The Japanese Sedentary Fisheries with Special Reference to the Japanese-Australian Dispute Introduction The sedentary fisheries--oysters, pearl shell oysters, etc.--if confined to the coastal or territorial waters of a nation, are not likely to present a difficult problem under international law. 1/ On the high seas adjacent to a coastal nation, however, such fisheries present interesting legal questions: (1) how to treat them, i.e., whether or not they differ from the high-seas fisheries and (2) how to reconcile conflicts of claims between the state sending a fishing fleet to exploit such fisheries, and the nation on whose coastal waters adjacent to the high seas the foreign fishing boats are in operation. On September 11, 1953, the Government of Australia 2/ issued a proclamation claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf adjacent to the coast of Australia where pearl oyster beds __________ 1/ The Japanese domestic oyster and pearl fisheries-- especially the pearl beds--are mainly confined to the coastal waters of Eheme, Nagasaki and Mie Prefectures. See Suisan jihô [Journal of Fishing Industry], v. 14, No. 164 (1952), p. 15. Another journal reports that trawler fishing was first employed on the fishing grounds adjacent to the continental shelf, from the edge of the shelf to the continental slope, 400 to 800 meters deep. See Japan. Fishery Bureau. Nihonkai seinankaiiki no sohobikiami gyogyô to so no shigen [Trawler Fishing and its Resources in Japan Sea and South-West Sea Areas], 1960. 2/ Commonwealth of Australia Gazette. A. J. I. L., v. SLVIII, No. 56 (1934), p. 102.The Japanese Sedentary Fisheries with Special Reference to the Japanese-Australian Dispute Introduction The sedentary fisheries--oysters, pearl shell oysters, etc.--if confined to the coastal or territorial waters of a nation, are not likely to present a difficult problem under international law. 1/ On the high seas adjacent to a coastal nation, however, such fisheries present interesting legal questions: (1) how to treat them, i.e., whether or not they differ from the high-seas fisheries and (2) how to reconcile conflicts of claims between the state sending a fishing fleet to exploit such fisheries, and the nation on whose coastal waters adjacent to the high seas the foreign fishing boats are in operation. On September 11, 1953, the Government of Australia 2/ issued a proclamation claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf adjacent to the coast of Australia where pearl oyster beds __________ 1/ The Japanese domestic oyster and pearl fisheries-- especially the pearl beds--are mainly confined to the coastal waters of Eheme, Nagasaki and Mie Prefectures. See Suisan jihô [Journal of Fishing Industry], v. 14, No. 164 (1952), p. 15. Another journal reports that trawler fishing was first employed on the fishing grounds adjacent to the continental shelf, from the edge of the shelf to the continental slope, 400 to 800 meters deep. See Japan. Fishery Bureau. Nihonkai seinankaiiki no sohobikiami gyogyô to so no shigen [Trawler Fishing and its Resources in Japan Sea and South-West Sea Areas], 1960. 2/ Commonwealth of Australia Gazette. A. J. I. L., v. SLVIII, No. 56 (1934), p. 102.The Japanese Sedentary Fisheries with Special Reference to the Japanese-Australian Dispute Introduction The sedentary fisheries--oysters, pearl shell oysters, etc.--if confined to the coastal or territorial waters of a nation, are not likely to present a difficult problem under international law. 1/ On the high seas adjacent to a coastal nation, however, such fisheries present interesting legal questions: (1) how to treat them, i.e., whether or not they differ from the high-seas fisheries and (2) how to reconcile conflicts of claims between the state sending a fishing fleet to exploit such fisheries, and the nation on whose coastal waters adjacent to the high seas the foreign fishing boats are in operation. On September 11, 1953, the Government of Australia 2/ issued a proclamation claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf adjacent to the coast of Australia where pearl oyster beds __________ 1/ The Japanese domestic oyster and pearl fisheries-- especially the pearl beds--are mainly confined to the coastal waters of Eheme, Nagasaki and Mie Prefectures. See Suisan jihô [Journal of Fishing Industry], v. 14, No. 164 (1952), p. 15. Another journal reports that trawler fishing was first employed on the fishing grounds adjacent to the continental shelf, from the edge of the shelf to the continental slope, 400 to 800 meters deep. See Japan. Fishery Bureau. Nihonkai seinankaiiki no sohobikiami gyogyô to so no shigen [Trawler Fishing and its Resources in Japan Sea and South-West Sea Areas], 1960. 2/ Commonwealth of Australia Gazette. A. J. I. L., v. SLVIII, No. 56 (1934), p. 102.The Japanese Sedentary Fisheries with Special Reference to the Japanese-Australian Dispute Introduction The sedentary fisheries--oysters, pearl shell oysters, etc.--if confined to the coastal or territorial waters of a nation, are not likely to present a difficult problem under international law. 1/ On the high seas adjacent to a coastal nation, however, such fisheries present interesting legal questions: (1) how to treat them, i.e., whether or not they differ from the high-seas fisheries and (2) how to reconcile conflicts of claims between the state sending a fishing fleet to exploit such fisheries, and the nation on whose coastal waters adjacent to the high seas the foreign fishing boats are in operation. On September 11, 1953, the Government of Australia 2/ issued a proclamation claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf adjacent to the coast of Australia where pearl oyster beds __________ 1/ The Japanese domestic oyster and pearl fisheries-- especially the pearl beds--are mainly confined to the coastal waters of Eheme, Nagasaki and Mie Prefectures. See Suisan jihô [Journal of Fishing Industry], v. 14, No. 164 (1952), p. 15. Another journal reports that trawler fishing was first employed on the fishing grounds adjacent to the continental shelf, from the edge of the shelf to the continental slope, 400 to 800 meters deep. See Japan. Fishery Bureau. Nihonkai seinankaiiki no sohobikiami gyogyô to so no shigen [Trawler Fishing and its Resources in Japan Sea and South-West Sea Areas], 1960. 2/ Commonwealth of Australia Gazette. A. J. I. L., v. SLVIII, No. 56 (1934), p. 102.The Japanese Sedentary Fisheries with Special Reference to the Japanese-Australian Dispute Introduction The sedentary fisheries--oysters, pearl shell oysters, etc.--if confined to the coastal or territorial waters of a nation, are not likely to present a difficult problem under international law. 1/ On the high seas adjacent to a coastal nation, however, such fisheries present interesting legal questions: (1) how to treat them, i.e., whether or not they differ from the high-seas fisheries and (2) how to reconcile conflicts of claims between the state sending a fishing fleet to exploit such fisheries, and the nation on whose coastal waters adjacent to the high seas the foreign fishing boats are in operation. On September 11, 1953, the Government of Australia 2/ issued a proclamation claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf adjacent to the coast of Australia where pearl oyster beds __________ 1/ The Japanese domestic oyster and pearl fisheries-- especially the pearl beds--are mainly confined to the coastal waters of Eheme, Nagasaki and Mie Prefectures. See Suisan jihô [Journal of Fishing Industry], v. 14, No. 164 (1952), p. 15. Another journal reports that trawler fishing was first employed on the fishing grounds adjacent to the continental shelf, from the edge of the shelf to the continental slope, 400 to 800 meters deep. See Japan. Fishery Bureau. Nihonkai seinankaiiki no sohobikiami gyogyô to so no shigen [Trawler Fishing and its Resources in Japan Sea and South-West Sea Areas], 1960. 2/ Commonwealth of Australia Gazette. A. J. I. L., v. SLVIII, No. 56 (1934), p. 102.-2- are located. The Pearl Fisheries Act was subsequently enacted in order to prohibit Japanese fishing boats from engaging in pearling operations within the designated area in which Japanese pearlers had been fishing for many years. The problem of sedentary fisheries attracted much attention when the Convention of the Continental Shelf was adopted at the Geneva Conference on April 28, 1958. By this Convention, these fisheries were brought under the regime of the shelf. The Convention will be in force after its ratification by one more nation. Japan, however, has not signed it. This report will present, first, a resumé of the background of the Japanese-Australian dispute on the pearl fisheries. It will then discuss (1) the Japanese government position, and (2) press comments and opinions of Japanese scholars with regard to the continental shelf and sedentary fisheries in general, and the Japanese-Australian dispute in particular. In conclusion, an attempt will be made to evaluate the impact, if any, of the Convention on the Continental Shelf upon the Japanese-Australian dispute, in the light of the present needs and requirements of a world-wide trend.-2- are located. The Pearl Fisheries Act was subsequently enacted in order to prohibit Japanese fishing boats from engaging in pearling operations within the designated area in which Japanese pearlers had been fishing for many years. The problem of sedentary fisheries attracted much attention when the Convention of the Continental Shelf was adopted at the Geneva Conference on April 28, 1958. By this Convention, these fisheries were brought under the regime of the shelf. The Convention will be in force after its ratification by one more nation. Japan, however, has not signed it. This report will present, first, a resumé of the background of the Japanese-Australian dispute on the pearl fisheries. It will then discuss (1) the Japanese government position, and (2) press comments and opinions of Japanese scholars with regard to the continental shelf and sedentary fisheries in general, and the Japanese-Australian dispute in particular. In conclusion, an attempt will be made to evaluate the impact, if any, of the Convention on the Continental Shelf upon the Japanese-Australian dispute, in the light of the present needs and requirements of a world-wide trend.-2- are located. The Pearl Fisheries Act was subsequently enacted in order to prohibit Japanese fishing boats from engaging in pearling operations within the designated area in which Japanese pearlers had been fishing for many years. The problem of sedentary fisheries attracted much attention when the Convention of the Continental Shelf was adopted at the Geneva Conference on April 28, 1958. By this Convention, these fisheries were brought under the regime of the shelf. The Convention will be in force after its ratification by one more nation. Japan, however, has not signed it. This report will present, first, a resumé of the background of the Japanese-Australian dispute on the pearl fisheries. It will then discuss (1) the Japanese government position, and (2) press comments and opinions of Japanese scholars with regard to the continental shelf and sedentary fisheries in general, and the Japanese-Australian dispute in particular. In conclusion, an attempt will be made to evaluate the impact, if any, of the Convention on the Continental Shelf upon the Japanese-Australian dispute, in the light of the present needs and requirements of a world-wide trend.-2- are located. The Pearl Fisheries Act was subsequently enacted in order to prohibit Japanese fishing boats from engaging in pearling operations within the designated area in which Japanese pearlers had been fishing for many years. The problem of sedentary fisheries attracted much attention when the Convention of the Continental Shelf was adopted at the Geneva Conference on April 28, 1958. By this Convention, these fisheries were brought under the regime of the shelf. The Convention will be in force after its ratification by one more nation. Japan, however, has not signed it. This report will present, first, a resumé of the background of the Japanese-Australian dispute on the pearl fisheries. It will then discuss (1) the Japanese government position, and (2) press comments and opinions of Japanese scholars with regard to the continental shelf and sedentary fisheries in general, and the Japanese-Australian dispute in particular. In conclusion, an attempt will be made to evaluate the impact, if any, of the Convention on the Continental Shelf upon the Japanese-Australian dispute, in the light of the present needs and requirements of a world-wide trend.-2- are located. The Pearl Fisheries Act was subsequently enacted in order to prohibit Japanese fishing boats from engaging in pearling operations within the designated area in which Japanese pearlers had been fishing for many years. The problem of sedentary fisheries attracted much attention when the Convention of the Continental Shelf was adopted at the Geneva Conference on April 28, 1958. By this Convention, these fisheries were brought under the regime of the shelf. The Convention will be in force after its ratification by one more nation. Japan, however, has not signed it. This report will present, first, a resumé of the background of the Japanese-Australian dispute on the pearl fisheries. It will then discuss (1) the Japanese government position, and (2) press comments and opinions of Japanese scholars with regard to the continental shelf and sedentary fisheries in general, and the Japanese-Australian dispute in particular. In conclusion, an attempt will be made to evaluate the impact, if any, of the Convention on the Continental Shelf upon the Japanese-Australian dispute, in the light of the present needs and requirements of a world-wide trend.-3- Background The beginning of the Australian pearling industry in the Timor and Arafura Seas dates from the middle of the 19th century. Later its operations were extended to the waters of the Torres Strait. 3/ For a number of years prior to World War II, Japanese divers were engaged in pearl oyster fishing in the Arafura Sea area. At that time, however, they were working as "contract immigrants," employed by Australian operators. 4/ From 1932 until the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Japanese pearlers sent their own craft to the Arafura Sea. 5/ In the post war period, the MacArthur Lines prevented Japanese boats from resuming fishing operations in these areas. When the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Allied Powers came into force on April 28, 1952, 6/ the Australian Government expressed 3/ D. R. O'Connell. Sedentary Fisheries and the Australian Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., v. XLIX (1955), p. 185. 4/ Hideo Okuhara. Wagakuni kokusai gyogyo no riron to mondai [The Theory and Problems of Japanese International Fisheries]. The Reference, No. 112, (1960), p. 50. 5/ In the peak year, 1937-1938, about 160 Japanese boats were engaged in operations and the total haul reached was about 4,000 tons, half of the world's production of the shell. See The Japan Annual, 1958, p. 95. According to O'Connell, Japanese pearlers took one and a half times as much pearl in one year as the amount estimated to be a maximum seasonal harvest. See O'Connell. A.J.I.L., v. XLIX (1955), p. 185. 6/ T.I.A.S. 2490.-3- Background The beginning of the Australian pearling industry in the Timor and Arafura Seas dates from the middle of the 19th century. Later its operations were extended to the waters of the Torres Strait. 3/ For a number of years prior to World War II, Japanese divers were engaged in pearl oyster fishing in the Arafura Sea area. At that time, however, they were working as "contract immigrants," employed by Australian operators. 4/ From 1932 until the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Japanese pearlers sent their own craft to the Arafura Sea. 5/ In the post war period, the MacArthur Lines prevented Japanese boats from resuming fishing operations in these areas. When the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Allied Powers came into force on April 28, 1952, 6/ the Australian Government expressed 3/ D. R. O'Connell. Sedentary Fisheries and the Australian Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., v. XLIX (1955), p. 185. 4/ Hideo Okuhara. Wagakuni kokusai gyogyo no riron to mondai [The Theory and Problems of Japanese International Fisheries]. The Reference, No. 112, (1960), p. 50. 5/ In the peak year, 1937-1938, about 160 Japanese boats were engaged in operations and the total haul reached was about 4,000 tons, half of the world's production of the shell. See The Japan Annual, 1958, p. 95. According to O'Connell, Japanese pearlers took one and a half times as much pearl in one year as the amount estimated to be a maximum seasonal harvest. See O'Connell. A.J.I.L., v. XLIX (1955), p. 185. 6/ T.I.A.S. 2490.-3- Background The beginning of the Australian pearling industry in the Timor and Arafura Seas dates from the middle of the 19th century. Later its operations were extended to the waters of the Torres Strait. 3/ For a number of years prior to World War II, Japanese divers were engaged in pearl oyster fishing in the Arafura Sea area. At that time, however, they were working as "contract immigrants," employed by Australian operators. 4/ From 1932 until the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Japanese pearlers sent their own craft to the Arafura Sea. 5/ In the post war period, the MacArthur Lines prevented Japanese boats from resuming fishing operations in these areas. When the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Allied Powers came into force on April 28, 1952, 6/ the Australian Government expressed 3/ D. R. O'Connell. Sedentary Fisheries and the Australian Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., v. XLIX (1955), p. 185. 4/ Hideo Okuhara. Wagakuni kokusai gyogyo no riron to mondai [The Theory and Problems of Japanese International Fisheries]. The Reference, No. 112, (1960), p. 50. 5/ In the peak year, 1937-1938, about 160 Japanese boats were engaged in operations and the total haul reached was about 4,000 tons, half of the world's production of the shell. See The Japan Annual, 1958, p. 95. According to O'Connell, Japanese pearlers took one and a half times as much pearl in one year as the amount estimated to be a maximum seasonal harvest. See O'Connell. A.J.I.L., v. XLIX (1955), p. 185. 6/ T.I.A.S. 2490.-3- Background The beginning of the Australian pearling industry in the Timor and Arafura Seas dates from the middle of the 19th century. Later its operations were extended to the waters of the Torres Strait. 3/ For a number of years prior to World War II, Japanese divers were engaged in pearl oyster fishing in the Arafura Sea area. At that time, however, they were working as "contract immigrants," employed by Australian operators. 4/ From 1932 until the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Japanese pearlers sent their own craft to the Arafura Sea. 5/ In the post war period, the MacArthur Lines prevented Japanese boats from resuming fishing operations in these areas. When the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Allied Powers came into force on April 28, 1952, 6/ the Australian Government expressed 3/ D. R. O'Connell. Sedentary Fisheries and the Australian Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., v. XLIX (1955), p. 185. 4/ Hideo Okuhara. Wagakuni kokusai gyogyo no riron to mondai [The Theory and Problems of Japanese International Fisheries]. The Reference, No. 112, (1960), p. 50. 5/ In the peak year, 1937-1938, about 160 Japanese boats were engaged in operations and the total haul reached was about 4,000 tons, half of the world's production of the shell. See The Japan Annual, 1958, p. 95. According to O'Connell, Japanese pearlers took one and a half times as much pearl in one year as the amount estimated to be a maximum seasonal harvest. See O'Connell. A.J.I.L., v. XLIX (1955), p. 185. 6/ T.I.A.S. 2490.-3- Background The beginning of the Australian pearling industry in the Timor and Arafura Seas dates from the middle of the 19th century. Later its operations were extended to the waters of the Torres Strait. 3/ For a number of years prior to World War II, Japanese divers were engaged in pearl oyster fishing in the Arafura Sea area. At that time, however, they were working as "contract immigrants," employed by Australian operators. 4/ From 1932 until the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Japanese pearlers sent their own craft to the Arafura Sea. 5/ In the post war period, the MacArthur Lines prevented Japanese boats from resuming fishing operations in these areas. When the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Allied Powers came into force on April 28, 1952, 6/ the Australian Government expressed 3/ D. R. O'Connell. Sedentary Fisheries and the Australian Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., v. XLIX (1955), p. 185. 4/ Hideo Okuhara. Wagakuni kokusai gyogyo no riron to mondai [The Theory and Problems of Japanese International Fisheries]. The Reference, No. 112, (1960), p. 50. 5/ In the peak year, 1937-1938, about 160 Japanese boats were engaged in operations and the total haul reached was about 4,000 tons, half of the world's production of the shell. See The Japan Annual, 1958, p. 95. According to O'Connell, Japanese pearlers took one and a half times as much pearl in one year as the amount estimated to be a maximum seasonal harvest. See O'Connell. A.J.I.L., v. XLIX (1955), p. 185. 6/ T.I.A.S. 2490.-4- its intention to conclude with Japan an agreement on fisheries, pursuant to the provision of Article 9 of the Treaty which provides: 7/ Art. 9. Japan will enter promptly into negotiations, with Allied Powers so desiring, for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas. In consequence, the Japanese-Australian parleys on the fisheries were commenced in Canberra on April 13, 1953. However, while negotiations between the two governments were still in progress, the Japanese pearlers resumed their pre-war activities in the Arafura Sea. They sent 25 boats into the area in June 1953, taking 1,100 tons of pearl shell. During the same period, the Australian harvest was only 170 tons. 8/ On August 28, 1953, the talks were called off by the Australian side. 9/ ----------------------------------------------- 7/ Of the motives underlying this provisions, Mr. Okuhara stated that the incorporation of Article 9 in the Peace Treaty was due to distrust and fear by the Allied Powers of the Japanese attitude toward international fisheries during the pre-war period. According to him, three facts were illustrative: (1) Japan terminated in 1941 an Agreement regarding the Protection of Fur Seals concluded among the U.S., U.K., Russia and Japan; (2) Japan refused to take part in any of the world-wide agreements for the regulation of whaling in 1931, 1937 and 1938; and (3) a threat to American salmon fisheries in the Bristol bay area in 1936-1938. See Okuhara, The Reference, No. 112 (1960), p. 9. See also Keishiro Irie. Nihon kowa joyaku no kenkyu [Study of the Japanese Peace Treaty]. Tokyo, Itagaki Shoten, 1951. p. 347. 8/ According to an Australian jurist, is is a unilateral decision of the Japanese Government to approve without any prior consultation with Australia) the sending of a pearling fleet off the Australian coasts. Mr. Goldie was of the opinion that "the object of this policy is to manoeuvre Japan into a favorable position, by giving an appearance of continuity to her activities during 1936-1939 (which were, it is believed, no more than poaching)…" L.F.E. Goldie, The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries of the Australian Coasts. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), p. 84. 9/ The Japan Annual. 1958, p. 95.-4- its intention to conclude with Japan an agreement on fisheries, pursuant to the provision of Article 9 of the Treaty which provides: 7/ Art. 9. Japan will enter promptly into negotiations, with Allied Powers so desiring, for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas. In consequence, the Japanese-Australian parleys on the fisheries were commenced in Canberra on April 13, 1953. However, while negotiations between the two governments were still in progress, the Japanese pearlers resumed their pre-war activities in the Arafura Sea. They sent 25 boats into the area in June 1953, taking 1,100 tons of pearl shell. During the same period, the Australian harvest was only 170 tons. 8/ On August 28, 1953, the talks were called off by the Australian side. 9/ ----------------------------------------------- 7/ Of the motives underlying this provisions, Mr. Okuhara stated that the incorporation of Article 9 in the Peace Treaty was due to distrust and fear by the Allied Powers of the Japanese attitude toward international fisheries during the pre-war period. According to him, three facts were illustrative: (1) Japan terminated in 1941 an Agreement regarding the Protection of Fur Seals concluded among the U.S., U.K., Russia and Japan; (2) Japan refused to take part in any of the world-wide agreements for the regulation of whaling in 1931, 1937 and 1938; and (3) a threat to American salmon fisheries in the Bristol bay area in 1936-1938. See Okuhara, The Reference, No. 112 (1960), p. 9. See also Keishiro Irie. Nihon kowa joyaku no kenkyu [Study of the Japanese Peace Treaty]. Tokyo, Itagaki Shoten, 1951. p. 347. 8/ According to an Australian jurist, is is a unilateral decision of the Japanese Government to approve without any prior consultation with Australia) the sending of a pearling fleet off the Australian coasts. Mr. Goldie was of the opinion that "the object of this policy is to manoeuvre Japan into a favorable position, by giving an appearance of continuity to her activities during 1936-1939 (which were, it is believed, no more than poaching)…" L.F.E. Goldie, The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries of the Australian Coasts. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), p. 84. 9/ The Japan Annual. 1958, p. 95.-4- its intention to conclude with Japan an agreement on fisheries, pursuant to the provision of Article 9 of the Treaty which provides: 7/ Art. 9. Japan will enter promptly into negotiations, with Allied Powers so desiring, for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas. In consequence, the Japanese-Australian parleys on the fisheries were commenced in Canberra on April 13, 1953. However, while negotiations between the two governments were still in progress, the Japanese pearlers resumed their pre-war activities in the Arafura Sea. They sent 25 boats into the area in June 1953, taking 1,100 tons of pearl shell. During the same period, the Australian harvest was only 170 tons. 8/ On August 28, 1953, the talks were called off by the Australian side. 9/ ----------------------------------------------- 7/ Of the motives underlying this provisions, Mr. Okuhara stated that the incorporation of Article 9 in the Peace Treaty was due to distrust and fear by the Allied Powers of the Japanese attitude toward international fisheries during the pre-war period. According to him, three facts were illustrative: (1) Japan terminated in 1941 an Agreement regarding the Protection of Fur Seals concluded among the U.S., U.K., Russia and Japan; (2) Japan refused to take part in any of the world-wide agreements for the regulation of whaling in 1931, 1937 and 1938; and (3) a threat to American salmon fisheries in the Bristol bay area in 1936-1938. See Okuhara, The Reference, No. 112 (1960), p. 9. See also Keishiro Irie. Nihon kowa joyaku no kenkyu [Study of the Japanese Peace Treaty]. Tokyo, Itagaki Shoten, 1951. p. 347. 8/ According to an Australian jurist, is is a unilateral decision of the Japanese Government to approve without any prior consultation with Australia) the sending of a pearling fleet off the Australian coasts. Mr. Goldie was of the opinion that "the object of this policy is to manoeuvre Japan into a favorable position, by giving an appearance of continuity to her activities during 1936-1939 (which were, it is believed, no more than poaching)…" L.F.E. Goldie, The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries of the Australian Coasts. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), p. 84. 9/ The Japan Annual. 1958, p. 95.-4- its intention to conclude with Japan an agreement on fisheries, pursuant to the provision of Article 9 of the Treaty which provides: 7/ Art. 9. Japan will enter promptly into negotiations, with Allied Powers so desiring, for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas. In consequence, the Japanese-Australian parleys on the fisheries were commenced in Canberra on April 13, 1953. However, while negotiations between the two governments were still in progress, the Japanese pearlers resumed their pre-war activities in the Arafura Sea. They sent 25 boats into the area in June 1953, taking 1,100 tons of pearl shell. During the same period, the Australian harvest was only 170 tons. 8/ On August 28, 1953, the talks were called off by the Australian side. 9/ ----------------------------------------------- 7/ Of the motives underlying this provisions, Mr. Okuhara stated that the incorporation of Article 9 in the Peace Treaty was due to distrust and fear by the Allied Powers of the Japanese attitude toward international fisheries during the pre-war period. According to him, three facts were illustrative: (1) Japan terminated in 1941 an Agreement regarding the Protection of Fur Seals concluded among the U.S., U.K., Russia and Japan; (2) Japan refused to take part in any of the world-wide agreements for the regulation of whaling in 1931, 1937 and 1938; and (3) a threat to American salmon fisheries in the Bristol bay area in 1936-1938. See Okuhara, The Reference, No. 112 (1960), p. 9. See also Keishiro Irie. Nihon kowa joyaku no kenkyu [Study of the Japanese Peace Treaty]. Tokyo, Itagaki Shoten, 1951. p. 347. 8/ According to an Australian jurist, is is a unilateral decision of the Japanese Government to approve without any prior consultation with Australia) the sending of a pearling fleet off the Australian coasts. Mr. Goldie was of the opinion that "the object of this policy is to manoeuvre Japan into a favorable position, by giving an appearance of continuity to her activities during 1936-1939 (which were, it is believed, no more than poaching)…" L.F.E. Goldie, The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries of the Australian Coasts. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), p. 84. 9/ The Japan Annual. 1958, p. 95.-4- its intention to conclude with Japan an agreement on fisheries, pursuant to the provision of Article 9 of the Treaty which provides: 7/ Art. 9. Japan will enter promptly into negotiations, with Allied Powers so desiring, for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas. In consequence, the Japanese-Australian parleys on the fisheries were commenced in Canberra on April 13, 1953. However, while negotiations between the two governments were still in progress, the Japanese pearlers resumed their pre-war activities in the Arafura Sea. They sent 25 boats into the area in June 1953, taking 1,100 tons of pearl shell. During the same period, the Australian harvest was only 170 tons. 8/ On August 28, 1953, the talks were called off by the Australian side. 9/ ----------------------------------------------- 7/ Of the motives underlying this provisions, Mr. Okuhara stated that the incorporation of Article 9 in the Peace Treaty was due to distrust and fear by the Allied Powers of the Japanese attitude toward international fisheries during the pre-war period. According to him, three facts were illustrative: (1) Japan terminated in 1941 an Agreement regarding the Protection of Fur Seals concluded among the U.S., U.K., Russia and Japan; (2) Japan refused to take part in any of the world-wide agreements for the regulation of whaling in 1931, 1937 and 1938; and (3) a threat to American salmon fisheries in the Bristol bay area in 1936-1938. See Okuhara, The Reference, No. 112 (1960), p. 9. See also Keishiro Irie. Nihon kowa joyaku no kenkyu [Study of the Japanese Peace Treaty]. Tokyo, Itagaki Shoten, 1951. p. 347. 8/ According to an Australian jurist, is is a unilateral decision of the Japanese Government to approve without any prior consultation with Australia) the sending of a pearling fleet off the Australian coasts. Mr. Goldie was of the opinion that "the object of this policy is to manoeuvre Japan into a favorable position, by giving an appearance of continuity to her activities during 1936-1939 (which were, it is believed, no more than poaching)…" L.F.E. Goldie, The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries of the Australian Coasts. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), p. 84. 9/ The Japan Annual. 1958, p. 95.-5- Throughout the negotiations, the Australian Government took the position that, despite the fact that Japanese pearlers had established prewar operations in the southern Arafura Sea and its adjacent waters, Australia could not now acquiesce in Japanese participation in these operations on an equal footing. Australia contended to assert a proprietary interest in specific pearl beds, and to rely on "the evidence of a century of continuous exploitation by Australians," as her argument. 10/ Japan, as its basic contention, insisted that the marine resources on the high seas should be open to whoever desired to fish there. 