GEORGE S. PATTON DIARIES Annotated transcripts Jan. 26-Apr. 8, 1943 BOX 2 FOLDER 14 January 26, 1943 Had a letter from Everett Hughes enclosing one General Wilson had given him to read. Wilson criticized everything I or my staff had done in a very stupid manner. I returned the letter to him, telling him to go ahead and send it to General Lutes 1 and that I was enclosing a copy of the letter I had written him (Wilson), to Lutes. Wilson is a back-biting fool with an inferiority complex, who will not last long. Drove to Safi to inspect port and troops. Both in excellent shape. But what a place to have attacked! Only luck and the Lord working together made it possible to take it. Had the French retired to the walled city we could hardly have landed. Generals Marshall, Hull, Gailey and Col. McCarthy came to dinner. They leave for the U.S. at 0800 in the morning. We had a monologue. It is most unfortunate that weather prevented General Marshall from seeing the troops. He now will think they are as good as mine, which is not so. He should have especially seen the airports, which are terrible. All he did was to make excuses for the lack of discipline of the Air Force. There is no excuse -- my troops are disciplined. As Everett Hughes says, "This is still a General Staff war, not a soldiers' war." Now General Marshall will fly the Atlantic with Devers and swallow all his misinformation. I wish someone would listen to me. I have something which makes people reluctant to question me; perhaps I always have an answer based on truth and not bootlick? January 27, 1943 Saw General Marshall off at 0820. Read this Diary up to November 7. It is quite interesting. My order to go to Algiers was canceled. Went 1. MAJ Gen LeRoy Lutes (Deputy Chief Supply Services) -79- January 27, 1943 (cont'd p.2) to a Diffa by Sultan's brother given in my honor. There were 17 courses, then we drank tea and then they took us to a room in a sort of roofed over court where there was a table covered with flowers, candy, cakes and nuts. There were 52 plates of this and 33 quarts, or larger, flasks or orange juice flavored with rosewater, almond milk and prune juice, none of which was more than touched. The host has 11 sons and 6 daughters and is a very fine looking and generous man. At last I have learned not to eat too much. January 28, 1943 On reaching the office I found that the 9th Division is to start East on February 1st instead of March 1st as formerly ordered. I think some General Staff child just made a mistake of one month. As there were a lot of points to be settled I flew to Oudja in my B-25. We made it in one hour and 20 minutes. It was lovely flying and very clear. Clark had just gotten in from seeing Ike. He was too friendly and I feared a stab in the back at any moment, but none came. He told me the damnedest thing I have ever heard. The Tunisia attack will start It will be made by a group of armies, i.e. First and Eighth British. Alexander will command. Anderson (British) will have the First, which will consist of the V British Corps, the II U. S. Corps, First Armored and First Infantry and a French corps. The French corps will have one French division, or possibly two, and the U. S. 34th Division. The Eighth British Army under Montgomery will be as is. Shades of J. J. Pershing! We have sold out birthright and the mess of pottage is, in my opinion, the title of Allied Commander to General Marshall. I am shocked and distressed. The next operation, amphibious, 1. Gen. Harold Alexander 2. Gen. Sir B. L. Montgomery -80- January 28, 1943 (cont'd p.2) half American and Half British, may also be commanded by British, though Clark is trying to get hold of it. It would be safe physically, and, if successful, would give him great credit. Apparently I am to command the U. S. forces; 2d Armored, 3rd Division, 45th Division. My luck will have to be pretty good and the Lord on the job to put it over. One is inclined to think that fighting ability is at a discount. However, I think that I was fortunate in not being made Deputy Commander-in-Chief to Ike. I guess destiny is still on the job. God, I wish I could really command and lead as well as just fight. The set up is so absurd that I doubt if it ever comes off. There are 67,000 Boches in Tunisia now, with Rommel 1 yet to come in. I don't think they can evict that many men by May 1st, as hopefully planned. I truly think that the whole set up is the result of clever politics by the British and selfish ambition on our part. Perhaps a minor role, if successful, in a probable defeat might be best. "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick." Ike will be a sort of War Department. The air set up is even worse. I hear Jimmy Doolittle has been fired. He is coming to see me now. January 29, 1943 Jimmy stayed all night and told us all about Tokyo. He has been fired. He is a fine personal leader but lacked the experience for the command of an air force. Also Ike and friends not only told him what to do but how to do it. We flew to Rabat at 0830, picked up Nogues and Lascroux and went to see Second Armored. Gaffey's Combat Command passed in review and was 1. Field Marshall Irwin Rommel, commanding Africa Corps. -81- January 29, 1943 (cont'd p.2) fine. We had a nice lunch al fresco and then saw the 41st Infantry put on an attack. The Spanish attache was present at my request, and was certainly impressed. It may prevent a fight, though God knows we need one soon. Sgt. Mims got drunk and ran over a Frenchman. He will have to take his medicine. January 30, 1943 Keyes, Wilbur and I went to Rabat for an audience with Sa Majeste. I had an M-1 rifle with a plate of silver on it "To this Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Morocco from his friend General Patton." Keyes and I gave S.M. a new 16mm movie projector and Wilbur gave the Crown Prince a trench knife and a bomb fragment. The first thing that S.M. asked me was, had the President gotten back safely? He was very friendly. General and Mme. Nogues came to dinner at our house very informally, and we had a very nice evening. January 31, 1943 Went to church. Gay andItook Mrs. Emmitt some tea, sugar and milk. I went home at 5:00 p.m. and M. Boisson sent his secretary with a note and a saddle for me. He and I get on fine; he is quite a man. February 1, 1943 Went to Marrakesh by place to visit Pasha. Called on General Martin then went to Pasha's palace. He has two guest houses and a sort of extra house for tea. The houses are truly magnificent. The one I lived in took ten years to build. We had a Diffa, which was the most splendid I have ever seen. General Martin said that in all his years here he had never seen such a party. 1. General Patton's chauffeur -82- February 1, 1943 (con't.p. 2) The usual food, but better cooked, and the tea cups were museum pieces in blue and gold. After dinner we had dancing. Women very sedate and lots of clothes. The Arab idea of hospitality is profusion. Mama must have been part Arab. February 2, 1943 Left Palace at 0700 in a Rolls Royce to drive into mountains. The Pasha said we would have a light breakfast. It took five men to serve mine: tea, coffee, butter, three sorts of preserves, cakes, candy. Later I found the five eating what was left, which was plenty for them and then some. We drove through about 100 miles of desert and mountains: the Pasha fought there as a young man and was most interesting. At the meet there was a tent with more food, also horses and mules. I drew a fine gray stallion about 15-2 and weighing 1100 pounds. He had on a French Field saddle and bridle made by A. Jannin of Saumur -- the exact duplicate of the one I bought in 1912. We rode through the mountains for about an hour, the Pasha on a fine black mule with a huge [red] purple silk saddle and two men on foot to lead it. These men and about 30 others kept up with the horses with ease, though we were moving out at a good hound trot. The Pasha gave me a fine stand next to him. Then the beat commenced. There were 1000 beaters. Soon the jackals and foxes came up. I missed three snap shots in the brush. Then a boar came between me and General Wilbur, who was on my left. Wilbur broke his leg but failed to stop him. Then one came right at the Pasha, who was using a rifle. He drilled it but failed -83- February 2, 1943 (cont'd p.2) to stop it and there was a general fusillade to the rear. Why no one was hit I don't know. The Pasha finally killed it. Just then the largest and blackest boar I have seen broke cover some 20 yards to my front and came straight at me, with a nasty expression on his face. I put a solid slug in his right eye at about 3 yards and he fell dead so that the blood from his mouth wet my feet. It was quite exciting, but I was not perturbed till afterwards. I never am at the time. Of course I did not aim at his eye. I shot at the whole hog. It was fortunate that I killed him instantly. Of course I had a second barrel of buckshot but he would probably have cut me up. We had a second drive but no pig came my way. I killed a jackal. On the way home we stopped at a small Kasbah and the local Chief gave us a Diffa. All the inhabitants sang and danced during the whole meal which lasted an hour only, as I had to get back by dark. I have always wanted to talk to a bandit on his native heath and to have a thrill shooting. This day I had both. February 3, 1943 Clark called me to meet him at Oudja and go with him to Algiers. We got there at noon. Ike talked in glittering-generalities and then said as nearly as I can remember, "George, you are my oldest friend, but if you or anyone else criticizes the British, by God I will reduce him to his permanent grade and send him home. The reason that I have not promoted you is that I want to promote three of you, and one of the others (Fredendall) is reported to have talked against the British. If he had, by God I'll bust him. I any case you will get promoted in less than a month". -84- February 3, 1943 (con't p.2) Later I asked Clark if I had been accused. Clark said no, and that Ike had talked to him the same way. Clark thinks General Marshall told Ike to do it to all of us. "Cromwell beware ambition, by it the angels fell." February 4, 1943 I had all heads of Staff Sections in at 1000 and told them that in order for the Allies to work together harmoniously there must be no criticism of Russians, British, French or any others. General Gaffey was in and I sent similar instructions by him to Harmon. I will see Anderson and Eddy in the morning. Just notified Wilbur. Sending troops to Marrakesh to look out for B-1. Am to accompany Clark on a trip of unknown destination, probably on Sunday. February 5, 1943 Kay, the WAC, who drove Ike in UK, is now in Algiers driving him. I see no use in women drivers -- simply as drivers -- at the front as they to have a soldier guard with them. My mysterious trip has been delayed for a few days. I flew to Lyautey to tell the 9th Division goodbye. J. W. Anderson was there too so I gave both of them instructions on no criticism of Allies. Nixon 1 showed me the mock up of the head cover for the scout car I devised. Told 9th Division goodbye. Warned 3rd Division about criticism. Got a secret letter from Ike in which he advises me to be more circumspect and less flip in my conversation on military matters. He means well and I certainly have thus far failed to sell myself in a big way to my seniors. February 6, 1943 Wrote a reply to Ike but will sleep on it. Inspected double pack 1. CoL T. F. Nixon 0rd officer W.T.F. -85- February 6, 1943 (con't p. 2) assembly and was very much impressed. Keyes flew to Gibraltar. We had a second call to prepare for the P.M. at Marrakesh but it was called off. All I have to do is sit and fret about the future -- in the past I have always done well. Allied Force Headquarters was changed to NATOUSA with Ike in Command. My hunch is that this means Marshall will be announced as Allied Commander-in-Chief. Arnold will be Chief of Staff, Devers Deputy Chief of Staff, McNarney [1] will get an air command. We shall see. February 7, 1943 Went on hunt with Monsier Poussier, did not fire a shot but had a very nice lunch in the woods. If the French ate less they could hunt more. February 8, 1943 Had the"cafard"all day because I have nothing to do and don't seem to be getting anywhere. Little B's rug arrived and is very pretty. Saw Monsieur Boisson off to Dakar and gave him the carbine General Campbell [2] had made for me. February 9, 1943 Inspected Corps troops. They have improved. Atlantic Base seems to be getting too exigent. I will get facts, but give them more rope. Inspected a battery with a case of spinal meningitis. Sent chief surgeon to investigate. Sent Jenson to Algiers with letter for Ike. Geoff Keyes went along for the trip. 1. MAJ. Gen J.T. MCNARNEY (DeP C/S USA) 2. Maj.Gen.L. G. Campbell, Chief of Ordnance -86- February 10, 1943 Had Admiral Hall to dinner last night. He is going away to command an amphibious force for some new operation. He said that, if he did, he hoped that I would command it and him both at sea and ashore. Flew to Rabat and had lunch with Harmon. We inspected an AA mount he had devised by use of turret ring off a truck. We drove to Meknes stopping on way to inspect a large winery. It reminded me of San Gabriel [1] winery but is smaller. The French press the grapes the way we do for the good wine, and then press the hulls for vin ordinaire. Saw a stable -- a ruin -- for 5,000 horses in old palace at Meknes. The wives and mistresses of the former Sultan live in the palace. Also went to the Moroccan West Point in an old palace and inspected a remount station. Drove to Arzev and spent night in a very nice hotel. It is a sort of winter resort. We saw a trout hatchery and had dinner with local French commander -- a major. February 11, 1943 Drove about 75 kilometers into the mountains, going to 7000 feet. It was quite cold with some snow. At a little Goumiers station we were met by a company who marched 25 miles to salute me. They marched back the same day. We went fishing -- each man had two Arabs. One baited the hook and the other carried a huge basket for the expected fish. In two and a half hours I did not get a