GEORGE S. PATTON DIARIES Annotated transcripts Aug 1-Nov. 29, 1944 (1 of 2) BOX 3 FOLDER 7 GEO S PATTON JR DIARIES TYPED (VII) AUGUST 1, 1944-MARCH 22, 1945 [Nov 29, 1944] VOLUME 7 AUGUST 1, 1944 - MARCH 22, 1945 Volume 7 August 1, 1944 I was very nervous all morning because it seemed impossible to get any definite news and the clock seemed to have stopped. At noon, Colonel Harkins and I, who were the only ones at Headquarters, took a drink of horrible brandy, which Campanole had presented to Harkins to celebrate the fact that we were operational. General Bradley arrived at 1500. Walker and Haislip were already here. Bradley showed us the army boundaries. These are rather cramped so far as the Third Army is concerned, as we have to slide through a very narrow bottleneck between Avranches and St. Hilaire. Part of the road from St. Hilaire to the north, that is the part of it north of Bracey, is being used by the VII Corps of the First Army. Bradley is worried about an attack west from Mortain. Personally I do not give much credence to this, but by moving the 90th Division I can get it forward and also cover the exposed flank. I started this movement by truck at once. Gaffey, Harkins, Haislip and myself then visited the VIII Corps to coordinate the movement of the 90th Division through their rear area. This is an operation which, at Leavenworth, would certainly give you an unsatisfactory mark, as we are cutting the 90th Division through the same town and on the same street being used by two armored and two other infantry divisions. However, there is no other way of doing it at this time. I remained at the VIII Corps (Middleton"s) Headquarters. I found that Middleton, in spite of what I had already told him, had failed to send any infantry with the 4th Armored Division but had decided to send one infantry division with the 6th Armored on Brest, and the other infantry division along north on the coast behind General Earnest's task August 1, 1944 (cont'd p.2) force. I therefore directed him to send the 8th Infantry Division behind Wood (4th Armored) with one Combat Command team, motorize, and to send the 79th Infantry Division behind the 6th, similarly arranged;and to use General Earnest with the 15th Cavalry, a battalion of self-propelled tank destroyers and a battalion of infantry from the 8th Division to move along the north road with special directions to secure the seventeen miles of trestle on the railway in the vicinity of Morlaix, because if this piece of trestle is destroyed, the capture of Brest will have little value. I cannot make out why Middleton was so apathetic, or dumb - I don't know what was the matter with him. Of course it is a little nerve-wracking to send troops straight into the middle of the enemy with front, flanks and rear open. I had to keep repeating to myself, "Do not take counsel of your fears." General Bradley simply wants a bridgehead over the Selune River. What I want, and intend to get, is Brest and Angers. We just had word that the 4th Armored Division is 15 kilometers northeast of Rennes, and an enemy armored column is 25 kilometers kilometers southwest of Rennes. I got hold of General Weyland, who commands the XIX Tactical Air Command, and asked him to put some air on it. So far, no results have been heard. (Not by G.S.P.Jr. - The "enemy" column was actually General Wood's column, and it was reported southeast instead of northeast of Rennes through mistake.) However, the airplanes did a splendid job by attacking enemy installations who were confronting the 4th Armored Division. It was the best cooperation between air and ground so far achieved in this war. The 6th Armored is at Pontorson, where Beatrice and I spent [the] a night in 1913. August 1, 1944 (cont'd p.3) These truck movements of large numbers of infantry are very dangerous and might be almost fatal if the Germans should spot them, particularly if there is a traffic jam. I have all available staff officers out a critical points and have told General Haislip to be personally at Avranches to see that the 90th Division gets through without a jam. I am going there myself in the morning, as I have a feeling something may happen. The operations for the first day are very satisfactory. Compared to war all human activities are futile, if you like was as I do. August 2, 1944 Left at 0830 with Codman and Stiller to watch operation of 90th Division. We stopped at Granville for a few moments. Codman had passed a summer there and his son had been there to school. The 4th Armored lost ten tanks in a fight four kilometers north of Rennes. One Combat Command of the 8th Infantry Division has closed on the tail of the 4th Armored. The 6th Armored is past Pontorson, where it lost six self-propelled guns in an ambush. It is pushing on. As far as I can learn, the guns were moving too close together without adequate reconnaissance. The officer in command should be tried, but he is dead. These two losses, however, are cheap for the ground taken. Before turning East to find the 90th Division, we drove to the bridge over the Selune River at Pontabault. This bridge is constantly being attacked by the Germans, but so far they have not got a good hit. We have engineers repairing it as fast as it is bombed. On the way to the bridge we passed a large number of dead Germans, destroyed vehicles, dead horses, etc. At one place our air had attacked an ambulance column, unquestionably through mistake, and the whole country smelled of Iodoform. August 2, 1944 (cont'd p.2) East of Avranches we caught up with the 90th, which is moving along the road between the River See and the River Selune. The Division is bad, the discipline poor, the men filthy and the officers apathetic, many of them removing their insignia and covering the markings on helmets. I saw one artillery lieutenant jump out of his peep and hide in a ditch when one plane flew over at a high altitude firing a little. I corrected these acts on the spot. I got out and walked in the column for about two miles, talking to the men. Some were getting rides on guns and the others made no comment. I called them babies and they dismounted. They seemed normal but are not in hard condition. We met General Haislip and General McClain, the new Division Commander, of the 90th just north of St. Hilaire-du-Harcouet, which at the moment was being attacked by General Weaver, the new Assistant Division Commander of the 90th. Apparently the bridge at Pont Au Bault is still intact. Haislip drove back with me to Third Army Headquarters, which had moved up this morning to a Command Post east of Granville. When we arrived, however, there was nothing there except General Gay and one peep. On the way in, the dust and traffic congestion were terrible. Near La Haye-Pesnel we saw a man with a terribly mangled leg. Apparently he had fallen off a bulldozer and had been run over. I waited until an ambulance came and gave him some morphine. I am quite sure he will die. I told General Haislip to get the 5th Armored Division down at once and have it cross the See east of Avranches by fording. Also to alert the 83d to follow as soon as the traffic situation permitted. Shortly after Haislip left, General Bradley arrived about 1600 and, with some embarrassment, stated that he had been waiting for me at the VIII Corps, and as I had not arrived there, he had taken the responsibilities August 2, 1944 (cont'd p.3) responsibility of telling Middleton to move the 79th Division to the east in the vicinity of Fougeres as to establish a strong bridgehead on the arc Dinant-Rennes-Fougeres and St. Hilaire. He said that he knew I would concur. I said that I would, but that I did not agree with him and feared he was getting the British complex of over-caution. It is noteworthy that just about a year ago to the day I had to force him to conduct an attack in Sicily. I do not mean by this that he is avengeful, but he is naturally super-conservative. General Gay and I drove at once to the VIII Corps and passed an engineer train of useless junk which was cluttering up the already overcrowded roads (87th Engineers). General Wyche of the 79th Division was at VIII Corps Headquarters and we decided to shift him to the XV Corps and use the 83d in place of the 79th to follow the 6th Armored Division. I dictated the necessary orders to put these operations into effect. When I returned to Headquarters at 1900 I dictated a chronological account of what had happened. We will build prisoner of war cages on the Army axes as we advance, and fill them by the use of returning empty trucks. The Germans are quite active over Avranches tonight. I have counted a hundred bomb hits, some quite near, up to the present moment, which is midnight. The signal system, as usual, does not work. August 3, 1944 The bombing last night hit some road intersections near here and also the bridge at Avranches, without destroying it. However, we are having the engineers construct an extra crossing near Avranches. We are not allowed to use our 90-mm anti-aircraft guns for fear of hitting August 3, 1944 (cont'd p.2) one solitary British night fighter who is supposed to protect us, but who spends his time in bed, as far as we can find out, or at least in taking bank holidays. We are trying to have the areas of Avranches, St. Malo and the dams made a gun area 1 so that we can protect ourselves. General Collins of the VII Corps is having a lot of trouble northwest of Mortain, and is also causing us trouble by having areas of this Army for his own rear echelons, particularly the road running north through Bracey. As of 1800 things are very satisfactory. The 79th is in Fougeres; the 5th Armored has arrived and is in between the 79th and 90th Divisions; the 4th Armored Division has by-passed Rennes headed on Vannes, and the 6th Armored Division has passed Dinan and is being followed by one Combat Command of the 83d. General Earnest is investing St. Malo. I did nothing. August 4, 1944 Left at 1000 with Codman and Stiller. We had an L-29 (Armored Car) and a peep. I rode in the Peep with Codman, and Stiller preceded us in the armored car via Avranches-Pont Aubault-Ponterson-Combourg-Merdrig- nac. We passed one combat command of the 6th Armored and found Grow just leaving. The 6th is too careful, and so gets shot up. I told them to use more dash and keep going. On the way back I stopped at Pontorson to see the 83d Division, which attacks St. Malo in the morning, then drove to a point 6 kilometers west of St. James to see VIII Corps. Generals Bradley and Spaatz had been to see me but left before I got back. Bradley wants the XV Corps, 90th and 79th Divisions to attack the Mayenne 1. A gun area is an anti air area into which no one is supposed to fly without giving identification lest they get shot. August 4, 1944 (cont'd p.2) River between Mayenne and Laval, direction Le Mans. We will put the 5th Armored in on the right and start to assemble the XX Corps at Vitre. Sent for Haislip, gave him the order and started him. General "P" Wood got bull headed and turned east after passing Rennes, and we had to turn him back on his objectives, which are Vannes and Lorient, but his over-enthusiasm wasted a day. Gaffey woke me at 0130 to show me an order. Middleton to Wood, which gave Wood a defensive role. We changed it. August 5, 1944 I drove to Headquarters First Army east of St. Lo to talk over Army boundaries with Generals Bradley and Hodges. I succeeded in getting the boundary Bracey-St.Hilaire-Mayenne-Le Mans all to the Third Army. This is exactly the boundary I desire as it keeps me on the outside - on the running end. St. Lo is pretty well bashed in. Beatrice and I spent a night there in 1913 and bought a chair and a chest. August 6, 1944 The 5th Infantry Division is assembling at Vitre and the 35th at Bracey, both on their way back from the First Army. The 90th Division was slow in crossing the Mayenne. The 79th has not yet reached Laval. The 6th Armored is closing on Brest and the 4th Armored on Vannes. I went to the Headquarters VIII Corps to see what is delaying the capture of St. Malo. Apparently is is simply the fact that the people are so damn slow, mentally and physically, and lack self-confidence. Am disgusted with human fraility. However, the lambent flame of my own self-confidence burns ever brighter. August 7, 1944 We had a really good bombing last night for about 45 minutes. I August 7, 1944 (cont'd p.2) think they were using small bombs, around 200 lbs. and possibly some personnel bombs as there was a funny noise I have never heard before. One bomber got our ammunition dump north of Avranches to the tune of one to three thousand tons. This is still going off. The 83d is on the outskirts of St. Malo but has not taken it and are having heavy casualties. The 6th Armored is close to, but not in, Brest, Dinan was captured by an infantry team of the 8th Division, which is now moving up the Peninsula west of St. Malo on Dinard. The 4th Armored is in Vannes and is approaching Lorient. The 79th Division is crossing the river on pontoons at Laval and the 90th is across at Mayenne and being