GEORGE S. PATTON DIARIES Original Mar. 5-May 21, 1943 BOX 1 FOLDER 6 DIARY (III) MAR. 5, 1943 I MAY 21, 1943 IVI Mar 5 - 43 to May 21 - 43 1 First Page of New Diary Old Diary closed on Mar 5, 43. 3 - 5 - 43 All general officers and most of the senior staff officers came to say good by in office at 1000 Then they went down the street and lined up. The MP Co formed a guard of honor and there was a band. Most of the more senior officers went to the Air Port. Where there was a second Guard from the 82nd Plan. Bn. and the 67 A Regt. Band. The band gave me three ruffels At Alger, Ike and Beadle were at the Port to meet me. Told me I was to replace Fredendahl. On ground that it was presumably a Tank show and I know more about Tanks 2 Stressed that criticism of B. must stop. I fear he has sold his soul to the devil in "cooperation?" which I think means that we are pulling the chestnuts for our nobler allies. Flew to Constantine called on Gen. Alexander who seem competent. He told me trust on 8th There would be an American [?] under me and I would be directly under him. [C?] Crane is on his staff and came to see me giving me a lot of [?] on how to get on. It is clear that I too must "cooperate" or get out. Saw Doolittle. 3-6-43 Around Hq 2d Corps at 1000. F still at [?] he was very nice and conducted himself well-- very well. H's staff is general is poor. Discipline and dress is poor 3 There is a Brit Lt Gen COCRAN Here named who is clearly sent to instruct me by a great effort I let him think he was so he was happy and leaves in the morning. I had Allen and Ward in and explained our next operation. F. leaves in the morning. I got out some orders on dress etc - none have ever been issued. I think F is a little nuts or badly scared. He wont fly to Constantine and proposes to leave at 3:30 AM by car clearly that is the safest time on the road. 3-7-43 Got up at 6:30 breakfast at 07:00 no one there but Gaffey I told the cooks to close the mess at 730 so I suppose people will be on time. Went to office and found G-2 asleep because he had been up most of the night 4. woke him. I took Bradley to inspect 9th & 1st Armored. Country is really under water men have a terrible time but are well and cheerful. It was very cold I damned froze. Troops are not too keen. Hope I can pep them up. Talked to Col. Connor O.P.D. He has the picture of the mess that is here. Especially of the fact that the British dominate Ike. 3-8-43 Inspected J.A. Crane's F.A. Brig also 34 Div. Ryder the discipline and dress and condition of weapons is very bad - terrible. on the other hand elements of the division have fought well. I inspected their position and think it weak and not well arranged. At HIADRA saw a Roman ruin. Much abused by Arabs also apparently part of it was used to start the construction of a fort of about 16-1700. 5 the whole country full of Ruins great stones and pillars sticking up like the ribs of wrecked ships or dead men through sand. It is said that before the Arabs came in 632 this country was well forested and very agricultural now it's is a desert. The Arab has picked the bones and built his hovels out of the palaces of the Pro-Consuls. His hovels are of stone in this country with a door and no windows there is nothing with which to close the door opening. [3-8-43] All Div CG's F.A. Brig CG and heads of Corps Staff sections came to dinner. Bradley, Allen, Ward, Rider Eddy, J. A. Crane. After dinner G-3, G-2 give plan and enemy situation Allen & Ward gave their tentative plans. I finally approved plans as altered, and fixed H hour as 9. 6/ My concern is for fear that the enemy will attack us first. Today his 10th Panza made an 8 hour march North. This could mean either Gafsa or Gabes. 3-9-43. Gen Alexander and his C of S Ma. Gen. [?] (brother of the international no. 1.) came at 1335. I had had a guard of honor posted at 1200 and it was so cold I had dismissed them at 1330. I recollected them and the Gen. was very pleased. We went to see 9th Div and 60 C.T. Eddy made a good impression. I was very much taken with Alexander. He is a [?] in the best sense of the word- very alert and interested in all sorts of things including [?] Had them to dinner and discussed plans in evening. He seemed to 7 -- agree with most of my ideas I realy think he is a good soldier and much more talkative than he's supposed to be. We will inspect the 1st A. D. and 1st D. in morning. John A. Crane says that I am the oldest general in Africa and that he is next. I am the best any how. 3-10-43 Gen. Alexander Gen McCreery and I visited the 1st Amd Div Hq and then Hanes Regiment which is the one that has seen the most action. They all say that what we have [?] is sound but that the men went in too fast. Most of the shooting takes place at more than 1000 yds. Our sights are not as good as the German. The Graves Registration visited Sidi Bu-Zid and could not find a grave marked for John so we 8. hope he is a prisoner. Had lunch on road and then went to see 1st Div. Terry, Roosevelt and Anderson. They made a good impression on me and on Gen. Alexander Gen Alexander has had 4 years in WWI. 2 years in russia fighting Reds. 1 year on N border of India. Three years in this war=10 years he has had three wounds. Quite a man. 3-11-43 Had all the staff in to meet Gen Alexander he talked a lot to each one. Then he and I went to visit the mine. M. Robert who runs it looked to us like a German. I felt that they might try to kill Alexander so I walked in front of him. We were in the mine for one hour walking fast and when we came up we were sweating. Gen left at 1000 I had a guard for him. 9 --- Spent rest of day going over plan. In a show involving four divisions one can do so little everything must be left to the Divisions. It all shows that to win one must have personality and luck all possible time should be spent with men and younger officers. Made 100 word speech to phonograph for W. P. [?] The utter worthlessness of most officers amazes me they have no back bones and no sense of responsibility. 3-12-43 (Friday) We left Rabat one week ago to day. We have done a lot but much remains to be done. Freedenhal just exited he did not command and with few exceptions his staff was worthless due to youth and lack of leadership. Bradley got [?] last night. Ike has three plans. One that I should keep on with II Corps and have 10 -- Bradley replace me at Rabat. I said no on that one as it is unfair to Kemp. Though possibly safer for me. Plan 2. For Bradley to go to Rabat and plan with Kemp and when this show is over to have me go back to [?] Haskey and B. take II Corps. Note that as utterly crazy. Plan 3. For B to stay on as Deputy Commander with me get him a staff to work in with mine and then when this battle is over to have me go [?] with my staff to [?] Haskey and Bradley take over. Kemp to plan until I get [?] I accepted this as best. I am not at all sure that this show will run according to plan and feel that as long as it is interesting Alexander will keep me. If it [?] down I can get out. If Rommel attacks first that will be something different -- [?] may. 11 _ _ _ Wrote Gen Orders to Troops. [?] came to lunch. After lunch I went with him and inspected 2[?]th Inf. Col Taylor & 18th Inf Col. [?]. The 2[?]th been badly shot up but seemed fine. 18th has done well and is quite [?]. Terribly cold took a drink to get warm. Gen [?] called at 2100 to tell me he had heard on the radio that I was a LIEUTENANT GENERAL. [?] [?] [?] a [?] I am sleeping under the three stars. When I was a little boy at home I used to wear a wooden sword and say to my self. "George S. Patton for Lieut Gen" at that time I did not know there were [?] [?] Now I want and will get five stars. 3-13-43 (Sat) got signal to prepare [?]. I fear Rommel will take the initiative. But I will not 12 become defensive. Sent Bradley to 34th Div to preach bloody war. they are defensive. 9th Div has "valor of ignorance" 1st Inf. Div is good. 1st Armored Div is a little scared. Had funny letter from Ike on Mar 7 day I arrived 2d Corps reported normal Patrols no enemy contact. Since that date we have captured 89 enemy soldiers, two aviators and one spy who tried to "escape" The 7th I ordered all patrols out till they [?ped]. Having a big program on discipline. Soaked two officers $25.00 a piece for improper uniform. Confound some 30 men. Discipline consists in obeying orders. I will have discipline to do otherwise is to be a murderer. I cannot see what LLoyd did to justify his existence. I have never seen so little order or discipline. I seem just the same since I am a Lt. Gen. 13 Just read The "Mary Gloster" and came on a great line: "I didn't begin with askings I took my job and I stuck; I took the chances they wouldn't, An' now they are calling it luck." 3-14-43 Sunday Rained all night. Left in two peeps to visit 1st Div and Katherine pass and 1st Armd. rained all day roads horrible I was just plastered with mud so that George had to wash all my outer clothes. The Katherine pass is fierce and a sea of mud. We expected Rommel to attack it to day that is why I went there but nothing happened. Gen McCreery met me when I got back at 1700 he brought me a bottle of Scotch which I don't drink. Had several letters. I think the soldiers are improving 14 a little I am sure it does good to be seen. Yesterday I took a walk and collected 8 soldiers and 2 Lts for improper uniform I had them fall in and follow me - it was quite a procession. As far as I can see this show is a second Manassas. The 2d Corps. (mine and Jacksons) being sent to start a flank battle so that the 1st Corps or in this case 8th Army can make a break through. This being so it makes no difference where we fight provided we take and hold Gafsa. Whatever credit I get from this show will be due solely to personality unless during the battle something happens. 3-15-43 I have had a horrible day. One of my pre match days. Everything that there has been time to do has been done. Not enough but all there has been 15 time for. Now it is up to the others and I have not too much confidence in any of them. I wish I was triplets and could personally command two divisions and the Corps. Bradley, Gaffney and Lambert are a great comfort. Oh God help me and see to it that I do my duty but I must have your help. I am the best there is but of my self I am not enough. "Give us the victory Lord". I went to bed and slept well till 0600, this morning 3-16-43 3-16-43 Have just sent little B an account of Johns last fight with a map. I also wrote Group. I feel well this morning and am "Radiating confidence" actually I am quite confident and not at all worried the way I should be. The only trouble I have is a coal sore on my lip. 16 The hardest thing a general has to do is to wait for the battle to start after all the orders are given. Ike got in about 1200 Terry came just before. Terry had no plan to cover march of right col 16 inf with TD's so I told him to. He left at once. Had lunch with Ike and later drove via short cut to Feriana arriving about 400 P. Inspected 17 F A one Bn 36 and 18 could not find 60th. There is a [?] Roman city here a temple is still standing. About 1100 P there is firing north of Gasfa. Brad Ike and I had long talk. Well the battle is on I am taking off my shoes to go to bed. 3-17-43 The great and famous battle of GASFA has been 17 fought and won. So far as I now know we did not have a single casualty. The show was well done by Terry Allen and the 1st Div. They jumped off at 1000 as per schedule but according to them could have done so at 0700. The Air came down at 0930 and we had the town by 1130. I went up to the OP getting there at 1030 as Dick got lost as usual on the way up. We sat on a hill and could see the troops moving and the shells mostly ours bursting. Allen did well and his communications and control [was] were fine. The enemy pulled out on the Gabey road leaving mines. I could not get into town as Gen. Alexander sent for me. Dick stayed and got the last dope as of 1700 We had a little scare at the end. I told Allen to put his T.D's to the N E of town to cover a threat from that side 18 and then we got a report that 40 tanks (there were actually 20) were coming in from the south. They were French tanks. I used my new scout car with the 3 stars and II Corps flag. At first I was nervous for fear of air attack but soon got used to it. Courage is largely habit and self confidence. I thank God that He has again aided me. 3-18-43 It rained and blew hard all last night and all to day up to noon. The 1st A Div is largely stuck in the mud Gen. Alexander drove to Gafsa in my Scout Car and was washed off a ford. He was satisfied with situation. 