NAWSA SUBJECT FILE Coolidge, Calvin THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS And on the DEMOCRACY which gives it EXISTENCE September-October, 1924 'Washington, D. C. 20c a Copy THE PLAIN TRUTH ABOUT CALVIN COOLIDGE By Lynn Haines An Unbiased Picture of the Coolidge Background, Ability and Character--Bill Collecting and Petty Politics--"Bellhopping for the Bosses"--Taken Up and Put Through The Massachusetts "Succession" by the Crane Machine--His Record As Legislator and Governor--Three Revealing Episodes What Coolidge Was and Did in The Boston Police Strike Tragedy As Governor: The Burrell Case in Massachusetts As President: Slempian Politics in Washington Volume X (Copyrighted 1924: by The Searchlight Publishing Co.) Number 2 Why These Revelations of Calvin Coolidge AS BOY AND MAN, no American ever had a more reverential attitude toward the Presidency of the United States than I. That respect for this high office is stronger today than ever before. It is a position far too vital and sacred to be prostituted by politics, or occupied by anyone unworthy and unqualified. Calvin Coolidge is too much politician and too little statesman to be at the head of the greatest Anglo-Saxon nation. He is woefully lacking in character and equipment. With no prejudice, and without preconceived conclusions, representatives of The Searchlight devoted weeks, in Massachusetts and Washington, to a patient, thorough investigation of the public life of Coolidge. The results of that searching into his methods and motives take up all of this issue. Their presentation is a duty I owe to my country, a token of my high regard for the Presidency. So here you get a portrayal of the real Coolidge, not as the propagandists have pictured him, but as his own acts reveal the truth. Indecision is his outstanding characteristic. He says little because he thinks little and knows little. Misfortune—to others—has never stirred him to two-fisted fighting, and never will. Misfortune—to others—has been largely the foundation of the Coolidge career. Each of his greatest advancements came directly from the womb of tragedy: A predecessor's defeat game him his chance to become President of the Massachusetts Senate, with the inevitable, machine- controlled sequence of Lieutenant Governor and Governor. Next came the Boston police strike, which left easily avoidable death and devastation in its wake—that gave him the Vice Presidency. Then Harding died, and he thus became President. The Boston calamity was his political chariot. The Harding hearse carried him into the White House. These are harsh facts, you may say. They are. But remember, always, that the victims of tragedy are more to be considered than its accidental beneficiaries. The American people today are most in need of sympathy and succor. The welfare of the American nation is paramount to any personal or political objective. The great calamity, in a Republic, is for the voters not to have the facts upon which to base their judgment. That is why this is a Coolidge number. LYNN HAINES. ------------------------------ THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS LENOX BUILDING. WASHINGTON, D. C. Enclosed is $______________for_____________year's subscription. Name__________________________________________ Address_______________________________________ City______________________ State________________ Subscription, $2.00 per year—Please send check or money order to above address. CONTENTS Page The Plain Truth About Calvin Coolidge By Lynn Haines _ _ _ _ _ _ 3 The Real Coolidge Character _ _ _ 4 Coolidge's Massachusetts Record _ _ 4 The Machine Takes Him Up _ _ _ 5 When Coolidge Was Governor _ _ 5 An Elastic Contingent Fund _ _ _ 6 Coolidge as Vice President _ _ _ 7 Coolidge as President _ _ _ _ _ 7 The Boston Police Strike Tragedy _ 9 When Public Office Was a Private Trust (The Burrell Case) _ _ 17 When Stearns Spoke _ _ _ _ _ 18 Political Broker Chosen Coolidge Secretary _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 19 Clean the Augean Stables _ _ _ _ 23 The Pro-Coolidge Propaganda _ _ 23 ============================ Extra copies of this number will be mailed postpaid to one address upon receipt of check or money order at the following rates: ten for $1.50; twenty-five for $3.50; fifty for $6.00; one hundred for $10.00. ============================ THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS And on the DEMOCRACY which gives it EXISTENCE LYNN HAINES, Editor DORA B. HAINES, Business Manager _________________________________________ Published Monthly by The Searchlight Publishing Company PRESIDENT—JAMES H. McGILL TREASURER—DORA B. HAINES Lenox Building Washington, D. C. _________________________________________ Subscription rate: $2.00 a year. Single copies 20 cents. Entered as second-class matter May 26, 1919, at the Postoffice at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3,1879. THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS 3 The Plain Truth About Calvin Coolidge By LYNN HAINES THE untimely death of President Harding saved Calvin Coolidge from political obscurity. As Vice President, he had failed to impress the party bosses. There was too great a lack of color in his character and conduct. He had not proved, nor merited, any elements of popular strength. Accordingly, he was slated for the discard. No renomination would have come to him. Had Harding lived, it would have meant the political end of Coolidge. Suddenly all that has changed. Becoming President by the passing of Harding, Coolidge fell heir to the existing federal machine. Instead of being any longer subordinate to and dependent upon the bosses, the political powers of his accidental position made him their master. That at once settled the issue of the nomination. No outsider has any chance in a Republican Convention. It is a performance of, by and for the party machine. Through patronage and prestige, any President can nominate himself. Of course, he decided and determined upon his own candidacy. So Calvin Coolidge is the Republican nominee. The people have little or nothing to do with presidential nominations. Those are matters of manipulation which the electorate does not and cannot control. But the voters do have the opportunity to make a choice in the election. That decision should be based upon the most complete and impartial information as to the equipment and record of the candidates. Therefore, we here present the plain truth about the public career of Calvin Coolidge. Summed up, it amounts to this: The Coolidge boyhood was colorless. During his educational days no distinctive attainments or characteristics stand out. As an attorney he did not rise above the pettiest of local litigation, practically all of his "law business" being his collection of bills. Like many unsuccessful lawyers, he turned to politics. The beginnings of his political activities were small offices and small services for the dominant bosses. Being "loyal, industrious and unquestioning," he was taken up by the old Crane machine in Massachusetts. Proving "faithful" at all times and in all situations, he passed each grade of the Old Guard school, finally graduating into the Governorship. That was the Murray Crane method—the bay state system. Once started, a "regular" politician went to the top—unless he showed signs of independence and made trouble for the machine. Then came the attempt of capital to deal a crushing blow to labor, through the Boston police strike— one of the most tragic and misunderstood incidents in American history. At first Coolidge dodged responsibility—until all seeming danger of a political mistake was past. After the easily preventable calamity of rioting and bloodshed, with public opinion falsely founded, he assumed the authority that had been several times disclaimed and capitalized the episode into the Vice Presidency. * * * The Real Coolidge Character PEOPLE are accustomed to think of Calvin Coolidge as a man of mystery. There is nothing mysterious in or about him. No politician has ever steered a more clearly charted course. His mentality is accurately measurable; his methods and motives are an open book. He never once defined an issue upon which to stand for advancement. Always did he ally himself to forces that would carry him forward without effort on his part. Fighting the preferment was wholly alien to his political nature. Without exception, it has been his policy patiently to wait until opportunism and the "powers that be" should be joined in his favor. Indecision is the chief Coolidge characteristic. Inaction will, in time, remove the necessity for action. Coolidge knows that, thoroughly, and applies it to all embarrassing situations. Accordingly, he acts only when circumstances actually compel him to do so. A farmer would describe him as "better at the breeching than the tugs." In politics do nothing that is not imperatively necessary; defer decisions until they are no longer dangerous; make no fights and fewer enemies will be found fighting you. That is the Coolidge political philosophy. He avoids every possible election THE COOLIDGE CHRONOLOGY 1872—Born in Vermont. 1891-5—Attended Amherst College. 1895-7—Studied law with local attorneys. Petty Politics 1897—Admitted to the bar. 1899—Served on Northampton city council. 1900-1—City Solicitor of Northampton. 1902—Practiced law. 1903—Appointed Clerk of Court. 1904—Chairman City Republican Committee. 1905-6—Practiced law. Taken Up by Crane Machine 1907-8—Member Massachusetts Legislature. 1910-11—Mayor of Northampton. 1912-13—Member Massachusetts Senate. 1914-15—President Massachusetts Senate. 1916-18—Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts. 1919-20—Governor of Massachusetts. Result of Police Strike 1921-23—Vice President of United States. By Death of Harding 1923—President of the United States. 1924—Republican nominee for President. 4 THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS difficulty that indecision and inaction can obviate. It is the settled policy and practice of his life to face no risks that are not forced upon him, and always patiently to wait until the winds and the tides are moving the Coolidge way. In public life one is best known by his associates. It matters not whether the station be high or low, that responsibility is personal to the particular politician under inspection. He choose those above whom he will serve and also those below whose service he seeks. The Coolidge affiliation, both as to superiors and subordinates, has invariably been with a view to his own sure advancement politically. When dependent upon those higher up, he attached himself to the most dominant and powerful, regardless of how selfish or unscrupulous their powers might be. When selecting subordinates, it was Coolidge politics, rather than public service, that determined his choice. Murray Crane, the high boss of Massachusetts Republicanism, best typifies the earlier kind of political alliance deliberately sought by Coolidge. C. Bascom Slemp most conclusively illustrates the type of politician upon whom Coolidge now depends. Slemp, "the political bootlegger," was his first important appointment as President. Slemp was an experienced and successful spoilsman. He knew how to handle the southern delegates. It was not a lack of information concerning Slempianism that led Coolidge to make him Secretary to the President; that knowledge undoubtedly was the determining factor. Slemp could and would "play the game" as the Crane school had taught Coolidge to make it pay. ______________________ Coolidge's Massachusetts Record THE SEARCHLIGHT has made a careful investigation of the Coolidge background. That inspection, plus a revelation of his later record, more than justifies the conclusions already stated. In his college days he made and left no impression upon either students or faculty. The most that can be said of that period is that he was punctual. Then he read law in the office of Hammond and Fields, and was admitted to the bar. For ten years he "practiced law," and "cut his milk teeth on the ring of ward politics." There is nothing of importance to record concerning his legal career; but a tradition lingers that, if anyone had a bill to be collected, Coolidge could get the money. Says his biographer: "His life . . . so early went into the science of politics that he was not known much for his work as a lawyer." "The science of politics" in those days and in that environment was "machine politics" from beginning to end. Department counted above ability. Obedience was the road to promotion. "Bell-hopping for the bosses," is how one Massachusetts citizen describes it. Coolidge mastered the lessons of "regularity." He got experience as a municipal politician. From 1899 to 1906 his "law practice" was mixed with small offices—Councilman, City Solicitor, Clerk of Court and Chairman of the City Republican Committee. The Murray Crane machine was dominant. He was in line for reward, and, of course, it came. As the result of a perfunctory election in 1906, Coolidge was sent to Boston as a member of the State Legislature. Says his biographer: "He had bided his time for coming to the House from Northampton, when he could come without opposition." That was the Coolidge way—"fixing" instead of "fighting"; to get there without opposition; to wait until the powers that be had removed all necessity for controversy and conflict. In the Legislature COOLIDGE served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives one term—1907-8. He did not seek reelection, perhaps because there would have been opposition. So, for two years, he again "practiced law." Then, by a "gentleman's agreement," it being Northampton's turn to have the state senatorship, he became a member of that body. All this period is generally colorless, but not entirely devoid of interest to those seeking light upon the Coolidge attitude toward public issues. Certain of his legislative actions are significant. In 1912, while a State Senator, when the Governor recommended ratification to the then pending federal amendment to the Constitution to permit the taxation of incomes, he voted to postpone consideration of the message, thus taking a stand against the Sixteenth Amendment. * * * Upon labor issues, Coolidge generally displayed hostility to those who toil. In 1907, labor opposed the appointment of a special joint committee to consider the expediency of legislation with respect to the relations between employers and employees: he voted for it. In 1907, labor favored a bill protecting the union stamp: he voted against it. In 1907, labor favored an amendment providing for a system of old age pensions: he voted against it. In 1913, while a Senator, labor favored the "9 in 11" bill, regulating the hours of street railway employees: he voted against its advancement. Later, he also voted against the passage of this measure over the Governor's veto. In 1913, labor favored a measure relating to the enrollment of members in political parties: he voted against it. Labor favored the "public opinion" bill: he voted against it. He voted against an amendment intended to put teeth in a legislative investigation of the Lawrence strike. THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS 5 On the other hand, in the Senate he voted with labor for a bill concerning the licensing of barbers; and once in the House he side with the labor forces on a measure relating to injunctions. * * * Everywhere in Massachusetts one hears that Coolidge was a "wet" on liquor issues, and there are amazing rumors of close connection with brewery interests; but the record discloses little beyond the fact that he several times voted against the dry forces on relatively unimportant measures. * * * Suffrage leaders are still uncertain as to where Coolidge "belonged" on political issues affecting women. One prominent woman summed it up: "We were never sure that Coolidge favored woman suffrage. When the question was once put to him, he answered indirectly, as he answers most controversial questions, by saying that 'he did not see why Mrs. Coolidge was not as able to vote as he.' This sounded well, until we were informed by some of the leading club women of Northampton that Mrs. Coolidge did not vote, giving as her reason that 'Mr. Coolidge did not wish her to.'" It may, at this point, be pertinent to recall that the Coolidge biographer says of Mrs. Coolidge: "She tactfully declines to commit herself on public questions that she may not embarrass her husband." During his service as a state legislator, Massachusetts women favored a measure to regulate prize fighting and another to provide free meals for public school children, Coolidge voting against both. On the other side, he voted for two constitutional amendments, one making women eligible as notaries public and the other removing the word "male," from the suffrage qualification. * * * The principle of more democracy in governmental affairs was then a live and practical issue in Massachusetts. Coolidge consistently opposed all attempts to vitalize the will of the people through the referendum idea. In 1907 there was a bill providing that questions of public policy be submited to the electorate on official ballots; he voted against it. That same year he