GEORGE S. PATTON DIARIES Annotated transcripts Nov. 30, 1944-Mar. 22, 1945 (1 of 2)

BOX 3 FOLDER 9

November 30, 1944
Had in General Weyland and all the general staff to talk over
the current situation.  If the mediums can bomb visually, they will
do so tomorrow.  If they cannot, they will bomb on "Obo" (blind)
either Saturday or Sunday, depending on which day they can take off.
In any case, the 90th and 95th will attack on Sunday, bombing or
not.  It is a serious but not a desperate operation.
I called General Allen, Chief of Staff of the 12th Army Group,
to try and get at least one regiment of the 87th released at once
to take over Metz, so that I could get the entire 5th Division useable
for a breakthrough, should it occur.  I sent the 6th Cavalry
Group to cover the right flank of the XX Corps.  at 1800 Gaffey told
me that General Weyland felt that the medium bombers should attack
tomorrow by "Obo" for, if we wait, we might not again have flyable
weather.  The XX Corps could well use one more day to get ready,
but I decided that the advantages of the bombers out-weighed the
disadvantage of the lack of readiness and ordered the attack with
"Obo" bombing.
December 1, 1944
Governor Lehman (N.Y.) dined with us last night and seems quite
a man.  This morning I sent him with Codman to visit General Wood
to see how nasty the weather and mud really are.
The eight groups of light bombers were over the target,
Saarlautern, at 1100, but due to radio failure, only half of them
could release their bombs.  This is too bad.  Also the 95th Division
is having a lot of trouble getting to the river.  This is probably
partly my fault in jumping off today, but it seemed to me the lesser 
of two evils.  I will try to get the bombers again tomorrow.  Perhaps

December 1, 1944 (cont'd p.2)
our luck is still with us, and a second bombing may turn the trick. 
The 4th Armored Division, "P" Wood, got a counterattack by 13 tanks, but the situation is in hand. The other night two companies of Germans in a V formation with two tanks at the apex of the wedge made a night attack. The whole thing was lead by a cow with a red lanturn above her head, led in turn by a soldier, who must have been the least popular man in the outfit. Our artillery got them. 
December 2, 1944
        Some women in uniform sniped the right regiment of the 95th yesterday. All were killed. 
       Drove to XX Corps and visited Headquarters 95th Division. While we were there, ten groups of medium bombers flew over and bombed Saarlautern. 
      I then visited the 90th Division and went up to the Command Post of the 359th Infantry under Lt. Col. R.E. Bell. I told him I wanted to visit an observation post, so he guided me up the road. We got out of the peep in a woods and started walking down the road towards a big brown house on the right about 1000 meters from us. Bell and I were in the front, followed by Codman and Stiller. About half a mile down the hill, Bell showed me a pillbox covering the road at a range of some 250 yards. I felt very conspicuous but fortunately nothing happened. The observation post in the house was given a concentration just after I got there, but the shells fell about 75 yards to the north. I always hate to go in OP's in houses as they are too conspicuous and you always have a feeling that you are going to fall a long way from the roof, where the OP is situated. I 
was glad to leave, but feel that the Germans are not in Merzig or I 
would be dead.

December 2, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
            We then visited the 10th Armored which is in good shape, al-
though it received some money artillery fire last night. 
        It was finally necessary to ask for P. Wood's relief, as he is 
entirely too nervous to remain in command at the present time. 
December 3, 1944 
      Wood came to say goodbye. I had gotten Eisenhower's permission to send Wood home on a sixty-day detached service. I doubt that he was really sorry to go. 
        Eddy came in to talk about replacements. Our situation is bad; 
11,000 short in an army of three armored divisions and six infantry 
division. This means that the rifle companies are about 55% short 
of strength and no replacements in sight. Damn the weather; it is 
starting to rain.
       It will certainly be necessary to take another 5% of the head-
quarters Units and also to cannibalize the divisions to provide 
rifleman. 
      Sent Gaffey to take command of the 4th Armored. He is a most 
able soldier and has been my Chief of Staff three times; first in 
the Desert Training Center, then in Tunisia, then in France. He has 
already commanded a combat team and an armored division in action with outstanding ability. When I thought I would have to take over the Anzio beachhead, I had planned to take him along. He is a great pinch hitter, and I hope that by getting him this division I will be able to get him a corps. 
December 4, 1944
        I visited the XV Corps and Seventh Army. Their supply and re-
placement situation is much better than that of the 12th Army Group. 
1. take men from rear units to fill rifle units.

December 4, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
I think this is due to the fact that the 6th Army Group lets the Army deal directly with Com Z, while the 12th Army Group tries to administer too much. 
December 5, 1944 
         The 4th Armored Division made an advance of seven miles. General Earnest, whom I attached to it, led the attack. 
          The 90th Division will cross the Saar north of Saarlautern tonight. The 95th has made a second crossing further to the south. Both divisions are getting heavy artillery fire, but are not having heavy losses. 
       Madame La Marachale, 83 years old, came to dinner tonight and is most interesting. She leaves for Africa in the morning, but has arranged for me to visit her house, which is near here. 
December 6, 1944 
           The following Congressmen came at 1030: Merritt, New York; Costello, California; Brooks, Louisiana; Kilday, Texas; Davis, Tenn.; Sheridan, Pa; Winstead, Miss; Thomas, New Jersey; Elston, Ohio, Luce, Conn.; Harness, Indiana; Schafer, Michigan; Farrington, Hawaii, Pagon, Porto Rico. A WAC Lieutenant Colonel, Secretary to General Marshall was also along. 
           Congresswoman Luce made a very unfavorable impression on me and, I think, on everyone else. The whole crowd seemed to be below average  and was looking for trouble. We had them in for lunch, gave them nothing to drink, and only fed them issue food, as they were the type who would go home and say we ate too well. After lunch, I sent them via Chateau Salin to Metz, where Millikin took them charge. After they had all gone we visited the Lyautey house which is most interesting and has, naturally, 
a very complete collection of Arab and Berber things. 
        At 1845 I heard that Merritt and Luce had pulled the lanyards on

December 6, 1944 (cont'd p.2)
two of our guns firing on Fort Driant. I remember a similar incident in the last war which caused a great deal of unpleasant notoriety, so I called the Public Relations Officers to cut the story, only to find that this idiot had been passed by the SHAEF censor and sent out at 5:40. I am very angry.
      Generals Spaatz, Doolittle and Vandenburg spent the night, and we arranged for a future heavy bombing attack on the Siegfried Line in the vicinity of Kaiserslautern. We planned on a two or three day show, weather permitting. They visit Devers tomorrow to arrange for details with him. 
       At the briefing, at 1930, I fell on a stairway in the dark and hurt 
my coccyx. 
December 7, 1944 
Stayed in all day on account of the fact that I hurt my back last 
night. Colonel Maddox, who visited the XX Corps, reports slow house to house fighting in front of both the 90th and 95th Divisions, but the losses are not bad, although there is still heavy artillery fire. Whenever our planes can fly, this fire diminishes. The 90th cannot build a bridge over the river, due to enemy direct fire, so have to ferry across in the dark.  
      At my request, General Patch relieved the 4th Armored Division with part of the 12th Armored of the XV Corps. He was most cooperative
      The Black Market says we will get an air attack on our south flank, but I believe it is too rainy. I forgot to state that at the time General Devers was here on the 5th to learn my plans, he promised complete corporation, and so far seems to have given it. I am not sure that, as the lesser of two evils, it might not be better to be in his Army Group; he interferes less and is not as timid as Bradley. It would perhaps be a

December 7, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
mercy if the latter were gathered- a fine man, but not great. 
December 8, 1944
       We have been attacking now for one month and have liberated 873
towns and 1600 square miles. We have taken 30,136 prisoners and 
buried 2,158. We estimate, addition, aggregate of 88,900 German 
casualties; 137 tanks, 400 guns, and 301 other vehicles. We have lost 
23,235 men in battle; 18,641, sick or a total of 41,876. Replacements 
received are 30,177, thus making us about 11,000 short. We have lost 
15 tanks, 7 guns and 441 vehicles. 
                                     Score Sheet

December 8, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
During the 130 days of fighting to date we have averaged a daily loss 
from all causes of 812; the Germans have averaged during the same 
period 2,701. On November 8 our total casualties were 63,814; on December 
8, they were 105,690 or we have had 40% of our total casualties 
in the last month. In our score sheets we include our own sick but do 
not include the German sick, who must be equally numerous. 
December 9, 1944 
Things are going well, but not rapidly. The 26th Division gained 
5 kilometers today and has taken the high ground needed. One Combat Command of the 87th Division went up, starting the relief of the 26th, 
which will be assembled at Metz. All the 4th Armored Division is 
out resting; so is the 80th. Fort Driant fell yesterday at 1545. Bradley 
called up and seems to think that at long last the weight of the 
attack may be given to me. He also asked me to talk to the press on 
air-ground support used in this Army in order to defeat the advocation 
of other methods being used in other theaters. We are to be quoted. 
Weyland and I talked and had Sergeant Rosevich take down our remarks in
case of a misquote. One can't be too careful. 
December 10, 1944 
Generals Patch, [Gordon] General Saville and Weyland and the Third Army 
Staff all met to discuss a three-day blitz in the ZWeibrucken area. 
Spaatz and Doolittle suggested It when last here. All previous bomb 
carpets have been for one day, so we feel that three days will catch 
the enemy off base. As part of the XV Corps is tactically connected 
with the attack, we had to coordinate with Patch. We are now in agreement 
and will make a final decision on the 13th, when we find out

December 10, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
whether we can get a similar blitz five days later in front of the 
VI Corps. 
Went to church.
I got four watches from Patek, Phillipe and Company today. Lt
Colonel Prince Aly Kahn secured them for me. 1 
December 11, 1944 
I had the Army Chaplain direct all chaplains to pray for dry 
weather. I will publish this prayer with a Christmas greeting on the 
back of it to all members of the command. 2
December 12,  1944 
Stiller and I visited the XII Corps and drove along the front 
to the 4th Armored Division where I saw both combat commands and looked 
over the messes. The food was and abundant, and every man was 
sheltered in some sort of building. The maintenance was good, and 
they are only ten medium tanks short. We next visited the command 
post of the 26th and 87th which at the moment are combined, as the 87th 
is taking over from the 26th. One combat command of the 87th is in 
action and apparently doing well. I talked to about thirty officers of 
the Division, giving them all the battle lore which I have accumulated. 
Next we visited the 35th Division which was doing well but is pretty 
tired. In the big attack they are occupying high ground covering our 
left. Their present attack is to secure this ground. I decided to put 

1. Weeks before, I had a letter saying "I'm afraid there won't be 
any Christmas presents this year on account of the fighting." The 
watches came as a great surprise with a little note saying: "The perpetual 
motion is for George - the others to be chosen by you and the 
girls according to rank." BAP

2. Prayer:

December 12, 1944 (cont'd p.2)
the 6th Armored and the 26th Division in the III Corps at least for 
the present.  If the enemy attacks the VIII Corps of the First Army, 1
as is probable, I can use the III Corps to help.  If my XX Corps get 
jumped from the north after it breaks through, It can face to the 
left and the III Corps can carry on the attack along the old axis of 
the XX Corps.  I talked this over with Eddy and he agrees.  We will 
move our command post to St. Avold on the 19th. 
December 13, 1944
             I had arranged to visit the Seventh Army to make final arrangements for the air blitz, but General Patch phoned me that he would not be at his headquarters, but was sending his G-3 and air officer. The 8th Air Force representative, General Vandenberg of the9th Air, a RAF representative and General Saville of the 6th Army Group, together with Weyland and myself went over the final plans for the blitz.  We set the target date as December 19th, which gives us ten days available for the operation.  If the XII Corps gets through the enemy's lines by the 22d as a result of the blitz, and the VI Corps has not broken through, we can then have time to move the blitz to the front of the VI Corps.  It takes about four days to set up the radio beacons necessary for such an operation.  Personally I doubt that the VI Corps will break through because, while for the moment they are going very fast, they have not yet hit the Seigfried Line. 
             One of the battalions of the 87th broke badly yesterday, as is usual with green troops. 
[The 90th and 95th Division of the XX Corps are having a hard time]
1. Note this - see November 25th.

December 13, 1944 cont'd p.2) 
            The 90th and 95th Division of the XX Corps are having a hard 
time at Saarlautern; that is, they are going slowly against heavy 
opposition fighting from house to house, but the casualties are light. 
             The 80th and 5th Divisions are now full, and we have 4,000 men, 
gleaned by a 5% out of the Army and Corps troops, in training at Metz. 
This will fill the 26th Division and leave some over for the 90th and 
95th. If the Com Z would do the same thing with its vast army, we would 
have enough soldiers to complete the war. All that is necessary is for 
them to have General Eisenhower issue an for them to train 10%. 
For some reason, he is reluctant to issue such an order.

