GEORGE S. PATTON DIARIES Annotated transcripts July 1-23, 1943 BOX 3 FOLDER 1 GEO S PATTON JR DIARIES TYPED (III) July 3, 1943 - July 23, 1943 [1] July 2 - July (?) 23 July 1, 1943 (Cont'd p. 2) more than I ever did but they attract me just the same. Having dinner with Hughes, Lucas and Farman at 1930. X July 2, 1943 Went to a movie of myself in Tunisia. I do not photograph well, or I think I look better than I do - probably the latter. Dictated a typed version of this diary to include July 1. This terminates the Diary prior to the next operation. Both copies will be kept by General Hughes for safekeeping until things are more settled and he will mail them to Bea if I pass on. July 3, 1943. begin. Vol III. to here Called on Hughes. Colonel Julius Caesar Holmes came in with a wild story about a bad behavior of the 1st Division. Called General Allen to investigate. Hughes went with him. Have not seen Hughes but Allen says it was an absolutely groundless rumor started by Murphy and helped along by Bedell Smith, who takes delight in smearing the character of everyone. Visited Brigadier Strong, G-2 AFHQ who had nothing new. He said he felt that the U.S. would be counter-attacked at the end of 24 hours. I said I thought it would be 48 hours and that I believed the British would get more than the U.S. as they were using vital ports. I told him we might have to swing half right to help the British. He agreed but he would agree to anything. Going to see Bradley in the morning. Saw Hewitt and asked that he report any trouble to me and not to AFHQ, who always magnify and put what they hear to the discredit of the Americans. Went to see Vice Air Marshal Wigglesworth and told him that I was pleased with the Air Plan - this is not wholly true, but I 1. Col E.E. Farman (Ret) July 3, 1943 (Cont'd p. 2) can now only work by seduction. He showed me the combined air and navy map room of AFHQ - not an American in it. It is not in the same class with our map rooms. Went for a swim. Saw Allen and told him how good he is. He is a good battle leader. The water was perfect. Sitting on flag bridge after supper with Keyes. All the men steal looks at me - it is complimentary but a little terrible. I am their God or so they seem to think. Hear that Truscott has the wrong date but don't believe it' however, I sent him word of the correct one. July 4, 1943 Flew to Mostaganem with Codman. Flint met us at Nouvion. Saw Gaffey at old Headquarters and had clothes tried on and paid for them, $15.00. Two trousers, a shirt and a short coat fairly well cut. While we were at the tailor's quite a crowd collected, probably attracted by the motorcycle escort. Drove to Oran and lunched on Kirk's flag ship. Bradley and Middleton also present. Few back in fairly bad weather, and off Tunis I had to do a most distasteful thing. I asked Codman to tell the pilot that, if it got worse, to turn back. This is, so far as I know, the only time I ever publicly showed timidity. I think I did it because I hated to run a chance of the next battle. It is a good thing to be alone with nothing to do. It gives the spirit a chance to feed on itself. There is an infinite capacity in our own souls, which we don't usually develop. It looks as if fate were fattening me up for something. I hope I perform when the time comes. Battles take years to July 4, 1943 (Cont'd p. 2) get ready for, and all one's life can be expressed in one little decision but that decision is the labor of uncounted years. It is not genius but memory - unconscious memory - and character, and Divine Wrath which does not hesitate nor count the cost. A week from tomorrow we should get a good counter-attack if one is to come. Last night I sat up till 0100 reading a detective story, hundreds of pages about the death of one fool. I am sending possible thousands to death and glory and don't, or won't, think about it. The human mind is very queer - only God could have devised such a complex machine. July 5, 1943 Keyes, Ridgeway(1), Gay and I went to say goodbye to General Ike. We got to the office just as the telegram with Gay's promotion came in and I took a star off my cap and pinned it on his collar. Ike started out by giving me a long lecture on the bad discipline of the 1st Division. I told him he was mistaken and that, anyhow, no one whips a dog just before putting him in a fight. Then he talked about criticism of the Air Corps and I told him that the only criticism had come from the Air Force (referring to Conyngham's attack on the II Corps). He said, without giving any reason, that he had followed the British system in using the Air Force. I told him that, due to his efforts, we were apparently going to get support. This is a fib, as I was the one who attacked them and made them come across. At no time did Ike wish us luck or say he was back of us - fool. After others, including Wedemeyer who had come in, left, I told him that I was very appreciative 1. Maj Gen Mathew B. Ridgway - CG 82nd (?) B. Div July 5, 1943 (Cont'd p. 2) of being selected. He said, "You are a great leader but a poor planner". I replied that, except for Torch, which I had planned and which was a hugh success, I had never been given a chance to plan. He said that if "Husky" turned into a slugging match he might recall me to get ready for the next operation, and let Bradley finish Husky. I protested that I would like to finish one show. I can't make out whether he thinks Bradley is a better close fighter than I am or whether he wants to keep in with General Marshall, who likes Bradley. I know that Bradley is completely loyal to me. Ike has never asked me to a meal since I have been here, one week. However it turns out, I would not change places with anyone I know. I am leading 90,000 men in a desperate attack and eventually it will be over 250,000. If I win I can't be stopped! If I lose I shall be dead. July 6, 1943 Generals Ridgeway and Swing (1) came in at 0715 with the problem of how to get the succeeding lifts of the 82nd Airborne Division in without having our land anti-aircraft shoot them down. On July 2, I took up this question with Admirals Cunningham and Wigglesworth and they assured me it was "well laid on". We only got the dope at Malta yesterday. The C-47's will come in at our right flank, go in from 2 to 4 miles, swing Northwest following the coast, drop near Gela and go on out near Licata. This means that they may fly over the Canadians and our 45th, 1st, 3d, and 2d Armored. They will fly under 1000 feet. I wrote a draft and Keyes correct it. I added paratroops and gliders. Swing will get it out for us. AFHQ will be excited because we did not get the information out sooner, 1. Maj Gen J.M. Swing CG 11the AB Div Gen Swing was an observer on Husky July 6, 1943 (Cont'd p.2) regardless of the fact that we only got it this morning. We will have to rebroadcast D, D plus 1 night, and to D plus 6. Monrovia gave the order "Let go all lines" at 0810, and we stood out to the anchorage followed by our landing craft, anchored, and took them up. Much photography of Admiral Hewitt and myself with Algiers as a backdrop. We passed the British Battleships Nelson and Rodney and many other ships. At 1710 we got finally under way. It is a moving sight, but over all is the feeling that only God and the Navy can do anything until we hit the shore. I hope God and Navy do their stuff. To be stopped now would have the most adverse effect on the future of the world. We will not be stopped. General Lucas is sharing my cabin and is most excellent company. 1. July 7, 1943 Lovely day. The convoy with the Canadian Division passed us to port at 1500 and we are now following them with "Cent" 1 convoy behind us. Read "Beat to Quarters" most of the day. Had the first roll of film from my Minox developed and it turned out well. One flight of eight unidentified planes, probably friendly, picked up our radar about 1430; no subs reported. Have long trousers ready if I have to get up in the night for an attack. July 8, 1943 A very quiet night last night. At the moment, 0830, we are off the end of Cape Bon. The Canadian convoy is ahead of us and the "Joss" 2 convoy behind. Lots of officers I talk to say that they look forward to fishing, farming, etc., after the war. I don't - I look forward to fighting, here, in Japan, or at home, for the rest of my days. I called Colonel Maddox in and explained that, if I have to make a maneuver, it will possibly be necessary to disengage the maneuvering unit by first attacking with it about four hours before dark and then pulling out, so he is to keep me informed of the number of trucks available to lift a mass maneuver. That is as far as one could plan; to do more at this stage of an attack cramps one's style. The motto, "attack and then look" (Napoleon's) is true. I got the French Legion of Honor, Commander Class. I have the usual shortness of breath I always have before a polo game. Took photographs of General and Special Staffs, then of Navy and Army Staffs. After supper I heard more laughing and singing among the men than I have to date. I would not change places with anyone I know right now. 1. Convoy of 45th Div - (to land at Seuglitti) "Cent" Code word" 2. 