11/ On September 11, 1953, the Governor General of Australia issued two proclamations claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf, one with respect to the area contiguous to the Commonwealth, and the other with respect to that contiguous to the Trust Territory of New Guinea. The first proclamation declared: 12/ "...Australia has sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil of: (a) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of its coasts; and (b) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of the coasts of territories under its authority other than territories administered under the trusteeship system of the United Nations, -------------------- 10/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nichi-Co koaho uchikiri ni tsuite [On the break-off of the Japanese-Australian Fisheries Negotiations], Sept. 15, 1953, Shiryo No. 13, The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 11/ O'Connell, A.J.I.L., XLIX (1955), p. 188. 12/ Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No. 56, Sept. 11, 1953; A.J.I.L., XLVIII (1954), pp. 102-103.-5- Throughout the negotiations, the Australian Government took the position that, despite the fact that Japanese pearlers had established prewar operations in the southern Arafura Sea and its adjacent waters, Australia could not now acquiesce in Japanese participation in these operations on an equal footing. Australia contended to assert a proprietary interest in specific pearl beds, and to rely on "the evidence of a century of continuous exploitation by Australians," as her argument. 10/ Japan, as its basic contention, insisted that the marine resources on the high seas should be open to whoever desired to fish there. 11/ On September 11, 1953, the Governor General of Australia issued two proclamations claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf, one with respect to the area contiguous to the Commonwealth, and the other with respect to that contiguous to the Trust Territory of New Guinea. The first proclamation declared: 12/ "...Australia has sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil of: (a) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of its coasts; and (b) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of the coasts of territories under its authority other than territories administered under the trusteeship system of the United Nations, -------------------- 10/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nichi-Co koaho uchikiri ni tsuite [On the break-off of the Japanese-Australian Fisheries Negotiations], Sept. 15, 1953, Shiryo No. 13, The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 11/ O'Connell, A.J.I.L., XLIX (1955), p. 188. 12/ Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No. 56, Sept. 11, 1953; A.J.I.L., XLVIII (1954), pp. 102-103.-5- Throughout the negotiations, the Australian Government took the position that, despite the fact that Japanese pearlers had established prewar operations in the southern Arafura Sea and its adjacent waters, Australia could not now acquiesce in Japanese participation in these operations on an equal footing. Australia contended to assert a proprietary interest in specific pearl beds, and to rely on "the evidence of a century of continuous exploitation by Australians," as her argument. 10/ Japan, as its basic contention, insisted that the marine resources on the high seas should be open to whoever desired to fish there. 11/ On September 11, 1953, the Governor General of Australia issued two proclamations claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf, one with respect to the area contiguous to the Commonwealth, and the other with respect to that contiguous to the Trust Territory of New Guinea. The first proclamation declared: 12/ "...Australia has sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil of: (a) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of its coasts; and (b) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of the coasts of territories under its authority other than territories administered under the trusteeship system of the United Nations, -------------------- 10/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nichi-Co koaho uchikiri ni tsuite [On the break-off of the Japanese-Australian Fisheries Negotiations], Sept. 15, 1953, Shiryo No. 13, The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 11/ O'Connell, A.J.I.L., XLIX (1955), p. 188. 12/ Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No. 56, Sept. 11, 1953; A.J.I.L., XLVIII (1954), pp. 102-103.-5- Throughout the negotiations, the Australian Government took the position that, despite the fact that Japanese pearlers had established prewar operations in the southern Arafura Sea and its adjacent waters, Australia could not now acquiesce in Japanese participation in these operations on an equal footing. Australia contended to assert a proprietary interest in specific pearl beds, and to rely on "the evidence of a century of continuous exploitation by Australians," as her argument. 10/ Japan, as its basic contention, insisted that the marine resources on the high seas should be open to whoever desired to fish there. 11/ On September 11, 1953, the Governor General of Australia issued two proclamations claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf, one with respect to the area contiguous to the Commonwealth, and the other with respect to that contiguous to the Trust Territory of New Guinea. The first proclamation declared: 12/ "...Australia has sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil of: (a) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of its coasts; and (b) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of the coasts of territories under its authority other than territories administered under the trusteeship system of the United Nations, -------------------- 10/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nichi-Co koaho uchikiri ni tsuite [On the break-off of the Japanese-Australian Fisheries Negotiations], Sept. 15, 1953, Shiryo No. 13, The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 11/ O'Connell, A.J.I.L., XLIX (1955), p. 188. 12/ Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No. 56, Sept. 11, 1953; A.J.I.L., XLVIII (1954), pp. 102-103.-5- Throughout the negotiations, the Australian Government took the position that, despite the fact that Japanese pearlers had established prewar operations in the southern Arafura Sea and its adjacent waters, Australia could not now acquiesce in Japanese participation in these operations on an equal footing. Australia contended to assert a proprietary interest in specific pearl beds, and to rely on "the evidence of a century of continuous exploitation by Australians," as her argument. 10/ Japan, as its basic contention, insisted that the marine resources on the high seas should be open to whoever desired to fish there. 11/ On September 11, 1953, the Governor General of Australia issued two proclamations claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf, one with respect to the area contiguous to the Commonwealth, and the other with respect to that contiguous to the Trust Territory of New Guinea. The first proclamation declared: 12/ "...Australia has sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil of: (a) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of its coasts; and (b) the continental shelf contiguous to any part of the coasts of territories under its authority other than territories administered under the trusteeship system of the United Nations, -------------------- 10/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nichi-Co koaho uchikiri ni tsuite [On the break-off of the Japanese-Australian Fisheries Negotiations], Sept. 15, 1953, Shiryo No. 13, The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 11/ O'Connell, A.J.I.L., XLIX (1955), p. 188. 12/ Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No. 56, Sept. 11, 1953; A.J.I.L., XLVIII (1954), pp. 102-103.- 6 - for the purpose of exploding and exploiting the natural resources of that sea-bed and subsoil. . . ." On the same day, the Australian Parliament passed the bill which set forth controls for fishing and pearling in the waters thus claimed to be under Australian jurisdiction.13/ It should be noted that prior to this, the Pearl Fishing Act was enacted in 1952. This, however, was never put into force. There was no indication in the Act of 1952 that it would be enforced against foreign nationals.14/ No sooner had the Governor's prolamation of September 11, 1953, been issued, than the Act of 1952 was amended so as to make it correspond with the continental shelf doctrine.15/ The Act of 1952-53, as amended, was applicable not only to Australian fishing vessels, but also to those of foreign nations. It provided that pearl fishing vessels and divers must have licenses and must submit period returns of the 13/ Act no. 38 of 1953. This is called the Act of 1952-53. 14/ The same was also true in the case of the Western Australian Pearl Shell and Bache-de-[??r] Fisheries Act of 1899 which was repealed by Act of 1952. These acts were apparently conceived on traditional theories of occupation and use, and were not enforced against nonnationals outside the territorial waters. See Fankhurst. The Fisharies Act and the Pearl Fisheries Act. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), pp. 96-104. 15/ The amendment of the Act of 1952 was due to the International Commissions's reversal of view in 1953 in which the sedentary fisheries were brought under the shelf regime. The 1951 draft article which regarded two different regimes was therefore eliminated. For further discussion, see Richard Young. Sedentary Fisheries and the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., LX (1961), p. 370.- 6 - for the purpose of exploding and exploiting the natural resources of that sea-bed and subsoil. . . ." On the same day, the Australian Parliament passed the bill which set forth controls for fishing and pearling in the waters thus claimed to be under Australian jurisdiction.13/ It should be noted that prior to this, the Pearl Fishing Act was enacted in 1952. This, however, was never put into force. There was no indication in the Act of 1952 that it would be enforced against foreign nationals.14/ No sooner had the Governor's prolamation of September 11, 1953, been issued, than the Act of 1952 was amended so as to make it correspond with the continental shelf doctrine.15/ The Act of 1952-53, as amended, was applicable not only to Australian fishing vessels, but also to those of foreign nations. It provided that pearl fishing vessels and divers must have licenses and must submit period returns of the 13/ Act no. 38 of 1953. This is called the Act of 1952-53. 14/ The same was also true in the case of the Western Australian Pearl Shell and Bache-de-[??r] Fisheries Act of 1899 which was repealed by Act of 1952. These acts were apparently conceived on traditional theories of occupation and use, and were not enforced against nonnationals outside the territorial waters. See Fankhurst. The Fisharies Act and the Pearl Fisheries Act. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), pp. 96-104. 15/ The amendment of the Act of 1952 was due to the International Commissions's reversal of view in 1953 in which the sedentary fisheries were brought under the shelf regime. The 1951 draft article which regarded two different regimes was therefore eliminated. For further discussion, see Richard Young. Sedentary Fisheries and the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., LX (1961), p. 370.- 6 - for the purpose of exploding and exploiting the natural resources of that sea-bed and subsoil. . . ." On the same day, the Australian Parliament passed the bill which set forth controls for fishing and pearling in the waters thus claimed to be under Australian jurisdiction.13/ It should be noted that prior to this, the Pearl Fishing Act was enacted in 1952. This, however, was never put into force. There was no indication in the Act of 1952 that it would be enforced against foreign nationals.14/ No sooner had the Governor's prolamation of September 11, 1953, been issued, than the Act of 1952 was amended so as to make it correspond with the continental shelf doctrine.15/ The Act of 1952-53, as amended, was applicable not only to Australian fishing vessels, but also to those of foreign nations. It provided that pearl fishing vessels and divers must have licenses and must submit period returns of the 13/ Act no. 38 of 1953. This is called the Act of 1952-53. 14/ The same was also true in the case of the Western Australian Pearl Shell and Bache-de-[??r] Fisheries Act of 1899 which was repealed by Act of 1952. These acts were apparently conceived on traditional theories of occupation and use, and were not enforced against nonnationals outside the territorial waters. See Fankhurst. The Fisharies Act and the Pearl Fisheries Act. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), pp. 96-104. 15/ The amendment of the Act of 1952 was due to the International Commissions's reversal of view in 1953 in which the sedentary fisheries were brought under the shelf regime. The 1951 draft article which regarded two different regimes was therefore eliminated. For further discussion, see Richard Young. Sedentary Fisheries and the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., LX (1961), p. 370.- 6 - for the purpose of exploding and exploiting the natural resources of that sea-bed and subsoil. . . ." On the same day, the Australian Parliament passed the bill which set forth controls for fishing and pearling in the waters thus claimed to be under Australian jurisdiction.13/ It should be noted that prior to this, the Pearl Fishing Act was enacted in 1952. This, however, was never put into force. There was no indication in the Act of 1952 that it would be enforced against foreign nationals.14/ No sooner had the Governor's prolamation of September 11, 1953, been issued, than the Act of 1952 was amended so as to make it correspond with the continental shelf doctrine.15/ The Act of 1952-53, as amended, was applicable not only to Australian fishing vessels, but also to those of foreign nations. It provided that pearl fishing vessels and divers must have licenses and must submit period returns of the 13/ Act no. 38 of 1953. This is called the Act of 1952-53. 14/ The same was also true in the case of the Western Australian Pearl Shell and Bache-de-[??r] Fisheries Act of 1899 which was repealed by Act of 1952. These acts were apparently conceived on traditional theories of occupation and use, and were not enforced against nonnationals outside the territorial waters. See Fankhurst. The Fisharies Act and the Pearl Fisheries Act. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), pp. 96-104. 15/ The amendment of the Act of 1952 was due to the International Commissions's reversal of view in 1953 in which the sedentary fisheries were brought under the shelf regime. The 1951 draft article which regarded two different regimes was therefore eliminated. For further discussion, see Richard Young. Sedentary Fisheries and the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., LX (1961), p. 370.- 6 - for the purpose of exploding and exploiting the natural resources of that sea-bed and subsoil. . . ." On the same day, the Australian Parliament passed the bill which set forth controls for fishing and pearling in the waters thus claimed to be under Australian jurisdiction.13/ It should be noted that prior to this, the Pearl Fishing Act was enacted in 1952. This, however, was never put into force. There was no indication in the Act of 1952 that it would be enforced against foreign nationals.14/ No sooner had the Governor's prolamation of September 11, 1953, been issued, than the Act of 1952 was amended so as to make it correspond with the continental shelf doctrine.15/ The Act of 1952-53, as amended, was applicable not only to Australian fishing vessels, but also to those of foreign nations. It provided that pearl fishing vessels and divers must have licenses and must submit period returns of the 13/ Act no. 38 of 1953. This is called the Act of 1952-53. 14/ The same was also true in the case of the Western Australian Pearl Shell and Bache-de-[??r] Fisheries Act of 1899 which was repealed by Act of 1952. These acts were apparently conceived on traditional theories of occupation and use, and were not enforced against nonnationals outside the territorial waters. See Fankhurst. The Fisharies Act and the Pearl Fisheries Act. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), pp. 96-104. 15/ The amendment of the Act of 1952 was due to the International Commissions's reversal of view in 1953 in which the sedentary fisheries were brought under the shelf regime. The 1951 draft article which regarded two different regimes was therefore eliminated. For further discussion, see Richard Young. Sedentary Fisheries and the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., LX (1961), p. 370.- 7 - amount of shell taken. Violations of these regulations were subject to penalties. 16/ The Japanese Government protested to Australia against these regulations. It declared that the breakdown of the negotiations had come about when the Australian Government persisted in regarding the southern part of the Arafura Sea as Australian waters and would not concede to Japanese pearlers a fair share of the fishing ground there. Later Japan declared that it was ready to resume the negotiations on a fair treatment basis and that it would voluntarily respect conservation measures. /17 As a result of the punitive measure taken by the Australian Government, Japan proposed on October 8, 1953, that the issue be referred to the International Court of Justice. On October 30, 1953, the Australian Government agreed to the Japanese proposal, on the condition that a provisional agreement on fishing be reached between the two governments. /18 /16 Penalty: Five hundred pounds, and, if the Court so orders, the forfeiture of any ship or equipment used in the commission of the offenses or any pearl shell, trochus, beche-de-mer or green snail taken in contravention of this Act, or the proceeds of the sale of any such pearl shell, trochus, beche-de-mer or green snail. Article 14 of the Pearl Fisheries Act, No. 8 of 1952; Australia Commonwealth Acts, V.I, 1952, p. 33. 17/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 18/ The Japan Annual, 1958, p. 96. For further discussion, see below, page- 7 - amount of shell taken. Violations of these regulations were subject to penalties. 16/ The Japanese Government protested to Australia against these regulations. It declared that the breakdown of the negotiations had come about when the Australian Government persisted in regarding the southern part of the Arafura Sea as Australian waters and would not concede to Japanese pearlers a fair share of the fishing ground there. Later Japan declared that it was ready to resume the negotiations on a fair treatment basis and that it would voluntarily respect conservation measures. /17 As a result of the punitive measure taken by the Australian Government, Japan proposed on October 8, 1953, that the issue be referred to the International Court of Justice. On October 30, 1953, the Australian Government agreed to the Japanese proposal, on the condition that a provisional agreement on fishing be reached between the two governments. /18 /16 Penalty: Five hundred pounds, and, if the Court so orders, the forfeiture of any ship or equipment used in the commission of the offenses or any pearl shell, trochus, beche-de-mer or green snail taken in contravention of this Act, or the proceeds of the sale of any such pearl shell, trochus, beche-de-mer or green snail. Article 14 of the Pearl Fisheries Act, No. 8 of 1952; Australia Commonwealth Acts, V.I, 1952, p. 33. 17/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 18/ The Japan Annual, 1958, p. 96. For further discussion, see below, page- 7 - amount of shell taken. Violations of these regulations were subject to penalties. 16/ The Japanese Government protested to Australia against these regulations. It declared that the breakdown of the negotiations had come about when the Australian Government persisted in regarding the southern part of the Arafura Sea as Australian waters and would not concede to Japanese pearlers a fair share of the fishing ground there. Later Japan declared that it was ready to resume the negotiations on a fair treatment basis and that it would voluntarily respect conservation measures. /17 As a result of the punitive measure taken by the Australian Government, Japan proposed on October 8, 1953, that the issue be referred to the International Court of Justice. On October 30, 1953, the Australian Government agreed to the Japanese proposal, on the condition that a provisional agreement on fishing be reached between the two governments. /18 /16 Penalty: Five hundred pounds, and, if the Court so orders, the forfeiture of any ship or equipment used in the commission of the offenses or any pearl shell, trochus, beche-de-mer or green snail taken in contravention of this Act, or the proceeds of the sale of any such pearl shell, trochus, beche-de-mer or green snail. Article 14 of the Pearl Fisheries Act, No. 8 of 1952; Australia Commonwealth Acts, V.I, 1952, p. 33. 17/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 18/ The Japan Annual, 1958, p. 96. For further discussion, see below, page- 7 - amount of shell taken. Violations of these regulations were subject to penalties. 16/ The Japanese Government protested to Australia against these regulations. It declared that the breakdown of the negotiations had come about when the Australian Government persisted in regarding the southern part of the Arafura Sea as Australian waters and would not concede to Japanese pearlers a fair share of the fishing ground there. Later Japan declared that it was ready to resume the negotiations on a fair treatment basis and that it would voluntarily respect conservation measures. /17 As a result of the punitive measure taken by the Australian Government, Japan proposed on October 8, 1953, that the issue be referred to the International Court of Justice. On October 30, 1953, the Australian Government agreed to the Japanese proposal, on the condition that a provisional agreement on fishing be reached between the two governments. /18 /16 Penalty: Five hundred pounds, and, if the Court so orders, the forfeiture of any ship or equipment used in the commission of the offenses or any pearl shell, trochus, beche-de-mer or green snail taken in contravention of this Act, or the proceeds of the sale of any such pearl shell, trochus, beche-de-mer or green snail. Article 14 of the Pearl Fisheries Act, No. 8 of 1952; Australia Commonwealth Acts, V.I, 1952, p. 33. 17/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 18/ The Japan Annual, 1958, p. 96. For further discussion, see below, page- 7 - amount of shell taken. Violations of these regulations were subject to penalties. 16/ The Japanese Government protested to Australia against these regulations. It declared that the breakdown of the negotiations had come about when the Australian Government persisted in regarding the southern part of the Arafura Sea as Australian waters and would not concede to Japanese pearlers a fair share of the fishing ground there. Later Japan declared that it was ready to resume the negotiations on a fair treatment basis and that it would voluntarily respect conservation measures. /17 As a result of the punitive measure taken by the Australian Government, Japan proposed on October 8, 1953, that the issue be referred to the International Court of Justice. On October 30, 1953, the Australian Government agreed to the Japanese proposal, on the condition that a provisional agreement on fishing be reached between the two governments. /18 /16 Penalty: Five hundred pounds, and, if the Court so orders, the forfeiture of any ship or equipment used in the commission of the offenses or any pearl shell, trochus, beche-de-mer or green snail taken in contravention of this Act, or the proceeds of the sale of any such pearl shell, trochus, beche-de-mer or green snail. Article 14 of the Pearl Fisheries Act, No. 8 of 1952; Australia Commonwealth Acts, V.I, 1952, p. 33. 17/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 18/ The Japan Annual, 1958, p. 96. For further discussion, see below, page-8- On May 24, 1954, an Agreement on a Provisional Regime to Regulate Pearling by Japanese Nationals pending the Final Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Dispute Concerning the Application to Japanese Nationals of the Australian Pearl Fisheries Act 1952-53/ was signed at Canberra. 19/ In order to engage in pearl fishing in the defined area, Japanese nationals had to obtain licenses from both Governments. Articles 6 and 7 of the Act provides: Art. 6. Japanese nationals, pearling luggers and other vessels engaging in pearling in the defined area will comply with the provisions of the Australian legislation in addition to those of Japanese laws and regulations. Art. 7. The Government of Japan undertakes to carry out effective inspection, through its own fisheries inspection ship, in order to ensure observance of this provisional regime by Japanese nationals, pearling luggers and other vessels operating in the defined are. In carrying out inspections under the Australian legislation, the Government of Australia will take account of inspections which the Government of Japan undertakes through its own fisheries inspection ship. With respect to the number of Japanese luggers and the total Japanese catch of pearl shell, Article 4 provides: Art. 4. For the 1954 pearling season (a) the number of Japanese pearling luggers in the defined area will not exceed 25 (not including a meter ship, a carrier and a fisheries inspection ship); (b) the total Japanese catch of pearl shell in the defined area will not exceed the Japanese catch in that area in the 1953 season; (c) {Omitted}. 19/ U.N. Treaty Series, CXCI (1954), p.125. -8- On May 24, 1954, an Agreement on a Provisional Regime to Regulate Pearling by Japanese Nationals pending the Final Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Dispute Concerning the Application to Japanese Nationals of the Australian Pearl Fisheries Act 1952-53/ was signed at Canberra. 19/ In order to engage in pearl fishing in the defined area, Japanese nationals had to obtain licenses from both Governments. Articles 6 and 7 of the Act provides: Art. 6. Japanese nationals, pearling luggers and other vessels engaging in pearling in the defined area will comply with the provisions of the Australian legislation in addition to those of Japanese laws and regulations. Art. 7. The Government of Japan undertakes to carry out effective inspection, through its own fisheries inspection ship, in order to ensure observance of this provisional regime by Japanese nationals, pearling luggers and other vessels operating in the defined are. In carrying out inspections under the Australian legislation, the Government of Australia will take account of inspections which the Government of Japan undertakes through its own fisheries inspection ship. With respect to the number of Japanese luggers and the total Japanese catch of pearl shell, Article 4 provides: Art. 4. For the 1954 pearling season (a) the number of Japanese pearling luggers in the defined area will not exceed 25 (not including a meter ship, a carrier and a fisheries inspection ship); (b) the total Japanese catch of pearl shell in the defined area will not exceed the Japanese catch in that area in the 1953 season; (c) {Omitted}. 19/ U.N. Treaty Series, CXCI (1954), p.125. -8- On May 24, 1954, an Agreement on a Provisional Regime to Regulate Pearling by Japanese Nationals pending the Final Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Dispute Concerning the Application to Japanese Nationals of the Australian Pearl Fisheries Act 1952-53/ was signed at Canberra. 19/ In order to engage in pearl fishing in the defined area, Japanese nationals had to obtain licenses from both Governments. Articles 6 and 7 of the Act provides: Art. 6. Japanese nationals, pearling luggers and other vessels engaging in pearling in the defined area will comply with the provisions of the Australian legislation in addition to those of Japanese laws and regulations. Art. 7. The Government of Japan undertakes to carry out effective inspection, through its own fisheries inspection ship, in order to ensure observance of this provisional regime by Japanese nationals, pearling luggers and other vessels operating in the defined are. In carrying out inspections under the Australian legislation, the Government of Australia will take account of inspections which the Government of Japan undertakes through its own fisheries inspection ship. With respect to the number of Japanese luggers and the total Japanese catch of pearl shell, Article 4 provides: Art. 4. For the 1954 pearling season (a) the number of Japanese pearling luggers in the defined area will not exceed 25 (not including a meter ship, a carrier and a fisheries inspection ship); (b) the total Japanese catch of pearl shell in the defined area will not exceed the Japanese catch in that area in the 1953 season; (c) {Omitted}. 19/ U.N. Treaty Series, CXCI (1954), p.125. -8- On May 24, 1954, an Agreement on a Provisional Regime to Regulate Pearling by Japanese Nationals pending the Final Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Dispute Concerning the Application to Japanese Nationals of the Australian Pearl Fisheries Act 1952-53/ was signed at Canberra. 19/ In order to engage in pearl fishing in the defined area, Japanese nationals had to obtain licenses from both Governments. Articles 6 and 7 of the Act provides: Art. 6. Japanese nationals, pearling luggers and other vessels engaging in pearling in the defined area will comply with the provisions of the Australian legislation in addition to those of Japanese laws and regulations. Art. 7. The Government of Japan undertakes to carry out effective inspection, through its own fisheries inspection ship, in order to ensure observance of this provisional regime by Japanese nationals, pearling luggers and other vessels operating in the defined are. In carrying out inspections under the Australian legislation, the Government of Australia will take account of inspections which the Government of Japan undertakes through its own fisheries inspection ship. With respect to the number of Japanese luggers and the total Japanese catch of pearl shell, Article 4 provides: Art. 4. For the 1954 pearling season (a) the number of Japanese pearling luggers in the defined area will not exceed 25 (not including a meter ship, a carrier and a fisheries inspection ship); (b) the total Japanese catch of pearl shell in the defined area will not exceed the Japanese catch in that area in the 1953 season; (c) {Omitted}. 19/ U.N. Treaty Series, CXCI (1954), p.125. -8- On May 24, 1954, an Agreement on a Provisional Regime to Regulate Pearling by Japanese Nationals pending the Final Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Dispute Concerning the Application to Japanese Nationals of the Australian Pearl Fisheries Act 1952-53/ was signed at Canberra. 19/ In order to engage in pearl fishing in the defined area, Japanese nationals had to obtain licenses from both Governments. Articles 6 and 7 of the Act provides: Art. 6. Japanese nationals, pearling luggers and other vessels engaging in pearling in the defined area will comply with the provisions of the Australian legislation in addition to those of Japanese laws and regulations. Art. 7. The Government of Japan undertakes to carry out effective inspection, through its own fisheries inspection ship, in order to ensure observance of this provisional regime by Japanese nationals, pearling luggers and other vessels operating in the defined are. In carrying out inspections under the Australian legislation, the Government of Australia will take account of inspections which the Government of Japan undertakes through its own fisheries inspection ship. With respect to the number of Japanese luggers and the total Japanese catch of pearl shell, Article 4 provides: Art. 4. For the 1954 pearling season (a) the number of Japanese pearling luggers in the defined area will not exceed 25 (not including a meter ship, a carrier and a fisheries inspection ship); (b) the total Japanese catch of pearl shell in the defined area will not exceed the Japanese catch in that area in the 1953 season; (c) {Omitted}. 19/ U.N. Treaty Series, CXCI (1954), p.125. -9- As a conservation requirement, Article 5 provides: Art. 5. For subsequent reasons, while this provisional regime continues in force, the Australian Government will make arrangements for pearling by Japanese nationals on the basis of the arrangements set out in Article 4, with such variations as may be appropriate, having regard to conservation requirements and in the light of results of operations in the preceding season. Due to the rigid requirements regarding fishing areas and conditions, under the provisional agreement of the Australian Government, the total annual catch of pearl shell by Japanese vessels in these waters has subtantially declined. 20/ This provisional agreement is to be in force continuously until the final judgment is handed down by the International Court of Justice. No agreement on the appeal to the Court has thus far been reached. 