GEORGE S. PATTON DIARIES Original Aug. 5-17, 1942 BOX 1 FOLDER 4 Armored forces in Lybia have been unsuccessful on the defensive, except delaying actions on successive, previously selected, positions and by COUNTER ATTACK. Armored forces must be kept concentrated except for special mission small combat teams. Dispersion of forces in never warranted unless communication and control is perfect. Insist on correct intelligence. The British have lost many tank battles by basing their operations on incorrect intelligence reports underestimating the Axis tank and gun strength. Close air support is essential and must be developed. It can only be attained by continuous training. Balanced Force Team coordination from Tank Platoon to Division is important. Stress recovery and field repair. Recovery of disabled vehicles starts with the tank company. The tank company should be equipped with an armored tow vehicle that in battle takes position in rear of the line of contact within very pistol or signal rocket visual distance. When a vehicle is disabled it signals the tow vehicle which goes into the fire fight if necessary and tows the disabled vehicle out of range, where it can either be repaired or picked up by a transporter equipped recovery unit and transported to where it can be repaired. Every disabled vehicle must be destroyed beyond repair either by gunfire, the expensive way, or by a forward engineer demobilition unit Infantry defense must be built around the anti-tank gun even more completely than we once thought building the defense around the machine gun. Mobile anti-tank guns are essential for a defense position reserve. Desert Notes and Brit, German, Jap tactics Diary Aug 5-17 1942 I INDEX. A. Movement to Ports. B. Orders C. Notes on Tactics D. Gadchets E. Maxims F. Desert G. Desert Training Notes H. Air Ground Support I MOVEMENTS. 1. See A.R. 30-1190 2. Dog Tags -- correct. Innoculations Clothes. 3. Extra, motors Tracks-Bogies-Gun Barrels-Sights. 4. List of Minimum Vehicles Needed. Gracie I ORDERS 1. Warning in Ample Time. 2. Letters of Instruction or Conferences. 3. Don't Change Plan. 4. All C. P's well up. & with one of next lower units. 5. Commanders must fight. 6. "Reporting Lines" 7. Life Radio Silence when contact is gained. 8. Move by Bn bounds from cover to cover. 9. Artillery FORWARD 2 Reconnaissance- Reconnaissance--then more reconnaissance. Distant observation for security. Sig & Med units must be told of tactical plans well in advance so they can plan. Every vehicle driver must know the route if one exists on the map, or the azimuth, or a distant directing point if he has no compass. Gracie I Notes on Tactics. 1942 British in Desert. Div. units 20-30 Mi apart. 150-200 yds between vehicles. Individual cooking (due to dispersion) Camouflage replaced by dust. Tanks engage at long range- (poor idea) Defense of L of C & R. Installations V. I AT's surround TKS in dark, attack at dawn. -- Put security further out - attack the AT'S. Some of our AT should be with each TK. group. 37 M/M too small. 2. Rec. Should have A.T. & TKS with it. Also Air. All under C.O. attack Armd D:VS covered by MTZ. s. Strong in AT. AT, AA, ART. all aid in TK. vs TK battle. Close Air support V.I. Prompt report recovery & repair of Combat Vehicles V.I. 2 AA Watchers per vehicle. Bomb C. P's before starting an attack Gracie 3 TACTICS Attack weakness or key points. JAPS Prefer to attack. Hence attack them. They use close in envelopments. Hence go wide. They attack from march column- do not use assembly areas. On defensive they lack depth & counter attack promptly. Prefer high tide just before dawn for landings. Rain or fog helps. Once landed troops move rapidly inland. Great secrecy & use of difficult & unlikely landing sites. 4 Japs have lots of cycle troops. Show great boldness in infiltration & night operations. Uses noisy frontal attacks to cover quiet envelopments by lightly armed troops. Trust no oriental. # Walkie-talkies to maintain communication in jungle. # Due to excessive moisture Marine type radio might be useful in jungle war. # Japs carry chlorine on person to purify water. 5 Prior to landing Japs place range lights visible only from sea. No attempts at daylight landings reported. Landing boats armored proof to S.M.F. at 300 yds. Six days rations carried on landing. Wind effects visibility by moving dust. Hand packs on outside of vehicle. Voice radio used by Japs for air ground. Snipers in trees. Sentries 60-125 yds. of camp. 6 Use stealth & quiet in night attacks. Crawl right up. Do not shoot at night. Japs cook by section or by individuals. Live off country. Japs keep fighter patrols constantly in air over columns. Japs Motorized infantry use a minimum of equipment. Should only carry a fighting load. Japs land just before dawn on a rising tide, therefore, when high water slack occurs just after dawn is a likely night for attack. Prefer bad weather and rough coasts. Ships guns firing at maximum elevation with reduced charges have supported Jap attack. 7 Japs work by memory; hence surprise attack may throw them out. Germans strong points provide slit trenches with the parapets for the infantry component. When the tanks approach, the infantry do not attempt to shoot at them but conceal themselves, leaving to the anti-tank weapons behind them the job of shooting at the tanks. From the concealment of these deep trenches, they attack the tanks with gasoline bottles and by dragging mines across their path by the use of wires. All column commanders will move with advanced guard until the fighting starts and will constantly remain in a position from which they can personally see the battlefield. Wireless silence will be enforced during the advance, except that, when contact is made, units in contact will report enemy position by wireless. 