voted against a proposal to submit to the people of the cities and towns the question of whether or not the merger of the Boston and Maine and the New Haven railroads was advisable. In 1908 he voted against a referendum of Essex County citizens on the question of accepting the legislative act authorizing the building of a court house. As a State Senator, Coolidge voted against a constitutional amendment providing for the referendum in 1912, and for identically the same proposal in 1913. * * * It is with reference to railroad matters that Coolidge most clearly revealed himself. In 1913 there was a bill, apparently misnamed, "to provide better transportation facilities in western Massachusetts." The then Governor characterized it as "the last of a series of measures conceived in the interest of the railroad company by which it has been sought to break down the established law and policy of the commonwealth." The Governor vetoed this measure on the ground that it legalized previous unlawful acts of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Company and tended to create a monopoly of street railway transportation. Coolidge voted for this bill upon its final passage and again to pass it over the veto. * * * There was an attempt, in 1913, to "slip through" the Massachusetts legislature a most vicious pro- railroad measure. Fortunately, the scheme failed because its character was discovered. This was in effect a stock-watering bill. It was sponsored by the Senate Committee on Railroads, of which Coolidge was chairman. Section 16 provided that capital stock, bonds, notes or other evidence of indebtedness authorized by the law of the commonwealth, the proceeds of which were to be expended in another state or country, need not require an application to the Board of Railroad Commissioners for approval. This virtually would have removed the railroads from the control of any public authority. The Ways and Means Committee of the House saw the "joker." Members asked if the Railroad Commissioners had approved the bill. It developed that none of them had ever seen it. What happened was revealed to us by a legislator who was present, as follows: "The House Committee called for a conference with the Committee on Railroads. Coolidge was one of those who came down to defend the bill. However, there was no active defense. As soon as it became apparent that the Ways and Means Committee understood the true nature of the bill, the Committee on Railroads dropped all active, open support and the whole scheme collapsed of its own flagrance." As a result, all after the enacting clause was struck from the measure. This same legislator said: "At that time I had so little respect for Coolidge's ability that I considered that he did not know what he was doing, but later in that light of subsequent happenings, I changed my mind. Not only do I believe that Calvin Coolidge knew what he was doing, but also that this incident shows that he had, even at that time, as he was today, the corporation's point of view." __________________________ The Machine Takes Him Up COOLIDGE had qualified for bigger and more important promotion. And his chance came. Up to this point he had been no different, nor did he have better prospects, than dozens of other Murray Crane adherents. He had not yet "gotten in line" for the succession of offices that culminated in the Governorship. Now that opportunity presented itself. As usual, it meant misfortune to others. 6 THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS Says his biographer: "In 1913 . . . Honorable Levi Greenwood, a splendid political colt, was unexpectedly defeated for reelection. Within two days of his defeat Coolidge was assured of the succession. What he wanted he got, because it came." Greenwood had been President of the Senate. It was "the unwritten political law" of Massachusetts that the President of the Senate became in turn Lieutenant Governor and then Governor. That was the "succession" of which the Coolidge biographer knowingly, but perhaps foolishly, speaks. At once Coolidge acted. Characteristically, he proceeded, not to fight for the position, but to fix things so it would "come" his way. The story goes that he was in Northampton when the news came that disaster had overtaken Greenwood; that he caught a milk train to Boston; that he pulled wires and played politics until the job was his. This was the great crisis of the Coolidge "career." What happened later was the result of what happened then. Coolidge himself should be given "credit" for getting the machine to "put him in line." Says his biographer: "Calvin Coolidge is essentially a politician. . . . The best estimate of Calvin Coolidge is not as a farmer or as a lawyer, but as a politician, for this is his trade." He proved it when, from the rear platform of a milk train, he grabbed the falling toga of Levi Greenwood. The rest was easy. He had merely to wait for the unwritten law of Massachusetts succession to operate in its routine way. So Coolidge got the presidency of the Senate. Next, as a matter of course, he was Lieutenant Governor. Then the Governorship. There is nothing outstanding to record of him as presiding officer of the Senate. And little when he was Lieutenant Governor, except the suggestion of unwavering party "loyalty." In that office he was a member of the Governor's council, and of those meetings Governor McCall has said: "He was with me in the Council even when the voted stood seven to two." Everything was "regular" and orderly, according to the Murray Crane system. Again we quote his biographer: "Coolidge was nominated for Governor in the fall of 1918, Samuel W. McCall having served the customary three years. When he was ready to retire, Coolidge was ready to proceed. He had not sought to facilitate his preferment by a critical attitude of his superiors. He believed in Republicanism and in harmony and was content to go up or down with his party." _________________________ When Coolidge Was Governor IT IS clear how, and why Coolidge became Governor of Massachusetts. In that position he "ran true to form." A Boston observer sums it up: "He was inane and inadequate. He never quarrelled with any of the politicians. He never acted until forced to, and if one does not act until driven to it, one may, by the mere device of waiting, avoid all action. That is the course Coolidge followed as Governor." The Boston police strike was the outstanding event of that period. Moreover, it was the only big test ever to be faced by Coolidge. Because of its overshadowing importance, this strike is presented as a separate article—more completely than the story has ever been told before. That alone would reveal all that needs to be known about Coolidge. You will find it beginning on page nine. The Burrell case also is significant. It has to do with the "political maladministration" of state funds, campaign contributions, etc., etc. It was a scandal comparable in character to those of the Fall-Daugherty-Denby days in Washington—less extensive, perhaps, but possibly more rotten to the square inch. This episode is the subject of another separate article, beginning on page seventeen. Next to these two matters, the most discussed gubernatorial act of Coolidge was his veto of the bill to provide state censorship for motion picture films. This was known as "the million dollar veto." Said the Boston Herald: "The Governor is likely to be somewhat embarrassed by the enthusiasm with which the opponents of censorship will no doubt extend to him evidences of their gratitude for having saved them from censorship. Already they have publicly expressed their admiration for his action. . . . One admirer of Governor Coolidge predicted at the State House, after his veto, that the motion picture men, in appreciation of the Governor's service to them, would give him screen publicity 'worth $1,000,000 to any candidate for the presidency." No other comment seems necessary. An Elastic Contingent Fund WHAT Coolidge did with "the Governor's contingent fund" in 1920 is interesting—and entertaining. The legislature appropriated $9,000. He used $12,366.62. A summary of those executive expenditures follows: Automobile Hire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $140.68 Books, Newspapers, etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 747.97 Express and Messenger Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175.48 Invitations, Tickets, etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439.25 Luncheons, etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987.56 Multigraphing, Typing, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484.59 Office Furniture and Furnishings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.00 Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958.20 Postage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,299.48 Printing and Binding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190.20 Sixteen Hundred Copies Governor's Address . . . . . . . . 83.51 Stationary and Office Supplies: Filing cases, cards, etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.25 Note paper, envelopes, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,694.97 Office machines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170.00 Other office supplies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,033.16 Telephone and Telegrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,683.50 Traveling Expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,086.48 Sundries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.34 ____________ Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$12,366.62 We were not permitted to examine the vouchers, but from Boston newspapers and other sources certain items can be identified. For example, there was paid a bill of $3.00 for "six handkerchiefs." We do not suggest any impropriety in this transaction by the state. It was a practical expenditure and, without doubt, publicly THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS 7 expedient. Boston has a climate that is sometimes unsalubrious. Colds are common. If it was necessary occasionally to blow the gubernatorial nose, certainly the commonwealth should not have been niggardly in the matter of money for that purpose. Apparently the total "for photographs" was $958.20. Here our information as to details is deficient. Only a small part of those expenditures can be specifically explained as follows: To the Marceau Company—$18 for "a dozen photographs of Mrs. Coolidge." To the International Film Co.—$18 for "photographs of Governor and family." To the Garo Galleries—$100 for "portraits of the Governor." To the Shervee Studio—$50 for "glossy prints of Governor Coolidge." To the Forbes Lithograph Co.—$85 for "1,000 photogravures of Governor Coolidge." Governor Coolidge very properly belonged to the Union Club, where good food is served and politicians foregather. The contingent fund evidently followed the Executive in his luncheon excursions. Union Club bills were paid by the state to a total of about $500. The campaign was on. Governor Coolidge had been nominated for the Vice Presidency. During the week of the Chicago Convention, Massachusetts -paid telegrams were sent at a cost of about $20— a very modest amount. During November of that year, after the national election, vouchers, so the newspapers say, include payment for messages to far distant points, one being a cable to Manila. It seems fair to assume that these were responses to congratulatory telegrams, a courtesy which the commonwealth of Massachusetts was doubtless glad to see graciously acknowledged and to have charged to the state. There was also some political traveling. A trip by Governor Coolidge to Marion, Ohio, for a "conference" with President-elect Harding is said to have depleted the contingent fund $204.52. On the same journey Coolidge attended a gubernatorial meeting at Harrisburg, Pa., for which the expenses were of a different class. But the state generously made no protest to the part pertaining strictly to the Ohio pilgrimage. Thirty-six copies of "Have Faith in Massachusetts," one of the books propagandizing Coolidge, were paid for out of the Governor's contingent fund. Just by way of comparison, in 1917 Governor McCall's contingent fund expenditures summarized as follows (apparently he had a better appetite, but in other respects was less inclined to stretch both authority and amount than was Coolidge): A. Louise Mullen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$1,400.00 Henry F. Long . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240.00 Extra Clerical Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95.00 Automobile Hire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.10 Books and Newspapers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119.64 Luncheon and Dinner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112.91 Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.50 Reception, February 22nd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251.04 Stationary, Office Supplies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82.00 Telephone and Telegraph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878.56 Traveling Expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990.93 Dinners, etc., Boston Hotels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,239.15 Sundries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47.09 ______________________ Coolidge As Vice President COOLIDGE became Vice President as a direct result of the wholesale perversion of truth with respect to the Boston police strike. In this position he was completely colorless. He said nothing and did nothing, except, of course, to preside over the Senate in strict obedience to the wishes of the Old Guard machine. The Newberry scandal broke. He saw and heard it all; yet at no time, before, then or since, did he utter a word of protest against its clearly proven infamy. There were the unprecedented scandals centering about Fall and Denby and Daugherty. He was unmoved, although fully informed of each and every disclosure of corruption. In January, 1924, The Searchlight said: "Mr. Coolidge 'sat with the Cabinet' as Vice President. When he became President it was urged that he was better equipped than any ordinary new President because he had learned all about every department by being a kind of ex-officio Cabinet member. If Mr. Coolidge did not know about the iniquities and criminalities of Teapot Dome, that ignorance suggests an unfitness for his present position. If he did know, and kept silent, until the disclosures made it politically expedient to 'take a hand,' his disqualification becomes more apparent." The information concerning corrupt conditions and corrupt officials that Coolidge attained as Vice President was limited only by his capacity to comprehend. Everything "happened right under his nose." That cannot be disputed. Then Harding died and Coolidge took up the responsibilities of the White House—in ability and character the most poorly equipped American citizen ever to have thought seriously of the presidency. _____________________ Coolidge As President ANYONE who studied the Coolidge background, watched his character unfold in Massachusetts and observed him presiding over the Senate, could have foretold exactly the course he has followed as President. His first thought, apparently, was of the nomination. He knew only one road to personal advancement— the machine method. He had never made a campaign on issues, nor against fighting opposition. "Fixing," not fighting, was the Coolidge way. So he at once selected about the best "fixer" to be found in the whole country for the politically potential post of Secretary to the President—C. Bascom Slemp, of Virginia. No act of his life more accurately and characteristically discloses the real Coolidge. The political character of Slemp already has been suggested. Public records supply the proof. What those records show will be found in a separate article. The acceptance and adoption of Slempianism is the most revealing thing about Coolidge. 