21/ When the Prime Minister of Australia visited Japan in April 1957, and Japanese Premier Kishi went to Australia the next year, talks were resumed in an effort to work out a practical solution to avoid referring the prolonged dispute to the International Court of Justice. the talks, however, were again deadlocked and the 20/ In the case of the catch by Japanese ships, it was revealed that 942 tons were caught in 1953; 940 tons in1954; 740 tons in 1955; 651 tons in 1956; 701 tons in 1957; 475 tons in 1958 and 340 tons in 1959. The 25 Japanese luggers which were authorized in the beginning were reduced to 11 in 1959. In the case of the haul by Australian ships: 1,143 tons in 1953; 1,119 in 1954;1,304 in 1955; 1,626 in 1956; 1,573, in 1957; 1,183 in 1958; and 950 in 1959. See Okuhara, Reference, No. 112, p. 50. 21/ Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Waga gaikô no kinkyô { The Recent Development of our Diplomacy}, No. 1, 1957, p. 70.-9- As a conservation requirement, Article 5 provides: Art. 5. For subsequent reasons, while this provisional regime continues in force, the Australian Government will make arrangements for pearling by Japanese nationals on the basis of the arrangements set out in Article 4, with such variations as may be appropriate, having regard to conservation requirements and in the light of results of operations in the preceding season. Due to the rigid requirements regarding fishing areas and conditions, under the provisional agreement of the Australian Government, the total annual catch of pearl shell by Japanese vessels in these waters has subtantially declined. 20/ This provisional agreement is to be in force continuously until the final judgment is handed down by the International Court of Justice. No agreement on the appeal to the Court has thus far been reached. 21/ When the Prime Minister of Australia visited Japan in April 1957, and Japanese Premier Kishi went to Australia the next year, talks were resumed in an effort to work out a practical solution to avoid referring the prolonged dispute to the International Court of Justice. the talks, however, were again deadlocked and the 20/ In the case of the catch by Japanese ships, it was revealed that 942 tons were caught in 1953; 940 tons in1954; 740 tons in 1955; 651 tons in 1956; 701 tons in 1957; 475 tons in 1958 and 340 tons in 1959. The 25 Japanese luggers which were authorized in the beginning were reduced to 11 in 1959. In the case of the haul by Australian ships: 1,143 tons in 1953; 1,119 in 1954;1,304 in 1955; 1,626 in 1956; 1,573, in 1957; 1,183 in 1958; and 950 in 1959. See Okuhara, Reference, No. 112, p. 50. 21/ Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Waga gaikô no kinkyô { The Recent Development of our Diplomacy}, No. 1, 1957, p. 70.-9- As a conservation requirement, Article 5 provides: Art. 5. For subsequent reasons, while this provisional regime continues in force, the Australian Government will make arrangements for pearling by Japanese nationals on the basis of the arrangements set out in Article 4, with such variations as may be appropriate, having regard to conservation requirements and in the light of results of operations in the preceding season. Due to the rigid requirements regarding fishing areas and conditions, under the provisional agreement of the Australian Government, the total annual catch of pearl shell by Japanese vessels in these waters has subtantially declined. 20/ This provisional agreement is to be in force continuously until the final judgment is handed down by the International Court of Justice. No agreement on the appeal to the Court has thus far been reached. 21/ When the Prime Minister of Australia visited Japan in April 1957, and Japanese Premier Kishi went to Australia the next year, talks were resumed in an effort to work out a practical solution to avoid referring the prolonged dispute to the International Court of Justice. the talks, however, were again deadlocked and the 20/ In the case of the catch by Japanese ships, it was revealed that 942 tons were caught in 1953; 940 tons in1954; 740 tons in 1955; 651 tons in 1956; 701 tons in 1957; 475 tons in 1958 and 340 tons in 1959. The 25 Japanese luggers which were authorized in the beginning were reduced to 11 in 1959. In the case of the haul by Australian ships: 1,143 tons in 1953; 1,119 in 1954;1,304 in 1955; 1,626 in 1956; 1,573, in 1957; 1,183 in 1958; and 950 in 1959. See Okuhara, Reference, No. 112, p. 50. 21/ Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Waga gaikô no kinkyô { The Recent Development of our Diplomacy}, No. 1, 1957, p. 70.-9- As a conservation requirement, Article 5 provides: Art. 5. For subsequent reasons, while this provisional regime continues in force, the Australian Government will make arrangements for pearling by Japanese nationals on the basis of the arrangements set out in Article 4, with such variations as may be appropriate, having regard to conservation requirements and in the light of results of operations in the preceding season. Due to the rigid requirements regarding fishing areas and conditions, under the provisional agreement of the Australian Government, the total annual catch of pearl shell by Japanese vessels in these waters has subtantially declined. 20/ This provisional agreement is to be in force continuously until the final judgment is handed down by the International Court of Justice. No agreement on the appeal to the Court has thus far been reached. 21/ When the Prime Minister of Australia visited Japan in April 1957, and Japanese Premier Kishi went to Australia the next year, talks were resumed in an effort to work out a practical solution to avoid referring the prolonged dispute to the International Court of Justice. the talks, however, were again deadlocked and the 20/ In the case of the catch by Japanese ships, it was revealed that 942 tons were caught in 1953; 940 tons in1954; 740 tons in 1955; 651 tons in 1956; 701 tons in 1957; 475 tons in 1958 and 340 tons in 1959. The 25 Japanese luggers which were authorized in the beginning were reduced to 11 in 1959. In the case of the haul by Australian ships: 1,143 tons in 1953; 1,119 in 1954;1,304 in 1955; 1,626 in 1956; 1,573, in 1957; 1,183 in 1958; and 950 in 1959. See Okuhara, Reference, No. 112, p. 50. 21/ Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Waga gaikô no kinkyô { The Recent Development of our Diplomacy}, No. 1, 1957, p. 70.-9- As a conservation requirement, Article 5 provides: Art. 5. For subsequent reasons, while this provisional regime continues in force, the Australian Government will make arrangements for pearling by Japanese nationals on the basis of the arrangements set out in Article 4, with such variations as may be appropriate, having regard to conservation requirements and in the light of results of operations in the preceding season. Due to the rigid requirements regarding fishing areas and conditions, under the provisional agreement of the Australian Government, the total annual catch of pearl shell by Japanese vessels in these waters has subtantially declined. 20/ This provisional agreement is to be in force continuously until the final judgment is handed down by the International Court of Justice. No agreement on the appeal to the Court has thus far been reached. 21/ When the Prime Minister of Australia visited Japan in April 1957, and Japanese Premier Kishi went to Australia the next year, talks were resumed in an effort to work out a practical solution to avoid referring the prolonged dispute to the International Court of Justice. the talks, however, were again deadlocked and the 20/ In the case of the catch by Japanese ships, it was revealed that 942 tons were caught in 1953; 940 tons in1954; 740 tons in 1955; 651 tons in 1956; 701 tons in 1957; 475 tons in 1958 and 340 tons in 1959. The 25 Japanese luggers which were authorized in the beginning were reduced to 11 in 1959. In the case of the haul by Australian ships: 1,143 tons in 1953; 1,119 in 1954;1,304 in 1955; 1,626 in 1956; 1,573, in 1957; 1,183 in 1958; and 950 in 1959. See Okuhara, Reference, No. 112, p. 50. 21/ Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Waga gaikô no kinkyô { The Recent Development of our Diplomacy}, No. 1, 1957, p. 70.-10- claims of both parties were in conflict: one basing its claims on the traditional freedom to fish on the high seas, and the other advocating preservation of its coastal fishing rights. However, both parties agreed to conduct scientific research on the resources of the fisheries. 22/ This first meeting of the Expert Conference was held in Canberra in 1958. In 1961, it was decided that the formula adopted in 1960 would apply for three consecutive years without renewing it every year in spite of the provision of Article 5 of the provisional agreement. 23/ 22/ Ibid., No. 2, 1958, p. 79. 23/ Suisan nenkan { The Yearbook of Fishing Industry}. Tokyo, Suisansha, 1962. p. 793.-10- claims of both parties were in conflict: one basing its claims on the traditional freedom to fish on the high seas, and the other advocating preservation of its coastal fishing rights. However, both parties agreed to conduct scientific research on the resources of the fisheries. 22/ This first meeting of the Expert Conference was held in Canberra in 1958. In 1961, it was decided that the formula adopted in 1960 would apply for three consecutive years without renewing it every year in spite of the provision of Article 5 of the provisional agreement. 23/ 22/ Ibid., No. 2, 1958, p. 79. 23/ Suisan nenkan { The Yearbook of Fishing Industry}. Tokyo, Suisansha, 1962. p. 793.-10- claims of both parties were in conflict: one basing its claims on the traditional freedom to fish on the high seas, and the other advocating preservation of its coastal fishing rights. However, both parties agreed to conduct scientific research on the resources of the fisheries. 22/ This first meeting of the Expert Conference was held in Canberra in 1958. In 1961, it was decided that the formula adopted in 1960 would apply for three consecutive years without renewing it every year in spite of the provision of Article 5 of the provisional agreement. 23/ 22/ Ibid., No. 2, 1958, p. 79. 23/ Suisan nenkan { The Yearbook of Fishing Industry}. Tokyo, Suisansha, 1962. p. 793.-10- claims of both parties were in conflict: one basing its claims on the traditional freedom to fish on the high seas, and the other advocating preservation of its coastal fishing rights. However, both parties agreed to conduct scientific research on the resources of the fisheries. 22/ This first meeting of the Expert Conference was held in Canberra in 1958. In 1961, it was decided that the formula adopted in 1960 would apply for three consecutive years without renewing it every year in spite of the provision of Article 5 of the provisional agreement. 23/ 22/ Ibid., No. 2, 1958, p. 79. 23/ Suisan nenkan { The Yearbook of Fishing Industry}. Tokyo, Suisansha, 1962. p. 793.-10- claims of both parties were in conflict: one basing its claims on the traditional freedom to fish on the high seas, and the other advocating preservation of its coastal fishing rights. However, both parties agreed to conduct scientific research on the resources of the fisheries. 22/ This first meeting of the Expert Conference was held in Canberra in 1958. In 1961, it was decided that the formula adopted in 1960 would apply for three consecutive years without renewing it every year in spite of the provision of Article 5 of the provisional agreement. 23/ 22/ Ibid., No. 2, 1958, p. 79. 23/ Suisan nenkan { The Yearbook of Fishing Industry}. Tokyo, Suisansha, 1962. p. 793.-11- The Japanese Government Position According to the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 15, 1953, Japan proposed a three-point program when the negotiations with Australia began on April 13, 1953: (a) that an international committee composed of representatives of all signatory nations to the Japanese Peace Treaty be formed; (b) that the above committee, on the basis of scientific research, devise appropriate control measures; and (c) that such an arrangement be made that would guarantee continuous protection of pearl shell resources during the time the control measures were being devised that would be compatible with arrangement by the countries concerned. 24/ On July 2, 1953, Japan made a slight concession to the above, proposing that: (a) the survey and study of resources in all waters to come under the proposed agreement be undertaken under the joint responsibility of all the signatory countries to the Japanese Peace Treaty; (b) Japanese fishing craft operation be restricted for the first three years to the waters west and east of Darwin (this was not to include two highly productive fishing grounds: Thursday Island and the Sea of Broome) and (c) within these areas allocated to Japanese operations no objection would be raised against the operation of Australian craft. 25/ 24/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 25/ Ibid.-11- The Japanese Government Position According to the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 15, 1953, Japan proposed a three-point program when the negotiations with Australia began on April 13, 1953: (a) that an international committee composed of representatives of all signatory nations to the Japanese Peace Treaty be formed; (b) that the above committee, on the basis of scientific research, devise appropriate control measures; and (c) that such an arrangement be made that would guarantee continuous protection of pearl shell resources during the time the control measures were being devised that would be compatible with arrangement by the countries concerned. 24/ On July 2, 1953, Japan made a slight concession to the above, proposing that: (a) the survey and study of resources in all waters to come under the proposed agreement be undertaken under the joint responsibility of all the signatory countries to the Japanese Peace Treaty; (b) Japanese fishing craft operation be restricted for the first three years to the waters west and east of Darwin (this was not to include two highly productive fishing grounds: Thursday Island and the Sea of Broome) and (c) within these areas allocated to Japanese operations no objection would be raised against the operation of Australian craft. 25/ 24/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 25/ Ibid.-11- The Japanese Government Position According to the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 15, 1953, Japan proposed a three-point program when the negotiations with Australia began on April 13, 1953: (a) that an international committee composed of representatives of all signatory nations to the Japanese Peace Treaty be formed; (b) that the above committee, on the basis of scientific research, devise appropriate control measures; and (c) that such an arrangement be made that would guarantee continuous protection of pearl shell resources during the time the control measures were being devised that would be compatible with arrangement by the countries concerned. 24/ On July 2, 1953, Japan made a slight concession to the above, proposing that: (a) the survey and study of resources in all waters to come under the proposed agreement be undertaken under the joint responsibility of all the signatory countries to the Japanese Peace Treaty; (b) Japanese fishing craft operation be restricted for the first three years to the waters west and east of Darwin (this was not to include two highly productive fishing grounds: Thursday Island and the Sea of Broome) and (c) within these areas allocated to Japanese operations no objection would be raised against the operation of Australian craft. 25/ 24/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 25/ Ibid.-11- The Japanese Government Position According to the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 15, 1953, Japan proposed a three-point program when the negotiations with Australia began on April 13, 1953: (a) that an international committee composed of representatives of all signatory nations to the Japanese Peace Treaty be formed; (b) that the above committee, on the basis of scientific research, devise appropriate control measures; and (c) that such an arrangement be made that would guarantee continuous protection of pearl shell resources during the time the control measures were being devised that would be compatible with arrangement by the countries concerned. 24/ On July 2, 1953, Japan made a slight concession to the above, proposing that: (a) the survey and study of resources in all waters to come under the proposed agreement be undertaken under the joint responsibility of all the signatory countries to the Japanese Peace Treaty; (b) Japanese fishing craft operation be restricted for the first three years to the waters west and east of Darwin (this was not to include two highly productive fishing grounds: Thursday Island and the Sea of Broome) and (c) within these areas allocated to Japanese operations no objection would be raised against the operation of Australian craft. 25/ 24/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 25/ Ibid.-11- The Japanese Government Position According to the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 15, 1953, Japan proposed a three-point program when the negotiations with Australia began on April 13, 1953: (a) that an international committee composed of representatives of all signatory nations to the Japanese Peace Treaty be formed; (b) that the above committee, on the basis of scientific research, devise appropriate control measures; and (c) that such an arrangement be made that would guarantee continuous protection of pearl shell resources during the time the control measures were being devised that would be compatible with arrangement by the countries concerned. 24/ On July 2, 1953, Japan made a slight concession to the above, proposing that: (a) the survey and study of resources in all waters to come under the proposed agreement be undertaken under the joint responsibility of all the signatory countries to the Japanese Peace Treaty; (b) Japanese fishing craft operation be restricted for the first three years to the waters west and east of Darwin (this was not to include two highly productive fishing grounds: Thursday Island and the Sea of Broome) and (c) within these areas allocated to Japanese operations no objection would be raised against the operation of Australian craft. 25/ 24/ Statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Reference, No. 33, p. 18. 25/ Ibid.-12- The above Japanese proposal, the statement said, conceded a very favorable position to Australia, by enabling Australian fishers to operate virtually in all areas, while confining Japanese fishing craft to a limited area. However, the Australian Government insisted on a predominant position for Australian fishing craft even in waters designated to Japan. The same statement pointed out that Australia seemed to treat the South Arafura Sea as her territorial sea as far as pearl shell operations were concerned; and that this attitude, on the part of Australia, ignored completely the contribution which Japanese divers had made in developing pearl shell resources in the same area. Referring to the question of the resumption of the Japanese operations while negotiations between the two governments were in progress, the above statement declared that "according to the Japanese Government's view, Japan can decide freely the question of fisheries on the high seas in the absence of international agreement." 26/ Furthermore, it argued, Japanese pearlers who resumed the pre-war activities had been instructed not to engage in fishing within 10 miles of the costal waters of Australia, as this might disturb the operations of Australian fleets around the Darwin area. 27/ The statement concluded that even though 26/ Ibid., pp. 18-19. 27/ Ibid., p. 19.-12- The above Japanese proposal, the statement said, conceded a very favorable position to Australia, by enabling Australian fishers to operate virtually in all areas, while confining Japanese fishing craft to a limited area. However, the Australian Government insisted on a predominant position for Australian fishing craft even in waters designated to Japan. The same statement pointed out that Australia seemed to treat the South Arafura Sea as her territorial sea as far as pearl shell operations were concerned; and that this attitude, on the part of Australia, ignored completely the contribution which Japanese divers had made in developing pearl shell resources in the same area. Referring to the question of the resumption of the Japanese operations while negotiations between the two governments were in progress, the above statement declared that "according to the Japanese Government's view, Japan can decide freely the question of fisheries on the high seas in the absence of international agreement." 26/ Furthermore, it argued, Japanese pearlers who resumed the pre-war activities had been instructed not to engage in fishing within 10 miles of the costal waters of Australia, as this might disturb the operations of Australian fleets around the Darwin area. 27/ The statement concluded that even though 26/ Ibid., pp. 18-19. 27/ Ibid., p. 19.-12- The above Japanese proposal, the statement said, conceded a very favorable position to Australia, by enabling Australian fishers to operate virtually in all areas, while confining Japanese fishing craft to a limited area. However, the Australian Government insisted on a predominant position for Australian fishing craft even in waters designated to Japan. The same statement pointed out that Australia seemed to treat the South Arafura Sea as her territorial sea as far as pearl shell operations were concerned; and that this attitude, on the part of Australia, ignored completely the contribution which Japanese divers had made in developing pearl shell resources in the same area. Referring to the question of the resumption of the Japanese operations while negotiations between the two governments were in progress, the above statement declared that "according to the Japanese Government's view, Japan can decide freely the question of fisheries on the high seas in the absence of international agreement." 26/ Furthermore, it argued, Japanese pearlers who resumed the pre-war activities had been instructed not to engage in fishing within 10 miles of the costal waters of Australia, as this might disturb the operations of Australian fleets around the Darwin area. 27/ The statement concluded that even though 26/ Ibid., pp. 18-19. 27/ Ibid., p. 19.-12- The above Japanese proposal, the statement said, conceded a very favorable position to Australia, by enabling Australian fishers to operate virtually in all areas, while confining Japanese fishing craft to a limited area. However, the Australian Government insisted on a predominant position for Australian fishing craft even in waters designated to Japan. The same statement pointed out that Australia seemed to treat the South Arafura Sea as her territorial sea as far as pearl shell operations were concerned; and that this attitude, on the part of Australia, ignored completely the contribution which Japanese divers had made in developing pearl shell resources in the same area. Referring to the question of the resumption of the Japanese operations while negotiations between the two governments were in progress, the above statement declared that "according to the Japanese Government's view, Japan can decide freely the question of fisheries on the high seas in the absence of international agreement." 26/ Furthermore, it argued, Japanese pearlers who resumed the pre-war activities had been instructed not to engage in fishing within 10 miles of the costal waters of Australia, as this might disturb the operations of Australian fleets around the Darwin area. 27/ The statement concluded that even though 26/ Ibid., pp. 18-19. 27/ Ibid., p. 19.-12- The above Japanese proposal, the statement said, conceded a very favorable position to Australia, by enabling Australian fishers to operate virtually in all areas, while confining Japanese fishing craft to a limited area. However, the Australian Government insisted on a predominant position for Australian fishing craft even in waters designated to Japan. The same statement pointed out that Australia seemed to treat the South Arafura Sea as her territorial sea as far as pearl shell operations were concerned; and that this attitude, on the part of Australia, ignored completely the contribution which Japanese divers had made in developing pearl shell resources in the same area. Referring to the question of the resumption of the Japanese operations while negotiations between the two governments were in progress, the above statement declared that "according to the Japanese Government's view, Japan can decide freely the question of fisheries on the high seas in the absence of international agreement." 26/ Furthermore, it argued, Japanese pearlers who resumed the pre-war activities had been instructed not to engage in fishing within 10 miles of the costal waters of Australia, as this might disturb the operations of Australian fleets around the Darwin area. 27/ The statement concluded that even though 26/ Ibid., pp. 18-19. 27/ Ibid., p. 19.-13- unilateral action by the Australian Government had resulted in breaking off the four-month-long negotiations, Japan, because she was deeply interested in conservation of pearl shell in the Arafura Sea, would be willing to resume negotiations on an equal footing whenever Australia might so request. At the same time, it declared that in the absence of an agreement, the Japanese government would propose three appropriate measures: (1) Japanese fishing boats would abide by regulations for conservation of resources such as restrictions on size, tonnage and number of ships; (2) no operations would be conducted by Japanese ships within the 10 mile limit of Australian coasts; and (3) the best possible measurements would be taken in order to avoid conflict between Japanese and Australian pearlers. 28/ Japan took a very active part in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea of Geneva in 1958. Among the items discussed at the at the Conference was the nature of the rights to be enjoyed by the coastal States upon the continental shelf. The discussion centered around whether these rights are sovereign or exclusive. Whether called sovereign or exclusive, however, the rights of the coastal State to exploit the continental shelf was no longer contested. The Japanese delegate, believing it practically useless to oppose the basic doctrine, endeavored to confine the right of 28/ Ibid.-13- unilateral action by the Australian Government had resulted in breaking off the four-month-long negotiations, Japan, because she was deeply interested in conservation of pearl shell in the Arafura Sea, would be willing to resume negotiations on an equal footing whenever Australia might so request. At the same time, it declared that in the absence of an agreement, the Japanese government would propose three appropriate measures: (1) Japanese fishing boats would abide by regulations for conservation of resources such as restrictions on size, tonnage and number of ships; (2) no operations would be conducted by Japanese ships within the 10 mile limit of Australian coasts; and (3) the best possible measurements would be taken in order to avoid conflict between Japanese and Australian pearlers. 28/ Japan took a very active part in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea of Geneva in 1958. Among the items discussed at the at the Conference was the nature of the rights to be enjoyed by the coastal States upon the continental shelf. The discussion centered around whether these rights are sovereign or exclusive. Whether called sovereign or exclusive, however, the rights of the coastal State to exploit the continental shelf was no longer contested. The Japanese delegate, believing it practically useless to oppose the basic doctrine, endeavored to confine the right of 28/ Ibid.-13- unilateral action by the Australian Government had resulted in breaking off the four-month-long negotiations, Japan, because she was deeply interested in conservation of pearl shell in the Arafura Sea, would be willing to resume negotiations on an equal footing whenever Australia might so request. At the same time, it declared that in the absence of an agreement, the Japanese government would propose three appropriate measures: (1) Japanese fishing boats would abide by regulations for conservation of resources such as restrictions on size, tonnage and number of ships; (2) no operations would be conducted by Japanese ships within the 10 mile limit of Australian coasts; and (3) the best possible measurements would be taken in order to avoid conflict between Japanese and Australian pearlers. 28/ Japan took a very active part in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea of Geneva in 1958. Among the items discussed at the at the Conference was the nature of the rights to be enjoyed by the coastal States upon the continental shelf. The discussion centered around whether these rights are sovereign or exclusive. Whether called sovereign or exclusive, however, the rights of the coastal State to exploit the continental shelf was no longer contested. The Japanese delegate, believing it practically useless to oppose the basic doctrine, endeavored to confine the right of 28/ Ibid.-13- unilateral action by the Australian Government had resulted in breaking off the four-month-long negotiations, Japan, because she was deeply interested in conservation of pearl shell in the Arafura Sea, would be willing to resume negotiations on an equal footing whenever Australia might so request. At the same time, it declared that in the absence of an agreement, the Japanese government would propose three appropriate measures: (1) Japanese fishing boats would abide by regulations for conservation of resources such as restrictions on size, tonnage and number of ships; (2) no operations would be conducted by Japanese ships within the 10 mile limit of Australian coasts; and (3) the best possible measurements would be taken in order to avoid conflict between Japanese and Australian pearlers. 28/ Japan took a very active part in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea of Geneva in 1958. Among the items discussed at the at the Conference was the nature of the rights to be enjoyed by the coastal States upon the continental shelf. The discussion centered around whether these rights are sovereign or exclusive. Whether called sovereign or exclusive, however, the rights of the coastal State to exploit the continental shelf was no longer contested. The Japanese delegate, believing it practically useless to oppose the basic doctrine, endeavored to confine the right of 28/ Ibid.-13- unilateral action by the Australian Government had resulted in breaking off the four-month-long negotiations, Japan, because she was deeply interested in conservation of pearl shell in the Arafura Sea, would be willing to resume negotiations on an equal footing whenever Australia might so request. At the same time, it declared that in the absence of an agreement, the Japanese government would propose three appropriate measures: (1) Japanese fishing boats would abide by regulations for conservation of resources such as restrictions on size, tonnage and number of ships; (2) no operations would be conducted by Japanese ships within the 10 mile limit of Australian coasts; and (3) the best possible measurements would be taken in order to avoid conflict between Japanese and Australian pearlers. 28/ Japan took a very active part in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea of Geneva in 1958. Among the items discussed at the at the Conference was the nature of the rights to be enjoyed by the coastal States upon the continental shelf. The discussion centered around whether these rights are sovereign or exclusive. Whether called sovereign or exclusive, however, the rights of the coastal State to exploit the continental shelf was no longer contested. The Japanese delegate, believing it practically useless to oppose the basic doctrine, endeavored to confine the right of 28/ Ibid.-14- monopoly of the coastal States to mineral resources. In a general debate, Mr. Tsuruoka stated on March 26, 1958: 29/ It (The International Law Commission) had first limited the definition to mineral resource, had then included sedentary fisheries and had finally introduced the concept of constant physical and biological contact with the seabed. It was, therefore, obvious that the Commission had had considerable doubts with regard to the definition. The Japanese delegation, however, was convinced that if the exclusive rights of the coastal State were recognized, the definition should be confined in mineral resources only. With respect to the sedentary fisheries, he pointed out: 30/ Sedentary fisheries, however, had since the time immemorial been subject to their own regime and the technical advances that had been made given rise to no serious practical difficulties in that regard. It would, therefore, be unwise to submit both types of resources to the same regime. Furthermore, the International Law Commission's growing tendency to make the definition of sedentary fisheries more flexible might 29/ A/CONF. 13/42, pp. 55-56. 30/ Ibid., p. 56.