1st div. has occupied and passed El Guettar which the enemy have evacuated. We had to put all available Engrs on the Feriana-Gafsa road to fill craters and remove mines also at 19 at some Wadi crossings. Ike left at about 1145 by motor for Constantine. He was in good form and like his old self. Gen Alexander left at about 1500 also seemingly well pleased I think that if I can I will start to push in on Maknassy tomorrow. All depends on the amount the ground dries. With luck we can take Sened Station with infantry and artillery. Of course the weather hurts the Bosch as much as it does us. I feel that if we attack first we will have an advantage in making the enemy dance to our tune. 3-19-43 Left for 1st Armored Div at 0900 drove over road we had made about 42 miles took three hours. I never saw such mud nor such men as the Engrs who [maid] built and are maintaining it. Wet dirty and isolated they keep right at it 20 I stopped and talked to each group and it seemed to please them. Called on Gen Robinett Commanding CCB. Don't like his mental attitude he is defensive and lacks confidence. I talked attack. Called on Ward he is in a sea of mud realy awful it rained all the time I was there. Went over his plans to capture DJEBEL GOUSSA and DJEBEL MAJOURA which command SENED STATION. He fears that tanks cant move due to mud but I told him to do it with infantry 60th CT and one Bn of 6th inf. and all the guns he has four battalions I told him to use all available half tracks to move infantry weapons. I want to hit Rommel before he hits us also to help 8th Army which attacks tomorrow night. On the way to see Ward someone shot at us 21 the bullet went quite close as we heard it. Stiller fired a clip at an Arab who was running but I fear he did not hit him. When I got back Gen McCreery C of S to Alexander was here. He explained the future plan of the campaign to us. In brief it is to pinch us out so asto insure a British triumph. I kept my temper and agreed there is nothing else to do but I can't see how Ike can let them pull his leg so. It is awful I hope I will be back in Morocco on the other job before we are punched out. Had letter from B. On Feb 16 the day I knew John was missing she saw me in a dream. Oh! God let us win in the morning! 3-20-43 Omar Bradley woke me 22 at midnight to read me the radio that John was safe. Terry Allen and Teddy Roosevelt also called up to day. The attack of the 60th CT went OK but not brilliantly. The took the DJEBELS and are sure of SENED if they are not already in it. I had to sit at the phone all day - it is a Hell of a way to fight a war I hope to get in tomorrow with the 1st Div. Both the 1st Inf and the 1st Armored will attack. The 8th Army jumped off tonight. I think that if Rommel reacts he will do it tomorrow. I feel that we will lick him so long as the Lord stays with me. 3-21-43 Went to watch attack of 1st Inf. Had a good seat at Div OP but it was too far back so I went to front and sat on forward face of hill some soldiers told me the 23 enemy were shelling it but I sat on. After a while I decided to visit 1st Armored Div and left a few minutes later a shell struck just where I had been sitting it was a dud. The Lord looked out for me both ways. Went to Sened Station and saw McQuillen things were going too slow. Wrote Ward a message to use more drive and keep his CP at front. We were strafed twice on road but nothing hit near us. Keyes was with me. 3-22-43 Sent Bradley to Algiers to tell Ike situation and that it is apparently the British win to steal the show Keyes advised that I go up to kick Ward but I feared I would cramp his style. This was a mistake I should have gone. Ward has simply dawdled all day he has no drive and is no good 24 I sent Gen Gaffney he did all he could but it was not enough Ward has not taken Maknassy Heights. I hope that this will not be too much of a failure. I blame my self. I think the Bosches will react this evening or in the morning. God please fix it up O.K. 3-23-43 Went to bed in full pack except shoes and coat. Nothing happened. At 0630 Terry Allen phoned that he was being attacked by 100 tanks - actually there were 50 As his division was advancing when attack struck he was not well disposed [fixed] to meet an attack and they broke through the 18th Inf and over ran B battery of the 32 FA and a battery of the 17 getting 12 guns 6-155 & 6-105. I sent him the reserve TD battalion with 3" guns also ordered in a battalion of the 39th Inf 9 Div and a battalion of 155 Hows. The attack was stopped 25 ---- around 1100 after penetrating some three miles. We [?] 20 tanks nocked out, I doubt it. perhaps 10 or 15. The first air attack took 1 hour 40 min to get in. Since then we have had good air support some 340 missions to now. We have an intercept that they will attack again at 1600. it is now 1545. Attack started 1645 due to fact that one German Art Regt was shelled and got up late. Attack was stopped in its tracks. We had unduly heavy losses in A. [?] S P Guns due to faulty employment and very unfamiliar terrain., [?] [?] The Lord [?] a lot today I visited the Surgical Hospital it was pretty gruesome but it was strange how the men followed me with their eyes fearing I would not speak to each one I talked to all who were conscious. One little boy said are you Gen Patton I said yes he said Oh! G. 26 Another one said "you know me you made a talk to my battalion at Casablanca." I told him I remembered him well. I hate fighting from the rear but to day it was too complicated to leave the place. Ward has not done well- no drive. 3-24-43 Went to 1st Div. first picked up Terry Allen at his C P and went forward to C P 18 Inf on way up a shell hit quite near and a few small fragments hit car. While at the C P there was more shelling and some German planes came over but did nothing. The whole battlefield of yesterday was visible and covered with destroyed vehicles mostly ours TD & TD M10 we lost 24 TD 75 out of 34 and 7 M10 out of 12 [36]. Clearly the tactics of those vehicles is wholy wrong. I told them what 27 to do let their faulty training cropped up in the heat of battle. I got back home at 4:30 P and inspected hospital there were some bad fracture cases but no complaint, many of the men were very interested in what I told them of the battle. Spatts, Harmon, Williams White and [?] were at dinner. After dinner I found that the 1st Armored Div had still failed to get the heights E. of Maknasse so I called Gen Ward on phone and told him to personally lead the attack on the hill and take it. Now my conscience hurts me for fear I have ordered him to his death but I feel that it was my duty. Vigorous leadership would have taken the hill the day before yesterday. I hope it comes out all right. 28 3-25-43 About 1100 P last night Terry phoned he was being attacked After thinking it over I called Benson and told him to move his M-Bat & Bn of FA to a post on the Gafsa-Sidi-bou-Zid road 12 mi N of Gafsa. Here he could form a reserve for Terry and yet give the appearance of being enroute to join 1st Armored Div. I told him he was to see Terry and get the situation but that he only [improved?] on my orders. At 0130 this morning Gaffney woke me to say that Terrys position had been penetrated and that he wanted a Bn of the 39th to hold the town. I decided to send it. I went to sleep and slept soundly. This morning as is usually the case things looked better. They had [re?] too much and wanted to use the battalion I had sent him to make a long end run 29 omitted by mistake. 29 around the Germans left it was a fool idea and I stopped it. Wards attack had failed and Ward got a [st?] wound he showed good personal courage. I told him to quit attacking and consolidate. At Noon Gen Alexander came and approved my use of the 9th Div with the 1st to push on towards Gabes when situation gets ripe we will also bring the 1st Armored in and hold Maknassy with 60 C.T. and leave 9th Div near Gafsa to use either way 34th is moving on SBEITLA for future use N.E. For the first time all units of Corps 4 Div and FA Brig are going into action it may be a big show. I hope it comes out. Had long letter from R.E. 3-26-43 Quiet day. Saw Ike at Thelepte Air Port at 1345. He gave me Telegram of congratulations from the PM 30 with an added note from Gen Alexander. See below. It is almost too quiet. 34th will attack in morning. I hope to [u?] 1st Armd. "Personal and Most Secret From Prime Minister To General Eisenhower (Eyes Only) Signed Andrews "If you think well, pray give the following message from me to General Patton: "Many Congratulations on your fine advance and capture of prisoners" General Alexander added following. "May I add my congratulations to General Patton who has and is handling his Corps in a most able and efficient manner- I have complete confidence in him" (Signed) H. R. Alexander General Commander 18th Army Group. 31 3-27-[31]43 I forgot to mention that when I inspected the 3d Bn 26 Inf on March 16 I casually said that owing to my promotion I was short of stars and hoped I could get some Italian ones. (Every 1st C/C Pat in Italian army wears one on each lappell.) On Mar 22 Co I 26th Inf Capt W. H. SEITZ SR sent me 15. Visited 1st Armored Div near Maknassy saw Ward. Talked with him of next operation. Also told him that he lacked drive and trusted his staff. That if in the next operation he failed I would relieve him. He took it very well. I decorated him with a Silver Star. Think he should have a D.S.C. He lead the attack I ordered him to and did it well 34 Div is advancing on FOUNDOUK with little opposition. Tomorrow all four Divs and Corps troops will be in action but I think it will go easily. 32 3-28-[31] 43 Left Feriana at 0750 went to CP 1st Div. situation was OK but enemy resistance serious due to excessively rugged nature of ground. CP 9th Div visited well set up but showed lack of habit too may tents. Gen Eddy at front with 47th CT. Visited him. Had to drive for four miles over open field subject to shelling. Felt very conspicuous but nothing happened. Fighting nasty in high rugged hills too steep to man handle mortars in. We could use a pack train to great advantage. Found a chaplain who was poking around the CP while wounded were being put into ambulances close by - gave him hell. Just after I left a 150 shell hit right in CP and hurt no one. Gen Alexander was at new CP at Gafsa when I returned I took him to see CP of 1st & 9th. He seemed pleased and showed me report from 8th Army which is most satisfactory. 33 Gen McQuillen who will command defenses of Maknassy came in and got orders. Told Ward to get some of his light staff back here under cover of darkness. I have little confidence in Ward or in the 1st Armored Div. Ward lacks force. The division has lost its nerve and is jumpy. I fear that all our troops want to fight without getting killed. This is especially true of the Capts & Lieuts. 