.1 "4 HOLLINGER pH8.5 MILL RUN F3-1543 E 415 .9 .S4 E8 Copy 1 THE STATESMANSHIP OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD As Seen in liis Public Career prior to 1861 BY ANDREW ESTREM ,^.s.s^K..---;^^Sr FOR THE DEGREE OF PRIVATE EDITION 1S93 «v fl343 THE STATESMANSHIP OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD As Seen in his Public Career prior to 1861 BY ANDREW ESTREM A THESIS SUBMITTED A T CORNELL UNIVERSITY FOR THE DECREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PRIVATE EDITION 1893 Printed by Lutheran Publishing House. Decorah. Iowa. PREFATORY NOTE. This brief study pretends to be neither a biography nor a history', but, in a measure, a combination of both. Such being the plan, the characfler of the execution must depend partly on the manner in which the necessary limitations have been ob- served. A somewhat close adherence to the title of the paper has made necessary the omission of much biographical detail that would have revealed some of Seward's traits in a most attracflive light, — such as the gentleness of his domestic life, the strength of his personal friendships, his integrity, his religious temperament. These things are best learnt, however, through his letters as they appear in the biography written by his son, Frederick W. Seward. From a biographical point of view, it is evidently unsatisfacftory to stop short in the account at the point at which the person under consideration entered upon what many will deem the most important part of his public career. But considered with reference to historic unity, such a proceeding stands, in this case, in need of no apology. Acknowledgments are due to Professor Moses Coit Tyler, in whose historical seminary this paper was prepared. A. E. Cresco, Iowa, July 21, 1892. Cornell Uuiv. Lib, BxcUang MAR J3 4»0*« / CONTENTS. CHAPTER 1. EARLY POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS ..... I CHAPTKll II. IN THE NEW YORK SENATE ...... 8 CHAPTER 111. FIRST WHIG GOVERNOR OF NEW Y'ORK . . . -14 CHAPTER IV. FIRST WHIG GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK (Con.) . . 25 CHAPTER V. EARLY ANTI-SLAVERY IDEAS . . . . . -32 CHAPTER VI. IN THE COMPROMISE CONGRESS OF 1850 . . . 41 CHAPTER VII. DEFENDS THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE . . . -51 CHAPTER VIII. PLE.'VDS FOR THE STATE OF KANSAS .... 59 t'HAPTKR IX. IN POLITICS, 1855-60 ....... 67 CHAPTER X. IN THE L.VST CONGRESS BEFORE THE W..\R ... 73 LIST OF AUTHORITIES ....... 85 INDEX .......... 87 THE STATESMANSHIP OF WILLIAM H, SEWARD. CHAPTER I. EARLY POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS. Near the close of the first quarter of this century, New York pohtics presented the spectacle of nominally one part}- with three or four more or less antagonistic subdivisions. In federal politics this was the "era of good feeling," but this feeling had evidently not taken possession of the New York politicians. Here the Bucktail facftion fought against the Clin- tonian with all the bitterness of partisan warfare. Between these stood the remnant of the Federal party, no longer keep- ing up an independent organization, but still strong in the character of its chief men. The origin of the quarrel between the Clintonian and Bucktail branches of the Republican party dated from De Witt Clinton's election as governor in 1S17. As the proje(fi:or and chief advocate of the Erie canal, he en- countered the opposition of manj- who thought his scheme extravagant and impracticable, and of many more, in the southern parts of the state, who regarded it as of onh" local importance. The opposition was led by Tammany Hall men, some of whom wore, on certain occasions, an ornament which secured for the opponents of Clinton the name the}- bore. Promi- nent among the Bucktails were such men as Daniel D. Tomp- kins, then vice-president, William L. Marcy, and Martin Van Buren. The latter was their acknowledged leader, though per- sonally he was not opposed to the canal scheme. In a year or two, when Clinton's projedl had gained more approval, the Bucktails ceased their opposition to it altogether, but their hostility to Clinton was as bitter as ever. Nor need this occa- sion surprise. New York politics have always had in them something that baffles ordinary explanation. So far as one can Z WILLIAM H. SEWARD. ascertain, the opposition was now continued on a personal basis. Clinton was accused of attempting to form about himself a per- sonal party and of being in secret alliance with the Federalists. In 1819, it was thought a sufficiently .serious charge to accuse him of favoring the re-ele(5tion to the United States senate of the Federalist Rufus King. But the next year Van Buren and his friends came out strongly in favor of King's election.' In general ability, and especially in political shrewdness, the Bucktail party was superior to the Clintonian. Clinton him- self, though able and patriotic, was somewhat cold in demeanor and liable to over-confidence. He had always been the child of power and a di.stributer of patronage. When some of his opponents proposed a convention to revise the constitution of the state, and among other things to abolish the obnoxious coun- cil of appointment, he at first opposed the plan, wishing to retain the council. The Bucktail party, having perceived the drift of public opinion, made efforts to have a convention called while they had the power to control it. In this they were successful. When the convention met in 1821, they had the greater number of delegates, among them Van Buren, who on this occasion did some of his most meritorious work. The councils of appointment and revision were abolished, the suffrage was extended, and man}- offices formerly appointive were made eledlive. When the new constitution went into effedl in 1822, Clinton retired from office and his party praeflically dissolved. But a circumstance occurred in the beginning of 1824 which again brought him prominently before the people. By an ill- advised scheme of his opponents in the legislature, he was re- moved from the office of canal commissioner, which he had long filled with conspicuous ability. This aroused the indig- nation of the people, and he was again brought forward as a candidate for governor in 1824. The presidential question, complicated by the prominent appearance of four candidates — Adams, Jackson, Crawford, and Clay — was now distracting New York politicians, and a new party, the People's party — organ- ized for the occasion and disappearing with it — came forward to add further diversity to the scene. Such in brief was the political situation in New York when ' llaninioiid, Hisl. nf I'nl. I'nrtUa in X. 1'.. i. .514-.51(;. EARLY POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS. 6 William Henry Seward began to take an aeftive interest in public affairs. He was now a pradlicing young lawyer in Auburn, having been admitted to the bar in 1S22. His early education had been obtained in Orange county, on the Hud- son, where his father, an ardent believer in Jeffersonian demo- cracy, had held several positions of public trust. Seward's college life had been spent at Union college, then under the presidency of Dr. Eliphalet Nott, distinguished as an educator, an inventor, and a divine. In him Seward had in his subse- quent career always a valued adviser and friend. Although adopting the legal profession, Seward had early conceived a liking for questions of a political nature. His home training had tended to make him an admirer of Daniel D. Tompkins and an opponent of Clinton's scheme of internal improvements, but in the elec~tion of 1824 he cast his vote for De Witt Clinton and John Quincy Adams. This change was due to the matur- ing of his ideas respedting public policy. He thought that what the country now needed was "a policy which .should strengthen its foundations, increase its numbers, develop its resources, and extend its dominion."' This statement may be regarded as the keynote of most of his subs^quent endeavors. He saw the Republican party, both in state and nation, assume an attitude of hostility or indifference to internal improvements, and further, that it had its chief strength in the slaveholding states.- He therefore became an earnest supporter of the national adminis- tration of Adams and of the now forming National Republican party, whose chief spokesman was Henry Clay. In the state he lent his aid to the building up of the new organization around the nucleus of the Clintonian party, but the task was not an easy one. Although Clinton was elected in 1S24, and again in 1S26, the party was losing ground, partly because per- sonal and local differences were scattering its forces, partly because the opposition was conducted with greater skill. Up to this time, such political acflivity as Seward had put forth had been of little more than local significance. But in the year 1826 occurred an event which in the course of the next few years was to bring a new element of confusion into the politics of New York, and to a less extent also into national ' Seward. AiilnUhKinqih]!. .")4. - //)/''. 4 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. politics. This event was the abdu(5lion of one William Morgan, of Batavia, New York, tlirough the influence of freemasons, for his attempt to publish a book disclosing the secrets of their order. Morgan was never more seen, and as indi\idiial guilt could not be established, and as masonic influence seemed to be at work hampering the investigation, the masonic order was charged with his murder. The abdudlion of Morgan produced a strong feeling of excitement throughout western New York, soon extending itself also to other states, especially Pennsyl- vania, Massachusetts, and Vermont. To vindicate the majesty of the law as against certain criminals was at first the only objeifl of the movement, but as is generally the case with moral impulses when sufficiently intensified, this idea soon sought a political embodiment. Secret .societies were presently declared incompatible with the spirit of a free government, and it was agreed to vote against all candidates who were known to be freemasons. Onlj' by force of circumstances did this programme later expand so as to embrace general principles of government. ' In New York state the Anti-masonic party found such sup- porters as William H. Seward, Thurlow Weed, Francis Granger, and Millard Fillmore ; elsewhere it gained the favor and the support of such men as John Quincy Adams, Richard Rush, William Wirt, and Thaddeus Stevens. Its first prominent appearance in politics was in ih]i, i. 300. ' Seward, Autiiliiii(iiiii>)i}i. Tl. ■• Haniiiioiul, ii. :!87. EARLY POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS. O After the eledlions of 1S28, which made Jackson president and Van Buren governor of New York, Seward began to take a leading part in the organization of Anti-masonry. He was present in county and state conventions, was a delegate to the national Anti-masonic convention of 1830, at Philadel- phia, and to the Baltimore convention of 1S31, bj^ which William Wirt was nominated for president. The new party had now become, in some localities, the chief opposition to Jackson. Some hopes were entertained that the National Republicans would endorse Wirt as their candidate in 1832. But they would have none other than Clay, and Claj', though willing to have support from Anti-masons, declined to pose as their candidate. He thought the masonic question had nothing to do with poli- tics. ' In the national eledtion of 1832, the Anti-masons suffered a decisive defeat — receiving the ele<5toral votes of no state but Vermont. This marked the pradlical collapse of the party. In some of the states they had enjoyed, and still continued to enjoy, some successes. Such was the case in New York, where thej- sent many members to the legislature. It was by this party that Seward, in 1S30, was elected to his first office, that of state senator. The question may arise. Why was it that Seward, who had alread}' given evidence of political talent, chose to identify him- self with a party whose essential objedt was so politicall5^ insuffi- cient, and so politically imprac5ticable, as the abolition of a secret .society? What at the outset influenced him more espe- cialh- was, no doubt, his strong native sense of justice and regard for political equality, and the convidlion that justice had been thwarted and political equality put in danger by the machinations of a secret oath-bound organization.'- To this consideration must be added the fadt of his residence near the center of the agitation, the intensity of which could not help affeefting him in some degree. Another circumstance, of a similar nature, may be alluded to. Thurlow Weed, at this time a journalist in Rochester and soon afterward in Albanj', became one of the most zealous advocates of the new move- ment. Between him and Seward a close personal and political ' Clay, iri/iA.s-, iv. :J04. ^ Cf. resolutious presented liy Seward, in Pro- ceedinfjs «/ I'. S. Aiili-iiiiis Aiit(jl/iST. -• Ibid. -i-'H. '■' Ibid, -iil-i. ' Ibiil. r,IIS-IU)!l. 18 WII.I.IA.M H. SKWARD. to the land proceeds, came to naught. But the legislature made liberal appropriations for internal improvements, for the interest in this subject was not confined to the chief executive. It was a time of bold enterprise and high expectations regard- ing the future of the state. In 1842, however, when the finan- cial pressure in the state became greatest, its debt amounting to more than twenty-three millions of dollars, ' a law was passed indefinite!}' suspending all the works of internal improvement. This meaisure originated with the Democrats in the legislature, who now had large majorities in both branches. Seward felt constrained, in view of the financial urgency and the decided stand taken by the legislature, to give his assent to the measure.'^ But in a subsequent message he recommended the rescinding of the law. It was not until several years later, however, that the prosecution of the public works was resumed. We now know that the Erie canal enlargement, as well as some of the lateral canals, proved to be beneficial and profit- able enterprises in the end, especially to the last generation. But it seems plain that .Seward pushed the matter with too much devotion to the future benefits of the policy, without sufficiently reckoning with the financial and political situation of the time. The fact that the work was suspended during his incumbency tends to confirm this opinion. Furthermore, it is evident from the manner in which he advocated this policy that he held to a somewhat paternal theory of government ; not that he lacked faith in the progress and in the self sustain- ing capacity of the people, but he considered it the duty of the state to seek, by generous efforts, to quicken their progress, and more particularly to give them the means of becoming good citizens. This leads to the consideration of another subject, which became the occasion of much political contention during Sew- ard's administration, namely the public school question. The question of religious instruction in the common schools had begun to be a subject of discussion in 1838. John A. Dix, as secretary of state — the schools being then under the charge of that official — had advocated such instruction based on the Bible without note or comment.'' But the question soon assumed ' Nilcs' Rci/r. Ixiii. :^T4. - lliid. Ixii. sii. ■' Roberts. y<-ir Varh. ii. .'i.W-.ifi. I'IKST WHIC; COVKRXOR OF NEW VOKK. 19 \'arious other forms and became a perplexing one for several 3-ears. The Catholics, more especially those of New York cit3', felt prejudiced against the public schools as then administered and declined to make use of their advantages. As a result, thousands of the children of poor Catholic parents were grow- ing up in ignorance.' The problem, as it presented itself to Seward's mind, was, how to make the public school system reach these classes, in the interest of good citizenship. In liis annual message of 1840, he stated his position in the following manner: "The children of foreigners . . . are too often deprived of the advantages of our system of public education, in con- sequence of prejudices arising from difference of language or religion. It ought never to be forgotten that the public wel- fare is as deeph" concerned in their education as in that of our own children. I do not hesitate, therefore, to recommend the establishment of schools in which they may be instructed by teachers speaking the same language with themselves and professing the same faith."- Elsewhere he expressed the belief that "no system of education could answer the ends of a republic but one which secures the education of all,"-' and that "knowledge taught by any sect is better than ignorance."' The position taken by Seward on this question gave rise to much opposition. He was denounced not only by political opponents but by members of his own party. He was said to have recommended a division of the school funds between Catholics and Protestants, and was charged with a design to subvert the .school system and undermine the Protestant re- ligion. He was "sapping the foundations of liberty," and was "in league with the Pope." Many honest people who cared little about politics were alarmed lest the work of the Pilgrim fathers was to be undone. ■' The popularity of the governor was diminished in consequence, his re-election in 1S40 being by a largely reduced majority, caused chiefly by his attitude on the school question. At this opposition Seward was surprised, having supposed this to be a policy in which all j(epublican and Christian citi- zens would concur. '' He remarked that he had not recom- ' I!isliii|i lliislif^. iri.);,.v. i. T!l, -' Wtirlin. ii. --il.i. ' liUajiiiiihii. i. .50-i. ■* ir<,;7r.s-. iii. 4S(|. ■■> I'f. niaiirdiiliii. i. 4(1:;. « IhUl. M)->. 