strike. I had a rod that could easily have held a tarpon. We then had a Diffa in a regular Arab black goat hair tent. There were magnificent rugs on the floor. The tent was very large and all hand made. There are six sticks of different lengths along each side and two long poles and a curved ridge in the middle. I was told that the whole thing could be carried 1. California winery owned by Mr. B.D. Wilson, G.S.P.'s grandfather. -87- February 11, 1943 (con't p.2) by three mules or camels. I doubt it. Food was plentiful but bad. I got some pictures -- both movies and stills. We drove back through a cedar forest of huge trees, perhaps 12 feet thick and 100 feet tall. We had to stop to inspect a Tabor (battalion) of Goumiers: 3 companies of infantry and troop of cavalry. They had marched 10 miles to be reviewed. As I had to get back to Casa for 7:00 PM dinner with Consul and Mrs. Brooks, I had a cub plane at Arzeu to fly me to Meknes. We just barely missed crashing on take-off. At Meknes, I transferred to my B-25 and got home at 6:15. I found that Lieutenant General McFarlan[d]e, Governor of Gibraltar, was there, so I could not go to the Brooks. The Lieutenant General is a fine gentleman but a fool. He writes limericks of a vulgar sort and insists on reciting them. February 12, 1943 John C. H. Lee and the QM, General [1] called this morning. I took Lee all around. Ike got four stars. Gruenther got his second, Harmon, Air Corps, got three. Happy day. February 13, 1943 Flew to Oudja with Lee, lunch with Gruenther. Saw Clark after lunch. He is quite ill with ptomaine. Flew to Algiers and had a talk with BedellSmith. Had dinner with Sir Andrew Cunningham and General Paget [2]. February 14, 1943 Left Algiers at 8:30 in B-17 for Tripoli. On way the crew fired their guns to see if they worked and we all got badly scared. Just 1. MAJ. Gen Edmund B. Gregory (QAn. Gen OJA) 2. Gen Sir B. Paget (Br) -88- February 14, 1943 (con't p.2) before we got in , we saw a German Junker 109 and thought we were in for a fight, but heard later that it was a captured one being flown by the British. Took us an hour to find airport. Met by British Captain and taken to hotel Mehari near mouth of harbor. Attended lecture by Brigadier Sir Brian Robertson, D.A. and QMG.Eighth Army, son of F. M. Robertson of World War I. Talked on supply of Eighth Army. I sat in front with General Paget. Met the following Brass Hats from U.K.: General Sir B. Paget; Lt. Generals Swayne, Gammel, Templer, Morlan, Crerar; Major Generals Bullen-Smith, Godwin-Austen, X [Tenth] Corps, and Lieutenant General Horocks, who spent World War I in a German Prison Prison Camp. Nice fellow. Major General Briggs, whom I liked a lot, commands Armored Division. XIII [Thirteenth] Corps, Lieutenant General Dempsey; XXX [Thirtieth] Corps, Lieutenant General Sir O. W. Leese; who wore plus fours and a little coat of his own edsign but was and is a very able soldier. Lieutenant General Sir N. Freyberg. He started life as dentist in New Zealand, got the V.C. at Gallipoli and in two wars and has been wounded 18 times - - quite a man, rather fat but with a fine mouth. General Sir Bernard Montgomery, commander of Eighth Army. He is small, very alert, wonderfully conceited and the best soldier -- or so it seems -- I have met in this war. My friend General Briggs, says he is the best soldier and the most disagreeable man he knows. I also met General Alexander. He is very quiet and not impressive looking. The British say that Montgomery commands and Alexander supplies -- this may be so. -89- February 14, 1943 (con't p. 3) Except for Montgomery, Freyberg, Briggs and Robertson, I saw nothing out of the ordinary. Most of them are the same non-committal clerical type as our generals. I am about the junior and possibly the oldest, certainly the oldest looking general, here. February 15, 1943 In the morning General Montgomery gave a general talk on the campaign. It was very well done. After lunch General Freyberg and members of his division talked on a long end run by the New Zealand Division. We had an air alert but nothing happened. February 16, 1943 In the morning Major General Wimberley, S-1 (HD) described the action of a division supported by a tank battalion in attack against an enemy vanguard. In the afternoon an 8th [Eighth] Armored Brigadier gave a sand table demonstration of an armored regiment in an attack against a defended position in open country. Their method of approach was O.K. but they did not use infantry to attack anti-tank guns and their artillery was so far back that it took two hours to get in. On the way to dinner I talked it over with General Briggs, who felt as I did. He asked me to talk to Lieutenant General Horrocks, his Corps C.G. on it, which I did. I met General Alexander and told him that I expected to be under him in a certain operation. He replied "Yes unless the Boches put troops in there, in which case it is off." This may prove to be an historic remark. February 17, 1943 Visited Air Ground Headquarters Eighth Army. It seemed complicated but it had apparently worked during battle. We went to the airfield and -90- February 17, 1943 (con't p. 2) saw briefing of air crews and bomb loading. Had lunch with XXX Corps. I sat with Generals Paget and Montgomery. After lunch saw very impressive demonstration of enemy mines and of our means of locating and removing them, then saw several very well done demonstrations by 51st Division, including use of scorpions and mine detectors. I was very much impressed with the power and capability of mines and of our need to develop means to meet this danger. February 18, 1943 Left Tripoli in B-17 at 08:30. Arrived Algiers in bad weather at 12:00. Due to change of time, this was 11:00. Lunched with Ike. Had long talk with Rooks [1] and Brigadier [Studgen] Sugden [2] on new operation [3]. I will have very important job in what seems to me a desperate operation, especially as at least two of my divisions will not have had battle experience. Shores are mined and wired. Studgen asked me what I thought of it and I said "I have always been lucky and I am going to need all I have". He agreed most heartily but I suppose "nothing ventured nothing gained." What I fail to see is what real value we will achieve if we do win? Lady Beatty, and daughter-in-law of the Admiral, and Kay and another girl came to supper. Paget came in earlier than expected, and found them. This irked Ike, but I lied like a gentleman. Ike and Paget talked for a long time. Ike certainly makes a fine impression when he talks. I was proud of him. I think I could do better in the same job, but I seem to lack something which makes the politicians trust Ike. 1. Brig Gen Lowell Rooks (USA) 2. Brig C.S. Sugden (Br) 3. Husky, the invasion of Sicily. -91- February 18, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) Terrible thunder storm during the night. February 19, 1943 Too wet and foggy to start so I talked with Admirals Hall and Kirk 1 [*at Algiers*] on operation. Hall was fine and I felt better, but we all realize it is a damned poor bet. Still, it is an honor to be trusted with the American part of the plan. I feel I will win. I feel more and more that I have a mission; then I lose my confidence but get it back. The real need for a Man will be after the peace in U.S. I could do something there but must first demonstrate great combat leadership and have the troops with me. Left at 3:30 /P.M. in very bad visibility. Flew over ocean till we passed Mostaganem then went inland up a valley. We nearly hit several mountains [*?*] and I was scared till I thought of my destiny. That calmed me. I will not be killed in a crash. Landed O.K. in about a foot of water. Spent night with Clark. He is most polite. I think he wants to hook up with me. Heard Harmon has been ordered to take over 1st Armored Division and that I will get Ward 2 for 2d Armored Division. February 20, 1943 Took off from Oujda at 11:30 in very bad weather. It cleared and was fine after we passed Fez. Stopped at Lyautey to let Admiral Kirk catch his seaplane. Stopped at Rabat to tell Harmon goodbye. He has a very bad job, taking over a beaten and scattered division in face of the enemy. We had a farewell dinner -- the Poussiers, Dareys, 3 Brooks, Russells, British Consul General Rand, the Pasha of Casa and the _ , 19 in [*?*] all. 1. Adm A.G. KIRK (USM) 2. Maj.Gen. Orlando Ward 3. ? Desres(?) Gen Desres was Cmdr of Fr. Troops in Casablanca -92- February 21, 1943 Too wet to go to church. February 22, 1943 Anderson came to say goodbye and spent night. Colonel JJB. Williams [1], who had been present at battles of 15-16-17th gave us an account of the fighting. Apparently John's battalion was destroyed [not quite]. I have no news of him. Our three battalions of corps artillery one from the desert, are to leave us, also our two tank destroyer battalions and possibly the 3d [Third] Division. Not much left. The late winter and early spring seem my bad seasons. Last year I was in command of nothing at this time. We will also also the 20th Engineers. Tea at Russells'. February 23, 1943 Met Clark at Sale. Saw Sultan. Clark got Grand Cross of Morocco. Lunch with Nogues. Inspected native part of Rabat. Long talk with Clark. He feels that Ike is sold out to British and that they talked him into not putting in the Fifth Army and an American sector. He also feels that Alexander talked Ike into not attacking Gabes on January 20th, as planned, so that this could be a British victory. He may well be right. If so it is too terrible for words. Some heads will fall if the show aborts, as it may well do. February 24, 1943 Clark left at 2:30 P.M. I went to movie called, "Road to Morocco", utterly crazy but I liked it as it was the first movie I had seen since October. February 25, 1943 Moved to Rabat. Have a fair house. [1.] -93- February 26, 1943 Witnessed American-French demonstration of an attack. Made short speech in French. Reconnoitered some roads north. If I can keep two divisions I think I can take T [TANGIERS]. The Boches should such us east and then close the straits. February 27, 1943 Inspected 2d [Second] Armored Division. They still are playing at war. Guns not dug in and vehicles crowded. I raised hell. Dined with Poussier. February 28, 1943 Went to church at Army service. Went for a ride with Wilbur. My horse is too light for me. I can now chin myself three times; two days ago I could only do it once. We went to the movies. March 1, 1943 Inspected training in 3d [Third] Division. Not good. Men advanced by rushes when they were not under fire. Talked on target designation. Wore helmet and pistol so as to impress men with the need of being properly equipped. Phoned Gruenther about getting Truscott soon. Saw Muller about supplies for either contemplated operation. March 2, 1943 General Harmon just came in and told me John Waters was missing in action at Sidi Bou-Zid since February 16. His battalion was cut off by a German attack of 80 tanks, which came in from the northeast and destroyed 36 of the 40 US tanks holding Sidi. John told his battalion and the infantry with it to cut their way out. He stayed on the hill with 150 men to cover the retreat. Later Fredendall radioed him to surrender as he could not be rescued [1]. This was a mistake but I hope 1. He never got the radio & never surrendered. B.A.P. -94- March 2, 1943 (con't p. 2) 1 John complied. According to Harmon, Fredendall is a physical and moral coward. Harmon did well. He commanded what was left of the 1st Armored Division, the 6th British Armored Division, and a combat team from the 1st and 34th US Divisions and the artillery of the [Ninth] 9th, and drove the Germans from the path of . He said it was due to what I had told him on a fishing trip about clearing a pass by capturing the heights. That is what he did with his infantry. Fredendall never went to the front at all and tried to make Harmon the goat. Harmon won the battle. I called Ike and he has wired Bea. I also wrote both Beas and Fred Ayers about John. I fear John is dead. March 3, 1943 Went on a duck hunt with a Mr. Carleton on a 10,000 acre farm nothwest of Port Lyautey. Shot last night and this morning. Ducks very wild, flew too high, also I shot badly. Carleton was born in Chicago and lived in Larache 20 years. Speaks Spanish, French and Arabic fluently -- English with an accent. He will be useful if we go north. [He says Arab have no loyalty, morality, nor honesty and are utterly lazy]. He was very interesting. Have located two more Roman ruins on the Sebou. Went for a trip in the amphibious peep and had a good time. We got stuck and eight Arabs were pulling on a rope with no results. Lt. Stiller and a Sergeant pulled it out. This shows the value of Arab labor. At dinner at Carletons three languages were going at once. A Frenchman and an American were talking to each other in Arabic, I was talking French and Stiller was talking English. Received notification from Ike that Bea has received wire about John. No further news 1. He never received the message (B.A.P.) - 95 - March 3, 1943 (con't p. 2) is that on John. Carleton's opinion of the Plains Arab - is that the hill ones are less base - the Arab lacks honesty, loyalty, decency, affection, self-respect, morality and ambition. He is a devoted father and is generous - quite a man? March 4, 1943 Inspected replacements for 3a Division. By and large they are fine. Some runts and some too old. They have no discipline and know next to nothing about camp sanitation or how to take care of themselves. General Nogues loaned me his horse, "Joyeuse", a good big thoroughbred ; Wilbur and I had a nice ride. When I got back at 4:40 Ike had phoned for me to be ready to leave tomorrow for extended field service and to pack tonight. I phoned "Beedle Smith, Ike's Chief of Staff, and asked what it was about. He said I may relieve Fredendall. Well, it is taking over rather a mess but I will make a go of it. I think I will have more trouble with the British than with the Boches. "God favors the brave, victory is to the audacious! March 5, 1943 Am leaving in a few minutes for Algiers. Hope for the best. This terminates this volume. General Keyes will see that it gets to you. It