8 When the situation developes sufficiently the commanding officer will remove wireless silence. When wireless silence is in effect, all sets will, nevertheless, listen in. Wireless silence will be enforced for two hours prior to going into bivouac and during the night when enemy activity is anticipated. Reports from artillery observers, both ground and air, must be immediately repeated to next senior commander. In tank versus tank actions, enemy tanks will be engaged by platoon concentrations from right to left or from front to rear when the range becomes less than 500 yards. To date Japs have attempted no landing more than 400 miles from a land base airfield Japs landings occurred from 2 to 3 hours 9 before high tide and preferably on moonless nights. They are not adverse to difficult landing beaches as these insure surprise. They frequently land on a front of from 5-16 miles. First troops ashore have radio through which they direct air support. When landing is unopposed, Japs move rapidly along the roads until contact is made. Japanese patrols and columns moving on roads carry flags for the purpose of identifying themselves to their own aviation. They use parachute troops to secure local landing fields from which fighter squadrons can immediately operate. Through use of conscripted local labor, they enlarge fields so that within two days to a week heavy bombers can operate. They also bring up interceptor units. 10 Japs are strong for reconnaissance. They are great bluffers. The Japs avoid frontal attacks and do everything to procure infiltration followed by rear attacks. The infiltration is carried out by small patrols operating with the greatest boldness and initiative. In large scale attacks, Japs take off at dawn closely supported by aviation and artillery. In pursuit, the Japs will abandon their own weapons when the ammunition is expanded and rearm themselves with captured rifles, machine guns, and artillery. When weapons are captured, the Japs do not send them to rear, but take them forward with them in the hope of finding ammunition. Air Forces-- "The Task Force commanders have full control over all their weapons, and the necessary aircraft for the task are just 11 additional weapons for the commander to employ. The commander is presumed to know the proper use of his air weapons just as he knows the proper use of infantry and artillery." All Japanese commander tanks, down to and including platoons, have two-way radios. Small armored mobile launches are used to maintain communication during landing operations. Gracie Germans On defense Germans fortify areas for all-around defense with as much depth as they have troops. They echelon their tanks on the dangerous flank or in rear of gaps. In withdrawals, supply trains move out first by infiltration or at night. This is covered by an actual or a threatened attack by the tanks. This operation is usually conducted in the evening so as to develop 12 a defensive frame of mind on part of enemy. All units pull out during the night. When the German withdraws he moves out fast to a new battle position and and attempts to break off all contact with enemy during the movement. At all times the Germans execute long distance raids against air fields, supply bases, headquarters, and communication centers. In combined operations where infantry and tanks are attacking, the German uses a few tanks to support his infantry and attacks with them on the axis of attack of the infantry. He uses majority on an attack in a wide or close envelopment on a different axis so as to diffuse the fire of the enemy antitank guns. I orig GADCHETS. 1. Pedistal mount for AT & AA Gun. 2. Overhead armor on A.C's. D Grorie 1 Maxims E If you are sure that the enemy is sure a thing can't be done DO IT. What is not inspected is not respected. Death is lighter than a feather. Duty is heavier than a mountain. Man brings recognition on himself. Defeat or victory comes out of his own mind. The destiny of whole peoples hangs on the resolute or indolent souls of a few men. Failure in war comes from not considering the Morale factor: from failing to call out the strength that is to be found in the soul of man. Of all military virtues energy in the conduct of operations has always 2. contributed most to the glory and success of arms. When everything else fails we must familiarize ourselves with the idea of dying with honor, for without this firm determination nothing great can be effected in war. If we are willing to die we will probably live. In all matters which pertain to an army, organization, discipline, or tactics, the human heart in the supreme moment of battle is the basic factor. "Habit (discipline)," says Clausewitz, "gives strength to the body in great exertions, to the mind in great danger, and to the judgment against first impressions." 3. "Fighting when there is no hope of victory is not mad; it is the deepest wisdom, beyond the comprehension of timorous leaders who look into the book and decide all is lost. It is wisdom because courage achieves the impossible." "Even when the prospect of success is against us we must not on that account consider our undertaking as impossible." "We must be willing to accept death gladly, to give everything in us in our effort to win over the enemy though all indications declare it is impossible to check him. The impossible has been achieved by valour in man's long road over defeat and glory." "Until a man knows he is defeated he is never defeated." 