-14- monopoly of the coastal States to mineral resources. In a general debate, Mr. Tsuruoka stated on March 26, 1958: 29/ It (The International Law Commission) had first limited the definition to mineral resource, had then included sedentary fisheries and had finally introduced the concept of constant physical and biological contact with the seabed. It was, therefore, obvious that the Commission had had considerable doubts with regard to the definition. The Japanese delegation, however, was convinced that if the exclusive rights of the coastal State were recognized, the definition should be confined in mineral resources only. With respect to the sedentary fisheries, he pointed out: 30/ Sedentary fisheries, however, had since the time immemorial been subject to their own regime and the technical advances that had been made given rise to no serious practical difficulties in that regard. It would, therefore, be unwise to submit both types of resources to the same regime. Furthermore, the International Law Commission's growing tendency to make the definition of sedentary fisheries more flexible might 29/ A/CONF. 13/42, pp. 55-56. 30/ Ibid., p. 56.-14- monopoly of the coastal States to mineral resources. In a general debate, Mr. Tsuruoka stated on March 26, 1958: 29/ It (The International Law Commission) had first limited the definition to mineral resource, had then included sedentary fisheries and had finally introduced the concept of constant physical and biological contact with the seabed. It was, therefore, obvious that the Commission had had considerable doubts with regard to the definition. The Japanese delegation, however, was convinced that if the exclusive rights of the coastal State were recognized, the definition should be confined in mineral resources only. With respect to the sedentary fisheries, he pointed out: 30/ Sedentary fisheries, however, had since the time immemorial been subject to their own regime and the technical advances that had been made given rise to no serious practical difficulties in that regard. It would, therefore, be unwise to submit both types of resources to the same regime. Furthermore, the International Law Commission's growing tendency to make the definition of sedentary fisheries more flexible might 29/ A/CONF. 13/42, pp. 55-56. 30/ Ibid., p. 56.-14- monopoly of the coastal States to mineral resources. In a general debate, Mr. Tsuruoka stated on March 26, 1958: 29/ It (The International Law Commission) had first limited the definition to mineral resource, had then included sedentary fisheries and had finally introduced the concept of constant physical and biological contact with the seabed. It was, therefore, obvious that the Commission had had considerable doubts with regard to the definition. The Japanese delegation, however, was convinced that if the exclusive rights of the coastal State were recognized, the definition should be confined in mineral resources only. With respect to the sedentary fisheries, he pointed out: 30/ Sedentary fisheries, however, had since the time immemorial been subject to their own regime and the technical advances that had been made given rise to no serious practical difficulties in that regard. It would, therefore, be unwise to submit both types of resources to the same regime. Furthermore, the International Law Commission's growing tendency to make the definition of sedentary fisheries more flexible might 29/ A/CONF. 13/42, pp. 55-56. 30/ Ibid., p. 56.-14- monopoly of the coastal States to mineral resources. In a general debate, Mr. Tsuruoka stated on March 26, 1958: 29/ It (The International Law Commission) had first limited the definition to mineral resource, had then included sedentary fisheries and had finally introduced the concept of constant physical and biological contact with the seabed. It was, therefore, obvious that the Commission had had considerable doubts with regard to the definition. The Japanese delegation, however, was convinced that if the exclusive rights of the coastal State were recognized, the definition should be confined in mineral resources only. With respect to the sedentary fisheries, he pointed out: 30/ Sedentary fisheries, however, had since the time immemorial been subject to their own regime and the technical advances that had been made given rise to no serious practical difficulties in that regard. It would, therefore, be unwise to submit both types of resources to the same regime. Furthermore, the International Law Commission's growing tendency to make the definition of sedentary fisheries more flexible might 29/ A/CONF. 13/42, pp. 55-56. 30/ Ibid., p. 56.-15- eventually lead to the restriction of all freedom of fishing. The precise definition of sedentary fisheries was an extremely controversial matter. But it was generally argued that absolute or relative, there seemed to be no reason to subject different types of fisheries to different principles, for it could not be denied that all fish lived in the water. Mr. Tsuruoka then stressed that "it was always possible to draw the distinction between the living resources of the sea by conventions, in which case it would be binding only on the parties thereto." 31/ 31/ Ibid.-15- eventually lead to the restriction of all freedom of fishing. The precise definition of sedentary fisheries was an extremely controversial matter. But it was generally argued that absolute or relative, there seemed to be no reason to subject different types of fisheries to different principles, for it could not be denied that all fish lived in the water. Mr. Tsuruoka then stressed that "it was always possible to draw the distinction between the living resources of the sea by conventions, in which case it would be binding only on the parties thereto." 31/ 31/ Ibid.-15- eventually lead to the restriction of all freedom of fishing. The precise definition of sedentary fisheries was an extremely controversial matter. But it was generally argued that absolute or relative, there seemed to be no reason to subject different types of fisheries to different principles, for it could not be denied that all fish lived in the water. Mr. Tsuruoka then stressed that "it was always possible to draw the distinction between the living resources of the sea by conventions, in which case it would be binding only on the parties thereto." 31/ 31/ Ibid.-15- eventually lead to the restriction of all freedom of fishing. The precise definition of sedentary fisheries was an extremely controversial matter. But it was generally argued that absolute or relative, there seemed to be no reason to subject different types of fisheries to different principles, for it could not be denied that all fish lived in the water. Mr. Tsuruoka then stressed that "it was always possible to draw the distinction between the living resources of the sea by conventions, in which case it would be binding only on the parties thereto." 31/ 31/ Ibid.-15- eventually lead to the restriction of all freedom of fishing. The precise definition of sedentary fisheries was an extremely controversial matter. But it was generally argued that absolute or relative, there seemed to be no reason to subject different types of fisheries to different principles, for it could not be denied that all fish lived in the water. Mr. Tsuruoka then stressed that "it was always possible to draw the distinction between the living resources of the sea by conventions, in which case it would be binding only on the parties thereto." 31/ 31/ Ibid.-16- Press Comments When the Australian Government's declaration on the continental shelf and the subsequent legislation regarding pearl fisheries became known, strong opposition was voiced against them in numerous Japanese newspapers. For example, Nippon Time, an English language paper, reported on September 17, 1953, as follows: Australia's move to establish its sovereignty over the continental shelf seemed to have originally aimed at establishing its exclusive and monopolistic rights concerning pearl fishing in the Arafura Sea area. It urged that the Australian Government should not shut Japan out of the fishing lots, but seek an agreement with Japan, through negotiations, for the common use of the high seas. Nihon keizai shimbun, a leading economic paper, said on September 18, 1953, that "it cannot object to the latest Australian move which negates the principle of freedom of the high seas under the pretense of protecting marine resources," and that "the Australian Government was going to restrict Japanese fishing operations merely for the purpose of preserving the maximum productivity of pearl shells." Tokyo Shimbun of September 19, 1953, considered the Australian move as outrageous as was the unilateral declaration of the Red Line (of South Korea). The paper went on to state that Japan would oppose both the Rhee Line and the Proposed Australian-16- Press Comments When the Australian Government's declaration on the continental shelf and the subsequent legislation regarding pearl fisheries became known, strong opposition was voiced against them in numerous Japanese newspapers. For example, Nippon Time, an English language paper, reported on September 17, 1953, as follows: Australia's move to establish its sovereignty over the continental shelf seemed to have originally aimed at establishing its exclusive and monopolistic rights concerning pearl fishing in the Arafura Sea area. It urged that the Australian Government should not shut Japan out of the fishing lots, but seek an agreement with Japan, through negotiations, for the common use of the high seas. Nihon keizai shimbun, a leading economic paper, said on September 18, 1953, that "it cannot object to the latest Australian move which negates the principle of freedom of the high seas under the pretense of protecting marine resources," and that "the Australian Government was going to restrict Japanese fishing operations merely for the purpose of preserving the maximum productivity of pearl shells." Tokyo Shimbun of September 19, 1953, considered the Australian move as outrageous as was the unilateral declaration of the Red Line (of South Korea). The paper went on to state that Japan would oppose both the Rhee Line and the Proposed Australian-16- Press Comments When the Australian Government's declaration on the continental shelf and the subsequent legislation regarding pearl fisheries became known, strong opposition was voiced against them in numerous Japanese newspapers. For example, Nippon Time, an English language paper, reported on September 17, 1953, as follows: Australia's move to establish its sovereignty over the continental shelf seemed to have originally aimed at establishing its exclusive and monopolistic rights concerning pearl fishing in the Arafura Sea area. It urged that the Australian Government should not shut Japan out of the fishing lots, but seek an agreement with Japan, through negotiations, for the common use of the high seas. Nihon keizai shimbun, a leading economic paper, said on September 18, 1953, that "it cannot object to the latest Australian move which negates the principle of freedom of the high seas under the pretense of protecting marine resources," and that "the Australian Government was going to restrict Japanese fishing operations merely for the purpose of preserving the maximum productivity of pearl shells." Tokyo Shimbun of September 19, 1953, considered the Australian move as outrageous as was the unilateral declaration of the Red Line (of South Korea). The paper went on to state that Japan would oppose both the Rhee Line and the Proposed Australian-16- Press Comments When the Australian Government's declaration on the continental shelf and the subsequent legislation regarding pearl fisheries became known, strong opposition was voiced against them in numerous Japanese newspapers. For example, Nippon Time, an English language paper, reported on September 17, 1953, as follows: Australia's move to establish its sovereignty over the continental shelf seemed to have originally aimed at establishing its exclusive and monopolistic rights concerning pearl fishing in the Arafura Sea area. It urged that the Australian Government should not shut Japan out of the fishing lots, but seek an agreement with Japan, through negotiations, for the common use of the high seas. Nihon keizai shimbun, a leading economic paper, said on September 18, 1953, that "it cannot object to the latest Australian move which negates the principle of freedom of the high seas under the pretense of protecting marine resources," and that "the Australian Government was going to restrict Japanese fishing operations merely for the purpose of preserving the maximum productivity of pearl shells." Tokyo Shimbun of September 19, 1953, considered the Australian move as outrageous as was the unilateral declaration of the Red Line (of South Korea). The paper went on to state that Japan would oppose both the Rhee Line and the Proposed Australian-16- Press Comments When the Australian Government's declaration on the continental shelf and the subsequent legislation regarding pearl fisheries became known, strong opposition was voiced against them in numerous Japanese newspapers. For example, Nippon Time, an English language paper, reported on September 17, 1953, as follows: Australia's move to establish its sovereignty over the continental shelf seemed to have originally aimed at establishing its exclusive and monopolistic rights concerning pearl fishing in the Arafura Sea area. It urged that the Australian Government should not shut Japan out of the fishing lots, but seek an agreement with Japan, through negotiations, for the common use of the high seas. Nihon keizai shimbun, a leading economic paper, said on September 18, 1953, that "it cannot object to the latest Australian move which negates the principle of freedom of the high seas under the pretense of protecting marine resources," and that "the Australian Government was going to restrict Japanese fishing operations merely for the purpose of preserving the maximum productivity of pearl shells." Tokyo Shimbun of September 19, 1953, considered the Australian move as outrageous as was the unilateral declaration of the Red Line (of South Korea). The paper went on to state that Japan would oppose both the Rhee Line and the Proposed Australian-17- action, not so much because she would suffer from these measures as because she feared they might open the way for a division of high seas among the great powers. An interesting article in the Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 1953, said there were strong political motives behind the Australian pearl fisheries legislation in addition to the alleged desire for conservation of the pearl fisheries resources. According to the paper, the Australian Labor Party had put pressure on the Australian Government for overall restrictions on the operations of foreign pearlers. In view of the fact that only Japanese nationals were engaged in pearling operations, the paper declared that the Australian Government feared that the Labor Party would take full advantage of this political situation if lenient restrictive measures were taken against the Japanese. The paper went on to state that the Labor Party blamed the Government because express provisions prohibiting Japanese fishing boats from fishing on the waters adjacent to Australian coasts had not been incorporated in the Treaty of Peace with Japan.-17- action, not so much because she would suffer from these measures as because she feared they might open the way for a division of high seas among the great powers. An interesting article in the Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 1953, said there were strong political motives behind the Australian pearl fisheries legislation in addition to the alleged desire for conservation of the pearl fisheries resources. According to the paper, the Australian Labor Party had put pressure on the Australian Government for overall restrictions on the operations of foreign pearlers. In view of the fact that only Japanese nationals were engaged in pearling operations, the paper declared that the Australian Government feared that the Labor Party would take full advantage of this political situation if lenient restrictive measures were taken against the Japanese. The paper went on to state that the Labor Party blamed the Government because express provisions prohibiting Japanese fishing boats from fishing on the waters adjacent to Australian coasts had not been incorporated in the Treaty of Peace with Japan.-17- action, not so much because she would suffer from these measures as because she feared they might open the way for a division of high seas among the great powers. An interesting article in the Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 1953, said there were strong political motives behind the Australian pearl fisheries legislation in addition to the alleged desire for conservation of the pearl fisheries resources. According to the paper, the Australian Labor Party had put pressure on the Australian Government for overall restrictions on the operations of foreign pearlers. In view of the fact that only Japanese nationals were engaged in pearling operations, the paper declared that the Australian Government feared that the Labor Party would take full advantage of this political situation if lenient restrictive measures were taken against the Japanese. The paper went on to state that the Labor Party blamed the Government because express provisions prohibiting Japanese fishing boats from fishing on the waters adjacent to Australian coasts had not been incorporated in the Treaty of Peace with Japan.-17- action, not so much because she would suffer from these measures as because she feared they might open the way for a division of high seas among the great powers. An interesting article in the Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 1953, said there were strong political motives behind the Australian pearl fisheries legislation in addition to the alleged desire for conservation of the pearl fisheries resources. According to the paper, the Australian Labor Party had put pressure on the Australian Government for overall restrictions on the operations of foreign pearlers. In view of the fact that only Japanese nationals were engaged in pearling operations, the paper declared that the Australian Government feared that the Labor Party would take full advantage of this political situation if lenient restrictive measures were taken against the Japanese. The paper went on to state that the Labor Party blamed the Government because express provisions prohibiting Japanese fishing boats from fishing on the waters adjacent to Australian coasts had not been incorporated in the Treaty of Peace with Japan.-17- action, not so much because she would suffer from these measures as because she feared they might open the way for a division of high seas among the great powers. An interesting article in the Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 1953, said there were strong political motives behind the Australian pearl fisheries legislation in addition to the alleged desire for conservation of the pearl fisheries resources. According to the paper, the Australian Labor Party had put pressure on the Australian Government for overall restrictions on the operations of foreign pearlers. In view of the fact that only Japanese nationals were engaged in pearling operations, the paper declared that the Australian Government feared that the Labor Party would take full advantage of this political situation if lenient restrictive measures were taken against the Japanese. The paper went on to state that the Labor Party blamed the Government because express provisions prohibiting Japanese fishing boats from fishing on the waters adjacent to Australian coasts had not been incorporated in the Treaty of Peace with Japan.-18- Scholars' View Numerous Japanese scholars expressed themselves in opposition to the proclamations of the Australian Government on the continental shelf of September 11, 1953. Regarding the 1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf, however, it should be noted that some scholars opposed the doctrine of the continental shelf in its entirety, while others were in favor of this doctrine in general, and only opposed bringing the sedentary fisheries under the regime of the continental shelf. Professor TAOKA Ryoichi, flatly rejected the proclamations of the Australian Government (as well as those of the Government of South Korea), and considered them as "robbery at the scene of fire," stating that it would be unjustifiable to title such proclamations, new international law. 32/ In a book written jointly with Professor Minemura, Dr. Taoka further stated that Australia's reason for declaring her claims over the continental shelf was quite different from President Truman's proclamation of 1945, and that the Australian Government should not ignore the fact that Japan had engaged in pearl fishing operations in the Arafura Sea before World War II. 33/ Mr. Shisuoka specifically pointed out 32/ Yomiuri shimbun [The Yomiuri Press], Sept. 15, 1953. 33/ Ryoichi Taoka and Shigeru Minemura. Kokusaiho [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1957. p. 213. See also Ryoichi Taoka. Kokusaiho kogi [Lecture on International Law]. Tokyo, Yukikaku, 1955. p. 356.-18- Scholars' View Numerous Japanese scholars expressed themselves in opposition to the proclamations of the Australian Government on the continental shelf of September 11, 1953. Regarding the 1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf, however, it should be noted that some scholars opposed the doctrine of the continental shelf in its entirety, while others were in favor of this doctrine in general, and only opposed bringing the sedentary fisheries under the regime of the continental shelf. Professor TAOKA Ryoichi, flatly rejected the proclamations of the Australian Government (as well as those of the Government of South Korea), and considered them as "robbery at the scene of fire," stating that it would be unjustifiable to title such proclamations, new international law. 32/ In a book written jointly with Professor Minemura, Dr. Taoka further stated that Australia's reason for declaring her claims over the continental shelf was quite different from President Truman's proclamation of 1945, and that the Australian Government should not ignore the fact that Japan had engaged in pearl fishing operations in the Arafura Sea before World War II. 33/ Mr. Shisuoka specifically pointed out 32/ Yomiuri shimbun [The Yomiuri Press], Sept. 15, 1953. 33/ Ryoichi Taoka and Shigeru Minemura. Kokusaiho [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1957. p. 213. See also Ryoichi Taoka. Kokusaiho kogi [Lecture on International Law]. Tokyo, Yukikaku, 1955. p. 356.-18- Scholars' View Numerous Japanese scholars expressed themselves in opposition to the proclamations of the Australian Government on the continental shelf of September 11, 1953. Regarding the 1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf, however, it should be noted that some scholars opposed the doctrine of the continental shelf in its entirety, while others were in favor of this doctrine in general, and only opposed bringing the sedentary fisheries under the regime of the continental shelf. Professor TAOKA Ryoichi, flatly rejected the proclamations of the Australian Government (as well as those of the Government of South Korea), and considered them as "robbery at the scene of fire," stating that it would be unjustifiable to title such proclamations, new international law. 32/ In a book written jointly with Professor Minemura, Dr. Taoka further stated that Australia's reason for declaring her claims over the continental shelf was quite different from President Truman's proclamation of 1945, and that the Australian Government should not ignore the fact that Japan had engaged in pearl fishing operations in the Arafura Sea before World War II. 33/ Mr. Shisuoka specifically pointed out 32/ Yomiuri shimbun [The Yomiuri Press], Sept. 15, 1953. 33/ Ryoichi Taoka and Shigeru Minemura. Kokusaiho [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1957. p. 213. See also Ryoichi Taoka. Kokusaiho kogi [Lecture on International Law]. Tokyo, Yukikaku, 1955. p. 356.-18- Scholars' View Numerous Japanese scholars expressed themselves in opposition to the proclamations of the Australian Government on the continental shelf of September 11, 1953. Regarding the 1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf, however, it should be noted that some scholars opposed the doctrine of the continental shelf in its entirety, while others were in favor of this doctrine in general, and only opposed bringing the sedentary fisheries under the regime of the continental shelf. Professor TAOKA Ryoichi, flatly rejected the proclamations of the Australian Government (as well as those of the Government of South Korea), and considered them as "robbery at the scene of fire," stating that it would be unjustifiable to title such proclamations, new international law. 32/ In a book written jointly with Professor Minemura, Dr. Taoka further stated that Australia's reason for declaring her claims over the continental shelf was quite different from President Truman's proclamation of 1945, and that the Australian Government should not ignore the fact that Japan had engaged in pearl fishing operations in the Arafura Sea before World War II. 33/ Mr. Shisuoka specifically pointed out 32/ Yomiuri shimbun [The Yomiuri Press], Sept. 15, 1953. 33/ Ryoichi Taoka and Shigeru Minemura. Kokusaiho [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1957. p. 213. See also Ryoichi Taoka. Kokusaiho kogi [Lecture on International Law]. Tokyo, Yukikaku, 1955. p. 356.-18- Scholars' View Numerous Japanese scholars expressed themselves in opposition to the proclamations of the Australian Government on the continental shelf of September 11, 1953. Regarding the 1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf, however, it should be noted that some scholars opposed the doctrine of the continental shelf in its entirety, while others were in favor of this doctrine in general, and only opposed bringing the sedentary fisheries under the regime of the continental shelf. Professor TAOKA Ryoichi, flatly rejected the proclamations of the Australian Government (as well as those of the Government of South Korea), and considered them as "robbery at the scene of fire," stating that it would be unjustifiable to title such proclamations, new international law. 32/ In a book written jointly with Professor Minemura, Dr. Taoka further stated that Australia's reason for declaring her claims over the continental shelf was quite different from President Truman's proclamation of 1945, and that the Australian Government should not ignore the fact that Japan had engaged in pearl fishing operations in the Arafura Sea before World War II. 33/ Mr. Shisuoka specifically pointed out 32/ Yomiuri shimbun [The Yomiuri Press], Sept. 15, 1953. 33/ Ryoichi Taoka and Shigeru Minemura. Kokusaiho [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1957. p. 213. See also Ryoichi Taoka. Kokusaiho kogi [Lecture on International Law]. Tokyo, Yukikaku, 1955. p. 356.- 19 - that the main motives for Australia's claim to this continental shelf was protection of the sedentary fisheries rather than of the mineral resources on the shelf. He stated that in the case of Australia, an interest in pearl fisheries outweighed the usual claims on the continental shelf. 34/ According to Mr. Sugiyama, the claim by Australia had gone beyond the interpretation of international law. 35/ Professor Ôhira, without mentioning the Australian pearl fisheries, felt that the doctrine of the continental shelf should be confined to the mineral resources and should be treated differently from that of the exclusive fishing zones. 36/ The foremost authority on the subject of the continental shelf is Professor ODA Shigeru of Tôhoku University. In reference to the Australian proclamation on the continental shelf, he stated in 1953 that: 37/ 34/ Senjin Shizuoka. Kokuren Kokusaihô Iinkai no tairikudana mondai ni kansuru gyôseki no kentô to ketsuron [Evaluation and Conclusion of the Achievements by the International Law Commission regarding the Continental Shelf]. Juristo, No. 69 (1954), pp. 25-33. 35/ Shigeo Sugiyama. Syngman Rhee Line to chôsen bôei suiiki [Rhee Line and Sea Defense Zones in Korean Waters]. The Reference, No. 33 (1953), pp. 1. 36/ Zengo Ôhira. Tairikudana to hozen suiiki. Hitotsubashi ronsô, v. XXX, No. 3 (1953), pp. 305-306. See also [?], Tairikudana no hôri [Theory of the Continental Shelf]. Hikakuho zasshi [Journal of Comparative Law], v. II, No. 1 (1953), p. 53. 37/ Shigeru Oda. Teichaku gyogyô no hôri--Arafurakai no shinjukai saishû o meguru mondai [Legal Theory of the Sedentary Fisheries-- Problems Arising from Pearl Fisheries in the Arafura Sea]. Juristo, No. 45 (1953), p. 23. See also: Tairikudana no hôri (1) [Theory of the Continental Shelf (1)]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], v. LIII (1954), p. 19; [?], Kaiyô no kokusaihô kôzô [Framework of Maritime International Law]. Tokyo, Yûshindô, 1956, p. 155.- 19 - that the main motives for Australia's claim to this continental shelf was protection of the sedentary fisheries rather than of the mineral resources on the shelf. He stated that in the case of Australia, an interest in pearl fisheries outweighed the usual claims on the continental shelf. 34/ According to Mr. Sugiyama, the claim by Australia had gone beyond the interpretation of international law. 35/ Professor Ôhira, without mentioning the Australian pearl fisheries, felt that the doctrine of the continental shelf should be confined to the mineral resources and should be treated differently from that of the exclusive fishing zones. 36/ The foremost authority on the subject of the continental shelf is Professor ODA Shigeru of Tôhoku University. In reference to the Australian proclamation on the continental shelf, he stated in 1953 that: 37/ 34/ Senjin Shizuoka. Kokuren Kokusaihô Iinkai no tairikudana mondai ni kansuru gyôseki no kentô to ketsuron [Evaluation and Conclusion of the Achievements by the International Law Commission regarding the Continental Shelf]. Juristo, No. 69 (1954), pp. 25-33. 35/ Shigeo Sugiyama. Syngman Rhee Line to chôsen bôei suiiki [Rhee Line and Sea Defense Zones in Korean Waters]. The Reference, No. 33 (1953), pp. 1. 36/ Zengo Ôhira. Tairikudana to hozen suiiki. Hitotsubashi ronsô, v. XXX, No. 3 (1953), pp. 305-306. See also [?], Tairikudana no hôri [Theory of the Continental Shelf]. Hikakuho zasshi [Journal of Comparative Law], v. II, No. 1 (1953), p. 53. 37/ Shigeru Oda. Teichaku gyogyô no hôri--Arafurakai no shinjukai saishû o meguru mondai [Legal Theory of the Sedentary Fisheries-- Problems Arising from Pearl Fisheries in the Arafura Sea]. Juristo, No. 45 (1953), p. 23. See also: Tairikudana no hôri (1) [Theory of the Continental Shelf (1)]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], v. LIII (1954), p. 19; [?], Kaiyô no kokusaihô kôzô [Framework of Maritime International Law]. Tokyo, Yûshindô, 1956, p. 155.- 19 - that the main motives for Australia's claim to this continental shelf was protection of the sedentary fisheries rather than of the mineral resources on the shelf. He stated that in the case of Australia, an interest in pearl fisheries outweighed the usual claims on the continental shelf. 34/ According to Mr. Sugiyama, the claim by Australia had gone beyond the interpretation of international law. 35/ Professor Ôhira, without mentioning the Australian pearl fisheries, felt that the doctrine of the continental shelf should be confined to the mineral resources and should be treated differently from that of the exclusive fishing zones. 36/ The foremost authority on the subject of the continental shelf is Professor ODA Shigeru of Tôhoku University. In reference to the Australian proclamation on the continental shelf, he stated in 1953 that: 37/ 34/ Senjin Shizuoka. Kokuren Kokusaihô Iinkai no tairikudana mondai ni kansuru gyôseki no kentô to ketsuron [Evaluation and Conclusion of the Achievements by the International Law Commission regarding the Continental Shelf]. Juristo, No. 69 (1954), pp. 25-33. 35/ Shigeo Sugiyama. Syngman Rhee Line to chôsen bôei suiiki [Rhee Line and Sea Defense Zones in Korean Waters]. The Reference, No. 33 (1953), pp. 1. 36/ Zengo Ôhira. Tairikudana to hozen suiiki. Hitotsubashi ronsô, v. XXX, No. 3 (1953), pp. 305-306. See also [?], Tairikudana no hôri [Theory of the Continental Shelf]. Hikakuho zasshi [Journal of Comparative Law], v. II, No. 1 (1953), p. 53. 37/ Shigeru Oda. Teichaku gyogyô no hôri--Arafurakai no shinjukai saishû o meguru mondai [Legal Theory of the Sedentary Fisheries-- Problems Arising from Pearl Fisheries in the Arafura Sea]. Juristo, No. 45 (1953), p. 23. See also: Tairikudana no hôri (1) [Theory of the Continental Shelf (1)]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], v. LIII (1954), p. 19; [?], Kaiyô no kokusaihô kôzô [Framework of Maritime International Law]. Tokyo, Yûshindô, 1956, p. 155.- 19 - that the main motives for Australia's claim to this continental shelf was protection of the sedentary fisheries rather than of the mineral resources on the shelf. He stated that in the case of Australia, an interest in pearl fisheries outweighed the usual claims on the continental shelf. 34/ According to Mr. Sugiyama, the claim by Australia had gone beyond the interpretation of international law. 35/ Professor Ôhira, without mentioning the Australian pearl fisheries, felt that the doctrine of the continental shelf should be confined to the mineral resources and should be treated differently from that of the exclusive fishing zones. 