'Joss' convoy of 3rd Div (To " " Licata) code word 'Joss' July 9, 1943 Slept as much as possible. Wind came up in the PM to about 20 mph a little W. of N. I fear this may delay Truscott and his light craft and will certainly make the men seasick. Had no return of yesterdays nervousness. Read a detective story till 2200, then went to bed. Some soldiers outside the door were talking and said, "When we get ashore tomorrow the papers will report that the marines have landed in Sicily. Had the chaplain in after supper to say a prayer. Had a dream about a black kitten, then lots of cats that spat at me and ran downstairs. Went to sleep. D-Day, July 10, 1943 The davit on the boat outside my port broke at 0145 and made a loud noise and a man fell overboard, but was rescued. Went on deck at 0155. Gela and all beaches were burning brightly from an air attack which came on earlier. There are four search lights near Licata which no one is shooting out. At 0215 Admiral Kirk asked for an hour's delay in H. 1 It was then thirty minutes to H(0245) and "Dime" had already started for shore. Admiral Hewitt refused to grant it. At 0250 some firing southeast of Gela, partly from us and, I think, partly from enemy. It was quite cold on deck and I had on my leather coat. We may feel anxious but I trust the Italians are scared to death. No attack by subs or planes on us yet. Now 0323. All beaches except "Joss" Yellow were in our hands by 0530 or earlier. The Navy did a fine job in gun fire support, sending destroyers to within a mile of the beaches. There was one searchlight east of Gela which kept opening up and then going out. 'H' = H-hour Time set for attack July 10, 1943 (cont'd p.2) Whenever it opened, the 20 mm tracers flocked toward it like bees to the mouth of a hive. We could see the 4.2 mortars and the rockets hitting the shore as the navy patrol boats came in. The searchlight was knocked out around 0430. We lost a destroyer last night. In the early part of the morning, around 0500, the Germans dropped a number of flares of considerable power, evidently with the purpose of silhouetting our ships against them, but the dropping of these flares was not followed by an air attack in any considerable force. Our own air cover came over at 0500 and will stay until 2030. About 0900 we could hear, on the voice intercept, the 16th Infantry talking about an enemy attack. First there were 6, then 14, and finally 30 tanks. The navy put the Cruiser Boise on them and the First Division got a couple of batteries on about noon. They, the tanks, pulled out, leaving 3 or 4. We also asked for a dive bombing attack on these tanks at 0925 and the request was honored, but we did not get them till 1300 - too late. With such a lag, dive bombing is hardly efficient. If it were possible in landing attack, we should have a flight of dive bombers waiting overhead so that they could be put on immediately. If no immediate necessity arose for their use, they could launch their bombs on a previously assigned secondary objective, and then be replaced by a second flight similarly waiting and so on. This, however, cannot be done unless we have considerable air superiority. Navy anti-aircraft fired often and badly at our own planes and a few German planes that came over. The greatest culprits are the Navy small craft, LSTS, LCTS, p. 235 A I was about 500 yds from this LST going ashore in a small LCVP. It was not unloaded and carried most of the anti-tank guns of the 1st Div. which were lost and missed badly by them later. Maj. Gen. T.G. White July 10, 1943 (cont'd p.3) and smaller. German air got one LST on the "Dime" beaches at 1845. It had been unloaded The wind came up in the afternoon, more to the westward, and with considerable force, making the sea very rough. It put the breakers at an angle of about 45 degrees to the beach with the result that at least 40 small landing craft have broached to. As I know the situation of 2200, we are successful at all points. "Kool" (1) is landing now and the sea is moderating. We have taken over 1,000 prisoners and our losses are tiny, not over 100 so far as I know. Things were so complicated that I did not go ashore. I feel like a cur, but I probably did better here. Hewitt is a perfect fool, but Adm. Lewis, his chief of staff, is good. Having trouble making Hewitt take over prisoners so as to relieve guards, or move his LSTS, now empty, back for the next load. God has again helped me. I hope He keeps on. Headquarters and Headquarters Company of 180th Combat Team landed on "Dime" beaches instead of "Cent". No news of paratroops except one company north of "Dime". Successful landings were made on all beaches by the three sub-task forces as follows: Beaches Captured 45th Division [(Cent)] Beach 66 B by 179th Infantry at 0350 Beach 66 B by 180th " at 0434 Beach 65 C by 157th " at 0420 Beach 65 B by 157th " at 0515 1st Division {(Dime)] Beach 67 by 16th Infantry at 0243 Beach 67 26th Infantry at 0245 Beach 68 by Ranger Force at 0247 3d Division [(Joss)] Beach 70 A by 30th Infantry at 0415 Beach 70 B 15th " at 0430 Beach 73 7th " at 0430 Beach 71 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry, plus Beach 72 3rd Ranger Battalion at 0515 [1. 'Kool' (code name for Reserve force "2nd And Div + 1 Reg+ 2nd)] July 10, 1943 (cont'd p.4) Insert "Description of Events" GSP's book July 18, 1943 Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4 Appendix 5 July 10, 1943 (cont'd p.5) App 6 App 7 App 8 App 9 July 11, 1943 General Gay, Captain Stiller and myself and soldiers left the Monrovia in the Admiral's barge at 0900 and reached the beach at Gela at 0930. Standing on the beach, I noticed two dukws destroyed by personnel mines and about seven small landing craft broached. While I was making these observations, the enemy opened fire with what was probably an 88 mm or 105 mm gun. The shells hit the water about thirty July 11, 1943 (cont'd p.2) yards from the beach but could not get into the beach on account of the defilade afforded by the town [behind] in front of it. After our scout car was de-waterproofed, I intended to go to the Headquarters of the 1st Division, which is about five miles to the southeast along the coast road. As we got into town we noticed a flag on the left and decided to call on Lt. Col. Darby, commanding the Rangers. This was very fortunate because, had we proceeded down the road, we would have run into seven German tanks, which at that moment were advancing along it towards the town. As we arrived at the Rangers Command Post, Colonel Darby and the town of Gela were being attacked from the northwest by quite a number of Germans and Italians. Darby had a battery of captured German 77's, "K" Company of the 3 Battalion of the 26th Infantry, two Rangerx battalions, a company of 4.2 chemical mortars, and a battalion of the 39th Engineers. He wascut off from the 1st Division on his right by the 7 tanks which now closed into 1,000 yards on the right side of town. We went up to an observation post about 100 yards behind the front line where we could plainly see the enemy moving across the field, perhaps 800 yards away. Darby had roads patrolled by groups of three half tracks. Those halftracks, intended not for combat but to carry engineers' equipment, worked very well, greatly annoying the Italians, who apparently had no mobile artillery with them. The Italian advance seemed to stick about 1130 and we went back to Darby's Headquarters to find out what was transpiring on the right, which we could see from the town of Gela. About the time we got there, two hurricane bombers dropped bombs in the town. Then German artillery, apparently 