relieved by the 1st Division of the First Army. The 5th Armored is near Chateau Gontier while a reconnaissance troop of the 8th Division is at Chateaubriant. About 0830, an Aviation Lt. Colonel named Coffee, who was shot down at Angers, came in with an FFI officer he had hidden with, near Angers, for three weeks. He and the FFI and a U.S. Lieutenant, whom they picked up, drove from Angers to Chateaubriant by back roads and met no large formed bodies of Germans. They saw German signal detachments taking up wire while moving east. The French say the Germans are steadily drifting east, north, and west of the Loire River. The bridge at Angers is intact, and as our telephone lines were blown out, I sent General Gaffey, the Frenchman, and Lt. Colonel Bernard Carter to Vitre to pick up a combat team of the 5th Division and its tank battalion and reconnaissance troop and, guided by the Frenchman, to attack and take Angers; also directing the Division to send a battalion to Nantes. I am doing this without consulting General Bradley as I am sure he would think it too risky. It is slightly risky, but so is war. August 7, 1944 (cont'dp.3) We got a rumor last night from a secret source that several Panzer Divisions will attack west from the line Mortain-Barenton on Avranches. Personally I think it is a German bluff to cover a withdrawal, but I stopped the 80th, French 2d Armored, and 35th in the vicinity of St. Hilaire just in case something might happen. Generals Lee, Plank, and Hughes called. As usual, Lee was in a great hurry to do nothing and covered with smiles. I have seldom seen a man less suited for his job. Someone described him very aptly the other day; "He is a pompous little son-of-a-bitch only interested in self-advertisement." August 8, 1944 We are moving the Command Post to a point southeast of St. James. At 0900 Bradley released the 80th, French Armored and the 35th. As soon as it is disengaged, I am closing them on Le Mans with a view to attacking north on the axis Le Mans-Alencon-Sees. I would rather head for Chatres or Dreux but Bradley won't let me. This axis of attack is, in my opinion, too close in. Hughes and I drove to Dol to see the VIII Corps, then on to near St. Malo, where the leading regiment of the 83d Division has its Command Post. General Macon, who commands the 83d, is doing well, but unquestionably the American infantryman is not as good as the engineer, the signal, the ordnance, the tanker or the aviator. I do not know why this is, but it is an evident fact. The 83d has already lost 800 men and taken 1300 prisoners, but in the street fighting the men lack drive. When Macon saw me coming with Hughes he turned quite pale - I presume imagining that Hughes was to relieve him, so I called out, "Fine work", and he felt better. At the moment he needs more praise than blame. August 8, 1944 (cont'd p.2) When I got back I wrote an order for the attack of the XV Corps. Hughes and Kenner said it was historic - I hope so. August 9, 1944 Visited the XV Corps to see that they get going. They are attacking with the 2d French Armored and the 90th Division on the left, and the 5th Armored and 79th Division on the right. Since there is a gap, and a large one, between Mayenne and Le Mans, we moved the 80th Division, covered by the 106th Cavalry, into it as a precautionary measure. St. Malo and Angers have both fallen. When I got home I found Spaatz, Tedder and Bradley. The last time we were all together was at Gafsa, when the Germans bombed us in broad daylight. Spaatz brought me six bottles of beer, all the way from America [*Sp. for addn'l text from long hand diary*] August 10, 1944 Flew to 12th Army Group, as I am worried about the hole in our line from St. Hilaire to Mayenne, and also another gap southwest of Alencon. The people at Army Group Headquarters did not take any interest as Bradley feels that there is no danger, but anyhow I am concentrating on the 7th Armored at Fougeres just in case of trouble. August 11, 1944 The night before last the Germans strafed our prisoner of war camps on the Granville-Avranches road three times, getting seventeen of their own people. Our Provost Marshal very properly opened the gates and let August 11, 1944 (cont'd p.2) the prisoners scatter. About fifty failed to return. Those who did come back were very grateful to us and loud in their condemnation of the Germans. They all opened up and talked much more freely. The officers said that in Germany, prisoners would not have been treated with equal humanity. Visited XV Corps headquarters northeast of Le Mans, then the 79th and the 5th Armored and the 90th Divisions. I could not find General Le-Clerc, of the 2d French Armored, as he was running around the front, although I followed him further up than caution should have permitted. I did meet his Chief of Staff. The 5th Armored and the 2d French Armored had quite a fight yesterday and lost, between them, 40 tanks. However, they caused equal or greater casualties to the Germans, and got several thousand prisoners. Haislip is always complaining and asking for help. Got home to find that Gaffey had not yet got the VIII Corps going, so we can release the 4th Armored. I was quite angry. We will assemble the 7th Armored Division at Fougeres to cross the Mayenne, moving on Alencon, while the 80th moves north to join them from the Laval-Le Mans Road. When and if the 35th is relieved by the 1st Army, I will have it close on the same units to form the XX Corps, which will then be on the left of the XV Corps. The 5th Infantry Division, less on Combat Team at Angers, will assemble at Le Mans and be joined by the 4th Armored as soon as relieved. These two divisions will then form the XII Corps and be prepared to move northeast. Dinard still holds out. August 12, 1944 Decided to put the XII Corps, under General Gilbert Cook, southeast August 12, 1944 (cont'd p.2) of the XV Corps, that is, on the right flank. It will consist, as before, of the 4th Armored Division and the 5th Infantry Division, less one Combat Team. This will permit us to retain a stranglehold on the Brest Peninsula, having two combat teams of the 6th Armored Division take over from the 4th, if General Bradley consents. Middleton came and I explained it to him. He was disappointed, but nice as usual. Bradley will try to get the British Navy to do something about the enemy boats off St. Malo, and the U.S. air to work on the little fortified islands; also to get some air on the Dinard peninsulas and town of Dinard. We have had too many casualties trying to avoid bombing towns. General Cook came in and we talked over his mission. He understands. Drove to our new command post at a point about six miles northwest of Le Mans P. 18-44-3. It is in a woods and quite hot. On the way Codman and I visited the Chateau Fougeres. It is one of the best, from a military point of view, that I have ever seen, because the dwelling part of it was destroyed by Richelieu and people have not lived in it and improved it. It has only been taken twice until we took it, although it dates from 1100. The XX Corps jumped off this morning, headed north. August 13, 1944 This morning we decided that since the XX Corps was hitting nothing, we had best send it northeast, east of Le Mans. We will use the 7th Armored and 5th Infantry, sending the Combat Team of the 80th, now at Le Mans, to Angers. The XII Corps will then consist of the 4th Armored and the 35th Infantry, which is assembling southeast of Le Mans tonight. The 4th Armored Division should close there in two days. The XV Corps, consisting as before of the 5th Armored, 2d French Armored, 90th and August 13, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 79th Divisions, has taken Alencon and the Sees-Argentan line and is in battle to the north. This Corps could easily advance to Falaise and completely close the gap, but we have been ordered to halt because the British sowed the area between with a large number of time bombs. I am sure that this halt is a great mistake, as I am certain that the British will not close on Falaise. As a matter of fact, we had reconnaissance parties within a few miles of it when we were ordered back. When I get the 80th, less one combat team pinched out, as it will be by the 1st Division of the First Army and the left of the French, I will put it in the VIII Corps and get the 6th Armored Division relieved. This will give me five armored and four infantry divisions on the marching flank, the XX Corps moving on Dreux and the XII Corps on Chartres, the XV Corps remaining where it now is. In this formation I can turn from north to southeast without crossing columns and can shift divisions between Corps at will; as I have no Corps administration it is all from division directly to Army. It should be a very great success, God helping and Monty keeping hands off. August 14, 1944 In exactly two weeks the Third Army 1 has advance farther and faster than any army in the history of the war. So far that is not known. 1. Third Army was not officially released as in action until August 15, Though they were actually operational on July 28. On that date I marked the map and the official communique as my instinct told me that Patton strategy was on the march. I verified this weeks later. BAP August, 1944 (cont'd p.2) One of our own P-47*s strafed the crossroads near Headquarters, getting a tank carrier. It was shot down by one of our antiaircraft guns. Codman and I took off in two cubs and flew via Le Mans to Alencon. I admit that I never cared to do anything less, particularly since all my friends assured me that I would be shot down by our own air, or by our ground troops. We landed in a field and commandeered a medical peep to visit Haislip, whom we found quite pepped up. I told him of my plan to move the XX Corps on Dreux and the XII Corps on Chartres. I then flew back to the Command Post at St. James to see Bradley and sell him the plan. He consented, and even permitted me to change it so as to move the XX Corps on Chartres, the XV on Dreux, and the XII on Orleans. He will also let me keep the 80th and give Middleton an infantry division from the First Army to replace the 6th Armored in Brittany. It is really a great plan, wholly my own, and I made Bradley think he thought of it. "Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to deceive." I am very happy and elated. I got all the Corps moving by 2030 so that if Monty tries to be careful, it will be too late. No bombing for the first time in two weeks. August 15, 1944 Patch and the 7th Army landed at Toulon this morning. I inspected two evacuation hospitals at Le Mans with Colonel Odom. Many Free French and German wounded, and few Americans there. The French are real fighters and keen to get back. For the first time the Americans are showing a desire to get back into the fighting line. This is very refreshing. Also, the number of cases of war-wearies (the new name for August 15, 1944 (cont'd p.2) cowardice) and self-inflicted wounds have dropped materially since we got moving. People like to play on a winning team. General LeClerc of the 2d French Armored, came in, very much excited, for the following reason: In order to save time in the attack on Mantes-Gassicourt, I simply had the two right divisions of the XV Corps, now the 5th and 79th, change direction on Dreux, leaving the French and 90th to hold the Argentan pincer and backing them up with the 80th. I had no intention of doing anything to hurt the feelings of the French, but did have very strong intentions of having the troops move east promptly. General LeClerc wrote me a fool letter, which he failed to sign, and in which he said among other things that if he were not allowed to advance on Paris he would resign. I told him in my best French that he was a baby, and I would not have division commanders tell me where they would fight, and that anyway, I had left him in the most dangerous place. We parted friends. Bradley came down to see me, suffering from nerves. There is a rumor, which I doubt, that there are five Panzer Divisions at Argentan, so Bradley wants me to halt my move to the east on the line of the XX Corps at Chartres, the XV Corps at Dreux, and the XII Corps Chateaudun. His motto seems to be, "In case of doubt, halt." I am complying with the order, and by tomorrow I can probably persuade him to let me advance. I wish I were Supreme Commander. Just heard on radio that I command the Third Army in France. August 16, 1944 As to the question of why the XV Corps halted on the east and west line through Argentan will certainly become of historical importance, I wish to add the following: After I had telephonic orders to halt from General Leven Allen, Chief of Staff of the 12th Army Group, August 16, 1944 (cont'd p.2) I again called him at 1215 on the 13th of August and asked if he had any orders to permit me to advance. I told him that we were on the line directed and had reconnaissance beyond it, and it was perfectly feasible to continue the operation. General Allen repeated his orders to halt on the line, and consolidate. I believe that the order to