3-29-43 Quiet night last night I was sleepy as I had spent the last two days in a sand storm. 1st Armored Div units did not close till 0700 I am very disgusted. I would relieve Ward but fear that this is the wrong time I will send Bradley with him when he [?] out. One company of 1st Inf Div give ground before an attack of four tanks Italians and Germans not a good sign. Fighting so far to day very sticky. 33 Further investigation shows that only a Platoon of the 1st Div gave ground. About 1900 Gen McCreery called and told me to launch tanks in morning. He said Gen Holmes was coming with final picture. The reason I brought the 81 Recon & the Bn of FA down last night was that[?] [?] I anticipated such a contingency. [*Begin [?] I here & read all L.H. continuing with type for this date*] Holmes arrived at 2300 and told me what McCreery had already said on phone. He further said that I was to put a Bn of TD and a Bn of inf on the SENED Station line and was to leave one med. Bn of Tanks at Gafsa, and was to do all this with out taking units from Maknassy. I told him that * I could put the TD Bn in place but that all the infantry was in action I also told him that I had only two med. Bns of Tks here and that if I left one back I could not put enough force in the tank attack. He said he would 34 have to call General McCreery which he did the latter agreed to what I suggested he had thought that I had three Med. Bns here. I feel that I must respectfully call Gen Alexander's attention to the fact that in the U.S. Army we tell officers what to do not how to do it. That to do otherwise suggests lack of confidence in the officer and reduces him to the status of an A.G. I doubt if Gen Alexander him self issued any such orders. I feel that for the honor and prestige of the US Army I must protest. The 1st Armored Div was attacked four times yesterday Reports from the front line seems to suggest that the troops in front of the 1st Inf and 9th are pulling out. I hope so. I put Benson in command of the tank operation. He will have a Recon Bn Two Med Tk. Bns, Two SP. 105 Bns, one TD Bn M 10 35 a company of Engrs. 16 SP. AT-AA 1 Bn 39 inf - 82 Rec guns (2.50's and a 37) and some med and maintenance. Also [amount?] 160 to 120 miles of gas depending on how much cross country he has to do. Col Jimmy Williams who ranks Benson volunteered to go as C of S. I am sending Gaffney along to keep an eye on the show. If the enemy has plenty of artillery Benson may not get through. The worst danger is that the hole may close behind him. I feel confident that with God's help it will work. 3-30-43 We moved all artillery found last night to support the attack it is getting dive bombed at the moment. Rider just called to say that he will have to quit attacking and reorganize. The life of a General is certainly full of thrills but I am 36 worried only cold all over I wish I could do more personally it is awful to have to confide every thing to others but there is no other way and if you trust people they seem to perform. "God show the right" I am going out to see the show start. I went up to find Benson and got infront of our front line before I stopped. On way back I met the Chaplain and slapped him. Tried to locate Benson with Radio but it did not work. Lt Stiller found him not far away Radio was using wrong call. Benson jumped off at noon. It was a slow process getting into formation. I watched from a hill and got shelled then went forward over road which was under pretty accurate fire 37 We passed several tank wrecks from fight on 22. Benson was held up by artillery and mines I hope he gets going in morning lost two M-10 T.D. usual way. Rider just called thinks he is getting in trouble wants me or Bradley to come up will send Brad - he is good and I will be needed here. All things considered we have been lucky under God to day. 3-31-43 This morning things looked pretty bad we seemed to be stuck every where. I sent Col. Lambert to Benson to stir things up. I told Benson to expend a whole tank company if necessary to break through. I then decided on a coordinated attack with every thing and had the Div commanders the Air Officer and the FA Brig CG in at 11:30 to settle the details 32 H. was decided as at 1600. The preparation was to open at 1500 by Artillery and Air. In the meantime Jake Williams phoned that Benson was putting on a combined infantry and Tank attack to break through the attack to start at 1230. So I said that if this succeeded we could cancel the other attack by the word "Stop" Benson's attack with a Bn of the 39 Inf from the north and Talbots Tank Bn from the west broke through we lost five tanks and 3 TD including 2 TD hit yesterday. There is a phantom battery in the ridge to the south which we cant locate and hit which is causing a lot of trouble. Told 9th Div to find it and destroy it. This morning at 0130 Eddy called me and asked that I change the plan of using a Bn of the 39th to help Benson I told him it was too late 39 had I listened to him Benson would not have gotten through Some times I earn my pay. One must be chary of ever changing a plan. Gens Davis Beadle Smith and McCreery came at 1230 with a plan which I suggested the day before yesterday it would have worked then now as usual with them it is too late I told Beadle Smith about my getting orders where to plan separate battalions See 3-29-43. He will speak to Gen Alexander. I also think I got Beadle to see that battle hardened troops are necessary for Husky - they are. I called Ward on phone and told him to put on an attack he said he could not do it successfully I told him to attack and if necessary take losses up to 25% our people especially the 1st Armd Div 40 don't want to fight it is disgusting. I feel quite brutal in issuing orders to take such losses especially when I personally am safe but it must be done. Wars can only be won by killing and the sooner we start the better also an attack by the 1st Armd at Maknassy will pull off from Benson and possibly from Rider I sent Bradley up to see what is the matter with Rider. Rider must hold on. Recommended that two colonels with Very Sat. reports be relieved and sent home. We are having a lot of trouble shooting our own planes. We have issued orders not to fire until we are attacked I hope I can catch some one. Just now there was a lot of unnecessary firing right here in Gafsa 41 4-1-43 About 0130 Williams called up wanting to change Bensons plan. I told him to obey orders. Gens Bradley, Pink Bull, Crane and Dumphey went to Bensons C.P. at 1012 twelve J.K. 88's bombed them with 500 lb bombs with instantaneous fuses. They fell right in the C.P. all jumped into slit trenches of which there were plenty. One bomb hit right at edge of trench Capt Jenson was in killing him instantly his watch stopped at 1012 I am terribly sorry as he was a fine boy, loyal, unselfish and efficient. As soon as he was brought in I went to the Cemetery with Gaffey he was on a stretcher rolled up in a shelter half. We uncovered his face and I got on my knees to say a prayer and all the men did the same. There was some blood from his mouth but he was not mangled and 42 I doubt if he was hit. There was a small stone bruise on his forehead. I kissed him on the brow and covered him up. At 1600 Stiller, Sgt. Meeks, Sgt Mims and I went to the cemetery he was on a stretcher wrapped in a white mattress cover we had a squad and a trumpeter but did not fire the volleys as it would make people think an air raid was on. The Corps Chaplain read the Episcopal service and he was lowered in there are no coffins here as there is no wood. Lt. Stiller, Lt. Craig, Sgt. Meeks and Sgt. Mims carried the stretcher they were all his friends. I wrote Nita inclosing a letter to his mother with a lock of his hair. I radioed B through Gen Smith to notify the Jenson family. He was a fine man and officer he had no vices I can't see the reason that such fine young men get 43 killed. I shall miss him a lot. C'est la guerre. The Air Force went on a parade with 1000 planes to destroy the Hun air force - result we had the hell bombed out of us all day. "While the cat's away the mice will play." We continue the attack in the morning I hope we make progress. The plans of the Allied High Command are all about three days to a week too late and too timid When we took Gafsa we were told to halt at El Guettar. We waited there from the 19 to the 22 and gave the Bosch time to bring the 10 Panza down from the north. At the same time they told me to take Maknassy and halt in the hills just east and send a raid to the air field at MEZZOUNA Have I failed by not personally backing the attack on the heights. Ward fooled around for three days and let the 44 enemy build up and then he attacked with great personal courage but failed to take the ridge. However I asked to take the whole 9th Div in with the 1st Armored and was only allowed to take the 60th C.T. Not enough. Next we were told to attack towards GABEZ with the 1st & 9th and when we had secured the pass as far as the Wadi West of DJEBEL BEN KREIR to launch the Armor on GABEZ . Also to move the 34 Div on FONDOUK. D for these operations was set as 28. On the night of the 30 at 7:30 P we were told to launch the armor in the morning as Brig Aries G-2 to Alexander had looked at the field and could see no enemy. We did and lost 13 tanks two TD's and many men. This morning Gen McCreery told me to continue the attack with infantry. Now at 500 P I get a note from Alexander suggests but 45. not ordering the use of Armor. I will start with infantry and use Armor if I get the chance. 4-2-43 Very dull day. It was blowing so hard that our fighters could not get in the air but the Germans could with the result that we were bombed all day. About 0830 32 tanks were reported by an OP just captured by 1st Div. Col Hart [*?*] requested 3 Bns one of 155 guns one 155 Hows one 105 and switched onto them with a 36 gun concentration these tanks were hit and men left vehicles. We kept concentration on them all day. I tried one of White Phosphorous hoping to set some on fire or at least give the impression we were going to attack in the hope they would man the vehicles then in five minutes we gave them a concentration 46 of H.E. I called Gen Alexander for Bombers to attack the tanks but he could get none. Later I called him to protest against the failure to assign A-20's & Hurricane Bombers to the 12 Air Support Command. He said he would try to get some. Later I called Ike and told him the same story he later had Gen Smith call to say he had fixed it up. Our air cant fly at night or in wind or support troops the Germans do all three and do it as the result of three years of experience in war. Had letter from Alexander asking that I relieve Ward. Radioed AFHQ for Harmon. Photographed Dicks grave I had some flowers put on it. We have not yet been bombed here to night. 