80 mm all-purpose guns, opened fire. They hit the building July 11, 1943 (cont'd p.3) we were in twice, and also made a hole in the roof of the building across the street, but no one was hurt, except some civilians. I have never heard so much screaming. About that time an officer from the 3d Division came in with ten tanks which Truscott had sent to make contact, having made the trip by the shore road from Licata to Gela. Two tanks of Combat Command "B" also arrived. I told Gaffey to close the gap between Gela and the 1st Division and to send a company of tanks to help Darby. This was done. Darby counterattacked at once to his left and took 500 prisoners. Our soldiers started to feed them, but I stopped it as we were short of rations. Some of them were Czechs who were willing to talk. We also destroyed the seven tanks east of Gela. After I got the situation of the 3d Division from the officer who made the trip, General Roosevelt arrived and I talked to him about the failure of the 1st Division to carry its objective last night. The chief reason, as far as I can see, is that the Division attacked without anti-tank guns and without moving up their artillery. When they were counterattacked by the German tanks, they did very well and accounted for quite a few of them. The bag of enemy tanks for the day is, I think, about fourteen. I have seen eleven. I then decided to go down and see Generals Allen and Gaffey. While we were driving down the road, we met Allen coming in and halted on a fill. This was about 1530. while we were there, fourteen German bombers came over and were attacked by our anti-aircraft. We got off the road, but as it was parallel to the line of flight of the enemy airplanes, quite a number of fragments from the anti-aircraft hit along the July 11, 1943 (cont'd p.4) road. One piece struck, I should think, within five to ten yards of General Gay and myself. During this attack, we saw two bombers and one other enemy plane shot down. After this, we mounted our cars and drove to the headquarters of the 2d Armored Division. While we were there, a German battery kept shelling us but was not very accurate, or else the hill behind was too high for him to clear, as nearly all of his shots were overs. We arranged for Allen and Gaffey to take Ponte Olivo in the morning. We then drove back to Gela without incident, except that I think it is quite unusual for an Army Commander and his Chief of Staff to travel some six miles on a road parallel to the front of two armies and about equally distant between the two. It was quite a lonesome feeling, but not very dangerous. It is good for self esteem. On the way back to Gela I happened to be looking out to sea. From a Liberty freightship, which the Germans had bombed about a half an our earlier, smoke was issuing. Before our eyes a tremendous explosion threw white and black clouds several thousand feet into the air. The ship was literally blown in two, but at the present writing, some 6 hours later, the after half is still afloat. Most, if not all, of the Army personnel on board who numbered only 115, were saved. While we were on the beach at Gela, waiting for a boat to take us out to the Monrovia, I saw the most stupid thing I have seen soldiers do. There were about 300 five hundred pound bombs and seven tons of 20mm high explosive shells piled on the sand, and, in between the bombs and boxes of ammunition, these soldiers were digging foxholes. I told them if they wanted to save the Graves Registration burials, that was a fine thing July 11, 1943 cont'd p.5 to do, but otherwise they better dig somewhere else. About the time we got through explaining this to them, two "Hurry" bombers came over and strafed the beach, and all the soldiers jumped right back into the same holes they had dug. I continued to walk up and down and soon shamed them into getting up. One signal officer got panicky and destroyed a box of signal equipment when the enemy was still three miles away. I put him in arrest. We got back to the Monrovia at 1900, completely wet. This is the first day in this campaign that I think I earned my pay. I am well satisfied with my conduct today. God certainly watched over me today. Went to office [22] at 2000 to see if we could stop the 82d airborne lift, as enemy air attacks were heavy and inaccurate [*chk. with type*] and army and navy anti-air was jumpy. Found we could not get contact by radio. Am terribly worried. July 12, 1943 General Ike radioed that he would meet me on the beach or the Monrovia at 0600 today. I elected Monrovia. He came in a light cruiser escorted by a destroyer. General Whiteley accompanied him. The only Americans with him were Huebner and Butcher. Admiral Hewitt had him to breakfast. When I took him to my room to show him the situation, he was not much interested but began to compare the sparsity of my reports with the almost hourly news bulletins of the 8th Army. I have intercepts of many of them and they are both non-essential and imaginary in the majority of cases. Furthermore, they are not fighting, and we are. I directed Gay to send in three reports in addition to regular 1600 situation reports. Ike also told me that I am too prompt in my replies and should hesitate more, the way he does, before replying. I think July 12, 1943 (cont'd p.2) he means well, but it is most upsetting to get only piddling criticism when one knows one has done a good job. Ike is now wearing suede shoes a la British. He told me to congratulate the troops in his name. This was done. His party left at about 0930. [*chk. time 0930*] Left Monrovia with staff in LCT at 1700; saw three Boche planes shot down on the way in, and also one of our barrage balloons. Stopped first at Ranger headquarters to see what was going on.They had killed 50 and captured 250 Wops. They had one man hurt in the little toe, either by a shell splinter or cactus - he could not tell which. We have an advance command post on a nose east of Gela and are sleeping in a huge double house in town, very gorgeous, in marble, etc., with bedbugs in the bed. I had the forethought to use my bedding roll. Stiller captured some champagne and that was all we had for supper excepting a can of cheese. Keyes, Lucas and Wedemeyer went to Licata. [*Appendices 10 & 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17*] July 13, 1943 Got up at 0600 and ate some issue chocolate and coffee, went to command post and sat on a rock overlooking the water, as nothing is set up yet. Sent for Ridgeway, Swing and Bradley. Keyes got in from Licata. I am not too pleased with progress of 1st Division. They had halted just north of Ponte Olivo airport, waiting for 16th (Inf Regt.) to catch up. I ordered them to keep moving. [I am not too pleased with progress of 1st Division. They had halted just north of Ponte Olivo airport, waiting for 16th to catch up.] [*A*] We all knew these planes were coming in. I personally reminded all my troops and many other I passed of the expected air drop. All precautions were taken from Gen. Patton down through the chain of command. The planes came over - off their course and during and just following a German air-raid. To my knowledge no army elements fired on them. Many of the planes and paratroopers landed in and around my C.P. WE gave them first aid and all possible assistance. (Next day the C.G. 82d AB ranked me out of my humble C.P.!) I made a certificate for the investigation as indicated above. Maj.Gen. T.D. White As a sidelight - it is my belief that we (2d A.D.) suffered more casualties from our own air attacks than from all other sources. 