halt and consolidate emanated from the 21st Army Group, and was either due to jealousy of the Americans or to utter ignorance of the situation, or to a combination of the two. It is very regrettable that the XV Corps was ordered to halt, because it could have gone on to Falaise and made contact with the Canadians northwest of that point, and definitely and positively closed the escape gap. A stenographic report of this conversation with General Allen is in the telephone conversations in the History of the Third Army. Codman, Stiller and I drove in two peeps to Chartres, which had just been taken, and met General Walker at the bridge. There was still firing going on in the town. The bridge had been partially destroyed by a German hiding in a foxhole, who pulled the detonator, blew up the bridge, killing some Americans on it, and then put up his hands. The Americans, instead of killing him, took him prisoner. I can never get over the great generosity of the American soldier which, I am sorry to say, costs him many casualties. We then drove via Chateauneuf-en-Thim to the Headquarters of the XV Corps, which is between that town and Dreux. General Haislip had a bad eye from being run into by a French truck. I believe there were some sixteen stitches taken. However, he is in good spirits and the troops were in position in the vicinity of Mantes. We drove to Alencon and north on the road to Sens to the rear headquarters of the XV Corps August 16, 1944 (cont'd p.3) which consists of the 2d French and 90th U.S. Divisions, who occupy the line between Argentan and Sens, holding the southern half of the bottleneck, which is only partially shut and still waiting the arrival of the Canadians. When, on the 15th, I told Haislip to move on Dreux, I used the two right divisions of his Corps, the 5th Armored and the 79th, to save time. When I returned to Third Army Headquarters at 1830, Bradley called up and directed that I use the 2d French, 90th and 80th Divisions to capture a town called Trun about halfway up in the gap to Falaise. He said that General Gerow, of the V Corps would arrive in a couple of days to take over the command of these two divisions, as his own Corps had been pinched out. I told him that pending the arrival of Gerow, I would make a temporary Corps with Gaffey. Gaffey left at 2000 with orders to attack tomorrow morning. At 2330 Bradley called up and told me to withhold the attack until he, Bradley, ordered it. I delivered this order. Life is rather dull. August 17, 1944 This morning at 0730 Gerow called from Gaffey's Headquarters north of Argentan, saying he was there with a small staff, ready to take command. I told him that since Gaffey had arranged the attack, which might come off at any moment, Gaffey should run it and he, Gerow, could take over as the opportunity afforded. I could not talk to General Bradley on the radio as it is too dangerous, so I decided to fly up and see him. The weather was so bad that I could not take off until 1200, arriving at Headquarters 12 Army Group at 1250. General Hodges was there, also under the impression that Gerow was commanding. The August 17, 1944 (cont'd p.2) temporary corps, consisting of the 90th, 80th and 2d French, is attacking in conjunction with the rest of the First Army, and for this reason it is sound that Gerow should run it. Imagining that something like this would happen, I told General Gay before I left headquarters that I would call him on the radio, and that if Gerow was to take over at once, I would simply say, "Change horses". I therefore called Gay on the phone and gave this phrase, adding that the attack should take place at once on same objectives. I doubt whether in the history of the world an attack order was ever shorter. I will lose these three divisions at least temporarily, and the VIII Corps will get two pinched out divisions from the First Army; also two Ranger Battalions for the purpose of cleaning up Brittany, still under the Third Army. Haislip's Corps will press the attack to secure Mantes and thereby close the Seine and the road west of the river, to prevent German reinforcements. I will close the XX XII Corps to the north to support this movement. We got the directive for this operation at 2210. The XV Corps will attack in the morning. I phoned a warning order over the radio to the XX Corps, but could not say where. However, I happened to meet Walker on the road and told him the general idea. His G-3, Colonel W B * Griffith, was killed today by a sniper. I fear General Cook is out of this war with bad arteries. He is a fine man and very sorry about leaving and I am sorry to have him go. Colonel Odom got wounded by a sniper, but it is said to be not * W B Griffith #9 August 17, 1944 (cont'd p.3) serious. He was wounded in the same woods through which I drove this afternoon. General LeClerc cut up again today and Gaffey had to ask him categorically whether he would disobey a written order. One year ago today I finished the Sicilian Campaign. August 18, 1944 In spite of the fact that I dispatched an order by armored car to the XV Corps at 2000 last night, which was an extension of the warning order sent by radio phone, the message did not reach them until 0600 today. Regardless of this fact, they jumped off and reached Mantes, meeting with small opposition, killing about 50 Germans and taking about 125 prisoners. I visited General Cook at the hospital. His circulation is so bad that he has no feeling in his hands or legs below the elbows and knees and his toes are turning black. It is impossible for him to walk a hundred yards. After a long conversation, in which I was very frank and honest, I told him that in justice to himself and his men, I could not retain him in command. It was a great blow to us both. I telephoned General Eisenhower, asking him as a personal favor to give General Cook a DSM. I also wrote General Cook a letter of commendation, and wrote General Lear asking him to use Cook at home. August 19, 1944 I flew to Chatueauneuf, then drove, via Dreux, to Mantes, and saw the Seine. I then flew to St. James, headquarters of the 12th Army Group. This was a long flight in very bad weather. We almost had to turn back twice. However, I was rewarded by seeing three trains on the track between Mayenne and Le Mans. August 19, 1944, cont'd p.2 Bradley had just returned from a visit to Monty and Ike. He now has a new plan. He thinks there are still Germans east of Argentan and in order to check up on this pocket, he wants me to move the 5th Armored Division of the XV Corps north along the west bank of the Seine to Louviers, while the XIX Corps of the First Army comes up on its left as far as Audemer. The British were asked to do this but said they could not move fast enough. We get the Risle River as a boundary between the bombing efforts of the RAF and the VII and XV Corps. I asked if the 79th could make a bridgehead at Mantes and was given reluctant permission. I then asked if I could take Melun-Fountainbleu and Sens. By getting these in addition to the crossing at Mantes, the line of the Seine becomes useless to the enemy. Bradley said it was too risky, but eventually I talked him into letting me try Monday, the 21st, if I do not receive a stop order by midnight, Sunday, the , 20th. I also asked for a plan of future operations and an inter-Army boundary, extending well to the front so I can plan supply - to the present time the boundary has always stopped at the front line. To placate Montgomery, Eisenhower is going to put the Ninth Army between him and the First Army and let them turn northeast, while the First and Third Armies go east. There is also some talk of sending the VIII Corps south over the Loire, at Nantes, to clear up the area. Bradley also declined to let me withdraw the 6th Armored from Brittany for fear of a possible attack from the south. In my opinion, such an attack is wholly impossible because the bridges are out, there are very few Germans and those that still exist have to walk. Therefore, even if they cross at the Loire they can do no harm. August 19, 1944 (cont'd p.3) Codman flew to Vannes and brought my old friend, General Koechlin- Schwartz, French Army, of the Langres days, up to spend the night. He said, "Had I taught 25 years ago what you are doing, I should have been put in a madhouse, but when I heard that an armored division heading for Brest, I knew it was you." He said that the trouble with the French army of 1940 was that for ten years they had taught, thought and practiced defense, never attack. I reminded him that at Langres he had said, "The poorer the infantry, the more artillery it needs, the American infantry needs all it can get." He was right then, and still is. I phoned the XV Corps to attack, and will have the XX and XII Corps Commanders in tomorrow to explain what to do. Civil life will be mighty dull - no cheering crowds, no flowers, no private airplanes. I am convinced that the best end for an officer is the last bullet of the war. Quelle vie. August 20, 1944 One combat Team of the 79th Division of the XV Corps crossed the river at Mantes with little opposition. The 5th Armored Division was starting on Louviers at a point near Evreux when some Germans hit it in the tail. The 7th Armored Division, which was at Evreux, joined in and the Germans lost ten tanks and withdrew, but it delayed the move for the 5th Armored. Had in Walker of the XX Corps and Eddy of the XII Corps and told them to get ready to move out at daylight Monday. The XX on Melun and Montereau and the XII on Sens. I gave them one code word "Proset", which means "halt in place", to be used in case Bradley loses his nerve at the last moment. I always have a funny reaction before a show like this. I think of the plan and am all for it, and then just as I give the order, I get nervous and must say to August 20, 1944 (cont'd p.2) myself, "Do not take counsel of your fears" and then go ahead. It is like a steeplechase - you want to ride in it and then when the saddling bugle goes, you are scared but when the flag drops, all is well. Eddy asked me how much he should worry about his right flank and I told him that depended on how nervous he was. If you worry about flanks you could never fight this sort of war. Our air can spot any group of enemy large enough to hurt us and I can always pull something out of the hat. In addition, the air can delay them. We moved to a new Command Post at Drou, 15 kilometers north of Chateaudun. Willie got bitten by hornets and is quite ill. General B.O. Davis (colored) wants to see me. I went to see him. We are having too much raping and murder by the colored troops - at least 15 rape cases, 2 murders and a riot. Davis is a very sensible man. August 21, 1944 Colonel Nixon just came in at 1600 with three complete fuses out of enemy buzz bombs. We also captured at the airdrome three complete engines and a lot of crated bombs; also 500 five thousand pound bombs. Had a long letter from Jake Devers. When I am in the money, he is devotion itself, but he had forgotten my address for a year. The score sheet of the Third Army for the first 20 days of operation is as follows: U.S. Troops killed, 1713; wounded, 7,928; missing, 1,702; Total, 11,343; non-battle casualties, 4286; Grand total, 15,629. Replacements, 10,622. August 21, 1944 (cont'd p.2) Enemy casualties - killed (official) 10,055; Prisoners of War, 45,270; total, 53,325. The estimated enemy losses; killed, 11,025; prisoners of war, 49,650; wounded, 48,900; Total 109,575. Material losses (U.S. ) light tanks, 70; medium tanks, 157; guns (75mm and over) 64; other vehicles 780; total, 1071. Material losses (German) German Mark III and IV tanks, 269; Mark V and VI, 174; Guns (75mm and over) 680; other vehicles, 2,492; Total, 3,615. In all cases the estimates are larger than the reported enemy casualties and losses because, due to the slowness of getting in reports, there is a lag of from five to fifteen days. However, at the final sum0 mation of the Sicilian Campaign, the estimates and the actuals differed by only 2% and the estimates were shorter than the actuals. Mr. Patterson 1 and General Somervell 2 called this morning and were both very nice and complimentary. General Somervell noticed that I had no bifocal glasses so he said that he would send me a pair. Our attacks on the crossings of the Seine and Yonne have been successful. Eddy got Sens with the bridges intact. Walker got Montereau and they are closing on Melun. Apparently there is quite a fight going on at Rambouillet between a couple of thousand Germans and the 2d Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division. We have, at this time, the greatest chance to win the war ever presented. If they will let me move on with three corps, two up and one back, on the line of Metz- Nancy-Epinal, we can be in Germany in ten days. There are plenty of roads and railroads to support the operation. It can be done with three armored and six infantry divisions. I would like an extra armored division. It is such a sure thing that I fear these blind moles don't see it. "If I were