36/ The foremost authority on the subject of the continental shelf is Professor ODA Shigeru of Tôhoku University. In reference to the Australian proclamation on the continental shelf, he stated in 1953 that: 37/ 34/ Senjin Shizuoka. Kokuren Kokusaihô Iinkai no tairikudana mondai ni kansuru gyôseki no kentô to ketsuron [Evaluation and Conclusion of the Achievements by the International Law Commission regarding the Continental Shelf]. Juristo, No. 69 (1954), pp. 25-33. 35/ Shigeo Sugiyama. Syngman Rhee Line to chôsen bôei suiiki [Rhee Line and Sea Defense Zones in Korean Waters]. The Reference, No. 33 (1953), pp. 1. 36/ Zengo Ôhira. Tairikudana to hozen suiiki. Hitotsubashi ronsô, v. XXX, No. 3 (1953), pp. 305-306. See also [?], Tairikudana no hôri [Theory of the Continental Shelf]. Hikakuho zasshi [Journal of Comparative Law], v. II, No. 1 (1953), p. 53. 37/ Shigeru Oda. Teichaku gyogyô no hôri--Arafurakai no shinjukai saishû o meguru mondai [Legal Theory of the Sedentary Fisheries-- Problems Arising from Pearl Fisheries in the Arafura Sea]. Juristo, No. 45 (1953), p. 23. See also: Tairikudana no hôri (1) [Theory of the Continental Shelf (1)]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], v. LIII (1954), p. 19; [?], Kaiyô no kokusaihô kôzô [Framework of Maritime International Law]. Tokyo, Yûshindô, 1956, p. 155.- 19 - that the main motives for Australia's claim to this continental shelf was protection of the sedentary fisheries rather than of the mineral resources on the shelf. He stated that in the case of Australia, an interest in pearl fisheries outweighed the usual claims on the continental shelf. 34/ According to Mr. Sugiyama, the claim by Australia had gone beyond the interpretation of international law. 35/ Professor Ôhira, without mentioning the Australian pearl fisheries, felt that the doctrine of the continental shelf should be confined to the mineral resources and should be treated differently from that of the exclusive fishing zones. 36/ The foremost authority on the subject of the continental shelf is Professor ODA Shigeru of Tôhoku University. In reference to the Australian proclamation on the continental shelf, he stated in 1953 that: 37/ 34/ Senjin Shizuoka. Kokuren Kokusaihô Iinkai no tairikudana mondai ni kansuru gyôseki no kentô to ketsuron [Evaluation and Conclusion of the Achievements by the International Law Commission regarding the Continental Shelf]. Juristo, No. 69 (1954), pp. 25-33. 35/ Shigeo Sugiyama. Syngman Rhee Line to chôsen bôei suiiki [Rhee Line and Sea Defense Zones in Korean Waters]. The Reference, No. 33 (1953), pp. 1. 36/ Zengo Ôhira. Tairikudana to hozen suiiki. Hitotsubashi ronsô, v. XXX, No. 3 (1953), pp. 305-306. See also [?], Tairikudana no hôri [Theory of the Continental Shelf]. Hikakuho zasshi [Journal of Comparative Law], v. II, No. 1 (1953), p. 53. 37/ Shigeru Oda. Teichaku gyogyô no hôri--Arafurakai no shinjukai saishû o meguru mondai [Legal Theory of the Sedentary Fisheries-- Problems Arising from Pearl Fisheries in the Arafura Sea]. Juristo, No. 45 (1953), p. 23. See also: Tairikudana no hôri (1) [Theory of the Continental Shelf (1)]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], v. LIII (1954), p. 19; [?], Kaiyô no kokusaihô kôzô [Framework of Maritime International Law]. Tokyo, Yûshindô, 1956, p. 155.- 20 - If Australia alone engaged in operations of sedentary fisheries and if Japan later joined her, the former may, according to the orthodox theory, exclusively fish in these waters and may refuse permission to Japan to engage in fishing operations lawfully. However, Japan and Australia had engaged in pearl fishing together in the same waters. Mere proximity of Australian coasts does not constitute alleged exclusion of Japanese pearlers. . . . Australia has infringed rights which were lawfully exercised by a foreign country. Then he referred to the Truman Procalmation of 1945 which was fundamentally different from those of Australia in 1953. He pointed out that, from the legislative viewpoint, the American proclamation should not necessarily be opposed; and he concluded that Australian infringement of Japanese interests should neither be held as legally nor morally permissible. He suggested that since sedentary fisheries in the Arafura Sea had been conducted by two countries, only joint measures between the two governments would satisfactorily achieve a conservation program. 38/ Referring to the question of restrictive measures imposed by one nation on another to regulate fisheries on the high seas, Professor IRIE Kieshirô of Seikei University stated that "those measures are limited to the extent allowed under the terms of a treaty; furthermore, that although such measures are concerned with control of the fishing boats of another nation which have violated the provisions of the treaty, punishment of the culprit is always imposed by the country to which the ship belongs." 39/ 38/ __________, Juristo, No. 45 (1953), p. 23. 39/ Keishirô Irie. Rhee Line o meguru kokusaihôjô no mondai [International Legal Problems Arising from the Rhee Line]. Jiyû [?] seigi, v. X, No. 7 (1959), p. 16.- 20 - If Australia alone engaged in operations of sedentary fisheries and if Japan later joined her, the former may, according to the orthodox theory, exclusively fish in these waters and may refuse permission to Japan to engage in fishing operations lawfully. However, Japan and Australia had engaged in pearl fishing together in the same waters. Mere proximity of Australian coasts does not constitute alleged exclusion of Japanese pearlers. . . . Australia has infringed rights which were lawfully exercised by a foreign country. Then he referred to the Truman Procalmation of 1945 which was fundamentally different from those of Australia in 1953. He pointed out that, from the legislative viewpoint, the American proclamation should not necessarily be opposed; and he concluded that Australian infringement of Japanese interests should neither be held as legally nor morally permissible. He suggested that since sedentary fisheries in the Arafura Sea had been conducted by two countries, only joint measures between the two governments would satisfactorily achieve a conservation program. 38/ Referring to the question of restrictive measures imposed by one nation on another to regulate fisheries on the high seas, Professor IRIE Kieshirô of Seikei University stated that "those measures are limited to the extent allowed under the terms of a treaty; furthermore, that although such measures are concerned with control of the fishing boats of another nation which have violated the provisions of the treaty, punishment of the culprit is always imposed by the country to which the ship belongs." 39/ 38/ __________, Juristo, No. 45 (1953), p. 23. 39/ Keishirô Irie. Rhee Line o meguru kokusaihôjô no mondai [International Legal Problems Arising from the Rhee Line]. Jiyû [?] seigi, v. X, No. 7 (1959), p. 16.- 20 - If Australia alone engaged in operations of sedentary fisheries and if Japan later joined her, the former may, according to the orthodox theory, exclusively fish in these waters and may refuse permission to Japan to engage in fishing operations lawfully. However, Japan and Australia had engaged in pearl fishing together in the same waters. Mere proximity of Australian coasts does not constitute alleged exclusion of Japanese pearlers. . . . Australia has infringed rights which were lawfully exercised by a foreign country. Then he referred to the Truman Procalmation of 1945 which was fundamentally different from those of Australia in 1953. He pointed out that, from the legislative viewpoint, the American proclamation should not necessarily be opposed; and he concluded that Australian infringement of Japanese interests should neither be held as legally nor morally permissible. He suggested that since sedentary fisheries in the Arafura Sea had been conducted by two countries, only joint measures between the two governments would satisfactorily achieve a conservation program. 38/ Referring to the question of restrictive measures imposed by one nation on another to regulate fisheries on the high seas, Professor IRIE Kieshirô of Seikei University stated that "those measures are limited to the extent allowed under the terms of a treaty; furthermore, that although such measures are concerned with control of the fishing boats of another nation which have violated the provisions of the treaty, punishment of the culprit is always imposed by the country to which the ship belongs." 39/ 38/ __________, Juristo, No. 45 (1953), p. 23. 39/ Keishirô Irie. Rhee Line o meguru kokusaihôjô no mondai [International Legal Problems Arising from the Rhee Line]. Jiyû [?] seigi, v. X, No. 7 (1959), p. 16.- 20 - If Australia alone engaged in operations of sedentary fisheries and if Japan later joined her, the former may, according to the orthodox theory, exclusively fish in these waters and may refuse permission to Japan to engage in fishing operations lawfully. However, Japan and Australia had engaged in pearl fishing together in the same waters. Mere proximity of Australian coasts does not constitute alleged exclusion of Japanese pearlers. . . . Australia has infringed rights which were lawfully exercised by a foreign country. Then he referred to the Truman Procalmation of 1945 which was fundamentally different from those of Australia in 1953. He pointed out that, from the legislative viewpoint, the American proclamation should not necessarily be opposed; and he concluded that Australian infringement of Japanese interests should neither be held as legally nor morally permissible. He suggested that since sedentary fisheries in the Arafura Sea had been conducted by two countries, only joint measures between the two governments would satisfactorily achieve a conservation program. 38/ Referring to the question of restrictive measures imposed by one nation on another to regulate fisheries on the high seas, Professor IRIE Kieshirô of Seikei University stated that "those measures are limited to the extent allowed under the terms of a treaty; furthermore, that although such measures are concerned with control of the fishing boats of another nation which have violated the provisions of the treaty, punishment of the culprit is always imposed by the country to which the ship belongs." 39/ 38/ __________, Juristo, No. 45 (1953), p. 23. 39/ Keishirô Irie. Rhee Line o meguru kokusaihôjô no mondai [International Legal Problems Arising from the Rhee Line]. Jiyû [?] seigi, v. X, No. 7 (1959), p. 16.- 20 - If Australia alone engaged in operations of sedentary fisheries and if Japan later joined her, the former may, according to the orthodox theory, exclusively fish in these waters and may refuse permission to Japan to engage in fishing operations lawfully. However, Japan and Australia had engaged in pearl fishing together in the same waters. Mere proximity of Australian coasts does not constitute alleged exclusion of Japanese pearlers. . . . Australia has infringed rights which were lawfully exercised by a foreign country. Then he referred to the Truman Procalmation of 1945 which was fundamentally different from those of Australia in 1953. He pointed out that, from the legislative viewpoint, the American proclamation should not necessarily be opposed; and he concluded that Australian infringement of Japanese interests should neither be held as legally nor morally permissible. He suggested that since sedentary fisheries in the Arafura Sea had been conducted by two countries, only joint measures between the two governments would satisfactorily achieve a conservation program. 38/ Referring to the question of restrictive measures imposed by one nation on another to regulate fisheries on the high seas, Professor IRIE Kieshirô of Seikei University stated that "those measures are limited to the extent allowed under the terms of a treaty; furthermore, that although such measures are concerned with control of the fishing boats of another nation which have violated the provisions of the treaty, punishment of the culprit is always imposed by the country to which the ship belongs." 39/ 38/ __________, Juristo, No. 45 (1953), p. 23. 39/ Keishirô Irie. Rhee Line o meguru kokusaihôjô no mondai [International Legal Problems Arising from the Rhee Line]. Jiyû [?] seigi, v. X, No. 7 (1959), p. 16.- 21 - He made an interesting comparison of punitive measures taken by the Australian and South Korean Governments. In the former case, he stated that Japan is under voluntary control or that the Australian Government puts its confidence in the control of the Japanese Government inspection ship, under the terms of the provisional agreement. If an Australian patrol ship finds that Japanese fishing boats have violated the law, the fact would only be reported to the Japanese patrol ship for appropriate action. 40/ Under no circumstances, would the Japanese ship be forcibly confiscated or detained at an Australian harbor for further search. No trial would be held nor any penalty imposed. With respect to the Korean Government's action in penalizing Japanese fishermen, he pointed out that unilateral action which penalizes foreign nationals or confiscates their ships is, in the absence of a treaty, a grave violation of international law. 41/ Dr. SHINOBU Jumpei had a somewhat different viewpoint on the provisions of the Pearl Fisheries Act of Australia, saying that as far as the act is construed to be applicable to Australian as well as Japanese nationals equally, the law did not appear to be discriminatory against Japanese pearl fishing operations in the Arafura Sea. 42/ 40/ Ibid. 41/ Idem. 42/ Jumpei Shinobu. Kaijô kokusaihô rom [Maritime Law of Nations]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1957. p. 109.- 21 - He made an interesting comparison of punitive measures taken by the Australian and South Korean Governments. In the former case, he stated that Japan is under voluntary control or that the Australian Government puts its confidence in the control of the Japanese Government inspection ship, under the terms of the provisional agreement. If an Australian patrol ship finds that Japanese fishing boats have violated the law, the fact would only be reported to the Japanese patrol ship for appropriate action. 40/ Under no circumstances, would the Japanese ship be forcibly confiscated or detained at an Australian harbor for further search. No trial would be held nor any penalty imposed. With respect to the Korean Government's action in penalizing Japanese fishermen, he pointed out that unilateral action which penalizes foreign nationals or confiscates their ships is, in the absence of a treaty, a grave violation of international law. 41/ Dr. SHINOBU Jumpei had a somewhat different viewpoint on the provisions of the Pearl Fisheries Act of Australia, saying that as far as the act is construed to be applicable to Australian as well as Japanese nationals equally, the law did not appear to be discriminatory against Japanese pearl fishing operations in the Arafura Sea. 42/ 40/ Ibid. 41/ Idem. 42/ Jumpei Shinobu. Kaijô kokusaihô rom [Maritime Law of Nations]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1957. p. 109.- 21 - He made an interesting comparison of punitive measures taken by the Australian and South Korean Governments. In the former case, he stated that Japan is under voluntary control or that the Australian Government puts its confidence in the control of the Japanese Government inspection ship, under the terms of the provisional agreement. If an Australian patrol ship finds that Japanese fishing boats have violated the law, the fact would only be reported to the Japanese patrol ship for appropriate action. 40/ Under no circumstances, would the Japanese ship be forcibly confiscated or detained at an Australian harbor for further search. No trial would be held nor any penalty imposed. With respect to the Korean Government's action in penalizing Japanese fishermen, he pointed out that unilateral action which penalizes foreign nationals or confiscates their ships is, in the absence of a treaty, a grave violation of international law. 41/ Dr. SHINOBU Jumpei had a somewhat different viewpoint on the provisions of the Pearl Fisheries Act of Australia, saying that as far as the act is construed to be applicable to Australian as well as Japanese nationals equally, the law did not appear to be discriminatory against Japanese pearl fishing operations in the Arafura Sea. 42/ 40/ Ibid. 41/ Idem. 42/ Jumpei Shinobu. Kaijô kokusaihô rom [Maritime Law of Nations]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1957. p. 109.- 21 - He made an interesting comparison of punitive measures taken by the Australian and South Korean Governments. In the former case, he stated that Japan is under voluntary control or that the Australian Government puts its confidence in the control of the Japanese Government inspection ship, under the terms of the provisional agreement. If an Australian patrol ship finds that Japanese fishing boats have violated the law, the fact would only be reported to the Japanese patrol ship for appropriate action. 40/ Under no circumstances, would the Japanese ship be forcibly confiscated or detained at an Australian harbor for further search. No trial would be held nor any penalty imposed. With respect to the Korean Government's action in penalizing Japanese fishermen, he pointed out that unilateral action which penalizes foreign nationals or confiscates their ships is, in the absence of a treaty, a grave violation of international law. 41/ Dr. SHINOBU Jumpei had a somewhat different viewpoint on the provisions of the Pearl Fisheries Act of Australia, saying that as far as the act is construed to be applicable to Australian as well as Japanese nationals equally, the law did not appear to be discriminatory against Japanese pearl fishing operations in the Arafura Sea. 42/ 40/ Ibid. 41/ Idem. 42/ Jumpei Shinobu. Kaijô kokusaihô rom [Maritime Law of Nations]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1957. p. 109.- 21 - He made an interesting comparison of punitive measures taken by the Australian and South Korean Governments. In the former case, he stated that Japan is under voluntary control or that the Australian Government puts its confidence in the control of the Japanese Government inspection ship, under the terms of the provisional agreement. If an Australian patrol ship finds that Japanese fishing boats have violated the law, the fact would only be reported to the Japanese patrol ship for appropriate action. 40/ Under no circumstances, would the Japanese ship be forcibly confiscated or detained at an Australian harbor for further search. No trial would be held nor any penalty imposed. With respect to the Korean Government's action in penalizing Japanese fishermen, he pointed out that unilateral action which penalizes foreign nationals or confiscates their ships is, in the absence of a treaty, a grave violation of international law. 41/ Dr. SHINOBU Jumpei had a somewhat different viewpoint on the provisions of the Pearl Fisheries Act of Australia, saying that as far as the act is construed to be applicable to Australian as well as Japanese nationals equally, the law did not appear to be discriminatory against Japanese pearl fishing operations in the Arafura Sea. 42/ 40/ Ibid. 41/ Idem. 42/ Jumpei Shinobu. Kaijô kokusaihô rom [Maritime Law of Nations]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1957. p. 109.- 22 - Prior to the adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, Professor Oda again declared that the United Nations was in a hurry to conclude a convention and urged that the proposed Convention regarding the shelf be reconsidered. He stated in 1957: 43/ Practically, the substance of the continental shelf doctrine is an affirmation of sheer monopoly in the coastal State; it has its genesis in a desire for this monopoly, and if allowed to prevail, it will have the effect of dividing another region of the globe into portions of limited access. . . . Neither is geographical contiguity a basis for monopoly, unless it is coupled with a hitherto unrecognized legal mysticism of the percolation of sovereignty. It must be remembered that supporters of the continental shelf doctrine must show not only why the coastal State should have affirmative rights of its own, but also why it should be allowed to exclude all others. In another article, he said that there should be no haste to approve new trends towards the division of the submarine areas through the use of the still ambiguous doctrine of the continental shelf. 44/ On the question of sedentary fisheries, he stated that there is no logical or practical reason for separating the exploitation of live resources attached to the seabed from customary type of fishing. Further, he stated that "the only reason for treating the exploitation of live resources attached to the seabed differently from regular fishing should be the existence of 'historical rights.' " 45/ 43/ Shigeru Oda. Reconsideration of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Tulane Law Review, v. XXXII (1957), p. 35. 44/ __________. The Continental Shelf. The Japan Annual of International Law, No. 1 (1957), p. 37. 45/ Ibid., p. 36.- 22 - Prior to the adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, Professor Oda again declared that the United Nations was in a hurry to conclude a convention and urged that the proposed Convention regarding the shelf be reconsidered. He stated in 1957: 43/ Practically, the substance of the continental shelf doctrine is an affirmation of sheer monopoly in the coastal State; it has its genesis in a desire for this monopoly, and if allowed to prevail, it will have the effect of dividing another region of the globe into portions of limited access. . . . Neither is geographical contiguity a basis for monopoly, unless it is coupled with a hitherto unrecognized legal mysticism of the percolation of sovereignty. It must be remembered that supporters of the continental shelf doctrine must show not only why the coastal State should have affirmative rights of its own, but also why it should be allowed to exclude all others. In another article, he said that there should be no haste to approve new trends towards the division of the submarine areas through the use of the still ambiguous doctrine of the continental shelf. 44/ On the question of sedentary fisheries, he stated that there is no logical or practical reason for separating the exploitation of live resources attached to the seabed from customary type of fishing. Further, he stated that "the only reason for treating the exploitation of live resources attached to the seabed differently from regular fishing should be the existence of 'historical rights.' " 45/ 43/ Shigeru Oda. Reconsideration of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Tulane Law Review, v. XXXII (1957), p. 35. 44/ __________. The Continental Shelf. The Japan Annual of International Law, No. 1 (1957), p. 37. 45/ Ibid., p. 36.- 22 - Prior to the adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, Professor Oda again declared that the United Nations was in a hurry to conclude a convention and urged that the proposed Convention regarding the shelf be reconsidered. He stated in 1957: 43/ Practically, the substance of the continental shelf doctrine is an affirmation of sheer monopoly in the coastal State; it has its genesis in a desire for this monopoly, and if allowed to prevail, it will have the effect of dividing another region of the globe into portions of limited access. . . . Neither is geographical contiguity a basis for monopoly, unless it is coupled with a hitherto unrecognized legal mysticism of the percolation of sovereignty. It must be remembered that supporters of the continental shelf doctrine must show not only why the coastal State should have affirmative rights of its own, but also why it should be allowed to exclude all others. In another article, he said that there should be no haste to approve new trends towards the division of the submarine areas through the use of the still ambiguous doctrine of the continental shelf. 44/ On the question of sedentary fisheries, he stated that there is no logical or practical reason for separating the exploitation of live resources attached to the seabed from customary type of fishing. Further, he stated that "the only reason for treating the exploitation of live resources attached to the seabed differently from regular fishing should be the existence of 'historical rights.' " 45/ 43/ Shigeru Oda. Reconsideration of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Tulane Law Review, v. XXXII (1957), p. 35. 44/ __________. The Continental Shelf. The Japan Annual of International Law, No. 1 (1957), p. 37. 45/ Ibid., p. 36.- 22 - Prior to the adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, Professor Oda again declared that the United Nations was in a hurry to conclude a convention and urged that the proposed Convention regarding the shelf be reconsidered. He stated in 1957: 43/ Practically, the substance of the continental shelf doctrine is an affirmation of sheer monopoly in the coastal State; it has its genesis in a desire for this monopoly, and if allowed to prevail, it will have the effect of dividing another region of the globe into portions of limited access. . . . Neither is geographical contiguity a basis for monopoly, unless it is coupled with a hitherto unrecognized legal mysticism of the percolation of sovereignty. It must be remembered that supporters of the continental shelf doctrine must show not only why the coastal State should have affirmative rights of its own, but also why it should be allowed to exclude all others. In another article, he said that there should be no haste to approve new trends towards the division of the submarine areas through the use of the still ambiguous doctrine of the continental shelf. 44/ On the question of sedentary fisheries, he stated that there is no logical or practical reason for separating the exploitation of live resources attached to the seabed from customary type of fishing. Further, he stated that "the only reason for treating the exploitation of live resources attached to the seabed differently from regular fishing should be the existence of 'historical rights.' " 45/ 43/ Shigeru Oda. Reconsideration of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Tulane Law Review, v. XXXII (1957), p. 35. 44/ __________. The Continental Shelf. The Japan Annual of International Law, No. 1 (1957), p. 37. 45/ Ibid., p. 36.- 22 - Prior to the adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, Professor Oda again declared that the United Nations was in a hurry to conclude a convention and urged that the proposed Convention regarding the shelf be reconsidered. He stated in 1957: 43/ Practically, the substance of the continental shelf doctrine is an affirmation of sheer monopoly in the coastal State; it has its genesis in a desire for this monopoly, and if allowed to prevail, it will have the effect of dividing another region of the globe into portions of limited access. . . . Neither is geographical contiguity a basis for monopoly, unless it is coupled with a hitherto unrecognized legal mysticism of the percolation of sovereignty. It must be remembered that supporters of the continental shelf doctrine must show not only why the coastal State should have affirmative rights of its own, but also why it should be allowed to exclude all others. In another article, he said that there should be no haste to approve new trends towards the division of the submarine areas through the use of the still ambiguous doctrine of the continental shelf. 44/ On the question of sedentary fisheries, he stated that there is no logical or practical reason for separating the exploitation of live resources attached to the seabed from customary type of fishing. Further, he stated that "the only reason for treating the exploitation of live resources attached to the seabed differently from regular fishing should be the existence of 'historical rights.' " 45/ 43/ Shigeru Oda. Reconsideration of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Tulane Law Review, v. XXXII (1957), p. 35. 44/ __________. The Continental Shelf. The Japan Annual of International Law, No. 1 (1957), p. 37. 45/ Ibid., p. 36.- 23 - Pointing out that the sedentary fisheries should be subject to the regime of the high seas, and not under the control of the coastal State, he concluded, "the interest of all may be better served by considering these resources as belonging to all, like the high seas." 46/ After the Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted at the Geneva Conference in 1958, Professor Oda again stressed that his views had not changed. 47/ He believed that the Convention was not an encouraging example of the codification and progressive development at which the International Law Commission aims; and that exploitation of resources would result in division and monopoly by coastal nations. 48/ He pointed out that the Convention per se contains a number of contradictions and shortcomings and that consequences were to be feared if it were put into effect. While admitting that there was a world-wide trend towards the continental shelf system, he emphasized that he finds no reason why the exploitation of mineral resources under the sea should be handled together with the question of ordinary fishery resources. He added that giving a different treatment to both ordinary and sedentary fisheries under the Convention was the result of bargaining and selfishness on the part of the coastal nations. 49/ 46/ Ibid. 47/ _____________. Tairikudana ni kansuru jôyaku [Convention on the Continental Shelf]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi, v. LVIII, No. 1-2 (1959), p. 123 48/ Ibid. 49/ Idem.- 23 - Pointing out that the sedentary fisheries should be subject to the regime of the high seas, and not under the control of the coastal State, he concluded, "the interest of all may be better served by considering these resources as belonging to all, like the high seas." 46/ After the Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted at the Geneva Conference in 1958, Professor Oda again stressed that his views had not changed. 47/ He believed that the Convention was not an encouraging example of the codification and progressive development at which the International Law Commission aims; and that exploitation of resources would result in division and monopoly by coastal nations. 48/ He pointed out that the Convention per se contains a number of contradictions and shortcomings and that consequences were to be feared if it were put into effect. While admitting that there was a world-wide trend towards the continental shelf system, he emphasized that he finds no reason why the exploitation of mineral resources under the sea should be handled together with the question of ordinary fishery resources. He added that giving a different treatment to both ordinary and sedentary fisheries under the Convention was the result of bargaining and selfishness on the part of the coastal nations. 49/ 46/ Ibid. 47/ _____________. Tairikudana ni kansuru jôyaku [Convention on the Continental Shelf]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi, v. LVIII, No. 1-2 (1959), p. 123 48/ Ibid. 49/ Idem.- 23 - Pointing out that the sedentary fisheries should be subject to the regime of the high seas, and not under the control of the coastal State, he concluded, "the interest of all may be better served by considering these resources as belonging to all, like the high seas." 46/ After the Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted at the Geneva Conference in 1958, Professor Oda again stressed that his views had not changed. 47/ He believed that the Convention was not an encouraging example of the codification and progressive development at which the International Law Commission aims; and that exploitation of resources would result in division and monopoly by coastal nations. 48/ He pointed out that the Convention per se contains a number of contradictions and shortcomings and that consequences were to be feared if it were put into effect. While admitting that there was a world-wide trend towards the continental shelf system, he emphasized that he finds no reason why the exploitation of mineral resources under the sea should be handled together with the question of ordinary fishery resources. He added that giving a different treatment to both ordinary and sedentary fisheries under the Convention was the result of bargaining and selfishness on the part of the coastal nations. 49/ 46/ Ibid. 47/ _____________. Tairikudana ni kansuru jôyaku [Convention on the Continental Shelf]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi, v. LVIII, No. 1-2 (1959), p. 123 48/ Ibid. 49/ Idem.- 23 - Pointing out that the sedentary fisheries should be subject to the regime of the high seas, and not under the control of the coastal State, he concluded, "the interest of all may be better served by considering these resources as belonging to all, like the high seas." 46/ After the Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted at the Geneva Conference in 1958, Professor Oda again stressed that his views had not changed. 47/ He believed that the Convention was not an encouraging example of the codification and progressive development at which the International Law Commission aims; and that exploitation of resources would result in division and monopoly by coastal nations. 