December 14, 1944 
            Codman, Stiller and I left at 0815 and drove to Headquarters 90th
Division and then into Saarlautern, where the fighting is still going 
on. Nearly all the houses I Inspected in Saarlautern are really forts. 
It was supposed to be dangerous to cross the bridge, but we had only one 
shot hit near us while doing so. General Walker wished to go across the 
bridge with me, but I decided it was not necessary to risk both an Army 
and a Corps Commander. Later he accompanied us to the Headquarters of 
the 90th Division. 
          They are having a hell of time because of know bridge till today, 
and it only supplies two regiments. The northern regiment is still 
supplied at night by assault boat, all their supplies and tanks having 
to be ferried, and they are living in the open with a resulting large 
amount of trench foot, The rifle strength is a very low, poor devils, 
but they are killing large numbers of Germans. 
        Drove to Thionville and saw Captain Wadsworth, son of the Sen-
ator. I had him brought there to meet me at his father's request.


December 14, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
Then drove to Luxembourg to see Bradley. Apparently Monty, with the assistance
of the Prime Minister, will get the Ninth Army. Monty is bitterly 
opposed to the operations of both Patch and myself. He still wants 
all available forces massed on the north and wants to command them. He
told Ike and Brad that when he command the war it was a success, but 
since he has been relieved of the Supreme Command it has become a stalemate. 
I do not see how they stand such conversation. Montgomery still 
maintains that the Rhine can only be crossed at one place, namely, at  
Cologne, and that this must be done under one Army Group Commander. 
My attack still go on with it's present short means, but if 
it fails to break through after the blitz, I will have to go on the defensive 
until more troops arrive, and pending their arrival, I will 
probably lose several divisions. It is certainly up to me to make a break-
through and I feel that, God helping, it will come about. It has certainly
rained less since my prayer. I may get three new infantry regiments. 
I also asked Bradley for one of the airborne divisions which is 
now sitting doing nothing, but had know success. While I was with the 
90th Division, I went to the river and saw a house belonging to Von 
Papen. I also decorated a Lt. Colonel of Engineers. While the decorating 
was gone on, the Germans dropped a concentration which landed just 
a block away. It was the funniest musical accompaniment to such a ceremony 
I'ever heard. 
Had Eddy come in and spend the nights of the 13th and 14th, as 
he is tired and nervous and should relax. 
December 15,1944 
General Kenner is here and made a very good suggestion to the 
effect that we use the infantry of the new divisions for replacements, 
and later refill them with returned wounded and new replacements from

December 15, 1944 (cont'd p.2)
the Com Z, if we ever get them pried loose.  By this means we get immediately 
fairly trained replacements to the fighting divisions, and at the 
same time we build up in the new divisions a certain number of battle-
experienced men who would have a great effect in training, through association, 
the green troops in these divisions.  Called Bradley and urged 
this, but he was very apathetic.  He is going to see Eisenhower tomorrow, 
so I flew Kenner to Paris to put the project up personally to General 
Eisenhower.  I fear that it is such a simple solution that it will not 
be adopted.  It has not rained today. 
December 16, 1944
Visited General Eddy.  He is in a very depressed and nervous state. 
The 87th Division is not doing well - one Colonel had to be relieved on 
account of failure to suppress trench foot.  I personally believe the 
situation looks very good, but fear we cannot be ready for the blitz 
before the 22 of December.  I hope we don't lose it due to dirt.  I 
think it may be a good idea to put the III Corps in behind the 35th Division 
to exploit any success we may get during the breakthrough.  While 
Milliken is untried in battle, he is at least not fatigued.  I also ordered 
the 6th Armored to make a limited attack tomorrow to hold the enemy 
on its front so as to prevent them from moving over to resist the attack 
of the 35th Division.  After leaving Eddy, I visited Haislip to see how 
he was getting on, and also to thank him for a knife he sent me.  He is 
stalled by three forts in the Maginot Line and is not over-enthusiastic. 
When I got home I had to address a number of newspaper correspondents 
on air and ground support.  General Weyland also spoke. 
I may have to put Eddy on leave for a few days.  I would so so, 
but feel the cure might be worse than the disease.  If I do put him on 
leave, I will put Gaffey in temporary command of his Corps.

December 16, 1944 (cont'd p.2)
The Chief of Staff of the 12th Army Group called to have the 10th 
Armored attached to the VIII Corps to help repulse a rather strong 
German attack. 1 I called General Bradley and called his attention to 
the fact that the Third Army has paid a very heavy price in blood in the 
hope of a break through at Saarlautern and Saarbrucken and that, when it 
comes, we will need the 10th Armored.  In my opinion, to move the 10th 
Armored would be to play into the Germans' hands.  Bradley admitted my 
logic but took counsel of his fears and ordered the 10th to move.  I 
wish he were less timid.  He probably knows more of the situation than 
he can say over the telephone.  He also turned down my ideas of using 
the infantry elements of the new divisions for replacements.  I took 
another 5% out of the Corps and Army troops to make infantrymen. 
General [Linden], [*?*] second in command of the 42d Division, reported 
and informed me to my regret that it is not well trained and 
should certainly not be put into the line until it has had some experience 
in camping.  What a bunch of fools we have at home.  The 
critical point of the war and after three years, no trained men. 
December 17, 1944
The German attack is on a wide front and moving fast.  Elements 
of many different divisions have been located, but no large units so 
far.  Last night there was a considerable road and rail movement into 
my area.  This may be a feint, or the attack on the front of the VIII 
Corps may be, although at the moment it looks like the real thing.  if 
the Germans are feinting in front of the VIII Corps and are intending 
to attack me, we will stop them as we are very well placed.  The 5th 
is relieving the 95th Division, and the 80th is moving in.  The only 
place the Germans could hurt is [in] the front held by Colonel Polk I
1  First news of the Bulge.

December 17, 1944 (cont'd p.2)
talked to General Walker and told him to reconnoiter defensive positions 
in that area and to put out road blocks. 
Had Millikin down to plan some use of the III Corps.  He will not 
be very adept, but as I said before, he is fresh and ambitious.  As an 
afterthought I told General Eddy to move the 4th Armored into action so 
that no one can withdraw it, because I still feel that if we put on the 
blitz and break through, as we will, it will halt the German attack.  Had 
the V And VIII Corps of the First Army been more aggressive, the Germans 
could not have prepared this attack; one must never sit still. 
December 18, 1944
Bradley called at 1030 and asked me to bring my G-2, G-3 and G-4
and myself to Luxembourg for a conference.  He said he was afraid that 
what he was going to suggest would be unacceptable to me, but that he 
wanted to see me.  When we arrived he said, "I feel you won't like what 
we are going to do but I fear it is necessary."  He then showed that the 
Germna penetration is much greater than I had thought.  He asked me what 
I could do.  I told him that I would halt the 4th Armored and concentrate
it near Longwy, starting at midnight, and that I would start the 80th 
in the morning on Luxembourg.  I also said that I could alert the 26th 
to move in 24 hours if necessary.  He seemed satisfied.  Drove home in 
the dark, a very dangerous operation, which I hate. 
December 19, 1944 
Had a staff meeting called at 0800 for all members of the General 
Staff, and General Weyland and his staff of the XIX Tactical Air
Command.  At this meeting I explained the change in plan and told them 
we would have to make rapid movements, which would depend on them.  I 
then made a rough plan for operations based on the assumption that I

December 19, 1944 (cont'd p.2)
would use the VIII Corps (Middleton) and the III Corps (Millikin) on 
any two of three possible axes.  From the left, the axes of attack were 
as follows:
From the general vicinity of Neufchateau against the left nose 
of the salient.  From the general vicinity of Arlon on Bastogne, which 
is still being held by our troops; and finally, a third attack due north 
from Diekirch. 
I made a simple code, one copy of which I left with General Gay
so that if I was ordered to execute the operation, I could call him on 
the phone. 
At 0915 I departed for Verdun where I arrived at 1045.  General 
Eisenhower, Bradley, Devers, Tedder and a large number of staff officers 
were there.  Ike had the SHAEF G-2 give the picture and then said he 
wanted me to get to Luxembourg and take command of the battle and make 
a strong counterattack with at least 6 divisions.  The fact that three 
of these divisions exist only on paper did not enter his head.  He said 
he was prepared to take the defensive from Saarlautern south and asked 
Devers how much of the line he could take over.  Devers made a long speech 
on strictly selfish grounds, and said nothing.  Bradley said little.  I 
kept still, except that I said we needed replacements and repeated my 
suggestion that the basic privates in the three new infantry divisions 
could be used for replacements.  Ike said, "No, I won't admit we are 
that near beaten."  I said, "If we don't get replacements, we will be 
beaten."  As I figure it now, I will have the VIII Corps, XII Corps, 
III Corps, and XX Corps, consisting of the 101st Airborne, the 28th, 26th, 
5th, 4th, [8th] 80th, 90th, 95th and 35th Infantry Divisions; also the 4th, 6th, 
9th and 10th Armored Divisions.  For the present the 6th Armored takes 
over to include the old boundary between the XX and XII Corps at Saar-

December 19, 1944 (cont'd p.2)
lautern and I gave the 87th and 42d Division to Devers to hold the Saar 
line.
Ike said, "When can you attack?" I said, "On December 22 with 
three divisions; the 4th Armored, the 26th and 80th."  He said he was 
afraid this was not strong enough, but I insisted that I could beat the 
Germans with three divisions, and if I waited, I would lose surprise. 
Tedder urged me to get rid of the XX Corps, but I wish to hold it and 
use it for a possible rest area.  When I said I could attack on the 22d, 
it created quite a commotion - some people seemed surprised and others 
pleased - however, I believe it can be done.  Ike said in departing, 
"Every time I get a new star I get attack", and I said, "And every 
time you get attacked I pull you out.."
Drove to the XX Corps to explain the situation to Walker, and 
decided to spend the night there and sent Codman back to Nancy to get 
Headquarters moved to Luxembourg.  Prince Felix also spent the night 
with Walker.  Obviously he is afraid to stay in Luxembourg, not from 
personal reasons, but because it would be a great feather in the Germa ns'
cap to catch him. 
Before leaving Verdun, I directed that the 26th Division and 
4th Armored Division move at once on Arlon via Longwy, and the 80th 
Division move on Luxembourg.  The 4th had actually pulled out last night, 
and the 80th started this morning on Thionville and received instructions 
there to move on Luxembourg. 
December 20, 1944 
In the morning I drove to Luxembourg arriving at 0900.  Bradley 
had halted the 80th Division at Luxembourg and had also engaged one
combat command of the 4th Armored Division in the vicinity east of

December 20, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
Bastogne without letting me know, but I said nothing. While I was 
there Ike called and he Brad had a long talk. He told Bradley that 
he was putting Monty in operational control of the 1st and 9th Armies, 
due to the fact that telephonic connections between Bradley and those 
two armies was difficult. As a matter of fact telephonic communications 
were all right, and it is either a case of having lost confidence in Brad-
ley, or having been forced to put Montgomery in through the machina-
tions of the Prime Minister, or with the hope that if he gives Monty 
operational control, he will get some of the British Division in.
General Eisenhower is unwilling, or unable, to command Montgomery. 
            Drove to Arlon and saw Middleton, Millikin, Gaffey and Paul.
The VIII Corps is fighting very well, but at the moment consisting of
nothing but remnants, except in the case of the 101st Airborne, which 
is holding Bastogne. In Bastogne there is also one combat command of 
the 9th Armored and one of the 10th Armored, two companies of tank 
destroyers and some colored artillery. I told Middleton to give ground 
and blow up bridges so that we can get the enemy further extended be-
fore we hit him in flank. However, on Bradley's suggestion, in which 
Middleton strongly occurred, we decided  to hang on to Bastogne, be-
cause it is a very important road net, and I do not believe the enemy 
would dare pass it without reducing it. The Combat Command of the 
4th Armored Division had not been engaged, so I with it. Also 
visited the 4th Division and 80th Division, and the 9th and 10th Armor-
ed Division. The troops of the two latter units are badly scrambled 
so I sent General Leonard, of the 9th Armored, to the VIII Corps to take
over two combat commands of his division and one of the 10th Armored 
now in Bastogne; and I told General Morris to take command of one Com-
bat Command of the 9th Armored and two of his, which are north of Lux-

