected to the prices, and ' greatly re- duced them.' If the prices nanuHl in thecontract wure the ' reduced ' prices, it would l)e a matter of curiosity to know what the original prices were as sent from lieadquarlers." I cannot forbear another quotation from the report of the committee: " The money appropriated by Congress to subsist and clothe and transport our armies was thus, in utter con- tempt of all law and of the Army regulations, as well as in utter defiance of superior authority, ordered to be diverted from its lawful purpose, and turned over to the cormorant. Beard. While he had received .*171,000 from the Govern- ment, it will be seen from the testimony of Major Kappner that there liad only been paid to the honest German la- borers, who did the work on the first five forts built under his direction, the sum of .'5'15,500, leaving from forty to fifty thousand dollars still their due. And while these laborers, whose families were clamoring for bread, were besieging the quartermaster's department for their [lay, this rapacious contractor, Beard, with ,*171,000 in his pocket, is found fol- lowing up the army, aiul in the confidence of the major general, who gives Jiim orders for large purchases, which only could have been legally made through the quartermas- ter's department, and wliich afforded him further opportu- nities for still plundering the Government." I can only add to this, that the laboring men who did the work for Beard went without their money as well as those who did the work under Kappner. Dozens of them came to my house to ask how they should get their money, and as I was not as well acquainted with Beard as General Fremont appears to be, from his statcuKint, and had not the same confidence in him as the general declared that he had, I could not answer their questions. The above quotations show what was the grava- men of the charge made by the committee, and I regard it as a most singular answer to this charge that Q,uartermastcr General Meigs had recom- mended him to purchase fiCteen-inch guns for his gunboats. G0XBOATS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS. This allusion to gunboats, however, reminds me of the declaration made by the gentleman from Indiana, [Mr. Shanks,] and many times repeated in his speech, in praise of the forethought and en- ergy of Fremont in ordering and constructing the gunboats on the western waters. The gentleman sa^s they were a part of Fremont's plan, and ori- ginated by him. Now, sir, I am compelled to slate, in vindication of the truth of history, that Fremont did not order the gunboats, and that the jilaii did not originate with him. They were ordered be- lt> fore he cnmo bark from Europe. The Govern- ment had determined upon the plan, and tlie ad- vertisements for jiroposals were publislied before he readied tlie siiores of America. Tiicy were intended for McCielhin wlien he was in command of that dejiartmont. The idea of the mortar boats originated witii Captain Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to whom tlie whole merit of their plan is justly due. COMBINATION AND CONSPIRACY. The gentleman from Indiana is haunted with the idea of an awful combination against the "champion of freedom." There is scarcely a paragraph in his speech in which this combination does not crop out. He classifies the parties to that combination or conspiracy, and goes over it again and again in "damnable iteration," show- ing that it had made a great impression on his mind, and that he actually believed in it. Parties tothis " unholy alliance" consisted of pm-slavory men, jealous politicians looking to the Presi- dency, West Pointers, and contractors. I do not know in which of these classes the gentleman has placed me. I am inclined to think that I am left out altogether. My op|)osition to slavery has been tried and proven in a more severe ordeal than any through which the gentleman from Indiana or General Fremont have ever been called on to pass. It has been tested in worse plalfes and in worse times than ei4,her of them have ever'cxperienced. I have sealed my devotion to that cause by. quite as many sacrifices as the gentlemaw from Indiana, or his friend General Fremont. «([ intend, s» far as I can, under the Constitution of my couhtry, to continue my hostility to the institution of sla- . very. I shall oppose, as I have always opposed, its existence in the State in which I live;»and if any mode, under the Constitution, can be c^fvised by which the institution^ of slavery can be obliter- ated from all the States in the Union, I shall be among thafiist to sujiport that mcaswft'e; but I will not aid in breaking down the Constitution even to destroy slavery. I consider the Constitu- tion of more value to me and to my children than any other earthly possession. ' During the pendency of the present struggle, I have taken upon myself some slight hazards in its defense, and will never be found enrolled among its enemies and violators, no matter from what quarter they may come. I understand that by pro-slavery men the gentleman means to designate those who opposed the proclamation of General Fremont. I cr>n say that I did not see anything very bad in that nroclamaiion. Nobody paid much attention to it in Missouri, where it really liad little or no effect. Everybody understood very well