is too frank to be shown anyone but may some day be of historic value. s/ G. S. Patton, Jr. -96 March 5, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) All general officers and most of the senior staff officers came to say goodbye in the office at 10:00. Then they went down to the street and all lined up. The Military Police Company formed a Guard of Honor and there was a band. Most of the same senior officers went to the airport, where there was a second Guard from the 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion and the 67th Regiment band. The band gave me three ruffles. [1] At Algiers Ike and Smith were at the Port to meet me and told me I was to replace Fredendall, on grounds that it was primarily a tank show and I know more about tanks. Stressed that criticism of British must stop. I fear he was sold his soul to the devil on "Cooperation", which I think means we are pulling the chestnuts for our noble allies. Flew to Constantine; called on General Alexander, who seems competent. He told me that on the 8th there will be an American sector under me and that I will be directly under him as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army Group. He was very friendly and complimentary in his remarks, stating he wanted the best Corps Commander he could get and had been informed that I was the man. Carey Crane [2] is on his staff and came to see me, giving me a lot of dope on how to get on, and we sat and talked till 1:00 AM. It is clear that I too must "cooperate" or get out. Saw Doolittle. March 6, 1943 Arrived Headquarters II [Second] Corps at 10:00 AM. Gen. Fredendall still at breakfast. Very nice and conducted himself well -- very well. His staff in general poor. Discipline and dress poor. Lt. General Cochran, British Army, has been with Fredendall for some time. He clearly gave me the impression that he was sent to instruct me. I let him think he 1. The Lt. General's salute. He was a Maj. Gen. at this time. 2. Brig. Gen. W. C. Crane -97- March 6, 1943 (con't p. 2) was doing so. He leaves in the morning. I had General Terry Allen, 1st Infantry Division, and General Orlando Ward, 1st Armored Division, come in and explain the next operation. This explanation was based on a letter of instruction received from General Anderson,First British Army. General Fredendall leaves in the morning. I issued some orders on dress, saluting, etc. None have ever been issued. It is absurd to believe that soldiers who cannot be made to wear the proper uniform can be induced to move forward in battle. I think Fredendall is either a little nuts or badly scared. He won't fly to Constantine and proposes to leave at 3:30 AM by car. That is the safest time on the road. March 7, 1943 Up at 06:30, breakfast at 07:00. No one there but Gaffey. I told the cooks to close the mess at 07:30, so I believe that tomorrow people will be on time. Went to office and found G-2 asleep because he had been up most of the night. Woke him. Issued an order yesterday detailing Omar N. Bradley as Deputy Corps Commander. Bradley and I inspected the 1st Armored and 9th Infantry Divisions Command Posts. The country is really under water. Men have a terrible time but are well and cheerful. Very cold -- I damned near froze. Troops not too keen -- hope I can pep them up. Talked to Colonel Connor [1], OPD. He has the picture of the mess that is here, especially of the fact that the British dominate Ike. March 8, 1943 Bradley and I inspected John A. Crane's 13th Field Artillery Brigade, also 34th Division under General Ryder. The discipline, dress and condition of 1. Col Vitti CONNOR (OPERATIONS DIV. U.S. ARMY) -98- March 8, 1943 (cont. p. 2) [?] Weapons at 34th very bad -- terrible. On the other hand, elements of the division have fought well. Inspected their position and found it weak, particularly in the emplacement of 37 mm anti-tank guns, which are on the crest instead of on the reverse slope where they belong. On the way back stopped at Haidra, much abused by the Arabs. Apparently part of it was used to start the construction of a fort about 16-1,700. Whole country full of ruins -- great stones and pillars sticking up like ribs of wrecked ships, or dead men through sand. It is said that before the Arabs came in 632 this country was well forested and very agricultural. Now it is a desert. The Arab has picked the bones and built his hovels out of the palaces of the Pro-Consuls. His hovels are of stone with a door and no windows. There is nothing with which to close the door opening. All division commanders, field artillery brigade commanders and head of corps staff sections came to supper namely: Omar Bradley, Deputy Corps Commander; Terry Allen, 1st Infantry Division; Orlando Ward, 1st Armored; Charles Ryder, 34th; Manton C. [S] Eddy, 9th; J.A. Crane, 13th Field Artillery Brigade. After dinner G-3 and G-2 gave plan and enemy situation. Generals Allen and Ward gave their tentative plans. I finally approved plans, as altered, and fixed H hour as 0900: My concern is for fear that the enemy will attack us first. This command post was situated at Djkouis. a French mining town. This was too far in the rear. I will change it as soon as the army operations start. G-2 reports that the 10th Panzer Division made an eight hour march north, This could mean that they were headed for Gafsa or Gabes. -99- P.C. Hains III March 9th, 1943 General Alexander and his Chief of Staff, Major General McCreery, (brother of the international polo No. 1) came at 1335. I had had a guard of honor posted at 1200 and it was so cold I had dismissed them at 1330. I recollected them and the General was very pleased. We went to see 9th Division and the 60th Combat Team. General Eddy made a very good impression. I was very much taken with Alexander. He is a snob in the best sense of the word -- very alert and interested in all sorts of things including genealogy. Had them to dinner and discussed plans [in] [*?*] . He seemed to agree with most of my ideas. I really think he is a good soldier and much more talkative than he is supposed to be. They are going to stay all night and we will inspect the 1st Armored and the 1st Division in the morning. John Crane says that I am the oldest General in Africa and that he is next. I am the best anyhow. March 10, 1943 General Alexander, General McCreery and I visited the 1st Armored Division Headquarters and the Haines 1 Regiment, which is the one that has seen the most action. They all say that what we have taught is sound, but that the men went in too fast. Most of the shooting takes place at over 1,000 yards. Our sights are not as good as the German's. The Graves Registration visited Sidi Bu Zid and could not find a grave marked for John, so we hope he is a prisoner. Had lunch on road and then went to see 1st Division, Brig. Gen. Teddy Roosevelt and Terry Allen. They made a good impression on me and on General Alexander. The 1st Division made an extremely good impression on me, both as to discipline and general appearance. General Alexander 1. PC HAINS, Col 1st Armd Div. -100- Dickson Insert W. P. speech March 10, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) has had four years in World War I, two years in Russia fighting Reds, one year on Northwestern Frontier of India, three years in this war... 10 years and three wounds. March 11, 1943 All the staff came to pay their respects to General Alexander. He talked at considerable length to each officer, and made a considerable impression on them. He and I then visited the phosphate mine. Monsieur Robert, who runs it, looked to us like a German. I felt that they might try to kill Alexander so I walked in front of him. We were in the mine for one hour, walking fast, and when we came up we were sweating. General Alexander left at 10:00 and I had a Guard for him. Spent rest of day going over plan. It is a difficult thing to go into battle with troops one has not trained. The only people on the staff I know are those I brought with me, namely General Gaffey, Chief of Staff, Colonel Lambert, G-3, Col. O. W. Koch, Assistant G-2, Colonel Harvey, Assistant G-4. My opinion of the Staff of the Second Corps is better than what I had been told; particularly Colonel B. A. Dixon, G-2 and Colonel R.W. Wilson, G-4, very sound. In a show involving four divisions one can do so little: Everything must be left to the divisions. It all shows that, to win, one must have personality and luck. All possible time should be spent with men and younger officers. Made 100 word speech to phonograph for West Point dinner. The utter worthlessness of most officers amazes me -- no backbone and no sense of responsibility. March 12, 1943 Left Rabat one week ago today. We have done a lot but much remains to be done. Fredendall just existed -- he did not command, -101- March 12, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) and with few exceptions, his staff was worthless due to youth and lack of leadership. General Bradley got back from Algiers last night. General Eisenhower has three propositions for me: One, that I should keep on in command of the II Corps and have Bradley replace me in the I Armored Corps. I decided against this on the grounds that it was unfair to General Keyes, though possibly safer for me. Two, for Bradley to stay on as Deputy Commander with me, get himself a staff and work into the situation, and when the first phase of this battle is over, for me to return to "Husky" and Bradley to take II Corps. I said no to that, as utterly crazy, to which Bradley agreed. Three, for Bradley to stay on as Deputy Commander with me, get himself a staff, work into the situation and when the first phase of this battle is over, for me to return to "Husky" and Keyes to plan until I get there. I accepted this as best. I am not at all sure this show will run according to plan and feel that as long as it is interesting, Alexander will keep me. If it bogs down I can get out. If Rommel attacks first, that will be something different -- he may. Wrote General Order to troops. Terry Allen came to lunch. After lunch, I went with him and inspected 17th Field Artillery and battalions of the 26th Infantry, General G.A. Taylor, and 18th Infantry, Colonel F.U. Greer. The 26th has been badly shot up and has a number of replacements, but seemed in good shape. 18th has always done well and is very sure of itself. Terribly cold. Took a drink to get warm. General Eddy called at 21:00 to tell me he had heard on radio that I am a Lieutenant General. Dick Jenson brought me a flag he had been carrying with him for a year. I am sleeping under the three stars. When I was a little boy at home, I used to wear a wooden sword and say to myself "George S. Patton, Jr., -102- March 12, 1943 (cont'd p. 3) Lieutenant General." At that time I did not know there were full generals. Now I want, and will get, four stars. March 13, 1943 Received order from 18th Army Group to postpone "D" Day to 17th. I fear Rommel will take initiative, but I shall not assume the defensive. Sent General Bradley to 34th Division to preach bloody war. Thirty-fourth Division is too defensive. Ninth Division has "Valor of Ignorance." First Division is good. First Armored Division is timid. Had funny letter from Ike on March 7th stating that II Corps is not sufficiently offensive in that their daily report shows normal patrols, no enemy contact. Since that date we have captured 89 enemy soldiers, two aviators and one spy who tried to "escape". On the 7th I ordered all patrols out till they made contact. Having a big program on discipline. Fined several officers $25.00 a piece for improper uniform. Fined 35 men for same. Discipline consists in obeying orders. If men do not obey orders in small things, they are incapable of being lead in battle. I will have discipline -- to do otherwise is to commit murder. Am also enforcing speed limits and intervals between trucks and demanding that maintenance be examined. I cannot see what Fredendall did to justify his existence. Have never seen so little order or discipline. I seem just the same since I am a Lieutenant General. Just read the "Mary Gloster" and came on a great line: "I didn't begin with askings, I took my job and I stuck. I took the chances they wouldn't An' now they are calling it luck." -103- March 14, 1943 Rained all night. Left [in] with two peeps to visit 1st Division near Bou Chebka. 1st Armored at Kasserine Pass. Roads impassable except for peeps. Rained all day -- roads horrible. Was so plastered with mud that George 1 had to wash all my outer clothes. Kasserine Pass is fierce and a sea of mud. We expected Rommel to attack today. That is why I went there but nothing happened. General McCreery met me when I got back at 1700 and brought me a bottle of Scotch, which I don't drink. Had several letters. Think the soldiers are improving a little. Am sure it does good to be seen. Yesterday, I took a walk and collected 8 soldiers and 2 lieutenants for improper uniform. Had them fall in and follow me -- quite a procession. As far as I can see the impending battle is a second Manassas: II Corps (mine and Jacksons's) being sent to start a flank battle so Longstreet's I Corps (British Eighth Army) can make a breakthrough. This being so, it makes no difference where we fight provided we take and hold Gafsa. Whatever credit I get from this show will be due solely to personality unless, during the battle, something happens. March 15, 1943 A horrible -- one of my pre-match-days. Everything there was time to do has been done. Not enough, but all there is time for. Now it is up to the others and I have not too much confidence in any of them. Wish I were triplets and could personally command two divisions and the Corps. Bradley, Gaffey and Lambert are a great comfort. God help me and see to it that I do my duty, but I must have Your help. I am the best there is, but of myself I am not enough. "Give us the victory, Lord". Went to bed and slept well till 0600. 