20 WII.LIAJI H. SEWARD. mended, nor did he seek, "the education of any class in for- eign languages, or in particular creeds," but observed, at the same time, that he indulged no apprehensions from the influ- ence of any language or creed among an enlightened people.' He looked to "the great ends of the equal dissemination of knowledge, and the consequent improvement of societv," and felt confident that his views would prevail in due time, in spite of prejudice. - While this controversy was clouding the political horizon, especially from the Whig point of view, the Catholics of New York city, under the leadership of Bishop Hughes, were mak- ing efforts to secure their share of the school fund. Thej- applied to the common council and subsequently to the legis- lature, praying for redress. Bishop Hughes delivered a large number of addresses on this question during 1.S40-41, in which he held that the school laws, as then administered, required a violation of their rights of conscience; that the schools were either irreligious or sectarian in the interest of Protestantism ; and that the Catholics were reduced to the alternative of main- taining separate schools, in which case there was double tax- ation, or of suffering their children to go without an education.^ Meanwhile, J. C. Spencer, secretary of state, submitted a report wherein he admitted the justice of some of the complaints made against the Public School Society. He made it appear that the number of children not attending the public schools was more than twice as large in the city of New- York as in all the re- mainder of the state, and recommended, in effect, that the district .system prevailing elsewhere in the state be introduced into the city.' In his annual message of 1S42, Seward based his recom- mendations on this report, holding that the magnitude of the evil had not till then been fully known, nor its causes suffi- ciently understood. What had been supposed to be due to indi- vidual and occasional prejudices was discovered to be due to a permanent conscientious distrust of the education given in the public schools. This distrust was deepened by reason of the subversion of precious civil rights. The Public School Society ' Works, ii. 281). - Ibid. iii. 4sn. 4S2. •' Hii;^'lies. U'orl.s, i. 41, (( sty. * HUiilfiiiihyi. i. 58.5-.5:!{i. FIRST WHIG (;()\-KRN()K OI" XI'.W YORK. 21 was too much of an independent corporation, and, whatever the merits of its management, it had failed to gain broad con- fidence. He submitted, therefore, tlie expediency of vesting the control of the schools in a board of commissioners eletfted by the people, which board was to have charge of the school moneys. One of the questions involved, he observed, was whether parents had a right to be heard concerning the instruc- tion and instrudlors of their children.' In behalf of the existing sj-stem it was urged, on the other hand, that the great body of citizens approved of it and de- sired no change, that the Public School Society was not a pri- vate corporation, its accounts being submitted to the legislature, and membership being open to all citizens who chose to pay a small amount ; and furthermore, that in but few counties of the state was the condition of education better than in the city of New York.- The legislative outcome of the controver.sy was the passage of an adl in 1842 carrying out the suggestion as to a board of commissioners, and making the sj'stems of the city and the rest of the state more nearlj- correspond. The measure was introduced and carried through the legislature by the Van Buren party, the Whigs lending it apparenth- no support.-' The adoption of this measure can not be said 'to have car- ried out to the full the original intentions of Seward. What those intentions were, as regards pracflical policy, is by no means unmistaktably clear. His general purpose is sufficiently obvi- ous. He desired to broaden the influence of education. But he evidently felt some concession to be necessary if those who considered themselves aggrieved in conscience were to be reached by the educational system of the state. That their grievance was well founded he neither asserted nor attempted to prove — to exclude for a moment the argument as to the school societj'. The concession was therefore to be, so far as the Catholics were concerned, an adl of magnanimit.v. B3' the estab- lishment of schools in which instrutflion might be made espe- cially agreeable by reason of the language and faith of the in- strucflors, it is most natural to suppo.se that he meant the em- ' iro/7..v. ii. :l(l6-:j0'.l. - (\f. synopsis nf oomiiiissioners' rciunt. .V. 1'. TrilHiiK'. Sci)t. IS. 1S41. 3 yilcK' HnjiKUi: Ixii. 113. 22 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. ployment by the state of schools in which such instruction was already provided. This once done, however, it is difficult to see how the line of distindlion between public aid to secular and to religious education could be maintained. In .so far, therefore, as his school policy will bear this interpretation, it properl}' failed of legislative approval. The proposition to change the school management in New York city was a less radical one, and seems to have had no essential connecftion with the foregoing recommendation, except in so far as, favoring a more popular control, it tended to meet .some of the objedtions urged. That the Catholics expecfled some relief from this proposition, is shown by the facfl that the}- favored the school bill of 1842.^ Still, their favorite plan, as we have seen, was of a different scope. Although Seward exchanged views with Bishop Hughes on the school question, - the assertion that he acted under Catholic influence is without proof Whatever one may think of the advisability of his cour.se, one cannot help commending the courage and personal disinterestedness with w-hich he maintained it. The discussion of the school question naturall}- brought up the question as to foreigners. The Whig party, as in a sense a continuation of the old Federal part}', had never pos- sessed, in a large measure, the confidence of the foreign ele- ment. But this was due to acftual conditions quite as much as to past tradition. Relative to banks, tariffs and similar issues, the Whigs had, as a matter of choice or of party ne- cessity, assumed the side of the well-to-do classes. This made them appear less friendly to the poorer classes of foreign de- scent. The membership of the part}- being thus somewhat restricfted, its prejudices against foreigners were easily aroused. Such was the case on the present occasion. Seward's friendly attitude toward foreigners, as indicated by his school policy, appeared to man\- to be a yielding to un-American influences, and to proceed from a desire to gain political favor with citi- zens of foreign birth. A study of Seward's general political principles, however, does not confirm the existence of such a motive. These principles, as developed during this period, may be briefly stated as follows : To aid in the development of our ' yUcs' Eiyisti 1: Ixii. 113. - Cf. IVnrkx. iii. 483. KIKST WIIIC. G()\'KKNOK dl' NICW ^■()KK. 2$ resources, immigration was desirable ; to attract immigration required easy naturalization laws, and .the extension of equal privileges to the native and the foreign born ; to make immi- grants as well as others good members of the state, it was necessarj' to furnish them with education and the franchise. ^ Personal s\mpathies may at times have colored his opinions on the subjecft of foreigners. In speaking of the Irish, he says: "I think them more generous, liberal, and disinterested than most other classes of the community," and "less exacftiug of this government than any other portion of our population.'"^ It may here be noticed that his mother was of Irish descent, and that he always expressed deep interest in the cause of Ireland. Seward's ambition touching this question seems to have been limited to a desire to promote the interests of his party, for he perceived that its prejudice against foreigners was narrowing the base on which it stood.-' The same liberal, and even charitable, spirit which char- adterized his administration in the foregoing respecfts marked also his treatment of the penal problem. He held that prison discipline ought to be tempered with kindness, the chief objedl of the penitentiary system being the reformation of offenders.* As such reformation could seldom be expedled without address- ing the mind, he recommended that provision be made to in- struct the convicfts who could not read, and to furnish suitable books to those who could.'' An oppo.sition paper, referring to this topic, jocosely remarked that, under Seward's administra- tion, "going to prison was not so burdensome, since one could have good clothing, substantial food, exercise in the open air of the stone-quarry, and the volumes of Harper's Library for amusement." " As the Whigs of New York had not, prior to 1S39, tasted the sweets of office, they were now animated by the usual eager- ness of a vicftorious party to lend their .services to the state. Ten thousand applications were received for fifteen hundred offices, the governor's hall being, for a time, occupied by the eager throng from morning till midnight. ' As regards the dispensation of patronage, Seward took higher ground than had 1 Cf. Works, ii. 198-199. - lhi'• StiitKlis til Liiiye. v. 539. ■■' ll'oi/.-.v. ii. 44;i-.i{l. 4-.'-.4, 4.1(5. - II, ii!. 4C.il. •' Ihiil. 474 -84. FiKST wiiu; (',uv1':rn"ok of ni-:\v vokk. 29 Tliiis the discussion coiitimied, extending through the greater part ol Seward's two terms of office. The grievance felt by Virginia was much increased bj' a measure passed by the legislature of New York in Maj', 1S40. This was an a<5t extending trial by jur\- to persons claimed as fugitive slaves. Such a measure had been discus.sed in the state before this controversy aro.se,' but its passage was, perhaps, hastened by it. Virginia now resorted to retaliatory measures. When Sew- ard had occasion to make requisition on the governor of that state for the surrender of a person charged with forgery, com- pliance was promised imly in case the three fugitive sailors should be surrendered.- In this course, however, the governor was not supported by the house of delegates, a majority of whom, while considering New York in the wrong, regretted his decision as not comporting with the duty and the dignity of the state. '■'■ The forger was shortly afterward delivered up, and New York was urged to respond by taking similar acftion in regard to the three fugitives. But Seward .saw no reason for reversing his previous decision, holding the two cases to be essentially dissimilar. Meanwhile, the legislature of Virginia had passed an adl to prevent the citizens of New York from carrying slaves out of that commonwealth, which acl was to be suspended when New York should have repealed the trial- by-jur3' law and surrendered the three seamen. It prescribed a rigid inspe(flion of New York vessels before leaving the harbors of Virginia, tlie owners of the vessels to bear the expense.* This plainly involved a discrimination by one state against the commerce of another, and Seward could rightfulh" complain that the acft was an attempt at the coercion of a sister-state. He announced that New York would neither yield nor retaliate, but that she could not discuss the original subject of contro- versy while \'irginia maintained her aggressive attitude.'' In this contention with New York Virginia did not stand alone. She had the sympathy, and in some cases the support, of the other slaveholding states. Georgia, about the same time, made somewhat similar demands on New York and on Maine, which, however, were not complied with. South Carolina, al- I H'.i/7..v. ii. .")U(;. -' IIihI. ■Mi). ' .Vi/i.s' 11,'iiiyli r. \\. m. ^ Iliiil. ■• ii'.ii/i.v. ii. ."lO;-:, :m'.\. 30 WILLIAM H. sk;\vard. ways alert in the defense of what she considered southern rights, passed a law similar to that of Virginia regarding inter- course with New York. Calhoun, in presenting in the federal senate the resolutions of South Carolina on this subject, chose the opportunity- to descant on the dangers of abolitionism, ' thereb)' showing in what light he viewed the policy of New York's governor. Nor was hostile criticism of Seward's course, and that of the legislature of his state, confined to the south. Many northern papers expressed their disapprobation. JVi/cs' Register, for instance, spoke of the "injustice of the condudl of the authorities of New York, not only toward \'irginia, but to the whole south."- In 1S42, even the legislature of New York passed resolutions in disapproval of the position assumed by the governor. But Seward remained firm. Whatever of settlement the controversy had was morally in his favor. In point of constitutional law, at least as it was subse- quently interpreted, his argument was defecftive. Statutory crimes are as much within the provision relating to extradition as crimes existing at the common law. The laws of the state making the demand determine the question of crime, not the laws of the state on which the demand is made.'' But it may readih' be admitted that in this particular case the dictates of justice made extradition less imperative. Incidental to the con- troversy was the New York extension of the trial by jury. Here too, as it turned out, Virginia had more of the technical right on her side. B3' a decision of the supreme court, rendered in 1842, state legislation on the subject of fugitive slaves was declared unconstitutional, jurisdiction in the matter belonging exclusively to the national government.'' This decision appeared to Seward to contain "startling doctrines," while justice Storj', who delivered the opinion, considered it "a triumph of free- dom. "■'• Noticeable in this controversy is the stress laid by Seward on the rights of the states, within their own limits, whereas Virginia, to secure protection to slave property, insisted largely on the obligations of the national compadl. Noticeable also, is > CiiDij. (ihihi: -Jd se.ss., 'JTtli Coiiii.. 'ilo. - Xitix' Uniistcr. Ix. .').'). •■' Kfiituoky I'.s. Deunisoii, 24 How., 60, Oil. ' I'ligS i'"- Pennsylvania, Hi Pet.. .ISO. ° nuxjmph]!. i. .")95: W. W. Story. IJfc nf Stiirij. ii. :)ii-i. FIRST WHIG COVEKXOR OF NEW VOKK. 31 his close adherence to the question of law, with only incidental reference to the moral side of the case. The rigid moralist John Qnincy Adams, while strongly approving Seward's course, could not help criticising him for "tameness of tone" as com- pared with the "insolence" of \'irginia.i An episode though it be in our national history, this controversy between two repre- sentative states formed also one of the many points in the con- fli(5t between slavery and freedom. ' .1. O. Adaiii^. Mciiinirs. \. 4(11. CHAPTER V. KARLY AXTI-SLAVERY IDEAS. On retiring from his executive duties, at the close of the year 1842, Seward resumed the pra<5lice of law. His public career he regarded as closed. He had declined a second renom- ination with a view to avert party discord, for he felt that his principles were too liberal, too philanthropic for his party. * In this he was no doubt right, if his principles are to be judged by the opposition they encountered. But he had shown courage and ability in maintaining them, and this atoned in the eyes of the masses for his occasional offending against their accepted ideas of political prudence. His hold on the Whig party in the state was really stronger than ever; it needed only time to soften the asperities of political feeling. This Seward well knew, for he understood the art of holding one's self in reserve. His name was now known beyond the borders of the state ; his official contacfl with the general government and with another state had already given him something of a national reputation. With his political temperament, he could not but continue his interest in public affairs. Although he declared himself satis- fied with the measure of public confidence and of political suc- cess which he had enjoyed, it was but natural that his eyes should be turned toward the future. While busily engaged in his legal profession, he took and gave counsel on political matters, both state and national. For his party associates had confidence in his political sagacity, and in this confidence he himself shared. During the period just reviewed, he seemed at times to pride himself of his being in advance of public opinion, and often expressed his assurance of the vindication of the future. This trait in his characfler — a generous self- ' B'Kitjniphy. i. 547. \ EARLY ANTI-SLAVERY IDEAS. 