4. General Grant said, "In every battle their comes a time when both sides consider themselves licked. The one who still hands on wins." Gracie I DESERT. Food. Avoid condiments Salt inscreases thirst but is needful for health.? Don't drink water in daytime. You sweat it out. Water to be issued only on order. Issue salt tablets. Don't smoke, it chaps lips. Hot tea with lots of sugar useful. Vitamin Pills. 1 gal. satisfactory, 3/4 gal minimum. 1 qt if movement by night. 2 Use more than one water container on account of danger of leaks. Provide funel per vehicle to avoid wastage. Woolen belly band. Grorie 3 DESERT Move dispersed 100 yds. minium interval & distance. All around security against both air & ground is necessary. Avoid geometrical formations. Supply vehicles move like tactical vehicles by day or in moonlight. In dark--no lights--no smoking--. Move in line of columns with reduced distance & intervals all around protection. Navigation very important. Take tables. 4 Bivouacs. By day: disperse as in movement. By night: units size of Bn. camp in [square] [diamond] formation, all guns laid to cover lines of attack. Supply vehicles in side. Radio silence for at least one hour before going into bivouac. Radio silence at night. All vehicles head in direction of movement. A-A guns always maned & A-A lookouts & warning system provided. Patrols Patrols should not return by the same route they went by. Must be able to navigate and move silently. Never use less than two vehicles Security units should see and report, usually they will not fight. 5 A reserve of fuel and water in addition to estimated expenditure required. British use light trucks, Germans armored cars. For rec. In figuring water, ammunition and gas, estimate on 150 miles a day. Better 50 Out posts should be at least a 1000 yards from main body (probably further). Camouflage Oil smeared on vehicles attracts dust, makes better camouflage. Cover wind- shields with oil. Leave aperture 2 by 8 inches. Camouflage nets necessary. Conceal nature of vehicles by camouflage, make tanks look like trucks, trucks look like tanks. **(Ref. to Patrols) Germans use one armored car and two light cars as patrol units. 6 General Do not close up to refuel. Use pyrotechnics for recognition signal by the air and ground, also, to show positions(assembly positions might be located with direction finding radio). Water and ammunition D. P's must be scattered. Funnels and screw caps on tanks must be wiped clear of dust. Each vehicle to have small funnel to fill canteens. Gasoline and ammunition have to be buried, dummy dumps useful. Get sun in enemies eyes. Retreat through known routes in mine fields or over bad ground so that pursuing enemy will get into trouble and be ambushed. 7 Dirt around slit trenches to be scattered. In taking turret defilade place tank to secure glancing fire on front and sides. Use grazing fire with machine guns against artillery to get under shields. Turn turret guns to rear to deceive enemy as to type of tank. Germans seeking ration of 9 anti-tank guns(47MM) per company. Germans provide one recovery vehicle per nine tanks. Ours is one for 30 tanks. [*11*] Anti-tank mines used in defensive. Anti-personnel mines sown with them. Mine fields in rear area fenced off. 8 150 MM Howitzer percussion fuses effective against tanks. Germans place 50 and 80 MM guns on flanks of all units in combat. Air attack against AA and AT effective. German tank cannons effective to 2000 yards. Tanks must carry HE phosphorus and armor piercing. Germans always bring artillery up with tanks when later fire from turret defilade. When tanks withdraw, artillery cover. Refueling must be covered by AA and AT and fighting planes. German tanks attack in line of platoon columns, 50 yards distance. 9 Close laguer with tanks only. A 100 yards out as practiced by British is suicidal. Germans always reform units after dark and regroup preparatory for dawn attack. Pyrotechnics used to indicate assembly points(How about radio direction finder). British lost 60% of tanks in one day due to lack of reconnaissance. Germans avoid using tank on defensive. Use guns to cover tanks and form pivot. High altitude bombing dangerous to own forces. Slit trenches need not be deep. Low flying air attack must be shot at. Radio messages brief; write it first. 10 Don't halt to fire under 700 yds unless you have defilade, always zig-zag. [*?*] Drills Mounted drills by voice and flag signal vital. Practice change of direction in dispersed movement. Use flag signals in platoons. Artillery Ricochet fire more effective than impact bursts. Artillery implaced in depth. No geometrical formations, slit trenches. Trains Unit trains should carry 100 miles fuel and one refull of artillery AT and tank ammunition. In figuring loads, remember water and fuel necessary for return trip. Individual Driving Move by compass. 11 start with change of direction after halting to fire. Track targets. Always drill with full packs, personnel and vehicular. Use camouflage on cover. Do not follow in trace, makes more dust and better air target. ? Check accuracy of speedometer for distance. Maintain 3 days rations and water in vehicle at all times. Maintenance Clean all filters, check tire pressure. Clean radiators Wipe top of gas and water cans before using or filling. 