king..."etc. The 5th Division presented me with 1. Mr Robert B Patterson Under Secretary of War 2. Gen Brenton Somervell - Chief SOS USA August 21, 1944 (cont'd p.3) a captured Cadillac car and a huge Moroccan rug, both taken from German Headquarters in Orleans. I turned the car over to the Ordnance but will send the rug home. I will now read the Bible to get some support for my argument in the morning. August 22, 1944 Flew to 12th Army Group at 1130 to see General Bradley about my plan but found he had gone to see Generals Eisenhower and Monty, so left my plan with Allen. It seems that Bradley has an almost identical plan, only he uses two armies. I told him that I feared that General Middleton was through as an active commander, as he is too querulous. Just heard that the citadel at St. Malo fell, because an American of German ancestry, who was a prisoner of war, was put on kitchen police. This man was from Brooklyn and met two German cooks who were also from Brooklyn. He talked the cooks into punching a hole in the water tank so that all the water ran out, and the garrison then had to surrender. True or not, this is a very good story. I will send General Gay to Brest tomorrow to see about the situation there. Colonel Codman goes to Cherbourg, and Stiller and I will go to Sens to have a look and be seen by the troops. August 23, 1944 At 0815, General Gaffey said that the brother of the Swedish consul in Paris, a man named Ralph Nordling, and a group of other French individuals from Paris were in camp with a proposition. I immediately thought that this might be the asking for a surrender, so had Sergeant Rosevich take down the conversation and had photographers take pictures. However, it turned out that these people simply wanted to get a suspension of hostilities in order to save Paris, and probably save some Germans. I August 23, 1944 (cont'd p.2) sent them to General Bradley, who locked them up. Just as they were leaving, General Juin of the French Army, whom I knew in Corsica, came in. He is de Gaulle's Chief of Staff, and he was quite complimentary and said that my daring was Napoleonic. He also said that the soft place in the Siegfried Line is through Nancy Gap. I had come to this conclusion simply by a study of the road map. It is my belief that wherever you see numbers of good roads, the going is good. I am not particularly interested in the strength of the line itself, because I believe that American troops can break any line. After Juin left, six labor leaders from the U.S. came in and I had to talk to them. While this was going on, Haislip called up to protest against leaving the Third Army and to say he was being strafed with rockets. As he was on a radio link I could not tell him that due to our rapid advance our fields are so far in the rear that we have practically outrun air cover and will not get any for some weeks. I later found that the rocket strafing did not kill anybody. To go east, as I planned, I need two more divisions. It will take till late on the 25th to get up the 80th and at least 24 to 36 hours more to get the 90th, so I decided to see Bradley and to try to steal, or borrow, all or part of the VII Corps supposed to be closing at Chartres. I rather hate to go east with only four divisions, especially if I have to leave one north of Orleans. Took Colonel Muller with me to clarify the supply situation. When I got to Laval, Bradley was waiting for me on his way to see Ike and Monty. He was quite worried, as he feels that Ike won't go against Monty and that the American armies will have to turn north in whole or in part. Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory had been with him all day, trying to sell him this idea. Bradley was August 23, 1944 (cont'd p.3) madder than I have ever seen him and wondered aloud "what the Supreme Commander amounted to". I then went to headquarters Twelfth Army Group to see General Allen. After seeing him and finding that I could not get the VII Corps due to the fact that it has not closed on Chartres as I had supposed, it occured to me that we must go north, the XX Corps from Melun and Montereau and the XII Corps from Sens can do it faster than anyone else. By heading on Bauvais we can pick up the 4th Division, which will be south of Paris tomorrow, and then get the 79th and possibly the 5th Armored by having them cross at Mantes and paralleling the Seine, open that river to the British and Canadians, and have our supplies come across at Mantes, thereby reducing the present haul by 50%. This is the best strategical idea I have ever had. I sold it to Allen. If Bradley approves he has only to wire me, "Plan 'A'" by 1000 tomorrow. If I do not hear anything by that time, I shall then move east as already decided in "Plan B" I am having the staff put both plans in concrete form. This may well be a momentous day. The French 2d Armored and the 4th Infantry Division entered Paris this afternoon. The XII Corps wiped out several thousand Germans at Montargis this afternoon. They were probably elements of the 16th Division, lateley south of the Loire. I cannot understand why Monty keeps asking for all four armies in the Calais area and then through Belgium, where the tanks are practically useless now, and will be wholly useless this winter. Unfortunately, he has some way of talking Ike into his own way of thinking. I told Bradley that if he, Hodges and myself offered to resign unless we went east, Ike would have to yield but Bradley would not agree and said august 23, 1944 (cont'd p.4) we owed it to the troops to hold on because if we left, the pickings were poor. I think other motives activated him. I feel that in such a showdown we would win, as Ike would not dare to relieve us. August 24, 1944 The British radio, BBC, said this morning that Patton's Third Army had taken Paris. Poetic justice. It will be refuted, but no one will pay any attention. However, I found out that when the French 2d Armored got into Paris they stated that they were still under the Third Army, although they were in the First Army at the time. Just as I was starting out to visit the XX Corps, General Koenig came to see me and said that he was enroute to Paris. August 25, 1944 We moved today to a new Command Post - the eighth move - this time 15 kilometers south of Pithiviers. While I was waiting to start, General Bradley called and asked me to come to his headquarters at Chartres at 1100. The Cathedral is not hurt and is very lovely. All the glass has been removed; it is quite light. I said a prayer for continued success. Hodges was at Bradley's and we got our new directive. The First Army of nine divisions will cross the Seine at Melun and Mantes, both of which places were captured, and bridges erected, by Third Army. He will then drive in the general direction of Lille. The Third Army with seven divisions, the XII Corps (4th Armored, 35th and 80th) the XX Corps (7th Armored and 5th) the XV Corps (French 2d Armored and 90th) will advance in the direction of the line Metz-Strasbourg. The direction is part of my plan. August 25, 1944 (cont'd p.2) Drove to the new Command Post and decided to fly to the XX Corps. The sergeant pilot said he knew where it was but got lost and finally we flew over a group of German ambulances, so it was clear we were behind their lines. I turned back at once and nothing happened. August 26, 1944 The Signal Corps asked to have pictures of one day's operations, so this morning, when I was driving to Headquarters at Fontainbleau, I let some of them accompany me. Then on via Nemours to beyond Montereau to the Headquarters 5th Division under General S. Le Roy [Lip] Irwin. They have done a great job and are full of pep. I complimented them and gave them some DSC's. Then drove back via XX Corps to Melun, where we crossed the Seine on a pontoon bridge along with elements of the 3d Armored Division, who cheered me; thence to Headquarters of the 7th Armored Division. I told General Sylvester very clearly that I was not satisfied with his Division, either as to looks or progress, and that he had to do better at once. I then flew to headquarters XII Corps to see Eddy on the Sens-Troyes Road. While I was there General "P" Wood, 4th Armored, called to say he was in Troyes. The 80th Division is to be assigned to the XII Corps today, so it will be able to carry out the new movement. Eddy asked when he should move and I told him at 0600 on the 28th. He is not used to our speed yet, so was a little surprised. When I got to camp I found that a flock of Red Cross doughnut girls had descended on us. August 27, 1944 XX Corps took Nogent last evening and will continue on Reims. XII Corps is moving on Chalons via Vitre, leaving the 35th Division to cover August 27, 1944 (cont'd p.2) the right flank. I am doing this on the order of higher authority, as personally I do not believe there is anything south of the Loire. Studied the "black market" dope intently and could see no hazards there. Flew to Orleans where a little shelling is going on from across the river, which seems to indicate that some Germans are there, but not many. The airport northwest of town broke a world's record by receiving and dispatching 600 planes yesterday, with 1500 tons of supplies. August 28, 1944 As of August 26, the score sheet was as follows: Losses, U.S.: killed, 1930; wounded, 9041; missing, 1854; total 12,825. non-battle casualties, 5,414; grand total, 18,239. Replacements, 13,649 Losses, German (estimated casualties) killed, 16,000; wounded, 55,500; prisoners of war, 65,000; total, 136,506. Materiel losses, U.S. - light tanks, 82; medium tanks, 187; artillery (75 mm and over) 74; other vehicles, 956; total 1299. Materiel losses, German - tanks, Mark III and IV 327; Mark V&VI, 231, Artillery (75 mm and over) 892; other vehicles, 2903; total 4,353. Today was the first day that I have received letters and clippings from home which appeared subsequent to the announcement of my commanding the Third Army, and I spent a very pleasant evening reading them. We took Chateau Thierry at noon and will, I hope, have Vitry-Le- Francois, Chalons and Reims by now. Bradley came in at 10:30 and I had to beg like a beggar for permission to keep on to the line of the Meuse. What a life. August 29, 1944 Went carefully over the situation. There is no real threat against us from anywhere so long as we do not let imaginary dangers worry us. Drove to headquarters XII Corps just short of Troyes. "P" Wood and Eddy were both there. I told Eddy to move on Commercy in the morning and Gay will visit Walker and have him move on Verdun. While at XII Corps I found that, for unknown reasons, we had not been given our share of gas - 140,000 gallons short. This may be an attempt to stop me in a backhanded manner but I doubt it. I will go to see General Bradley in the morning and straighten the thing out. The fact that we can talk only be radio link is a great drawback, because the enemy can hear this if he is listening, and I do not wish him to know we are short of gasoline. August 30, 1944 Tried to fly to Chartres, Headquarters 12th Army Group, but had to turn back due to bad weather, and therefore decided to drive up in the new Cadillac which the 5th Division presented to me. Bradley, Bull (Ike's G-3) and Leven Allen (Bradley's Chief of Staff) were all talking when I arrived. I asked to present my case for an immediate advance to the east and a rupture of the Siegfried Line before it can be manned. Bradley was sympathetic but Bull - and I gather the rest of Ike's staff - no not concur and are letting Montgomery over- persuade Ike to go north. It is a terrible mistake, and when it comes out in after years it will cause much argument. The British have put it over again. We got no gas because, to suit Monty, the First Army must get most of it, and we are also feeding the Parisians. When I got back to our new Command Post, the ninth, at La Chaume, 10 kilometers north of Sens, I found that Eddy, of the XII Corps, had told Gaffey August 30, 1944 (cont'd p.2) during my absence that if he pushed on to Commercy he would arrive with no gas, so Gaffey told him to halt near St. Dizier. I told Gaffey to have Eddy run till his engines stop and then go on, on foot. We must and will get a crossing on the Meuse. In the last war I drained 3/4 of my tanks to keep the other 1/4 going. Eddy can do the same. It is terrible to halt, even on the Meuse. We should cross the Rhine in the vicinity of Worms and the faster we do it the less lives and munitions it will take. No one realizes the terrible value of the ' unforgiving minute ' except me. Someway I will get on yet. De Gaulle is now trying to hold the 2d French Armored Division in Paris although they were promised to me yesterday. I need them badly in order to relieve the 35th Division from guarding the right flank and let the 35th join up with the XII Corps. August 31, 1944 Flew to Chartres in the cub and then with Bradley in a C-47 to Morlaix. Then we drove, one hour, to Hdqts VIII Corps, and another half hour to the Plougastel-Daulas Peninsula which had just been taken and where we now have