JOURNAL FEDERAL CONVENTION JAMES MADISON KEPRINTED FROM THE EDITION OF 184O, WHICH WAS PUBLISHED UNDER DIRECTION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS. A COMPLETE INDEX SPECIALLY ADAPTED TO THIS EDITION IS ADDED EDITED BY E. H. SCOTT VOLUME I CHICAGO : SCOTT, FORESMAN AND CO. 1398. &J 1 3 1 Copyright, 189?, B< ALBERT, SCOTT & CO. TRESS OF THK HENRY O. SHETARD CO. CHICAGO, y >> PKEFACE. On the 15th November, 1836, Mrs. Madison addressed the following letter to the President of the United States: "Montpelier, November 15, 1836. "Sir: The will of my late husband, James Madison, contains the following provision: " ' Considering the peculiarity and magnitude of the occasion which produced the Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787, the characters who composed it, the Constitution which resulted from their deliberations, its effects during a trial of so many years on the prosperity of the people living under it, and the interest it has inspired among the friends of free government, it is not an unreasonable inference that a careful and extended report of the pro- ceedings and discussions of that body, which were with closed doors, by a member who was constant in his at- tendance, will be particularly gratifying to the people of the United States, and to all who take an interest in the progress of political science and the cause of true liberty. " This provision bears evidence of the value he set on his Report of the Debates in the Convention, and he has charged legacies on them alone to the amount of twelve hundred dollars for the benefit of literary institu- tions and for benevolent purposes, leaving the residuary net proceeds for the use of his widow." The President's message in relation to the purchase of the Madison Papers contains the following: "Con- 4 PREFACE. gress has already, at considerable expense, published in a variety of forms, the naked journals of the Revolutionary Congress, and of the Convention that formed the Consti- tution of the United States. I am persuaded that the work of Mr. Madison, considering the author, the subject matter of it, and the circumstances under which it was prepared — long withheld from the public, as it has been, by those motives of personal kindness and delicacy that gave tone to his intercourse with his fellow -men, until he and all who had been participators with him in the scenes he describes have passed away — well deserves to become the property of the nation, and cannot fail, if published and disseminated at the public charge, to confer the most important of all benefits on the present and succeeding generations, accurate knowledge of the principles of their Government, and the circumstances under which they were recommended and embodied in the constitution, for adopti Andrew Jackson." The message of the President was referred to the Joint Library Committee, who, on the 24th January, 1837, reported a resolution authorizing that committee " to contract for and purchase, at the sum of thirty thousand dollars, the manuscripts of the late Mr. Madison, conced- ing to Mrs. Madison the right to use copies of the said manuscripts in foreign countries, as she might think On the 9th July the House of Representatives, after having had under consideration the resolution of the Senate, amended it by changing it into an act, in which form, it was passed, and being concurred in by the Senate and approved by the President on the same day, became a law in the following terms: PREFACE. 5 " An act authorizing the printing of the Madison Papers. "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Joint Committee on the Library be authorized to cause the Madison Papers to be printed and published ; and that a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars be appropriated for that purpose out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated." On the 28th January, 1839, Mr. Wall of New Jersey, reported to the Senate, a contract made in pursuance of the act of Congress, by Messrs. Bobbins of Ehode Island, and Pope of Kentucky, the Chairmen of the Joint Library Committee for the publication of the work in its present form, to be executed under the superintendance of Mr. Gilpin, the Solicitor of the Treasury. For this purpose, one of the duplicate manuscript copies, deposited by Mrs. Madison, was withdrawn by the Library Committee from the Department of State, and delivered to the pursuers. In the publication thus directed it has been deemed to be a primary and indispensable duty to follow the manuscript with scrupulous care. It was not thought proper to admit any note or comment, even explanatory; and all those that are found, were in the manuscript de- posited in the Department of State. No alteration of any sort from the copy furnished and revised by Mrs. Madison, has been permitted, except the correction of a few slight and evident clerical errors, and the inser- tion of some dates and formal parts of official documents, for which blanks had been left. CONTENTS. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL, CONVENTION, FROM MONDAY, MAY 14th, 1787, TO MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17th, 1787. Introduction, 29 Confederacies — Meeting of Colonial Deputies at Albany, in 1754 — Congress of 1774 — Declaration of Independence — Articles of Con- federation — Difficulties arising from the public lands, and duties on foreign commerce — Want of a permanent revenue — Resolution of Virginia for a Convention — Meeting of the Convention at An- napolis, in 1786 — Recommends Federal Convention — Proceedings of Virginia and other States — Previous suggestions for a Conven- tion by Pelatiah Webster, General Schuyler, Alexander Hamilton, Richard H. Lee, and Noah Webster — Defects to be provided for by a Constitution — Mr. Madison's sketch — Meeting of Federal Convention in 1787 — Manner in which the Reports of the Debates were taken. Friday, May 25th, 53 Organization of Convention — General Washington chosen Presi- dent, and Major Jackson Secretary — Delaware credentials — Com- mittee on Rules. Monday, May 28th, 55 Rules reported — No yeas and nays required — Vote by States— Let- ter from Rhode Island. Tuesday, May 29th, 58 Additional rules — Keeping of minutes — Convention goes into Com- mittee of the Whole— Mr. Randolph submits fifteen propositions — His remarks— Propositions stated— Mr. Charles Pinckney submits a plan of a Constitution — Plan stated. Wednesday, May 30th, 72 Mr. Randolph's first proposition withdrawn, and a substitute offer- ed — The proposed government to be National, and to consist of a Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. Mr. Randolph's second proposition — The right of suffrage in the National Legislature, to be proportioned to the quotas of contribu- tion, or the number of free inhabitants as is best in different cases — Postponed. b CONTENTS. Thursday, May 31st, • 78 Mr. Randolph's third proposition— The National Legislature to have two branches — Agreed to. Mr. Randolph's fourth proposition — First branch of the National Legislature to be elected by the people — Agreed to — Qualifications &c. of members of first branch — Postponed. Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition — Second branch of the National Legislature to be chosen by the first branch, from nominations by State Legislatures — Disagreed to — Qualifications of members of second branch — Not considered. Mr. Randolph's sixth Proposition — Powers of the National Leg- islature — Each branch to originate laws — Agreed to — National Legislature to possess all the legislative powers of the Congress of the Confederation, to pass laws where State Legislatures are incompetent; or where necessary to preserve harmony among the States, and to negative State laws contravening the articles of union or foreign treaties — Agreed to — The National Legislature authorized to exert the force of the whole against a delinquent State — Postponed Friday, June 1st, . . . . . ... 84- Mr. Randolph's seventh proposition — The National Executive to possess the Executive powers of the Congress of the Confedera- tion — Amended, to possess power to execute the National laws, and appoint to offices not otherwise provided for — Amendment agreed to — To be chosen for a term of years — Amended, for seven years — Amendment agreed to — To be chosen by the National Legislature — Postponed Saturday, June 2d, 89 Mr. Randolph's sevent h proposition — The National Executive to be chosen by the National Legislature, resumed — Agreed to — To receive fixed compensation — Amended, to receive no salary, but ex penses to be defrayed — Amendment postponed — To be ineligible a second time — Amended, to be removable on impeachment — Clause and amendment agreed to — To consist of persons — Postponed. Monday, .Tine 4th, 99 Mr. Randolph's seventh proposition — The National Executive to consist of persons, resumed — Amended, a single person — Agreed to. Mr. Randolph's eighth proposition — A Council of Revision, to consist of the National Executive, and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, to have a negative on acts of National Legisla- ture unless again passed by — Members of each branch — Amended, to give the National Executive alone that power, unless overruled by two-thirds of each branch of the National Legislature — Amend- ment agreed to. Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition — The National Judiciary to be CONTENTS. 9* established — Agreed to — To consist of one or more supreme tri- bunals and of inferior tribunals — Amended to consist of one supreme tribunal and of inferior tribunals — Amendment agreed to. Tuesday, June 5th, . .... 108 Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition — The National Judiciary to be chosen by the National Legislature — Disagreed to — To hold office during good behaviour and to receive fixed compensation — Agreed to — To have jurisdiction over offences at sea, captures, cases of foreigners and citizens of different States, of National revenue, im- peachments of National officers, and questions of National peace and harmony — Postponed. Mr. Randolph's tenth proposition — New States to be admitted — Agreed to. Mr. Randolph's eleventh proposition — Republican government and its territory, except in case of voluntary junction, to be guar- anteed to each State — Postponed. Mr. Randolph's twelfth proposition — The Congress of the Con- federation to continue till a given day, and its engagements to be fulfilled — Agreed to. Mr. Randolph's thirteenth proposition — Provision to be made for amendments of the Constitution, without the assent of the Na- tional Legislature — Postponed. Mr. Randolph's fourteenth proposition — National and State offi- cers to take an oath to support the National Government — Post- poned. Mr. Randolph's fifteenth proposition — The Constitution to be ratified by Conventions of the people of the States recommended by the State Legislatures — Postponed. Motion to strike out "inferior tribunals" in the ninth proposi- tion — Agreed to. Motion to amend the ninth proposition, so as to empower the National Legislature to institute inferior tribunals — Agreed to. Wednesday, June 6th, . . . . . .115 Motion to amend fourth proposition so as to provide that the first branch of the National Legislature be elected by the State Legis- latures — Disagreed to. Motion to reconsider the vote on the eighth proposition, so as to unite a convenient number of the National Judiciary with the Na- tional Executive in the revision of the acts of the National Legis- lature — Disagreed to. Thursday, June 7th, 124 Motions to supply the blank occasioned by the disagreement to Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition relative to the mode of choosing the second branch of the National Legislature — To be elected by the people divided into large districts — Disagreed to — To be ap- pointed by the National Executive out of nominations by the State 10 CONTENTS. Legislatures— Disagreed to — To be chosen by the State Legisla- tures—Agreed to. Friday, June 8th, .131 Motion, on a reconsideration of that part of the sixth proposition which gives the National Legislature power to negative State laws contravening the articles of union, or foreign treaties, to extend the power so as to authorize the National Legislature to negative all laws which they should judge to be improper— Disagreed to. Saturday, June 9th, 136 Motion, on a reconsideration of that part of the seventh proposition which declares that the National Executive shall be chosen by the National Legislature, to substitute therefor that the National Exec- utive be elected by the Executives of the States, their proportion of votes to be the same as in electing the second branch of the National Legislature — Disagreed to. Monday, June 11th, 142 Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's second proposition, as to the right of suffrage in the National Legislature, which had been post- poned — Agreed to — Motion to substitute therefor that the right of suffrage in the National Legislature ought not to be according to the rule in the Articles of Confederation, (an equality, each State having one vote therein,) but according to some equitable ratio of representation — Agreed to — Motion that this equitable ratio of rep- resentation should be according to the quotas of contribution — Postponed — Motion that this equitable ratio of representation should be in proportion to the number of free citizens and inhabit- ants, and three-fifths of other persons in each State — Agreed to — Motion that there should be an equality of suffrage in the second branch of the National Legislature, each State to have one vote therein — Disagreed to — Motion that the right of suffrage should be the same in each branch — Agreed to. Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's eleventh proposition, guaran- teeing republican government and its territory to each State, which had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion to amend it, so as to guarantee to each State a republican Constitution, and its existing laws — Agreed to. Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's thirteenth proposition, provid- ing for amendments to the Constitution, which had been post- poned, agreed to — Motion that provision for amendments ought to be made — Agreed to — That the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required — Postponed. Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's fourteenth proposition, requir- ing oaths of National and State officers to observe the National Constitution, which had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion to strike out the part requiring oaths of State officers — Disagreed to — Proposition agreed to. CONTENTS. 11 Tuesday, June 12th, 150 Mr. Randolph's fifteenth proposition relative to ratification of the Constitution by State Conventions considered and agreed to. Motion to consider that part of Mr. Randolph's fourth proposi- tion relative to the qualifications of the members of the first branch, which had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion that the members of the first branch shall be elected every three years — Agreed to — Shall be of years of age— Disagreed to— Shall be allowed a fixed compensation, to be paid out of the National Treasury — Agreed to — Shall be ineligible to State or National offices during their term of service, or for one year after — Agreed to — Shall be incapable of re-election for years after, and subject to recall — Disagreed to. The part of Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition relative to qualifi- cations of the members of the second branch, considered — Motion that the members of the second branch shall be of the age of thirty years — Agreed to — Shall hold their offices for the term of seven years — Agreed to — Shall be entitled to no compensation — Disagreed to — Shall be subject to the same qualifications as to compensation and ineligibility as the members of the first branch — Agreed to. Wednesday, June 13th, 157 The part of Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition relative to the juris- diction of the National Judiciary was struck out —Motion that National Judiciary shall have jurisdiction in cases of national rev- enue, impeachments of national officers and questions of national peace and harmony — Agreed to — Motion that the judges of the supreme tribunal be appointed by the second branch (Senate) of National Legislature — Agreed to. Motion to amend that part of the sixth proposition which em- powers each branch to originate acts by restraining the second (senatorial) branch from originating money bills — Disagreed to. State of the resolutions (nineteen in number) as adopted by the Committee of the Whole; and founded on Mr. Randolph's fifteen propositions. Friday, June 15th, 163 Mr. Patterson submits nine propositions to be substituted for those of Mr. Randolph — Propositions stated. Saturday, June 16th, . . . . . .167 Mr. Patterson's first proposition — The Articles of Confederation to be revised and enlarged — Adjourned. Monday, June 18th, 175 Mr. Patterson's first proposition — The Articles of Confederation to be revised and enlarged, resumed — Motion to amend so as to V 12 CONTENTS. provide for an adequate government of the United States — Post- poned. Mr. Hamilton submits eleven propositions as amendments which he should probably offer to those of Mr. Randolph — Read but not moved. Tuesday, June 19th, 187 Motion to amend Mr. Patterson's first proposition 60 as to provide for an adequate government of the United States, resumed — Dis- agreed to — Motion to postpone Mr. Patterson's first proposition — Agreed to. Motion for the Committee of the Whole to rise and report the nineteen resolutions founded on Mr. Randolph's propositions as amended and adopted in committee — Agreed to. First resolution establishing a National Government to consist of a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, considered by the Con- vention. Wednesday, June 20th, 199 First resolution, establishing a National Government, resumed — Motion to amend so as to establish a government of the United States — Agreed to. Second resolution that the National Legislature consist of two branches — Motion to amend by striking out National — Agreed to — Motion to amend by declaring that legislation be vested in the United States in Congress — Disagreed to. Thursday, June 21st, 209 Second resolution, that the Legislature consist of two branches? resumed — Agreed to. Third resolution, fixing election, term, qualifications. - to establish a qualification of its members — Agreed to — Motion to reduce a quorum of each House below a majority — Disagreed to — Motion to authorize the compulsory attendance of members — Agreed to — Motion to require a vote of two-thirds to expel a mem- ber — Agreed to — Motion to allow a single member to call the yeas and nays — Disagreed to — Motion to allow Senators to enter their dissent on the journals — Disagreed to — Motion to strike out the clause which confines the keeping and publication of the journal of the Senate to its Legislative business — Agreed to. Saturday, August 11th, ...... 502 Article sixth, relative to the elections, qualifications, and proceed- ings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to except from publica- tion of such parts of the Senate journal, not Legislative, as it may judge to require secrecy — Disagreed to — Motion to except from publication such parts of the Senate journal as relate to treaties and military operations — Disagreed to — Motion to omit the publi- cation of such parts of the journals as either House may judge to require secrecy — Agreed to. Monday, August 13th, ...... 506 Article fourth, relative to the House of Representatives, resumed — Motion to require only citizenship and inhabitancy in members — Disagreed to — Motion to require nine years' citizenship — Disa- greed to — Motion to require four and five years' citizenship instead of seven — Disagreed to — Motion to provide that the seven years' citizenship should not affect the rights of persons now citizens — Disagreed to. Article fifth, relative to the Senate, resumed — Motion to require seven years' citizenship in Senators instead of nine — Disagreed to. Article fourth, relative to the House of Representatives, resumed — Motion to restore the clause relative to money bills — Disa- greed to. Tuesday, August 14th, 520 Article sixth, relative to the elections, qualifications, and proceed- ings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to permit members to be appointed to office during their term, but to vacate their seats — Disagreed to — Motion to permit members to be appointed during their term to offices in the Army or Navy, but to vacate their seats — Postponed — Motion to pay the members out of the National Treasury, a sum to be fixed by law — Agreed to. Wednesday, August 15th, ...... 531 Article sixth, relative to the* elections, qualifications, and proceed- ings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to unite the judges of the supreme court with the President, in his revisory power over acts CONTENTS. 21 of the Legislature — Disagreed to — Motion to require three -fourths instead of two-thirds to pass bills negatived by the Executive — Agreed to — Motion to extend the negative of the Executive to re- solves as well as bills — Disagreed to — Motion to allow the Execu- tive ten days to revise bills — Agreed to — Article sixth, as amended, agreed to. Thursday, August 16th, 537 Article sixth, relative to the elections, qualifications, and proceed- ings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to subject joint resolu- tions, (except on adjournment,) to the negative of the Executive — Agreed to. Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature — Mo- tion to exclude exports from duty — Postponed — Motion to author- ize the establishment of post roads — Agreed to — Motion to forbid the emission of bills of credit — Agreed to. Friday, August 17th, ...... 544 Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed — Motion that it may appoint a Treasurer by joint ballot — Agreed to — Subdue rebellion in a State without the application of its Legislature when it cannot meet — Disagreed to — Declare war — Agreed to. Saturday, August 18th, 549 Motion to add various powers to the Legislature — Referred to the Committee of Detail. Motion relative to an assumption of the State debts — Referred to a Grand Committee. Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, re- sumed — Motion that it may make rules for the Army and Navy — Agreed to — Motion that the army shall be limited in time of peace to a fixed number — Disagreed to — Motion that the subject of regu- lating the militia be referred to the Grand Committee — Agreed to. Monday, August 20th, ...... 558 Motion to add various powers to the Legislature — Referred to the Committee of Detail. Article seventh, relative to the powers of Congress, resumed — Motion that it may pass sumptuary laws — Disagreed to — Motions to amend the language defining and providing for the punishment of treason — Agreed to — Motion to require the first census in three years — Agreed to. Tuesday, August 21st, . . . . . . 568 Report of Grand Committee on assuming State debts, and regu- lating the militia. Article seventh, relative to the powers of Congress, resumed — Motion that State quotas for the expenses of the war be adjusted by the same rate as representation and direct taxation — Postponed 22 CONTENTS. — Motion that until a census, direct taxation should be in propor- tion to representation — Disagreed to — Motion to raise direct taxes by requisitions on the States — Disagreed to — Motion to permit taxes on exports by a vote of two-thirds — Disagreed to. Wednesday, August 22d, 578 Report of Committee of Detail on various proposed additional pow- ers of the Legislature. Article seventh, relative to the powers of Congress, resumed — Motion to refer the clauses relative to the importation and migra- tion of slaves, and to a capitation tax, and navigation act. to a Grand Committee — Agreed to — Motion to prohibit attainders or ex post facto laws — Agreed to — Motion to require the Legislature to discharge the debts, and fulfil the engagements of the United States — Agreed to. Thursday, August 23d, 588 Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed — Motion requiring them to organize the militia, when in the service of the United States, reserving the training and appoint- ment of officers to the States — Agreed to — Motion to prohibit for- eign presents, offices, or titles, to any officer without consent of the Legislature — Agreed to. Article eighth, relative to the supreme authority of acts of the Legislature and treaties — Agreed to. Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to refer to a Committee, to consider the propriety of a power to them to negative State laws — Disagreed to. Article ninth, relative to the powers of the Senate — Motion to require treaties to be ratified by law — Disagreed to. Friday, August 24th, ...... 598 Report of the Grand Committee on the importation and migration of slaves, and a capitation tax, and navigation act. Article ninth, relative to the powers of the Senate, resumed — Motion to strike out the power to decide controversies between the States — Agreed to. Article tenth, relative to the Executive — Motion that the Ex- ecutive be elected by the people — Disagreed to — By Electors chosen by the people of the States — Disagreed to — By joint ballot of the Legislature, and a majority of the members present — Agreed to — Motion that each State have one vote in electing the Executive — Disagreed to — Motion to require the President to give information to the Legislature — Agreed to — Motion to restrain appointing power by law — Disagreed to — Motion to except from the appoint- ing power, officers otherwise provided for by the Constitution — Agreed to — Motion to authorize by law, appointments by State Legislatures ami Executives Disagreed to. CONTENTS. 23 Saturday, August 25th, 605 Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed — Motion that in discharging the debts of the United States, they shall be considered as valid under the Constitution, as they were under the Confederation — Agreed to — Motion to postpone the prohibition for importing slaves to 1808 — Agreed to — Motion to confine the clause to such States as permit the importation of slaves — Disagreed to — Motion that the tax on such importation shall not exceed ten dollars for each person — Agreed to — Motion that a cap- itation tax shall be in proportion to the census — Agreed to. Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to limit reprieves to the meeting of the Senate, and requiring their consent to pardons — Disagreed to — Motion to except cases of im- peachment from the pardoning power — Agreed to — Motion that his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar — Disagreed to. Monday, August 27th, . . . . . 613 Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to limit his command of the militia to their being in the service of the United States — Agreed to — Motion to require an oath from the Executive — Agreed to. Article eleventh, relative to the Judiciary — Motion to confer equity powers on the courts — Agreed to — Motion that the judges may be removed by the Executive, on application of the Legisla- ture — Disagreed to — Motion that the salaries of judges should not be increased while they are in office — Disagreed to — Motion to ex- tend jurisdiction to cases in which the United States are a party, or arising under the Constitution, or treaties, or relating to lands granted by different States — Agreed to — Motion to extend the ap- pellate jurisdiction to law and fact — Agreed to. Tuesday, August 28th, ...... 618 Article eleventh, relative to the Judiciary — Motion to confine the appellate jurisdiction in certain cases to the Supreme Court — Agreed to — Motion that crimes not committed within any State be tried where the Legislature directs — Agreed to — Motion that the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless required by invasion or rebellion — Agreed to. Article twelfth, relative to the prohibitions on the power of the States— Motions to prohibit them absolutely from emitting billsof credit, legalizing any tender except gold or silver, or passing attain- ders or retrospective laws, or laying duties on imports— Agreed to — Motion to forbid them to lay embargoes — Disagreed to. Article thirteenth, relative to the prohibitions on slaves, unless authorized by the National Legislature — Motion to include in these duties on exports, and, if permitted, to be for the use of the use of the United States — Agreed to. 24 CONTENTS. Article fourteenth, relative to the rights of citizens of one State in another — Agreed to. Article fifteenth, relative to the delivery of persons fleeing to other States — Motion to extend it to all cases of crime — Agreed to — Motion to extend it to fugitive slaves — Withdrawn. Wednesday, August 29th, t 624 Article sixteenth, relative to the effect of public records and docu- ments of one State in another — Motion to refer it to a Committee to add a provision relative to bankruptcies and foreign judgments — Agreed to. Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to require two-thirds of each House on acts regulating foreign commerce — Disagreed to — Motion to strike out the provision requiring two-thirds of each House on navigation acts — Agreed to. Article fifteenth, relative to the delivery of persons fleeing to other States, resumed — Motion to extend it to slaves — Agreed to. Article seventeenth, relative to the admission of new States — Motion to strike out the clause requiring their admission on the same terms with the original States — Agreed to. Thursday, August 30th, ..... 634 Article seventeenth, relative to the admission of new States, resumed — Motion not to require any other assent than that of Congress to admit other States now existing — Disagreed to — Motion not to require any other assent than that of Congress, to admit States over which those now existing exercise no jurisdiction — Agreed to — Motion to allow the Legislature to form new States within the territory claimed by the existing States — Disagreed to — Motion to require assent of the State Legislatures to a junction of States — Agreed to — Motion to authorize the Legislature to make regulations regarding the territories, but not to affect the claims either of the United States, or the States — Agreed to — Motion to refer such claims to the Supreme Court — Disagreed to. Article eighteenth, guaranteeing to the States a republican gov- ernment, and protection against foreign invasion, and, on the appli- cation of the State Legislature, against domestic violence — Motion to strike out the clause requiring the application of the State Leg- islature — Disagreed to — Motion to authorize it on the application of the State Executive — Agreed to — Motion to limit the Execu- tive application to a recess of the Legislature — Disagreed to. Article nineteenth, relative to amendments of the Constitution — Agreed to. Article twentieth, relative to the oath to support the Constitu- tion — Motion to forbid any religious test — Agreed to. Article twenty -first, relative to the ratification of the Constitu- tion — Motion to require it to be by all the States. CONTENTS. 25 Friday, August 31st, . . .... 642 Article twenty -first, relative to the number of States necessary for a ratification of the Constitution, resumed — Motion that the Constitution be confined to the States ratifying it — Agreed to — Motion not to require the ratification to be made by conventions — Disagreed to — Motion to require unanimous ratification of the States — Disagreed to — That of nine States — Agreed to. Article twenty -second, relative to the mode of ratification — Mo- tion not to require the approbation of the present Congress — .Agreed to — Motion that the State Legislatures ought to call Con- ventions speedily — Disagreed to. Article twenty -third, relative to the measures to be taken for carrying the Constitution into effect when ratified — Motion to strike out the clause requiring the Legislature to choose the Exe- cutive — Agreed to. Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed — Motion that no different duties or regulations, giving preference to the ports of any particular State, or requiring clearances, &c, between them, shall be made — Agreed to. Saturday, September 1st, . . . . . 649 Report of Committee on Article six, section nine — Report of Committee on Article sixteen. • Monday, September 3d . . . . . . 649 Article sixteenth, relative to the effect of public records and documents of one State in another, resumed — Motion to require the Legislature to provide the manner of authenticating them — Agreed to. Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed — Motion that they may establish a bankrupt law — Disagreed to. Article sixth, relative to the elections, qualifications, and pro- ceedings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to amend the rule as to incapacity, by prescribing only that members shall not hold an office of emolument, and shall vacate their seats on appointment — Disagreed to — Motion to limit such incapacity to offices created, or whose emoluments were increased during their term — Agreed to — Motion to render office and membership incompatible — Agreed to. Tuesday, September 4th ...... 654 Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature resumed — Motion that they shall lay and collect taxes to pay debts and provide for the common defence and welfare — Agreed to — Regu- late trade with the Indians — Agreed to. Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to ap- point a Vice President, and he and the President to be chosen by 26 CONTENTS. Electors appointed in such manner as the State Legislatures may direct; if not chosen by a majority of the Electors to be balloted for by the Senate from the five highest — Postponed. Wednesday, September 5th ..... 660 Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed — Motion that they may grant letters of marque — Agreed to — Not make army appropriations for more than two years — Agreed to — Have exclusive jurisdiction in the district ceded for the seat of gov- ernment, and for other purposes with the consent of the State Leg- islatures — Agreed to — Grant patents and copyrights — Agreed to. Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion that in case of failure of the Electors to elect, the choice shall be by the Legislature — Disagreed to — Motion not to require a majority of the Electors but one third to choose a President — Disagreed to — Motion that a choice of the Senate be limited to the three highest — Disagreed to — To the thirteen highest — Disagreed to. Thursday, September 6th ...... 668 Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to ex- clude members of the Legislature, and public officers from being Electors — Agreed to — Motion to extend the Executive term to seven and six years — Disagreed to — Motion to elect the Executive by Electors — Agreed to — Motion that the election be at the seat of Government — Disagreed to — On the same day throughout the Union — Agreed to — Motion to refer it to the Senate, two thirds being present, if not made by the Electors — Agreed to — Motion to refer it to the House of Representatives, two thirds of the States being present, and each State to have one vote — Agreed to. Friday, September 7th 676 Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to leave to the Legislature to declare the Executive officer in case of death, &c, of President and Vice President, until a new election — Agreed to — Motion that the President be a natural born citizen, and thirty five years of age — Agreed to — Motion that the Vice President be President of the Senate — Agreed to — Motion to unite House of ■sA Representatives in the treaty power — Disagreed to — Motion to give the Executive and Senate the appointing power — Agreed to — Motion to allow treaties of peace to be made by the Executive and a majority of the Senate — Agreed to — Motion to allow two thirds of the Senate to make treaties of peace without the Execu- tive— Disagreed to— Motion to appoint an Executive Council — Disagreed to. Saturday, September 8th ...... 685 Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to re- quire treaties of peace to be consented to by two thirds of the Sen- CONTENTS. 27 ate — Agreed to — Motion to require that in such cases two thirds of all the members be required — Disagreed to — Motion to extend impeachment to high crimes and misdemeanors — Agreed to — Mo- tion to withdraw trial of impeachment from the Senate — Disa- greed to. Article fourth, relative to the House of Representatives, resumed — Motion that it must originate, but Senate may amend, money bills — Agreed to. Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion that he may convene both or either House — Agreed to. All the Articles as amended and agreed to, referred to a Com- mittee of Revision. Monday, September 10th . . . . . 692 Article nineteenth, relative to amendments of the Constitution, resumed — Motion that Legislature may propose amendments, to be binding when assented to by three-fourths of the States — Agreed to. Article twenty-first, relative to the number of States necessary for a ratification of the Constitution — Motion to require the assent of the present Congress, before submitting it to the States for rati- fication — Disagreed to. Article twenty -second, relative to the mode of ratifying the Con- stitution — Motion to require the assent of the present Congress — Disagreed to — Motion to submit the Constitution after it is acted on by the State Conventions, to a second Federal Convention — Postponed — Motion that an address to the States accompany the Constitution, when transmitted for ratification — Agreed to. Wednesday, September 12th 699 The Constitution as reported by the Committee of Revision, con- sidered. Article first, relative to the Legislative power — Motion to require two thirds instead of three fourths to overrule the negative of the President — Agreed to. Motion to add a bill of rights — Disagreed to. Thursday, September 13th . . . . . 719 Motion for a Committee to report articles of association for en- couraging, by the influence of the Convention, economy, frugality, and A merican manufactures — Agreed to. Article first, relative to the Legislative power, resumed — Motion to permit the States to impose such duties on exports as are neces- sary to execute their inspection laws — Agreed to. Resolutions directing the mode of proceeding in the present Con- gress to submit the Constitution to the States. Friday, September 14th ..... 722 Article first, relative to the Legislative powers, resumed — Motion to change the present proportion of members in the House of Rep- 28 CONTENTS. resentatives — Disagreed to — Motion that officers impeached be suspended till trial — Disagreed to — Motion to require the House of Representatives to publish all its proceedings — Disagreed to — Motion that Treasurer be appointed as other officers — Agreed to — Motion to provide for cutting canals and granting charters of incorporation, where the States may be incompetent — Disagreed to — To establish a university — Disagreed to — To provide for the preservation of the liberty of the press — Disagreed to — To pub- lish the expenditures — Agreed to. * Saturday, September 15th ..... 730 Article first, relative to the Legislative powers, resumed — Mo- tion to change the present proportion of members in the House of Representatives — Disagreed to — Motion that the inspection laws of the State may be revised by Congress — Agreed to — Motion that no State shall lay a duty on tonnage, without assent of Congress — Agreed to. Article second, relative to the Executive — Motion that Presi- dent shall receive no emolument from the States during his term — Agreed to — Motion to deprive the President of the power to pardon treason — Disagreed to — Motion that appointments to inferior offices may be vested by law — Agreed to. Article third, relative to the Judiciary — Motion to provide for trial by jury in civil cases — Disagreed to. Article fifth, relative to amendments to the Constitution — Mo- tion to require Congress to call a Convention on an application of two thirds of the States — Agreed to. Article first, relative to the Legislative power, resumed — Motion to guarantee to the States an equal representation in the Senate — Agreed to — Motion to forbid the passage of a navigation act before 1808, without two thirds of each House — Disagreed to. Motion that the amendments of the States be submitted to a new Federal Convention — Disagreed to. The Constitution, as amended — Agreed to. Monday, September 17th ..... 741 Article first, relative to the Legislative power, resumed — Motion to provide that thirty thousand instead of forty thousand, be the lowest ratio of representation — Agreed to. Motion that the Constitution be signed as agreed to by all the States — Agreed to. Motion that the Journals and papers be deposited with the Pres- ident — Agreed to. The Constitution signed as finally amended, and the Convention adjourned. INTRODUCTION. Note.— The following paper is copied from a rough draught in the handwriting of Mr. Madison. The particular place it was intended to occupy in his works is not designated ; but as it traces the causes and steps which led to the meeting of the Convention of 1787, it seems properly to preface the acts of that body. The paper bears evidence, in the paragraph preceding its conclusion, that it was written at a late period of the life of its author, when the pressure of ill health, combined with his great age, in preventing a final revision of it. As the weakness and wants of man naturally lead to an association of individuals under a common authority, whereby each may have the protection of the whole against danger from without, and enjoy in safety within the advantages of social intercourse, and an exchange of the necessaries and comforts of life; in like manner feeble communities, independent of each other, have resorted to a union, less intimate, but with common councils, for the common safety against powerful neighbours, and for the preservation of justice and peace among themselves. Ancient history furnishes examples of these confederate associations, though with a very imperfect account of their structure, and of the attributes and functions of the presid- ing authority. There are examples of modern date also, some of them still existing, the modifications and transac- tions of which are sufficiently known. It remained for the British Colonies, now United States of North America, to add to those examples, one of a more interesting character than any of them; which led to a system without an example ancient or modern. A system founded on popular rights, and so combining a federal form with the forms of individual republics, as may enable each 29 30 INTRODUCTION TO THE to supply the defects of the other and obtain that advantage of both. Whilst the Colonies eujoyed the protection of the parent country, as it was called, against foreign danger, and were secured by its superintending control against conflicts among themselves, they continued independent of each other, under a common, though limited, dependence on the parental authority. When, however, the growth of the offspring in strength and in wealth awakened the jealousy, and tempted the avidity of the parent, into schemes of usurpation and exaction, the obligation was felt by the former of uniting their counsels and efforts, to avert the impending calamity. As early as the year 1754, indications having been given of a design in the British government to levy con- tributions on the Colonies without their consent, a meeting of Colonial deputies took place at Albany, which attempted to introduce a compromising substitute, that might at once satisfy the British requisitions, and save their own rights from violation. The attempt had no other effect, than, by bringing these rights into a more conspicuous view, to invigorate the attachment to them, on the one side; and to nourish the haughty and encroaching spirit on the other. In 1774, the progress made by Great Britain in the open assertion of her pretensions, and the apprehended purpose of otherwise maintaining them by legislative en- actments and declarations, had been such that the Colonies did not hesitate to assemble, by their deputies, in a formal Congress, authorized to oppose to the British innovations whatever measures might be found best adapted to the occasion; without, however, losing sight of an eventual reconciliation. The dissuasive measures of that Congress being with- out effect another Congress was held in 1775, whose pacific efforts to bring about a change in the views of the other party being equally unavailing, and the commencement of actual hostilities having at length put an end to all hope of DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 31 reconciliation, the Congress finding, moreover, that the pop- ular voice began to call for an entire and perpetual dissolu- tion of the political ties which had connected them with Great Britain, proceeded on the memorable Fourth of July, 1776, to declare the thirteen Colonies Independent States. During the discussions of this solemn act, a Committee, consisting of a member from each Colony, had been appointed, to prepare and digest a form of Confederation for the future management of the common interests, which had hitherto been left to the discretion of Congress, guided by the exigencies of the contest, and by the known inten- tions or occasional instructions of the Colonial Legislatures. It appears that as early as the twenty-first of July, 1775, a plan, entitled " Articles of Confederation and per- petual union of the Colonies," had been sketched by Doc- tor Franklin, the plan being on that day submitted by him to Congress; and though not copied into their Journals, remaining on their files in his handwriting. But notwith- standing the term ''perpetual" observed in the title, the Articles provided expressly for the event of a return of the Colonies to a connection with Great Britain. This sketch became a basis for the plan reported by the Committee on the twelfth of July, now also remaining on the files of Congress in the hand-writing of Mr. Dickinson. The plan, though dated after the Declaration of Indepen- dence, was probably drawn up before that event; since the name of Colonies, not States, is used throughout the draught. The plan reported was debated and amended from time to time, till the seventeenth of November, 1777, when it was agreed to by Congress, and proposed to the Legislatures of the States, with an explanatory and recom- mendatory letter. The ratifications of these, by their dele- gates in Congress, duly authorized, took place at successive dates; but were not completed till the first of March, 1781, when Maryland, who had made a prerequisite that the vacant lands acquired from the British Crown should be a common fund, yielded to the persuasion that a final and- 32 INTRODUCTION TO THE formal establishment of the Federal Union and Government would make a favorable impression, not only on other foreign nations, but on Great Britain herself. The great difficulty experienced in so framing the Fed- eral system, as to obtain the unanimity required for its due sanction, may be inferred from the long interval, and recur- ring discussions, between the commencement and completion of the work; from the changes made during its progress; from the language of Congress when proposing it to the States, which dwelt on the impracticability of devising a system acceptable to all of them; from the reluctant assent given by some; and the various alterations proposed by others; and by a tardiness in others again, which produced a special address to them from Congress, enforcing the duty of sacrificing local considerations and favorite opinions to the public safety, and the necessary harmony; nor was the assent of some of the States finally yielded without strong protests against particular Articles, and a reliance on future amendments removing their objections. It is to be recol- lected, no doubt, that these delays might be occasioned in some degree by an occupation of the public councils, both general and local, with the deliberations and measures essential to a voluntary struggle ; but there must have been a balance for these causes in the obvious motives to hasten the establishment of a regular and efficient government; and in the tendency of the crisis to repress opinions and pretensions which might be inflexible in another state of things. The principal difficulties which embarrassed the prog- ress, and retarded the completion, of the plan of Confed- eration, may be traced to — first, the natural repugnance of the parties to a relinquishment of power; secondly, a natural jealousy of its abuse in other hands than their own; thirdly, the rule of suffrage among parties whose inequality in size did not correspond with that of their wealth, or of their military or free population; fourthly, the selection and DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 33 definition of the powers, at once necessary to the federal head, and safe to the several members. To these sources of difficulty, incident to the formation of all such confederacies, were added two others, one of a temporary, the other of a permanent nature. The first was the case of the Crown lands, so called because they had been held by the British Crown, and being ungranted to individuals when its authority ceased, were considered by the States within whose charters or asserted limits they lay, as devolving on them ; whilst it was contended by the others, that being wrested from the dethroned authority by the equal exertions of all, they resulted of right and in equity to the benefit of all. The lands being of vast extent, and of growing value, were the occasion of much discussion and heart-burning; and proved the most obstinate of the impediments to an earlier consummation of the plan of fed- eral government. The State of Maryland, the last that acceded to it, held out as already noticed, till the first of March, 1781 ; and then yielded only to the hope that, by giving a stable and authoritative character to the Confedera- tion, a successful termination of the contest might be accel- erated. The dispute was happily compromised by succes- sive surrenders of portions of the territory by the States having exclusive claims to it, and acceptances of them by Congress. The other source of dissatisfaction was the peculiar sit- uation of some of the States, which, having no convenient ports for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by their neighbours, through whose ports their commerce was carried on. New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and North Carolina, between Virginia and South Carolina, to a patient bleeding at both arms. The Articles of Confeder- ation provided no remedy for the complaint; which pro- duced a strong protest on the part of New Jersey, and never ceased to be a source of dissatisfaction and discord, until the new Constitution superseded the old. 3 34 INTRODUCTION TO THE But the radical infirmity of the "Articles of Confedera- tion" was the dependence of Congress on the voluntary and simultaneous compliance with its requisitions by so many independent communities, each consulting more or less its particular interests and convenience, and distrusting the compliance of the others. Whilst the paper emissions of Congress continued to circu]ate, they were employed as a sinew of war, like gold and silver. When that ceased to be the case, and the fatal defect of the political system was felt in its alarming force, the war was merely kept alive, and brought to a successful conclusion, by such foreign aids and temporary expedients as could be applied; a hope prevailing with many, and a wish with all, that a state of peace, and the sources of prosperity opened by it, would give to the Confederacy, in practice, the efficiency which had been inferred from its theory. The close of the war, however, brought no cure for the public embarrassments. The States, relieved from the pressure of foreign danger, and flushed with the enjoyment of independent and sovereign power, instead of a dimin- ished disposition to part with it, persevered in omissions and in measures incompatible with their relations to the Federal Government, and with those among themselves. Having served as a member of Congress through the period between March, 1780, and the arrival of peace, in 1783, I had become intimately acquainted with the public distresses and the causes of them. I had observed the successful opposition to every attempt to procure a remedy by new grants of power to Congress. I had found, more- over, that despair of success hung over the compromising principle of April, 1783, for the public necessities, which had been so elaborately planned and so impressively recom- mended to the States. Sympathizing, under this aspect of affairs, in the alarm of the friends of free government at the threatened danger of an abortive result to the great, and perhaps last, experiment in its favor, I could not be in- sensible to the obligation to aid as far as I could in averting DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 35 the calamity. With this view I acceded to the desire of my fellow citizens of the County, that I should be one of its representatives in the Legislature, hoping that I might there best contribute to inculcate the critical posture to which the Revolutionary cause was reduced, and the merit of a leading agency of the State in bringing about a rescue of the Union, and the blessings of liberty staked on it, from an impending catastrophe. It required but little time after taking my seat in the House of Delegates in May, 1784, to discover, that, how- ever favorable the general disposition of the State might be towards the Confederacy, the Legislature retained the aversion of its predecessors to transfers of power from the State to the Government of the Union ; notwithstanding the urgent demands of the Federal Treasury, the glaring inad- equacy of the authorized mode of supplying it, the rapid growth of anarchy in the Federal system, and the animosity kindled among the States by their conflicting regulations. The temper of the Legislature, and the wayward course of its proceedings, may be gathered from the Journals of its sessions in the years 1784 and 1785. The failure, however, of the varied propositions in the Legislature, for enlarging the powers of Congress ; the con- tinued failure of the efforts of Congress to obtain from them the means of providing for the debts of the Revolu- tion, and of countervailing the commercial laws of Great Britain, a source of much irritation, and against which the separate efforts of the States were found worse than abor- tive; these considerations, with the lights thrown on the whole subject by the free and full discussion it had under- gone, led to a general acquiescence in the Resolution passed on the twenty -first of January, 1786, which proposed and invited a meeting of Deputies from all the States, as follows: " Resolved, that Edmund Randolph, James Madison, Jr., Walter Jones, St. George Tucker, and Meriwether Smith, Esquires, be appointed Commissioners, who, or any 36 INTRODUCTION TO THE three of whom, shall meet such Commissioners as may be appointed in the other States of the Union, at a time and place to be agreed on, to take into consideration the trade of the United States ; to examine the relative situations and trade of said States ; to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent harmony ; and to report to the several States such an act, relative to this great object, as, when unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United States in Congress, effectually to provide for the same." The Eesolution had been brought forward some weeks before, on a failure of a proposed grant of power to Con- gress to collect a revenue from commerce, which had been abandoned by its friends in consequence of material alter- ations made in the grant by a Committee of the Whole. The Eesolution, though introduced by Mr. Tyler, an influ- ential member, — who, having never served in Congress, had more the ear of the House than those whose services there exposed them to an imputable bias, — was so little acceptable, that it was not then persisted in. Being now revived by him, on the last day of the session, and being the alternative of adjourning without any effort for the crisis in the affairs of the Union, it obtained a general vote; less, however, with some of its friends, from a con- fidence in the success of the experiment, than from a hope that it might prove a step to a more comprehensive and adequate provision for the wants of the Confederacy. It happened also, that Commissioners, appointed by Virginia and Maryland to settle the jurisdiction on waters dividing the two States, had, apart from their official reports, recommended a uniformity in the regulations of the two States on several subjects, and particularly on those having relation to foreign trade. It appeared at the same time, that Maryland had deemed a concurrence of her neighbours, Delaware and Pennsylvania, indispensable in such a case; who, for like reasons, would require that of their neighbours. So apt and forcible an illustration of the DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 37 necessity of an uniformity throughout all the States could not but favor the passage of a resolution which proposed a Convention having that for its object. The Commissioners appointed by the Legislature, and who attended the Convention, were Edmund Randolph, the Attorney of the State, St. George Tucker and James Madi- son. The designation of the time and place to be pro- posed for its meeting, and communicated to the States, having been left to the Commissioners, they named, for the time the first Monday in September, and for the place the city of Annapolis, avoiding the residence of Congress, and large commercial cities, as liable to suspicions of an extra- neous influence. Although the invited meeting appeared to be generally favored, five States only assembled; some failing to make appointments, and some of the individuals appointed not hastening their attendance; the result in both cases being ascribed mainly to a belief that the time had not arrived for such a political reform as might be expected from a further experience of its necessity. But in the interval between the proposal of the Con- vention and the time of its meeting, such had been the advance of public opinion in the desired direction, stimulated as it had been by the effect of the contemplated object of the meeting, in turning the general attention to the critical state of things, and in calling forth the sentiments and exertions of the most enlightened and influential patriots, that the Convention, thin as it was, did not scruple to decline the limited task assigned to it, and to recommend to the States a Convention with powers adequate to the occasion. Nor had it been unnoticed that the commission of the New Jersey deputation had extended its object to a general provision for the exigencies of the Union. A recommendation for this enlarged purpose was accordingly reported by a committee to whom the subject had been referred. It was drafted by Col. Hamilton, and finally agreed to in the following form: 38 INTRODUCTION TO THE " To the Honorable, the Legislatures of Virginia, Dela- ware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, the Com- missioners from the said States, respectively, assembled at Annapolis, humbly beg leave to report: " That, pursuant to their several appointments, they met at Annapolis, in the State of Maryland, on the eleventh day of September instant ; and having proceeded to a communi- cation of their powers, they found that the States of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, had, in substance, and nearly in the same terms, authorized their respective Com- missioners ' to meet such commissioners as were, or might be, appointed by the other States of the Union, at such time and place as should be agreed upon by the said Commis- sioners, to take into consideration the trade and commerce of the United States ; to consider how far an uniform system in their commercial intercourse and regulations might be necessary to their common interest and permanent harmony ; and to report to the several States such an act, relative to this great object, as, when unanimously ratified by them, would enable the United States in Congress assembled effectually to provide for the same.' "That the State of Delaware had given similar powers to their Commissioners, with this difference only, that the act to be framed in virtue of these powers is required to be reported ' to the United States in Congress assembled, to be agreed to by them, and confirmed by the Legislature of every State.' " That the State of New Jersey had enlarged the object of their appointment, empowering their commissioners, ' to consider how far an uniform system in their commercial regulations, and other important matters, might be necessary to the common interest and permanent harmony of the sev- eral States ; ' and to report such an act on the subject, as, when ratified by them, * would enable the United States in Congress assembled effectually to provide for the exigencies of the Union.' " That appointments of Commissioners have also been DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 39 made by the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina, none of whom, however, have attended; but that no information has been received by your Commissioners of any appointment having been made by the States of Maryland, Connecticut, South Caro- lina or Georgia. " That the express terms of the powers to your Com- missioners supposing a deputation from all the States, and having for object the trade and commerce of the United States, your Commissioners did not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business of their mission under the circum- stances of so partial and defective a representation. "Deeply impressed, however, with the magnitude and importance of the object confided to them on this occasion, your Commissioners cannot forbear to indulge an expression of their earnest and unanimous wish, that speedy measures may be taken to effect a general meeting of the States in a future Convention, for the same and such other purposes, as the situation of public affairs may be found to require. " If, in expressing this wish, or in intimating any other sentiment, your Commissioners should seem to exceed the strict bounds of their appointment, they entertain a full confidence, that a conduct dictated by an anxiety for the welfare of the United States will not fail to receive an indul- gent construction. "In this persuasion, your Commissioners submit an opinion, that the idea of extending the powers of their Deputies to other objects than those of commerce, which has been adopted by the State of New Jersey, was an improvement on the original plan, and will deserve to be incorporated into that of a future Convention. They are the more naturally led to this conclusion, as, in the course of their reflections on the subject, they have been induced to think that the power of regulating trade is of such com- prehensive extent, and will enter so far into the general system of the Federal Government, that to give it efficacy, and to obviate Questions and doubts concerning its precise 40 INTRODUCTION TO THE nature and limits, may require a correspondent adjustment of other parts of the Federal system. "That there are important defects in the system of the Federal Government, is acknowledged by the acts of all those States which have concurred in the present meeting. That the defects, upon a closer examination, may be found greater and more numerous than even these acts imply, is at least so far probable, from the embarrassments which characterize the present state of our national affairs, foreign and domestic, as may reasonably be supposed to merit a deliberate and candid discussion, in some mode which will unite the sentiments and councils of all the States. In the choice of the mode, your Commissioners are of opinion, that a Convention of deputies from the different States, for the special and sole purpose of entering into this investigation, and digesting a plan for supplying such defects as may be discovered to exist, will be entitled to a preference, from considerations which will occur without being particularized. "Tour Commissioners decline an enumeration of those national circumstances on which their opinion, respecting the propriety of a future Convention with more enlarged powers, is founded ; as it would be an useless intrusion of facts and observations, most of which have been frequently the subject of public discussion, and none of which can have escaped the penetration of those to whom they would in this instance be addressed. They are, however, of a nature so serious, as, in the view of your Commissioners, to render the situation of the United States delicate and critical, calling for an exertion of the united virtue and wisdom of all the members of the Confederacy. " Under this impression, your Commissioners, with the most respectful deference, beg leave to suggest their unan- imous conviction, that it may essentially tend to advance the interests of the Union, if the States by whom they have been respectively delegated would themselves concur, and use their endeavours to procure the concurrence of the other States, in the appointment of Commissioners, to meet at DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 41 Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take into consideration the situation of the United States ; to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the Federal Govern- ment adequate to the exigencies of the Union ; and to report such an act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and after- wards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State, will effectually provide for the same. " Though your Commissioners could not with propriety address these observations and sentiments to any but the States they have the honor to represent, they have never- theless concluded, from motives of respect, to transmit copies of this Eeport to the United States in Congress assembled, and to the Executives of the other States." The recommendation was well received by the Legisla- ture of Virginia, which happened to be the first that acted on it; and the example of her compliance was made as con- ciliatory and impressive as possible. The Legislature were unanimous, or very nearly so, on the occasion. As a proof of the magnitude and solemnity attached to it, they placed General Washington at the head of the deputation from the State; and as a proof of the deep interest he felt in the case, he overstepped the obstacles to his acceptance of the appointment. The law complying with the recommendation from Annapolis was in the terms following : 4 'Whereas, the Commissioners who assembled at Annapolis, on the fourteenth day of September last, for the purpose of devising and reporting the means of enabling Congress to provide effectually for the commercial interests of the United States, have represented the necessity of extending the revision of the Federal system to all its defects; and have recommended that deputies for that pur- pose be appointed by the several Legislatures, to meet in Convention in the City of Philadelphia, on the second Mon- day of May next, — a provision which seems preferable to a 42 INTRODUCTION TO THE discussion of the subject in Congress, where it might be too much interrupted by the ordinary business before them, and where it would, besides, be deprived of the valuable counsels of sundry individuals who are disqualified by the constitution or laws of particular States, or restrained by peculiar circumstances, from a seat in that Assembly: " And whereas, the General Assembly of this Common- wealth, taking into view the actual situation of the Con- federacy, as well as reflecting on the alarming representa- tions made from time to time, by the United States in Congress, particularly in their act of the fifteenth day of February last, can no longer doubt that the crisis is arrived at which the good people of America are to decide the solemn question, whether they will, by wise and magnan- imous efforts, reap the just fruits of that independence which they have so gloriously acquired, and of that union which they have cemented wiih so much of their common blood; or whether, by giving way to unmanly jealousies and prejudices, or to partial and transitory interests, they will renounce the auspicious blessings prepared for them by the Kevolution, and furnish to its enemies an eventual triumph over those, by whose virtue and valour, it has been accomplished: "And whereas, the same noble and extended policy, and the same fraternal and affectionate sentiments, which originally determined the citizens of this Commonwealth to unite with their brethren of the other States, in estab- lishing a federal government, cannot but be felt with equal force now, as motives to lay aside every inferior considera- tion, and to concur in such farther concessions and provis- ions, as may be necessary to secure the great objects for which that government was instituted, and to render the United States as happy in peace, as they have been glorious in war. " Be it, therefore, enacted, by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, That seven Commissioners be appointed by joint ballot of both Houses of Assembly, DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. ±3 who, or any three of them, are hereby authorized as Depu- ties from this Commonwealth, to meet such Deputies as may be appointed and authorized by other States, to assem- ble in Convention at Philadelphia, as above recommended, and to join with them in devising and discussing all such alterations and farther provisions, as may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and in reporting such an act for that pur- pose, to the United States in Congress, as when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several States, will effectually provide for the same. " And be it further enacted, That in case of the death of any of the said deputies, or of their declining their ap- pointments, the Executive are hereby authorized to supply such vacancies; and the Governor is requested to transmit forthwith a copy of this act to the United States in Con- gress, and to the Executives of each of the States in the Union." * A resort to a General Convention, to re-model the Con- federacy, was not a new idea. It had entered at an early date into the conversations and speculations of the most reflecting and foreseeing observers of the inadequacy of the powers allowed to Congress. In a pamphlet published in May, 1781, at the seat of Congress, Pelatiah Webster, an able though not conspicuous citizen, after discussing the fiscal system of the United States, and suggesting, among other remedial provisions, one including a national bank, remarks, that "the authority of Congress at present is very inadequate to the performance of their duties; and this indicates the necessity of their calling a Continental Convention for the express purpose of ascertaining, defin- ing, enlarging and limiting, the duties and powers of their Constitution." On the first day of April, 1783, Colonel Hamilton, in a debate in Congress, observed, " that he wished, instead of * Drawn by J. Madison, passed the House of Delegates November 9th, the Senate November 23d — and Deputies appointed December 4th, 1786. 