8 THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS Coolidge was part and parcel of an administration undoubtedly the most corrupt in American history. While not responsible for "the Harding gang," he was responsible for keeping a Cabinet so clearly and completely discredited. After Fall had gone, Daugherty and Denby were the worst offenders against official decency. Coolidge kept them until their retention was threatening his election. Finally he let them go, with reluctance and, in the Denby case, sickening words of approval. Because, as always, he was undecided and inactive, the Senate passed this resolution: "That it is the sense of the Senate of the United States that the President of the United States immediately request the resignation of Edwin Denby as Secretary of the Navy." Coolidge responded: "No official recognition can be given to the passage of the Senate resolution relative to their opinion concerning members of the Cabinet or other offices under Executive control." When Denby resigned, Coolidge wrote to him: "It is with regret that I am to part with you. You will go with the knowledge that your honesty and integrity have not been impugned." Despite the disclosures, Coolidge kept Daugherty - and watched the primaries. North Dakota supported Coolidge, after which there was an apparent lull in the talk about "firing" Daugherty. Then South Dakota spoke - against Coolidge - and at once the President acted, demanding Daugherty's resignation. It was not so much his official character and official failures that "Jonahed" Daugherty; it was political expediency. At that time The Searchlight said: "A real President would have recognized that Fall, Denby and Daugherty were no worse, politically, than all the rest of the Cabinet. He would have said to the country: 'There has been quite enough of special interest favors. It is high time to give the people a square deal. This political thing called reactionaryism means only that the profiteers and exploiters of one kind and another get every advantage that those in control of the government, directly and indirectly, can bestow. I will wipe the slate clean and give the country a completely new Cabinet, superseding the present corps of politicians with statesmen, whose hearts and hands are free of selfishness and subserviency." * * * Far more important than all else, Coolidge lent himself to the un-American task of opposing and suppressing the cleansing, corrective power of investigation. In April of this year The Searchlight said: "The steps in the great conspiracy 'to keep the lid down' have been: "1. The vicious power of propaganda. Throughout the country, with only occasional exceptions, the great newspapers, caucus or counting-room controlled, have come to the aid of infamies which they must have known and understood. It was their plain duty, their patriotic opportunity, to take an affirmative, fighting stand on the side of public decency. What they did was to publish only so much as was 'absolutely necessary' of the official news. From the beginning they sought to belittle and discredit the exposures, subtly and insidiously to create the popular impression that the investigations were only 'political bunk.' "But the investigations went on, revealing so much of revolting dishonesty that the publication of even a twentieth part of the 'official news,' mitigated as it might be by the most damnable editorial lying, was leading inevitably to the disgrace and overthrow of those in power. Then - "2. The desperately driven politicians and their predatory partners appealed to the courts for a refuge. The investigative power of Congress was challenged in that way. Subpoenas were ignored. Sinclair, Mannington and others flatly refused to testify. Mal Daugherty, brother of the deposed Attorney General, would not permit the inspection of his bank, where it is alleged graft funds were deposited. Senator Wheeler was indicted on a trumped-up charge, in the hope of terrorizing the probers; but that quickly became a boomerang. Likewise, all this attempt to prostitute the judiciary was not stopping the flood of exposure. Instead, the next big exposure was pointing directly at the Treasury, probably the worst condition of all. So, finally - "3. The President himself took a hand in challenging the inquisitorial authority of Congress. In sheer, last-ditch desperation, he characterized the patriotic public service of the probers as 'lawlessness.' " * * * "The simple truth is that the investigations were getting close to 'big game' and 'had to be stopped,' or the whole Administration would stand discredited and disgraced in the eyes of all honest citizens. "The Couzens Committee had been authorized to investigate the Internal Revenue Bureau, including the scandalous story of prohibition enforcement, which, of course, took in the notorious Overholt whiskey case. Because Mr. Couzens was in poor health and further handicapped through having his committee headed by one of the most thorough Old Guarders in the Senate (Watson of Indiana), Mr. Vanderlip persuaded Mr. Couzens to employ Francis Heney to conduct the inquiry. Over the protest of Watson and Ernst, subservient Administration supporters on the committee (Couzens, Jones, N. Mex., and King voting 'yea'), Mr. Heney was so employed, with Mr. Couzens to pay the cost of his services. "That, of course, meant it would be a real, effective investigation, a prospect which the Administration dared not face. "Immediately Senator Watson offered a resolution to discharge the committee and thus end the inquiry before it had fairly started. "As quickly did President Coolidge address a communication to the Senate, protesting against Mr. Heney's employment and charging that such a procedure was 'lawless.' The real reason for this executive interference was that the lid had to be clamped down and kept tight on the Treasury Department. "Senator Jones, of New Mexico, countered with a resolution authorizing the committee both to employ and to pay Mr. Heney. "That would have removed any doubtful claim of 'lawlessness,' but the Coolidge regime did not dare to permit Mr. Heney to have any part in the investigation. That it could be done 'legally' made no difference. Their opposition was directed to blocking the investigation. Accordingly, they worked for delay, and apparently have won a 'victory,' which is, perhaps, the most disgraceful in American history. . . . " * * * "The attitude taken by Coolidge was a challenge to Congress. 'You have no authority to discover and publish the truth about executive malfeasance,' is a practical interpretation of his communication to the Senate "The corollary is that there shall be no apprehension and punishment of these conspirators, than whom the Republic has no more destructive enemies - because official corruption cannot continue, if the nation is to endure under a system of representative government. "There are but three possible sources of corrective power - judicial, executive and legislative. "With politically appointed judges, among whom the conspirators can pick and choose . . . what hope is there for the initiation and prosecution of a house-cleaning through the courts? "And are the executive departments, as at present constituted, at all likely voluntarily to expose their own crookedness and incompetency? "What chance is left, then, for a regeneration of American public decency, if the President succeeds in his desperate contention that Congress cannot move to reveal and remedy the blighting graft that so obviously exists?" Here you see the very climax of Coolidgeism. He never saw and acted for the general good. Always his motives appeared personal and political. Now, because further and more serious disclosures would involve his administration and so involve him, he brought the powers of the presidency to bear against the investigations. THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS 9 The Boston Police Strike Tragedy Had there been no Boston police strike there would be no Calvin Coolidge in national politics. It was the one outstanding event in his career. All his prominence is due to the wholesale misrepresentation of that tragic episode. Out of the resulting propaganda was born "the Coolidge myth." If you desire an explanation of the real Coolidge, with an accurate appraisal of his character and capacity, here it is. We present the story exactly as the record was made. Our duty is done: yours is to consider its meaning to America. CAST OF CHARACTERS CALVIN COOLIDGE - Governor of Massachusetts, with direct control over Police Commissioner; when trouble threatened, he dodged responsibility; when the smallest interest on his part would have prevented a strike, he refused to act; when his cooperation, to say nothing of leadership, would have made the effort successful, he took no action to promote a settlement; when disorder broke, he made no move to protect the city and could not be found at the crisis of the controversy; after the easily preventable disaster had developed and begun to recede, after the affair had been so misrepresented as to discredit the police and turn public opinion against them, after the Mayor had restored order, he assumed the authority that repeatedly had been disclaimed, wrested control from the Mayor, became dictator, and turned the tragedy into his own political aggrandizement. EDWIN U. CURTIS - Police Commissioner appointed by the Governor; his course seemed directed toward making a strike certain, and then to preventing a satisfactory settlement; fooled both police and citizens by a false promise that the city would be amply protected, if the former "went out." HERBERT PARKER - Corporation lawyer; advised Curtis, and probably Coolidge; the master mind in making tragedy of a situation that was handled without difficulty in all other cities when the same issues were faced. ANDREW J. PETERS - Mayor of Boston; when Coolidge and Curtis fell down, he labored to prevent a strike and effect a settlement; appointed a Citizens' Committee to study and settle the controversy; tried in every possible way to do what Coolidge and Curtis should have done; when there were rioting and bloodshed, he took control and restored order. THE CITIZENS' COMMITTEE - Appointed by Mayor Peters to investigate and adjust the difficulties; reported a plan satisfactory to all, except those who wanted trouble; its efforts were made futile by the attitude of Coolidge, Curtis and Parker. THE BOSTON POLICE - Most poorly paid of all municipal employees and had other grievances; refused redress, they affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, the result being that Curtis "fired" their officials; after Curtis, Parker and Coolidge had made a settlement impossible, being assured by Curtis' public statement that the city would have protection, they went out on strike. VAHEY AND FEENEY - Attorneys for the police; worked for peace and approved the Citizens' Committee plan of settlement. THE BOSTON PUBLIC - The immediate victims of the seemingly contrived tragedy; were needlessly subjected to destruction of property, bloodshed and death; saddled with unnecessary expense running into the millions. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC - The larger victims of the wholesale propaganda, resulting in "the Coolidge myth." The Calamity That Made Coolidge THE Boston police strike is set against the background of the economic conditions produced by the World War. In 1918 wages were still up, prices yet mounting, and industry was marshalling its forces to reduce wages, with labor fighting wage reductions. Signs of imminent industrial struggle were everywhere. Those familiar with conditions in the Boston Police Department in the early summer of 1919 unanimously admit that the policemen had serious and legitimate grievances in respect to hours, pay and conditions in the barracks. The Department itself, although maintained by city funds, was not a part of the municipal administration. The Police Commissioner was appointed by the Governor for a term of years, and was removable by him. Edwin U. Curtis, then Police Commissioner, was an appointee of Governor McCall, but had not taken office until about the time Calvin Coolidge became Governor. Andrew J. Peters, a Democrat, was Mayor of Boston. In May, and again in July, of 1919, the Boston policemen had called attention to their grievances. They had requested an increase in pay and improved labor conditions. Most of the Boston police force had begun at an initial salary of $900 a year. New men then joining the force entered at $1,100 a year, and out of this sum they were obliged to expend $200 for uniforms and equipment. This base pay was increased $100 a year until a maximum of $1,600 was reached. Their hours of duty were long: seventy-three hours weekly for day-duty men; eighty-three hours weekly for night-duty men, and ninety-eight hours weekly for wagon men. Figured on an hourly basis, their compensation was the lowest wage paid by the city to any of its employees. Following the failure to secure any amelioration of their condition, the police began to consider affiliation with the American Federation of Labor. Commissioner Curtis expressed himself in opposition to such a course, but did not forbid affiliation. There is evidence, however, that as early as June the Commissioner was preparing for a strike. One of the members of the then Civil Service Commission stated recently that three months before the strike Curtis came to the Commission and asked that body immediately to pass a rule to the effect that any policeman who struck would not be reinstated. He demanded to know the Commission's attitude, suggesting that if that body were to reinstate policemen who struck, his fight might as well be abandoned before it was started. The Civil Service Commissioners informed Curtis that they would make no such ruling in advance of a strike; that the situation would be dealt with as it developed. The rule requested was never passed, but later the former Commissioner stated: 10 THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS "We simply did without any rule. We acted as if the rule were in actual operation. We refused to take the men back and we never did take them back." In July, 1,100 Boston policemen signed a petition to the American Federation of Labor, asking for a charter. On August 8th they were notified that the charter had been granted. When these 1,100 men had taken that step, Commissioner Curtis issued an order to the effect that no member of the force should "join or belong to any organization, club or body composed of present or present and past members of the force affiliated with or a part of any organization or body outside the Department." The G. A. R., the U. S. Spanish War Veterans and the American Legion of World War Veterans were excepted. This order was issued on August 11th. The police proceeded to organize, and on August 15th elected officers. Then, on August 26th, Commissioner Curtis filed charges against eight policemen who had been chosen to officer the local union. There were afterwards added, on August 29th, eleven other men, nine of whom were officers of the union. These men were ordered before the Commissioner for trial. The policemen retained for these trials the services of two attorneys - James F. Vahey and John P. Feeney. Mayor Peters First to Act AS SOON as charges had been filed against these men, Mayor Peters, although without jurisdiction over the police force, appointed a committee of thirty-four Boston citizens to investigate the whole matter and do whatever seemed necessary for the best interests of the city. Of course, a settlement was the chief objective. The Chief Committee was composed of substantial, prosperous business men. It was not a body of men in any sense partial to labor. That the Committee had no bias in favor of the policemen was obvious from its personnel. Had there been any doubt on this score, it would speedily have been dispelled by a personal statement issued by the chairman, James J. Storrow, a prominent Boston banker, before the Committee even met. Storrow declared that the policemen should not affiliate with the American Federation of Labor. At its first meeting the Committee unanimously adopted a resolution supporting that position. Before the names of the members of the Citizens Committee had been made public, Curtis was asked by an intimate friend if such a committee could be of assistance to him and if Storrow were a satisfactory chairman. To both these questions Curtis answered in the affirmative. The Police Commissioner also saw and informally approved Storrow's preliminary statement. The advance statement issued by Storrow drew immediate comment from the policemen, and a protest from their counsel. As a result, Storrow invited the officers of the union and their counsel into conference. The effort to bring about an amicable settlement was immediately undertaken by the committee of thirty-four and representatives of the policemen. A sub-committee first heard testimony as to pay, hours and living conditions of the men. Representative policemen testified to their grievances, submitting themselves to examination by members of the committee, and furnishing all the information they had on every aspect of their situation. The utmost harmony prevailed throughout these investigations and conferences. After the disclosure that thus came to them fully verified, members of the committee expressed themselves as "shocked and humiliated" that such a state of affairs could exist in Boston, and as being ready to do everything in their power to correct these unjust conditions. At all times, however, they held to the position that the police ought not to be members of the American Federation of Labor. They then set out to find compromise ground acceptable to the Mayor, the Police Commissioner and the men. On September 1st, Commissioner Curtis came down to Boston from his summer home in Nahant and a friendly conference was held with the subcommittee. On September 2nd, the Citizens Committee stated that they had "reached the conclusion that an amicable agreement could be obtained, the men to give up their charter in the A. F. of L. and obtain better working conditions," which would satisfy all parties. Parker Becomes Curtis Counsel SEPTEMBER 4th had been set as the day when Commissioner Curtis would render a decision on his