1 Sgt Make -104- March 16, 1943 Under letter 2 March, Headquarters British First Army, the commanding general II Corps was ordered to prepare forthwith an offensive operation with the following objects: a. To draw off reserves from the enemy forces facing Eighth Army. b. To enable our Air Forces to re-occupy advanced airfields and thus develop the maximum support to help Eighth Army in its attack on the Mareth-Gabes position. c. To establish a forward maintenance center from which the mobile forces of Eighth Army could draw to maintain the momentum of their advance. d. To be prepared to put the above plan into effect not later than 15 March. The Second Corps, under authority contained in letter referred to in par. 1, was given the mission of: a. Capturing Gafsa. b. After its capture to secure and hold Gafsa, and with troops not required for the defense of Gafsa to operate towards Maknassy in order further to threaten the enemy's line of communication from Gabes. c. As an essential preliminary to the operation to establish fighter aircraft on the Thelepte airfields before 15 March. d. To hold securely the passes between inclusive, ABIOD and SBIBA. II Corps passed from under command British First Army to command 18th Army Group 8 March, 1943. -105- March 16, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) For this operation II Corps consisted of 1st, 9th, 34th Infantry Divisions; 1st Armored Division, 13th Field Artillery Brigade (reinforced by Fifth Armored Field Artillery Group which arrived after the operation started); Firs Derbyshire Yeomanry (a British Reconnaissance unit of 2 squadrons); First Tank Destroyer Group consisting of seven tank destroyer battalions (5 battalions equipped with 75mm guns and 2 battalions equipped with 3-inch guns); 4 anti-aircraft consisting of 4 automatic weapons battalions plus one extra battery, one 90mm battalion and 3 separate batteries; and corps service and supporting troops. The 12th Air Support Command supported the operation of the II Corps throughout the operation. Mobile French forces operating from the Negrine area were on the right flank of the II Corps. On 15 March, Rommel's main force, consisting of 4 Yong Facist Triate Spezia PISTOLA Italian Infantry Divisions, 2 German Infantry Divisions, and the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions together with supporting and service troops was believed to be concentrated along or in support of the Mareth Position. The Centauro Division was believed to be in the Gafsa area. Task Forces held the passes at Faid, Maknassy, and Fondouk. These positions were well organized for defense. The 10th Panzer was not officially definitely located but believed to be in General Reserve somewhere in the SFAX area. The plans for the operation consisted of having the 9th Infantry Division reinforced (one /Combat Team) defend the passes ABIOD-Kasserine both inclusive; the 34th Infantry Division reinforced to defend the SBIBA Pass; the 1st Infantry Division reinforced to move from Bouchebka via Feriana -106- March 16, 1943 (con't p.3 on Gafsa; and the 1st Armored Division, with one [CT] Combat team of the 9th Infantry Division attached, to concentrate in an area 25 miles northeast of Gafsa prepared to operate on Maknassy after First Infantry Division had captured and secured Gafsa. Light forces were to be placed at Feriana and Sbeitla prior to 15 March to cover airfields in immediate vicinity. General Eisenhower arrived at DJ/ebel Kouif at 1200. General Allen came in a few minutes later. He had no plan to cover his left column, the 18th Infantry, with tank destroyers, so I told him to do so. He left at once. After lunch we drove by short-cut to Feriana, arriving at 4:00. p.m. Inspected the 17th Field Artillery and battalions of 36th and 18th. Could not find 60th. Command Post II Corps opened Feriana this time. Have just sent little Bea an account of John's last fight, and a map. I also wrote George. I feel well this morning and am "radiating confidence". Actually I am quite confident and not at all worried the way I should be. The only trouble I have is a cold-sore on my lip. The hardest thing a General has to do is wait for the battle to start after all the orders are given. Brad, Ike and I had a long talk. About 11:00 PM-there is firing north of Gafsa. Well, the battle is on, I am taking off my shoes to go to bed. Ike leaves in the morning. March 17, 1943 Under cover of darkness night 16-17 March, First Infantry Division moved into forward assembly areas for attack on Gafsa. Attack jumped off at 1000 hours as per schedule. The first operation was for the purpose of capturing and securing Gafsa with a view to using it as -107- March 17 (cont'd p.2) a forward supply base for resupplying the Eighth Army on its move to the North. The Corps left flank was to be secured by emplacing the 1st Armored Division in the vicinity of Djebel Souinia. Owing to heavy rain and the uncertain state of the 1st Armored Division route - a new road connecting Theoepte with the Sid Bou Zid road and constructed by the 19th Engineers in three days - it was decided to start moving the 1st Armored Division in on the morning of 16 March. Colonel Benson with a force consisting of one medium tank battalion, one tank destroyer battalion of self-propelled guns was moved to an area southeast of Sbeitla on 15 March to provide flank security. The 1st Infantry Division captured Gafsa at 12:30 hours, 17 March. Italian garrison from Centauro Division withdrew without offering serious resistance. At 15:10, 1st Infantry Division occupied Lala three miles southeast of Gafsa. At 16:30 patrol from 1st Armored Division entered Zannouch. So far as I know we had about 20 casualties. The great and famous battle of Gafsa has been fought and won. The show was well done by Terry Allen and the 1st Division, who jumped off at 10:00 as per schedule, but according to them could have done so at 07:00. Our Air came down at 09:30, with fragmentation bombs and we had the town by 1130. I went up to the [Observation Post.] getting there at 10:30, as Dick got lost on the way up. We sat on a hill and could see the troops moving and the shells, mostly ours, bursting. Allen did well and his communications and control were fine. The enemy pulled out on the Gabes road, leaving mines. I could not get into town as General Alexander sent for me. Dick stayed and got the last dope as -108- March 17, 1943 (cont'd p.3) of 1700. We had a little scare at the end. I told Allen to put his tank destroyers to the northeast of town to cover a threat from that side, and then we got a report that 40 tanks (there were actually 20) were coming in from the south. They were French tanks. I used my new scout car with the three stars and II Corps flag. At first I was nervous for fear of air attack, but soon got used to it. Courage is largely habit and self-confidence. I thank God that He has again aided me. March 18, 1943 It rained and blew hard all last night and all today up to noon. The 1st Armored Division is largely stuck in the mud. General Alexander drove to Gafsa in my scout car and was washed off a ford. He was satisfied with the situation. We had to put all available engineers on the Feriana-Gafsa road to fill craters and remove mines, also at some Wadi crossings. Ike left at about 11:45 by motor for Constantine. He was in good form and like his old self. General Alexander left at about 15:00, also seemingly well pleased. I think that, if I can, I will start to push in on Maknassy tomorrow. All depends on the amount the ground dries. With luck we can take Sened Station with infantry and artillery. Of course the weather hurts the Boche as much as it does us. I feel that, if we attack first, we will have an advantage in making the enemy dance to our tune. First Ranger Battalion attached to First Infantry Division occupied El Guettar at 16:00. First Armored Division closed up with Combat Command "A" at Zannouch Station, Combat Command "B" in the vicinity of Djebel El Hafey, and the rest of the Division at Souinia. -109- March 19, 1943 (longhand) Left for 1st Armored Division at 09:00, drove over road we had made, about 42 miles. Took three hours. I never saw such mud nor such men as the Engineers who built, and are maintaining it. Wet, dirty and isolated, they keep right at it. I stopped and talked to each group and complimented them on what they had done and they seemed pleased I also stopped and talked to a squadron of Derbyshire Yeomen, who are with us. They were drying their blankets on cactus bushes, which either indicates great hardihood or great stupidity. Called on General Paul Robinett[e] [*?*] Commanding [CCB.]/Combat Command "B" Don't like his mental attitude - he is defensive and lacks confidence. I talked attack. Called on Ward. He is in a sea of mud, really awful. It rained all the time I was there. Went over his plans to capture Djebel Goussa and Djebel Majoura which command Sened Station. He fears that tanks can't move, due to mud, but I told him to do it with infantry; 60th Combat Team and one battalion of 6th Infantry and all the guns he has, four battalions. I told him to use all available half-tracks to move infantry weapons. I want to hit Rommel before he hits us, also to help Eighth Army, which attacks tomorrow night. On the way to see Ward, someone shot at us. The bullet went quite close as we heard it. Stiller fired a clip at an Arab who was running, but I fear he did not hit him. When I got back, Maj. General McCreery, Chief of Staff to General Alexander, 18th Army Group, was here. He explained the future plan of the campaign to us and sent outlined instructions for future operations as follows: a. To hold Gafsa b. To secure and hold heights east of Maknassy, and send light -110- March 19, 1943 (cont'd p.2) Armored Raiding parties to airfield at Mezzouna to destroy installations and return. c. Large forces not to be passed beyond the line Gafsa-Maknassy Faid-Fondouk. d. On passage of Eight Army north of Maknassy, 9th Infantry Division to be turned over to British First Army to relieve 46th British Infantry Division on extreme left (north) flank of that army. e. II Corps after relief of the 9th Infantry Division to attack Fondouk from the west and southwest for the purpose of securing the heights in that vicinity. 34th Infantry Division to side-slip to the north and attack along the axis Maktor-Pichon. (This plan apparently envisaged pinching out the II Corps after capture of the Fondouk heights.) It is noteworthy that these instructions definitely prohibit an American advance to the sea. In other words, we continue to threaten the enemy's right flank, but we do not participate in cutting him off. In brief, this is to pinch us out so as to insure a British triumph. I kept my temper and agreed. There is nothing else to do, but I can't see how Ike can let them pull his leg so. It is awful. I hope I will be back in Morocco on the other job before we are pinched out. Had letter from Bea on February 16th, the day I knew John was missing. She saw me in a dream. Oh God, let us win in the morning! First Infantry Division completed mopping up of Gafsa and area to the southeast as far as El Guettar, thus accomplishing its original mission. -111- The Kasta O. B., which appears in one enemy order of battle in March '43 proves to have been a small roving combat staff which the Germans used to take care of casual units. Geo. F. Howe goes to Ike's speech - Yes March 19, 1943 First Armored Division in contact with enemy north of Sened Station. The more I think about the plan of pinching us out, the madder I get, but no one knows that except me. March 20, 1943 Omar Bradley woke me at midnight to read me the radio that John is safe [1]. Terry Allen and Teddy Roosevelt also called up about John today. I had to sit at the phone all day - a hell of a way to fight a war. I hope to get in tomorrow with the 1st Division. Both the 1st Infantry and the 1st Armored will attack. The Eighth Army jumped off tonight. I think that, if Rommel reacts, he will do it tomorrow. I feel that I will lick him so long as the Lord stays with me. Later, 1st Armored Division with 60th Combat Team attached attacked and captured Djebel Goussa and Djebel Majoura overlooking Sened Station. This attack was to be assisted by Combat Command "A", moving northeast from vicinity of Zannouch, but owing to bad state of road, little progress was made by Combat Command "A". The attack of the remainder of the Division was successful, however, and Sened Station was occupied. Forces which were believed to be defending the area Sened-Maknassy at this time included elements of Kasta O.B. 1., 50th reconnaissance Unit, elements First Afrika Artillery Regiment, elements 131st Centauro Division, and 50th Special Brigade which had been toughened considerably by the inclusion of key German personnel. 1 *Lt.Col. John K. Waters, Gen. Patton's son-in-law, was wounded and captured during the German attack of Feb.16. Gen. Eisenhower considered that his action in covering the withdrawal of his battalion was one of the finest performed during the war. Lt.Col. Waters was awarded the DSC and the Croix de Guere. 