33 appreciation — will find a fuller justification in that period of his life in which he came to deal with the larger and profounder questions of national concern. Of such questions, the one to which his maturer life was chieflj' to be dedicated was that of slaver>\ At this time — during the administration of Tyler — the slavery question had not yet become the dominant one in party politics. But it was a question that had long given tone and trend to the politics of the south, the influence of which was plainly to be discerned in the administration of the national government. After the enacftment of the Missouri compromise in 1820, the slavery question had apparently dropped out of politics for a time, but the .slaveholders' sense of insecurity had not been appeased nor the awakening conscience of the north put at rest. The mind of the north was but slowly and, at first, sporadically aroused, while the political self-interest of the south was constantly adlive. Hence the long-continued inequal- ity between the sections on the slavery issue. The establishment of Garrison's Liberator, in 1831, and the organization of the American Anti-Slavery Society, in 1833, were evidences of the northern awakening. The south now took alarm, and made bold to interfere with a time-honored custom of Anglo-Saxon freedom — the right of petition. Against this interference, and the cause which prompted it, John Quincy Adams stood up boldly in congress, but as yet he was almost single-handed in the combat. The general northern feeling was opposed to agita- tion. The abolitionists were therefore condemned by both north and south — by one sedtion as misguided individuals disturbing the general peace, by the other as hot-headed incendiaries en- dangering the Union. But time and development favored the cause of the north. The south felt, therefore, the need of sur- rounding itself with further safeguards. Chief among these was always the acquisition of new southern territory, for, if adroitly managed, such a scheme would appeal also to northern ambition and patriotism. The annexation of Texas, which had long been desired by the south, finally became a party question with the southern Democrats in the presidential campaign of 1844. The Whigs, however, ignored the question in their plat- form. 34 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. It was at this point that Seward first came into diredl con- tadl with the slavery question. Before proceeding to speak of his present position, it seems well, for the sake of completeness of view, to take a glance at some of his earlier expressions on the same subjecft. Seward had spent his early boyhood in a home where a few .slaves were kept as domestic servants, this being a common practice with well-to-do families in New York in the early part of the century. But the ignorance and vice of the black people of the neighborhood led him to suspe(ft that something was wrong, and determined him, as he tells us, "at that early age, to be an abolitionist."' It is curious to notice that one of his earliest expressions on the subjecft seems to countenance the idea that the national government had the power to work out gradual emancipation. In a patriotic address delivered in 1825, he remarked, in arguing the permanence of the Union, that "the north will not willingly give up the power they now have in the national councils, of gradually completing a work in which, whether united or separate, from proximity of territory, we shall ever be interested — the emancipation of slaves.'"'' In the summer of 1835 Seward travelled in Virginia and was there much impressed by what he saw of the efifedls of slavery. Roads were bad, towns unthrifty, and a general lack of enterprise noticeable, while at the same time the people seemed uncon- scious of the cause of their backwardness, and unaware that other parts of the country were enjoying greater prosperity.* In the same year Seward wrote to a friend touching the attempts then being made to suppress anti-slavery publications: "I think those err, who suppose that the efforts of the north to extirpate abolitionism will tranquilize the South."'' This remark pointed to a better understanding of the slavery question than was then usual with the average politician. Still the evils of slavery seem not to have claimed much of Seward's attention during the next few years. In 1838, the American Anti-Slavery Society resolved that abolitionists should inquire into the sentiments of candidates for office. Such inquiries were direcfted to Seward when a candidate for governor. His answers, while conveying ' Aiitfihiogrdplty, *JS. - M'i)/7r.s'. iii. lO."). ■' li'uxiniiiliii. i. 2iiS. •• Ibid. 393. EARLY ANTI SLAVERY IDEAS. 35 the idea of opposition to slavery, were marked by something of the politician's evasiveness.' They were not satisfacftor}- to many of the abolitionists, Gerrit Smith being one of the dis- satisfied.- But Seward's firmness in the Virginia controversy convinced them that he was on their side, if not one of their number. He then took occasion to assert Ir's belief that a human being could not, by the force of any constitution or laws, be converted into a chattel or a thing. He did not think that the national constitution was intended to have such a meaning. '* But Seward differed even from the moderate abolitionists — in motive somewhat, in method more. The abolitionists gener- ally placed the opposition to slavery on grounds of phil- anthropy, on the grounds of the inhumanity and injustice done to the negro race. While Seward was by no means insensible to these considerations, he was influenced chiefly b)- solicitude for the welfare of the white race and the prosperity of the country.* He preferred to base the argument for abolishing .slaverjr largely on the grounds of the evils resulting to the whole country from the maintenance in the .south of a system of compulsory labor. This argument, he thought, would con- stantly gain strength and favor, while the moral question would encounter prejudices, the growth of centuries.'' As to the methods to be emplo^-ed, he believed in the progress and effec- tiveness of the Whig party, holding separate political acflion to be a waste of effort. He held, moreover, that to leave that party because it was not sufficiently anti slavery in tone was to diminish the prospedls of its improvement. For his own part, he felt persuaded that, by remaining a Whig, his influ- ence would extend to a larger number of those who stood in need of knowing the truth." For these reasons, as well as from a feeling of loyalty to his party, he declined offers, made to him in the summer of 1843, of the Liberty party's nomina- tion for president. " Now came the campaign of 1844, with Polk, favoring im- mediate annexation of Texas, as the Democratic candidate, and ' UKrA.s. iii. 4-Jii-:B. = Wilson, Rine atul Fall nf Sinn Patrn: i. 408. ' VForfo. ii. .i08. ■• lliid. iii. 4:-!5. '^ lihKjrapliti. i. .ifl.'j. •= f/)M. vnii-TOT. ■ Ihiil. 67(i. 3(5 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Clay, who declared himself opposed to immediate annexation, as the candidate of the Whigs. Other questions entered into the canvass, but with earnest opponents of slavery the Texas scheme was the center of interest. Seward took an active part in the campaign, his aid being sought in different parts of the country, for it was felt that he, above all others, would be influential in persuading restless anti-slavery Whigs to remain in the party. ' His influence was cast in favor of Clay also after the publication of the "Alabama letter" in which the latter admitted that, under certain circumstances, he would be glad to see annexation accomplished. '^ For Seward held that Clay's election was the only alternative, and that if annexation were only prevented during his term, it would be time enough to take precautions for the future.'' His support of Clay was sincere but not enthusiastic. The force and importance of his utterances during the canvass consisted in the parts bearing on the question of slavery and on his own relation to it. While Seward opposed the annexation of Texas, he was not on general grounds averse to the idea of territorial expan- sion. Quite otherwise. With him it was an article of political faith, often adverted to, that the country's destiny was to expand both north and south, provided it could be done without injury to the nation. ' But the annexation of Texas would not be beneficial expansion ; it would lead to war with Mexico, would extend slavery and endanger the integrity of the Union. To in- crease the slaveholding power was to subvert the constitution, was to give a preponderance to that power which might be followed by demands to which the free states could not yield, and the refusal of which would be made the ground of secession and disunion.^ Here he made a prediction that found its fulfillment in subsequent events. If Texas had not been annexed, and the resulting events had not taken place, it is .safe to say that the demands of the slave power would have been less radical during the following decade. During this period vSeward sometimes spoke of the consti- tution as being perverted in the interest of the slave power, at other times he evidently felt impatient under its concessions ' Bloijniijliii, i. TIT. ^ Xilex' Hiyistcr. Ixvi. 4:i9. ■' llo/7,.v. Hi. 274. * Cf. Work", iii. '^T:!. •• llihl. 253. EARLY ANTISI.AVKRY IDEAS. 37 to slavery. Tluis, in referring to the three-fifths ratio, he ob- served: "This principle of slave representation is the Corinthian pillar of the constitution. Its base is sunk deep, and serpents hiss among the leaves that entwine its capital." He considered an aristocracy of wealth as unjust, and especially so if the wealth consisted in human beings, "yet such," said he, "is the aristocracy of the federal constitution."' In arguing, a few years later, the unconstitutionalit}- of the fugitive slave adt of 1793, partly because it interdicfted hospitality to the fugitive, he affirmed that congress had "no power to interdidl any duty enjoined by God on Mount Sinai, or inculcated by his Son, on the Mount of Olives."-' This was assuming ground which lay close to the borderland of abolitionism. But he took heed to advocate none but constitutional methods, holding that the abolition of slavery was to be accomplished b}' political argu- ment and suffrage, and by the constitutional action of all the public authorities. That slavery would eventually disappear was his firm convidtion. The laws of political economy and the tendencies of population were hastening emancipation, and all attempts to prevent it would prove futile. The attempt of the slaveholders to widen their territory had made slavery a national concern. It could now no longer be said that the north had nothing to do with it. Slaver)' was now on trial before the people, and must go down. That Henry Clay was not in the vanguard of emancipation was occasion for regret, but the Whig party might be trusted to prove faithful to the cause : if it should prove false in the hour of trial, it would be time enough to look elsewhere for more effecftive agency.' Such in the main was the position taken by Seward in the campaign of 1844. The adverse result of the eledtion did not affedl his views. He advised friends in the Liberty party to employ moderation, and not to associate the ideas of abolition and disunion. The American people, he said, would lend no countenance to any other than lawful and constitutional means, nor were such means narrowly restricfted. The admission of more slave states was to be resisted, slavery in the Distridt of Columbia could be abolished, and amendments to the consti- tution might be initiated.^ He should remain with his party, ' HoJ-te, iii. -i.iO, 2.")1. - IhUl. i. .5l:i. '^ Uml. iii. 370-374. < Ihxd. 443. 38 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. but remarked at the same time : "I am for emancipation and against slavery, whether my party go with me and live, or go against it and fall."' In national politics events were transpiring rapidly. Texas was annexed, war with Mexico ensued, the American arms were successful, and more territory was acquired. What to do with this new territory as regards the question of slavery im- mediately became an object of anxious concern in and out of congress. The northern hostility to further slavery extension had grown stronger by reason of the late events, for the self-seek- ing of the slave power was now revealed in a stronger light. When the presidential canvass of 1848 began, the territorial question was therefore really the one of most pressing im- portance, but the politicians of both the leading parties hesi- tated to face the issue. Each party had in it a slave element and a free element, both of which it was thought wise to con- ciliate. The Democrats nominated a northern man, I^ewis Cass, on a platform which was silent on the territorial question, while the Whigs, dispensing with a platform, nominated a general who had won his distindtion in a war of which they had gener- ally disapproved, who himself was a large slave-owner, and who, though a sensible and honest man, had only "crude impressions about matters of policy.'"^ Out of elements of dissent in both parties, but chiefly in the Democratic, arose the Free-soil party. It disclaimed any right to interfere with slavery in the states, but boldly declared itself against its extension into new territory. In this state of affairs, what course was Seward as a pradlical anti-slavery man to pursue? Well might he have felt some dissatisfa(flion with the action of his party. ■' But he soon announced himself strongly in favor of the election of Zachary Taylor. In strict consistency with his anti-slavery creed, his place should have been with the Free-soilers. Party loyalty, however, and a regard for the highest attainable rather than the highest abstract good, influenced him to support the warrior candidate. He admitted the lukewarmness of the Whig party, "but," said he, "it is still the truest and most faithful of the two parties, and one or the other of them must prevail."'' He ' Schuckers, Life of Chase, 72, 11. -' Taylor to Allison, JV. 1". 'Pi-ihnnr. May 3, 1848. ^ BvKjvdtiliil. ii. 70, 71. ' Wiirks. iii. 300. EARLY ANTI-SLAVERY IDEAS. 39 considered the shortcoming of his party due to the inert con- science of the American people, but he seemed to overlook the fact that the aroused conscience could find but little comfort in a party that timidly ignored all issues for the sake of gaining what would seem like a vicftory. Apparently Seward did not at this time believe that a new party would arise expressly to deal with the slavery question. Said he to Whigs who desired to form a new and better party: "You will not succeed, in any degree, neither now nor hereafter, because it is impossible. Society is divided, classified already."' Here he showed less than his usual forecast. The explanation — aside from campaign assertiveness — is to be sought not in a lack of power to grasp the importance of the slavery problem, but in a too strong faith in the stability and effedliveness of a long-established party, somewhat confirmed, perhaps, by his earh' experience in the Anti-masonic venture. It must be conceded for the Whigs, however, that, as regarded the near future, their success was the only chance there was for freedom in the territories, and it was this future Seward had now chiefly in mind. Still he did not restrict himself to a consideration of the immediate future. la his speech at Cleveland, notable among campaign speeches for prac?lical tendency combined with loftiness of tone, he took ground which placed him far in advance of his party. He here announced a principle which came to be an important guide in his later career, namely that the first duty of American citizens was to preser\'e the integrity of the Union.- Though the public conscience was yet inert, he held that much could be done. "Slavery," said he, "can be limited to its present bounds, it can be ameliorated, it can be and must be abolished, and you and I can and must do it." "Wherein do the strength and security of slavery lie? You answer that they lie in the con- stitution of the United States, and in the constitutions and laws of all slaveholding states. Not at all. They lie in the errone- ous sentiment of the American people." "Inculcate, then, the love of freedom and the equal rights of man, under the paternal roof; . . . reform your code — extend a cordial welcome to the fugitive who lays his weary limbs at your door, and defend him as you would your paternal gods ; corredl your own error, ' Works, iii. 'iiH. '■' llikl. 29.3. 40 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. that slavery has any constitutional guaranty' whicli may not be released, and ought not to be relinquished." "Inculcate that . . . executive authority can forbear to favor slavery ; that Congress can debate ; that Congress at least can mediate with the slaveholding states, that at least future generations might be bought and given up to freedom, . . . Do all this and incul- cate all this in the spirit of moderation and benevolence, and not of retaliation and fanaticism, . . . Whenever the public mind shall will the abolition of slavery, the way will open for it."' Thus pleaded Seward with anti-slavery Whigs, and his plea contains some of the most advanced opinions he ever ex- pressed on the relation of the slavery question to national politics. The presidential elecftion of 1848 resulted in the success of the Whigs. On their shoulders, more especially, rested now the responsibility of devising plans for the settlement of the territorial question. In the winter of 1849, the Whig members of the legislature of New York desired the eledtion of Seward to the United States senate. Some of the members, however, expressed an apprehension that, if eledled, he might pursue too radical a course. But he declared that he should not needlessly agitate even the question of slavery, but should labor to form public opinion by kind and peaceful discussion. The constitu- tional barriers which protedted the slave states in their rights would be as sacred in his regard as those which protected the free states in theirs.