artillery emplaced. Middleton is not too sanguine about the capture of Brest. He is full of alibis and complaints about the fact that his infantry does not fight very well. We then flew back to Chartres and, on the way, saw our air attack the islands off St. Malo. It was too late to return to my Headquarters so I spent the night with Bradley. Simpson of the Ninth Army was there, and we arranged that he will take over the Brest Peninsula campaign, using the 94th Division to relieve the 6th Armored Division, which will move east to the line of Orleans-Troyes. Bradley definitely wants us to go on east but cannot August 31, 1944 (cont'd p.2) persuade Eisenhower. This is the last day that Montgomery commands the U.S. Troops, for which we all thank God! September 1, 1944 At 0800 we heard on the radio that Ike said Monty was the greatest living soldier and is now a Field Marshal. I then flew up to the Command Post and worked on administration papers for the rest of the day. September 2, 1944 Got set to visit the XV Corps, when Bradley asked me to come to Chartres at 11:00. Weather too bad to fly, so left by car. Arrived at 12:45. Ike, Brad, Hodges and Vandenberg, of the 9th Air Force, were there. Ike was very pontifical and quoted Clausewitz to us, who has [have] commanded larger forces than C ever heard of. He is all for cleaning up the Calais area. I told him the Third Army already had patrols on the Moselle near Metz and Nancy. We finally talked him into letting the V Corps, First Army, and Third Army attack the Siegfried line as soon as the Calais area stabilizes. Until this is done we will not be able to get gas or ammunition for a further advance. He kept talking about the future great battle of Germany, while we assured him that the Germans have nothing left to fight with if we push on now. If we wait, there will be a great battle of Germany. He also said that Lee and the communications zone have done a marvelous job, whereas we consider thatthey have failed utterly and probably lost a victory before winter, through their inability to keep us supplied with gasoline. As soon as I get sufficient gasoline, I have permission to secure crossings over the Moselle and prepare to attack th Siegfried Line. Ike is all for caution, since he has never been at the front and September 2, 1944 (cont'd p.2) has no feel of actual fighting. Bradley, Hodges and I are all for a prompt advance. Ike did not thank or congratulate any of us for what we have done. General "Wild Bill" Donovan was in camp when I got back and was most complimentary. While I think the efforts of his cohorts (office of strategic services) are futile, I personally like and admire him a lot. I will now get set for the next move. September 3, 1944 Campanole, Stiller and I left by plane for the old Headquarters of the XII Corps, 14 kilometers west of Vitry-le-Francois. There we picked up a car provided by General Eddy and drove to the new command post at Ligny-En-Barrois, which we reached at noon. I explained the new plan to Eddy and found, to my delight, that he had captured 100,000 gallons of gas, so could still move "P" Wood was there and came to lunch. Then we all drove, via Commercy, to the headquarters of the 80th Division at Gironville. Vitry and St. Dizier were pretty well bashed. After talking with General McBride of the 80th, who seemed in good form, we had a look at the country. Montseg, situated well out to our left front, Apremeont, Pannes and Essey, were there too, as they had been in 1918 when we attacked on the 12th of September, exactly 26 years less 9 days ago today, and here we are again. On top of Montseg is a huge monument to our dead at St.Mihiel. This monument was erected under the supervision of General Eisenhower when he was with the Graves Registration, after the last war - his only experience of that incident. Our present delay in advancing, due to the turn to the north, which he permitted, will probably cause the erection of many similar monuments. On the way back heard a rumor that there was an attack on Troyes so flew by on the way home to see, September 3, 1944 (cont'd p.2) but all was quiet. Colonel Bruce Clark, 4th Armored Division, took Commercy by a headlong charge with his light company, putting out four 88"s right beyond the bridge. He is a most dashing officer. In this operation he had one company of medium tanks (17) and two companies of armored infantry in line advance over flat country for a distance of 5,000 meters. During this advance all weapons fired. The Germans were strongly posted with guns and machine guns, but we didn't lose a man nor have a vehicle hit and killed some 600 Germans. When Clark reached Vitry he heard from a French civilian that the bridge was not blown up, but was covered by four 88's. He charged through the town and over the bridge with a company of light tanks, all guns firing, and either killed or drove away the crews of the 88's so that he captured the bridge intact and actually knocked some of the 88's off the road. He certainly is the most brilliant tank commander we have so far developed. We will get crossings at Nancy and Metz by the "rock-soup" method and I gave the orders today. This is the rock soup.method: once a tramp went to a house and asked for boiling water to make rock soup. The lady was interested and gave him the latter, in which he placed two polished rocks he had in his hand. He then asked for some potatoes and carrots to put in the soup to flavor the water a little, and finally ended up by securing some meat. In other words, in order to attack, we have first to pretend to reconnoiter and then reinforce the reconnaissance and then finally attack. It is a very sad method of making war. The Score sheet as of midnight 2d of September is as follows: September 3, 1944 (cont'd p.3) U.S. casualties - killed, 2678; wounded, 12,756; missing, 2474; total 17,908; non-battle casualties, 6,912; grant total, 24,820; replacements 19,506. German losses (actually recorded) 10,000 buried by our Graves Registration; procecessed through prison pens, 61,937; total, 72,320. Materiel losses, U.S. - light tanks, 94; medium tanks, 223; artillery (75 mm and over) 83; other vehicles, 1,147; total, 1,547. Materiel losses, German - Mark III and IV tanks, 402; Mark V and VI, 247; Artillery (75 mm and over) 1,236; other vehicles, 3,524; total, 5,409 It should be noted that many of our vehicles can be repaired since we retain the battlefield. None of the German vehicles can. Moved camp to a point southeast of Chalons. Colonel Solbert 1 and Mrs. Rosenmann, wife of the President's adviser, Sam Rosenmann, ostensibly making a study of the soldiers' reactions to the so-called GI Bill of Rights, came in. She is just sightseeing, and a very Jewy Jewess. Flew to the rear echelon north of Orleans and then drove to Orleans to see how the 6th Armored Combat Command are getting on. Everything was satisfactory. Then flew to new headquarters site, number 10, southeast of Chalons. September 5, 1944 Bradley called to say he would be here at 1100, so we got three Corps Commanders in. Bradley said that as the situation in northern France is now stabilized, the Third Army would get half of all the available supplies and can move across the Moselle and force the Seigfried line and halt on the Rhine. We will also get the 2d French, 70th 83d and 6th Armored; the latter two as soon as they can be relieved by 1. Col. Oscar Solbert (changed from Sohlberg) Chief of Special Service September 5, 1944 cont'd p.2) units of the Ninth Army. Until the XV Corps (79th, 83d, 2d French) get [in] near Troyes, the XII Corps will have to simply hold the shoulder from Neufchateau to Nancy, but secure a crossing at or near Toul or at Pont-a-Mousson. When the XV Corps is operational, the XII will advance along the line Nancy-Chateau-Salins. The XV Corps will attack echeloned to the right rear, crossing the Moselle south of Nancy, probably in the vicinity of Charmes. Eddy is still hopped on the idea that his right flank is in danger, which it is, but not as much as he thinks. September 6, 1944 Codman, Stiller and I drove to the front, passing through Verdun and Etain. When we got to Etain we moved to the north. When we came to the forward position of the Headquarters of the 90th Division, however, we got there before the Division did and could only find the Provost Marshal. We then returned to Etain and to Conflans, which is famous as having been the birthplace of Brigadier Gerard's famous Hussars. It is on the front line and being held by elements of the 2d Infantry of the 5th Division under Colonel A.W. Roffe, who accompanied us from a town just west of Conflans. In the town we found some of the 7th Armored which had been halted for an hour by machine gun and mortar fire to the front. On the way back I stopped at the Headquarters and told General Sylvester that he was not doing his stuff and that I expected within two days to have him make a tank charge and get somewhere. I am convinced that Sylvester while not sufficiently bad to warrant reclassification, is very mediocre, if not worthless, as an armored commander. If he does not improve, it may be necessary to replace him. I also told him that he had been quoted in the press as saying, "The only thing which stopped the 7th Armored Division has been orders from higher authority." He denied September 6, 1944 (cont'd p.2) having said it. In view of my experience with the press, I believe him. I then stopped to see General Walker, who promises to get things going. When I returned to Headquarters, I found that the First Army was planning to use 250 trucks attached to the 2d French - which reverts to us - for the supply of the First Army. General Gaffey had already kicked to General Allen and had gotten a compromise, saying that the gasoline procured by the French trucks would give the French a basic load and they would receive 50% of the residue, with the rest going to the First Army. The First Army is constantly trying to do picayune things like this. Will send Gay to Paris to see that we are not shortchanged. The XII Corps got a bloody nose at Pont-a-Mousson, and one battalion of the 11th Infantry was forced back across the river with a loss of 294 men. All this comes from the fatal decision of the Supreme Commander to halt the Third Army until the Pas-de-Calais was cleared up. A fateful blunder. September 7, 1944 Stayed in camp. Sent Gaffey to XX Corps and Gay to Paris. Drove to Reims in the afternoon, just for a look. September 8, 1944 Drove to Ligny-En-Barrois to see the XII Corps, then on to the front line east of Toul. It is clear to me that the battle of the war may well be in, or [and] south of, Toul. Visited the front line where General "P" Wood has his headquarters, if anything too close to the front, as shell fire was coming up the valley to the left. However, it is refreshing to find somebody who will September 8, 1944 (cont'd p.2) get up. The people in this part of the country are certainly pro-German, and show no enthusiasm for us when we drive through . Called Bradley to ask that the 83d and 6th Armored be moved east, and let the Loire take care of itself. No supply line runs near it and any enemy who is fool enough to cross it would have to walk. As it is, we have two divisions guarding nothing and our future south of Toul is in danger, due to the absence of these two divisions. But Bradley said, "I can't take the risk". And by so saying takes a much worse risk. If the weather is flyable I will go up and try to talk him over in the morning. September 9, 1944 Arrived Headquarters 12th Army Group at 0845. Bradley, due to my telephone conversation last night, is now partially in favor of letting the 83d and 6th Armored divisions move up. He is flying to Brest to have a look at the situation and talk with General Simpson. He said to me, with reference to the Brest Operation, "I would not say this to anyone but you, and have given different excuses to my staff and higher echelons, but we must take Brest in order to maintain the illusion of the fact that the U.S. Army cannot be beaten." More emotion than I thought he had. I fully concur in this view. Anytime we put our hand to a job we must finish it. I accompanied him in his plane as far as Paris. Codman and I called on Madame De Vaux and her son, where I had lunch. I had known them 27 years ago at Bourg. After lunch we called on General Bernard Serigny, Petain's old Chief of Staff, and who has broken with Petain as the result of the latter's actions. Serigny said September 9, 1944 that, 'while he admired General Pershing, my tactics were a thousand times better.' Of course this is French. The XX Corps now has five battalions across the river south of Metz. The counter-attack on the 80th Division at Toul was not as bad as pictured. However, a wandering group of Germans got into the command post of the 90th Division and are alleged to have captured some important papers, but were knocked out with heavy losses; 700 men and 11 tanks. September 10, 1944 There were two phases to the attack on the 90th Division. During the night 8-9 September, sometime after midnight, a deployed tank company of Germans stumbled by accident into the Command Post of the Division where they did some harm and, in fact, awoke General McLain with a tank firing in the opposite direction from him at a distance of about 20 feet. This outfit was driven out and apparently rejoined the rest of their unit, a Panzer Division. The survivors returned to their unit and the reduced Panzer Division attacked the 90th at dawn, but in the meantime the 90th was ready. They had quite a fight at close range and destroyed 40 German tanks and killed 900 Germans. One of the few tanks to escape was a Panther, Mark V. It came straight through our lines, apparently oblivious to what we shot at it, and then turned sharply left to a road leading to Germany, still not firing. Up this road came one of our scout cars and the German tank ran over it, squashing it flat, and then disappeared in the dust. This is the first instance, to my knowledge, of a German tank running away. I will send General Gaffey to Paris in the morning to see what we September 10, 1944 (cont'd p.2) can do about getting more supplies and about extracting the 6th Armored and 83d Infantry Divisions. The XV Corps will attack along the line Chaumont-Neufchateau-Luneville at 0800 tomorrow. September 11, 1944 XII Corps is having a hard fight south of Nancy but is making progress. It is reported that one reconnaissance tank company [will get] got across the Moselle in the face of heavy resistance, while a second one crossed farther south, unopposed. In both cases, though, they were having difficulty erecting bridges due to enemy artillery fire which is very intense, the heaviest we have so far encountered. The XX Corps lost one bridgehead and a battalion of infantry from the 5th Division, but captured a second bridgehead. 