1. Ober befehlshaber - (In general refers to a commander & his headquarters (OPP. Page) -112- March 21, 1943 (longhand) Went to watch attack of 1st Infantry Division, who jumped off at dawn and attacked and captured hills six miles east of El Guettar. This attack was over extremely rough terrain, but by clever maneuver, which was preceded by a night march, the 1st Division got around the enemy's right flank. This, together with an intense artillery preparation, enable us to capture some several hundred Italians of the Seventh Bersaglieri Regiment of the Centauro Division. It was very interesting to see the prisoners come in. Some of them were wounded and our medical people gave them equal care with our own soldiers. I had a good seat at the Division Command Post but it was too far back, so I went to front and sat on forward face of hill. IN fact, I was ahead of the right company of the 18th Infantry. The soldiers told me to get back, which, of course, prevented me from doing so. Shortly after I left, the place where I had been sitting was struck by a salvo of 150's almost on the spot. Went to Sened Station and saw McQuillen. Things were going too slow. Wrote Ward a message to use more drive and keep his Command Post at the front. We were strafed twice on road but nothing hit near us. Keyes was with me. March 22, 1943 I sent General Bradley to Algiers to see General Eisenhower and express my fears that it is the plan of the 18th Army Group to keep us from a decisive part and I feel we should attack and pass through Fondouk. I also protested against moving the 9th Division. -113- March 22, 1943 cont'd p.2 Keyes advised that I go up personally and push Ward's attack. I felt that having written him such a letter yesterday, I might scare him to death if I went, so I sent General Gaffey, who did all he could but it was not enough. Ward simply dawdled all day, finally capturing the town of Maknassy, but has not taken Maknassy Heights. It is very apparent that they went all out in building up to the northeast. We were bombed at Maknassy by 10 German planes. The 1st Infantry Division executed local attacks and continued to push along the Gafsa-Gabes road. The fact that Ward has not taken the heights east of Maknassy nor gotten the armored raiding party through many result in a serious failure. I blame myself for not having taken Keyes' advice. If I had led the First Armored Division we would have taken the heights. I believe that the Boches may attack either at Maknassy or against El Guettar, either tonight or tomorrow morning. This belief is accentuated by the fact that Colonel Dixon, G-2, is convinced that the 10th Panzer has moved south. The British 18th Army Group does not concur in this belief, but I have considerable confidence in Colonel Dixon. He thinks that the 10th Panzer left the Kairouan area sometime on the night of the 18th and is probably moving by night. We have no night air reconnaissance. I ordered the 1st Armored Division to make a night attack against the hills east of Maknassy. The attack was made and failed. -114- March 23, 1943 (longhand) Went to bed in full pack except shoes and coat. Nothing happened. At 06:30 Terry Allen phoned that he was being attacked by 100 tanks -- actually there were 50. As his division was advancing when the attack struck, he was not well disposed to meet it and the enemy broke through the 18th Infantry and overran "B". Battery of the 32d Field Artillery and a battery of the 17th, getting 12 guns, six 155's and six 105's. I sent him the reserve Tank Destroyer Battalion with 3" guns, also ordered in a battalion of the 39th Infantry 9th Division) and a battalion of 155 howitzers. The attack was stopped around 1100 after penetrating some three miles to within 2 miles of Division headquarters. We claim 20 tanks knocked out. I doubt it, perhaps 10 or 15. The first air attack took one hour and 40 minutes to get in. Since then we have had good air support, some 340 missions to now. We have an intercept that the Boche will attack again in 16:00. It is now 15:45. Attack started 16:45, due to fact that one German Artillery Regiment was shelled and got up late. Attack was stopped in its tracks. We had unduly heavy losses in Anti-tank,. self-propelled guns, due to faulty employment and very unfavorable terrain. In the second attack the enemy infantry preceded their tanks and got to within 300 yards of our positions where they were stopped by our artillery with air bursts. When the smoke cleared away, we found that not a single American soldier had given any ground. The German prisoners captured stated that they were from the 10th Panzer and had been sent to destroy the 1st Infantry Division. They failed to do so. The Lord helped a lot today. I visited the surgical hospital -- it was pretty gruesome but it was strange how the men followed -115- March 23, 1943 (con't. p. 2) me with their eyes, fearing I would not speak to each one. I talked to all who were conscious. One little boy said, "Are you General Patton?" I said, "Yes" and he said, "Oh, God". Another one said, "You know me. You made a talk to my battalion at Casablanca." I told him I remembered him well. I hate fighting from the rear, but today it was too complicated to leave the telephone. Ward has not done well -- no drive. March 24, 1943 Command Post II Corps opened at Gafsa. Visited 1st Division and in company with General Allen went to the 18th Infantry Command Post which had been within 300 yards of the leading point of the German advance. On the way up a shell hit quite near and a few small fragments hit car. While at the observation post there was some shelling and some German planes came over but did nothing. The foreground to the front was covered with tanks and tank destroyers. Fifteen German tanks were blown up by our engineers last night and sixteen others were removed by the Germans under cover of darkness. The Germans showed great gallantry in the recovery of tanks. In two cases, their tanks drove up under our artillery concentrations and hooked up [the] disabled tanks and dragged them off. For our part we lost, and could see on the field in front of us, 24 tank destroyer half-tracks out of 34 engaged, and 7 tank destroyer M-10's out of 12 engaged. The losses in the tank destroyers are due to their failure to carry out my instructions. I told them personally that they must not engage in combat with tanks because they do not have sufficient differential in speed and their armor is wholly inadequate -116- March 24, 1943 (con't. p. 2) The only way they can be successfully employed, and they were so instructed by me, is to use their mobility, and the cover of ground, or darkness, or smoke, to gain defiladed positions, preferably to a flank. After they have occupied a position and dug in to the extent they can, they should pull out to a camouflaged or concealed station a few hundred yards from the firing position, leaving one man on the hill, but not in the immediate vicinity of the firing position, to signal the approach of the enemy. When the enemy tanks appear, this man should give their direction and the destroyers should move into the firing position with their guns set more or less in azimuth. In the heat of battle our tank destroyers reverted to the teachings of the Tank Destroyer School, that is, the pursuit of tanks, which in this type of country is impossible. The enemy continued small counter- attacks with tanks and infantry throughout the day, in the course of which we took 600 prisoners and repulsed all attacks. Got back here at 4:30 PM and inspected hospital. There were some bad fracture case but no complaints; many of the men were very interested in what I told them of the battle. Spaatz, 1 Harmon, Williams, White 2 and Nevins were at dinner. After dinner I found that the 1st Armored Division had still failed to get the heights east of Maknassy so I called General Ward on phone and told him to personally lead the attack on the hills and take them. Now my conscience hurts me for fear I have ordered him to his death, but I feel that it was may duty. Vigorous leadership would have taken the hill the day before yesterday. I hope it comes out alright. 1. Lt Gen Carl Spaatz 2. Maj Gen C. H. White (Sig Corps) -117- March 24, 1943 (con't. p. 3) As a result of the above orders, the 1st Armored Division attacked, led by General Ward, and gained a temporary foothold on top of the ridge, but were unable to maintain it, due to the fact that they had wasted so much time that the position was too thoroughly organized to be held with the troops available. I, therefore, ordered the 1st Armored Division to quit attacking and consolidate. In the course of the above attack, General Ward received a slight wound. He showed good personal courage. To insure the security of Gafsa from an attack from the south, I ordered one battalion of the 9th Division, one battalion of artillery, and a medium battalion from Combat Command "A", 1st Armored Division, to take a position southeast of Gafsa. March 25, 1943 At noon, General Alexander came and approved my use of the 9th Division with the 1st to push on towards Gabes when the situation gets ripe. We will also bring the 1st Armored in, holding Maknassy with the 60th Combat Team, and leave the 9th Division near Gafsa to use either way. The 34th is moving on Sbeitla for future use northeast. For the first time all units of Corps, four divisions, and field artillery brigade are going into action -- it may be a big show. I hope it comes out. Had a long letter from Ruth Ellen. 1 At 23:00 night of 24th-25th, Terry Allen telephoned he was being attacked. After thinking it over I ordered Benson to move his medium battalion and a battalion of field artillery to a position on the Gafsa-Sidi Bou Zid road, 5 miles north of Gafsa, to see Allen and get the situation, but that he was to engage on my order. Actually, through an error in reading the map, Benson occupied a position 12 miles 1. G.S.P.'s daughter, Mrs. James W. Totten -118- March 25, 1943 north of Gafsa. The purpose of having him halt here was to deceive the enemy's air, because in a position five or more miles north of Gafsa he could be enroute to Maknassy as well as to Gafsa. On the other hand, he was close enough to Gafsa to give immediate protection to the 1st Division. Gaffey woke me to say that Allen had telephoned that his position was penetrated and that he needed the battalion of the 9th Division to defend the town. I decided to send it, then went to sleep and slept soundly. In the morning, as is usual, things looked less gloomy. The position had not been penetrated. Allen then ordered the use of the tanks and the infantry battalion to make a long end run south of Djebel Berda. I vetoed this idea. At noon, General Alexander came and gave us a new directive. This directive stated that the firm base initially held along the line Abiod-Sbiba should be moved forward to the line Gafsa-Sbeitla. That the 9th Division and 34th Division were released to me, the 9th to attack in conjunction with the 1st Division along the Gafsa-Gabes axis, with a view to opening the pass north of hill 369 to permit the passage of the 1st Armored Division. That this attack was to take place in three phases, the first phase to secure the road junction north of Djebel and the hills north and south thereof. The second phase was to secure the position as far forward as the pass between Djebel Chemsi and Djebel Ben Kreir. That, when this second phase had been achieved, the pass would be open so that the 1st Armored Division could move through and take up a position in the vicinity of Djebel Tebaga Fatnassa, from which the armor would harass and destroy the enemy's line of communications to the north and -119- March 25, 1943 (con't p. 2) inflict all possible damage on him without bringing on a major tank battle. The words, "To create a tank-infested area similar to what we used in Egypt," were used in describing the mission of the 1st Armored Division. It was stated in the original instructions that the 18th Army Group would give the time of launching the 1st Armored Division through this gap. To insure the integrity of Maknassy, I was directed to leave one medium tank battalion, the 60th Combat Team and two additional artillery battalions in that vicinity. The 34th Division was to move to Sbeitla, and leaving a combat team there, to advance rapidly on Fondouk. The attack of the 34th Division against Fondouk, and of the 1st and 9th against the first phase of their operations was to take place on the 27th or 28th, depending when it could be mounted. It occurs to me that had we been permitted, or directed, to push straight through Gafsa on the 17th, we would certainly have reached the second phase of the impending operation by the 20th, because, at that time, the Italians were on the run, and there were no German troops ahead of us. The restriction to only work forward slowly along the Gafsa-Gabes axis, permitted the arrival of the 10th Panzer Division and their counterattack of the 23rd. I called the attention of the commanding General of the 18th Army Group to the fact, that, under the dispositions ordered, Faid Pass was wholly unguarded except for the squadron of Derbyshire Yeomanry. March 26, 1943 Quiet day. Saw Ike at Thelepte Airport at 13:45. He gave me telegram -120- March 26, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) of congratulation from the Prime Minister with an added note from General Alexander. "Personal and most secret from Prime Minister To General Eisenhower (eyes only) Signed Andrews If you think well, pray give the following message from me to General Patton: Many Congratulations on your fine advance and capture of prisoners" General Alexander added the following: "May I add my congratulations to General Patton who has and is handling his Corps in a most able and efficient manner. I have complete confidence in him" (signed) H. R. Alexander, General Commander 18th Army Group I mailed this dispatch to Bea. This was a quiet day so far as Corps Headquarters was concerned in that it was occupied with the movement of the 9th and 34th Divisions and the regrouping of the 1st Inf and 1st ARMORED Divisions for the ensuing operations. Things are going too quietly. The 34th will be able to move out on Fondouk tomorrow. The 9th Division will not be able to attack until the 28th. I made inquiries through Brigadier Dunphie, British liasion Officer, to determine whether I or the 18th Army Group is to determine the time of launching the Armor. I received the following letter from General R. L. McCreery: "Headquarters 18th Army Group, 26th March, 1943, Most Secret Dear General: -121- March 26, 1943 (con't. p. 2) "Brigadier Dunphie writes me that there is one point you wished cleared up. Is the First Armored Division to go through the infantry and exploit on your order or only when General Alexander orders the move? The answer is that you will decide when to order the First Armored Division when to pass through. General Alexander things that from the news of the general situation in the south, it will certainly not be two soon to employ the First Armored Division to exploit success as soon as it can get through. To decide when to order the First Armored Division to move you will no doubt establish a forward command post so that you can be in close touch with the local situation. Our first news of Eighth Army's attack this afternoon is that they are making progress, and reports from fighters indicate that a withdrawal may be starting from the Mareth