12 Clean dust from fins of tank engines. (Note on section headed "Driving) In soft sand avoid sharp turns. DO Not follow in trace. Change gears in time. Do not use brakes. Germans Apparently the desert combat group for the Germans consists of tanks, assault guns, medium guns, tank and anti-aircraft guns. They advance in the normal method by bounds, half the group moving at one time. Guns emplace themselves by the tanks to participate in fire fighting. While halting for the night, they form a circle with armored fighting vehicles on the outside and an interval of 50 to 75 yards. Beyond this circle, they maintain listening posts and patrols and frequently use flares to illuminate the foreground. Supply vehicles, which apparently accompany these units at a distance of a mile to a mile and a half, form inside the circle established by the armored vehicles. 13 Ground vehicles identify themselves to air by the use of colored smoke and red bunting. British British, apparently, have no anti-aircraft guns with their trains. This is a mistake. Trains should be escorted by tanks, armored cars, and anti-aircraft guns. In advancing, they move and camp by battalion units, and in night movements, they advance in line of small columns with very short distances and with anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns on the flank Vehicles All distributor heads, dynamos, carburators should be dust proof. All vehicles should carry sand channels and large entrenching tools. Gyroscopic compasses should be in every tank. 14 [Gasoline cooker to every vehicle.] Every driver should have a map. Germans carry five days supply of drinking water and radiator water for each vehicle in desert marches. Avoid marching in heat of day. At nigh, move on roads wherever possible. Desert roads should be marked by signs or piles of rocks. During air attack, leave roads. Always reconnoiter. Ranger estimation should be taught all troops. All weapons must be kept dry polished, not greased. Avoid opening fire too soon or continuing it after enemy is out of range. 15 The 50 mm. gun outranges all British tank cannon. The skirting(track protection) on British tanks can be easily bent by hostile fire. Germans fire at this and driving sprocket, and at base of turret. Tank mines must be expected in all passes. Use all small arm fire available against air attack. Reconnaissance must be well out. Targets can only be recognized in evening and morning. Practice target identification during middle of day. Use reconnaissance tanks on flanks of column and to cover the next succeeding ridge. Germans use inverted "V" formation with light companies forward and medium 16 (Cont'd) companies to the rear. In the regiments, the battalions are formed in depth. Distances between tanks are 100 yards. 17 German Method of Moving in Desert From a British Prisoner: The German force consisted of about 35 tanks, half of which were Mark IV, eight 105 MM field guns rather larger than our own 25 pounders, 4 Howitzers, probably 155, at least four anti-tank guns, four A.A. guns, four armored cars. Immediately behind came about ten trucks, all containing fitters, in one of which I travelled. The tanks were divided into two groups which advanced together or one at a time, depending on the opposition they encountered. They advanced by bounds and usually halted in horseshoe formation. When they advanced two guns were advanced with each group, leaving two in action. When they came up against opposition the guns with the tanks dropped into action beside them. When the advance continued the rear two guns leap-frogged. There was considerable German air activity and the cooperation between 18 ground and air was very close. Messages were dropped on three occasions which I saw, and there must have been others. The ground to air recognition signal is a magenta-coloured smoke cartridge fired from a special smoke projector. They also draped red swastika banners over some of the vehicles. The medium guns followed us about 1 1/2 - 3 miles behind. I never saw them in action. No precautions were taken against air attacks, vehicles constantly being closely bunched. The advance halted at about530 hours and at about 615 hours they went into night leaguer. The tanks formed a vast circle facing outwards, with everything else in the middle. They did not close right up like our close leaguers, but every vehicle was about 50 - 75 yards from the rest. Patrols were circling the leaguer all night, and white verey lights were sent up every few minutes. Next morning they stayed where they were, not opening out at all. "B" Echelon came up on a long crocodile, nose to tail, and the 19 tanks were refuelled. The petrol was all brought up in 50 gallon drums and was decanted from these into the ordinary hand 5 gallon cans. This was considerably slower than our method of distribution, but there appeared to be no waste at all. The Germans seem to be using thermite or flame producing 75mm shells. Anti-tank weapons, such as tank chaser units and dual purpose anti-aircraft-- anti-tank weapons should be used as artillery in the attack. Porte or towed guns must be prepared to fire in the probable direction of the enemy at all halts. Individual tanks moving into firing positions should not move more than a hundred yards from the location in which they halted in search for better defilading positions. 