47 4-3-43 Went out to See 1st & 9th Divs & Benson. The 1st Div was going well and taking prisoners and guns in one place they got 37 81 M/M mortars and killed many Germans they are fighting units of both the 10th & 21st Panza and some Africa Corps inf. The 9th Div was lost six Bn Commanders out of six and is not doing too well. They did not go right to the top of the ridge first. In mountain fighting one should secure the observation points by night patrol activity and then work along the ridge and down the valleys. I got the most outrageous telegram I have ever seen from Air Marshall Conningham He accused me of being a fool and of lying. He said that our calls for air support were due to the fact that American troops were not battle worthy and used the Cry of 48 "wolf" for lack of air support as a means of excusing our slow advance. On the 1st I reported that "Air Support was wholly absent". I called Gen Alexander and then I called Ike. Conningham had told Ike that we had only four men wounded and only three attacks as a matter of fact we had 15 men killed 55 wounded sustained 51 air attacks in which 163 planes took part. At noon Chief Air Marshall Tedder Lt Gen Spatz and some other boy wonder by the name of Cuter arrived and Tedder said at once we did not only come about the Conningham Signal but because we wanted to see you. I told them I was glad to see them and that I intended to take up the Telegram officially they were clearly uncomfortable and talked a lot about air superiority at the 49 height of this four German planes flew right down the street not fifty feet from the window firing machine guns and dropping small bombs. No one was hurt except a camel who moved so fast he dislocated his leg an Arab ran out and put it back and the camel then bolted pursued by all available Arabs. The raid had a good effect we were raided twice more last night. Fourteen Turkish officers came one a four star one three and one two. We had them to the mess. Also Olmstead and some of his adherents. While at supper Brig Holmes - a bird of ill omen - came with a directive for the next operation. The 34 is to be detached from II Corps and join 9 Brit Corps it together with 128 Brit Brig will attack Fondukes to make a hole for 6th Brit 50 Armored Div. As soon as possible probably when Boches pass N of Maknassy the 9th Div is to leave and go on the Brit left on the N. Coast. In this way the US troops get wholy separated and all chance of being in at the kill and getting some natural credit is lost. Bradley and I explained this to Ike and he said he would stop it he has done nothing. He is completely sold out to the British I hope the press at home gets onto it. Brad and I have decided to saw wood and say nothing. If he falls it is not our fault. I hope the Boches beat the complete life out of the 128 Brig and 6 Armd div. I am fed up at being treated like a moron by the British. There is no national honor or prestige left to us Ike must go. He is a tipical case of a of a beggar on horseback - could not stand prosperity. 51 4-4-43 Sent Bradley to Maknassy to tell Ward he was to be relieved While Gen. Alexander had written me a letter asking that I relieve him I did not use this as a cloak for my acts. I should have relieved him on the 22 or 23 but did not do so as I hated to change leaders in battle. But a new leader is better than one who is timid. Air Marshall Conningham asked if he could call on me around noon. As I felt that I might not want to eat with him I had lunch early He arrived at 1215 I asked him to come in but made no motion to shake hands I also asked Gaffey to be present. C. Started by saying I am dreadfully sorry for that horrible signal. I want to apologize and do what I can to make amends. I said so far as I personally am concerned I am willing to accept your appologies 52 and forgive you for indicating that I was a fool etc but I cannot accept an oral apology for your calling sixty thousand American soldiers unbattleworthy and failing in their duty. He said I would never have done it but I had received a barrage of requests all day I am proud of my air force and will not have them criticized he spoke quite loud I responded equally loud that my men had been under a barrage all day due to what I considered was his fault then I added, pardon my also shouting, but I too have pride and will not stand for having Americans called cowards. I have asked for an official investigation. If I had said half what you said I would now be a Colonel and on my way home. He cooled down and said I am awfully sorry what can I do to make 53 amends. I said If you will send a message specifically retracting your remarks about the lack of battle worthiness of our men and send it to the same people to whom you sent the first message I will consider the incident closed he said I will and I then offered him my hand and took him to lunch. When he left he said "I cant thank you enough you have been very generous" I said It is always easy to be generous to a gentleman who admits his mistake. We parted friends and I think we will now get better air support than ever before. I was rather proud of my self as I was firm but moderate. I doubt if he ever sends the telegram because Ike will tell him it is not necessary. Three Corps Commanders Simpson, Hull and Lucas came to dinner and we had 54 a good time. After I got through with Conningham I felt ill with pains in my back so I inspected the front line but was not fired at. April 5 1943 The three Corps Commanders made a tour of the front and Halls car got shot at near Kil. 116. The shot a 2.5 mm stuck in the back of the car. Gen. Bull left for Algiers to see Ike. His attitude is I think unfortunate. He is very critical of all we do and is very prone to argue in favor of the B. Bradley and I had a long talk and decided to answer any questions he propounds as Ikes Deputy but to volunteer neither advice or information. We feel that the U.S. is being sold out for a theory and that the theory is bad. There is no attempt to aggrandize the American Army we have fought continuously for 19 days have never given ground. The 8th Army 55 has fought five days. We have pulled the 10 & 21 Panza off them and it is gently - not too gently - intimated to us that we are not doing our best. At 2:30 we got definite information from artillery OP's that three columns of tanks supported by Inf were moving forward and East of Dj BERDA in expectation of this attack we had last night brought in the 19 & 20 Engrs as a last reserve and put the 19 two cos of T.D. and 3 cos of Rangers in position south of town to stop a breakthrough from the east or to meet an attack around the west end of Dj. Berda from the south. [*A.*] We asked for air reconnaissance last night to see which way they were coming and got none. We were told that it would take eight hours to get such a mission. The attack petered out [*A*] at dark we asked at noon to day for night reconnaissance to night 5-6 56 were told that it was operationally impossible as the air force had other more important duties - probably sleeping - result we will be unable to tell whether the enemy withdrew after his feint as we think or whether he is still waiting to attack. We have no information asto 8th Army. 4-6-43 I inspected positions south of town and told Benson to attack the R.J. E of Dj Berda to clear it up he was very slow and put on a half hearted attack losing one tank and gaining nothing. When things looked bad yesterday I decided not to leave Gafsa alive Bradley was with me the decision was a comfort and did much to harden our hearts. I feel sure that the Bosch have pulled out a lot but are still strong in 57 MGs and mortars especially on hill 369. I told Eddy to take it and he said he would try a night attack but felt sure that owing to future of men they could not do it. I told him not to try the 47th inf which was to make the attack has lost 23 percent of its men and 26% of its officers in 11 days of battle. I told the 9th to hold and the 1st and Benson to attack. The stuff they give us against malaria makes me ill I took some to day and feel like hell. 4-7-43 Had belly ake all night and was sick this morning but decided to go to see 47 and find out how sad they were. At 0800 Carey Crane brought me a phone message from Gen McCreery to the effect that our tanks were timid and that we were to push on regardless of losses. I had already 58 ordered Benson to break through and damn the expense. Joeff Keyes came last night to talk about Huskey so I asked him to come with me to see the 47th. On the way I stopped at Bensons CP and told him that he must succeed or else and that I was disgusted with his slowness yesterday. I asked him to push on till he got into a big fight or hit the ocean. We went to the 47 OP Col Randall the ground is appalling. Had a good view of Bensons advance which was meeting little resistance except from long range fire. I called Gaffey to tell him to have Benson move faster. We then drove back and headed East on the Gabez road we found Benson eating lunch - not much - so I told him to stop eating and get out in front 59. He moved out. He was being delayed by a mine field We drove through the mine field and after a while got to Kil 70 at this time there was only one jeep and one scout car ahead of my jeep and every one told me I was going to be killed. I told Benson who came up to get his column on the road and keep pushing for a fight or a bath. On the way back we past quite a few prisoners including Germans of a low type. Shortly after I turned back Benson's advance guard made contact with a patrol of the 12 Lancers(?) 8th Army. I am glad I was not there it would have been too spectacular as it was I had no idea they were around and was simply up doing my duty as I saw it. I don't think there was any danger in it. 60 About 2000 I told Brig Holmes that we had broken through and that Benson was going to the sea. He told me to order him back to the Boundary which is at Kil. 96 This after in the morning we had been ordered to push on regardless of losses. One can only conclude that when the 8th Army is in trouble we are to expend our lives gladly but that when the 8th is going well we are to halt so as not to take any glory. It is an inspiring method of making war and shows rare qualities of leadership and Ike falls for it. Oh! for a Pershing. I must have been more tired than I realized I went to bed at 2200 and never woke until 0600. Sic Transit Gloria Mundi. 4-8-43 This morning we got an order saying that the 61 second Corps consisting of two infantry divisions would be assembled on the left of the 5th British Corps. Just what becomes of one infantry division and one Armored division is not said. At lunch Gen. McCreery called and after his usual giggle said that the 34th Div needed a medium Artillery Battalion. I replied "I thought you would" and heard him shudder so I added "you see we always think alike" What I really think is that they will reinforce piecemeal. He also said that he would possibly have to ask us to take Faid to help Fondukes. I had expected that too and had already sent a medium Tank Bn up. I investigated Faid and find it is very strong and that we could not take it without an all out effort. So at 2100 I called McCreery 62 “Shall we attack Faid when we must or when we can" He saw the point and said when we can which I told him would be on the 10th. As of midnight Apr 7-8 we had 3028 casualties (361) dead Prisoners 3296 prisoners (215 Germans) 51 materiel 66 vehicles, 51 machine guns 50 81mm mortars 38 cannon We estimate that by to night the prisoners will pass 4000. I hope so. 4-9-43 I worried a lot over the future of the II Corps and the American Army. So this morning Bradley and I decided to go and have a look at the battlefield from the Enemy side. Our artillery fire was devastating acres and acres covered with shell splinters lots of new graves all nicely made. Most of the Italian ones have a bottle at the head under the cross with the man's rosery in it. One poor fellow 63 killed the 29 had a picture of his wife and baby at the foot of his grave held down by a rock. We came where one of our shells had hit a German AT 75 gun. There were four helmets four rifles clothes much burned note books and a Christmas card from some ones mother. One man had a set of the nastiest pictures I have ever seen in it and the fragment that killed him went right through the center of them. We also found a new Italian light Breda M.G. with the cosmoline still on it. After seeing how strong the position was I don't wonder that we took so long to take it. I wonder that we ever drove them out. When we got back at 1215 Gen. McCreery had brought F.M. Lord Gorth to lunch. Gorth is not an inspiring type 64 McCreery gave us the new set up. The II Corps 9 & 34 divs and 1/2 1st Armd Div will be on the north of line mission to take Bizerta. The 1st Div is to be withdrawn to get ready for Huskey. Corps Hq is to move N. just before 34th starts say two weeks. It is not a bad set up. I expect I will be pulled out and Bradley take over. It may be for the best. Harmon is to be ready to attack Faid at 1430 10 Apr if the enemy is still there. McCreery is to call me. At the moment it looks as if the enemy may leave Faid tonight. Had letter from B that she was reading the papers about Mar 18 attack. French gave John a citation. I sent copy to B. Things look pretty good but I fear the papers will make too much of 65 a play about me I have not yet begun to fight. 