position. General Alexander is glad that you have decided to attack early on 28 March and not tomorrow, so that preparations can be quite complete and so that the necessary conference can be held by commanders to enable everyone, right down to the Junior leaders, to know exactly what to do. The very best of luck. I am off early tomorrow on a short visit to Eighth Army." Yours very sincerely, R. L. McCreery. This letter definitely states that I shall decide when to put the Armor through. This is most satisfactory to me as I am sure that no one farther back can decide such a question. March 27, 1943 I forgot to mention that when I inspected the Third Battalion, 26th Infantry, on March 16, I casually said that, owing to my promotion, I was short of stars and hoped that I could get some Italian ones. (Every First Class Private in Italian Army wears one on each lapel). On March 22, Company I, 26th Infantry, Captain W. H. Seitz, Jr, sent me 15. -122- March 27, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) Visited 1st Armored Division near Maknassy and talked with General Ward, explaining the ensuing operation. I also told him that he lacked drive and trusted his staff too much in that he presumed orders were carried out and did not take the trouble to find out that they were. He admitted this. I also told him that if he failed in the next operation I would relieve him. He took it very well. I decorated him with the Silver Star for his action in leading the attack. I believe his action would have merited the D.S.C. except for the fact that it was necessary for me to order him to do it. March 28, 1943 Left Feriana at 0750, went to Command Post 1st Division. Situation was O.K. but enemy resistance serious, due to excessively rugged nature of ground. The enemy consisted of the Centauro Division and elements of the 10th Panzer. They occupied wired-in and concrete positions, some of which had been blasted from the solid rock. They had also done a great deal of mining. Told Ward to get some of his light stuff back here under cover of darkness and to put General McQuillin in command of the defenses at Maknassy, consisting of 60th Combat Team, a medium battalion of tanks and two extra battalions of self-propelled guns. I also told him to send the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion and one battalion of artillery during the night of 28th-29th to complete the movement before dawn and occupy the field positions in the olive trees southwest of Gafsa. I have little confidence in Ward or in the 1st Armored Division. Ward lacks force. The Division has lost its nerve and is jumpy. I -123- March 28, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) fear that all our troops want to fight without getting killed. This is especially true of the captains and lieutenants. Visited Command Post 9th Division; well set up but shows lack of habit -- too may tents. General Eddy at front with 47th Combat Team Visited him. Had to drive for four miles over open fields subject to shelling. Felt very conspicuous but nothing happened. Fighting nasty in high rugged hills, too steep to man handle mortars in. We could use a pack train to great advantage. Found a chaplain who was poking around the command post, while wounded were being put into ambulances close by, and gave him hell. Just after I left a 150 shell hit right in command post and hurt no one. In visiting the Command Posts 1st and 9th Divisions it was interesting to note that the 1st Division, having had more battle experience than the 9th, have a less complicated and more workable command post. -124 March 29, 1943 Quiet night last night. I was sleepy as I had spent the last two days in a sandstorm. First Armored division units did not close till 0700. I am very disgusted. I would relieve Ward, but fear this is the wrong time. I will send Bradley with him when he breaks out. One company of 1st Infantry Division gave ground before an attack of four tanks, Italians and Germans: not a good sign. Fighting so far to day very sticky. Further investigation shows that only a platoon of the 1st Division gave ground. About 1900 General McCreery called and told me to launch tanks in the morning. He said General Holmes 1 was coming with final picture. The reason I brought the 81st Reconnaissance and a battalion of field artillery down last night was that I anticipated that contingency. Holmes arrived at 23:00 and told me what McCreery had already said on phone. He further said that I was to put a battalion of tank destroyers and a battalion of infantry on the Sened Station line, and was to leave one medium battalion of tanks at Gafsa, and was to do all this without taking units from Maknassy. I told him that I could put the tank destroyer battalion in place but that all the infantry was in action. I also told him that I had only two medium battalions of tanks here, and that if I left one back, I could not put enough force in the tank attack. He said he would have to call General McCreery, which he did, and the latter agreed to what I suggested. He had thought/ that I had/ three medium battalions here. I feel that I must respectfully call General Alexander's attention 1. -125- March 29, 1943 (cont'd p.2) to the fact that in the United States Army we tell officers what to do, not how to do it, that to do otherwise suggests lack of confidence in the officer and reduces him to the status of an adjutant general. I doubt if General Alexander himself issued any such order. I feel that, for the honor and prestige of the U.S. Army, I must protest. For the breakthrough, I have placed the force available under Colonel Benson 1. It consists of two battalions of medium tanks, the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion, two armored field artillery battalions, one tank destroyer battalion M-10, one company of engineers, one motorized battalion 39th Infantry ( 9th Division), 16 self-propelled anti-aircraft mounts, medical and maintenance. The force will have between 120 - 160 miles of gasoline depending upon the amount of cross-country they have to do. [General Jimmy] Col JAKE [*?*] Williams, who ranks Benson, volunteered to go as chief of staff. I am sending Gaffey along to keep an eye on the show. If the enemy has plenty of artillery, Benson may not get through. The worst danger is that the hole may close behind him. I feel confident that with God's help, it will work. The corps artillery and the artillery of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions has been ordered to move forward during the night in order to support Benson's attack. The 1st Armored Division was attacked four times within the last 24 hours by small forces of infantry and tanks. All of these attacks were beaten off but there were reasonable losses on both sides. Reports from the front lines seem to suggest that the enemy in front of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions are pulling out. I hope so. 1. C.C.Benson, under Gen. Patton in two wars. -126- March 30, 1943 (longhand) We moved all artillery forward last night to support the attack. It is getting dive-bombed at the moment. General Ryder, 34th Division, called up to state that he will have to stop attacking the range of hills extending south of Fondouk and reorganize, as the enemy on his front is building up rapidly and he is over-extended. He wants me or Bradly to come up. I will send Brad. He is good and I will be needed here. I left immediately after breakfast to find Benson and see the start of his operation, and got in front of our front lines before I stopped. On the way I met the chaplain and stopped him. Tried to locate Benson with radio but it did not work. Lt. Stiller found him not far away. Radio was using wrong call. Benson jumped off at noon, which was very creditable considering the amount of movement necessary, and also the necessity of organizing his forces. This delay was the result of the sudden change of mind of the high command. I watched from a hill and got shelled, then went forward over the road, which was under pretty accurate fire. We passed several tank wrecks from fight on 22d. Benson's attack was held up by a mine field and we lost 3 tanks and 2 destroyers. I am not wholly satisfied with his attack. On the other hand, the conditions under which he had to operate were almost impossible for armored vehicles. I have ordered one battalion of the 6th Armored Infantry to join Benson tonight. The first battalion, First Armored Regiment, Light Tanks, which arrived in the Theater today, have been sent to Sbeitla to reinforce the combat team of the 34th Division still holding that place. -127- March 30, 1943 (cont'd p.2) The life of a General is certainly full of thrills, but I am not worried, only cold all over. I wish I could do more personally. It is awful to have to confide everything to others, but there is no other way, and if you trust people they seem to perform. "God show the right" March 31, 1943 This morning things looked pretty bad. We seemed to be stuck everywhere. I sent Colonel Lambert to Benson to stir things up. I told Benson to expend a whole tank company, if necessary, to break through. I then decided on a coordinated attack with everything, and had the division commander, the Air officer and the field artillery brigade /Commanding General in at 11:30 to settle the details. "H"/Hour was decided as at 1600. The preparation was to open at 15:00 by artillery and air. In the meantime Jake Williams phoned that Benson was putting on a combined infantry and tank attack to break through, the attack to start at 12:30, so I said that if this succeeded we could cancel the other attack by the word "stop". Benson's attack with a battalion of the 39th Infantry from the north and Tallbert's [*Talbott 1*] tank battalion from the west broke through. We lost 5 tanks and 3 tank /destroyers including 2 TD's hit yesterday. There is a phantom battery in the ridge to the south which we cannot locate and hit, which is causing a lot of trouble. Told 9th Division to find it and destroy it. This morning at 01:30 Eddy called me and asked that I change the plan of using a battalion of the 39th to help Benson. I told him it was too late. Had I listened to him, 1. Col [*?*] TALBOTT -128- March 31, 1943 (cont'd p.2) Benson would not have gotten through. Sometimes I earn my pay. One must be chary of ever changing a plan. Generals Davis 1, Beedle Smith and McCreery came at 1230 with a plan which I suggested the day before yesterday. It would have worked then. Now, as usual with them, it is too late. I told Beedle about my getting orders where to place separate battalions (see March 29, 1943). He will speak to General Alexander. I also think I got Beedle to see that battle-hardened troops are necessary for "Husky"- they are. I told him about the vital necessity of getting more infantry over here and suggested that the 3rd Infantry be sent up. He said it was impossible to get more infantry or to move the 3rd Infantry. I called Ward on the phone and told him to put on an attack. He said he could not do it successfully. I told him to attack and, if necessary, take losses up to 25 per/cent Our people, especially the 1st Armored Division, don't want to fight - it is disgusting. I feel quite brutal in issuing orders to take such losses, especially when I personally am safe, but it must be done. Wars can only be won by killing and the sooner we start the better; also an attack by the 1st Armored at Maknassy will pull the enemy off from Benson and possibly from Ryder. I sent Bradley up to see what is the matter with Ryder. Ryder must hold on. Recommended that two colonels with "very satisfactory" reports be relieved. We are having a lot of trouble shooting our own planes. 1. Gen T. J. Davis -129- March 31, 1943 (cont'd p.3) We have orders not to fire until we are attacked. I hope I can catch someone. Just now there was a lot of unnecessary firing right here in Gafsa. There is some indication, perhaps wishful thinking, that the Germans are withdrawing in front of the 1st and 9th Divisions. April 1, 1943 About 01:30 Williams called up wanting to change Benson's plan. I told him to obey orders. Generals Bradly, "Pink" Bull 1, Crane and Dumphie went to Benson's Command Post at 10:12. Twelve Junker 88's bombed them with 500-pound bombs with instantaneous fuses. They fell right in the command post. All jumped into slit trenches, of which there were plenty. One bomb hit right at edge of trench Jenson was in, killing him instantly. His watch stopped at 10:12. I am terribly sorry as he was a fine boy, loyal, unselfish and efficient. As soon as he was brought in, I went to the Cemetery with Gaffey. He was on a stretcher rolled up in a shelter half. We uncovered his face and I got on my knees to say a prayer, and all the men did the same. There was some blood from his mouth, but he was not mangled and I doubt if he was hit. There was a small stone bruise on his forehead. I kissed him on the brow and covered him up. At 1600 Stiller, Sgt.Meeks, Sgt. Mims and I went to the cemetery. Dick was on a stretcher wrapped in a white mattress cover. We had a squad and a trumpeter, but did not fire the volleys, as it would make people think an air raid was on. The Corps Chaplain read the Episcopal service and he was lowered in. There are no coffins here, as there is no wood. Lt. Stiller, Lt. Craig 2, Sgt. Meeks and Sgt. Mims carried the stretcher. They were all his friends. 1. MAJ Gen H.R. BULL 2. Lt [*L?