48/ He pointed out that the Convention per se contains a number of contradictions and shortcomings and that consequences were to be feared if it were put into effect. While admitting that there was a world-wide trend towards the continental shelf system, he emphasized that he finds no reason why the exploitation of mineral resources under the sea should be handled together with the question of ordinary fishery resources. He added that giving a different treatment to both ordinary and sedentary fisheries under the Convention was the result of bargaining and selfishness on the part of the coastal nations. 49/ 46/ Ibid. 47/ _____________. Tairikudana ni kansuru jôyaku [Convention on the Continental Shelf]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi, v. LVIII, No. 1-2 (1959), p. 123 48/ Ibid. 49/ Idem.- 23 - Pointing out that the sedentary fisheries should be subject to the regime of the high seas, and not under the control of the coastal State, he concluded, "the interest of all may be better served by considering these resources as belonging to all, like the high seas." 46/ After the Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted at the Geneva Conference in 1958, Professor Oda again stressed that his views had not changed. 47/ He believed that the Convention was not an encouraging example of the codification and progressive development at which the International Law Commission aims; and that exploitation of resources would result in division and monopoly by coastal nations. 48/ He pointed out that the Convention per se contains a number of contradictions and shortcomings and that consequences were to be feared if it were put into effect. While admitting that there was a world-wide trend towards the continental shelf system, he emphasized that he finds no reason why the exploitation of mineral resources under the sea should be handled together with the question of ordinary fishery resources. He added that giving a different treatment to both ordinary and sedentary fisheries under the Convention was the result of bargaining and selfishness on the part of the coastal nations. 49/ 46/ Ibid. 47/ _____________. Tairikudana ni kansuru jôyaku [Convention on the Continental Shelf]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi, v. LVIII, No. 1-2 (1959), p. 123 48/ Ibid. 49/ Idem.- 24 - Dr. YOKOTA Kisaburô, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, also did not object entirely to the doctrine of the continental shelf in general. He stated in 1958: 50/ A new problem, there is proper reason to believe that the coastal nation can claim sovereignity over mineral resources on the continental shelf. The recent developments in science and technology have enabled many nations to exploit such resources. For economic reasons, it is deemed proper for a coastal nation to exploit these mineral resources, since they lie on the shelf which is an extention of the landmass of the nation. Furthermore, if a nation were to exploit resources and establish installations on the high seas adjacent to the coasts of another nation, the latter would prevent the former from so doing on the basis of military, political and social reasons. Dr. Yokota pointed out, based on the aforementioned reasons, that it might be proper to regulate the continental shelf by a new international law. At the same time, he refuted the claim that the sedentary fisheries should be governed by the regime of the continental shelf on the ground that this would be contrary to the freedom of the high seas. In his opinion, if the claim of sovereignty over the continental shelf were extended to include fisheries resources attached to the shelf, it should not be supported. 51/ 50/ Kisaburô Yokota. Kokusaihô (2) [International Law (2)]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1958. p. 141; __________. Kokusaihô [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1960. p. 153. 51/ Ibid.- 24 - Dr. YOKOTA Kisaburô, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, also did not object entirely to the doctrine of the continental shelf in general. He stated in 1958: 50/ A new problem, there is proper reason to believe that the coastal nation can claim sovereignity over mineral resources on the continental shelf. The recent developments in science and technology have enabled many nations to exploit such resources. For economic reasons, it is deemed proper for a coastal nation to exploit these mineral resources, since they lie on the shelf which is an extention of the landmass of the nation. Furthermore, if a nation were to exploit resources and establish installations on the high seas adjacent to the coasts of another nation, the latter would prevent the former from so doing on the basis of military, political and social reasons. Dr. Yokota pointed out, based on the aforementioned reasons, that it might be proper to regulate the continental shelf by a new international law. At the same time, he refuted the claim that the sedentary fisheries should be governed by the regime of the continental shelf on the ground that this would be contrary to the freedom of the high seas. In his opinion, if the claim of sovereignty over the continental shelf were extended to include fisheries resources attached to the shelf, it should not be supported. 51/ 50/ Kisaburô Yokota. Kokusaihô (2) [International Law (2)]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1958. p. 141; __________. Kokusaihô [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1960. p. 153. 51/ Ibid.- 24 - Dr. YOKOTA Kisaburô, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, also did not object entirely to the doctrine of the continental shelf in general. He stated in 1958: 50/ A new problem, there is proper reason to believe that the coastal nation can claim sovereignity over mineral resources on the continental shelf. The recent developments in science and technology have enabled many nations to exploit such resources. For economic reasons, it is deemed proper for a coastal nation to exploit these mineral resources, since they lie on the shelf which is an extention of the landmass of the nation. Furthermore, if a nation were to exploit resources and establish installations on the high seas adjacent to the coasts of another nation, the latter would prevent the former from so doing on the basis of military, political and social reasons. Dr. Yokota pointed out, based on the aforementioned reasons, that it might be proper to regulate the continental shelf by a new international law. At the same time, he refuted the claim that the sedentary fisheries should be governed by the regime of the continental shelf on the ground that this would be contrary to the freedom of the high seas. In his opinion, if the claim of sovereignty over the continental shelf were extended to include fisheries resources attached to the shelf, it should not be supported. 51/ 50/ Kisaburô Yokota. Kokusaihô (2) [International Law (2)]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1958. p. 141; __________. Kokusaihô [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1960. p. 153. 51/ Ibid.- 24 - Dr. YOKOTA Kisaburô, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, also did not object entirely to the doctrine of the continental shelf in general. He stated in 1958: 50/ A new problem, there is proper reason to believe that the coastal nation can claim sovereignity over mineral resources on the continental shelf. The recent developments in science and technology have enabled many nations to exploit such resources. For economic reasons, it is deemed proper for a coastal nation to exploit these mineral resources, since they lie on the shelf which is an extention of the landmass of the nation. Furthermore, if a nation were to exploit resources and establish installations on the high seas adjacent to the coasts of another nation, the latter would prevent the former from so doing on the basis of military, political and social reasons. Dr. Yokota pointed out, based on the aforementioned reasons, that it might be proper to regulate the continental shelf by a new international law. At the same time, he refuted the claim that the sedentary fisheries should be governed by the regime of the continental shelf on the ground that this would be contrary to the freedom of the high seas. In his opinion, if the claim of sovereignty over the continental shelf were extended to include fisheries resources attached to the shelf, it should not be supported. 51/ 50/ Kisaburô Yokota. Kokusaihô (2) [International Law (2)]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1958. p. 141; __________. Kokusaihô [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1960. p. 153. 51/ Ibid.- 24 - Dr. YOKOTA Kisaburô, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, also did not object entirely to the doctrine of the continental shelf in general. He stated in 1958: 50/ A new problem, there is proper reason to believe that the coastal nation can claim sovereignity over mineral resources on the continental shelf. The recent developments in science and technology have enabled many nations to exploit such resources. For economic reasons, it is deemed proper for a coastal nation to exploit these mineral resources, since they lie on the shelf which is an extention of the landmass of the nation. Furthermore, if a nation were to exploit resources and establish installations on the high seas adjacent to the coasts of another nation, the latter would prevent the former from so doing on the basis of military, political and social reasons. Dr. Yokota pointed out, based on the aforementioned reasons, that it might be proper to regulate the continental shelf by a new international law. At the same time, he refuted the claim that the sedentary fisheries should be governed by the regime of the continental shelf on the ground that this would be contrary to the freedom of the high seas. In his opinion, if the claim of sovereignty over the continental shelf were extended to include fisheries resources attached to the shelf, it should not be supported. 51/ 50/ Kisaburô Yokota. Kokusaihô (2) [International Law (2)]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1958. p. 141; __________. Kokusaihô [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1960. p. 153. 51/ Ibid.- 25 - Similarly Dr. Shinobu, who supported the doctrine of the continental shelf, cited various theories enunciated by western scholars, but limited his support to that part of the doctrine pertaining to mineral resources. He stated: 52/ The continental shelf system which was originally established to provide for the exploitation of mineral resources--chiefly petroleum--in the case of Japan is considered necessary. If modern scientific techniques can make this exploitation possible, it should be accepted, with the prevision that the freedom of the high seas is not disturbed. There is no reason to regard it as illegal. In the case of Japan it is especially necessary, for the present resources of the land do not meet the food supply of Japanese people. With respect to the results of the Geneva Conferences in 1958 and 1960, Mr. Okuhara stated that developments stemming from the conventions on the law of the sea, including one on the continental shelf, would need to be watched. 53/ Except for problems which might arise in the Japanese-Australian dispute concerning pearl-shell, there would be no immediate effects upon Japan's relations with neighboring countries. He hoped that Japan would solve any fisheries problems with other countries through negotiations on an individual-country basis rather than making use of the general criteria set forth under these conventions. Through individual negotiations, he said, Japan must endeavor to reach regional agreements. To do so, he felt that two elements were necessary. One of these is the need to conduct 52/ Jumpei Shinobu. Kaijo kokusaihô ron. p. 239. 53/ Hideo Okuhara. the Reference. No. 112 (1960), p. 25.- 25 - Similarly Dr. Shinobu, who supported the doctrine of the continental shelf, cited various theories enunciated by western scholars, but limited his support to that part of the doctrine pertaining to mineral resources. He stated: 52/ The continental shelf system which was originally established to provide for the exploitation of mineral resources--chiefly petroleum--in the case of Japan is considered necessary. If modern scientific techniques can make this exploitation possible, it should be accepted, with the prevision that the freedom of the high seas is not disturbed. There is no reason to regard it as illegal. In the case of Japan it is especially necessary, for the present resources of the land do not meet the food supply of Japanese people. With respect to the results of the Geneva Conferences in 1958 and 1960, Mr. Okuhara stated that developments stemming from the conventions on the law of the sea, including one on the continental shelf, would need to be watched. 53/ Except for problems which might arise in the Japanese-Australian dispute concerning pearl-shell, there would be no immediate effects upon Japan's relations with neighboring countries. He hoped that Japan would solve any fisheries problems with other countries through negotiations on an individual-country basis rather than making use of the general criteria set forth under these conventions. Through individual negotiations, he said, Japan must endeavor to reach regional agreements. To do so, he felt that two elements were necessary. One of these is the need to conduct 52/ Jumpei Shinobu. Kaijo kokusaihô ron. p. 239. 53/ Hideo Okuhara. the Reference. No. 112 (1960), p. 25.- 25 - Similarly Dr. Shinobu, who supported the doctrine of the continental shelf, cited various theories enunciated by western scholars, but limited his support to that part of the doctrine pertaining to mineral resources. He stated: 52/ The continental shelf system which was originally established to provide for the exploitation of mineral resources--chiefly petroleum--in the case of Japan is considered necessary. If modern scientific techniques can make this exploitation possible, it should be accepted, with the prevision that the freedom of the high seas is not disturbed. There is no reason to regard it as illegal. In the case of Japan it is especially necessary, for the present resources of the land do not meet the food supply of Japanese people. With respect to the results of the Geneva Conferences in 1958 and 1960, Mr. Okuhara stated that developments stemming from the conventions on the law of the sea, including one on the continental shelf, would need to be watched. 53/ Except for problems which might arise in the Japanese-Australian dispute concerning pearl-shell, there would be no immediate effects upon Japan's relations with neighboring countries. He hoped that Japan would solve any fisheries problems with other countries through negotiations on an individual-country basis rather than making use of the general criteria set forth under these conventions. Through individual negotiations, he said, Japan must endeavor to reach regional agreements. To do so, he felt that two elements were necessary. One of these is the need to conduct 52/ Jumpei Shinobu. Kaijo kokusaihô ron. p. 239. 53/ Hideo Okuhara. the Reference. No. 112 (1960), p. 25.- 25 - Similarly Dr. Shinobu, who supported the doctrine of the continental shelf, cited various theories enunciated by western scholars, but limited his support to that part of the doctrine pertaining to mineral resources. He stated: 52/ The continental shelf system which was originally established to provide for the exploitation of mineral resources--chiefly petroleum--in the case of Japan is considered necessary. If modern scientific techniques can make this exploitation possible, it should be accepted, with the prevision that the freedom of the high seas is not disturbed. There is no reason to regard it as illegal. In the case of Japan it is especially necessary, for the present resources of the land do not meet the food supply of Japanese people. With respect to the results of the Geneva Conferences in 1958 and 1960, Mr. Okuhara stated that developments stemming from the conventions on the law of the sea, including one on the continental shelf, would need to be watched. 53/ Except for problems which might arise in the Japanese-Australian dispute concerning pearl-shell, there would be no immediate effects upon Japan's relations with neighboring countries. He hoped that Japan would solve any fisheries problems with other countries through negotiations on an individual-country basis rather than making use of the general criteria set forth under these conventions. Through individual negotiations, he said, Japan must endeavor to reach regional agreements. To do so, he felt that two elements were necessary. One of these is the need to conduct 52/ Jumpei Shinobu. Kaijo kokusaihô ron. p. 239. 53/ Hideo Okuhara. the Reference. No. 112 (1960), p. 25.- 25 - Similarly Dr. Shinobu, who supported the doctrine of the continental shelf, cited various theories enunciated by western scholars, but limited his support to that part of the doctrine pertaining to mineral resources. He stated: 52/ The continental shelf system which was originally established to provide for the exploitation of mineral resources--chiefly petroleum--in the case of Japan is considered necessary. If modern scientific techniques can make this exploitation possible, it should be accepted, with the prevision that the freedom of the high seas is not disturbed. There is no reason to regard it as illegal. In the case of Japan it is especially necessary, for the present resources of the land do not meet the food supply of Japanese people. With respect to the results of the Geneva Conferences in 1958 and 1960, Mr. Okuhara stated that developments stemming from the conventions on the law of the sea, including one on the continental shelf, would need to be watched. 53/ Except for problems which might arise in the Japanese-Australian dispute concerning pearl-shell, there would be no immediate effects upon Japan's relations with neighboring countries. He hoped that Japan would solve any fisheries problems with other countries through negotiations on an individual-country basis rather than making use of the general criteria set forth under these conventions. Through individual negotiations, he said, Japan must endeavor to reach regional agreements. To do so, he felt that two elements were necessary. One of these is the need to conduct 52/ Jumpei Shinobu. Kaijo kokusaihô ron. p. 239. 53/ Hideo Okuhara. the Reference. No. 112 (1960), p. 25.- 25 - scientific research to find ways to protect fisheries resources and attain the maximum fishing product. Finally, he pointed out that Japan must realize that, should the Convention on the Continental Shelf come into force, it would serve as a guideline in regulating international fisheries and that public opinion of the world would support it. 54/ With respect to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, as interesting comment was made by Professor IRIE Keisbirô: 55/ Japan's fisheries activities are to be restricted substantially by the codification of international law on the continental shelf. Japan was opposed to the proclamation made by South Korea and Australia respectively on the ground that they were contrary to the traditional freedom of the high sea. Even if Japan admitted that the principle of the freedom of the sea needs to be revised to some extent for the purpose of serving the interest of mankind in the preservation and exploitation of the marine resources, she objected vigorously to these proclamations, because punitive measures were enforced against the Japanese people through unilateral actions. The Convention on the Continental Shelf would certainly prove to be a disadvantage to the opposition higherto lodged by Japan. ... Accordingly, it is to be expected that Japan's position in opposing the Pearl Fisheries Act of Australia would subsequently be weakened. Furthermore, in his opinion, although Japan has no obligation to accept against its own will such a particular Convention as this, Japan's opposition to the Convention would 54/ Ibid. 55/ Kaishirô Irie. Geneva Kaiyôhô Kaigi no seika [The Result of the Geneva Conference]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXX, No. 6 (1958), p. 58.- 25 - scientific research to find ways to protect fisheries resources and attain the maximum fishing product. Finally, he pointed out that Japan must realize that, should the Convention on the Continental Shelf come into force, it would serve as a guideline in regulating international fisheries and that public opinion of the world would support it. 54/ With respect to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, as interesting comment was made by Professor IRIE Keisbirô: 55/ Japan's fisheries activities are to be restricted substantially by the codification of international law on the continental shelf. Japan was opposed to the proclamation made by South Korea and Australia respectively on the ground that they were contrary to the traditional freedom of the high sea. Even if Japan admitted that the principle of the freedom of the sea needs to be revised to some extent for the purpose of serving the interest of mankind in the preservation and exploitation of the marine resources, she objected vigorously to these proclamations, because punitive measures were enforced against the Japanese people through unilateral actions. The Convention on the Continental Shelf would certainly prove to be a disadvantage to the opposition higherto lodged by Japan. ... Accordingly, it is to be expected that Japan's position in opposing the Pearl Fisheries Act of Australia would subsequently be weakened. Furthermore, in his opinion, although Japan has no obligation to accept against its own will such a particular Convention as this, Japan's opposition to the Convention would 54/ Ibid. 55/ Kaishirô Irie. Geneva Kaiyôhô Kaigi no seika [The Result of the Geneva Conference]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXX, No. 6 (1958), p. 58.- 25 - scientific research to find ways to protect fisheries resources and attain the maximum fishing product. Finally, he pointed out that Japan must realize that, should the Convention on the Continental Shelf come into force, it would serve as a guideline in regulating international fisheries and that public opinion of the world would support it. 54/ With respect to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, as interesting comment was made by Professor IRIE Keisbirô: 55/ Japan's fisheries activities are to be restricted substantially by the codification of international law on the continental shelf. Japan was opposed to the proclamation made by South Korea and Australia respectively on the ground that they were contrary to the traditional freedom of the high sea. Even if Japan admitted that the principle of the freedom of the sea needs to be revised to some extent for the purpose of serving the interest of mankind in the preservation and exploitation of the marine resources, she objected vigorously to these proclamations, because punitive measures were enforced against the Japanese people through unilateral actions. The Convention on the Continental Shelf would certainly prove to be a disadvantage to the opposition higherto lodged by Japan. ... Accordingly, it is to be expected that Japan's position in opposing the Pearl Fisheries Act of Australia would subsequently be weakened. Furthermore, in his opinion, although Japan has no obligation to accept against its own will such a particular Convention as this, Japan's opposition to the Convention would 54/ Ibid. 55/ Kaishirô Irie. Geneva Kaiyôhô Kaigi no seika [The Result of the Geneva Conference]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXX, No. 6 (1958), p. 58.- 25 - scientific research to find ways to protect fisheries resources and attain the maximum fishing product. Finally, he pointed out that Japan must realize that, should the Convention on the Continental Shelf come into force, it would serve as a guideline in regulating international fisheries and that public opinion of the world would support it. 54/ With respect to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, as interesting comment was made by Professor IRIE Keisbirô: 55/ Japan's fisheries activities are to be restricted substantially by the codification of international law on the continental shelf. Japan was opposed to the proclamation made by South Korea and Australia respectively on the ground that they were contrary to the traditional freedom of the high sea. Even if Japan admitted that the principle of the freedom of the sea needs to be revised to some extent for the purpose of serving the interest of mankind in the preservation and exploitation of the marine resources, she objected vigorously to these proclamations, because punitive measures were enforced against the Japanese people through unilateral actions. The Convention on the Continental Shelf would certainly prove to be a disadvantage to the opposition higherto lodged by Japan. ... Accordingly, it is to be expected that Japan's position in opposing the Pearl Fisheries Act of Australia would subsequently be weakened. Furthermore, in his opinion, although Japan has no obligation to accept against its own will such a particular Convention as this, Japan's opposition to the Convention would 54/ Ibid. 55/ Kaishirô Irie. Geneva Kaiyôhô Kaigi no seika [The Result of the Geneva Conference]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXX, No. 6 (1958), p. 58.- 25 - scientific research to find ways to protect fisheries resources and attain the maximum fishing product. Finally, he pointed out that Japan must realize that, should the Convention on the Continental Shelf come into force, it would serve as a guideline in regulating international fisheries and that public opinion of the world would support it. 54/ With respect to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, as interesting comment was made by Professor IRIE Keisbirô: 55/ Japan's fisheries activities are to be restricted substantially by the codification of international law on the continental shelf. Japan was opposed to the proclamation made by South Korea and Australia respectively on the ground that they were contrary to the traditional freedom of the high sea. Even if Japan admitted that the principle of the freedom of the sea needs to be revised to some extent for the purpose of serving the interest of mankind in the preservation and exploitation of the marine resources, she objected vigorously to these proclamations, because punitive measures were enforced against the Japanese people through unilateral actions. The Convention on the Continental Shelf would certainly prove to be a disadvantage to the opposition higherto lodged by Japan. ... Accordingly, it is to be expected that Japan's position in opposing the Pearl Fisheries Act of Australia would subsequently be weakened. Furthermore, in his opinion, although Japan has no obligation to accept against its own will such a particular Convention as this, Japan's opposition to the Convention would 54/ Ibid. 55/ Kaishirô Irie. Geneva Kaiyôhô Kaigi no seika [The Result of the Geneva Conference]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXX, No. 6 (1958), p. 58.- 27 - be meaningless in actual practice should the Convention come into force and become positive international law. 56/ Regarding the legal effects of the Convention on the Continental Shelf upon a non-signatory country, Professor Terasawa stated that the legal effects of treaties are not necessarily restricted to the signing parties alone, and then cited advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice which come to a similar conclusion. In his opinion, under these circumstances, the legal effects of the conventions on the law of the sea, would not be of mere passing interest to the nonsignatory countries, including Japan. 57/ 56/ Hajime Terasawa. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru shejôyaku [Conventions on the Law of the Sea]. Kokka Cakkai zasahi [The Journal of the Association of Political and Social Science], v. LXXII, No. 7 (1958), p. 54; A/CN 4/63, pp. 14-15. Advisory opinion on the Reparation of Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. J. C. J. Reports, 1949, p. 185; Asland Islands Case, Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement, No. 3 (1920), p. 17-19; Status of South-West Africa. J.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 132. 57/ Ibid.- 27 - be meaningless in actual practice should the Convention come into force and become positive international law. 56/ Regarding the legal effects of the Convention on the Continental Shelf upon a non-signatory country, Professor Terasawa stated that the legal effects of treaties are not necessarily restricted to the signing parties alone, and then cited advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice which come to a similar conclusion. In his opinion, under these circumstances, the legal effects of the conventions on the law of the sea, would not be of mere passing interest to the nonsignatory countries, including Japan. 57/ 56/ Hajime Terasawa. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru shejôyaku [Conventions on the Law of the Sea]. Kokka Cakkai zasahi [The Journal of the Association of Political and Social Science], v. LXXII, No. 7 (1958), p. 54; A/CN 4/63, pp. 14-15. Advisory opinion on the Reparation of Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. J. C. J. Reports, 1949, p. 185; Asland Islands Case, Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement, No. 3 (1920), p. 17-19; Status of South-West Africa. J.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 132. 57/ Ibid.- 27 - be meaningless in actual practice should the Convention come into force and become positive international law. 56/ Regarding the legal effects of the Convention on the Continental Shelf upon a non-signatory country, Professor Terasawa stated that the legal effects of treaties are not necessarily restricted to the signing parties alone, and then cited advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice which come to a similar conclusion. In his opinion, under these circumstances, the legal effects of the conventions on the law of the sea, would not be of mere passing interest to the nonsignatory countries, including Japan. 57/ 56/ Hajime Terasawa. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru shejôyaku [Conventions on the Law of the Sea]. Kokka Cakkai zasahi [The Journal of the Association of Political and Social Science], v. LXXII, No. 7 (1958), p. 54; A/CN 4/63, pp. 14-15. Advisory opinion on the Reparation of Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. J. C. J. Reports, 1949, p. 185; Asland Islands Case, Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement, No. 3 (1920), p. 17-19; Status of South-West Africa. J.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 132. 57/ Ibid.- 27 - be meaningless in actual practice should the Convention come into force and become positive international law. 56/ Regarding the legal effects of the Convention on the Continental Shelf upon a non-signatory country, Professor Terasawa stated that the legal effects of treaties are not necessarily restricted to the signing parties alone, and then cited advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice which come to a similar conclusion. In his opinion, under these circumstances, the legal effects of the conventions on the law of the sea, would not be of mere passing interest to the nonsignatory countries, including Japan. 57/ 56/ Hajime Terasawa. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru shejôyaku [Conventions on the Law of the Sea]. Kokka Cakkai zasahi [The Journal of the Association of Political and Social Science], v. LXXII, No. 7 (1958), p. 54; A/CN 4/63, pp. 14-15. Advisory opinion on the Reparation of Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. J. C. J. Reports, 1949, p. 185; Asland Islands Case, Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement, No. 3 (1920), p. 17-19; Status of South-West Africa. J.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 132. 57/ Ibid.- 27 - be meaningless in actual practice should the Convention come into force and become positive international law. 56/ Regarding the legal effects of the Convention on the Continental Shelf upon a non-signatory country, Professor Terasawa stated that the legal effects of treaties are not necessarily restricted to the signing parties alone, and then cited advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice which come to a similar conclusion. In his opinion, under these circumstances, the legal effects of the conventions on the law of the sea, would not be of mere passing interest to the nonsignatory countries, including Japan. 57/ 56/ Hajime Terasawa. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru shejôyaku [Conventions on the Law of the Sea]. Kokka Cakkai zasahi [The Journal of the Association of Political and Social Science], v. LXXII, No. 7 (1958), p. 54; A/CN 4/63, pp. 14-15. Advisory opinion on the Reparation of Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. J. C. J. Reports, 1949, p. 185; Asland Islands Case, Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement, No. 3 (1920), p. 17-19; Status of South-West Africa. J.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 132. 57/ Ibid.