4-10-43 Left at 0830 to see 1st Armd Div. We drove up the SEDi-BU-ZiD road as I had been fired at by an Arab on that road and hoped he would try it again. No luck it was the dustiest drive I have had since I left Louisiana. When we got to 1st Armored we found that at 0900 they had received an order to force the pass of Faid or next to south move north east of Dj. KRALIF and link up with the 34 Div east of Fondouk. When Gay and I got there at 1145 Harmon was in his CP and so far as I could see nothing had been done but issue orders. We ate a good lunch and at 1210 went to see McQuillen. When we got there nothing had been done. McQuillen told me with evident pride that he had just issued the order 66 I asked him where his leading elements were - he did not know so I took Harmon and went forward. We were assured that SIDI-BU-ZID could not be entered because it was full of mines and boobie traps we drove through it with impunity and went up a dirt road toward the pass - no mines at last we came to the engineers who had just removed 10 mines I told the reconnaissance to move off the road and push on. We lost two half tracks but saved hours of time. We sent Harmon's aid Major Runey to kick McQuillin along. On the way back we met two Cs of 81 Recon. Bn coming up the road through some artillery but no tanks yet clearly tanks should have lead as we were at the pass and might be counter attacked - no flexibility of mind, no desperate desire to get forward. I left Harmon at SIDI -- to push and 67 drove along the main road to SBEITLA. I was assured it was mined. Mines are largely a mental hazard one must not give in to them. I heard later that the troops were much impressed by seeing me in the mine fields. There was no danger. My luck in being at the right place at the right time held. We got home about 1900 after some 300 miles in a jeep. 4-11-43 At 0800 Gen Alexander phoned and asked me to come to lunch at HAIDRA so we left at 0845 arriving at 1315. Conyngham was at lunch and greeted me as a long lost brother. At the end of the meal he took me aside and said, "I deeply appreciate your most generous letter" I replied "It was from the heart" and the lightning did not strike me dumb but I think I will get plenty of air from now on. 68 After lunch Gen. Alexander took me to his "Caravan" and told me that as the 34th had been reported to him by Lt Gen. Crocker as no good so he wanted to use the 1st, 9th and a Combat Command of the 1st Armd. Holmes said "How many tanks will you take" I said that question should be answered by the Corps Commander Gen A. agreed he also agreed that I should take all the Corps Troops I needed. I asked if we would be under the 1st Army he was uncomfortable and said that the question of communication made it necessary. I said I preferred to be under 18 Army Group direct. He said that if at any time the 1st Army bothered me I was to call him direct. (A very improper procedure) I feel sure they neither hope or expect that we will be able to do any thing. Gen A. said if 69 by chance we (the British) are about to enter Tunis I will send for an American and a French Combat team to march in with us. This is of course an insult but I failed to see it, on purpose. God Damn all British and all so called Americans who have their leg pulled by them. On the way back I felt more and more certain that the II Corps should be coequal with the British so I wrote a letter so stating. I said that the question of where the II Corps [served?] was not one of command or signal communication but of military Prestige and that if America ended the last scene of the opening act [we assigned here?] in a minor roll it might have unfortunate repercussions. I heard that Lt Gen Crocker told the Press that the 34th Div was no 70 good. I will bet that Ike does nothing about it. I would rather be commanded by an Arab. I think less than nothing of Arabs. 4-12-43 I wrote a letter to Gen A. that I felt that the 34th div must be in the show to restore its soul (it did not do too well but that was largely because Crocker sent it on an impossible mission with both flanks open. After we had drawn off the Germans the British came in and took their hill. I feel all the time that there must be a show down and that I may be one of the victims. Ike is more British than the British and is as putty in their hands. Oh God for J.J. Pershing. Driving home I passed a Roman mile post that 71 must have been there 1300 years - how young we are. It gave me quite a thrill. Visited hospital this P.M. some pretty sick men but all cheerful. Saw two pretty nurses or perhaps my eyes is off? 4-13-43 Gen Bradley accompanied by G-3, G-4 & the Corps Engr went to Hq 18th Army Group this morning to arrange details for the transfer of the II Corps to the north flank. His primary mission was to secure the participation of the 34th Div so as to restore its soul. He was successful He presented Gen Alexander with a letter from me in which I pointed out that if the 34 div failed to fight it would be permanently ruined I further said that since the 34 was a 72 National Guard Division and came from part of the country where war is unpopular. I said that I felt that to with hold the 34th from combat particularly at the instance of a British General might well produce most unfortunate and far reaching political repercussions. This did the trick. Our real reason was to get the maximum number of troops into the area so we could make a real effort. I feel that the B. don't want us to make a success. They have asked me to come to a conference in the morning. I feel that this may be a prelude to putting a british officer on our staff. Ike will be there I am interested in his reaction. I think it probable that he 73 may send me back to work on Huskey. I would like to finish the fight but shall not argue as it seems to me that I am in the hands of fate who is forging me for some future bigger roll. McQuillen came by to say good by. I relieved him yesterday at Harmons request. He was much broken up but very manly. I gave him a silver star and made him happy. He deserved the S.S. I forgot to say that on the 10th I took some pictures of Djebel de Souda where John was lost. 4-14-43 Left this morning to meet Ike at Haidra, Hq 18 Army Group. Got stuck in fog so landed at Thelepte and took some gas from 74 an ambulance. Tried it again and got through. Bradley in second cub did not make it went back to Thelepte and came on by car. Ike also landed at T. When he met Bradley and I he never mentioned our victory - some leader? We three saw Gen Alexander who be it noted did not come to air field to meet his aledged boss Ike. Ike talked a lot and let Alex do just what he wanted to. Ike said the he did not consider him self as an American but # as an allie. And he told the truth what an ass. And how tragic for us. He is all heated up about Huskey and wants me to go back. I hate to quit a fight but feel that I had best do so as I fear that on the north flank where Alexander has put us there is no future also the II Corps will be under 75 the I British Army. I fear the worst. On the way back we flew over the ruins of a great Roman Villa there was a bath and a wall it must have been stupendous. Now it is swarming with human lice in the form of Arabs. I have been very fortunate so far I hope the Lord keeps helping me. Saw Gen Clark he was sour as a pickle. I think I have passed him and am amused at all the envy and hatred I wasted on him and many others. Looking back men seem less vile. 4-15-43 II Corps HQ starts north this morning. Stiller is taking my three radio scout cars and jeep back by road with most of my staff. Gay Sgt. Meeks and I are driving to Constantine via Timgad 76 we left in a sedan at 0815. We got to Tingad (TINGABIA) founded by Trajian in 200 (100)? A.D. it is a wonderful sight at the entrance there is a Roman fountain still running after 1700 years. The public library is still in tact. The theater is well preserved. The forum Temple of jupiter, Temple of Janus Arch of Trajian and thousands of houses the toilets are very amusing and one I saw still had water running below it. The sewer system still drains the city. Under the Arch. The ruts made by the chariot wheels are six inches deep. There is a whore house with a sign on it right near the Arch. I was tremendously impressed with this monument of a great and vanished race. Yet I have fought and won a bigger battle than Trajian ever heard of. We got to Constantine 77 around 1700 and put up at the AFHQ villa. I had dinner at Spaats mess. Hall his staff is British and he and all his men are for a separate air force. This is absurd. The system of command by cooperation which we now have in joint operations with the navy would simply be excentuated. There must be one commander for Ground Air and Sea. The trouble is we lack leaders with sufficient strength of character. I could do it and possibly will. As I gain in experience I do not think more of my self but less of others. Men, even so called great men - are wonderfully weak and timid. They are too damned polite. War is very simple, direct, and ruthless. It takes a simple direct and ruthless man to wage war. Some times I wonder if I will have to laugh at my self for writing things like the 75 above but I think not. I have developed a lot and my never small self confidence has vastly grown. I am sure that with Gods help I will succeed at Huskey and so on to the end which is far distant. Before leaving Gafsa I picked some nasturtiums in the yard and Gay Sgt. Meeks and I went to the cemetery to tell Dick good by. There are more than 700 graves there now. 4-16-43 Spent a while looking around Constantine. There is a gorge perhaps 1000 feet deep that in places is spanned about half way up with natural bridges. Had a long talk with Spaats on Air Support. I think he will do but he lacks any idea of discipline. He flew us to Alger in his plane. Butch met us and I spent the night with Ike. 79 It appears to me that Ike is acting a part and knows he is damned near a Benedict Arnold and is either obeying orders (If he does it in a soldierly way with out squealing) or else the British have got him completely fooled In any case he is usually not telling the truth. He is nothing but a Popinjay a stuffed doll. The British are running the show on the sea on the land and in the air. they are running it to their advantage and are playing us for suckers not only in a military way but politically also. The B's dictate what troops come, what quantity and type of supplies we give the French and how and where our troops are used. There is no excuse for moving the II Corps to the North Flank where the ground is unsuitable for a main attack. We should 80 have gone in at Mengis-el-Bab. Lt Gen Cocran - the son of a bitch - publically called our troops cowards. Ike says that since they were serving in his Corps that was O.K. I told him that had I so spoken of British under me my head would have come off. He agreed but does nothing to Cocran. Bradley, Everett, Hughes, Rooks, Gaffey and I and probably many more feel that America is being sold. I have been more than loyal to Ike I have talked to no one and taken things from the Bs that I would never take from an American. If this trickery to America comes from above it is utterly damnable if it eminates with Ike it is utterly terrible. I seriously talked to Hughes of asking to be relieved as a protest. I feel like Judas. Hughes says that he and I and some others must stick it out to save the pieces. I am not sure 91 but I love fighting and if I asked to be relieved I would not even be a good marter. [*?