90th Division is pushing towards the river north of Metz from Thionville south. Elements of the 2d French Armored made contact with the 1st French Division of the Seventh Army 25 kilometers northwest of Dijon today. There seems to be a new plan in the offing which will place more emphasis on the action of the First Army. I wish people would stop making plans and changing their minds, particularly when they always seem to do so at our expense. We may now lose the 83d Division. The arrival of the 6th Armored Division is again delayed, so that they can help escort 20,000 Germans, who surrendered south of Orleans, to the Border, and protect them from the French FFI. When these Germans surrendered, they said it must be specifically understood that they were not surrendering to the Ninth Army but to the Third Army. Some way I will manage to keep going. We fly to 12th Army Group in the morning for a conference on the whole subject. September 12, 1944 Archbishop Spellman was with Bradley when I got there. He is a very clever little Irishman. I had with me General Gaffey, Colonels Muller and Nixon. General Hodges was there with his G-4 Colonel Wilson, who is a very able crook. Lee's G-4 and Communication Zone's General Plank were also present. Wilson read his list of supplies received from the 10th of September back to the 1st. They were smaller than mine, but we compared this with the list issued to the Com Z and found that actually he had gotten more. He was falsifying his record in order to steal more supplies from the Third Army. It was decided that we had enough supplies to get to the Rhine and force a crossing. It seems that Joe Collins of the VII Corps told Monty, who told Ike, that the VII Corps was held up due to lack of gasoline. Actually, he was held up by enemy resistance, but wished to avoid making such a statement. Ike jumped on Bradley for not taking gas from the Third Army to help the VII Corps. Monty is still trying to make all the Armies attack in the low countries and against the Ruhr. If he does this I shall have to hold the west bank of the Moselle defensively and put the XX Corps into Luxembourg. I persuaded Bradley to let me continue the attack until the night of the 14th, but if, by that time, I have not secured a bridgehead, I will move to the north as he wishes. Got back to camp at 1430 to find General Hughes. He brought me a pearl-handed 38 Colt, also letters, and a new type of issue coat. We tried to visit the XV Corps, but it had moved so we only found the rear echelon. This was Stiller's fault as he had nothing to do all day but get the exact location. He is too casual. September 12, 1944-(cont'd p.2) While at the 12th Army Group, General White, Chief of Staff of the Seventh Army, came in and we made arrangements to have physical contact between the two armies. I will send Colonel Harkins with a man from SHAEF and a man from the 12th Army Group to visit the Seventh Army on the 16th. I will also try to get General Patch's son, who is in the 79th Division, sent down to visit his father. September 13, 1944 Hughes and I flew to the Command Post of the XII Corps and found that General Eddy had gone to the 80th Division, which had got five battalions across the Moselle south of Pont-a-Mousson. This group was surprised by a German counterattack this morning and didn't behave too well. In fact, the Germans got right down to the bridge. Fortunately Colonel Clark of the 4th Armored arrived in the nick of time and drove the enemy back and took a lot of prisoners. The 2d Infantry and one Combat Command of the 7th Armored Division were also driven off a hill northwest of Metz by a German counter-attack. However, the 35th Division, less one Regiment, but with Dager's Combat Command of the 4th Armored Division are well over south of Nancy. Also the 5th Division, less the 2d Infantry, are across south of Metz. Hughes and I crossed over the Moselle and visited an observation post from which we saw a nice tank fight about 1500 yards away. In the foreground were two dead German tanks burning brightly, while beyond them four of our tanks were attacking the woods. You could see the gun flashes and distinctly hear both the reports of the cannons and machine guns and tell the difference between the rate of fire of the German and our own machine guns. We then drove to the XV Corps headquarters, which took about three hours, They did very well taking September 13, 1944 (cont'd p.2) Neufchateau and bypassing Chaumont, whose garrison now wants to surrender, and they also secured a crossing across the Moselle, at Charmes. When we got back to camp at 19:30, Archbishop Spellman was there. I had sent a plan[c]e to Paris for him and he brought me a letter from the President. September 14, 1944 Stayed in camp today to work on papers. Archbishop Spellman came back from a visit to the XX Corps and we had a long talk. He is a most interesting man - anti-Roosevelt, anti- CIO, anti-Negro, Jew and English - quite a man. The 2d French Armored Division got three attacks from Epinal last night and repulsed them all and then took Epinal. We move camp in the morning. September 15, 1944 Moved to a new camp five miles southwest of Etain, east of Verdun. It is an old battlefield full of shell holes and trenches, presumably German. Stopped for lunch at Verdun with Bradley. Pink Bull, G-3 to Ike, was there. He and Bradley were having quite an argument. Monty does what he pleases and Ike says "yes sir". Monty wants all supplies sent to him and the First U.S. Army, and for me to hold. Brad thinks I can and should push on. Brad told Ike that if Monty takes control of the XIX and VII Corps of the First Army, as he wants to, he, Bradley, will ask to be relieved. Bull says that Ike feels that we think he is selling us out but that he has to, as Monty will not take orders, so we have to. Bradley said it was time for a showdown. I offered to resign with him but he backed out. One corps of two divisions from the 12th Army Group will go to Patch, Seventh Army. Then Simpson (Ninth Army) will get seven divisions, and the First and Third Armies will be reduced [raided] to nine infantry September 15, 1944 (cont'd p.2) and three armored divisions each, by which time, in my opinion, the war will be over. I feel now that I will get the 83d in addition to the 6th Armored Division, which I already have. That will give me ten divisions - I need them. While this argument was going on, we got news that Nancy had fallen; also that the XV Corps had destroyed the 16th German Division and sixty tanks. This is a great piece of timing, both as to the attack and the receipt of it. These tanks had the intention of attacking the right of the XII Corps, and I had sent the XV Corps where I had to, to Charmes, to take these tanks in flank. It all worked out as planned. The 80th Infantry Division was attacked all day but held its ground, though one battalion was cut off at Mt. Pont-a-Mousson. It got 27 tanks, total for the day, 87 - not bad. We asked for an air drop to give them ammunition and rations, which was approved all the way until it got to some agency in England, where a 2d Lieutenant stopped it. However, we will get the drop some way. I looked up General Walker and asked him why he was so slow. He got the idea, but is having trouble with the fort west of Metz. I hope to bomb hell out of them tomorrow. If the XII Corps breaks through, I will give it the 7th Armored Division and let the XX Corps, with the 83d 90th and 5th Divisions, contain Metz. September 16, 1944 Ten assorted Russians are to visit us today, so I won't be here. I decided to go to the front. I had a map prepared for them which showed exactly nothing in a big way. This is what they do to us. Visited the XII Corps at noon. Eddy is quite tense, but doing a good job. I told him to go to bed early and take a couple of drinks. September 16, 1944 (cont'd p.2) I hope he can make a rush for the Siegfried Line on the 18th, by which time he should have cleaned up the Moselle in his sector. I gave him the new boundaries and advised, but did not order, that he attack in columns of divisions, leading with the 4th Armored, and that he be prepared to move first, to secure a gap through the Siegfried Line; than to send some armor, backed by one Recon. Combat Team, straight to the Rhine in the vicinity of Worms in the hope we may grab a bridge before it is blown up, then to leave a second unit to hold open the gap in the Siegfried Line and [the 3d] a third Division to mop up any Germans between the Moselle and the Siegfried Line. I told him he had [bad] more Corps artillery than ammunition, and to demobilize half of it and use its vehicles to move infantry and [men to] have the artillery men garrison the town. I then drove to XX Corps via Toul, Essey and Pannes. I could recognize all the places where I was 26 years and 4 days ago. From what I noted today I must have walked a long distance on that 12th of September. Everything looked natural except a wall behind which I observed the enemy from Pannes in 1918. As I remembered it, it was a low rubble wall. As I found it today, it is a high, thin, cement wall. They must [may] have built a new one. General Walker was quite pessimistic as to his ability to take Metz, so that I told him that if he could not take it in a few days, I would take the 7th Armored Division away from him and give it to the XII Corps leaving him to contain Metz with what he has. That may get him going. Haislip called up to say that the 2d French Armored Division wants to stay with the XV Corps. There is an effort on the part of the French Army in the south to have it detached from the Third Army and attached to it. I would like to keep them as they have fought very well and by holding them I will have four armored divisions. September 16, 1944 (cont'd p.3) I moved Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored to Neufchateau. We had a plan to use 11 groups of medium bombers on the Metz forts today, but the weather prevented this. I will attempt to get it done tomorrow. September 17, 1944 The Scoresheet as of September 17th: U.S. casualties - killed, 3,841; wounded, 18,231; missing, 4,120; total 26,202; non-battle casualties, 10,185; grand total, 36,387; replacements to date, 34,595. German casualties - (official count) prisoners of war, 74,097; buried, 10065; total, 84,702. German casualties (estimated) - prisoners of war, 87,800; killed, 26,200; wounded, 73,600; total, 187,600. Materiel losses - U.S. - light tank, 121; medium tanks, 264; artillery,(75mm and over) 99; other vehicles, 1354; total, 1,838. Materiel losses - German - Mark III and IV (mostly Mark IV tanks) 542; Mark V and VI (mostly Mark V) 307; artillery (75 mm and over) 1,596; other vehicles, 4,206; total, 6,651. The anti-aircraft in the Third Army has shot down to date, 234 German planes, certain, plus 106, probable. It has rained all day and the ground is so slippery that it has adversely affected our tanks. I sent Gaffey to the XII Corps to try to get the attack on the Siegfried Line started. The best they can do is the morning of the 19th. That is too late, but we can do no better. Have ordered Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored to move to Toul, September 17, 1944 (cont'd p.2) so that all of