charges against the nineteen policemen. The Citizens Committee, realizing that an adverse decision in these cases would nullify their efforts and make reconciliation impossible, sought, on September 3rd, to obtain a postponement of the decision. While these conferences were being held, and every effort made to reach an acceptable compromise, Herbert Parker, at one time Attorney General of the Commonwealth, had been retained as counsel by Curtis. If it be true, as many people in Boston believe, that big business saw in the police crisis an opportunity to make of Boston the Marne of labor by forcing a strike and then crushing it, these interests could have chosen no abler strategist than Parker. It is a matter of common report in Massachusetts that Parker was counsel for the packers and Standard Oil, and that he indirectly represented the United States Steel Corporation. At any rate, from this point, he appears always as the master mind in each situation, either behind the scenes or actually on the stage. For all his services in this matter, Parker made almost no charge. Possibly his motive was largely altruistic, which the record makes to appear doubtful. Perhaps, as many believe, outside anti-labor interests had a stake in the controversy. THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS 11 The Police Commissioner, in his report, states: "The Hon. Herbert Parker charged but a nominal fee of $50 and charged that merely because he felt that it was necessary in order that the relation of counsel and client be established. Nevertheless, he postponed all his other affairs for the matter in which the Department was concerned and was constantly available for any service required." Parker was retained after the Chamber of Commerce had advised the Commissioner that he should engage counsel. When the Commissioner's choice of counsel became known, however, the Chamber of Commerce at once sent a committee to wait upon him, with the request that he change his selection. Vahey and Feeney, counsel for the police, state that some of the members of the Mayor's Executive Committee, the counsel for the policemen, and Chairman Macomber, of the Chamber of Commerce, were fearful of the influence of Mr. Parker, not upon questions of law, but upon the policy of the Police Commissioner. On Wednesday, September 3rd, a close personal friend of the Commissioner's, convinced that a postponement of the findings would be in the interest of public welfare, agreed to see Curtis on behalf of the Mayor's committee and ask for a delay. He carried with him a letter from Chairman Storrow asking for such a stay. What happened is told in the report of the committee: "No action was taken in response nor reply received to the letter, because counsel for the Commissioner (Herbert Parker), who received and read the letter, declined to permit its delivery to the Commissioner." During that same day Curtis sent word to the attorneys for the police officials that he would read his decision the following morning at 9:45 o'clock. The report of the Citizens Committee, with reference to this crisis, says: "That evening, feeling that an avoidable strike was impending, and because under our laws the control and government of the police force is vested in the state and not in the hands of the municipal authorities, a conference was sought with the Governor." Coolidge Declines to Act GOVERNOR Coolidge was at Westfield celebrating his anniversary. He was reached by telephone, told the acute condition in Boston, and asked to return. He was reluctant to do so but, after being urged strongly, consented. He reached Boston late that night. The entire situation was laid before him. Vahey and Feeney, in their statement, quote Governor Coolidge as saying that "he did not want to get mixed up in it." The report of the Citizens Committee on this point is a bit more dignified, but says the same thing: Similar Police Controversies Many other American cities faced similar police problems, but Boston was the only municipality in which a settlement was not accomplished without serious difficulty. Cincinnati, Detroit, Buffalo, Albany, Norfolk, Macon and Washington are among the cities where "labor troubles" with the police were threatened. But in none of these did the authorities desire to deal labor a crushing blow; they did not bungle their situation; peaceful adjustments were easily and quickly accomplished. You have heard little of these situations because they were not manhandled, and, moreover, propaganda did not magnify and misinterpret their meaning. "The Governor, however, stated to the representatives of the committee that he felt it was not his duty to communicate with the Commissioner on the subject." Thus, in his first test, his first great opportunity to end the trouble before it had fairly started, Coolidge did nothing. He avoided the issue. Curtis was in the hands of Parker. If, as later developments might indicate, Coolidge was equally controlled by Parker, criticism should be directed to that fact quite as much as to his costly indecision. On the Mayor's Initiative THE next morning, Thursday, September 4th, Mayor Peters, believing the Citizens Committee could accomplish a settlement, and realizing the gravity of the situation that might develop following drastic action by the Commissioner, made a formal request by letter for a delay in the proceedings. Peters had spine, and a purpose. Keep in mind that the Mayor was without authority, whereas the state administration was directly responsible for the police department. At 10:30 that morning - Thursday, September 4th - the policemen and their counsel appeared at the police hearing room. Commissioner Curtis invited Vahey and Feeney into his private office, with Herbert Parker and Secretary Devlin present. According to the statement of Vahey and Feeney, the Commissioner announced that he resented outsiders interfering in the case, that he was going to make his findings that day, but that if any good reason could be presented for the postponement of the imposition of the penalty he would hear it. Feeney contended that the Commissioner's resentment at the Mayor's letter was unwarranted, in view of the fact that the Mayor and the Citizens Committee, having worked day and night to settle the controversy, with the knowledge and consent of the Commissioner, had a perfect right to ask for a postponement. Apparently Parker was dominating the Commissioner, and evidently making trouble, for the record shows this statement made by Vahey to Parker: "This matter can be settled if you will act sensibly and settled to your satisfaction and the satisfaction of all the men. But it looks to me as though you don't want to settle it. It looks to me as though you are seeking trouble." The Commissioner finally announced that his decision was postponed until Monday, September 8th, at 9:15 o'clock. The Citizens Committee Plan ON THE afternoon of Thursday, September 4th, Mr. Choate, of the Citizens Committee, drew up and presented to Messrs. Vahey and Feeney a preliminary draft of a plan for a settlement of the controversy. This was based on voluntary surrender by the police of their charter from the American Federation of Labor. That same afternoon, as though it were an answering challenge, Commissioner Curtis announced that he was drilling 150 voluntary police and adding many recruits daily. On September 6th the revised draft of the settlement, in terms acceptable to the Citizens Committee 12 THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS and the counsel for the policemen's union, was submitted to the Mayor and approved by him. It was also informally offered to the Commissioner for his consideration, criticism and suggestions. Of course, no action was taken by the Commissioner. Mayor Peters thereupon decided formally to submit the plan, as approved, to the Commissioner, and this was done by letter dated September 6th. The Storrow report says that this letter was delivered to the Commissioner at his residence at 9:10 o'clock the next morning (Sunday, September 7th), but Vahey and Feeney state that Captain Ratshesky was sent that day to Nahant, but found that Curtis was visiting Herbert Parker at Lancaster. Boston papers on Monday morning carried the statement that "efforts to communicate with Commissioner Curtis at his summer home in Nahant failed. A woman answered the telephone and said the Commissioner had gone to the house of a relative for a rest and that she was not at liberty to say where he was." So nothing was heard from Commissioner Curtis during that Sunday. Nor Could Coolidge Be Found THE Citizens Committee also endeavored on Sunday, September 7th, to obtain a second conference with Governor Coolidge, as the report states, "for the purpose of reporting upon the then critical situation and presenting for his consideration the committee's plans. The Governor was reported to be in the western part of the state." When action was needed to avert the crisis that Threatened the city of Boston next morning, the Governor could not be found. Thus in the second instance, whether or not it was wilfully done, Coolidge evaded action. There are those in Boston who maintain that big business, as represented by Herbert Parker, was on the job to see that no compromise should succeed. They believe, too, that Coolidge was taking his instructions from Parker. Apropos of this, there is a story, never published, that on that Sunday afternoon, when the Citizens Committee were trying to reach Curtis and at the same time endeavoring to obtain a conference with Governor Coolidge, "reported to be somewhere in the western part of the state," that Coolidge motored to Lancaster, that Curtis was there, that the Commissioner's car and the Governor's car were parked for several hours near Parker's house. At any rage, with a crisis at hand, Coolidge was not in Boston and could not be reached by the Citizens Committee. Attitude of the Press AS THE members of the Citizens Committee realized that, if Curtis insisted upon sentencing the nineteen policemen next day, there would be vastly less hope of a friendly settlement, the met Sunday night and appointed a close friend of the Commissioner to visit his home, wait for him and personally deliver to him the plea that he postpone his action for "just a day or two," to give the policemen a chance to meet Monday or Tuesday and accept the terms of the proposed settlement. At a late hour, all efforts to locate either Coolidge or Curtis having failed, the committee agreed, according to the statement made by Vahey and Feeney, to visit the editors of all the Boston papers that night and to secure editorial support for the settlement. Eight newspapers endorsed the Citizens Committee plan, one with an editorial headed: "Public Safety Menaced as Curtis Ignores Peace Plan." Attitude of the Police WITH regard to the attitude of the police toward the plan, the report of the Citizens Committee states: "The Executive Committee . . . was clearly of the opinion that on Sunday the plan was on the point of being approved by their officials, and that it would also be approved at a general meeting of the men. The opinion of your committee in this regard was also confirmed by the fact that the counsel for the police union, Messrs. Vahey and Feeney, both unqualifiedly advised the officials to accept it and also undertook to attend the general meeting of the police union and there unqualifiedly to advise the men to accept it. Such a meeting could and would have been held probably on Monday." Curtis "Fires" the Men THE report sent to the Police Commissioner was accompanied by a letter from Mayor Peters, dated September 6th, stating that he had examined it carefully, for he knew the patience and thoroughness with which the committee had acted and the extent of the time they had given to a study of the situation. He wrote to Curtis: "The report commended itself to me as a wise method of dealing with the subject and I recommend it your favorable consideration. If acceptable to you and the men, it affords a speedy, and it seems to me, satisfactory settlement of the whole question." However, on Monday, September 8th, the policemen were ordered before Curtis at 9:15 a. m. Vahey and Feeney in their report state: "It was apparent to everybody present at neither Commissioner Curtis nor Mr. Herbert Parker were amenable to reason. They apparently cared not for the advice of the Mayor of Boston, the Mayor's committee or the editors of every Boston paper." Ignoring all these influences, Curtis rendered his decision, "firing" the nineteen policemen under charges. Thus the work of the Citizens Committee Why the Police Walked Out The immediate reason for the strike of Boston policemen was that Commissioner Curtis had suspended nineteen of their number. Their act was "a declaration that, if the officers of the union were guilty, the men who elected them were equally guilty and would accept equal consequences with them." One who investigated the situation came to this conclusion: "Right or wrong, they were actuated by loyalty rather than selfishness and were carrying to its logical conclusion the Commissioner's action in disciplining nineteen of their number." THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS 13 went for naught; a peaceful settlement was immediately made impossible; and the strike, which could easily have been avoided, became inevitable. Who Wrote This Letter? AFTER his decision against the police, Curtis made a reply to the Mayor, on September 8th, as follows (the italics being ours): "Dear Sir: The Police Commissioner begs to acknowledge receipt of your communication under date of September 6. The Commissioner has given to it that careful consideration which the occasion demands. It will be obvious to your honor that the Commissioner cannot consider this communication as having relation to the present duty of the Commissioner to act upon the complaints now pending before him. "The Commissioner can discover nothing in the communication transmitted by your honor and relating to action by him which appears to him to be either consistent with his prescribed legal duties or calculated to aid him in their performance. The Commissioner approves necessary betterment in the economic conditions in the police force of the city of Boston and has heretofore expressed such approval, but these are not the conditions which require his present action. "The Commissioner has therefore felt compelled to proceed to make his findings upon the complaints pending before him, pursuant to the adjournment of such action heretofore declared. I am, Very respectfully, E. U. CURTIS, Police Commissioner for the City of Boston. Vahey and Feeney, in their report, say: "A casual reading of the above letter, apparently written in the third person, indicates who was the actual Police Commissioner." If it was dictated by Herbert Parker, so perhaps, was the later letter (which appears farther on) from Coolidge to Peters. There are obvious similarities that seem to point to an identical dictator. The Governor Again Evades Action ON MONDAY afternoon the policemen, as a result of the Commissioner's findings of that morning, began taking a strike vote. The Curtis decision, in defiance of what everybody most concerned seemed to desire, had made their task of conciliation nearly hopeless, but the Citizens Committee did not lessen their activity. The Governor could intervene to avert the catastrophe. They again appealed to Coolidge. Concerning this, the Storrow report says: "On Monday, September 8th, the Mayor, in cooperation with the members of your committee, again endeavored to obtain a conference with the Governor, and such conference was arranged to take place early in the evening of that day. At that time the Commissioner had taken final action in regard to the police officials. Your committee, in collaboration with your honor, thereupon advised the Governor the entire situation, presenting the plan and stating its status. Constructive action upon the principles proposed was urged. In the absence of such action, your honor and the members of your committee emphasized the prospective seriousness of the situation which would result from the absence of the great majority of the patrolmen and expressed their strong conviction as to the necessity of troops to the number of not less than three or four thousand to be present in Boston on the following day at 5:45 p. m., either upon the streets or ready in the armories." With reference to that conference, Vahey and Feeney, in their report, say: "Told to mind his own business by Commissioner Curtis, Mayor Peters appealed to Governor Coolidge. On Monday night a committee of seven met Governor Coolidge at the Union Club. He was here forced to 'mix into it.' The members of the Mayor's committee, when asked, 'Why did not you see the Governor before the men were judged guilty?' said, 'We could not find him. We have been searching for him since Sunday.'" That Mayor Peters had also been searching for the Governor is apparent from a paragraph in the letter sent by the Mayor to Coolidge under date of September 8th. Mayor Peters wrote in part: "I have been and am still trying to get in touch with you on the telephone this afternoon, as I should