1 Co, 41st Amd. Inf. Regt was practically decimated by our own air. Suggest text of all messages be arranged in logical sequence since they would be easier to read and understand. They are now in same form as when enciphered. July 13, 1943 (cont'd p.2) [I ordered them to keep moving.] We explained the situation in the fronts of the different divisions, and of those units of the 82d Airborne. I then gave them the next objectives I wanted, and gave each a memo so there would be no mistake. Bradley wanted to get Lt Col Darby to command the 180th Regimental Combat Team of the 45th Division with rank of Colonel. Darby preferred to stay with his Rangers. This is the first time I ever saw a man turn down a promotion. Darby is really a great soldier. I gave him the D.S.C. General Wedemeyer asked to be reduced to a Colonel so he could get the 180th. I sent him up to command it as a brigadier general. I have no real authority to do this, but like to help a fighting man. At this moment got a wire from Ike, cussing me out because the night of the 11th-12th, approximately 27-C-47's [some T and T. 27's and 47's] were shot down. He demanded an investigation and statement of punishments for those guilty of firing on them. [*A*] It is my opinion that every possible precaution was taken by this headquarters to obviate firing on our own airborne troops and that /the failure to do so was an unavoidable incident of combat. At the time the airborne came in, continuous air raids by the Germans were in progress and furthermore, the pilots failed to follow the course indicated. To my personal knowledge, a number of C-47's flew in at right angles to the beach at Gela, although they were to follow a route striking Sicily to the east of the 45th division and then follow the coast at a distance of from two to four miles inland and make the drop in the vicinity of Gela. As far as I can see, if anyone is blameable, it must be myself, but personally I feel immune to censure. July 13, 1943 (cont'd p.3) Perhaps Ike is looking for an excuse to relieve me. I am having a full report made but will not try anyone. If they want a goat, I am it. Fortunately, Lucas, Wedemeyer and Swing are here and know the facts. It is rather trying to have more trouble from the rear than from the enemy. There were 160 planes over us the day of the 11th and many more during the night. Men who have been bombed all day get itchy fingers. Ike has never been subjected to air attack or any other form of death. However, he is such a straw man that his future is secure. The British will never let him go. Went to lunch at 1250. Generals Alexander, Air Marshall Conygham, Aires and Miller and other members of the staff of 12th Army Group arrived at 1310, so I had to quit eating and see them. They gave us the future plan of operations which cuts us off from any possibility of taking Messina. It is noteworthy that Alexander, the allied commander of a British and American Army, had no Americans with him. What fools we are. I asked General Alexander permission to advance and take Agrigento, which is beyond the line specified for the front of the Seventh Army. He stated that if this could be done through the use of limited forces, in the nature of a reconnaissance in force, he had no objection. It is very essential to capture this port as, by so doing, we can obviate the necessity of using Siracusa as a base, thus saving a turn around of 140 miles over bad roads and also obviating the necessity of using a port in conjunction with the Eighth Army. If we take Agrigento we can supply the 3d Division through Licata, and the 45th, 82d and 39th. Regimental Combat Teams through Gela and adjacent "Dime" beaches. This will permit the abandonment of the "Cent" beaches, which are difficult and distant. July 13, 1943 (cont'd p.4) General Lucas, Swing and I drove to a point 3,000 yards east of Butera, which General Gaffey is to attack tonight. The whole country we passed through is full of bands of wire, pillboxes and dugouts. The construction of the pillboxes is most interesting. Each one is sur/mounted by a thin stucco well giving the appearance of a normal house. When it is necessary to employ the pillboxes these walls can be pushed down. It is noteworthy that the tremendous effort put into the construction of the bands of wire, pillboxes, etc., proved abortive due to the failure of the enemy to show courage in defending them. Had the Italians and the few Germans with them fought to the limit of their ability it would have been most difficult to evict them. Mind over matter. I feel that our success in rapidly passing through this powerful position was due to our policy of continuous and violent attack, which, it seems to me, is very essential in this operation. We are holding the initiative and must continue to do so. The people of this country are certainly in a deplorable condition. While not actually starving they are exsisting on a minimum of food, the present ration being 200 grams per day per person. It would be desirable to increase this, but owing to the difficulty of landing stores, no increase is at this moment possible. [*Appendices 18, 19, 20, 21*] July 14, 1943 Worked on an outline plan for the continuance of the operation as directed by General Alexander. I propose to make a provisional corps under General Keyes consisting of the 3d Division, and a composite division consisting of the elements of the 82d Airborne present, and the 39th Combat Team of the 9th Division, which is due to arrive tomorrow. This organization is necessary if we continue towards Palermo as now seems indicated. Two controlling forces will be necessary. The 2d Armored Division, less elements in Africa, will be combined as army reserves in the vicintiy of Licata. Lucas and I went to Licata in the Biscayne with Admiral Connolly, visited Licata, lunched with Truscott and told him to take Agrigento and arrange with Connolly for naval fire support. General Truscott has done a splendid job. Congratulated him and 3rd [30th] Division most warmly. He gave me an Italian flag taken at Licata. Again I am amazed at the work put on defensive positions and the lack of heart shown in their defense. The situation here is extremely satisfactory and the beaches are practically empty. Truscott and I talked over the operation for trying to take Agrigento by bluff, supported by the fire of the cruisers. I believe this operation can be successfully carried out with practically no loss and with great advantage to our supply system as previously stated. Eventually this place must be taken, and if it can be done now, it will be cheaper than waiting. It is my opinion that when the present line of the combined armies is secured, which will probably be around the 19th, it will be feasible to advance rapidly with the 3d Division and 2d Armored Division and July 14, 1943 (cont'd p.2) take Palermo. I will bring this question up to General Alexander when the time is ripe. Butera surrendered at 0400. Took about 100 Germans and many Italians. Germans are not fighting as well as in Tunisia. The Tabor of Goums which we had assigned to the 3d Division landed at Licata this afternoon. As we passed them on the road, I told them in French that I was glad to see them with us. The commanding officer of one of the Goums saluted smartly and said, "Nous vous devons beaucoup, mon General, d'etre ici pour le Quartorze Juillet." [*Appendix 22*] July 15, 1943 General Bradley, a most loyal man, arrived in great excitement about 0900 to report that a captain in the 180th R.C.T. 45th Division had taken my instructions to kill all those who resisted after we got within 200 yards too literally and had shot between 50 and 70 prisoners in cold blood and also in ranks - an even greater error. I told Bradley that it was probably an exaggeration, but in any case to tell the officer to certify that the dead men were snipers or had attempted to escape, or something, (as it would make a stink in the press and also would make the civilians mad.)[*?