the 4th Armored and 35th Divisions can move into the line. I will send the XV Corps across the Moselle to cover the right flank. I think now that I may accompany the 4th Armored in their attack on the 19th, as a little personal influence may be helpful. Bradley called to say that Monty wants all the Americans to stop so that he, Monty, can "make a dagger-thrust with the 21st Army Group at the heart of Germany." Bradley said he thought it would be a "butter-knife thrust." To hell with Monty. I must get so involved that they can't stop me. I told Bradley not to call me until after dark on the 19th. He agreed. September 18, 1944 Drove to XV Corps to tell Haislip to attack his axis tomorrow morning as far as the line Luneville-Baccarat. Decorated General LeClerc with the Silver Star and Bronze Star and gave him five Silver Stars and 25 Bronze Stars to hand out in his division. Just then, at 1330, we got a message from Vetnard Wilson's Cavalry that two columns of infantry and tanks were attacking Luneville from the direction of Baccarat. On hearing this I told the XV Corps to move out at once on their objective with the 79th on the left and the 2d French on the right, leaving one combat command of the French west of the Moselle. General Wyche, commanding the 79th Division, happened to arrive at this moment and showed great promptitude in getting his units moving. I left at once for Nancy to see Eddy. He was a little worried, but not badly, so he is sending Combat Command "B", 6th Armored Division, to stop the counter-attack. It is just as well that I got this unit up last night. The attack by the XII Corps against the Siegfried September 18, 1944 (cont'd p.2) Line will go on as planned in the morning, counterattack or not. General Eddy still thinks my attack is premature - I hope that the Germans agree with him. The 5th Division of the XX Corps, and the 80th Division of the XII Corps, are now in physical contact east of the Moselle near Pont-a-Mouson. We will surround Metz from the south with the 5th Infantry and 7th Armored, and contain west of the river with the 90th. The 90th Division is doing a hell of a lot of shooting. I can hear the guns plainly. This may be necessary, but we are very short of ammunition. If the weather ever permits we will have eleven groups of medium bombers to work on Metz. Meantime, there is no use in making poor infantry worse by batting their heads against forts they won't take. If I had one more infantry division I could really do something, but Bradley is afraid to release the 83d on account of German ghosts south of the Loire. I went over a G-2 and Engineer study of the Siegfried Line and find that the two places I picked from a study of the road net are the best from all viewpoints. In the higher brackets, such as an Army, a study of roadmaps is more important than a study of contour maps. Roads govern war. September 19, 1944 Codman, Stiller and I drove to headquarters XII Corps. We found Eddy quite down and in a defeated state of mind. The 35th Division had been counter-attacked and pushed off the hills northeast of Nancy, with the result that the enemy has observation and can fire into Nancy. Wood's 4th Armored was being attacked and the XV Corps had not yet September 19, 1944 (cont'd p.2) reached Luneville, so I told Eddy what Grant once said, "In every battle there comes a time when both sides consider themselves beaten; then he who continues the attack wins." I also told him what Lee said at Chancellorsville, "I was too weak to defend, so I attacked." These wise remarks seemed to revive Eddy and he directed that Baade 1 of the 35th retake the hills by dark. Drove over to see Wood. He was out in the front line and there was shooting going on. Clarke, with Combat Command "A", had just destroyed 20 tanks. Since Clarke crossed the Moselle he has bagged 1,462 prisoners, killed 676, destroyed 70 tanks, 455 other vehicles and 27 guns. I realize that Wood is pretty thinly extended, but feel that the risk of continuing the attack is justified, owing to the effect it will have on the Germans if we break through the Siegfried Line. Anyway, it is always best to attack, especially against the Germans, because if you defend against them, they get a chance to get set and make plans to attack you. The XV Corps is having a hard time getting to Luneville. The 80th Division of the XII Corps is fighting southeast, but very slowly. The Germans are really putting on a show. The 15th Panzer Division has been identified. September 20, 1944 Went to Verdun for a conference with Bradley and Hodges. The latter failed to show up. We saw a map study which completely confirms the line of attack I have been advocating, namely, to drive through with two Corps abreast and the third echeloned to the right rear on the general axis; Nancy-Chateau-Salins-Sarreguemines-Mainz or Worms, and then northeast. To do this successfully I need at least two more infantry divisions and should retain four armored divisions. I may be able to use 1. Gen Paul W. Baade CG 35th Div September 20, 1944 (cont'd p.2) the Moselle-Rhine Canal to cover my flank as far as the border. I believe that the Germans fighting us now are all the Germans there are, and that they have no depth. I further believe that at least 4/5 of the German armor is opposed to the Third Army. Before I start east I must either take, or contain, Metz. If I can get the 11 groups of bombers on Metz for three consecutive days, I can take it. The situation tonight is tense but we will win out. We must. September 21, 1944 Things look better today. The 4th Armored lost 30 tanks in a fight yesterday, but the enemy lost more and withdrew. The 35th and 80th Divisions, also XII Corps, have pushed the enemy back to the northeast of Nancy. Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored, will join them in the final attack. The XV Corps is progressing satisfactorily. The XX Corps is still very sticky. Harkins returned from a liaison visit to the 6th Army Group (General Devers) and told me that Devers was making a great deal of talk about the number of troops he is going to take from me, so I flew to Paris for an hour this morning to see Ike and spike Dever's guns. Ike hates him. He was very nice and had me to lunch. I think my visit was a success. Devers and Patch got there shortly after I did but were told to wait until 2:00 o'clock. We then had a meeting but the question of stealing troops from the Third Army did not come up. However, I took the occasion to speak to Beedle Smith and ask his assistance in case it did come up. One has to fight one's friends more than the enemy. Just called up all three corps and things seem much brighter. Ike still insists, for the present at least, the main effort must be thrown to the British and the northern flank of the First Army. However, September 21, 1944 (cont'd p.2) he was more peevish with Montgomery than I have ever seen him. In fact he called him a "clever son of a bitch", which was very encouraging. September 22, 1944 Codman, Stiller and I drove to the 90th Division, where I talked over with their staff the plans for future operations against Metz. We then drove to Headquarters of the 358th Infantry of the 90th Division, commanded by Lt.Col. Christian Clark, formerly General Drum's Aide. This regiment holds the line of the Moselle from Thionville inclusive to Metz exclusive. They were very glad to see me, insisted on my staying for lunch and presented me with a captured dagger. It is a good thing to get down to the small units and a great pleasure, as they are always so glad to see you. After lunch we drove to the Headquarters 3d Cavalry Group and picked up Colonel Jimmy Polk. From there we drove north into Luxembourg as far as the Third Army Boundary and visited Headquarters 3d Cavalry Squadron. On the way we passed some alleged French troops whom General Walker inadvisedly got to hold the line of the Moselle. They are the most undisciplined bandits I have ever met and have no weapons to speak of. I believe their sole purpose in life is to eat American rations and to do as little work as possible, except some quiet murder on the side. I hope to get rid of them. September 23, 1944 I intended to visit units of the 5th Infantry and 7th Armored but at 11:00 General Bradley called saying that I will have to give up the 6th Armored, so I drove to Verdun to see him. He was feeling very low because Montgomery has again put it over on Ike and demands the assistance of the First Army in a push into the Ruhr. To do this, I September 23, 1944 (cont'd p.2) will have to send an armored division and also assume a defensive attitude, due to lack of adequate supplies. Also, General Devers told Eisenhower that since he could easily supply the XV Corps via Dijon, it should go to him. He said he could give it a thousand tons a day after October 1. I pointed out to Bradley that if he can supply it in his Group, he can also supply it in my Army. Bradley will take this up with General Eisenhower. The truck haul from Dijon to Luneville is less than a hundred miles. Going on the defensive and having our limited supplies cut still more is very discouraging. Bradley and I are depressed. We would like to go to China and serve under Admiral Nimitz. When I got back I found that I could disengage the 7th Armored Division and move it faster to the north than the 6th, and so arranged to do this. I also called General Bradley, due to the fact that a t Granville, in the motor park, there are 200 special tanks which we could possibly get. I did succeed in talking him out of the 83d Division, which will move in north of the 90th to cover the so-called Luxembourg Gap. In my opinion the gap does not really exist, but it was a good talking point to secure the division. When I told General Gay about our various disappointments, he said "What price glory!", meaning that after the Moroccan success, the Tunisian success, the Sicilian success, and now, finally, in France, we have invariably been whittled down. Mr. Bailey, head of the United Press, called this morning. I told him that I can not and will not be quoted, and he said that he understood. He seemed a very intelligent man; possibly I was prejudiced in his favor because he told me that he had just been to the States and September 23, 1944 ( cont'd p.3) that when I appeared on the screen in the movies, I received more applause than any other person except the President, and tied him. At 1800 Bradley called to say that Ike feels he is committed to let General Devers have the XV Corps permanently, if Devers can support it. I am not usually incli[d]ed to grumble or to think that the cards are stacked against me, but sometimes I wish that someone would get committed to do something for me. However, all my disappointments have turned out for the best. I wanted to command in Italy and that turned out badly. I wanted to command the assault on the beaches here. It also was quite a failure. I felt, and with reason, that when the XIX and VII Corps of the First Army turned north, I should have got the V Corps, which was paralleling my left. I didn't get it, and this attack also soured. I should have more faith. If Jake Devers gets the XV Corps, I hope his plan goes sour. The Lord is on my side, but he has a lot of getting even to do for me. September 24, 1944 As a result of my talk with Bradley, Gaffey, Maddox and I drove to Nancy where we met the three Corps Commanders and arranged for a present defensive front, and also selected the point where we will make limited attacks in order to fix that front, so that when we resume the offensive as we will, we will have a good take-off line. The 4th Armored was attacked this morning and was in very bad need of air assistance. The weather was really unflyable; however, General Weyland ordered two squadrons to attack. This they did, coming in through radio direction at a height of about 15 feet. Then they turned and skip-bombed the enemy tanks, hitting one. The remaining tanks retreated into the woods where the airplanes bombed them quite successfully 1. It was a very fine example of air-ground 1. They knocked out 24 of 26, according to German reports. September 24, 1944 (cont'd p.2) support. Fortunately the planes were able to re-land at the advanced air strip near Conflans. Haislip was very depressed at the prospect of leaving Third Army and I was equally depressed at the prospect of losing him. September 25, 1944 General Bradley wrote me a "Top Secret" letter on September 25th, today, copies of which are in this typed diary, which says on the second sheet, "In order to insure supplies sufficient for an offensive operation by the First Army, the Third Army and any elements of the Ninth Army placed in the line are directed to assume the defensive." This plan is based on having enough "rectifying" of the line necessary so we can continue to attack. In consonance with this letter I got out an overlay covering my conference with the corps commanders of yesterday. This conference was based on previous oral knowledge of the directive. My plan for taking the defensive is to