like to go over the matter with you personally; and I am now sending this information to you at the State House in order that it may be laid before you at the earliest possible moment. . . . I am now presenting it to you with my strong opinion that it offers a basis of solution. I hope that you may feel that you can take steps to assist in the solution suggested. . . ." Another writer has this to say of that last desperate effort to influence Coolidge to some helpful action: "The conference with the Governor lasted until after midnight. What took place in that midnight conference has never been told. Governor Coolidge afterwards said the plan was talked over in detail for an hour and a half and the committee felt that even this was a gain. But the Governor and the committee both said that His Excellency had not approved the compromise plan. What possible objections he could have had to the plan, what he did do, or in what frame of mind he closed the conference remains a mystery." So, in the third instance, Coolidge did nothing. The situation called for decisive action, yet "in what frame of mind he closed the conference remains a mystery." Curtis Assured City of Protection THE Mayor at this critical juncture endeavored to make sure that the bungling would not leave the city unprotected. What steps he took are set forth in a letter, signed by Mayor Peters, from which we quote: "On September 9th, at about one o'clock, I visited the Commissioner at his office in Pemberton Square and was assured by him that he had the situation well in hand and had ample means at his disposal for the protection of the city. I asked him whether he did not think he ought to have the State Guard ready for emergencies and he replied that he did not need it and did not want it. "I then suggested to the Commissioner that the Governor's consideration of the question of protection for the city should then be asked. He replied that it was not necessary, but he consented to see the Governor with me. At the conference in the afternoon with the Governor the same ground was gone over again. The Police Commissioner reiterated his assurances that he had the situation in hand and had made ample provision, and again stated that he did not need or want the State Guard." The morning papers of September 8th gave space to reports from Superintendent of Police Crowley, stating that 500 volunteer special police had been sworn in and equipped as special officers, and that these men had been receiving instructions for several days from police captains. It was also stated that two hundred able-bodied men from the retired police were available for service, and that 100 metropolitan police had been ordered to report for duty. Both the Boston Traveler and the Boston Post on September 9th quoted Commissioner Curtis as saying: "I am ready for anything." All this is crucially important. The police were falsely charged with desertion of duty, with walking 14 THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS out and leaving the city unprotected. The truth is that the police did not go on strike until they had been assured, and reassured, as were the citizens of Boston, that the state authorities had every needed facility to maintain law and order. On the other hand, the record seems clearly to suggest, if not to justify, the suspicion that those in authority, or the powers back of them, may have had an ulterior motive in leaving the city defenseless. It should be remembered that Herbert Parker was still acting as adviser to the Police Commissioner. The Boston Evening Record, of September 8th, gave this warning: "The Police Commissioner seems to be under an unfortunate influence with sinister consequences." Plainly the inaction of the state authorities was a puzzle to those who expected to replace the police. On Tuesday, many members of the citizens voluntary police, organized by the Chamber of Commerce, called up to inquire if they were wanted, getting a negative answer. An affidavit made later by a newspaper man and published in the Boston American said that on Tuesday the signer had interviewed Superintendent Pierce, in charge of the voluntary police, that Pierce stated to him that there had been no call for the voluntary police and that none would be sent out before eight o'clock on Wednesday. Meantime more than 1,100 policemen had voted to strike. Coolidge Fails in Supreme Crisis REFERRING to the conference held at the Union Club with Governor Coolidge, Vahey and Feeney stated: "On Tuesday after the strike vote was declared, but before the men went on strike, the lawyers were told the matter was not hopeless, that something might come up as a result of the conferences; and it was not until the Governor sent his memorable letter to the Mayor about Tuesday noon that the policemen or their attorney, and, we believe, also the Mayor's committee, knew where the Governor stood." That "memorable letter" from Governor Coolidge to Mayor Peters, like the previously quoted letter from Curtis to Peters, failed "to discover" any ground for action. The reader can judge whether or not the points of similarity are pronounced enough to warrant the conclusion that these letters were dictated by one and the same person. No one has ever yet charged that Calvin Coolidge or Commissioner Curtis wrote them both. The second "discover" letter follows (the italics being ours): "September 9, 1919. "Hon. Andrew J. Peters, "Mayor's Office, City Hall, Boston: "My dear Mr. Mayor: Replying to your favor and to the suggestions laid before me by yourself and certain members Affiliated Police Unions The American people were falsely given the impression that police affiliation with the American Federation of Labor was unique and unusual; that in taking that step the Boston police had no precedent. In 1919 there were thirty-seven policemen's unions in that many American cities, all affiliated with the A. F. of L., none of whom threatened to strike. of your committee, it seems to me that there has arisen a confusion which would be cleared up if each person undertakes to perform the duties imposed upon him by law. "It seems plain that the duty of issuing orders and enforcing their observance lies with the Commissioner of Police and with that no one has any authority to interfere. We must all support the Commissioner in the execution of the laws. "Regarding the matter of improvements in the condition of employment in the Police Department of Boston the law requires that they be initiated by the Mayor and City Council, subject to the approval of the Commissioner. If wages, hours or station houses ought to be improved, such improvements can be initiated by the Mayor and the City Council, without any consideration of the making and observance of rules, because over that the Mayor and City Council have no jurisdiction. If justice requires improvements in conditions of employment, I believe such improvements, or such parts thereof as can be, should be made forthwith, accompanied by a statement that such additional improvements will be made at the earliest possible time and without reference to any other existing conditions in the Police Department. "There is no authority in the office of the Governor for interference in the making of orders by the Police Commissioner or in the action of the Mayor and the City Council. The foregoing suggestion is therefore made, as you will understand, in response to a request for suggestions on my part. I am unable to discover any action that I can take. "Yours very truly, "CALVIN COOLIDGE." Thus, in the fourth instance, Coolidge refused to act. He was unable to discover any action that he could take. Later, as will be shown, he completely reversed this attitude. He "discovered" the most ample authority for dictatorial action. At this time, however, there was much sympathy for the police, and perhaps Coolidge could not be sure which way the pendulum of public opinion would swing. At any rate, he did nothing. And at 5:45 p. m., Tuesday, September 9th, the union policemen walked out. Was Rioting a Part of the Plot? THE Boston police "walked out," expecting that the voluntary and other forces which had been organized would at once take their places. Curtis repeatedly had stated that the new men were ready. But he did not call them out. If this failure to furnish the city protection was deliberately intended to result in lawlessness, with the sinister object of turning public sentiment against the strikers, it would not be the first time such a conspiracy was consummated in America. It succeeded, however, beyond any previous official atrocity of its kind. Furthermore, it looked mightily as though disorder was planned. At a quarter to six the police walked out. At six, almost simultaneously, being but fifteen minutes later, "curious" things began to happen. In various parts of the city crap-shooting started on the sidewalks. Groups of crap-shooters sprang up, as if by magic. This was at the rush hour, when office people were leaving for their homes. It was observed that these pettily irritating indications that the lid was off and lawlessness beginning to reign occurred at subway station doorways, so that all home-goers were given a first-hand impression. There was some rioting. Windows were broken. THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS 15 Gangs engaged in fighting. Minor illegalities were everywhere. But no banks were robbed. During that night nothing was done to suppress the disorder. The so-called "loyal police" were held in the barracks. The voluntary police were not called out. Police Commissioner Curtis' statement - "I am ready for anything" - took on a new meaning. He did nothing. The Governor did nothing. A few days later, when order had been restored, Coolidge took command. If, within a half hour of the disorder, he had exemplified a tenth part of the dictatorial power that came after it was all over, there would have been some justification for his subsequent "police strike glory," even though his previous part was at all points so inglorious. Where Was the Governor? AS TO the whereabouts of Governor Coolidge during that critical Tuesday night and the day that followed, there has been a considerable conflict of statement. Some have asserted that Coolidge disappeared and could not be found. Some say that he fled to Parker's house in Lancaster and remained there, with the telephone wires cut, in order that he might not be reached and forced to show his hand. Others think that he was hiding in Westfield. Others tell of his crouching in fear behind a barricade at the Adams House, and still others of how, in the midst of the disorder on Tuesday night, he quietly left the Adams House by a side door and walked unobserved through the streets. Wherever the Governor was on Tuesday night is of no particular moment. What he did, or rather failed to do, is the only matter of importance. Here there is no dispute. Coolidge did absolutely nothing to prevent or to disquiet disorders. He must have been informed that his Police Commissioner had failed in his promise to replace the police and protect the city. Yet Coolidge made no move. The Mayor Takes Control SOMETHING had to be done. The duly constituted state authorities had failed to act in this emergency. Accordingly, Mayor Peters took control. Because the situation was desperate, acting under a law which gave him that power after tumult had occurred, Peters assumed command of the Police Department. The Mayor also called out the State Guard located in Boston, and asked the Governor again for three additional regiments of infantry. Concerning this, we quote from a report: "The Commissioner and his Superintendent fell down so badly on Tuesday night and Wednesday that Mayor Peters was forced to take the Police Department into his own hands. He did so on Wednesday and, with the very agency he suggested to the Commissioner, he brought order out of chaos in a few hours. To the Mayor and his advisers is due the credit for bringing Boston back to normal." Peters Proposes a Settlement THE Mayor, and not the proper state authorities, brought order out of the chaos. When order had been reestablished, not by any act of Coolidge or Curtis, but in spite of their attitude, Peters presented a plan for getting out of the deplorable situation. He proposed that Mayor General Charles Cole, a former Police Commissioner, be made adjutant and mediator; that the police request arbitration of the dispute; that they voluntarily surrender their A. F. of L. charter; that the police return to their duties; and that the State Guardsmen be sent home. This seemed a practical solution, and the police appeared eager to act upon it. But the Peters plan evidently was not agreeable to Herbert Parker, to Coolidge, or to Curtis. Such a program would have eliminated them. It promised to stop and settle the strike. Also it might have prevented any punishment to organized labor. Birth of "The Coolidge Myth" SO NOW, at last, had come the time for Coolidge to act - to keep the trouble going, to take advantage of those elements of the situation which were personal and political. He had made no move to forestall the strike. He had done nothing to promote a settlement. He had not acted when the city was left defenseless. Several times had he disclaimed authority and dodged responsibility. But now, with order restored, with public opinion misinformed and misdirected against the police, and with the prospect of a settlement under other than Coolidge-Curtis-Parker auspices, he suddenly and spectacularly assumed dictatorial power. It made no difference that he had previously ducked and dodged and disappeared, nor that he had up to this point maintained the position that it was none of his affair, that he could not "be mixed up in it." Unmindful of the fact that that official had been chiefly responsible for all that was done in every emergency, he pushed the Mayor into the background and restored Curtis to power. Says the Coolidge biographer: "He issued one order and two proclamations. He wired Samuel Gompers two messages as straight as electricity ever carried from a public official to labor." This is what Coolidge wired to Gompers: "There is no right to strike against the public service by anybody, anywhere, any time." The country was impressed - because the country Arthur Warner in the Nation "One takes leave of the Boston police strike feeling not so much that injustice was done the men as that the city was the victim of a miscarriage of the normal processes of democracy and that the public interest was flouted by three personally insignificant men - a police commissioner, a lawyer and a Governor of Massachusetts." 16 THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS did not know what had preceded that attitude, nor of the bigger bungling that was to follow. The misinformed and the uninformed everywhere acclaimed Coolidge. It was big stuff: it was kept going strong. Instead of a settlement, the strike became more extensive, at least in the eyes of the public. Nothing so fortunate for Coolidge had ever happened. "Let it continue" was evidently his policy, and it did. Coolidge as Dictator THERE is practical unanimity of opinion that "Boston was an orderly city when the Governor wrested the control of the Police Department from the Mayor." On this point the Citizens Committee said: "By Thursday morning order had generally been restored in the city. On Thursday afternoon the Governor assumed control of the situation." What did Coolidge do? In Executive Order No. 1 he instructed Curtis "to proceed in the performance of your duty as Police Commissioner of Boston under my command and in obedience to such orders as I shall issue from time to time and obey only such orders as I may issue or transmit." Mayor Peters was thus swept aside and the Mayor's plan for a settlement of the strike without needless expense was thwarted. To Coolidge a settlement was evidently the least of all considerations, and public expense of absolutely no consequence. The thing got bigger - and better, politically. To take the place of 1,100 striking policemen, the 7,000 guardsmen then in Boston were increased to 10,000, and naval militia a thousand strong were mustered in for patrol duty. There was launched a state-wide campaign to organize 10,000 voluntary militia. Twenty thousand stands of new army rifles were shipped in from Camp Devens. In addition, Commissioner Curtis began to advertise for new policemen, offering for the first year $500 more than the striking police had received, with $200 worth of uniforms and equipment free. Of course, the Boston police strike, which could easily have been avoided, and just as easily settled after it had started, kept mounting. The expense of it, practically all incurred after Coolidge took control, was tremendous. For sixty days the National Guard was kept on duty, at a cost of more than $1,000,000. Destruction of property had to be paid for. All told, the cost was several millions, whereas the striking policemen would have been satisfied with an increase in pay totalling $227,000, or about $200 per man. The subsequent increase in police salaries amounted to nearly $700,000 annually. In terms of humanity, thirteen men were killed in cold blood, while more than a hundred were wounded, some of them young girls, as innocent as they were defenseless. Let Coolidge Answer A GROUP of independent-minded Massachusetts voters, in 1919, framed a series of questions for Calvin Coolidge to answer, as follows: 1. During May and August, while the police were negotiating with Commissioner Curtis and with the American Federation of Labor for a charter, did you, or did you not, refrain from any public statement or action that might have averted the crisis? 