Class L Book Ccpiglrti\°- COraRIGHT DEPOSm NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR LIEUT. GOMDR. CHARLES C. GILL, U.S.N. NATIONS AT WAR WITH GERMANY (or h Turkey and Buli!nria);— Serbia (vs. Austria July 28, 1914), Russia (August i, 1QI4). France (August 3, 1914), BelKium (August 4, IQ14), Great Britain (August 4, 1914), Montenegro (vs. Austria August 8, 1914). Japan (August 23, 1914), Italy (vs. Austria May 24, igis), San Marino (vs. Austria May 24, iQis), Portugal (March 9, 1016), Rumania (vs. Austria August 27. 1916), United States (April 6, 1917). Cuba (April 7, 1917), Panama (April 7. 1917), Greece (Prov. Govt. Nov. 28, 1916, Govt. 0! Alex. July 2, 1917), Siam (July 22, 1917), Liberia (August 4, 1917), China (August 14, 1917), Brazil (October 26, 1Q17). allies, Austria THE WORLD Aim, DECEMBER, 191 7 NATIONS THAT HAVE IIONS NEUTRAL BUT CHIEF NEUTRA. SEVERED RELATIONS IVOURABLE TO THE NEUTRAL WITH GERMANY:— ILIES:— NATIONS:— 1917) Bolivia (April i. Honduras (May - , , Haiti (June 17, 1917) Costa Rica (Sept. 21, Uruguay (Oct. 7. iQi?) Guatemala (April 27, igi7) Nicaragua (May 18, 1017) Peru (October 6, 1917) Ecuador (Dec. 8, 1917) ILIES:— 917) irgentina, Paraguay '9'" hili, Salvador Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Spain, Switzerland, Mexico. Venezuela, Colombia.' NOTE:--Central and South America are more or less mvolved, but in a diplomatic rather than a miUtary sense. As Africa has been practically annexed by European powers the whole continent is involved except the ancient empire of Abyssinia and unap- propriated portions of the Libyan Desert Prac t.cally all Asia is involved. Although Persia has not declared war there has been considerable fight- ing there. The South Arabian revolt has aligned tHat country against Turkey. NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR . GEOGRAPniCAL INDirATIONS natio^d'e^an'Sta^^ou^e" Thist™'ri?aTn 'alf naff™" Sf ? '"f'''', "^^ ^^'^"^ '—'I """■ In an mternational war neutrality has become d!ffir,nff„.IH" '""* "V^.^" ""^ """""'ly dependent, annihilated the theory of national isolation ^ dangerous. The experience of this war has scatteredthr^rh™? tt S'" Allied rvTcoZr'has"™'!!.'^^'' '"''', ^"1^""^' f™"'-" "»«"-""- of this force against the enemy "' '""' '"^''^ P'"*^''''^ ""e slow but sure concentration an a?s"crup'utol;s"u'rof lh";.^lrrii^"Ge"™anv^':'h'' ""? ''™'^"' ^''"f ' """ '"'l-"' G^"™-^ '« to thl'seaTo^ bnd™?k:d'"aU ns 'a"n"Jl rsfrate i Tafue'lir^"' "P™ '."^ -"■;*.? n^lr'of'lrlrjutiets verge such as Panama, Suel^Gibraluran^tg' D^rllaVeU^^ "^'"^ '" "''"'• ^'^^ "■'■"'-''^^ ->"■ * rresident Wtlson, \ NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR (1914-1917) BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CHARLES CLIFFORD GILL UNITED STATES NAVY NEW YORK GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY J] 58 .&5 COPYRIGHT, 1918, BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY JAN 28 I9f8 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ©CI.A492082 PREFACE The eleven chapters in this work, with one ex- ception, were contributed to The New York Ti?nes Current History Magazine during the year 1917 and now appear in revised form. The exception is the sixth chapter — The Dardanelles Operations — which was written to complete the series covering the major naval operations of the war and is now published for the first time. The author takes occasion to extend his ac- knowledgments and thanks to the editors of The New York Times Current History Magazine for permission to republish which they have kindly given. Acknowledgment is also made to Allan West- cott, Ph.D., Instructor in the United States Naval Academy, for maps and diagrams contributed and for help given in editing the text. Sincere thanks are expressed to Mr. T. G. Frothingham, to the Staff of the English Department of the United States Naval Academy, and to the Officers of the Oklahoma and the Seattle for many help- ful suggestions cordially given throughout the progress of these studies. Charles C. Gill. INTRODUCTION The present volume had its origin in lectures delivered by Lieutenant Commander Gill at the United States Naval Academy in the winter of 1915-16 to midshipmen who have since been grad- uated and are now in active service. For this audience, the facts and lessons of recent naval his- tory had a special signihcance, as a very practical preparation for the responsibilities they were soon to undertake. To quote the words of Napoleon, "The happiest inspiration in battle is often a rec- ollection of the past." The discussion was afterward continued in The New York Times Current History Magazine, and, with the sanction of the Navy Department, is now published in book form. In selecting and prepar- ing the material, the author had in mind not only the special needs of young naval officers, whether midshipmen or volunteers now entering the naval service, but also the general popular interest in naval affairs. The book is to be used this year by the Department of English at the Naval Acad- emy in the teaching of naval history. viii INTRODUCTION Undertaking these studies before the entry of the United States into the war, the author has maintained throughout the standpoint of the tech- nical student of naval warfare, rather than that of the philosophical historian. Needless to say, he is not without strong sympathies and convic- tions; but these, from the nature of the investiga- tion, are subordinated to the search for truth. In other words, the book is not partisan and is not propaganda; it has no special thesis to maintain — except an underlying belief in the importance of naval power to a nation whose boundaries are the two oceans, and whose interests extend throughout the Seven Seas. The wisdom of attempting to write naval his- tory at such close range may be questioned. The question may be answered by pointing out that the book aims to draw the significant naval les- sons, rather than to chronicle events in minute de- tail. Whatever the paucity of the data, it is im- portant that these lessons should be drawn im- mediately. Frank discussion clears the air. There is an advantage also in the contemporary point of view, with its appreciation of concurrent events and the feeling of the hour. If distant perspective gives proper proportion, it also throws a haze over the scene. And in naval history par- ticularly, the facts are not always clearer with the INTRODUCTION ix lapse of time. Historians a century ago could have determined, more easily than it can be deter- mined to-day, the exact manner in which Nelson brought his fleet into action at Trafalgar; and a century ago there was a recognition — more in- stinctive and less reasoned, perhaps, but not less genuine than to-day — of the greatness of that vic- tory and its meaning in the Napoleonic War. Students of naval history, therefore, may feel indebted to the writer for this book — written un- der pressure of duties afloat which since our par- ticipation in the war have left slight leisure for outside work. Allan Westcott, Department of English, U. S. Naval Academy. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR 1 II DEFINITIONS AND ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 9 Sea Power 9 Sea Control 11 Plans of Warring Navies .... 14 III OPENING ACTIVITIES 19 Strength and Disposition of Fleets 19 "Goeben" and "Breslau" Episode . 24 Attacks on Cable and Wireless Sta- tions 28 IV NAVAL ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 33 V CORONEL AND FALKLAND EN- GAGEMENTS 44 Battle off Coronel 44 Falkland Islands Engagement . . 51 VI DARDANELLES OPERATIONS . . 59 yil NORTH SEA BATTLES 83 Dogger Bank Encounter .... 83 Battle of Jutland (Part 1) ... 88 VIII NORTH SEA BATTLES (Cont.) ... 101 Battle of Jutland (Part 2) . . . 101 xi xii CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE IX SUBMARINE WARFARE . ." . . 120 X ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS ... 132 XI NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR . . 145 APPENDIX (1) Comparative Strength of Navies . . . . 