*] CRAIG -130- April 1, 1943 (cont'd p.2) I wrote Nita, enclosing a letter to his mother with a lock of his hair. I radioed Bea, through Beedle Smith, to notify the Jenson family. He was a fine man and officer. He had no vices. I can't see the reason that such fine young men get killed. I shall miss him a lot. C'est la guerre. The Air Force went on /sort of a a parade with 1,000 planes to destroy the Hun air force and celebrate the anniversary of the foundling of the R.A.F.; - result, we had the hell bombed out of us all day. "While the cat's away, the mice will play." The 1st Armored Division is continuing the attack launched yesterday. We have been receiving very heavy air attacks since 08:30, total casualties amounting up to 1230 hours, 15 men killed and 55 wounded. Benson's force continued its attack but met with heavy hostile artillery fire. The chief of staff of the 18th Army Group directed that the tank attack be called off but that the attack of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions be continued. This brings them into the second phase of the operation as originally planned and it should be noted that the tanks, as originally planned, should not have been launched until the completion of the second phase by the infantry. The fact that they were launched and failed is a justification of the original plan and illustrates the fact that one cannot change plans in war. The plans of the Allied High Command are all about 3 days to a week too late, and too timid. When we took Gafsa we were told to halt at El Guettar. We waited there from the 19th to the 22d and gave -131- April 1, 1943 (cont'd p.3) Boches time to bring the 10th Panzer down from the north. At the same time they told me to take Maknassy and halt on the hills just east and send a raid to the airfield at Mezzouna. Here I failed by not personally backing the attack on the heights. Ward fooled around for 3 days and let the enemy build up and then he attacked with great personal courage but failed to take the ridge. However, I asked to take the whole 9th Division in with the 1st Armored and was only allowed to take the 60th Combat Team. Not enough. Next, we were told to attack Gabes with the 1st and 9th and when we had secured the pass as far as the Wadi west of Djebel Ben Kreir, to launch the Armor on Gabes, also to move the 34th Division on Fondouk. "D" Day for these operations was set as 28. On the night of the 30th at 7:30 PM we were told to launch the armor in the morning, as Brigadier Aries, G-2 to Alexander, had looked at the field and could see no enemy. We did, and lost 13 tanks, 2 tank destroyers and many men. This morning General McCreery told me to continue the attack with infantry. Now at 5:00 PM I get a note from Alexander suggesting, but not ordering, the use of armor. I will start with infantry and use armor if I get the chance. April 2, 1943 The second phase of the attack started at dawn with the 1st and 9th Infantry moving forward in their zones. The action was very slow, due to strong enemy resistance, very difficult country, and the fatigue of our troops. -132- April 2, 1943 cont'd p.2) The armor under Benson moved forward during the afternoon to keep contact with the infantry, and be prepared to meet a possible enemy counterattack. It was blowing so hard that our fighters could not get in the air but the Germans could, with the result that we were bombed all day. About 08:30, 32 tanks were reported by an observation post on Hill 574, just captured by the 1st Division. Colonel Hart requested 3 battalions, one of 155 guns, one 155 howitzers, one 105, and switched on to them with a 36 gun concentration. Five tanks were hit and men left vehicles. We kept concentration on them all day. I tried one of white phosphorous hoping to set some on fire, or at least give the impression we were going to attack, in the hope they would man the vehicles. Then, in 5 minutes we gave them a concentration of high explosives. I called General Alexander for bombers to attack the tanks we were holding under fire, but he could get none. Later I called him to protest against the failure to assign A-20's and hurricane bombers to the 12th Air Support Command. He said he would try to get some. Later I called Ike and told him the same story. He later had General Smith call to say he had fixed it up. Our air cannot fly at night, nor in wind, nor support troops. The Germans do all three, and do it as the result of three years' experience in war. However, in fairness to our air, it may be said that there is less wind on the German airport near the coast than there is on Thelepte airfield in the mountain. Had letter from Alexander asking that I relieve Ward. Radioed AFHQ for Harmon. Photographed Dick's grave and had some flowers put on it. We have not yet been bombed here tonight. -133- mortars April 3, 1943 (longhand) Went out to see 1st and 9th Divisions and Benson. The 1st Division was going well and taking prisoners and guns. In one place they got / thirty-seven 81mm motors and killed many Germans. They are fighting units of both the 10th and 21st Panzer and some Afrika Corps infantry. The 9th Division has lost six battalion commanders out of six and is not doing too well. They did not go right to the top of the ridge. In mountain fighting one should secure the observation point by night patrol activity, and then work along the ridge and down the valleys. I got the most outrageous telegram I have ever seen from Air Marshall Conyngham. He accused me of being a fool and of lying. He said that our calls for air support were due to the fact that American troops were not battle worthy and used the cry of "wolf" for lack of air support as a means of excusing our slow advance. On the first, I reported that air support was wholly absent. I called General Alexander and then I called Ike. Conyngham had told Ike that we had only 4 men wounded and only 3 attacks. As a matter of fact we had 15 men killed, 55 wounded, / and sustained 51 air attacks in which 163 planes took part. At noon Chief Air Marshall Tedder, Lt. General Spaatz and some boy wonder by the name of Kuter 1 arrived, and Tedder said at once, "We did not only come about the Conyngham signal but because we wanted to see you." I told them I was glad to see them and that I intended to take up the telegram officially. They were clearly uncomfortable and talked a lot about air superiority. At the height of this, 4 1. MAJ Gen L.S. Kuter. -134- April 3, 1943 cont'd p.2) German planes flew right down the street not 50 feet from the window, firing machine guns and dropping small bombs. No one was hurt except a camel, who moved so fast he dislocated his leg. An Arab ran out and put it back and the camel then bolted pursued by all available Arabs. The raid had a good effect. We were raided twice more last night. Fourteen Turkish officers came, one a four-star, one three and one two. We had them to the mess; also Olmstead 1 and some of his adherents. While at supper Brigadier Holmes - a bird of ill omen - came with a directive for the next operation. The 34th is to be detached from the II Corps and join the IX British Corps. It, together with 128th British Brigade, will attack Fondouk to make a hole for the 6th British Armored Division. As soon as possible, probably when the Boches pass north of Maknassy, the 9th Division is to leave and go on the British left on the North Coast. In this way the U.S. troops get wholly separated, and all chance of being in at the kill and getting some natural credit is lost. Bradley and I explained this to Ike, and he said he would stop it. He has done nothing. He is completely sold out to the British. I hope the Press at home gets on to it. Brad and I have decided to saw wood and say nothing. If he falls it is not our fault. I hope the Boches beat the complete life out of the 128th Brigade and 6th Armored Division. I am fed up at being treated like a moron by the British. There is no national honor nor prestige left to us. Ike must go. He is a typical case 1. Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead, Chief of Signal Corps. -135- April 3, 1943 cont'd p. 3 of a beggar on horseback - could not stand prosperity. (typed) (Appendix "A") Copy INCOMING MESSAGE FROM NATAF DATED 2 APRIL 1942 NO. SPEC 40 RECEIVED 1942 DECODED BY FE CHECKED BY TO: 2 CORPS RRR FAIRFIELD FREEDOM, NAAT (SPAATZ), 1ST ARMY, 19 CORPS 10 CORPS, 18 ARMY GP, 12 ASC, ADV HQ WD TOR FORCE [*to be decoded*] -136- To be decoded April 3, 1943 (con'd p. 4) MOST SECRET. WITH REFERENCE TWO CORPS SITREP OF 1200 HOURS 1 APRIL AND LATER REPETITION BY CG TWO CORPS THE WORDING OF WHICH WAS BEGINS. FORWARD TROOPS HAVE BEEN CONTINUOUSLY BOMBED ALL MORNING. TOTAL LACK OF AIR COVER FOR OUR UNITS HAS ALLOWED GERMAN AIR FORCE TO OPERATE ALMOST AT WILL. ENEMY AIRCRAFT HAVE BOMBED ALL DIV, C. P. S. AND CONCENTRATED ON UNIT SUPPORTING MAIN EFFORT. NEDS. FACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: TOTAL ENEMY EFFORT OVER TWO CORPS GUETTAR FRONT. 0730 UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF FIGHTERS. 0950 12 J & 87S 1000 5 JU 88 AND 12 ME 109 OF WHICH SOME BOMBED. TOTAL CASUALTIES FOUR KILLED VERY SMALL NUMBER WOUNDED. OUR EFFORT UP TO 1200 HOURS 92 FIGHTERS OVER TWO CORPS FRONT 96 FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS ON ENEMY AERODROMES CONCERNED. ON SFAX 90 BOMBERS AT 0900. FOR FULL DAY 362 FIGHTERS OF WHICH 260 OVER TWO CORPS ON RECEIPT OF SITREP IT WAS FIRST ASSUMED TO BE SEASONAL FIRST APRIL JOKE. IT HAD HAD LATER TO BE REGARDED SERIOUSLY AND ACTION WAS TAKEN TO ASCERTAIN ABOVE FACTS. IT IS ASSUMED THAT INTENTION WAS NOT TO STAMPEDE LOCAL AMERICAN AIR COMMAND INTO PURELY DEFENSIVE ACTION. IT IS ALSO ASSUMED THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO ADOPT DISCREDITED ACTION OF USING AIR FORCE AS AN ALIBI FOR LACK OF SUCCESS ON GROUND. IF SITREP IS IN EARNEST AND BALANCED AGAINST ABOVE FACTS IT CAN ONLY BE ASSUMED THAT TWO CORPS PERSONNEL CONCERNED ARE NOT BATTLEWORTHY IN TERMS OF PRESENT OPERATION. IN VIEW OF OUTSTANDINGLY EFFICIENT AND SUCCESSFUL WORK OF AMERICAN AIR COMMAND CONCERNED IT IS REQUESTED THAT SUCH INACCURATE AND EXAGGERATED REPORTS SHOULD CEASE. 12 AIR SUPPORT COMMAND HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO ALLOW THEIR BRILLIANT AND CONSCIENTIOUS AIR SUPPORT OF TWO CORPS TO BE AFFECTED BY THIS FALSE CRY OF WOLF. ENDS. (This was General Marshall Conyngham's telegram.) The following is a directive from Alexander. COPY (APPENDIX "B") MOST SECRET H.Q. 18th ARMY GROUP OFFICER ONLY 18 AG/CGS/30. Notes on Future Operations TO: Lt. Gen. G. S. Patton, Jr., C.G. 2 US Corps 1. The FONDOUK operation.- This will be carried out under Commander 9 Corps by 6 Armoured Division,128 Infantry Brigade, 34 US Infantry Division and certain additional BRITISH and US artillery units. I have decided that the above troops are sufficient for the operation and not to employ additional infantry from 2 Corps because, (a) surprise might be given away by the large-scale movement northwards. (b) 2 Corps isstill fully employed in the GAFSA-MAKNASSY area. -137- April 3, 1943 (cont'd p. 5) 2. General RYDER'S task, however, would be helped by some additional artillery. It is likely that his Division, in cooperation with the attack of 128 Brigade will be given a limited task on the right flank of 128 Brigade. It is hoped, therefore, you can make available one Field Artillery Battalion and one Medium Ar- tillery Battalion for 34 Division. The move of this artillery should start not later than night 4/5 Apr. 3. Command. Unity of command for the FONDOUK operation is necessary and I would be grateful if you would place General RYDER under command of the Commander 9 Corps. Lt. Gen. J. T. CROCKER, so that all details can be arranged between them. 4. EL GUETTAR sector. It is realized that the movement of the above artillery units will lessen the artillery support avail- able for this sector, but the FONDOUK operation now has first priority. Every effort will be made to contain the enemy's forces now opposing 2 Corps East of EL GUETTAR by making the enemy think that a break is still imminent. 5. MAKNASSY sector. Plans will be made to take the most aggressive action possible when the enemy starts his withdrawal from this area. Very active reconnaissance must be maintained to ensure that early warning is obtained of any signs of enemy withdrawal. 6. SBEITLA. The Regiment of 34 Division in SBEITLA will be required to join its Division before the FODOUK operation. You will arrange to relieve this Regiment with one battalion, and some supporting units, from the Southern sector. 7. As soon as the Eighth Army has broken through the enemy's present position in the WADI AKARIT, 9 US Infantry Division will be required to move to 5 Corps sector in the North to take over a part of the front near the sea. It is important to initiate this move as soon as the advance of Eighth allows, on orders from this H.Q. (Signed) H. R. ALEXANDER General Commanding, 18th Army Group. 