- He was eledled by a large majority, as the successor of John A. Dix, whose term expired on the fol- lowing 3d of March. Seward's career as a national legislator began, therefore, under what seemed to be the favorable auspices of a Whig administration. ' Works, iii. 301-303. -' Iliid. 415. CHAPTER VI. IN THE COMPROJIISE CONGRESS OF 185O. The' congress which ended on the 3d of March, 1849, had failed to provide civil governments for the territories of Cali- fornia and New Mexico. This failure was due to a disagree- ment between the two houses as to the admission of slavery into the new domain. But the struggle as j-et had been only tentative and preliminary ; the responsibilities of decision in the matter were transferred to the new congress which was to meet in December. Meanwhile president Taylor had sent an agent to California to invite her people to form a state constitution and appl)' to congress for admission. A similar iilvitation had been extended to New Mexico. ' In this way it was hoped to avoid a decision by congress of the irritating question of slavery in the new territories, which had arisen through the introduc- tion of the Wilmot proviso. That occasions for angry dissen- sions might thus be avoided l>a-d been Taylor's patriotic wi-h, and that one of the proposed states would form a constilution permitting slaver)- may naturally have been his hope. For he must have seen that otherwise the south would never acquiesce. Being a slaveholder himself, he could, without losing his hold on the nation, go farther than a northern president in meeting the wishes of the north, but one is scarcely justified in assum- ing, as a recent historian has done,' that Taylor favored the formation of only free states out of the domain wrested from Mexico. In the autumn of 1849 California, taken possession of by 'niggerless' gold-diggers, adopted a free constitution, but New- Mexico was yet to be heard from. This acftion of Cali- fornia alarmed the south. It looked as if they might lose what they had schemed to acquire, and that under a slaveholding ' Pres. message, Jan. 23, 18.50, Sen. Doc, lS-W-50, ix. l-'2. ' Sehouler, Hist. U. S., v. 181, 189. 42 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. president. Thus, instead of the tranquiUity and kind feeling which Tajdor had hoped to preserve, a storm of portentous character approached. In the position he assumed on the territorial question, the president had the general concurrence of Seward. The latter early became a confidential friend and adviser of the new president, ^ The ' ' rough and ready ' ' warrior, not being held in high con- sideration by many of the older politicians, found congenial personal and political traits in the new senator from New York. While both were new men in national politics, Seward had had much political experience and was well conversant with northern sentiment. The senator was the more far-sighted and adroit, but both were alike fearless and honest, and both were devotedly attached to the Union. The first session of the 31st congress was a notable one in many ways. In it sectional feeling ran higher than in any congress since the enactment of the Missouri compromi.se. The south now felt that their ' peculiar institution ' had reached another of its critical stages. Theories were invented and menaces were employed to convince the north that unless they could get their share of the common territories and other securi- ties beside, there was no safety for them in the Union. Nor was this mere bravado. It was the consciousness that power was gradually slipping from their grasp, in spite of their efforts to retain it, that made them so determined and bold in their attitude toward the north. But the disunion sentiment was as yet seriously entertained by but a few. •' This session of congress was notable also on account of the prominent statesmen who took part in its debates. Clay had returned after an absence of several years, and was now to play his last role as a compromiser. Webster was there ; so was Calhoun, the third member of this famous trio. Of the new members of the senate, Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, and Seward had been elected distinctly by reason of their anti-slavery views. John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, a member since 1847, repre- sented likewise the more positive northern sentiment on the slavei'y question. Of other notable senators mention may be 1 Cf. Biixjtd 11)111, ii. 1(11, 108, ll.-). ' Cf. Globe, 1st sess., 31st Cong., 28, 2fl. 20:;. 1102. IN THE COMPROMISE CON'GRESS. 43 made of Thomas H. Benton, of Missouri, Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, Lewis Cass, of Michigan, and Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi. Clay's compromise plan was introduced January 29, 1850, and embodied the following as its main features : the admission of California with her free constitution ; the establishment of territorial governments in the remainder of the territory acquired from Mexico, without conditions regarding slavery ; a declara- tion that it was inexpedient to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, but expedient to prohibit the slave trade therein ; more effectual provision for the recovery of fugitive slaves ; the denial to congress of power to obstruct the slave trade between the states. ' These resolutions formed the basis of the subse- quent compromise measures and became the subject of prolonged debate. Clay's plan encountered opposition both among northern and southern members of congress, but the general drift of opinion was in their favor. The president's plan, which pro- posed the immediate admission of California as the most press- ing object of legislation, was favored by many of the northern Whigs, but found little acceptance among southern senators. Some of the greater senatorial speeches on these various measures were made in March. Cla}-, in introducing his plan, spoke in behalf of mutual concession, and urged that the north, being in the ascendency, ought to be magnanimous and concede more than the south, because it was easier to make a conces- sion of sentiment than of interest. The saving of the Union was his main plea.- Calhoun, being then an invalid, had his speech read by a fellow-senator. It was his last elaborate speech in the senate, and was filled with gloomy forebodings. As one remedy for saving the Union, he proposed the restora- tion by constitutional amendment of the equilibrium between the north and the south.-* Webster, in his 7th of March speech, practically took the side of the south and of compromise. He held that slavery was excluded from the Mexican acquisitions by the law of physical geography, that it was needless "to re- enact the will of God," and declared that he should not vote to apply the Wilmot proviso to New Mexico — to do so would be considered a taimt, an indignity, by the south.'' ' GUilic. 1st sess., 31st Con!?., a4H. = Ihiil. '■> Ihiil. 45,5. " Ihkl. 480-81. 44 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. It was under tliese circumstances that Seward, on the nth of March, made his first important speech in the senate, in favor of the immediate and unconditional admission of Cali- fornia. He first proceeded to show that California nuist be speedily admitted if she was not to set up independence for herself Her mineral wealth, her rapidly growing population, and her distance from the Atlantic states would make possible the accomplishment of such an object. Our destiny as a civil- izing nation, he held, would be partly defeated unless we .secured a firm foothold on the Pacific coast. The Atlantic states were, through their influence and example, "steadily renovating the governments and social constitutions" of Europe, and the Pacific states must necessarih' perform the same funcfions in Asia. ' This was in keeping with Seward's somewhat grandiose con- ception of American destiny, noticeable in several of his public speeches. But on this occasion his purpose was chiefly to emphasize the importance of separate action on the California question. He even went so far as to say that slavery might be left out of consideration, admitting that, in view of "the inevitable dismemberment of the empire consequent upon her reje(ftion," he would favor her admission even as a slave state. - He evidently felt satisfied that slavery would disappear in the course of time, while California, if once lost, might never be regained. For firm as were his convictions against slavery, he did not allow himself to be governed exclusivel}- by those con- victions, but understood the statesman's necessary art of adapta- tion to circumstances. He opposed the proposed compromise, and declared it as 6is belief that all legislative compromises not absolutely neces- sary' were "radically wrong and essentially vicious."^ They bound future legislatures and precluded the right of adling on each separate question as it arose. Referring to Calhoun's proposition to restore the equilibrium between the secflions, he observed that this would change the characfter of the Union, as it implied that though one sedtion had a majority it should concede equality to the other. An equilibrium was, moreover, impossible, since the free states were developing faster than the slave states. On the subjedl of fugitive slaves he took ' Uorto-, i. .58. - Ilikl. 63. " Ihid. GO. IN THE COMPROMISE CONGRESS. 45 the advanced ground that the south was entitled to no more stringent laws, and that, if enacfted, such laws would be use- less because there was no public conscience to sustain them. If the slave states wished to have the fugitive slave law exe- cuted, they must alleviate, not increase its rigors.' This im- plied that they must be satisfied with .something less than a rigid enforcement of that law. And if the spirit of the consti- tution was really opposed to slavery, none will deny that the defec5live obedience of the north on this point had a measure of even legal justification. In regard to the national domain Seward observed that, although it had been acquired by the expense and valor of the whole nation, yet congress held no arbitrary power over it. "The Constitution," said he, "regulates our stewardship; the Con- stitution devotes the domain to union, to justice, to defence, to welfare, and to liberty. But there is a higher law than the Constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain, and devotes it to the same noble purpo.ses. " - He had no fears for the Union, and therefore he would enter into no compromise to save it. The Union was the creature of necessities, and would endure by reason of those necessities. The question of dissolving the Union embraced the issue whether slavery should be removed by gradual, voluntary effort within the Union, or whether the Union should be dissolved, and civil v^'ar ensue, ■"bringing on violent but complete and immediate emancipa- tion." "We are now," said he, "arrived at that stage of our national progress when that crisis can be foreseen, when we must foresee it." "I feel assured that slavery mu.st give way, and will give way, to the salutary instrucflions of economy, and to the ripening influences of humanity; that emancipation is inevitable, and is near ; . . . that all me.'isures' which fortify slavery or extend it, tend to the consummation of violence; all that check its extension and abate its, strength, tend to its peaceful extirpation." He held that the di.scussion of slavery could not cease so long as slavery endured, and maintained that the south, whatever its opinion now, would in due time yield to the progress of emancipation ■* This speech of Seward was one of the signs of the times. ' iri-;7,.v. i. a4-(i;. -* ihi To the advocacy of such admission Seward stood now in a measure committed. When, in July, it was understood that New Mexico had framed a state constitution, he moved her immediate admission, his strongest argument being that this would facilitate the settle- ment of the boundary dispute between New Mexico and Texas. However noble the ultimate object in view, this was an ill- timed proposition, and the more so for being offered as an amendment to the Omnibus bill, which Seward steadily opposed. Of the 43 votes cast on the amendment, Seward's own was the only vote in the affirmative.'- But notwithstanding his adherence to the plan of president Taylor, Seward was earnestly in favor of the assertion by congress of its power to deal with slavery in the territories. On June 5th, he had submitted an amendment to the com- promise bill that slavery be prohibited in the territories of Utah and New Mexico. As he had offered no argument on the subjecft at the time, his proposition was evidently intended as a test question. Seward seems to have felt that the Wilmot proviso could not be passed at this session. In this he was, as matters then stood, probably right. Whether the fate of the proviso might not have been different had its friends remained firm and united their efforts, must remain somewhat conjecftural. It was at least a sign in its favor that manj' of the southern members felt considerably alarmed lest it might become law. As regards numbers, it is known that, at the opening of the session, the majority of the house favored the proviso^ as well as a considerable portion of the senate. But the alarms raised had had the effecft of lowering the tone of man}', of changing the convidlions of some. The vote on Seward's amendment resulted adversely by 33 to 23. With the northern doubters ' Globe, 1st sess., 31st Cong., App., 1443. - [biJ. 1447. ' Globe. 1st sess., 31st Cong., 91. IN THK COMPROMISE CONGRESS. 49 and time-servers Seward expressed in private his hearty dis- satisfaction, and declared that he sometimes felt, when viewing the situation in congress, as though slavery must be the normal condition of mankind. ' That he used his main influence, dur- ing this controversy, to further the president's policy was due, therefore, to the belief that this policy, under the circumstances, would best serve the cause of freedom. And in this he came very much nearer to the truth than did the northern com- promisers. After the death of president Taylor, in July, more hope was felt by Clay and his supporters as to the fate of the Ouinibus bill. Taylor had with fixed purpose set himself against the proposed compromi.se. He had aLso boldh- put at defiance the didlation of southern extremists, and had been wiiming for his plan much popular support.'^ But now Millard Fillmore, a cautious anti-slavery New Yorker, succeeded to the presidency, and he felt more the need of concession. With the new admin- istration Seward sustained no relation of intimacy; — but short had been his service as presidential adviser. His course toward the compromise plan, however, remained unchanged. The Omnibus bill, loaded to death with amendments in July, was subsequently revived in its separate parts. To such of these as favored freedom Seward gave his support. He thus voted for California's admission and for the suppression of the slave trade in the Distridt of Columbia. But while the latter subjedt was under discussion, he submitted an amendment to abolish slavery in the federal districft, with compensation to the slave- holders. He took this adlion because the original bill had been so amended that he could not vote for it, and because he held, as regarded the time for abolishing slavery in the distridl, that the first time was the right one.-* This amendment gave rise to considerable bitterness of debate. One of the southern senators declared that he should not vote for the original bill after this ; it was impossible to satisfy certain gentlemen. "To attain their objects they would wade through the blood knee-deep of the whole south, and over the wreck of this Union." Another considered this a proposition to dis- ' Bkxjriiiihii. ii. 138, 139. * Cf. Sohouler, Hist. V. S., v. 183, 18.i. » Ghilic. 1st sess.. :nst Cong.. .Vpj)., ir,42. 1IU9. 4 .'iO WII.LIAM H. SEWARD. solve the Union, and in every way " unpardonably reprehensi- ble." A third senator likened it to a fire-brand thrown into the senate. Many northern senators opposed it as untimely and likely to defeat the original bill. But Hale and Chase expressed their approval, the latter admitting the corredlness of a remark made that this was a step toward the abolition of slavery' itself; "and gentlemen deceive themselves," said he, "if they suppose it is the last step."' During this rambling discussion Seward remained silent. As a rule he took no large part in general debates, it being his custom to concentrate what he wished to sa)' in a few well-considered speeches. Seward's amendment was reje Vf. Globe. 