161 Excerpts from a compilation by T. G. Frothingham, reprinted by courtesy of Current History _ 161 Table prepared and arranged by C. H. Fos- ter, U. S. N. A 192 Table published by office of U. S. Naval Intelligence 19-2 (^) "Emden' Exploits 195 Excerpts from articles by Comdr. L. A. Cotton, U. S. N., and Lt. H. von Miicke (executive officer of Emden), the latter translated by Lt. Comdr. J. H. Klein, Jr., U. S. N., reprinted by courtesy of U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings . . 195 (3) America's Part in the Development (f Naval Weapons and Tactics 206 By T. G. Frothingham, reprinted by courtesy of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 206 MAPS AND DIAGRAMS Map of the World Indicating Barred Zones AND Location of Chief Naval Events . Frontispiece PAGE . . 21 North Sea and Baltic Map of Eastern Mediterranean Map of German North Sea Coast Diagram of Battle off Coronel 25' 35 •" Diagram of Falkland Islands Engagement . 55 Map of Dardanelles, Sea of ]\Iarmora and Bosporus (The Approaches to Constanti- nople) 65*^ Diagram of Dogger Bank Encounter . . . 85"^ Diagram of Battle of Jutland 93 '^ British Fleet Formation 103' Diagram Indicating Fleet Movements after Battle of Jutland 113*^ ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE U. S. S. Constitution 207 American Letter of Marque Brig Grand Turk of Salem 211' American Armed Brig Tenbdos 213' U. S. S. Niagara 21V American Armed Barque Stamboul . . , . 215' U. S. S. P/?.v.Y.s)7.r.(.N7.i, 1887 SIG-" U. S. S. Pennsylvania, 1916 217*^ NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR CHAPTER I Significance of Naval Power im the War SEA power in the present war has been exerted for the most part behind the scenes. It is hard to realise that the achievements of the Allied fleets, accomplished with so little fighting, have proved, in their influence upon the war, more im- portant than the much heralded land battles in- volving enormous loss of life and property. The German Government admitted this potency of sea power, when, in April, 1917, Hindenburg an- nounced that it was only necessary for the Ger- man armies to hold their own on land while on the sea the U-boats hemmed in Great Britain and so crippled the ocean trade supplying men, food and munitions to Allied armies as to compel the ac- ceptance of peace terms pleasing to the Prussian leaders. 2 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR It is strange that Germany's first soldier should have made the point, that the submarine, the only naval weapon able to evade the Allied blockade, promised a respite and a hope that the German armies could not give, even though the latter had been successful on all fronts and had conquered entire countries. Thus Germany recognised the principle well taught by the distinguished Ameri- can naval officer, Admiral Mahan, that in all great wars between commercial nations land power is ancillary to sea power. At this stage of the war there can be no doubt of the effect upon its grand tactics of command of the sea. In this war, as in past wars, the force of sea power is slowly but surely shaping the issues. As the arteries of sea-borne commerce to the Teutonic Powers are more and more effec- tually blocked, and as the U-boat terror subsides while new strength and vigour from America, Af- rica and Asia is transported more and more eas- ily to France, England and Italy — the realisation will slowly but surely be forced home, that Pan- Germanism has been defeated and Germany must give up the evil policies of her present Govern- ment which she has fought so desperately to propa- gate and defend. In following the developments of the present war it is of interest to note that in the main noth- SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER J3 ing startling has happened to upset expert predic- tions, either as to the part sea power would take, or as to which of the belligerent navies would dominate. In the course of the fighting there have not been any great surprises. Generally speaking, results have corresponded with the degree and kind of peace time naval preparation made by the war- ring nations. The statement that there have been no great sur- prises should be modified by one exception, sub- marine warfare against merchant ships. Before the British blockade forced Germany to plan her unscrupulous submarine campaign against com- merce it is doubtful if any country, not except- ing Gennany, ever thought seriously of such a campaign as a contingency of modern civilised war. It came therefore as a surprise, and its temporary success was due to the fact that in the years of pre-war time development of the submarine there had been no contemporaneous de- velopment of naval weapons to combat it as a commerce destroyer. The submarine had always been looked upon as a lawful weapon for use against enemy fighting ships, and its meagre suc- cess in this capacity shows that the preparations made against it were adequate; but the submarine as an unscrupulous commerce raider had thirty years' start of the weapons science designed to use ii NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR against it in this new and unexpected role. If it had been foreseen thirty years ago that subma- rines would be used in this way, step by step with the development of underwater craft, there would have been a corresponding improvement in scien- tific contrivances for safeguarding commerce; and had this been the case it is reasonable to suppose that the U-boat would never have reaped its grim harvest of peaceful shipping. So this exception goes to prove the rule that naval weapons both for offence and defence are highly scientific products resulting from long years of development. There is alwaj^s the chance, of course, that one side or the other will hit upon some revolutionising invention. Nor does it nec- essarily follow because none has appeared in three and one-half years of fighting that none will ap- pear in the future; but there is, nevertheless, evi- dence that in shaping a policy of defence it is safer to heed the lessons of experience than to rely on a mere theory of inventive abilities adequate to meet any situation. Neither an army nor a navy can be improvised, but it is an important difference between them that an army can be prepared more quickly and easily than can a navy. At the outbreak of this war Great Britain's army was small, but her pow- erful fleet was ready. Under the protection of SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER 5 this first line of defence a great army was recruit- ed from British possessions all over the world, and equipped, and trained. Navies cannot so readily be built up; it takes years to construct a battleship fleet and train the personnel to fight it. When the war began Germany's army was ten times as strong as Great Britain's army, but three and one-half years later there was no such dif- ference between the two and in some respects the British army was superior to that of Germany. On the other hand, in 1914 Germany's sea power was about two-thirds the strength of England's sea power, and approximately this same relative strength has been maintained up to the present time. It takes so long to build fighting ships and the demand on a nation's resources are such that Germany could hardly hope to construct during the war a fleet to rival that of her enemy. But it is different in the case of land forces. Great Britain is rapidly overcoming an initial discrep- ancy in armies much grea.ter than was the naval discrepancy facing Germany in July, 1914. Careful analysis of the battles fought in previ- ous wars has contributed much to naval science, and the general theories previously deduced have been verified by the events of this war. There is, however, by reason of improvements in ships and weapons, continuous change in the conditions af- 6 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR fecting the application of strategic and tactical principles. This makes it advisable to alter rules of practice in the light of lessons learned from day to day. In attempting a study of the naval operations of the present war