20. Refeuling areas should be selected in advance and ground and air protection provided to cover them during the operation Air filters are vital. Distributor heads and dynamo bearings should be dustproof. All vehicles should carry the following spares: Radiator hose connections, Water pump glands, Diaphragms for fuel pumps, Insulating tape, Extra spark plugs, Extra spring leaves or compression springs to replace broken springs, One extra inner-tube, patches and a pump. On a cross country marches loads not to exceed 3/4 capacity should be used. [*?*] Speedometers and clocks should be checked. 21. Gyroscopic compasses should be carried in platoon and other higher leader tanks and other armored vehicles. All vehicles should have a map and know where they are going. At night, wherever possible move on roads without any lights. Desert tracks should be marked by white stakes, rock piles, etc. Leave roads at halts, move to up-wind side. Do not open fire too soon or continue too long; this wastes ammunition. Fire at the tracks and wheels of all armored vehicles, and at the base ring of turrets. Mines can be expected in all passes. When moving through defiles crown the heights first. Use half-tracks to bring up extra ammunition. 22. Fire control of all weapons during a firing situation is vital. Wherever possible use guns instead of tanks on the defensive. Keep anti-aircraft with the trains. All units in desert warfare must be well-balanced and self-contained. Engineer demolition charge squads in half-tracks should be well up to destroy enemy tanks so that they cannot be recovered. Maintenance must be close up and start operations as soon as the situation permits, even when still under fire. The Germans keep tank chaser units on the flanks at all times. The instant German tanks engage in a fight they are supported by all types of artillery available. This artillery covers the advance by bounds and secures their withdrawal. When a unit is reduced by casualties, reinforce it with whole groups not with individual vehicles. 23. Groiee LIBYA - MAY, June '42. May 27- Lack of British reconnaissance resulted in surprise. Less than 20 men warned of German attach resulting in a panic. Participated in by 3,000 vehicles moving hub-to-hub. British counter-attack with tanks supported by infantry and field. RAF bombed own men. June 1 - RAF bombed own man. Up to this date, tank losses 70%, of which 50% were completely out. No relief thanks had arrived at end of five days. The need of smoke to identify tanks too freely - air again evident. June 2 - RAF using low flight attacks on Germans. These attacks were effective, but very costly. Germans used anti-tank guns to hold defensive flanks. June 6 - RAF attack regularly dive bombers and army transports. Effect against dive bombers good, against transports doubtful. British armed divisions were not used as units but as brigades. They were not supported by infantry. Note: It is my opinion that the British failure is due generally to inability to use combined arms. 24. June 9 - British Railway providing 26,000 tons freight daily. June 10 - British called for bombardment aviation which requested three hours to arrive. Note: If no previous warning had been given this was a good time. 88 mm duel purpose gun extremely effective. British totally lack security at night. Their men are wholly lacking in training in the sense that we understand training. June 12 - Between May 27th and June 8th, British lost 742 tanks out of 1,022. Of the 742 lost, 450 were total casualties. German 88 mm gun is a toad gun. This day British attack German tank unit of 50 tanks with a brigade of 150 tanks, which they sent in by regiment with the result that all the 150 tanks became casualties. Germans intimidate enemy with the 88 mm gun so that he does not dare to move then, as soon as it dark, withdraw tanks to attack elsewhere. Note: As a result of all the telegrams on this operation, I believe that an armored division or two armored divisions must always be used in a Corps, with a motorized division and that all trains in any armore 25. unit or motorized unit must have anti-aircraft protection by self propelled duel purpose guns. June 14 - Germans used planes in close support. From May 26th to June 9th, German Air Force consists of about 1,000 plans - flew 1710 close support missions and 273 missions against rear area installations. In the same period the RAF, with slightly more plans, flew 825 missions against trains and scheduled vehicles and 330 missions against air-drones. The result is self-evident. RAF attack their own troops. Germans move much at night. Assemblying in dark and attacking at dawn. British failed to use MACHINE guns against anti- tanks and artillery even when within range. [General corps had small quarters and at front]. Free french lost 3,750 to 3,800. June 15 - SPARE parts for U. S. M3 medium lacking. June 21 - British morale low. Will continue attack, British have 3,550 air-craft in Middle East, of which 1,065 are servicable. In Egypt, Sudan and Palestine 950 planes, of which 647 are servicable. In Malta 225 planes, 141 serviceable. British have about 26. 100 tanks left, have lost about 50% of artillery. Note: I believe that British lack of morale and sickness is due to bad feeding. It is necessary, in my opinion, that field kitchen equipment forces to be used whenever tactical situation permits. 