that it was not intended for that meridian, but that it was put out for a campaign in New England and elsewhere. It was not intended to operate upon the theater of war, where its only effect would be to make the rebels fight more desperately to save their property and negroes; it was rather intended for a political campaign in which the general had embarked, and in which he hoped for better suc- cess than had attended his arms. Tlie net results of this bombastic proclamation was the loss of Ivvo armies and the liberation of two negroes — negroes that did not belong to the man from whom they were taken, but to his wife, to whom they were secured by a marriage contract. The deeds of emancipation which he gave to these two negro men were intended to point an electioneering doc- ument. In the course that I have thought proper to pursue towards General Fremont, 1 believe I am uninfluenced by any sentiment of jealousy. I have heretofore given him a very cordial support for every position to which he has aspired, and I am unconsciousof ever having experienced a feel- ing of jealQusy to anyone, ^here is certainly nothing in General Fremont's present position to inspire any one with jealousy. I am neither aWest Pointer nor a contractor, and do not feel myself in- cluded in the conspiracy, which the imagination of the gentleman from Indiana has conjured up. WHY FREMONT WAS REMOVED. My belief is that the President was operated upon in the removal of General Fremont by his own judgment upon events which transpired in Missouri. Before General Fremont took com- mand in that department uninterrupted success at- tended the standard of the Union. The first blow which was struck for the Government was given in Missouri; the first successes of the cause were won upon the soil of that State. Camp Jackson, Booneville, and Carthage, made the names of Lyon and Sigel historic, and gilded the cloud of disaster which had settled upon our arms elsewhere. The welcome which greeted the advent of Fremont had hardly ceased to sound before the cry of distress broke upon our ears. Humiliation, disaster, de- feat, and disgrace, came with him, remained with him, and went away with him and his army of contractors. As soon as the paralyzing influence of his im- becility was removed victory came back to the standard of the Union in the West, and the ad- vancing columns of our victorious armies have penetrated to the very heart of the rebellion, in- flicting blows from which it lies writhing in death, and from which it can never recover. I believe it is the judgment of mankind that there is no such thing as an unfortunate great man. A man to be great must be able to do great things with small means; and when we hear of a fellow going whimpering around the country try- ing to give the reasons for his being whipped, the spectacle may excite sympathy, he may even be regarded as a very good man, but nobody will ever select him as a lit person to fight battles and tpcarry on war. r'l'he admirers of General Fremont say that he w*uld have won a victory if he had been permitted to remain in command. The world would have more confidence if he had given any proof of his capacity by winning victories when he had a command. It was with great difficulty that the order for General Fremont's removal was carried through his lines. A messenger who bore the dispatch passed through his lines by a ruse, as I am given to understand, and delivered it to Gen- eral Fremont. ALL THE MUTINY OF HIS OWN MAKING. The newspapers that were in his interest in St. Louis announced that, when the intelligence of 16 his removal was made known, there was a mutiny in the army, and that there was a meeting of offi- cers, especially of those whose commissions ex- pired with the end of his service in the depart- ment; that they gathered around him, and shouted " Hurrah for Fremont, and down with Hunter!" His friends say that he usi'd his potent influence to put down this terrible mutiny. There was no mutiny that was not of his own making. The press in St. Louis, in his interest and under his control, ihsti*at|d mutiny, and promoted it by every species of influence they could bring to bear; by misrepresentations of the grossest character^ by appeals to the pride and passions of tiie men. The general himself permitted it by not pre- venting it_r3lf he did anything to quell the mu- tiny, it was only when he found that it did not extend beyond a few of his own dependents and retainers, and that the army had risen in defense of tl^country and not to put him above the coun- try. rThe conduct of his nearest and most trusted frienQs,find the conduct of the press, which had only spoken during his administration of the de- partment as he dictated, proved most conclusively that he would have defied the Government and retained the command, if he had dared to do so.""! The fact that his friends applaud him, even f(5r yielding his command when ordered to do so by the Government, shows how little margin there is for praise when such an act, under such cir- cumstances, is extolled. But as little as there is to exalt in liis enforced obedience to what he could not and dared not resist, yet it was the most com- mendable act, after all, of his administration, * " Notliing in life [official life] so became liim As tlie leaving it." \ LB D '05 1 kS