the handicap of in- sufficient and unreliable data is admitted, but even if some of the premises are slightly in error, still, the inferences drawn will have value so long as they are logical and square with accepted na- val opinion. Secrecy forms an important part of naval strat- egy and is favoured by nature. The sea isolates and frequently swallows up all testimony of the fighting done. Hence in the present war, the Admiralty announcements of both sides have been laconic. Notwithstanding this, however, there is plenty of evidence that the silent navies have not been idle. This is indicated by a summary of the losses sustained up to November, 1917. It is reported that in first line ships Great Brit- ain and her Allies have lost six dreadnoughts and sixteen pre-dreadnoughts, while Germany and her allies have lost one dreadnought and three pre- dreadnoughts. The Allies have lost eighteen ar- moured, cruisers and twelve light cruisers, against six armoured cruisers arid twenty-four light cruis- ers lost by the Central Powers. In other types the figures are less reliable, but the Allies have lost SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER 7 about forty-five destroyers, twenty torpedo boats, twenty-nine submarines, and forty-eight converted cruisers and auxiliaries, while the Central Powers have lost about twenty-eight destroyers, fourteen torpedo boats, between fifty and one hundred sub- marines, and forty-two converted cruisers and auxiliaries. In addition to these, both sides have lost numerous small craft, including air scouts, patrol boats, yachts and mine sweepers. This list of losses, however, indicates only a part of the naval work accomplished. Difficult and important operations are frequently unat- tended by losses. A complete narrative of the war would include not only the engagements fought, but in addition all the activities incident to mobilising, blockading, commerce destrojang, transporting, convoying, patrolling, scouting, raiding, and mine laying. It will be many years before the data for such a work will be available. The scope of this brief study is limited, there- fore, to the more important naval events. These will be discussed not so much with a view to com- pleteness in detail as with the aim of bringing out the points of policy, strateg)% and tactics nec- essary to an understanding of the general prin- ciples governing the size, composition, training, and uses of battle fleets. These principles are 8 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR important as the starting point from which more difficult scientific deductions proceed. To deter- mine the latter is the function of naval experts who have devoted years to the exhaustive study of technical naval problems. The former com- prise a portion of general knowledge which even a casual student of world politics can ill afford to neglect. CHAPTER II Definitions and Estimate of the Situation Sea Power — Sea Control — Plans of Warring Navies SEA POWER THE sea power of a nation may be said to comprise all its means for contesting the control of the sea. It includes the battle fleets and their auxiliaries, cruisers, destroyers, subma- rines, aircraft, also naval bases and stations, for- tified or naturally protected harbours, coast de- fences, the merchant marine (embracing armed and unarmed vessels engaged in commerce and passenger traffic), in short, everything the country possesses that may be useful, directly or indirectly, for the purposes of naval warfare. Big-gun ships comprise the main reliance in battle and are known as "dreadnoughts," These are divided into dreadnought battleships and dreadnought battle cruisers, the difference between the two being that a certain amount of the gun power and armour of the battleship is sacrificed 9 10 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR in the battle cruiser in order to get speed. Pre- dreadnought battleships differ from dreadnought battleships in that, instead of carrying all big guns and torpedo defence guns, they carry some big guns and some smaller or intermediate bat- tery guns, thus tapering down to the torpedo de- fence guns. The armoured cruiser carries a mixed calibre battery like her running mate, the pre- dreadnought battleship, but is faster by reason of having less armour and less powerful guns. Both pre-dreadnought battleships and armoured cruisers are discredited as shown by the fact that no more are being built, but they are by no means useless and still form an important part of the strength of the more powerful navies. The light cruiser, used for commerce destroying and scout- ing, is a fast vessel without armour and carries torpedoes as well as a light battery of intermedi- ate calibre guns. The light cruiser type, which has shown considerable usefulness in the present war, may be regarded as a development of the torpedo boat destroyer, as it is larger, more sea- worthy, more habitable and better armed. The torpedo boat is a smaller edition of the destroyer, and the submarine requires no definition. An aux- iliary cruiser or a converted cruiser is a merchant ship or private vessel requisitioned by the Govern- ment for naval purposes. Such a vessel is usually ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 11 armed for both offence and defence. She loses her character of a merchant ship engaged in peaceful pursuits and becomes a part of the fighting navy with the status of a regular man-of-war. On the other hand, an armed merchantman is armed simply for defence. She is not a part of the fighting navy, and her character is determined by her employment. If she is still engaged in the peaceful pursuits of trade the fact that a ship car- ries one or two guns for defence only does not change her character into that of a man-of-war. Strategy and tactics comprise the science and art of using sea power with the object of getting control of the seas. The word strategy' conveys the idea of preparation for the fighting and tac- tics that of execution of the fighting. But before discussing the points of naval strategy and tactics exemplified in the present war, it is well to explain the uses of naval power and to outline the mari- time situation in July, 1914. SEA CONTROL When nations of maritime importance are at war, relative control of the sea, or certain parts of the sea, belongs to the belligerent whose sea power has practically driven the sea power of the other from the areas in question, so that the mari- 12 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR time operations of the former, both naval and commercial, are practically unhindered, while the maritime operations of the latter are for the time being practically non-existent. For example, it is generally considered that since the beginning of the war the Allies have had control of the Atlan- tic. This does not mean that the maritime oper- ations of the Central Powers in these waters have been literally extinguished. It would appear im- possible, in the face of an enterprising and re- sourceful enemy, to prevent completely the opera- tions of submarines and occasional commerce de- stro5^ers. But since these have not materially af- fected the maritime operations of the Allies it is proper to say that the latter have controlled the Atlantic. There are varying degrees of sea con- trol, and the more extensive the submarine and commerce destroying activities of the weaker bel- ligerent, the less completely does the stronger enemy control the sea areas in question. Theoretically, in times of peace at least, the seas are free to all, but even then certain areas are said to be potentially controlled by certain nations by virtue of their relatively superior sea power in these respective waters. For example, the supe- rior sea power of Japan in Asiatic waters gives her in peace times what might be called potential con- trol of those seas, and it may be assumed that this ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 13 potential control increases the weight of her voice in international affairs of the Far East, In times of war also the potential sea power of neutrals