December 20,1944 (cont'd p.3) 
embourg. 
               Ordered up all the self-propelled tank destroyer battalions and 
divisional tank battalions I could get hold of. I ordered Eddy to move 
his headquarters and artillery at once to Luxembourg. I ordered the 
35th to move to Metz at once and pick up replacements. I told General 
Gay to fill the 90th and 95th Divisions, and to put anything that was
left in the 4th Infantry Division. I told the 9th and 10th Armored 
Divisions to cannibalize their anti-tank gun units, and other units, to
fill up their Infantry riflemen. The setup is now as follows: VIII 
Corps (Middleton) will consist of the 101st Airborne, the 28th Infantry, 
and 9th Armored: The III Corps (Millikin), the 26th, 80th and 4th Ar-
mored Division. The XII Corps (Eddy), the 4th, 5th and the 10th Ar-
mored Division. The XX Corps (walker), the 90th, 95th and 6th Armored 
Division. The 35th will go either to the XII or VIII Corps, according 
to circumstances. I also got up ammunition, hospitals and bridges. I 
have no staff officer and conducted the whole thing by telephone through 
General Gay and a fine staff at Nancy. 
          I forgot to mention yesterday that I also ordered the 5th Infantry 
Division to move on Luxemburg. The 10th Infantry Regiment of that 
Division arrived this evening.  This has been a most wonderful move on 
the part of the whole Army. We still at 4:00 a.m., December 22d. 
December 21, 1944 
           Ike and Bull are getting jittery about attacking too soon and 
too weak. I have all I can get. If I wait, I will lose surprise. Be-
tween the 23d and 24th I can get Eddy up with the 5th Infantry Division 
and the 10th Armored Division, and his staff and guns. The First Army 
could in my opinion, attack on the 23d if they wanted to (were pushed) 
but they seem to have no ambition in that line. The enemy may attempt



December 21, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
to put in spoiling attack from the vicinity of Echternach against 
the 4th Division. I had all staffs, except the VIII Corps, in for a 
conference. As usual on the verge of an attack, they were full of 
doubt. I seemed always to be the ray of sunshine, and by God, I al-
ways am. We can and will win, God helping. At 1700 the 4th Infantry 
Division reported a violent attack, which I doubt, but took the ne-
cessary measures. I wish it were this time tomorrow night. When one 
attacks, it is the enemy who has to worry. Give us the victory, Lord. 
December 22, 1944
         The III Corps jumped off at 0600 and is making fair progress. On
the left, the 4th Armored Division was hindered by many craters and 
road blocks blown by the Com Z Engineers prior to our arrival, but we 
are making reasonable progress. The 26th, in the center, is doing 
well against delaying action. The 80th on the right is doing the
worst, as it had to force a defended river line. However, they are 
across and should do better. Tonight they will continue during 
darkness. Bastogne is still holding out, and we will re-supply it by 
air, using the pathfinder method. It snowed until 1200, so that no 
air could get up. I am satisfied, but particularly happy, over 
the results of today. It is always hard to get an attack rolling. I 
doubt if the enemy can make a serious reaction for another 36 hours. I 
hope by that time we will be moving. The men are in good spirits and 
full of confidence. 
     The 10th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division attacked 
northeast of Echternach to drive the enemy east of the Sauer River. They 
jumped off at noon and ran into a German attack of two battalions. The 
results so far are not known.


December 22, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
I talked to eight men of the 28th Division and Combat Command "A" 
of the 9th Armored Division who had walked in from Wiltz, leaving there 
on the 19th of December. They came right through the German salient 
and saw only seven Germans. I think that perhaps there is less weight 
in the middle of the salient than we think. 
At 1700, learned that due to icy conditions, our air resupply will
not be able to work tonight, but we will try to put it on in the morning. 
If Dager [*?*] with Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored gets through, 
this re-supply will not be necessary, and Millikin will inform me so 
that I can call off the air supply. The reason for calling off the air 
supply is that in order to escort it, we have to use so many fighter-
bombers that we have little left to attack the Germans with. 
I will not attack with the XII Corps until I have driven the enemy 
east of the Sauer River. I may replace the 4th Infantry Division, which
is very tired and 1600 men short, with the 90th Division, and exchange 
the 10th Armored for the 6th Armored when the latter is released. The 
10th Armored and the 4th Infantry will then go to the XX Corps, the 
others to the XII Corps, or I may be able to get the 11th Armored to 
relieve the 6th Armored and keep the 10th Armored in place. At the 
moment the 11th Armored Division is closing on Reims and is a SHAEF 
reserve. 
We now have 108 battalions of Corps and Army artillery supporting 
this attack- in other words, 1,296 guns of 105 or bigger. I don't see 
how the Boche can take this much artillery. 
Our average advance for today is better than 7 miles, and we will 
continue to attack all night. The situation at Bastogne is grave but 
not desperate. I will again try to get Dager through.  
Col. W. F. Blanchard was Combat-
Command-commander.

December 23, 1944 
We have not done so well today as I had hoped, but have advanced 
from two to five miles and have beaten the enemy wherever we have met 
him. Due to road blocks, craters and enemy counter-attacks, Dager has 
not yet reached Bastogne, but they are re-supplying it by air. Also, 
the 101st Airborne repulsed a very strong counterattack from the northwest. 
This is probably the first reaction to our attack. 
From captured orders, it seems that the enemy intended to push 
west beyond Arlon and then turn and attack Luxembourg from the West. 
This gives me some concern for my left rear; however, I think that, 
by pushing hard to the northeast, I will force him to dance to our
tune. I will call Middleton to see if he can lend a hand, if needed, 
to protect the left flank. 
The XII Corps attacked with limited objectives northeast, to 
drive the Germans east of the Sauer River. The attack by the III Corps 
continues. The XX Corps will make limited objective attack in the 
direction of Saarbourg as a diversion. The XIX Tactical Air command 
and the 9th Bomber Command got bridges in the vicinity of Saarbourg 
today. If any enemy are in the pocket, they will be very scared. 
The weather today is fine. We had seven groups of fighter-bombers, 
eleven groups of medium bombers, one division of the 8th Air Force 
and some RAF planes helping us. I hope it got results. 
It was necessary to move Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored 
from the right to the left in order to break through to Bastogne. 
This leaves a gap between the 26th and 4th Armored Division, which 
we will try to fill up with cavalry. 
December 24, 1944
This has been a very bad Christmas Eve. All along our line we 
have received violent counter-attacks, one of which forced Dager, of

December 24, 1944 (cont'd p.2)
the 4th Armored, back some miles with the loss of ten tanks. This was 
probably my fault, because I had been insisting on day and night attacks. 
This is all right on the first or second day of the battle and 
when we had the enemy surprised, but after that the men get too tired.
Furthermore, in this bad weather, it is very difficult for armored 
outfits to operate at night. Once in a while I was impressed with how 
long it takes to really learn how to fight a war. 

The 101st Airborne got more supplies and ammunition by air today. 
They have not been attacked so far, at 1640, because the enemy is probably 
afraid of our air. He will probably attack tonight.
 
The XII Corps, using one Combat Command of the 10th Armored, all 
of the 5th Infantry and one Regiment of the 4th, made limited attack
at 1100 to secure the Sauer River Line from Diekirch to Echternach. 
Except at the last named town the attack is going well. 

We also intercepted a radio call from the 5th German Paratroop 
Division saying they could not hold out much longer without help; that
they needed bazookas, ammunition, etc. I notified all the commands 
of this happy state, and that the enemy is being reduced. In the
XX Corps all is quiet, and a very low grade of troops is opposing 
Colonel Polk- in fact Polk is insulted because he says " They are 
nothing but Poles with ulcers."

I believe the German General Staff is running this attack and 
has staked all on this offensive to regain the initiative. They are 
far behind schedule and, I believe, beaten. If this is true, the
whole army may surrender. On the other hand, in 1940 they attacked 
as at present, and then came over at Saarbrucken and Thionville to
Metz. They may repeat- but with what ?

December 24, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
The Scoresheet as of midnight, December 21, 1944, which terminated 
the Saar Operation, is as follows:
U.S. Casualties: (since Aug.1) killed, 10,264: wounded, 49,703;
missing, 9,149 total, 69,116; non-battle casualties, 49,844; grand 
total, 118,960; replacements, 102,844. 
German losses (actual since Aug.1) prisoners of war, 139,779;
enemy buried, 14,942; total, 152,721.
German losses (estimated since Aug. 1) prisoners, 140,000 killed,
63,800; wounded, 180,200; total 384,000.
U.S. material losses (since Aug. 1) Mark III and IV tanks; 946;
Mark VI 485, artillery (75 and over) 2,216; vehicles, 5,431; total,
9,078.
December 25, 1944
A clear cold Christmas, lovely weather for killing Germans, which 
seems a bit queer, seeing whose birthday it is. Last night Codman and 
I went to the Candlelight Communion at the Episcopal Church here in 
Luxembourg. It was very nice and we sat in the former Kaiser Wilhelm 
II's box. I left early this morning to try to visit all the divisions 
in contact with the enemy. Saw both Combat Command "B" (Dager) and 
"A" Col Blanchard of the 4th Armored Division. Also saw Gaffey commanding 
the 4th Armored, Paul of the 26th, McBride of the 80th and Irwin 
of the 5th. All were very cheerful. I am not, because we are not going 
fast enough. The 5th Infantry Division has done the best and has 
forced the enemy back almost to the Sauer River. All the men were very 
cheerful and in most cases got hot turkey sandwiches for dinner.

December 25, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
The 80th isn't doing much and the 26th is preparing. The 4th Armor-
ed is fighting hard but making slow progress. I feel that all are 
doing their best. The 6th Armored will exchange with the 10th Armor-
ed north of Luxembourg tonight. The 35th Infantry, which has only 
been in Metz since the night of the 23d, will move up and join the 
III Corps tomorrow morning. I wanted to move it up today, but General 
Gay assured me that it could not possibly absorb its replacements 
and move. He was probably right. The 35th will move in between the 
4th Armored and 26th, and 80th Division will revert as soon as 
possible to the XII Corps. The 101st Airborne was not re-supplied by 
air today, because the ships could not take off from the Uk due to 
icy conditions, and nobody had the forethought to have ships take
off from France. 
      We had quiet dinner at Bradley's mess. 
      While I was with Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored, two 
planes strafed and bombed, but did no damage. 
       After supper Brad and I had a talk. Monty says that the 1st 
Army cannot attack for three months and that the only attack that can 
be made is by me, but that I am too weak; hence we should fall back 
to the Saar-Vosges Line or even to the Moselle to gain more divisions. 1 
I feel that this is disgusting and might remove the valor of our army 
and the confidence of our people. It will have tremendous political 
implications and probably condemn to death, or slavery, all the inhabitants
of Alsace and Lorraine, if we abandon them to the Germans. 
If ordered to fall back, I think I will ask to be relieved. 
1. The possibility of falling back to the Meuse was also 
mentioned. P.D.H.

December 26, 1944
Today has been rather trying as in spite of our efforts, we have 
failed to make contact with the defenders of Bastogne. On our right 
the enemy in front of the 5th Division is clearly on the run. Last
night we got a battalion of them with proximity fuses and counted
over 700 dead. Today whole companies of them are attempting to swim
the Sauer River under direct fire, which is hardly a healthy pastime, 
since the rivers are frozen and these Germans are under machine gun
fire. 
I had the Combat Command of the 9th, which has been working with 
the XII Corps, pulled out, and had it report to the 4th Armored Division
to extend the attacking front of the latter to the west. I also 
sent the remnants of a regiment of the 28th Division from north of 
Luxembourg to the VIII Corps. The 35th Division moves into line between
Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored and the 26th Division, 
and will attack to the north tomorrow, the 27th. This should be a 
help. At 1400, General Gaffey phoned to say that if I authorized the 
risk, he thought that Command B of the 4th Armored, under Colonel
Wendell Blanchard, could break through to Bastogne by a rapid 
advance. I told him to try it. At 1845 they made contact, and Bastogne
was liberated. It was a daring thing and well done. 1 Of course 
they may be cut off, but I doubt it. Two thirds of the 6th Armored 
Division have closed in the vicinity of Luxembourg. The speed of 
our movements is amazing, even to me, and must be a constant source 
of surprise to the Germans. I think I made a mistake in bringing 
the 6th Armored up so soon; it might have been better sent to the 
left. I can still do it but that requires two moves. The corridor 
1. The actual breakthrough into Bastogne was made 
by [Major] L/Col. Creighton Abrams. BAP