2d sess.. 30th Cong.. App., 273-74. DEFENDS THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 55 In February, 1854, when the senate debates were in progress, Seward wrote: "The storm that is rising is such an one as this countr}' has never yet seen."' Sagacious Clay was no longer there to devise new plans of conciliation, nor weighty Webster to enforce the propriety of supporting them. But new plans were not proposed. Both parties in the debate took their stand on previous compromises, the free state party on that of 1820, the slave state party on that of 1850. In the issue as thus presented, the south had, besides the advantage resulting from the plausible appearance of Douglas's dogma, the further advan- tage of attacking their opponents at their weak point. For the chief opponents of the adjustment of 1850 now came forward as the defenders of the older compromise. Why should those who opposed slavery compromises on principle, it w-as asked, speak of the special sacredness of such a compacfl? But this tacftical disadvantage was morally outweighed bj- the justice of their cause and the ability of its defenders. Of new anti-slavery senators who had entered congress since 1850, the most notable were Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts, and Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio. These, with Chase and Seward, took the leading part against the proposed repeal. The debate began in earnest on the 30th of January, a week after Douglas had submitted the substitute for his original bill. The main arguments urged in favor of the measure were that the Missouri compromi.se, in so far as it prohibited slavery north of the line 36° 30', had been superseded by the principles of the legislation of 1850; that that compromise was unconsti- tutional because it denied to slaveholders their equal rights in the common territories ; that it had been violated by the north when they in 1848 had refused to extend the line to the Pacific ocean ; that congress had no right to legislate on the subjetfl of slavery in the territories ; that congressional non-intervention was the only plan of safetN^ ; and that the south had onlj' acceded to the proposition for repeal, not made it.- Butler, of South Carolina, declared, with much simplicity, that he knew of no sacrifices to preserve the Union which had been made on the part of the north, and that it were better for the south never ' lliiiiiriiiihji, ii. 33'i. - Cf. (iUihc. 1st sess.. 38(1 Cong., •i7.'J-T7; App.. 334, 377-78, 347, 383. 56 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. to take refuge in compromises. The decision of the present question was not likely to make an}' pradlical difference in the relative strength of the two sections. "The South," said he, "wants her heart lightened — not her power increased."' On the 17th of February Seward spoke. He maintained that it had been the policy of the founders of the republic to prevent the introduction of slavery wherever it was practicable, but that they had not attempted the impracticable. Thus they had prohibited .slavery northwest of the Ohio, but left the matter undecided south of that river. He held that the Missouri com- promise was a solemn compact, and that it could not be repealed without a violation of honor and good faith. If the Missouri compromise were unconstitutional, that objection, like all other objections, had been waived at the time, in return for equiva- lents. Furthermore, the slaveholding states had enjoyed their equivalents, while the free states had not practically enjoyed theirs. The compromise could not therefore be justly supplanted until both parties were restored to the slalus quo.'- This was one of Seward's strongest points, and it plainly indicated the nature of the motive which actuated the south in urging the repeal. As to the merits of the Missouri compromise, Seward ob- served that he did not hold a geographical line between freedom and slavery to be a perfect arrangement. He desired that all territory might be free, but since that was not possible, some line of division was necessary. Reasoning from his present con- victions, he should not have voted for that compromise, but he wished to see preserved the landmark of freedom which it had assigned. Seward as well as many of his associates employed much shrewd and able reasoning to prove that the compromise of 1850 did not impair that of 1820, and that the claim of supersedure was a recent invention. This may be granted, but the point was scarcely worth the proving, unless it were to show the question- able sincerity of those who made the claim. If there had been no supersedure, there might be a legislative annulment. As the legal right of repeal could not be disputed, the question at issue was really a moral-political one, the defense and attack of a compromise being only incidental to it. With the one party ' GUibe, 1st sess., 33d Coug., App., 'J40. - Wurkf, iv. 447. DEFENDS THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 57 the question was, whether a compromise of which they dis- approved ill the abstract was not yet to be defended when it favored freedom ; with the other, whether compromises, whose general importance they appreciated, might not be safely de- parted from in cases which promised special advantages to slavery. This showed that the slavery question was becoming too large for compromise. As Seward observed, both slavery and freedom were more active now than they had ever been before. "The contest between them," said he, "has been only protracted, not decided. It will be a great feature in our national hereafter."' But while he held the slavery agitation to be "an eternal struggle between conservatism and progress, between truth and error, between right and wrong," he also thought that the conflict of opinion would be "peaceful in its course and beneficent in its termination. "'- Chase and Sumner spoke in similar strain. Both insisted on the maintenance of plighted faith, and on the duty of re- stricting slavery within its present limits, with the view of re- lieving the national government of all political responsibility for its continuance. Chase spoke with calm earnestness, Sumner with that boldness of utterance and that beauty of style which at once marked him as one of slavery's most conspicuous foes. Like Seward, Sumner maintained that the original policy of the government had been to discourage slavery, while now the policy was to favor it. "Our Republic," said he, "has swollen in population and power; but it has shrunk in character." He held that there was no place accessible to human avarice, to which the prohibition of slavery, like the commandments of the Decalogue, ought not to extend. ■' On the 25th of May, the day on which the bill was passed in the senate, Seward again spoke. He admitted that there was no hope of defeating the measure, but derived comfort from the indication that the day of compromises had passed. The Union he considered safe ; when it came to a question whether the Union should stand, "either with freedom or with slavery," the masses would uphold it. As to the effect of the repeal, he held that freedom might lose but could not gain, ' Wiirtis. iv. 440. = Ihiil. idi, 40o. •' aiiibe, 1st sess., 3od Cong., App.. 303-70. 58 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. while slavery might gain but could not lose. Still he felt hope- ful. The supply of slaves was limited, while the tide of free immigration was constantlj' increasing. Said he to the senators from the slaveholding states: "Since there is no escaping your challenge, I accept it in behalf of the cause of freedom. We will engage in competition for the virgin soil of Kansas, and God give the victory to the side which is stronger in numbers as it is in right. "^ ' Warkx. iv. 471. CHAPTER VIII. PLEADS FOR THK STATE OF KANSAS. The competition for the soil of Kansas which Seward had alluded to was soon to follow. In the repeal of the Missouri coruproniise the slave power had overreached itself. It had gone beyond the point at which the freemen of the north would passively acquiesce, much as they loved peace. Emigrant colonies were organized in various states with a view to settle- ment in Kansas and the saving of the territory to freedom. The New England Emigrant Aid Society had been organized even before the Kansas-Nebraska bill became law, and the society had sent out its first little band of colonists within two months of the passage of the act. ' This alarmed the slave- holders, although they had been first in the field : it seemed as if they might, after all, lose at their own game. Counter-move- ments were rapidly multiplied by the slaveholders of Missouri. But they came not in the spirit of peaceful colonizers. Inti- midation and force became their frequently-employed weapons. The plains of Kansas now became for many years the .scene of a struggle that brought disgrace upon the principles of free government. This was the result of the so-called popular sovereignty, which was in reality the shrinking by the national government from a solemn responsibility. The actual state of things was aptly described by Seward when he later observed that "the popular sovereignty of Kansas proved to be the state sovereignty of Missouri.'"-' In October, 1854, a territorial governor of Kansas was ap- pointed by president Pierce. In March, 1855, a legislature was elected, but fraudulent voting played such a part that the free state men repudiated it, and called a constitutional convention ' Wilson, Sloce Power, ii. U'lh. - M'orhx. iv. t!'i». 60 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. to meet in the following autumn. This convention framed the Topeka free state constitution, elected a delegate to congress, and prayed for admission into the Union. In December, 1855, this constitution was ratified by popular vote of the free state men, the slavery party at present ignoring the movement. Shortly afterward, a governor, a legislature, and United States senators, were eledted under this constitution. But no laws of importance were passed, nor were such laws as the legislature did pass ever put into force. The scheme was rather intended as an emphatic protest against the pro-slavery government previ- oush' organized, and as an effective appeal to northern sym- pathy. ' Thus two governments claimed to exist in Kansas, the territorial government possessing something of technical legal- ity, the Topeka government liable to the charge of technical disloyalty. But affairs were unsettled, almost revolutionary, on the western plains. Freedom was fighting against slavery, and was under the necessity, for purposes of defense, of employing some of the same weapons. During the next few years, legis- latures met or constitutional conventions were held, at one time or another, in almost every hamlet in Kansas. In congress the Kansas question became for many years an important topic of debate. President Pierce, in a special message of January 24, 1856, recognized the validity of the territorial government, described the Topeka movement as being of a revolutionary characfler, and complained of the ' propa- gandist colonization ' of tiie New England aid society. He ad- mitted that there had been disorders, but none to impair the validity of laws enaifled by the territorial legislature. As a remedy, he recommended that provision be made for the admis- sion of Kansas whenever her people, being sufficient in number, should desire it. '^ In accordance with this recommendation, Douglas, as chairman of the committee on territories, in March introduced a bill providing for the future calling of a constitu- tional convention by the legislature of the territory.-' The calling of a convention by such authority could not meet the approval of- those who regarded this legislature as spurious. ' Spring,. Kii.'iifids, .5V)-7><: Wilsdii, Slave Power, ii. 4BT-(;9. - .S'cti. I)i>f., WK^yi. vi. No. 4. ^ Gluhr. 1st sess., 34th Coug., App., 280. PLEADS FOR THJv STATE OF KANSAS. 61 Seward soon afterward offered a substitute that Kansas be ad- mitted with her present population, under the Topeka consti- tution. On the gth of April, he supported liis position in an able and elaborate speech. He lield that if the admission of Kansas was to afford adequate relief, this remedy ought to be applied immediately. No rule as to population had been laid down in the constitution. Freedom justly due could not be conceded too soon. Irregularities there had been, but the exi- gencies of the case would excuse them. The proceedings had, indeed, been instituted by a party, but the ele(flions had been open to all the qualified voters of the territory, and the new state organization had engaged in no conflict with the federal or territorial authorities. Congress could refuse admis- sion to Kansas only on the" ground that it would not relinquish the hope of carrying slavery into that territory. Such a hope was delusive ; if the attempt should be made it would be at the risk of subverting American liberties. The political power of .slavery was passing away. The defenders of slavery had form- erly tried to avoid discussing the suhjecfl in the national coun- cils ; they now pra(5lically confessed to the necessitj' of defend, ing it there, by initiating discussion. Said the speaker: "The^- have at once thrown away their most successful weapon, com- promise, and worn out that one which was next in effectiveness, threats of secession from the Union. It is under such unpro- pitious circumstances that they begin the next experiment of extending slavery into free territory by force ..." He declared to the senators of the free states that the debate about slavery would not cease even if they consented to make Kansas a slave state. The debate would be transferred to other topics and other territory. If we examined the ways we had pursued hitherto, he observed, we should find that we had forgotten moral right in the pursuit of material greatness. ' A few weeks later Sumner delivered his famous speech, "The Crime Against Kansas," in which he referred to Seward's substitute as offering the remedy of justice and peace. In speak- ing of the merit of this proposition, he said of Seward; "He has, throughout a life of unsurpas.sed industry, and of eminent ability, done much for Freedom, which the world will not let ' Olobi: 1st sess., 34tli Cong.. App., 4(l4-.5. 62 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. die; but he has done nothing more opportune than this."^ Certain expressions used in this speech resulted unfortunately for Sumner, but his misfortune was freedom's gain. Slavery had now become the occasion of violence both in the senate chamber and on the plains. Another impulse was given to the anti-slavery cause of the north. Meanwhile, the debate on the Douglas bill continued. The report of the Kansas investigating committee, submitted in July, supported the position of those who claimed the territorial legis- lature to be a usurpation. On the 2d of July, Seward spoke a second time, the pending measure being now somewhat modified in the direcftion of compromise. In the course of his remarks, Crittenden, of Kentucky, perhaps the most noble hearted of the border state compromisers, appealed to him not to set himself against all compromising. The adoption of the Topeka consti- tution, which alone of the remedies proposed would satisfy Sew- ard, Crittenden described as impradlicable. With some reason he asked why their feelings had been assailed with so much eloquence on the subjec5t of the distress in Kansas if the terri- tory was to have no relief whatever.' But the question was not only one of immediate relief, and Seward rightly insisted on its wider bearing. Technically, however, the present appli- cation of Kansas for admission was more irregular than the application of anj^ previous state. As to Crittenden's plea for compromises, Seward remarked that, while personal and tempo- rary questions might lawfully he compromi.sed, principles could never be justly the subjedts of compromise. He should insist on the settlement of the Kansas que.stion and other disturbing questions by legislative majorities.^ No settlement of the Kansas difficulty was reached in this congress. The house passed a bill to admit the state with its free state constitution, but the .senate passed its own bill in opposition. Shortly before the adjournment, the house resorted to a questionable expedient for protedling the free state settlers of Kansas. To the army appropriation bill it attached a clause prohibiting the president from using the army to enforce the territorial laws of Kansas. Seward supported the house in this proceeding. He maintained that congress had full power to ■ (iliihr. 1st sess.. ;MMi Clous.. .Vpp.. .'i4(). -' Ihirl. Tii:i. 7114. " Ihid. 789. PLEADS FOR THK STATE OV KANSAS. 63 declare the territorial legislature void, and, therefore, to pass a bill to prevent the employment of the army for the enforcement of the pretended laws.^ Aside from the parliamentary irregu- larity of this proceeding, it was based on the presumption that the territorial laws emanated from an illegal authority, a pre- sumption which, however well founded, congress had not yet declared to be a fadl. Furthermore, this army bill proviso pointed toward an encroachment on the military powers of the president. The senate refused to assent to the proviso, and congress adjourned without having made the customary appro- priation for the army. After a week had been spent of an extra .session, called to aCl on this subjecft, the house finally receded from its position. During this session Seward again spoke on the general question. He held that before peace could be re- stored in Kansas, the laws of its conquerors as well as the conquest itself must be abolished. What Kansas wanted, he observed, was the freedom granted, or professed to be granted, by the Kansas- Nebraska law.'