*] Anyhow, they are dead so nothing can be done about it. Upon further investigation, it proved that many of these men killed were snipers who had been picked up for firing at us after we passed, and naturally had to be killed. Others were killed and justly so, due to the fact that the enemy in this vicinity has been booby July 15, 1943 (cont'd p.2) trapping the dead, blowing up our burial details, causing considerable casualties among our men. These booby traps are made by pulling the pin of a hand grenade and placing it in the pocket of the dead so that when they are moved for burial, the grenade falls out and kills those engaged in the operation. In some cases, also, trip wires to land mines are attached to the dead. In the afternoon Colonel Campanole and I drove through Ragusa, which is a fair town and which we captured ahead of the Canadians on the 11th and later turned over to them after they had vigorously shelled it, but fortunately with no loss to us. We also went to Cosimo airfield and the headquarters of the 45th Division where we complimented Middleton on his very fine performance. We then drove to Biscari airport. There had been quite a fight there the day before and General Wedemeyer had done well as acting regimental commander. For at least five miles we smelled dead men whom there had been no time to bury. When I returned to Headquarters, Air Marshal Wigglesworth was there and he was much pleased with the honest compliments I paid the air for their pre-D Day and D Day activities. I told him, however, that defensively against counter-attacks, they are too slow, and that we must have faster action. I believe that in amphibious operations, this action should result from making a carrier available with fighters and light bombers, so that they can get into the air on call in a very short time. Just as Wigglesworth left, I bet him a bottle of whiskey against a bottle of gin that we would take Palermo by midnight on the 23d. He was very skeptical, but I believe without logical reason, that we can July 15, 1943 (cont'd p.3) do so, because I am sure that the enemy, German or Italian, cannot resist our continues attacks. One Italian prisoner, an officer, is alleged to have said in a captured letter that the Americans were strange people; that they attacked all day, marched all night, and fired all the time. July 16, 1943 At 0930, Bradley called up to say that he had just received information that the 26th RCT of the 1st Division was being overrun by enemy tanks at a point about 6 kilometers south of Mazzarino and needed help. I told him that I would attend to it and sent General Keyes to get the situation and to use elements of the 3d Division and 2d Armored Division, which were respectively east of Reisi and north of Butera, should the situation demand their intervention. About 1200 General Keyes called up and said, "Fire out; damage not over $10.00". What had happened was that in the open country, 14 M-IV tanks had run over the left battalion and had gone clear through it. Our men had taken cover without breaking and had, so far as I am able to find out, received no losses from the tanks. The enemy tanks then turned north to the right of the road and were attacked in turn by 35 of our M-5's from the 70th Tank Battalion belonging to the 1st Division. As a result of this combat, the 14 enemy tanks were put out of action with the loss on our part of three M-5's. There is considerable argument as to whether the casualties to the enemy tanks were caused by M-5 or artillery. In my opinion both units participated. We were still attacking Agrigento but have not taken it at 1800 at which hour the enemy in Agrigento counterattacked. Lt. General H. Leese 1, 30th Corps, says we can use road 117. This will be a great help. We deserve well of Leese as we have cleared out most of his objectives for him. 1. Lt Gen H. Leese (Bv) GG. 30th Corps (Bn) July 16, 1943 (cont'd p.2) General Lucas left at 1500 with an overlay showing the daily progress of the attack of the 7th Army so far. I also requested him to see that we are not pinned down to the tails of the Eighth Army but be permitted to move west and take Palermo, and also to get the names of the divisions released. [*appendices 27, 28*] July 17, 1943 Last night received a message from General Alexander as follows: "ON COMPLETION OF THE OPERATIONS ORDERED IN MY 0569 DATED 13 JULY EIGHTH ARMY WILL (FROM FINBAT TO SEVENTH ARMY, EIGTH ARMY RPTD MAIN HQ 15 ARMY GROUP MAC CITE 0.5999) DRIVE THE ENEMY INTO THE MESSINA PENINSULA ADVANCING BY THREE MAIN ACES. (A) NORTHWARD FROM CATANIA. (B) LEONFORTE-REGALBUTO-ARDANO. (C) NICOSIA-TROINA-RANDAZZO. SEVENTH ARMY WILL PROTECT THE REAR OF EIGHTH ARMY IN TWO PHASES. (1) ESTABLISH A SECURE BASE WITH ONE DIVISION IN AREA ROAD JUNCTION H087-VILLAROAA-ENNA- CALTINISSETTA. (2) THRUST NORTH TO HOLD THE ROAD JUNCTIONS AT PETRALIA AND H0195 SOUTH OF RESUTTANO. PARAGRAPH. THE ROAD VIZZINI-CALTAGIRONE- PIAZZA ARMERINA-RAOD JUNCTION H1979- PASSING EAST OF ENNA-NICOSIA MUST BE LEFT FREE FOR USE OF EIGHTH ARMY FOR ABOVE OPERATIONS+ IF IT ENTAILS NO HEAVY FIGHTING THE CAPTURE OF AGRIGENTO AND PORTO EMPEDOCILE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN ON COMPLETION OF ABOVE TASK. IF THE PORT CAN BE OCCUPIED WITHOUT GETTING COMITTED SERIOUSLY IT SHOULD BE SECURED EARLY AS IT WILL BE REQUIRED FOR MAINTENANCE IN THE FUTURE. ACKNOWLEDGE. FROM: FINBAT TIME SIGNED: 161420B " July 17, 1943 (cont'd p.2) This message directs that the Seventh Army protect the rear of the Eighth Army, thus putting the Americans in a secondary role, which is a continuation of such roles for the whole campaign and may find the war ending with us being overlooked. I am flying to Tunis to see General Alexander. I am sure that neither he nor any of his British staff has any conception of the power or nobility of the Seventh Army, nor are they aware of the political implications latent in such a course of action. I shall explain the situation to General Alexander on the basis that it would be inexpedient politically for the Seventh Army not to have equal glory in the final stage of the campaign. Arranged a map showing our proposed operation and attached a copy of the order we believe should be written. Appendix 29 Proposed change in Directive of July 16, 1943 The Eighth Army will drive the enemy into the Messina Peninsula advancing by three main axes. a. Northward from Catania b. Leonforte-Regalbuto-Adrano c. Nicosia-Troina-Randazzo Appendix 30 Comments on the role assigned the Seventh Army: Gen. Gay [by: ? Gen. Gay to: ? Gen. Patton] 1. The Seventh Army was given, initially, a secondary role supporting the Eighth Army in the main effort. 2. This was acceptable in the belief that in the second phase the Seventh Army would have the mission of taking the important and critical triangle Caltanissetta-San Catering-Enna, and later be July 17, 1943 (cont'd p.3) charged with the capture of Palermo and the clearing up of the western portion of the island, or with participation in the operation against Messina via the direction north of Mount Etna. 3. Beginning with the initial study and plan for "Husky", the capture of Palermo has been considered essential to the successful conclusion of the campaign. This has obtained through the various changes and modifications of the plan, including the one finally put into execution. 4. In the plan outlined by General Alexander about 1400 July 13, the dispositions to be taken by the Seventh Army indicated its principal effort to be to the northwest with Palermo as the objective. By this plan, which was confirmed that night by a directive received from Force 141, the Seventh Army, then in position to attack and capture the important localities of Grammichele and Caltagirone, was not only deprived of that honor, as well as that of capturing the key point of Enna, but also delayed in effecting its new dispositions by the necessity of waiting for the capture of the above localities by the XXX British Corps, and by being deprived of the road Vizzini-Enna, and being forced to move by roads far to the north. Thus, again, the Seventh Army is assigned to a supporting role. 5. If the plan understood being considered, outlined on the attached map, is adopted, the Seventh Army will end the campaign without having been assigned the principal effort in any phase. Its supply has been subordinated in each instance by the assignment of roads and ports to facilitate the supply of the Eighth Army. This applies to the directive on which my order 15 July was based. General Wedemeyer and I left in a B-25 from Ponte Olivo airport at 1210, arrived at Tunis at 1309 and saw General Alexander. He explained that he had planned to do just what I asked but that his chief of staff had failed to tell me (pretty weak) when issuing the order. He gave me permission to carry out my plan if I would assure him that the road net near Caltanissetta would be held...the quadrilateral Caltanisetta-San Caterina-Enna and the road junction Petralia. If I do what I am going to do, there is no need of holding anything, but it's a mean man who won't promise, so I did. July 17, 1943 (cont'd p.4) While I was with General Alexander, General Swing came and showed me two letters he had written to Ike covering the incident of the shooting up of the 82d Airborne lift, which I now presume is closed. The letters were very fair and showed that the whole thing was an incident of battle. I left Tunis at 1700, arrived Ponte Olivo Airport at 1810. Got back to Gela at 1900. Became quite ill with stomach upset during night. [*appendix 31 - 43*] July 19, 1943 Gillem 1, Stiller