27 Gracee Paraphrase of Secret Cable from Fellers, Cairo, Filed 1448/20, Journal #100. Enemy procedure normally used by German reinforced batallions attacking hostile positions: 1. Mobile light artillery, anti- tank guns, self-propelled guns and some infantry are brought up under cover of 1 company MK 4 tanks, accompanied by artillery observers. Infantry dismounts moving forward until it brings hostile artillery and anti-tank guns under fire by longrange machine guns. All above advance elements establish fire superiority over hostile forces, being assisted by usual fire from artillery in rear whose fire is controlled by observers with forward tanks. 2. Balance of armored batallion is formed for assault behind this covering force, while above action is in progress. Assault is pushed home, usually with tank elements in three lines, when fire superiority is established over hostile anti-tank elements. Some tanks stop to assist 28 friendly infantry while majority of tanks push through hostile positions to reform behind them. Mobile positions are taken under fire from rear by last wave of tanks after they have penetrated defended area. 3. Infantry assigned to tank batallion, not covering force, follows in vehicles approximately 200 yards behind rear wave of tanks. In some cases infantry rides on exterior of tanks jumping off at important places. 4. Assault is rarely headon, but is usually a close envelopment. Pivot of attack is covering force which may remain in position to cover withdrawal should attack be stopped. It and artillery follow up on batallions orders and are not used to direct fire. Flank is protected by reconnaissance units during action 5. Highly explosive shells are use by self-propelled artillery and anti-tank guns against hostile artillery or anti-tank guns. Smoke is used to confuse any hostile observers or guns which have not been put out of action and to protect final assault Frequent overhead fire is utilized and fire of this pivot is continued as long as possible. 29 Our own equipment and organization, with infantry in armored vehicles and with assault cannons is better adapted to this form of action than that of the Germans, being ideal for it. MINES A density of 1 to 1 1/2 mines per yard of front is necessary. No regular pattern should be used for edgeof mine field next to enemy. Mines are laid out by knotted strings as shelter tent camps are pitched. Strings marked for each line of mines should be retained in case it is necessary to remove field. Field must be marked with wire. Comments by General Freyberg and General Scott: In attack, armored fighting vehicles must have maximum firing support. If anti-tank weapons are numerous, tanks should support tank by long range defilade fire, and the anti-tank guns should be located by infantry and cleared out by artillery. 30 It is necessary to protect tank recovery units on the battlefield. Excessive dispersion to avoid enemy air leads to defeat. All mortar or towed guns should be put into position to fire at all halts. General Scott: Anti-tank guns and smoke are necessary in armored operations to form pivots on maneuver. Motorized infantry should remain mounted as long as possible. Armored reconnaissance patrols are a vital need to armored divisions. 1 G DESERT TRAINING NOTES April 13, 1942 1. Avoid abrupt turns in sand. 2. Where attempting to back out or move ahead from a stall, be sure all four wheels are parallel. 3. Change into lower gear before entering doubtful area and move rapidly through it. 4. Avoid ground full of rat holes. 5. In following a [?][bearing course], move by tangents rather than by adhering directly to the course; that is, take advantage of open spaces on either side of the course ordered, making mental notes of the divergence and correct by equal divergence in the other direction at an early occasion. April 15, 1942 1. Reconnaissance must receive main body far enough to locate and report unsuitable ground. 2. Ground on the west side of north and south ridges, particularly if it appears white, should be carefully reconnoitered before attempting to cross. 2 3. Half-tracks TANKS and peeps seem the most reliable vehicles. ? 4. In crossing soft ground, go as fast as possible. 5. In portions of desert covered with high cover, vehicles move in line of columns, take up line of staggered columns on approaching open desert on order of column commander. April 18, 1942. 1. Except in case of alarm, no vehicle will move in bivouac during the night unless preceded by a man on foot. 2. Slit trenches will be dug at right angles to the defense perimeter so that they may be used for firing positions. 3. In forming a bivouac the Commander's yellow flag will be conspicuously flown in order to indicate the center of the bivouac. 4. If attacked from air in brushy desert ? [hold] vehicles preferably in the shadow of bushes. 3. 5. If attacked in open desert continue the march. HALT 6. In either case all weapons susceptible of anti-aircraft fire must open fire. 7. Immediately when a vehicle is assigned to its night position the crew will [immediately] dig split trenches, automatic weapons will be sighted to sweep the foreground at 200 yards, and ropes will be tied to the barrels so that the guns cannot be traversed far enough to strike adjacent friendly vehicles. 8. All guns will be half-loaded. 9. One man per vehicle will be awake and on duty during the hours of darkness. 10. Company Commanders will check and report the presence of all vehicles, or the number and type absent. April 29, 30, and May 1, 1942. 1. Radio orders too long, too conversational, tell people what to do and how to do it. This is wrong, radio. orders should not exceed nine words. 