may easily prove an important factor. For example, at the beginning of the war had the United States possessed a navy superior to the navies of the Allies, although, relatively speak- ing between the belligerent powers, the Allies would still have controlled the Atlantic Ocean, the superior sea power of the United States would have given this country a potential control of this ocean, which might have affected the conduct of the maritime operations of all the belligerents, particularly in matters concerning the lawful in- terests of the United States. International law is not very clearly codified, and it is natural that different nations should look at things from different angles. This means that when great wars are going on potential sea power may prove especially valuable in securing respect for neutral rights. At the beginning of the war the Allies had su- perior sea power and consequent potential control in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterra- nean Sea, Black Sea, North Sea — in short, in all sea areas excepting those adjacent to the ports and naval bases of the Central Powers, namely, the Adriatic near Austria's ports, the North Sea and U NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR the Baltic adjacent to Germany's ports, and the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, and the Bos- porus, under the control of Turkey. Making a similar estimate of the situation at the close of the first three and one-half years of war, we find no material alteration. The fighting, which has changed the potential control into ac- tive control, followed a course quite to be ex- pected, and maritime operations have been singu- larly free of surprises. The Allies made a nota- ble attempt to wrest control of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, and Bosporus from Turkey and her allies, but it failed, and, with the possible ex- ception of the battle off the Jutland Peninsula, there has been no other active struggle to alter the areas of sea control as determined by the pre- wartime disposition of sea power. This appor- tionment of the seas has been manifestly disad- vantageous to the Teutonic powers, but the sea power of the latter, the part their navies have played, and the waters they have controlled, have by no means been negligible. PLANS OF WARRING NAVIES .Broadly speaking, Great Britain's plan of naval campaign at the outbreak of hostilities aimed : — first, to destroy the enem)^ fleets with superior ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 15 forces, or, failing in this, to confine the enemy fleets and restrict his trade by a system of distant blockades; second, to convert potential control of the high seas into active control by destroy- ing, capturing, or bottling up enemy men-of-war operating on foreign stations. On the other hand, the weaker German and Austrian navies instituted a different kind of cam- paign. The Teutonic powers planned: — first, to operate the home fleets so as to protect their coast lines and control as wide as possible sea areas be- yond, thereby preventing a close blockade and permitting commercial intercourse with neighbour- ing neutral countries; second, to use their naval vessels abroad so as to inflict the greatest possible damage on their enemies before being cornered and destroyed by superior Allied sea power or es- caping to the shelter of home or friendly ports, as was the case when the Goebcn and Breslau eluded numerous enemy ships in the Mediterra- nean and steamed safely through the Dardanelles to Constantinople; third, to interfere with and damage enemy commerce by means of submarines and commerce destroyers, such as the Moewe; and fourth, the Teutonic powers planned to lessen the disparity of force between their navies and the superior navies of their enemies by so-called attri- tion warfare, harassing and menacing the enemy 16 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR in all possible ways, instituting raids with fast air and sea squadrons, attacking with mines and tor- pedoes, and watchfully seeking opportunity to fall upon a detached portion of the enemy fleet with a superior force. How have these plans worked out"? What has Teutonic sea power accomplished ? What has Al- lied sea power accomplished? Early in the war German commerce destroyers, of which the Emden is a historic example, did considerable damage to Allied shipping. Turkey, aided by Germany, defeated the Allies at the Dar- danelles, where a costly attempt was made to wrest from Turkey waterways over which she had exercised authority practically since the beginning of modern history. The potential defensive pow- er proved adequate when put to the test of active resistance. The exploits of submarines have as- tonished the world. The British shores have been raided both by air and by sea attacks. In minor engagements as well as in the battle of Jutland, Germany, hitherto without traditions of the sea, has made a record in fighting efficiency which, ship for ship, places her fleet in the front rank. But to what purpose*? The superior naval power of the Allies has slowly but surely swept the German flag from the seas. In the first month of the war, the German cruisers in American and ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 17 Far Eastern waters were skillfully drawn away from enemy-infested areas and concentrated un- der the command of Vice Admiral von Spee off the west coast of South America. Here they gained a brief respite by defeating an inferior British squadron. But they were doomed ships, and it was only a question of time before the more powerful enemy navies would find and destroy them. This happened in the Falkland Islands en- gagement, which took place a month after the German victory off Coronel. With no navy to protect them, the German colonies have been cap- tured one by one. On the other hand, the colo- nies of the Allies have been secure, and a source of aid and comfort to their mother countries. German submarines have inflicted enormous losses but have not succeeded in closing the sea highways to the Allies. Supplies and munitions of war con- stantly stream into their ports. Transports bring their troops from all parts of the world. It was the pressure of naval power which com- pelled Germany as a last hope to undertake her lawless submarine campaign against commerce. This precipitated the United States into the war. Again it is the ability of the naval power of the United States to check the submarine menace in the Atlantic which has made the money, food, and man power of America transported over-seas to 18 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR the support of hard-pressed England, France, and Italy a decisive factor of the war. Naval events in this war, therefore, have sup- plied corroborative evidence to inductions ground- ed in the experience of past wars, thus clarifying rather than confusing the principles already more or less firmly established. Naval power dominates the military situation. Unless there is an over- whelming discrepancy, the armies of the belliger- ent denied the sea will surely weaken and be over- come by the armies fed and equipped and sup- ported by means of ocean traffic. CHAPTER III Opening Activities Strength and Disposition of Fleets — Goeben and Breslau Episode — Attacks on Cable and Wireless Statioas. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF FLEETS (JULY, 1914) WHEN hostilities opened, the naval fleets of the countries involved were concentrated in well-defined theatres of operations. Disregard- ing the small detachments on independent or for- eign service, the bulk of Great Britain's fleet faced the German high sea fleet in North Europe, while the French navy was opposed to the Austrian navy in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Russia's navy had not been rehabilitated since the Russo-Japa- nese war, but the few ships she had guarded Rus- sian Baltic and Black Sea coasts. The relative strengths of these belligerent navies at the begin- ning of the great war may be approximately in- dicated by the following figures. Great Britain's navy consisted of sixty-three battleships, ten battle cruisers, thirty-four ar- 19 20 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR moured cruisers, seventy-four cruisers, two hun- dred destroyers, eighty-five torpedo boats and seventy-eight submarines. Of these, two of the older battleships, three battle cruisers, sixteen cruisers, and a few destroyers were on foreign sta- tions, Germany's navy consisted of thirty-five battle- ships, five battle cruisers, nine armoured cruisers, forty-five light cruisers, one hundred and forty- three destroyers, and about thirty-five submarines. This fighting strength was concentrated in home waters except for one battle cruiser, two armoured cruisers, eight light cruisers, and one destroyer on duty abroad. The French navy comprised twenty-two battle- ships, nineteen armoured cruisers, twelve light cruisers, eighty-four destroyers, one hundred and thirty-five torpedo boats, and seventy-eight sub- marines. As early as 1912, the Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France resulted in the general scheme that France would look out for British naval interests in southern Europe, while Great Britain would protect French naval inter- ests in northern Europe. France had only four cruisers engaged in distant service. Austria's navy numbered twelve battleships, ten cruisers, eighteen destroyers, sixty-three torpedo boats, and ten submarines. All of these, with the 21 22 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR exception of one armoured cruiser on the China station, were in home waters. Table (approximate) of Belligerent Fleets July, 1914^ Battle- ships, dread- nought type Battle- ships Battle cruis- ers Ar- moured cruis- ers Cruis- ers De- stroy- ers Tor- pedo boats Sub- ma- rines Coast defense vessels ^ England .... Germany . . . France Russia Austria- Hungary. . 231 152 4 4 40 20 18 7 6 10 5 34 9 19 6 74 45 12 9 10 200 143 84 91 18 85 135 14 63 78 30 78 30 10 2 1 2 6 1 Assuming 2 Queen Elizabeth class practically completed. 2 Assuming 2 Koenig class practically completed. Just before the outbreak of war the British fleet had been mobilised at Spithead, and early on Au- gust 4th, the day. of Great Britain's war declara- tion against Germany, this fleet put to sea under sealed orders. Less is known about the exact dis- position of the German forces, but probably they were equally ready and concentrated in the vi- cinity of the fortified bases at either end of the Kiel canal connecting the North and Baltic seas. On August 5th the British ship Drake cut two cables off the Azores, thus severing this means of communication between the German ships abroad and their Admiralty at home. On the same day, ^ For further details of all the navies finally engaged in the war, see Appendix. OPENING ACTIVITIES 23 the crew of a fishing boat reported that they had seen a large merchant ship in the North Sea throw- ing things overboard. A British destroyer flotilla of four ships was sent to investigate and soon gave chase to the steamer Koenigen Louise. A shot across the bow was unheeded, thus confirming the suspicions that the fleeing steamer had been con- verted by Germany into a mine layer. An en- gagement lasting about six minutes followed, dur- ing which the mine layer was repeatedly hit and finally sunk by gun fire. Fifty of her crew of one hundred and thirty were saved and made prison- ers. The next day the British light cruiser Am- phion struck a mine, probably one of those laid by the Koenigen Louise, and was destroyed. On August 9th a flotilla of German submarines made an unsuccessful attack against the light cruiser Birmingham^ which escaped unharmed after sink- ing by gun fire the German U-15. These early happenings give an idea of how the struggle on the seas began. As fast as the war news spread throughout the world the fight- ing ships and merchant ships of the nations in- volved proceeded, in accordance v/ith instructions, to modify their conduct and movements to meet the change from peace to war conditions. The German warships at large did what they could to safeguard their own commerce, destroy enemy 24 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR commerce, and evade destruction themselves. The Allied navies set to work blockading enemy coasts, protecting Allied commerce, clearing the seas of enemy flags, rendering assistance to the expedi- tions sent to reduce German colonies, and trans- porting troops with their impedimenta from all parts of the world to the fighting front. Although the primary purpose of battleships is to give battle, it is readily seen that naval war- time work covers a wide and varied field. Some- times there are important naval happenings with- out attendant losses or even without fighting. The escape of the Go eh en and Breslau may be cited as of conspicuous political significance. "goeben" and "breslau" episode It is reported that during the first few days of the war the German battle cruiser Goeben and light cruiser Breslau bombarded the Algerian coast, sank a few ships in Bona harbour, and then proceeded to Messina, arriving there on August 5th, 1914. It is also rumoured that while off the northern coast of Africa the two German cruisers, when hard beset by enemy forces, escaped during misty weather by the aid of the ruse of placing some musicians on a raft to attract the attention of enemy patrols by playing German 25 26 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR airs, while the warships laid their course for Mes- sina. From the pre-wartime disposition of forces it may be assumed that the Allies had in the Medi- terranean at this time numerous men-of-war, in- cluding very likely two or three British battle cruisers, several fast light cruisers, and many de- stroyers. International law required that the Ger- man warships leave the neutral port of Messina within twenty-four hours. The chances for es- cape appeared dubious to say the least, and the following version of the manoeuvre, purporting to be based on the log of the Goeben, is of interest: On Aug. 6, 1914, just before sailing from Messina the German commander issued these orders : "News about the enemy is uncertain, I presume his strength lies in the Adriatic and that he is watching both exits to the Messina Strait. Our object is to break through to the east and reach the Dardanelles. I want to create the impression that we intend to go to the Adriatic. In case I so succeed I will veer round in the night and make for Cape Matapan, if possible throwing the enemy off our track." As the ships — flags flying and music playing — were reaching the open sea the following wireless message from the Kaiser reached the Admiral : "His Majesty expects the Goeben and the Breslau to succeed in break- ing through." Shortly after leaving the harbour the English cruiser OPENING ACTIVITIES ^7 Gloucester appeared on the horizon. The English cruiser was emitting signals in three groups. The word "Mumfu" frequently occurred and it was clear that it referred to the Goeben. The wireless receivers inter- preted the signal of the British cruiser as follows: ''Goe- ben making for the Adriatic." The German wireless officer argued thus : "I can jam him. If I break my waves against his perhaps I can confuse, hold up, destroy his messages. Shall I jam his wireless?" he asked the Admiral. "Shall we fire?" asked the Commander. "No," was the answer to both questions. No one apart from the staff understood the Admiral. This is how he argued, however: "This boat is evidently a patrol, intending to wireless our movements to the main British fleet. He shall save us, not ruin us. He shall do his work. We will neither fire at nor jam him. Let him wireless that the Germans are making for the Adri- atic, 'whereas the Dardanelles is our object." It was dark. The Breslau closed in. It was 10 o'clock in the evening; then came the order from the bridge: "Starboard; make for Cape Matapan." The watching British cruiser saw the manoeuvre, but before she could wireless the news that the Germans were making for the east the following order flashed out from