December 26, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
on the right, that is, north of Diekirch, is rather narrow for an ar-
mored division. Why in the hell the SHAEF thinkinkers hold the 11th Armor-
ed Division, 17th Airborne and 87th Infantry Divisions at Reims is 
beyond me. They should be attacking. 
       The German has shot his wad. Prisoners have had no food 
for three to five days, we should attack. Last night during an
air raid, 100 German prisoners rushed the guards and were killed. 
So far we have taken about 5,000 prisoners and killed more. 
December 27, 1944 
        Bradley left at 1000 to see Ike, Montgomery and Smith. If Ike 
will put Bradley back in command of the First and Ninth Armies, we 
can bag the whole German army. I wish Ike were more of a gambler, 
but he is certainly a lion compared to Montgomery, and Bradley is
better than Ike as far as nerve is concerned. Of course he did 
make bad mistakes in being passive on the front of the VIII Corps. 
Monty is a tired little fart. War requires the taking of risks and
he won't take them.
         I would like at least to put the 11th Armored Division and 17th 
Airborne on a switch line along the Samois River. This would cover 
the left rear of the Third Army and be just as good as the Meuse 
Line, which covers only Paris. 
      Pink Bull had the nerve to call me up and say that Ike is very 
anxious that I put every effort on securing Bastogne. What the hell 
does he think I've been doing for the last week?
       Went to Arlon to see Millikin and Middleton. The III Corps 
will keep operational control of the VIII Corps troops in Bastogne 
until the situation is clarified. We will attack with one armored


December 27, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
division, reinforced, to take Houffalize not later than the 30th, 
and attack northeast on St. Vith with one armored and two infantry
divisions on the 31st. VIII Corps will take over the 101st and rem-
nants of the 9th Armored and 10th Armored divisions to cover the left 
flank. If I could get three more divisions I could win this war now. 
December 28, 1944
       During the night, and after talking with Brad, I am going to 
plan an attack over the Sauer River on Bonn, crossing near Echternach. 
General Anderson of the 8th Air Force is here and we are planning a
combined operation with an air blitz. I will precede it with an at-
tack on Saarbourg by the XX Corps and so- if possible- pull the 
troops in that direction. The above will be very profitable 
if we get troops released by Ike, but it should not be attempted 
with less than dive divisions. Things along the III Corps front are 
going well, but not fast enough. Sent Grow and Harkins to Bastogne 
to arrange for the next move. I would like to get the 6th Armored 
into the Bastogne area under cover of darkness so as to attack by sur-
prise. 
        Prisoners of War tonight amount to 5,800 
Bradley succeeded in getting the 11th Armored and 87th Infantry 
released to me. 
December 29, 1944
        Bradley decorated me with the second Oak Leaf Cluster to the DSM 
at 1000. Very nice citation. Had a head cold so stayed in all after- 
noon. 
         The 11th Armored and the 87th Infantry will be closed southwest 
of Bostogne by 2400 and will attack in the direction of Houffalize in

December 29, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
the morning, possibly assisted by the 101st Airborne, which is up to 
strength. We have to send one Combat Command of the 9th Armored to 
Reims as a mobile SHAEF reserve, but will have one Combat Command of 
the 9th and one of the 10th and all of the 4th Armored southwest of 
Bastogne to cover the left flank and rear. The 6th Armored closes
west of Arlon tonight and they will attack on the 31st in the direc-
tion of St. Vith. The situation in front of the XII and XX Corps
seems to remain static. The "black Market" stated there would be a 
bombing attack on Bastogne at 0400, December 30. It is also rumored 
there will an attack on the same town by ground troops from Houf-
falize. 
December 30, 1944 
        The 11th Armored and 87th Infantry jumped off west of Bastogne 
as planned and ran right into the flank of a large German Counter-
attack headed southeast. The German units consisted of elements 
of the 130th Panzer and a Panzer Grenadier Division (probably the 
6th). This Lucky meeting stopped the Germans and probably corrected 
a bad situation. 
        Everyone of the generals involved urged me to postpone the at-
tack until today, but I held to my plan, although I did not know the 
German attack was coming. Some people call it luck, some genius. I 
call it determination. The 35th and 26th also got attacked at dawn 
by the 1st SS and 167th. We had an inkling that was coming and 
were set for it. The 35th lost a village and a little ground, but re-
rook it when the 4th Armored came to its help. The enemy lost 55
tanks. Prisoners reported that they had not had a warm meal in 
five days- many of them will never eat another. Obviously this morn-


December 30, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
ing's attack was pre-arranged to again isolate Bastogne. They failed. 
     Today we killed four Germans in one of our peeps, dressed in American
uniforms. Two were dressed as officers and two as enlisted men. 
A sentry, who stated he was "reinforced", saw 17 other Germans in our 
uniforms. Fifteen were killed and the other two were reported as having
"died suddenly". 
      Drove to Bastogne and had to pass about a thousand yards from the 
Germans, but they did not fire. The town has been very well liberated. 
I decorated Brig. Gen. A.C. McAuliffe who command the 101st during 
the fight, and Lt. Col. S.A. Chappey's with the DSC. The letter 
commands the 502 Airborne Infantry. They were delighted and wanted 
me to drive slowly so the soldiers could see me. They told me that 
on the 25th, the Germans sent in a white flag demanding that the 101st 
surrender as they were surrounded, and if they would not surrender, 
they would be destroyed. McAuliffe replied "Nuts!" A historic 
answer. 
December 31, 1944 
         This has been a very long day for me. The Germans launched a
heavy counter-attack on the 26th and took a little ground, but were 
driven back. On the 35th front, they made several small attacks and 
lost. They may launch a heavy counter-attack on the 35th tonight 
or in the morning. However, the 6th Armored got off and moved four 
kilometers on the road to St. Vith. This may pull the teeth of the 
attack.
          It has snowed and frozen over all day, and the tractors which 
pull our medium and heavy artillery are perfectly useless. We either 
have to replace them by truck, or send a truck ahead with a cable to
haul them over the road. Some of our heavy bombers dropped about a

December 31, 1944 (cont'd p.2) 
hundred bombs near the Command Post of the 4th Infantry Division -
obviously by mistake. Also eight of our planes strafed one of our 
convoys north of Thionville by mistake and got two vehicles. 
          Generals Spaatz, Doolittle and Vandenberg were in to ask about 
stopping the rumors that the Germans are flying our P-47's. This 
rumor has a very bad effect on our aviators and ground troops and 
must be stopped. Tomorrow no P-47's will fly in the area of the XII
or XX Corps. Total number of counter-attacks for today aggregates 
17- all repulsed. On the other hand, we have not made such ground. 
Succeeded in getting the 17th Airborne Division released to the Third 
Army in exchange for the 28th Division.
January 1, 1945
        Visited III Corps. The 35th and 26th Division are doing well 
but going slowly. There were rather heavy air attacks on us, both
by the Germans and by some of our own planes, which I believe came 
from the First Army Area. General Eddy was chased into a ditch by 
three P-47's. Also, General Spaatz called up to say that our AA
hit his plane and Doolittle's plane when they were flying south of 
Arlon. Later General Vandenberg, who was with them, said that this 
was not true- they may have thought they were hit, but they were 
not. 
      The 6th Armored Division did well in spite of snow and icy 
roads. The 11th Armored yesterday fought well but stupidly and lost 
too many tanks. Apparently they are very green and particularly in-
ept at fighting in the woods. At midnight December 31, all guns 
fired rapidly on the enemy for twenty minutes, as a New Year's greet-
ing. When the firing stopped, forward observer said they could hear 
Germans screaming in the woods. I hope is true.

January 1, 1945 (cont'd p.2) 
         The 17th Airborne started moving in to replace the 28th, which 
is going to Rheims. 
          All my troops are just where they should be, so if we lose it 
will be due to better fighting on the part of the enemy, and he has
not got it, not to many mistakes which I may have made 
       Talked to correspondents and stressed the necessity of killing 
the rumor that Germans are flying American planes. I also told them 
of the speed and secrecy with which movements of our troops were 
made, and said that the soldiers and the staff should be given credit 
for this. 
January 2, 1945
         I had in all four Corps Commanders before lunch to discuss the 
plan, so that now each one knows what all the others are doing. The 
17th Airborne will attack though the 11th Armored in the morning. 
Apparently yesterday the 11th Armored got very badly confused and 
it took a person in the position of General Middleton to straighten 
them out. I will pull them back behind the 17th Airborne. However, 
since the 17th has no organic tank battalion. Battalion of the 11th Armored will 
have to stay with it. 
         The 6th Armored made good progress, but the 35th and 26th moved 
very slowly against have enemy resistance.  
        The XV Corps, Seventh Army, got a heavy attack. All the enemy 
units identified are those we chased 60 miles between the 8th of 
November and the 20th of December, so they should not be too good. 
The enemy may make one more effort on Bastogne from the north tonight, 
or he may try our left rear. I rather fancy he will try Bastogne. 
The 4th Armored is well set to stop anything that can happen. At

January 2, 1945 (cont'd p.2) 
Last the VII Corps the First Army is attacking in the direction of 
Houffalize with the 2d and 3d Armored Division and 83d and 84th 
Infantry Divisions. I still see no reason to change my disposition. 
God show the right. 
         Score sheet as of January 2, 1945: 
U.S. Losses (since Aug. 1); Killed, 11,520; wounded, 56,706;
missing, 11,694; total, 79,920; non-battle casualties, 55,675; grand
total, 135,595; replacements, 120,785 (giving a shortage of 14,810). 
          Third U.S. Losses (since Dec.22) killed 11,500; wounded, 56,706;
2,545; total, 11,224; non-battle casualties 6,732 grand total, 17,956; 
replacements, 17,397. 
          German Losses (actual-since Aug. 1) Prisoners of War, 147,604; 
enemy buried, 15,533; total, 163,137. 
           German losses( actual since Dec.22) Prisoners of War, 7,825; 
Enemy buried; 591; total, 8416.
          German Losses ( Estimated-since Aug.1) Prisoners 8,3000: killed, 
13,200; wounded, 34,400; total, 55,990 
         U.S Material Losses (since Aug. 1) light tanks, 223; medium 
tanks, 597; artillery (75 and over) 139; vehicles, 2,546; total, 3,505. 
        U.S. Material Losses (since Dec 22); light tanks, 25; medium 
tanks, 90; artillery (75 and over) 23; vehicles, 369; total, 507. 
         German Material Losses (since Aug. 1) Light Tank, 991; medium
tanks, 523; artillery  (75 and over) 2,290; vehicles, 5,592; total, 9396.
        German Material Losses (since Dec.22) light tanks, 45; medium 
tanks, 38, artillery (75 and over) 74; vehicles, 161; total, 318. 
           Enemy planes shot down by AA of Third Army sine Aug. 1, 505; 
since Dec. 22,1944, 63.

January 3, 1945 
          The enemy did not attack anywhere last night, although I had an-
ticipated that he would. The 6th Armored made two miles to the east. 
The 26th and 35th made nothing. The 87th gained a little on its left. 
The 11th Armored repelled an enemy attack on its left center. Due 
to bad weather conditions and failure on the part of the Com Z trucks, 
the 17th Airborne did not get in time to attack at noon today as 
planned, but will attack in the morning in conjunction with the 101st 
Airborne.
        The new SHAEF Directive returns the First Army to the 12th Army 
Group Control as soon as contact between the First and Third  Armies 
is made near Houffalize. When this has occurred, both armies drive 
northeast via St. Vith. 
          The 6th Army Group is trying to steal the XX Corps. 
          General Montgomery got some fool Englishman in America to suggest 
that as General Eisenhower had too much work, he (Montgomery) should 
be made Deputy Ground Forces Commander of all troops in Europe. If 
this occurs, I will ask to be relieved. I will not serve under Mont-
gomery and neither, I think, will Bradley. 
January 4, 1945 
         I want to attack to the north from Diekirch, but Bradley is 
all for putting  new divisions in the Bastogne fight. In my opinion, 
this is throwing good money after bad. In this weather, on the defen-
sive, the Germans can hold us well enough so that we can never trap 
them there, whereas if we attack close to the base, they will have to 
pull out and we will regain ground and probably catch just as many 
Germans as the other way. 
          Visited the III and VIII Corps; also the 11th Armored, where I 
met Colonel Jake Williams, who is Chief of Staff. The division is 
         1. J.J.B. Williams of Desert Training Corps ?