*] 4-17-43 I talked very plainly to Ike this morning - strange to say he took it but he has a sophist argument, probably provided by the British for every thing he has done. I told him he was the reverse of JJ P he quoted the time in March 1918 when Pershing put every American at the disposal of Foch. I countered with the time in August of the same year Gen P. Told Foch that unless Foch issued orders for the concentration of an American Army, Americans would not fire a shot or move a vehicle or train. St. Mihiel was the result. Had lunch with Hughes who has a lovely villa and nice garden. He is more rabid than I am. Also he puts out with justice that Ike cant even 82 enforce discipline or police regulations in Alger. Left at 1400 in a T 47 loaned by Spaats and got in at 1800 Keyes & Harkins met me I have been gone 43 days fought several successful battles commanded 95800 men lost about ten pounds gained a third star and a hell of a lot of poise and confidence and am otherwise the same. 4-18-43 Got up late 0700 went to church at Casablanca took a picture of the pulpit. Had lunch with Poussier. Called on Nogues 4:30 4-19-43 Worked on lesson from Tunisia. Gov. Boisson called at 530 and stayed till seven. I like him more each time I see him. Dined with Nogues, Boisson etc at 8:00 P 83 4-20-43 Completed notes on Tunisia and read up on next show so far it is pretty confused in my mind but I think that we are much further towards a perfect solution than we were in Torch. As usual the Navy and the Air are not lined up. Of course being connected with the British is bad. So far this war is being fought for the benefit of the British empire and for post war considerations no one gives a damn about winning it for its self now. No one busts a gut to get as many men as possible in. They talk about supply difficulties. Some damned fool wants ship space in Huskey for lend-lease if we fail to land due to lack of men what is the good of L.L.? 84 4-21-43 Nothing. Accosted by Arab whore. 4-22-43 Gens. Dawley, Walker (36) Truscott (3) Middleton (45), Nevins (planner) Hartel, Cushman Gerow, Tailor (82) called at various times. We are to have a conference on Huskey tomorrow Gerow and Hartel are not in on it just visitors. I am most impressed with Middleton and Dawley seems O.K. Walker is hard to size up. 4-23-43 Gen Keyes made the general presentation and did it well. Col. Cox gave G-2 very well Lt Col. Harkins explained G-3 I gave a talk on valor and killing and cited a few lessons. [Falley?] came to lunch. 85 4-24-43 Worked on diary and ISIS Had lunch with Gen Nogues. 4-25-43 [*?*] Sent three Banners the II Corps flag some films and letters on the Matsonia. Went to Church and communion. Had lunch with Gen. Wilson also had some pimples burned off. Casa is very well run I complimented Wilson. 4-26-43 [*?*] Geoff Keyes Lowman and I flew to Oran in a B-17 loaned by Gen Cannon. Truscotts Aid met us with some cars and we drove to the CP 3d Div near - west of -our new home MOSTAGANEM. We had supper there. On the way up at ARZOUF we had met Truscott and stopped to see some of the new landing craft loaded. As the soldiers were 86 waiting to get on board I did too. We went to a landing operation East of Mostaganem arriving at 2230. The Navy was one and a half hours late getting in and missed the right beach by eight miles. The unloading was fair but there was no drive at the beach no one give commands, no one led. The men bunched badly it was - very bad. Got to bed at 0400. 4-27-43 Keyes and I went to the beach where the shore parties were working. Some of the Navy small boat work was excellent. But the navy boats bunch badly. No one man was in charge of the beach. Some one must be. In a real landing the number two general of each Div must be at the beach and must stay there 87 The navy landed at the wrong Beach and their signal man on shore had great trouble in making them change to the proper beach. Our gear such as cables and toe chains were not properly made up. This will have to be corrected. In the attack on the hills the troops failed to get right to the top and then work down the hog backs. After lunch and a nap we went to see Adm Hewitt. He was very affable and in his usual mental fog. Gen McNair who was wounded by a shell last Friday asked me to come and see him at AIN EL TURK W. of Oran I shall go in the morning. 4-28-43 About 2200 last night 141 (Gen Alex) told me to be at Algiers for a conference at 1200 to day. 88 I got a plane from Cannon. Gen McNair was fine and we had a good talk but too short as I had to catch the plane. He asked me what I thought about combined command I told him it will not work allies must fight in separate theaters or they will hate each other more than they do the enemy. Got to Algiers at 1330 due to fog. Gen. Montgomery was sick and Lt Gen Lees 30 Corps who was to represent him had been grounded so we had no meeting. I saw Gen Rooks and Gen Beadle Smith. I dined with Bedel. Ike was away. Gen Alex and I stayed at Ikes. April 29 1943 The famous meeting started at 1000 Present Gen Alexander, Admiral Cunningham ,Chief Air Marshall Tedder, Vice Adm Ramsey, 89 Air Marshal Conyngham Air Marshall Wigglesworth Comodore Dick, Maj Gen Browning(Air Borne advisor) Maj Gen Gardiner (C of S 141) Brigadier Richardson. Lt Gen Patton Brig. Gen. Nevins Alex started by saying that we had met to consider changes in the Huskey plan proposed by the CG 8th Army. Adm Cunningham said that he wished to ask if it was not too late to change Alex said we will hear what the 8th Army wants. Gen Lees read a paper which said that Gen M. objected to having his army split and wanted to attack as a united army in the vicinity of SIRACUSA Further that Lees 30 Corps of two divs 50 & 51 was too weak to attack near LICATA and capture and hold the air ports there. The whole change was predicated on the possibility that the Germans could move the 10-15-21 Panza and 90 Light to the Island. 90 And further in my opinion to make a sure thing attack for the 8th Army and its "Ever victorious general". And to hell with the rest of the war. Tedder said "Really gentlemen I don't want to be difficult but I am profoundly moved with out the capture of these air ports the operation is impossible. Adm C. said "From a naval view point the massing of so many ships in the Siracusa area is to invite disaster and besides the chief merit of an amphibious attack is to do so on a broad front and disperse enemy effort. I am definitely opposed to the plan." Alex said "But if from our view point that is the Army it is necessary we must do it." Tedder said "We are all in it it is not an Army show but three arms are in it. 91 Besides we can't support Patton unless we get these fields." I said "I would like to stress that point because I am sure that with out the air fields while I may get ashore I wont live long" Lees was then asked if he could do his part if he got an extra division which Adm. C. said he could lift. Lees said that the Army Commander would never consent to splitting his Army. To me this is a small minded attitude and very selfish. I whispered to Tedder that my force was split by more than 45 miles. He said "Say it out loud" I did. Alex said "that the man on the ground must decide." I said in view of Gen Alex remark I withdraw mine but that I felt sure if I refused to attack because my force was split I would be relieved. Lees 92 "I am sure of it in your case and there would be a file of asparants." I am not sure whether he was insulting or not? Alex said I think we should send a wire to the P.M. Amd. C said Why not ask Eisenhower After all he is C in C. The argument got quite hot and lasted 2 3/4 hours. At one point Adm C said "Well if the Army cant agree let them do the show alone - I wish to God they would." At last it was suggested that Alex Tedder and Adm C. go to visit Monty and argue with him. Adm C said "I shant go I also have something to do." It was finally suggested that Air Marshall Conyngham go. Tedder said "Fine it will be good for Monty to hear his masters voice" 93 About then the telephone rang and Alex apparently got some bad news for he and Conyngham left at once and the meeting ended in an impass. All due, in my opinion to lack of force on the part of Alexander who cut a sorry figure at all times. He is a fence walker. As the meeting broke up I asked Adm. C if I had been too frank. He said not at all you were the only one that said any thing and inspite of your tactful retraction what you said had a profound effect. Tedder over heard me and said he was for me. He took me to lunch. After lunch we were talking and Tedder said, "It is bad form for officers to criticize each other so I shall. 94 "The other day Alex who is very selfish said of of Gen Anderson 'As a soldier he is a good plane military cook.' The remark applies absolutely - to Montgomery" He is a little fellow of average ability who has had such a build up that he thinks of him self as Napoleon - he is not. The quotes I have used are from memory but as I am writing this with in the hour they are very nearly correct. This may have been a most momentous meeting. Flew back to Oran hoping to see Gen McNair but he had gone. 4-30-43 At 1025 Gruenther called to alert the 3d Div to go to the front. I called Truscott at 1035 95 and told him to get ready to move and to report to me. He arrived about 11:30 with his two Brigs. I told him more than I could say on the phone and give him or rather repeated some tactical advice. While he was here Gruenther called to start the move I had already called Ike and asked if I could attack the 77 F.A. 155 Hows I also asked to go back to the front. Ike had not heard that the 3d was moving??? What a general!!! Gen Huebner came in at 1600 and said that things were bad at the Front and that the Germans had broadcast that they had won a great victory and stopped the British and Americans. I guess they have. I again asked him to try and get us two extra infantry 96 divs. I have asked and asked for the last four months for more infantry this war is not won. And all Ike thinks of is SOS troops I hear there are 120000 of them here now. It is horrible to have a spineless desk soldier in command. Huebner, Rooks, Smith Keyes, Hughes and even Alexander agree we need more decision but nothing is done. I now think that possibly the earliest date we can lick the Boches in Africa is July 1. Had division been brought when I first asked for them in January the war would now be won. 5-1-43 Went to Port aux Poules with Keyes to a critique on the last landing operation. It was very 97 very well conducted by Truscott and most instructive. I have just finished dictating the expurgated edition of my diary. Even that is pretty lurid. The 7th CT of the third moved out at 0230 to day. 5-2-43 Sunday Beadle Smith called at 1500 and said that there were probably going to be some big changes in the Huskey plan. And that Montey would be there to present his ideas and that he thought that before any changes were made I should have a chance to be heard. In view of the last meeting I fancy that Montey will insist on his plan which means that The Air fields at Dime will not be taken. This situation can be solved either by 343 Taking them or else by delaying 343 until 98 the British eventually take them. Or that the Ad Hock plan will be used. I intend to do a hell of a lot of listening. But I will not sacrifice American lives to save my job. I will get there as early as possible and see Sir Andrew & Tedder. 