2. Lack of realism. 3. Some cases of men stopping because they were tired. 4. 4. Armored operations must not lag; as soon as contact is made you must push in for a decision. 5. Never give up ground, never withdraw to reform. 6. Phase lines are a vital necessity. Heads of columns should be ordered to stop on an azimuth reading from the vehicle to a conspicuous point, or to stop on a speedometer reading. 7. There must be lateral liaison. 8. There must be vigorous leadership; if things go wrong they must be corrected at once. 9. At all halts officers are to supervise maintenance. 10. Movement from march formation to combat formation in new directions must be practiced. 11. Do not advance by rushes unless you are forced to do so by enemy fire. Keep moving rapidly forward until forced to rush. 12. Armored infantry must come into effective small-arms range before dismounting. 13. All fire weapons must be used. 14. The greatest defect noted was lack of realization that this is war. 15. Reconnaissance is not [actionary]. ? 5. 16. The mission of the reconnaissance unit is to locate the road, leave markers at bad places, describe the country, find the enemy and get around him. 17. When the reconnaissance has located the enemy it must remain in contact. 18. It must report positive or negative information hourly on the hour. 19. It also must report immediately the first contact with the enemy. 20. The main body should only acknowledge; it should not send radio instructions to the reconnaissance because the enemy intercepts them. 21. Radio silence must be maintained during the approach march except where conditions of visibility render it unnecessary. 22. In no case should tactical orders for events in the distant future be sent by radio. 23. During the [campaign] COMBAT brief messages in the vicinity of approximately nine words may be sent as the enemy does not have time to react. 24. When the fight starts the advance guard of the vehicles must clear the front. 25. All non-armored vehicles must get out of the way. It is absurd to see 6. unarmored vehicles in the tank line during a battle. 26. In the formation used the artillery should have been further forward. Emphasize: AMMUNITION, PHYSICAL FITNESS, DISCIPLINE, AIR GROUND & GROUND AIR IDENTIFICATION 1 H Air Ground Support May 4, 1942 1. If attacked from air, report fact with type and number of ships and method of attack to own aviation instantly. 2. Maintain offices from G-2 section to our airdromes to obtain information from returning pilots, and to be sure that all flying missions have the latest ground information available. 3. Air targets should be beyond the the range of ground weapons 4. An air attack against a portion of the enemy might be a good ruse to draw his attention from real attack of some other place. 5. Methods of showing enemy targets: Lead in by observation plane, flares or smoke dropped on target by observation plane, firing smoke 2. from artillery, markers on ground, showing direction and distance of target. 6. The order for a combined operation should show the air mission, method of support, ground unit to be supported, probable time support will be available, means of sending information and asking for it. 7. Identify own front line by colored smoke, flags, or very light pistols. 8. Use air for distant rout reconnaissance and to attack and delay enemy approaching vital points until our ground troops can secure them. Also to cut bridges, railways, roads in rear of enemy. July 2, 1942. 1. German army air units remain under the German Air Force for supply and administration, but under the German 3 1. (cont'd) Ground Force for tactical employment. 2. The majority of observers in the Air Force working with Ground Forces are Ground Force officers who are attached to Air Force for duration of the war. 3. The Germans have difficulty in direct air-ground communications between tanks and air, owing to the difference in sets used. The same is true with us. 4. The Germans drop marked maps in cylinders which have a harmless yellow smoke that burns when a cylinder hits the ground for the purpose of facilitating their recovery by Ground Forces. [Omit?] Have Air Support units radio [?] to arrival using a code word H.H. SEMMES H.A. FLINT MH PATTON P. PASCHAL ARTHUR THAYER I D. WHITE BURRACKER CALLAHAN KOCH MART BAILEY BIG NOSE? STRAUSS SHAGG CALDERA MITCHELL KEYES PICKERING Should be August Diary July 5, 1942 Got word at 6:00p last night to fly to U.K. this morning. Arrived Wash Air Port 7:45 a. My baggage weighed only 35 lbs. Got on 4 motored strato liner left ground at 9:13 a. E.W.T. Gen. Dolittle, Col Lambert and 2 Air Caps Colonels two Lt Cols & 1 capt all A.C. Ship's name is Z U N I. 10:30 a we are over N.Y. quite cool. The light over N.F. beautiful it is absolutely wild. Many lakes and swamps no roads. Around Goose 4:30 EWT Had good dinner at club. took off for U.K. at 7:20 EWT All on Plane going to war but all the talk was of fishing and shooting very normal. All the water in the lakes & streams was clear and there was no muddy water till we got almost to Goose and saw some "canalization." Aug July 6 Slept well most of night in transit ship bunk. Got up at dawn and we have cover clouds this was good as could hide in them if attacked. Over Ireland at 6:15 A M EWT 21 hours and 18 hours of flying. It is the greenest and most cultivated country I have seen with many houses all white or gray - [?] like toy or Walt Disney country. 