and I drove to see II Corps and 45th Division. We passed over all the battle fields of 1st Division and Rangers. As always, I was amazed at what our troops have accomplished over truly terrible country. Everywhere one looks there are destroyed tanks, guns and trucks. At Mazzarino there is a very fine chateau on the top of a rocky hill. It must have been a hell of a climb. But these old people really knew nothing of the horrors of war; even when they fed Christians to lions they dealt in hundreds. At Caltanissetta, we killed at least 4,000 civilians by air alone and the place smelled to heaven as the bodies are still in the ruins. I had to feel sorry for the poor devils. We had lunch in the Facist Palace, which, strangely enough, was not hurt much. It was truly magnificent, all velvet and brocade and gold chairs and we had lunch of "C" rations in the state dining room 1. Maj Gen A.C. Gillem (W.D. observer) July 19, 1943 (cont'd p.2) on a silk tablecloth, lovely china and silver with toilet paper napkins. After lunch we went to a high place and had a look to the north where the 157 Regimental is in a fight. Between Licata and Gela I passed a battalion of the Coast Artillery Antiaircraft and was very much disgusted with their lack of discipline. I will have the Colonel report to me tomorrow. I have never seen such dust. Everytime we passed anything we had to stop till the dust settled, as we could not see a thing. My face and hair were as gray as my shirt when I got back. The whole trip of 9 hours convinces me still more that my policy of continuous attack is correct. The farther we press, the more stuff we find abandoned that should not be abandoned. The Italians are fighting very well in face of certain defeat. They must crack soon. I think that the British have the bear by the tail in the Messina Peninsula and we may have to go in and help. Had they let us use Road 117 and take Caltagirone and Enna ourselves, instead of waiting for them, we would have saved two days and been on the north coast now. Alexander has no idea of either the power or speed of American armies. We can go twice as fast as the British and hit harder, but to save British prestige the XXX Corps (British) had to make the envelopment, and now I think they are stuck. They attacked Catania with a whole division yesterday and only made 400 yards. Keyes has patrols in Sciacco now, and we may be able to turn the armor loose on the 23rd. Our method of attacking all the time is better than the British system of stop, build up, and start, but we must judge by the enemy reaction. July 19, 1943 (cont'd p.3) I can do it here -- Alex can't in Tunis. Our score as of today is U.S. - killed 611 wounded 2564 missing 1500 -------- Total 4675 Enemy - killed 6572 prisoners 25851 __________ Total 32423 U.S. Losses: Enemy: Tanks 26 Tanks 84 Artillery 77 Artillery 248 Vehicles 279 Vehicles 446 The 45th Division has advanced north to the hills above S. Catarina and hope to reach the hills overlooking the railway near Vallelunga Pratemeno tonight. Of course, the necessity for taking Enna will slow our advance on the street. The Canadians have apparently decided to bypass Enna where yesterday they lost 500 men in an unsuccessful attack. This leaves a nasty hole there which the Germans can penetrate if they have the strength - I doubt that they will. Bradley will take it tomorrow with the 1st Division. I would complain to General Alexander about this except that I think there must be some mistake because the British clearly stated they would take Enna. (Appendix 44) Headquarters II Corps APO 302 Memorandum: 19 Jly, 1943 T0: Commanding General, Seventh Army. July 19, 1943 (con'td p. 4) 1. As of 1945 this date, I secured information from the II Corps Liaison Officer who works with XXX British Corps that the XXX Corps has turned east with an objective of Aderno 704970. This move to be made by the most expeditious route and that as of 1600 leading elements were at the cross roads at 355825. Apparently no elements are between that point and Enna. 2. I consider that this change of plans and change in direction without notifying the II Corps leaves a dangerous gap between the Seventh and Eighth Armies which may prove serious. 3. The tactical plan for II Corps was based upon reasonable protection of the right flank by the XXX British Corps. 4. A report indicates that as of 1750B a column of tanks is approaching Enna from the northeast. This might mean that the enemy is taking advantage of the gap created. As a consequence, I intend to limit all forward movement of the II Corps until the situation at Enna is cleared up. 5. This is furnished you as a matter of record and as a protest to the change of plan of the adjacent unit without notifying II Corps"** O. N. Bradley Lieut. General, U. S. A. Commanding ** Longhand note attached to above letter -- General Patton: Please don't worry too much about this. I propose to turn the 1st Division against Enna, probably tomorrow night. Brad. (Appendix 45) Outgoing message Chief of Staff 19 July 1943 Cadet 5 Secret Routine CG Fifteenth Army Group If it is contemplated that the Seventh Army be used later in advance on Messina (Patton to CG Fifteenth Army Group) it is recommended that the remainder of the 9th Division arrive in Sicily as presently scheduled around D plus twenty or prior to that date if this can he done without interrupting present convoy schedule. R. E. Cummings Colonel, GSC Dept. C/S Time signed 190927B (I was quite right in this idea as events have shown. Again I had out guessed the situation). July 19, 1943 (con't p.5) [Appendix 46] (Appendix 47) 607-H 191635B RAD Routine Nr 2120 To: CG Seventh Army Effective 001 hours 19 July the following units of the First TD Group are detached from Seventh Army and are attached to Fifth Army for administration and training pending call by Seventh Army: Added Fifth Army, Seventh Army information Fifteenth Army Group signed CINC cite FHGOT. HQ and HQ Co First TD Group, 776 TD BN, 894 TD BN, 899 TD BN. Commanding General Fifth Army will comply with provisions of paragraph 2 letter AG370.5-5C-M dated 11 June this headquarters subject assignment of the Ninth Division substituting above units for Ninth Division From: 15th Army Time signed: 191303B Rec. 192020B (Appendix 48) Summary of Events 18, July, 1943 After the initial successful assault on the beaches before daylight on the 10th, we have continued to push along several days ahead of our assumed schedule. This has been due to the fact that having once gotten the enemy started, we have not let him stop but have, so to speak, kept him on his heels. It is also due to the fact that the Italians and Germans spent tremendous effort in time, labor and money, building defensive positions. I am sure that just as in the case of the Walls of Troy and the Roman walls across Europe, the fact that they trusted to defensive positions reduced their power to fight. Had they spent one-third as much effort fighting as they did in building, we never could have taken the positions. On the other hand, the Italian troops, most of whom are from Northern Italy, have fought very desperately. The German troops have not fought as well as those we destroyed in Tunisia. This is particularly true of their tanks. They have shown gallantry but bad judgment. The score of prisoners, guns, etc. at the end of this document speak more forcefully than words as to the success of the operation. July 19, 1943 (con't p.6) While comparisons are odious, I believe that up to yesterday, the Eighth Army had not taken over 5,000 prisoners. The enemy has been booby trapping his dead, firing on us from the rear after we have passed through his, and using dum-dum bullets. This has caused us some casualties but has caused him a great deal more. On the field south of Biscari Airport, where we had quite a fight, I could smell dead enemy while driving for at least six miles along the road. The Germans have on several occasions put mines in behind the Italians so that when the Italians attempt to run, they get blown up. This naturally does not make the Italians love the Germans., There has been several very gallant instances. On the 10th some Italian tanks entered the town of Gala, which was defended by engaged one of the tanks at 50 yards with a light machine gun from his peep. When he found that these bullets would not penetrate, he hurried down to the beach, under