44 INTRODUCTION TO THE them (partial Conventions), to see a general Convention take place ; and that he should soon, in pursuance of instructions from his constituents, propose to Congress a plan for that purpose, the object of which would be to strengthen the Federal Constitution." He alluded prob- ably, to the resolutions introduced by General Schuyler in the Senate, and passed unanimously by the Legislature of New York in the summer of 1782, declaring, that the Con- federation was defective, in not giving Congress power to provide a revenue for itself, or in not investing them with funds from established and productive sources ; and that it would be advisable for Congress to recommend to the States to call a general Convention to revise and amend the Confederation." It does not appear, however, that his expectation had been fulfilled. In a letter to James Madison from E. H. Lee, then President of Congress, dated the twenty-sixth of November, 1784, he says : "It is by many here suggested as a very necessary step for Congress to take, the calling on the States to form a Convention for the sole purpose of revising the Confederation, so far as to enable Congress to execute with more energy, effect and vigor the powers assigned to it, than it appears by experience that they can do under the present state of things." The answer of Mr. Madison remarks : "I hold it for a maxim, that the union of the States is essential to their safety against foreign danger and internal contention ; and that the perpetuity and effi- cacy of the present system cannot be confided in. The question, therefore, is, in what mode, and at what moment, the experiment for supplying the defects ought to be made." In the winter of 1784-5, Noah Webster, whose political and other valuable writings had made him known to the public, proposed, in one of his publications, " a new system of government which should act, not on the States, but directly on individuals, and vest in Congress full power to carry its laws into effect." DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 45 The proposed and expected Convention at Annapolis, the first of a general character that appears to have been realized, and the state of the public mind awakened by it, had attracted the particular attention of Congress, and favored the idea there of a Convention with fuller power for amending the Confederacy.* It does not appear that in any of these cases the reformed system was to be otherwise sanctioned than by the Legislative authority of the States; nor whether, nor how far, a change was to be made in the structure of the deposi- tory of Federal powers. The act of Virginia providing for the Convention at Philadelphia was succeeded by appointments from the other States as their Legislatures were assembled, the appointments being selections from the most experienced and highest standing citizens. Rhode Island was the only exception to a compliance with the recommendation from Annapolis, well known to have been swayed by an obdurate adherence to an advantage which her position gave her, of taxing her neighbours through their consumption of imported supplies, an advantage which it was foreseen would be taken from her by a revisal of the Articles of Confederation. As the public mind had been ripened for a salutary reform of the political system, in the interval between the proposal and the meeting of the Commissioners at Annapolis, the interval between the last event and the meeting of deputies at Philadelphia had continued to develope more and more the necessity and the extent of a systematic pro- vision for the preservation and government of the Union. Among the ripening incidents was the insurrection of Shays, in Massachusetts, against her government; which was with difficulty suppressed, notwithstanding the influ- ence on the insurgents of an apprehended interposition of the Federal troops. * The letters of Wm. Grayson, March 22, 1786, and of James Monroe, of April 28th, 1786, both then members, to Mr. Madison, state that a proposition for such a Con- vention had been made. 46 INTRODUCTION TO THE At the date of the Convention, the aspect and retrospect of the political condition of the United States could not but fill the public mind with a gloom which was relieved only by a hope that so select a body would devise an adequate remedy for the existing and orospective evils so impres- sively demanding it. It was seen that the public debt, rendered so sacred by the cause in which it had been incurred, remained without any provision for its payment. The reiterated and elabo- rate efforts of Congress to procure from the States a more adequate power to raise the means of payment, had failed. The effect of the ordinary requisitions of Congress had only displayed the inefficiency of the authority making them, none of the States having duly complied with them, some having failed altogether, or nearly so; while in one in- stance, that of New Jersey,* a compliance was expressly refused; nor was more yielded to the expostulations of members of Congress depused to her Legislature, than a mere repeal of the law, without a compliance. The want of authority in Congress to regulate commerce had produced in foreign nations, particularly Great Britain, a monopoliz- ing policy, injurious to the trade of the United States, and destructive to their navigation; the imbecility, and antici- pated dissolution, of the Confederacy extinguishing all apprehensions of a countervailing policy on the part of the United States. The same want of a general power over commerce led to an exercise of the power, separately, by the States, which not only proved abortive, but engendered rival, conflicting and angry regulations. Besides the vain attempts to supply their respective treasuries by imposts, which turned their commerce into the neighbouring ports, and to coerce a relaxation of the British monopoly of the West India navigation, which was attempted by Virginia, f the States having ports for foreign commerce, taxed and * A letter of Mr. Grayson to Mr. Madison of March 22, 1786, relating the conduct of New Jersey, states this fact. t See the Journal of her Legislature. DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 47' irritated the adjoining States, trading through them, as New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. Some of the States, as Connecticut, taxed imports from others, as from Massachusetts, which complained in a letter to the Executive of Virginia, and doubtless to those of other States. In sundry instances, as of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Maryland, the navigation laws treated the citizens of other States as aliens. In certain cases the authority of the Confederacy was disregarded, as in violation, not only of the Treaty of Peace, but of treaties with France and Holland; which were complained of to Congress. In other cases the Federal authority was vio- lated by treaties and war with Indians, as by Georgia ; by troops raised and kept up without the consent of Congress, as by Massachusetts; by compacts without the consent of Congress, as between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and between Virginia and Maryland. From the Legislative Journals of Virginia it appears, that a vote refusing to apply for a sanction of Congress was followed by a vote against the communication of the compact to Congress. In. the internal administration of the States, a violation of con- tracts had become familiar, in the form of depreciated paper made a legal tender, of property substituted for money, of instalment laws, and of the occlusions of the courts of jus- tice, although evident that all such interferences affected the rights of other States, relatively creditors, as well as citi- zens creditors within the State. Among the defects which had been severely felt was want of an uniformity in cases requiring it, as laws of naturalization and bankruptcy, a coercive authority operating on individuals, and a guarantee of the internal tranquillity of the States. As a natural consequence of this distracted and dis- heartening condition of the Union, the Federal authority had ceased to be respected abroad, and dispositions were* shown there, particularly in Great Britain, to take advan- tage of its imbecility, and to speculate on its approaching downfall. At home it had lost all confidence and credit ; 48 INTRODUCTION TO THE the unstable and unjust career of the States had also for- feited the respect and confidence essential to order and good government, involving a general decay of confidence and credit between man and man. It was found, moreover, that those least partial to popular government, or most dis- trustful of its efficacy, were yielding to anticipations, that from an increase of the confusion a government might re- sult more congenial with their taste or their opinions ; whilst those most devoted to the principles and forms of Republics were alarmed for the cause of liberty itself, at stake in the American experiment, and anxious for a system that would avoid the ineflicacy of a mere confederacy, without passing into the opposite extreme of a consolidated government. It was known that there were individuals who had betrayed a bias towards monarchy, and there had always been some not unfavorable to a partition of the Union into several confederacies; either from a better chance of figuring on a sectional theatre, or that the sections would require stronger governments, or by their hostile conflicts lead to a mon- archical consolidation. The idea of dismemberment had recently made its appearance in the newspapers. Such were the defects, the deformities, the diseases and the ominous prospects, for which the Convention were to provide a remedy, and which ought never to be overlooked in expounding and appreciating the constitutional charter, the remedy that was provided. As a sketch on paper, the earliest, perhaps, of a Consti- tutional Government for the Union (organized into the reg- ular departments, with physical means operating on indi- viduals) to be sanctioned by the people of the States, acting in their original and sovereign character, was contained in the letters of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson of the nineteenth of March; to Governor Randolph of the eighth of April; and to General Washington of the sixteenth of April, 1787, for which see their respective dates. The feature, in these letters which vested in the general authority a negative on the laws of the States, was Bug- DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 49 gested by the negative in the head of the British Empire, which prevented collisions between the parts and the whole, and between the parts themselves. It was supposed that the substitution of an elective and responsible authority, for an hereditary and irresponsible one, would avoid the appearance even of a departure from Republicanism. But although the subject was so viewed in the Convention, and the votes on it were more than once equally divided, it was finally and justly abandoned, as, apart from other objec- tions, it was not practicable among so many States, increas- ing in number, and enacting, each of them, so many laws. Instead of the proposed negative, the objects of it were left as finally provided for in the Constitution. On the arrival of the Virginia Deputies at Philadelphia, it occurred to them, that, from the early and prominent part taken by that State in bringing about the Convention, some initiative step might be expected from them. The Resolu- tions introduced by Governer Randolph were the result of consultation on the subject, with an understanding that they left all the Deputies entirely open to the lights of discus- sion, and free to concur in any alterations or modifications which their reflections and judgments might approve. The Resolutions, as the Journals show, became the basis on which the proceedings of the Convention commenced, and to the developements, variations and modifications of which the plan of government proposed by the Convention may be traced. The curiosity I had felt during my researches into the history of the most distinguished confederacies, particularly those of antiquity, and the deficiency I found in the means of satisfying it, more especially in what related to the pro- cess, the principles, the reasons, and the anticipations, which prevailed in the formation of them, determined me to preserve, as far I could, an exact account of what might pass in the Convention while executing its trust; with the magnitude of which I was duly impressed, as I was by the gratification promised to future curiosity by an authentic 4 50 INTRODUCTION TO THE exhibition of the objects, the opinions, and the reasonings, from which the system of government was to receive its peculiar structure and organization. Nor was I unaware of the value of such a contribution to the fund of materials for the history of a Constitution on which would be staked the happiness of a people great even in its infancy, and possibly the cause of liberty throughout the world. In pursuance of the task I had assumed, I chose a seat in front of the presiding member, with the other members on my right and left hands. In this favorable position for hearing all that passed, I noted, in terms legible and in abbreviations and marks intelligible to myself, what was read from the Chair or spoken by the members; and losing not a moment unnecessarily between the adjournment and reassembling of the Convention, I was enabled to write out my daily notes during the session, or within a few finishing days after its close, in the extent and form preserved in my own hand on my files. In the labor and correctness of this I was not a little aided by practice, and by a familiarity with the style and the train of observation and reasoning which characterized the principal speakers. It happened, also, that I was not absent a single day, nor more than a casual fraction of an hour in any day, so that I could not have lost a single speech, unless a very short one. It may be proper to remark, that, with a very few exceptions, the speeches were neither furnished, nor revised, nor sanctioned, by the speakers, but written out from my notes, aided by the freshness of my recollections. A further remark maybe proper, that views of the subject might occa- sionally be presented, in the speeches and proceedings, with a latent reference to a compromise on some middle ground, by mutual concessions. The exceptions alluded to were, — first, the sketch furnished by Mr. Eandolph of his speech on the introduction of his propositions on the 29th day of May ; secondly, the speech of Mr. Hamilton, who happened to call on me when putting the last hand to it, and who DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 51 acknowledged its fidelity, without suggesting more than a very few verbal alterations which were made ; thirdly, the speech of Gouverneur Morris on the second day of May,* which was communicated to him on a like occasion, and who acquiesced in it without even a verbal change. The correctness of his language and the distinctness of his enunciation were particularly favorable to a reporter. The speeches of Doctor Franklin, excepting a few brief ones, were copied from the written ones read to the Convention by his colleague, Mr. Wilson, it being inconvenient to the Doctor to remain long on his feet. Of the ability and intelligence of those who composed the Convention the debates and proceedings may be a test ; as the character of the work which was the offspring of their deliberations must be tested by the experience of the future, added to that of nearly half a century which has But whatever may be the judgment pronounced on the competency of the architects of the Constitution, or what- ever may be the destiny of the edifice prepared by them, I feel it a duty to express my profound and solemn con- viction, derived from my intimate opportunity of observing and appreciating the views of the Convention, collectively and individually, that there never was an assembly of men, charged with a great and arduous trust, who were more pure in their motives, or more exclusively or anxiously devoted to the object committed to them, than were the members of the Federal Convention of 1787, to the object of devising and proposing a constitutional system which should best supply the defects of that which it was to replace, and best secure the permanent liberty and happi- ness of their country. * It reads thus in original copy, but probably refers to July 2nd. (Pub. Note.) DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. Monday, May 14th, 1787, Was the day fixed for the meeting of the Deputies in Convention, for revising the federal system of government. On that day a small number only had assembled. Seven States were not convened till, Friday, May 25th. When the following members appeared: From Massachusetts, New York, Rufus King. Robert Yates, and Alexander Hamilton. New Jersey, David Brearly, William Churchill Houston, and William Patterson. Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, Thomas Fitzsimons, James Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris. Delaware, George Read, Richard Basset, and Jacob Broom. Virginia, George Washington, Edmund Randolph, John Blair, James Madison, 53 54 DEBATES IN THE [1787. George Mason, George Wythe, and James McClurg. North Carolina, Alexander Martin, William Kichardson Davie, Eichard Dobbs Spaight, and Hugh Williamson. South Carolina, John Eutledge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, and Pierce Butler. Georgia, William Few. Mr. Eobert Morris informed the members assembled, that, by the instruction and in behalf of the deputation of Pennsylvania, he proposed George Washington, Esquire, late Commander-in-Chief, for President of the Convention.* Mr. John Eutledge seconded the motion, expressing his confidence that the choice would be unanimous; and ob- serving, that the presence of General Washington forbade any observations on the occasion which might otherwise be proper. General Washington was accordingly unanimously elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by Mr. E. Morris and Mr. Eutledge ; from which, in a very emphatic manner, he thanked the Convention for the honor they had conferred on him; reminded them of the novelty of the scene of business in which he was to act, lamented his want of better qualifications, and claimed the indulgence of the House towards the involuntary errors which his inex- perience might occasion. Mr. Wilson moved that a Secretary be appointed, and nominated Mr. Temple Franklin. Colonel Hamilton nominated Major Jackson. On the *The nomination came with particular grace from Pennsylvania, as Doctor Franklin alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Doctor was him- self to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of the weathor and of his health confined him to his house. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 55 ballot Major Jackson had five votes, and Mr. Franklin two votes. On reading the credentials of the Deputies, it was noticed that those from Delaware were prohibited from changing the Article in the Confederation establishing an equality of votes among the States. The appointment of a Committee, on the motion of Mr. C. Pinckney, consisting of Messrs. Wythe, Hamilton, and 0. Pinckney, to prepare standing rules and orders, was the only remaining step taken on this day. Monday, May 28th. In Convention, — From Massachusetts, Nathaniel Gor- ham and Caleb Strong ; from Connecticut, Oliver Ells- worth ; from Delaware, Gunning Bedford ; from Mary- land, James McHenry ; from Pennsylvania, Benjamin Franklin, George Clymer, Thomas Mifflin, and Jared Ingersoll, — took their seats. Mr. Wythe, from the Committee for preparing rules, made a report, which employed the deliberations of this day. Mr. King objected to one of the rules in the report authorizing any member to call for the Yeas and Nays and have them entered on the minutes. He urged, that as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the constituents, it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes ; and improper, as changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of the business, and would fill the minutes with con- tradictions. Colonel Mason seconded the objection, adding, that such a record of the opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change of them on conviction ; and in case of its being hereafter promulged, must furnish handles to the adversaries of the result of the meeting. The proposed rule was rejected, nem. con. The standing rules agreed to were as follows : 56 DEBATES IN THE [1787. RULES. " A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not less than seven States ; and all questions shall be decided by the greater number of these which shall be fully represented. But a less number than seven may adjourn from day to day. " Immediately after the President shall have taken the Chair, and the members their seats, the minutes of the pre- ceding day shall be read by the Secretary. "Every member, rising to speak, shall address the President ; and, whilst he shall be speaking, none shall pass between them, or hold discourse with another, or read a book, pamphlet, or paper, printed or manuscript. And of two members rising to speak at the same time, the Presi- dent shall name him who shall be first heard. " A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without special leave, upon the same question; and not the second time, before every other who had been silent shall have been heard, if he choose to speak upon the subject. " A motion, made and seconded, shall be repeated, and, if written, as it shall be when any member shall so require, read aloud, by the Secretary, before it shall be debated; and may be withdrawn at any time before the vote upon it shall have been declared. " Orders of the day shall be read next after tne minutes; and either discussed or postponed, before any other busi- ness shall be introduced. " When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, other than to amend the question, to commit it, or to post- pone the debate, shall be received. " A question which is complicated shall, at the request of any member, be divided, and put separately upon the propositions of which it is compounded. " The determination of a question, although fully de- bated, shall be postponed, if the Deputies of any State desire it, until the next day. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 57 u A writing which contains any matter brought on to be considered shall be read once throughout, for information ; then by paragraphs, to be debated; and again, with the amendments, if any, made on the second reading; and afterwards the question shall be put upon the whole, amended, or approved in its original form, as the case shall be. "Committees shall be appointed by ballot; and the members who have the greatest number of ballots, although not a majority of the votes present, shall be the Committee. When two or more members have an equal number of votes, the member standing first on the list, in the order of taking down the ballots, shall be preferred. " A member may be called to order by any other mem- ber, as well as by the President; and may be allowed to explain his conduct, or expressions supposed to be repre- hensible. And all questions of order shall be decided by the President, without appeal or debate. " Upon a question to adjourn, for the day, which may be made at any time, if it be seconded, the question shall be put without a debate. " When the House shall adjourn, every member shall stand in his place until the President pass him."* A letter from sundry persons of the State of Khode Island, addressed to the Chairman of the General Conven- tion, was presented to the Chair by Mr Gouverneur Mor- ris; and, being read, was ordered to lie on the table for further consideration. * Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the rule by which they ought to vote in the Convention had been made a subject of conversation among the mem bers present. It was pressed by Gouverneur Morris, and favored by Robert Morris and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States should unite in firmly refusing to the small States an equal vote, as unreasonable, and as enabling the small States to negative every good system of government, which must, in the nature of things, be founded on a violation of that equality. The members from Virginia, conceiving that such an attempt might beget fatal altercations between the large and small States ; and that it would be easier to prevail on the latter, in the course of the deliberations, to give up their equality for the sake of an effective government, than on taking the field of discussion, to disarm themselves of the right, and thereby throw themselves on the mercy of the larger States, discountenanced and stifled the project. 58 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Mr. Butler moved that the House provide against interruption of business by absence of members, and against licentious publications of their proceedings. To which was added, by Mr. Spaight, a motion to provide, that, on the one hand, the House might not be precluded by a vote upon any question from revising the subject matter of it, when they see cause, nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily to rescind a decision which was the result of mature discussion. Whereupon it was ordered, that these motions be referred for the consideration of the Committee appoint- ed to draw up the standing rules, and that the Committee make report thereon. Adjourned till to-morrow, at ten o'clock. Tuesday, May 29th. In Convention, — John Dickinson, and Elbridge Gerry, the former from Delaware, the latter from Massachusetts, took their seats. The following rules were added, on the Eeport of Mr. Wythe, from the Committee — " That no member be absent from the House, so as to interrupt the representation of the State, without leave. " That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall be, or ought to be, sitting. " That no copy be taken of any entry on the Journal during the sitting of the House, without leave of the House. "That members only be permitted to inspect the Journal. "That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published, or communicated without leave. " That a motion to reconsider a matter which has been determined by a majority, may be made, with leave, unani- mously given, on the same day on which the vote passed ; but otherwise, not without one day's previous notice; in which last case, if the House agree to the reconsideration, some future day shall be assigned for that purpose." 1787 ] FEDERAL CONVENTION 59 Mr. C. Pinckney moved, that a Committee be appointed to superintend the minutes. Mr. G. Morris objected to it. The entry of the pro- ceedings of the Convention belonged to the Secretary as their impartial officer. A Committee might have an interest and bias in moulding the entry, according to their opinions and wishes. The motion was negatived, five Noes, four Ayes. Mr. Eandolph then opened the main business: — He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather than those who were of longer standing in life and political experience, to open the great subject of their mis- sion. But as the Convention had originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed that some proposition was ex- pected from them, they had imposed the task on him. He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American downfall. He observed, that, in revising the Federal system we ought to inquire, first, into the properties which such a government ought to possess; secondly, the defects of the Confederation; thirdly the danger of our situation; and fourthly, the remedy. 1. The character of such a government ought to secure, first, against foreign invasion ; secondly, against dissensions between members of the Union, or seditions in particular States; thirdly, to procure to the several States various blessings of which an isolated situation was incapable; fourthly, it should be able to defend itself against encroach- ment; and fifthly, to be paramount to the State Constitu- tions. 2. In speaking of the defects of the Confederation, he professed a high respect for its authors, and considered them as having done all that patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science of constitutions, and of confed- eracies ; when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown — no commercial discord had arisen among any States — no 60 DEBATES IN THE [1787. rebellion had appeared, as in Massachusetts — foreign debts had not become urgent — the havoc of paper-money had not been foreseen — treaties had not been violated — 'and perhaps nothing better could be obtained, from the jealousy of the States with regard to their sovereignty. He then proceeded to enumerate the defects: — First, tnat the Confederation produced no security against foreign invasion; Congress not being permitted to prevent a war, nor to support it by their own authority. Of this he cited many examples; most of which tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties, or of the law of nations to be punished; that particular States might by their conduct provoke war without control ; and that, neither militia nor drafts being fit for defence on such occasions, enlistments only could be successful, and these could not be executed without money. Secondly, that the Federal Government could not check the quarrel between the States, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor means to impose according to the exigency. Thirdly, that there were many advantages which the United States might acquire, which were not attainable under the Confederation — such as a productive impost — counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations — pushing of commerce ad libitum, &c, &c. Fourthly, that the Federal Government could not defend itself against encroachments from the States. Fifthly, that it was not even paramount to the State Constitutions, ratified as it was in many of the States. 3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation and appealed to the sense of the best friends of the United States — to the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of gov- ernment every where — and to other considerations. 4. He then proceeded to the remedy ; the basis of which he said must be the republican principle. He proposed, as conformable to his ideas, the following resolutions, which he explained one by one. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 61 1. " Kesolved, that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected and enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution ; namely, " common defence, security of liberty, and general warfare." 2. " Eesolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases. 3. "Kesolved, that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches. 4. " Eesolved, that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States every for the term of ; to be of the age of years at least ; to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service ; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belong to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of after its expiration ; to be incapable of re-election for the space of after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject to recall. 5. " Eesolved, that the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of years at least ; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency ; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service ; and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of service ; and for the space of after the expiration thereof. 62 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 6. "Resolved, that each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts ; that the National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, and moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be inter- rupted by the exercise of individual legislation ; to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening, in the opinion of the National Legislature, the Articles of Union, or any treaty subsisting under the authority of the Union ; and to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfil its duty under the Articles thereof. 7. " Resolved, that a National Executive be instituted ; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of ; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed com- pensation for the services rendered, in which no increase nor diminution shall be made, so as to affect the magistracy existing at the time of increase or diminution ; and to be ineligible a second time ; and that, besides a general authority to execute the national laws, it ought to enjoy the executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation. 8. " Resolved, that the Executive, and a convenient number of the national Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of Revision, with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature, before it shall operate, and every act of a particular Legislature before a negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by of the members of each branch. 9. "Resolved, that a National Judiciary be established; to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature ; to hold their offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctu- ally, at stated times, fixed compensation for their services. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 63 in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the same time of such increase or diminution. That the jurisdiction of the infe- rior tribunals shall be to hear and determine, in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and deter- mine, in the dernier resort, all piracies and felonies on the high seas ; captures from an enemy ; cases in which foreign- ers, or citizens of other States, applying to such jurisdic- tions, may be interested; or which respect the collection of the national revenue ; impeachments of any national officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony. 10. "Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than the whole. 11. " Resolved, that a republican government, and the territory of each State, except in the instance of a volun- tary junction of government and territory, ought to be guaranteed by the United States to each State. 12. "Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress and their authorities and privi- leges, until a given day after the reform of the Articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engagements. 13. " Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary; and that the assent of the National Legis- lature ought not to be required thereto. 14. "Resolved, that the legislative, executive, and ju- diciary powers, within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the Articles of Union. 15. " Resolved, that the amendments which shall be of- fered to the Confederation, by the Convention, ought, at a proper time or times, after the approbation of Congress, to 64 DEBATES IN THE [1787. be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of representa- tives, recommended by the several Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon." He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the present opportunity of establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the United States to pass away un- improved.* It was then resolved, that the House will to-morrow resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole House, to con- sider of the state of the American Union; and that the. pro- positions moved by Mr. Bandolph be referred to the said Committee. Mr. Charles Pinckney laid before the House the draft of a federal government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between the free and independent States of America: PLAN OF A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. We, the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massa- chusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Con- necticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish the following Constitution, for the government of ourselves and posterity. Article I. " The style of this government shall be, The United States of America, and the government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive and judicial powers. Article II. " The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist of two separate Houses ; one to be called the House of Delegates ; and the other the Senate, who shall meet on the day of in every year. * This abstract of the speech was furnished to James Madison by Mr. Randolph, and is in his hand-writing. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. $$ Article III. " The members of the House of Delegates shall be chosen every year by the people of the several States ; and the qualification of the electors shall be the same as those of the electors in the several States for their Legislatures. Each member shall have been a citizen of the United States for years ; and shall be of years of age, and a resident in the State he is chosen for. Until a census of the people shall be taken in the manner hereinafter men- tioned, the House of Delegates shall consist of -, to be chosen from the different States in the follow- ing proportions: for New Hampshire, ; for Massa- chusetts, ; for Rhode Island, ; for Connecticut,— — ; for New York, — ; for New Jersey, ; for Pennsylvania, ; for Delaware, ; for Maryland, ; for Virginia, ; for North Carolina, ; for South Carolina ; for Georgia, ; and the Legislature shall hereinafter regulate the number of Dele- gates by the number of inhabitants, according to the pro- visions hereinafter made, at the rate of one for every thousand. All money bills of every kind shall originate in the House of Delegates, and shall not be altered by the Senate. The House of Delegates shall exclusively possess the power of impeachment, and shall choose its own officers ; and vacancies therein shall be supplied by the executive authority of the State in the representation from which they shall happen. Article IV. " The Senate shall be elected and chosen by the House of Delegates; which House, immediately after their meet- ing, shall choose by ballot Senators from among the citizens and residents of New Hampshire; from among those of Massachusetts ; from among those of Rhode Island ; from among those of Connecti- cut ; from among those of New York ; from among those of New Jersey; from among 5 66 DEBATES IN THE [1787. those of Pennsylvania ; from among those of Dela- ware; from among those of Maryland; from among those of Virginia ; from among those of North Carolina; from among those of South Carolina; and — from among those of Georgia. The senators chosen from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, shall form one class; those from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, one class; and those from Maryland, Virginia, North Caro- lina, South Carolina, and Georgia, one class. The House of Delegates shall number these classes one, two, and three ; and fix the times of their service by lot. The first class shall serve for years ; the second for years ; and the third for years. As their times of service expire, the House of Delegates shall fill them up by elections for years; and they shall fill all vacancies that arise from death or resignation, for the time of service remaining of the members so dying or resigning. Each Senator shall be years of age at least; and shall have been a citizen of the United States for four years before his election; and shall be a resident of the State he is chosen from. The Senate shall choose its own officers. Article V. "Each State shall prescribe the time and manner of holding elections by the people for the House of Delegates ; and the House of Delegates shall be the judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their members. " In each House a majority shall constitute a quorum to do business. Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall not be impeached, or questioned, in any place out of it; and the members of both Houses shall in all cases, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be free from arrest during their attendance on Congress, and in going to and returning from it. Both Houses shall keep Journals of their proceedings, and publish them, ex- cept on secret occasions; and the Yeas and Nays may be 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 67 entered thereon at the desire of one of the members present. Neither House, without the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than days, nor to any place but where they are sitting. " The members of each House shall not be eligible to, or capable of holding, any office under the Union, during the time for which they have been respectively elected ; nor the members of the Senate for one year after. The mem- bers of each House shall be paid for their services by the States which they represent. Every bill which shall have passed the Legislature shall be presented to the President of the United States for his revision; if he approves it, he shall sign it ; but if he does not approve it, he shall return it, with his objections, to the House it originated in; which House, if two-thirds of the members present, notwithstand- ing the President's objections, agree to pass it, shall send it to the other House, with the President's objections; where if two-thirds of the members present also agree to pass it, the same shall become a law; and all bills sent to the Pres- ident, and not returned by him within days, shall be laws, unless the Legislature, by their adjournment, prevent their return ; in which case they shall not be laws. • Aeticle VI. " The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; To regulate commerce with all nations, and among the several States; To borrow money and emit bills of credit; To establish post-offices; To raise armies; To build and equip fleets; To pass laws for arming, organizing, and disciplining the militia of the United States ; To subdue a rebellion in any State, on application of its Legislature ; 68 DEBATES IN THE [1787. To coin money, and regulate the value of all coins, and fix the standard of weights and measures ; To provide such dockyards and arsenals, and erect such fortifications as may be necessary for the United States, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction therein; To appoint a Treasurer, by ballot; To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court ; To establish post and military roads; To establish and provide for a national university at the seat of government of the United States; To establish uniform rules of naturalization; To provide for the establishment of a seat of govern- ment for the United States, not exceeding miles square, in which they shall have exclusive jurisdiction ; To make rules concerning captures from an enemy; To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies at sea, and of counterfeiting coin, and of all of- fences against the laws of nations; To call forth the aid of the militia to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions ; And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing powers into execution. " The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to declare the punishment of treason, which shall con- sist only in levying ^ar against the United States, or any of them, or in adhering to their enemies. No person shall be convicted of treason but by the testimony of two witnesses. " The proportion of direct taxation shall be regulated by the whole number of inhabitants of every description ; which number shall, within years after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within the term of every year after, be taken in the manner to be prescribed by the Legislature. "No tax shall be laid on articles exported from the States ; nor capitation tax, but in proportion to the census before directed. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 69 " All laws regulating commerce shall require the assent of two-thirds of the members present in each House. The United States shall not grant any title of nobility. The Legislature of the United States shall pass no law on the subject of religion ; nor touching or abridging the liberty of the press ; nor shall the privilege of the writ of Habeus Corpus ever be suspended, except in case of rebellion or invasion. " All acts made by the Legislature of the United States, pursuant to this Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land ; and all judges shall be bound to consider them as such in their decisions. Aeticle VII. " The Senate shall have the sole and exclusive power to declare war ; and to make treaties ; and to appoint ambas- sadors and other ministers to foreign nations, and judges of the Supreme Court. " They shall have the exclusive power to regulate the manner of deciding all disputes and controversies now ex- isting, or which may arise, between the States, respecting jurisdiction or territory. Article VIII. "The executive power of the United States shall be vested in a President of the United States of America, which shall be his style ; and his title shall be His Excel- lency. He shall be elected fors — years ; and shall be re-eligible. " He shall from time to time give information to the Legislature, of the State of the Union, and recommend to their consideration the measures he may think necessary. He shall take care that the laws of the United States be duly executed. He shall commission all the officers of the United States ; and, except as to ambassadors, other minis- ters, and judges of the Supreme Court, he shall nominate. 70 DEBATES IN THE [1787. and, with the consent of the Senate, appoint, all other officers of the United States. He shall receive public ministers from foreign nations ; and may correspond with the Executives of the different States. He shall have power to grant par- dons and reprieves, except in impeachments. He shall be Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States ; and shall receive a compensation which shall not be increased or diminished during his continuance in office. At entering on the duties of his office, he shall take an oath faithfully to execute the duties of a President of the United States. He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Delegates, and conviction in the Supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his removal, death, resignation, or disability, the President of the Senate shall exercise the duties of his office until another President be chosen. And in case of the death of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Delegates shall do so. Article IX. 1 The Legislature of the United States shall have the power, and it shall be their duty, to establish such courts of law, equity, and admiralty, as shall be necessary. " The judges of the courts shall hold their offices during good behaviour; and receive a compensation, which shall not be increased or diminished during their continuance in office. One of these courts shall be termed the Supreme Court; whose jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the laws of the United States, or affecting embassa- dors, other public ministers and consuls; to the trial of impeachment of officers of the United States; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In cases of im- peachment affecting ambassadors, and other public minis- ters, this jurisdiction shall be original; and in all other cases appellate. " All criminal offences, except in cases of impeachment 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 71 shall be tried in the State where they shall be committed. The trials shall be open and public, and shall be by jury. Article X. " Immediately after the first census of the people of the United States, the House of Delegates shall apportion the Senate by electing for each State, out of the citizens resi- dent therein, one Senator for every members each State shall have in the House of Delegates. Each State shall be entitled to have at least one member in the Senate. Article XL " No State shall grant letters of marque and reprisal, or enter into treaty, or alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of nobility ; nor, without the consent of the Legis- lature of the United States, lay any impost on imports ; nor keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor enter into compacts with other States or foreign powers ; nor emit bills of credit; nor make any thing but gold, silver, or cop- per, a tender in payment of debts; nor engage in war, except for self-defense when actually invaded, or the danger of invasion be so great as not to admit of a delay until the Government of the United States can be informed thereof. And to render these prohibitions effectual, the Legislature of the United States shall have the power to revise the laws of the several States that may be supposed to infringe the powers exclusively delegated by this Constitution to Con- gress, and to negative and annul such as do. Article XII. " The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all priv- ileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. Any person, charged with crimes in any State, fleeing from jus- tice to another, shall, on demand of the Executive of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, and removed to the State having jurisdiction of the offence. 72 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Article XIII. "Full faith shall be given, in each State, to the acts of the Legislature, and to the records and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates, of every State. Article XIV. " The Legislature shall have power to admit new States into the Union, on the same terms with the original States ; provided two-thirds of the members present in both Houses agree. Article XV. " On the application of the Legislature of a State, the United States shall protect it against domestic insurrection. Article XVI. " If two-thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply for the same, the Legislature of the United States shall call a convention for the purpose of amending the Constitu- tion; or, should Congress, with the consent of two-thirds of each House, propose to the States amendments to the same, the agreement of two-thirds of the Legislatures of the States shall be sufficient to make the said amendments parts of the Constitution. " The ratification of the conventions of States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution." Ordered, that the said draft be referred to the Com- mittee of the Whole appointed to consider the state of the American Union. Adjourned. Wednesday, May 30th. Roger Sherman, from Connecticut, took his seat. The House went into Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union. Mr. Gorham was elected to the Chair by ballot. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 73 The propositions of Mr. Eandolph which had been re- ferred to the Committee being taken up, he moved, on the suggestion of Mr. G. Morris, that the first of his proposi- tions, — to-wit: "Resolved, that the Articles of Confedera- tion ought to be so collected and enlarged, as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare, — should mutually be postponed, in order to consider the three fol- lowing: " 1. That a union of the States merely federal will not accomplish the objects proposed by the Articles of Confed- eration, namely, common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare. " 2. That no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States, as individual sovereignties, would be suffi- cient. " 3. That a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive and Judi- ciary " The motion for postponing was seconded by Mr. G. Morris, and unanimously agreed to. Some verbal criticisms were raised against the first prop- osition, and it was agreed, on motion of Mr. Butler, sec- onded by Mr. Randolph, to pass on to the third, which un- derwent a discussion, less, however, on its general merits than on the force and extent of the particular terms national and supreme. Mr. Charles Pinckney wished to know of Mr. Ran- dolph, whether he meant to abolish the State governments altogether. Mr. Randolph replied, that he meant by these general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones which explained the outlines of the system he had in view. Mr. Butler said, he had not made up his mind on the subject, and was open to the light which discussion might throw on it. After some general observations, he concluded with saying, that he had opposed the grant of powers to Congress heretofore, because the whole power was vested in 74 DEBATES IN THE [1787. one body. The proposed distribution of the powers with different bodies changed the case, and would induce him to go great lengths. General Pinckney expressed a doubt whether the act of Congress recommending the Convention, or the commissions of the Deputies to it, would authorize a discussion of a system founded on different principles from the Federal Constitution. Mr. Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt. Mr. Gouverneur Morris explained the distinction be- tween a federal and a national, supreme government; the former being a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a complete and compulsive operation. He contended, that in all communities there must be one supreme power, and one only. Mr. Mason observed, not only that the present Confed- eration was deficient in not providing for coercion and pun- ishment against delinquent States ; but argued very cogently, that punishment could not in the nature of things be exe- cuted on the States collectively, and therefore that such a government was necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt required it. Mr. Sherman admitted that the Confederation had not given sufficient power to Congress, and that additional pow- ers were necessary; particularly that of raising money, which he said would involve many other powers. He ad- mitted also, that the general and particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed, however, not to be disposed to make too great inroads on the exist- ing system; intimating, as one reason, that it would be wrong to lose every amendment by inserting such as would not be agreed to by the States. It was moved by Mr. Head, and seconded by Mr. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, to postpone the third proposition last offered by Mr. Kandolph, viz. " that a national government ought to be established, consisting of 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 75 a supreme Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary," in order to take up the following, viz. " Kesolved, that, in order to carry into execution the design of the States in forming this Convention, and to accomplish the objects proposed by the Confederation, a more effective Government, consisting of a Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, ought to be established." The motion to postpone for this purpose was lost: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, aye — 4 ; New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Caro- lina, no — 4. On the question, as moved by Mr. Butler, on the third proposition, it was resolved, in Committee of Whole, "that a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary," — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 6 ; Connecticut, no — 1 ; New York divided (Colonel Hamilton, aye, Mr. Yates, no). The following Resolution, being the second of those proposed by Mr. Randolph, was taken up, viz. " that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases." Mr. Madison, observing that the words, " or to the num- ber of free inhabitants" might occasion debates which would divert the Committee from the general question whether the principle of representation should be changed moved that they might be struck out. Mr. King observed, that the quotas of contribution, which would alone remain as the measure of representation, would not answer; because, waiving every other view of the mat- ter, the revenue might hereafter be so collected by the General Government that the sums respectively drawn from the States would not appear, and would besides be continu- ally varying. 76 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Mr. Madison admitted the propriety of the observation, and that some better rule ought to be found. Colonel Hamilton moved to alter the resolution so as to read, " that the rights of suffrage in the National Legisla- ture ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabi- tants." Mr. Spaight seconded the motion. It was then moved that the resolution be postponed; which was agreed to. Mr. Eandolph and Mr. Madison then moved the fol- lowing resolution: "that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned." It was moved and seconded to amend it by adding, ' ' and not according to the present system," which was agreed to. It was then moved and seconded to alter the resolution so as to read, "that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought not to be according to the present system." It was then moved and seconded to postpone the resolu- tion moved by Mr. Eandolph and Mr. Madison; which being agreed to, — Mr. Madison moved, in order to get over the difficulties, the following resolution: "that the equality of suffrage established by the Articles of Confederation ought not to prevail in the National Legislature; and that an equitable ratio of representation ought to be substituted." This was seconded by Mr. Gouverneur Morris, and, being generally relished, would have been agreed to ; when — Mr. Read moved, that the whole clause relating to the point of representation be postponed ; reminding the Com- mittee that the Deputies from Delaware were restrained by their commission from assenting to any change of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be fixed on, it might become their duty to retire from the Convention. Mr. Gouverneur Morris observed, that the valuable assistance of those members could not be lost without real concern; and that so early a proof of discord in the Con- vention, as the secession of a State, would add much to the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 77 regret; that the change proposed was, however, so funda- mental an article in a national government, that it could not be dispensed with. Mr. Madison observed, that, whatever reason might have existed for the equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among sovereign States, it must cease when a national government should be put into the place. In the former case, the acts of Congress depended so much for their efficacy on the co-operation of the States, that these had a weight, both within and without Congress, nearly in proportion to their extent and importance. In the latter case, as the acts of the General Government would take effect without the intervention of the State Legislatures, a vote from a small State would have the same efficacy and importance as a vote from a large one, and there was the same reason for different numbers of representatives from different States, as from counties of different extents within particular States. He suggested as an expedient for at once taking the sense of the members on this point, and saving the Delaware Deputies from embarrassment, that the question should be taken in Committee, and the clause, on report to the House, be postponed without a question there. This, however, did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read. By several it was observed, that no just construction of the act of Delaware could require or justify a secession of her Deputies, even if the resolution were to be carried through the House as well as the Committee. It was finally agreed, however, that the clause should be postponed; it being understood that, in the event, the proposed change of representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty being started from any other quarter than from Delaware. The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed to, — The Committee then rose ; the Chairman reported progress ; and the House, having resolved to resume the subject in Committee to-morrow, — Adjourned to ten o'clock. 78 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Thursday, May 31st. William Pierce, from Georgia, took his seat. In the Committee of the Whole on Mr. Randolph's Resolutions, — The third Resolution, "that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches" was agreed to without debate, or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, — given probably from complaisance to Doctor Franklin, who was understood to be partial to a single house of legislation. The fourth Resolution, first clause, " that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States" being taken up : Mr. Sherman opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures. The people, he said, immediately, should have as little to do as may be about the government. They want information, and are constantly liable to be misled. Mr. Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In Massachusetts it had been fully confirmed by experience, that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions, by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the admin- istration of government. It would seem to' be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular clamor in Massachusetts for the reduction of salaries, and the attack made on that of the Governor, though secured by the spirit of the Constitution itself. He had, he said, been too republican heretofore : he was still, however, republican ; but had been taught by experience the danger of the leveling spirit, j Mr. Mason argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the government. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons. It ought to know 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 79 and sympathize with every part of the community ; and ought therefore to be taken, not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it ; which had in several instances, particularly in Virginia, different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits, &c. &c. He admitted that we had been too democratic, but was afraid we should incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people. He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity and policy ; considering, that, however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years not only might, but certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of society. Every selfish motive, therefore, every family attachment, ought to recom- mend such a system of policy as would provide no Jess care- fully for the rights and happiness of the lowest, than of the highest, order of citizens. Mr. Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist without the confidence of the people. In a repub- lican government, this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the National Legislature. All interference between the general and local governments should be obviated as much as possi- ble. On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to Federal measures had proceeded much more from the officers of the States than from the people at large. Mr. Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the National Legislature as essential to every plan of free government. He observed, that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men 80 DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors. That if the first branch of the General Legisla- ture should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first, the Executive by the second together with the first, and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive nitrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive and Judiciary branches of the government. He thought, too, that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures. Mr. Gerry did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from the British constitution were often fal- lacious when applied to our situation, which was extremely different. Experience, he said, had shown that the State Legislatures, drawn immediately from the people, did not always possess their confidence. He had no objection, however, to an election by the people, if it were so qualified that men of honor and character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number, out of which the State Legislatures should be bound to choose. Mr. Butler thought an election by the people an impracticable mode. On the question for an election of the first branch of the National Legislature, by the people, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; New Jersey, South Carolina, no — 2 ; Connecticut, Delaware, divided. The remaining clauses of the fourth Kesolution, relating t<> the qualifications of members of the National Legislature, 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 81 being postponed, nem. con,, as entering too much into detail for general propositions, — The Committee proceeded to the fifth Resolution, thai the second [or senatorial] branch of the National Legislatui'e ought to be chosen by the first branch, out of persons nomi- nated by the State Legislatures. Mr. Spaight contended, that the second branch ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures, and moved an amend- ment to that effect. Mr. Butler apprehended that the taking so many pow- ers out of the hands of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve; and called on Mr. Randolph, the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members he meant to assign to this second branch. Mr. Randolph observed, that he had, at the time of offering his propositions, stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required; that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the passionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies are liable. He observed, that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the United States labored; that in tracing these evils to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy; that some check therefore was to be sought for, against this tendency of our governments; and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose. Mr. King reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as proposed, (by Mr. Spaight) viz., by the State Legislatures, would be impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea of proportion among the States was to be disregarded. According to this idea, there 6 82 DEBATES IN THE [1787. must be eighty or a hundred members to entitle Delaware to the choice of one of them. Mr. Spaight withdrew his motion. Mr. Wilson opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an election by the first branch of the National Legislature, because the second branch of the latter ought to be independent of both. He thought both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested the mode of choosing the Senate of New York, to wit, of uniting several election districts for one branch, in choosing members for the other branch, as a good model. Mr. Madison observed, that such a mode would destroy the influence of the smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the latter would choose from within themselves, although better men might be found in the former. The election of Senators in Virginia, where large and small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had illustrated this consequence. Local partiality would often prefer a resident within the county or State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known through- out his own State. Mr. Sherman favored an election of one member by each of the State Legislatures. Mr. Pinckney moved to strike out the " nomination by the State Legislatures ; " on this question — * Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9 ; Delaware, divided. On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures — Massa- chusetts, Virginia, South Carolina, aye — 3 ; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 7. ♦This question is omitted in the printed Journal, and the Totee applied to the succeeding one, instead of the votes as here stated. 1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 83 So the clause was disagreed to, and a chasm left in this part of the plan. The sixth Resolution, stating the cases in which the National Legislature ought to legislate, was next taken into discussion. On the question whether each branch should originate laws, there was an unanimous affirmative, without debate. On the question for transferring all the legislative powers of the existing Congress to this assembly, there was also an unanimous affirmative, without debate. On the proposition for giving legislative power in all cases to which the State Legislatures were individually incompetent, — Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge objected to the vagueness of the term " incompetent,'''' and said they could not well decide how to vote until they should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this definition. Mr. Butler repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme, in taking away the powers of the States ; and called on Mr. Randolph for the extent of his meaning. Mr. Randolph disclaimed any intention to give indefi- nite powers to the National Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State juris- dictions ; and that he did not think any considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion was fixed on this point. Mr. Madison said, that he had brought with him into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the National Legislature ; but had also brought doubts con- cerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered ; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be, he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of government as would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to. 84 DEBATES IN THE [1787. On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not competent — Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Caro- lina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; Connecticut divided, (Sheeman, no, Ellsworth, aye.) The other clauses, giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the States, to negative all State laws con- travelling, in the opinion of the National Legislature, the Articles of Union, down to the last clause, (the words, "or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," being added after the words " contravening, &c. the articles of the Union," on motion of Doctor Franklin) were agreed to without debate or dissent. The last clause of the sixth Resolution, authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole against a delinquent State, came next into consideration. Mr. Madison observed, that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the jus- tice and the efficacy of it, when applied to people collectively, and not individually. An union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruc- tion. The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment ; and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system w r ould be framed as might render this resource unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to, nem. con. The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned. Friday, June 1st. William Houstoun, from Georgia, took his seat. The Committee of the Whole proceeded to the seven tli Resolution, that a National Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 85 years, &c, to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the Execu- tive powers of Congress, &c. Mr. Pinckney was for a vigorous Executive, but was afraid the executive powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace and war, &c. ; which would render the Executive a monarchy of the worst kind, to wit, an elective one. Mr. Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a single person. Mr. C. Pinckney seconded the motion so as to read "that a National Executive, to consist of a single per- son, he instituted." A considerable pause ensuing, and the Chairman asking if he should put the question, Doctor Franklin observed that it was a point of great importance, and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the question was put. Mr. Rutledge animadverted on the shyness of gentle- men on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded, by having frankly dis- closed their opinions, from afterwards changing them, which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting the executive power in a single person, though he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibility, and administer the public affairs best. Mr. Sherman said, he considered the executive magis- tracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the legislature into effect ; that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the legislature only, which was the depository of the supreme will of the society. As they were the best judges of the business which ought to be done by the executive department, and consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he wished the number might not be fixed, but that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate. Mr. Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving 86 . DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. most energy, dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the prerogatives of the British monarch as a proper guide in defining the executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a legislative nature; among others, that of war and peace, &c. The only powers he considered strictly executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to, and ap- pointed by, the legislature. Mr. Gerry favored the policy of annexing a council to the Executive, in order to give weight and inspire con- fidence. Mr. Eandolph strenuously opposed an unity in the ex- ecutive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus of mon- archy. We had, he said, no motive to be governed by the British government as our prototype. He did not mean, however, to throw censure on that excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it, he did not know that he should be opposed to it ; but the fixed genius of the people of America required a different form of government. He could not see why the great requisites for the executive de- partment, vigor, dispatch, and responsibility, could not be found in three men as well as in one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It ought, therefore, in order to support its independence, to consist of more than one. Mr. Wilson said, that unity in the Executive, instead of being the fcetus of monarchy, would be the best safe- guard against tyranny. He repeated, that he was not gov- erned by the British model, which was inapplicable to the situation of this country ; the extent of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated republic would do for it. Mr. Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was post- poned by common consent, the Committee seeming unpre- pared for any decision on it ; and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz. "that a national Executive be instituted." Mr. Madison thought it would be proper, before a choice should be made between a unity and a plurality in the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 87 Executive, to fix the extent of the executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature executive, and must be given to that department, whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive should be struck out, and that •after the words "that a national Executive ought to be instituted," there be inserted the words following, viz. " with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers, ' not legislative nor judiciary in their nature,' as may from time to time be delegated by the na- tional Legislature." The words "not legislative nor judi- ciary in their nature," were added to the proposed amend- ment, in consequence of a suggestion, by General Pinckney, that improper powers might otherwise be delegated. Mr. Wilson seconded this motion. Mr. Pinckney moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member of it, viz. "and to execute such other powers, not legislative or judiciary in their nature, as may from time to time be delegated." He said they were un- necessary, the object of them being included in the " power to carry into effect the national laws." Mr. Bandolph seconded the motion. Mr. Madison did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words, "to appoint to offices, &c, " the whole being, perhaps, included in the first member of the proposition. He did not, however, see any inconvenience in retaining them ; and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and miscon- structions. In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinckney, the ques- tion on Mr. Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by Mr. Pinckney struck out, by the votes of Con- necticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 88 DEBATES IN THE [1787. North Carolina and Georgia — 7, against Massachusetts, Virginia and South Carolina — 3 ; the preceding part of the motion being first agreed to, — Connecticut, divided ; all the other States in the affirmative. The next clause in the seventh Resolution, relating to the mode of appointing, and the duration of, the Executive, being under consideration, — Mr. Wilson said, he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say, however, at least, that in theory he was for an election by the peo- ple. Experience, particularly in New York and Massa- chusetts, showed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large was both a convenient and successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be oersons whose merits have general notoriety. Mr. Sheeman was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which was to be executed. An inde- pendence of the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was, in his opinion, the very essence of tyranny, if there was any such thing. Mr. Wilson moved, that the blank for the term of dura- tion should be filled with three years, observing, at the same time, that he preferred this short period on the sup- position that a re- eligibility would be provided for. Mr. Pinckney moved, for seven years. Mr. Sherman was for three years, and against the doc- trine of rotation, as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties. Mr Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a re-eligibility, as the best expedient, both for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment. Mr. Bedford was strongly opposed to so long a term as 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 89 seven years. He begged the Committee to consider what the situation of the country would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a period, and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the qualifi- cations ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment. An impeachment, he said, would be no cure for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years. On the question, for seven years, — New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virgina, aye — 5; Con- necticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no 4; Massachusetts divided. There being five yeas, four noes, and one divided, a question was asked, whether a majority had voted in the affirmative. The President decided that it was an affirmative vote. The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question. Mr. Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people without the intervention of the State Legislatures, but the Execu- tive also, in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States. Colonel Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracti- cable. He wishes, however, that Mr. Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form. The clause " to be chosen by the National Legislature," was accordingly postponed. Mr. Rutledge suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch only of the National Legislature. The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned. Saturday, June 2nd. William Samuel Johnson, from Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, from Maryland, and John Lansing, Jun., from New York, took their seats. 90 DEBATES IN THE [1787. In Committee of the Whole, — It was moved and seconded to postpone the Resolutions of Mr. Randolph respecting the Executive, in order to take up the second branch of the Legislature; which being negatived, — by Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia — 7; against New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland — 3; the mode of appointing the Executive was resumed. Mr. Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode proposed by Mr. Randolph's Resolution, "that the executive magistracy shall be elected in the following manner : That the States be divided into districts and that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the National Legislature elect members for their respective dis- tricts to be electors of the executive magistracy; that the said electors of the executive magistracy meet at , and they, or any of them, so met, shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body, person- in whom the executive authority of the National Government shall be vested." Mr. Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the intervention of the States. He sup- posed, too, that this mode would produce more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election by the National Legislature. Mr. Gerry opposed the election by the National Legis- lature. There would be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature and the candidates would bargain arid play into one another's hands. Votes would be given by the former under promises or expecta- tions from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or their friends. He liked the principle of Mr. Wilson's motion, but fears it would alarm and give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the community not yet ripe for stripping the States of their 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 91 powers, even such as might not be requisite for local pur- poses. He was for waiting till the people should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States, instead of electors ; or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little informed of personal char- acters in large districts, and liable to deceptions. Mr. Williamson could see no advantage in the intro- duction of electors chosen by the people, who would stand in the same relation to them as the State Legislatures; whilst the expedient would be attended to with great trouble and expense. On the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's substitute, it was negatived, — Pennsylvania, Maryland, aye — 2 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,* Delaware, Vir- ginia North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. On the question, for electing the Executive by the National Legislature, for the term of seven years, it was agreed to, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Dela- ware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Pennsylvania, Maryland, no — 2. Doctor Franklin moved, that what related to the com- pensation for the services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute, " whose necessary expenses shall be de- frayed, but who shall receive no salary, stipend, fee or reward whatsoever for their services." He said, that, being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion, and had reduced them to writing, that he might, with the permission of the Committee, read, instead of speaking, them. Mr. Wilson made an offer to read the paper, which was accepted. The following is a literal copy of the paper : " Sir, it is with reluctance that I rise to express a dis- approbation of any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it * New York , in the printed Journals, divided. 92 DEBATES IN THE [1787. before us. From its first reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive branch, I happen to differ : and as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty, that I hazard it. The Committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may pos- sibly change mine. I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of salaries ; I see none in refusing them, but, on the contrary, great advantages. "Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice • the love of power, and the love of money. Sepa- rately, each of these has great force in prompting men to action ; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men a post of honor, that shall be at the same time a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it is that renders the British government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions, which are perpetually dividing the nation, distracting its councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless and mischievous wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of peace. "And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters ? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust them- selves into your government, and be your rulers. And these, too, will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation : for their vanquished competitors, of the same spirit, and from the same motives, will perpetually be 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 93 endeavouring to distress their administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the people. " Besides these evils, Sir, though we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them. Hence, as all history informs us, there has been in every state and kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the governing and governed, the one striving to obtain more for its sup- port, and the other to pay less. And this has alone occa- sioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the princes, or enslaving of the people. Generally, indeed, the ruling power carries its point, the revenues of princes constantly increasing ; and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes, the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his partizans, and pay the troops that are to sup- press all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in an hundred, who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharaoh, get first all the people's money, then all their lands, and then make them and their children servants for ever. I It will be said, that we don't propose to establish kings. I know it ; but there is a natural inclination in mankind to kingly government. It sometimes relieves them from aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive, therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that the government of these States may in future times end in a monarchy. But this catastrophe I think may be delayed, if in our proposed system we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction, and tumult, by making our posts of honor, places of profi A If we do, I fear that, though we do employ at first a number, and not a single 94 DEBATES IN THE [1787. person, the number will in time be set aside ; it will only nourish the foetus of a king, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it, and a king will the sooner be set over us. " It may be imagined by some that this is a Utopian idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive department without paying them well for their services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The high-sheriff of a county in England is an honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and usually by some of the principal gentlemen of the county. In France, the office of Counsellor, or member of their judiciary parliament, is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a high price : there are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more than three per cent on the sum paid for the place. There- fore, as legal interest is there at five per cent, they in fact pay two per cent for being allowed to do the judiciary busi- ness of the nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not, however, mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary department. I only bring the instance to show, that the pleasure of doing good and serving their country, and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time to the public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction. "Another instance is that of a respectable society who have made the experiment, and practised it with success more than one hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 95 time in composing their differences. In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it is never made profitable by salaries, fees or perquisites. And, indeed, in all cases of public service, the less the profit the greater the honor. " To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen the great and most important of our offices, that of General of our armies, executed for eight years together without the smallest salary, by a patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise ; and this, through fatigues and distresses, in common with the other brave men, his military friends and companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station ? And shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the United States, with public spirit enough to bear sittirfg in peaceful council for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed ? Sir, I have a better opinion of our country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and faithfully the office in question. " Sir, the saving of the salaries that may at first be pro- posed is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted, I must be contented with the satisfaction of hav- ing delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty. " The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with the view, he said, merely of bringing so respectable a proposi- tion before the Committee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight. No de- bate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the con- sideration of the members. It was treated with great re- spect, but rather for the author of it, than from any appa- rent conviction of its expediency or practicability. Mr. Dickinson moved, " that the Executive be made re- movable by National Legislature, on the request of a ma- 96 DEBATES IN THE [1787. jority of the Legislatures of individual States. " It was necessary, lie said, to place the power of removing some- where. He did not like the plan of impeaching the great officers of state. He did not know how provision could be made for removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. (He had no idea of abolishing the State governments, as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The happiness of this country, in his opinion, required con- siderable powers to be left in the hands of the States, f Mr. Bedford seconded the motion. Mr. Sherman contended, that the National Legislature should have power to remove -the Executive at pleasure. Mr. Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magis- trate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature, as a violation of the fundamental principle of good government. Mr. Madison and Mr. Wilson observed, that it would leave an equality of agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent the removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for intrigues against him in States where his administration, though just, might be unpopular; and might tempt him to pay court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency could be other- wise supplied. Mr. Dickinson considered the business as so important that no man ought to be silent or reserved. YHe went into a discourse of some length, the sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary departments ought to be made as independent as possible; but that such an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent with a republic; that a firm Executive could only 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 97 exist in a limited monarchy. In the British government itself the weight of the Executive arises from the attach- ments which the Crown draws to itself, and not merely from the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must look out for something else. One source of sta- bility is the double branch of the Legislature. The divis- ion of the country into distinct States formed the other principal source of stability. This division ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future fate of his country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the States into one great republic, we might read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A limited monarchy he considered as one of the best govern- ments in the world. It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet been derived from any of the republican forms. A limited monarchy, however, was out of the question. The spirit of the times, the state of affairs forbade the experiment, if it were desirable. Was it possible, moreover, in the nature of things, to introduce it even if these obstacles were less insuperable ? A house of nobles was essential to such a government, — could these be created by a breach, or by a stroke of the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a complication of circumstances none of which existed in this country. But though a form the most perfect, perhaps, in itself, be unattainable, we must not despair. If ancient republics have been found to flourish for a moment only, and then vanish forever, it only proves that they were badly constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky division of this country into distinct States; a division which some seemed desirous to abolish altogetherj As to the point of representation in the National Legis- lature, as it might affect States of different sizes, he said it 7 98 * DEBATES IN THE [1787. must probably end in mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice at least in one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within each State would form a better ratio for the other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of property. A motion being made to strike out, " on request by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual States," and rejected — (Connecticut, South Carolina and Georgia, being aye; the rest, no,) the question was taken on Mr. Dickin- son's motion, " for making the Executive removable by the National Legislature at the request of a majority of State Legislatures," which was also rejected, — all the States being in the negative, except Delaware, which gave an affirmative vote. The question for making the Executive ineligible after seven years, was next taken and agreed to, — Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 7; Connecticut, Georgia,* no — 2;. Pennsylvania, divided. Mr. Williamson, seconded by Mr. Davie, moved to add to the last clause the words, " and to be removable on im- peachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty;" which was agreed to. Mr. Kutledge and Mr. C. Pinckney moved, that the blank for the number of persons in the Executive be filled with the words, "one person." He supposed the reasons to be so obvious and conclusive in favor of one, that no member would oppose the motion. Mr. Randolph opposed it with great earnestness, declar- ing that he should not do justice to the country which sent him, if he were silently to suffer the establishment of a unity in the Executive department. He felt an opposition to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long as he lived. He urged — first, that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of mon- *In the printed Journal, Georgia, aye. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 99 archy; secondly, that a unity was unnecessary, a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of the depart- ment; thirdly, that the necessary confidence would never be reposed in a single magistrate /fourthly, that the appoint- ments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near the centre of the community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal footing. He was in favor of three members of the Executive, to be drawn from dif- ferent portions of the country. Mr. Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate, as most likely to answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed, he would be responsible to the whole, and he would be impartial to its interests. If three or more should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In mil- itary matters this would be particularly mischievous. He said, his opinion on this point had been formed under the opportunity he had had of seeing the manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland, when threat- ened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of the country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest. The motion was then postponed; the Committee rose; and the House adjourned. Monday, June 4th. In Committee of the Whole. — The question was resumed on motion of Mr. Pinckney, seconded by Mr. Wilson, ' shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled with a single person ? ' Mr. Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had been opposed by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) ; but the arguments used had not convinced him. He observed that the objections of Mr. Randolph were level- led not so much against the measure itself, as against its LofC. 100 DEBATES IN THE [1787. unpopularity. If he could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of the plan of which it should form a part, though the part were an important one, yet he would give it up rather than lose the whole. On examination, he could see no evidence of the alleged antipathy of the people. On the contrary, he was persuaded that it does not exist. All know that a single magistrate is not a king. One fact has great weight with him. All the thirteen States, though agreeing in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of the government. The idea of three heads had taken place in none. The degree of power is, indeed, different; but there are no co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former reasons for preferring a unity, he would mention another. The tranquillity, not less than the vigor, of the government, he thought, would be favored by it. Among three equal members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrolled, continued and violent animosities ; which would not only interrupt the public administration, but diffuse their poison through the other branches of gov- ernment, through the states, and at length through the people at large. If the members were to be unequal in power, the principal of opposition to the unity was given up. If equal, the making them an odd number would not be a remedy. In courts of justice there are two sides only to a question. In the legislative and executive departments questions have commonly many sides. Each member, therefore, might espouse a separate one, and no two agree. Mr. Sherman. This matter is of great importance, and ought to be well considered before it is determined. Mr. Wilson, he said, had observed that in each State a single magistrate was placed at the head of the government. It was so, he admitted, and properly so; and he wished the same policy to prevail in the Federal Government. But then it should be also remarked, that in all the States there was a council of advice, without which the first magistrate <3ould not act. A council he thought necessary to make the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 101 establishment acceptable to the people. Even in Great Britain, the King has a council ; and thongh he appoints it himself, its advice has its weight with him, and attracts the confidence of the people. Mr. Williamson asks Mr. Wilson, whether he means to annex a Council. Mr. Wilson means to have no Council, which oftener serves to cover, than prevent malpractices. Mr. Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of: three members for the Executive. It would be extremely incon- venient in many instances, particularly in military matters, whether relating to the militia, an army, or a navy. It would be a general with three heads. On the question for a single Executive, it was agreed to, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, (Mr. Randolph and Mr. Blair, no ; Doctor McClurg, Mr. Madi- son and General Washington, aye ; Colonel Mason being no, but not in the House, Mr. Wythe, aye, but gone home), North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye, — 7 ; New York, Delaware, Maryland, no — 3. The first clause of the eighth Resolution, relating to a council of revision, was next taken into consideration. Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as they will have a sufficient check against en- croachments of their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their con- stitutionality. In some States the judges had actually set aside laws, as being against the Constitution. This was done, too, with general approbation. It was quite foreign from the nature of their office to make them judges of the policy of public measures. He moves to postpone the clause, in order to propose, "that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards passed by parts of each branch of the National Legislature." Mr. King seconded the motion, observing that the judges ought to be able to expound the law, as it should 102 DEBATES IN THE [1787. come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation. Mr. Wilson thinks neither the original proposition nor the amendment goes far enough. If the Legislative, Ex- ecutive, and Judiciary ought to be distinct and indepen- dent, the Executive ought to have an absolute negative. Without such a self-defence, the Legislature can at any moment sink it into non-existence. He was for varying the proposition, in such a manner as to give the Executive and Judiciary jointly an absolute negative. On the question to postpone, in order to take Mr. Gerry's proposition into consideration, it was agreed to, — Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye, — 6 ; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no — 4. Mr. Gerry's proposition being now before the Committee, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hamilton moved, that the last part of it (viz. ''which shall not be afterwards passed by parts of each branch of the National Legislature"), be struck out, so as to give the Executive an absolute negative on the laws. There was no danger, they thought, of such a power being too much exercised. It was mentioned by Colonel Hamilton that the King of Great Britain had not exerted his negative since the Revolution. Mr. Gerry sees no necessity for so great a control over the Legislature, as the best men in the community would be comprised in the two branches of it. Doctor Franklin said he was sorry to differ from his col- league, for whom he had a very great respect, on any occasion, but he could not help it on this. He had had some experience of this check in the Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary government of Pennsylvania. The negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without a private bar- gain with him. An increase of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition ; till at last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 103 presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive the former before he should sign the latter. When the Indians were scalping the western peo- ple, and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the Gov- ernor in the means of self-defence could not be got, till it was agreed that his estate should be exempted from tax- ation : so that the people were to fight for the security of his property, whilst he was to bear no share of the burden. This was a mischievous sort of check. If the Executive was to have a Council, such a power would be less objec- tionable. It was true, the King of Great Britain had not, a,s was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution ; but that matter was easily explained. The bribes and emolu- ments now given to the members of parliament rendered it unnecessary, every thing being done according to the will of the ministers. He was afraid, if a negative should be given as proposed, that more power and money would be demanded, till at last enough would be got to influence and bribe the Legislature into a complete subjection to the will of the Executive. Mr. Sheeman was against enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws, but not permit him to overrule the decided and cool opinions of the Legis- lature. Mr. Madison supposed, that, if a proper proportion of each branch should be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely, if ever, happen that the Executive, constituted as ours is proposed to be, would have firmness enough to resist the Legislature, unless backed by a certain part of the body itself. The King of Great Britain, with all his splendid attributes, would not be able to withstand the unanimous and eager wishes of both Houses of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would 104 DEBATES IN THE [1787. certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this country, — its present temper at least. Mr. Wilson believed, as others did, that this power would seldom be used. The Legislature would know that such a power existed, and would refrain from such laws as it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation would therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief. The case of Pennsylvania formerly was very different from its present case. The Executive was not then, as now to be, appointed by the people. It will not in this case, as in the one cited, be supported by the head of a great empire, actuated by a different and sometimes opposite interest. The salary, too, is now proposed to be fixed by the Consti- tution, or, if Doctor Franklin's idea should be adopted, all salary whatever interdicted. The requiring a large pro- portion of each House to overrule the Executive check, might do in peaceable times ; but there might be tempestu- ous moments in which animosities may run high between the Executive and Legislative branches, and in which the former ought to be able to defend itself. Mr. Butler had been in favor of a single executive magistrate; but could he have entertained an idea that a complete negative on the laws was to be given him, he cer- tainly should have acted very differently. It had been observed, that in all countries the executive power is in a constant course of increase. This was certainly the case in Great Britain. Gentlemen seemed to think that we had nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the executive power. But why might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in this country as well as in others? Mr. Bedford was opposed to every check on the Legis- lature, even the council of revision first proposed. He thought it would be sufficient to mark out in the constitu- tion the boundaries to the legislative authority, which would give all the requisite security to the rights of the other departments. The representatives of the people were the best judges of what was for their interest, and ought 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 105 to be under no external control whatever. The two branches would produce a sufficient control within the Legislature itself. Col. Mason observed that a vote had already passed, he found — he was out at the time — for vesting the executive powers in a single person. Among these powers was that of appointing to offices in certain cases. The probable abuses of a negative had been well explained by Doctor Franklin, as proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will not the same door be opened here? The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures, till new ap- pointments shall be referred to him ; and, having by degrees engrossed all these into his own hands, the American Exec- utive, like the British, will, by bribery and influence, save himself the trouble and odium of exerting his negative afterwards. We are, Mr. Chairman, going very far in this business. We are not indeed constituting a British gov- ernment, but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. We are introducing a new principle into our system, and not necessary, as in the British government, where the Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen mean to pave the way to hereditary monarchy? Do they flatter themselves that the people will ever consent to such an innovation? If they do, I venture to tell them, they are mistaken. The people never will consent. And do gentlemen consider the danger of delay, and the still greater danger of a rejection, not for a moment, but forever, of the plan which shall be proposed to them ? Notwithstanding the oppression and injustice experienced among us from democracy, the genius of the people is in favor of it; and the genius of the people must be consulted. He could not but consider the Federal system as in effect dissolved by the appointment of this Convention to devise a better one. And do gentlemen look forward to the dan- gerous interval between extinction of an old, and the establishment of a new, government; and to the scenes of confusion which may ensue? He hoped that nothing like 106 DEBATES IN THE [1787. a monarchy would ever be attempted in this country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the late Revolution. Will it not be enough to enable the Ex- ecutive to suspend offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections to them overruled by a greater majority than was required in the first instance ? He never could agree to give up all the rights of the people to a sin- gle magistrate. If more than one had been fixed on, greater powers might have been entrusted to the Executive. He hoped this attempt to give such powers would have its weight hereafter, as an argument for increasing the number of the Executive. Doctor Franklin. A gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Butler) a day or two ago called our attention to the case of the United Netherlands. He wished the gentleman had been a little fuller, and had gone back to the original of that government. The people being under great obli- gations to the Prince of Orange, whose wisdom and bravery had saved them, chose him for the Stadtholder. He did very well. Inconveniences, however, were felt from his powers; which growing more and more oppressive, they were at length set aside. Still, however, there was a party for the Prince of Orange, which descended to his son ; who excited insurrections, spilled a great deal of blood, murdered the De Witts, and got the powers re-vested in the Stadt- holder. Afterwards another prince had power to excite insurrections, and make the Stadtholdership hereditary. And the present 'Stadtholder is ready to wade through a bloody civil war to the establishment of a monarchy. Col. Mason had mentioned the circumstance of appointing officers. He knew how that point would be managed. No new appointment would be suffered, as heretofore in Penn- sylvania, unless it be referred to the Executive ; so that all profitable offices will be at his disposal. The first man put at the helm will be a good one. Nobody knows what sort may come afterwards. The Executive will be always increasing here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a monarchy. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 107 On the question for striking out, so as to give the Executive an absolute negative, — Massachusetts, Con- ~ necticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 10. Mr. Butler moved that the Resolution be altered so as to read, " Resolved, that the national Executive have a power to suspend any legislative act for the term of ." Doctor Franklin seconded the motion. Mr. Gerry observed, that the power of suspending might do all the mischief dreaded from the negative of useful laws, without answering the salutary purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones. On the question for giving this suspending power, all the States, to wit, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Penn- sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, were, no. On a question for enabling two-thirds of each branch of the Legislature to overrule the provisionary check, it passed in the affirmative, sub silentio; and was inserted in the blank of Mr. Gerry's motion. On the question of Mr. Gerry's motion, which gave the Executive alone, without the Judiciary, the revision - ary control on the laws, unless overruled by two-thirds of each branch, — Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Connecticut, Maryland, no — 2. It was moved by Mr. Wilson, seconded by Mr. Madison, that the following amendment be made to the last Resolution : after the words " national Executive," to add " and a conve- nient number of the national Judiciary." An objection of order being taken by Mr. Hamilton to the introduction of the last amendment at this time, notice was given by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Madison, that the same would be moved to-morrow ; whereupon Wednesday was assigned to reconsider the amendment of Mr. Gerry. It was then moved and seconded to proceed to the con- 108 DEBATES IN THE [1787. sideration of the ninth Eesolution submitted by Mr. Ean- dolph; when, on motion to agree to the first clause, namely, "Resolved, that a national Judiciary be established" it passed in the affirmative, nem. con. It was then moved and seconded, to add these words to the first clause of the ninth Resolution, namely, " to con- sist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals;" which passed in the affirmative. The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned. Tuesday, June 5th. Governor Livingston, of New Jersey, took his seat. In Committee of the Whole. — The words " were struck out before "inferior tribunals," as an amend- ment to the last clause of the ninth Eesolution. The clause, " that the national Judiciary be chosen by the .National Legislature," being under consideration. Mr. Wilson opposed the appointment of Judges by the National Legislature. Experience showed the impropriety of such appointments by numerous bodies. Intrigue, par- tiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences. A principal reason for unity in the Executive was, that officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person. Mr. Eutledge was by no means disposed to grant so great a power to any single person. The people will think we are leaning too much towards monarchy. He was against establishing any national tribunal, except a single supreme one. The State tribunals are most proper to de- cide in all cases in the first instance. Doctor Franklin observed, that the two modes of choosing the Judges had been mentioned, to wit, by the Legislature, and by the Executive. He wished such other modes to be suggested as might occur to other gentlemen; it being a point of great moment. He would mention one which he had understood was practised in Scotland. He then, in a brief and en- 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 109 tertaining manner, related a Scotch mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the profession, in order to get rid of him, and share his practice among themselves. It was here, he said, the interest of the electors to make the best choice, which should always be made the case if possible. Mr. Madison disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature, or any numerous body. Besides the danger of intrigue and partiality, many of the members were not judges of the requisite qualifications. The legislative talents, which were very different from those of a Judge, commonly recommended men to the favor of legislative assemblies. It was known, too, that the accidental circum- stances of presence and absence, of being a member or not a member, had a very undue influence on the appointment. On the other hand, he was not satisfied with referring the appointment to the Executive. He rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch, as numerous enough to be confided in; as not so numerous as to be governed by the motives of the other branch ; and as being sufficiently stable and independent to follow their deliberate judgments. He hinted this only, and moved that the appointment by the Legislature might be struck out, and a blank left, to be hereafter filled on maturer reflection. Mr. Wilson seconds it. On the question for striking out, — Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; Connecticut, South Carolina, no — 2. Mr. Wilson gave notice that he should at a future day move for a reconsideration of that clause which respects "inferior tribunals." Mr. Pinckney gave notice, that when the clause respect- ing the appointment of the Judiciary should again come before the Committee, he should move to restore the " appointment by the National Legislature." The following clauses of the ninth Kesolution were 110 DEBATES IN THE [1787. agreed to, viz., "to hold their offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensa- tion for their services, in which no increase nor diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution." The remaining clause of the ninth Resolution was postponed. The tenth Resolution was agreed to, viz.. " that provision ought to be made for the admission of States, lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national legis- lature less than the whole" The eleventh Resolution for guaranteeing to States republican government and territory, &c, being read, — Mr. Patterson wished the point of representation could be decided before this clause should be considered, and moved to postpone it; which was not opposed, and agreed to, — Connecticut and South Carolina only voting against it. The twelfth Resolution, for continuing Congress till a given day, and for fulfilling their engagements, produced no debate. On the question, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,* Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Connecticut, Delaware, no — 2. The thirteenth Resolution, to the effect that provision ought to be made for hereafter amending the system now to be established, without requiring the assent of the National Legislature, being taken up, — Mr. Pinckney doubted the propriety or necessity of it. Mr. Gerry favored it. The novelty and difficulty of the experiment requires periodical revision. The prospect of such a revision would also give intermediate stability to the government. Nothing had yet happened in the States where this provision existed to prove its impropriety. — The proposition was postponed for further consideration ; *New Jersey omitted in the printed Journal. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. Ill the votes being, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye — 7 ; Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 3. The fourteenth Resolution, requiring oath from the State officers to support the National Government, — was postponed, after a short, uninteresting conversation ; the votes, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, no — 4 ; Massachusetts, divided. The fifteenth Resolution, for recommending conventions under appointment of the people to ratify the new Consti- tution, &c, being taken up, — Mr. Sheeman thought such a popular ratification un- necessary ; the Articles of Confederation providing for changes and alterations, with the assent of Congress, and ratification of State Legislatures. Mr. Madison thought this provision essential. The Articles of Confederation themselves were defective in this respect, resting, in many of the States, on the legislative sanction only. Hence, in conflicts between acts of the States and of Congress, especially where the former are of posterior date, and the decision is to be made by State tribunals, an uncertainty must necessarily prevail ; or rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of the State authority. He suggested also, that, as far as the Articles of Union were to be considered as a treaty only, of a par- ticular sort, among the governments of independent states, the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one Article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from the whole obligation. For these reasons, as well as others, he thought it indispensable that the new Consti- tution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves. /" Mr. Gebky observed, that in the Eastern States the I Confederation had been sanctioned by the people them- selves. He seemed afraid of referring the new system to \ them. The people in that quarter have at this time the 112 DEBATES IN THE [1787. wildest ideas of government in the world. They were for abolishing the Senate in Massachusetts, and giving all the other powers of government to the other branch of the Legislature. Mr. King supposed, that the last Article of the Con- federation rendered the Legislature competent to the rati- fication. The people of the Southern States, where the Federal Articles had been ratified by the Legislatures only, had since, impliedly, given their sanction to it. He thought, notwithstanding, that there might be policy in varying the mode. A convention being a single house, the adoption may more easily be carried through it, than through the Legislatures, where there are several branches. The Legis- latures also, being to lose power, will be most likely to raise objections. The people having already parted with the necessary powers, it is immaterial to them, by which govern- ment they are possessed, provided they be well employed. Mr. Wilson took this occasion to lead the Committee, by a train of observations, to the idea of not suffering a disposition in the plurality of States, to confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few States. He hoped the provision for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to admit of such a partial union, with a door open for the accession of the rest.* Mr. Pinckney hoped, that, in case the experiment should not unanimously take place, nine States might be author- ized to unite under the same government. The fifteenth Eesolution was postponed, nem. con. Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Eutledge moved, that to-mor- row be assigned to reconsider that clause of the fourth Eesolution which respects the election of the first branch of the National Legislature; which passed in the affirmative, — Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, •This hint was probably meant in terrorem to the smaller States of New Jersey and Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to it. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 113 Virginia, aye — 6 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Caro- lina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 5. Mr. Rutledge having obtained a rule for reconsidera- tion of the clause for establishing inferior tribunals under the national authority, now moved that that part of the clause in the ninth Resolution should be expunged; argu- ing, that the State tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance, the right of appeal to the supreme, national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights and uniformity of judgments; that it was making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdic- tion of the States, and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system. Mr. Sherman seconded the motion. Mr. Madison observed, that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdic- tion in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree ; that, besides, an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after im- proper verdicts, in State tribunals, obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent judge, or the local preju- dices of an undirected jury ? To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial at the supreme bar, would oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, though ever so distant from the seat of the court. An effective Judiciary establishment commen- surate to the Legislative authority, was essential. A gov- ernment, without a proper Executive and Judiciary, would be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or move. Mr. Wilson opposed the motion on like grounds. He said the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the National Government, as it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of particular States, and to a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to hap- pen. Mr. Sherman was in favor of the motion. He dwelt 8 114 DEBATES IN THE [1787. chiefly on the supposed expensiveness of having a new set of courts, when the existing State courts would answer the same purpose. Mr. Dickinson contended strongly, that if there was to be a National Legislature, there ought to be a National Judiciary, and that the former ought to have authority to institute the latter. On the question for Mr. Butledge's motion to strike out "inferior tribunal," it passed in the affirmative, — Con- necticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- land, Virginia, no — 4 ; Massachusetts, divided. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Madison then moved, in pursu- ance of the idea expressed above by Mr. Dickinson, to add to the ninth Kesolution the words following: "that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals." They observed, that there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not to estab- lish them. They repeated the necessity of some such pro- vision. Mr. Butler. The people will not bear such innovations. The States will revolt at such encroachments. Supposing such an establishment to be useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the example of Solon, who gave the Athenians not the best government he could devise, but the best they would receive. Mr. King remarked, as to the comparative expense, that the establishment of inferior tribunals would cost infinitely less than the appeals that would be prevented by them. On this question, as moved by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Madison, — Massachusetts, New Jersey,* Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Connecticut, South Carolina, no — 2; New York, divided. The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned. * In the printed Journal. New Jersey, no. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 115 Wednesday, June 6th. In Committee of the Whole. — Mr. Pinckney, according to previous notice, and rule obtained, moved, " that the first branch of the National Legislature be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the people;" contending that the people were less fit judges in such a case, and that the Leg- islatures would be less likely to promote the adoption of the new government if they were to be excluded from all share in it. Mr. Eutledge seconded the motion. Mr. Gerry. Much depends on the mode of election. In England the people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from the opposite extreme. Hence in ; Massachusetts the worst men get into the Legislature. Several members of that body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes. Men of indigence, ignorance, and base- ness, spare no pains, however dirty, to carry their point against men who are superior to the artifices practised. He was not disposed to run into extremes. He was as much principled as ever against aristocracy and monarchy. It was necessary, on the one hand, that the people should appoint one branch of the government, in order to inspire them with the necessary confidence; but he wished the election, on the other, to be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit. His idea was, that the people should nominate certain persons, in certain dis- tricts, out of whom the State Legislatures should make the appointment./ Mr. Wilson. He wished for vigor in the government, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority. The govern- ment ought to possess, not only, first, the force, but second, the mind or sense, of the people at large. The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society. Representation is made necessary only because it is impos- 116 DEBATES IN THE . [1787. sible for the people to act collectively. The opposition was to be expected, he said, from the governments, not from the citizens of the States. The latter had parted, as was ob- served by Mr. King, with all the necessary powers; and it was immaterial to them by whom they were exercised, if well exercised. The State officers were to be the losers of power. The people, he supposed, would be rather more attached to the National Government than to the State Governments, as being more important in itself, and more flattering to their pride. There is no danger of improper elections, if made by large districts. Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts, which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office. Mr. Sherman. If it were in view to abolish the State Governments, the elections ought to be by the people. If the State Governments are to be continued, it is necessary, in order to preserve harmony between the National and State Governments, that the elections to the former should be made by the latter. The right of participating in the National Government would be sufficiently secured to the people by their election of the State Legislatures. The objects of the Union, he thought were few, — first, defence against foreign danger; secondly, against internal disputes, and a resort to force ; thirdly, treaties with foreign nations ; fourthly, regulating foreign commerce, and drawing revenue from it. These, and perhaps a few lesser objects, alone rendered a confederation of the States necessary. All other matters, civil and criminal, would be much better in the hands of the States. The people are more happy in small than in large States. States, may, indeed, be too small, as Ehode Island, and thereby be too subject to fac- tion.' Some others were, perhaps, too large, the powers of government not being able to pervade them. He was for giving the General Government power to legislate and execute within a defined province. Col. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent the States, and not the people of the States; 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 117 their acts operate on the States, not on the individuals. The case will be changed in the new plan of government. The people will be represented; they ought therefore to choose the Representatives. rcThe requisites in actual rep- resentation are, that the representatives should sympathize with their constituents ; should think as they think, and feel as they feel; and that for these purposes they should be residents among them. Much, he said, had been alleged against democratic elections. He admitted that much might be said; but it was to be considered that no govern- ment was free from imperfections and evils ; and that improper elections in many instances were inseparable from republi- can governments. But compare these with the advantage of this form, in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of human nature! He was persuaded there was a better chance for proper elections by the people, if divided into large districts, than by the State Legislatures. Paper- money had been issued by the latter, when the former were against it. Was it to be supposed that the State Legisla- tures, then, would not send to the National Legislature., patrons of such projects, if the choice depended on them?/ Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch, at least, of the Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free government; and that this mode, under proper regulations, had the additional advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments in the general one. He differed from the member from Connecticut, (Mr. Sherman,) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a national government. Those were certainly important and necessary objects ; but he com- bined with them the necessity of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensa- tion of justice. Interferences with these were evils which had, more perhaps than anything else, produced this Con- vention. Was it to be supposed, that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practised in some of 118 DEBATES IN THE [1787. the States? The gentleman (Mr. Sherman) had admitted, that in a very small State faction and oppression would prevail. It was to be inferred, then, that wherever these prevailed the State was too small. Had they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest, though less than in the smallest ? And were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the government would admit ? This was the only defence against the inconveniences of democracy, consistent with the demo- cratic form of government. /All civilized societies would be divided into different sects, factions, and interests, as they happened to consist of rich and poor, debtors and creditors, the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the followers of this political leader or that political leader, the disciples of this religious sect or that religious sect. In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are injianger. What motives are to restrain them ? A prudent regard to the maxim, that honesty is the best policy, is found by expe- rience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals. Kespect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in individuals ; in large numbers, little is to be expected from it. Besides, religion itself, may become a motive to persecution and oppression. These observations are verified by the histories of every country, ancient and modern. In Greece and Borne the rich and poor, the creditors and debtors, as well as the patricians and plebeians, alternately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness. What a source of oppression was the relation between the parent cities of Home, Athens, and Carthage, and their respective provinces ; the former possessing the power, and the latter being sufficiently dis- tinguished to be separate objects of it ? Why was America so justly apprehensive of parliamentary injustice ? Be- 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. H9 cause Great Britain had a separate interest, real or sup- posed, and, if her authority had been admitted, could have pursued that interest at our expense. We have seen the mere distinction of color made, in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man. What has been the source of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves ? Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the major number ? Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest. The holders of one species of property have thrown a dis- proportion of taxes on the holders of another species. The lesson we are to draw from the whole is, that where a majority are united by a common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become inse- cure. In a republican government, the majority, if united, have always an opportunity. The only remedy is, to enlarge the sphere, and thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests and parties, that, in the first place, a majority will not be likely, at the same moment, to have a common interest separate from that of the whole, •or of the minority ; and in the second place, that in case they should have such an interest, they may not be so apt to unite in the pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us, then, to try this remedy, and, with that view, to frame a repub- lican system on such a scale, and in such a form, as will control all the evils which have been experienced. J Mr. Dickinson considered it essential, that one branch of the Legislature should be drawn immediately from the people; and expedient, that the other should be chosen by the Legislatures of the States. This combination of the State Governments with the National Government was as^i politic as it was unavoidable. In the formation of the ' Senate, we ought to carry it through such a refining pro- cess as will assimilate it, as nearly as may be, to the House of Lords in England. He repeated his warm eulogiums on the British Constitution. He was for a strong National 120 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Government; but for leaving the States a considerable agency in the system. The objection against making the former dependent on the latter might be obviated by giving to the Senate an authority permanent, and irrevocable for three, five or seven years. Being thus independent, they will check and decide with uncommon freedom. Mr. Read. Too much attachment is betrayed to the State Governments. We must look beyond their continu- ance. A National Government must soon of necessity swallow them all up. They will soon be reduced to the mere office of electing the National Senate. He was against patching up the old Federal system: he hoped the idea would be dismissed. It would be like putting new cloth on an old garment. The confederation was founded on tem- porary principles. It cannot last: it cannot be amended. If we do not establish a good government on new princi- ples, we must either go to ruin, or have the work to do over again. The people at large are wrongly suspected of be- ing averse to a General Government. The aversion lies among interested men who possess their confidence. Mr. Pierce was for an election by the people as to the first branch ; and by the States as to the second branch ; by which means the citizens of the States would be repre- sented both individually and collectively. General Pinckney wished to have a good National Gov- ernment, and at the same time to leave a considerable share Of power in the States. An election of either branch by the people, scattered as they are in many States, particularly in South Carolina, was totally impracticable. He differed from gentlemen who thought that a choice by the people would be a better guard against bad measures, than by the Legislatures. (A majority of the people in South Carolina were notoriously for paper-money, as a legal tender; the Legislature had refused to make it a legal tender. The reason was, that the latter had some sense of character, and were restrained by that consideration.' The State Legisla- tures, also, he said, would be more jealous, and more ready 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 121 to thwart the National Government, if excluded from a par- ticipation in it. The idea of abolishing these Legislatures would never go down. Mr. Wilson would not have spoken again, but for what had fallen from Mr. Bead ; namely that the idea of preser- ving the State Governments ought to be abandoned. He saw no incompatibility between the National and State Gov- ernments, provided the latter was restrained to certain local purposes; nor any probability of their being devoured by the former. In all confederated systems, ancient and mod- ern, the reverse had happened; the generality being de- stroyed gradually by the usurpations of the parts composing it. On the question for electing the first branch by the State Legislatures as moved by Mr. Pinckney, it was nega- tived, — Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, aye — 3; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- land, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. Mr. Wilson moved to reconsider the vote excluding the Judiciary from a share in the revision of the laws, and to add, after " national Executive," the words, " with a conven- ient number of the national Judiciary ; " remarking the ex- pediency of reinforcing the Executive with the influence of that department. Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He observed, that the great difficulty in rendering the Executive competent to its own defence arose from the nature of republican govern- ment, which could not give to an individual citizen that settled pre-eminence in the eyes of the rest, that weight of property, that personal interest against betraying the national interest, which appertain to an hereditary magis- trate. In a republic personal merit alone could be the ground of political exaltation; but it would rarely happen that this merit would be so pre-eminent as to produce uni- versal acquiescence. The executive magistrate would be envied and assailed by disappointed competitors: his firm- ness therefore would need support. He would not possess 122 DEBATES IN THE [1787. those great emoluments from his station, nor that perma- nent stake in the public interest, which would place him out /of the reach of foreign corruption. He would stand in need therefore of being controlled as well as supported. An as- sociation of the judges in his revisionary function would both double the advantage, and diminish the danger. It would also enable the Judiciary department the better to defend itself against legislative encroachments. Two ob- jections had been made, — first, that the judges ought not to be subject to the bias which a participation in the making of laws might give in the exposition of them ; secondly that the Judiciary department ought to be separate and dis- tinct from the other great departments. The first objection had some weight ; but it was much diminished by reflecting, that a small proportion of the laws coming in question before a judge would be such wherein he had been con- sulted; that a small part of this proportion would be so ambiguous as to leave room for his prepossessions ; and that but a few cases would probably arise in the life of a judge, under such ambiguous passages. How much good, on the other hand, would proceed from the perspicuity, the con- ciseness, and the systematic character which the code of laws would receive from the Judiciary talents. As to the second objection, it either had no weight, or it applied with equal weight to the Executive, and to the Judiciary re- vision of the laws. The maxim on which the objection was founded, required a separation of the Executive, as well as the Judiciary, from the Legislature and from each other. There would, in truth, however, be no improper mixture of these distinct powers in the present case. In England, whence the maxim itself had been drawn, the Executive had an absolute negative on the laws; and the supreme tribunal of justice (the House of Lords), formed one of the other branches of the Legislature. In short, whether the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the Legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from passing laws 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 123 unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form; the utility of annexing the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to the Executive seemed incontestable. Mr. Gerry thought the Executive whilst standing alone would be more impartial than when he could be covered by the sanction and seduced by the sophistry of the Judges. Mr. King. If the unity of the Executive was preferred for the sake of responsibility, the policy of it is as applica- ble to the revisionary, as to the executive, power. Mr. Pinckney had been at first in favor of joining the heads of the principal departments, the Secretary at War, of Foreign Affairs, &c, in the Council of Revision. He had, however, relinquished the idea, from a consideration that these could be called on by the executive magistrate, when- ever he pleased to consult them. He was opposed to the introduction of the judges into the business. Colonel Mason was for giving all possible weight to the revisionary institution. The executive power ought to be well secured against legislative usurpations on it. The purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands whether legislative or executive. Mr. Dickinson. Secrecy, vigor, and despatch are not the principal properties required in the Executive. Import- ant as these are, that of responsibility is more so, which can only be preserved by leaving it singly to discharge its functions. He thought, too, a junction of the Judiciary to it involved an improper mixture of powers. Mr. Wilson remarked, that the responsibility required belonged to his executive duties. The revisionary duty was an extraneous one, calculated for collateral purposes. Mr. Williamson was for substituting a clause requiring two-thirds for every effective act of the legislature, in place of the revisionary provision. On the question for joining the judges to the Executive in the revisionary business, — Connecticut, New York, Vir- ginia, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylva- 124 DEBATES IN THE [1787. nia, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina. Georgia, no — 8. Mr. Pinckney gave notice, that to-morrow he should move for the re-consideration of that clause in the sixth Kesolution adopted by the Committee, which vests a nega- tive in the National Legislature on the laws of the several States. The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. Thuesday, June 7th. In Committee of the Whole — Mr. Pinckney, accord- ing to notice, moved to reconsider the clause respecting the negative on State laws, which was agreed to, and to-mor- row fixed for the purpose. The clause providing for the appointment of the second branch of the National Legislature, having lain blank since the last vote on the mode of electing it, to wit, by the first branch, Mr. Dickinson now moved, "that the members of the second branch ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures." Mr. Sheeman seconded the motion ; observing, that the particular States would thus become interested in support- ing the National Government, and that a due harmony between the two governments would be maintained. He admitted that the two ought to have separate and distinct jurisdictions, but that they ought to have a mutual interest in supporting each other. Mr. Pinckney. If the small States should be allowed one Senator only, the number will be too great; there will be eighty at least. Mr. Dickinson had two reasons for his motion — first, because the sense of the States would be better collected through their Governments, than immediately from the people at large; secondly, because he wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters, distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 125 bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible; and he thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any other mode. The greatness of the number was no objection with him. He hoped there would be eighty, and twice eighty of them. If their number should be small, the popular branch could not be balanced by them. The Legislature of a numerous people ought to be a numerous body. Mr. Williamson preferred a small number of Senators, but wished that each State should have at least one. He suggested twenty -five as a convenient number. The differ- ent modes of representation in the different branches will serve as a mutual check. Mr. Butler was anxious to know the ratio of represen- tation before he gave any opinion. Mr. Wilson. If we are to establish a National Govern- ment, that government ought to flow from the people at large. If one branch of it should be chosen by the Legis- latures, and the other by the people, the two branches will rest on different foundations, and dissensions will naturally arise between them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the people, as well as the other branch ; the people might be divided into proper districts for the purpose; and he moved to postpone the motion of Mr. Dickinson, in order to take up one of that import. Mr. Morris seconded him. Mr. Read proposed " that the Senate should be appointed by the Executive magistrate, out of a proper number of persons to be nominated by the individual Legislatures." He said, he thought it his duty to speak his mind frankly. Gentlemen he hoped would not be alarmed at the idea. Nothing short of this approach towards a proper model of government would answer the purpose, and he thought it best to come directly to the point at once. His proposition was not seconded nor supported. Mr. Madison. If the motion (of Mr. Dickinson) should be agreed to, we must either depart from the doctrine of 126 DEBATES IN THE [1787. proportional representation, or admit into the Senate a very- large number of members. The first is inadmissible, being evidently unjust. The second is inexpedient. The use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system, and with more wisdom, than the popular branch. Enlarge their number, and you communicate to them the vices which they are meant to cor- rect. He differed from Mr. Dickinson, who thought that the additional number would give additional weight to the body. On the contrary, it appeared to him that their weight would be in an inverse ratio to their numbers. The example of the Roman tribunes was applicable. They lost their influence and power, in proportion as their number was augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious: they were appointed to take care of the popular interests and pretensions at Rome; because the people by reason of their numbers could not act in concert, and were liable to fall into factions among themselves, and to become a prey to their aristocratic adversaries. The more the representa- tives of the people, therefore, were multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the more liable they became to be divided among themselves, either from their own indiscretions or the artifices of the opposite faction, and of course the less capable of fulfilling their trust. When the weight of a set of men depends merely on their personal characters, the greater the num- ber, the greater the weight. When it depends on the de- gree of political authority lodged in them, the smaller the number, the greater the weight. These considerations might perhaps be combined in the intended Senate; but the latter was the material one. Mr. Gerry. Four modes of appointing the Senate have been mentioned. First, by the first branch of the National Legislature, — this would create a dependence contrary to the end proposed. Secondly, by the National Executive, — this is a stride towards monarchy that few will think of. Thirdly, by the people ; the people have two great interests, 1787.J FEDERAL CONVENTION. 127 the landed interest, and the commercial, including the stockholders. To draw both branches from the people will leave no security to the latter interest; the people being chiefly composed of the landed interest, and erroneously supposing that the other interests are adverse to it. Fourthly, by the individual Legislatures, — the elections being carried through this refinement, will be most like to provide some check in favor of the commercial interest against the landed; without which, oppression will take place ; and no free government can last long where that is the case. He was therefore in favor of this last. (Mr. Dickinson.* The preservation of the States in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce that collision between the different authorities which should be wished for in order to check each other. To attempt to abolish the States altogether, would degrade the councils of our country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He compared the proposed national system to the solar system, in which the States were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilson) wished, he said, to extinguish these planets. If the State Governments were excluded from all agency in the national one, and all power drawn from the people at large, the consequence would be that the National Government would move in the same direction as the State Governments now do, and would run into all the same mischiefs. The reform would only unite the thirteen small streams into one great current, ^pursuing the same course without any opposition whatever^ He adhered to the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed of a large number; and that their influence, from family weight and other causes, would be increased thereby. He did not admit that the Tribunes lost their weight in proportion as * It will throw light on this discussion to remark that an election by the State Legislatures involved a surrender of the principle insisted on by the large States, and dreaded by the small ones, namely, that of a proportional representation in the Senate. Such a rule would make the body too numerous, as the smallest State must elect one member at least. 128 DEBATES IN THE [1787. their number was augmented, and gave a historical sketch of this institution. If the reasoning (of Mr. Madison) was good, it would prove that the number of the Senate ought to be reduced below ten, the highest number of the Tribu- nitial corps. Mr. Wilson. The subject, it must be owned, is sur- rounded with doubts and difficulties. But we must sur- mount them. The British Government cannot be our model. We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of the people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger of the States being devoured by the National Government. On the contrary, he wished to keep them from devouring the National Government. He was not, however, for extinguishing these planets, as was supposed by Mr. Dickinson; neither did he, on the other hand, be- lieve that they would warm or enlighten the sun. Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for sub- ordinate purposes, for which their existence is made essen- tial by the great extent of our country. He could not com- prehend in what manner the landed interest would be ren- dered less predominant in the Senate by an election through the medium of the Legislatures, than by the people them- selves. If the Legislatures, as was now complained, sacri- ficed the commercial to the landed interest, what reason was there to expect such a choice from them as would defeat their own views? He was for an election by the people, in large districts, which would be most likely to obtain men of intelligence and uprightness ; subdividing the districts only for the accommodation of voters. Mr. Madison could as little comprehend in what manner family weight, as desired by Mr. Dickinson, would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate through elections by the State Legislatures, than in some other modes. The true question was, in what mode the best choice would be made ? If an election by the people, or through any other channel than the State Legislatures, promised as uncorrupt and 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 129 impartial a preference of merit, there could surely be no necessity for an appointment by those Legislatures. Nor was it apparent that a more useful check would be derived through that channel, than from the people through some other. /The great evils complained of were, that the State Legislatures run into schemes of paper-money, they had certainly divested themselves of essential portions of it, If they formed a confederacy in some respects, they formed a nation in others. The Convention could clearly deliberate on and propose any alterations that Congress 198 DEBATES IN THE [1787. could have done under the Federal Articles. And could not Congress propose, by virtue of the last Article, a change in any article whatever, — and as well that relating to the equality of suffrage, as any other? He made these remarks to obviate some scruples which had been expressed. He doubted much the practicability of annihilating the States; but thought that much of their power ought to be taken from them. Mr. Martin said, he considered that the separation from Great Britain placed the thirteen States in a state of nature towards each other ; that they would have remained in that state till this time, but for the Confederation; that they entered into the Confederation on the footing of equality; that they met now to amend it, on the same footing; and that he could never accede to a plan that would introduce an inequality, and lay ten States at the mercy of Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Mr. Wilson could not admit the doctrine that when the colonies became independent of Great Britain, they became independent also of each other. He read the Declaration of Independence, observing thereon, that the United Colo- nies were declared to be free and independent States ; and inferring, that they were independent, not individually but unitedly, and that they were confederated, as they were independent States. Colonel Hamilton assented to the doctrine of Mr. Wilson. He denied the doctrine that the States were thrown into a state of nature. He was not yet prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confederacy could be dissolved by partial infractions of it. He admitted that the States met now on an equal footing, but could see no inference from that against concerting a change of the system in this particular. He took this occasion of observing, for the purpose of appeasing the fear of the small States, that two circumstances would render them secure under a national Government in which they might lose the equality of rank which they now held: one was the local situation of the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 199 -three largest States, Virginia, Massachusetts and Penn- sylvania. They were separated from each other by distance of place, and equally so, by all the peculiarities which dis- tinguish the interests of one State from those of another. No combination, therefore, could be dreaded. In the second place, as there was a gradation in the States, from Virginia, the largest, down to Delaware, the smallest, it would always happen that ambitious combinations among a few States might and would be counteracted by defensive combinations of greater extent among the rest. No combi- nation has been seen among the large counties, merely as such, against lesser counties. The more close the union of the States, and the more complete the authority of the whole, the less opportunity will be allowed to the stronger States to injure the weaker. Adjourned. Wednesday, June 20th. In Convention, — Mr. William Blount, from North Carolina, took his seat. The first Resolution of the Report of the Committee of the Whole being before the House — Mr. Ellsworth, seconded by Mr. Gorham, moves to alter it, so as to run " that the government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme Legislative, Execu- tive and Judiciary." This alteration, he said, would drop the word national, and retain the proper title " the United States." He could not admit the doctrine that a breach of any of the Federal Articles could dissolve the whole. It would be highly dangerous not to consider the Confedera- tion as still subsisting. He wished, also, the plan of the Convention to go forth as an amendment of the Articles of the Confederation, since, under this idea the authority of the Legislatures could ratify it. If they are unwilling, the people will be so too. If the plan goes forth to the people for ratification, several succeeding conventions within the ■States would be unavoidable. He did not like these con- 200 DEBATES IN THE [1787. ventions. They were better fitted to pull dowii than to build up constitutions. Mr. Randolph did not object to the change of expres- sion, but apprised the gentleman who wished for it, that he did not admit it for the reasons assigned; particularly that of getting rid of a reference to the people for ratification. The motion of Mr. Ellsworth was acquiesced in, nem. con. The second Resolution, "that the national legislature ought to consist of two branches," being taken up, the word "national" struck out, as of course. Mr. Lansing observed, that the true question here was, whether the Convention would adhere to, or depart from, the foundation of the present confederacy; and moved, instead of the second Resolution, " that the powers of legislation be vested in the United States in Congress." He had already assigned two reasons against such an innovation as was proposed, — first, the want of competent powers in the Convention ; secondly, the state of the public mind. It had been observed by (Mr. Madison), in discussing the first point, that in two States the Delegates to Congress were chosen by the people. Notwithstanding the first appear- ance of this remark, it had in fact no weight, as the Dele- gates, however chosen, did not represent the people, merely as so many individuals; but as forming a sovereign State. Mr. Randolph put it, he said, on its true footing, namely that the public safety superseded the scruple arising from the review of our powers. But in order to feel the force of this consideration, the same impression must be had of the public danger. He had not himself the same impression, and could not therefore dismiss his scruple. Mr. Wilson contended, that, as the Convention were only to recommend, they might recommend what they pleased. He differed much from him. Any act whatever of so respectable a body must have a great effect; and if it does not succeed will be a source of great dissensions. He admitted that there was no certain criterion of the public mind on the subject. He 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 201 therefore recurred to the evidence of it given by the oppo- sition in the States to the scheme of an Impost. It could not be expected that those possessing sovereignty could ever voluntarily part with it. It was not to be expected from any one State, much less from thirteen. He pro- ceeded to make some observations on the plan itself, and the arguments urged in support of it. The point of repre- sentation could receive no elucidation from the case of England. The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed from their comparative smallness; but from the actual few- ness of the inhabitants, some of them not having more than one or two. A great inequality existed in the counties of England. Yet the like complaint of peculiar corruption in the small ones had not been made. It had been said that Congress represent the State prejudices, — will not any other body whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of the States, also represent their prejudices? It had been asserted by his colleague (Colonel Hamilton), that there was no coincidence of interests among the large States that ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller. If it were true that such a uniformity of interests existed among the States, there was equal safety for all of them whether the representation remained as heretofore, or were pro- portioned as now proposed. It is proposed that the General Legislature shall have a negative on the laws of the States. Is it conceivable that there will be leisure for such a task? There will, on the most moderate calculation, be as many acts sent up from the States as there are days in the year. Will the members of the General Legislature be competent judges? Will a gentleman from Georgia be a judge of the expediency of a law which is to operate in New Hampshire ? Such a negative would be more injurious than that of Great Britain heretofore was. It is said that the National Govern- ment must have the influence arising from the grant of offices and honors. In order to render such a government effectual, he believed such an influence to be necessary. But if the States will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse than in vain, 202 DEBATES IN THE [1787. to make the proposition. If this influence is to be attained, the States must be entirely abolished. Will any one say, this would ever be agreed to? He doubted whether any General Government, equally beneficial to all, can be attained. That now under consideration, he is sure, must be utterly unattainable. He had another objection. The system was too novel and complex. No man could foresee what its operation will be, either with respect to the General Govern- ment, or the State Governments. One or other, it has been surmised, must absorb the whole. Col. Mason did not expect this point would have been reagitated. The essential differences between the two plans had been clearly stated. The principal objections against that of Mr. Kandolph were, the want of power, and the want of practicability. There can be no weight in the first, as the fiat is not to be here, but in the people. He thought with his colleague ( Mr. Kandolph,) that there were, besides certain crises, in which all the ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity. He gave as an example, the eventual treaty with Great Britain, in forming which the Commissioners of the United States had boldly disregarded the improvident shackles of Congress; had given to their country an honorable and happy peace, and, instead of being censured for the transgression of their powers, had raised to themselves a monument more durable than brass. The impracticability of gaining the public concurrence, he thought, was still more groundless. Mr. Lansing had cited the attempts of Congress to gain an enlargement of their powers, and had inferred from the miscarriage of these attempts, the hopelessness of the plan which he (Mr. Lan- sing) opposed. He thought a very different inference ought to have been drawn, viz. that the plan which Mr. Lansing espoused, and which proposed to augment the pow- ers of Congress, never could be expected to succeed. He meant not to throw any reflections on Congress as a body, much less on any particular members of it. He meant, however, to speak his sentiments without reserve on this 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 203 subject; it was a privilege of age, and perhaps the only compensation which nature had given for the privation of so many other enjoyments; and he should not scruple to exercise it freely. Is it to be thought that the people of America, so watchful over their interests, so jealous of their liberties, will give up their all, will surrender both the sword and the purse, to the same body, — and that, too, not chosen immediately by themselves ? They never will. They never ought. Will they trust such a body with the regulation of their trade, with the regulation of their taxes, with all the other great powers which are in contemplation ? Will they give un- bounded confidence to a secret Journal, — to the intrigues, to the factions, which in the nature of things appertain to such an assembly ? If any man doubts the existence of these characters of Congress, let him consult their Journals for the years '78, '79, and '80. It will be said, that if the people are averse to parting with power, why is it hoped that they will part with it to a national Legislature ? The proper answer is, that in this case they do not part with power: they only transfer it from one set of immediate representatives to another set. Much has been said of the unsettled state of the mind of the people. He believed the mind of the people of America, as elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points, but settled as to others. In two points he was sure it was well settled, — first, in an attachment to republican government; secondly, in an attachment to more than one branch in the Legisla- ture. Their constitutions accord so generally in both these circumstances, that they seem almost to have been precon- certed. This must either have been a miracle, or have resulted from the genius of the people. The only excep- tions to the establishment of two branches in the Legisla- ture are the State of Pennsylvania, and Congress; and the latter the only single one not chosen by the people them- selves. What has been the consequence ? The people have been constantly averse to giving that body further powers. It was acknowledged by Mr. Patterson, that his plan could not be enforced without military coercion. Does he con- 204 DEBATES IN THE [1787. aider the force of this concession ? The most jarring ele- ments of nature, fire and water themselves, are not more incompatible than such a mixture of civil liberty and mili- tary execution. Will the militia march from one State into another, in order to collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of the Eepublic? Will they maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the citizens of the invaded State assist one another, till they rise as one man and shake off the Union altogether? Kebellion is the only case in which the military force of the State can be properly exerted against its citizens. In one point of view, he was struck with horror at the prospect of recurring to this expe- dient. To punish the non-payment of taxes with death was a severity not yet adopted by despotism itself; yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared to a military collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no discrimination between the innocent and the guilty. He took this occasion to repeat, that, notwithstanding his solici- tude to establish a national Government, he never would agree to abolish the State Governments, or render them absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary as the General Government, and he would be equally careful to preserve them. He was aware of the difficulty of drawing the line between them, but hoped it was not insurmountable. The convention, though comprising so many distinguished characters, could not be expected to make a faultless Gov- ernment. And he would prefer trusting to posterity the amendment of its defects, rather than to push the experi- ment too far. Mr. Luther Martin agreed with Colonel Mason, as to the importance of the State Governments: he would sup- port them at the expense of the General Government, which was instituted for the purpose of that support. He saw no necessity for two branches; and if it existed, Congress might be organized into two. He considered Congress as representing the people, being chosen by the Legislatures, who were chosen by the people. At any rate, Congress 1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 205 represented the Legislature; and it was the Legislatures, not the people, who refused to enlarge their powers. Nor could the rule of voting have been the ground of objection, otherwise ten of the States must always have been ready to place further confidence in Congress. The causes of repug- nance must therefore be looked for elsewhere. At the sep- aration from the British Empire, the people of America preferred the establishment of themselves into thirteen separate sovereignties, instead of incorporating themselves into one. To these they look up for the security of their lives, liberties, and properties ; to these they must look up. The Federal Government they formed to defend the whole against foreign nations in time of war, and to defend the lesser States against the ambition of the larger. They are afraid of granting power unnecessarily, lest they should defeat the original end of the Union ; lest the powers should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular States which the Union was meant to support; and expose the lesser to being swallowed up by the larger. He con- ceived also that the people of the States, having already vested their powers in their respective Legislatures, could not resume them without a dissolution of their Govern- ments. He was against conventions in the States — was not against assisting States against rebellious subjects — thought the federal plan of Mr. Patterson did not require coercion more than the national one, as the latter must depend for the deficiency of its revenues on requisitions and quotas — and that a national judiciary, extended into the States, would be ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy inconsistent with its usefulness. Mr. Sherman seconded and supported Mr. Lansing's motion. He admitted two branches to be necessary in the State Legislatures, but saw no necessity in a confederacy of States. The examples were all of a single council. Congress carried us through the war, and perhaps as well as any government could have done. The complaints at pres- ent are, not that the views of Congress are unwise or un- 206 DEBATES IN THE [1787. faithful, but that their powers are insufficient for the execution of their views. The national debt, and the want of power somewhere to draw forth the national resources, are the great matters that press. All the States were sen- sible^ of the defect of power in Congress. He thought much might be said in apology for the failure of tlie State Legislatures, to comply with the Confederation. They were afraid of leaning too hard on the people by accumula- ting taxes; no constitutional rule had been, or could be observed in the quotas; the accounts also were unsettled, and every State supposed itself in advance, rather than in arrears. For want of a general system, taxes to a due amount had not been drawn from trade, which was the most convenient resource. As almost all the States had agreed to the recommendation of Congress on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly that they were willing to trust Congress with power to draw a revenue from trade. There is no weight, therefore, in the argument drawn from a dis- trust of Congress; for money matters being the most im- portant of all, if the people will trust them with power as to them, they will trust them with any other necessary pow- ers. Congress, indeed, by the Confederation, have in fact the right of saying how much the people shall pay, and to what purpose it shall be applied; and this right was granted to them in the expectation that it would in all cases have its effect. If another branch were to be added to Congress, to be chosen by the people, it would serve to embarrass. The people would not much interest them- selves in the elections, a few designing men in the large districts would carry their points; and the people would have no more confidence in their new representatives than in Congress. He saw no reason why the State Legisla- tures should be unfriendly, as had been suggested, to Con- gress. If they appoint Congress, and approve of their mea- sures, they would be rather favourable and partial to them. The disparity of ihe States in point of size he perceived was the main difficulty. But the large States had not yet 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 207 suffered from the equality of votes enjoyed by the smaller ones. In all great and general points, the interests of all the States were the same. The State of Virginia, notwith- standing the equality of votes, ratified the Confederation without even proposing any alteration. Massachusetts also ratified without any material difficulty, &c. In none of the ratifications is the want of two branches noticed or com- plained of. To consolidate the States, as some have pro- posed, would dissolve our treaties with foreign nations, which had been formed with us, as confederated States. He did not, however, suppose that the creation of two branches in the Legislature would have such an effect. If the diffi- culty on the subject of representation cannot be otherwise got over, he would agree to have two branches, and a pro- portional representation in one of them, provided each State had an equal voice in the other. This was necessary to secure the rights of the lesser States ; otherwise three or four of the large States would rule the others as they please. Each State, like each individual, had its peculiar habits, usages, and manners, which constituted its happi- ness. It would not, therefore, give to others a power over this happiness, any more than an individual would do, when he could avoid it. Mr. Wilson urged the necessity of two branches ; observed, that if a proper model was not to be found in other confederacies, it was not to be wondered at. The number of them was small, and the duration of some at least short. The Amphictyonic and Achaean were formed in the infancy of political science ; and appear, by their history and fate, to have contained radical defects. The Swiss and Belgic confederacies were held together, not by any vital principle of energy, but by the incumbent pressure of formidable neighbouring nations. The German owed its continuance to the influence of the House of Austria. He appealed to our own experience for the defects of our con- federacy. He had been six years, of the twelve since com- mencement of the Revolution, a member of Congress, and 208 DEBATES IN THE [1787. had felt all its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others, whether, on many important occasions, the public interest had not been obstructed by the small members of the Union. The success of the Revolution was owing to other causes, than the constitution of Congress. In many instances it went on even against the difficulties arising from Congress themselves. He admitted that the large States did accede, as had been stated to the Confederation in its present form. But it was the effect of necessity not choice. There are other instances of their yielding, from the same motive, to the unreasonable measures of the small States. The situation of things is now a little altered. He insisted that a jealousy would exist between the State Legislatures and the General Legislature ; observing, that the members of the former would have views and feelings very distinct in this respect from their constituents. A private citizen of a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by the General or State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his happiness. His representative has an interest in its being exercised by the body to which he belongs. He will therefore view the National Legislature with the eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Congress to the people at large had always been better received, and produced greater effect, than those made to the Legislatures. On the question for postponing, in order to take up Mr. Lansing's proposition, " to vest the powers of legislation in Congress," — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Dela- ware, aye — 4 ; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6; Maryland, divided. On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the question on the second Resolution in the Report from the Commit- tee of the Whole, was postponed till to-morrow. Adjourned. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 209 Thuksday, June 21st. In Convention, — Mr. Jonathan Dayton, from New Jer- sey, took his seat. The second Eesolution in the Eeport from the Commit- tee of the Whole, being under consideration,— Doctor Johnson. On a comparison of the two plans which had been proposed from Virginia and New Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity which characterized the latter was its being calculated to preserve the individuality of the States. The plan from Virginia did not profess to destroy this individuality altogether; but was charged with such a tendency. One . gentleman alone (Colonel Hamil- ton), in his animadversions on the plan of New Jersey, boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of the State Governments. Mr. Wilson and the gentleman from Virginia, who also were adversaries of the plan of New Jersey, held a different language. They wished to leave the States in possession of a considerable, though a subordinate, jurisdiction. They had not yet, however, shewn how this could consist with, or be secured against, the general sovereignty and jurisdiction which they proposed to give to the National Government. If this could be shewn, in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the New Jersey propositions, that the individu- ality of the States would not be endangered, many of their objections would no doubt be removed. If this could not be shewn, their objections would have their full force. He wished it, therefore, to be well considered, whether, in case the States, as was proposed, should retain some por- tion of sovereignty at least, this portion could be pre- served, without allowing them to participate effectually in the General Government, without giving them each a dis- tinct and equal vote for the purpose of defending them- selves in the general councils. Mr. Wilson's respect for Doctor Johnson, added to the importance of the subject, led him to attempt, unprepared 14 210 DEBATES IN THE [1787. as he was, to solve the difficulty which had been started. It was asked, how the General Government and individual- ity of the particular States could be reconciled to each other, — and how the latter could be secured against the former ? Might it not, on the other side, be asked, how the former was to be secured against the latter? It was gem erally admitted, that a jealousy and rivalship would be felt, between the general and particular Governments. As the plan now stood, though indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch of the General Government (the Senate, or second branch) was to be appointed by the State Legisla- tures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this partici- pation in the General Government, would have an oppor- tunity of defending their rights. Ought not a reciprocal opportunity to be given to the General Government of defending itself, by having an appointment of some one constituent branch of the State Governments. If a security be necessary on one side, it would seem reasonable to demand it on the other. But taking the matter in a more general view, he saw no danger to the States, from the General Government. In case a combination should be made by the large ones, it would produce a general alarm among the rest, and the project would be frustrated. But there was no temptation to such a project. The States having in general a similar interest, in case of any propositions in the National Legislature to encroach on the State Legisla- tures, he conceived a general alarm would take place in the National Legislature itself; that it would communicate itself to the State Legislatures; and would finally spread among the people at large. The General Government will be as ready to preserve the rights of the States, as the latter are to preserve the rights of individuals, — all the members of the former having a common interest, as rep- resentatives of all the people of the latter, to leave the State Governments in possession of what the people wish them to retain. He could not discover, therefore, any danger whatever on the side from which it was apprehended. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 211 On the contrary, he conceived, that, in spite of every pre- caution, the General Government would be in perpetual danger of encroachments from the State Governments. Mr. Madison was of opinion, — in the first place, that there was less danger of encroachment from the General Government than from the State Governments ; and in the second place,that the mischiefs from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the greater tendency, in such systems, to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobedience of the members, than usurpa- tions of the Federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this tendency. But it will be said, that the pro- posed change in the principles and form of the Union will vary the tendency; that the General Government will have real and greater powers, and will be derived, in one branch at least, from the people, not from the Governments of the States. To give full force to this objection, let it be sup- posed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the General Legislature, and the States reduced to corpora- tions dependent on the General Legislature, — why should it follow that the General Government would take from the States any branch of their power, as far as its operation was beneficial, and its continuance desirable to the people? In some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all the townships are incorporated, and have a certain limited juris- diction, — have the representatives of the people of the townships in the Legislature of the State ever endeavoured to despoil the townships of any part of their local authority ? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people, they are attached to it ; and their representatives, chosen by and amenable to them, naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any other right or interest. The relation of a General Government to State Governments is parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary against encroachments 212 DEBATES IN THE [1787. of the State Governments on the General Government, than of the latter on the former, The great objection made against an abolition of the State Governments was, that the General Government could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not against the probable abuse of the general power, but against the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of objects. As far as its operation would be practicable, it could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the convenience of the General Government itself would concur with that of the people in the mainte- nance of subordinate governments. Were it practicable for the General Government to extend its care to every requi- site object without the co-operation of the State Govern- ments, the people would not be less free as members of one great Eepublic, than as members of thirteen small ones. A citizen of Delaware was not more free than a citizen of Virginia; nor would either be more free than a citizen of America. Supposing, therefore, a tendency in the General Government to absorb the State Governments, no fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse as the sup- position, that a tendency should be left in the State Govern- ments towards an independence of the General Govern- ment, and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them must have suggested to the States the experiment we are now making, to prevent the calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the arduous task. On the question for resolving, " that the Legislature ought to consist of two branches," — Massachusetts, Con- necticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7 ; New York, New Jersey, Dela- ware, no — 3 ; Maryland, divided. The third Eesolution of the Eeport being taken into consideration — 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 213 General Pinckney moved, "that the first branch, in- stead of being elected by the people, should be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each State should direct." He urged, — first, that this liberty would give more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accommo- date the mode to the convenience and opinions of the peo- ple; secondly, that it would avoid the undue influence of large counties, which would prevail if the elections were to be made in districts, as must be the mode intended by the report of the Committee; thirdly, that otherwise disputed elections must be referred to the General Legislature, which would be attended with intolerable expense and trouble to the distant parts of the Eepublic. Mr. L. Maktin seconded the motion. Col. Hamilton considered the motion as intended man- ifestly to transfer the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which would essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence which could not be too watchfully guarded against. All, too, must admit the pos- sibility, in case the General Government should maintain itself, that the State Governments might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system, therefore, should not be en- grafted on what might possibly fail. Mr. Mason urged the necessity of retaining the election by the people. Whatever inconvenience may attend the democratic principle, it must actuate one part of the Gov- ernment. It is the only security for the rights of the peo- ple. Mr. Sherman would like an election by the Legisla- tures best, but is content with the plan as it stands. Mr. Kutledge could not admit the solidity of the dis- tinction between a mediate and immediate election by the people. It was the same thing to act by one's self, and to act by another. An election by the Legislature would be more refined, than an election immediately by the people ; and would be more likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community. If this Convention had been chosen 214 DEBATES IN THE [1787. by the people in districts, it is not to be supposed that such proper characters would have been preferred. The Dele- gates to Congress, he thought, had also been fitter men than would have been appointed by the people at large. Mr. Wilson considered the election of the first branch by the people not only as the corner-stone, but as the foun- dation of the fabric ; and that the difference between a medi- ate and immediate election was immense. The difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect, that the Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people ; but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the General Government, and perhaps to that of the people themselves. Mr. King enlarged on the same distinction. He sup- posed the Legislatures would constantly choose men subser- vient to their own views, as contrasted to the general inter- est; and that they might even devise modes of election that would be subversive of the end in view. He remarked sev- eral instances in which the views of a State might be at variance with those of the General Government; and men- tioned particularly a competition between the National and State debts, for the most certain and productive funds. General Pincjkney was for making the State Govern- ments a part of the general system. If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency, South Carolina and the other States would have but a small share of the benefits of Government. On the question for General Pinckney's motion, to sub- stitute " election to the first branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint," instead of its being " elected by the people," — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina, aye — 4: Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylva- nia, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 6 ; Maryland divided. General Pinckney then moved, " that the first branch be elected by the people in such mode as the Legislatures should direct," but waived it on its being hinted that such a pro- 1787,] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 215 vision might be more properly tried in the detail of the plan. On the question for the election of the first branch " by the people" — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; New Jersey, no — 1 ; Maryland divided. The election of the first branch " for the term of three years," being considered, — Mr. Randolph moved to strike out "three years," and insert "two years." He was sensible that annual elections were a source of great mischiefs in the States, yet it was the want of such checks against the popular intemperance as were now proposed, that rendered them so mischievous. He would have preferred annual to biennial, but for the extent of the United States, and the inconvenience which would result from them to the representatives of the extreme },a.rts til the Empire. The people were attached to fre- quency of elections. All the Constitutions of the States, except that of South Carolina, had established annual elec- tions. Mr. Dickinson. The idea of annual elections was bor- rowed from the ancient usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours. He supposed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial; and in order to pre- vent the inconvenience of an entire change of the whole number at the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election of one-third. Mr. Ellsworth was opposed to three years, supposing that even one year was preferable to two years. The peo- ple were fond of frequent elections, and might be safely indulged in one branch of the Legislature. He moved for " one year." Mr. Strong seconded and supported the motion. Mr. Wilson, being for making the first branch an effectual representation of the people at large, preferred an annual election of it. This frequency was most familiar 216 DEBATES IN THE [1787. and pleasing to the people. It would not be more incon- venient to them than triennial elections, as the people in all the States have annual meetings with which the election of the national Representatives might be made to coincide. He did not conceive that it would be necessary for the National Legislature to sit constantly, perhaps not half, perhaps not one-fourth of the year. Mr. Madison was persuaded that annual elections would be extremely inconvenient, and apprehensive that biennial would be too much so ; he did not mean inconvenient to the electors, but to the Representatives. They would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the Union ; and would probably not be allowed even a reimbursement of their expenses. Besides, none of those who wished to be re-elected would remain at the seat of government, confiding that their absence would not affect them. The members of Congress had done this with few instances of disappointment. But as the choice was here to be made by the people themselves, who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a rival candidate, it must be supposed that the members from the most distant States would travel backwards and forwards at least as often as the elections should be repeated. Much was to be said, also, on the time requisite for new members, who would always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge of the affairs of the States in general, without which their trust could not be usefully discharged. Mr. Sherman preferred annual elections, but would be content with biennial. He thought the Representatives ought to return home and mix with the people. By remain- ing at the seat of government, they would acquire the habits of the place, which might differ from those of their con- stituents. Colonel Mason observed, that, the States being differ- ently situated, such a rule ought to be formed as would put them as nearly as possible on a level. If elections were 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 217 annual, the middle States would have a great advantage over the extreme ones. He wished them to be biennial, and the rather as in that case they would coincide with the periodical elections of South Carolina, as well of the other States. Colonel Hamilton urged the necessity of three years. There ought to be neither too much nor too little depend- ence on the popular sentiments. The checks in the other branches of the Government would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. The British House of Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit of the Constitution had not ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make the people listless to them ; and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This evil was complained of in all the States. In Virginia it had been lately found necessary to force the attendance and voting of the people by severe regulations. On the question for striking out " three years," — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; New York, Delaware, Maryland, no — 3 ; New Jersey divided. The motion for " two years " was then inserted, nem. con. Adjourned. Friday, June 22d. In Convention, — The clause in the third Kesolution " to receive fixed stipends, to be paid out of the National Treasury," being considered,— Mr. Ellsworth moved to substitute payment by the States, out of their own treasuries: observing, that the manners of different States were very different in the style of living, and in the profits accruing from the exercise of like talents. What would be deemed, therefore, a reason- able compensation in some States, in others would be very unpopular, and might impede the system of which it made a part. 218 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Mr. Williamson favored the idea. He reminded the House of the prospect of new States to the westward. They would be too poor — would pay little into the common treasury — and would have a different interest from the old States. He did not think, therefore, that the latter ought to pay the expense of men that would be employed in thwart- ing their measures and interests. Mr. Gorham wished not to refer the matter to the State Legislatures, who were always paring down salaries in such a manner as to keep out of office men most capable of executing the functions of them. He thought, also, it would be wrong to fix the compensation by the Constitution, because we could not venture to make it as liberal as it ought to be, without exciting an enmity against the whole plan. Let the National Legislature provide for their own wages from time to time, as the State Legislatures do. He had not seen this part of their power abused, nor did he apprehend an abuse of it. Mr. Randolph said he feared we were going too far in consulting popular prejudices. Whatever respect might be due to them in lesser matters, or in cases where they formed the permanent character of the people, he thought it neither incumbent on, nor honorable for, the Convention, to sacrifice right and justice to that cor sideration. If the States were to pay the members of the National Legislature, a depend- ence would be created that would vitiate the whole system. The whole nation has an interest in the attendance and services of the members. The National Treasury therefore is the proper fund for supporting them. Mr. King urged the danger of creating a dependence on the States by leaving to them the payment of the members of the National Legislature. He supposed it would be best to be explicit as to the compensation to be allowed. A reserve on that point, or a reference to the National Leg- islature of the quantum, would excite greater opposition than any sum that would be actually necessary or proper. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 219 Mr. Sherman contended for referring both the quantum and the payment of it to the State Legislatures. Mr. Wilson was against fixing the compensation, as circumstances would change and call for a change of the amount. He thought it of great moment that the mem- bers of the National Government should be left as inde- pendent as possible of the State Governments in all re- spects. Mr. Madison concurred in the necessity of preserving the compensations for the National Government indepen- dent of the State Governments ; but at the same time ap- proved of fixing them by the Constitution, which might be done by taking a standard which would not vary with cir- cumstances. He disliked particularly the policy, suggest- ed by Mr. Williamson, of leaving the members from the poor States beyond the mountains to the precarious and parsimonious support of their constituents. If the West- ern States hereafter arising should be admitted into the Union, they ought to be considered as equals and as breth- ren. If their representatives were to be associated in the common councils, it was of common concern that such pro- visions should be made as would invite the most capable and respectable characters into the service. Mr. Hamilton apprehended inconvenience from fixing the wages. He was strenuous against making the national council dependent on the legislative rewards of the States. Those who pay are the masters of those who are paid. Payment by the States would be unequal, as the distant States would have to pay for the same term of attendance and more days in traveling to and from the seat of govern- ment. He expatiated emphatically on the difference be- tween the feelings and views of the people and the govern- ments of the States, arising from the personal interest and official inducements which must render the latter unfriendly to the General Government. Mr. Wilson moved that the salaries of the first branch 220 DEBATES IN THE ,1787. " be ascertained by the National Legislature and be paid out of the National Treasury." Mr. Madison thought the members of the Legislature too much interested, to ascertain their own compensation. It would be indecent to put their hands into the public purse for the sake of their own pockets. On this question, " shall the salaries of the first branch be ascertained by the national Legislature?" — New Jer- sey, Pennsylvania, aye — 2 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car- olina, no — 7 ; New York, Georgia, divided. On the question for striking out "National Treasury," as moved by Mr. Ellsworth, — Mr. Hamilton renewed his opposition to it. He pressed the distinction between the State Governments and the people. The former would be the rivals of the General Government. The State Legislatures ought not, therefore, to be the paymasters of the latter. Mr, Ellsworth. If we are jealous of the State Gov- ernments, they will be so of us. If on going home I tell them, we gave the General Government such powers because we could not trust you, will they adopt it? And without their approbation it is a nullity. On the question, — Massachusetts,* Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 4 ; New Jersey, Pennsyl- vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no — 5 ; New York, Georgia, divided; so it passed in the negative. On a question for substituting " adequate compensa- tion" in place of "fixed stipends," it was agreed to, nem. con., the friends of the latter being willing that the practi- cability of fixing the compensation should be considered hereafter in forming the details. It was then moved by Mr. Butler, that a question be taken on both points jointly, to wit, " adequate compensa- * It appeared that Massachusetts concurred, not because they thought the State Treasury ought to be substituted : but because they thought nothing should be said on the subject, in which case it would silently devolve on the National Treasury to support the National Legislature. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 221 tion to be paid out of the National Treasury." It was objected to as out of order, the parts having been separately decided on. The President referred the question of order to the House, and it was determined to be in order, — Con- necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 6 ; New York, Pennsylvania, Vir- ginia, Georgia, no — 4: Massachusetts, divided. The ques- tion on the sentence was then postponed by South Caro- lina, in right of the State. Col. Mason moved to insert " twenty -five years of age as a qualification for the members of the first branch." He thought it absurd that a man to-day should not be permitted by the law to make a bargain for himself, and to-morrow should be authorized to manage the affairs of a great nation. It was the more extraordinary, as every man carried with him, in his own experience, a scale for measuring the defi- ciency of young politicians ; since he would, if interrogated, be obliged to declare that his political opinions at the age of twenty-one were too crude and erroneous to merit an influence on public measures. It had been said, that Con- gress had proved a good school for our young men. It might be so, for any thing he knew; but if it were, he chose that they should bear the expense of their own edu- cation. Mr. Wilson was against abridging the rights of election in any shape. It was the same thing whether this were done by disqualifying the objects of choice, or the persons choosing. The motion tended to damp the efforts of genius and of laudable ambition. There was no more reason for incapacitating youth than age, where the requisite qualifica- tions were found. Many instances might be mentioned of signal services, rendered in high stations, to the public, before the age of twenty-five. The present Mr. Pitt and Lord Bolingbroke were striking instances. On the question for inserting " twenty-five years of a g e >" — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Vir- 222 DEBATES IN THE [1787. ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye, — 7 ; Massachu- setts, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no, — 3 ; New York, divided. Mr. Gorham moved to strike out the last member of the third Resolution, concerning ineligibility of members of the first branch to office during the term of their membership, and for one year after. He considered it unnecessary and injurious. It was true, abuses had been displayed in Great Britain; but no one could say how far they might have contributed to preserve the due influence of the Government, nor what might have ensued in case the contrary theory had been tried. Mr. Butler opposed it. This precaution against in- trigue was necessary. He appealed to the example of Great Britain, where men get into Parliament that they might get offices for themselves or their friends. This was the source of the corruption that ruined their government. Mr. King thought we were refining too much. Such a restriction on the members would discourage merit. It would also give a pretext to the Executive for bad appoint- ments, as he might always plead this as a bar to the choice he wished to have made. Mr. Wilson was against fettering elections, and dis- couraging merit. He suggested, also, the fatal consequence in time of war, of rendering, perhaps, the best commanders ineligible; appealed to our situation during the late war, and indirectly leading to a recollection of the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief out of Congress. Colonel Mason was for shutting the door at all events against corruption. He enlarged on the venality and abuses, in this particular, in Great Britain; and alluded to the multiplicity of foreign embassies by Congress. The disqualification he regarded as a corner-stone in the fabric. Colonel Hamilton. There are inconveniences on both sides. We must take man as we find him ; and if we expect him to serve the public, must interest his passions in doing so. A reliance on pure patriotism had been the source of many of our errors. He thought the remark of Mr. Gor- 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 223 ham a just one. It was impossible to say what would be the effect in Great Britain of such a reform as had been urged. It was known that one of the ablest politicians (Mr. Hume) had pronounced all that influence on the side of the Crown which went under the name of corruption, an essen- tial part of the weight which maintained the equilibrium of the Constitution. On Mr. Goeham's motion for striking out " ineligibil- ity," it was lost by an equal division of the votes, — Massa- chusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 4; Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no, — 4 New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, divided. Adjourned. Satueday, June 23d. In Convention, — the third Resolution being resumed, — On the question, yesterday postponed by South Carolina, for agreeing to the whole sentence, "for allowing an ade- quate compensation, to be paid out of the Treasury of the United States," — Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye — 5 ; Connecticut, New York, Del- aware, North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 5 ; Georgia, divided. So the question was lost, and the sentence not inserted. General Pinckney moves to strike out the ineligibility of members of the first branch to offices established " by a particular State." He argued from the inconvenience to which such a restriction would expose both the members of the first branch, and the States wishing for their services; and from the smallness of the object to be attained by the restriction. It would seem from the ideas of some, that we are erecting a kingdom to be divided against itself: he dis- approved such a fetter on the Legislature. Mr. Sheeman seconds the motion. It would seem that we are erecting a kingdom at war with itself. The Legis- lature ought not to be fettered in such a case. 224 DEBATES IN THE [1787. On the question, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Geor- gia, aye — 8; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no — 3. Mr. Madison renewed his motion, yesterday made and waived, to render the members of the first branch " ineligi- ble during their term of service, and for one year after, to such offices only, as should be established, or the emolu- ment augmented, by the Legislature of the United States during the time of their being members." He supposed that the unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of salaries, were the evils most experienced, and that if the door was shut against them, it might properly be left open for the appointment of members to other offices as an encouragement to the legislative service. Mr. Alexander Martin seconded the motion. Mr. Butler. The amendment does not go far enough, and would be easily evaded. Mr. Butledge was for preserving the Legislature as pure as possible, by shutting the door against appointments of its own members to office, which was one source of its corruption. Mr. Mason. The motion of my colleague is but a par- tial remedy for the evil. He appealed to him as a witness of the shameful partiality of the Legislature of Virginia to its own members. He enlarged on the abuses and cor- ruption in the British Parliament connected with the appointment of its members. He could not suppose that a sufficient number of citizens could not be found who would be ready, without the inducement of eligibility to offices, to undertake the Legislative service. Genius and virtue, it may be said, ought to be encouraged. Genius, for aught he knew, might; but that virtue should be encouraged by such a species of venality, was an idea that at least had the merit of being new. Mr. King remarked that we were refining too much in this business; and that the idea of preventing intrigue and 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 225 solicitation of offices was chimerical. You say, that no member shall himself be eligible to any office. Will this restrain him from availing himself of the same means which would gain appointments for himself, to gain them for his son, his brother, or any other object of his par- tiality? We were losing, therefore, the advantages on one side, without avoiding the evils on the other. Mr. Wilson supported the motion. The proper cure, he said, for corruption in the Legislature was to take from it the power of appointing to offices. One branch of cor- ruption would, indeed, remain, that of creating unnecessary offices, or granting unnecessary salaries, and for that the amendment would be a proper remedy. He animadverted on the impropriety of stigmatizing with the name of venality the laudable ambition of rising into the honourable offices of the Government, — an ambition most likely to be felt in the early and most incorrupt period of life, and which all Avise and free governments had deemed it sound policy to oherish, not to check. The members of the Legislature have, perhaps, the hardest and least profitable task of any who engage in the service of the State. Ought this merit to be made a disqualification ? Mr. Sherman observed that the motion did not go far enough. It might be evaded by the creation of a new office, the translation to it of a person from another office, and the appointment of a member of the Legislature to the latter. A new embassy might be established to a new Court, and an ambassador taken from another, in order to create a vacancy for a favorite member. He admitted that incon- veniences lay on both sides. He hoped there would be sufficient inducements to the public service without resort- ing to the prospect of desirable offices ; and on the whole was rather against the motion of Mr. Madison. Mr. Gerry thought, there was great weight in the objection of Mr. Sherman. He added, as another objection against admitting the eligibility of members in any case, that it would produce intrigues of ambitious men for dis- 226 DEBATES IN THE [1787. placing proper officers, in order to create vacancies for themselves. In answer to Mr. King, he observed, that, although members, if disqualified themselves, might still intrigue and cabal for their sons, brothers, / disturbances among ourselves, and make us parties to all their own quarrels. Foreign nations having American do- minion are, and must be, jealous of us. Their representa- tives betray the utmost anxiety for our fate, and for the re- sult of this meeting, which must have an essential influence on it. It had been said, that respectability in the eyes of foreign nations was not the object at which we aimed; that the proper object of republican government was domestic tranquillity and happiness. This was an ideal distinction. No government could give us tranquillity and happiness at home, which did not possess sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad. This was the critical moment for forming such a government. We should run every risk in trusting to future amend- ments. As yet we retain the habits of union. We are weak, and sensible of our weakness. Henceforward, the motives will become feebler, and the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we are now here, exercising our tranquil and free deliberations on the subject. It would be madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must ob- struct a reproduction of them. Mr. Pierce considered the equality of votes under the Confederation as the great source of the public difficulties. The members of Congress were advocates for local advan- tages. State distinctions must be sacrificed, as far as the general good required, but without destroying the States. Though from a small State, he felt himself a citizen of the United States. Mr. Gerry urged, that we never were independent States, were not such now, and never could be, even on the principles of the Confederation. The States, and the advo- cates for them, were intoxicated with the idea of their sovereignty. He was a member of Congress at the time the Federal Articles were formed. The injustice of allowing each State an equal vote was long insisted on. He voted 268 DEBATES IN THE [1787. for it, but it was against his judgment, and under the pressure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser States. The present Confederation he considered as dis- solving. The fate of the Union will be decided by the Convention. If they do not agree on something, few dele- gates will probably be appointed to Congress. If they do, Congress will probably be kept up till the new system should be adopted. He lamented that, instead of coming here like a band of brothers, belonging to the same family, we seem to have brought with us the spirit of political negotiators. Mr. L. Martin remarked, that the language, of the States being sovereign and independent, was once familiar and understood; though it seemed now so strange and obscure. He read those passages in the Articles of Con- federation which describe them in that language. On the question, as moved by Mr Lansing, shall the word "not" be struck out? — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, aye — 4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6 ; Maryland, divided. On the motion to agree to the clause as reported, " that the rule of suffrage in the first branch ought not to be according to that established by the Articles of the Con- federation," — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 4; Maryland, divided. Doctor Johnson and Mr. Ellsworth moved to postpone the residue of the clause, and take up the eighth Resolution. On the question, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; Massachusetts, Delaware, no — 2. Mr. Ellsworth moved, " that the rule of suffrage in the second branch be the same with that established by the Articles of Confederation." He was not sorry on the whole, 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 269 he said, that the vote just passed had determined against this rule in the first branch. He hoped it would become a ground of compromise with regard to the second branch. We were partly national, partly federal. The proportional representation in the first branch was conformable to the national principle, and would secure the large States against the small. An equality of voices was conformable to the federal principle, and was necessary to secure the small States against the large. He trusted that on this middle ground a compromise would take place. He did not see that it could on any other, and if no compromise should take place, our meeting would not only be in vain, but worse than in vain. To the eastward, he was sure Massachusetts was the only State that would listen to a proposition for excluding the States, as equal political societies, from an equal voice in both branches. The others would risk every consequence rather than part with so dear a right. An attempt to deprive them of it was at once cutting the body of America in two, and, as he supposed would be the case, somewhere about this part of it. The large States he con- ceived would, notwithstanding the equality of votes, have an influence that would maintain their superiority. Holland, as had been admitted (by-Mr. Madison), had, notwithstand- ing a like equality in the Dutch confederacy, a prevailing influence in the public measures. The power of self-defence was essential to the small States. Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the creation. He could never admit that there was no danger of combinations among the large States. They will like individuals find out and avail them- selves of the advantage to be gained by it. It was true the danger would be greater if they were contiguous, and had a more immediate and common interest. A defensive com- bination of the small States was rendered more difficult by their greater number. He would mention another consider- ation of great weight. The existing Confederation was founded on the equality of the States in the article of suffrage, — was it meant to pay no regard to this antecedent 270 DEBATES IN THE [1787. plighted faith. Let a strong Executive, a Judiciary, and Legislative power, be created, but let not too much be attempted, by which all may be lost. He was not in general a half-way man, yet he preferred doing half the good we could, rather than do nothing at all. The other half may be added when the necessity shall be more fully experienced. Mr. Baldwin could have wished that the powers of the general Legislature had been defined, before the mode of constituting it had been agitated. He should vote against the motion of Mr. Ellsworth, though he did not like the Resolution as it stood m the Report of the Committee of the Whole. He thought the second branch ought to be the representation of property, and that, in forming it, therefore, some reference ought to be had to the relative wealth of their constituents, and to the principles on which the Senate of Massachusetts was constituted. He concurred with those who thought it would be impossible for the General Legislature to extend its cares to the local matters of the States. Adjourned. Saturday, June 30th. In Convention, — Mr. Brearly moved that the President write to the Executive of New Hampshire, informing it that the business depending before the Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance of the Deputies of that State. In support of his motion, he ob- served that the difficulties of the subject, and the diversity of opinions called for all the assistance we could possibly obtain. (It was well understood that the object was to add New Hampshire to the number of States opposed to the doctrine of proportional representation, which it was presumed, from her relative size, she must be adverse to). Mr. Patterson seconded the motion. Mr. Rutledge could see neither the necessity nor pro- priety of such a measure. They are not unapprized of the 1^8^.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 271 meeting, and can attend if they choose. Ehode Island might as well be urged to appoint and send deputies. Are we to suspend the business until the Deputies arrive ? If we proceed, he hoped all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could produce its effect. Mr. King said he had written more than once as a private correspondent, and the answer gave him every reason to expect that State would be represented very shortly, if it should be so at all. Circumstances of a per- sonal nature had hitherto prevented it. A letter could have no effect. Mr. Wilson wished to know, whether it would be con- sistent with the rule or reason of secrecy, to communicate to New Hampshire that the business was of such a nature as the motion described. It would spread a great alarm. Besides, he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State on the subject, the meeting being merely voluntary. On motion of Mr. Brearly, New York, New Jersey, aye — 2 ; Massachusetts, Con- necticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 5 ; Maryland, divided ; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Georgia, not on the floor. The motion of Mr. Ellsworth being resumed, for allowing each State an equal vote in the second branch, — Mr. Wilson did not expect such a motion after the establishment of the contrary principle in the first branch ; and considering the reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the first branch. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Ellsworth) had pro- nounced, that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States north of Pennsylvania one only would agree to any General Government. He entertained more favourable hopes of Connecticut and of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a country to which they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the de- plored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments 272 DEBATES IN THE [1787. nor his duty. If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles ; if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday against the just principle of representation, were as twenty-two to ninety, of the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure, if there was any room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the question will be, shall less than one-fourth of the United States withdraw themselves from the Union, or shall more than three-fourths renounce the inherent, indisputable and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial system of States ? If issue must be joined, it was on this point he would choose to join it. The gentleman from Connecticut, in supposing that the preponderance secured to the majority in the first branch had removed the objections to an equality of votes in the second branch for the security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to control, in all cases whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will control six : seven States, according to the estimates that had been used, composed twenty-four ninetieths of the whole people. It would be in the power, then, of less than one-third to overrule two-thirds, whenever a question should happen to divide the States in that man. ner. Can we forget for whom we are forming a Govern- ment ? Is it ior men, or for the imaginary beings called States ? Will our honest constituents be satisfied with metaphysical distinctions ? Will they, ought they to, be satisfied with being told, that the one-third compose the greater number of States ? The rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the second as in the first branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be local, confined and temporary. This will expand with the expansion, aud grow with the growth of the United States. Much has been said of an imaginary combination 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 273 of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, some- times of aristocracy, has been charged on it. No explana- tion, however, of the danger has been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove, both from reason and history, that rival - ships would be more probable than coalitions ; and that there are no coinciding interests that could produce the latter. No answer has yet been given to the observations of Mr. Madison on this subject. Should the Executive magistrate be taken from one of the large States, Would not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the other States ? Whence, then, the danger of monarchy ? Are the people of the three large States more aristocratic than those of the small ones ? Whence, then, the danger of aristocracy from their influence ? It is all a mere illusion of names. We talk of States, till we forget what they are composed of. Is a real and fair majority the natural hot-bed of aristocracy? It is a part of the defini- tion of this species of government, or rather of tyranny, that the smaller number governs the greater. It is true that a majority of States in the second branch cannot carry a law against a majority of the people in the first. But this removes half only of the objection. Bad governments are of two sorts, — first, that which does too little ; secondly, that which does too much; that which fails through weak- ness, and that which destroys through oppression. Under which of these evils do the United States at present groan? Under the weakness and inefficiency of its government. To remedy this weakness we have been sent to this Con- vention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave the United States fettered precisely as heretofore; with the additional mortification of seeing the good purposes of the fair representation of the people in the first branch, defeated in the second. Twenty-four will still control sixty-six. He lamented that such a disagreement should prevail on the point of representation ; as he did not foresee that it would happen on the other point most contested, the boundary between the general and the local authorities. 18 274 DEBATES IN THE [1787. He thought the States necessary and valuable parts of a good system. Mr. Ellswokth. The capital objection of Mr. Wilson. "that the minority will rule the majority," is not true. The power is given to the few to save them from being de- stroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given to them in both branches, the objection might have had weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the many ? Is it not the case in the British Con- stitution, the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation, a negative on the laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights against the encroachments of the Commons ? No instance of a confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are running from one extreme to another. We are razing the foun- dations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority of the States to favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for, the first branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not imaginary. Although no particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the possibil- ity of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations. Suppose, that, in pursuance of some com- mercial treaty or arrangement, three or four free ports and no more were to be established, would not combinations be formed in favor of Boston, Philadelphia, and some port of the Chesapeake? A like concert might be formed in the appointment of the great offices. He appealed again to the obligations of the Federal compact, which was still in force, and which had been entered into with so much solemnity ; persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to the plighted faith under which each State, small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage in the general coun- cils. His remarks were not the result of partial or local 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 275 views. The State he represented (Connecticut) held a mid- dle rank. Mr. Madison did justice to the able and close reasoning of Mr. Ellsworth, but must observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another occasion, the large States were described by him as the aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small. Now the small are the House of Lords, requiring a negative to defend them against the more nu- merous Commons. Mr. Ellsworth had also erred in say- ing that no instance had existed in which confederated states had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the German system, in which the King of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded Mr. Ells- worth of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of government. Had the fact been as stated by Mr. Ellsworth, it would have been of little avail to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments against him ; the history and fate of the several confederacies, modern as well as ancient, demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the appeal of Mr. Ellsworth to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact, he remarked, that the party claiming from others an adherence to a com- mon engagement, ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all the States, however, Connecticut was per- haps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts, from which no State was free, the Legislature of that State had, by a pretty recent vote, positively refused to pass a law for complying with the requisitions of Congress, and had transmitted a copy of the vote to Congress. It was urged, he said, con- tinually, that an equality of votes in the second branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be per- fectly safe to the large ones; whose majority in the first branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the majority of States might still injure 276 DEBATES IN THE [1.787. the majority of the people. In the first place, they could obstruct the wishes and interests of the majority. Secondly, they could extort measures repugnant to the wishes and interest of the majority. Thirdly, they could impose mea- sures adverse thereto; as the second branch will probably exercise some great powers, in which the first will not par- ticipate. He admitted that every peculiar interest, whether in any class of citizens, or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack, there ought to be given a constitutional power of defence. But he contended that the States were divided into different interests, not by their difference of size, but other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the United States. It did not lie between the large and small States. It lay between the Northern and Southern; and if any de- fensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth, that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient that would answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was, that, instead of propor- tioning the votes of the States in both branches, to their respective numbers of inhabitants, computing the slaves in the ratio of five to three, they should be represented in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants only ; and in the other according to the whole number, counting the slaves as free. By this arrangement the Southern scale would have the advantage in one House, and the Northern in the other. He had been restrained from pro- posing this expedient by two considerations ; one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests on an occa- sion where it is but too apt to arise of itself; the other was the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two branches, and which would destroy the equilibrium of interests. 1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 277 Mr. Ellsworth assured the House, that, whatever might be thought of the Representatives of Connecticut, the State was entirely Federal in her disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the war, in supplying both men and money. The muster - rolls would show she had more troops in the field than Virginia. If she had been delinquent, it had been from inability, and not more so than other States. Mr. Sherman. Mr. Madison animadverted on the delinquency of the States, when his object required him to prove that the constitution of Congress was faulty. Con- gress is not to blame for the faults of the States. Their measures have been right, and the only thing wanting has been a further power in Congress to render them effectual. Mr. Davie was much embarrassed, and wished for explanations. The Report of the Committee, allowing the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and establishing a pro- portional representation in it, seemed to be impracticable. There will, according to this rule, be ninety members in the outset, and the number will increase as new States are added. It was impossible that so numerous a body could possess the activity and other qualities required in it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of the Report, as it stood, and the amendment, he should be constrained to prefer the latter. The appointment of the Senate by electors, chosen by the people for that purpose, was, he conceived, liable to an insuperable difficulty. The larger counties or districts, thrown into a general district, would certainly prevail over the smaller counties or districts, and merit in the latter would be excluded altogether. The report, therefore, seemed to be right in referring the appointment to the Legislatures^ whose agency in the general system did not appear to him objectionable, as it did to some others. The fact was, that the local prejudices and interests which could not be denied to exist, would find their way into the national councils, whether the Representatives should be chosen by the Legis- latures, or by the people themselves. On the other hand, 278 DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. if a proportional representation was attended with insuper- able difficulties, the making the Senate the representative of the States looked like bringing us back to Congress again, and shutting out all the advantages expected from it. Under this view of the subject, he could not vote for any plan for the Senate yet proposed. He thought that, in general, there were extremes on both sides. AVe were .partly federal, partly national, in our union ; and he did not see why the Government might not in some respects ope- rate on the States, in others on the people. Mr. Wilson admitted the question concerning the num- ber of Senators to be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked forward to the time when the smallest States will contain a hundred thousand souls at least. Let there be then one Senator in each, for every hundred thousand souls, and let the States not having that number of inhabitants be allowed one. He was will- ing himself to submit to this temporary concession to the small States; and threw out the idea as a ground of com- promise. Doctor Fkanklin. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that their liberties will be in dan- ger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the large States say their money will be in danger. When a broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner, here, both sides must part from some of their demands, in order that they may join in some accommodating proposition. He had prepared one which he would read, that it might lie on the table for considera- tion. The proposition was in the words following: " That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose and send an equal number of delegates, namely, , who are to compose the second branch of the General Legislature. 1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 279 " That in all cases or questions wherein the sovereignty of individual States may be affected, or whereby their authority over their own citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General Government within the several States augmented, each State shall have equal suffrage. " That in the appointment of all civil officers of the Gen- eral Government, in the election of whom the second branch may by the constitution have part, each State shall have equal suffrage. " That in fixing the salaries of such officers, and in all allowances for public services, and generally in all appro- priations and dispositions of money to be drawn out of the general Treasury; and in all laws for supplying that Trea- sury, the Delegates of the several States shall have suffrage in proportion to the sums which their respective States do actually contribute to the Treasury." Where a ship had many owners, this was the rule of deciding on her expedition. He had been one of the min- isters from this country to France during the joint war, and would have been very glad if allowed to vote in distributing the money to carry it on. Mr. King observed, that the simple question was, whether each State should have an equal vote in the second branch ; that it must be apparent to those gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this quality, nor the Keport as it stood, that the Report was as susceptible of melioration as the motion ; that a reform would be nugatory and nomi- nal only, if we should make another Congress of the pro- posed Senate ; that if the adherence to an equality of votes was fixed and unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy on the other side ; and that we were in fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it. That he was, however, filled with astonishment, that, if we were convinced that every man in America was secured in all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good io the phantom of State sovereignty. That his feelings were more harrowed and his fears more agitated for his 280 DEBATES IN THE [1787. country than he could express; that he conceived this to be the last opportunity of providing for its liberty and happi- ness: that he could not, therefore, but repeat his amaze- ment, that when a just government, founded on a fair representation of the people of America, was within our reach, we should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom and importance of States. That should this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, his mind was prepared for every event, rather than sit down under a Government founded on a vicious principle of representa- tion, and which must be as short-lived as it would be unjust. He might prevail on himself to accede to some such expe- dient as had been hinted by Mr. Wilson; but he never could listen to an equality of votes as proposed in the motion. Mr. Dayton. When assertion is given for proof, and terror substituted for argument, he presumed they would have no effect, however eloquently spoken. It should have been shown that the evils we have experienced have pro- ceeded from the equality now objected to; and that the seeds of dissolution for the State Governments are not sown in the General Government. He considered the system on the table as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never would be received by the people. Mr. Maktin would never confederate, if it could not be done on just principles. Mr. Madison would acquiesce in the concession hinted by Mr. Wilson, on condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the States. The Senate, therefore, is only another edition of Congress. He knew the faults of that body, and had used a bold language against it. Still he would preserve the State rights as care- fully as the trial by jury. Mr. Bedford contended, that there was no middle way between a perfect consolidation, and a mere confederacy of the States. The first is out of the question; and in the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 281 latter tney must continue, if not perfectly, yet equally, sovereign. If political societies possess ambition, avarice, and all the other passions which render them formidable to each other, ought we not to view them in this light here? Will not the same motives operate in America as elsewhere ? If any gentleman doubts it, let him look at the votes. Have they not been dictated by interest, by ambition ? Are not the large States evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the small? They think, no doubt, that they have right on their side, but interest had blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a great one. South Carolina is actuated both by present interest, and future prospects. She hopes, too, to see the other States cut down to her own dimensions. North Carolina has the same motives of present and future interest. Virginia fol- lows. Maryland is not on that side of the question. Penn- sylvania has a direct and future interest. Massachusetts has a decided and palpable interest in the part she takes. Can it be expected that the small States will act from pure disinter- estedness. Look at Great Britain. Is the representation there less unequal ? But we shall be told again, that that is the rot- ten part of the Constitution. Have not the boroughs, however, held fast their constitutional rights ? And are we to act with greater purity than the rest of mankind? An exact pro- portion in the representation is not preserved in any one of the States. Will it be said that an inequality of power will not result from an inequality of votes. Give the opportunity, an ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole history of mankind proves it. The three large States have a common interest to bind them together in commerce. But whether a combination, as we supposed, or a competition, as others supposed, shall take place among them, in either case the small States must be ruined. We must, like Solon, make such a government as the people will approve. Will the smaller States ever agree to the proposed degradation of them? It is not true that the 282 DEBATES IN THE [178T. people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present Congress. The language of the people has been, that Congress ought to have the power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the States where it may be necessary. On the first point they have been explicit, and, in a manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree to this, and similar measures, if they ever mean to dis- charge their engagements ? The little States are willing to observe their engagements, but will meet the large ones on no ground but that of the Confederation. "VVe have been told, with a dictatorial air, that this is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a good government. It will be the last, indeed, if the propositions reported from the Com- mittee go forth to the people. He was under no apprehen- sions. The large States dare not dissolve the Confedera- tion. If they do, the small ones will find some foreign ally, of more honour and good faith, who will take them by the hand, and do them justice. He did not mean, by this, to intimidate or alarm. It was a natural consequence, which ought to be avoided by enlarging the Federal powers, not annihilating the Federal system. This is what the people expect. All agree in the necessity of a more efficient government, and why not make such an one as they desire ? Mr. Ellsworth. Under a National Government, he should participate in the national security, as remarked by Mr. King ; but that was all. What he wanted was domes- tic happiness. The National Government could not descend to the local objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes, therefore, for the preservation of his rights, to the State Governments. From these alone he could derive the great- est happiness he expects in this life. His happiness depends on their existence, as much as a new - born infant on its mother for nourishment. If this reasoning was not satis- factory, he had nothing to add that could be so. Mr. King was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and as far as they could be necessary for the pur- 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 283 poses stated by Mr. Ellsworth. He did not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a danger- ous encroachment on their jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised, as he conceived, that would give them all the secu- rity the nature of things would admit of. In the establish- ment of societies, the Constitution was to the Legislature, what the laws were to individuals. As the fundamental rights of individuals are secured by express provisions in the State Constitutions, why may not a like security be pro- vided for the rights of States in the National Constitution? The Articles of Union between England and Scotland fur- nish an example of such a provision, in favor of sundry rights of Scotland. When that union was in agitation, the same language of apprehension which has been heard from the smaller States, was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. The articles, however, have not been violated, and the Scotch have found an increase of prosperity and happiness. He was aware that this will be called a mere paper security. He thought it a sufficient answer to say, that if fundamental articles of compact are no sufficient defence against physi- cal power, neither will there be any safety against it, if there be no compact. He could not sit down without tak- ing some notice of the language of the honorable gentle- man from Delaware (Mr. Bedford). It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance had marked the honorable gentleman himself. It was not he who, with a vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to turn his hopes from our common country, and court the protection of some foreign hand. This, too, was the language of the honorable member him- self. He was grieved that such a thought had entered his heart. He was more grieved that such an expression had dropped from his lips. The gentleman could only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For himself, what- ever might be his distress, he would never court relief from a foreign power. Adjourned. >> 284 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Monday, July 2d. In Convention, — On the question for allowing each State one vote in the second branch, as moved by Mr. Ellswoeth, it was lost, by an equal division of votes, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,* aye — 5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Car- olina, South Carolina, no — 5; Georgia, divided (Mr. Bald- win aye, Mr. Houston, no),. Mr. Pinckney thought an equality of votes in the sec- ond branch inadmissible. At the same time, candor obliged him to admit, that the large States would feel a partiality for their own citizens, and give them a preference in appointments: that they might also find some common points in their commercial interests, and promote treaties favorable to them. There is a ljeal distinction between the Northern and Southern interests. North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, in their rice and indigo, had a pecu- liar interest which might be sacrificed. How, then, shall the larger States be prevented from administering the General Government as they please, without being them- selves unduly subjected to the will of the smaller? By allowing them some, but not a full, proportion. He was extremely anxious that something should be done, consider- ing this as the last appeal to a regular experiment. Con- gress have failed in almost every effort for an amendment of the Federal system. Nothing has prevented a dissolution of it, but the appointment of this Convention ; and he could not express his alarms for the consequence of such an event, He read his motion to form the States into classes, with an apportionment of Senators among them (see Article 4, of his plan— May 29th, page 61). General Pinckney was willing the motion might be con- sidered. He did not entirely approve it. He liked better the motion of Doctor Franklin, (q. v. June 30, page 278). * Mr. Jenifer not bein^r present, Mr. Martin alone voted. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 285 Some compromise seemed to be necessary, the States being exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in the second branch. He proposed that a Committee consist- ing of a member from each State should be appointed to devise and report some compromise. Mr. L. Martin had no objection to a commitment, but no modifications whatever could reconcile the smaller States to the least diminution of their equal sovereignty. Mr. Sherman. We are now at full stop; and nobody, he supposed, meant that we should break up without doing something. A committee he thought most likely to hit on some expedient. Mr. Gouverneur Morris* thought a Committee advis- able, as the Convention had been equally divided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode of appointing the sec- ond branch tended, he was sure, to defeat the object of it. What is this object? To check the precipitation, change- ableness, and excesses of the first branch. Every man of observation had seen in the democratic branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation — in Congress, change- ableness — in every department, excesses against personal liberty, private property, and personal safety. What qual- ities are necessary to constitute a check in this case ? Abil- ities and virtue are equally necessary in both branches. Something more, then, is now wanted. In the first place, the checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the other branch. One interest must be opposed to another interest. Vices, as they exist, must be turned against each other. In the second place, it must have great personal property; it must have the aristocratic spirit; it must love to lord it through pride. Pride is, indeed, the great principle that actuates both the poor and the rich. It is this principle which in the former resists, in the latter abuses, authority. In the third place it should be inde- pendent. In religion the creature is apt to forget its Cre- * He had just returned from New York, having left the Convention a few days after it commenced business. 286 DEBATES IN THE [1787. ator. That it is otherwise in political affairs, the late de- bates here are an unhappy proof. The aristocratic body should be as independent, and as firm, as the democratic. If the members of it are to revert to a dependence on the demo- cratic choice, the democratic scale will preponderate. All the guards contrived by America have not restrained the Senatorial branches of the Legislatures from a servile com- plaisance to the democratic. If the second branch is to be dependent, we are better without it. To make it independ- ent, it should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so ; he hoped so. The rich will strive to establish their dominion, and enslave the rest. They always did. They always will. The proper security against them is to form them into a separate interest. The two forces will then control each other. Let the rich mix with the poor, and in a commercial country they will estab- lish an oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the demo- cracy will triumph. Thus it has been all the world over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are but men ; and we are not to expect any particular interference of Heaven in our favor. By thus combining, and setting apart, the aristocratic interest, the popular interest will be combined against it. There will be a mutual check and mutual security. In the fourth place, an independence for life, involves the necessary permanency. If we change our measures nobody will trust us, — and how avoid a change of measures, but by avoiding a change of men ? Ask any man if he confides in Congress — if he confides in the State of Pennsylvania — if he will lend his money, or enter into contract? He will tell you, no. He sees no stability. He can repose no confidence. If Great Britain were to explain her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be employed. He disliked the exclusion of the second branch from holding offices. It is dangerous. It is like the im- prudent exclusion of the military officers, during the war, from civil appointments. It deprives the Executive of the principal source of influence. If danger be apprehended 1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 287 from the Executive, what a left-handed way is this of obvi- ating it! If the son, the brother, or the friend can be ap- pointed, the danger may be even increased, as the disquali- fied father, &c. can then boast of a disinterestedness which he does not possess. - Besides, shall the best, the most able, the most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold offices ? Who then are to hold them? He was also against paying the Senators. They will pay themselves, if they can. If they cannot, they will be rich, and can do without it. Of such the second branch ought to consist ; and none but such can compose it, if they are not to be paid. He contended that the Executive should appoint the Senate, and fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty in the present question. You may begin with any ratio you please, it will come to the same thing. The members being independent, and for life, may be taken as well from one place as from another. It should be considered, too, how the scheme could be carried through the States. He hoped there was strength of mind enough in this House to look truth in the face. He did not hesitate, therefore, to say that loaves and fishes must bribe the demagogues. They must be made to expect higher offices under the General, than the State Governments. A Senate for life will be a noble bait. Without such captivating prospects, the popular leaders will oppose and defeat the plan. He perceived that the first branch was to be chosen by the people of the States, the second by those chosen by the people. Is not here a government by the States — a government by compact be- tween Virginia in the first and second branch, Massachu- setts in the first and second branch, &c? This is going back to mere treaty. It is no government at all. It is al- together dependent on the States, and will act over again the part which Congress has acted. A firm government alone can protect our liberties. He fears the influence of the rich. They will have the same effect here as elsewhere, if we do not, by such a government, keep them within their proper spheres. We should remember that the people- 288 DEBATES IN THE [1787. never act from reason alone. The/ rich will take the ad- vantage of their passions, and awake these the instruments for oppressing them. The result of the contest will be a violent aristocracy, or a more violent despotism. The schemes of the rich will be favoured by the extent of the country. The people in such distant parts cannot commu- nicate and act in concert. They will be the dupes of those who have more knowledge and intercourse. The only secu- rity against encroachments, will be a select and sagacious body of men, instituted to watch against them on all sides. He meant only to hint these observations, without ground- ing any motion on them. Mr. Randolph favored the commitment, though he did not expect much benefit from the expedient. He animadverted on the warm and rash language of Mr. Bedford on Satur- day; reminded the small States that if the large States should combine, some danger of which he did not deny, there would be a check in the revisionary power of the Ex- ecutive; and intimated, that, in order to render this still more effectual, he would agree, that in the choice of an Executive each State should have an equal vote. He was persuaded that two such opposite bodies as Mr. Morris had planned could never long co-exist. Dissensions would arise, as has been seen even between the Senate and House of Delegates in Maryland; appeals would be made to the people; and in a little time commotions would be the result. He was far from thinking the large States could subsist of themselves, any more than the small; an avulsion would involve the whole in ruin ; and he was determined to pursue such a scheme of government as would secure us against such a calamity. Mr. Strong was for the commitment ; and hoped the mode of constituting both branches would be referred. If they should be established on different principles, contentions would prevail, and there would never be a concurrence in necessary measures. Doctor Williamson. If we do not concede on both 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 289 sides, out business must soon be at end. He approved of the commitment, supposing that, as the Committee would be a smaller body, a compromise would be pursued with more coolness. Mr. Wilson objected to the Committee, because it would decide according to that very rule of voting, which was opposed on one side. Experience in Congress had also proved the inutility of Committees consisting of members from each State. Mr. Lansing would not oppose the commitment, though expecting little advantage from it. Mr. Madison opposed the commitment. He had rarely seen any other effect than delay from such committees in Congress. Any scheme of compromise that could be pro- posed in the Committee might as easily be proposed in the House ; and the report of the Committee, where it contained merely the opinion of the Committee, would neither shorten the discussion, nor influence the decision of the House. Mr. Gerry was for the commitment. Something must be done, or we shall disappoint not only America, but the whole world. He suggested a consideration of the state we should be thrown into by the failure of the Union. We should be without an umpire to decide controversies, and must be at the mercy of events. What, too, is to become of our treaties — what of our foreign debts — what of our domestic ? We must make concessions on both sides. Without these, the Constitutions of the several States would never have been formed. On the question for committing, generally, — Massa- chusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; New Jersey, Delaware, no — 2. On the question for committing it " to a member from each State," — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 10 ; Pennsylvania, no — 1. The Committee, elected by ballot, were. Mr. Gerry, Mr. 19 J ■ 290 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Ellsworth, Mr. Yates, Mr. Patterson, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Bedford, Mr. Martin, Mr. Mason, Mr. Davy, Mr Rut- ledge, Mr. Baldwin. That time might be given to the Committee, and to such as chose to attend to the celebrations on the anni- versary of Independence the Convention adjourned till Thursday. Thursday, July 5th. In Convention, — Mr. Gerry delivered in, from the- Committee appointed on Monday last, the following Report : " The Committee to whom was referred the eighth Reso- lution of the Report from the Committee of the Whole House, and so much of the seventh as has not been decided on, submit the following Report : " That the subsequent propositions be recommended to the Convention on condition that both shall be generally adopted. " 1. That in the first branch of the Legislature each of the States now in the Union shall be allowed one member for every forty thousand inhabitants, of the description reported in the seventh Resolution of the Committee of the Whole House : that each State not containing that number shall be allowed one member : that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the Government of the United States, shall originate in the first branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch ; and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the first branch. " 2. That in the second branch, each State shall have an equal vote." * *This Report was founded on a motion in the Committee made by Doctor Franklin. It was barely acquiesced in by the members from the States opposed to an equity of votes in the second branch, and was evidently considered by the mem- be-s on the other side, as a gaining of their point. A motion was made by Mr Sher- man, (who ;ictod in the place of Mr. Ellsworth who was kept away by indisposi- 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 291 Mr. Gorham observed, that, as the report consisted of propositions mutually conditional, he wished to hear some explanations touching the grounds on which the conditions were estimated. Mr. Gerry. The Committee were of different opinions, as well as the Deputations from which the Committee were taken ; and agreed to the Report merely in order that some ground of accommodation might be proposed. Those opposed to the equality of votes have only assented con- ditionally; and if the other side do not generally agree, will not be under any obligation to support the Report. Mr. Wilson thought the Committee had exceeded their powers. Mr. Martin was for taking the question on the whole Report. Mr. Wilson was for a division of the question; other- wise it would be a leap in the dark. Mr. Madison could not regard the privilege of origi- nating money bills as any concession on the side of the small States. Experience proved that it had no effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished a bill to be origi- nated, they might surely find some member from some of the same States in the lower branch, who would originate it. The restriction as to amendments was of as little consequence. Amendments could be handed privately by the Senate to members in the other House. Bills could be negatived, that they might be sent up in the desired shape. If the Senate should yield to the obstinacy of the first branch, the use of that body as a check, would be lost. If the first branch should yield to that of the Senate, the privilege would be nugatory. Experience had also shown, both in Great Britain, and the States having a similar tion), in the Committee, to the following effect, "that each State should have an equal vote in the second branch ; provided that no decision therein should prevail unless the majority of States concurring should also comprise a majority of the inhabitants of the United States." This motion was not much deliberated on, nor approved, in the Committee. A similar proviso had been proposed, in the debates on the Articles of Confederation, in 1777, to the articles giving certain powers to " nine States." See Journals of Congress for 1777, page 462. 