-' Optimistic as he was, and con- fident as he usually expressed himself as to the future of the Union, he seemed not always to be free from a foreboding of possible trials. Said he, on this occasion: "I do not know the fearful horrors through which either Kansas or the country is to pass ; but be they what they may, the destiny of Kansas is freedom." ■ Almost two years elapsed before the situation of the popular sovereigns of Kansas again became a chief topic of debate in congress. Meantime, even the Missouri borderers had begun to feel some doubt as to the feasibility of making Kansas a slave state. But another efibrt, more shrewd and less vulgar, was yet to be made. In 1857, the pro-slavery legislature had issued a call for a con.stitutional convention, but the free state party, chiefly because it considered this legislature illegal, refrained from taking any part in the choice of delegates. The conven- tion, being thus easily harmonious, formed a pro-slavery con- stitution. But for fear it would be rejecfled if submitted to the people, only the slavery clause was to be submitted, with the reservation that whichever way the vote went on this clause the rest of the constitution should be adopted. As the terri- ' Warks. iv. r,M). - 11, ill. .5T-J. ■' Ilihl. 64 WILLIAM H. SKWARD. torial legislature had now come into the control uf the free state men — no longer standing aloof on their Topeka ground — this was thus to be superseded by a new one. Such was the Le- compton scheme. It was adopted by the pro-slavery party in December, 1857, the free state men again refusing to take part in the vote. But in the following January, when officers were to be eledled under the new constitution, they took occasion to vote on the instrument as a whole, and rejeifled it by a majority of 10,000. This time the pro-slavery party abstained in turn from voting. ' Thus oddly mixed were matters in Kansas, but that the free state party largely outnumbered their oppo- nents was sufficiently plain. President Buchanan, in a special message of February 2, 1858, accepted the first vote on the Lecompton constitution as conclusive proof of its adoption, and favored the admission of Kansas under that charter. - In congress long debates took place, as was now usual whenever the slavery question was approached. But not all northern Democrats were willing to give their sancftion to the Lecompton scheme. Douglas was among those who, while no defenders of freedom, were yet opposed to the forcing of slavery upon Kansas. On the 3d of March, Seward spoke at length against the proposed plan of admission. He reviewed the circumstances of the case, and maintained that the Lecompton convention had been called by illegal authority, and that its work had not been approved by a majority of the people. But his main argu- ment was based on the unwisdom of admitting more slave states. He contended that in the work of national expansion and develop- ment skilled labor was required, not that of slaves. •' The white man needed this continent to labor upon. The interests of the white races demanded the ultimate emancipation of all men. Whether this change should be effedled with wise precautions, was all that remained for the slave states to decide. "The nation," said he, "has advanced another stage; it has reached the point where intervention by the government, for slavery and slave states, will no longer be tolerated. Free labor has at last apprehended its rights, its interests, its power, and its ' Spring, Kansas, ch. x. ; Schouler, Hixt. I'. S.. v. S8.5, 391. = Sen. Ddc. /,S.37-.W. vii. Xo. 31. ■' ir«i/-Ax. iv. (iOO. PLEADS FOR THE STATE OF KANSAS. 65 destiny, and is organizing itself to assume the government of the republic. It will henceforth meet you boldly and resolutely here; it will meet you everywhere, in the territories or out of them, wherever you may go to extend slavery."' Speaking of the position of the slave states as regards Kansas, he asked whether they could compel Kansas to adopt slavery against her will. "To what end would they agitate? It can now be only to divide the Union. Will they not need some fairer or more plausible excuse for a proposition so desperate? How would they improve their condition, by drawing down a certain ruin upon themselves? Would they gain any new security for slav- ery? Would they not hazard securities that are invaluable? "^ The wounds of society, he held, could be healed onlj' by the immediate admission of Kansas as a free state, and by the abandonment of all further attempts to extend slavery under the federal constitution.-' These were plain and bold remarks, but, however true, they changed no slaveholder's convicftion or vote. The bill for the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton constitution passed the senate, March 23, by a vote of 33 to 25. ' It being defeated in the house, a species of compromi.se was arranged, which was but little of an improvement. It virtually gave Kansas no choice but that of accepting a slavery constitution together with a handsome gift of public lands, or of remaining yet awhile in her territorial condition. Seward, as a member of the conference committee, dissented from the report of the majority as offering an unfair alternative.'' But the substitute devised passed both houses and became law. When submitted to Kansas, however, the proposition was overwhelmingly re- jedted. After some time, Kansas again applied to congress with another free constitution, and Seward again advocated her ad- mission. But the question was no longer debated on its own merits; it merged into the broader question of the Union. To Seward belongs the credit of having been, during these many j'ears, the foremost among the defenders of the free state cause in Kansas. Nor was it a cause of which parliamentary defense was always easy, for the free state party was sometimes » Wnrkii, iv. (iOl. = Ihld. 505. " Ibid. 602. < Globe, 1st sess., :i5th Cons.. ViM. ■> Ibid. lT(i2. 5 66 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. guilty of indiscreet and inconsistent acfliou. But Seward was skillful in argument, especially when it involved considerations of higher expediency and justice. His hopes, never failing him, had grown stronger of late. In the Kansas debates of 1858 he expressed it as his convidlion, that whatever disposition was then made of the question, this would be, for the free state cause, either the first vicflory or the last defeat. * It was pradli- cally the first vidlory ; yet it was not until secession made room for her that Kansas gained admission to the Union. 1 WorJcs, iv. 617. CHAPTER IX. IN POLITICS, 1855-60. A brief survey must now be made of some phases of Sew- ard's political a(5livity subsequent to the passage of the Kansas- Nebraska bill. The Whig party in New York state finally merged into the Republican in the autumn of 1855. ^ In some other states the new organization had come earlier to the front. But Seward, the chief leader of the anti-slavery forces in the state, favored no hasty adoption of the new name. He was aware of the difficulty of making a new party organization strong and enduring. At last, however, he avowed himself no longer a Whig, admitted that that party had proved deficient in anti-.slavery virtue, and that it had met its fate. If it be thought by some that he adhered too long to the Whig party, this must be his justification that he, more than others, devoted himself to the task of raising it to an appreciation of its higher duty. In this he was not successful because the question at issue was one that could be effedlively met only by a party specially organized, by what at first must virtually be an one- idea party. Such a party was the Republican. During the time which intervened between the repeal of the Missouri compromise and the presidential nomination of 1856, Seward had often been spoken of by his party friends as a desirable candidate for the presidencj'. He was recognized as being a leading representative of the most advanced as well as of the most pradlical anti-slavery ideas of the north. It was felt that success was more probable with him than with another, and that, if defeated, he would still remain the leader of the new party. '■' While not averse to this presidential idea, Seward left the matter with his friends, one of whom was always > Biography, ii. 354. ' Ibid. 276. 68 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Thurlow Weed. In 1855, he wrote that he did not think it probable that the slavery problem in national politics could be "completely and safely" worked out the next year.' The situ- ation was rendered somewhat less encouraging to the Repub- licans by reason of the large following secured by the Know- Nothing party. To this organization Seward was entirely opposed ; he had always dissented from the policy it advocated, and considered it as raising a false issue in a critical time. He would have nothing to do with a combination of Republicans and Know Nothings. 2 When the Philadelphia nominating con- vention met, his name was not presented, a letter having been received from him in which he declined, on the ground that the convention was not prepared to adopt all of his principles and policy.^ Although he might have preferred a different nomination from the one made, he spoke zealously in behalf of the party's cause during the canvass. Throughout the fol- lowing years he labored to promote the interests of the party in congress and in his own state. He seemed at times to feel burdened by his responsibilities in congress, and expressed a wish for retirement. Once he wrote: "I see true friends, and hear of so' many timid and fickle ones as almost to make me sorry that I have ever attempted to organize a part)' to save the country."'' These were private expressions; in public he was courageous and hope-inspiring. ■ When the Chicago con- vention assembled, in i860, he was the most prominent can- didate for the nomination, but again he had to give way to another. The disappointment of his friends was so great as almost to be pathetic. Nor need we doubt that he himself felt disappointed. But historj' has attested the wisdom of the choice made as well as his own magnanimity in the sequel, for during that memorable canvass he made a series of speeches that could not have been without a considerable influence on the result. In the political speeches that vSeward made during the years 1855-60, certain ideas and tendencies are deserving of notice. He frequently referred to the slaveholders as a privileged class, as an aristocracy, as the dominant class in the republic. The basis of their power he considered to be their personal dominion over man and the guaranties afforded them in the • Bior/riipliy, ii. 3.52. = lliid. 364. » [bid. '278. ■* [bid. 448. IN POLITICS. 69 federal constitution. He found no fault with the founders for granting these guaranties, but argued that their hopes of the gradual disappearance of slavery had been frustrated by subse- quent industrial and political changes, and that the constitution had then been perverted in the interest of the slave power. This privileged class, he intimated, stood on an enduring found- ation and was growing stronger and stronger.' "The question now to be decided," said he in 1S56, "is, whether a slave- holding class exclusively shall govern America, or whether it shall bear only divided sway with non-slaveholding citizens."^ In a speech made at Rochester, in 1858, he went a step farther, and declared that there was an " irrepressible conflidl " between the systems of free labor and slave labor, and "it means," said he, "that the United States must and will, sooner or later, be- come entirely a slaveholding nation, or entirely a free-labor nation."^ This was the announcement which created so much stir at the time, not so much by reason of its novelty — rather because the people were unwillingly coming to the same belief, and because a prominent politician should have dared to give that belief such emphatic utterance. But the true meaning of the phrase was often perverted. The above position of Seward was historically correct, and in the main consistent. It seems to confli(5t with his previous assertions that the power of slavery was passing away, but he then referred mor^ especially to the operation of moral and economic laws, now to political fadls and ambitions. Still, in the long run, the latter must necessarily adapt themselves to the former. Seward therefore strained the argument — assuming the course of development to be against slavery — when he inti- mated the possibility of the nation's becoming entirely slave- holding. Yet this might have happened, it is true, if the free states should have allowed themselves to become so far demoral- ized as to cease developing. But how could the nation, on the other hand, become all free so long as the slave power rested on an enduring foundation? How could a conflidl that was irrepressible find a peaceful termination under a constitution which, in a manner, recognized both of the conflicting parties? Yet Seward continually maintained that the Union was safe ' Works, iv. 236, 271. ' Ibid. 274. ^ Ibid. 292. 70 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. and that slavery could never be perpetual. These ideas could be founded only upon the supposition that the slaveholders thought less of slavery than of the Union, and so much less that they would be willing, in due time, to abolish it. There is some reason to think that Seward did at times entertain this hopeful view ; and to the extent of his doing so, he was quite consistent in what seems like contradictory ideas. But he did not generally, during these years, hold to a view so optimistic, nor would it have reflected favorably on his political discern- ment had he done so. In 1855, he said of slavery: "It will be overthrown, either peacefullj' or lawfully, under this consti- tution, or it will work the subversion of the constitution, to- gether with its own overthrow."' This implies that even the constitution might have to give way to a higher necessity. Nevertheless, it must be said that Seward did not consistently adhere to, nor did he generally carry to its logical conclusion, the idea of an irrepressible conflidl. He seemed to believe, or hope, that the conflicfl might be fought out with moral weapons, under the existing constitution, provided that right political adlion were taken. Such political action was, in the first place, to consist in returning to the original policy of the nation in favor of freedom instead of slavery. Slavery was to be excluded from the terri- tories, and the growth of the privileged class to be thus checked. Such a return, he thought, would be acquiesced in by all par- ties, would eliminate the slavery question from politics, and would end the irrepressible conflicft.^ With this change in policy was to follow a return to the principle of the equality of men, embodied in the declaration of independence. But for the repre- sentative of a party that opposed slavery under limitations, this was rather broad ground to assume. He therefore felt con- strained to refer to this 'self-evident truth' as "the principle of the political equality of men within the exclusive range of the federal constitution. "■'' This shows how curiously but ne- cessarily restri(5ted was the warfare which the Republican party might wage against slavery. It could not, consistently with its programme, diredt its main artillery against slavery as an in- humane and sinful institution. It was no wonder, therefore, ' Wmks, iv. 237. ' Ibid. 318, 366. ' Ibid. 384. IN POLITICS. 71 that some politicians of the south, crediting the party with more logic than it professed, were ready to believe that it must aim against slavery everywhere.' This party limitation also explains whj' Seward so often placed his arguments on political and economic rather than on moral grounds. The motive of the Republican party was, therefore, not that of improving the condition of the negro. Seward seemed desirous of having this understood, partly, no doubt, with the view of quieting undue feelings of alarm at the south. In the campaign of i860, he observed: "How natural has it been to assume that the motive of those who have protested against the extension of slavery, was an unnatural sympathy with the negro instead of what it always has really been, concern for the welfare of the white man."'- In another speech of that cam- paign he said, in speaking of the so-called negro question : "The negro is no party to it; he is only an incident ... It is an eternal question between classes . . . between aristocracy and democracy. "3 Yet we know that, on other occasions, Sew- ard often insisted on the requirements of natural justice. His speeches during this period were pradtical and serious in tone, but animated by a feeling that vidtory over the slave power was almost achieved : it was necessary only to bring the Republican party into power and to support its principles. He believed that the last slavery-supporting Democrat had already been born. The reason for this belief was that, in his opinion, slavery could pay no longer, and that the partisan alluded to would not work for a cause that did not pay. In this connec- tion, Seward made this rather curious announcement: "I pro- pose to pay all kinds of patriots hereafter, just as they come. I propo.se to pay them fair consideration if they will only be true to freedom. I propose to gratify all their aspirations for wealth and power, as much as the slave states can."*" This probably referred to the disposition that the Republican party, on coming into power, could make of its patronage; but it hardly seems like a high-minded allusion. Seldom, indeed, was it that Seward alluded to things quite so pradlical. The nearer the victory of the new party was seen to be, ' Cf. Globe, 3d sess., 34th Cong., 153. « Wvrhs, iv. 313. » lUd. 373. « Ibid. 360. rl, WIL,UAM H. SEWARD. the more moderate became Seward's tone. This is explained partly by the fadl that aggressive work was now less necessary, partly by an undoubted feeling on his part that moderation might prove effecflive in counteradling what tendencies there existed toward disunion. In 1856, he had observed that the American people were under the responsibility not only of pre- serving the Union but also of making it serve the cause of justice and humanity, and that neglecft of the latter responsi- bility involved the chief peril to which the Union itself was exposed. 