7:00 am EWT we are low over water with what may be Scotland just ahead. What I thought was Scotland is not as we have passed it. Apparently a high island or a part of Ireland. We are going in now 7:07 EWT Had lunch at Port left at 3:30 London WT. Arrived London at 5:30 LWT Billeted at Claridges Hotel shown several rooms already occupied finally got a huge empty one with Doolittle next door had dinner with British G-2. No bomb damage apparent except for empty blocks. 8/7/42 Reported to IKE Spent morning working on plan. Talked many people London seems just half alive with very few people even soldiers about. All the women are very homely and wear their clothes badly. 8/8/42 Self, Jim D, and A.S. had big talk for four hours I said that NTF was being favored at the expense of WTF finally I get some change. No one likes the plan but we will do it. Talked to Brit. & Truscott in P.M. The food is very expensive and not numerous it costs about $5 for dinner of ham & soup. the style is kept on Saw Dick Vidmer who is a Major A.C. All women at dance in dining room hideous. 8/9/42 Read and discussed operation all day Took Gen Truscott to lunch. Went to movie at 6:30 P. Young Mr. Pitt very fine and timely. Had supper with Ike and talked till 1:00 AM. We both feel that the operation is bad and is mostly political however we are told to do it and intend to succeed or die in the attempt. If the worst we can foresee occurs it is an impossible show but with a little luck it can be done at a high price and it might be a cinch. 8/10/42 Bought some shoes lunched with Ike Clark and Gen Mason? who will command NTF He seems earnest but Dumb. 8/11/42 Gen Lee, Ike and I had a meeting I got Gens Wilson and Larkin out of it for the S.O.S. Had lunch at the In & Out club with Gen. Dyer, Brit Laison his son was killed May 1st. Talked to very secret man who should write movies. Raised hell with Staff. Am having Gen Mt Batton and some others including Truscott Gruenther Lambert to a swank Dinner here. U.S. to Pay. Big U S Navey parley this morning I was there they are certainly not on their toes. It is very noticable that most the American Officers here are Prou British even Ike. The G-3 Barker is terrible I am not, repeat not Pro B. 8/12/42 This morning Ike and I had conference with Navy. They say that the means do not exist for a second attack so we are only going to try NTF. I think this is fortunate for me so far as a longer life goes but it is bad for the country. Very dangerous in fact. Ike is not as rugged mentally as I thought he vacilates and is not a realist. Went to a Private Flat for dinner very nice the women are more warmhearted than the men. 8/14/42 At 9:00 AM Ike asked me what I thought of plan he had made I said it was too complicated He said Navy thought so too. Navy and I agreed each for a different reason. New plan worked on all day - it is not too promising but best we can manage. Went with Ike to a private showing of "10 Gents. from W.P.". Lee brought me home. Clark is Deputy C in C I doubt the wisdom of it he may be too intrusive. 8/15/42 At 9:15 Doolittle, Clark and I met with Ike to discuss a new telegram from Wash. in which the whole question of the possibility of the Torch operation have to be discussed. It may have been a momentous meeting. All but me felt it was out but I said it was 52 to 48 against us but I favored going on Ike worked on a reply till 3:00 PM when we sent a cable - all concurring - that it was better than even money we could land but a poor bet that we could get Tunis ahead of the Boschs. Gen Anderson commanding Best Sphere was called in and agreed. I feel that we should fight but for success we must have luck. I also showed that the RR from Casablanca East is only good now to sustain 5000 men at Oran. I hope we get a positive answer we must do something now I feel that I am the only true gambler in the whole outfit. Am going to bed now 10:00 P. 8/16/42 Waited all day to get initial plan worked through typist. Saw Terry Allen at lunch Went to movie Mrs. Miniver very fine but too realistic for Brit. 8/17-18/42 Things seem to be jelling and I have gotten a lot of valuable information Supposed to go back tomorrow. Had a drink with Clark at his flat I don't trust him yet but he improves on acquaintance. Ike is getting megalo mania. 1 divs Air-Ground Sig Black Outs Permanent alert unit Naval Officer Poem by Peter Wilson Patton August 6th. 1942 The town was still, in cold damp darkness, The wind went howling through the night, The ground lay white, like the moon in its starkness, And a dog howled mournfully at his plight. And through the darkness came sounds of marching, Of shadowy forms moving swift and fleet, Then suddenly : "The British are marching." Echoed down each darkened street. To arms ! to arms ! the cry went echoing. Gather at the Tavern, be fleet be fleet. Still through the darkness echoing ghostlike Came the sound of marching feet. Eight men fell in that first small battle Eight men fighting for liberty, Men that were brave and honest, loyal Men that were fighting so we could be free!! That was the beginning of many a battle Battles fought for liberty Battles that are still not ended. Battles to make the whole world free !!! Placed herewith for information. Ahk 11-12-64 To Dr Broderick Library of Congress 1. Included in this drawer is the original long-haul World War II Diary and a copy. Set A - The last copy I have. 2. I believe this is what you want. Patt Transcribed and reviewed by contributors participating in the By The People project at crowd.loc.gov.