the Admiral: "Jam the wireless; jam it like the devil." For hours the Germans were travelling eastward with- out obstacle, while the patrol boat tried to make itself understood in vain. Where did the error of our enemy lie ? In England the excuse was advanced that the Ger- mans had acquired knowledge of the British secret wire- , less code and so deceived the latter into waiting. Is it worth while contradicting such stuff? The English 28 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR should have waited before the Strait of Messina, and nowhere else. But so confident were they that the Goe- ben and Breslau must try and break through to the Adri- atic in order to reach an Austrian port, that they thought it safe to wait in the Strait of Otranto, which is forty sea miles wide. So positive were they on this point that the thought of our making for the Dardanelles never seems to have occurred to them. When the wireless messages of the Gloucester finally reached the British fleet it was too late. The German ships were en route for Constantinople. That this episode caused the Allies considerable chagrin may well be imagined. The British com- mander was afterwards relieved. A little later, apparently as an alternative to disarming and being interned, the Go eh en and Breslau were sold by Germany to Turkey, a transaction without pre- cedent and involving a question of international law. Sharp representations were made by the Al- lies to Turkey, claiming that the latter had vio- lated her neutrality and demanding immediate repatriation of the officers and crews. Turkey , failed to comply with this demand and it is rea- sonable to suppose that the presence of the two warships in Constantinople had considerable in- fluence in persuading the Turkish Government to join Germany and Austria in the war. At this initial period in near Eastern affairs determined action on the part of the Allies to- OPENING ACTIVITIES 29 ward Turkey might possibly have had important effects. Suppose, for example, that a powerful com- bined British and French naval force had steamed through the Dardanelles up to Constantinople and demanded the surrender of the Goebcn and Bres- lau because of Turkey's alleged violation of neu- trality laws. Suppose, also, if Turkey had for- bidden this passage and refused these demands, that the Allied force had fought its way through the Dardanelles and either captured or destroyed the Goeben and Breslau in spite of any armed resistance which might have been offered. It is, of course, problematical how much strength Tur- key could have shown at this time, but it is not an unreasonable supposition that a resolute naval demonstration in the Dardanelles might have been successful and might have had a decisive influence on the wavering Turks, with consequently far- reaching effects upon the general course of the war. ATTACKS ON CABLE AND WIRELESS STATIONS As another example of the kind of naval activ- ity frequently overlooked because unmarked by fighting, the work of destroying the enemy's cable and wireless service and safeguarding one's own, may be mentioned. 30 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR Means of transmitting information are most important factors in modern strategy. These are now so efficient that it is extremely difficult for commerce destroyers of the nation of weaker sea power to escape the net drawn about them by the stronger navies dominating the seas. That the German ships on foreign stations well realised the part wireless and cable would play in their final downfall is evidenced by some interesting attempts made by them to destroy wireless sta- tions and cable stations. An instance of this was the visit of the Niirn- berg and a German collier to the British cable station at Fanning Island, situated about four hundred miles south of the Hawaiian group in the mid-Pacific. It was in the morning of Sep- tember 7, 1914, that the German cruiser rudely intruded upon the usually quiet and uneventful life of Fanning. The cable employes were hard at work, when they were paralysed to see a German officer at the door of the operating room with a revolver. "Take your hands off those keys, all of you!" he commanded. The men were made to line up against the wall, while the sailors with axes smashed the delicate and costly instruments. Heavy charges of dynamite were planted and the cable was blown to atoms. In the meanwhile the OPENING ACTIVITIES 31 collier grappled for the cable further out to sea, with the intention of doing additional damage. A search was then made by the officers, and a num- ber of papers were found which revealed that sev- eral valuable instruments were buried in reserve for just such contingencies, and that a quantity of hidden arms and ammunition existed, all of which were quickly uncovered and confiscated/ Later on the Niirnberg formed a part of Ad- miral von Spec's squadron, which after the vic- tory off Coronel attempted to raid the Falkland Islands, just as Fanning had been raided. But this time the British Navy did the surprising, and instead of a defenceless wireless station the Ger- mans found Vice Admiral Sturdee on guard with a battle cruiser division. Another instance of cable attack, also unhappy in its results for the raiders, occurred in the Far East at the Cocos Islands. The valiant Captain Miiller of the Emden attempted one of his bogus- funnel ruses as a means of taking by storm the cable and wireless station on Keeling-Cocos Isl- and. But the ruse was detected — and well ahead — by those in charge on shore, who promptly ad- vised by wireless several British men-of-war with- in call. This led to the Emden's ultimate doom. Moreover, a rush cable message was sent out to * Chas. Bright, igth Century Magazine, April, 1915. 32 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR the Navy Office at Melbourne, and the alertness and intelligence of the cable and wireless Super- intendents showed that they had well learned the lesson taught by the raid on Fanning Island. The Emden landing parties did, indeed, succeed in cut- ting two cables, but were too late. The intelli- gence which proved fatal had already passed over the wires. The story of the operator's part in the sinking of the Emden is one of those records of ready wit and efficiency which make the best of romance. The guns of the Sydney sent the Emden on the rocks, but those guns would not have come into play had not the operator at Cocos Island quickly recognised the enemy in all her disguise and dis- patched the warning message throughout the world which brought the Sydney up in time. It is almost disturbing to think that before the boat's crew had landed from the Emden the warships were moving to the rescue and London was mak- ing arrangements for repairing the cable and wire- less station. The superior sea power of the Allies, however, has made German attempts on Allied wireless and cable stations difficult, and, when successful, of only temporary embarrassment, while the over- seas German stations, without ships to defend them, have passed permanently into the hands of the Allies. CHAPTER IV Naval Action in Heligoland Bight THE first noteworthy naval engagement of the war occurred off Heligoland in August, 1914. In connection with this action which at once and so dramatically brought this strategi- cally commanding naval fortress to the world's attention, it is interesting to keep in mind the events that gave to Germany this island outpost and the double base of the Kiel canal. It has been a strange fatality that Great Brit- ain's foreign policy throughout the 19th Century has strengthened the sea power of her enemies both off her own shores and at the Dardanelles, while at the same time her contemporary naval policy has carefully ' maintained a navy strong enough to dominate all rivals. This illustrates the necessity in any country for mutual under- standing and co-operation between the Foreign Office and the Navy department in shaping for- eign policies. The island of Heligoland had been a British possession from 1807, but in the late eighties was 33 34 