292 DEBATES IN THE [1787. regulation, that it was a source of frequent and obstinate altercations. These considerations had produced a rejection of a like motion on a former occasion, when judged by its own merits. It could not, therefore, be deemed any con- cession on the present, and left in force all the objections which had prevailed against allowing each State an equal voice. He conceived that the Convention was reduced to the alternative, of either departing from justice in order to conciliate the smaller States, and the minority of the people of the United States, or of displeasing these, by justly gratifying the larger States and the majority of the people. He could not himself hesitate as to the option he ought to make. The Convention, with justice and a majority of the people on their side, had nothing to fear. With injustice and the minority on their side, they had every thing to fear. It was in vain to purchase concord in the Convention on terms which would perpetuate discord among their con- stituents. The Convention ought to pursue a plan which would bear the test of examination, which would be espoused and supported by the enlightened and impartial part of America, and which they could themselves vindicate and urge. It should be considered, that, although at first many may judge of the system recommended by their opinion of the Convention, yet finally all will judge of the Convention by the system. The merits of the system alone can finally and effectually obtain the public suffrage. He was not apprehensive that the people of the small States would obstinately refuse to accede to a government founded on just principles, and promising them substantial protection. He could not suspect that Delaware would brave the conse- quences of seeking her fortunes apart from the other States, rather than submit to such a Government; much less could he suspect that she would pursue the rash policy, of courting foreign support, which the warmth of one of her ^Representatives (Mr. Bedford) had suggested; or if she should, that any foreign nation would be so rash as to hearken to the overture. As little could he suspect that the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 293 people of New Jersey, notwithstanding the decided tone of the gentleman from that State, would choose rather to stand on their own legs, and bid defiance to events, than to acquiesce under an establishment founded on principles the justice of which they could not dispute, and absolutely necessary to redeem them from the exactions levied on them by the commerce of the neighbouring States. A review of other States would prove that there was as little reason to apprehend an inflexible opposition elsewhere. Harmony in the Convention was, no doubt, much to be desired. Satis- faction to all the States, in the first instance, still more so. But if the principal States comprehending a majority of the people of the United States, should concur in a just and judicious plan, he had the firmest hopes that all the other States would by degrees accede to it. Mr. Butlee said, he could not let down his idea of the people of America so far as to believe they would, from mere respect to the Convention, adopt a plan evidently unjust. He did not consider the privilege concerning money bills as of any consequence. He urged, that the second branch ought to represent the States according to f heir property. Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the form as well as the matter of the Report objectionable. It seemed, in the first place, to render amendment impracticable. In the next place, it seemed to involve a pledge to agree to the second part, if the first should be agreed to. He conceived the whole aspect of it to be wrong. He came here as a Representative of America; he flattered himself he came here in some degree as a Representative of the whole hu- man race; for the whole human race will be affected by the proceedings of this Convention. He wished gentlemen to extend their views beyond the present moment of time; beyond the narrow limits of place from which they derive their political origin. If he were to believe some things which he had heard, he should suppose that we were assem- bled to truck and bargain for our particular States. He cannot descend to think that any gentlemen are really actu- 294 DEBATES IN THE [1787. ated by these views. We must look forward to the effects of what we do. These alone ought to guide us. Much has been said of the sentiments of the people. They were un- known. They could not be known. All that we can infer is, that, if the plan we recommend be reasonable and right, all who have reasonable minds and sound intentions will embrace it, notwithstanding what had been said by some gentlemen. Let us suppose that the larger States shall agree, and that the smaller refuse ; and let us trace the con- sequences. The opponents of the system in the smaller States will no doubt make a party, and a noise for a time, but the ties of interest, of kindred, and of common habits, which connect them with other States, will be too strong to be easily broken. In New Jersey, particularly, he was sure a great many would follow the sentiments of Pennsyl- vania and New York. This country must be united. If persuasion does not unite it, the sword will. He begged this consideration might have its due weight. The scenes of horror attending civil commotion cannot be described; and the conclusion of them will be worse than the term of their continuance. The stronger party will then make traitors of the weaker ; and the gallows and halter will fin- ish the work of the sword. How far foreign powers would be ready to take part in the confusions, he would not say. Threats that they will be invited have, it seems, been thrown out. He drew the melancholy picture of foreign intrusions, as exhibited in the history of Germany, and urged it as a standing lesson to other nations. He trusted that the gentlemen who may have hazarded such expres- sions did not entertain them till they reached their own lips. But returning to the Report, he could not think it in any respect calculated for the public good. As the second branch is now constituted, there will be constant disputes and appeals to the States, which will undermine the Gen- eral Government, and control and annihilate the first branch. Suppose that the Delegates from Massachusetts and Rhode Island, in the upper house, disagree, and that 1T87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 295 the former are outvoted. What results? They will imme- diately declare that their State will not abide by the decis- ion, and make such representations as will produce that effect. The same may 'happen as to Virginia and other States. Of what avail, then, will be what is on paper? State attachments, and State importance have been the bane of this country. We cannot annihilate, but we may per- haps take out the teeth of, the serpents. He wished our ideas to be enlarged to the true interest of man, instead of being circumscribed within the narrow compass of a par- ticular spot. And, after all, how little can be the motive yielded by selfishness for such a policy ? Who can say, whether he himself, much less whether his children, will the next year be an inhabitant of this or that State ? Mr. Bedford. He found that what he had said, as to the small States being taken by the hand, had been mis- understood, — and he rose to explain. He did not mean that the small States would court the aid and interposition of foreign powers. He meant that they would not con- sider the federal compact as dissolved until it should be so by the acts of the large States. In this case, the conse- quence of the breach of faith on their part, and the readi- ness of the small States to fulfil their engagements, would be that foreign nations having demands on this Country, would find it their interest to take the small States by the hand, in order to do themselves justice. This was what he meant. But no man can forsee to what extremities the small States may be driven by oppression. He observed, also, in apology, that some allowance ought to be made, for the habits of his profession, in which warmth was natural and sometimes necessary. But is there not an apology in what was said by (Mr. Gouverneuk Morris), that the sword is to unite — by Mr. Gorham, that Delaware must be annexed to Pennsylvania, and New Jersey divided between Pennsylvania and New York? To hear such language without emotion, would be to renounce the feelings of a Jinan and the duty of a citizen. As to the propositions of 296 DEBATES IN THE [178 if. the Committee, the lesser States have thought it necessary to have a security somewhere. This has been thought necessary for the Executive magistrate of the proposed government, who has a sort of negative on the laws ; and is it not of more importance that the States should be pro- tected, than that the Executive branch of the Government should be protected ? In order to obtain this, the smaller States have conceded as to the constitution of the first branch, and as to money bills. If they be not gratified by correspondent concessions, as to the second branch, is it to be supposed they will ever accede to the plan? And what will be the consequence, if nothing should be done? The condition of the United States requires that somethings should be immediately done. It will be better that a defec- tive plan should be adopted, than that none should be recommended. He saw no reason why defects might not be supplied by meetings ten, fifteen or twenty years hence. Mr. Ellsworth said, he had not attended the proceed- ings of the Committee, but was ready to accede to the com- promise they had reported. Some compromise was neces- sary ; and he saw none more convenient or reasonable. Mr. Williamson hoped that the expressions of indi- viduals would not be taken for the sense of their colleagues, much less of their States, which was not and could not be known. He hoped, also, that the meaning of those expres- sions would not be misconstrued or exaggerated. He did not conceive that (Mr. Gouvep.neur Morris) meant that the sword ought to be drawn against the smaller States. He only pointed out the probable consequences of anarchy in the United States. A similar exposition ought to be given of the expressions of (Mr. Gorham). He was ready to hear the Keport discussed; but thought the propositions contained in it the most objectionable of any he had yet heard. Mr. Patterson said that he had, when the report was agreed to in the Committee, reserved to himself the right of freely discussing it. He acknowledged that the warmth 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 297 complained of was improper ; but he thought the sword aud the gallows little calculated to produce conviction. He com- plained of the manner in which Mr. Madison and Mr. G. Morris had treated the small States. Mr. Gerry. Though he had assented to the Keport in the Committee, he had very material objections to it. We were, however, in a peculiar situation. We were neither the same nation, nor different nations. We ought not, therefore, to pursue the one or the other of these ideas too closely. If no compromise should take place, what will be the consequence. A secession he foresaw would take place ; for some gentlemen seemed decided on it. Two different plans will be proposed, and the result no man could foresee. If we do not come to some agreement among ourselves, some foreign sword will probably do the work for us. Mr. Mason. The Report was meant not as specific propositions to be adopted, but merely as a general ground of accommodation. There must be some accommodation on this point, or we shall make little further progress in the work. Accommodation was the object of the House in the appointment of the Committee, and of the Committee in the report they had made. And, however liable the Report might be to objections, he thought it preferable to an ap- peal to the world by the different sides, as had been talked of by some gentlemen. It could not be more inconvenient to any gentleman to remain absent from his private affairs, than it was for him, but he would bury his bones in this city, rather than expose his country to the consequences of a dissolution of the Convention without any thing being done. The first proposition in the Report for fixing the repre- sentation in the first branch, " one member for every forty thousand inhabitants," being taken up, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris objected to that scale of ap- portionment. He thought property ought to be taken into the estimate as well as the number of inhabitants. Life and liberty were generally said to be of more value than 298 DEBATES IN THE [1787. property. An accurate view of the matter would, neverthe- less, prove that property was the main object of society. The savage state was more favorable to liberty than the civ- ilized ; and sufficiently so to life. It was preferred by all men who had not acquired a taste for property ; it was only renounced for the sake of property which could only be secured by the restraints of regular government. These ideas might appear to some new, but they were neverthe- less just. If property, then, was the main object of gov- ernment, certainly it ought to be one measure of the influ- ence due to those who were to be affected by the govern- ment. He looked forward, also, to that range of new States which would soon be formed in the West. He thought the rule of representation ought to be so fixed, as to secure to the Atlantic States a prevalence in the national councils. The new States will know less of the public in- terest than these; will have an interest in many respects different ; in particular will be little scrupulous of involv- ing the community in wars the burdens and operations of which would fall chiefly on the maritime States. Provis- ion ought, therefore, to be made to prevent the maritime States from being hereafter outvoted by them. He thought this might be easily done, by irrevocably fixing the num- ber of representatives which the Atlantic States should re- spectively have, and the number which each new State will have. This would not be unjust, as the western settlers would previously know the conditions on which they were io possess their lands. It would be politic, as it would recommend the plan to the present, as well as future, inter- est of the States which must decide the fate of it. Mr. Kutledge. The gentleman last up had spoken some of his sentiments precisely. Property was certainly the principal object of society. If numbers should be made the rule of representation, the Atlantic States would be subjected to the western. He moved that the first propo- sition in the Report be postponed, in order to take up the following, viz. : " that the suffrages of the several States be 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 299 regulated and proportioned according to the sums to be paid towards the general revenue by the inhabitants of each State respectively; that an apportionment of suffrages, according to the ratio aforesaid shall be made and regulated at the end of years from the first meeting of the Legis- lature of the United States, and at the end of every years ; but that for the present, and until the period above mentioned, the suffrages shall be for New Hampshire , for Massachusetts , &c." Col. Mason said, the case of new States was not unno- ticed in the Committee; but it was thought, and he was himself decidedly of opinion, that if they made a part of the Union, they ought to be subject to no unfavorable discrim- inations. Obvious considerations required it. Mr. Eandolph concurred with Mr. Mason. On the question on Mr. Rutledge's motion, — South Carolina, aye — 1 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no — 9 ; Georgia, not on the floor. Ad- journed. Friday, July 6th. In Convention, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to commit so much of the Report as relates to " one member for every forty thousand inhabitants." His view was, that they might absolutely fix the number for each State in the first instance ; leaving the Legislature at liberty to provide for changes in the relative importance of the States, and for the case of new States. Mr. Wilson seconded the motion; but with a view of leaving the Committee under no implied shackles. Mr. Gorham apprehended great inconvenience from fix- ing directly the number of Representatives to be allowed to each State. He thought the number of inhabitants the true guide, though perhaps some departure might be expedient from the full proportion. The States, also, would vary in 300 DEBATES IN THE [1787. their relative extent by separations of parts of the largest States. A part of Virginia is now on the point of a sepa- ration. In the province of Maine, a Convention is at this time deliberating on a separation from Massachusetts. In such events the number of Representatives ought certainly be reduced. He hoped to see all the States made small by proper divisions, instead of their becoming formidable as Avas apprehended to the small States. He conceived, that, let the government be modified as it might, there would be a constant tendency in the State Governments to encroach upon it; it was of importance, therefore, that the extent of the States should be reduced as much, and as fast, as possi- ble. The stronger the government shall be made in the first instance, the more easily will these divisions be effected ; as it will be of less consequence in the opinion of the States, whether they be of great or small extent. Mr. Gerry did not think with his colleague, that the larger States ought to be cut up. This policy has been inculcated by the middling and small States, ungenerously and contrary to the spirit of the Confederation. Ambitious men will be apt to solicit needless divisions, till the States be reduced to the size of counties. If this policy should still actuate the small States, the large ones could not con- federate safely with them ; but would be obliged to consult their safety by confederating only with one another. He favored the commitment, and thought that representation ought to be in the combined ratio of numbers of inhabitants and of wealth, and not of either singly. Mr. King wished the clause to be committed chiefly in order to detach it from the Report, with which it had no connection. He thought, also, that the ratio of represen- tation proposed could not be safely fixed, since in a century and an half our computed increase of population would carry the number of Representatives to an enormous excess ; that the number of inhabitants was not the proper index of ability and wealth ; that property was the primary object of society ; and that, in fixing a ratio, this ought not to be 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 301 excluded from the estimate. With regard to new States, he observed that there was something peculiar in the busi- ness, which had not been noticed. The United States were now admitted to be proprietors of the country North West of the Ohio. Congress, by one of their ordinances, have impolitically laid it out into ten States, and have made it a fundamental article of compact with those who may become settlers, that as soon as the number in any one State shall ?qual that of the smallest of the thirteen original States, it nay claim admission into the Union. Delaware does not 3ontain, it is computed, more than thirty-five thousand souls ; and for obvious reasons will not increase much for a considerable time. It is possible, then, that if this plan be persisted in by Congress, ten new votes may be added, without a greater addition of inhabitants than are repre- sented by the single vote of Pennsylvania. The plan, as it respects one of the new States, is already irrevocable ; the sale of the lands having commenced, and the purchasers and settlers will immediately become entitled to all the privi- leges of the compact. Mr. Butler agreed to the commitment, if the Committee were to be left at liberty. He was persuaded, that, the more the subject was examined, the less it would appear that the number of inhabitants would be a proper rule of proportion. If there were no other objection, the change- ableness of the standard would be sufficient. He concurred with those who thought some balance was necessary between the old and the new States. He contended strenuously, that property was the only just measure of representation. This was the great object of government ; the great cause of war ; the great means of carrying it on. Mr. Pinckney saw no good reason for committing. The value of land had been found, on full investigation, to be an impracticable rule. The contributions of revenue, includ- ing imports and exports, must be too changeable in their amount ; too difficult to be adjusted ; and too injurious to the non-commercial States. The number of inhabitants 302 DEBATES IN THE [1787. appeared to him the only just and practicable rule. He thought the blacks ought to stand on an equality with the whites ; but would agree to the ratio settled by Congress. He contended that Congress had no right, under the Articles of Confederation, to authorize the admission of new States, no such case having been provided for. Mr. Davy was for committing the clause, in order to get at the merits of the question arising on the Report. He seemed to think that wealth or property ought to be represented in the second branch ; and numbers in the first branch. On the motion for committing, as made by Mr. Gouver- neur Morris, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7 ; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 3 ; Maryland, divided. The members appointed by ballot were Mr. Gouverneur Morris, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. King. Mr. "Wilson signified, that his view in agreeing to the commitment was, that the Committee might consider the propriety of adopting a scale similar to that established by the Constitution of Massachusetts, which would give an advantage to the small States without substantially depart- ing from the rule of proportion. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Mason moved to postpone the clause relating to money bills, in order to take up the clause relating to an equality of votes in the second branch. On the question of postponement, — New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, no — 3. The clause relating to equality of votes being under <»,onsideration, — Doctor Franklin observed, that this question could not be properly put by itself, the Committee having reported several propositions as mutual conditions of each other. He 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 303 could not vote for it if separately taken ; but should vote for the whole together. Colonel Mason perceived the difficulty, and suggested a reference of the rest of the Report to the Committee just appointed, that the whole might be brought into one view. Mr. Randolph disliked the reference to that Committee, as it consisted of members from States opposed to the wishes of the small States, and could not, therefore, be acceptable to the latter. Mr. Martin and Mr. Jenifer moved to postpone the clause till the Committee last appointed should report. Mr. Madison observed, that if the uncommitted part of the Report was connected with the part just committed, it ought also to be committed ; if not connected, it need not be postponed till report should be made. On the question for postponing, moved by Mr. Martin and Mr. Jenifer, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 3; Massachusetts, New York, divided. The first clause, relating to the originating of money bills, was then resumed. Mr. Gouverneur Morris was opposed to a restriction of this right in either branch, considered merely in itself, and as unconnected with the point of representation in the second branch. It will disable the second branch from proposing its own money plans, and give the people an opportunity of judging, by comparison, of the merits of those proposed by the first branch. Mr. Wilson could see nothing like a concession here, on the part of the smaller States. If both branches were to say yes or no, it was of little consequence which should say yes or no first, which last. If either was, indis- criminately, to have the right of originating, the reverse of the Report would, he thought, be most proper ; since it was a maxim, that the least numerous body was the fittest for deliberation — the most numerous, for decision. He oh- 304 DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. served that this discrimination had been transcribed from the British into several American Constitutions. But he was persuaded that, on examination of the American experi- ments, it would be found to be a ' trifle light as air.' Nor could he ever discover the advantage of it in the parliamen- tary history of Great Britain. He hoped, if there was any advantage in the privilege, that it would be pointed out. Mr. Williamson thought that if the privilege were not common to both branches, it ought rather to be confined to the second, as the bills in that case would be more narrowly watched, than if they originated with the branch having most of the popular confidence. Mr. Mason. The consideration which weighed with the Committee was, that the first branch would be the im- mediate representatives of the people ; the second would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the people's money, they might soon forget the source from whence they received it. We might soon have an aris- tocracy. He had been much concerned at the principles which had been advanced by some gentlemen, but had the satisfaction to find they did not generally prevail. He was a friend to proportional representation in both branches , but supposed that some points must be yielded for the sake of accommodation. Mr. Wilson. If he had proposed that the second branch should have an independent disposal of public money, the observations of Colonel Mason would have been a satis- factory answer. But nothing could be farther from what he had said. His question was, how is the power of the first branch increased, or that of the second diminished, by giving the proposed privilege to the former ? Where is the difference, in which branch it begins, if both must con- cur, in the end ? Mr. Gerry would not say that the concession was a sufficient one on the part of the small States. But he could not but regard it in the light of a concession. It would make it a constitutional principle, that the second 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 305 branch were not possessed of the confidence of the people in money matters, which would lessen their weight and influence. In the next place, if the second branch were dispossessed of the privilege, they would be deprived of the opportunity which their continuance in office three times as long as the first branch would give them, of making three successive essays in favor of a particular point. Mr. Pinckney thought it evident that the concession was wholly on one side, that of the large States; the priv- ilege of originating money bills being of no account. Mr. Gouverneur Morris had waited to [hear the good effects of the restriction. As to the alarm sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there never was, nor ever will be, a civilized society without an aristocracy. His en- deavour was, to keep it as much as possible from doing mis- chief. The restriction, if it has any real operation, will deprive us of the services of the second branch in digesting and proposing money bills, of which it will be more capa- ble than the first branch. It will take away the responsi- bility of the second branch, the great security for good be- haviour. It will always leave a plea, as to an obnoxious money bill, that it was disliked, but could not be constitu- tionally amended, nor safely rejected. It will be a danger- ous source of disputes between the two Houses. We should either take the British Constitution altogether, or make one for ourselves. The Executive there has dissolved two Houses, as the only cure for such disputes. Will our Executive be able to apply such a remedy? Every law, directly or indirectly, takes money out of the pockets of the people. Again, what use may be made of such a privilege in case of great emergency? Suppose an enemy at the door, and money instantly and absolutely necessary for re- pelling him, — may not the popular branch avail itself of this duresse, to extort concessions from the Senate, de- structive of the Constitution itself? He illustrated this danger by the example of the Long Parliament's expe- 20 306 DEBATES IN THE [1787. dients for subverting the House of Lords; concluding, on the whole, that the restriction would be either useless or pernicious. Doctor Franklin did not mean to go into a justification of the Report ; but as it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the second branch from meddling with money bills, he could not but remark, that it was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of their money, and how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim, that those who feel, can best judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained, if money affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of the peo- ple. This was his inducement to concur in the Report. As to the danger or difficulty that might arise from a nega- tive in the second branch, where the people would not be proportionally represented, it might easily be got over by declaring that there should be no such negative ; or, if that will not do, by declaring that there be no such branch at all. Mr. Martin said, that it was understood in the Com- mittee, that the difficulties and disputes which had been apprehended should be guarded against in the detailing of the plan. Mr. Wilson. The difficulties and disputes will increase with the attempts to define and obviate them. Queen Ann was obliged to dissolve her Parliament in order to termi- nate one of these obstinate disputes between the two houses. Had it not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one can say what the result would have been. The point is still sab jadice in England. He approved of the principles laid down by the Honourable President* (Doctor Franklin) his colleague, as to the expediency of keeping the people in- formed of their money affairs. But thought they would know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one way as in the other. General Pinckney was astonished that this point should * He was at that time President of the State of Pennsylvania. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 307 have been considered as a concession. He remarked, that the restriction as to money bills had been rejected on the merits singly considered, by eight States against three; and that the very States which now called it a concession were then against it, as nugatory or improper in itself. On the question whether the clause relating to money bills in the Report of the Committee consisting of a mem- ber from each State, should stand as part of the Report, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Caro- lina, aye — 5 ; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 3; Massachusetts, New York, Georgia, divided. A question was then raised, whether the question was carried in the affirmative; there being but five ayes, out of eleven States present. For the words of the Rule, see May 28th. On this question, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; New York, Virginia, no — 2. ( In several preceding instances like votes had sub silentio been entered as decided in the affirmative. ) Adjourned. Saturday, July 7th. In Convention, — The question, shall the clause " allow- ing each State one vote in the second branch, stand as part of the Report," being taken up, — Mr. Gerry. This is the critical question. He had rather agree to it than have no accommodation. A Gov- ernment short of a proper national plan, if generally accept- able, would be preferable to a proper one which, if it could be carried at all, would operate on discontented States. He thought it would be best to suspend this question till the Committee appointed yesterday should make report. Mr. Sherman supposed that it was the wish of every- one that some General Government should be established. 308 DEBATES IN THE [1787. An equal vote in the second branch would, he thought, be most likely to give it the necessary vigor. The small States have more vigor in their Governments than the large ones; the more influence therefore the large ones have, the weaker will be the Government. In the large States it will be most difficult to collect the real and fair sense of the people. Fallacy and undue influence will be practised with most success; and improper men will most easily get into office. If they vote by States in the second branch, and each State has an equal vote, there must be always a majority of States, as well as a majority of the people, on the side of public measures, and the Government will have decision and efficacy. If this be not the case in the second branch, there may be a majority of States against public measures ; and the difficulty of compelling them to abide by the public determination will render the Government feebler than it has ever yet been. Mr. Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating temper, but firmness was sometimes a duty of higher obligation. Conciliation was also misapplied in this instance. It was pursued here rather among the representatives, than among the constituents; and it would be of little consequence if not established among the latter; and there could be little hope of its beLig established among them, if the founda- tion should not be laid in justice and right. On the question, shall the words stand as part of the Report ? — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye — 6; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 3; Massachusetts, Georgia, divided.* Mr. Gerry thought it would be proper to proceed to enumerate and define the powers to be vested in the General Government, before a question on the Report should be taken as to the rule of representation in the second branch. Mr. Madison observed that it would be impossible to say what powers could be safely and properly vested in the ♦Several votes were given here in the affirmative, or were divided, because another final question was to bo taken on the whole Report. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 309 Government, before it was known in what manner the States were to be represented in it. He was apprehensive that if a just representation were not the basis of the Government, it would happen, as it did when the Articles of Confedera- tion were depending, that every effectual prerogative would be withdrawn or withheld, and the new Government would be rendered as impotent and as short-lived as the old. Mr. Patterson would not decide whether the privilege concerning money bills were a valuable consideration or not ; but he considered the mode and rule of representation in the first branch as fully so; and that after the establish- ment of that point, the small States would never be able to defend themselves without an equality of votes in the second branch. There was no other ground of accommodation. His resolution was fixed. He would meet the large States on that ground, and no other. For himself, he should vote against the Keport, because it yielded too much. Mr. Gouverneur Morris. He had no resolution un- alterably fixed except to do what should finally appear to him right. He was against the Report because it main- tained the improper constitution of the second branch. It made it another Congress, a mere whisp of straw. , It had been said (by Mr. Gerry), that the new Government would be partly national, partly federal ; that it ought in the first quality to protect individuals ; in the second, the State. But in what quality was it to protect the aggregate interest of the whole ? Among the many provisions which had been urged, he had seen none for supporting the dignity and splendor of the American Empire. It had been one of our greatest misfortunes that the great objects of the nation had been sacrificed constantly to local views ; in like manner as the general interest of States had been sacrificed to those of the counties. What is to be the check in the Senate ? None; unless it be to keep the majority of the people from injuring particular States. But particular States ought to be injured for the sake of a majority of the people, in case their conduct should deserve it. Suppose they should insist 310 DEBATES IN THE [1787. on claims evidently unjust, and pursue them in a manner detrimental to the whole body: suppose they should give themselves up to foreign influence: Ought they to be pro- tected in such cases? They were originally nothing more than colonial corporations. On the Declaration of Inde- pendence, a Government was to be formed. The small States aware of the necessity of preventing anarchy, and taking advantage of the moment, extorted from the large ones an equality of votes. Standing now on that ground, they demand, under the new system, greater rights, as men, than their fellow-citizens of the large States. The proper answer to them is, that the same necessity of which they formerly took advantage does not now exist ; and that the large States are at liberty now to consider what is right, rather than what may be expedient. We must have an efficient Govern- ment, and if there be an efficiency in the local Governments, the former is impossible. Germany alone proves it. Not- withstanding their common Diet, notwithstanding the great prerogatives of the Emperor, as head of the Empire, and his vast resources, as sovereign of his particular dominions, no union is maintained; foreign influence disturbs every internal operation, and there is no energy whatever in the general government. Whence does this proceed? From the energy of the local authorities; from its being con- sidered of more consequence to support the Prince of Hesse, than the happiness of the people of Germany. Do gentle- men wish this to be the case here? Good God, Sir, is it possible they can so delude themselves? What if all the Charters and Constitutions of the States were thrown into the fire, and all their demagogues into the ocean — what would it be to the happiness of America? And will not this be the case here, if we pursue the train in which the business lies? We shall establish an Aulic Council, with- out an Emperor to execute its decrees. The same circum- stances which unite the people here unite them in Germany. They have there a common language, a common law, com- mon usages and manners, and a common interest in being J 787-] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 311 united; yet their local jurisdictions destroy every tie. The case was the same in the Grecian states. The United Netherlands are at this time torn in factions. With these examples before our eyes, shall we form establish- ments which must necessarily produce the same effects ? It is of no consequence from what districts the second branch shall be drawn, if it be so constituted as to yield an asylum against these evils. As it is now constituted, he must be against its being drawn from the States in equal portions; but shall be ready to join in devising such an amendment of the plan as will be most likely to secure our liberty and happiness. Mr. Sherman and Mr. Ellsworth moved to postpone the question on the Report from the Committee of a mem- ber from each State, in order to wait for the Report from ■the Committee of five last appointed, — Massachusetts, Con- necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 6 ; New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- lina, Georgia, no — 5. Adjourned. Monday, July 9th. In Convention, — Mr. Daniel Carroll, from Maryland, took his seat. Mr. Gouverneur Morris delivered a Report from the Committee of five members, to whom was committed the clause in the Report of the Committee consisting of a mem- ber from each State, stating the proper ratio of represen- tatives in the first branch to be as one to every forty thousand inhabitants, as follows, viz : " The Committee to whom was referred the first clause of the first proposition reported from the Grand Committee, beg leave to report : " That in the first meeting of the Legislature the first branch thereof consist of fifty-six members, of which num- ber New Hampshire shall have 2, Massachusetts 7, 312 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Khode Island 1, Connecticut 4, New York 5, New Jersey 3, Pennsylvania 8, Delaware 1, Maryland 4, Virginia 9, North Carolina 5, South Carolina 5, Georgia 2. .. " But as the present situation of the States may prob- ably alter, as well in point of wealth as in the number of their inhabitants, that the Legislature be authorized from time to time to augment the number of Representatives. And in case any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or any two or more States united, or any new States created within the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall possess authority to regulate the number of Representatives in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principles of their wealth and number of inhabitants." Mr. Sherman wished to know, on what principles or calculations the Report was founded. It did not appear to correspond with any rule of numbers, or of any requisition hitherto adopted by Congress. Mr. Gorham. Some provision of this sort was neces- sary in the outset. The number of blacks and whites,, with some regard to supposed wealth, was the general guide. Fractions could not be observed. The Legislature is to make alterations from time to time, as justice and propriety may require. Two objections prevailed against the rule of one member for every forty thousand inhabitants. The first was, that the representation would soon be too numerous, the second that the Western States, who may have a differ- ent interest, might, if admitted on that principle, by degrees outvote the Atlantic. Both these objections are removed. The number will be small in the first instance, and may be continued so. And the Atlantic States, having the Govern- ment in their own hands, may take care of their own inter- est, by dealing out the right of representation in safe proportions to the Western States. These were the views of the Committee. Mr. L. Martin wished to know whether the Committee were guided in the ratio by the wealth, or number of 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 313 inhabitants, of the States, or both ; noting its variations from former apportionments by Congress. Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Kutledge moved to postpone the first paragraph, relating to the number of members to be allowed to each State in the first instance and to take up the second paragraph, authorizing the Leg- islature to alter the number from time to time according to wealth and inhabitants. The motion was agreed to, nem. con. On the question on the second paragraph, taken without any debate, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- lina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; New York, New Jersey, no — 2. Mr. Sherman moved to refer the first part, apportioning the representatives, to a Committee of a member from each State. Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion ; observ- ing that this was the only case in which such committees were useful. Mr. Williamson thought it would be necessary to return to the rule of numbers, but that the Western States stood on different footing. If their property should be rated as high as that of the Atlantic States, then their representation ought to hold a like proportion. Otherwise, if their property was not to be equally rated. Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The Keport is little more than a guess. Wealth was not altogether disregarded by the Committee. Where it was apparently in favor of one State whose numbers were superior to the numbers of another, by a fraction only, a member extraordinary was allowed to the former ; and so vice versa. The Committee meant little more than to bring the matter to a point for the consideration of the House. Mr. Read asked, why Georgia was allowed two mem- bers, when her number of inhabitants had stood below that of Delaware ? Mr. Gouverneur Morris. Such is the rapidity of the 314 DEBATES IN THE [1787. population of that State, that before the plan takes effect, it will probably be entitled to two Kepresentatives. Mr. Kandolph disliked the Keport of the Committee, but had been unwilling to object to it. He was apprehen- sive that, as the number was not to be changed, till the National Legislature should please, a pretext would never be wanting to postpone alterations, and keep the power in the hands of those possessed of it. He was in favor of the commitment to a member from each State. Mr. Patterson considered the proposed estimate for the future according to the combined rules of numbers and wealth, as too vague. For this reason New Jersey was against it. He could regard negro slaves in no light but as property. They are no free agents, have no personal liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, but on the con- trary are themselves property, and like other property entirely at the will of the master. Has a man in Virginia a number of votes in proportion to the number of his slaves ? and if negroes are not represented in the States to which they belong, why should they be represented in the General Government. What is the true principle of repre- sentation ? It is an expedient by which an assembly of certain individuals, chosen by the people, is substituted in place of the inconvenient meeting of the people themselves. If such a meeting of the people was actually to take place, would the slaves vote ? They would not. Why then should they be represented ? He was also against such an indirect encouragement of the slave trade ; observing that Congress, in their Act relating to the change of the eighth Article of Confederation, had been ashamed to use the term "slaves," and had substituted a description. Mr. Madison reminded Mr. Patterson that his doc- trine of representation, which was in its principle the gen- uine one, must forever silence the pretensions of the small States to an equality of votes with the large ones. They ought to vote in the same proportion in which their citizens would do, if the people of all the States were col- 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 315 lectively met. He suggested as a proper ground of com- promise, that in the first branch the States should be rep- resented according to their number of free inhabitants ; and in the second, which had for one of its primary objects the guardianship of property, according to the whole number, including slaves. Mr. Butler urged warmly the justice and necessity of regarding wealth in the apportionment of representation. Mr. King had always expected, that, as the Southern States are the richest, they would not league themselves with the Northern, unless some respect were paid to their superior Avealth. If the latter expect those preferential distinctions in commerce, and other advantages which they will derive from the connexion, they must not expect to re- ceive them without allowing some advantages in return. Eleven out of thirteen of the States had agreed to consider slaves in the apportionment of taxation; and taxation and representation ought to go together. On the question for committing the first paragraph of the Report to a member from each State, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- land, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; New York, South Carolina, no — 2. The Committee appointed were Messrs. King, Sherman, Yates, Brearly, Gouverneur Morris, Read, Carroll, Madison, Williamson, Rutledge, Houston. Adjourned. Tuesday, July 10th. In Convention, — Mr. King reported, from the Commit- tee yesterday appointed, " that the States at the first meet- ing of the General Legislature, should be represented by sixty -five members, in the following proportions, to wit: — New Hampshire, by 3 ; Massachusetts, 8 ; Rhode Island, 1 ; Connecticut, 5; New York, 6; New Jersey, 4; Pennsylvania, 316 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 8 ; Delaware, 1 ; Maryland, 6 ; Virginia, 10 ; North Carolina, 5; South Carolina, 5; Georgia, 3." Mr. Rutledge moved that New Hampshire be reduced from three to two members. Her numbers did not entitle her to three, and it was a poor State. General Pinckney seconds the motion. Mr. King. New Hampshire has probably more than 120,000 inhabitants, and has an extensive country of toler- able fertility. Its inhabitants may therefore be expected to increase fast. He remarked that the four Eastern States, having 800,000 souls, have one - third fewer representatives than the four Southern States, having not more than 700,- 000 souls, rating the blacks as five for three. The Eastern people will advert to these circumstances, and be dissatis- fied. He believed them to be very desirous of uniting with their Southern brethren, but did not think it prudent to rely so far on that disposition, as to subject them to any gross inequality. He was fully convinced that the question concerning a difference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto been discussed, between the great and small States ; but between the Southern and Eastern. For this reason he had been ready to yield something, in the proportion of representatives, for the security of the Southern. No principle would justify the giving them a majority. The}- were brought as near an equality as was possible. He was not averse to giving them a still greater security, but did not see how it could be done. General Pinckney. The Report before it was committed was more favorable to the Southern States than as it now stands. If they are to form so considerable a minority, and the regulation of trade is to be given to the General Government, they will be nothing more than overseers for the Northern States. He did not expect the Southern States to be raised to a majority of representatives; but wished them to have something like an equality. At present, by the alterations of the Committee in favor of the Northern States, they are removed further from it than 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 317 they were before. One member indeed had been added to Virginia, which he was glad of, as he considered her as a Southern State. He was glad also that the members of Georgia were increased. Mr. Williamson was not for reducing New Hampshire from three to two, but for reducing some others. The Southern interest must be extremely endangered by the present arrangement. The Northern States are to have a majority in the first instance, and the means of perpetua- ting it. Mr. Dayton observed, that the line between Northern and Southern interest had been improperly drawn; that Pennsylvania was the dividing State, there being six on each side of her. General Pinckney urged the reduction; dwelt on the superior wealth of the Southern States, and insisted on its having its due weight in the Government. Mr. Gouverneur Morris regretted the turn of the debate. The States, he found, had many representatives on the floor. Few, he feared, were to be deemed the Repre- sentatives of America. He thought the Southern States have, by the Report, more than their share of representa- tion. Property ought to have its weight, but not all the weight. If the Southern States are to supply money, the Northern States are to spill their blood. Besides, the probable revenue to be expected from the Southern States has been greatly overrated. He was against reducing New Hampshire. Mr. Randolph was opposed to a reduction of New Hampshire, not because she had a full title to three mem- bers ; but because it was in his contemplation, first, to make it the duty, instead of leaving it to the discretion, of the Legislature to regulate the representation by a periodical census; secondly, to require more than a bare majority of votes in the Legislature, in certain cases, and particularly in commercial cases. On the question for reducing New Hampshire from 318 DEBATES IN THE [1787. three to two Representatives, it passed in the negative, — North Carolina,* South Carolina, aye — 2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- land, Virginia, Georgia,* no — 8. General Pinckney and Mr. Alexander Martin moved that six Representatives, instead of five, be allowed to North Carolina. On the question it passed in the negative, — North Caro- lina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- land, Virginia, no — 7. General Pinckney and Mr. Butler made the same mo- tion in favor of South Carolina. On the question, it passed in the negative, — Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 4; Massa- chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva- nia, Maryland, Virginia, no — 7. General Pinckney and Mr. Houston moved that Geor- gia be allowed four instead of three Representatives ; urg- ing the unexampled celerity of its population. On the question, it passed in the negative, — Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 4 ; Massa- chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva- nia, Delaware, Maryland, no — 7. Mr. Madison moved that the number allowed to each State be doubled. A majority of a Quorum of sixty-five members was too small a number to represent the whole in- habitants of the United States. They would not possess enough of the confidence of the people, and would be too sparsely taken from the people, to bring with them all the local information which would be frequently wanted. Double the number will not be too great, even with the future additions from the new States. The additional expense was too inconsiderable to be regarded in so important a case. And as far as the augmentation might be unpopular * In the printed Journal, North Carolina, no; Georgia, aye. 1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 319 on that score, the objection was overbalanced by its effect on the hopes of a greater number of the popular candidates. Mr. Ellsworth urged the objection of expense; and that the greater the number, the more slowly would the business proceed; and the less probably be decided as it ought, at last. He thought the number of representatives too great in most of the State Legislatures; and that a large number was less necessary in the General Legislature, than in those of the States ; as its business would relate to a few great national objects only. Mr. Sherman would have preferred fifty to sixty -five. The great distance they will have to travel will render their attendance precarious, and will make it difficult to prevail on a sufficient number of fit men to undertake the service. He observed that the expected increase from new States also deserved consideration. Mr. Gerry was for increasing the number beyond sixty- five. The larger the number, the less the danger of their being corrupted. The people are accustomed to, and fond of, a numerous representation; and will consider their rights as better secured by it. The danger of excess in the number may be guarded against by fixing a point with- in which the number shall always be kept. Colonel Mason admitted, that the objection drawn from the consideration of expense had weight both in itself, and as the people might be affected by it. But he thought it outweighed by the objections against the smallness of the number. Thirty- eight will, he supposes, as being a major- ity of sixty-five, form a quorum. Twenty will be a major- ity of thirty-eight. This was certainly too small a number to make laws for America. They would neither bring with them all the necessary information relative to various local interests, nor possess the necessary confidence of the peo- ple. After doubling the number, the laws might still be made by so few as almost to be objectionable on that account. Mr. Eead was in favor of the motion. Two of the 320 DEBATES IN THE [1787. States (Delaware and Rhode Island) would have but a single member if the aggregate number should remain at sixty-five; and in case of accident to either of these, one State would have no Representative present to give explan- ations or informations of its interests or wishes. The peo- ple would not place their confidence in so small a number. He hoped the objects of the General Government would be much more numerous than seemed to be expected by some gentlemen, and that they would become more and more so. As to the new States, the highest number of Representa- tives for the whole might be limited, and all danger of ex- cess thereby prevented. Mr. Rutledge opposed the mo- tion. The Representatives were too numerous in all the States. The full number allotted to the States may be ex- pected to attend, and the lowest possible quorum should not therefore be considered. The interests of their constitu- ents will urge their attendance too strongly for it to be omitted: and he supposed the General Legislature would not sit more than six or eight weeks in the year. On the question for doubling the number, it passed in the negative, — Delaware, Virginia, aye — 2 ; Massachu- setts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9. On the question for agreeing to the apportionment of Representatives, as amended by the last Committee, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 9 ; South Carolina, Georgia, no — 2. Mr. Broom gave notice to the House, that he had con- curred with a reserve to himself of an intention to claim for his State an equal voice in the second branch ; which he thought could not be denied after this concession of the the small States as to the first branch. Mr. Randolph moved, as an amendment to the Report of the Committee of five, " that in order to ascertain the alterations in the population and wealth of the several [1787. FEDERAL CONVENTION. 321 States, the Legislature should be required to cause a cen- sus and estimate to be taken within one year after its first meeting ; and every ■ years thereafter ; and that the Legislature arrange the representation accordingly." Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed it, as fettering the Legislature too much. Advantage may be taken of it in time of war or the apprehension of it, by new States to extort particular favors. If the mode was to be fixed for taking a census, it might certainly be extremely inconveni- ent : if unfixed, the Legislature may use such a mode as will defeat the object ; and perpetuate the inequality. He was always against such shackles on the Legislature. They had been found very pernicious in most of the State Con- stitutions. He dwelt much on the danger of throwing such a preponderance into the western scale ; suggesting that in time the western people would outnumber the Atlantic States. He wished therefore to put it in the power of the latter to keep a majority of votes in their own hands. It was objected, he said, that, if the Legislature are left at liberty, they will never re-adjust the representation. He admitted that this was possible, but he did not think it prob- able, unless the reasons against a revision of it were very urgent ; and in this case, it ought not to be done. It was moved to postpone the proposition of Mr. Ran- dolph, in order to take up the following, viz : " that the Committee of eleven, to whom was referred the Report o£ the Committee of five on the subject of Representation, be requested to furnish the Convention with the principles on which they grounded the report ; " which was disagreed to, — South Carolina alone voting in the affirmative. Adjourned. Wednesday, July 11th. In Convention, — Mr. Randolph's motion, requiring the Legislature to take a periodical census for the purpose of redressing inequalities in the representation was resumed. 21 322 DEBATES IN THE [1787.. Mr. Sherman was against shackling the Legislature too much. We ought to choose wise and good men, and then confide in them. Mr. Mason. The greater the difficulty we find in fixing a proper rule of representation, the more unwilling ought we be to throw the task from ourselves on the General Legislature. He did not object to the conjectural ratio which was to prevail in the outset ; but considered a revis- ion from time to time, according to some permanent and precise standard, as essential to the fair representation required in the first branch. According to the present population of America, the northern part of it had a right to preponderate, and he could not deny it. But he wished it not to preponderate hereafter, when the reason no longer continued. From the nature of man, we may be sure that those who have power in their hands will not give it up, while they can retain it. On the contrary, we know that they will always, when they can, rather increase it. If the Southern States, therefore, should have three-fourths of the people of America within their limits, the Northern will hold fast the majority of Representatives. One-fourth will govern the three-fourths. The Southern States will com- plain, but they may complain from generation to generation without redress. Unless some principle, therefore, which will do justice to them hereafter, shall be inserted in the Constitution, disagreeable as the declaration was to him, he must declare he could neither vote for the system here, nor support it in his State. Strong objections had been drawn from the danger to the Atlantic interests from new Western States. Ought we to sacrifice what we know to be right in itself, lest it should prove favourable to States which are not yet in existence ? If the Western States are to be admitted into the Union, as they arise, they must, he would repeat, be treated as equals, and subjected to no degrading discriminations. They will have the same pride, and other passions, which we have; and will either not unite with, or will speedily revolt from, the Union, if they are not in all 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 323 respects placed on an equal footing with their brethren. It has been said, they will be poor, and unable to make equal contributions to the general treasury. He did not know but that, in time, they would be both more numerous and more wealthy, than their Atlantic brethren. The extent and fertility of their soil made this probable; and though Spain might for a time deprive them of the natural outlet for their productions, yet she will, because she must, finally yield to their demands. He urged that numbers of inhabi- tants, though not always a precise standard of wealth, was sufficiently so for every substantial purpose. Mr. Williamson was for making it a duty of the Legis- lature to do what was right, and not leaving it at liberty to do or not to do it. He moved that Mr. Kandolph's propo- sitions be postponed, in order to consider the following, " that in order to ascertain the alterations that may happen in the population and wealth of the States, a census shall be taken of the free white inhabitants, and three-fifths of those of other descriptions on the first year after this government shall have been adopted, and every year thereafter ; and that the representation be regulated accordingly." Mr. Eandolph agreed that Mr. Williamson's proposi- tion should stand in place of his. He observed that the ratio fixed for the first meeting was a mere conjecture; that it placed the power in the hands of that part of America which could not always be entitled to it; that this power- would not be voluntarily renounced; and that it was conse- quently the duty of the Convention to secure - its renuncia- tion, when justice might so require, by some constitutional provisions. If equality between great and small States be inadmissible, because in that case unequal numbers of con- stituents would be represented by equal numbers of votes, was it not equally inadmissible, that a larger and more populous district of America should hereafter have less representation than a smaller and less populous district ? If a fair representation of the people be not secured, the in- justice of the Government will shake it to its foundations. 