2. Before the strike, were you, or were you not, repeatedly in conference with and guided by Herbert Parker, and did you, or did you not, follow his plan and his advice in refraining from any public action until Thursday, September 11, 1919, when order had been completely restored through the Mayor's action and when the situation had been so shaped and publicity agencies so set in motion that you might derive political advantage therefrom? 3. Was not this Mr. Parker, the skillful lobbyist, attorney for the Standard Oil Company and other large financial interests, the same Herbert Parker who promoted the Secret Police and Anti-Anarchy Bills before the Massachusetts legislature, the vicious provisions of which drew the protests of the commonwealth leading citizens? 4. It has been publicly stated for you by Attorney-General Wyman that on Sunday, September 7th, you went by automobile from Boston to Northampton. Did you, or did you not, on that date, at the summons of Herbert Parker, go to his estate in Lancaster, where he had also summoned Commissioner Curtis; and there in conference, was there, or was there not, a plan laid before you whereby events were to be so shaped that the police would be forced to go out and the city left unprotected in order that the rioting sure to follow might turn public opinion against them? 5. On Sunday, September 7th, at Lancaster, did or did not, Herbert Parker lay before you and Commissioner Curtis the plan that you were both to follow during the ensuing days? If so, did you, or did you not, know that he had evolved this plan in consultation with a representative of one of Boston's leading banking houses, with the financial interests in New York and with President Gary of the United States Steel Corporation? 6. Was it, or was it not, in conformity with this plan that you refused the request of the Mayor and the Mayor's committee to have the militia in the armory on the night of the strike and was it, or was it not, in accordance with this plan that the hundreds of volunteer police and the hundreds of loyal police were kept off the streets during the first night of the rioting in order that public opinion might be turned against the police? 7. Did you, or did you not, know that Commissioner Curtis gave orders on Monday, September 8th, to Superintendent Pierce, in charge of the volunteer police (as set forth in sworn affidavit by P. H. Drake) that no one of the hundreds of volunteer police ready to serve were to be permitted to go upon the streets before Wednesday and that loyal police were held in the station houses all through the first night of the rioting? 8. Did you, or did you not, know that those devising this plan were acting for great outside financial interests who hoped to force labor to a general strike and at the same time by carefully laid plans of publicity turn public opinion against the strikers and thus make of Boston the Homestead of this quarter-century, the Belgium of the labor struggle? 9. Did you, or did you now, know that if a general strike could have been forced, that labor would have been defeated so decisively and so intimidated that the steel strike might have been averted, greatly to the satisfaction of President Gary and to the profit of the steel trust? 10. Did you, or did you not, suspect, or know, that those to whose counsel you so fully yielded had any such sinister designs as some believe them to have had? 11. Was it, or was it not, for such diabolical ends of selfish men that the name of Boston has been tarnished, incalculable damage done, and expenses been put upon the taxpayers of this commonwealth? These questions have never been answered. They should be answered now - fully and truthfully. Throughout these interrogations there is the inference, the accusation, the charge, that the Boston THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS 17 police strike was wilfully mishandled - to discredit and weaken the hosts who live by their toil, and for the personal aggrandizement of one petty politician. "The Coolidge myth" came out of this episode. It has no other foundation. Coolidge himself should not be content to appear before the public with only a mythical background upon which to stand. Nor do the American people need any other evidence than that of this tragedy upon which to base a just verdict in the pending election. Therefore, let Coolidge now, at once, either confirm or deny, through a complete explanation of his motives and actions at every step and stage, the indictment that the Boston police strike brings against him. When Public Office Was a Private Trust WHEN Coolidge was Governor, Massachusetts had a scandalous time with the State Treasurer. Fred J. Burrell occupied the latter office. Simultaneously, he conducted an advertising agency. Funds of the commonwealth were so distributed among banks as to favor those who patronized the advertising part of the official Jekyll and private Hyde combination. Treasurer Burrell sent out circulars to banks and trust companies soliciting business for Advertiser Burrell. It appears that coercion was almost openly practiced. At first the situation caused a disturbance and then a riot of indignation throughout the state. Everybody knew the disgraceful facts. Charles W. Bailey, President of the Boylston National Bank, in response to a personal solicitation from Advertiser Burrell, informed him that the advertising of that institution was placed through a friend. Later Treasurer Burrell withdrew three- fifths of the state deposit. Apparently this was a typical case. All told, about $5,000,000 was withdrawn from banks, supposedly for the same reason. At one stage, the Boston Herald published the fact that in twelve of the strongest banks in Boston, with combined assets of $942,000,000, Burrell had on deposit state funds to the amount of $2,033,893, while in the twelve banks which used Burrell advertising, with assets of only about $82,000,000, he had placed on deposit $2,584,769. The Hanover Trust Company gave Burrell its advertising and he increased the deposit of state funds from $10,000 to $125,000. The notorious Charles Ponzi was connected with this bank, having acquired $150,000 of stock. It failed, despite Burrell's sustaining reciprocity of favors. A statute fixed the limit of state money that could be deposited in a banking institution at 40 per cent of the bank's paid-up capital. Law did not deter Burrell. For example, on July 31, 1920, it was found that he had place $950,000 of public money with the Tremont Trust Company, whereas its paid-up capital was only $845,000. * * * The Governor and his Council had to approve these deposits. Governor Coolidge became alarmed and promised a changed policy. On August 18th the Boston Transcript quoted him as saying that he was - "not going to approve any banks as state depositories that purpose to continue employing Fred J. Burrell, the State Treasurer, as advertising agent. . . . While I am not criticising the banks or the Treasurer, I do not want to be responsible for that way of doing State's business. It might be perfectly all right, and I am not making any criticism, but I do not want to be in any way a party to it." The Herald commented, and quoted Coolidge: Under the law, the State Treasurer may choose his own depositories, so long as they are approved by the Governor and Council. This approval is more or less perfunctory, and is generally given as soon as the bank commissioner vouches for a bank's reliability. "Naturally, we must give the indorsement as soon as we are sure such a bank is reliable. We could not withhold public moneys from a bank which the bank commissioner had certified as safe for the moneys of the people." Asked if any legal steps could be taken against Burrell as a result of his manipulation of the state funds, the Governor said, according to the Herald: "Under the statutes the Governor is empowered to remove the Treasurer from office for any one of three reasons: insanity, insolvency, or continued neglect of his duties through absence from the state or his office. Manifestly, I am powerless in this case." * * * Burrell callously flaunted his dual character. He became a candidate for reelection. The popular indignation took the form of protest meetings. Also the Republican bosses were getting alarmed, not righteously perhaps, but at least politically. Something had to be done. So, although Coolidge had just taken the position that he was "powerless," he discovered "authority." It was announced that the Governor and the Executive Council had ordered an investigation of the records of the State Treasurer. At almost the same time, an election-fearing group of fifty prominent Republicans, representing the State Committee and various other party organizations, in their political capacity, submitted Burrell to what was called "a grilling examination." The disclosures were such that "regular Republicans" urged the voters to support an opposition candidate in the primary - which rather conclusively condemns Burrell - in a state like Massachusetts. Burrell, on newspaper accounts of a rumored Coolidge plan to impeach him, declined to withdraw his candidacy. This at 6 o'clock, September 3rd. Two or three hours later he announced he would 18 THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS resign as Treasurer, and asked his friends not to vote for him at the primaries. That was his political finish. * * * The Cosmopolitan Trust Company case is about the most flagrant. Its paid-up capital was then only $600,000. The legal deposit limit for state funds was $240,000, but Burrell had on deposit there $795,000. This bank failed. More than 20,000 creditors were victimized. It made a scandal of large proportions. The President of the Cosmopolitan Trust Company was Max Mitchell. He and Coolidge called each other by their first names. Said the Boston Herald, November 1, 1923: "Burrell in his examination by his counsel had testified that the motive behind the deposit of $1,040,000 of state funds in the bank was a $35,000 contribution by Max Mitchell, when president of the bank, to a campaign fund. . . . " Perhaps that explains why, when the Max Mitchell bank was about to break, not being able to meet its clearings, State Treasurer Burrell added a large sum of the public money to the deposit there - with the consent and approval of Governor Coolidge. In a subsequent court proceeding, defending a suit brought against him, Burrell testified: Q. "If you knew this bank was in such bad condition, can you tell us how you happened to keep $500,000 of the commonwealth's money in there?" A. "All right, sir. Because during the year 1920 the Cosmopolitan Trust Company commenced to find difficulty in meeting their clearings, and so during the spring of that year I received, about one o'clock in the morning, a call from Max Mitchell to come down to his office; that unless he received money from some source before 9:30 that day his bank would be closed. Whereupon I went over to see Mr. Grow, the President of the National Union Bank, who does the clearing, who did the clearing for the Cosmopolitan Trust Company, and asked him the Cosmopolitan Trust Company was having difficulty in meeting their clearings, and he said they certainly were; that they left a reserve down there of $300,000 to $400,000 and that amount had all been wiped out, and that unless they came through with an additional deposit that day, they would refuse their clearing, which would mean that the bank would have to close. Then I went up to Calvin Coolidge and Joseph C. Allen and had a talk with them, and I brought Max Mitchell up with me, and I told them the story, that I had so much money on deposit with the Cosmopolitan Trust Company and that it was either a case of the state losing that money or we would have to put more with it in order to save the bank and save our money and the people's money. After talking with Mr. Coolidge and Mr. Joseph C. Allen, they said: 'Put the money in because the bank will eventually come out of it all right,' and that is why I put the money in, because the Governor of Massachusetts at that time and the Bank Commissioner, who was appointed by the Governor, said to do it." Q. "What, if anything, did Calvin Coolidge say?" A. "Well, he - he didn't say much about Max Mitchell, except that he thought it was . . ." Mr. CHILD (attorney for plaintiff): "Just a moment." A. (Continued)" . . . advisable rather than have the bank closed that the state deposit money in that bank." Q. "What did the Governor say?" A. "Words to that effect - that the bank would eventually be all right if we could help them that day to meet their clearing." In response to a question as to the amount the state already had on deposit with the Commonwealth Trust Company on the day of this conference with Coolidge and Allen, Burrell testified: A. "Yes. I said something about the forty per cent limit. That is, the banks . . . the state was allowed to deposit in the different banks an amount equivalent to forty per cent of its capital stock; and that we had on deposit there then nearly that amount, and if we were going to save them for meeting their clearing that the amount which should be deposited, that is, an amount great enough to be deposited, would bring it above the forty per cent limit." Q. "What was said by the other gentlemen in that conference about that?" A. "Well, that there was no - that other Treasurers had done it before." All of which was not only illegal, but decidedly poor business for the state. * * * Here, in the briefest possible compass, you have the Burrell episode. Like the Boston police strike, it reveals the real Coolidge - hesitant, timorous, contradictory, politically minded and actuated. By his sponsors and supporters, the police strike is never mentioned except in terms of misrepresentation. The Burrell case is never mentioned at all. "When Stearns Spoke" ONE cannot speak of Coolidge without thinking of Stearns. No other President ever had, or needed, such an ally to build and sustain him, with money and influence - unless a similar relationship was exercised by Mark Hanna over McKinley. R. M. Washburn, the friendly Coolidge biographer, who refers to Coolidge as "our hero" and whose book is a part of the Coolidge propaganda, offers an astounding explanation of matters in this connection. He says: "This, gentle reader, that you may understand some of the ways in which Frank Waterman Stearns was an efficient ally to Calvin Coolidge and how you may intelligently shape your own political course or retire to obscurity. He is a successful business man, skilled in the art of organization. Hence his counsel is wise. He did much to spread through the country, 'Have Faith in Massachusetts.' Further, he controls a business which means much advertising in the columns of the press. The press has never sought to smother in its news and editorial columns such men as he. Hence, when Stearns spoke Coolidge, the press printed Coolidge. Gentle reader, have you ever noted that when you have made a speech, which, in your opinion has shadowed Webster, and you have feverishly searched the press, it has reported you somewhat in these words: 'Percy Alwin also spoke'? Perhaps, when if you work, you are a member of the bar or a veterinary. If you would proceed more rapidly, politically, then open a garage or enter into some other business . . . profitable to the press, then it is less unlikely to make political preferment impossible for you. . . . Ponder these sordid suggestions. Incidentally, Coolidge often looked into the business office of Stearns, where a sizable correspondence was typed ready for his signature. These are some of the things Stearns did for Coolidge, on top of what he modestly admits. . . . This is a plain paragraph." Far too "plain," we should think! If You Want Extra Copies Extra copies of this number will be sent to one address, postpaid, at the following rates: Ten for $1.50; twenty-five for $3.50; fifty for $6.00; one hundred for $10.00. Order at once, to be sure of getting them before the issue is exhausted. THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS 19 Political Broker Chosen Coolidge Secretary THE Coolidge biographer passes lightly over the Boston police strike. He also fails at all fully to discuss the vital question of Coolidge's political associations. There is one significant reference, however, in this language: "Our language was never skittish about his playmates whether they taught Sunday School or not so long as they could help in a cause which looked good to him." Upon this point a Boston observer remarked: "Among Calvin Coolidge's political friends in Massachusetts are numbered the most corrupt and vicious elements in local political circles. Coolidge never scrupled at