fire of three tanks, got ahold of a 37-mm gun just unloaded, split the box of ammunition with an axe, hurried back up the hill and went into position with his gun less than a hundred yards in front of a tank coming down on him. The first round failed to stop the tank, but the second did stop it. However, the enemy crew did not get out until Darby put a thermite grenade on top of the tank and roasted them. The other day this same officer was offered the command of a regiment with an increase of one grade in rank, but he refused to take it because he wished to stay with the men he had trained. On the same day, General Wedemeyer requested to be reduced to a colonel so that he could take command of a regiment. I consider these two acts outstanding. During the landing, an artillery lieutenant flew his piper cub off a landing boat with a run of about 50 feet of chicken wire. During the rest of the day, he circled the town under continuous fire. His plane was hit several times, bot he kept the Commanding General of the 3rd Division informed of the situation. A naval officer brin[g]ing in an LCT, 175 foot landing craft, found the water too shallow to get his bow in, so he breached it to on the beach and engaged the enemy machine guns with his two 22-mm cannon and silenced them, thereby permitting the troops to get ashore. The naval gunfire support, that is, naval fire put on the beaches from vessels at sea, has been outstanding. We have even called for this support at night and gotten it on the target on the third salvo. July 19, 1943 (con't P.7) The people of this country are the most destitute and God-forgotten people I have ever seen. One day, when I was in the town and the enemy nearly took it, some shells and bombs killed a few civilians and everyone in the town screamed like coyotes for about twenty minutes. The animals are better cared for and fatter, and also larger, than the animals in Africa; otherwise, everything here is much worse than in Africa. The carts are very peculiar. They are in the form of a box about 4 feet square with things that look like bedposts at the corners and along the sides. The panels between these bedposts are painted with pictures. Under the cart there is a scrollwork built up between the axle and the bottom of the box, just like the porches of houses built around 1880.(1) The collar of the animal has a spike projecting upwards about two feet, and many of the horses wear plumes on the crown piece of the bridle. During the first two or three days, when we were having fighting close to the towns, the inhabitants were, to say the least, not friendly, but since we have demonstrated that we can destroy either the ? Germans or Italians, they have become quite Americanized and spend their time asking for cigarettes. The roads are the most dusty I have ever seen. Everytime you pass a truck you have to stop until the dust clears so that you can see the road. However, in spite of this, our men are doing very fine driving and having relatively few accidents. I continue to be amazed at the efficiency of the American soldier and yet sometimes he nearly drives me crazy by foolish breaches of discipline , and lack of self-respect. My observations of the shattered state of enemy morale make me certain that our system of continued attack is better than the British system of attack, build up, and attack; because everytime they halt to build up, the enemy builds up in front of them, whereas in our system he does not have time to do this. However , in using our system, one must be guided by the enemy's reaction, and that means that the commanding general must be close enough to the front to see it. A general sitting in Tunis certainly cannot judge the reactions of an Italian on a mountain in Sicily. 1. A Sicilian cart was presented to General Patton by his staff. Two of the historic pictures decorating the sides were of the General landing in Scily and his meeting with Cardinal Lavitrano. The others were traditional. Perhaps a new tradition has started. B.A.P. July 20, 1943 Sent Gay to see Keyes, and Maddox to see Bradley. We took Enna at 0943. Enna was practically unoccupied. The Canadians came in from the east eight minutes later, which shows I was correct in assuming that they would not completely avoid the fight there. I sent a dispatch to General Alexander stating that we arrived at the same time. I will bet they claim to have got there first. . Decorated large number of Western Task Force with Legion of Merit. It has taken eight months to shake them loose. Band played Star Spangled Banner and God Save the King and then I had a concert and all the Dagos cheered and danced and asked for food. I often wonder when one of them will try to kill me, but I think that apparent lack of fear bluffs them and it is good for the troops to see my flags flying all over the front. One dies but once and I am on a high spot. A victorious memory may be better than to achieve success and be forgotten. However, I feel that I still have much to do, so probably won't get killed, but I do hate to be shot at just as much as I ever did. Keyes is going great and we may get Palermo by the 23d and I will win my bet with Wigglesworth. General Gillem left at 1400. I think he is quite impressed. I sent a drawing of our latest positions to General Eisenhower by him; also some letters to be mailed by him either at Algiers or in America, depending on which will be fastest. I could have been elected Pope right after the concert. I will move the Command Post to Agrigento in the morning. [*Appendices 49-54*] July 21, 1943 Moved the Command Post from Gela to Agrigento. "Campy" (Col. Campanole) and I drove along the coast to Command Post CCA of 2d Armored, some miles west of Menfi. Keyes had gone to see Truscott, so we missed him. 2d Armored started to move into assault position east of Castelvetrano at 1530 and we hope they will get Palermo tomorrow. [*To here*] General Larkin 1, Colonel Stuart 2 and General House 3 were at my quarters. General Leese (British Corps) came to supper. Leese talked over the operation against Messina. The British want us to take roads 113 and 120, to take the place from the west. Had they made this decision sooner we would now be much further advanced. I will give the II Corps 9th Division, for which, in anticipation of this move, I asked on the 19th; also I will give him all the extra artillery he can use. The British have a pretty bloody nose south of Catania. XXX Corps will attack west on 121 and north on Paterno; also north on Catania. They have asked for the 78th Division, which last week they said they did not need. They have been attacking Leonforte for three days without success. We will probably have to take it with the 1st Division from the north. I really feel like a great general today - all my plans have so far worked. I hope God stays with me. Keyes sent a message, "Peanuts for breakfast" which means the 2d Armored Division will be on the way at 0600, July 22nd. The 82d Airborne, 39th [Division] Inf Regt (49th Div), under Ridgeway on the left and the 3d Division under Truscott on the right are stopping short of route 119 so as not to interfere with the 2d Armored Division. Two battalions of rangers are working the western end of the island and have taken Marsala and Mazara. The 82d Reconnaissance has had patrols into Calatafimi. If 1. 