324: DEBATES IN THE [1787. What relates to suffrage, is justly stated by the celebrated Montesquieu as a fundamental article in Republican Gov- ernments. If the danger suggested by Mr. Gouverneur Morris be real, of advantage being taken of the Legislature in pressing moments, it was an additional reason for tying their hands in such a manner, that they could not sacrifice their trust to momentary considerations. Congress have pledged the public faith to new States, that they shall be admitted on equal terms. They never would, nor ought to, accede on any other. The census must be taken under the direction of the General Legislature. The States will be too much interested, to take an impartial one for them- selves. Mr. Butler and General Pinckney insisted that blacks be included in the rule of representation equally with the whites; and for that purpose moved that the words " three - fifths " be struck out. Mr. Gerry thought that three-fifths of them was, to say the least, the full proportion that could be admitted. Mr. Gorham. This ratio was fixed by Congress as a rule of taxation. Then, it was urged, by the Delegates representing the States having slaves, that the blacks were still more inferior to freemen. At present, when the ratio of representation is to be established, we are assured that they are equal to freemen. The arguments on the former occasion had convinced him, that three-fifths was pretty near the just proportion, and he should vote according to the same opinion now. Mr. Butler insisted that the labor of a slave in South Carolina was as productive and valuable, as that of a free- man in Massachusetts; that as wealth was the great means of defence and utility to the nation, they were equally val- uable to it with freemen; and that consequently an equal representation ought to be allowed for them in a govern- ment which was instituted principally for the protection of property, and was itself to be supported by property. Mr. Mason could not agree to the motion, notwithstand- 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 325 ing it was favourable to Virginia, because he thought it un- just. It was certain that the slaves were valuable, as they raised the value of land, increased the exports and imports, and of course the revenue, would supply the means of feed- ing and supporting an army, and might in cases of emer- gency become themselves soldiers. As in these important respects they were useful to the community at large, they ought not to be excluded from the estimate of representa- tion. He could not, however, regard them as equal to free- men, and could not vote for them as such. He added, as worthy of remark, that the Southern States have this pecu- liar species of property, over and above the other species of property common to all the States. Mr. Williamson reminded Mr. Gorham that if the Southern States contended for the inferiority of blacks to whites when taxation was in view, the Eastern States, on the same occasion, contended for their equality. He did not, however, either then or now, concur in either extreme, but approved of the ratio of three - fifths. On Mr. Butler's motion, for considering blacks as equal to whites in the apportionment of representation, — Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no - — 7 ; New York, not on the floor. Mr. Gouverneur Morris said he had several objections to the proposition of Mr. Williamson. In the first place, it fettered the Legislature too much. In the second place, it would exclude some States altogether who would not have a sufficient number to entitle them to a single repre- sentation. In the third place, it will not consist with the resolution passed on Saturday last, authorizing the Legis- lature to adjust the representation from time to time on the principles of population and wealth; nor with the princi- ples of equity. If slaves were to be considered as inhabi- tants, not as wealth, then the said Eesolution would not be pursued; if as wealth, then why is no other wealth but slaves included? These objections may perhaps be removed 326 DEBATES IN THE [1787. by amendments. His great objection was, that the number of inhabitants was not a proper standard of wealth. The amazing difference between the comparative numbers and wealth of different countries rendered all reasoning super- fluous on the subject. Numbers might with greater pro- priety be deemed a measure of strength, than of wealth; yet the late defence made by Great Britain, against her numerous enemies proved, in the clearest manner, that it is entirely fallacious even in this respect. Mr. King thought there was great force in the objections of Mr. Gouverneur Morris. He would, however, accede to the proposition for the sake of doing something. Mr. Rutledge contended for the admission of wealth in the estimate by which representation should be regula- ted. The Western States will not be able to contribute in proportion to their numbers ; they should not therefore be represented in that proportion. The Atlantic States will not concur in such a plan. He moved that, " at the end of years after the first meeting of the Legislature, and of every years thereafter, the Legislature shall pro- portion the representation according to the principles of wealth and population." Mr. Sherman thought the number of people alone the best rule for measuring wealth as well as representation ; and that if the Legislature were to be governed by wealth, they would be obliged to estimate it by numbers. He was at first for leaving the matter wholly to the discretion of the Legislature; but he had been convinced by the observa- tion of (Mr. Randolph and Mr. Mason), that the periods and the rule, of revising the representation, ought to be fixed by the Constitution. Mr. Read thought, the Legislature ought not to be too much shackled. It would make the Constitution like religious creeds, embarrassing to those bound to conform to them, and more likely to produce dissatisfaction and schism, than harmony and union. Mr. Mason objected to Mr. Rutledge's motion, as re- 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 32i quiring of the Legislature something too indefinite and impracticable, and leaving them a pretext for doing noth- ing. Mr. Wilson had himself no objection to leaving the Legislature entirely at liberty, but considered wealth as an impracticable rule. Mr. Gorham. If the Convention, who are compar- atively so little biassed by local views, are so much per- plexed, how can it be expected that the Legislature here- after, under the full bias of those views will be able to settle a standard? He was convinced, by the arguments of others and his own reflections, that the Convention ought to fix some standard or other. Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The argument of others and his own reflections had led him to a very different conclu- sion. If we cannot agree on a rule that will be just at this iime, how can we expect to find one that will be just in all times to come ? Surely those who come after us will judge better of things present, than we can of things future. He could not persuade himself that numbers would be a just rule at any time. The remarks of (Mr. Mason) relative to the Western country had not changed his opinion on that head. Among other objections, it must be apparent, they would not be able to furnish men equally enlightened, to share in the administration of our common interests. The busy haunts of men, not the remote wilderness, was the proper school of political talents. If the western people get the power into their hands, they will ruin the Atlantic interests. The back members are always most averse to the best measures. He mentioned the case of Pennsylvania formerly. The lower part of the State had the power in the first instance. They kept it in their own hands, and the country was the better for it. Another objection with him. against admitting the blacks into the census, was, that the people of Pennsylvania would revolt at the idea of being put on a footing with slaves. They would reject any plan that was to have such an effect. Two objections had been 328 DEBATES IN THE [1787. raised against leaving the adjustment of the representation, from time to time, to the discretion of the Legislature. The first was, they would be unwilling to revise it at all. The second, that, by referring to wealth, they would be bound by a rule which, if willing, they would be unable to execute. The first objection distrusts their fidelity. But if their duty, their honor, and their oaths, will not bind them, let us not put into their hands our liberty, and all our other great interests ; let us have no government at all. In the second place, if these ties will bind them, we need not distrust the practicability of the rule. It was followed in part by the Committee in the apportionment of Represen- tatives yesterday reported to the House. The best course that could be taken would be to leave the interests of the people to the representatives of the people. Mr. Madison was not a little surprised to hear this im- plicit confidence urged by a member who, on all occasions, had inculcated so strongly the political depravity of men, and the necessity of checking one vice and interest by op- posing to them another vice and interest. If the represen- tatives of the people would be bound by the ties he had mentioned, what need was there of a Senate ? What of a revisionary power? But his reasoning was not only in- consistent with his former reasoning, but with itself. At the same time that he recommended this implicit confidence to the Southern States in the Northern majority, he was still more zealous in exhorting all to a jealousy of a western majority. To reconcile the gentleman with himself, it must be imagined that he determined the human character by the points of the compass. The truth was, that all men having power ought to be distrusted, to a certain degree. The case of Pennsylvania had been mentioned, where it was admitted that those who were possessed of the power in the original settlement never admitted the new settlements to a due share of it. England was a still more striking example. The power there had long been in the hands of the bor- oughs — of the minority — who had opposed and defeated 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 32$ every reform which had been attempted. Virginia was, in a less degree, another example. With regard to the West- ern States, he was clear and firm in opinion, that no un- favourable distinctions were admissible, either in point of justice or policy. He thought also, that the hope of con- tributions to the Treasury from them had been much under- rated. Future contributions, it seemed to be understood on all hands, would be principally levied on imports and exports. The extent and fertility of the Western soil would for a long time give to agriculture a preference over manufactures. Trials would be repeated till some articles could be raised from it, that would bear a transportation to places where they could be exchanged for imported man- ufactures. Whenever the Mississippi should be opened to them, which would of necessity be the case as soon as their population would subject them to any considerable share of the public burden, imposts on their trade could be collected with less expense, and greater certainty, than on that of the Atlantic States. In the mean time, as their supplies must pass through the Atlantic States, their contributions would be levied in the same manner with those of the Atlantic States. He could not agree that any substantial objection lay against fixing numbers for the perpetual standard of representation. It was said, that representation and tax- ation were to go together ; that taxation and wealth ought to go together ; that population and wealth were not measures of each other. He admitted that in different climates, under different forms of government, and in different stages of civilization, the inference was perfectly just. He would admit that in no situation numbers of inhabitants were an accurate measure of wealth. He contended, however, that in the United States it was sufficiently so for the object in contemplation. Although their climate varied consider- ably, yet as the governments, the laws, and the manners of all, were nearly the same, and the intercourse between dif- ferent parts perfectly free, population, industry, arts, and the value of labor, would constantly tend to equalize them- 330 DEBATES IN THE [1787. selves. The value of labor might be considered as the principal criterion of wealth and ability to support taxes; and this would find its level in different places, where the intercourse should be easy and free, with as much cer- tainty as the value of money or any other thing. Where- ever labor would yield most, people would resort ; till the competition should destroy the inequality. Hence it is that the people are constantly swarming from the more, to the less, populous places — from Europe to America — from the Northern and middle parts of the United States to the Southern and Western. They go where land is cheaper, because there labor is dearer. If it be true that the same quantity of produce raised on the banks of the Ohio is of less value than on the Delaware, it is also true that the same labor will raise twice or thrice the quantity in the former, that it will raise in the latter situ- ation. Colonel Mason agreed with Mr. G. Morris, that we ought to leave the interests of the people to the repre- sentatives of the people ; but the objection was, that the Legislature would cease to be the representatives of the people. It would continue so no longer than the States now containing a majority of the people should retain that majority. As soon as the southern and western population should predominate, which must happen in a few years, the power would be in the hands of the minority, and would never be yielded to the majority, unless provided for by the Constitution. On the question for postponing Mr. Williamson's motion, in order to consider that of Mr. Rutledge, it passed in the negative, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no — 5. On the question on the first clause of Mr. Williamson's motion, as to taking a census of the free inhabitants, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 331 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 6 ; Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4. The next clause as to three-fifths of the negroes being considered, — Mr. King, being much opposed to fixing numbers as the rule of representation, was particularly so on account of the blacks. He thought the admission of them along with whites at all, would excite great discontent among the States having no slaves. He had never said, as to any particular point, that he would in no event acquiesce in and support it ; but he would say that if in any case such a declaration was to be made by him, it would be in this He remarked that in the temporary allotment of representa- tives made by the Committee, the Southern States had received more than the number of their white and three- fifths of their black inhabitants entitled them to. Mr. Sherman. South Carolina had no more beyond her proportion than New York and New Hampshire ; nor either of them more than was necessary in order to avoid fractions, or reducing them below their proportion. Georgia had more ; but the rapid growth of that State seemed to justify it In general the allotment might not be just, but considering all circumstances he was satisfied with it. Mr. Gorham supported the propriety of establishing numbers as the rule. He said that in Massachusetts esti- mates had been taken in the different towns, and that persons had been curious enough to compare these esti- mates with the respective numbers of people; and it had been found, even including Boston, that the most exact proportion prevailed between numbers and property. He was aware that there might be some weight in what had fallen from his colleague, as to the umbrage which might be taken by the people of the Eastern States. But he recol- lected that when the proposition of Congress for changing the eighth Article of the Confederation was before the Legislature of Massachusetts, the only difficulty then was, 332 DEBATES IN THE [1787. to satisfy them that the negroes ought not to have been counted equally with the whites, instead of being counted in the ratio of three-fifths only.* Mr. Wilson did not well see, on what principle the admission of blacks in the proportion of three-fifths could be explained. Are they admitted as citizens — then why are they not admitted on an equality with white citizens? Are they admitted as property — then why is not other prop- erty admitted into the computation ? These were difficulties, however, which he thought must be overruled by the necessity of compromise. He had some apprehensions also, from the tendency of the blending of the blacks with the whites, to give disgust to the people of Pennsylvania, as had been intimated by his colleague (Mr. Gouverneur Morris). But he differed from him in thinking numbers of inhabitants so incorrect a measure of wealth. He had seen the western settlements of Pennsylvania, and on a compari- son of them with the city of Philadelphia could discover little other difference, than that property was more un- equally divided here than there. Taking the same number in the aggregate, in the two situations, he believed there would be little difference in their wealth and ability to contribute to the public wants. Mr. Gouverneur Morris was compelled to declare him- self reduced to the dilemma of doing injustice to the Southern States, or to human nature ; and he must there- fore do it to the former. For he could never agree to give such encouragement to the slave trade, as would be given by allowing them a representation for their negroes ; and he did not believe those States would ever confederate on terms that would deprive them of that trade. On the question for agreeing to include three-fifths of the blacks, — Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 4; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela- ware, Maryland, f South Carolina, no — 6. *They were then to have been a rule of taxation only. t Mr. Carroll said, in explanation of the vote of Maryland, that he wished the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 333 On the question as to taking the census " the first year after the meeting of the Legislature," — Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 7; Connecticut, Maryland, Georgia, no — 3. On filling the blank for the periodical census with fif- teen years, — agreed to, nem. con. Mr. Madison moved to add, after " fifteen years," the words "at least," that the Legislature might anticipate when circumstances were likely to render a particular year inconvenient. On this motion, for adding " at least," it passed in the negative, the States being equally divided, — Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- land, no — 5. A change in the phraseology of the other clause, so as to read, " and the Legislature shall alter or augment the representation accordingly," was agreed to, nem. con. On the question on the whole resolution of Mr. Wil- liamson, as amended, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9 ; so it was rejected unani- mously. Adjourned. Thursday, July 12th. In Convention, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to add to the clause empowering the Legislature to vary the rep- resentation according to the principles of wealth and num- bers of inhabitants, a proviso, " that taxation shall be in proportion to representation." Mr. Butler contended again, that representation should be according to the full number of inhabitants, including phraseology to be so altered as to obviate, if possible, the danger which had been expressed of giving umbrage to the Eastern and Middle States. 334 DEBATES IN THE [1787. all the blacks; admitting the justice of Mr. Gouveeneur Morris's motion. Mr. Mason also admitted the justice of the principle, but was afraid embarrassments might be occasioned to the Legislature by it. It might drive the Legislature to the plan of requisitions. Mr. Gouverneur Morris admitted that some objections lay against his motion, but supposed they would be removed by restraining the rule to direct taxation. With regard to indirect taxes on exports and imports, and on consumption, the rule would be inapplicable. Notwithstanding what had been said to the contrary, he was persuaded that the im- ports and consumption were pretty nearly equal through- out the Union. General Pinckney liked the idea. He thought it so just that it could not be objected to; but foresaw, that, if the revision of the census was left to the discretion of the Legislature, it would never be carried into execution. The rule must be fixed, and the execution of it enforced, by the Constitution. He was alarmed at what was said* yester- day, concerning the negroes. He was now again alarmed at what had been thrown out concerning the taxing of ex- ports. South Carolina has in one year exported to the amount of £600,000 sterling, all which was the fruit of the labor of her blacks. Will she be represented in pro- portion to this amount? She will not. Neither ought she then to be subject to a tax on it. He hoped a clause would be inserted in the system, restraining the Legislature from taxing exports. Mr. Wilson approved the principle, but could not see how it could be carried into execution ; unless restrained to direct taxation. Mr. Gouverneur Morris having so varied his motion by inserting the word " direct," it passed nem. con., as follows: "provided always that direct taxation ought to be proportioned to representation." * By Mr. Gouveeneur Morris. 1787.] FEDERAL. CONVENTION. 335 Mr. Davie said it was high time now to speak out. He saw that it was meant by some gentlemen to deprive the Southern States of any share of representation for their blacks. He was sure that North Carolina would never confederate on any terms that did not rate them at least as three -fifths. If the Eastern States meant, therefore, to exclude them altogether, the business was at an end. Doctor Johnson thought that wealth and population were the true, equitable rules of representation; but he conceived that these two principles resolved themselves into one, population being the best measure of wealth. He concluded, therefore, that the number of people ought to be established as the rule, and that all descriptions, includ- ing blacks equally with the whites, ought to fall within the computation. As various opinions had been expressed on the subject, he would move that a committee might be appointed to take them into consideration, and report them. Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It had been said that it is high time to speak out. As one member, he would candidly do so. He came here to form a compact for the good of America. He was ready to do so with all the States. He hoped, and believed, that all would enter into such a com- pact. If they would not, he was ready to join with any States that would. But as the compact was to be volun- tary, it is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on what the Southern States will never agree to. It is equally vain for the latter to require, what the other States can never admit; and he verily believed the people of Pennsylvania will never agree to a representation of negroes. What can be desired by these States more than has been already pro- posed — that the Legislature shall from time to time regulate representation according to population and wealth ? General Pinckney desired that the rule of wealth should be ascertained, and not left to the pleasure of the Legisla- ture ; and that property in slaves should not be exposed to danger, under a government instituted for the protection of property. 336 DEBATES IN THE [1787. The first clause in the Keport of the first Grand Com- mittee was postponed. Mr. Ellsworth, in order to carry into effect the princi- ple established, moved to add to the last clause adopted by the House the words following, " and that the rule of con- tribution by direct taxation, for the support of the Govern- ment of the United States, shall be the number of white inhabitants, and three-fifths of every other description in the several States, until some other rule that shall more accurately ascertain the wealth of the several States can be devised and adopted by the Legislature." Mr. Butler seconded the motion, in order that it might be committed. Mr. Kandolph was not satisfied with the motion. The danger will be revived, that the ingenuity of the Legisla- ture may evade or pervert the rule, so as to perpetuate the power where it shall be lodged in the first instance. He proposed, in lieu of Mr. Ellsworth's motion, "that in order to ascertain the alterations in representation that may be required, from time to time, by changes in the relative circumstances of the States, a census shall be taken within two years from the first meeting of the General Legisla- ture of the United States, and once within the term of every years afterwards, of all the inhabitants, in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by Con- gress, in their Resolution of the eighteenth day of April, 1783, (rating the blacks at three -fifths of their number) ; and that the Legislature of the United States shall arrange the representation accordingly." He urged strenuously that express security ought to be provided for including slaves in the ratio of representation. He lamented that such a species of property existed. But as it did exist, the holders of it would require this security. It was perceived that the design was entertained by some of excluding slaves altogether ; the Legislature therefore ought not to be left at liberty. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 337 Mr. Ellsworth withdraws his motion, and seconds that of Mr. Eandolph. Mr. Wilson observed, that less umbrage would perhaps be taken against an admission of the slaves into the rule of representation, if it should be so expressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient in the rule, by saying that they should enter into the rule of taxation; and as repre- sentation was to be according to taxation, the end would be equally attained. He accordingly moved, and was seconded, so to alter the last clause adopted by the House, that, together with the amendment proposed, the whole should read as follows: " provided always that the representation ought to be proportioned according to direct taxation; and in order to ascertain the alterations in the direct taxation which may be required from time to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the States, Resolved, that a census be taken within two years from the first meeting of the Legislature of the United States, and once within the term of every years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the United States, in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution of the eighteenth day of April, 1783; and that the Legislature of the United States shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly." Mr. King. Although this amendment varies the aspect somewhat, he had still two powerful objections against tying down the Legislature to the rule of numbers, — first, they were at this time an uncertain index of the relative wealth of the States ; secondly, if they were a just index at this time, it cannot be supposed always to continue so. He was far from wishing to retain any unjust advantage whatever in one part of the Republic. If justice was not the basis of the connection, it could not be of long duration. He must be short-sighted indeed who does not foresee, that, whenever the Southern States shall be more numerous than the Northern, they can and will hold a language that will awe them into justice. If they threaten to separate now in case 22 338 DEBATES IN THE [1787. injury shall be done them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual when force shall back their demands. Even in the intervening period, there will be no point of time at which they will not be able to say, do us justice or we will separate. He urged the necessity of placing confidence to a certain degree in every government, and did not conceive that the proposed confidence, as to a periodical re- adjust- ment of the representation, exceeded that degree. Mr. Pinckney moved to amend Mr. ^Randolph's motion, so as to make "blacks equal to the whites in the ratio of representation." This he urged was nothing more than justice. The blacks are the laborers, the peasants, of the Southern States. They are as productive of pecuniary resources as those of the Northern States. They add equally to the wealth, and, considering money as the sinew of war, to the strength, of the nation. It will also be politic with regard to the Northern States, as taxation is to keep pace with representation. General Pinckney moves to insert six years instead of two, as the period, computing from the first meeting of the Legislature, within which the first census should be taken. On this question for inserting six years, instead of " two," in the proposition of Mr. Wilson, it passed in the affirma- tive, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 4 ; Delaware, divided. On the question for filling the blank for the periodical census with twenty years, it passed in the negative, — Con- necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, aye — 3 ; Massachu- setts, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 7. On the question for ten years, it passed in the affirma- tive, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Connecticut, New Jersey, no — 2. On Mr. Pinckney's motion, for rating blacks as equal to whites, instead of as three-fifths, — South Carolina, 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 339 Georgia, aye — 2; Massachusetts, Connecticut (Doctor Johnson, aye), New Jersey, Pennsylvania (three against two), Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no — 8. Mr. Randolph's proposition, as varied by Mr Wilson, being read for taking the question on the whole, — Mr. Gekey urged that the principle of it could not be carried into execution, as the States were not to be taxed as States. With regard to taxes on imposts, he conceived they would be no more productive where there were no slaves, than where there were ; the consumption being greater. Mr Ellsworth. In case of a poll-tax there would be no difficulty. But there would probably be none. The sum allotted to a State may be levied without difficulty, according to the plan used by the State in raising its own supplies. On the question on the whole proposition, as propor- tioning representation to direct taxation, and both to the white and three-fifths of the black inhabitants, and requir- ing a census within six years, and within every ten years afterwards, — Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Vir- ginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; New Jersey, Delaware, no — 2 ; Massachusetts, South Carolina, divided. Adjourned. Friday, July 13th. In Convention, — It being moved to postpone the clause in the Report of the Committee of Eleven as to the origi- nating of money bills in the first branch, in order to take up the following, " that in the second branch each State shall have an equal voice," — Mr. Gerry moved to add, as an amendment to the last clause agreed to by the house, " that from the first meeting of the Legislature of the United States till a census shall be taken, all moneys to be raised for supplying the public Treasury by direct taxation shall be assessed on the inhabi- 340 DEBATES IN THE [1787. tants of the several States according to the number of their Representatives respectively in the first branch." He said this would be as just before as after the census, according to the general principle that taxation and representation ought to go together. Mr. Williamson feared that New Hampshire will have reason to complain. Three members were allotted to her as a liberal allowance, for this reason among others, that she might not suppose any advantage to have been taken of her absence. As she was still absent, and had no opportunity of deciding whether she would choose to retain the number on the condition of her being taxed in proportion to it, he thought the number ought to be reduced from three to two, before the question was taken on Mr. G-erry's motion. Mr. Read could not approve of the proposition. He had observed, he said, in the Committee a backwardness in some of the members from the large States, to take their full proportion of Representatives. He did not then see the motive. He now suspects it was to avoid their due share of taxation. He had no objection to a just and accurate adjustment of representation and taxation to each other. Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Madison answered, that the charge itself involved an acquittal ; since, notwith- standing the augmentation of the number of members allotted to Massachusetts and Virginia, the motion for pro- portioning the burdens thereto was made by a member from the former State, and was approved by Mr. Madison, from the latter, who was on the Committee. Mr. Gouver- neur Morris said, that he thought Pennsylvania had her due share in eight members ; and he could not in candour ask for more. Mr. Madison said, that having always con- ceived that the difference of interest in the United States lay not between the large and small, but the Northern and Southern States, and finding that the number of members allotted to the Northern States was greatly superior, he should have preferred an addition of two members to the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 341 Southern States, to wit, one to North and one to South Carolina, rather than of one member to Virginia. He liked the present motion, because it tended to moderate the views both of the opponents and advocates for rating very high the negroes. Mr. Ellsworth noped the proposition would be with- drawn. It entered too much into detail. The general principle was already sufficiently settled. As fractions can- not be regarded in apportioning the number of Eepresenta- tives, the rule will be unjust, until an actual census shall be made. After that, taxation may be precisely propor- tioned, according to the principle established, to the number of inhabitants. Mr. Wilson hoped the motion would not be withdrawn. If it should, it will be made from another quarter. The rule will be as reasonable and just before, as after, a census. As to fractional numbers, the census will not destroy, but ascertain them. And they will have the same effect after, as before, the census; for as he understands the rule, it is to be adjusted not to the number of inhabitants, but of Representatives. Mr. Sherman opposed the motion. He thought the Legislature ought to be left at liberty; in which case they would probably conform to the principles observed by Con- gress. Mr. Mason did not know that Virginia would be a loser by the proposed regulation, but had some scruple as to the justice of it. He doubted much whether the conjectural rule which was to precede the census would be as just as it would be rendered by an actual census. Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Sherman moved to postpone the motion of Mr. Gerry. On the question, it passed in the negative, — Connecti- cut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 4 ; Massachu- setts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- lina, Georgia, no — 6. On the question on Mr Gerry's motion, it passed in the 342 DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. negative, the States being equally divided, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia> no — 5. Mr. Gerry finding that the loss of the question had pro- ceeded from an objection, with some, to the proposed assess- ment of direct taxes on the inhabitants of the States, which might restrain the Legislature to a poll-tax, moved his pro- position again, but so varied as to authorize the assessment on the States, which leaves the mode to the Legislature, viz: "that from the first meeting of the Legislature of the United States, until a census shall be taken, all moneys for supplying the public Treasury by direct taxation shall be raised from the said several States, according to the num- ber of their Representatives respectively in the first branch." On this varied question it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no — 4; Pennsylvania, divided. On the motion of Mr. Randolph, the vote of Monday last, authorizing the Legislature to adjust, from time to time, the representation upon the principles of wealth and numbers of inhabitants, was reconsidered by common con- sent, in order to strike out tvealth and adjust the resolution to that requiring periodical revisions according to the num- ber of whites and three-fifths of the blacks. The motion was in the words following: — "But as the present situation of the States may probably alter in the number of their in- habitants, that the Legislature of the United States be authorized, from time to time, to apportion the number of Representatives ; and in case any of the States shall here- after be divided, or any two or more States united, or new States created within the limits of the United States, the Legislature of the United States shall possess authority to regulate the number of Representatives in any of the fore- going cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabit- ants, according to the provisions hereafter mentioned." 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 343 Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed the alteration, as leaving still an incoherence. If negroes were to be viewed as inhabitants, and the revision was to proceed on the prin- ciple of numbers of inhabitants, they ought to be added in their entire number, and not in the proportion of three- fifths. If as property, the word wealth was right; and striking it out would produce the very inconsistency which it was meant to get rid of. The train of business, and the late turn which it had taken, had led him, he said, into deep meditation on it, and he would candidly state the re- sult. A distinction had been set up, and urged, between the Northern and Southern States. He had hitherto con- sidered this doctrine as heretical. He still thought the distinction groundless. He sees, however, that it is per- sisted in; and the Southern gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see the way open to their gaining a majority in the public councils. The consequence of such a transfer of power from the maritime to the interior and landed inter- est, will, he foresees, be such an oppression to commerce, that he shall be obliged to vote for the vicious principle of equality in the second branch, in order to provide some de- fence for the Northern States against it. But to come more to the point, either this distinction is fictitious or real ; if fictitious, let it be dismissed, and let us proceed with due confidence. If it be real, instead of attempting to blend incompatible things, let us at once take a friendly leave of each other. There can be no end of demands for security, if every particular interest is to be entitled to it. The Eastern States may claim it for their fishery, and for other objects, as the Southern States claim it for their pe- culiar objects. In this struggle between the two ends of the Union, what part ought the Middle States, in point of policy, to take? To join their Eastern brethren, according to his ideas. If the Southern States get the power into their hands, and be joined, as they will be, with the inte- rior country, they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain for the Mississippi. This language is already held. The 344 DEBATES IN THE [1787. interior country, having no property nor interest ex- posed on the' sea, will be little affected by such a war. He wished to know what security the Northern and Middle States will have against this danger. It has been said that North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia only, will in a little time have a majority of the people of America. They must in that case include the great exterior country, and everything was to be apprehended from their getting the power into their hands. Mr. Butler. The security the Southern States want is that their negroes may not be taken from them, which some gentlemen within or without doors have a very good mind to do. It was not supposed that North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia would have more people than all the other States, but many more relatively to the other States, than they now have. The people and strength of America are evidently bearing southwardly, and south westwardly. Mr. Wilson. If a general declaration would satisfy any gentleman, he had no indisposition to declare his sen- timents. Conceiving that all men, wherever placed, have equal rights, and are equally entitled to confidence, he viewed without apprehension the period when a few States should contain the superior number of people. The major- ity of people, wherever found, ought in all questions, to govern the minority. If the interior country should acquire this majority, it will not only have the right, but will avail itself of it, whether we will or no. This jealousy misled the policy of Great Britain with regard to America. The fatal maxims espoused by her were, that the Colonies were growing too fast, and that their growth must be stinted in time. What were the consequences ? First, enmity on our part, then actual separation. Like consequences will result on the part of the interior settlements, if like jealousy and policy be pursued on ours. Further, if numbers be not a proper rule, why is not some better rule pointed out ? No one has yet ventured to attempt it. Congress have never been able to discover a better. No State, as far as 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 345 he had heard, had suggested any other. In 1783, after elaborate discussion of a measure of wealth, all were satisfied then, as they now are, that the rule of numbers does not differ much from the combined rule of numbers and wealth. Again, he could not agree that property was the sole or primary object of government and society. The cultivation and improvement of the human mind was the most noble object. With respect to this object, as well as to other personal rights, numbers were surely the natural and pre- cise measure of representation. And with respect to prop- erty, they could not vary much from the precise measure. In no point of view, however, could the establishment of numbers, as the rule of representation in the first branch, vary his opinion as to the impropriety of letting a vicious principle into the second branch. On the question to strike out wealth, and to make the change as moved by Mr. Randolph, it passed in the affir- mative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Penn- sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- lina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; Delaware, divided. Mr. Read moved to insert, after the word "divided," " or enlarged by addition of territory ; " which was agreed to, nem con.* Adjourned. Saturday, July 14th. In Convention, — Mr. L. Martin called for the question on the whole Report, including the parts relating .to the orig- ination of money bills, and the equality of votes in the second branch. Mr. Gerry wished, before the question should be put, that the attention of the House might be turned to the dan- gers apprehended from Western States. He was for ad- mitting them on liberal terms, but not for putting ourselves into their hands. They will, if they acquire power, like all * His object probably was to provide for such cases as an enlargement of Dela- ware by annexing to it the peninsula on the East side of the Chesapeake. 346 DEBATES IN, THE [1787. men, abuse it. They will oppress commerce, and drain our wealth into the Western country. To guard against these consequences, he thought it necessary to limit the number of new States to be admitted into the Union, in such a manner that they should never be able to outnumber the Atlantic States. He accordingly moved, " that in order to secure the liberties of the States already confederated, the number of Representatives in the first branch, of the States which shall hereafter be established, shall never exceed in number, the Representatives from such of the States as shall accede to this Confederation." Mr. King seconded the motion. Mr. Sherman thought there was no probability that the number of future States would exceed that of the existing States. If the event should ever happen, it was too remote to be taken into consideration at this time. Besides, we are providing for our posterity, for our children and our grand children, who would be as likely to be citizens of new western States, as of the old States. On this consider- ation alone, we ought to make no such discrimination as was proposed by the motion. Mr. Gerry. If some of our children should remove, others will stay behind, and he thought incumbent on us to provide for their interests. There was a rage of emigra- tion from the Eastern States to the western country, and he did not wish those remaining behind to be at the mercy of the emigrants. Besides, foreigners are resorting to that country, and it is uncertain what turn things may take there. On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr. Gerry, it passed in the negative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 4 ; New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 5; Pennsylvania, divided. Mr. Rutledge proposed to reconsider the two proposi- tions touching the originating of money bills in the first, and the equality of votes in the second, branch. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 347 Mr. Sherman was for the question on the whole at once. It was, he said, a conciliatory plan ; it had been considered in all its parts ; a great deal of time had been spent upon it ; and if any part should now be altered, it would be necessary to go over the whole ground again. Mr. L. Martin urged the question on the whole. He did not like many parts of it. He did not like having two branches, nor the inequality of votes in the first branch. He was willing, however, to make trial of the plan, rather than do nothing. Mr. Wilson traced the progress of the report through its several stages; remarking, that when on the question concerning an equality of votes, the House was divided, our constituents, had they voted as their Representatives did, would have stood as two-thirds against the equality, and one-third only in favor of it. This fact would ere long be known, and it would appear that this fundamental point has been carried by one-third against two-thirds. What hopes will our constituents entertain when they find that the essential principles of justice have been violated in the out- set of the Government? As to the privilege of originating money bills, it was not considered by any as of much mo- ment, and by many as improper in itself. He hoped both clauses would be reconsidered. The equality of votes was a point of such critical importance, that every opportunity ought to be allowed for discussing and collecting the mind of the Convention upon it. Mr. L. Martin denies that there were two-thirds against the equality of votes. The States that please to call them- selves large, are the weakest in the Union. Look at Mas- sachusetts — look at Virginia — are they efficient States ? He was for letting a separation taka p^ac 3 , h they desired it. He had rather there should be two confederacies, than one founded on any other principle than an equality of votes in the second branch at least. Mr. Wilson was not surprised that those who say that a minority does more than a majority, should say the mi- 348 DEBATES IN THE [1787. nority is stronger than the majority. He supposed the next assertion will be, that they are richer also ; though he hardly expected it would be persisted in, when the States shall be called on for taxes and troops. Mr. Gerry also animadverted on Mr. L. Martin's re- marks on the weakness of Massachusetts. He favored the reconsideration, with a view, not of destroying the equality of votes, but of providing that the States should vote per capita, which, he said, would prevent the delays and incon- veniences that had been experienced in Congress, and would give a national aspect and spirit to the management of busi- ness. He did not approve of a reconsideration of the clause relating to money bills. It was of great conse- quence. It was the corner stone of the accommodation. If any member of the Convention had the exclusive privilege of making propositions, would any one say that it would give him no advantage over other members? The Report was not altogether to his mind ; but he would agree to it as it stood, rather than throw it out altogether. The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to, — Mr. Pinckney moved, that, instead of an equality of votes, the States should be represented in the second branch as follows: New Hampshire by two members; Massachusetts, four; Rhode Island, one; Connecticut, three; New York, three; New Jersey, two; Pennsylvania, four; Delaware, one; Maryland, three; Virginia, five; North Carolina, three; South Carolina, three: Georgia, two; mak- ing in the whole, thirty-six. Mr. Wilson seconds the motion. Mr. Dayton. The smaller States can never give up their equality. For himself, he would in no event yield that security for their rights. Mr. Sherman urged the equality of votes, not so much as a security for the small States, as for the State Govern- ments, which could not be preserved unless they were rep- resented, and had a negative in the General Government. He had no objection to the members in the second branch 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 349 voting per capita, as had been suggested by (Mr. Gerry. ) Mr. Madison concurred in this motion of Mr. Pinckney, as a reasonable compromise. Mr. Gerry said, he should like the motion, but could 9ee no hope of success. An accommodation must take place, and it was apparent from what had been seen, that it could not do so on the ground of the motion. He was utterly against a partial confederacy, leaving other States to accede or not accede, as had been intimated. Mr. King said, it was always with regret that he dif- fered from his colleagues, but it was his duty to differ from (Mr. Gerry) on this occasion. He considered the pro- posed Government as substantially and formally a General and National Government over the people of America. There never will be a case in which it will act as a Federal Government, on the States and not on the individual citi- zens. And is it not a clear principle, that in a free govern- ment, those who are to be the objects of a government, ought to influence the operations of it? What reason can be assigned, why the same rule of representation should not prevail in the second, as in the first, branch ? He could conceive none. On the contrary, every view of the subject that presented itself seemed to require it. Two objections had been raised against it, drawn, first, from the terms of the existing compact; secondly, from a supposed danger to the smaller States. As to the first objection, he thought it inapplicable. According to the existing Confederation, the rule by which the public burdens is to be apportioned is fixed, and must be pursued. In the proposed Government, it cannot be fixed, because indirect taxation is to be substi- tuted. The Legislature, therefore, will have full discretion to impose taxes in such modes and proportions as they may judge expedient. As to the second objection, he thought it of as little weight. The General Government can never wish to intrude on the State Governments. There could be no temptation. None had been pointed out. In order to prevent the interference of measures which seemed 350 DEBATES IN THE [1787. most likely to happen, he would have no objection to throwing all the State debts into the Federal debt, making one aggregate debt of about $70,000,000, and leaving it to be discharged by the General Government. According to the idea of securing the State Governments, there ought to be three distinct legislative branches. The second was admitted to be necessary, and was actually meant, to check the first branch, to give more wisdom, system and stability to the Government; and ought clearly, as it was to operate on the people, to be proportioned to them. For the third purpose of securing the States, there ought then to be a third branch, representing the States as such, and guarding, by equal votes, their rights and dignities. He would not pretend to be as thoroughly acquainted with his immediate constituents as his colleagues, but it was his firm belief that Massachusetts would never be prevailed on to yield to an equality of votes. In New York, (he was sorry to be obliged to say anything relative to that State in the absence of its representatives, but the occasion required it,) in New York he had seen that the most powerful argument used by the considerate opponents to the grant of the Im- post to Congress, was pointed against the vicious constitu- tion of Congress with regard to representation and suffrage. He was sure that no government would last that was not founded on just principles. He preferred the doing of nothing, to an allowance of an equal vote to all the States, It would be better, he thought, to submit to a little more confusion and convulsion, than to submit to such an evil. It was difficult to say what the views of different gentlemen might be. Perhaps there might be some who thought no Government co-extensive with the United States could be established with a hope of its answering the purpose. Per- haps there might be other fixed opinions incompatible with the object we are pursuing. If there were, he thought it but candid, that gentlemen should speak out, that we might understand one another. Mr. Strong. The Convention had been much divided 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 351 in opinion. In order to avoid the consequences of it, an accommodation had been proposed. A committee had been appointed; and though some of the members of it were averse to an equality of votes, a report had been made in favor of it. It is agreed, on all hands, that Congress are nearly at an end. If no accommodation takes place, the Union itself must soon be dissolved. It has been suggested that if we cannot come to any general agreement, the prin- cipal States may form and recommend a scheme of govern- ment. But will the small States, in that case, ever accede to it? Is it probable that the large States themselves will, under such circumstances, embrace and ratify it? He thought the small States had made a considerable conces- sion, in the article of money bills, and that they might nat- urally expect some concessions on the other side. From this view of the matter, he was compelled to give his vote for the Report taken altogether. Mr. Madison expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foundation of government was destroyed, by substi- tuting an equality in place of a proportional representation, no proper superstructure would be raised. If the small States really wish for a government armed with the powers necessary to secure their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger members as well as themselves, he could not help thinking them extremely mistaken in the means. He reminded them of the consequences of laying the existing Confederation on improper principles. All the principal parties to its compilation joined immediately in mutilating and fettering the Government, in such a manner that it has disappointed every hope placed on it. He appealed to the doctrine and arguments used by themselves, on a former occasion. It had been very properly observed (by Mr. Patterson), that representation was an expedient by which the meeting of the people themselves was rendered unnec- essary ; and that the representatives ought therefore to bear a proportion to the votes which their constituents, if con- vened, would respectively have. Was not this remark r ; 352 DEBATES IN THE [1787. applicable to one branch of the representation as to the other? But it had been said that the Government would, in its operation, be partly federal, partly national; that although in the latter respect the representatives of the peo- ple ought to be in proportion to the people, yet in the former, it ought to be according to the number of States. If there was any solidity in this distinction, he was ready to abide by it ; if there was none, it ought to be abandoned. In all cases where the General Government is to act on the people, let the people be represented, and the votes be pro- portional. In all cases where the Government is to act on the States as such, in like manner as Congress now acts on them, let the States be represented and the votes be equal. This was the true ground of compromise, if there was any ground at all. But he denied that there was any ground. He called for a single instance in which the ' General Gov- ernment was not to operate on the people individually. The practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands. He observed that the people of the large States would, in some way or other, secure to themselves a weight proportioned to the importance accruing from their superior numbers. If they could not effect it by a proportional rep- resentation in the Government, they would probably accede to no government which did not, in a great measure, depend for its efficacy on their voluntary co-operation; in which case they would indirectly secure their object. The exist- ing Confederacy proved that where the acts of the General Government were to be executed by the particular Govern- ments, the latter had a weight in proportion to their import- ance. No one would say, that, either in Congress or out of Congress, Delaware had equal weight with Pennsylvania. If the latter was to supply ten times as much money as the former, and no compulsion could be used, it was of ten times more importance, that she should voluntarily furnish the supply. In the Dutch Confederacy the votes of the provinces were equal. But Holland, which supplies about 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 353 half the money, governed the whole Republic. He enumer- ated the objections against an equality of votes in the second branch, notwithstanding the proportional represen- tation in the first. 1. The minority could negative the will of the majority of the people. 2. They could extort mea- sures, by making them a condition of their assent to other necessary measures. 3. They could obtrude measures on the majority, by virtue of the peculiar powers which would be vested in the Senate. 4. The evil, instead of being cured by time, would increase with every new State that should be admitted, as they must all be admitted on the principle of equality. 5. The perpetuity it would give to the preponderance of the Northern against the Southern scale, was a serious consideration. It seemed now to be pretty well understood, that the real difference of interests lay, not between the large and small, but between the North- ern and Southern States. The institution of slavery, and its consequences, formed the line of discrimination. There were five States on the Southern, eight on the Northern side of this line. Should a proportional representation take place, it was true, the Northern would still outnumber the other ; but not in the same degree, at this time ; and every day would tend towards an equilibrium. Mr. Wilson would add a few words only. If equality in the second branch was an error that time would correct, he should be less anxious to exclude it, being sensible that perfection was unattainable in any plan ; but being a funda- mental and a perpetual error it ought by all means to be avoided. A vice in the representation, like an error in the first concoction, must be followed by disease, convul- sions, and finally death itself. The justice of the general principle of proportional representation has not, in argu- ment at least, been yet contradicted. But it is said that a departure from it, so far as to give the States an equal vote in one branch of the Legislature, is essential to their preser- vation. He had considered this position maturely, but could not see its application. That the States ought to be 2io 354 DEBATES IN THE [1787. preserved, he admitted. But does it follow, that an equality of votes is necessary for the purpose ? Is there any reason to suppose that, if their preservation should depend more on the large than on the small States, the security of the States against the general government, would be diminished ? Are the large States less attached to their existence, more likely to commit suicide, than the small ? An equal vote, then,- is not necessary, as far as he can conceive, and is liable, among other objections, to this insuperable one, — the great fault of the existing Confederacy is its inactivity. It has never been a com- plaint against Congress that they governed over much. The complaint has been, that they have governed too little. To remedy this defect we were sent here. Shall we effect the cure by establishing an equality of votes, as is pro- posed ? No : this very equality carries us directly to Congress, — to the system which is our duty to rectify. The small States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equal- ity, but they may control the government, as they have done in Congress. This very measure is here prosecuted by a minority of the people of America. Is then, the object of the Convention likely to be accomplished in this way ? Will not our constituents say, we sent you to form an effi- cient government, and you have given us one, more complex, indeed, but having all the weakness of the former govern- ment. He was anxious for uniting all the States under one government. He knew there were some respectable men who preferred three Confederacies, united by offensive and defensive alliances. Many things maybe plausibly said, some things may be justly said, in favor of such a project. He could not, however, concur in it himself ; but he thought nothing so pernicious as bad first principles. Mr. Ellsworth asked two questions, — one of Mr. Wilson, whether he had ever seen a good measure fail in Congress for want of a majority of States in its favor ? He had himself never known such an instance. The other of Mr. Madison, whether a negative lodged with the majority 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 355 of the States, even the smallest, could be more dangerous than the qualified negative proposed to be lodged in a single Executive Magistrate, who must be taken from some one State ? Mr. Sherman signified that his expectation was that the General Legislature would in some cases act on the federal principle, of requiring quotas. But he thought it ought to be empowered to carry their own plans into exe- cution, if the States should fail to supply their respective quotas. On the question for agreeing to Mr. Pinckney's motion, for allowing New Hampshire two; Massachusetts four, &c, it passed in the negative, — Pennsylvania, Maryland, Vir- ginia, South Carolina, aye — 4; Massachusetts, (Mr. King, aye, Mr. Gorham absent), Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela- ware, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 6. Adjourned. Monday, July 16th. In Convention, — On the question for agreeing to the whole Report, as amended, and including the equality of votes in the second branch, it passed in the affirmative, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Caro- lina, (Mr. Spaight, no) aye — 5; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4; Massachusetts, divided, (Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong, aye; Mr. King, Mr. Gorham, no). The whole thus passed is in the words following, viz. " Resolved, that in the original formation of the Legis- lature of the United States, the first branch thereof shall consist of sixty-five members, of which number New Hamp- shire shall send, 3; Massachusetts, 8; Rhode Island, 1; Connecticut, 5; New York, 6; New Jersey, 4; Pennsylvania, 8 ; Delaware, 1 ; Maryland, 6 ; Virginia, 10 ; North Carolina, 5 ; South Carolina, 5 ; Georgia, 3. But as the present situa- tion of the States may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the Legislature of the United States shall 356 DEBATES IN THE [1787. be authorized, from time to time, to apportion the number of Representatives, and in case any of the States shall here- after be divided, or enlarged by addition of territory, or any two or more States united, or any new States created within the limits of the United States, the Legislature of the United States shall possess authority to regulate the number of Representatives in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabitants, accord- ing to the provisions hereafter mentioned ^provided always, that representation ought to be proportioned according to direct taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct taxation, which may be required from time to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the States — "Resolved, that a census be taken within six years from the first meeting of the Legislature of the United States, and once within the term of every ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the United States, in the mariner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution of the eighteenth day of April, 1783; and that the Legislature of the United States shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly. "Resolved, that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of officers of the Govern- ment of the United States, shall originate in the first branch of the Legislature of the United States ; and shall not be altered or amended in the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the first branch. " Resolved, that in the second branch of the Legislature of the United States, each State shall have an equal vote." The sixth Resolution in the Report from the Committee of the Whole House, which had been postponed, in order to consider the seventh and eighth Resolutions, was now resumed, (see the Resolution.) " That the National Legislature ought to possess the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 357 legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation," was agreed to, nem. con. " And moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent ; or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation," being read for a question, — Mr. Butler calls for some explanation of the extent of this power ; particularly of the word incompetent. The vagueness of the terms rendered it impossible for any pre- cise judgment to be formed. Mr. Gorham. The vagueness of the terms constitutes the propriety of them. We are now establishing general principles, to be extended hereafter into details, which will be precise and explicit. Mr. Kutledge urged the objection started by Mr. Butler ; and moved that a clause should be committed, to the end that a specification of the powers comprised in the general terms, might be reported. On the question for commitment, the votes were equally divided, — Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, South Car- olina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, no — 5. So it was lost. Mr. Bandolph. The vote of this morning (involving an equality of suffrage in the second branch) had embar- rassed the business extremely. All the powers given in the Beport from the Committee of the Whole were founded on the supposition that a proportional representation was to prevail in both branches of the Legislature. When he came here this morning, his purpose was to have offered some propositions that might, if possible, have united a great majority of votes, and particularly might provide against the danger suspected on the part of the smaller States, by enumerating the cases in which it might lie, and allowing an equality of votes in such cases. But finding 358 DEBATES IN THE [1787. from the preceding vote, that they persist in demanding an equal vote in all cases ; that they have succeeded in obtain- ing it ; and that New York, if present, would probably be on the same side ; he could not but think we were unpre- pared to discuss this subject further. It will probably be in vain to come to any final decision, with a bare majority on either side. For these reasons he wished the Conven- tion to adjourn, that the large States might consider the steps proper to be taken, in the present solemn crisis of the business ; and that the small States might also deliberate on the means of conciliation. Mr. Patterson thought with Mr. Eandolph, that it was high time for the Convention to adjourn ; that the rule of secrecy ought to be rescinded ; and that our constituents should be consulted. No conciliation could be admissible on the part of the smaller States, on any other ground than that of an equality of votes in the second branch. If Mr. Randolph would reduce to form his motion for an adjourn- ment sine die, he would second it with all his heart. General Pinckney wished to know of Mr. Randolph, whether he meant an adjournment sine die, or only an adjournment for the day. If the former was meant, it dif- fered much from his idea. He could not think of going to South Carolina and returning again to this place. Besides it was chimerical, to suppose that the States, if consulted, would ever accord separately and beforehand. Mr. Randolph had never entertained an idea of an adjournment sine die ; and was sorry that his meaning had been so readily and strangely misinterpreted. He had in view merely an adjournment till to-morrow, in order that some conciliatory experiment might, if possible, be devised; and that in case the smaller States should continue to hold back, the larger might then take such measures — he would not say what — as might be necessary. Mr. Patterson seconded the adjournment till to-mor- row, as an opportunity seemed to be wished by the larger States to deliberate further on conciliatory expedients. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 359 On the question for adjourning till to-morrow, the States were equally divided, — New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Mary- land, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 5 ; so it was lost. Mr. Broom thought it his duty to declare his opinion against an adjournment sine die, as had been urged by Mr. Patterson. Such a measure, he thought, would be fatal. Something must be done by the Convention, though it should be by a bare majority. Mr. Gerry observed that Massachusetts was opposed to •an adjournment, because they saw no new ground of com- promise. But as it seemed to be the opinion of so many States that a trial should be made, the State would now con- cur in the adjournment. Mr. Rutledge could see no need of an adjournment, because he could see no chance of a compromise. The lit- tle States were fixed. They had repeatedly and solemnly declared themselves to be so. All that the large States, then, had to do was, to decide whether they Would yield or not. For his part, he conceived, that, although we could not do what we thought best in itself, we ought to do some- thing. Had we not better keep the Government up a little longer, hoping that another convention will supply our omissions, than abandon every thing to hazard? Our con- stituents will be very little satisfied with us if we take the latter course. Mr. Randolph and Mr. King renewed the motion to adjourn till to-morrow. On the question, — Massachusetts, New Jersey, Penn- sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- lina, aye — 7 ; Connecticut, Delaware, no — 2 ; Georgia, divided. Adjourned. [ On the morning following, before the hour of the Convention, a number of the members from the larger 360 DEBATES IN THE [1787. States, by common agreement, met for the purpose of con- sulting on the proper steps to be taken in consequence of the vote in favor of an equal representation in the second branch, and the apparent inflexibility of the smaller States on that point. Several members from the latter States also attended. The time was wasted in vague conversation on the subject, without any specific proposition or agreement. It appeared, indeed, that the opinions of the members who disliked the equality of votes differed much as to the im- portance of that point ; and as to the policy of risking a fail- ure of any general act of the Convention by inflexibly opposing it. Several of them — supposing that no good government could or would be built on that foundation; and that, as a division of the Convention into two opinions was unavoidable, it would be better that the side compris- ing the principal States, and a majority of the people of America, should propose a scheme of government to the States, than that a scheme should be proposed on the other side — would have concurred in a firm opposition to the smaller States, and in a separate recommendation, if event- ually necessary. Others seemed inclined to yield to the smaller States, and to concur in such an act, however im- perfect and exceptionable, as might be agreed on by the Convention as a body, though decided by a bare majority of States and by a minority of the people of the United States. It is probable that the result of this consultation satisfied the smaller States, that they had nothing to appre- hend from a union of the larger in any plan whatever against the equality of votes in the second branch. ] Tuesday, July 17th. In Convention,— My. Gouverneur Morris moved to re- consider the whole Resolution agreed to yesterday concern- ing the constitution of the two branches of the Legislature. His object was to bring the House to a consideration, in the abstract, of the powers nec3ssary to be vested in the General IT 87 -] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 361 Government. It had been said, Let us know how the gov- ernment is to be modelled, and then we can determine what powers can be properly given to it. He thought the most eligible course was, first to determine on the necessary pow- ers, and then so to modify the Government, as that it might be justly and properly enabled to administer them. He feared, if we proceeded to a consideration of the powers, whilst the vote of yesterday, including an equality of the States in the second branch, remained in force, a reference to it, either mental or expressed, would mix itself with the merits of every question concerning the powers. This motion was not seconded. [ It was probably approved by several members who either despaired of success, or were apprehensive that the attempt would inflame the jealousies of the smaller States.] The sixth Resolution in the Report of the Committee of the Whole, relating to the powers, which had been post- poned in order to consider the seventh and eighth, relating to the constitution, of the National Legislature, was now resumed. Mr. Sherman observed, that it would be difficult to draw the line between the powers of the General Legislature, and those to be left with the States; that he did not like the definition contained in the Resolution; and proposed, in its place, to the words "individual legislation," inclusive, to insert "to make laws binding on the people of the United States in all cases which may concern the common interests of the Union ; but not to interfere with the government of the individual States in any matters of internal police which respect the government of such States only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States is not concerned." Mr. Wilson seconded the amendment, as better express- ing the general principle. Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed it. The internal police, as it would be called and understood by the States, ought to be infringed in many cases, as in the case of pa- 362 DEBATES IN THE [1787. per-money, and other tricks by which citizens of other States may be affected. Mr. Sherman, in explanation of his idea, read an enum- eration of powers, including the power of levying taxes on trade, but not the power of direct taxation. Mr. Gouverneur Morris remarked the omission, and inferred, that, for the deficiencies of taxes on consumption, it must have been the meaning of Mr. Sherman that the General Government should recur to quotas and requisi- tions, which are subversive of the idea of government. Mr. Sherman acknowledged that his enumeration did not include direct taxation. Some provision, he supposed, must be made for supplying the deficiency of other tax- ation, but he had not formed any. On the question on Mr. Sherman's motion, it passed in the negative, — Connecticut, Maryland, aye — 2 ; Massa- chusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. Mr. Bedford moved that the second member of the sixth Eesolution be so altered as to read, " and moreover to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are severally incom- petent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation." Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconds the motion. Mr. Kandolph. This is a formidable idea, indeed. It involves the power of violating all the laws and Constitu- tions of the States, and of intermeddling with their police. The last member of the sentence is also superfluous, being included in the first. Mr. Bedford. It is not more extensive or formidable than the clause as it stands: no State being separately com- petent to legislate for the general interest of the Union. On the question for agreeing to Mr. Bedford's motion, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye — f> ; Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4. 178?.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 363 On the sentence as amended, it passed in the affirma- tive, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl- vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 8 ; South Carolina, Georgia, no — 2. The next clause, "To negative all laws passed by the several States contravening, in the opinion of the National Legislature, the Articles of Union, or any treaties subsist- ing under the authority of the Union," was then taken up. Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed this power as likely to be terrible to the States, and not necessary if sufficient Legislative authority should be given to the General Government. Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary; as the Courts of the States would not consider as valid any law contravening the authority of the Union, and which the Legislature would wish to be negatived. Mr. L. Martin considered the power as improper and inadmissible. Shall all the laws of the States be sent up to the General Legislature before they shall be permitted to operate? Mr. Madison considered the negative on the laws of the States as essential to the efficacy and security of the Gen- eral Government. The necessity of a General Government proceeds from the propensity of the States to pursue their particular interests in opposition to the general interest. This propensity will continue to disturb the system unless effectually controlled. Nothing short of a negative on their laws will control it. They will pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects before they can be repealed by the General Legislature, or set aside by the National tribunals. Confidence cannot be put in the state tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests. In all the States these are more or less depend- ent on the Legislatures. In Georgia they are appointed annually by the Legislature. In Khode Island the Judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were dis- placed, and others substituted, by the Legislature, who 364 DEBATES IN THE [1787. would be the willing instruments of the wicked and arbi- trary plans of their masters. A power of negativing the improper laws of the States is at once the most mild and certain means of preserving the harmony of the system. Its utility is sufficiently displayed in the British system. Nothing could maintain the harmony and subordination of the various parts of the Empire, but the prerogative by which the Crown stifles in the birth every act of every part tending to discord or encroachment. It is true the prerogative is sometimes misapplied, through ignorance or partiality to one particular part of the Empire ; but we have not the same reason to fear such misapplications in our system. As to the sending all laws up to the National Legislature, that might be rendered unnecessary by some emanation of the power into the States, so far at least as to give a temporary effect to laws of immediate necessity. Mr. Gouverneur Morris was more and more opposed to the negative. The proposal of it would disgust all the States. A law that ought to be negatived, will be set aside in the Judiciary department ; and if that security should fail, may be repealed by a National law. Mr. Sherman. Such a power involves a wrong principle, to wit, that a law of a State contrary to the Articles of the Union would, if not negatived, be valid and operative. Mr. Pinckney urged the necessity of the negative. On the question for agreeing to the power of negativing laws of States, &c. it passed in the negative, — Massachu- setts, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 3 ; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 7. Mr. L. Martin moved the following resolution, " That the Legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in pursuance of the Articles of Union, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or their citizens and inhabitants; and that the Judiciaries of the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 365 several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, anything in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding; 1 ' which was agreed to, nem. con. The ninth Eesolution being taken up, the first clause, " That a National Executive be instituted, to consist of a single person," was agreed to, nem. con. The next clause, " To be chosen by the National Legis- ture," being considered, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris was pointedly against his be- ing so chosen. He will be the mere creature of the Legis- lature, if appointed and impeachable by that body. He ought to be elected by the people at large, by the free- holders of the country. That difficulties attend this mode, he admits. But they have been found superable in New York and in Connecticut, and would, he believed, be found so in the case of an Executive for the United States. If the people should elect, they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished character, or services ; some man, if he might so speak, of continental reputation. If the Leg- islature elect, it will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction ; it will be like the election of a pope by a con- clave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment. He moved to strike out " National Legisla- ture," and insert " citizens of the United States." Mr. Sherman thought that the sense of the nation would be better expressed by the Legislature, than by the people at large. The latter will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and besides will never give a majority of votes to any one man. They will generally vote for some man in their own State, and the largest State will have the best chance for the appointment. If the choice be made by the Legislature, a majority of voices may be made necessary to constitute an election. Mr. Wilson. Two arguments have been urged against an election of the Executive magistrate by the people. The first is, the example of Poland, where an election of the 366 DEBATES IN THE [1787. supreme magistrate is attended with the most dangerous commotions. The cases, he observed, were totally dissim- ilar. The Polish nobles have resources and dependants which enable them to appear in force, and to threaten the Republic as well as each other. In the next place, the electors all assemble at one place; which would not be the case with us. The second argument is, that a majority of the people would never concur. It might be answered, that the. concurrence of a majority of the people is not a necessary principle of election, nor required as such in any of the States. But allowing the objection all its force, it may be obviated by the expedient used in Massachusetts, where the Legislature, by a majority of voices, decide in case a majority of the people do not concur in favor of one of the candidates. This would restrain the choice to a good nomination at least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue and cabal. A particular objection with him against an absolute election by the Legislature was, that the Exec- utive in that case would be too dependent to stand the me- diator between the intrigues and sinister views of the Repre- sentatives and the general liberties and interests of the people. Mr. Pinckney did not expect this question would again have been brought forward ; an election by the people being liable to the most obvious and striking objections. They will be led by a few active and designing men. The most populous States, by combining in favor of the same indi- vidual, will be able to carry their points. The national Legislature being most immediately interested in the laws made by themselves, will be most attentive to the choice of a fit man to carry them properly into execution. Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It is said, that in case of an election by the people the populous States will combine and elect whom they please. Just the reverse. The people of such States cannot combine. If there be any combination, it must be among their Representatives in the Legislature. It is said, the people will be led by a few designing men. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 367 This might happen in a small district. It can never happen throughout the continent. In the election of a Governor of New York, it sometimes is the case in particular spots, that the activity and intrigues of little partizans are suc- cessful; but the general voice of the State is never influ- enced by such artifices. It is said, the multitude will be uninformed. It is true they would be uninformed of what passed in the Legislative conclave, if the election were to be made there; but they will not be uninformed of those great and illustrious characters which have merited their esteem and confidence. If the Executive be chosen by the national Legislature, he will not be independent of it; and if not independent, usurpation and tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be the consequence. This was the case in England in the last century. It has been the case in Holland, where their Senates have engrossed all power. It has been the case everywhere. He was surprised that an election by the people at large should ever have been likened to the Polish election of the first Magistrate. An election by the Legislature will bear a real likeness to the election by the Diet of Poland. The great must be the electors in both cases, and the corruption and cabal which are known to characterize the one would soon find their way into the other. Appointments made by numerous bodies are always worse than those made by single responsible individuals or by the people at large. Col. Mason. It is curious to remark the different language held at different times. At one moment we are told that the Legislature is entitled to thorough confidence, and to indefinite power. At another, that it will be governed by intrigue and corruption, and cannot be trusted at all. But not to, dwell on this inconsistency, he would observe that a government which is to last ought at least to be practicable. Would this be the case if the proposed election should be left to the people at large? He conceived it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for Chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, t- - -~i 368 DEBATES IN THE [1787. refer a trial of colors to a blind man. The extent of the country renders it impossible, that the people can have the requisite capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the candidates. Mr. Wilson could not see the contrariety stated by Col. Mason. The Legislature might deserve confidence in some respects, and distrust in others. In acts which were to affect them and their constituents precisely alike, confidence was due; in others, jealousy was warranted. The appoint- ment to great offices, where the Legislature might feel many motives not common to the public, confidence was surely misplaced. This branch of business, it was notori- ous, was the most corruptly managed, of any that had been committed to legislative bodies. Mr. Williamson conceived that there was the same dif- ference between an election in this case, by the people and by the Legislature, as between an appointment by lot and l>y choice. There are at present distinguished characters, who are known perhaps to almost every man. This will not always be the case. The people will be sure to vote for some man in their own State; and the largest State will be sure to succeed. This will not be Virginia, however. Her slaves will have no suffrage. As the salary of the Execu- tive will be fixed and he will not be eligible a second time, there will not be such a dependence on the Legislature as has been imagined. On the question on an election by the people instead of the Legislature, it passed in the negative, — Pennsylvania, aye — 1; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela- ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9. Mr. L. Martin moved that the Executive be chosen by Electors appointed by the several Legislatures of the indi- vidual States. Mr. Broom seconds. On the question it passed in the negative, — Delaware, Maryland, aye — 2 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jer- 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 369 sey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- lina, Georgia, no — 8. On the question on the words, " to be chosen by the National Legislature," it passed unanimously in the affirma- tive. " For the term of seven years," — postponed, nem. con., on motion of Mr. Houston and Mr. Gouverneur Morris. " To carry into execution the national laws," — agreed to, nem. con. " To appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for," — agreed to nem. con. " To be ineligible a second time," — Mr. Houston moved to strike out this clause. Mr. Sherman seconds the motion. Mr. Gouverneur Morris espoused the motion. The ineligibility proposed by the clause as it stood, tended to destroy the great motive to good behaviour, the hope of being rewarded by a re -appointment. It was saying to him, make hay while the sun shines. On the question for striking out, as moved by Mr. Houston, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- lina, no — 4. The clause, "for the term of seven years," being resumed, — Mr. Broom was for a shorter term, since the Executive Magistrate was now to be re-eligible. Had he remained ineligible a second time, he should have preferred a longer term. Doctor M'Clurg* moved to strike out seven years, and insert "during good behaviour." By striking out the words declaring him not re-eligible, he was put into a situation that would keep him dependent forever on the ♦The probable object of this motion was merely to enforce the argument against the re-eligibility of. the Executive magistrate, by holding out a tenure during good behaviour as the alternative for keeping him independent of the Legislature. 24 370 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Legislature ; and he conceived the independence of the Executive to be equally essential with that of the Judiciary department. Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. He expressed great pleasure in hearing it. This was the way to get a good Government. His fear that so valuable an ingredient would not be attained had led him to take the part he had done. He was indifferent how the Executive should be chosen, provided he held his place by this tenure. Mr. Broom highly approved the motion. It obviated all his difficulties. Mr. Sherman considered such a tenure as by do means safe or admissible. As the Executive Magistrate is now re-eligible, he will be on good behaviour as far as will be necessary. If he behaves well, he will be continued ; if otherwise, displaced, on a succeeding election. Mr. Madison.* If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other. The Executive could not be independent of the Legislature, if dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a re- appointment. Why was it determined that the Judges should not hold their places by such a tenure ? Because they might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by an undue complaisance, and thus render the Legislature the virtual expositor, as well as the maker of the laws. In like manner, a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature would render it the executor as well as the maker of laws ; and then, according to the observation of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner. There was an analogy between the Executive and Judiciary departments in several respects. * The view here taken of the subject was meant to aid in parrying the animad- versions likely to fall on the motion of Doctor McClurg, for whom J. M. had a par- ticular regard. The Doctor, though possessing talents of the highest order, was modest and unaccustomed to exert them in public debate. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 371 The latter executed the laws in certain cases as the former did in others. The former expounded and applied them for certain purposes, as the latter did for others. The difference between them seemed to consist chiefly in two circumstances, — first, the collective interest and security- were much more in the power belonging to the Executive, than to the Judiciary, department ; secondly, in the admin- istration of the former, much greater latitude is left to opinion and discretion, than in the administration of the latter. But if the second consideration proves that it will be more difficult to establish a rule sufficiently precise for trying the Executive, than the Judges, and forms an objection to the same tenure of office, both considerations prove that it might be more dangerous to suffer a union between the Executive and Legislative powers, than between the Judiciary and Legislative powers. He conceived it to be absolutely necessary to a well constituted Republic, that the two first should be kept distinct and independent of each other. Whether the plan proposed by the motion was a proper one, was another question ; as it depended on the practicability of instituting a tribunal for impeachments as certain and as adequate in the one case, as in the other. On the other hand, respect for the mover entitled his pro- position to a fair hearing and discussion, until a less objec- tionable expedient should be applied for guarding against a dangerous union of the Legislative and Executive de- partments. Colonel Mason. This motion was made some time ago, and negatived by a very large majority. He trusted that it would be again negatived. It would be impossible to de- fine the misbehaviour in such a manner as to subject it to a proper trial; and perhaps still more impossible to compel so high an offender, holding his office by such a tenure, to submit to a trial. He considered an Executive during good behaviour as a softer name only for an Executive for life, And that the next would be an easy step to hereditary 372 DEBATES IN THE [1787. monarchy. If the motion should finally succeed, he might himself live to see such a revolution. If he did not, it was probable his children or grand children would. He trusted there were few men in that House who wished for it. No State, he was sure, had so far revolted from republican principles, as to have the least bias in its favor. Mr. Madison was not apprehensive of being thought to favor any step towards monarchy. The real object with him was to prevent its introduction. Experience had proved a tendency in our government to throw all power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little more than cyphers; the Legislatures omnipo- tent. If no effectual check be devised for restraining the instability and encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some kind or other would be inevitable. The preservation of republican government therefore required some expe- dient for the purpose, but required evidently, at the same time, that, in devising it, the genuine principles of that form should be kept in view. Mr. Gouverneur Morris was as little a friend to mon- archy as any gentleman. He concurred in the opinion that the way to keep out monarchical government was to estab- lish such a Republican government as would make the peo- ple happy, and prevent a desire of change. Doct. McClurg was not so much afraid of the shadow of monarchy, as to be unwilling to approach it ; nor so wed- ded to republican government, as not to be sensible of the tyrannies that had been and may be exercised under that form. It was an essential object with him to make the Executive independent of the Legislature; and the only mode left for effecting it, after the vote destroying his ineligibility a second time, was to appoint him during good behaviour. On the question for inserting " during good behaviour," in place of "seven years [with a re-eligibility J," it passed in the negative, — New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 373 Virginia, aye — 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6.* On the motion to strike out " seven years," it passed in the negative, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, aye — 4; Connecticut, New Jersey, Mary- land, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6.f It was now unanimously agreed that the vote which had struck out the words "to be ineligible a second time," should be reconsidered to-morrow. Adjourned. Wednesday, July 18th. In Convention, — On motion of Mr. L. Martin to fix to- morrow for reconsidering the vote concerning the ineligi- bility of the Executive a second time, it passed in the amr- mative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Dela- ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 8 ; New Jersey, Georgia, absent. The residue of the ninth Resolution, concerning the Executive, was postponed till to-morrow. The tenth Resolution, " that the Executive shall have a right to negative legislative acts not afterwards passed by two-thirds of each branch," was passed, nem. con. The eleventh Resolution, "that a National Judiciary shall be established to consist of one supreme tribunal," agreed to nem. con. On the clause, " The judges of which to be appointed by the second branch of the National Legislature," — * This vote is not to be considered as any certain index of opinion, as a number in the affirmative probably had it chiefly in view to alarm those attached to a depend- ence of the Executive on the Legislature, and thereby facilitate some final arrange- ment of a contrary tendency. The avowed friends of an Executive " during good behaviour" were not more than three or four, nor is it certain they would have adhered to such a tenure. An independence of the three great departments of each other, as far as possible, and the responsibility of all to the will of the community, seemed to be generally ad- mitted as the true basis of a well constructed Government. t There was no debate on this motion. The apparent object of many in the affirma- tive was to secure the re-eligibility by shortening the term, and of many in the'nega- tive to embarrass the plan of referring the appointment and dependence of the Execu- tive to the Legislature. 374 DEBATES IN THE [178T. Mr. Gorham would prefer an appointment by the second branch to an appointment by the whole Legislature; but he thought even that branch too numerous, and too little per- sonally responsible, to ensure a good choice. He suggested that the Judges be appointed by the Executive with the ad- vice and consent of the second branch, in the mode pre- scribed by the Constitution of Massachusetts. This mode had been long practised in that country, and was found to answer perfectly well. Mr. Wilson would still prefer an appointment by the Executive; but if that could not be attained, would prefer, in the next place, the mode suggested by Mr. Gorham. He thought it his duty, however, to move in the first instance, " that the Judges be appointed by the Executive." Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. Mr. L. Martin was strenuous for an appointment by the second branch. Being taken from all the States, it would be best informed of characters, and most capable of making a fit choice. Mr. Sherman concurred in the observations of Mr. Martin, adding that the Judges ought to be diffused, which would be more likely to be attended to by the second branch, than by the Executive. Mr. Mason. The mode of appointing the Judges may depend in some degree on the mode of trying impeach- ments of the Executive. If the Judges were to form a tribunal for that purpose, they surely ought not to be appointed by the Executive. There were insuperable objections besides against referring the appointment to the Executive. He mentioned, as one, that as the seat of gov- ernment must be in some one State; and as the Executive would remain in office for a considerable time, for four, five, or six years at least, he would insensibly form local and personal attachments within the particular State that would deprive equal merit elsewhere of an equal chance of pro- motion. Mr. Gorham. As the Executive will be responsible, in 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 375 point of character at least, for a judicious and faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful to look through all the States for proper characters. The Senators will be as likely to form their attachments at the seat of government where they reside, as the Executive. If they cannot get the man of the particular State to which they may respect- ively belong, they will be indifferent to the rest. Public bodies feel no personal responsibility, and give full play to intrigue and cabal. Rhode Island is a full illustration of the insensibility to character produced by a participation of numbers in dishonourable measures, and of the length to which a public body may carry wickedness and cabal. Mr. Gouverneur Morris supposed it would be improper for an impeachment of the Executive to be tried before the Judges. The latter would in such case be drawn into intrigues with the Legislature, and an impartial trial would be frustrated. As they would be much about the seat of government, they might even be previously consulted, and arangements might be made for a prosecution of the Execu- tive. He thought, therefore, that no argument could be drawn from the probability of such a plan of impeach- ments against the motion before the House. Mr. Madison suggested, that the Judges might oe appointed by the Executive, with the concurrence of one- third at least of the second branch. This would unite the advantage of responsibility in the Executive, with the security afforded in the second branch against any incautious or corrupt nomination by the Executive. Mr. Sherman was clearly for an election by the Senate. It would be composed of men nearly equal to the Exec- utive, and would of course have on the whole more wisdom. They would bring into their deliberations a more diffusive knowledge of characters. It would be less easy for candi- dates to intrigue with them, than with the Executive Magis- trate. For these reasons he thought there would be a better security for a proper choice in the Senate, than in the Executive. 376 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Mr. Randolph. It is true that when the appointment of the Judges was vested in the second branch an equality of votes had not been given to it. Yet he had rather leave the appointment there than give it to the Executive. He thought the advantage of personal responsibility might be gained in the Senate, by requiring the respective votes of the members to be entered on the Journal. He thought, too, that the hope of receiving appointments would be more diffusive, if they depended on the Senate, the mem- bers of which would be diffusively known, than if they de- pended on a single man, who could not be personally known to a very great extent ; and consequently, that opposition to the system would be so far weakened. Mr. Bedfobd thought, there were solid reasons against leaving the appointment to the Executive. He must trust more to information than the Senate. It would put it in his power to gain over the larger States by gratifying them with a preference of their citizens. The responsibility of the Executive, so much talked of, was chimerical. He could not be punished for mistakes. Mr. Gobham remarked, that the Senate could have no better information than the Executive. They must like him trust to information from the members belonging to the particular State where the candidate resided. The Executive would certainly be more answerable for a good appointment, as the whole blame of a bad one would fall on him alone. He did not mean that he would be answerable under any other penalty than that of public censure, which with honourable minds was a sufficient one. On the question for referring the appointment of the Judges to the Executive, instead of the second branch, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, aye — 2 ; Connecticut, Dela- ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina South Carolina, no — 6 ; Georgia, absent. Mr. Gorham moved, "that the Judges be nominated and appointed by the Executive, by and with the advice and consent of the second branch ; and every such nomination 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 377 shall be made at least days prior to such appointment." This mode, he said, had been ratified by the experience of a hundred and forty years in Massachusetts. If the ap- pointment should be left to either branch of the Legisla- ture, it will be a mere piece of jobbing. Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded and supported the motion. Mr. Sherman thought it less objectionable than an abso- lute appointment by the Executive ; but disliked it, as too much fettering the Senate. On the question on Mr. Gorham's motion, — Massachu- setts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye — 4; Connect- icut, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 4 ,-. Georgia, absent. Mr. Madison moved, "that the Judges should be nominated by the Executive, and such nomination should become an appointment if not disagreed to within days by two-thirds of the second branch." Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. By common consent the consideration of it was post- poned till to-morrow. " To hold their offices during good behaviour, and to receive fixed salaries," — agreed to, nem. con. "In which [salaries of Judges] no increase or diminu- tion shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time." Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out " or increase." He thought the Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase salaries, as circumstances might require ; and that this would not create any improper dependence in the Judges. Doctor Franklin was in favor of the motion. Money may not only become plentier ; but the business of the Department may increase, as the country becomes more populous. Mr. Madison. The dependence will be less if the iucrease alone should be permitted ; but it will be improper 378 DEBATES IN THE [1787. even so far to permit a dependence. Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be in agitation in the Legislature, an undue complaisance in the former may be felt towards the latter. If at such a crisis there should be in court suits to which leading members of the Legisla- ture may be parties, the Judges will be in a situation which ought not to be suffered, if it can be prevented. The variations in the value of money may be guarded against by taking for a standard wheat or some other thing of per- manent value. The increase of business will be provided for by an increase of the number who are to do it. An increase of salaries may easilv be so contrived as not to affect persons in office. Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The value of money may not only alter, but the state of society may alter. In this event, the same quantity of wheat, the same value, would not be the same compensation. The amount of salaries must always be regulated by the manners and the style of living in a country. The increase of business cannot be provided for in the supreme tribunal, in the way that has been mentioned. All the business of a certain description, whether more or less, must be done in that single tribunal. Additional labor alone in the Judges can provide for addi- tional business. Additional compensation, therefore ought not to be prohibited. On the question for striking out, "or increase," — Mas- sachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, aye — 6 ; Virginia, North Carolina, no — 2 ; Georgia, absent. The whole clause, as amended, was then agreed to, nem. con. The twelfth Kesolution, " that the National Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals," being taken up — Mr. Butler could see no necessity for such tribunals. The State tribunals might do the business. Mr. L. Martin concurred. They will create jealousies 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 379 and oppositions in the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere. Mr. G-orham. There are in the States already Federal Courts, with jurisdiction for trial of piracies, &c. committed on the seas. No complaints have been made by the States or the courts of the States. Inferior tribunals are essential to render the authority of the National Legislature effect- ual. Mr. Eandolph observed, that the courts of the States cannot be trusted with the administration of the National laws. The objects of jurisdiction are such as will often place the general and local policy at variance. Mr. Gouverneur Morris urged also the necessity of such a provision. Mr. Sherman was willing to give the power to the Legislature, but wished them to make use of the State tri- bunals, whenever it could be done with safety to the general interest. Col. Mason thought many circumstances might arise, not now to be foreseen, which might render such a power absolutely necessary. On the question for agreeing to the twelfth Eesolution, empowering the National Legislature to appoint inferior tribunals, — it was agreed to, nem. con. The clause of "Impeachments of national officers,' 7 was struck out, on motion for the purpose. The thirteenth Eesolution, " The jurisdiction of the National Judiciary, &c." being then taken up, several criti- cisms having been made on the definition, it was proposed by Mr. Madison so to alter it as to read thus; "that the jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the na- tional laws; and to such other questions as may involve the national peace and harmony," which was agreed to, nem. con. The fourteenth Eesolution, providing for the admission of new States, was agreed to, nem. con. The fifteenth Eesolution, " that provision ought to be 380 DEBATES IN THE [1787. made for the continuance of Congress, &c. and for the com- pletion of their engagements," being consider ed,- Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the assumption of their engagements might as well be omitted ; and that Con- gress ought not to be continued till all the States should adopt the reform; since it may become expedient to give effect to it whenever a certain number of States shall adopt it. Mr. Madison. The clause can mean nothing more than that provision ought to be made for preventing an interreg- num; which must exist, in the interval between the adop- tion of the new Government and the commencement of its operation, if the old Government should cease on the first of these events. Mr. Wilson did not entirely approve of the manner in which the clause relating to the engagements of Congress was expressed ; but he thought some provision on the sub- ject would be proper in order to prevent any suspicion that the obligations of the Confederacy might be dissolved along with the Government under which they were contracted. On the question on the first part, relating to the contin- uance of Congress, — Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- lina,* aye — 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, no — 6. The second part, as to the completion of their engagements, was disagreed to, nem. con. The sixteenth Eesolution, " That a republican Constitu- tion and its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each State by the United States " being considered, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the Eesolution very objectionable. He should be very unwilling that such laws as exist in Rhode Island should be guaranteed. Mr. Wilson. The object is merely to secure the States against dangerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions. Col. Mason. If the General Government should have no right to suppress rebellions against particular States, it will be in a bad situation indeed. As rebellions against * In the printed Journal, South Carolina, no. 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 381 itself originate in and against individual States, it must re- main a passive spectator of its own subversion. Mr. Kandolph. The Kesolution has two objects, — first, to secure a republican government; secondly, to sup- press domestic commotions. He urged the necessity of both these provisions. Mr. Madison moved to substitute, "that the constitu- tional authority of the States shall be guaranteed to them respectively against domestic as well as foreign violence." Doctor McClurg seconded the motion. Mr. Houston was afraid of perpetuating the existing Constitutions of the States. That of Georgia was a very bad one, and he hoped would be revised and amended. It may also be difficult for the General Government to decide be- tween contending parties, each of which claim the sanction of the Constitution. Mr. L. Martin was for leaving the States to suppress rebellions themselves. Mr. Gorham thought it strange that a rebellion should be known to exist in the Empire, and the General Govern- ment should be restrained from interposing to subdue it. At this rate an enterprising citizen might erect the stand- ard of monarchy in a particular State, might gather to- gether partizans from all quarters, might extend his views from State to State, and threaten to establish a tyranny over the whole, and the General Government be compelled to remain an inactive witness of its own destruction. With regard to different parties in a State, as long as they con- fine their disputes to words, they will be harmless to the General Government and to each other. If they appeal to the sword, it will then be necessary for the General Govern- ment, however difficult it may be, to decide on the merits of their contest, to interpose and put an end to it. Mr. Carroll, Some such provision is essential. Every State ought to wish for it. It has been doubted whether it is a casus foederis at present ; and no room ought to be left for such a doubt hereafter. 382 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Mr. Randolph moved to add, as an amendment to the motion, " and that no State be at liberty to form any other than a republican government." Mr. Madison seconded the motion. Mr. Rutledge thought it unnecessary to insert any guarantee. No doubt could be entertained but that Congress had the authority, if they had the means, to co-operate with any State in subduing a rebellion. It was and would be involved in the nature of the thing. Mr. Wilson moved, as a better expression of the idea, " that a republican form of Government shall be guaranteed to each State ; and that each State shall be protected against foreign and domestic violence." This seeming to be well received, Mr. Madison and Mr. Randolph withdrew their propositions, and on the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's motion, it passed, nem. con. \, Adjourned. Thursday, July 19th. In Convention, — On re-consideration of the vote ren- dering the Executive re-eligible a second time, Mr. Mabtin moved to re-instate the words, " to be ineligible a second time." Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It is necessary to take into one view all that relates to the establishment of the Execu- tive; on the due formation of which must depend the efficacy and utility of the union among the present and future States. It has been a maxim in political science, that republican government is not adapted to a large extent of country, because the energy of the executive magistracy cannot reach the extreme parts of it. Our country is an extensive one. We must either then renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it. This subject was of so much importance that he hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of it. One great object of the Executive is, to con- 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 383 troJ the Legislature. The Legislature will continually seek to aggrandize and perpetuate themselves; and will seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion, or con- vulsion, for that purpose. It is necessary, then, that the Executive magistrate should be the guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, against legislative tyranny; against the great and the wealthy, who in the course of things will necessarily compose the legislative body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind; — to nourish its love of power; and to stimulate it to oppression. History proves this to be the spirit of the opulent. The check provided in the second branch was not meant as a check on legisla- tive usurpations of power, but on the abuse of lawful pow- ers, on the propensity of the first branch to legislate too much, to run into projects of paper-money, and similar expedients. It is no check on legislative tyranny. On the contrary it may favor it; and if the first branch can be seduced, may find the means of success. The Executive, therefore, ought to be so constituted, as to be the great protector of the mass of the people. It is the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers, and to command the forces, of the Republic ; to appoint, first, ministerial officers for the administration of public affairs; secondly, officers for the dispensation of justice. Who will be the best judges whether these appointments be well made? The people at large, who will know, will see, will feel, the effects of them. Again, who can judge so well of the discharge of military duties for the protection and security of the people, as the people themselves, who are to be protected and secured ? He finds, too, that the Executive is not to be re-eligible. What effect will this have? In the first place, it will destroy the great incitement to merit, public esteem, by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a re-appointment. It may give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the human breast. The love of fame is the great spring to noble and illustrious actions. Shut the civil road to glory, and he may be compelled Tl .384 DEBATES IN THE [1787, seek it by the sword. In the second place, it will tempt him to make the most of the short space of time allotted him, to accumulate wealth and provide for his friends. In the third place, it will produce violations of the very Con- stitution it is meant to secure. In moments of pressing danger, the tried abilities and established character of a favorite magistrate will prevail over respect for the forms of the Constitution. The Executive is also to be impeach- able. This is a dangerous part of the plan. It will hold him in such dependence, that he will be no check on the Legislature, will not be a firm guardian of the people and of the public interest. He will be the tool of a faction, of some leading demagogue in the Legislature. These then, are the faults of the Executive establishment, as now pro- posed. Can no better establishment be devised? If he is to be the guardian of the people, let him be appointed by the people. If he is to be a check on the Legislature, let him not be impeachable. Let him be of short duration, that he may with propriety be re-eligible. It has been said that the candidates for this office will not be known to the people. If they be known to the Legislature, they must have such a notoriety and eminence of character, that they cannot possibly be unknown to the people at large. It cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently dis- tinguished himself to merit this high trust, without having his character proclaimed by fame throughout the Empire. As to the danger from an unimpeachable magistrate, he could not regard it as formidable. There must be certain great officers of state, a minister of finance, of war, of foreign affairs, &c. These, he presumes, will exercise their functions in subordination to the Executive, and will be amenable, by impeachment, to the public justice. Without these ministers, the Executive can do nothing of consequence. He suggested a biennial election of the Executive, at the time of electing the first branch ; and the Executive to hold over, so as to prevent any interregnum in the administration. An election by the people at large, 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 385 throughout so great an extent of country, could not be influenced by those little combinations and those momen- tary lies, which often decide popular elections within a narrow sphere . It will probably be objected, that the elec- tion will be influenced by the members of the Legislature, particularly of the first branch ; and that it will be nearly the same thing with an election by the Legislature itself. It could not be denied that such an influence would exist. But it might be answered, that as the Legislature or the candidates for it, would be divided the enmity of one part would counteract the friendship of another; that if the administration of the Executive were good, it would be un- popular to oppose his re-election; if bad, it ought to be opposed, and a re-appointment prevented; and lastly, that in every view this indirect dependence on the favor of the Legislature could not be so mischievous as a direct depend- ence for his appointment. He saw no alternative for making the Executive independent of the Legislature, but either to give him his oflice for life, or make him eligible by the people. Again, it might be objected, that two years would be too short a duration. But he believes that as long as he should behave himself well he would be continued in his place. The extent of the country would secure his re-elec- tion against the factions and discontents of particular States. It deserved consideration, also, that such an ingredient in the plan would render it extremely palatable to the people. These were the general ideas which occurred to him on the subject, and which led him to wish and move that the whole constitution of the Executive might undergo re- consideration. Mr. Eandolph urged* the motion of Mr. L. Martin for restoring the words making the Executive ineligible a sec- ond time. If he ought to be independent, he should not be left under a temptation to court a re-appointment. If he should be re-appointable by the Legislature, he will be no check on it. His revision ary power will be of no avail. He had always thought and contended, as he still did, that 386 DEBATES IN THE [1787. the danger apprehended by the little States was chimerical ; but those who thought otherwise ought to be peculiarly- anxious for the motion. If the Executive be appointed, as has been determined, by the Legislature, he will prob- ably be appointed, either by joint ballot of both houses, or be nominated by the first and appointed by the second branch. In either case the large States will preponderate. If he is to court the same influence for his re-appointment, will he not make his revisionary power, and all the other functions of his administration, subservient to the views of the large States? Besides, is there not great reason to apprehend, that, in case he should be re-eligible, a false complaisance in the Legislature might lead them to continue an unfit man in office, in preference to a fit one ? It has been said, that a constitutional bar to re-appointment, will inspire unconstitutional endeavours to perpetuate himself. It may be answered, that his endeavours can have no effect unless the people be corrupt to such a degree as to render all precautions hopeless; to which may be added, that this argument supposes him to be more powerful and danger- ous, than other arguments which have been used admit, and consequently calls for stronger fetters on his authority. He thought an election by the Legislature, with an inca- pacity to be elected a second time, would be more accept- able to the people than the plan suggested by Mr. Gouver- neur Morris. Mr. King did not like the ineligibility. He thought there was great force in the remarks of Mr. Sherman, that he who has proved himself most fit for an office, ought not to be excluded by the Constitution from holding it. He would therefore prefer any other reasonable plan that could be substituted. He was much disposed to think, that in such cases the people at large would choose wisely. There was indeed some difficulty arising from the improbability of a general concurrence of the people in favor of any one marj. On the whole, he was of opinion that an appointment 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION 38 ? by electors chosen by the people for the purpose would be liable to fewest objections. Mr. Patterson's ideas nearly coincided, he said, with those of Mr. King. He proposed that the Executive should be appointed by electors, to be chosen by the States in a ratio that would allow one elector to the smallest, and three to the largest, States. Mr. Wilson, It seems to be the unanimous sense that the Executive should not be appointed by the Legislature, unless he be rendered ineligible a second time: he perceived with pleasure that the idea was gaining ground of an election, mediately or immediately, by the people. Mr. Madison, If it be a fundamental principle of free government that the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it is equally so that they be independently exercised. There is the same, and perhaps greater, reason why the Executive should be inde- pendent of the Legislature, than why the Judiciary should. A coalition of the two former powers, would be more imme- diately and certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is essential, then, that the appointment of the Executive should either be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, that will give him a free agency with regard to the Legisla- ture, This could not be, if he was to be appointable, from time to time, by the Legislature, It was not clear that an appointment in the first instance, even with an ineligibility afterwards, would not establish an improper connection between the two Departments. Certain it was, that the appointment would be attended with intrigues and con- tentions, that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He was disposed, for these reasons, to refer the appointment to some other source. The people at large was, in his opinion, the fittest in itself, It would be as likely as any that could be devised, to produce an Executive Magistrate of dis- tinguished character The people generally could only know and vote for some citizen whose merits had rendered him an object of general attention and esteem. There was 388 DEBATES IN THE [1787- one difficulty, however, of a serious nature, attending an immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the election, on the score of the negroes. The substitution of Electors obviated this difficulty, and seemed on the whole to be liable to fewest objections, Mr. Gerry. If the Executive is to be elected by the Legislature, he certainly ought not to be re-eligible. This would make him absolutely dependent. He was against a popular election, The people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing men. He urged the expedi- ency of an appointment of the Executive, by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives. The people of the States will then choose the first branch; the Legislatures of the States, the second branch of the National Legislature ; and the Executives of the States, the National Executive. This he thought would form a strong attachment in the States to the National system. The popular mode of electing the Chief Magistrate would certainly be the worst of all. If he should be so elected, and should do his duty, he will be turned out for it, like Governor Bowdoin in Massachu- setts, and President Sullivan in New Hampshire. On the question on Mr. Gouverneur Morris's motion, to reconsider generally the constitution of the Executive, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, and all the others, aye. Mr. Ellsworth moved to strike out the appointment by the National Legislature, and to insert, " to be chosen by Electors, appointed by the Legislatures of the States in the following ratio; to wit: one for each State not exceeding two hundred thousand inhabitants ; two for each above that number and not exceeding three hundred thousand; and three for each State exceeding three hundred thousand." Mr. Broom seconded the motion. Mr. Kutledge was opposed to all the modes, except the 1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION 389 appointment by the National Legislature. He will be sufficiently independent, if he be not re-eligible, Mr. Gerry preferred the motion of Mr. Ellsworth to an appointment by the National Legislature, or by the peo- ple; though not to an appointment by the State Executives, He moved that the Electors proposed by Mr. Ellsworth should be twenty-five in number, and allotted in the follow- ing proportion: to New Hampshire, one; to Massachusetts, three; to Rhode Island, one; to Connecticut, two; to New York, two; to New Jersey, two; to Pennsylvania, three; to Delaware, one; to Maryland, two; to Virginia, three; to North Carolina, two; to South Carolina two; to Georgia, one, The question, as moved by Mr. Ellsworth, being divi- ded, on the first part " Shall the National Executive be appointed by Electors? r — Connecticut, New Jersey, Penn- sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye — 6; North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 3; Massachusetts, divided* On the second part, " Shall the Electors be chosen by the State Legislatures?" — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Virginia, South Carolina no — 2> The part relating to the ratio in which the States should choose Electors was postponed, nem. con. Mr. L. Martin moved that the Executive be ineligible a second time Mr. Williamson seconds the motion. He had no great confidence in electors to be chosen for the special purpose. They would not be the most respectable citizens ; but per- sons not occupied in the high offices of government, They would be liable to undue influence, which might the more readily be practised, as some of them will probably be in appointment six or eight months before the object of it comes on. 390 DEBATES IN THE [1787. Mr. Ellsworth supposed any persons might be ap- pointed Electors, except, solely, members of the National Legislature. On the question, "Shall he be ineligible a second time?" — North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 2; Mas- sachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela- ware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no — 8. On the question, "Shall the Executive continue for seven years ?" It passed in the negative, — * Connecticut, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ; * New Jersey, Pennsyl- vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no — 5 ; Massachu- setts, North Carolina, divided. Mr. King was afraid we should shorten the term too much. Mr. Gouverneur Morris was for a short term, in order to avoid impeachments, which would be otherwise necessary. Mr. Butler was against the frequency of the elections. Georgia and South Carolina were too distant to send electors often. Mr. Ellsworth was for six years. If the elections be too frequent, the Executive will not be firm enough. There must be duties which will make him unpopular for the moment. There will be outs as well as ins. His administration, therefore, will be attacked and misrepre- sented. Mr. Williamson was for six years. The expense will be considerable, and ought not to be unnecessarily repeated. If the elections are too frequent, the best men will not undertake the service, and those of an inferior character will be liable to be corrupted. On the question of six years, — Massachusetts, Con- necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; Dela- ware, no. Adjourned. * In the printed Journal, Connecticut, no ; New Jersey, aye. Ir 12 «afl H HE m «,K, ARY 0F CONGRESS [0 029 729 460 A HUH BBHIr H m mm I ■ < ■•:■ I ? ■■■ ■■■■1 i ■ / Hitl RJ ■■A ii in HI m nil ■BIlltHBH iBiHillH I I IIII IL ■ inn ll lllliiiB , Hi II 11 Illillllli ■Hnni ■IIPI™^^ IB luBmHiffli 810 Iffl B Hi! ■