- 28 - Summary and Conclusion The significance of the Australian proclamations of September 11, 1953, lies in the fact that the Australian Government attempted for the first time to establish a specific relationship between the shelf and sedentary fisheries. When negotiations with Japan were broken off, Australia asserted, through these proclamations, an exclusive right to the pearl oysters attached to the continental shelf, more exclusive than that afforded by long usage and actual exploitation. An attempt was made by the Australain Government to work out through legislation a system of pearl fishing licensing in order to claim sovereignty over the continental shelf. The adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf at the Geneva Conference in 1958 reinforced once more the position of the Australian Government. This might have delayed submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice, as previously agreed. Pending the final decision of the Court, the provisional agreement will govern for some time the pearl fisheries operated by the Japanese in the Arafura Sea. This study indicates that the statement issued by the Japanese Government, press comments, and scholars' opinions showed concern for the traditional freedom to fish in the high seas, as well as a continuing interest in preserving that freedom. In the Geneva Conference, the Japanese delegate was not opposed- 28 - Summary and Conclusion The significance of the Australian proclamations of September 11, 1953, lies in the fact that the Australian Government attempted for the first time to establish a specific relationship between the shelf and sedentary fisheries. When negotiations with Japan were broken off, Australia asserted, through these proclamations, an exclusive right to the pearl oysters attached to the continental shelf, more exclusive than that afforded by long usage and actual exploitation. An attempt was made by the Australain Government to work out through legislation a system of pearl fishing licensing in order to claim sovereignty over the continental shelf. The adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf at the Geneva Conference in 1958 reinforced once more the position of the Australian Government. This might have delayed submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice, as previously agreed. Pending the final decision of the Court, the provisional agreement will govern for some time the pearl fisheries operated by the Japanese in the Arafura Sea. This study indicates that the statement issued by the Japanese Government, press comments, and scholars' opinions showed concern for the traditional freedom to fish in the high seas, as well as a continuing interest in preserving that freedom. In the Geneva Conference, the Japanese delegate was not opposed- 28 - Summary and Conclusion The significance of the Australian proclamations of September 11, 1953, lies in the fact that the Australian Government attempted for the first time to establish a specific relationship between the shelf and sedentary fisheries. When negotiations with Japan were broken off, Australia asserted, through these proclamations, an exclusive right to the pearl oysters attached to the continental shelf, more exclusive than that afforded by long usage and actual exploitation. An attempt was made by the Australain Government to work out through legislation a system of pearl fishing licensing in order to claim sovereignty over the continental shelf. The adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf at the Geneva Conference in 1958 reinforced once more the position of the Australian Government. This might have delayed submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice, as previously agreed. Pending the final decision of the Court, the provisional agreement will govern for some time the pearl fisheries operated by the Japanese in the Arafura Sea. This study indicates that the statement issued by the Japanese Government, press comments, and scholars' opinions showed concern for the traditional freedom to fish in the high seas, as well as a continuing interest in preserving that freedom. In the Geneva Conference, the Japanese delegate was not opposed- 28 - Summary and Conclusion The significance of the Australian proclamations of September 11, 1953, lies in the fact that the Australian Government attempted for the first time to establish a specific relationship between the shelf and sedentary fisheries. When negotiations with Japan were broken off, Australia asserted, through these proclamations, an exclusive right to the pearl oysters attached to the continental shelf, more exclusive than that afforded by long usage and actual exploitation. An attempt was made by the Australain Government to work out through legislation a system of pearl fishing licensing in order to claim sovereignty over the continental shelf. The adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf at the Geneva Conference in 1958 reinforced once more the position of the Australian Government. This might have delayed submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice, as previously agreed. Pending the final decision of the Court, the provisional agreement will govern for some time the pearl fisheries operated by the Japanese in the Arafura Sea. This study indicates that the statement issued by the Japanese Government, press comments, and scholars' opinions showed concern for the traditional freedom to fish in the high seas, as well as a continuing interest in preserving that freedom. In the Geneva Conference, the Japanese delegate was not opposed- 28 - Summary and Conclusion The significance of the Australian proclamations of September 11, 1953, lies in the fact that the Australian Government attempted for the first time to establish a specific relationship between the shelf and sedentary fisheries. When negotiations with Japan were broken off, Australia asserted, through these proclamations, an exclusive right to the pearl oysters attached to the continental shelf, more exclusive than that afforded by long usage and actual exploitation. An attempt was made by the Australain Government to work out through legislation a system of pearl fishing licensing in order to claim sovereignty over the continental shelf. The adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf at the Geneva Conference in 1958 reinforced once more the position of the Australian Government. This might have delayed submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice, as previously agreed. Pending the final decision of the Court, the provisional agreement will govern for some time the pearl fisheries operated by the Japanese in the Arafura Sea. This study indicates that the statement issued by the Japanese Government, press comments, and scholars' opinions showed concern for the traditional freedom to fish in the high seas, as well as a continuing interest in preserving that freedom. In the Geneva Conference, the Japanese delegate was not opposed- 29 - to the concepts of the continental shelf. On the contrary, he considered them to be justifiable in view of the need to develop and exploit the mineral resources on the shelf. Neverthless, the Government insisted that they should be limited to mineral resources only. Citing as an example the Truman Declaration of 1945, most scholars' opinions conformed to the Government position. Even Professor Oda, the strong advocator of the freedom of the seas, admitted the necessity of the continental shelf doctrine. In defining Japanese interest in the pearl fisheries in the Arafura Sea, however, he based his claims on historical rights. Under the Convention, which will be in force after the ratification of one more nation, the status of sedentary fisheries will have to be considered in the context of the continental shelf doctrine. It appears that the coastal States' claim to exclusive rights to the exploitation of natural resources on the continental shelf should prevail over that of "historical rights," on which Professor Oda relied. It is expected that the coastal States might intend to legislate enforcement measures to safeguard the continental shelf resources. Such measures implementing the Convention should be considered to be appropriate provided they come within the limits set forth in the Convention. However, the question of enforcement against nations which are not signatories to the Convention would be determined by international law. As stated by a Japanese delegate at the Geneva Conference, the Convention on the Continental Shelf would be binding on the- 29 - to the concepts of the continental shelf. On the contrary, he considered them to be justifiable in view of the need to develop and exploit the mineral resources on the shelf. Neverthless, the Government insisted that they should be limited to mineral resources only. Citing as an example the Truman Declaration of 1945, most scholars' opinions conformed to the Government position. Even Professor Oda, the strong advocator of the freedom of the seas, admitted the necessity of the continental shelf doctrine. In defining Japanese interest in the pearl fisheries in the Arafura Sea, however, he based his claims on historical rights. Under the Convention, which will be in force after the ratification of one more nation, the status of sedentary fisheries will have to be considered in the context of the continental shelf doctrine. It appears that the coastal States' claim to exclusive rights to the exploitation of natural resources on the continental shelf should prevail over that of "historical rights," on which Professor Oda relied. It is expected that the coastal States might intend to legislate enforcement measures to safeguard the continental shelf resources. Such measures implementing the Convention should be considered to be appropriate provided they come within the limits set forth in the Convention. However, the question of enforcement against nations which are not signatories to the Convention would be determined by international law. As stated by a Japanese delegate at the Geneva Conference, the Convention on the Continental Shelf would be binding on the- 29 - to the concepts of the continental shelf. On the contrary, he considered them to be justifiable in view of the need to develop and exploit the mineral resources on the shelf. Neverthless, the Government insisted that they should be limited to mineral resources only. Citing as an example the Truman Declaration of 1945, most scholars' opinions conformed to the Government position. Even Professor Oda, the strong advocator of the freedom of the seas, admitted the necessity of the continental shelf doctrine. In defining Japanese interest in the pearl fisheries in the Arafura Sea, however, he based his claims on historical rights. Under the Convention, which will be in force after the ratification of one more nation, the status of sedentary fisheries will have to be considered in the context of the continental shelf doctrine. It appears that the coastal States' claim to exclusive rights to the exploitation of natural resources on the continental shelf should prevail over that of "historical rights," on which Professor Oda relied. It is expected that the coastal States might intend to legislate enforcement measures to safeguard the continental shelf resources. Such measures implementing the Convention should be considered to be appropriate provided they come within the limits set forth in the Convention. However, the question of enforcement against nations which are not signatories to the Convention would be determined by international law. As stated by a Japanese delegate at the Geneva Conference, the Convention on the Continental Shelf would be binding on the- 29 - to the concepts of the continental shelf. On the contrary, he considered them to be justifiable in view of the need to develop and exploit the mineral resources on the shelf. Neverthless, the Government insisted that they should be limited to mineral resources only. Citing as an example the Truman Declaration of 1945, most scholars' opinions conformed to the Government position. Even Professor Oda, the strong advocator of the freedom of the seas, admitted the necessity of the continental shelf doctrine. In defining Japanese interest in the pearl fisheries in the Arafura Sea, however, he based his claims on historical rights. Under the Convention, which will be in force after the ratification of one more nation, the status of sedentary fisheries will have to be considered in the context of the continental shelf doctrine. It appears that the coastal States' claim to exclusive rights to the exploitation of natural resources on the continental shelf should prevail over that of "historical rights," on which Professor Oda relied. It is expected that the coastal States might intend to legislate enforcement measures to safeguard the continental shelf resources. Such measures implementing the Convention should be considered to be appropriate provided they come within the limits set forth in the Convention. However, the question of enforcement against nations which are not signatories to the Convention would be determined by international law. As stated by a Japanese delegate at the Geneva Conference, the Convention on the Continental Shelf would be binding on the- 29 - to the concepts of the continental shelf. On the contrary, he considered them to be justifiable in view of the need to develop and exploit the mineral resources on the shelf. Neverthless, the Government insisted that they should be limited to mineral resources only. Citing as an example the Truman Declaration of 1945, most scholars' opinions conformed to the Government position. Even Professor Oda, the strong advocator of the freedom of the seas, admitted the necessity of the continental shelf doctrine. In defining Japanese interest in the pearl fisheries in the Arafura Sea, however, he based his claims on historical rights. Under the Convention, which will be in force after the ratification of one more nation, the status of sedentary fisheries will have to be considered in the context of the continental shelf doctrine. It appears that the coastal States' claim to exclusive rights to the exploitation of natural resources on the continental shelf should prevail over that of "historical rights," on which Professor Oda relied. It is expected that the coastal States might intend to legislate enforcement measures to safeguard the continental shelf resources. Such measures implementing the Convention should be considered to be appropriate provided they come within the limits set forth in the Convention. However, the question of enforcement against nations which are not signatories to the Convention would be determined by international law. As stated by a Japanese delegate at the Geneva Conference, the Convention on the Continental Shelf would be binding on the- 30 - parties thereto only. This is perhaps the weakness of multilateral agreements. As an example, Japan's refusal, in the past, to participate in international conventions on whales placed Japanese whalers in an advantegeous position and threateded the success of the whole scheme. However, as evidenced in advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the principle that treaties are instruments intended to create legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto does not necessarily mean that their legal effects are restricted to the parties. As Professor Terasawa pointed out, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, would serve as a guideline in the future, and that Japan would be influenced by it, 58/ especially through the interpretation of the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, in the light of present needs and interests, economic and social repercussions of technical advances, and 58/ The Japanese Government's concern over the future impact of the Convention on Japanese king crab fisheries in the Araska Bay area, has already been expressed. For example, the Asahi Press of July 22, 1963, reported that "if the Convention on the Continental Shelf comes into force, Japanese crab fisheries would inevitably enter into a new phase. In order to cope with the above situation, an appropriate measure is now under discussion by the Fishery Bureau; and the Convention which is regarded as a new barrier against the Japanese fishing industry is also fully studied." On the bill concerning fishing by foreign vessels in the United States territorial waters which was passed in the Senate on October 1, 1963, the same press on October 2, 1963, reported that the bill was purported to prohibit fishing in the territorial waters of the United States and in certain other areas by nationals of the U.S.S.R. and Japan. The paper also reported that the bill would bring a great pressure to Japanese fisheries, especially king crab fishing operations in the Araska Bay area should this be passed by the House of Representatives.- 30 - parties thereto only. This is perhaps the weakness of multilateral agreements. As an example, Japan's refusal, in the past, to participate in international conventions on whales placed Japanese whalers in an advantegeous position and threateded the success of the whole scheme. However, as evidenced in advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the principle that treaties are instruments intended to create legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto does not necessarily mean that their legal effects are restricted to the parties. As Professor Terasawa pointed out, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, would serve as a guideline in the future, and that Japan would be influenced by it, 58/ especially through the interpretation of the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, in the light of present needs and interests, economic and social repercussions of technical advances, and 58/ The Japanese Government's concern over the future impact of the Convention on Japanese king crab fisheries in the Araska Bay area, has already been expressed. For example, the Asahi Press of July 22, 1963, reported that "if the Convention on the Continental Shelf comes into force, Japanese crab fisheries would inevitably enter into a new phase. In order to cope with the above situation, an appropriate measure is now under discussion by the Fishery Bureau; and the Convention which is regarded as a new barrier against the Japanese fishing industry is also fully studied." On the bill concerning fishing by foreign vessels in the United States territorial waters which was passed in the Senate on October 1, 1963, the same press on October 2, 1963, reported that the bill was purported to prohibit fishing in the territorial waters of the United States and in certain other areas by nationals of the U.S.S.R. and Japan. The paper also reported that the bill would bring a great pressure to Japanese fisheries, especially king crab fishing operations in the Araska Bay area should this be passed by the House of Representatives.- 30 - parties thereto only. This is perhaps the weakness of multilateral agreements. As an example, Japan's refusal, in the past, to participate in international conventions on whales placed Japanese whalers in an advantegeous position and threateded the success of the whole scheme. However, as evidenced in advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the principle that treaties are instruments intended to create legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto does not necessarily mean that their legal effects are restricted to the parties. As Professor Terasawa pointed out, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, would serve as a guideline in the future, and that Japan would be influenced by it, 58/ especially through the interpretation of the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, in the light of present needs and interests, economic and social repercussions of technical advances, and 58/ The Japanese Government's concern over the future impact of the Convention on Japanese king crab fisheries in the Araska Bay area, has already been expressed. For example, the Asahi Press of July 22, 1963, reported that "if the Convention on the Continental Shelf comes into force, Japanese crab fisheries would inevitably enter into a new phase. In order to cope with the above situation, an appropriate measure is now under discussion by the Fishery Bureau; and the Convention which is regarded as a new barrier against the Japanese fishing industry is also fully studied." On the bill concerning fishing by foreign vessels in the United States territorial waters which was passed in the Senate on October 1, 1963, the same press on October 2, 1963, reported that the bill was purported to prohibit fishing in the territorial waters of the United States and in certain other areas by nationals of the U.S.S.R. and Japan. The paper also reported that the bill would bring a great pressure to Japanese fisheries, especially king crab fishing operations in the Araska Bay area should this be passed by the House of Representatives.- 30 - parties thereto only. This is perhaps the weakness of multilateral agreements. As an example, Japan's refusal, in the past, to participate in international conventions on whales placed Japanese whalers in an advantegeous position and threateded the success of the whole scheme. However, as evidenced in advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the principle that treaties are instruments intended to create legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto does not necessarily mean that their legal effects are restricted to the parties. As Professor Terasawa pointed out, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, would serve as a guideline in the future, and that Japan would be influenced by it, 58/ especially through the interpretation of the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, in the light of present needs and interests, economic and social repercussions of technical advances, and 58/ The Japanese Government's concern over the future impact of the Convention on Japanese king crab fisheries in the Araska Bay area, has already been expressed. For example, the Asahi Press of July 22, 1963, reported that "if the Convention on the Continental Shelf comes into force, Japanese crab fisheries would inevitably enter into a new phase. In order to cope with the above situation, an appropriate measure is now under discussion by the Fishery Bureau; and the Convention which is regarded as a new barrier against the Japanese fishing industry is also fully studied." On the bill concerning fishing by foreign vessels in the United States territorial waters which was passed in the Senate on October 1, 1963, the same press on October 2, 1963, reported that the bill was purported to prohibit fishing in the territorial waters of the United States and in certain other areas by nationals of the U.S.S.R. and Japan. The paper also reported that the bill would bring a great pressure to Japanese fisheries, especially king crab fishing operations in the Araska Bay area should this be passed by the House of Representatives.- 30 - parties thereto only. This is perhaps the weakness of multilateral agreements. As an example, Japan's refusal, in the past, to participate in international conventions on whales placed Japanese whalers in an advantegeous position and threateded the success of the whole scheme. However, as evidenced in advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the principle that treaties are instruments intended to create legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto does not necessarily mean that their legal effects are restricted to the parties. As Professor Terasawa pointed out, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, would serve as a guideline in the future, and that Japan would be influenced by it, 58/ especially through the interpretation of the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, in the light of present needs and interests, economic and social repercussions of technical advances, and 58/ The Japanese Government's concern over the future impact of the Convention on Japanese king crab fisheries in the Araska Bay area, has already been expressed. For example, the Asahi Press of July 22, 1963, reported that "if the Convention on the Continental Shelf comes into force, Japanese crab fisheries would inevitably enter into a new phase. In order to cope with the above situation, an appropriate measure is now under discussion by the Fishery Bureau; and the Convention which is regarded as a new barrier against the Japanese fishing industry is also fully studied." On the bill concerning fishing by foreign vessels in the United States territorial waters which was passed in the Senate on October 1, 1963, the same press on October 2, 1963, reported that the bill was purported to prohibit fishing in the territorial waters of the United States and in certain other areas by nationals of the U.S.S.R. and Japan. The paper also reported that the bill would bring a great pressure to Japanese fisheries, especially king crab fishing operations in the Araska Bay area should this be passed by the House of Representatives.- 31 - together with defense objectives, the traditional concept of the freedom of the sea needs to be regulated. For instance, if foreign fishermen were to cross the Pacific and begin to exploit Japan's continental shelf resources to be found later, 59/ Japan would regard it as an encroachment upon a vital source of her food supply as well as on the security of Japan. It should be noted that the International Law Commission in its report to the General Assembly, pointed out that considerations of general utility provide a sufficient basis for the principle of the sovereign rights of a coastal State. This is based on general principles relating to the present needs of the international community and is in no way incompatible with the principle of the freedom of the sea. 60/ In another report to the General Assembly, the Commission said that "any freedom that is to be exercised in the interest of all entitled to enjoy it, must be regulated. Hence, the law of the high seas contains rules, most of them already recognized in positive international law, which are designed, not to limit or restrict the freedom of the entire international 59/ So far as we have been able to ascertain from our collection, no continental shelf resources have ever been exploited. At the present time Japan exploits petroleum off the coastal waters of the Akita Prefecture, but it is limited within a three-mile limit. See Shigeru Oda. Tarikudana ni kansuru jôyaku [Convention on the Continental Shelf]. Kokusaihô gaiko gasshi, v. LXIII, No. 1-2 (1959), p. 107. 60/ U. N. 1956 Report, Pa. (7) of the Commentary on Article 68 of the draft of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.- 31 - together with defense objectives, the traditional concept of the freedom of the sea needs to be regulated. For instance, if foreign fishermen were to cross the Pacific and begin to exploit Japan's continental shelf resources to be found later, 59/ Japan would regard it as an encroachment upon a vital source of her food supply as well as on the security of Japan. It should be noted that the International Law Commission in its report to the General Assembly, pointed out that considerations of general utility provide a sufficient basis for the principle of the sovereign rights of a coastal State. This is based on general principles relating to the present needs of the international community and is in no way incompatible with the principle of the freedom of the sea. 60/ In another report to the General Assembly, the Commission said that "any freedom that is to be exercised in the interest of all entitled to enjoy it, must be regulated. Hence, the law of the high seas contains rules, most of them already recognized in positive international law, which are designed, not to limit or restrict the freedom of the entire international 59/ So far as we have been able to ascertain from our collection, no continental shelf resources have ever been exploited. At the present time Japan exploits petroleum off the coastal waters of the Akita Prefecture, but it is limited within a three-mile limit. See Shigeru Oda. Tarikudana ni kansuru jôyaku [Convention on the Continental Shelf]. Kokusaihô gaiko gasshi, v. LXIII, No. 1-2 (1959), p. 107. 60/ U. N. 1956 Report, Pa. (7) of the Commentary on Article 68 of the draft of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.- 31 - together with defense objectives, the traditional concept of the freedom of the sea needs to be regulated. For instance, if foreign fishermen were to cross the Pacific and begin to exploit Japan's continental shelf resources to be found later, 59/ Japan would regard it as an encroachment upon a vital source of her food supply as well as on the security of Japan. It should be noted that the International Law Commission in its report to the General Assembly, pointed out that considerations of general utility provide a sufficient basis for the principle of the sovereign rights of a coastal State. This is based on general principles relating to the present needs of the international community and is in no way incompatible with the principle of the freedom of the sea. 60/ In another report to the General Assembly, the Commission said that "any freedom that is to be exercised in the interest of all entitled to enjoy it, must be regulated. Hence, the law of the high seas contains rules, most of them already recognized in positive international law, which are designed, not to limit or restrict the freedom of the entire international 59/ So far as we have been able to ascertain from our collection, no continental shelf resources have ever been exploited. At the present time Japan exploits petroleum off the coastal waters of the Akita Prefecture, but it is limited within a three-mile limit. See Shigeru Oda. Tarikudana ni kansuru jôyaku [Convention on the Continental Shelf]. Kokusaihô gaiko gasshi, v. LXIII, No. 1-2 (1959), p. 107. 60/ U. N. 1956 Report, Pa. (7) of the Commentary on Article 68 of the draft of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.- 31 - together with defense objectives, the traditional concept of the freedom of the sea needs to be regulated. For instance, if foreign fishermen were to cross the Pacific and begin to exploit Japan's continental shelf resources to be found later, 59/ Japan would regard it as an encroachment upon a vital source of her food supply as well as on the security of Japan. It should be noted that the International Law Commission in its report to the General Assembly, pointed out that considerations of general utility provide a sufficient basis for the principle of the sovereign rights of a coastal State. This is based on general principles relating to the present needs of the international community and is in no way incompatible with the principle of the freedom of the sea. 60/ In another report to the General Assembly, the Commission said that "any freedom that is to be exercised in the interest of all entitled to enjoy it, must be regulated. Hence, the law of the high seas contains rules, most of them already recognized in positive international law, which are designed, not to limit or restrict the freedom of the entire international 59/ So far as we have been able to ascertain from our collection, no continental shelf resources have ever been exploited. At the present time Japan exploits petroleum off the coastal waters of the Akita Prefecture, but it is limited within a three-mile limit. See Shigeru Oda. Tarikudana ni kansuru jôyaku [Convention on the Continental Shelf]. Kokusaihô gaiko gasshi, v. LXIII, No. 1-2 (1959), p. 107. 60/ U. N. 1956 Report, Pa. (7) of the Commentary on Article 68 of the draft of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.- 31 - together with defense objectives, the traditional concept of the freedom of the sea needs to be regulated. For instance, if foreign fishermen were to cross the Pacific and begin to exploit Japan's continental shelf resources to be found later, 59/ Japan would regard it as an encroachment upon a vital source of her food supply as well as on the security of Japan. It should be noted that the International Law Commission in its report to the General Assembly, pointed out that considerations of general utility provide a sufficient basis for the principle of the sovereign rights of a coastal State. This is based on general principles relating to the present needs of the international community and is in no way incompatible with the principle of the freedom of the sea. 60/ In another report to the General Assembly, the Commission said that "any freedom that is to be exercised in the interest of all entitled to enjoy it, must be regulated. Hence, the law of the high seas contains rules, most of them already recognized in positive international law, which are designed, not to limit or restrict the freedom of the entire international 59/ So far as we have been able to ascertain from our collection, no continental shelf resources have ever been exploited. At the present time Japan exploits petroleum off the coastal waters of the Akita Prefecture, but it is limited within a three-mile limit. See Shigeru Oda. Tarikudana ni kansuru jôyaku [Convention on the Continental Shelf]. Kokusaihô gaiko gasshi, v. LXIII, No. 1-2 (1959), p. 107. 60/ U. N. 1956 Report, Pa. (7) of the Commentary on Article 68 of the draft of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.- 32 - community." 