1. Maj Gen TB LARKIN (CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION AFHQ) 2 2 Col L.L. STUART 3 3 MAJ GEN E.J. HOUSE (A.C.) July 21, 1943 (cont'd p.2) the attack of the 2d Armored Division works out, it will be a classic example of the proper use of armor. I told Gaffey and Rose to take chances - to smoke the enemy and then charge him with tanks. I am sure that this will work as the enemy is jumpy and justly so, in the face of the power we can put against him. Flew back in a couple of cubs in a tail wind and made good time. [*Appendices 55-58*] July 22, 1943 Campanole, Stiller and I left for the front at 1400. We drove in a scout car followed by a peep as far as about 6 miles southeast of Castelvetrano. The road was fairly open but from then on it was solid with the rear elements of the Provisional Corps moving forward. We passed one enemy light tank covered with blood by the road on the way to the front; also several 105 mm German guns at different points where they had put up resistance. In one of these fights, one of our assault guns, a 75 howitzer, attacked a 105 mm at 500 yards and won. There were very few operational casualties in the tanks. I saw not over four out of some 300 which were moving up. The road discipline was superior. Whenever I passed any of the 2d Armored Division all the men first saluted me and then waved. It was quite cheering. On the way up we passed some very fine tank traps. There was a pit on the right ten feet square and about ten deep covered with matting and dust so it looked like the land. Then some thirty yards further a similar pit on the left. Each had wire in front of it so that traffic had to stop and make an "S" to get through. The hope is that in battle tanks will disregard the wire and go straight in. They did not. "Love's labor lost". They also had anti-tank ditches ten feet deep and twenty wide, as long as a mile. We went around them. July 22, 1943 (cont'd p.2) Only killing stops good troops - defenses sap the vitality of those who make them. I feel that future students of the Command and General Staff School will study the campaign of Palermo as a classic example of the use of tanks. I held them back far enough so that the enemy could not tell where they were to be used; then when the infantry had found the hole, the tanks went through and in large numbers and Fast. Such methods assure victory and reduce losses, but it takes fine leadership to insure the execution. General Keyes provided perfect leadership and great drive. The praise should be his. About dusk we got to the command post of the 2d Armored Division and Colonel Perry, Chief of Staff, told me he thought Palermo had fallen and that General Keyes and Gaffey had entered it. He volunteered to guide me in, so we started. The pass through the hills southwest of Palermo is one of the strongest defensive positions I have every seen, and I cannot see how we forced it, but we indubitably did, and at considerable loss to the enemy. The hills on each side were burning, as was also an ammunition dump, so that the night was quite translucent. It is a great thrill to be driving into a captured city in the dark. We got to the Headquarters at the Royal Palace at 2200 and found Keyes and Gaffey had gone to bed, and Combat Command "A" and elements of the 3d Division had the town under control. I saw Keyes and Gaffey and congratulated them. We had a small flask and each took a drink. Alex radioed, "This is a great triumph. Personal for General Patton from General Alexander. Well done. Heartiest congratulations to you and all your splendid soldiers." I told him once that Americans needed praise and here it is. good deal of repitition should be cut? July 23, 1943 ACCOUNT OF THE CAPTURE OF PALERMO On the afternoon of the 21st we secured a position northeast of Castelvetrano from which to launch the 2d Armored Division, which heretofore had been held back near the middle of the Island so that the enemy could not tell which way it was going. The troops moved into position, beginning at 4:00 p.m., and were all set by dark. In the morning they started their relentless advance. The first act was to break through the enemy on their immediate front. This was done by the 41st Infantry, supported by a battalion of medium tanks from the 66th. This started the enemy rolling back. From then on it was a question of attacking him with converging tanks whenever he tried to stop us, which he attempted on three occasions. In one case a 75 assault howitzer in a half-track engaged a German 105 at five hundred yards and destroyed him. This act was as lucky as it was heroic. The last stand was made in the mountains southwest of Palermo, which was a most difficult nut to crack, but was finally done with artillery fire and tanks. We met some of the most ingenious tank traps I have ever seen. They would dig a hole about eighteen feet long and ten feet deep half way across the right side of the road and cover it with chicken wire and dust to make it look like a road. Then about thirty feet beyond , on the left hand side of the road, they would make a similar pit. In front of each pit they would put a wire entanglement with the hope that our tanks would disregard the wire and crash into the holes. Fortunately we did not do so. July 23, 1943 cont'd p.2). In other places they dug tank traps about twenty feet wide and fifteen feet deep for distances of several miles, but by sticking to the roads and blasting our way through, we had no trouble with them. I drove up through the column and received a very warm reception from the Second Armored, all of whom seemed to know me, and all of whom first saluted and then waved. As we neared the City it was dark, so I picked up Colonel Perry, Chief of Staff of the Division, to act as a guide. He stated he believed the town had fallen, and we therefore decided to go in and see. As we approached, the hills on each side were burning. We then started down a long road cut out of a side of a cliff which went through an almost continuous village. The street was full of people shouting, "Down with Mussolini!" and "Long Live America". When we got into the town the same thing went on. Those who arrived before dark, among them General Keyes, had flowers thrown on the road in front of them, and lemons and watermelons given them in such profusion that they almost became lethal weapons. The Governor had left, but we captured the two Generals, both of whom said that they were glad to be captured because the Sicilians were not human beings but animals. The bag in prisoners for the day must have been close to ten thousand. On the morning of the 23d, when I was inspecting the harbor, I passed a group of prisoners, all of whom stood up, saluted and then cheered. The harbor is not too badly damaged, but the destruction around the lip is really appalling. For about two blocks in depth practically every house is a pile of rocks. Some ships, small fishing steamers, July 23, 1943 (cont'd p.3) were apparently blown completely out of the water and landed on the dock; at least I can account for their being there in no other way. A good many of the small craft in the harbor are sunk, several of them being cut completely in two. We took over the so-called Royal Palace for a headquarters and had it cleaned by prisoners for the first time since the Greek occupation . We are also having the prisoners remove the rubbish from the streets and plug the holes in the dock. The Italians here are much better looking than the ones we took in the rest of Sicily, being bigger and older. The Cardinal's Vicar came to call on me, and I assured him that I was amazed at the stupidity and gallantry of the Italian Army; stupid because they were fighting for a lost cause, and gallant because they were Italians. I asked him to tell them that and to spread the rumor. I further said that we had demonstrated our ability to destroy them , and if they failed to take the hint and surrender, we would certainly do so. As a matter of fact, I called off the air bombardment and naval bombardment which we had arranged, because I felt enough people had been killed, and felt that with the drive of the 20 Armored Division we could take the place without inflicting unproductive losses on the enemy. I believe that this operation will go down in history, certainly at Leavenworth, as a classic example of the proper use of armor, and I also believe that historical research will reveal that General Keyes' Corps moved faster against heavier resistance and over worse roads than did the Germans during their famous Blitz. July 23, 1943 (cont'd p.4) We did not waste any time, however, and started this morning, capturing the north road and also moving artillery to support the final effort of the II Corps which will begin in a few days. [*Appendices 59, 60, 61, 62*] I won a bottle of gin from Wigglesworth. I bet him on the 15th that we would take Palermo by midnight of the 23d and we took it at 19:24 on the 22d. Harbor less damaged than reported, but waterfront and much of city terribly destroyed. I am glad that I did not use an air or navy attack to facilitate the advance of the 2d Armored Division. I refrained from doing so because I did not wish to cause unnecessary deaths on any more civilians. The restraint was General Keyes' idea - a fine soldier. [*Appendices 63-72*] [*end Vol III*] Transcribed and reviewed by contributors participating in the By The People project at crowd.loc.gov.