1 In i860, there was a change, not in spirit, but in emphasis. Said he: "There are few men- — and there ought to be fe\^ — who would be so intent on the subje(5t of estab- lishing freedom that they would consent to a subversion of the Union to produce it, because the Union is a positive benefit, nay, an absolute necessity, and to save the Union, men may naturally dare to dela}'."^ In a politital speech which he made in congress in February, i860, and which Garrison charadterized as Seward's 'bid for the presidency,' he spoke thus to the senators from the slave states: "We are excluded justly, wisely and contentedly from all political power and responsi- bility in your capital states." "Use your authority to main- tain what system you plea.se." The north bore no ill will to- ward the south. They were all brethren. "We have never," said he, "been more patient, and never loved the representa- tives of other sections more than now."^ The Union was now becoming the leading subjecft also in Seward's mind, as it had formerly been with so many of the northern compromisers. While he considered the Union really safe by reason of the many bonds which held it together, he yet thought it possible that the slaveholders might, in a season of high excitement, secede from it, but believed that they would soon recover from their delusion and return. * To this personal belief was added some of that exaggerated confidence in the future which the statesman seems to need for effecftive leader- ship. This circumstance made his views seem the more hope- ful. A knowledge of these facfts will aid towards a better under- standing of the part that Seward sustained in the last congress before the war. ' TForfcs, iv. 374. ^ Ibid. 35.5. " Ihid. G33-36. ' Cf. ibid. 348. CHAPTER X. IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. Before proceeding to consider the course that Seward pur- sued on the national question, at this crilical period, it seems well at least to enumerate some of the other subjects of legis- lation that engaged his attention. He served for many years on the committee on commerce, and was much interested in the establishment of telegraphic communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific states, and between the United States and Europe. In 1857 he introduced a bill to carry out the plan of Cyrus W. Field for the laying of a cable, in partnership with Great Britain, between Newfoundland and Ireland. The plan was opposed by many as visionary, by others as likely, if carried out, to en- danger the country in case of war with a foreign state. Sew- ard spoke of the manifold benefits that would result, and pre- dicted that the reality would far exceed the expedlations. ^ The bill became law, and the plan was carried into execution ; but its success was, for the time, of only short duration. On the question of tariffs, Seward was, by reason of his broad views of governmental dutj', naturally a protedtionist, but he took no very prominent part in such tariiF debates as occurred during these j'ears. The national independence and the home market arguments were chiefly touched upon in his remarks on the Subjecft. When, in 1859, the subjedl of the acquisition of Cuba was introduced, bj' action of the committee on foreign relations, Seward, being a member of the committee, dissented from the majority's report in favor of that project. But he would not oppose the acquisition when it could be peacefully and honor- ably effected. This would depend on the coincidence of national opportunity and necessity, which he did not believe then to ' Globe, 3d sess., 34th Cong.. 422. 74 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. exist. ' It is noticeable that, in oppo.sing the Cuba scheme, he all but omitted mention of its evident bearing on slaverj'. He thought it better not to use anti-slavery arguments when others might suffice. Of all measures of legislation, however, aside from those involving the slavery question, none received more of Seward's attention than that of constructing a railroad to the Pacific. As early as 1854 he had been placed on a select committee of nine that was to consider this subject. In 1858, a bill was re- ported by the committee, of which W. M. Gwin, of California, was chairman, directing the president to invite propositions for the building of such a road from some point in western Mis- souri to San Francisco. Seward would have preferred a more northerly route, but he strongly supported the b'll in debate, holding that the importance of the enterprise could not be ex- aggerated, that it would realize the discovery of the western passage that Columbus supposed he was making, that it was necessary for administrative purposes, and that it was especially important as a means of firmly uniting the extreme west with the rest of the Union. For his own part, he should have pre- ferred to have the road built directly by the government, the means to be obtained by increasing the revenues and by em- ploying the national credit. ^ This bill passed the senate in January, 1859, but failed to become law. Two years later another bill, providing for three roads, likewise favored by Seward, passed the senate ; but the Pacific railroad question was not finally settled until after the opening of another era in our history. For the time being, all questions but one were of secondary importance. The election of Abraham Lincoln, in November, i860, was generally felt to betoken a change in the policy of the nation. The rapid ascendency to power of a party whose policy was the territorial restriction of slavery marked a decided advance in northern .sentiment. It was this advance and its moral tendency that disquieted the slave states rather than fear of actual encroachment on their domestic rights. Having ex- hausted all expedients for holding what they considered their own in the Union, the southern politicians wished their states ' Globe, 3d sess., 35tli Coug., .539. ' Ibid. 1st sess., 3.5th Cong., 1585; Ibid. 2d sess., 35th Cong., 157-58. I IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. 75 to withdraw from it. For the taking of such a step, the re- served powers of the states were often held to afford the right, the difficulty of recovering fugitive slaves a reason, and the elecflion of a Republican president the fit occasion. Accordingly, soon after the elecflion, movements were initiated in several of the gulf states, looking toward secession. South Carolina pro- vided for the meeting of a state convention on the 17th of De- cember, by which body it was generally felt that secession would be initiated. The national outlook was therefore gloomy when the second session of the thirty-sixth congress met, December 3d. Nor was the president's message destined to make the outlook brighter. Buchanan deprecated the slavery agitation at the north in the usual formulas, and while he argued against the right to secede, he likewise disallowed the right of employing force against a seceding state. The spirit of the message, though loyal, was weak and apologetic. ' But such was not the spirit of the south- ern members of congress. Some of them spoke boldly in favor of secession, others more temperately. Thej' seemed to have chosen their lot for weal or for woe, and if conciliatory meas- ures were to be offered, they looked to the northern members to propose them. War they hardly expeded, holding that the northern leaders well knew that they could not succeed in a war against the southern states. But if coercion should be attempted, then war would come, and they intended to prepare for it. 2 In the early weeks of this congress Seward remained mostly silent on the national issue. On the 8th of December, he wrote : "I am, thus far, silent, not because I am thinking of propos- ing compromises, but because I wish to avoid, myself, and re- strain other Republicans, from intermeddling, just now — when concession, or solicitation, or solicitude, would encourage, and demonstrations of firmness of purpose would exasperate. " •'' In another letter he wrote: "The ultra-Southern men mean to break up the Union, not really for the grievances of which they complain, but from cherished disloyalty and ambition. The 1 QXahe, 2d sess., 3Cth Cong., App., 1-4. » C/. Iverson, of Ga., anJ Cliugman, of N. C, Olobc, 2d sess., 36th Cong., 11-13, 733. » Bioijraphy, ii. 480. 76 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. President, and all Union men here, are alarmed and despondent. The Republicans who come here are ignorant of the real design or danger. I begin to see my way through, without sacrifice of principle."' From these expressions, as well as from others occurring in his letters of this period, it appears that he was aware that disunion influences were at work in the departments of the government, and that he was busily conferring and planning how to countera<5l them. When, on the 20th of December, a senate committee of thirteen was appointed to consider the state of the Union, Sew- ard was made one of its members. The most adlive members of the committee were naturally those from the border states. Crittenden submitted to it, two days later, a series of propo- sitions of the nature of a compromise, the most important of which was the one relating to a division of the territories on the former Missouri compromise line. These propositions, in the form of an amendment to the constitution, were repeatedly urged upon the attention of the senate by their Union-loving author. But they found no favor with the Republican members, and were generally considered inadequate by those from the extreme south. The habit of compromising, however, had not been shaken off by the north. Though this particular attempt failed to meet their approval, they were not unwilling to con- sider other plans. This was the disposition especially in the house of representatives, where a Union committee of thirty- three members had been appointed. Here various propositions were made from time to time, with a view to appease the south. But the south would not now be appeased. The more radical men of both sedlions occupied at last the same ground in regard to compromises. During this period Seward appeared in no wise like a radical. He opposed the Crittenden compromise, but in the committee of thirteen he submitted, at a suggestion from Lincoln, and with the consent of the northern members, a proposition that "the Constitution should never be altered, so as to authorize Congress to abolish, or interfere with .slavery in the States." This was accepted. He submitted, in like manner, two other propositions, the one providing a trial by jury for fugitive slaves, 1 Biography, ii. 478. IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. 77 the other requesting congress to recommend to all the states a revision of obnoxious state legislation. But these were not adopted by the committee. ' On the 2ist of December, the day after the secession of South Carolina, Seward spoke on the political situation before the New England societj^ of New York. His tone on this occa- sion was so moderate and pacifying as almost to convey the impression that also secession might have an apology. It was not strange, he thought, that one or more members of the federal family should, at times, become dissatisfied and wish to withdraw. But such a thing was unwise and unnatural; the states were always intended to remain together. As to the manner of treating the states that desired to leave the Union, he knew no better rule than that prevailing in the famil}' — not to tease, threaten, coerce — that was just the way to get rid of a family'. It was necessarj' to keep entirely cool and entirely kind. Time would allay the passions. - In the debate on the Pacific railroad bill, in the early part of January, he remarked that this was a great measure of con- ciliation, of compromise, and of union. This bill provided for a northern and a southern route, and referring to it as exadlly equal and just, Seward said: "It recognizes distincflly that which we are all required to recognize : that, owing to the peculiar conformation of the country and the habits of our people, there is one interest and civilization North, and another distindl interest and civilization South." "This measure equally provides for favoring the progress and development of the north- ern civilization, and that of the South."" From one who had so long used his influence against the latter civilization, this seems, at first glance, like a singular statement. Nor was there much reason for supposing that the Pacific railroad enterprise could, under the existing circumstances, become a measure ,of conciliation and union between the north and the south. Seward did not, indeed, insist on this as the most important measure for the occasion. His general views of the state of the Union, with his suggestions as to what the situation required, were made known in a speech which he delivered on the 12th of January. ■ Biography, ii. 484. 2 j\t. y_ Times, Dec. 24, ISGO. ' Olobe, 2d sess., 3Gtli Cong., 3.50. LOFC. 78 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. The fadl that Seward was to be secretary of state in Lin- coln's cabinet was now generally known. This, together with the facfl of his being recognized as the leader of the party that was soon to come into power, made people exceedingly anxious to hear him. Many came from neighboring cities; the crowd was said to be the largest that ever colledled inside the senate chamber. • Seward's speech on this occasion was a strong plea for the Union, and his arguments were such as might appeal to both sections. He began by affirming that he should adhere to the Union under all conceivable circumstances. He did not believe that it could be saved by debates on the powers of the federal government or on the unconstitutionalitj' of secession. Nor did he think that congressional compromises were likely to save it. As to the employment of coercion, he observed that he did not know what the Union would be worth if saved by the sword. Yet he did not agree with those who advised un- opposed separation. What congress, in his opinion, should do in the present situation was to redress, if it could, any real grievances of the offended states, and then to supply the presi- dent with all the means necessary to maintain the Union. But he desired the government to pradlice the utmost moderation and conciliation. His specific views as to what remedial measures might be wise and expedient were substantially as follows : i. Inasmuch as the constitution regarded slaves as bondsmen who might not be discharged from service by any law of the state into which they might escape, he agreed that all state laws which related to this class of persons, and which contravened the constitution or laws passed in conformity thereto, ought to be repealed. This might be a recommendation to repeal the personal liberty laws, or it might not, according to one's view of the constitu- tion on this point. What impression Seward at this time wished to convey is easily inferred. 2. Slavery had by the constitution been wisely left to the exclusive care of the states ; if it were in his power, he would not alter the constitution in that respe(5l. This declaration and the preceding were merely iterations of propositions that he had submitted in the committee of thirteen. 3. Congress had full power of legislation for the territories ; yet > N. Y. Times, .Jau. 14, 1801. IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. 79 the question as to what laws should at any time be passed in regard to them was to be determined on pra<5tical grounds. He thought that after Kansas should have been admitted as a free state, the territorial question might be ' happily ' solved by ad- milting the remaining territories as two states, provided that this were otherwise pracfticable and that reservations as to later subdivisions could constitutionally be made. This statement concerning the territories was so guarded as to be of little pradtical significance. The suggestion in regard to two states must be taken to mean that one of them might be admitted without any restridlion with reference to slavery, — otherwise the suggestion would, under the circumstances, be meaningless. 4. If it were pracfticable, he would have preferred a course differ- ent from the one just suggested, namely, the calling of a con- vention when the present excitement had passed away, to con- sider the question of amendments to the constitution. 