5-3-43 M. Beadle Smith called last night for me to come to Alger as Monty was coming and a change of pan was eminent. I got a plane for this morning but it was raining, so we had to drive. We left at 0745 Muller- Stiller and I. And got in at 1730 after the worst drive I have ever had we tried the coast road and after about 100 miles came to a washed out Bridge so had to turn back fifteen miles to Tenis and go over to the inside road. Here 99 got into the 3d Div convoys and were in them for about one hundred and fifty miles. The road was narrow and wet and often you could not see two hundred yards for the mist - we did not hit any thing. I reported to Ike and said "I am sorry I am late for the meeting but I did the best I could" He replied: "Oh thats all right I knew you would do what you were ordered with out question and told them so. We had better get hold of Alexander and Hewitt and show you the new set up." We - Alex - H. Beadle and Muller and I went to room 18, and they showed me on the map what had been done. In the meeting of Mar 29 Monty, through Lees had objected to the Huskey plan and a stale mate had resulted. Conyngham had been sent to talk 100 Monty over. Monty came up yesterday and so far as I can gather simply refused to play ball. So Alexander yielded in spite of the fact that the Supply people say that the plan Monty wants is logistically impossible. The plan as now set up is 8th Army lands at A & B W.T.F. at C & D. and later captures, LICATA, a small 1000 ton a day port. WTF to capture the 3 air ports near C & D. Inspite of the fact that Lees said he could not do it with two Divs and 2 parachute Regts (Brigs B) We are to do it with the same force. I told them at once that I was going to land 4 Divs and two para regts and take LICATA straight off and that the Brit would have to give me some supplies through SIRACUSA. They said they would. They promise easily. But even 101 so it means we have to supply more than two divs over the beaches indefinitely yet the navy says that after Sept. 1st beach supply is impossible. Well we will do it any way. Spent the night with Ike, Kay came to supper. Ike and I talked till 0120. He is beginning to see the light but is too full of him self. I was quite frank with him about the B and he took it. Alexander told me with great enthusiasm how well the 34th Div. had done. I did not remind him that I had had to force him to use them and had asked for the 3d Div in March. It is now going in. Ike still thinks the war is over and bet me we would be in Tunisia on May 8. My bet is June 15. 102 5-4-43 Saw Beadle he says that the reason every one yields to Monty is because Monty is the national Hero and writes direct to the P.M. and that if Ike crossed him Ike might get canned. Also that Monty is senior in service to Alex and taught Alex at the staff college and that Alex is afraid of Monty. Saw Hewitt and talked over Naval end this is not obviously effected Hewitt and I then went to 141 and saw Nevins 141 is very mad as it was their plan which was thrown out they gave me a paper full of objections to the new plan. Some of which are sound. Nevins, Hewitt, Muller and I went to see Gen Gairdner C of S 141 I said We are on the same side and I want your help in putting up our side when Montys 103 C of S comes up. Specifically I want all the Para troops and a definite written promise of supplies via SIRACUSA to make up the service for what we cant [use] get in at Cent and Dime also I want a definite Boundary between 8th Army and W.T.F. He said that he would help but that some one had suggested that we needed only two Para Bns. I said "While I have the highest respect for the valor of the US troops I do not feel that they are so superior to the British that an equal number of our infantry can succeed with only a third as many Para troops in an attack which the XXX Corps considered impossible." They saw the point. Had lunch with Gen Hughes who said he was going to try and get some money out of the British. Flew down to Oran in Ikes B-17 blew out right tire landing but no 104 trouble. Keyes & Walker met me. Walker asked some good questions about discipline and size of Armored Divs. 5-5-43 Had Red alert at 1030. I forgot to say that on the 3d Gen Alex. said to Gairdner to send a wire to Monty to send his C of S to Alger to arrange details between WTF & 8 Army Gairdner asked "What if he don't send him?" Alex replied then we will order him. I said that I felt in justice to all that a definite signed agreement should be reached with the binding effect of a treaty. I think this will be done. Beadle told me that Lord Gorth speaking of Monty said "In dealing with him one must remember that he is not quite a gentleman." Night of the third Ike said perhaps W T F 105 should be an Army. I said I should hate to serve under Clark. Ike said I don't mean that. I had Dawley - Taylor of the 82 and the staff in to discuss our new attack. I initially planned to put the 45 at "C" 36 or 1st at "D" and 3d at LICATA, with 2d Armd split and 82 landing behind beaches Keyes suggested that we do that but hold out one CT 45 & one CT 36 or 1st and one CC 2nd Armd - the old "F" force as a reserve this would result in little administrative change I accepted the idea. No one present had any objection so that plan was accepted. It all took about one hour. Some day bemused students will try to see how we came to this decision and credit us with profound thought we never had. The thing as I see it is to get a 106 definite SIMPLE plan quickly and win by execution and careful detailed study of the tactical operation of the lesser units. EXECUTION is the thing, that and LEADERSHIP. 5-6-43 Visited invasion training school Saw village attack with live ammunition passing just over and close beside the men. It was very impressive Also saw hardening area and bayonet fighting also a mock up drill in loading all left nothing to be desired. Clark called up and we arranged very amicably to provide men for his schools. We leave for Alger in the morning to settle mutual plans with 8th Army and Navy. 5-7-43 Left at 0915 arrived Alger 1020 had 30 mile Tail 107 wind. Nevins met us and we went direct to AFHQ. Gen Monty, Gen Gairdner, Brig Richardson, Keyes self and Beadel Smith were present. Monty had very definite ideas and avoided being pinned down asto what he would or would not do. I tried to get him to define a boundary and a phase line but could not. Smith talked a lot and made nasty remarks about Nevins and 141 but realy said nothing except that he did insist on my demand for 2/3 of the parashoot lift for first day. The B's had to yield as when they had planned to attack at C & D they had demanded two Para. Brigs. Later we Monty Keyes and I went into a few details. It is my opinion that Monty got out of attacking C & D for two reasons The beaches are 108 bad and there are no harbors. I insisted that 141 define boundary, number of para troops objectives and general plan of campaign and do it in writing. I shall put in a memo on this in the morning. Monty is a forceful selfish man but still a man. I think he is a far better leader than Alex and that he will do just what he pleases as Alex is afraid of him. Went to see Hewitt who can only think of objections. I told him that such talk was beside the point as we had been ordered to attack and were going to do so. Went to 141 and found all my staff confused in details and full of reasons why the thing can't be done. I straightened them out by the simple method of showing a confidence 109 which I don't feel although I am pretty confident. I believe in my fate and to fulfil it this show must be a success. I again brought up the subject of more troops with Beadle but got no where. Handy who was present said Ike could have them any time he asked but he wont. Heard a report that we were in Biserta & Tunis. I wish Ike had let me stay on in command of the II Corps but it is probably all for the best. Staying with Everett Hughes had a nice talk. 5-8-43 Went to see Ike in morning and found him much elated over his "great Victory" I had bet him that we would not be in Tunis and Biserta till after June 15 110 and a second bet that we would not be in on May 8. I lost both with great pleasure so got a new 500 F bill and presented it to him on a tray with a Red Rose and the remark "Hail Caesar" He walked the floor for some time orating and then asked me to mention how hard he had worked - what great risks he had taken and how well he had handled the B's in my next letter to Gen Marshall. I wrote a letter which largely over stated his merits but I felt that I owe him a lot and must stay in with him. I lied in a good cause. As a matter of fact I know of no one except my self who could do any better than Ike and God knows I don't want his job. While I was writing the letter I heard part of his press conference. He was asked several times what had become 111 of me. His official explanation was that at El Guettar a Tank expert was needed while in Northern Tunisia an infantry expert was required. This fooled no one and they kept on asking so Ike finally said, "I have had to pull Gen Patton out to plan a bigger operation and at the moment he commands the 1st Armored Corps. Please lay off mentioning him..." I know my reputation will catch hell for a month or so but it is a good cover plan. Once Grant said to Sherman in the Vicksburg campaign that he would like to make a feint with Shermans Corps at a place called Cedar Bluff (?) but as the operation could not succeed he did not order it as it would hurt Shermans reputation. Sherman replied, "Don't let my personal reputation interfere with winning t he war" I feel the same 112 way and told Ike the story. He needs a few loyal and unselfish men around him even if he is too weak a character to be worth of us. But if I do my duty I will be paid in the end. Went to 141 it is a mess neither Gen Gardiner nor Nevins has the rank or character to control Montey and Alexander is just as weak. Gen Huebner has been put in 141 as deputy C of S but he can't swing it either. Montey is all set to make America defend his left flank and to do it by landing at the most dificult beaches. From a logical aspect it is impossible both the landing and the supply - but I feel that by God's help and only by His help we will do it. I have to exude confidence I don't feel every minute. If the Germans succeed 113 in getting two divisions in place I think that the operation is impossible but the P and the PM will insist on it any how. Well one cant live for ever. We worked with the Navy all afternoon on the beaches our only chance is to get all the Ducks (2 1/2 Ton. Amp. Trucks) possible I got 100 extra out of the B's. As set up we had 350 and they 400 now it is 450 to 300 and they say? they will let us have the rest when they get in port. 5-9-43 (Sunday) Saw Adm Hewitt who as usual can't decide and is full of querilious reasons for failure. Saw Tedder who is a great promiser but I don't wholy trust him. He seems to me more interested in producing an independent Air Force in our Army than in winning 114 the war. Went to 141 and told Gen Gairdner that I thought he had been unduly criticized this cheered him up and may help us. Keyes, Maddox and Clark will have to stay over a day or so. We could not get a special plane so had to come home on the courier. This is due to British influence on Spaats I will write a letter to Hughes asking for a plane. We reached Mostaganem at 700 PM (1900). Had a lot of mail and some magazines. 