      


January 4, 1945 (cont'd p. 2)
very green and took unnecessary losses to no effect.  There were also
some unfortunate incidents in the shooting of prisoners.  (I hope we
can conceal this.)
The 17th Airborne, which attacked this morning, got a very bloody
nose and reported the loss of 40% in some of its battalions.  This is,
of course, hysterical.  A loss for any one day of over 8 to 10% can be
put down to a damn lie, unless the people run or surrender.  General
Miley did not impress me when I saw him at Bastogne at the Headquart-
ers of the 101st Airborne.  He told me he did not know where his right
regnent was, yet he was not out looking for it.  I also visited the
101st Airborne.  Bastogne was being shelled when I drove in.  The
flashes of the shells of our guns on the snow was pretty, but I could
have forgone the beauty.  It took two hours to drive home from Bas-
togne in the dark and it was very cold.  We can still lose this war.
However, the Germans are colder and hungrier than we are, but they
fight better.  I can never get over the stupidity of our green troops.
January 5, 1945
After talking to Bradley we concurred that the German pocket
southeast of Bastogne must be eliminated before we can attack Houff-
alize or send the XII Corps due north.  To clear this pocket, a fresh
new division is needed.  My plan - if I can get the 94th, is to send
the 94th to the XX Corps to relieve the 90th Division, which will
move to the III Corps and attack north through the 26th Division.
Next, replace the 94th with the 26th and send the 94th to the XII
Corps to aid the latter corps in its attack.  It is sort of grand 
right and left, but it is the shortest way I know of cleaning out the
pocket.
1.  Maj. Gen. W M Miley





January 5 . 1945 (cont'd p.2)
Unfortunately, SHAEF Reserve has held on to one Regimental Combat
Team of the 94th to support the 28th until the regiment missing from
that division reaches it.
Visited the 4th, 5th, and 80th Divisions of the XII Corps.  The
80th is putting on an attack on its left to get some high ground.This
will take pressure from the right of the 26th and will also cause the
German to worry about his left flank.
At 1730 we got a clearance on 2/3 of the 94th.  General Malony,
who commands it, spent the night.  Today has been a rather bad day -
no gains and some losses.  I am having Generals Millikin, Van Fleet,
Colonel E.W. Williams (artillery) and Colonel Roger Brown (Air) in tomorrow
morning to coordinate the plan for the use of the 90th Division.
General Walker is a very fine soldier.  He has never yet complained
about any order he has received.  The fact that he is not complaining
when I take the 90th Division is particularly noteworthy.
January 6, 1945
Had Millikin, Van Fleet and my general staff in the office this
morning to get the plan for the attack by the 90th Division settled
in all details.  It will pass through the 26th and attack northwest
along the ridge road.  One combat team of the 26th will attack on
each side, and one will relieve the right combat team of the 35th and
attack north.  The released combat team of the 35th will help the 6th
Armored to attack southeast to make a junction with the 90th.  We
will support the attack  with the fire of about a thousand guns. Some
will fire in prolongation of the axis and others at right angles to
the axis, so we will get a dispersion in depth both ways.  This particular
thought was my own.  We will also smoke the ridge northeast
of the Wiltz River to blind the enemy's guns, which are probably

stationed there.
The left regiment of the 80th, passing through the right of the
26th, attacks and takes the high ground in the vicinity of Dahl to-
night.  This will take the enemy's attention from his right and will
so tend to secure the left flank of the 26th Division.  One combat
team and the guns and armor of the 90th closed in the rear of the
26th tonight.  We are using a deception group and keeping the radio
traffic for the 90th in the old area.  The 90th is doing a very
clever piece of work in registering its guns.  As the guns come in,
they register and similar guns from the 26th cease firing.  In this
way, I believe, we can wholly deceive the enemy as to the arrival of
a new unit.  I rather think that instead of giving the XII Corps the
94th Division, we should give it the 26th, 35th or 87th, whichever
gets out first, and use the 4th, 5th, and part of the 80th for the at-
tack.
I had to use the whip on both Middleton and Millikin today.  They
are too cautious.  I know that their men are tired, but so are the
Germans.  We have to push people beyond their endurance in order to
bring this war to its end, because we are forced to fight it with in-
adequate means.  Only three small counterattacks today - all repulsed.
I fear this indicates the enemy is getting away.
January 7, 1945
Last night was almost too quiet.  The attack by the left regi-
ment of the 80th Division was a success at a very low cost.  We had
about 60 casualties and took three towns.  Apparently we caught the
Germans in the act of making a relief.  There was no counterattack
this morning, although we had anticipated one.  During our attack,
we got five tanks and some self-propelled guns with the loss of two
tanks.  The 101st Airborne sent a patrol into Feis, northwest of





January 7, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
Bastogne, and thence on a semi-circle of 1500 yards in all directions
without getting contact.  I told Middleton to push out till he bumps.
However, he feels that the enemy withdraws during the night and then
comes back in the daytime.  The way the ground lies would make such
a solution possible.
Eddy is worried about the possibility of attack straight south
through Diekirch.  Bradley fears the same thing.  It could be, but I
doubt it; however, I took one company of towed tank destroyers off
prisoner of war escort duty and turned them over to the XII Corps.
I also had the G-3 from the 4th Armored and 10th Armored Divisions re-
port to Eddy, to study possible uses of these two divisions in case
of an attempted attack from the north.  I had Colonel Conklin, the
Army Engineer, inspect the road blocks and mines in front of the XII
Corps.  If the enemy tries to get through he will be well stopped.
Had lunch at Bradley's with Mr. McNutt and the Manpower Board.  Mc-
Nutt is a pompous fool not at all interested in manpower.  During the
course of the talk about manpower, he told me he knew all about war.
I told him he knew nothing about it compared to the people fighting
it, and that he and his Board were responsible for the deaths of all
Americans who gave their lives due to the shortage of replacements.
I doubt if he loves me; it's mutual.
I sat next to a Professor Lowell from Harvard, who is quite a
character and who remarked to me that apparently I did not give a damn
as to what people thought of me.  I told him that depended upon who
the people were, but that in any case I did not give very much of a 
damn
January 8, 1945
At 0945 General Bradley asked me if I could attack Houffalize
today with the 101st Airborne and 4th Armored.  I said I could but
felt it a mistake, as all plans were made for a general attack

January 8, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
tomorrow morning.  I believe that he was induced to ask this at the
suggestion of General Silbert.  Silbert also remarked that he wonder-
ed if all troops of the Third Army were judiciously employed.  He is
the same genius who let the Germans attack in the Ardennes without
discovering their presence.
I drove out to see the III Corps, the 4th Armored and the 90th
Infantry Divisions.  I met General Gaffey on the road so took him to
the III Corps. When I told him that he was to attack in the morning,
he made no remarks at all, but simply wanted to know when, and in
what direction.
I told General Middleton that I wanted the 101st to attack also.
Gaffey has been backing up the 35th, so it was necessary for Millikin
to make certain re-arrangements and it was decided to let Gaffey's
guns continue to support the initial attack of the90th Division.  When
I visited the 90th Division, it was well closed up.  On the way I 
passed through the last battalion of this division moving in by
truck.  They must have been riding in the cold, blizzard weather in
open trucks for many hours, but were in splendid form and cheered and
yelled as I drove past.  It was a very inspiring sight.  We attack
in the morning from left to right as follows:
The VIII Corps - 87th, 17th Airborne, 101st Airborne, and 4th
Armored Divisions.  The III Corps - 6th Armored, 35th Infantry, 90th
Infantry, 26th Infantry Divisions.  In all, eight divisions.  It should
work.  The right regiment of the 80th Division, XII Corps, repulsed
a heavy counterattack by three battalions and 8 tanks near Dahl,the
town they took yesterday.  It is conservatively estimated that they
killed over 300 Germans.  In the front of one of the battalions, 140
German bodies were counted in the snow.  These Germans came from three

January 8,  (cont'd p. 3)
divisions, which shows the extent to which they are mixing units.
The 87th and 17th Airborne got fairly well chopped up yesterday due
at least in part, to Middleton's reluctance to use the 11th Armored
in backing them up.  He is still over-worried about his left flank
and rear.  Too much so.  At supper, Middleton called to say that the
87th and 17th Airborne could not attack tomorrow, and that the 101st
Airborne and 4th Armored should, if possible, wait until the 10th.  I
told him everything would to on as ordered, and that all units would
attack on the 9th, tomorrow, with the understanding that the 87th
and 17th Airborne would probably not be able to put on a very good
show.  Next, Gaffey called up and made the same recommendation and
got the same answer.  Then Eddy called up and said he heard the 4th
Armored was going into that fight and he couldn't count on it to sup-
port him, and that it would take 9 hours for the 10th Armored to
reach him.  I told him that in that event, he would certainly have
to hold for nine hours.  Again I earned my pay.
We continue to get a rumor of a German concentration at Saarbruck-
en.  The chief reason, I believe it is so, is that if I were the
Germans, that is what I would do.  There is a good enough road net
from St. Avold to Thionville, and Metz.  I told General Walker, XX
Corps, to prepare all roads for demolition.  I also secured the rest
of the 94th Division which will close at Thionville at 1400 tomorrow.
I think the Germans will attack towards Metz.  The 12th Army Group
believes they will attack to the south and cut behind the Seventh
Army.

January 9, 1945
The attack of the 90th Division jumped off at 1000 and was met
initially with heavy artillery and rocket fire and took losses.  Van
Fleet, the Commanding General, had two officers killed right beside
him but was not touched, which was fortunate as he is an extremely
good general.  By dark, his right had advanced two kilometers and
his left three kilometers.
The 6th Armored and 35th Infantry and 26th Infantry, attacking
in conjunction with him, made only slight progress.  The 101st, backed
by Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored, moved out as far as the
woods west of Noville, but received considerable fire on its right.
The 101st Airborne and 4th Armored, moved out as far as the
woods west of Noville, but received considerable fire on its right.
The 101st Airborne and 4th Armored will continue the attack in the
morning with the object of capturing Houffalize.  The rest of the
VIII Corps made little progress today and sustained some more counter-
attacks, each with a little armor.
I visited the 90th in the evening and found them quite content.
The rumors about the Saarbrucken attack continue.  I can't see how
the Germans have enough troops to do it unless they are pulling all
their armor out of the pocket, which they may have done.
January 10, 1945
At 1030 Bradley called up to say Eisenhower had ordered him to
get an armored division out of contact and pull it back to be avail-
able to counteract the Saarbrucken threat.  This will mean the sus-
pension of our attack on Houffalize.  I said I was perfectly willing
to gamble that the Germans would not attack, in spite of reports of
prisoners of war to the contrary.  Prisoners of War have said that
the attack is coming about the 15th, and also more prisoners, taken
last night by the XII Corps, say they are to attack on the 12th.


January 10, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
This would be a natural diversion if the other attack comes off. 
However, Brad said that it was an order from Ike and will have to be 
obeyed, so I asked him to go with me to Arlon and to talk to Middleton 
and Millikin.  When we got there it was evident that the 4th 
Armored division is the only one that can be pulled.  I phoned to 
halt the attack of the 101st Airborne and 4th Armored, and will assemble 
the 4th Armored southeast of Luxembourg where it can move in 
any direction.  The 101st and 6th Armored will link up about where 
they were yesterday, and hold what they have.  Gaffey will get out 
tonight and assemble near Luxembourg in the morning.  No written 
orders were issued.  I persuaded Bradley to have the 9th Armored, 
28th Infantry and all elements of the 8th Armored now available, move 
to the line of the Moselle. 
The two corps commanders, Millikin and Middleton, and myself drove 
to Bastogne where we talked with General Max Taylor of the 101st 
Airborne, Gaffey of the 4th Armored and Grow of the 6th Armored, to 
arrange the details.  On my way back I actually found elements of the 
4th Armored moving to their new assembly position.  The remarkable 
ability which General Gaffey has of doing what he is told fast was
well exemplified here.  On the way back I visited the 35th Division 
and explained the situation to them.  The 35th, 90th and 26th will 
continue their attack.  Today, all these units made fair progress 
and a column of enemy self-propelled guns, etc., was caught by our 
artillery and air moving northeast out of the Batogne salient.  It 
looks like a pull-out.  Our luck is still in if they do pull out, 
for I can take Houffalize with what is left, and if there is no enemy 
attack at Saarbrucken, I can at once attack north with the XII Corps, 
thus advancing the date for that attack.  