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR ceded to Germany in exchange for concessions in Africa. In times of peace the African explorer Stanley is said to have called this transfer of Heligoland for concessions in Africa, ''The ex- change of a trouser button for a whole suit.'' A German interviewer now reports that the Kaiser, "with joy and pride," spoke of a recent visit to Heligoland, and adapted the above figure to pre- sent conditions by saying, "Today this trouser but- ton holds our whole suit together T Heligoland is situated 35 miles northeast of Cuxhaven and 43 miles north of Wilhelmshaven, and it guards the naval bases and the North Sea entrance of the Kiel canal. As a part of the Ger- man program of naval expansion prior to the war it had been converted into an impregnable forti- fication, and the Bight of Heligoland has become an outwork of the German bases which has greatly increased their tactical value. The Bight forms a channel eighteen miles wide leading to the ports of the Elbe and it is a nest of mines and lurking submarines. The chief point of interest in the action of Au- gust 28, 1916, is the spirited dash against the out- skirts of these dangers by Admiral Beattie's squad- ron, and his escape without serious damage after inflicting losses upon the Germans. The action of August 28th took place about rt it»ii ;■■>.' y ^ tq ^ ■m ^ W -4- 3S 36 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR seven miles north of Heligoland. Reconnoitring British submarines had reported German light cruisers and smaller craft in the vicinity of Heli- goland. The British plan was to draw these enemy ships away from the protecting guns of the fortress island and then to destroy them. Detailed official reports have not been published, but various ver- sions appearing in the press indicate a British scheme carried out in some such way as is de- scribed in the following paragraphs. Three submarines were to steam ahead on the surface of the water to act as decoys, and to re- treat before the German ships which were ex- pected to give chase. The light cruisers Are thus a and Fearless were assigned the mission to cut the enemy off from their home bases. A squadron of light cruisers was detailed to support these two ships, while other light cruisers and battle cruis- ers were held in reserve farther away in the north- west. British destroyers accompanied each of these three cruiser detachments. Vice Admiral Beatty was in chief command of the British forces. All ships being in their allotted positions at daybreak of the 28th, the three decoy submarines showing their hulls advanced at half speed to- ward Heligoland. They were accompanied by five sister ships steaming submerged and followed by two destroyers. This detachment was soon ACTION I\ HELIGOLAND BIGHT 37 sighted, and German destroyers gave chase, fol- lowed by the light cruisers Ariadne and Strass- hurg. At about 7 a. m. this chase was being con- ducted toward the British reserve force in the northwest, while the supporting detachment, con- sisting of the Arethusa and the Fearless with ac- companying destroyers, was steaming toward the eastward to cut off the German retreat. At 8.10 a. m. these two cruisers were engaged by enemy cruisers, and a stubborn action ensued in which the Arethusa was damaged. At 8.25 a six-inch projectile from the Fearless wrecked the forward bridge of the Ariadne, killing her captain, and the German ships then withdrew. At about 9 o'clock the Fearless towed the Arethusa to the westward, where she was able to make temporary repairs which permitted her to return to the engagement about an hour later. Meanwhile lively destroyer actions were in progress. The German V-187 boldly attacked a superior number of enemy destroyers, but was overpowered by gun fire and sank with her crew cheering and firing their guns as long as the muz- zles were above water. During a lull in the fighting the British de- stroyers Goshawk and Defender lowered boats to rescue survivors of the V-187, but the German 38 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR light cruiser Mainz interrupted this operation and forced the destroyers to abandon two of their small boats. The commander of the submerged British submarine E-4 happened to be nearby watching this episode through his periscope. Tak- ing in the situation he manoeuvred his submarine for a rescue, and surprised the two small boats by suddenly coming to the surface midway between them. The Britishers and their rescued prisoners were quickly taken aboard, and the E-4 again sub- merged. At about 10 o'clock the British destroyers Lurcher and Firedrake, which were in company with the decoy submarines, reported that they were being chased by two fast enemy cruisers. The Arethusa^ Fearless^ and two more light cruis- ers armed with 4-inch guns went to the rescue and engaged the Strassburg, which vessel was soon supported by the Koln and Mainz. The larger guns carried by the German cruisers proved too strong for the lighter armed British cruisers, and calls for assistance were sent to the reserve force of battle cruisers and light cruisers previously sta- tioned in the northwest. In the meantime (at 11 a.m.) this reserve force had been attacked by three German subma- rines. This attack was frustrated by rapid ma- ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 39 noeuvring, and four British destroyers made a counter-attack. Shortly after eleven Vice Admiral Beatty, flying his flag in the battle cruiser Lion, received word that the British light cruisers were being hard pressed, and he ordered the Falmouth, carrying eight 8-inch guns, and the Nottingham, carrying nine 6-inch guns, to go to their support. A little later further calls for assistance were re- ceived, and the battle cruisers, having worked up to full speed, proceeded to the scene of the action. When the hion and Queen Mary appeared out of the mist their heavy guns quickly decided the battle. The noonday sun cleared away the mist which had masked the large guns of Heligoland during the engagement, and by evening both British and German forces had retired to their respective home ports. The Germans lost three light cruisers, Koln, Mainz and Ariadne, and one destroyer, V-i8y, sunk. The light cruiser Strassburg suf- fered severe damage as did also other of the Ger- man destroyers and small craft. The British lost no ships sunk, but the light cruiser Arethusa and some of the destroyers were hard hit and compelled to limp back to home navy yards for extensive repairs before returning again to active service. 40 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR The following is Admiral Beatty's report of the engagement : //. M. S. Lion, September l, 1914. Sir. — I have the honor to report that on Thursday, August 27, at 5 a. m., I proceeded with the First Battle Cruiser Squadron and First Light Cruiser Squadron in company, to rendezvous with the Rear Admiral, Invinci- ble. At 4 a. m., August 28, the movements of the flotillas commenced, as previously arranged, the Battle Cruiser Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron supporting. The Rear Admiral, Invincible, with Nezv Zealand and four destroyers, having joined my flag, the squadron passed through the prearranged rendezvous. At 8.10 a. m. I received a signal from the Commodore (T), informing me that the flotilla was in action with the enemy. This was presumably in the vicinity of their pre- arranged rendezvous. From this time until 11 a. m. I remained about the vicinity ready to support as neces- sary, intercepting various signals, which contained no in- formation on which I could act. At 11 a. m. the squadron was attacked by three sub- marines. The attack was frustrated by rapid maneuver- ing, and the four destroyers were ordered to attack them. Shortly after ) 1 a. m. various signals having been re- ceived indicating that the Commodore (T), and Com- modore (S) were both in need of assistance, I ordered the Light Cruiser Squadron to support the torpedo flotillas. Later I received a signal from the Commodore (T), stating that he was being attacked by a large