5-10-43 Gen Kingman called to say good by he is going with Clark. I think he guesses I made the deal but was very polite. He is a nice man but not a fighter. While at Alger Gen McClure 115 told me that the nasty article in the April 12 issue of Time was written in America and that the time correspondent in Africa had sent a 300 word telegram to the editor of Time cussing him out. McCluer said he would send me a copy of the telegram. I wrote Bradley of this and asked him to tell the Division Commanders. 5-11-43 The local Frog General called this morning also Gaffey and Walker. Inspected some personal combat and some landing operations of 2d Bn 141 Inf. Was quite impressed with the men and the Major. Gave each a war talk it is amusing to see the men pep up when they realize you have something to say and are not just talking. Wrote a letter to John Waters Am going out at midnight 116 to watch an [?appered?] landing by a battalion of the 41st Inf. Harry Semmes is coming to supper. Left house at 2345. Gay and Codman did not wake up. Smoke on Beaches slow work and lack of drive by men and officers. Cussed out Wolf and Hinds Navy got LCT's ashore in wrong sequence. Ramps too short they have done nothing to remedy it. Very distressing evening. 5-12-43 Met Clark and some French Generals at Beach 6. He was full of gloom and had some reason. It appears that now the director of training here is British and [the] two B. divs are coming to the 5th Army. He thinks he will lead the force that invades Italy. I doubt it. We wont invade and he won't lead. Saw a flame thrower attack a pill box. Gens Ridgeway and Tailor of the 82 called. 117 Asked to have Gen Wolf relieved and replaced by Caffey of the 20th Engrs. Called Adm Hall about ramps on LCT's. Directed that all landing drills be sand tabled. 5-13-43 Gen O'Daniel and I had some experiments this P.M. We fired .50 MG at a pill box and had good effect 25 rounds chipped off about a foot of concrete. The Rocket Gun & AT Grenade make holes about 18 inches deep in concrete but are very inaccurate 37 AP will make a hole in 3 feet of concrete in about six rounds. 57 AP is better. 75 HE with delay fuse from a How was best and busted a hole in two rounds It also has some effect in wire cutting but not much too slow. Flame thrower is useless to 118 to cut wire but will suffocate those in a pill box. Bangalor Torpedo cuts wire well and works best when laid on top. It failed to detonate Teller mines but I think they were too old as I shot the detonator with a rifle at 100 yds using a scope and it did not go off. The tests were very encouraging. No problem to night. Lt Col Brewster came in and I asked him to get me some clothes in U.K. 5-14-43 Did nothing all day except think about a training directive. I know what I want but find it hard to condense it enough. I guess I am mentally lazy. Keyes came back today we had a long talk. Robinette and Lambert were both wounded in Tunis. Benson is said to have done well. Received a letter from Gen Marshall in which he 119 said among other things "You did a masterful job in reorganising the II Corps and joining with the 8th Army to drive the Germans out of Southern Tunisia." Very nice as he seldom praises Got a letter from Ike in which he says: "President R has asked that I convey his thanks for your fine work in the early Tunisian Campaign." he adds some on his own. Nice of him. I hope I get to work in the morning. 5-15-43 Wrote letter to Gen Alex suggesting, use of smoke for feints, use of directional smoke, use of air to put out 150m/m guns unil we get some of ours ashore and getting a statement from Air asto what they were going to do to help. Went to hospital to see Robinett who is shot in the left leg. Also saw Lt Col Ringstock of 6 inf A wounded soldier came up 120 and said "Gen dont you remember me I am in the 1st Div?" I said I did and then he took me around for quite a while introducing me to all other soldiers of II Corps there. The attitude of the men was fine they all were cheerful and wanted to get back. We have now an army. Just as I was leaving a fine looking soldier stood up and said "Gen I think the 1st Div and the 1st Armd are fine but they aren't in it with the 9th". I shook hands with him for standing up for his own. 5-16-43 Gen Bradley arrived this morning. I met him at the Air Port (Nouvion) to congratulate him in person - I had already written him two letters - because when he and I met Ike after El Guettar he never mentioned that there had been a war. I had Gens Bradley, Terry Allen, Lemnintzer, Kean, Cols: Porter 121 Tully, Dixon, Wilson for lunch we had two bottles of champagne and I drank the health of the Conqueror of Bizerta and his assistants. 5-17-43 Wrote Hughes to get all Ducks being sent French. Phoned him to try and get 450 men from 36 Div to form third ranger Bn. Wrote Harmon and Dock Rider to congratulate them - may need them later. Ike called me to say we will probably do Huskey as [*#*] an Army. I have never asked him to do this but am glad he is going to. Had a long talk with Bradley. He grows on me as a very sound and extremely loyal soldier. We both feel that our chances of surviving Huskey are not better than 50-50 but God or luck will tip the beam to us. Told Koch G-2 to make a comparative study of maps showing coasts 122 here which we know and coasts of Huskey this will give us a physical idea of how it will be. I did that with streams in France in 1918. Every thing I have done helps now it is more than a coincidents. Henriques says that the day the PM left he called for a map of Italy and said Huskey was too slow I hope we land on the main land. If we take Italy Huskey will fall the reverse is not true. 5-18-43 This morning we had an exercise in which two Cos of medium Tanks advanced under high burst H.E. with supporting infantry shooting through the gaps. I rode in the captain's tank of the leading Co. The results were most impressive. The fragments tore up the ground all around us and some hit 123 the tank. Two shorts burst within about 20 yards of my tank but had they hit I doubt if they would have caused any trouble. I took the ride because some of the men felt it was dangerous. If we preceed such an attack by successive concentrations of H.E. impact then give a depth to the high burst barrage accompanying the attack of 1000 yds and smoke the enemy OP's on the flank I think it will be hard to stop. Ike phoned to invite Bradley and me to a triumphal parade at Tunis on the 20th. If we don't go there will be only British there so we are going. The British element at AFHQ is setting up the rehearsals for the attack to suit the British and bother us and no one is doing any thing about it. AFHQ is realy a British H.Q. with a 124 neuter general if he is not pro-B. It is a hell of a note. Some day some one at home will tumble to what is going on. I have a hope that owing to the loss of over 150000 Germans in Tunis the Germans may not be too keen to put Germans in Huskey if they don't we should not have too much trouble. If they do it will be bad. Harry Semmes thought of the high burst attack. 5-19-43 Gen Gaffey came in and told me how worried he was about the Navy's inability to find the beaches or unload the craft. So I took him with me and drove to Oran to see Admiral Hall. I told Hall that we were not finding fault with any one and that we assumed 50% responsibility but that unless some improvements were made the next operation was bound to be a bloody 125 failure. He was very nice and frank about the situation and assured us that they were working for a solution especially for the landing of tanks. I told him about the grapnels to be fired from the 81mm mortars and arranged to send him one to try from a craft. He said he would send his shore fire control officer to the 2d Armored to get our ideas. He has great belief in Navy fire support which I dont share but we must try everything. His arguments against a sub marine attack dont seem too good to me. I am sure that the Bosch will use both air and subs against our craft and do it soon and hard. We had a very nice lunch with him and I think the visit will be useful. Ike phoned to invite Bradley and I to come to Tunis tomorrow for a Victory Parade 126 5-20-43 Bradley and I left Nouvion in a B-25 provided by Cannon at 0700 and reached Tunis at 0945. I rode in the [nose?] most of the way and it was very interesting. We could see the battle fields and the site of Carthage. Tunis is hurt very little except on the water front and not very obviously there There are a great many [burned?] planes on the fields Doolittle says more than 400. This seems high to me. When we arrived Ike was there also Adm Cunningham, Alexander, [Anderson?], Conyningham Murphy McFarland and many French. Ike said he hated the hshow but was so busy being congratulated that he barely spoke to Bradley and me. Gen Gireau came and every one reached up to shake hands we were trampled in the back 127 and failed to secure. All got into cars Brad and I were with a five star [Frag?] whose name I did not get. He spoke the clearest French I have heard and we got on fine. Ike rode in a car with Gireau he and the British had a guard of armored cars we taged along behind and were [shunted?] off to a side street. We would have been last had not a British general showed us the way. Brad and I were put in a stand with a Bishop? a lot of Frogs and some civilians also a few British. Pretty soon the Holy Family drove up with much shouting and Feu de favin? which most people including our selves first thought was an air rade. French Colonial infantry and British MP's were 128 infront of our stand while across the street were British troops. No US troops visible. Gireau and Ike took the review also on his stand were Alexander, Anderson Cunningham, Tedder Conyingham. The Frog Catroux [Beqkere Roll?] Gen who drove with us Murphy and McFarland. It is note worthy that Ike and Murphy - a civilian - were the only Americans on the principle stand. Bradley and I who had at least done something to win the war were not officially present whether it was stupidity or design we don't know. But the U.S. was certainly playing a minor roll. The parade started with a march part of a Back pipe band at half time. Then the Foreign legion band of about 100 pieces with their white caps 129 red epaulits etc came by and took station opposite Then regiment after regiment of French, Colonial and black and white. They marched well but their weapons were 1914 one had to respect them for fighting so well with such junk. The Foreign legion resplendent with whiskers got the big hand. Then came a regiment of U.S. from the 34th Div. No flags and the colonel marching in ranks. Our men marched well and were clean and big but lack swank they have no pride in being soldiers. The French and British have. Then came the British thousands of them with Lt Gens & Major Gens walking. They were mostly in shorts and put on a fine show Then came a lot of our 130 tanks manned by the British also guns and some Churchill Tanks. The show took two hours and US came out a poor third. Had lunch at the Residence saw Harmon and arranged to trade Rose for Collier Met Gen. Briggs (Brit) who I knew in Tripoli. We had an Air Raid last night. May 21 1943 Gen Alex, Maj Gen. Browning and Brig Richardson arrived at 1100. Keyes and I met them with motcl escort Had Guard of Honor. Browning gave me a stick dagger Had them all to lunch then wanted invasion T. C where Navy failed to get a line ashore. Richardson told me we would be Seventh Army, at his insistence. Ike told me I was to have it two weeks ago Transcribed and reviewed by contributors participating in the By The People project at crowd.loc.gov.