January 10, 1945 (cont'd p.3)
There is a new rumor, invented by Sibert I think, of enemy concentration 
just north of Trier.  To me it is patently impossible that 
the Germans can have concentrations all over the face of nature - I 
do not believe it.  However, the position in which we have placed the 
4th is such that it can operate against this threat too. 
This is the second time I have been stopped in a successful attack 
due to the Germans having more nerve than we have - that is, not 
me but some of the others.  The ability of American troops to maneuver 
when properly led is wonderful.  Their ability to fight is not 
so good. 
We lost several carloads of ammunition this morning south of 
Arlon when one of our ration trains ran into an ammunition train. 
The amount of loss which was at first reported at 300 tons is unquestionably 
exaggerated. 
It was very cold driving and I may have frozen my face a little.
January 11, 1945
The III Corps and the 90th, 26th, 35th and 6th Armored Divisions 
all made good progress and are taking a lot of prisoners.  The end 
of the Bastogne Operation is in sight. 
Last night I had a map prepared by G-2 showing the road nets 
and river lines in the XX Corps area.  Today I drove to Thionville 
to see General Walker on future activity in his corps and took this 
map with me.  The enemy can attack over the Saar at three places. 
First in the vicinity of Saarburg.  It is known that he has quite 
a few pontoon sites constructed and there is one road and one railway 
bridge not wholly destroyed between the junction of the Moselle 
and Saar and Saarbourg.  However, I doubt if this is where he will 
come, because it cramps his style of maneuver, although protecting

January 11, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
his flanks, and the road net is not too good.
The next place he can attack is though our Present Saarlautern 
bridge head, but in order to do this he would have to fight through 
that half of the town which is on the west bank of the river, and now 
held by us.  Also, he would have to construct a bridge, since the 
concrete bridge in existence is mined and will be blown up if we 
have to abandon our bridgehead east of the river.  Speed is of such 
importance to him that he will not want to attack through here where 
it will take at least three or four days to cut a road.  Finally he 
can attack from the bridgehead at Saarbrucken.  This is the place, 
I believe, which he will use if he comes at all.  In the town of 
Saarbrucken there are seven good bridges across the river, and he 
has a bridgehead of seven to ten miles.  The road net from there 
to Thionville, Metz, Nancy and to the south is excellent.  However 
St. Avold is a critical point, and as long as it is held by us, any 
operations he makes will be slowed down or stopped.  General Walker 
is well aware of this fact.  There is a good road net from Saarbrucken 
to Thionville, Metz and Nancy and it is a historic avenue. 
I also told Walker to prepare all crossings at the Nied River for 
demolition, so we can canalize the enemy.  Walker is preparing various
plans based on the above which he will present to me in a few
days.  However, I would prefer to attack at once and take the German 
Bridgehead at Saarbrucken.  This could be done now.  Bradley 
thinks we had best wait.
My personal solution to the present problem would be to attack 
at Saarbrucken bridgehead now.  We have sufficient troops to do it; 
however, General Bradley believes in waiting to see what is going 
to happen.  At the present time in the XX Corps we have the 94th,

January 11, 1945 (cont'd p.3)
95th, and 10th Armored Divisions permanent, with the 4th Armored, 
part of the 9th Armored, and after the 13th of January, the 8th 
Armored available on release from SHAEF or from the Third Army; that 
is, the 4th Armored is held by me in Army reserve and the other two
in SHAEF reserve.  with this force, the sooner the enemy attacks the 
sooner he willl be licked.
As soon as I can get a division pinched out from the VIII Corps 
or the III Corps, I will move it into Eddy's area and start an attack 
north there.  I believe that today ends the Bastogne operation. 
From now on it is simply a question of driving a defeated enemy.
January 12, 1945
Bee's birthday.
The VIII and II Corps attack tomorrow to take Houffalize and 
should get it, as there is not much in the way.  That will tidy up [*Shades of Monty?*]
that job and next to the crossing of France it is the biggest one 
we have done.  I hope we get the credit. 
When Houffalize is taken, we will have a junction between the 
First and Third Armies which will put General Bradley back in control 
of the First Army.  This will be very advantageous, as Bradley 
is much less timid than Montgomery.  I believe that the Bastogne 
Operation is the biggest and best the Third Army has accomplished, 
not excluding the Battle of France, and I hope the troops 
get the credit for their great work. 
Sent Gay to the VIII and III Corps to check their plans and 
also to see about getting the Combat Command of the 10th Armored now 
at Bastogne relieved, as well as securing the relief of the 87th 
and 35th, or one of them, for Eddy.  Also a battalion of 155 howitzers 
which belongs to the XII Corps.

January 12, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
Leading elements of the 8th Armored Division reached Pont-a-
Mousson at 1400.  General J. A. Devine called.  I told him to see
Gaffey for tactics and Walker for possible routes of attack. 
The 9th Armored closed to the east side of the Moselle at 
Thionville and Metz.  The 10th Armored is at Metz, and the 4th 
Armored between Thionville and Luxembourg.  This places the troops 
in the best possible positions for anything that can happen.  An 
extra infantry division would be nice. 
Bradley came over late this afternoon to discuss long range 
plans for the employment of the Army Group.  He wants to attack east 
with the First Army on Cologne, while the Third Army maintains 
pressure and really holds a defensive flank from somewhere in the 
vicinity of St. Vith to our junction with the Seventh Army.  This 
plan has the advantage of attacking where we have already breached 
the Siegfried Line and also of using the shortest road to Cologne. 
It is probably sound, but slow.  However, for the moment he wants 
us to continue our attacks on Houffalize and St. Vith.
Personally I believe that an attack by the XX Corps, supported 
by another Corps (III orXII) straight east through Saarlautern would
bring better results and would certainly be more crippling to Germany, 
as it would get the whole Saar Valley.  Wherever we attack, 
one thing is certain, we should attack, because if we don't, the 
Germans will.
January 13, 1945 
Visited the VII and III Corps Commanders at the Headquarters 
of the 101st Airborne in Bastogne.  The attack on Houffalize is 
progressing steadily but not fast.  Also visited General Grow at

January 13, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
at the headquarters of the 6th Armored Division.  There is a distinct 
difference in the mental attitude of the officers and men today, 
and that prior to today.  Today they all feel that they are on the 
winning side, pursuing a beaten enemy; while yesterday or the day
before, they were dubious as to whether we could stop the German 
attack.  It is an interesting psychological situation.  Now that 
all feel the enemy is licked, they are sure of themselves.  Until 
today I was the only one sure of victory.  The fighting today has 
been bitter, but it is just what one would expect as it is to the 
north and northeast of Bastogne where the enemy must hold in order 
to extricate what he has left east of the town.  We will get them. 
Two RCTs of the 87th will pull out tomorrow and collect in the 
vicinity of Luxembourg to replace the 4th Infantry Division when 
the XII Corps attacks.  The XII Corps raided east of the river just 
north of the junction between the Sauer and the Moselle last night 
at the place where a large enemy concentration was supposed to be. 
They found it deserted.  All quiet in front of the XX Corps. 
Wrote the Editor of the Stars and Stripes protesting against 
his paper as subversive of discipline.  I sent a copy of my letter 
to General Lee.  In the letter I stated that unless there is an 
improvement, I will not permit the paper to be issued in this Army, 
nor permit his reporters or photographers in the Army area.  It is 
a scurrilous sheet. 
January 14, 1945
Generals Somervell, Campbell, Lee and Plank were here on a tour 
of inspection and wanted my opinion on various types of equipment.

January 14, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
I stressed overshoes, or shoe packs, and pointed out that replacements
are arriving without either.  I also stated that I believe 
no more tank destroyers should be made.  The tank is the satisfactory 
answer, and by putting two tank battalions in every infantry 
division, you would get a stronger combination than one tank 
battalion and one tank destroyer battalion. 
The VIII Corps has done very well and is in the woods east of 
Noville.  The 87th Division is pinched out with the exception of 
one RCT.  The III Corps has met sterner resistance and has done 
well except on the left of the 6th Armored, where progress has 
been poor. 
Two RCT's of the 35th are also pinched out.  The third one 
is accompanying the 6th Armored.  The 26th is still fighting hard 
along the Wiltz River.
In the XII Corps, the 80th Division took a town but lost a 
regimental commander in doing so.  This is a pity as he was very
good.  In the Corps the 94th Division took two towns in limited 
objective attacks in the vicinity of Remich.  I am using these attacks 
to train the division, also to kill Germans.  The 95th Division 
attacked in Saarlautern and took a couple more city blocks. 
Captain [*?*] Klemetti, Headquarters Company, Third Army was killed 
Friday night by a rocket.  I went to his funeral this morning. 
January 15, 1945
Ordered the XII Corps to start its attack north through Diekirch 
on the morning of the 18th.  For this purpose I assigned to it 
the 4th Armored and 87th Infantry Divisions,,thus giving it five

January 15, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
divisions; the 80th, the 4th Infantry, 5th Infantry, and above named 
two.  Bradley has gone to see Eisenhower in Paris. 
The VIII Corps attack is going well, but the III Corps, 
which is up against a very strong German position on its right - 
probably the hinge to their switch position in the defense of the 
Bulge - is killing Germans cheaply but is not making any ground; 
particularly the left of the 6th Armored Division is not going fast 
enough. 
Holbrook, in the 11th Armored, is not showing sufficient 
energy.  I may have to have both Holbrook and the Division Commander, 
Kilburn, relieved.  General Middleton is going to talk personally to 
Kilburn and Holbrook and tell them they have one more chance.  The 
other combat command under Colonel Yale is doing very well and is at 
Noville. 
January 16, 1945
At 0905 the 41st Cavalry Squadron of the 11th Armored made 
contact with the 41st Infantry Regiment of the 2d Armored Division 
at Houffalize.  This restores Bradley to the command of the First 
Army, in the Twelfth Army Group, and terminates the German offensive. 
Now we will drive them back. 
Bradley returned this evening bringing Hughes with him. 
Devers is to liquidate the Kolmar pocket and then take up a defensive 
line to include the present XX Corps front.  We have to loan him 
the 10th Armored and three battalions of artillery, which he will 
probably try to steal.  Personally I would rather fight Germans than
resist the inroads of Devers and Monty.

January 16, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
It is noteworthy that although we had all divisions in this Army in 
action, we provided what was asked for and had it moving in less than 12
hours.  No army that has ever been called on to give us anything has 
been able to do it in less than a week.
January 17, 1945
Hughes, Codman and I visited Millikin and Middleton at Arlon.  I had 
already congratulated both over the telephone and repeated it in person.
They have done exceptionally well.  Of course, Millikin being a greenhorn, 
required considerable shoving, but I think he has done a good job.
We then visited the 6th Armored, the 90th and 26th Infantry Divisions. 
I told the Division and Corps Commanders that it will be necessary to continue 
the attack, and that I know they are tired; therefore they should 
try to arrange to get one third of their forces out to rest up and warm 
up, because we are going to attack until the war is over.
I decorated General Van Fleet and two other officers and a sergeant 
at the 90th Division.  While this was going on, the 90th was being heavily 
counter-attacked on its right flank by a number of tanks and infantry. 
All these attacks were repulsed and twenty-four enemy tanks were destroyed. 
They were supposed to have been from the 1st SS Panzer Division. 
I told all three divisions as well as the corps commanders that they 
could rest, regroup, and be prepared to resume the attack vigorously on 
the 21st.  I told the VIII and III Corps that they would resume their 
attack along the axis, Bastogne-St. Vith on the morning of Sunday, the 
21st.  The First Army Chief of Staff, Keane, has been urging Middleton 
to resume the attack.  They can never get it out of their heads that he 
does not belong to them.  However, he told them he was only taking orders 
from me.  Had dinner with all wing and group commanders, XIX Tactical 
Air Force.

January 18, 1945
The Russian offensive seems to have started.  I hope they will attack 
with enough speed on each side of Warsaw so as to get hold of
the prison camp where John Waters is, and release him.
The VIII and III Corps are resting and getting the 101st Airborne 
out of the line, replacing them with the 17th Airborne, which in turn 
is being replaced through a side slip by the 11th Armored. 
The XII Corps attacked this morning int he Diekirch area, jumping 
off at 0330 without artillery preparation.  They got complete surprise. 
Apparently the Germans were all in the villages.
Eddy and I visited the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions.  The 4th 
seemed apathetic.  At the time of our visit they had two companies of 
different battalions across the river and were unable to reinforce 
them.  Eddy, at my instigation, told General H.W. Blakeley, 
the Division Commander, to get up there himself and also to see that 
the Battalion Commanders got across the river.  After Eddy's talk to 
General Blakeley, it did well.
The 5th Division is in fine spirits.  I visited an OP with General 
Irwin and got a very good look at the German position, which was 
about 600 yards below us in the river valley.  Our men had on snowsuits, 
some captured from the Germans and some made by local tailors
for us.  The German suits are excellent, being reversible, white on 
one side and green on the other, and they also provide adequate warmth. 
Our suits are simply sheeting.  On returning there were a few bullets 
in the woods but nothing serious.
While I was out SHAEF called and directed us to send a division 
to the 6th Army Group; also a tank destroyer unit and an anti-air unit. 
We selected the 101st Airborne because we will probably lose that

January 18, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
anyhow.  The only other division not in battle is the 35th, and one 
of its combat commands is completely committed.
General Walker, of the XX Corps, called up late in the evening 
and asked if he could continue a serious attack with the 94th Division 
and one Combat Team of the 8th Armored.  I told him to go ahead.  Now 
is the time to attack and keep it up. 
By delaying the attack of the VIII and III Corps to the 21st, I 
may get some of the German units in front of them to oppose the XII 
Corps.  This is a little hard on XII Corps but on the other hand, the 
XII Corps is fresher and the other two corps have a longer distance 
to go.
Hughes and Codman left for Paris this morning by motor as the
weather was too bad for flying.  From a telephone call he got from 
General Lear, it seems as if Hughes may become Chief of Staff of 
ETOUSA.  I certainly hope he does.  He has had a very raw deal and is
a very ableofficer.  In my opinion he should have Lee's job.  When 
Hughes came yesterday he told me with great glee that in his last interview 
with Eisenhower, the latter had said to him, "Do you know,
Everett, George is really a very great soldier and I must get Marshall
to do something for him before the war is over."
January 19, 1945
Had all the corps commanders and General Gaffey for lunch with a 
view to discussing future operations and also to determine the rear 
boundaries of the Corps, which will have to be changed in northwesterly 
direction.  I am sure that these occasional conferences of 
all Corps Commanders have a very unifying effect.  The VIII and III 
Corps are standing fast.  The XII advancing steadily but slowly,