the character of his political friends. The only question he ever asked has been: 'Can they be useful to me in furthering my personal ambitions?' " This is the supreme test. The Searchlight has learned by long experience that politicians can always be judged most accurately in the light of their associations. It is the one infallibly just and exact means of measuring motives and purposes in public men. In this connection, one does not need to seek evidence out of the past. The present is full of conclusive testimony as to the kind and character of "the Coolidge crowd." More than that, a single illustration would suffice. Slemp alone would tell the story. When Coolidge became President, not by election, but through the death of Harding, his first appointment was that of a Secretary. He chose C. Bascom Slemp, of Virginia. Slemp was a machine politician who had controlled the patronage in his own and other southern states. His acts in prostituting the public service for partisan aims and ends had given him a reputation more notorious perhaps than attached to the name of any other man in the present political generation. Coolidge could not conceivably have been ignorant of Slemp's political character. It was all a matter of public record. Those records were available and convincing. Coolidge was then facing the campaign for convention delegates. Slemp knew the game of getting southern delegates on the basis of barter and trade. Obviously that was the outstanding reason for his appointment as Secretary to the President. Obviously Slemp was selected, not in spite of his political character, but because of it. The responsibility is wholly upon Coolidge. It was a personal matter over which neither the public nor public officials had any influence or control. The appointment could be made without "confirmation by the Senate." If there had been the necessity of consideration by the Senate, in all probability the name of Slemp would never have been presented, for fear of an aftermath of scandal. Next to his campaign manager, his Secretary is Coolidge's most important political instrumentality. Slemp, therefore, becomes the expression of Coolidge politically. Prostituting the Public Service IN DECEMBER of 1922, The Searchlight published, from official data, the story of some of Slemp's activities as a "political broker." Because it is now, through the adoption of Slempianism by Coolidge, a most illuminating and significant annex to the Coolidge record, we here reproduce that article, as follows: Occasionally a congressman voluntarily terminates his career at the capitol. That happened in the case of C. Bascom Slemp, Republican Representative from the Ninth District of Virginia. Last summer (1922) he decided not to be a candidate for reelection. Perhaps Mr. Slemp possessed the political perspicacity to perceive that his district was destined to go Democratic, as it did, and "got out from under" in time to save his "reputation." Possibly he retired because his "side line" was developing into a "business" so stupendous and profitable as to demand undivided attention. This business, it would appear from the Record, might quite fittingly be described as "political bootlegging." If that characterization be offensive, let us refer to it as "Office Salesmanship" - a much more respectable term - until one discovers that it has to do with the sale of public positions - the worst possible form of prostitution - in fact, a kind of white slave traffic in offices. Bascom & Ben, "Brokers" It appears that C. Bascom Slemp, M. C., also officiated as a D. P. "D. P." means distributor of patronage. "C. P." might more accurately designate his duties, inasmuch as there seems to have been greater emphasis upon "collections" than "distributions." If politicians were given titles, comparable to those of royalty in other lands, or to college degrees, Bascom might be permitted to trail a considerable portion of the alphabet after his name - C. Bascom Slemp, M.C., N.C., D. C. P. The first two - M. C. - might be used twice, to indicate "Member of Congress" and "Manipulator of Conventions." Next, N. C. would stand for "National Committeemen." Then D. C. P. could be used to imply "Distributor and Collector of and for Patronage." Anyway, Bascom controlled the partisan spoils of the state of Virginia and also, it is said, the patronage of other commonwealths. No mere human, and Bascom is not a superhuman, can conduct an extensive enterprise without assistants. So it is necessary to introduce at least two other characters: his Secretary, Mr. L. B. Howard, and Mr. B. R. Powell, "District Referee," with home and headquarters at Gretna, Va. That this brokerage business was at times exciting, if not actually precarious, is hinted in a note of warning, written about a year ago by Bascom to Ben, as follows: December 22, 1921. Mr. B. R. POWELL, Gretna, Va. DEAR BEN: I have letters in regard to the collection of money for postoffices. One must be very careful about this. It will bring the party into disrepute which would be bad for every one. We must preserve our standing with the people and with the administration. With best wishes, I am Sincerely yours, C. B. SLEMP. "One must be very careful about this," says Mr. Slemp. That shows him to have been endowed with common sense. The next sentence, however, reveals a considerable lack of humor. "It will bring the party into disrepute," he fears. That letter (our reproduction being from a photographic copy) would seem to be sufficient to show that there had been a "collection of money for postoffices," and also that the "selling" would have to be conducted with greater cau- 20 THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS tion, to avoid scandal hurtful to the patriotic G. O. P. This advice may have caused Gretna to wear rubber soles and converse in whispers, but it does not appear that the Washington end of the combination at once became scrupulously "careful." Five days after the above warning from Bascom to Ben, we find Howard, Slemp's secretary, writing an urgent, solicitory epistle to Powell, as follows (the italics being ours): Committee on Appropriations. C. B. SLEMP, 9th District Virginia HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U. S. WASHINGTON, D. C. December 27th, 1921. DEAR BEN: I enclose you a copy of letter I received from Mr. Jones a short time ago. I have succeeded in pulling his son over the top and am ready to make the appointment, but before we do so it will be necessary for you to get in touch with him and arrange for some money. We will have to have at least $150.00 in order to come out whole. It took half of that amount to put the matter over, which I will explain to you when I see you. I want you to handle the matter instead of writing to them direct. It is a very delicate matter and I had to do some strong wire pulling to get it through and I know you can work it in the right way. I would not write any letter on the matter, but phone the boy to come and see you. If you can I would like for it to all be arranged by the first of the year. This is a life time position for the boy which he would not have gotten if it had not been for me, and I feel sure they will appreciate fully the circumstances and protect me in the matter. If you think it is worth more than the above amount, you can arrange accordingly. How are you getting along on the Meadows of Dan matter? Your friend, L. B. HOWARD. P. S. - Be sure and destroy this letter after you are through with it. The foregoing suggests that possibly this "white slave traffic in offices" may have had ramifications beyond the obvious circle of "Distributor," "Referee" and overcharged "Purchasers." "It took half of that amount to put it over," says Mr. Howard. Assuming that statement to be legitimately truthful, to whom, in official circles, was the seventy-five dollars paid? Did some one connected with the Civil Service Commission get it? Ought not this phase of the business particularly to be investigated? Meadows of Dan Mr. Secretary Howard, in the "Be sure and destroy this letter" last quoted, is evidently getting anxious about Meadows of Dan. It appears that some "graft" was ripening there and had to be seasonably harvested and housed. Going back a few days, on December 19, 1921, we find Howard writing to his friend Ben "to get something out of it." Says Howard in this letter: Dear Ben: We have a rural route matter at Meadows of Dan in Patrick County that I want you to try and work out on a way that we can get something out of it. . . . . The question is can we get the one we appoint to put up some cash. I know you can do it if any one can. It would be immaterial which one we appoint. My suggestion would be to work it through Arch Staples so as to not get in any hobble that might hurt. If you can agree to get one of the three to do something we can make the appointment at once. You better not use my name or Mr. Slemp's in the matter. Just say that you have authority to make the recommendation that will go. I enclose you a little note that will back you up in this connection. See what you can do and let me know. Get all you can. Your friend, L. B. HOWARD. At the same time this "get all you can" appeal went forth, Mr. Howard sent Referee Powell "credentials," which he could show to candidates with whom he was "dickering," as follows: December 19, 1921. This is to say that Mr. B. R. Powell is authorized to recommend rural mail carrier at Meadows of Dan, Va. L. B. HOWARD, Secretary. Evidently this prospect was very much on Mr. Howard's mind, for again that same day he communicated with the Gretna salesman, this time suggesting a price. Here it is: December 19, 1921. DEAR BEN: Further relative to Rural Route at Meadows of Dan I wrote you about today I would get all I could out of the matter give it to the one that will give you the most. You should have at least 200.00 I think. With best wishes I am Sincerely, L. B. HOWARD, Sec. Under date of January 14, 1922, there is the letter, which may or may not have had reference to the culmination of Republicanism at Meadows of Dan: DEAR BEN: Everything came in O.K. this morning I gave Mr. S. 200. He has taken your matter up with Judge McD. Let me know when I can serve you. Your friend, L. B. H. An undated dunning letter, probably just before Christmas, 1921, seems to indicate that Secretary Howard was personally interested in the gross receipts of the business. It follows: DEAR MR. POWELL: If you can arrange the balance of the $200.00 that I wrote you about I am leaving for home on about the 23rd and would like to have it before that time. Let me know when I can serve you. With best wishes, Your friend, L. B. H. Sec. Knocked Down Cheap Evidently in some items of traffic the traders had to depend more upon quantity than quality - a kind of 5 and 10 cent store brand of business. Of course all this is only conjecture, because the amount mentioned may have been a deferred or partial payment, possibly just enough "to bind the bargain." So form your own conclusions about the following: DEAR BEN: Lee Wolfe has recommended Will H. Henderson for acting P. M. at Lening. I have recommended him so he can take charge Jan. 1st 1922. Suppose this is alright with you. Lee said he would send $25.00 on this. Look after it. Dr. Smith was here yesterday raising hell about matter in Huey County. Will write you fully about it today or tomorrow. Keep all my letter confidential and don't say anything about the Smith matter until you hear further. Your friend, L. B. H. "Get Some Help" Letters There are a number of "get some help" letters from Howard to Powell. Some of these indicate that the "help" had to be extracted after appointments had been made. For example, this undated letter indicates such an unbusinesslike situation: DEAR BEN: I have had Mr. Moon appointed acting P. M. at Saxe. I suggest that you see him at once and have him help us. He should have his appointment within a few days. Your friend, L.B.H. Under date of July 27, 1921, which was evidently before the operating relationship had attained smoothly working informality, as it was then "Dear Mr. Powell," later to become "Dear Ben," we find this very interesting communication: MR. B. R. POWELL, Gretna, Va. DEAR MR. POWELL: The Civil Service Commission has announced examinations for Postmasters, on August 13th at Charlotte Court House, Halifax and Concord Depot. Please get in touch with our people at these places and have them thoroughly prepared for these examinations. I received your letter this morning in regard to the appointment of Rural Mail Carrier at Wirtz, but it came THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS 21 too late, as on yesterday I succeeded in getting Mr. Clyde Boone appointed and wrote you accordingly. I think you ought to see Mr. Boone before he gets his appointment and tell him what a fight we have made to have him appointed and make him promise to help out on expenses. Let me hear from you. With best wishes, I am Sincerely yours, L.B. HOWARD, Secretary. By December of that year, things were going more smoothly, according to such evidence as this: December, 20, 1921. DEAR BEN: The Post Master at Lening Halifax Co. has resigned and wants to be relieved by Jan. 1st. Please get in touch with Lee Wolfe and give us name and some one can appoint acting P. M. 4th class office paying about $500 per yr. Get some help out of party you recommend. Sincerely L.B. HOWARD, Here is another "destroy this letter": September 24, 1921. MR. B. R. POWELL, Gretna, Virginia. DEAR BEN: I am just in receipt of your letter and enclosure from Mr. Moon. I wrote you on yesterday that he had been appointed acting postmaster. His appointment should reach him within a few days. I note what you say about young Parsons doing some work in the eastern end of the district. My advice would be to just let them do what they can and keep in close touch with your friends in your county and the other counties of which you are referee. We have the advantage for I will keep you posted about any and all vacancies and will refer them to you. You will have to work on Doctor Smith some more as I wrote you. He is now getting awfully anxious about the post office. We can do nothing now toward making this appointment unless the present postmaster can be removed on charges. If they will get up some charges and send them in we will go to work on it. I wish you would write Dr. Smith and explain that we are doing everything we can along these lines. You might say to him that we have won out on every thing we have undertaken with one exception and will win on that sooner or later. Don't worry about the action of the people in the western end of the district. Just let them do what they can. Remember that we are your friend and will stay with you. Let me hear from you all along. With best wishes, Your friend, (Signed) L. B. H. P.S. Destroy this letter after you have read it. "Dear Ben" himself, or "L. B. H.," would have to be called upon to explain certain allusions, before the following would be quite clear in all particulars: September 28, 1921. MR. B. R. POWELL, Gretna, Va. DEAR BEN: Your letter enclosing letter written you from Charlottesville by Bascom received. This is what I want you to do. Don't send any more money to Richmond until I see you. Neither do I want you to tell Bascom or Mr. Crupper either anything about what has been done until I see you. Please follow this fully and when I explain why I ask this you will understand and agree with me. Another thing I want you to do for me is this. I have been asked to contribute to the campaign fund, but was told to get what I give from my friends that we had been helping in the way of appointments. If you will arrange this for me I will appreciate very much. Say something like $200.00. You can say to our friends that this contribution is for me so there will be no trouble about it. You know how to handle the matter. Let me know upon receipt of this if I may depend upon it. Your letter relative the Phenix Office received this morning and the matter will be handled as you desire. If you have not already done so don't send the balance of his contribution to Richmond. Don't worry about the letter Bascom wrote you. When I see will explain everything. I have several matters to talk over with you. When do you expect to be in Washington? I will take the Ridgeway office up and work it out without examination if one has not already been called. Another matter. Don't tell G. E. or any of the other western end fellows know what you have done or expect to do in the future. Let me hear from you. With best wishes, I am Sincerely your friend, L. B. H. Please destroy this letter after you have read it. This, however, tells its own story: January 12, 1921. DEAR BEN: The post master at Henry in Franklin County has died. The Department is asking for the name of some one to appoint acting. The office pays about $600.00 per year. I wish you would get in touch with Beverly Davis or some one and let us have name as soon as possible. I would have the party send in a little contribution. Say $25.00 or $35.00. Sincerely yours, L.B.H. Secretary. From a letter of July 2, 1921, Howard to Powell: July 2, 1921. I thank I have arranged for the appointment of Mrs. Angel