continue to rectify the line, thereby maintaining the offensive spirit in the troops so that when we will attack we will not be pacifists. After having this plan approved by Bradley, I visited Fort Vaux which certainly is a monument to concrete, because it was pounded to pieces and is still a defensible locality. Received a wire from General Marshall asking me to contact, at my convenience, Madame Jouatte at Gondrecourt. She was his landlady in the last war. September 26, 1944 Colonel Campanole, Codman and I drove to Gondrecourt onlyto find that the Jouatte family no longer live there. We got this information through the Mayor, who was a great friend of the family and who gave us their address. September 26, 1944 (cont'd p.2) We then drove via Neufchateau to Chamount and had lunch at the Hotel de France where 27 years ago Generals Pershing, Harbord, Colonel De Chaumbraun and I lunched the day we selected Chaumont for Headquarters American Expeditionary Force. After lunch we went to General Pershing's house in town and to the barracks where our offices used to be. The barracks had been badly bashed in by our air force, about 15 days before we retook Chaumont. We then drove to Langres and stopped on the way at Val Des Ecoliers, where General Pershing lived during the latter part of the war. It had apparently been vandalized by someone. Langres looked very natural, but we had no time to stop and drove on to Bourg. The first man I saw in the street here was standing on the same manure pile which he undoubtedly stood on in 1918. I asked him if he had been there in the last war and he replied, "Yes, General Patton, you were then here as a Colonel." Then we had an Old Home Week. He offered to show me around the town, which I really didn't need, but nevertheless I permitted him to do this. I visited my old office, my billet, and the Chateau of Madame De Vaux and took pictures. On the way back to Headquarters we drove past the airfield from which Codman's squadron operated in the last war and we took some pictures of him with the airfield for a background. A day full of memories 1. 1. On this day in 1918, G. Gen Patton was severely wounded while leading a tank attack at Cheppy-en-Varennes. September 27, 1944 A big day for visiting firemen. Generals Hughes, Peterson 1, "Happy" Green 2 of the AA, with five Brigadier Generals and Generals Lee, Plank, and finally General Spaatz, arrived. I had a very pleasant time with Spaatz, who is all for the Third Army. I have the airforce in my pocket. As usual, General Lee is a glib liar. Hughes was very much depressed at having to sit at the same table with him. The situation - and it will be a scandal some day - is that Lee made no preparation at all for Line of Communication troops and is now asking for between eight and eleven battalions of infantry to do his dirty work. He is also using all the transportation from the newly landed divisions in the Cherbourg Peninsula to haul supplies because he has failed in his supply set-up. I cannot understand why General Eisenhower does not get rid of him. Called Brad and found that Jake Devers will take and keep the XV Corps. May God rot his guts. However, I succeeded in talking him out of the infantry elements of the 26th Division, and later he told me I could get as much of the division as is movable. I will use the infantry regiments of the 26th Division to relieve part of the 80th and all of the 3th Armored Division. The 4th Armored was attacked three times today and repulsed all attacks. Colonel Sears' regiment of the 35th Division was kicked off a wooded hill northeast of Chateau-Salins and was ordered to retake it. Our infantry is certainly not up to the rest of our troops. Felt very low. Must trust in God and my destiny. 1. Gen Peterson (no initials to ?) H 2. Gen J.A. Green September 28, 1944 Stiller and I left at 0900 by peep to visit the leading elements of the 80th and 5th Divisions. I have had some discouraging reports about their morale, due largely to the horrid conditions under which they had to live. We went via St. Benoit and Thiaucourt, with its huge U.S. Cemetery, monument to the fatuous results of the last war, to Pont-a-Mousson, and thence to Command Post of the 80th Division where we picked up General McBride, crossed the river, and stopped at a regimental headquarters and on to the forward observation post. There was some shelling out in the valley, with occasional machinegun fire. The 80th Division does not hold a secure bridgehead, as right in front of it are three hills which look straight down the valley to the bridge. McBride has a plan for taking these hills when he can relieve his northern regiment, which is to be rested up. The other regiments now holding the line are dead on their feet. I told him that I had secured the infantry elements of the 26th Division (I will probably get all of it) and that when it arrives I will let him have a Combat Team. I noted two machine guns so placed that they could not hit anything except at extreme ranges, and yet the ground they were supposed to cover was within 400 yards range. This is due to the fact that the officer who emplaced them stood up when he picked the positions, thus putting his eye about five feet above the guns. At that elevation you can see everything - at the muzzle of the guns you can see nothing. I can never understand why some officers are such fools. Returning to the regimental headquarters, I decorated three men and made some battlefield promotions; then drove to the Headquarters 5th Division and picked up General Irwin, crossed the river and picked up Colonel Worrall Roffe, 2d Infantry, and went to his leading battalion. September 28, 1944 (cont'd p.2) The German position in their front is very strong. The Germans were shelling the road we had to drive over, and also a battery position we had to pass. On the way back one shell burst close enough to throw dirt on us and a second one struck just beside the peep about eight feet from the side of the road. Luckily this shell was a dud, or these lines would not be written. I heard that after we had passed another shell of the 150 mm size hit right in the road, but apparently it must have hit behind us. Colonel O.C. Harvey, who used to be Assistant G-4 of the Seventh Army under me, and who is now G-4 of that Army, called, and says that the Seventh Army will not be able to support the XV Corps until the 1st and then only with gas and rations, and no ammunition until the 10th. Yet the XV Corps is supposed to pass to the Seventh Army at 2400 today. As usual, Devers is a liar and, by his glibness, talked General Eisenhower into giving him the Corps. He got the XV Corps on a statement that he could easily supply it with 1000 tons a day. I also received a report that a British mission had just arrived in Luxembourg and had taken over control from my G-5 officer. Informed Bradley. I told Harvey that the Third Army would continue supporting the XV Corps for twenty-four hours. September 29, 1944 Eddy phoned and asked me to come to Nancy so I flew there, arriving at 10:00. The 35th Division is being attacked by at least one German Division and possibly two, and has lost some ground. The 4th Armored Division is also being attacked. I told Eddy to put the rest of the 6th Armored Division in to help the 35th. He was reluctant to do this, because he said that if they failed, they would be destroyed September 29, 1944 (cont'd p.2) because they would be on the far side of the river. I told him that was a damn good reason why they wouldn't fail, and reminded him that Cortez burned his ships. I also called Gaffey and told him that unless the XX Corps was worse off than I thought, they would send the Combat Command of the 6th Armored Division, now attached to the XX, back to the XII Corps. This Combat Command started to move in 15 minutes. I also told him to direct all ammunition available to the XII Corps. Generals Ike and Bradley came to lunch and we had a guard and a band. After lunch General Eisenhower talked to the assembled officers, who represented all the Divisions and the two Corps. He explained the situation in a lucid manner and assured us that eventually we would get supplies, and make a main effort. He said that the 6th Army Group [*(Devers)*] would never exceed 16 divisions and that the 21st Army Group [*(Metz)*] was limited to 17 divisions, due to a shortage of manpower. Therefore, all the remaining divisions which are landing will go to the 12th Army Group [*(Bradley)*]. The Ninth Army [*(Simpson)*] will take over Metz when we start our drive to the east. This is very reassuring, if true? He asked me for any suggestions and I told him that I felt someone should arbitrate the conflicting demands for supplies as between the 12th Army Group, the Com Z, and the Air Corps. Also, that the Com Z was too inflexible in its methods. That if things could not be done one way, they could be done another, and that fighting troops recognized this. I also asked him to release the names of all officers down, to include regimental commanders. Other officers' names and those of enlisted men have been already released. This will be a great help. So far so good. I also told him that I had a rumor, which I could not prove, that the Com Z had brought a number of grand pianos to France. September 29, 1944 (cont'd p.3) This seemed to make him very mad, and he said that if I could prove it, he would try somebody. After he left I had all the other officers come into the map room where I again explained my policy as outlined in Letter of Instructions #4 [*copy should be inserted here*]. In brief, we will defend by attacking locally, as and when we can get the supplies. As I see it, the Germans want both Metz and Nancy. They have Metz, so are content and will stay quiet there. Therefore, they will put all their efforts, which are not excessive, to re-capturing Nancy because they realize, as I did when I captured it, thatNancy, and particularly Chateau Salins, is the doorway to the invasion of Germany; therefore they will keep on attacking and get killed. September 30, 1944 Decided to stay in today, so sent Gaffey to the XII Corps. At 1500 the phone rang and Gaffey said he was talking over the radio and that I had best come to Nancy as fast as I could. I flew down, arriving at 1545, to find that General Eddy had ordered the two regiments of the 35th Division holding the woods west of Chateau Salins to withdraw, and that Gaffey had heard him give the order and had not protested. However, Gaffey did send for me. I was very angry. The 15th and 539th German Divisions were attacking the hill, but two-thirds of the 6th Armored Division was available and I had yesterday told General Eddy to put them in if the attack now in progress came off. Why Eddy did not do so, I cannot make up my mind. Eddy was at the command post of the 6th Armored, so Gaffey and I drove there and also sent for General Baade, 35th Division. I told all three generals that I was disgusted with them and wanted the 6th Armored to counter-attack in the morning, or tonight if they can get across. I also directed that the generals involved personally lead the troops to make up for their shortcomings. I told Baade to go to September 30th, 1944 (cont'd p.2) the front personally. I told Grow he was to retake the woods or not come back, and sent him to the front. To give up the ground which was contemplated would be equivalent to presenting the Germans with 100,000 men, because it would so favorably affect their morale. Called up the XX Corps and told General Walker to collect trucks for one Combat Command, less artillery, of the 90th Division, so that if the 35th breaks, as it well may do, he could get something down. Ordered all the extra ammunition we have - not much - sent to Eddy, and told XX Corps to be ready to move one infantry regiment by truck on call. Eddy was very manly in assuming full responsibility for the withdrawal order, but I cannot understand his frame of mind. He worries too much. I will do all the worrying necessary. The corps commanders must fight. I would get rid of him but I do not know of any other any better except possibly General Harmon, now commanding the 2d Armored Division. One explanation of Eddy's emotional failure may be that earlier in the afternoon he, Gaffey and Grow were all nearly killed by shell fire and Gaffey's Aide, Captain Taylor, and Grow's Aide, were hit. This may, unknown to them, have shattered their nerves. After I got through cussing them out, I told them the same thing I told Truscott in Sicily, namely, "Now I will go home as I know you will win." I feel they will. If I stayed it would show lack of confidence. We must remember the German is not a superman. We had to land in the dark, but made it. General Simpson, Ninth Army, came to dinner and is spending the night. It is now 0010 October 1st and I have heard nothing. I have called the Chief of Staff, XII Corps, and find that he is asleep, so things are probably going all right. Transcribed and reviewed by contributors participating in the By The People project at crowd.loc.gov.