January 19, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
deterred by weather more than by the enemy, through sleet, slush and 
snow but no so cold.  The 94th of the XX Corps got into quite a fight 
with part of the 11th Panzer but is handling the situation.  They 
caught a cub bear by the tail but are pushing on.  I am unable to move 
either the 101st or 76th due to icy roads.  At 1200 the sun came out 
and we got some air up. 
January 20, 1945
Weather bad with snow, sleet, slush and wind.  A few planes were 
able to get up around noon for about an hour.  The enemy may be withdrawing 
in front of the III and VIII Corps, both of whom have advanced 
two kilometers with little oppositions other than the terrain and mines. 
The XII Corps has advanced 7 kilometers since it jumped off on the 18th, 
with stiff fighting all the way.  The XX Corps has two combat teams of 
the 94th fighting in the triangle against the 11th Panzer.  The 95th 
Division repelled a counter-attack of some 400 Germans at Saarlautern. 
The Germans jumped off too soon and were caught in their own barrage 
and then in ours, so that very few survived. Only 40 prisoners were 
taken. 
General W.R. Schmidt of the 76th Division reported.  One of his
combat teams will close in the VIII Corps area today.  The 101st Airborne 
was able to start moving to the 6th Army Group. 
The score sheet for 2400 on the18th is as follows:
U.S. Losses since August 1, - killed, 13,721; wounded, 66,556; 
missing, 13,704; total 93,981; non-battle, 63,313; grand total,160,294; 
replacements, 138,640, leaving a total shortage of 21,654.  Due to my 
policy of reducing the Army and Crops overhead, this shortage exists 
mostly in those elements, the infantry units being closer to proper

January 20, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
strength.  The replacement situation is improving slightly both as to
numbers, quality and training.
U.S. Losses since December 22, 1944 - killed, 3,582; wounded, 
17,148; missing, 4,555; total, 25,285; non battle (largely frostbite)
17,270; grant total 42,655; replacements during same period, 35,252.
German losses since Aug. 1(official) prisoners of war, 156,801;
buried by us, 16,979; total 173,780.
German losses since December 22 (official)  prisoners of war,17,022,
enemy buried, 2,037, total 19,059.
German losses since Aug. 1(estimated) prisoners, 157,400; killed,
88,400; wounded, 244,700; total, 490,500.
German losses since December 22 (estimated) prisoners, 17,400;
killed, 24,600; wounded, 64,500; total, 106,500. I believe that the
enemy killed is greater than here set down because driving over
the battlefield today I saw literally hundreds of corpses partially
or wholly buried in the snow.  In some cases, I noticed little black
specks sticking out which on investigation proved to be toes of dead
Germans' shoes.
Material losses since Aug. 1 - U.S. - light tanks, 270; medium
tanks, 765; artillery (75 and over) 142; vehicles, 3,151; total, 4,328.
Materiel losses since December 22 - U.S.- light tanks, 72;
medium tanks, 258; artillery, (75 and over) 26; vehicles, 974; total,
1,330.
Materiel losses since Aug. 1 (German) light tanks, 1,243; panther 
and tiger tanks, 701; artillery (75 and over) 2, 485; vehicles, 5,969;
total, 10, 398.
Materiel losses since Dec. 22(German) light tanks, 297; panther
and tiger tanks, 216;artillery(75 and over)269;vehicles,538;total,1,320.

January 21, 1945
The attack of XII Corps is doing well with the 5th Division on 
the southern part of its final objective.  Caught a large enemy concentration 
at bridge near Vianden where we got good artillery observation 
and kept them under continuous fire, using new shell. [*(Posit)*]
Drove via Bastogne to a village southeast of Houffalize, headquarters 
17th Airborne, and to Combat Command "A", 11th Armored at 
Bourey to give each officer a pat on the back.  They have finally 
found themselves and have done well.  A fewdays ago I was on the point 
of relieving both Miley (17th) and Kilburn(11th) ; one should not act 
too fast.  Brig.Gen. W.A. Holbrook commands Combat Command "A" of the 
11th Armored.  At one time I was on the point of relieving him, but 
now he seems to be doing a good job.  During the drive I noticed 
another instance of the complete incapacity of inexperienced officers. 
Several ordnance trailers, each loaded with between 40 and 50 replacements 
for the 17th Airborne Division, were stuck on a slippery 
hill and not moving.  There were a number of officers present, but 
none of them had enough sense to make the men dismount and push the 
vehicles, until Stiller and I did so.  Then the trucks got moving 
fast.1
1.  In the Canal Zone, in the winter of 1947, I was halted by a 
sentry to inspect my pass.  He had been in Third Army, and I asked 
if he had ever seen his General.  "Oh, yes, I knew him, though I 
only saw him once.  We was stuck in the snow and he come by in a 
jeep.  His face was awful red and he must have been about froze 
riding in that open jeep.  He yelled to us to get out and push, and 
first I knew, there was General Patton pushing right alongside of me. 
Sure, I knew him; he never asked a man to do what he wouldn't do himself."
BAP

January 21, 1945(cont'd p.2)
In spite of my advocacy of General Gaffey for a Corps Commander, 
Bradley has selected Van Fleet.  After a canvass of Brigadier Generals 
in the Army, we selected H.L. Earnest to replace him in command of 
the 90th Division.  Tonight, Eisenhower directed that General Lowell 
Rooks be put in temporary command of the 90th in order to familiarize 
him with conditions, as he has been a major general for about two years 
and has never commanded anything.  At one time I considered that 
Rooks had good native ability, but when, as G-3 in Africa, he never 
left the office, I somewhat qualified my opinion. 
During the trip I stopped to take pictures of some dead Germans 
who were frozen in queer attitudes, and were the color of weak claret. 
Unfortunately I did not have my color camera with me. 
Devers is howling for more troops, although when he started to 
obliterate the Colmar Bulge he said he could do it with one division. 
I fear we may lose the 8th Armored.  We have already sent him the 
101st Airborne and the 10th Armored.
January 22, 1945
General Rooks called today and was quite apologetic, stating that 
he had not asked to be put in temporary command of the Division, and 
stating further that he would try to do well enough so that I would 
like to have him.  I told him that when the Armored Force first started, 
I asked him to join it, and had a high opinion of him.  However, 
I was opposed to putting untried generals in command of divisions
until they proved themselves, but that if he would make a success, I 
would be the first to recommend his appointment.  I believe he is 
quite a protege of either General Eisenhower or General Marshall - 
probably both.  However, Rooks has an unfortunate academic mind.  Among

January 22, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
other gems of thought he gave me was that an Army should always have 
a corps in reserve.  I told him that in all my fighting I never had 
more than a platoon, and that while it is desirable to have a reserve, 
battles are fought with what one has and not with what one hopes to 
have.
The VIII and III Corps are advancing against small arms fire 
only.  The VIII Crops is practically pinched out.  The 5th Division 
is on final objective of the XII Corps.  The 80th Division is progressing 
in an easterly direction north of the Wiltz River.  I told General 
Eddy not to halt on his final objective but to continue North and 
if necessary, use part or all of the 4th Armored to cover his flank. 
The XX is still fighting its limited operations in the Moselle-Saar 
triangle.  There is a rumor that the enemy is withdrawing, which I 
doubt. 
Called Bradley on the phone at 1030 and urged all armies attack 
in spite of fatigue or losses, as I am sure that in view of the Russian 
offensive, now is the time to strike. 
At 1530 we got reliable information from radio intercepts of 
an attack by the 2d Panzer to stop General Eddy; however, the radio
said that the division had been unable to get underway, owing to our
artillery and air attacks.  At about the same time General Weyland called, 
stating that there was a large concentration of enemy vehicles 
north of Diekirch moving north, northeast and south, which he is attacking 
with everything he has, and he also has asked for some Mediums. 
The pilots stated that it was a bigger mass murder than had 
occurred in the Falaise Gap. 
Up to a late hour tonight, no attack of any significance had 
been developed against us, so I believe the air stopped them.  Ap-

January 22, 1945 (cont'd p.3)
parently the Germans either figured on bad weather, or else they are 
in such a desparate need of reinforcing the Eastern Front that they 
took a chance on the air attack.  Whatever they did, they certainly 
guessed wrong.  The air claims 1200 vehicles and 30 tanks.  If this 
is only a quarter true, it is a serious blow to the Germans. 
January 23, 1945
The progress of all the units in the Army is very satisfactory 
except in the case of the 94th Division, where one battalion lost 40 
men killed and wounded and 400 missing in action.  This smells bad 
and General Walker is personally investigating. 
In spite of strong remonstrances by Bradley and myself, SHAEF 
ordered the 35th Division, less on Combat Team, which is with the 
6th Armored, to the Sixth Army Group.  It is too bad that the highest 
levels of command have no personal knowledge of war.  The 35th Division 
has been in actual combat every day except five days since the 
6th of July,(and I had only just succeeded in getting it out of the 
line.)1.
The VI Corps of the Seventh Army had to withdraw xeveral miles 
due to enemy pressure.  The elmination of the Colmar pocket seems to 
have developed into a fiasco.  I hope I don't get sent down to 
straighten it out. 
We changed the Corps boundaries of the VIII, III and XII Corps 
with a view to orienting their attack more on an east and west line 
rather than as at present, in a northeast direction.  Then Gay, Maddox, 
and myself called on Bradley to see how this would fit in with 
future plans, and we found they were exactly in line.  Two corps of 
the First Army will attack the Siegfried Line north of the VIII Corps
1.  this clarifying clause from WAR AS I KNEW IT added by F.A.

January 23, L945 (cont'd p.2)
and we will do the same thing to the south, with one strong corps 
under Middleton.  The III and XII Crops will hold defensively, and 
if the VIII Crops advances to the east, will move up on its right. 
If this plan fails Bradley will have to giveMonty a number of divisions, 
possibly 12, and all the remainder of the First and Third 
Armies will sit on the defensive, while Monty proceeds to do nothing, 
as usual.  We must succeed in our attack to avoid this, and also to 
maintain the prestige of the American Army.  Bradley's plan for the 
attack is good, and I think it will succeed.  He is also trying to 
get Monty to temporarily take over the Ninth Army front so we can send 
four more divisions to Devers to clean up the Colmar pocket, and then 
put the 6th Army Group on the defensive. 
The 4th Division, XII Crops, just stopped a counter-attack from 
its right front.  This counter-attack started out quite strong, but 
ended up with about 50 men and 3 tanks, none of which now exist.  The 
5th Division seems to have run into its old friend, the Panzer Lehr.
January 24, 1945 
I had General Middleton come in last night to spend the night 
and explained to him his new mission.  At one time I contemplated 
turning the attack over to Walker, but did not do so for two reasons; 
first, because it would take more time, and second, because Middleton 
knows the country over which he will have to attack, and although he 
is fatigued, he is a very great soldier. 
The plan for building up his corps is complicated and works as 
follows:  The 76th Division (VIII Crops) will relieve the 87th(XII 
Corps ) which will join Middleton.  The 90th division of the III 
Corps will also go to Middleton, and the 4th Infantry of the XII Corps
c

January 24, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
will go to Middleton.  This, in addition to the 11th Armored, will give 
Middleton four infantry and one armored divisions.  All the infantry 
divisions will be up to strength.  This should make a very powerful attack. 
We will try to make the attack continuous with a two division 
front, with a second pair just back, and the armor on the right rear. 
General Weyland was present and is arranging for maximum air support. 
General Hodges, First Army, arrived at lunch time, and after lunch 
we had a meeting attended by Bradley, Hodges, his G-3, myself, Gay, and 
Maddox at which the boundaries between the Armies were worked out very 
satisfactorily to us, and I also believe to Hodges. 
Just when everything had been satisfactorily arranged, and Hodges 
said he could attack Sunday, the telephone rang and General Whitely, 
G.-3 of SHAEF, called up Bradley and wanted to withdraw additional 
divisions and a Corps Headquarters from the 12th Army Group to help 
Devers.  Bradley told him that if this were true, we would be giving 
up a sure thing for a side show.  For the only time to my knowledge, 
he lost his good humor and told Whitely that if he wanted to destroy 
the whole operation he could do so and be dammed, or words to that 
effect, and to take all the corps and divisions.  It occurs to me that 
this patent attempt to prevent the attack of the First and Third Armies 
is a British effort to give Monty the leading role.  If our attack 
fails after a good try, we will have to give Monty troops, and the 
Americans simply sit on the defensive while U.S. blood aids British 
prestige.  At the moment four British divisions are out of contact and 
Monty says the earliest he can attack is February 8th.  Bradley was 
very firm and even angry.  Why isn't Ike a man?  We will attack and 
win, in spite of Ike and Monty.  General Bull then got on the phone