5. He remained of opinion that physical bonds, such as railroads, were more powerful for holding communities together than mere covenants. In closing, he observed that, in expressing these views, he had not always suggested "what in many respedls would have been in harmony with cherished convidlions of [his] own." In political affairs men must be content to lead when they could, and to follow when they could not lead. > This speech was generally recognized as being conciliatory in tone and as likely to produce a good effe(5t on the border states. But northern papers conceded that it would hardly have any marked effect on the disunion movement in the south. One paper thought that the conditional promise in regard to the territories amounted to very little, ^ another preferred that a bolder tone had been employed.'' To the more radical aboli- tionists the speech seemed to indicate a partial retreat from the previous anti-slavery position of the speaker. Wendell Phillips compared it to the 7th of March speech of Webster.'' In reality, the speech betokened no defection on the part of Seward. Aside from the rather doubtful appearance of his territorial idea, there was in it nothing that could be construed > Globe, 2d sess., 3Gth Cong., 341-44. ' N. V. Tw/ics, Jan. 14, 18B1. • N. Y. Trilnine, Jan. 14, ISGl. ' PliUli^is-PumplUcts, ii. 'Disunion' p. 6. 80 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. into a surrender of priuciple. Yet the pervading spirit was ex- ceedingly conciliatory. During this session of congress Seward certainly went as far in the diredtion of compromise as a man of his record could consistently have done. Nor did he, to out- ward appearances, always maintain his consistency. He some- times alluded to the southern interests in a gentle, forbearing- tone that seemed hardly in accord with his bolder utterances of the past. But there was an important political reason for this change of tone. Seward wished to smooth the way for the in- coming of the new administration. To gain time was his chief present aim, in the hope that time would bring a return of calm- ness and better reason to the southern mind. ' This is the ex- planation of his present policy, and in the light of it his sug- gestions regarding remedies must be viewed. Thus, when he suggested a future constitutional convention, as he did more than once, he must have felt that, if such a scheme were to have any effedl, it could at best be only that of delaying a(5tion in the border states. For he had early seen that the gulf states could not be arrested in their course by any reasonable conces- sions. ^ Nevertheless, he had strong hopes that these states could be recovered by peaceful means, and that the danger in which the Union was placed was only a passing one. He de- sired, therefore, that all adliqn which might tend to emphasize or widen the separation should be avoided. When the question came up in the senate as to what record to make of the with- drawal of senators, Seward wished no record to be made of the matter. He thought the less there was said, the sooner it would be mended. "I hope," said he, "that the time will not be long before they will be here again." ^ Conservative as was the Republican attitude, he thought that, for the objecft he had im- mediately in view, it was not sufficiently so. On the 13th of January, the day after he had spoken in the senate, he wrote : "Two- thirds of the Republican Senators are as reckless in atftion as the South. They, imagine that the Government can go on, and conquer the South, while they, themselves, sit still and see the work done. Without compromising any principle, I have shown the di.sposition I feel, to put aside this evil."'' ' BiAiiji-dijIiy, ii. 497. ' IIM.. iHU. •' Globe, 2d sess , .3Gtli Cong., 501. ■' Bidijriipliy. ii. 49(1. ■; IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. Sl^ For averting the evil of disunion, Seward depended not on the healing influence of time alone, hut on the efficacy of a change of issue. This change is noticeable in most of the re- marks he made during this period. The Union was now his chief topic, not slavery in the territories. The general wisdom of this course, now that the party of slavery restricflion had become vidlorious, cannot be doubted. But the territorial ques- tion had as yet by no means been settled ; its settlement would depend upon the firmness with which the new party maintained its ground. When, therefore, Seward remarked in the senate, as he did after the admission of Kansas, that slavery in the territories had "ceased to be a pradlical question," since there were only twenty-four African slaves in 1,063,000 square miles of national territory,' he belittled the issue in a manner that did little credit to the creed of his party. His love of the Union was deep and sincere, and this partly accounts for his present inclination to make other issues seem trifling. "With the loss of the Union," said he, "all would be lost."^ But^ could the Union be saved by guarded concessions and gentle words? If not, might it not have been well to have manifested more legislative energy even before the 4th of March? A re- sponsibility for positive adlion in support of national authority rested also upon the shoulders of the existing congress. But the position of congress is partly to be explained by the unde- cided and expe(ftant attitude of the northern mind. Ev'.-'u poli- ticians who used to lead slackened their pace, and wished to refer matters to the people. Seward's mistake at this time consisted in his misjudging the determination of the south, and in his pursuing a course that tended to add to the feeling of false security that existed, to some extent, in both the south and the north. His mistake was therefore that of many, but greater because of his prominence. In so far, however, as his course might have been necessary to prepare the way for the peaceful organization of the new administration, its wisdom cannot be open to doubt. His emphasis on the Union alone tended, moreover, toward the important end of lifting the pend- ing issue above mere party, and thus of drawing together the Union forces existing in all parties. In this manner, at any ' Worlis, iv. 074. ^ Biography, ii. 507. 6 82 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. rate, he may have aided in preparing the nation for that struggle which he did so httle expecft. During these anxious weeks Lincohi often conferred with Seward by letter as to the political situation in congress. On the 26th of December, vSeward wrote that several, perhaps all, of the slave states would stand in a contumacious attitude on the 4th of March, InU that sedition would constantly grow weaker, and loj'alty stronger. Inauguration, he thought, would not be resisted.' Later he informed Lincoln that a plot was forming to seize the capital, and that it would be well for him to come earlier than usual, since the responsibilities of his admin- istration must begin before the time arrived.''^ The draft of the inaugural address was by Lincoln sub- mitted to Seward for comment and criticism. While strongly approving its argumentative part, Seward advised the omission of certain paragraphs as likely to give an advantage to the dis- unionists. He counseled Lincoln to manifest the magnanimity of the vicflor. observing that something in addition to argument was needful, "to meet and remove prejudice and passion in the South, and despondency and fear in the East. Some words of affection. Some of calm and cheerful confidence."'' The most important changes suggested by Seward were these: i. To omit the reference to the Chicago platform, with the announce- ment that the president would follow the principles therein de- clared. 2. Instead of a declaration of intention to reclaim and hold the places and property belonging to the goverinnent, to speak in general terms, and to hint rather at forbearance. The first of the.se suggestions Lincoln adopted. The second was adopted only in so far as he, at the suggestion of another friend, omitted the declaration of a purpose to reclaim property that had already fallen into the hands of the secessionists. ' The greater number of Seward's minor changes in the address were adopted, though in many cases not without further modifications by Lin- coln himself. The beautitul closing paragraph owed its origin and much of its felicity of expression to a draft made by Seward. ' The session of congress was drawing to a close. The de- bates on the various compromise measures had been long but ' BU)(jr(iphy, ii. 485. = Ibkl. 488. = Ihhl. 51 :.'-!:■.. ' Mcolny and Hay, Lincoln, iii. 3ai, 328. 3.33. " Uf. ibid, faesimik'. oiipiKsilc ji. XU). IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. 83 unavailing. The Crittenden proposition.s, as well as the essen- tially similar ones submitted by the peace convention, which had met in Februar}-, were defeated in the senate, the former by the majority of only one vote. Both houses, however, had passed an amendment providing that the constitution should never be so amended as to authorize congress to abolish slavery in the states. But this last concession oflfered by the north to slavery was defeated by the succeeding events. Seward's career of public service extended beyond this period. But his subsequent career had a unity of its own. The work to which his energies as a national statesman were mainly devoted had now, so far as he was directly concerned, reached its conclusion. That work was the preparation of the public mind to offer resistance to the aggressions of the slave power, and above all, the directing of such resistance to attainable ends. Others had perhaps done more to awaken an anti-slavery con- science at the north, but none did more than he to make the demands of that conscience politically effective. Herein con- sisted his greatest service to the cause of freedom. Slavery he sincerely hated, but as a public man, he was obliged to temper his hate to the degree allowed by the constitution. While generally bold in proclaiming his opinions, he was on occasion wary and reticent, and — with the best of motives — showed a certain fondness for political indiredtion. This made him liable to be sometimes misjudged by the more single-purposed champions of the common cause. He was not always free from mistakes in judgment and in policy, but throughout times the most trying, he remained ever faithful, ever hopeful. > LIST OF AUTHORITIES. Adams, Charles Francis, An Address on the Life, Charadler and Public Services of William H. Seward. Albany: 1873. Adams, John Quincy, Memoirs of Edited by C. F. Adams. Vol. X. Philadelphia: 1876. Anti-Masonic Convention, Proceedings of the United States, Held at Philadelphia, Sept. 11, 1830. Philadelphia: 1830. Clay, Henry, Works of. Edited by Calvin Colton. 6 vols. New York: 1856-57. Coleman, Mrs. Chapman, The Life of John Jay Crittenden, with Seledlions from his Correspondence and Speeches. 2 vols. Philadelphia: 1873. Congressional Globe, from ist session, 31st Congress to 2d ses- sion, 36th Congress, including Appendices. Hammond, Jabez D., The History of Political Parties in the State of New York, from the Ratification of the Federal Constitution to December, 1840. 2 vols. Albany: 1842. Hughes, John, Works of the Most Reverend, Archbishop of New York. Edited by Lawrence Kehoe. Vol. i. New York: 1866. New York, Journal of the Senate of the State of, 56th session, 1833- — Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1 82 1, Assembled for tlie Purpose of Amending the Con- stitution of the State of. Albany: 1821. Nicolay, John G., and Hay, John, Abraham Lincoln. A History. Vol. iii. New York: 1890. Niles' Register. Baltimore. Phillips, Wendell, Pamphlets. Vol. ii. Discourse on 'Disunion,' January 20, 1S61. Boston: 1861. 86 LIST OF AUTHORITIES. Roberts, Ellis H., New York. 2 vols. (Am. Commonwealth Series.) Boston: 1887. Schouler, James, History of the United States of America, under the Constitution. 5 vols. New York: [1889-91.] Scluickers, J. W., The Life and Public Services of Salmon Port- land Chase. New York: 1874. Schurz, Carl. Life of Henry Clay. 2 vols. (Am. Statesmen Series.) Boston: 1887. Senate Documents, ist .session, 31st Congress. Vol. ix. No. 18. — 1st session, 34th Congress. Vol. vi. No. 4. — ist session, 35th Congress. Vol. vii. No. 21. Seward, Frederick W., Autobiography of William H. Seward, from 1 801 to 1S34. With a Memoir of his Life and Selec- tions from his Letters, 1831 to 1846. New York: 1877. — Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State. A Memoir of his Life, with Selecflions from his Letters, 1 846-1 86 1. Vol. ii. New York: 1 891.1 Seward, William H., Works of Edited by George E. Baker. 5 vols. Boston : 1884. Spring, Leverett W., Kansas. (Am. Commonwealth Series.) Boston: 1885. Story, Joseph, Life and Letters of. Edited by W. W. Story. Vol. ii. Boston : 1851. Supreme Court Reports, i Cranch, 24 Howard, 16 Peters. Von Hoist, H., The Constitutional and Political History of the United States. Vols. 1846-1859. Chicago: 1881-89. Webster, Daniel, Works of. 6 vols. Boston: 1851. Weed, Thurlow, Autobiography of. Edited by Harriet A. Weed. Boston: 1883. Wilson, Henry, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America. 3 vols. Boston: 1S73-77. • With the e.KMiitioii of llu' aiitobiograiihic part, Ixitli tlicsc vohmies are, for brevity's salfe, rpt'erieil to as ' l{iogi"ai>liy '. N D EX Abolitionists, condemned by both north andsoiitli, ?.'(: Seward differs from, •!.■). Adams, John Qiilncy, 2, 3, 4, 13, 31, 33. Albany 'regency,' Seward's criticism of, 8-9. American Anti-Slavery Society, 33; in- quiries of in 1838, 34. Anti-masonic imrtv, orijfin of, 4; collapse of, 5. Bank of United States, political contest relative to, (l-lO; Seward speaks in defense of. 10-11, 12: constitutional- ity of the removal of deposits from, ll-l:?. Benton, Thomas H., 43. Buchanan, .lames, (U, 75. Butler, .\. P.. \i\\es a reason why the south wished the Missouri compromise annulled, 0^^-06. Calhoun, John C, 30, 42, 43, 44, 54. Caroline, ease of the, 25. Cass, Lewis, 38. 43. Chase, Salmon P., 43, 4(i, 50, 55, 57. Clay, Henry, 2. 3, 42, 411, 55; declines to j be Anti-masonic caiulidate for presi- dent, 5; favors recharter of United States hank. '.I-IO; criticises removal of the deposits, 10, 11; in campaign of 1844, 3(i, 37; his compromise plan in 18.50, 43; sjieaks in support of it, 43. Clinton, I)e Witt, 1-2, 3. j Crawford. William H., 2. Crittenden. John J.. 02; his j)roposed coniiiromise, ISOO-iil, 7li, 83. 1 Davis. Jefferson, 43. i Dix, John A., 18, 40. j Doushis, Stephen A., -ili. 55. 00, 04; his ^ doctrine of non-intervention, 53-54. Emigrant Aid Society, of New England, j 59, GO. Kield, Cyrus W., 73. Fillmore, ]Millar-ij: his o|)lnioiis at tlie time coneernin!; Anti-masonry, ti: liis characteristics as a politician, il-": is one of tlie Anti-masonic leaders in the state senate, 8; writes party docu- ments, 8: speaks in favor of election of mayor hy the people, ',)■. criticises Jackson's removal of the deposits, to- ll; opposes a state loan to relieve the linancial i)rcssure, 1:!: his theory re- gardin.tc railroads. 1:.': argues ai:ainst instrnctintr nieniliers of <'oui.'n"ss. \'i: approves .lacUson's course touching nullilication, lr.'-i:i: not a strict con- structicniist, l.T; becomes a Whig, 14- 15; is dt?teate- 37; his position in the Virginia con- troversy, :37-ltl: resumes practice of the law in 184H, 3:.'; his self-conlidence. 32-3.3; his early expressions on tlie suiiject of slavery, 34-3.') ; Ins di- vergence from tlie abolitionists, 3.5: supports Clay in campaign of 1844, 3(5, 37; opposes anncxatii>i\ of Texas, 36; his ideas rcspi'Cting the relation of the federal constitution to slavery, Za, 30-37, 311-40 ; favors the use of only constitutional means against slavery, 37; supports Taylor in 1848, 38; disbelieves in the formation of a distinct anti-slavery party, 3(1; Ids Cleveland speech. 3ii-40; is elected United .States senator in 184'.i. 40; con- curs with Taylor in his jiolicy as to the new territories, 42; his California speech in congress, 44-4."i; recejition of his announcenunit of a •higlier law,' 40-17; weakness of Ids plan to admit new stat0 ; dislikes the Whig pUitfonu of 18.52, "il ; sug- gests propositions to promote emanci- jiation, .")2: his idea of national expan- sion, ,'i3; speaks against the Ivan^ias- Nebraska bill, ."iO-."i7; tavors immedi- ate admission of Kansas, 01, fiS; oj)- poses the r,ecomptoii |)lau, ()4-05; be- comes a licpublican, 07: is talked of for the jircsjdciK'y in 18.")0, 07-08; oi)])oses co-operation with Ivnow- IS'othings, 08; fails of nomination in 1800, OS : synopsis of his political speeches, 18">r)-00, ()8-72; his idea of an irrepressible conflict, 00-70 ; Ills opinion of the bc;uing of the negro question on tiiatof slavi'ry. 71: favors an Atlantic cable, 7.''.; favors protec- tion, 73; favors a conditional acqui- sition of Cuba, 73-74; advocates the building of a Pacilic railroiid, 74; his position in congress during December, 18li0, 7r>-71): submits jiropositious to committee of tbirtcen. 70-77: speaks on secession in New York. 77: favors a Pacific railroad system as a means of union, 77; his 12th of January si)eech, 77-79; its reception, 70; his present policy, 7il-S(l: bis change of i.ssue, 81; correspomls with Lincoln, 82; suggests changes in the inaugural, 83; his chief service to the anti-slavery cause, 83. Smith. Cicrrit. 3."i. .Spencer, .John C, 17, 20. Stevens. Tliaddeus, 4. Story, Joseph, 30. Sumner, Charles, 40, .55; defends Mis- souri compromise, .57; his estimate of Seward's policy respecting Kansas, 01-02. Taylor, Zachary, 38, 48, 40; his policy in regard to California and New Mexico. 41-42. Tomjikins, naniel D.. 1, 3. Tracy, Albert 11,8. Van Kuri'H, ^lartin. 1, 2, 5. 7, 0. Virginia controversy, 27-31; Calhoun on, 30: John Quincy Adams on, 31. Wade. ISenjamiu F., .5.5. Webster, Daniel, 27, 42, 47, 5.5, 79; his 7th of March speech, 43. Weed. Thurlow, 4, 5, 08. Whig party, origin of, 14; is considered nnfrienilly to foreigners, 22; in cam- l)aigu of i848, :^8. Wilmot proviso, 41, 43, 47, 48. Wirt, William, 4, 5. *^ HOLLINGER pH8.5 MILL RUN F3-1543