at Boon Mill without an examination though I prefer that you keep this in confidence. "Get men that will help us in a financial way," were Howard's instructions to Powell, on July 16, 1921: July 16, 1921. MR. B. R. POWELL, Gretna, Va. DEAR MR. POWELL: I certainly did enjoy being with you at the Convention and I appreciate the many courtesies extended to me while there. I am going to depend on you to work out the Henry County appointments. If our friend, Dr. Smith does not fall in line as he should, I think you ought to connect with some one else in that county, and still I think the Doctor will be alright if you will have a long talk with him. Of course you know that it is necessary in making these appointments to get men in that will help us in a financial way, and also I want you to look after the situation in Campbell County. I will send you copies of letters that I write to Mr. Morgan, the County Chairman, so you can keep in touch with the situation. Let me hear from you all along. With best wishes, I am Sincerely yours, L. B. HOWARD, Secretary. A similar bit of "itching palm" advice went to Powell July 19, 1921: MR. B. R. POWELL, Gretna, Va. DEAR MR. POWELL: The Post Office Department has ask us to give them the name of some one who they can appoint acting postmaster at Scottsburg. Please get in touch with Lee Wolfe and give us the name at your earliest convenience. Be sure and get some one that will help us in our finances. With best wishes, Sincerely yours, L. B. HOWARD, Secretary. On July 26, 1921, "L. B. H., Sec.," wrote: I think I have succeeded in having Clyde Boone appointed Rural Mail Carrier at Wirta. Had you better see him and have him help a little. The same day this went to Referee Powell: July 26, 1921. MR. B. R. POWELL, Gretna, Va. DEAR MR. POWELL: I have succeeded in having Mr. Archie H. Kirkland appointed Rural Mail Carrier at Concord Depot. Can you see him and have him help out a little on expenses. You know how to handle matters of this kind so 22 THE SEARCHLIGHT ON CONGRESS there will be no come back. I understand he is a very fine man. A good Republican coming from Mass. With best wish, I am Sincerely yours, L. B. H., Sec. Some Slemp Letters So far most of the communications that have been quoted were signed by his secretary. Now let us include a few from C. Bascom Slemp, M. C., N. C., D. C. P. On February 1, 1921, we find this in a Slemp letter to "My dear Mr. Powell": I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 31st. of Jan. enclosing checks in the amount of $70.00. Here is a complete epistle of that period: February 4, 1921. Mr. B. R. POWELL, Gretna, Va. MY DEAR MR. POWELL: Please accept my thanks for your letter of the 3rd, enclosing checks in the amount of $100.00. You are doing good work. Keep it up. With best wishes, I am Sincerely yours, C. B. SLEMP. On February 8, 1921, Slemp sent this to Powell: February 8, 1921. MR. B. R. POWELL, Gretna, Virginia. MY DEAR MR. POWELL: Your letter of the 7th, enclosing checks in the amount of $125.00 has been received for which I thank you very much. I hope you can rush this work in your district and report your full quota by the 12th of this month. You have been doing good work and I appreciate it very much. With best wishes, I am, Sincerely yours, C. B. SLEMP. P.S. Yes I received checks from Messrs. Tucker and Adams in the amount of 150.00. C. B. S. Total - The particular matters about which Slemp was appealing at this time are revealing in the following: January 15, 1921. HON. B. R. POWELL, Gretna, Va. MY DEAR MR. POWELL: I enclose you a copy of letter received from Mr. Hays. There is a deficit of a small amount on hand over matters. So we ought to raise $10,000.00 at least. I am sure I do not know what to do about this, except that we should do the best we can. Each District would be chargeable with $833.00, but as we will fail in some district, I think we should try to get $1,000.00 from each district, the over plus, if any to go to the State Chairman for State expenses. If any one has sent in money in response to the letter of Mr. Hays sent out on December, we should know about it and have it deducted. Please let me hear from you. I will be responsible for the 9th District and am ready anytime. With regards, I am, Sincerely yours, C. B. SLEMP. The G. O. P. Deficit These last few letters refer to a phase of the situation that is partisan rather than personal. There was a deficit in the treasury of the Republican National Committee. I was evidently handled in Virginia by the same Slemp- Powell combination that looked after offices. Presumably the money came from the same sources - appointees who were thus paying political obligations. With respect to a pat of the fund collected from office seekers and office holders, Mr. Slemp may be able to say that the money went into the coffers of the Republican party, through its chairman, who was then at the head of the Postoffice Department, and in a position to give "value received" in a distribution of spoils. To collect campaign funds, or wipe out a deficit, in that way is far more deadly to democracy than if the money went directly and solely into the hands of individual patronage venders. It means that the dominant part cares nothing about the public service, that it would betray its sacred trust by prostituting public positions to partisan purposes. Probable Extent of the Graft Judged by the canceled checks, and other evidence, plus reports of "sales," proof of which only a thorough investigation could disclose, we are of the opinion that this selling of offices in the one district under consideration would yield an annual income to the politicians involved of probably $10,000. That is a guess, but, we think, a good one. There are rumors of payments as high as $1,000 for a single postoffice appointment. Assuming, for the moment, that a single average district would yield a "political" income of $10,000 a year, then the selling of offices throughout the south would figure out as follows: Alabama, with 10 districts $100,000 Arkansas, with 7 districts 70,000 Florida, with 4 districts 40,000 Georgia, with 12 districts 120,000 Louisiana, with 8 districts 80,000 Mississippi, with 8 districts 80,000 North Carolina, with 10 districts 100,000 South Carolina, with 7 districts 70,000 Tennessee, with 10 districts 100,000 Texas, with 18 districts 180,000 Virginia, with 10 districts 100,000 Total $1,040,000 Congressman Harrison Starts It It was Congressman Harrison, of Virginia, who first disclosed the evidence of office selling from which we have quoted. In the House, on December 15th, he read into the Record some of the letters here reproduced. C. Bascom Slemp was present and offered no denial, even when Mr. Harrison spoke as follows: "The people of the country do not altogether understand Virginia Republican politics. It is a pure matter of patronage and a question of who feeds off patronage. I have been hearing all over my district about the sale of patronage. Constantly reports have come to me that offices were sold for what money there was in it. Let me repeat, I do not believe Republicans of the north realize southern Republicanism, and I do not believe they would indorse southern Republican methods. "I am going to read some letters. A man who I do not know and for who I do not vouch - I have not any idea who he is; he claims, as I understood him, and i do not even vouch for that - he complains that he bought an office and it was given to somebody else because that somebody else had given more money for it, and he put the correspondence in my hands. Now, the head of this whole patronage business in Virginia is the distinguished Member from the ninth district, Mr. Slemp. He is the disburser of all patronage. He is the man who has to give his indorsement to the applicant, not only in my own state but, also as I understand, in other states. Here are canceled checks. They are indorsed, some of them, by Mr. Slemp, some by his secretary, all for the indorsement of applicants to office." All this unerringly reveals Slemp in his political character. Because, among all the millions in America, Coolidge deliberately and knowingly selected Slemp to be his "right-hand man," it becomes a revelation of Coolidge. Instead of recognizing and rewarding and embracing Slempianism, a real President would have been militantly concerned with its reproval and punishment. A real President would have said to Congress and to the country: "This business of prostituting the public service, of bought-and-paid-for delegates, throughout the Republicanism of the South, has got to stop. Political corruption is degradingly and devastatingly un-American. It is a cancer, eating away at the very vitals of representative government." Instead, and notwithstanding its meaning to America, Coolidge made Slemp Secretary to the President. Slemp occupies that crucial position today. Clean the Augean Stables A HOUSECLEANING in public affairs should be the outstanding issue in this campaign. Its corollary should be: Revive the investigations: let exposures continue until every last bit of graft; including all the war graft, is revealed. The Searchlight said in March: The people are perplexed by the national situation. This perplexity is not surprising. There are some aspects explainable by no presumption save that of a degree and extent of criminality in official circles so astounding as to be utterly incredible. And the wholesale lying that is going on by those who would suppress investigation is the best organized and most reprehensible propaganda in the history of the Republic. Too much of the incredible is true. It is difficult to discover the truth and deadly dangerous to discuss it, but the evidence points plainly to these conclusions: That money madness is shriveling the soul of the nation; That the prevailing power of politics has sunk to the lowest depths of depravity and perversion; That corruption is coursing the veins of our public life; That the guiltless in high places are leagued with the criminals in a conspiracy of silence; That the hands of justice are palsied by her own infamy; That back of it all is the master ally of corruptionists, the modern Hercules of propaganda, with every roll of the press and every radio wave seeking subtly and insidiously to spread the impression that the exposures should stop. The dissembling power of propaganda - that is what makes one tremble for the future of America - the puny helplessness of truth. No other hour has been so critical. The supreme crisis is here. The fight is on against the deadliest, most venomous enemy of the Republic - to purge our public life of the black plague of corruption and exploitation. Nothing else matters, so long as there exists the necessity for such a purging. All other problems are temporarily unimportant. Graft, so gigantic and general as to stagger the imagination, has been rampant. Like the vilest, most virulent poison, it has permeated public affairs. God's laws are inexorably righteous and justly exacting. Unless this acute and malignant national sickness is cured, quickly and thoroughly, the Republic will wither and die. Yes, in this tragic hour, with the very fate of democracy at stake, we find practically the whole press of the country united in an effort to chloroform the public conscience, to stifle intelligence, to twist and turn popular opinion toward the belief that these investigations are only "political," that it is the duty of Congress to cease its "muck raking," and turn to legislation. Both press and politicians are doing this. They do not say: Stop the graft. Instead they insinuate: Stop the exposures of graft. The thing to stop is vicious propaganda. Let the investigations go on. Nothing else is so fundamentally vital, so imperatively essential, to the perpetuity of our sacred American institutions. Otherwise, the Republic will die, as any foully diseased organism deserves to die. The downfall of Rome was due to official venality. The French revolution developed out of a cesspool of social and political and church corruption. Our citizenship may now ignore the lessons of all history, but there can be no evasion of the consequences, if these modern American prostitutions are permitted to continue. The Pro-Coolidge Propaganda AT THE Murray Crane-Bascom Slemp kind of politics, Coolidge has sown a certain ability - perhaps adaptability would be much more apt, because he has not so much initiated as applied such methods. In all other fields he is inexpressibly dull. Newspaper propaganda has given him whatever reputation he possesses. Writing with astounding plainness of this "reportorial conspiracy" to "praise and protect" Coolidge, to build and sustain him in a false position, Frank R. Kent, a newspaper man who has seen it all from the inside, now moved to state the truth, says: "Without it (the propaganda) he would long ago have become a sort of sad political joke. Look at the fact for a moment. Here was the dullest and most ignored and obscure Vice-President in history, suddenly pitchforked into the presidency. As Governor of Massachusetts and as Vice-President he had been a laughing stock for those who watched him function - a thoroughly commonplace, colorless person with a neat little one cylinder intellect and a thoroughly precinct mind. A docile product of the Murray Crane machine, there was nothing unusual in the fact that he became Governor. That is the sort of thing that happens in many States. It is not necessarily a mark of ability, force, or character in Massachusetts, anymore than anywhere else. Those who know the facts - and there are a great many - know that, in the matter of the Boston police strike, he had to be forced to act and did not deserve the credit he got. He got it, solely and simply, because of this 'praise and protect' reportorial conspiracy that I have been discussing. "The newspaper men gave it to him because that was the way the thing 'framed up' and because it was the instinctive thing for reporters to protect public officials. It would have been hard to have told the exact truth about Mr. Coolidge in that strike business, and it would have taken a good deal of newspaper courage. It was not told, but there were few politicians and few newspaper reporters who did not know what it was - that Mr. Coolidge would have done nothing at all if he had not been pushed into it. In the three years he was Vice-President he made neither friends nor foes. Socially and politically, he was generally considered hopeless. He was as near nothing as any man we have ever had in that office, and it is no secret that had Mr. Harding lived the plan was not to renominate him. That single fact is the most revealing index of the intellectual inanimation and forcelessness of the man. It would have been a humiliating and unprecedented thing to have passed him over, but it was seriously contemplated - in fact, definitely discussed on the Harding trip to Alaska last summer." With reference to his weekly meetings with Washington correspondents, Mr. Kent writes: "Newspaper men who have regularly attended these Coolidge conferences from the start will tell you they are the most uninspiring, uninteresting, deadly dull affairs of the kind ever known in Washington, that it is extremely hard to get anything out of them worth writing, that you have to strain yourself to do it. In the year that they have been held, twice ever week, n one who has been in attendance can recall a single word from Mr. Coolidge that sparkled or glowed or indicated any force, feeling, grasp, or spirit. It has been literally amazing that a man could be so long, consistency and so unqualifiedly dull. But that is not the picture the country gets. That cannot be written. It is not news. While Congress lasted and before he was nominated, Mr. Coolidge profited enormously by this system of correspondents' conferences and indirect quotations. Since his nomination the protection continues. It will not fail him through the campaign. It is his biggest asset - this tendency of the newspaper writer who comes into personal contact to portray the President as of heroic size. There have been some Presidents whom some newspaper men really thought heroic - but not this President." There you have the explanation of "the Coolidge myth." If You Believe In Our Work- Help Spread The Facts To Others The Searchlight on Congress exists for a specific purpose. Its purpose is to give the facts about Congress and governmental affairs at Washington. It gives them fearlessly and interprets them solely from the point of view of the public interest. And they are the facts-the record facts. You can depend on them. Investigation, training and insight are behind every statement made. But the facts are powerless unless they get to the voters. In this campaign year we believe every live friend of honest government in the public interest needs this magazine. The greater the number of people you can get the facts to the more our joint work counts. Won't you show this copy to ten voters who ought to have it every month, and get them to subscribe? The Searchlight ($2.00 a year; 20 cents a copy) Lenox Building Washington, D. C. Transcribed and reviewed by contributors participating in the By The People project at crowd.loc.gov.