January 24, 1945 (cont'd p.3)
and Bradley repeated his statements, adding that much more than a tactical 
operation was involved, in that the prestige of the American 
Army was at stake.  We were all very pleased with Bradley's attitude 
and told him so. 
The 76th Division starts moving tonight, and the 87th will move 
to Middleton tomorrow.  Hodges expects to jump on Sunday.  I trust that 
I can beat him by one day. 
If SHAEF insists on the Colmar pocket venture, it is playing into 
the enemy's hands by moving our troops from a vital area to one of very 
little secondary importance.  Furthermore, this will be the third time 
such a mistake has been made, and I do not believe that people guilty 
of such errors in judgement can eventually avoid the censure of history. 
Bradley, Hodges, and myself are determined to carry on our attack 
no matter how much they deplete us.  Personally, I am convinced 
that the Germans are pulling out, probably as far as the Rhine, and 
if we go ahead, we will get to the Rhine, and very soon.  To do otherwise 
at this moment would, in my opinion, be criminal.  Decorated Middleton 
with oak leaf cluster to DSM and Eddy with DSM.
January 25, 1945
Codman, Stiller and I visited Headquarters of the 4, 5th and80th 
Infantry Divisions.  Also had a look at Diekirch, Ettelbruck and Wiltz. 
All had been very thoroughly liberated.  In this weather, the breaking 
of the glass in the windows always results in the destruction of the 
water system by freezing, so that none of the larger houses are habitable 
because the sewers won't work and the heating system is gone.  Last 
night the temperature at Wiltz fell to 7 below zero, Farenheit, and 
I fear that we will have a large number of frost bites.  I heard, on

January 25, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
getting back to town, that the temperature was 4 below in the city this 
morning, the lowest record in 38 years. 
All units of the VIII, III, and XII Corps, except the left regiment 
of the 80th Division, XII Corps, are on their final objectives 
east of the Diekirch - St. Vith road.  Two regimental combat teams 
of the 76th and 87th Infantry Divisions have changed places.  The current 
attack by the XII Corps was exceptionally well planned and executed 
at a very low cost. 
Yesterday the 5th Division found elements of five German divisions
in one group of 100 prisoners of war, while the 6th Armored in 
a group of 150 prisoners found elements of 10 German divisions.  This 
would seem to indicated complete disorganization among the Germans. 
The 6th Army Group sustained a heavy attack today. 
The 4th Infantry Division will start moving from the XII Corps 
to the VIII Corps in the morning, being replaced by elements of the 
80th Division. 
January 26, 1945
The 90th Division from the III Corps will be available in the 
southern sector of the VIII Corps zone by dark, and the 87th will be 
closed in the northern sector of the same corps.  At least two RCT's 
of the 4th Infantry Division from the XII Corps will be in the VIII 
Corps zone by Sunday, the 28th,probably tomorrow.  All this in spite 
of heavy local snows and intense cold.  By Sunday, the 28th, the 
greater part of the 95th Division should be relieved by the 26th, and 
be en route to, or assembled, in the northern sector of the VIII Corps 
zone. 
If such a problem of troop movement were posed at Leavenworth, 
everyone would go crazy, but the Third Army takes it in its stride

January 26, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
This is only possible, as I have frequently stated, due to the long 
experience and great efficiency of the staff, both special and general. 
Bradley leaves for his new command post at Namur today.  He will 
spend the night at his rear command post at Verdun and open on Sunday 
at Namur.  I called on him at 1100 to say goodbye.  He is a good officer 
but utterly lacks 'it'.  Too bad.
January 27, 1945
Codman, Stiller and I left at 0930 and drove via Arlon to the 
Headquarters of the VIII Corps at Bastogne.  Middleton showed me his 
plan of attack, which I approved.  Initially he will attack with the 
87th on the left and the 90th on the right, followed respectively by 
the 95th and 4th Infantry Divisions.  After a certain advance, the 
90th will form a defensive flank to the right, and the 4th will pass 
through and do the same thing farther to the east.  The 95th will 
pass through the 87th when the latter becomes tired, and will continue 
the attack along the axis of the Corps.  The 11th Armored Division 
will close on the 90th as soon as possible, to be available for exploitation. 
The schedule of the arrival of the units is on time.
There was an incipient traffic jam at Bastogne, which I had Middleton 
correct.  He is in very good spirits and eager to attack.  The 87th 
Division will continue its movement.  The 90th will jump off on Sunday 
morning. 
Visited the 11th Armored and told them how much I thought of 
their work.  I believe they are making an A-1 Division.  They are 
up to strength in vehicles and slightly over in infantrymen.

January 27, 1945 (cont'd p.2)

z  Stopped for lunch with the III Corps at Martelange and told them 
to be prepared to widen the base of the salient behind the 90th Division; 
that is, to cross through the hole made by the 90th and then move 
to the southeast.  To do this it will be necessary to get another division, 
because at the moment, the III Corps has only the 17th Airborne 
and one Combat Command of the 35th Infantry, and the 6th Armored Division.
Eddy came in when I got home.  He is full of offensive ardor and 
wants to get going.  I think his suggestion of attacking through the 
Siegfried Line northeast to join the 4th Division is sound, provided 
the means are available to do it, or provided the enemy is weak enough 
to let it be done with his present means.  If it succeeds, it will certainly 
pinch off a number of Germans and will also cash in on their 
pet fear- that is, of being hit on the base of a salient.  I told him 
to go to work on it.  Called the 12th Army Group to get roads running 
west from Houffalize in the First Army zone for the use of the VIII 
Corps, particularly when bringing in the 95th Division.  I asked for 
two roads and got one.
January 28, 1945
Very slow day except that the 5th Division, XII Corps had one 
rather hot fight driving the enemy from its front.  The replacement 
system is working much better than heretofore, and all units are 
practically up to strength.  All the transfers of divisions from and 
to the VIII Corps are on schedule in spite of intense cold and a heavy 
snowstorm. 
The situation as to truck maintanance is bad, and is accentuated

January 28, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
by the great amount of troop movement which we have been carrying on. 
For example, between December 19 and January 16, we moved 17 divisions 
an average distance of a hundred miles; however, now we are moving 8 
divisions about the same distance.  The glassy roads take a heavy 
toll of vehicles, and the freezing temperature and the caked ice make 
drivers careless as to first echelon maintenance.  I have taken corrective 
measures but it is certain that human nature being what it is, 
a time will come when a great many vehicles will have to be laid up 
for a general overhaul.  It is also a fact that shortage of manpower 
in ordnance maintenance units has a very bad effect, because when vehicles 
are brought in for maintenance they are not at once cleaned 
and greased, so that rust sets in with the result that the maintenance 
becomes a major, instead of a minor, job.  We are attempting to 
hire civilians to facilitate this, but the fact remains it is a very 
difficult operation. 
January 29, 1945
Have terminated the removal of the salient.  On January 29th we 
started to drive to the Siegfried Line.  The operation terminated lasted 
from December 22 to January 28th, both inclusive. 
Visited hospitals and found men in good spirits and well cared
for.  Had Eddy in to discuss the future offensive operations of his 
corps north from Echternach, on Bitburg.  It will be in inadequate 
strength but should work.  VIII Corps got off on time.  One battalion 
of the 4th Division is over the Our River and the 90th will cross 
tonight.  The 87th, which is further from the river due to the configuration 
of the ground, is closing on the west bank.  I have a strong 
feeling that the Germans may well pull back to the Rhine without

January 29, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
serious resistance if we can maintain pressure. 
I told General Walker, of the XX Corps, to come up tomorrow
and talk to Eddy with a view to taking over part of Eddy's proposed 
attack, if and when the XX Corps is replaced in the Moselle-Saar triangle 
by elements of the Seventh Army.
Called Bradley to urge that the XX Corps be relieved by the 
Seventh Army as soon as possible.  He thinks Colmar may possibly be 
taken by Feb. 7th, and shortly after that the 6th Army Group will take 
over our present XX Corps sector.  I also urged that the 9th Armored 
Division, which is doing nothing, be released to the XX Corps so that 
I can clean up the triangle before the arrival of the 6th Army Group. 
We lost the 35th Division to the Ninth Army.  I protested to the 
limit of my ability for sentimental reasons, and also because I am 
short of divisions.  The 35th is one of the oldest divisions in the 
Third Army and has always done well.  But the Brains, knowing nothing 
of the facts of war, don't understand sentiment or morale, so we lost 
the division.  It is unquestionably a fact that it is a great mistake 
to have to move divisions even from one corps to another, but certainly 
it is a worse mistake to move them from one army to another. 
Of course I swap divisions in corps, which is bad, but at times like 
this it is unavoidable.
Generals Lee, Plank, and Colonel Stubbs [(Stupps?)] came in at 
1700 to check up on supplies, and stayed for dinner.  As a matter of 
fact, we are better off today than at anytime since the end of August. 
I will visit the VIII Corps in the morning. 
January 30, 1945
Drove to Bastogne, and after lunch accompanied Middleton to St.
Vith.  This is the most completely destroyed town that I have seen

January 30, 1945 (cont'd p.2)
since the last war, done partially by our own Air Force and the RAF
and partially by the Germans.  The roads through the town were not 
initially passable, and it was necessary for the VIII Corps to make 
two roads by-passing the town.  Owing to the frozen condition of the 
soil, this was not difficult, and the roads are perfectly satisfactory 
until the thaw comes.  In the meantime, the engineers, with big
bulldozers and bucket dredges, are clearing the rubble from the city. 
If a thaw comes we will have to use old roads and to this end are 
clearing the rubble out of St. Vith.  A thaw will reveal a number of 
mines laid under the snow.  At the moment the spiders on these are 
frozen so they won't work, but a thaw will make them active.  On the 
road between Bastogne and St. Vith I saw more dead tanks than I have 
ever seen before.  They were about equally divided between us and the 
enemy.  We then visited the Headquarters, 87th Division, which has been 
doing very well, particularly its northern, or left, regiment which, 
by a night march, advanced some 7 miles, cutting the road to Schonberg. 
The other two regiments of the Division also made good progress. 
The next division to the south, the 4th Division, has not done so well. 
Whether it is due to lack of drive or to enemy resistance, I do not know; 
however, by 4:00 they had taken a large hill occupied by the enemy in 
their immediate front, and on the east side of the river.  Every precaution 
is taken to provide the men who ford the river with dry clothes 
and shoes; however, the cold was so intense that I am sure there will 
be considerable frostbites.  The 90th Division on the south has, as
usual, done very well and was practically on its final objective.  The
III Corps and XII Corps were still attacking [*holding aggressively*] holding defensively and reorganizing 
their units, bringing them up to strength.  The XX Corps continues

January 30, 1945 (cont'd p.3)
its fighting with the 94th Division in the Moselle triangle.  The 26th 
Division completed the relief of the 95th at Saarlautern. 
January 31, 1945
My eyes were very swollen as a result of the snow of yesterday. 
Nothing of interest happened.  The VIII Corps advanced several miles, 
hindered more by roads, and by the thaw which started today, than by 
enemy action.  The Germans made two strong patrols last night, one 
against the 76th where they got nothing, and one against Colonel 
Reed's force to the south where they secured five prisoners.  In this 
raid they used the old system of a box barrage.
February 1, 1945
General Eddy came in at 0930 to show his plan for the attack on 
Bitburg with his existing forces.  To put this across it will be necessary 
for the III Corps to take over a little more to the south, and 
we are attacking two engineer combat battalions to it.  It may be necessary 
for XX Corps to take a little on its northern flank, though I 
doubt this.  Eddy wanted to attack on the morning of the 6th but I told 
him he would have to attack on the 4th.  He said I never gave him 
time to get ready and did not appreciate time and space factors.  I
told him that had I ever given a corps commander the time he asked for 
we would still be on the Seine. 
I then called the Chief of Staff, 12th Army Group, to see if I 
could get the 9th Armored and an infantry division in exchange for the 
17th Airborne, which is very low in strength.  General Allen was optimistic 
and said he would communicate with Bradley, who is visiting with 
Eisenhower, and would call me back.  He called back shortly to say I 
would commit nothing and would get orders later.  As the result of 

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