cruiser, and a further signal informing me that he was being hard pressed, and asking for assistance. The Captain (D), ACTION IN HELIGOLAND lilGHT 41 First Flotilla, also signalled that he was in need of help. From the foregoing the situation appeared to me crit- ical. The flotillas had advanced only two miles since 8 a. m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy bases on their flank and rear respectively. Commodore Goodenough had detached two of his light cruisers to assist some destroyers earlier in the day, and these had not yet rejoined. (They rejoined at 2.30 p. m.) As the reports indicated the presence of many enemy ships — one a large cruiser^ — I considered that his force might not be strong enough to deal with the situation sufficiently rap- idly, so at 11.30 a. m. the battle cruisers turned to ESE. and worked up to full speed. It was evident that to be of any value the support must be overwhelming, and car- ried out at the highest speed possible. I had not lost sight of the risk of submarines, and pos- sible sortie in force from the enemy's base, especially in view of the mist to the southeast. Our high speed, however, made submarine attack diffi- cult, and the smoothness of the sea made their detection comparatively easy. I considered that we were powerful enough to deal with any sorties except by a battle squad- ron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided our stroke was sufficiently rapid. At 12.15 p. m. Fearless and First Flotilla were sighted retiring west. At the same time the Light Cruiser Squad- ron was observed to be engaging an enemy ship ahead. They appeared to have her beat. I then steered NE. to sounds of firing ahead, and at 12.30 p. m. sighted Arethusa and Third Flotilla retiring to the westward engaging a cruiser of the Kolberg class on our port bow. I steered to cut her ofc from Heligo- 42 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR land, and at 12.37 p. m. opened fire. At 12.42 the enemy turned to NE., and we chased at 27 knots. At 12.56 p. m. sighted and engaged a two-funnelled cruiser ahead. Lion fired two salvos at her, which took effect, and she disappeared into the mist, burning furi- ously and in a sinking condition. In view of the mist and that she was steering at high speed at right angles to Lion, who was herself steaming at 28 knots, the Lions firing was very creditable. Our destroyers had reported the presence of floating mines to the eastward, and I considered it inadvisable to pursue her. It was also essential that the squadrons should remain concentrated, and I accordingly ordered a withdrawal. The battle cruisers turned north and circled to port to complete the destruction of the vessel first en- gaged. She was sighted again at 1.25 p. m. steaming SE., with colors still flying. Lion opened fire with two turrets, and at 1.35 p. m., after receiving two salvos, she sank. The four attached destroyers were sent to pick up sur- vivors, but I deeply regret that they subsequently re- ported that they searched the area but found none. At 1.40 p. m. the battle cruisers turned to the north- ward, and Queen Mary was again attacked by a sub- marine. The attack was avoided by the use of the helm. Lowestoft was also unsuccessfully attacked. The battle cruisers covered the retirement until nightfall. By 6 p. m., the retirement having been well executed and all destroyers accounted for, I altered course, spread the light cruisers, and swept northwards in accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's orders. At 7.45 p. m. I de- tached Liverpool to Rosyth with German prisoners, seven ACTION IN HELIGOLAND BIGHT 43 officers and 79 men, survivors from Mainz. No further incident occurred. I have the honor to be, sir, your .obedient servant, (Signed) David Beattv, Ftce Admiral. The Secretary of the Admiralty. CHAPTER V CORONEL AND FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS BATTLE OFF CORONEL AT the beginning of the war the British ar- moured cruisers Good Hope and Mon- ??iouth, together with the light cruiser Glasgow and the transport Otranto^ were in Atlantic wa- ters off the coast of the Americas. These ships rendezvoused off Brazil under the command of Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock and proceeded south around Cape Horn, evidently with the mis- sion to find and destroy German vessels. The old battleship Canopus was also under his com- mand, but apparently did not cruise in company with the other ships because of her inferior speed. At this time German ships in the Pacific in- cluded the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the light cruiser Niirnberg, and the light cruiser Leipzig. These ships in the Pacific, together with the light cruiser Dresden, then in South Atlantic waters, proceeded at the outbreak of the war, apparently in accordance with a pre- arranged plan, to rendezvous off the coast of South America. 44 CORONEL— FALKLAND ENGAGEMENTS 45 A comparison of the strategic dispositions of the belligerents in this rather remote theatre of war, in the latter part of October, 1914, shows that the British Admiral had under his command two ar- moured cruisers, one light cruiser, and one battle- ship, while the German Admiral, Count von Spec, had two armoured cruisers and three light cruisers, thus giving the British a superiority of about 8,000 tons in displacement and about 2,200 pounds in weight of broadside. These figures, however, are misleading, because they do not truly measure the fighting values of the two groups. The German ships were newer and their squadron more homogeneous in both guns and speed. The British ships were a heterogeneous collection of less modern vessels, with the principal fighting strength in an old battleship of only sixteen knots speed, which did not get into the engagement at all. With the Canopus out of the battle line, the Germans had considerable advantage in tonnage and in weight of broadside.^ 'The following figures indicate the strength of the British ships actually engaged. For the strength of the German squad- ron, see table for Falkland Islands engagement, p. 53 Name Type Date Dis- place- ment (Tons) Belt ar- mour Guns Speed Good Hope .... Monmouth Glasgow .\rmoured Cruiser . . . .\rmourcd Cruiser . . . Light (scout) Cruiser 1903 1903 1911 14,100 9,S00 4.800 f>-inch 4-inch none 2-9.2', 16-6', 14-3' 14-6', 8-3' 2-6', 10-4' 24 24 26.5 46 NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR The information now available seems to afford evidence of superior strategy on the part of Ger- many, All the more credit is due on account of Germany's marked inferiority in total of sea pow- er, with consequently greater difficulties confront- ing Admiral von Spec, beset as he was by Japa- nese squadrons as well as by British squadrons, and without any naval bases in which to seek ref- uge and comfort. The movements of these squadrons up to the day of the battle have been considered as strateg- ical because they were in preparation for fighting. We now turn to the tactical phases which have to do with the execution of the fighting. On the afternoon of November l, 1914, the British squadron was spread out in scouting for- mation, steaming along the coast of Chile, look- ing for enemy ships. The light cruiser Glasgow had been dispatched to Coronel to send cables. She left there at 9 a. m., November 1, and while steaming to the northward sighted the German squadron about 4 p. m. At about 5 p. m. the British ships formed in line ahead, the Good Hope leading, followed by the Mon??iouth, Glasgow^ and Otranto. The battleship Canopus was about 250 miles to the southward. Admiral von Spec formed his ships in line ahead, the Scliarnhdrst leading, followed by the Gneisenau, with the 5^ OTRANTOO "'■D . GLASGOWO ""^ MONMOUTH^ a< 5 (\ Z OSGOOD HOPEVJ *^ F « ■^ o 9^ 6lP7_ 14,600 yds. 6:20 _ 13,600 yds. I _6l34 y 11,260 yds. GOOD HOPE t)it. OTRANTO^'' escapes S.W^^ 6:39 6:53 • NURNBERG ("far In rear") I DRESDEN ("l mile behind") 1 GNEISENAU i SCHARN HORST German ships close 1 point. / Open fire Tumbes Pt. Resume southerly course. . .'-°^—\ One point off. -