3 Apr 43 Copies to: A.F.H.Q. Lt. Gen. CROCKER April 4, 1943 Sent Bradley to Maknassy to tell Ward he is to be relieved. While General Alexander has written me a letter asking that I relieve him, -138- April 4, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) I did not use this as a cloak for my act. I should have relieved him on the 22nd or 23rd but did not do so as I hate to change leaders in battle, but a new leader is better than a timid one. Air Marshall Conyngham asked if he could call on me around noon. As I felt I might not want to eat with him, I had lunch early. He arrived at 12:15. I asked him to come in, but made no motion to shake hands. I also asked Gaffey to be present. Conyngham started by saying, "I am dreadfully sorry for that horrible signal. I want to apologize and do what I can to make amends". I said, "So far as I personally am concerned, I am willing to accept your apologies and forgive you for indicating that I was a fool, etc. but I cannot accept an oral apology for your calling 60,000 American soldiers unbattleworthy and failing in their duty." He said, "I would never have done it, but I had received a barrage of requests all day. I am proud of my air force and will not have them criticized." He spoke quite loud and I responded, equally loud, that my men had been under barrage all day due to what I considered was his fault. Then I added, "Pardon my also shouting, but I too have pride and will not stand for having Americans called cowards. I have asked for an official investigation. If I had said half what you said I would now be a Colonel and on my way home." He cooled down and said, "I am awfully sorry. What can I do to make amends?" I said, "If you will send a message specifically retracting your remarks about the lack of battleworthiness of our men, and send it to the same people to whom you sent the first message, I shall consider the incident closed." He said, "I will". and I then offered him my hand and took him to lunch. When he left he said, "I can't thank you enough. You have been very generous." I said, "It is always easy to -139- April 4, 1943 (cont'd p. 3) be generous to a gentleman who admits his mistakes". We parted friends and I think we will now get better air support than ever before. I was rather proud of myself as I was firm, but moderate. I doubt if he ever sends the telegram of retraction because Ike will tell him it is not necessary. Three Corps commanders, Simpson, Hall and Lucas came to dinner and we had a good time. After I got through with Conyngham I felt ill with pains in my back, so I inspected the front lines but was not fired at. (Typed) (Appendix "C") COPY INCOMING MESSAGE FROM NATAF p. 85 DATED 3 APRIL 1943 No. SPEC 42 RECEIVED 1924 1943 DECODED BY CHECKED BY CG VAD TO: 2 CORPS RPTD FAIRFIELD, FREEDOM, NAAF (SPAATZ), 19 CORPS, 18 ARMY GROUP, 12 ABC (CGNU PASS), ADV AIR HQ WESTERN DESERT. MOST SECRET. SIGNAL RELATING TO AIR OPERATIONS ON TWO CORPS FRONT NUMBER SPEC 40 OF 2 APRIL FROM THIS HQ TO ABOVE ADDRESSES IS TO BE WITHDRAWN AND CANCELLED. URGENT. (APPENDIX "D") INCOMING MESSAGE D.123 FROM AOC NATAF DATED 5 APRIL 1943 No. SPEC. 46 RECEIVED 11:47 1943 DECODED BY CHECKED BY BKD TO: FAIRFIELD, FREEDOM, NAAF, 1st ARMY, 19 CORPS, 10 CORPS, 18 ARMY GP, 12 ASC, WESTERN DESERT RPTD CG 2 CORPS 1. Lt Gen W. H. Simpson 2. Maj Gen C. P. HALL 3. MAJ Gen J. P. LUCAS -140- April 4, 1943 (cont'd p. 3) WITH REFERENCE TO SIGNALS SPEC. 40 and SPEC. 42. MOST SECRET I SHOULD LIKE RECIPIENT TO KNOW THAT I VISITED COMMANDING GENERAL 2 CORPS TO EXPRESS REGRET THAT SPEC. 40 MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS SLIGHT TO AMERICAN FORCES. NO SUCH THING WAS INTENDED. I EXPLAINED THAT A MISTAKE IN TRANSMISSION HAD CAUSED SIGNAL TO READ (QUOTE) TWO CORPS PERSONNEL CONCERNED (UNQUOTE). I GLADLY RENEWED ASSURANCE OF MY REGARD FOR AMERICAN FORCES AND ESPECIALLY TWO CORPS AT THIS TIME. OUR SQUADRONS ARE TAKING A SMALL PART OF THEIR LOAD AND REALIZE PROBABLY MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE WHAT A TOUGH JOB THEY HAVE ON HAND. GENERAL PATTON AND I AGREED TO CANCEL THE MUTUAL SIGNALS WHICH CONSTITUTED THE INCIDENT AND TO CONSIDER THE MATTER ENDED. URGENT T. O. O. 05/0920 (APPENDIX "E) HEADQUARTERS II CORPS APO # 302 In the Field 5 April, 1943 Air Marshal Conyngham Air Officer Commanding NATAF My dear Conyngham: Please accept on the part of myself and the officers and men of II Corps our most sincere appreciation of your more than generous signal. Personally, while I regret the misunderstanding, for which I was partially responsible, I cannot but take comfort and satisfaction from the fact that it gave me an opportunity of becoming better acquainted with you, because to me you exemplify in their most perfect form all the characteristics of the fighting gentleman. Truly yours, G. S. PATTON, JR. Secret (Appendix "F") HEADQUARTERS II CORPS APO 302 5 April 1943. -141- April 4, 1943 (Cont'd p. 5) Commanding General, 18th Army Group. My dear General Alexander: I should appreciate it if the signal, in the substance as follows, could be sent to 1st Army, 19 Corps, 10 Corps, 18 Army Group, and 12 ASC: "II CORPS deeply appreciates more than generous signal received from AOC NATAF. II Corps is deeply conscious of and grateful for, the magnificent support accorded them by the NATAF. PATTON" I was deeply appreciative of the more than generous attitude adopted by Air Marshal Conyngham and I am requesting this signal be sent in order to show him our complete unanimity of opinion. I am sure that however unfortunate the misunderstanding may have been, it has had the effect of drawing us closer together. Very respectfully, G. S. PATTON, Jr., Lt. General The 1st Derbyshire Yeomanry will be relieved and join the IX British Corps as soon as the 9th Reconnaissance Troop and elements of the 601 and 805 Tank Destroyer Battalions can replace them. The 1st Infantry Division has gained the second objective. The 9th Infantry Division is still held up. It has too much of a sector for its strength, being short one infantry combat team, the 60th, which is at Maknassy. Benson lost one additional tank and several additional men today. April 5, 1943 The three Corps Commanders made a tour of the front and Hall's car got shot at near Hill 116. The shot, a 2.5 mm, stuck in the back of the car. General Bull left for Algiers to see Ike. His attitude is, I think, -142- April 5, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) unfortunate. He is very critical of all we do and is very prone to argue in favor of the British. Bradley and I had a long talk and decided to answer any questions Bull propounds as Ike's deputy, but to volunteer neither advice or information. We feel that the U. S. is being sold out for a theory, and that the theory is bad. There is no attempt to aggrandize the American Army. We have fought continuously for 19 days and have never given ground. The Eighth Army has fought five days. We have pulled the 10th and 21st Panzer off them and it is gently - not too gently - intimated to us that we are not doing our best. At 2:30 [*PM OK 14:30*] we got definite information from artillery O.P.'s that three columns of tanks, supported by infantry, were moving forward and east to Djebel Berda. In expectation of this attack we had last night brought in the 19th and 20th Engineers, as a last reserve, and put the 19th, two companies of tank destroyers and three companies of rangers, in position south of town to stop a breakthrough from the east, or to meet an attack around the west end of Djebel Berda from the south. We asked for air reconnaissance last night, to see which way they were coming, but got none. We were told that it would take eight hours to get such a mission. The attack petered out at dark. We asked at noon today for night reconnaissance tonight 5-6. Were told that it was operationally impossible, as the air force had other more important duties - probably sleeping - result, we will be unable to tell whether the enemy withdrew after his feint, as we think, or whether he is still waiting to attack. We have no information as to Eighth Army. -143- Maizila April 6, 1943 I inspected positions south of town and told Benson to attack the road junction east of Djebel Berda to clear it up. Benson moved forward and by dark had reached a north and south grid line Y-45 and prepared to attack in the morning. He was very slow and put on a half-hearted attack, losing one tank and gaining nothing. When things looked bad yesterday, I decided not to leave Gafsa alive. Bradley was with me. The decision was a comfort and did much to harden our hearts. I feel sure that the Boches have pulled out a lot but are still strong in machine guns and mortars, especially on Hill 369. The 9th Division is still unable to take Hill 369. I told General Eddy to take it tonight, but after finding out that the 47th Infantry, which would have to make the attack, has already lost 23% of its enlisted men and 26% of its officers in 11 days of battle, I decided not to try it, and told the 1st Division and Benson to attack in the morning. The 1st Armored Division launched an attack against Djebel Mainztla, using tanks and infantry, and gained some ground. We now, for the first time, have good observation on Hill 369, so we have arranged to put on a combined shoot of 30 batteries of artillery, 105 or heavier, beginning at daylight, each gun to fire 50 rounds rapid fire - the first 25 rounds white phosphorous, with the idea of getting the enemy out of dougouts and caves to avoid suffocation, and under the impression that we are about to attack. The second 25 rounds are to be high explosive for effect. The stuff they give us against malaria makes me ill. I took some today and feel like hell. -144- Randle April 7, 1943 Had belly ache all night and was sick this morning, but decided to go to see 47th and find out how sad they were. At 08:00 Carey Crane brought me a phone message from General McCreery to the effect that our tanks were timid, and that we were to push on regardless of losses. I had already ordered Benson to break through and damn the expense. Geoff Keyes came last night to talk about "Husky", so I asked him to come with me to see the 47th. On the way I stopped at Benson's Command Post and told him that he must succeed or else, and that I was disgusted with his slowness yesterday. I asked him to push on until he got into a big fight or hit the ocean. We went to the 47th OP, Colonel Randall; the ground is appalling. Had a good view of Benson's advance, which was meeting little resistance except from long range fire. I called Gaffey to tell him to have Benson move faster. We then drove back and headed east on the Gabes road. We found Benson eating lunch - not much - so I told him to stop eating and get out in front, and he moved out. He was being delayed by a mine field. We drove through the mine field and after a while got to Kil 70. At this time there was only one jeep and one scout car ahead of my jeep and everyone told me I was going to be killed. I told Benson, who came up, to get his column on the road and keep pushing for a fight or a bath. On the way back we passed quite a few prisoners, including Germans of a low type. Shortly after I turned back, Benson's advance guard made contact with a patrol of the 12th Lancers, Eighth Army. I am glad I was not there. It would have been too spectacular. As it was, I had no idea they were around and was simply up doing my duty as I saw it. I don't think there was any danger in it. -145- April 7, 1943 (cont'd p. 2) Over a thousand prisoners were taken by Benson's force. at 19:40, Brigadier Holmes, 18th Army Group, called me on the telephone and I told him that we had broken through, and that Benson was going to the sea. He told me to order him back to the boundary which is at Kil. 96. This is afternoon. In the morning we had been ordered to push on regardless of losses. After having spent thousands of casualties making a breakthrough, we were not allowed to exploit it. The excuse is that we might interfere with the Eighth Army. Actually if we were allowed to continue we could cut in beyond the Grand Dorsal Mountains and head off the Germans in front of the Eighth Army, because, by moving north, we could clear Maknassy and permit the rest of the 1st Armored Division to come through. We could then head for Faid. In place of this, we were told to immediately withdraw the 9th Division and to complete the move to the assembly area at Bou Chebka not later than April 10. One can only conclude that when the Eighth Army is in trouble, we are to expend our lives gladly; but when the Eighth is going well, we are to halt so as not to take any glory. It is an inspiring method of making war and shows rare qualities of leadership, and Ike falls for it. Oh! for a Pershing. I must have been more tired than I realized. Went to bed at 22:00 and never woke until 06:00. Sic Transit Gloria Mundi. April 8, 1943 This morning a new boundary was assigned to the II Corps, consisting of two infantry divisions, running from the high around east of Maknessy, Faid and Fondouk inclusive, and the left of the V British Corps, but nothing to the east of this line. This boundary again -146- April 8, 1943 (cont'd) precludes us from breaking through. Just what becomes of one infantry division and one armored division is not said. At lunch General McCreery called, and, after his usual giggle, said that the 34th Division needed a medium artillery battalion. I replied "I thought you would", and heard him shudder so I added, "You see, we always think alike". What I really think is that they will reinforce piecemeal. He also said that he would possibly have to ask us to take Faid to help Fondouk. I had expected that too, and had already sent a medium tank battalion up. I investigated Faid and find it is very strong and that we cannot take it without an all out effort. So at 21:00 I called McCreery and said, "Shall we attack Faid when we must or when we can?" He saw the point and said "when we can", which I told him would be on the 10th. As of midnight April 7-8 we had 3,028 casualties (361 dead), 3,296 prisoners (215 Germans), 51 materiel, 66 vehicles, 51 machine guns, 50 81mm mortars, 38 cannon. We estimate that by tonight the prisoners will pass 4,000. I hope so. The First Armored Division captured Djebel Maiztla this morning. The resistance at Maknassy is considerably eased. The 9th Infantry Division has begun its movement to Bou Chebka. (APPENDIX "G") HEADQUARTERS II CORPS APO 302 In the Field 8 April 1932 GENERAL ORDER) NUMBER 25 ) Soldiers of the II Corps: After 22 days of relentless combat in mountains whose ruggedness -147- April 8, 1943 (con't p.2) beggars description, you have won the battle of El Guettar. Each one of you in his sphere has done his duty magnificently. Not alone on the front line, where death never ended his gruesome harvest, but everywhere else all of you have demonstrated your valor and constancy. Over countless miles of dusty, wind-swept roads, often under fire from the air, or from artillery, the men of the supply services have insured our food and ammunition. Under the most rigorous field conditions the maintenance units have collected and repaired your vehicles and weapons. In small, isolated groups, or as individuals, men of the Signal Corps have constructed and maintained your communications. Except for the unceasing efforts of our Engineers, the roads could not have been used, or the lurking hazards of the mine fields overcome. In the air, the 12th Air Support Command gave, as ever, proof of their untiring devotion and splendid courage. The Medical Corps has proven outstanding in its prompt and effective care of our wounded. Due to your united efforts and to the manifest assistance of Almighty God, the splendid record of the American Army has attained added lustre. G. S. Patton, Jr., Lieutenant General, Commanding 1 Victory to the Anderson 2 Give us the victory O Lord 3 Courage is largely habit & self confidence not - known 1 Page 2. in Eng. (A.S.) 2 Gen Martin (Fr) Page 62 3 Page 92 Daneys 4 Page 130 Lt Craig Transcribed and reviewed by contributors participating in the By The People project at crowd.loc.gov.