61/ Among these rules is mentioned specifically "the right of coastal States with regard to the continental shelf." Widely divergent views on the subject of the sedentary fisheries or debatable application of the principle of prescription, usage, occupation and acquiescence will be rendered largely academic as far as signatories of the Convention are concerned. The extension of the continental shelf doctrine to embrace sedentary fisheries may be not the best solution, as Mr. Young pointed out, 62/ but the absence of a shelf doctrine would probably make the situation more confused and uncertain. The future practice of nations under the Convention will attest to the role of the treaty in developing more definite and useful formulae for the solution of the intricate problems involved in the contunental shelf, especially for the solution of the Japanese- Australian dispute. Prepared by: Dr. Sung Yoon Cho Far Eastern Law Division Law Library Library of Congress 61/ This was reprinted by F. V. Garcia Amador, in his book entitled, The Exploration and conservation of the resources of the sea, Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959, p. 212. 62/ Richard Young. Sedentary Fisheries and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., v. LV (1961). p. 373. SYC:bac - 32 - community." 61/ Among these rules is mentioned specifically "the right of coastal States with regard to the continental shelf." Widely divergent views on the subject of the sedentary fisheries or debatable application of the principle of prescription, usage, occupation and acquiescence will be rendered largely academic as far as signatories of the Convention are concerned. The extension of the continental shelf doctrine to embrace sedentary fisheries may be not the best solution, as Mr. Young pointed out, 62/ but the absence of a shelf doctrine would probably make the situation more confused and uncertain. The future practice of nations under the Convention will attest to the role of the treaty in developing more definite and useful formulae for the solution of the intricate problems involved in the contunental shelf, especially for the solution of the Japanese- Australian dispute. Prepared by: Dr. Sung Yoon Cho Far Eastern Law Division Law Library Library of Congress 61/ This was reprinted by F. V. Garcia Amador, in his book entitled, The Exploration and conservation of the resources of the sea, Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959, p. 212. 62/ Richard Young. Sedentary Fisheries and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., v. LV (1961). p. 373. SYC:bac - 32 - community." 61/ Among these rules is mentioned specifically "the right of coastal States with regard to the continental shelf." Widely divergent views on the subject of the sedentary fisheries or debatable application of the principle of prescription, usage, occupation and acquiescence will be rendered largely academic as far as signatories of the Convention are concerned. The extension of the continental shelf doctrine to embrace sedentary fisheries may be not the best solution, as Mr. Young pointed out, 62/ but the absence of a shelf doctrine would probably make the situation more confused and uncertain. The future practice of nations under the Convention will attest to the role of the treaty in developing more definite and useful formulae for the solution of the intricate problems involved in the contunental shelf, especially for the solution of the Japanese- Australian dispute. Prepared by: Dr. Sung Yoon Cho Far Eastern Law Division Law Library Library of Congress 61/ This was reprinted by F. V. Garcia Amador, in his book entitled, The Exploration and conservation of the resources of the sea, Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959, p. 212. 62/ Richard Young. Sedentary Fisheries and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., v. LV (1961). p. 373. SYC:bac - 32 - community." 61/ Among these rules is mentioned specifically "the right of coastal States with regard to the continental shelf." Widely divergent views on the subject of the sedentary fisheries or debatable application of the principle of prescription, usage, occupation and acquiescence will be rendered largely academic as far as signatories of the Convention are concerned. The extension of the continental shelf doctrine to embrace sedentary fisheries may be not the best solution, as Mr. Young pointed out, 62/ but the absence of a shelf doctrine would probably make the situation more confused and uncertain. The future practice of nations under the Convention will attest to the role of the treaty in developing more definite and useful formulae for the solution of the intricate problems involved in the contunental shelf, especially for the solution of the Japanese- Australian dispute. Prepared by: Dr. Sung Yoon Cho Far Eastern Law Division Law Library Library of Congress 61/ This was reprinted by F. V. Garcia Amador, in his book entitled, The Exploration and conservation of the resources of the sea, Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959, p. 212. 62/ Richard Young. Sedentary Fisheries and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., v. LV (1961). p. 373. SYC:bac - 32 - community." 61/ Among these rules is mentioned specifically "the right of coastal States with regard to the continental shelf." Widely divergent views on the subject of the sedentary fisheries or debatable application of the principle of prescription, usage, occupation and acquiescence will be rendered largely academic as far as signatories of the Convention are concerned. The extension of the continental shelf doctrine to embrace sedentary fisheries may be not the best solution, as Mr. Young pointed out, 62/ but the absence of a shelf doctrine would probably make the situation more confused and uncertain. The future practice of nations under the Convention will attest to the role of the treaty in developing more definite and useful formulae for the solution of the intricate problems involved in the contunental shelf, especially for the solution of the Japanese- Australian dispute. Prepared by: Dr. Sung Yoon Cho Far Eastern Law Division Law Library Library of Congress 61/ This was reprinted by F. V. Garcia Amador, in his book entitled, The Exploration and conservation of the resources of the sea, Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959, p. 212. 62/ Richard Young. Sedentary Fisheries and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L., v. LV (1961). p. 373. SYC:bac SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ENGLISH Books Colombos, C. John. The International law of the sea. London, Longmans, 1959. Garcia Amador y Rodriguez, F. V. The Exploitation and conservation of the resources of the sea. Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959. The Japan Annual. Tokyo, 1958. pp. 95-96; 162-163. Leonard, L. Larry. International regulation of fisheries. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944. McDougal, Myres S. and William T. Burke. The Public order of the oceans. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962. Riesenfeld, Stefan A. Protection of coastal fisheries under international law. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1942. Periodicals and others Bishop, W. William. Need for a Japanese Fisheries Agreement. A.J.I.L., v. XLV, No. 4 (1951), pp. 712-719. Commonwealth Acts (Australia). v. I (1952). Commonwealth Acts (Australia). 1953. Goldie, L. F. E. The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries off the Australian Coasts. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1, (1953), pp. 84-95. The Nippon Time, Tokyo, Sept. 17, 1953. Oda, Shigeru. The Continental Shelf. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 1 (1957), pp. 15-37. __________, Japan and the International Fisheries. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 4 (1960), pp. 50-62.SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ENGLISH Books Colombos, C. John. The International law of the sea. London, Longmans, 1959. Garcia Amador y Rodriguez, F. V. The Exploitation and conservation of the resources of the sea. Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959. The Japan Annual. Tokyo, 1958. pp. 95-96; 162-163. Leonard, L. Larry. International regulation of fisheries. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944. McDougal, Myres S. and William T. Burke. The Public order of the oceans. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962. Riesenfeld, Stefan A. Protection of coastal fisheries under international law. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1942. Periodicals and others Bishop, W. William. Need for a Japanese Fisheries Agreement. A.J.I.L., v. XLV, No. 4 (1951), pp. 712-719. Commonwealth Acts (Australia). v. I (1952). Commonwealth Acts (Australia). 1953. Goldie, L. F. E. The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries off the Australian Coasts. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1, (1953), pp. 84-95. The Nippon Time, Tokyo, Sept. 17, 1953. Oda, Shigeru. The Continental Shelf. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 1 (1957), pp. 15-37. __________, Japan and the International Fisheries. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 4 (1960), pp. 50-62.SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ENGLISH Books Colombos, C. John. The International law of the sea. London, Longmans, 1959. Garcia Amador y Rodriguez, F. V. The Exploitation and conservation of the resources of the sea. Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959. The Japan Annual. Tokyo, 1958. pp. 95-96; 162-163. Leonard, L. Larry. International regulation of fisheries. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944. McDougal, Myres S. and William T. Burke. The Public order of the oceans. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962. Riesenfeld, Stefan A. Protection of coastal fisheries under international law. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1942. Periodicals and others Bishop, W. William. Need for a Japanese Fisheries Agreement. A.J.I.L., v. XLV, No. 4 (1951), pp. 712-719. Commonwealth Acts (Australia). v. I (1952). Commonwealth Acts (Australia). 1953. Goldie, L. F. E. The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries off the Australian Coasts. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1, (1953), pp. 84-95. The Nippon Time, Tokyo, Sept. 17, 1953. Oda, Shigeru. The Continental Shelf. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 1 (1957), pp. 15-37. __________, Japan and the International Fisheries. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 4 (1960), pp. 50-62.SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ENGLISH Books Colombos, C. John. The International law of the sea. London, Longmans, 1959. Garcia Amador y Rodriguez, F. V. The Exploitation and conservation of the resources of the sea. Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959. The Japan Annual. Tokyo, 1958. pp. 95-96; 162-163. Leonard, L. Larry. International regulation of fisheries. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944. McDougal, Myres S. and William T. Burke. The Public order of the oceans. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962. Riesenfeld, Stefan A. Protection of coastal fisheries under international law. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1942. Periodicals and others Bishop, W. William. Need for a Japanese Fisheries Agreement. A.J.I.L., v. XLV, No. 4 (1951), pp. 712-719. Commonwealth Acts (Australia). v. I (1952). Commonwealth Acts (Australia). 1953. Goldie, L. F. E. The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries off the Australian Coasts. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1, (1953), pp. 84-95. The Nippon Time, Tokyo, Sept. 17, 1953. Oda, Shigeru. The Continental Shelf. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 1 (1957), pp. 15-37. __________, Japan and the International Fisheries. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 4 (1960), pp. 50-62.SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ENGLISH Books Colombos, C. John. The International law of the sea. London, Longmans, 1959. Garcia Amador y Rodriguez, F. V. The Exploitation and conservation of the resources of the sea. Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959. The Japan Annual. Tokyo, 1958. pp. 95-96; 162-163. Leonard, L. Larry. International regulation of fisheries. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944. McDougal, Myres S. and William T. Burke. The Public order of the oceans. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962. Riesenfeld, Stefan A. Protection of coastal fisheries under international law. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1942. Periodicals and others Bishop, W. William. Need for a Japanese Fisheries Agreement. A.J.I.L., v. XLV, No. 4 (1951), pp. 712-719. Commonwealth Acts (Australia). v. I (1952). Commonwealth Acts (Australia). 1953. Goldie, L. F. E. The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries off the Australian Coasts. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1, (1953), pp. 84-95. The Nippon Time, Tokyo, Sept. 17, 1953. Oda, Shigeru. The Continental Shelf. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 1 (1957), pp. 15-37. __________, Japan and the International Fisheries. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 4 (1960), pp. 50-62.-2- Oda, Shigeru. Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 2, (1958), pp. 65-86 _____. A Reconsideration of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Tulane Law Review, v. XXXII, No. 1 (1957), pp. 21-36. Pankhurst, D. T. The Fisheries Act and the Pearl Fisheries Act. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), pp. 96-104. U.N. A/CN.4/60-75 (1953). U.N. ST/LEG/SER. B/5-6 (1955). U.N. Treaty Series, 191-192, (1954). Young, Richard. Sedentary Fisheries and the Conference on the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L, v. LV (1961), p.373. JAPANESE Books Iwamoto, Michio. Shin gygyôhô nokaisetau [Commentary of the New Fisheries Law]. Tokyo, Suisansha, 1962. Japan. Agricultural & Forestry Ministry. Nôrin hakusho [White paper of agriculture and forestry], 1957. Japan. Fishery Bureau. Mihonkai seinankaiiki no sokobikiami gyogyô to sono shigen [Trawler fishing and its resources in the Japan Sea and the South-east Sea areas], 1960. Shinobu, Jumpei. Kai jô kekusaihô ron [Treatise on maritime international law]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1957. Suisan nenkan 1962 [The fishery year book]. Tokyo, Suisanshe, 1961.-2- Oda, Shigeru. Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 2, (1958), pp. 65-86 _____. A Reconsideration of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Tulane Law Review, v. XXXII, No. 1 (1957), pp. 21-36. Pankhurst, D. T. The Fisheries Act and the Pearl Fisheries Act. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), pp. 96-104. U.N. A/CN.4/60-75 (1953). U.N. ST/LEG/SER. B/5-6 (1955). U.N. Treaty Series, 191-192, (1954). Young, Richard. Sedentary Fisheries and the Conference on the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L, v. LV (1961), p.373. JAPANESE Books Iwamoto, Michio. Shin gygyôhô nokaisetau [Commentary of the New Fisheries Law]. Tokyo, Suisansha, 1962. Japan. Agricultural & Forestry Ministry. Nôrin hakusho [White paper of agriculture and forestry], 1957. Japan. Fishery Bureau. Mihonkai seinankaiiki no sokobikiami gyogyô to sono shigen [Trawler fishing and its resources in the Japan Sea and the South-east Sea areas], 1960. Shinobu, Jumpei. Kai jô kekusaihô ron [Treatise on maritime international law]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1957. Suisan nenkan 1962 [The fishery year book]. Tokyo, Suisanshe, 1961.-2- Oda, Shigeru. Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 2, (1958), pp. 65-86 _____. A Reconsideration of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Tulane Law Review, v. XXXII, No. 1 (1957), pp. 21-36. Pankhurst, D. T. The Fisheries Act and the Pearl Fisheries Act. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), pp. 96-104. U.N. A/CN.4/60-75 (1953). U.N. ST/LEG/SER. B/5-6 (1955). U.N. Treaty Series, 191-192, (1954). Young, Richard. Sedentary Fisheries and the Conference on the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L, v. LV (1961), p.373. JAPANESE Books Iwamoto, Michio. Shin gygyôhô nokaisetau [Commentary of the New Fisheries Law]. Tokyo, Suisansha, 1962. Japan. Agricultural & Forestry Ministry. Nôrin hakusho [White paper of agriculture and forestry], 1957. Japan. Fishery Bureau. Mihonkai seinankaiiki no sokobikiami gyogyô to sono shigen [Trawler fishing and its resources in the Japan Sea and the South-east Sea areas], 1960. Shinobu, Jumpei. Kai jô kekusaihô ron [Treatise on maritime international law]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1957. Suisan nenkan 1962 [The fishery year book]. Tokyo, Suisanshe, 1961.-2- Oda, Shigeru. Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 2, (1958), pp. 65-86 _____. A Reconsideration of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Tulane Law Review, v. XXXII, No. 1 (1957), pp. 21-36. Pankhurst, D. T. The Fisheries Act and the Pearl Fisheries Act. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), pp. 96-104. U.N. A/CN.4/60-75 (1953). U.N. ST/LEG/SER. B/5-6 (1955). U.N. Treaty Series, 191-192, (1954). Young, Richard. Sedentary Fisheries and the Conference on the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L, v. LV (1961), p.373. JAPANESE Books Iwamoto, Michio. Shin gygyôhô nokaisetau [Commentary of the New Fisheries Law]. Tokyo, Suisansha, 1962. Japan. Agricultural & Forestry Ministry. Nôrin hakusho [White paper of agriculture and forestry], 1957. Japan. Fishery Bureau. Mihonkai seinankaiiki no sokobikiami gyogyô to sono shigen [Trawler fishing and its resources in the Japan Sea and the South-east Sea areas], 1960. Shinobu, Jumpei. Kai jô kekusaihô ron [Treatise on maritime international law]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1957. Suisan nenkan 1962 [The fishery year book]. Tokyo, Suisanshe, 1961.-2- Oda, Shigeru. Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 2, (1958), pp. 65-86 _____. A Reconsideration of the Continental Shelf Doctrine. Tulane Law Review, v. XXXII, No. 1 (1957), pp. 21-36. Pankhurst, D. T. The Fisheries Act and the Pearl Fisheries Act. Sydney Law Review, v. I, No. 1 (1953), pp. 96-104. U.N. A/CN.4/60-75 (1953). U.N. ST/LEG/SER. B/5-6 (1955). U.N. Treaty Series, 191-192, (1954). Young, Richard. Sedentary Fisheries and the Conference on the Continental Shelf. A.J.I.L, v. LV (1961), p.373. JAPANESE Books Iwamoto, Michio. Shin gygyôhô nokaisetau [Commentary of the New Fisheries Law]. Tokyo, Suisansha, 1962. Japan. Agricultural & Forestry Ministry. Nôrin hakusho [White paper of agriculture and forestry], 1957. Japan. Fishery Bureau. Mihonkai seinankaiiki no sokobikiami gyogyô to sono shigen [Trawler fishing and its resources in the Japan Sea and the South-east Sea areas], 1960. Shinobu, Jumpei. Kai jô kekusaihô ron [Treatise on maritime international law]. Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1957. Suisan nenkan 1962 [The fishery year book]. Tokyo, Suisanshe, 1961.-3- Periodicals and others Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 19, 1953. Irie, Keishirô. Geneva Kaiyôhô Kaigi no seika. [The Result of the Geneva Conference]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXX, No. 6 (1958), pp. 55-58. _________. Nihon Kôwa Jôyaku no kenkyû. [Study of the Peace Treaty with Japan]. Tokyo, Itagaki Shôten, 1951. _________. Rhee Line o meguru kokusaihôjô no mondai [Problems Arising from Rhee Line under International Law]. Jiyûto seigi, v. X, No. 7 (1959), pp. 13-17. Koh, Kwang Lim. The Continental Shelf and the International Law Commission. Boston University Law Review, v. XXXV, No. 4 (1955), pp. 522-540. Nakamura, Akira, Igirisu. Nolway gyogyô jiken no kokusaihôteki igi [The Decision of the International Court of Justice concerning the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], v. LVI, No. 3 (1957), pp. 240-274. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Sept. 18, 1953. Oda, Shigeru. Kokusai kaiyôhô kaigi (4) [Conference on the Law of the Sea (4)]. Juristo, No. 158 (1958), pp. 38-42. _________. Syngman Rhee sengen no ihôsei [Illegality of the Proclamation by Syngman Rhee]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXV, No. 10 (1953), pp. 82-87. _________. Teichaku gyogyô no hôri [Legal Theory of Sedentary Fisheries]. Juristo, No. 45 (1953). Ôhira, Zengo. Tairikudana no hôri [The Theory of Continental Shelf]. Hikakuhô zasshi [Comparative Law Review], v. II, No. 1 (1953), pp. 1-69. _________. Tairikudana to hozon suiiki [Continental Shelf and Fishery Conservation Zone]. Hitotsubashi ronsô, v. XXX, No. 3 (1953), pp. 108-128. Okuhara, Hideo. Wagakuni kokusai gyogyô no riron to mondai [Policy and Problems of Japanese International Fisheries]. The Reference, No. 112 (1960), pp. 1-66.-3- Periodicals and others Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 19, 1953. Irie, Keishirô. Geneva Kaiyôhô Kaigi no seika. [The Result of the Geneva Conference]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXX, No. 6 (1958), pp. 55-58. _________. Nihon Kôwa Jôyaku no kenkyû. [Study of the Peace Treaty with Japan]. Tokyo, Itagaki Shôten, 1951. _________. Rhee Line o meguru kokusaihôjô no mondai [Problems Arising from Rhee Line under International Law]. Jiyûto seigi, v. X, No. 7 (1959), pp. 13-17. Koh, Kwang Lim. The Continental Shelf and the International Law Commission. Boston University Law Review, v. XXXV, No. 4 (1955), pp. 522-540. Nakamura, Akira, Igirisu. Nolway gyogyô jiken no kokusaihôteki igi [The Decision of the International Court of Justice concerning the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], v. LVI, No. 3 (1957), pp. 240-274. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Sept. 18, 1953. Oda, Shigeru. Kokusai kaiyôhô kaigi (4) [Conference on the Law of the Sea (4)]. Juristo, No. 158 (1958), pp. 38-42. _________. Syngman Rhee sengen no ihôsei [Illegality of the Proclamation by Syngman Rhee]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXV, No. 10 (1953), pp. 82-87. _________. Teichaku gyogyô no hôri [Legal Theory of Sedentary Fisheries]. Juristo, No. 45 (1953). Ôhira, Zengo. Tairikudana no hôri [The Theory of Continental Shelf]. Hikakuhô zasshi [Comparative Law Review], v. II, No. 1 (1953), pp. 1-69. _________. Tairikudana to hozon suiiki [Continental Shelf and Fishery Conservation Zone]. Hitotsubashi ronsô, v. XXX, No. 3 (1953), pp. 108-128. Okuhara, Hideo. Wagakuni kokusai gyogyô no riron to mondai [Policy and Problems of Japanese International Fisheries]. The Reference, No. 112 (1960), pp. 1-66.-3- Periodicals and others Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 19, 1953. Irie, Keishirô. Geneva Kaiyôhô Kaigi no seika. [The Result of the Geneva Conference]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXX, No. 6 (1958), pp. 55-58. _________. Nihon Kôwa Jôyaku no kenkyû. [Study of the Peace Treaty with Japan]. Tokyo, Itagaki Shôten, 1951. _________. Rhee Line o meguru kokusaihôjô no mondai [Problems Arising from Rhee Line under International Law]. Jiyûto seigi, v. X, No. 7 (1959), pp. 13-17. Koh, Kwang Lim. The Continental Shelf and the International Law Commission. Boston University Law Review, v. XXXV, No. 4 (1955), pp. 522-540. Nakamura, Akira, Igirisu. Nolway gyogyô jiken no kokusaihôteki igi [The Decision of the International Court of Justice concerning the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], v. LVI, No. 3 (1957), pp. 240-274. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Sept. 18, 1953. Oda, Shigeru. Kokusai kaiyôhô kaigi (4) [Conference on the Law of the Sea (4)]. Juristo, No. 158 (1958), pp. 38-42. _________. Syngman Rhee sengen no ihôsei [Illegality of the Proclamation by Syngman Rhee]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXV, No. 10 (1953), pp. 82-87. _________. Teichaku gyogyô no hôri [Legal Theory of Sedentary Fisheries]. Juristo, No. 45 (1953). Ôhira, Zengo. Tairikudana no hôri [The Theory of Continental Shelf]. Hikakuhô zasshi [Comparative Law Review], v. II, No. 1 (1953), pp. 1-69. _________. Tairikudana to hozon suiiki [Continental Shelf and Fishery Conservation Zone]. Hitotsubashi ronsô, v. XXX, No. 3 (1953), pp. 108-128. Okuhara, Hideo. Wagakuni kokusai gyogyô no riron to mondai [Policy and Problems of Japanese International Fisheries]. The Reference, No. 112 (1960), pp. 1-66.-3- Periodicals and others Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 19, 1953. Irie, Keishirô. Geneva Kaiyôhô Kaigi no seika. [The Result of the Geneva Conference]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXX, No. 6 (1958), pp. 55-58. _________. Nihon Kôwa Jôyaku no kenkyû. [Study of the Peace Treaty with Japan]. Tokyo, Itagaki Shôten, 1951. _________. Rhee Line o meguru kokusaihôjô no mondai [Problems Arising from Rhee Line under International Law]. Jiyûto seigi, v. X, No. 7 (1959), pp. 13-17. Koh, Kwang Lim. The Continental Shelf and the International Law Commission. Boston University Law Review, v. XXXV, No. 4 (1955), pp. 522-540. Nakamura, Akira, Igirisu. Nolway gyogyô jiken no kokusaihôteki igi [The Decision of the International Court of Justice concerning the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], v. LVI, No. 3 (1957), pp. 240-274. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Sept. 18, 1953. Oda, Shigeru. Kokusai kaiyôhô kaigi (4) [Conference on the Law of the Sea (4)]. Juristo, No. 158 (1958), pp. 38-42. _________. Syngman Rhee sengen no ihôsei [Illegality of the Proclamation by Syngman Rhee]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXV, No. 10 (1953), pp. 82-87. _________. Teichaku gyogyô no hôri [Legal Theory of Sedentary Fisheries]. Juristo, No. 45 (1953). Ôhira, Zengo. Tairikudana no hôri [The Theory of Continental Shelf]. Hikakuhô zasshi [Comparative Law Review], v. II, No. 1 (1953), pp. 1-69. _________. Tairikudana to hozon suiiki [Continental Shelf and Fishery Conservation Zone]. Hitotsubashi ronsô, v. XXX, No. 3 (1953), pp. 108-128. Okuhara, Hideo. Wagakuni kokusai gyogyô no riron to mondai [Policy and Problems of Japanese International Fisheries]. The Reference, No. 112 (1960), pp. 1-66.-3- Periodicals and others Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 19, 1953. Irie, Keishirô. Geneva Kaiyôhô Kaigi no seika. [The Result of the Geneva Conference]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXX, No. 6 (1958), pp. 55-58. _________. Nihon Kôwa Jôyaku no kenkyû. [Study of the Peace Treaty with Japan]. Tokyo, Itagaki Shôten, 1951. _________. Rhee Line o meguru kokusaihôjô no mondai [Problems Arising from Rhee Line under International Law]. Jiyûto seigi, v. X, No. 7 (1959), pp. 13-17. Koh, Kwang Lim. The Continental Shelf and the International Law Commission. Boston University Law Review, v. XXXV, No. 4 (1955), pp. 522-540. Nakamura, Akira, Igirisu. Nolway gyogyô jiken no kokusaihôteki igi [The Decision of the International Court of Justice concerning the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case]. Kokusaihô gaikô zasshi [The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], v. LVI, No. 3 (1957), pp. 240-274. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Sept. 18, 1953. Oda, Shigeru. Kokusai kaiyôhô kaigi (4) [Conference on the Law of the Sea (4)]. Juristo, No. 158 (1958), pp. 38-42. _________. Syngman Rhee sengen no ihôsei [Illegality of the Proclamation by Syngman Rhee]. Hôritsu jihô, v. XXV, No. 10 (1953), pp. 82-87. _________. Teichaku gyogyô no hôri [Legal Theory of Sedentary Fisheries]. Juristo, No. 45 (1953). Ôhira, Zengo. Tairikudana no hôri [The Theory of Continental Shelf]. Hikakuhô zasshi [Comparative Law Review], v. II, No. 1 (1953), pp. 1-69. _________. Tairikudana to hozon suiiki [Continental Shelf and Fishery Conservation Zone]. Hitotsubashi ronsô, v. XXX, No. 3 (1953), pp. 108-128. Okuhara, Hideo. Wagakuni kokusai gyogyô no riron to mondai [Policy and Problems of Japanese International Fisheries]. The Reference, No. 112 (1960), pp. 1-66.- 4 - Sugiyama, Shigeo. Rhee Line to chôsen bôeisuiiki [Rhee Line and Sea Defense Zones in Korean Waters]. The Reference, No. 33 (1953), pp. 1-10. Suisan jihô, v. XIV (Oct. 1962), pp. 25-28. Taoka, Ryôichi and Minemura Shigeru. Kokusaihô [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1957. Taoka, Ryôichi. Kokusaihô kôgi [Lecture on International Law]. Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1955. Terasawa, Hajime. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru jôyaku no she mondai [Various Problems arising from the Conventions on the Law of the Sea]. Horitsu jihô, v. LXXX, No. 8 (1958), pp. 14-17; 79. _____________. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru shojôyaku [Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, v. LXXII, No. 7 (1958), pp. 47-74. Tokyo Shimbun, Sept. 19, 1953. Tsuruoka, Senjin. Kokuren kokusaihô linkai no tairikudana ni kansuru gyôseki no kentô to ketsuron [Evaluation and Conclusion of the Achievements by the International Law Commission regarding the Continental Shelf]. Juristo, No. 69 (1954), pp. 25-33. Prepared by: Dr. Sung Yoon Cho Far Eastern Law Division Law Library Library of Congress SYC:bac- 4 - Sugiyama, Shigeo. Rhee Line to chôsen bôeisuiiki [Rhee Line and Sea Defense Zones in Korean Waters]. The Reference, No. 33 (1953), pp. 1-10. Suisan jihô, v. XIV (Oct. 1962), pp. 25-28. Taoka, Ryôichi and Minemura Shigeru. Kokusaihô [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1957. Taoka, Ryôichi. Kokusaihô kôgi [Lecture on International Law]. Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1955. Terasawa, Hajime. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru jôyaku no she mondai [Various Problems arising from the Conventions on the Law of the Sea]. Horitsu jihô, v. LXXX, No. 8 (1958), pp. 14-17; 79. _____________. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru shojôyaku [Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, v. LXXII, No. 7 (1958), pp. 47-74. Tokyo Shimbun, Sept. 19, 1953. Tsuruoka, Senjin. Kokuren kokusaihô linkai no tairikudana ni kansuru gyôseki no kentô to ketsuron [Evaluation and Conclusion of the Achievements by the International Law Commission regarding the Continental Shelf]. Juristo, No. 69 (1954), pp. 25-33. Prepared by: Dr. Sung Yoon Cho Far Eastern Law Division Law Library Library of Congress SYC:bac- 4 - Sugiyama, Shigeo. Rhee Line to chôsen bôeisuiiki [Rhee Line and Sea Defense Zones in Korean Waters]. The Reference, No. 33 (1953), pp. 1-10. Suisan jihô, v. XIV (Oct. 1962), pp. 25-28. Taoka, Ryôichi and Minemura Shigeru. Kokusaihô [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1957. Taoka, Ryôichi. Kokusaihô kôgi [Lecture on International Law]. Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1955. Terasawa, Hajime. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru jôyaku no she mondai [Various Problems arising from the Conventions on the Law of the Sea]. Horitsu jihô, v. LXXX, No. 8 (1958), pp. 14-17; 79. _____________. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru shojôyaku [Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, v. LXXII, No. 7 (1958), pp. 47-74. Tokyo Shimbun, Sept. 19, 1953. Tsuruoka, Senjin. Kokuren kokusaihô linkai no tairikudana ni kansuru gyôseki no kentô to ketsuron [Evaluation and Conclusion of the Achievements by the International Law Commission regarding the Continental Shelf]. Juristo, No. 69 (1954), pp. 25-33. Prepared by: Dr. Sung Yoon Cho Far Eastern Law Division Law Library Library of Congress SYC:bac- 4 - Sugiyama, Shigeo. Rhee Line to chôsen bôeisuiiki [Rhee Line and Sea Defense Zones in Korean Waters]. The Reference, No. 33 (1953), pp. 1-10. Suisan jihô, v. XIV (Oct. 1962), pp. 25-28. Taoka, Ryôichi and Minemura Shigeru. Kokusaihô [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1957. Taoka, Ryôichi. Kokusaihô kôgi [Lecture on International Law]. Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1955. Terasawa, Hajime. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru jôyaku no she mondai [Various Problems arising from the Conventions on the Law of the Sea]. Horitsu jihô, v. LXXX, No. 8 (1958), pp. 14-17; 79. _____________. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru shojôyaku [Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, v. LXXII, No. 7 (1958), pp. 47-74. Tokyo Shimbun, Sept. 19, 1953. Tsuruoka, Senjin. Kokuren kokusaihô linkai no tairikudana ni kansuru gyôseki no kentô to ketsuron [Evaluation and Conclusion of the Achievements by the International Law Commission regarding the Continental Shelf]. Juristo, No. 69 (1954), pp. 25-33. Prepared by: Dr. Sung Yoon Cho Far Eastern Law Division Law Library Library of Congress SYC:bac- 4 - Sugiyama, Shigeo. Rhee Line to chôsen bôeisuiiki [Rhee Line and Sea Defense Zones in Korean Waters]. The Reference, No. 33 (1953), pp. 1-10. Suisan jihô, v. XIV (Oct. 1962), pp. 25-28. Taoka, Ryôichi and Minemura Shigeru. Kokusaihô [International Law]. Tokyo, Aobayashi Shoin, 1957. Taoka, Ryôichi. Kokusaihô kôgi [Lecture on International Law]. Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1955. Terasawa, Hajime. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru jôyaku no she mondai [Various Problems arising from the Conventions on the Law of the Sea]. Horitsu jihô, v. LXXX, No. 8 (1958), pp. 14-17; 79. _____________. Kaiyôhô ni kansuru shojôyaku [Conventions on the Law of the Sea. Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, v. LXXII, No. 7 (1958), pp. 47-74. Tokyo Shimbun, Sept. 19, 1953. Tsuruoka, Senjin. Kokuren kokusaihô linkai no tairikudana ni kansuru gyôseki no kentô to ketsuron [Evaluation and Conclusion of the Achievements by the International Law Commission regarding the Continental Shelf]. Juristo, No. 69 (1954), pp. 25-33. Prepared by: Dr. Sung Yoon Cho Far Eastern Law Division Law Library Library of Congress SYC:bac